Special Reports are longer, often more technical, documents consisting of entire articles, government statements, and other documents relevant to security and peace in Northeast Asia.
Australia’s participation in the Pine Gap enterprise
Australia’s participation in the Pine Gap enterprise Desmond Ball, Bill Robinson and Richard Tanter 9 June 2016 Full report available here [1.7 MB]. Summary Australian participation in the operation of Pine Gap is effectively complete, with access to all areas of the base except the US National Cryptographic Room. The senior Australian Defence officials who […]
Go to the article“Yes I Can!” Byungjin and Kim Jong Un’s Strategic Patience
NAPSNET Special Report Peter Hayes and Roger Cavazos March 29, 2016 I. INTRODUCTION North Korea upgraded its nuclear and military power and grew its economy slightly, thereby realizing Kim Jong Un’s byungjin line. It also attempted to open new external fronts and to coerce the South to cooperate on its terms, but failed. Instead, it […]
Go to the articleThe Antennas of Pine Gap
THE ANTENNAS OF PINE GAP Desmond Ball, Bill Robinson and Richard Tanter 22 February 2016 Full report available here [7 MB]. Online-optimized version for faster download here [ 2.6 MB]. I. Introduction Antennas are the most readily available and visible evidence of the existence, character, and size of signals intelligence facilities that operate or monitor space […]
Go to the articleUS signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities in Japan 1945 – 2015: A Visual Guide
US signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities in Japan 1945 – 2015: A Visual Guide Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter 23 December 2015 Full report available here [6MB]. I. Introduction The US maintained signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities at about 100 sites in Japan during the Cold War, probably than in any other country. In Japan today, about 1,000 […]
Go to the articleAnticipating Complex Northeast Asian Futures
by Peter Hayes, Joan Diamond and Kiho Yi 16 December 2015 I. Introduction “Another way that civil…
Go to the articleManagement of Operations at Pine Gap
by Desmond Ball, Bill Robinson and Richard Tanter 24 November 2015 The full report is available here. NAPSNet Special Report I. Introduction The management of operations at the Pine Gap facility has become increasingly complex as the functions of the station have expanded, the number of agencies involved has grown, and the demands of a wider […]
Go to the articleJapan’s Bid to Become a World Leader in Renewable Energy
by Andrew De Wit 26 October 2015 II. Introduction The present article argues that the LDP’s green-energy proponents aim at revitalizing local economies through renewable energy, growing strategic sectors of the economy, bolstering national security (especially energy security), enhancing resilience in the face of natural and other disasters, as well as dealing with the threat […]
Go to the articleThe SIGINT Satellites of Pine Gap: Conception, Development and in Orbit
Pine Gap’s initial and still principal importance to the United States lies in its role as a ground control and processing station for geosynchronous signals intelligence satellites. Nine geosynchronous SIGINT (signals intelligence) satellites have been operated by Pine Gap over the past 45 years. That role has grown as the satellites and their associated ground systems have developed in size, capacity and range of applications far beyond what was envisaged half a century ago – or understood by the host government that accepted the base at that time. During the ground station site selection process in 1966, one of the main criteria was that the horizon angle from the floor of the selected location and over the surrounding hills ‘should not exceed six degrees’. From Pine Gap’s latitude of 23.80° S and longitude of 133.74° E, this would allow connectivity (for both command and control and for data reception) with satellites stationed as far west as 60° E (or as far east as 153° W if ever required). The stations of the current three Orion SIGINT satellites controlled by Pine Gap make possible the collection of a wide range of signals across more than half the surface of the planet outside the polar regions – every continent except the Americas and Antarctica, and every significant region of contemporary US military concern. There is now just one US highly integrated geosynchronous signals intelligence satellite system, with comparable satellites operated by Pine Gap and Menwith Hill, with much greater capacities and much more focussed military roles than their Cold War equivalents.
Go to the articleThe Implications of Civic Diplomacy for ROK Foreign Policy
by Kiho Yi and Peter Hayes with Joan Diamond, Steven Denney, Christopher Green, and Jungmin Seo 5 October 2015…
Go to the articleHiroshima and Nagasaki: There were other choices
There is no single compelling factor to justify the bombings as inevitable, argues Peter Hayes. Rather, a series of decisions and events cumulatively drove the bomb forward from development to deployment at Hiroshima. The later nuclear attack on Nagasaki, moreover, was gratuitous.
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