Special Reports

Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Professor of Japanese History in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University and author of the forthcoming book Exodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan’s Cold War, writes, “Today in Japan, relatives of those who “returned” to North Korea in the Cold War years watch the difficult process of nuclear diplomacy quietly but with intense concern? While the story of the Japanese kidnap victims has dominated news headlines, this tragic story of the 93,340 who were “returned” remains little known, and hostility to North Korea (as well as fears for the fate of relatives in the North) makes it difficult for the small group of survivors now living in Japan to raise their voices.”

David Albright, President of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), writes, “Certainly, questions remain about North Korea’s gas centrifuge program that must be resolved if an agreement is to move forward and nuclear dismantlement is to occur verifiably. But the flawed 2002 assessment must not be allowed to undermine this agreement or distort our reactions to declarations North Korea may make once it fulfills its obligations to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.”

The Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 8 to 13 February 2007. The delegations agreed on this joint statement on February 13th, 2007.

Leon V. Sigal., director of the Northeast Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York and author of “Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea“, writes, “Will President Bush give Kim Jong-il — and himself — a similar face-saving way out? He could start by urging banks that have frozen North Korea’s hard currency accounts to release the proceeds of its legitimate trade and then engage in sustained diplomatic give-and take for a change.”

Tatsujiro Suzuki, Senior Research Scientist, Socio-economic Research Center, Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI), and Visiting Professor, Graduate School of Public Policy, the University of Tokyo, writes, “The primary driving force behind Japan’s reprocessing program is the management of spent nuclear fuel. The back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, i.e. management of spent fuel and waste, would pose significant financial, political, and social risks to Japan’s nuclear power program. Japan should explore alternative socio-political solutions, including multinational approaches, to its complex spent fuel management issues.”

The International Crisis Group an independent, non-profit, multinational organization, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict, writes, “A loose network of makeshift shelters focused on humanitarian aid has evolved into a politically-charged but fragile underground railroad on which some North Koreans can buy safe passage to Seoul in a matter of days, while others suffer years of violence and exploitation. If they are to minimise the exploitation of the most vulnerable and enhance the much-needed aid this network delivers, concerned governments must commit to a sustainable solution.”

Jungmin Kang, Science Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University, and Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute Executive Director, write, “Having tested and failed, the DPRK can no longer rely on opacity as the basis for having a credible nuclear force, at least sufficiently credible to threaten its adversaries with a nuclear explosion. The DPRK might believe that a half kilotonne “mininuke” still provides it with a measure of nuclear deterrence and compellence; but it could not rely on other nuclear weapons states to perceive it to have anything more than an unusable, unreliable and relatively small nuclear explosive device.”

Julia Choi and Karin Lee, from the National Committee on North Korea (http://www.ncnk.org ), write, “According to the New York Times, prior to the nuclear test an anonymous U.S. official indicated that a North Korean test would trigger extensive U.S. sanctions: ‘We’ll end up going to full-scale sanctions; the only debate is what “full-scale” means.’ With the adoption of Resolution 1718, the meaning of ‘full-scale’ should soon become clear.”

This is the full text of the United Nations Security Council Resolution passed in response to the DPRK nuclear test on October 9th, 2006. Also included is a summary of the response of North Korean Ambassador to the UN Pak Gil Yon to the resolution.

Nathaniel Aden, researcher at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, writes, “Whereas North Korean coal and electricity exports are sold at sub-market ‘friendship prices,’ Chinese coal and oil products have been sold to North Korea at premium prices? Chinese Customs data suggest that Beijing is taking a pragmatic, market-oriented approach to trade with its reclusive neighbor, while the increasingly asymmetrical energy embodiment of bilateral trade may reflect dilapidation of North Korea’s non-military industries.”

To see the presentation here.