Special Reports

Special Reports are longer, often more technical, documents consisting of entire articles, government statements, and other documents relevant to security and peace in Northeast Asia.

NAPSNet, Special Reports

COMMUNICATION DISRUPTION ATTACKS ON NC3

PAUL BRACKEN MAY 28, 2020      I.  INTRODUCTION In this essay, Paul Bracken argues “in a nuclear world we should be careful about attacking enemy communications because doing so leads to greater risks of uncontrolled escalation. The worst possible situation is the one the United States is now in, that is, to not be […]

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LAST CHANCE:  COMMUNICATING AT THE NUCLEAR BRINK, SCENARIOS AND SOLUTIONS WORKSHOP, SYNTHESIS REPORT

NAUTILUS INSTITUTE, STANLEY CENTER FOR PEACE AND SECURITY, AND TECHNOLOGY FOR GLOBAL SECURITY MAY 23 2020   I.   INTRODUCTION In this study, the authors describe CATALINK, a novel “hotline” system, to enable secure and verifiable communications between leaders during nuclear crises and other high-stakes scenarios. This unique, resilient system is designed for “radical simplicity” from […]

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STATUS OF CHINA’S ENERGY SECTOR, RECENT TRENDS, AND CURRENT AND EVOLVING ENERGY POLICIES: REPORT OF THE CHINA WORKING GROUP TO THE REGIONAL ENERGY SECURITY PROJECT

WANG YANJIA, GU ALUN NOVEMBER 24, 2019  I.  INTRODUCTION   In this Special Report, Wang Yanjia and Gu Alun summarize the status of China’s energy sector and recent trends, and describe projections of China’s energy future in the context of its energy policies. China’s energy imports have been rising in recent years, and environmental, energy […]

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FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: THE FUTURE OF C3I ENTANGLEMENT

JAMES M. ACTON NOVEMBER 21, 2019 I.  INTRODUCTION   In this essay, James Acton evaluates the risk of inadvertent escalation arising from attacks on dual-use (nuclear and conventional warfare) command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities in a conventional war because such attacks would degrade the target’s nuclear command-and-control system. James Acton  is co-director of […]

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NC3 INSIDER THREATS

RON SCHOUTEN NOVEMBER 14, 2019 I.  INTRODUCTION In this essay, Ron Schouten examines fundamental concepts of insider threats and provides an overview of the extent and significance of insider threats in US and other NC3 systems. A podcast with Ron Schouten, Peter Hayes, and Philip Reiner on China’s NC3 and emerging technologies is found here. Acknowledgments: […]

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COUNTER NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS

CAROL ANN JONES OCTOBER 31, 2019 I.  INTRODUCTION In this essay, Carol Ann Jones concludes: “Denying a country use of their nuclear combat forces could be the key to avoiding or limiting damage from a pending strike, but it could trigger unexpected actions from that country’s nuclear forces (assuming the weapons and launch capability were […]

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LAW, TARGETING AND NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

WILLIAM H BOOTHBY OCTOBER 31 2019 I.       INTRODUCTION In this essay, Bill Boothby observes: “For all States, there is an obligation to take constant care in nuclear operations to spare civilians and civilian objects. More detailed precautionary rules apply to all States with certain additional rules only applying to States that are party to API […]

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WHAT DO WE WANT FROM THE NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM?

PAUL K. DAVIS OCTOBER 24, 2019   I.  INTRODUCTION In this essay, Paul Davis suggest that US NC3 modernization “should place increased emphasis on assuring control, avoiding accidents, and avoiding ill-informed or unwise employment of nuclear weapons.” Paul K. Davis is a senior principal researcher, retired adjunct (RAND). Dr. Davis was a senior executive in […]

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NC3 AND CRISIS INSTABILITY–GROWING DANGERS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

DARYL G. PRESS OCTOBER 17 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay Daryl Press focuses on the growing threats to nuclear command and control and communication (NC3) systems around the world and the links between vulnerable NC3 and strategic instability due to the risky steps that nuclear weapons states may adopt to protect their arsenals during […]

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ISRAEL’S NC3 PROFILE: OPAQUE NUCLEAR GOVERNANCE

AVNER COHEN OCTOBER 11 2019 I.  INTRODUCTION In this essay, Avner Cohen traces and exposes Israel’s two most fundamental principles of the Israeli NC3 thinking: first, insisting on strict physical and organizational separation between nuclear (e.g., pits) and non-nuclear assets (e.g., military delivery platform); second, creating a two-tier governance architecture at various levels. Avner Cohen […]

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