NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** The following "DPRK Report" is the product of a joint project between the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (Monterey, California, USA) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) at the Russian Diplomatic Academy (Moscow, Russia). It is written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP and edited by the CNS. ----------------------------------------------------------- THE DPRK REPORT, No. 12 (March-May 1998) 1. The South Asian Tests and the North Korean Nuclear Program The threats by Pyongyang to restart its temporarily frozen nuclear program--coupled with the recent nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan--have triggered renewed discussions among Russian experts on the nuclear activities of the DPRK. Officials at Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy continue to maintain that North Korea does not yet possess a bomb, since its development would require testing. Thus far, the North has not conducted any such tests. A few years ago, North Korea asked for testing rights on the territory of China, but received a negative response. A majority of Russian experts from governmental agencies dealing with foreign affairs agree with the above-mentioned conclusions. Nevertheless, most of them believe that Pyongyang, once it started a military nuclear program, did not halt its work completely, despite signing the Agreed Framework in 1994. They believe that the North merely slowed the pace of its R & D work and has hidden its efforts more thoroughly. The logic behind such a stand, if this analysis is accurate, is that only a nuclear shield can guarantee the survival of the socialist state. Since Pyongyang realizes that its enemies are strong and numerous, their temptation to destroy the DPRK will not evaporate. According to this thinking, the only way of preventing eventual attack by these adversaries is to have a nuclear capability to deter them. The recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, according to Russian experts, are likely to reinforce Pyongyang's determination to carry on with its secret nuclear program. As one Russian Foreign Ministry official says, quoting a high- ranking North Korean diplomat, Pyongyang has drawn two lessons from the Indian and Pakistani tests: 1) If huge India feels it necessary to add the nuclear element to guarantee its own national security, then tiny North Korea should be even more attentive to this need; and 2) The world reaction to the South Asian tests shows that the "offenders," instead of being punished, may reap additional fruit from projecting a nuclear image. Russian experts argue, however, that all this does not mean that the DPRK will make good on its threats to halt implementation of the Agreed Framework. On the contrary, Pyongyang hopes that by uttering such threats it will be able to receive greater and more timely concessions from the United States and other interested parties. 2. An Optimistic Scenario for North Korean Reforms At a recent multinational conference on North Korea held at the Institute for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) in Moscow, a number of possible scenarios on the future evolution of North Korea were advanced. Most of them were quite gloomy, involving the collapse of the DPRK or the perpetuation of the hard-line, Stalinist regime in Pyongyang, which will continue to threaten peace and security in the Northeast Asia. However, one group of Russian scholars offered a rather optimistic view on the possibility of North Korean reforms. Since such a prospect would be ideal from the perspective of most observers, it seems worthwhile to recount the conditions under which the above-mentioned optimistic scenario might occur. The main points of this perspective are the following: A) The political system of the DPRK may survive for a long time, no matter how unjust, illogical, or simply strange it might seem to outsiders. These analysts note that there are plenty of examples--both in the past and present--of such regimes, which somehow remain stable despite their apparent internal contradictions. Libya, Iraq, and Myanmar may be mentioned (among others) as typical of such cases. A perhaps even more curious recent example is the case of the former Soviet republic of Turkmenistan, which has evolved into a one-man dictatorship despite its extensive contacts with newly democratic Russia and many Western states. Outside powers do not seem to be able to affect such developments, meaning that these regimes and their systems may continue for quite some time (or at least as long as their internal resources allow). B) The threat to the North Korean regime, though it exists, lies not in the political sphere, but in the worsening economic crisis. The economic system has, according to these Russian specialists, simply reached a dead-end. The most visible and pressing problem is the shortage of food. At least half of the North Korean population has been severely affected by malnutrition. Some 20 percent are facing life- threatening conditions. Unless drastic changes are introduced into the country's agricultural system, however, the food problem has no prospects of improving. Almost as serious and threatening to the ruling regime is the situation in industry and in other sectors of the economy. Experts see no possibilities within the current economic policy of overcoming severe shortages in the provision of electricity or in the oil and gas supply. Coal output and the production of various metals are also in deep crisis. Most plants and factories sit idle. But even if they could operate, their technological level is so low that their products would not have much use inside the DPRK, not to mention as exports to the rest of the world. The economic crisis has hurt the armed forces too. They increasingly suffer from a lack of modern weaponry and ammunition and a shortage of fuel and other necessary inputs. C) These desperate economic conditions, however, will not necessarily lead to large-scale countrywide uprisings by the masses. To the contrary, these Russian observers believe that such possibilities are remote. The majority of the population seems to remain loyal to the regime due to its upbringing, experience in persevering through difficult conditions, ingrained obedience to the authorities, and isolation from the outside world. In this sense, the North Korea of today cannot be even remotely compared to the East Germany of the late 1980s, where popular loyalty to the government had dropped to nearly zero. As for the few North Koreans who harbor some disloyalties and dare to display them even in their mildest forms, they are crushed by one of the most sophisticated punitive machineries ever created in the history of mankind. After all, the Soviet Union in