Notes on the history of Indonesian intelligence organizations, 1945-1965

Notes on the history of Indonesian intelligence organizations, 1945-1965

    There is a rich and complex history to be told of the part played by intelligence organizations in Indonesian political history from 1945 through the years of the Revolution, the liberal democratic period of the 1950s, Guided Democracy from 1959, the intelligence wars of the 1962-1966 period, and the intelligence-dominated campaigns against the Communist Party between October 1965 and the crushing of the South Blitar rebellion in 1968. What follows are brief notes towards such a history, in the form of sketches of some of the prominent or significant organizations in the Revolution, and rather briefer ones of organisations active in the next fifteen years. [1] It should not be treated in any respect as comprehensive or systematic in its coverage. This is especially true for the 1963-65 period.

Revolutionary intelligence organizations

It is likely that there were a number of different and diverse attempts at establishing intelligence and counter-intelligence organiz¬ations in the first months of the Revolution, some at a central level, and others locally or within particular army or laskar groups.  Not only did the situation of the Republican forces call for intelligence work urgently, but there were many young Indonesians already more or less well trained in a variety of types of intelligence operations.
Some intelligence officers had been trained by the Dutch or had worked with the Dutch military intelligence service in the war.  More importantly, very large numbers of Indonesian young men had undergone various kinds of military training under the Japanese Army occupation.
Peta was itself the creation of a Japanese intelligence agency, the Sanbobu Tokubetsu-han [Special Task Unit], usually known as Beppan.  This was a special operations and counter-intelligence unit within the 16th Army Headquarters, staffed mainly by graduates of the Nakano Intelligence School [Nakano Gakko].  In the addition to the regular training the Peta officers received at the Bogor Renseitai [Officers Training Unit] , several groups received special training that placed great emphasis on intelligence, operations, special warfare and psychological warfare. The first group were those who underwent training with Beppan at the Tanggerang Seinen Dojo [Tanggerang Youth Training Centre] in the first half of 1943.  A larger number underwent more advanced intelligence and special warfare training in late 1944. These Peta officer graduates of the first and second courses from the Bogor Renseitai were to be the instructors in the Yugekitai or I-go Kimmutai [First Task Force] . The Yugekitai was “geared more towards `intelligence type’ warfare rather than to `ordinary’ guerilla war”, and officer training emphasized “the theory of intelligence and territorial operations”.  Once posted with units near their home areas they were to recruit and train men in specialized guerilla techniques such as infiltration, liaison, communications and disguise. No uniforms were worn by this unit. Training focussed on surprise attack techniques. In addition to the intelligence and security courses run by the Special Task Unit [Beppan], some were also run by the Military Police [Kempeitai].
There were in addition Japanese-trained police, some of whom would have been introduced to the outlook and techniques of the Special Higher Police [Tokubetsu Koto  Keisatsu or Tokko] often known as the Thought Control Police, which operated in Java as an element of the 16th Army Headquarters, possibly under the Kempeitai.  Furthermore, there were Dutch-trained officials from the colonial police, political intelligence service [PID], prosecutor’s office, as well as Javanese aristocratic pangreh praja who often relied on more traditional forms of surveillance for their intelligence and local control.  In short, there was no shortage of people with a disposition and some training for such work.
Not much is known about intelligence activities in the chaotic early months of the Revolution, and the accounts available both from published sources and interviews are often confusing and unclear. Zulkifli Lubis was at the centre from the beginning. Lubis gathered together a group of wouldbe intelligence officers in Jakarta, with some activities outside the capital, mainly in Java. After the shift to Jogjakarta and the naiming of Sudirman as commander of the Republican forces, the first intelligence organization for the new Republican state was Badan Rahasia Indonesia [Indonesian Secret Agency] – Brani . Little is known about it, except that it did not last very long.
Another intelligence organization set up in the Army [TKR] about October of 1945 was headed by Dr. Soetjipto*, a medical doctor who had received Peta training, and who had then worked as a Peta Health Officer in Jakarta. Dr. Soetjipto’s intelligence group also survived only a short time, according to at least one source because it was ineffective , and also because Soetjipto himself was arrested in July 1946 for his part in the July 3rd affair.
Within a few months, certainly by early 1946, Zulkifli Lubis* was organizing a Republican intelligence group in Jogja within the Army headquarters or the Ministry of Defence.  According to Cribb, Lubis had a first organization named Special Military Intelligence [Penyelidik Militer Khusus] which overlapped with Soetjipto’s group for at least some period. He then formed a second group after May 1946, despite antagonism from the General Staff, called Field Preparation, with the task of challenging the Dutch hold on territory not in Republican hands .
At about the same time other intelligence groups were almost certainly being organized under different auspices. This can be deduced from the fact that in 1947, Amir Syarifuddin as Minister for Defence  ordered a number of different intelligence groups brought under one roof, as Part [Bagian] V of the Ministry of Defence. The head of the new combined intelligence grouping was Colonel K.Abdurrachman* .
The new intelligence organization brought together three existing intelligence streams, known within the Ministry and Part V as the “A Group”, the “B Group” and the “C Group”, between whom there were deep political tensions.
The most significant of the groups was the “A Group”, dominated by Zulkifli Lubis. Many of its members had been through Yugekitai officer training or some other Japanese intelligence training. Lubis himself had been regarded by the Japanese as one of their best intelligence graduates. This strongly-Japanese influenced group was regarded (at least by its own members) as being more “action-oriented” than the others. In trying to describe the nature of the Japanese influence, a comment by Nugroho about the concerns that led to the founding of the Nakano Gakko tradition (from which most of their Japanese teachers came) probably gets closest to the mark:

    It was then [in response to the Manchurian and Chinese experience] that they started thinking about what in present-day Indonesian armed forces circles is known as the “socio-political weapon system”, and is elsewhere known as “psychological warfare”, “secret war”, “special warfare”, etc. That kind of thinking gave birth to the tokumu kikan or “organ for special duties”, which was a group of people specially equipped, not only with the skills of an intelligence man, but also with a condensed knowledge of the area and the people to be conquered.

This “A Group” provided the base for the post-Revolutionary genera¬tion of Army intelligence officers, with one stream entering Army intelligence proper (such as Sutopo Yuwono*), and another stream passing on through the Military Police Corps [CPM], such as Nichlany* and Sudirgo*.
The “B Group” was made up of nationalists with a background in the colonial state – police, prosecutors and pangreh praja. Some were former members of the Dutch police Political Intelligence Service [PID], but with established nationalist credentials. Some of this group also went on to careers in Army intelligence.
The “C Group” was made up of intelligence activists on the left, “people close to Amir and the PKI – the Black group”, according to a member of the opposing Lubis group . The “C” group was dissolved by Hatta before Madiun. Little is known about this left group, which was regarded as a “closed community” by other groups. This may mean it was more conspiratorial and security-conscious than its competitors, but on the other hand, all intelligence groups tend to be conspiratorial and closed to outsiders. These three groups were all within the Ministry of Defence, but it is not clear just how each functioned, what its tasks were, and how it related to the complex network of regular and irregular troops. In the case of the C Group, almost nothing is known. Moreover accounts of this group which summarize its character as “leftist” gloss over the fratricidal and complicated politics of the left throughout the Revolution.
A certain amount of intelligence training took place during the Revolution. At least three intelligence training courses are said to have existed at some point – although “course” is in some places misleading for the type of training that was possible in the more chaotic times. In any case, it was a matter of coming in from the field, learning a little from others, exchanging experiences, and going back out a little better prepared. At Kaliurang regular courses were run on combat intelligence, field preparations, counter-intelligence, technical intelligence and domestic (i.e. political) intelligence. In Jogjakarta itself a three year course existed, but only one group of 40-50 people went through it.  Finally, there were special courses at Sarangan. These provided specialized training in international concerns, overseas operations, and so forth, mainly catering to people who were to enter and work through the Foreign Ministry and similar bodies.
By 1948 Lubis was Chief of Army Intelligence, although the structure of Army headquarters staff intelligence is unclear after 1947. Major regular Army units had intelligence sections and an established organization. Sutopo Yuwono, for example, was a staff intelligence officer at Army Headquarters/ Ministry of Defence for most of the Revolution, and in 1948 was simultaneously an Intelligence Officer [K-1] for the Jogjakarta Military Sub-Territory [STMJ].  But Sutopo is perhaps an atypical example, since he was known throughout his Army career as a staff and headquarters man rather than either a combat intelligence officer or a political intriguer.
Another example may be helpful. One Japanese-trained Javanese officer in Lubis’ group, a member of the Student Army [Tentara Peladjar], operated a counter-intelligence group in a region of East Java.  Such groups developed by requiring each initial member to expand numbers by recruiting – “special forces”-style. This particular group was loosely organized. Weapons were bought and people paid (to the extent they were at all) with money from sales of coffee from a plantation in the area.
What sort of activities were carried out by such groups? What was counter-intelligence in this case?

