NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** The following “DPRK Report"is the product of a joint project between the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, USA) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (located at the Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, Russia). It is funded by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation and is written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP. ------------------------------------------------ THE DPRK REPORT No. 10 -- November-December 1997 Visits of Russian Communists to North Korea In recent months, a number of prominent Russian communists have visited the DPRK at the invitation of the North Korean leadership. Such visitors have included former Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov, member of Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Oleg Shenin, and others. Back in Russia, they have shared their impressions of top North Korean leaders, as well as their views of the DPRK’s internal situation and foreign policy. All of the visitors give high praise to Kim Jong Il as a man of "extraordinary talents, high intellect, deep knowledge of life, and vast experience." Because of such qualities Kim Jong Il "skillfully, masterfully, and wisely governs the state." Marshal Yazov believes that Kim Jong Il "knows as much about military affairs as any great commander who has won important battles." Yazov adds: "Comrade Kim Jong Il is capable of not only winning wars, but of preventing a major war, which is even more important in our times." According to the Russian communists, Kim Jong Il, being an extraordinary leader, "holds all the strings of power and commands an indisputable admiration and authority among the party and the people." Kim Jong Il presumably "never makes noise, never shouts, doing everything in a low-key, dignified manner." Conversations between Kim Jong Il and these Russian visitors have been devoted mostly to the reasons and consequences of the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The supreme North Korean leader kept asking what had prompted Mr. Gorbachev "to choose the wrong way." Kim Jong Il himself believes that it was a case of high treason, that "Gorbachev and his henchmen on purpose destroyed the socialist system and the great state." According to their accounts, Kim Jong Il repeatedly expressed surprise that "genuine communists and patriots had not stopped the treasonous plot." The North Korean leadership "saw the danger of Gorbachev’s experiments back in 1986 and hoped that they would be terminated by healthy elements." Kim Jong Il criticized Mr. Yazov for not employing military force to quell the anti-communist "counter-revolution" in 1991. Russian visitors have returned with the impression that Kim Jong Il "firmly believes in the advantages and bright prospects of North Korean socialism." Notwithstanding current economic difficulties, as the DPRK leader put it to one Russian guest: "simple people enjoy many things that cannot exist in a capitalist society: every citizen has a home, a job, access to free education and medical care, and protection against crime, exploitation, and injustice." Kim Jong Il boasted to his Russian visitors that "people in the DPRK feel like they are part of one family, with the party and the people being united in their mutual love and respect." Because of this, he argued, "the DPRK achieved tremendous successes in a record-short period after the total destruction of the country by the American aggressors in 1950-1953." What has also contributed to these alleged successes, according to these reports, has been "vigilance against the enemy and its subversive activities, correct propaganda, and correct education of DPRK citizens." The North Korean leader says that the number one priority of his foreign policy is to "achieve unification of the Korean nation." Pyongyang reportedly "tries very hard to avoid sharpening of confrontation with the South." "Through a dialogue," points out Mr. Kim, "we should be able accelerate the process of bringing all Koreans back into one family." Kim Jong Il is equally full of resolve "to overcome differences with the USA and Japan and to normalize relations with these traditional antagonists." This goal is not easy, he argues, since "Americans and Japanese are not sincere and use every trick to weaken the DPRK and undermine our socialist system." He notes that "They distrust us and remain hostile to socialism." "So," concludes the North Korean leader, "we are not idealists, we understand the realities of international politics. That’s why the DPRK pays special attention to strengthening its defensive capabilities." The Russian communists testify that North Korean armed forces are "in very good shape." Officers and soldiers are well trained, know how to conduct modern warfare and, what is the most important, "they are highly motivated and loyal to the motherland, socialism, and the leader." 2. Chances for South-North Dialogue under New ROK President Kim Dae Jung Russian analysts believe that the election of Kim Dae Jung to the ROK presidency should help to promote a dialogue between the two Koreas. They emphasize the fact that the newly elected president is a very intelligent, experienced, and knowledgeable politician who will not push Pyongyang into a corner. Instead, Seoul will allow North Korea to solve its urgent internal problems (the famine and the economic crisis) and external difficulties (normalization of relations with the United States and Japan) and thereby prepare itself for a serious and meaningful dialogue with the South. The financial crisis will also add to the caution and prudence of President Kim Dae Jung. He will prefer to overcome internal difficulties before trying to sit down with his North Korean counterparts for talks. Pyongyang, in its turn, would want to see the outcome of South Korean problems before committing itself to anything vis-a-vis the ROK. However, from a medium-term perspective, the gradual approach of Kim Dae Jung’s diplomacy towards the DPRK, according to Russian experts, will pay off and bring progress in the South-North dialogue. 