Special Reports

The Russian National Committee writes, “From the conceptual point of view, for Russia the most desired outcome is national reconciliation and the peaceful coexistence of the two Korean states on the path to an eventual unification of Korea over a long period of time. The appearance in the long-perspective of a unified Korea that seeks to maintain friendly, neighborly and cooperative relations with Russia does not contradict Russia’s core interests (in particular in comparison to other neighboring countries). At the same time, the prospects for a united Korea in the foreseeable future are quite low. However, it would be prudent to hedge our risks, as we cannot completely rule out the possibility of a sudden crisis that could lead to a rushed unification. The uncontrollable escalation of the Korean conflict remains a possibility, and the task of Russian policy is to not allow the “explosive” scenario to unfold and to explain that the most advantageous scenario is gradual convergence, which at the appropriate time would put voluntary rapprochement of state mechanisms on the agenda.”

Michael Hamel-Green, Dean of and Professor in the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development, Victoria University, writes, “The time is now ripe for the leaderships in Korea and Japan to show the same kind of vision that Brazilian and Argentina leaders showed in the early 1990s in averting a nuclear arms race that would have undermined their economic development at the same time as risking future nuclear conflict… we now have a new window of opportunity for denuclearization of Northeast Asia despite the current crisis in relations between the two Koreas.”

Leon V. Sigal, Director, Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council, writes, “While broaching the subject of a NWFZ runs political risks, conventional deterrence continues to operate on the Korean Peninsula. The South has long had conventional forces capable of defeating the North, with or without U.S. troops, and the North has long held Seoul hostage to its forward-deployed artillery. The North’s nuclear weapons affect the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula insofar as they could put U.S. forces and bases in Japan at risk.”

A Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (hereafter KJNWFZ) is a new concept. Once realized, it could help resolve a number of linked and intractable security issues in Northeast Asia at the same time. This includes the need to respond to North Korea’s nuclear breakout without undermining the Global Abolition policy announced by President Obama; the need for Japan and Korea to deepen their non-nuclear commitments to more deeply ingrained “forever” status without hedging; and the need for Japan-Korean cooperation to lay the foundations for a comprehensive security mechanism and long-term regional security institution, including through cooperative nuclear fuel cycle and space development activities.

A version of this concept paper is also available in Korean and Japanese.

Joint Investigation Group released the full report on the sinking of the ROK Corvette Cheonan. This 300 page report includes detailed results from the JIG’s investigation including testimony from survivors and analyses of possible causes of the sinking.  The report concludes that the Cheonan was sunk by a “CHT-02D torpedo with approximately 250kg of explosives manufactured and used by North Korea.”

A collection of links regarding analysis and news of the 1999 East Timor Crisis.   Wade Huntley and Peter Hayes, “East Timor and Asian Security” Theodore Friend, “Indonesia: Confronting the Political and Economic Crisis” James Cotton, “East Timor and Australia- Twenty-Five Years of the Policy Debate” Sylvia Tiwon, “East Timor and the ‘Disintegration’ of Indonesia […]

The ROK Ministry of Unification released this statement explaining the measures that the ROK government will take in response to the sinking of the Cheonan. These measures include a ban on DPRK ships navigating ROK territorial waters, the suspension of trade with and humanitarian aid to the DPRK, a ban on new investment in the DPRK, and the prohibition of travel to the DPRK by ROK citizens.

Read a discussion of this article here.

Dick K. Nanto, Specialist in Industry and Trade, Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, and Kerry Dumbaugh, Specialist in Asian Affairs, at the Congressional Research Service wrote this report on the relationship between the PRC and DPRK. The report examines the PRC’s DPRK policy, the DPRK’s policy objectives in its interactions with the PRC, Sino-DPRK diplomatic and economic relations, and the impact of PRC sanctions on the DPRK.

Michael Hamel-Green of Victoria University and Peter Hayes of the Nautilus Institute argue that a “Korean NWFZ may be a necessary condition to achieving the full denuclearization of Korea”. As well as providing “benefits to the United States in preventing a major direct and wider proliferation threat from North Korea, and to China, Japan and South Korea in maintaining stability in the Northeast Asian Region, it would also serve to address North Korean security concerns about potential US nuclear strikes”. They point out that “the two Koreas have already negotiated a legal basis for a Korean Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the form of the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korea Peninsula.” This could form the basis of a NWFZ covering the peninsula. Alternately, they suggest, the ROK and Japan could create a Japan Korea NWFZ via a bilateral treaty.

Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, analyses developments in the system of United States nuclear hegemony in East Asia deriving from North Korea’s drive for nuclear weapons. Hayes argues that “the nuclear threat projected by the US in this hegemonic system drove the DPRK to adopt a nuclear weapons proliferation strategy that was aimed at compelling the United States to change its policies towards the DPRK. The latter’s successful nuclear breakout demonstrates that today, the hegemon has no clothes, that is, it is not capable of stopping nuclear breakout by a key adversary.” Arguing that the reinforcing of guarantees of extended nuclear deterrence will be unsuccessful and “will lead to eventual nuclear proliferation by the allies themselves”, Hayes concludes that only conventional deterrence “is likely to curb the DPRK’s nuclear threat, head off long-run proliferation by the ROK and Japan, and by realigning its legitimating ideology (“Global Abolition”) with alliance institutions and force structures, restore the now rapidly dwindling US hegemony in the region.”