its later period was a much looser dictatorship and its citizens were far more sophisticated and skeptical about the communist regime than those in present- day North Korea. And yet, Soviet citizens did not revolt, but rather passively accepted the decay and degradation of their state and society. It was members of the Soviet leadership who initiated and promoted changes in their obsolete, ineffective state. This is precisely what can and should be expected in the DPRK. The disastrous economic crisis creates anxiety, displeasure, and tensions in the ruling circles of the North, including among the most conservative elements, such as the military. This conclusion is no longer based on guesswork. It is substantiated by facts-- even officials of the highest rank now are braving the difficulties of defecting from the DPRK, risking their own lives. Contradictions in the North Korean elite are demonstrated as well by the unexplained disappearances of numerous officials of the DPRK and public executions of prominent figures of the party and the government. Just a year ago, foreign observers were observing how Kim Jong Il was exercising a very sophisticated management of his inner elite-- its members were praised, showered with benefits, awarded medals, and swiftly promoted. But now we are witnessing a very different Kim Jong Il: acting tough and cruel with his subordinates. The reason for the change in the dictator's behavior can be only one: tensions in the inner leadership and a challenge to his power and policies from within North Korea's ruling circles. It goes without saying that the quickly deteriorating economic and social conditions will continue to erode the loyalty of officials to the "great leader" and to heat up pro-reform feelings. D) The main difficulty, according to these experts, is that there is only one man in Pyongyang who can open the road to reforms. That man is Kim Jong Il. He is certainly aware of the troubles in his country. Moreover, Kim Jong Il has taken some measures to correct the situation. However, his measures amount to no more than "patching holes" in the present juch'e strategy. Kim Jong Il has rejected drastic reforms for a number of reasons. His level of education, knowledge, and life experience prevent him from comprehending the real causes of the current crisis and the proper remedies for North Korea's economic and social ills. Kim Jong Il still believes that the juch'e model of development is much more just and promising than the capitalist one. Current difficulties in the South have only reinforced Mr. Kim's illusions. He blames the enemy, nature, history, and the shortcomings of ordinary people and officials-- but not juch'e ideology--for the troubles of the DPRK. Kim Jong Il is reluctant to abandon his father's heritage also because it provides the "legality" to his claim to power. If he strays from his father's platform, he will lose the right to be called the "great leader" and to stay in power. He will lose the ability to control both the elite and the general population. Equally worrisome for Kim Jong Il is the prospect that reforms will help to undermine and eventually destroy "socialism" in the DPRK. Kim Jong Il has not forgotten the lessons of East Germany, the Soviet Union, Romania, and other former socialist states. If the prospects of the DPRK are going to be different from those of the East European socialist countries, then it may be for the worse. Considering the legacy of the 1950-1953 war and the following decades of a harsh confrontation with Seoul, Southerners may be merciless towards the defeated communists. E) Notwithstanding the above-mentioned arguments, however, these Russian analysts believe it is likely that the DPRK will sooner or later embark upon serious reforms. In case Kim Jong Il stubbornly resists these changes, at some point his associates will likely topple or exterminate him. History offers numerous examples of such fates for dictators who became intolerable to their subordinates and dangerously harmful to the interests of the ruling regime and the nation. Julius Caesar, Nikita Khrushchev, and Park Chung Hee, among others, all suffered overthrow or worse at the hands of their own entourages. There is, at same time, a chance that Kim Jong Il himself will be forced to realize that continued resistance to the reforms could be more costly and dangerous to his personal power than the reforms themselves. Out of a sense of self-interest and self-preservation, therefore, Mr. Kim and the entire elite may eventually undertake the risk of reforms. F) Pro-reform feelings in the ruling circles of the DPRK may be helped, according to this school of thought, by the external environment, which is becoming more favorable than ever. First, there are policies of accommodation with the North promoted by new South Korean President Kim Dae Jung. It seems that President Kim may be able to convince the entire ruling class of the ROK of the validity of such a strategy (especially considering the South's present economic woes). Second, all interested major powers (the United States, Russia, China, and Japan) are united in their readiness to prevent the collapse of the DPRK and to help ease the transition of this state to an open, flexible, and efficient model of development. Objectively, Pyongyang has no reason now to be afraid of subversive activities from outside. This fact will help to strengthen the reformist drive in the elite of the North, and it will be taken into account by Kim Jong Il himself when circumstances make him think hard about the necessity of reforms. G) After embarking upon reforms, these Russian analysts believe that the DPRK may reap the harvest rather quickly--thanks to foreign aid, investments, technical assistance, and other support. The examples of China and Vietnam should also serve as encouraging signals to Pyongyang. Success could be facilitated by such factors as the rather limited size of North Korean economy, the eagerness of South Koreans (as well as Americans and Japanese) to provide funds and services for the cause of "de-Stalinizing" North Korea, the comparative political stability of the regime (unlike Russia after 1991), the strong work ethic of the population, and the people's readiness to be satisfied with even limited improvement of their living conditions. H) Finally, these Russian analysts believe that early achievements in the reform process are likely to raise the enthusiasm of the ruling elite and ordinary North Koreans for reforms, providing a powerful momentum for further changes in economic, social, and (finally) political and ideological spheres. These "optimistic" participants from the above-mentioned ICIP conference expect that, if their analysis is correct, reforms in the DPRK will be enacted within the next two years, and certainly before the year 2000. 2 3