NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** The following "DPRK Report" is the product of a joint project between the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (Monterey, California, USA) and the Institute for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Moscow, Russia). It is written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP and edited by the CNS. ------------------------------------------ THE DPRK REPORT, No. 18 (May-June 1999) 1. Prospects for North Korean-U.S. Relations North Korean officials continue to view the prospects of the normalization of North Korean-U.S. relations with skepticism. The primary obstacle they see to normalization is the hidden hope of the United States that the DPRK is nearing its ultimate collapse. As one North Korean diplomat observed: "Washington wants us to become relaxed, to slow down our military efforts with promises of "carrots" and other nice things. However, the United States does not have the slightest desire to fulfill its own promises. The Americans are simply counting time, while devising various tricks to speed up the DPRK's collapse." Lately, Pyongyang has spotted another obstacle on the way of its accommodation with the United States. This derives from the plans of Pentagon to create a new missile defense system in Northeast Asia. DPRK officials point out that American generals will "now be looking for every pretext to convince the U.S. Congress and their allies in Asia of the necessity of such a system; if no pretexts arise, they will invent them." Because of this, Pyongyang expects increasingly frequent U.S. accusations concerning North Korea's development of missile, nuclear, biological, and chemical technologies, as well as conventional weapons. 2. North Korea's Nuclear Program and Russian Policy Russian nuclear officials and experts describe reports that Moscow has assisted the DPRK in creation of nuclear bombs as "ridiculous." North Korean defector Kim Duk-hong claimed in an April 14, 1999 press interview that the DPRK had started developing nuclear weapons back in the 1960s with technical assistance from Soviet scientists. Representatives of the Russian nuclear industry explain that the USSR had a very strict policy of not sharing nuclear secrets with any foreign country, including its closest and most trusted allies, such as East Germany and Bulgaria. As for the DPRK, it had ceased being regarded as a reliable ally by the end of the 1950s. It was rather perceived as a capricious and adventurist regime that had to be deterred from provocations undermining peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The Soviet government was reluctant to give Pyongyang even advanced conventional weapons, to say nothing about sharing nuclear weapons technology that could be leaked to then-hostile Maoist China. Russian nuclear officials and experts also deny another allegation of Kim Duk-hong concerning exports of nuclear components and technicians to the DPRK in recent years. They maintain that "not a single piece of nuclear fuel or equipment has been delivered from Russia to North Korea during the 1990s." As for Russian technicians, while some of them taught general subjects at North Korean universities from 1991-1995, they had nothing to do with military matters. Since then, all of these experts have returned home. As one official says in this connection: "How could Pyongyang have entrusted our technicians with its sacred secrets when Russian-North Korean relations had deteriorated in the early 1990s to a level of animosity?" 3. On DPRK-ROK Relations Some experts in Russia believe that Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine policy" may bear some fruit already in 1999-2000. The prime target of Pyongyang's strategy, however, is Washington. But attempts to normalize relations with the United States will not succeed, according to Russian analysts, due to the prevailing mood in the U.S. Congress and the fall 2000 U.S. presidential elections. As a result, the DPRK will have to settle for a lesser "prize," South Korea. If the North acts skillfully and prudently, it may get a sizable input into its economy from the South, which is quickly recovering from a financial crisis. The goal of Kim Jong Il will be to prevent any negative side effects from the North's increasing interactions with the ROK. He may feel confident that he is successful in this endeavor, but, in the long run, the opening of the DPRK is more likely to correspond to the aims of Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy. 4. Comparative Chinese Relations with the Two Koreas Chinese officials complain that although Pyongyang insists on increased bilateral trade and more aid, this "cannot be done." As one functionary in Beijing noted recently, "North Korea is so poor that there is nothing it can buy from us, and there is nothing it can offer to us." He added that the DPRK routinely fails to pay its bills, does not return transportation equipment (such as the Chinese railroad cars that carry cargo into the DPRK) and "forgets" to deliver its own goods. Another Chinese official revealed the fact that all PRC delegations visiting North Korea come back "shocked" by what they have seen. In their reports to the government concerning the trips, the delegations invariably describe economic and social conditions in the North as "disastrous." There are cases when Chinese delegates leave even some of their own clothes, shoes, soap, and medicine at the request of their North Korean counterparts. Beijing is also reluctant to provide aid since "there is no doubt that it will be wasted or stolen by officials of various levels." A representative of one Chinese ministry pointed out recently: "Pyongyang never explains how it is going to utilize our aid. In fact, we are denied any information on the real situation in the DPRK's economy and on the real plans of the leadership." In contrast to the North, the South continues to attract growing interest from the PRC. Local authorities in many Chinese provinces, including in the south and northwest, identify the ROK's chaebols and individual firms as "the most promising, reliable, and desirable foreign partners." The South Korean economic presence is becoming more and more visible all over China, which continues to elevate the perceived importance of the ROK connection for the PRC. None of this bodes well for Pyongyang. ------------------------------------- The CNS website is located at http://cns.miis.edu. The ICIP can be contacted via e-mail at icipu@glasnet.ru.