Special Reports

This 1973 report by W.W. Whiston is the first of a two-part analysis of Chinese nuclear policy and weapons options carried out as a part of the U.S. Air Force Project RAND’s studies of the implications of Soviet and Chinese military policy and strategy for Air Force planning. It examines (1) internal political and ideological conflict, (2) alternative military strategies for coping with external versus internal threats, and (3) nuclear technological capabilities from 1958 to 1972. Whiston examines how the Mao-Liu divide impacted the military structure and organization and the newborn nuclear weapons program in the 1960s.

This report was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See the Institute’s FOIA Global Disclosure Project page to read more chronologies, histories and reports released to Nautilus.

This report is one of a series of studies on air operations in international incidents, prepared by the USAF Historical Division Liaison Office at the request of the Directorate of Plans, Headquarters USAF.  This historical narrative, by Jacob Van Staaveren, is based on primary source materials available in 1960–messages and correspondence–and on histories from many levels of the Air Force, including units, commands, and the Air Staff. As Staaveren’s report demonstrates, the crisis in 1958 provided a test of American military planning concepts. Occurring in the Pacific almost simultaneously with the Lebanon crisis of July-August 1958, it created certain planning, operational and logistical problems that had not been anticipated.

This report was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See the Institute’s FOIA Global Disclosure Project page to read more chronologies, histories and reports released to Nautilus.

In this 1963 report B.F. Jaeger and M. Weiner analyze Chinese nuclear capabilities under three different cross-strait conflict scenarios. The three scenarios provide an assessment of the possible military consequences of China’s possession of a modest nuclear arsenal, and give some indication of the magnitude of the risks China might face in a military confrontation with the United States over Taiwan.

This report was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See the Institute’s FOIA Global Disclosure Project page to read more chronologies, histories and reports released to Nautilus.

Morton H. Halperin served four US presidents and is currently a Senior Adviser at the Open Society Foundation. Halperin notes that, as the Six-Party talks aimed at eliminating North Korea’s nuclear program remain stalled, a fresh approach incorporating the concept of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia should be considered as a way of ensuring peace and security in the region.

A version of this essay was originally presented at the East Asia Nuclear Security Workshop in Tokyo, Japan, on Nov. 11, 2011 convened by Nautilus Institute, Mansfield Foundation,  and the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network. The workshop addressed the robustness of proposals to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Northeast Asia region.

The study describes the political and economic conditions that impacted the U.S. Air Force basing posture in Tokyo, Japan in early 1970 and the plan that was developed to reduce these impacts. The main theme explains the formulation and successful implementation of this plan that was designed to preserve mission capability at reduced cost by consolidating widely scattered activities away from metropolitan Tokyo by fiscal year 1975. John G. McKay writes, “Perhaps this case study of a successful USAF plan and program will serve some useful purpose in future U.S. force posturing in that it records the methodology employed for achieving a significant cost-savings through dedicated and perserving efforts in effective resource management.”

This report was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See the Institute’s FOIA Global Disclosure Project page to read more chronologies, histories and reports released to Nautilus.

In this 1964 report Wolf explores US extended nuclear deterrence in China, Japan, and South Korea as well as the impact it could have in Asian countries then “under Communist threat”. Wolf uses two frameworks to assess the effectiveness of US conventional military and nuclear options in Asia: “broad-deterrence” and “narrow-deterrence” options. Wolf uses these two views to consider the provocation threshold, military and political pressures and alternative actions at play in each situation. Wolf writes, “In Asia, we are left with a wide range of current and potential undeterred conflicts.  Although nuclear deterrence is more operative and effective than is often believed, its limitations are manifest not only in the Vietnamese and Laos cases, but in the unambiguous Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia and in the case of various forms of possible Chinese aggression against India or Burma.  It is in this area of undeterred conflicts where our greatest need for improvements in programs and policies lie.”

This report was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See the Institute’s FOIA Global Disclosure Project page to read more chronologies, histories and reports released to Nautilus.