NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK *** SPECIAL REPORT *** [The following "DPRK Report" is the product of a joint project between the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, USA) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (located at the Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, Russia). The report is funded by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation and is written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP. The report is distributed through NAPSNet in collaboration with the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development in Berkeley, California, USA.] THE DPRK REPORT (January-February 1997) 1. Hwang Jang-yop's Defection Commenting on Mr. Hwang's defection, Russian analysts displayed surprise. Those who had met Mr. Hwang in the past described him as "a staunch supporter of juche-ism and a loyal party functionary." He never betrayed any traces of dissent from the official line. The defection has led Russian analysts to reappraise the situation in the DPRK leadership. Until now, Russian observers believed that Kim Jong-il had surrounded himself with devoted aides whom he showered with privileges and decorations. The supreme leader was believed to be running the state affairs in a collectivist fashion and, in this way, was believed to have prevented any power struggle or disloyalty at the top. It is obvious now that this assumption was wrong. Flexible handling of subordinates could not outweigh the negative impact of the quickly worsening situation in the country. Kim Jong-il has doggedly resisted the introduction of reforms and, as a result, the economy continued to deteriorate. Not only has industry virtually came to a standstill -- due to the lack of electricity and raw materials -- but famine has become a permanent feature of people's lives. Instead of concentrating efforts on overcoming this negative phenomenon, Kim Jong-il has continued hostile actions against the South, whipped up war hysteria, and kept on spending almost all resources on military preparations. The disparities between real life in the country and the official slogans finally became so great that even the old guard of the regime, the theoretician of juche ideas and member of the inner circle of the young leader, lost patience and presented an open challenge to Kim Jong-il. As some Russian analysts now predict, this move by Mr. Hwang may shake the ruling circle of the DPRK to its depths. It will serve as a signal to those who oppose Kim-junior and his dead-end policies (or rather lack of any sensible policies) to start acting. Some of them may try to follow Mr. Hwang's example by defecting abroad. Others will dare to start requesting changes in the country and its foreign policy. Internal pressures on Kim Jong-il are bound to increase. Mr. Hwang's affair will seriously undermine North Korea's relations with Beijing. Kim Jong-il will very soon feel that Chinese "comrades" have ceased entirely to be his sympathizers and supporters. Beijing on many occasions advised Pyongyang to launch reforms: instead, an unrepentant North Korea has created more and more problems not only for itself but for China. It has become an embarrassment for the China and an obstacle to its profitable cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK). Pyongyang's pressure on Beijing in connection with Mr. Hwang's case will only increase China's anger with the senseless dictator. The North's relations with the South will also be adversely affected by the defection of Mr. Hwang. If Mr. Hwang settles in Seoul and starts denouncing Pyongyang's regime, one can hardly expect a good rapport and active economic ties between the two parts of Korea. The revelations of Mr. Hwang will further tarnish the Kim junior's image in the United States, Japan, and the world community at large. Under these circumstances, Kim Jong-il faces two possible courses of action. The first one is unrelenting resistance to changes. This line will soon require purges in the leadership and a new wave of terror in the DPRK at large. But it will not help Kim junior in halting domestic opposition, since purges and terror will only worsen economic and social conditions in the country. Sooner or later, and now it appears likely to be rather soon, Kim Jong-il will be toppled. This prospect, though it may seem attractive to many South Koreans and foreign observers, is not the best outcome from the point of view of most Russian observers. They argue that such developments may create chaos and even civil war. If Kim Jong-il chooses a second course of action, however, the prospects for the DPRK (and the Korean nation as a whole) may improve. The possibility exists for Kim junior to agree on certain economic and political changes, shifting the emphasis from the unworkable juche system, the cult of personality, and hostility towards the South to an open-door policy and internal reforms. To be sure, Kim Jong-il fears that this strategy will -- in the final analysis -- bring an end to his rule and to the entire communist regime in the North. And such fears are justified. Nevertheless, as Russian observers point out, this option offers a better choice for Kim junior than the hard-line approach mentioned above. Indeed, Russian observers do see some signs that Kim Jong-il might be preparing for changes (for details see "The DPRK Report," November-December 1996). 