NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK
     ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** 

The following "DPRK Report" is the product of a joint project between the 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies (Monterey, California, USA) and the Institute for 
Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Moscow, Russia).   It is 
written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP and edited by the 
CNS.

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THE DPRK REPORT, No. 23 (March-April 2000)

1.  North Korean Views of the Significance of the Upcoming DPRK-ROK 
Summit

North Korean representatives stress that the summit being held in 
Pyongyang "will demonstrate the superiority of the DPRK in the eyes of 
all Koreans living in the South and abroad."  Kim Dae-jung had insisted 
on a neutral venue for the summit (Beijing, Vladivostok, the 38th 
Parallel on the Korean Peninsula, or some other site), but was 
"categorically rebuffed."  As North Korean officials stress, "The side 
that is morally weaker and that committed so many crimes against its own 
nation must kowtow before the real and only leader of all Koreans."

The summit in Pyongyang, as North Korean officials admit, should also 
boost the morale of the DPRK population.  "The country is undergoing 
serious difficulties," a high-ranking diplomat admitted, "and it will be 
very encouraging for our citizens to see that Seoul's leaders are coming 
to pay respect to the DPRK." 

North Koreans believe as well that the summit will "greatly promote" the 
prestige of the DPRK and personally Kim Jong-il throughout the world and 
will attract new countries to cooperate with Pyongyang.

Of special significance for the North Korean leadership will be the U.S. 
reaction to the inter-Korean summit.  Pyongyang, as can be construed from 
private remarks by its representatives, expects "major economic and 
strategic concessions from Washington."  As one official emphasizes, "The 
summit is in fact a concession to the United States, so we are entitled 
to reciprocal moves by the U.S."  The DPRK leadership wants Washington to 
provide "a full green light" to U.S. economic cooperation with North 
Korea and to drop its plans for theater missile defenses (TMD) in the 
Asian-Pacific region.  The development of improved economic ties with 
Japan is also envisaged.

Some North Koreans express the hope that the June summit will pave the 
way to expanded economic exchanges with the South, though others dismiss 
this perspective as "not important."  One official stated, "We don't need 
their money."

2.  Russia's Reaction to the Planned Inter-Korean Summit

Russian authorities consider the Korean situation to be the most 
dangerous hot spot in the Asian-Pacific region and one that directly 
concerns Russia.  Moscow has all along supported a direct political 
dialogue and rapprochement between the North and the South.  It has 
criticized both Korean sides for not having improved their relations long 
after the great powers put an end to the Cold War.  

The agreement between Pyongyang and Seoul finally to hold a summit is 
being hailed in Russia as a breakthrough and is sincerely welcomed.  
However, Russian analysts express caution about the likely results of the 
June meeting in Pyongyang.  They feel that Kim Jong-il will not risk the 
future of his regime by undertaking a significant opening of the DPRK to 
the rest of the world.  Such an opening would first require preliminary 
steps in the domestic ideological, political, and economic spheres.  None 
of these steps can be observed at present in the North.

Pyongyang, as Russian experts argue, "will use the summit to wrest 
concessions from the United States and its allies without altering its 
traditional external and internal strategies."  Some specialists don't 
exclude that the summit itself might be canceled under some as yet 
uncertain pretext.

3.  New Soviet-Era Archival Materials on the Korean War

Materials found in the Russian archives reveal the reasons why Stalin 
changed his views in 1950 and decided to support Kim Il-sung's desire "to 
liberate" the South.

In conversations with Kim Il-sung in April 1950 in the Kremlin, Stalin 
gave four reasons to support his conclusion that the international 
environment had "changed sufficiently to permit a more active stance on 
the unification of Korea."

The first reason was "the significant strengthening of the socialist camp 
in the East: the victory of the Chinese revolution, the signing of an 
alliance between the USSR and the PRC, and the USSR's acquisition of an 
atomic bomb."

The second reason concerned "the obvious weakness of the reactionary camp 
[as seen in]: the shameful defeat of America's intervention into Chinese 
affairs, Western troubles in Southeast Asia, and the inability of the 
South Korean regime and its American masters to improve the social, 
economic, and political situation in South Korea."

Stalin listed as the third factor contributing to the Soviet Union's new 
stance "the dishonest, perfidious, and arrogant behavior of the United 
States in Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, and especially its 
decision to form NATO."  According to Stalin, "America was no longer a 
partner, but [instead] an adversary, and the Soviet Union could not bind 
itself any longer to agreements with [such] an adversary."

The fourth reason was the "aggressive designs of the South Korean junta."  
As Stalin concluded, "the South was determined to launch an attack on the 
North sooner or later and it was important to forestall this aggression." 

This information could change the way outside analysts understand the 
Korean War and may add useful details toward a future resolution of this 
still-unsettled conflict.