     It was all new. We knew nothing. All a matter of our imagination. We knew we had to send people into the Dutch areas. A lot of it was killing traitors, the ones collaborating with the Dutch – merchants, intellectuals, pamong pradja, Chinese. Anyone important who helped the Dutch.

There was little danger from the Dutch by way of counter-penetration. Dutch counter-intelligence was tough, “but not beyond the limits”. The real danger was the pamong pradja, the colonial civil servants who chose to support the Dutch.

I lost a lot of my own people…They [the pamong pradja] were our biggest mistake, but what else could we do?

Intelligence: 1950-1965

After the final victory of the unitary state of Indonesia, the intelligence organizations continued to change, but were a little more settled than during the Revolution, at least until the Guided Democracy period. The three armed forces branches had their intelligence branches, as did the police. To take the least significant first, the name of the police intelligence office changed to the Office of State Security Protection [Dinas Pengawas Keamanan Negara – DPKN], and again to Community Security Protection [Pengawas Keamanan Masyarakat – PKM], which it remained until the early 1970s, when it was changed to its present title – Police Intelligence and Security [Intelpampol].
Army line intelligence appears to have remained essentially unaltered through the 1950s: each large territorial unit  had an intelligence stream, headed by an Intelligence Assistant, and so on down the line of middle-sized territorial units.  However, while these positions were highly oriented to social-political surveillance and control, they were much less centralized than was the case once Moerdani began his re-structuring of intelligence in the late 1970s. Normally, the Asintel at the Military Region [Kodam] level would report directly to the Kodam Commander – later, there were two lines of responsibility – a primary one to Bais, and a secondary one to the Kodam commander.
Army staff intelligence went through a number of re-organizations in the 1950s – especially as a result of the October 17th affair in 1952; again under Guided Democracy; and once again in the aftermath of October 1st, 1965. To begin with the Ministry of Defence intelligence section was formally known as Defence Ministry Intelligence [Intelijen Kementerian Pertahanan – IKP], but was more publicly known as the Military Forces Intelligence Division [Bagian Intel Angkatan Perang], with Zulkifli Lubis as the head.
After the October 17th affair in 1952, Lubis, who had been a close ally of Bambang Supeno, returned to the army as Deputy Army Chief of Staff. However, one of Lubis’ group, Colonel Maryudi, was appointed Head of the re-organized intelligence division, now known as the Internal Security Staff [Staf Keamanan Dalam Negeri – SKDN]. A comparable but reverse purge and re-organization took place when Lubis in turn was displaced in 1956, and a new intelligence staff appointed, headed fairly soon afterwards, if not immediately, by his rival Sukendro*.
From about this time onwards it appears that the main Army intell¬igence staff fell under two sets of supervisory eyes, with titles and exact functions varying through the larger-scale re-organizations. On the one hand there was the First Assistant (Intelligence) to the Minister/¬Commander of the Army. On the other hand there was the supervision through the Ministry’s Head of the Joint Intelligence Group [Gabungan I – G-1], or through the Armed Forces General Staff’s First Assistant for Intelligence.