2. "Information Deprivation" in the DPRK The North Korean propaganda machine is a unique instrument playing a very important role in keeping the present regime in power. Information in the country is totally monopolized by the party and state. North Korea's secret services keep a day-to-day vigil over the implementation of the leadership's information strategy and tactics. The larger part of historical and fictional literature and even dated national periodicals have been transferred to "special collections," where only authorized persons, having special assignments, can get acquainted with selected materials. Ordinary citizens are completely barred from such collections, to say nothing of foreign newspapers and magazines. Even conversations with foreigners may lead to severe punishments, including imprisonment in "reeducation" (read: concentration) camps. Not surprisingly most North Koreans still blindly believe that their society is the most just and prosperous in the world, and that their motherland is about to be invaded by imperialist and other enemies. In order to defend their country, most DPRK citizens are prepared to persevere through any material difficulties and to even to sacrifice their lives. Yet there are exceptions, and their numbers are growing. It is estimated that about 100,000-150,000 North Koreans are serving prison terms for dissent. Officials in Pyongyang admit that the total number of "hostile elements" in need of an intensive reeducation is about three million people. The top echelon of the regime is not immune to dissent either, as evidence by Mr. Hwang's February 1997 defection. However, even if reforms are finally launched, the social transformation will be a painful one. This is due in no small degree to the brainwashing of the North Korean population. Authorities have perfected a specific system of "ideological work among the masses." Teaching of juche ideas starts in kindergartens. A law stipulates: "In pre-school institutions the state teaches children to take part in revolutionary activities(...). Teachers and teaching aides must strongly arm themselves with juche ideas(...)." Every morning children in kindergartens have to bow in an expression of gratitude and loyalty to the supreme leader. In addition, basic lessons in juche-ism are given to children daily. In secondary schools, stories about the two Kims and their teachings are studied in all details and are supposed to be the most important subject. At the college level, juche-ism dominates the curriculum and requires thousands of hours of classwork and homework. At factories and offices, the work day is extended by two hours in order to conduct mandatory training lessons. Participants recite editorials of central newspapers, swear to fight "American imperialism" and its "lackeys" in Seoul, and recount their own contributions to the cause of juche-ism. Foreign responses to the achievements of the DPRK are also scrutinized. Gathering and publicizing positive remarks by foreigners is an important activity in the North. Foreign guests are taken such good care of that they sometimes say things in the DPRK that they would be ashamed to utter in their home country. Thus, one of the leaders of the communist movement in Russia declared during his recent stay in Pyongyang: "We regard Comrade Kim Il-sung with special respect, because he has most brilliantly solved the issue of the revolutionary cause of safely defending the juche banner, the red banner of revolution, although the change of generations is underway(...). Dear Comrade Kim Jong-il is a great philosopher and a man of practice, a zealous and thinking one. Carrying further on the leader's ideas and cause, he wisely guides the struggle for the realization of...socialism. The banner of socialism, the red banner of revolution in Korea flutters ever stronger in the East, with Comrade Kim Jong-il being the commander-in-chief of the struggle for the building of socialism. Comrade Kim Jong-il, having raised high the juche banner, leads the socialist movement, so that socialism will inevitably be crowned with victory." Statements of this kind are widely used by North Korean propaganda to represent juche-ism as the revolutionary continuation of Communist teachings, although in reality the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin are far from being studied, but rather are concentrated in library collections with limited access. The information flow in the DPRK is designed, disseminated, and controlled by the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee (CC) of the Korean Worker's Party (KWP). Lately, the Chief Political Directorate (CPD) of the Korean People's Army has gained a certain level of independence from the CC's Propaganda and Agitation Department. Now, it is more common that key political directives originate instead in the Defense Committee (rather than in party organs) and are subsequently disseminated by the army's CPD. However the CC's Propaganda and Agitation Department is generally still in charge of the propaganda field. Its control is executed through the main political directorates within all the ministries, even the paramilitary ones: public security, transportation, post and telegraph service, the general procurator's office, etc. The ideological chiefs in all of these ministries practically rival the heads of the ministries in power and influence. A number of new features have emerged in North Korean propaganda after the death of Kim Il-sung. There has been a definite increase in the claims to the key role of the DPRK in the "defense of socialism" and "radical revolutionary transformation" of the planet. A new interpretation has been given to the problem of interactions between the masses and the supreme leader. Contrary to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, North Korean propaganda claims now that "only under an outstanding leader's guidance can the masses fulfill their role as history's moving force." So, instead of leaders being a product of popular movements, as communists traditionally believed, popular movements are explained by the DPRK's propaganda as the creation of the leadership. It is also stated in Pyongyang that in the 21st Century juche-ism will become the universal ideology of mankind: the basis of morality, politics, economics, social life, and culture. These claims are supported by certain practical steps being taken to strengthen the ideological position of North Korea abroad. For instance, with Pyongyang's financial assistance, the East European Coordination Bureau of Friendship Societies of the Countries