Special Reports are longer, often more technical, documents consisting of entire articles, government statements, and other documents relevant to security and peace in Northeast Asia.
NAPSNet, Special Reports
LAST CHANCE: COMMUNICATING AT THE NUCLEAR BRINK, SCENARIOS AND SOLUTIONS WORKSHOP, SYNTHESIS REPORT
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE, STANLEY CENTER FOR PEACE AND SECURITY, AND TECHNOLOGY FOR GLOBAL SECURITY MAY 23 2020 I. INTRODUCTION In this study, the authors describe CATALINK, a novel “hotline” system, to enable secure and verifiable communications between leaders during nuclear crises and other high-stakes scenarios. This unique, resilient system is designed for “radical simplicity” from […]
Go to the articleSTATUS OF CHINA’S ENERGY SECTOR, RECENT TRENDS, AND CURRENT AND EVOLVING ENERGY POLICIES: REPORT OF THE CHINA WORKING GROUP TO THE REGIONAL ENERGY SECURITY PROJECT
WANG YANJIA, GU ALUN NOVEMBER 24, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this Special Report, Wang Yanjia and Gu Alun summarize the status of China’s energy sector and recent trends, and describe projections of China’s energy future in the context of its energy policies. China’s energy imports have been rising in recent years, and environmental, energy […]
Go to the articleFOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: THE FUTURE OF C3I ENTANGLEMENT
JAMES M. ACTON NOVEMBER 21, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, James Acton evaluates the risk of inadvertent escalation arising from attacks on dual-use (nuclear and conventional warfare) command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities in a conventional war because such attacks would degrade the target’s nuclear command-and-control system. James Acton is co-director of […]
Go to the articleNC3 INSIDER THREATS
RON SCHOUTEN NOVEMBER 14, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Ron Schouten examines fundamental concepts of insider threats and provides an overview of the extent and significance of insider threats in US and other NC3 systems. A podcast with Ron Schouten, Peter Hayes, and Philip Reiner on China’s NC3 and emerging technologies is found here. Acknowledgments: […]
Go to the articleCOUNTER NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS
CAROL ANN JONES OCTOBER 31, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Carol Ann Jones concludes: “Denying a country use of their nuclear combat forces could be the key to avoiding or limiting damage from a pending strike, but it could trigger unexpected actions from that country’s nuclear forces (assuming the weapons and launch capability were […]
Go to the articleLAW, TARGETING AND NUCLEAR OPERATIONS
WILLIAM H BOOTHBY OCTOBER 31 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Bill Boothby observes: “For all States, there is an obligation to take constant care in nuclear operations to spare civilians and civilian objects. More detailed precautionary rules apply to all States with certain additional rules only applying to States that are party to API […]
Go to the articleWHAT DO WE WANT FROM THE NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM?
PAUL K. DAVIS OCTOBER 24, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Paul Davis suggest that US NC3 modernization “should place increased emphasis on assuring control, avoiding accidents, and avoiding ill-informed or unwise employment of nuclear weapons.” Paul K. Davis is a senior principal researcher, retired adjunct (RAND). Dr. Davis was a senior executive in […]
Go to the articleNC3 AND CRISIS INSTABILITY–GROWING DANGERS IN THE 21ST CENTURY
DARYL G. PRESS OCTOBER 17 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay Daryl Press focuses on the growing threats to nuclear command and control and communication (NC3) systems around the world and the links between vulnerable NC3 and strategic instability due to the risky steps that nuclear weapons states may adopt to protect their arsenals during […]
Go to the articleISRAEL’S NC3 PROFILE: OPAQUE NUCLEAR GOVERNANCE
AVNER COHEN OCTOBER 11 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Avner Cohen traces and exposes Israel’s two most fundamental principles of the Israeli NC3 thinking: first, insisting on strict physical and organizational separation between nuclear (e.g., pits) and non-nuclear assets (e.g., military delivery platform); second, creating a two-tier governance architecture at various levels. Avner Cohen […]
Go to the articleINNOVATION AND ADAPTIVE CONTROL IN AMERICA’S ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE: PARALLELS TO NC3
MASON WILLRICH OCTOBER 3, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Mason Willrich suggests that there are important lessons for NC3 operators in how electric power utilities control their grids, and especially, how they ensure that interconnections with adjacent grids are maintained continuously in spite of the potentially catastrophic risks of grid failure arising from instability […]
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