Friday, September 1, 2000
The “DPRK Report” is the product of a joint project between the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (Monterey, California, USA) and the Institute for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Moscow, Russia). It is written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP and edited by the CNS.
Copyright material is distributed without profit or payment for research and educational purposes only, in accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107.
1. North Korean Perspectives on International Relations 2. North Korean-U.S. Relations 3. Prospective Venues for Cooperation between the DPRK and Russia
1. The Role of the United States, Russia, China, and Japan in the Inter-Korean Dialogue; 2. The Summit’s Influence on North Korea’s Foreign Policy; 3. Reaction to the Summit within the DPRK; 4. The Summit’s Impact on the Political and Economic Stability of Kim Jong-il’s Regime; 5. Chinese Appraisals of the Inter-Korean Summit; 6. Russian President Putin’s Visit to the DPRK; 7. Pyongyang’s Missile Potential and American Plans for NMD and TMD; 8. North Korean Refugees in China.
1. North Korean Views of the Significance of the Upcoming DPRK-ROK Summit, 2. Russia’s Reaction to the Planned Inter-Korean Summit; 3. New Soviet-Era Archival Materials on the Korean War.
1. North Korean Views of the U.S. National Missile Defense Program; 2. North Korean Views of Japanese Plans to Develop TMD; 3. The New Phase in Russian-North Korean Relations; 4. Izvestiya Report on Alleged Russian Influence over Pyongyang’s Missile Tests; 5. North Korean Views on the Russian Presidential Elections.
1. The Russian General Staff’s View of the North Korean Missile Program; 2. DPRK Views of U.S. Missile Defenses; 3. Pyongyang’s Appraisals of ROK President Kim Dae-jung’s Policies; 4. DPRK Hopes to Overcome Its Food Shortage; 5. The DPRK Military.
1. Differing U.S./Russian Views about the DPRK 2. Russian Appraisals of the Perry Report 3. The Mood in the North Korean Armed Forces
1. DPRK Missile Tests 2. Russian Experts Predict More Extensive Missile Deployments by the DPRK 3. China Reassesses Its Korean Policy 4. The Food Situation in the North 5. Pyongyang’s Displeasure with Moscow
1. Prospects for North Korean-U.S. Relations 2. North Korea’s Nuclear Program and Russian Policy 3. On DPRK-ROK Relations 4. Comparative Chinese Relations with the Two Koreas
1) North Korea’s Reaction to the NATO Bombing of Yugoslavia. 2) The Status of North Korean Military Maintenance and Readiness. 3) The First Russian-South Korean Forum on Relations with the DPRK. 4) The Impact of South Korean Tourism on the North.
1) Pyongyang Feels It Has Won Again. 2) North Korea Moves Closer to Russia. 3) North Korean Missile Developments. 4) Russian Appraisals of Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy”. 5) Problems in Chinese-North Korean Relations. 6) Military Cooperation between the DPRK and Vietnam.
1) North Korea Prepares for an “Imminent” U.S. Attack. 2) Underground Facilities in the DPRK. 3) North Korean Officials Denounce Market-Style Reforms. 4) Chinese Views of the Korean Peninsula. 5) China’s Reaction to the North Korea’s Missile (Satellite) Launch. 6) Kim Jong-il’s Alleged Refusal to Meet Chinese Leaders.
1) The Results of the First Session of the 10th Supreme People’s Assembly. 2) North Korean Foreign Policy after the First Session of the 10th SPA.
1) The DPRK’s Alleged Construction of a New Nuclear Facility. 2) North Korea’s Appraisal of U.S. Policies. 3) Pyongyang’s Reaction to Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine” Policy. 4) The Food Situation in the DPRK. 5) Kim Jong Il’s Plans to Consolidate Power.
1) The South Asian Tests and the North Korean Nuclear Program. 2) An Optimistic Scenario for North Korean Reforms.
1) Developments in the Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic Zone. 2) North Korea’s Participation in the Winter Olympics in Nagano, Japan. 3) The Deepening of the North Korean Economic and Social Crisis.
1) Visits of Russian Communists to North Korea. 2) Chances for South-North Dialogue under New ROK President Kim Dae Jung. 3) On the Effectiveness of Internal North Korean Propaganda.
1) Kim Jong Il’s Regime Strengthens Its Grip on Power. 2) Impressions of the DPPK by Recent Russian Visitors. 3) Russia’s Goals in Northeast Asia.
1) Conditions in the North Korean Countryside. 2) Dissenting Views in the DPRK. 3) Corruption in the North Korean Elite.
1) North Korean Military Policy. 2) Changes in North Korean Propaganda. 3) Activities of the Pro-Pyongyang Lobby in Russia.
1) Reaction in Russia to Hwang Jang-yop’s Statements. 2) The Military Component of Kim Jong-il’s Regime. 3) Appraisals of Russia’s Present and Future Role in Korea.
1) Hwang Jang-yop’s Defection. 2) “Information Deprivation” in the DPRK. 3) The Fighting Spirit of the North Korean Armed Forces. 4) Russian Appraisals of U.S. Policy towards North Korea.
1) North Korea may start reforms in 1997. 2) Arms procurement in the DPRK.
1) Russia’s Policy towards the DPRK. 2) Russian Followers of Juche Ideas. 3) The North Korean Military-Industrial Complex (MIC).
1) The North Korean Economy 2) Russia’s Reaction to the Four-Power Talks Proposal. 3) Attitudes in China towards North Korea.
1) Internal Situation. 2) Russian-North Korean relations. 3) Russian State Duma Discussions on the Korean Problem.