of the CIS and East Europe has been established in Moscow. The bureau is run by Russian sympathizers of the North Korean brand of socialism: scholars, retired military officers, communist party activists, etc. The purpose of this establishment is to revive an interest in juche ideas on the territory of the former Soviet Union and the former communist countries of Eastern Europe. Summing up, it can be stated that the psychological impact of juche propaganda is very negligible abroad, but it is quite strong inside the DPRK. Long years of impenetrable isolation and massive brainwashing via the channels of the state, the ruling Party, enterprises, schools, and even the family have succeeded in their task -- a considerable portion of North Korean society has lost the ability to perceive reality objectively, is exhausted to its limits not only physically (as a result of material deprivation) also psychologically by fear of the emergence in its thoughts of ideas "alien" to the official ideology and the ruling regime. An eventual opening up of North Korea to the world will certainly create traumas for the population. Many people will lose all trust in juche-ism, the DPRK, and its authorities. For others, the shock of discovering the truth about real life abroad may create the opposite result -- they might violently reject unfamiliar ways and nostalgically cling to the old dogmas. 3. The Fighting Spirit of the North Korean Armed Forces According to Russian military experts, notwithstanding the DPRK's current economic and social difficulties, North Korea's armed forces still maintain a high fighting spirit. Both men and women are obliged to undergo military training, and, according to Russian experts, it is done "willingly, in many cases with pleasure." Soldiers are supposedly disciplined, patriotic, respectful to each other, physically tough and prepared to "sacrifice their lives for the motherland." According Russian experts, this high level of preparedness in the North Korean armed forces is achieved through strict discipline, intensive indoctrination, the lack of independent sources of information, fear, and enjoyment of better living conditions than those of civilians. Activities of the U.S. and South Korean military commands presumably help to consolidate loyalty in the ranks of North Korean servicemen. Pyongyang, as well as its military men, are -- in the words of Russian experts -- "genuinely afraid of an attack from the South as an extension of regular military maneuvers." As one North Korean general complained to his Russian counterpart: "You never know if it is another training session, or if this time American-South Korean marines will actually land on the DPRK's coast." Russian analysts surveyed believe that if an actual attack is launched, North Korea "will be able to rebuff it" and that "Americans will boggle down in the DPRK like they did in Vietnam." They maintain that the North Korean command has designed tactics called "one to a hundred." Their essence is to prepare the armed forces to fight against an overwhelmingly stronger adversary. The regular forces will be helped by the population. Each North Korean will resist the invader by serving in a fighting unit or on his (or her) own. The North Korean general cited above assured a Russian expert: "Americans will encounter 'burning soil' in our country." Russian defense analysts, in principle, tend to trust North Korean assurances. They point out that, in any case, U.S. plans to subvert the DPRK's armed forces ideologically are "doomed to failure." 4. Russian Appraisals of U.S. Policy towards North Korea The steps of the Clinton administration aimed at improving relations with the DPRK create a certain apprehension in the ruling circles of Russia. The Agreed Framework, KEDO activities, and the four-power talks initiative are perceived as detrimental to Russia's interests. As officials complain in private conversations, the United States is getting the upper hand and pushing Moscow aside in a country on which the Soviet Union spent so much time, money, and effort. Opposition figures, as well many scholars and journalists go, much further in denouncing Washington's policies vis-a-vis North Korea. The United States is criticized not only for damaging Russian interests in the DPRK, but for what one analyst calls "consistent attempts to destroy an independent republic." At various political and scholarly fora and in the media, the following interpretation of American motives and actions is given: a. After the collapse of the USSR and the termination of Soviet aid to the DPRK, Washington expected its early collapse due to the shortage of electricity. However, North Korea wisely concentrated its efforts on producing electricity with the help of nuclear stations. b. To block such efforts, the Americans unleashed what one Russian analyst calls a "propaganda campaign which invented the story of a North Korean atomic bomb." Using the nuclear pretext the United States hoped to strangle the DPRK with international sanctions. c. But these accusations were completely groundless. If North Korea wanted to it could have created a military nuclear potential long ago. But there was no reason to acquire such a capability: the DPRK's missiles cannot reach American soil anyway, while bombing its own brothers in South Korea with nuclear weapons was seen as ridiculous. d. Thus, American strategy failed completely. North Korea responded with strong countermeasures, including departure from Non-Proliferation Treaty. Faced with Pyongyang's toughness, the Americans got scared and made numerous concessions. This line of Russian "analysis" concludes with suggestions that Moscow should learn from the North Korean experience and respond to the expansion of NATO and other unfriendly policies of the United States with strong countermeasures. The Kremlin is advised to abandon all arms control agreements, conclude military alliances with friendly Arab regimes, and preserve a strategic partnership with the DPRK.