3. On the Effectiveness of Internal North Korean Propaganda After the death of Kim Il Sung, the main thrust of North Korean internal propaganda has been the replacement of Kim senior by Kim junior in the role of the great leader as a "living god." By now, this task has been achieved, at least on the surface. Today, the same epithets that had been reserved in the past for Kim Il Sung also include his son. Kim Jong Il is referred to as the "great leader" and the population is told that the DPRK’s very existence is impossible without this man--that everything is done and will continue to be done by his personal order and his personal leadership. Kim junior is described in the same fashion as Kim senior: as the number one politician, theoretician, revolutionary, and leader, not only in Korea, but in world history as well. Citizens of the DPRK are told to offer their unlimited loyalty to the two Kims and to devote their lives and even to sacrifice them for the cause of the supreme leadership. The key element of Pyongyang’s propaganda machine, particularly after Kim Jong Il’s elevation to the top party position, is the Propaganda and Agitation (PA) Department of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). It is headed by Central Committee Secretary Kim Gi Nam, who is very close to the supreme leader. The PA Department supervises the media and the system of political indoctrination in the DPRK. The entire country devotes two hours daily to political classes. All enterprises and offices spend Saturdays on political education. There are also special courses every year for leading cadres at the Kim Il Sung Party School. As for North Korean students, they spend two months each summer in camps, where they combine military training with studying the two Kims’ ideas. Educational institutions allocate most of their time to studying the teachings of the two Kims, their biographies, and the KWP’s history. Feature movies and documentaries about the two great leaders make up 20 percent of the broadcasting time on television and radio. According to official statistics, over 200 periodicals (including 18 newspapers and 60 magazines) are published in the DPRK. The total circulation of newspapers is three million copies, while the total circulation of all periodicals reaches seven million copies. However, in reality, the figures are much smaller. Lately, many newspapers have had to stop publishing due to the shortage of paper and other materials. Newspapers are not sold through retail channels and are available exclusively through subscription. Subscriptions are handled by district authorities, who decide who reads what. Each family may subscribe to only a single periodical; everything else must be read in libraries. Foreign media are available only to the Central Committee of the KWP, the Foreign Ministry, certain other government agencies, and the Academy of Social Sciences. Non-provocative foreign publications are also available in the "special" sections of major libraries for authorized persons. Unlike in the Eastern bloc communist countries in former years, there is no criticism allowed of any officials in the North Korean press. Newspapers do not even publish readers’ letters with criticism of shortcomings, complaints, and requests. As representatives of the ruling regime explain (in private), "any criticism of the socialist system is dangerous due to the presence of enemies in the south of Korea." There is probably another reason for this situation: criticism of even low-ranking bureaucrats could be construed as a veiled denunciation of the great leader, since he is in charge of everything and everybody. One of the main thrusts of North Korean propaganda is promotion of the uniqueness of the Korean nation. This quality and the "greatness" of Koreans are explained first of all by the fact that they have been led by the two Kims. The Korean press describes the people as "full of happiness and revolutionary optimism as nowhere else in the world." The Korean revolution is qualified as "the most optimistic, luckiest, [and most] full of great romanticism." Internal propaganda is divided into open and classified versions. The classified version is presented at indoctrination sessions and in special publications with limited access. The second version is much harsher and more hostile to external enemies. South Korea is treated invariably as the "military-fascist puppet" of the United States. Citizens of the DPRK are called upon "to fight to the end for the toppling of the fascist dictatorship" in the South. The term "to liberate" is used concerning Pyongyang aims vis-a-vis the ROK. Proposals are put forward aimed at the withdrawal of American troops from the Peninsula and the instigation of a popular uprising in the South and its merger with the North. Negotiations with the United States and South Korea are presented as continuation of war by other means. Comparison of North Korean propaganda of today with that of previous periods shows that basically it has not changed much over the years. When one reads a North Korean newspaper, one gets the impression that it is a very old newspaper except for dates and names. Otherwise it contains essentially the same ideas, slogans, style, and logic. This controlled press is the only "intellectual food" that most DRPK citizens are fed. Influence from abroad is getting even weaker than before, since fewer and fewer people travel nowadays to other countries. In recent years, the DPRK has cut the staff at a large number of its embassies, recalled most of its students from abroad, and engaged in other cost-cutting measures. As a result, it should be admitted that the North Korean regime has largely succeeded in its propaganda efforts to brainwash its population and to create a special "brand" of people: who will give their maximum effort to work for a minimum of rewards; who will labor because of their love for their motherland, rather than for money; and who love their leaders and are convinced that Korean history is a story of heroic acts by Kim Il Sung and his son. However, hunger and poverty have recently started to erode the monolith of North Korean society. According to recent observations, quite a few DPRK citizens have lost interest in work and no longer pay attention to propaganda. The black market is growing in the North, and even such "sacred" objects as Kim Il Sung badges are being sold to foreigners. Young people are reported to dream about going abroad to study and work. It is a telling sign of conditions in the DPRK that North Korean lumberjacks interviewed in their Siberian work camps describe their difficult jobs as a "great privilege." In this context, it is also revealing that a growing number of North Koreans are fleeing their country, despite the serious personal risks involved. 5