NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** The following "DPRK Report" is the product of a joint project between the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (Monterey, California, USA) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) at the Russian Diplomatic Academy (Moscow, Russia). It is written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP and edited by the CNS.] ----------------------------------- THE DPRK REPORT, No. 16 (January-February 1999) 1. Pyongyang Feels It Has Won Again North Korean diplomats in Moscow and other CIS capitals point out that the situation in DPRK-U.S. relations has relaxed considerably now compared to the end of 1998. They claim that Washington has softened its approach to all existing issues of contention and has temporarily shelved its former plans to bomb suspected nuclear targets in the DPRK. According to North Korean representatives, Washington's change of mind is the direct result of the "brave and principled" stand of the North Korean government. "Americans," as they explain it, "got scared to death in the face of a country that was ready to fight its enemy to the end." These North Korean diplomats conclude that "Washington understands nothing else but force, so the DPRK has to continue to build up its power and be ready to demonstrate its resolve to use this power." 2. North Korea Moves Closer to Russia Moscow's opposition to the bombings of Iraq and Yugoslavia, as well as the general deterioration of Russian-American relations, have substantially improved Russia's image in Pyongyang. North Korean officials hint that the Kremlin is now emerging as the only reliable force capable of countering American aggression and of opposing Washington's pressure tactics against the DPRK. According to a high- ranking North Korean diplomat, Kim Jong Il "feels that Russian foreign policy is evolving in the right direction and that the DPRK should move closer to Russia." This official adds that Moscow's behavior stands in contrast to the "hypocritical line of Beijing, which plays its own games with Seoul and Washington at the expense of the DPRK." Analysts in Moscow give credence to these pronouncements by North Korean officials and believe that Pyongyang hopes that the logic of Russia's geopolitical tensions with the United States will eventually lead Moscow to adopt a more pro-North Korean stance. 3. North Korean Missile Developments North Korean officials complain that the United States, which possesses "thousands" of missiles and spy satellites, is attempting to deny the DPRK its right for elementary defenses and even the limited use of space for peaceful purposes. Most Russian experts agree with these arguments. The common thesis is that Washington believes its security concerns and defense requirements are legitimate. Washington purportedly believes that all others should turn into U.S. protectorates or be prohibited from military preparations. Russian analysts point out that this hegemonic U.S. logic threatens to throw the world back to the hostile international relations of the Cold War. Nevertheless, Russian experts do not support Pyongyang's efforts to develop a missile force. The reason for this stand is that such developments could lead to disproportionate countermeasures by the United States and Japan, thus heightening tensions and pressures for an arms race in the Far East. They see a possible way out of the situation via Russian attempts to move closer to Pyongyang and thereby restore the DPRK's confidence vis-a-vis the United States and its allies. Russian experts also suggest that all interested parties should extend joint security guarantees to North Korea in exchange for Pyongyang's cessation of its missile program. 4. Russian Appraisals of Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine Policy" Russian officials give very positive appraisals of Seoul's present strategy towards the DPRK. They argue that there is no sensible alternative to this strategy, and that it maximizes chances for the preservation of peace on the Korean Peninsula as well as for opening channels of dialogue between the two Koreas (en route to their eventual unification). Sooner or later, according to Russian analysts, Pyongyang will begin responding to this positive, constructive approach and will initiate the process of opening itself to the outside world. This opening, in turn, will increasingly influence the North Korean regime, making it more pragmatic and flexible. While this process is bound take a long time, Russian analysts see no better options. If Seoul were instead to attempt to increase its pressure on the DPRK-hoping to bring about an early collapse of Kim Jong Il's regime-the results would be disastrous: either a devastating North-South war or the possible disintegration of the DPRK, with its ensuing chaos, anarchy, economic decline, and civil strife throughout the Korean Peninsula. Russian analysts also point out that Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine policy" is helping to overcome the contradictions and tensions among the great powers regarding the Korean Peninsula. The previous South Korean government's policy led instead to conflicts between Seoul and its allies and raised strong objections in Beijing and Moscow. Today, Russia, for one, is ready to support Seoul's moves vis-a-vis Pyongyang and to participate in multi-national efforts to bring lasting peace and security to the peninsula. 5. Problems in Chinese-North Korean Relations North Korean nationals, working and residing in Russia, have started to criticize what they describe as Beijing's "mounting pressure" on Pyongyang. Reportedly, China has denounced the DPRK leadership for its economic policies and "demands in an arrogant manner" that Pyongyang launch Chinese-style reforms. Beijing has argued that not only have North Koreans themselves suffered from the regime's juch'e strategy, but that China itself is being left to cope with the consequences of this policy. Hundreds of thousands of North Korean citizens are fleeing into China's northeast region, creating numerous social problems for the local population. Beijing has allegedly warned Pyongyang that "it will not tolerate this situation much longer." North Koreans are equally unhappy with the Chinese refusal to provide adequate aid to its crisis-stricken neighbor. The aid provided to date is described as "very limited and accompanied by an insistence that North Korea initiate reforms." North Korean officials complain that "China is ignoring the fate of socialism in the DPRK and putting our country in jeopardy." Such feelings are reinforced by the stand of Beijing concerning the North Korean missile program. There are at least two DPRK missile bases in the vicinity of the border with the China. Beijing is angry about this, and insists that North Korea dismantle these bases or move them elsewhere. North Koreans interpret this behavior as "a clear case of betrayal of an ally, who is being threatened by powerful enemies." They point out that "Instead of helping the DPRK to defend itself, the Chinese are following American orders try to make us even weaker and more defenseless." Other North Korean complaints concern China's "arrogant stance on fishing rights, the mistreatment of North Korean diplomats in China, and unfair trade practices." North Koreans also feel that Beijing has refused to support the DPRK at the Four-Party Talks on the Korean settlement. Pyongyang purportedly now regrets that it agreed to include China in these negotiations. Special indignation is now expressed by North Koreans about the flourishing of Chinese-South Korea ties. As they emphasize, "The Chinese are no longer real communists. For them, money means everything, and money can be found in the South, so Beijing is ready to bow to the South." The North Koreans hint that, as a reprisal against China's romance with the Republic of Korea, Pyongyang may promote a dialogue with Taiwan. 6. Military Cooperation between the DPRK and Vietnam According to various sources, North Korea is stepping up its sales of military equipment to Vietnam. Among other items, Pyongyang has recently sold Hanoi a number of submarines and short-range missiles. Experts see two motives behind North Korean's interest in establishing Vietnam as its military customer. The first one is a desire to play on Beijing's nerves and to avenge China for its dealings with Seoul and for other "misdeeds." But the second factor is North Korea's hope of using Hanoi to acquire access to more advanced Russian-made weapons, which were previously purchased by Vietnam.