Ali Moertopo’s invention of RK/RT

During the Guided Democracy period a number of new national level intelligence organizations and groups were set up. These had two immediate contexts. The first was the military and political campaigns against the Dutch in Irian and against Malaysia. The second was the general attempted re-structuring of the state along militarist/corpor¬atist lines , especially in the later years of Soekarno’s rule.
The West Irian campaign involved a number of different military intelligence groupings. At least three task-oriented groups were established: Operation A (Infiltration), Operation B (training of Irianese), and Operation C (Netherlands political operations).  The Mandala Siaga Command under Soeharto, in addition to its formal intelligence staff, also spawned Opsus in 1963 or 1964.
The Supreme Operational Command [Komando Operasi Tertinggi – KOTI] announced in 1963 was a displacement of the Cabinet, with Subandrio as Head of Intelligence.  Subandrio was head of the Central Intelligence Board [BPI] from its inception in 1959.  The KOTI intelligence division had some officers allocated to it (and possibly some civilians), and was supposed to receive cooperation from the service intelligence branches. It was intended originally, at least in the eyes of the military, to be part of the operational staff for the anti-Malaysian campaign, but Soekarno and Subandrio turned it into much more.  Just what this amounted to in practice is not clear.
Only one properly civilian intelligence organization has been confirmed to have existed in the Guided Democracy period – Subandrio’s Central Intelligence Body [Badan Pusat Intelijens – BPI]. This is dealt with in the discussion of the origins of Bakin in Chapter Eight above.
However two other civilian organizations have been reported to exist, although these claims have not yet been confirmed. The first, and less important, is an Intelligence Coordinating Body [Badan Kordinasi Intelligence] which Napitupulu claims was established in 1958 . Napitupulu cites the legislative explanation  as saying that the BKI was intended to be a coordinating body, “which does not lessen the authority of the existing civil and military bodies in the intelligence field.” Napitupulu points out that this lack of authority over the existing bodies undercut the objective of the whole exercise – coordination without directive powers means little. He concludes by saying that although there was an evident need for it, the fate of the body was unknown. Napitupulu’s discussion is not particularly clear in any case, and is presented without either context or supporting evidence. There is some indirect confirmation of Napitupulu’s claim. About 1958 or 1959 there was a military initiative to set up a an integrated intelligence service, but inter-service rivalry led to the appointment of Subandrio as head of what became the Central Intelligence Board [BPI], a nominally civilian organization in 1959.
The other unconfirmed report is both more important and more mysterious. In 1950, according to one source , Vice-President and then Prime Minister Hatta  wanted to establish a professional civilian intelligence agency. Hatta asked a senior Javanese official named Kolopaking to establish such an agency within his department. Kolopaking came from an old Mataram aristocratic family, was a former Bupati of Bandjar Negara, and according to the original source, had been the highest ranking police official under the Dutch, by whom he had been well trained. Most importantly, Kolopaking was close to the Sultan of Jogjakarta, then Minister of Defence.
The organization that Kolopaking established was secret [“diam”], never public, and was based in Bogor. It was known, to the extent it was known at all, as the Special Directorate [Direktorat Khusus], possibly with some other internal name. For its first decade its head was responsible to the Prime Minister, but in 1959 First Minister Juanda transferred the organization unofficially to the control of some other high official.
It is not clear, from the account I have been given, whether Kolopaking was its formal head, but it is claimed that he pulled the strings for some years, and appointed the key people in the beginning, including his son, and a man named Harjo. Because of party politics, the organization did not develop as intended, but it did recruit and train people, and sent some abroad, and was important in the penetration of the PKI. Money for it came from the government budget, but in at least one case, its funds were pilfered by the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for it.
It was stressed, in this account, that many of its personnel were agents and informants with other jobs, rather than fulltime bureaucratic staff. There was a sense, in listening to the account, of an organization more like Opsus than Bakin. A more accurate comparison would be with the type of traditional village surveillance networks used by Javanese rulers in the colonial period.  Most of its agents had incomes from other, cover sources. Its activities were to be limited to pure information gathering: “a social democratic notion of Hatta’s”, partly in response to the politicizing of intelligence in the Revolution. Infiltration was its main way of gathering information.
As an assurance of the significance of the organization, it was said that “Aidit was captured because of its work”.  Within a year or so of this successful performance, the organization was closed down by Soeharto. Some of its agents went into Bakin, some into other intell¬igence organizations.
It is difficult to know what to make of the claim. The source was certainly one in a position to know of the existence of such an organization if not the whole truth of the matter. And while admitting to being hazy of memory on a few details, the source was insistent about the general lines of the account and the significance of the organiz¬ation. Hatta and the Sultan are dead. Various people who might have been expected to know of such an organization failed to confirm the claim when approached.  On the other hand that may constitute a measure of its success. The lack of a substantial civilian intelligence organization in the 1950s is striking. Even for those without Japanese training, the political importance of such organizations must have been clear through the Revolutionary experience, to say nothing of the manipulations of the 1950s. It is difficult to imagine the Sultan of Jogjakarta being entirely without such semi-traditional networks, at least in certain circles. The matter of the Special Directorate must remain open, either until the original source chooses to say more, or confirmation comes from another direction.
Other civilian intelligence organizations of importance would be those operated outside the state – by the rebel groups: the Darul Islam in West Java, Kahar Muzakar’s rebellion in Sulawesi, and the PRRI-Permesta rebels; and by political parties – the PKI, the PSI, Murba; and by non-party political activists such as Father Beek*. Some of these last issues are touched on in Part II, and in relevant parts of the biographical appendix.



