NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** The following "DPRK Report" is the product of a joint project between the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (Monterey, California, USA) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) at the Russian Diplomatic Academy (Moscow, Russia). It is written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP and edited by the CNS. ------------------------------------------ THE DPRK REPORT, No. 14 (September-October 1998) 1. The Results of the First Session of the 10th Supreme People's Assembly North Korea's recent parliamentary elections and the convocation of the first session of the 10th term of the DPRK's Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) have revived the legislative branch of the North Korean regime. The five-year term of office for the ninth SPA expired back in 1995, so the parliament has not functioned at all during the past three years. Despite the rubber-stamp status of the North Korean legislature, the revival of the SPA may contribute to a certain normalization in the way the regime conducts its affairs. While crucial decisions will continue to be made elsewhere, at least more rational procedures may be followed in the election or approval of the highest state and government officials, the execution of ties with foreign countries, and the adoption of laws, regulations, the state budget, and other official policies. Moreover, the DPRK has finally acquired a premier and defense minister (both posts had remained vacant for more than a year) as well as other cabinet members-all of which were elected at the first session of the SPA. The composition of the SPA has also changed significantly. More than 60 percent of the 687 SPA members were replaced in the latest election, compared with 31 percent in the preceding election in April 1990. The list of new SPA members reflects shake-ups that have taken place under Kim Jong Il's rule during the past four years. Consistent with the strong influence of the military in the North Korean leadership, the list of the representatives to the 10th term of the SPA includes 75 higher military leaders with ranks at or above lieutenant (two-star) general. The biggest surprise of the session was the proclamation in the newly revised constitution that the late Kim Il Sung would be the "eternal president" of the DPRK. Even on the very eve of the SPA session, there were clear indications that the post would be taken by Kim junior. This sudden change of mind can be explained by two factors: 1) Kim Jong Il's desire to exploit popular allegiance to his late father to further cement the basis for his own leadership; and 2) his well-known distaste for the public politics required of heads of state (meeting with foreigners, presiding at official functions, etc.). Another main constitutional revision is the creation of an omnipotent National Defense Commission (NDC). The DPRK Defense Committee has been already in existence for a long time and Kim Jong Il has been its head. However, the renovated NDC is now defined as the nation's most powerful organ, with Kim Jong Il in the new position of chairman. The role of the NDC's chairman is described by the North Korean media as that of the supreme leader in charge of spearheading the nation's political, military, and economic organizations, safeguarding the entire state system of the socialist fatherland and the fate of its people, and maintaining the nation's defense capabilities. The changes in the constitution also concern the economic sphere. From now on, business and trade activities within the special economic zones will be extended from the state itself to so-called "socialist cooperative groups," or non-state workers' collectives. It is also likely that Pyongyang will establish more free economic zones, in addition to the existing Rajin-Sonbong area and the Nampo-Wonsan bonded area just south of Pyongyang. The DPRK is expected to redouble its efforts to attract more foreign investment, especially from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asia Development Bank (ADB), and by improving its relations with the United States. The revised constitution also allows the North Korean people to engage in small-scale private farming and to earn income through legal, private businesses. Greater autonomy has been granted in factory management, and the concept of profitability has been introduced. However, North Korean authorities continued to reaffirm that juche will continue to remain the backbone of the country's economic policy. Thus, a September 9 article in the party newspaper, Rodong Shinmun, argued: "It is a foolish daydream to try to revive the economy by introducing foreign capital, not relying on one's own strength." The newspaper described this article as representing the policy of Kim Jong Il. The essay warned that capitalistic economic reforms would cause catastrophic results, as evidenced by the experience of the former Soviet-bloc countries. It concluded, "We will...set ourselves against all the attempts to induce us to join an 'integrated' world. We have nothing to 'reform' and 'open.'" The decision of Kim Jong Il to rule the country in his capacity as chairman of the NDC signifies that the military remains his favorite branch for exercising authority. The prominent role of the military is also evident in its widening presence throughout North Korean ruling party and legislative bodies and in the fact that Kim Jong Il continues to be shown in the media dealing predominantly with marshals and generals and being accompanied everywhere by military personnel. Editorials in Rodong Shinmun continue to reiterate the thesis that the army "will complete its juche-oriented task relying on [its] weapons and will play a pivotal role in safeguarding the command post of the revolution" (meaning Kim Jong Il). Nevertheless, the role of the party should not be underestimated. Kim Jong Il is now secretary general of the Korean Worker's Party (KWP), which in itself gives considerable authority to the KWP party apparatus. If one examines Kim's latest pronouncements, as well as the editorials in North Korean newspapers, one notices that the KWP is presented as "the core driving force of socialist society," "the vanguard advancing the most correct lines and policies in each period of the revolution's development," "the only guiding force of the masses," "the fundamental source in creating new heroic achievements," and "the most formidable force for carrying out any task." If one reads Pyongyang's statements carefully, one notices that the armed forces are also ranked as the vanguard "in carrying out the tasks of the Party." The KWP's prominence in the DPRK can be seen not only on the propaganda level. On the practical level, the party continues to have a Military Committee, which supervises the daily activities of the armed forces. It was, incidentally, the above-mentioned committee that-along with the Central Committee of the KWP-officially nominated Kim Jong Il to head the NDC. It is also significant that the DPRK's Unification Committee of the previous SPA has been abolished, and that the extremely important DPRK- ROK relationship has been taken over by the KWP Central Committee. Thus, the party apparatus, in the view of many Russian experts, remains an institution