NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** The following "DPRK Report" is the product of a joint project between the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, USA) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (located at the Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, Russia). It is funded by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation and is written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP. The report is distributed through NAPSNet in collaboration with the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development. ----------- THE DPRK REPORT No. 9 -- September-October 1997 1. Kim Jong Il's Regime Strengthens Its Grip on Power During the three years that have passed since the death of Kim Il Sung, the North Korean political scene has continued to intrigue foreign observers. Analysts have been trying to figure out if his son, Kim Jong Il, is completely in charge in Pyongyang or if his power is being severely limited by others in the official entourage, suggesting that he might eventually be pushed out. But the recent election of Kim Jong Il to the leadership of the ruling party lays these speculations to rest. From now on, Kim Jong Il is not only a son of the "great leader" and the supreme military commander, he is also the highest official of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP), having been formally elected by the entire rank and file, not just the Central Committee. This new position not only adds legitimacy to Kim's rule, but also gives him enormous new leverage to control the state and society. It will be even more difficult than before for someone (or some group) to challenge his dictatorship. Most Russian observers believe that Kim junior's election will certainly lead to the strengthening of the KWP's role. For three years, many observers argued that the DPRK had turned virtually into a military dictatorship and that the armed forces called all the shots, while party mechanisms had almost collapsed. The mere fact that the new "great leader" heads the KWP now gives the party renewed authority. Russian experts expect that Mr. Kim will appoint his confidants to key party positions and that they will participate actively in the business of running the country. The strengthening of the KWP's position will, in turn, make North Korean state affairs more manageable. The government will be based on two institutions instead of one (the army), which will make it easier to take decisions and to implement them. And, of course, the party (compared to the armed forces) is much more suitable as a tool for managing civilian state affairs. Foreign observers will be relieved too. The activities of the North Korean leadership will become more visible, orderly, and clear, so it will be easier to understand the DPRK and to predict its moves and prospects. On the whole, observers in Russia conclude that the accession of Kim Jong Il to the party throne has strengthened the ruling regime in Pyongyang. Earlier hopes that Kim junior would be challenged and ousted by his entourage do not seem possible in the near future. As for ordinary North Koreans, the majority of them remain loyal to the existing system--due to their upbringing, widespread indoctrination, and personal fear, combined with the country's political inertia and isolation from outside information sources. Dissidents are clearly in a very small minority. Unless they manage to flee abroad, the life-span of their dissident activities is quite short--as they almost immediately end up in concentration camps or are physically exterminated. Not everything is perfect though for the new leader of the "Hermit Kingdom." The main trouble spot is the economy. North Korea, for many years to come, will not be able to feed itself. Russian estimates show that the DPRK will have to import at least 2 million tons of grain yearly. The appropriate funds may not be available, but the international community will inevitably be helping Pyongyang when absolutely necessary. While life will be tough for North Korean citizens, it can be argued that they have largely gotten used to such conditions. In any case, the general population can do nothing to change the situation. Revolts in the DPRK have as much chance to succeed as those in a concentration camp. Only if authorities of the concentration camp alter their views and decide to improve the lot of their inmates can one hope for changes for the better. The question is: will Kim Jong Il agree to do what is expected by the international community? Russian experts believe that the supreme leader is aware of the difficulties in his country. Kim Jong Il is reported to have admitted recently to his entourage: "After 30 years of life under socialism, we have to turn to the West in order to feed our people. We now are far behind the West." No less worrisome to Kim junior and his associates is the energy shortage. It is crippling the entire economy: plants lie idle, railroads do not function, and research laboratories have shut down their operations. The most acute problem is in the military field. To keep the economy afloat, Pyongyang has had to reduce its expenditures on the armed forces and on armaments, worsening the DPRK's already existing lag behind the South in military technology and weaponry. These military and economic problems make the introduction of reforms urgent in order to make the economy more efficient. Kim Jong Il, however, is reluctant to launch such reforms. He is known to have said at one of the leadership's meetings: "Are you waiting for me to initiate changes? You will not live to see me doing anything of the sort." As observers in Russia note, Kim Jong Il has not only indoctrinated North Korean society; he is also a victim of self-indoctrination. Kim