* Name refers to entry in Richard Tanter, Intelligence Agencies and Third World Militarization: A Case Study of Indonesia, 1966-1989, with Special Reference to South Korea, 1961-1989, PhD dissertation, Department of Politics, Faculty of Economic and Politics, Monash University, February 1991, Appendix 1, Indonesian Intelligence and Security Figures 1945-1989 – Biographical notes.
1. This article is based on work for a systematic study of intelligence organisations in New Order Indonesia, in which the organisations’ history prior to the 1970s was not a major concern. Hence the unsystematic character of these notes. See Tanter, op. cit.
2. See …….. and ………
3. The following account of the Revolutionary period intelligence organizations is mainly based on interviews with former intelligence activists or military officers of the time. The only other accounts of this period that I know of are Robert Cribb’s brief but fascinating comments on his translation of a Dutch intelligence document, “The adventures of Captain Mulyono: Indonesian intelligence operations in Kalimantan, 1946 1948”, Kabar Seberang, 17 (1986), and his Jakarta in the Indonesian Revolution, 1945-1949, Ph.D Thesis, University of London, 1984. Unfortunately I have not been able to examine the latter.
4. Cribb, “Adventures…”, op.cit., p.212.
5. By the end of the war the combined numbers of Indonesians in the Peta or Yugekitai battalions reached a total of 40,000. Moreover, about half a million young men were inducted into the para-military Seinendan [Youth Corps] and more than one million into the Keibo^dan [Police Auxiliary Corps]. The last was under the direction of the local police chief in every village in the regions where it was established. An elite group within the Keibodan was the Tokubetsu Keibotai [Special Body for Assisting the Police]. Other para-military groups included the Barisan Pelopor [Vanguard Corps], Barisan Berani Mati [Suicide Corps], Hizbu’llah [Allah’s Army] numbering about 50,000, and the Gakutotai [Student Corps]. See Nugroho Notosusanto, The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation, (Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 1979), pp. 65-67.
6. In April 1945 Beppan was re-named Nanseitai, by which time it was mainly involved in defence activities and preparations for guerilla and intelligence operations behind Allied lines. By that time it had 150 members, including some Indonesians. See Joyce M. Lebra, Japanese Trained Armies in Southeast Asia, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p.92.
7. The Nakano Gakko was an intelligence school managed by the Eighth Section of the Imperial Army General Staff. It commenced in 1940, but in fact developed out of an earlier organization, the Koho Kimmu Yoin Yoseisho  [Training Depot of Personnel for Information Duties], controlled by the Heimukyoku [Military Affairs Bureau]. These schools were developed in response to the Japanese experience in China and Manchuria in the 1920s and 1930s, and gave particular emphasis to the use of intelligence and psychological warfare as a means of territorial control. See Nugroho, op.cit. pp.81ff; and Richard Deacon,  A History of the Japanese Secret Service, (London: Frederick Muller, 1982). Nugroho gives a useful account of the training Nakano Gakko graduates and their deployment in Southeast Asia.
8. The full name of the Bogor Renseitai was Jawa Bo-ei Giyugun Kanbu Renseitai. A second Renseitai was set up at Singaraja in Bali in April 1945. Amongst its instructors were Kemal Idris and Zulkifli Lubis. See Nugroho, op.cit., pp.116,124.
9. This group included Zulkifli Lubis.
10. This force was established in January 1945. Its names are confusing. The name under which it was promulgated was Bo-ei Giyugun Tokusetsu Yugekitai [Special Guerilla Defence Force], but it is often known by “code”-name Iggo Kimmutai or I-go Kimmutai [No.1 Duty Unit]. Ibid., p.133.
11. Ibid., pp.122-3.
12. Lebra, op.cit., p.110. One of the Indonesians involved in the formation of the Peta, Raden Gatot Mangkupradja, has the following to say about the I-go Kimmutai