constituting-with the armed forces-one of the most important pillars of Kim Jong Il's personal dictatorship. As for the SPA and its Presidium, their role is only a decorative one, meant to provide a convenient democratic facade to the totalitarian regime. Yet, the revival of the parliament's activities and the elevation of the NDC may set the stage for an increased role for technocrats in economic policymaking processes, given the recent return to influence of the DPRK's former reform-minded Prime Minister Yon Hyong- muk. His resurgence is one of the most notable developments in the recent reshuffling of key DPRK officials and KWP leaders, especially because he has been added to the NDC. 2. North Korean Foreign Policy after the First Session of the 10th SPA In the view of many Russian analysts, North Korea's decision to conduct a combined missile test and satellite launch on August 31 was clearly meant not only to boost the prestige of Mr. Kim, but also to send a warning message to the United States. In combination with threats to abrogate the 1994 Agreed Framework, Pyongyang wanted to press Washington for further concessions. Such tactics worked successfully in the early 1990s and North Korea sees such messages as the only leverage it can use to soften American positions. Yet, as Russian experts note, the initial reaction of the United States seems to have been quite opposite to the one expected by the DPRK. Instead of making concessions, the Americans reinforced their military potential in the North Pacific, stepped up military exercises with South Korea, beefed up security links with both South Korea and Japan, announced plans to upgrade South Korea's anti-missile defense, aroused world public opinion against the "aggressive designs" of the North, and delayed its preparations for the exchange of liaison offices with the DPRK. The U.S. House of Representatives also cut off funds for the Agreed Framework and established new conditions for their reinstatement. There is a growing pressure now by U.S. political elites on the Clinton administration to give up its entire strategy of accommodation towards Pyongyang. North Korea, according to Russian appraisals, did not expect such a "violent" response from the United States and is now trying to calm things down and resume a dialogue with Washington. The prevailing mood in the White House is to save the Agreed Framework and to restart attempts to engage Pyongyang in a dialogue on missiles and other important issues. However, it will not be easy for the Clinton administration to gather broad support for these efforts, especially on Capitol Hill. Besides, many U.S. politicians expect North Korea to collapse in the near future and consequently do not feel obliged to exhibit new flexibility to this dying regime. Most experts in Moscow expect that, even if the dialogue is revived, the United States will certainly press hard to eliminate the missile activities of the DPRK in exchange for their full implementation of the Agreed Framework and other concessions. In this context, it would be naive to expect any progress in the four- party peace talks. These negotiations reached an impasse last spring due to preconditions laid down by Pyongyang, despite a warmer political climate at the time. North Korea demanded that the United States withdraw its troops from the South and that South Korea repeal its National Security Law and dismantle its Agency for National Security Planning. Washington and Seoul flatly rejected these preconditions. At the upcoming session, it is likely that the Americans and South Koreans will be the ones putting forward demands (which are likely to be unacceptable to the DPRK) concerning Pyongyang's activities in the satellite and missile fields as well as allegations that North Korea may be building an underground nuclear facility northeast of Yongbyon. Most Russian analysts believe that the session will turn into another round of mutual recriminations and threats to terminate the talks. As for Sino-North Korean relations, they have become even more strained than previously. Pyongyang is unhappy with the renewed Sino-U.S. rapprochement after President Clinton's recent trip to China. The North Koreans are nervous about the possible development of a cooperative strategy by Beijing, Washington, and Seoul oriented against the DPRK. Such concerns can be found (albeit in a veiled form) in statements by North Korean officials and in press reports. Beijing, in its turn, is quite angry with the recent North Korean missile test. The Chinese have strongly urged the North Koreans to "exercise restraint and refrain from doing anything that may cause tensions in the region and spark a new arms race." The Chinese government's position is that unless the DPRK acts prudently, Tokyo and Seoul "may be pushed to a more militaristic stance--intensified cooperation with the USA [and] procurement of more sophisticated weapons." Another irritant in Sino-North-Korean relations are Beijing's attempts to encourage reforms in the DPRK, offering its own experience in this field. In Kim Jong Il's eyes, the social and economic reforms going on now in China pose a threat to North Korea. In its internal propaganda, Pyongyang brands Chinese reforms as a "dangerous policy not only undermining socialism in the PRC, but doomed to deny the DPRK of its socialist ally and having a [negative] impact on the DPRK." This rejection is so strong that a number of North Korean officials were dismissed and arrested recently for praising Chinese economic policies. All of these points do not rule out the possibility that Kim Jong Il may someday decide to visit China and that he will be welcomed there (although rumors are circulating that North Korean dictator did try to tour China earlier this year, but did not receive the requested invitation). Finally, Russia is also upset with the North Korean satellite launch, especially since it was not informed in advance and because the launch could aggravate tensions in an area that borders the Russian Far East. As Russian officials point out, instead of concentrating on tackling its food shortage, Pyongyang is spending valuable resources merely to achieve propagandistic and political aims. The Russian government requested an official explanation from North Korea, specifically mentioning the fact that the launch landed in Russia's exclusive economic zone. The answer was that the DPRK had simply launched a satellite and that, in similar cases, the United States, Russia, and other countries never provide prior warning. The DPRK should not be an exception, according to North Korean officials. The North Korean side stated as well that the world cannot be divided into countries with the right to produce missiles and threaten others, and countries that are denied this right. It is also significant, added North Koreans, that India and Pakistan tested nuclear bombs and nothing happened. Thus, why is such a fuss raised when a small country launches a peaceful satellite? Despite its criticisms of Pyongyang's actions, however, Moscow clearly wants the United States and South Korea to continue their flexible policies towards the DPRK. Russia views such an approach as "the only sensible one." ------------- The CNS website is located at http://cns.miis.edu. The ICIP can be contacted via e-mail at icipu@glasnet.ru.