junior realizes that there are many shortcomings in the DPRK. At the same time, however, he believes that nothing better can be designed for the country and that the system established by his father is perfect. Thus, if there are difficulties, it is not because of deficiencies in the system, but rather due to the laziness and stupidity of bureaucrats, unfortunate external conditions, bad weather, or some other problem. Kim Jong Il is also reluctant to engage in reform because it might undermine the foundations of his power. Deng Xiaoping emerged from exile to launch reforms and so challenged the heritage of his opponents (including Mao Zedong and the "gang of four"). If Kim Jong Il initiated reforms, by contrast, he would be challenging the heritage of his own father. This is dangerous because the legitimacy of Kim junior's power rests on adherence to this heritage. Finally, according to most Russian observers, Kim Jong Il is simply scared to launch reforms. He remembers the fate of communist reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, especially East Germany. When East German leaders embarked on their transformation process, soon the very raison d'etre of a separate East German state disappeared. The regime was quickly engulfed by its more powerful, viable, and popularly appealing neighbor: West Germany. Kim junior realizes that his case will be even harder: South Koreans still remember with bitterness the 1950-53 war and the subsequent provocations of the DPRK. Depending on the outcome of reforms, Kim Jong Il and his entourage may end up before a firing squad. And yet, the majority of Russian experts are not entirely pessimistic about the prospects for North Korean reforms. Pyongyang has already introduced some innovations into its economy. It very well may be that--under the pressure of real problems and the growing influence of the United States and Japan--Kim Jong Il will continue to make adjustments in his economic policies. As a result, sooner or later, he may find himself going down the path of reform. However, if cooperation between the DPRK and the major powers does move forward and if North Korea gradually embarks on reforms and improves its economy, the mentality of Pyongyang's leadership will start to change. The fear of the South might begin to melt away and, one day, the DPRK might feel confident enough to get into a serious and constructive dialogue with the South. The election of a new man to the South Korean presidency would facilitate conditions for such a dialogue. 2. Impressions of the DPPK by Recent Russian Visitors A number of Russian delegations have visited North Korea lately. The prevailing impression is that, at least in the cities and towns, there is no famine. The food supply is very limited, there are cases of malnutrition; however, most people have the minimum sufficient for survival. These observers emphasis the fact that North Koreans have gotten used to Spartan conditions that might seem intolerable, for example, to Western observers. Some Russian experts point out that the North Korean population has encountered similar difficulties throughout its history. Back in the 1950s, there were periods of severe food shortage and many people (especially children) suffered from malnutrition, which killed quite a few. Conditions were not much better in the 1960s and 1970s. These experts reason that even if the present food situation in North Korea can be described as very grave and the ruling regime is backed into a corner: for the DPRK, this is nothing new. Russians returning from North Korea also voice some positive impressions. They find most North Koreans very disciplined, optimistic, devoted to their homeland, and friendly towards Russia. Many North Koreans allegedly remember with warmth the days of close friendship between Moscow and Pyongyang. According to one observer, they "sing Soviet songs, cite Soviet poetry by heart, and reveal that their favorite movies are those produced in the USSR and devoted to the Bolshevik revolution and the great patriotic war against fascist Germany." Some of the Koreans, including high officials, admit that they long for the old Soviet-North Korean friendship and hope that soon the peoples of Russia and the DPRK will be together again. Russian visitors underline the fact that quite a few graduates of Soviet universities can be found now in responsible positions in the North: in the ministries, armed forces, at plants and factories, and in research institutes. They are especially friendly towards Russians. Those who return from visits to the DPRK are also pleasantly surprised by the cleanliness of North Korean cities, conditions of law and order, and their beautiful monuments. 3. Russia's Goals in Northeast Asia Back in the early 1990s, Russia's young democracy concentrated on becoming a respected member of the Western community. The United States and Europe were seen as the main political and ideological allies of post-communist Russia, the principle source of economic aid, and the model for Russian development. Quite soon, however, the mood in Moscow changed due to difficulties with Western-style reforms, the West's own plans to expand NATO, and other reasons. As a result, Russia became disillusioned with the West. Security concerns moved to the forefront of the Kremlin's foreign policy, which became increasingly conservative and nationalistic. The re-election of Boris Yeltsin as Russian president in 1996, however, has reversed this trend. Russia is again emphasizing internal reforms and striving to subordinate its international strategy to domestic needs. Unlike in 1991-92, this goal is not resulting in a pro-Western tilt in foreign policy. Instead, Moscow feels that reforms will be better served if it conducts a balanced foreign policy: developing close ties with all of its neighbors and world centers of power, not only in the West, but in the East, South, and North as well. Moscow's other motives--security concerns and great power ambitions--are also helping to promote a balanced and active Russian foreign policy in all directions. President Yeltsin's recent summits with the leaders of Japan and China illustrate Moscow's desire to play a more visible role in Northeast Asia. The Korean Peninsula is one of the most important targets of Russia's new drive to the East. The Kremlin hopes to see in the near future a dramatic rise in South Korean investment into the Russian economy. As a high official in the Russian government noted recently, "huge Korean companies have already established a solid presence in our country, there are also numerous agreements between Moscow and Seoul, laying the proper foundation for cooperation." What is still lacking is South Korean trust in the stability and good prospects of the Russian market. But current signs of recovery in the Russian economy, coupled with progress in Russia's economic ties with Japan and China, might stimulate further activities of South Korean companies in Russia. North Korea too has a certain value as a business partner for Russia. North Korean workers are playing a useful role as lumberjacks in Siberia and the Far East. Russia is also interested in buying North Korean raw materials and in building nuclear power plants and other industrial facilities there. The "Rajin-Sonbon" special economic zone is attracting Russian attention as well. It now appears to be a real possibility that Moscow may cooperate with Beijing and Tokyo in promoting development of this zone. Security concerns make the Korean Peninsula even more important in Russian eyes. Korea is Russia's immediate neighbor and, if stability and peace are disrupted there, Russia will certainly be affected. Refugees from the North will engulf the Russian Far East, while nuclear materials located on the peninsula may spread around and get into hands of terrorists and other irresponsible individuals. This is why Moscow is ready to do as much as possible to contribute to the preservation of peace and the relaxation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. To this end, the Kremlin favors a dialogue with Pyongyang and encouragement of the opening up and reform of the DPRK. This will help the North to change and become more flexible towards the South, as well as more receptive to the idea of inter-Korean cooperation. The mistaken policy of the early 1990s--when the DPRK was left virtually isolated and engaged in desperate and dangerous attempts to create nuclear weapons--should not be repeated. President Yeltsin has conferred with his Chinese and Japanese counterparts on ways to elicit a more constructive foreign policy from North Korea. It seems that these three powers, plus the United States, now agree on the necessity of engaging North Korea in a constructive dialogue, rather than pushing it into a corner. Moscow is ready to do this on a bilateral basis, as well as in concert with other interested parties. Of course, Russia would also like to be added to the list of participants of the four-party talks. It is encouraging that the major powers, in contrast to the past, are at least no longer competing against each other in Korea, but instead are aiming for coordinated policies there. Great power ambitions, for their part, contribute to the high profile of Russia on the Korean Peninsula. Russia is a founding member of the United Nations and has a permanent seat on the Security Council. Consequently, along with other permanent members of the Security Council, Moscow has responsibility for maintaining peace worldwide. The Korean Peninsula is certainly one area of concern, especially because Russia has deep-rooted historical reasons to be involved in the process of a settlement on the Korean Peninsula. After all, it was the Soviet leadership that created the DPRK and authorized the North Korean attack on the South in June 1950. The responsibility of Moscow to bring to the conclusion this last vestige of the Cold War cannot be ignored by the Russian government or by other parties. There is another angle to the great power ambitions of Russia on the Korean Peninsula. In the 1950 to 1970s, the Soviet Union competed for world supremacy against the United States and tried to include into its sphere of influence all states and nations that were not part of the American camp. Moscow opposed multipolarity and condemned any forces that tried to break up the bipolar world (especially China). The current international environment is different. Russia is not a superpower anymore and is afraid that the world could turn into a unipolar one controlled by the United States. To prevent this unwelcome development, Moscow encourages multipolarity in international relations. The Kremlin supports the growing independent role of China in world affairs. It will vote for the elevation of Japan and Germany to permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council. President Yeltsin has also called upon Germany and France to join Moscow in forming a triumvirate to make coordinated decisions regarding Europe. In Northeast Asia, Russia is interested in the future in an active role for a united Korea. The stronger Korea is, the less chance that China or Japan might try to impose its supremacy on the region. This is why Russia is more interested in the eventual unification of Korea than any other foreign state. Future Russian diplomacy, no doubt, will increasingly emphasize policies aimed at facilitating the achievement of this goal. [End of DPRK Report No. 9] Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development Berkeley, CA, USA; January 2, 1998 6