They [I-go Kimmutai] were led by Peta officers who had been trained in Lembang, Salatiga, and Malang to carry out a system of guerilla warfare as in China, the idea being to form three Kidobutai [mobile shock troops] for West, Central and East Java. Instructors were taken from the Kyoikutai and included Lt. Yabe, Abdullah Ono, Lt. Katsura, and Lt.Nagano; assistants, taken from several Daidan, included Chudancho Sutjipto*, the late Sjirifin, Shodancho Otje Mochtan, Sukendro*, Kosasih, Sabirin, and Moh. Saleh. See Mangkupradja, “The Peta and my relations with the Japanese: a correction of Sukarno’s Autobiography”, Indonesia, 5 (1968), p.123.
13. PS/40.
14. A number of Indonesians were trained at Dai I-kai Koto Keisatsu Gakko [No.1 Higher Police School]. One source has said that the curriculum was virtually the same as the old Dutch one, but with a much greater emphasis on military training and physical toughness, and an element called Himitsu Sen [Secret War], which provided basic intelligence and counter-intelligence training. [PS/36]  On the Tokko generally (though somewhat selectively and apologetically), see Richard Mitchell, Thought Control in Prewar Japan, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976). On the Tokko in Java see Theodore Friend, “Hellcraft, nostalgia and error: thoughts on the memoirs of the Kenpeitai in wartime Indonesia”, in National Federation of Kenpeitai Veterans’ Associations, The Kenpeitai in Java and Sumatra, (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia project, Cornell University, Translation Series No.65, 1986), p.3, and ibid., p.35.
15. See Onghokham, “The inscrutable and the paranoid: an investigation into the Brotodiningrat affair” in Ruth T. McVey (ed.) Southeast Asian Transitions: Approaches Through Social History, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978).
16. PS/40, and Yoga Soegama in B. Wiwoho and Banjar Chaeruddin, Memori Jenderal Yoga, (Jakarta: PT Bina Rena Pariwara, 1990, p.75.
17. PS/40. By mid-1946 Dr. Soetjipto had the title of Head of Research at Army Headquarters. Just what this meant in practice is not clear.
18. Cribb reports that Soetjipto’s group was named General Military Intelligence [Penyelidik Militer Umum]. See Cribb, “Adventures…”, op.cit., pp.212-3.
19. PS/21.
20. Yoga Soegama’s brief account states that Field Preparation was the name for the field operational aspect of Brani, and was dissolved together with the parent organisation when Lubis came under Section V of the Ministry of defence, with Abdul Rachman as head. See Wiwoho and Chaeruddin, op.cit. p.76.
21. It is not clear whether this was before or after Syarifuddin became Prime Minister in July 1947. He remained Minister for Defence at the same time. Note that Yoga, op.cit., implies that Section V was formed rather earlier.
22. Not to be confused with Otto Abdurrachman*, also in intelligence in the 1950s, and later a major-general. Cribb reports that one Aburrachman (presumably K.Abdurrachman) had worked with the Dutch intelligence service NEFIS in Australia during the war. In the Ministry of Defence, according to Cribb, he headed an intelligence group allied to Amir Syarifuddin and aligned with the Dutch KNIL trained officers of the general staff. See Cribb, “Adventures…”, op.cit., p.212.
23. It is not clear whether these were formal organizational groupings, or tendencies within what was intended to be a unitary organization.
24. Nugroho, op.cit., p.82.
25. During the Revolution police also played an intelligence role through the successor to the Dutch PID, with a group called Community Group Security [Pengawas Aliran Masyarakat – PAM]. According to Anderson (1972), the Japanese Special Higher Police gave rise to an Indonesian organization, the Special Police, in August 1945, which was still in existence , at provincial as well as national level, in mid-1946.
26. PS/40.
27. See especially Lucas 1986b and Leclerc 1986a.
28. The exact name is not clear. According to my informant, it translates as something close to “Intelligence Academy”, but the Indonesian name was not Akademi Intelijens. [PS/40] According to Apa dan Siapa, 1986:1229, Sutopo Yuwono went through an Intelligence Officer Course [Kursus Officer Intel] in Jogjakarta in 1945-46.
29. Bachtiar, 1988:153.
30. PS/39. Amongst his colleagues was Suwarto*.
31. One useful member of the group, an “anarchist”, lived in a remote place. In a hard period in a dry season he was rewarded with 2,000 mice.
32. PS/39.
33. PS/39. The Dutch intelligence report translated by Robert Cribb tells of the adventures of a young Javanese officer recruited by Lubis (as Deputy Commander of Field Preparation) who in early 1946 undertook a perilous trip to southern Kalimantan to establish a propaganda base in Dutch territory and prepare for a Republican landing.
34. The form and title changed over the years: Territory/Army [Territorium dan Tentara]; Military District [Komando Daerah – Kodam]; Regional Defence Command [Komando Wilayah Pertahanan – Kowilhan].
35. It is not clear just how far specialized Army intelligence positions went into the Army’s territorial organization in practice prior to 1966. Ward (1974:60) notes that in East Java, Koramils [Military District Commands] were only set up as late as 1965, and Babinsa [Village Guidance NCOs] had been allocated to each village later still.
36. PS/13.
37. One source mentions an organization called Biro Informasi Staf Angkatan Perang [BISAP], which has also been named by Nugroho Notosusanto as Biro Informasi (Intelijen) Staf Angkatan Perang. [PS/50]
38. The position of Chief of Staff (Intelligence) [Intel SAB] was abolished in 1962 as part of the manoeuvres between Soekarno and Nasution. [PS/13] The First Army Assistant was later called the Assistant I/Security. The actual changes in titles and lines of responsibility for intelligence to the Commanders and Ministers of the Army and Armed Forces through successive re-organizations of the armed forces hierarchy can be seen in the appropriate editions of “Current data on the Indonesian military elite”.
39. See Herbert Feith, “Dynamics of Guided Democracy”, in Ruth T. McVey (ed.), Indonesia (rev. ed.), (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1963).
40. PS/13. In 1962 Moertopo was head of a unit in Operation A operating in the southeast Malukus.
41. On the KOTI see J.A.C.Mackie, Konfrontasi, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974).
42. Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945 1967, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), p.163.
43. PS/13. Subandrio received the military rank of Air Vice-Marshal (Intelligence) to enable him to deal appropriately with ranking military officers in this and similar organizations. See Sundhaussen, op.cit., p.163. Yoga Soegama was Deputy Head of Intelligence in KOTI in 1966-67. In the eyes of the Army leadership and intelligence at the time of the coup, KOTI intelligence was regarded as being in PKI hands (PS/13).
44. P. Napitupulu, Intelligence (Fungsi dan Peranannja), (Jakarta: Bhratara, 1966), pp.157-8.
45. Legislative explanation: “pendjelesan undang-undang”. No reference is given to a law or presidential decree.
46. PS/13.
47. PS/13.
48. Hatta left the Prime Minister’s office with the establishment of the unitary state under Prime Minister Natsir in August 1950.
49. See Onghokham, “The inscrutable and the paranoid: an investigation into the Brotodiningrat affair” in Ruth T. McVey (ed.) Southeast Asian Transitions: Approaches Through Social History, (New Haven: Yale University Press).1978a.
50. For the little that is otherwise known about the capture and murder of Aidit see “The `trial’ of D.N. Aidit” (1980), Tapol Bulletin, 41/42.
51. The most confirmation I was able to get is that the Sultan is believed to have maintained a small group, possibly from the time he was Minister of Defence. This group would not have been formally organized, and would have been at most an embryo group. PS/40. No doubt further research will shed light on the matter.