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THE KANTO PLAIN CONSOLIDATION PLAN: A Case Study
of Military Cost Reduction


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ABSTAINER

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT SUMMARY
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TITLE: THE KANTO PLAIN CONSOLIDATION PLAN - A Case Study of Military
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The study describes the political and economic conditions that impacted the U.S. Air Force basing posture in Tokyo, Japan in early 1970 and the plan that was developed to reduce these impacts. The main theme explains the formulation and successful implementation of this plan that was designed to preserve mission capability at reduced cost by consolidating widely scattered activities away from metropolitan Tokyo by fiscal year 1975.

CHAPTER I

THE NEED FOR A PLAN

United States Military presence in Japan has varied in size over the years since the occupation era which followed World War II. Periodic force buildups during the Korean conflict in the early 50's and the Pueblo crisis in 1968 combined to form an extensive military basing structure throughout the four main islands of Japan (Fig. 1). All U.S. military installations overseas were scrutinized for possible reductions as a result of public dissent expressed over U.S. involvement in the Indochina war and increasing Congressional pressures to deflate defense expenditures. To accommodate this budget pressure, the United States Air Force (USAF) embarked on an extensive realignment of its forces in Northeast Asia. In a three year period between early 1971 and end 1973, USAF resources in Northeast Asia (primarily inclusive of Japan, South Korea, and Okinawa) were reduced by the following percentages:

Number of Aircraft	61%
Number of Facilities	50%
Manpower Spaces	42%
Budget Expenditure	28%

The initial step toward this massive reduction and realignment of USAF assets began in 1971 and was called "Operation Cherry Tree."¹ Part of this plan called for the relocation of two tactical fighter wings from bases on the main island of Japan; one was relocated to Korea and the other to Okinawa. Commensurate with this reposturing

The primary mission of Yokota AB, subsequent to the departure of the 347th Tactical Fighter Wing in the spring of 1971, was to provide support to the Military Airlift Command.³ The host unit at Yokota was to provide the Military Airlift Command's Far East air terminal with an active airdrome and a sizeable passenger and air freight handling capability. Secondly, the Yokota-based host unit was responsible for all USAF support installations on the Kanto Plain.⁴ Fuchu Air Station was the other major mission facility that functioned as a key nodal point in the Air Force managed, long-haul communication system in Japan (Fig. 3). Fuchu Air Station also was the site of a dual headquarters facility for Fifth Air Force (5 AF) and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ).⁵ Basically, these were the major missions that the USAF considered vital and enduring, at least for the period of the 1970's. The USAF had intended to maintain this basing structure in Tokyo for some time to come. However, rising costs and shrinking budgets dictated that severe adjustments would have to be made. Arbitrary cutbacks in all mission support areas would obviously place in serious jeopardy USAF capability to perform residual missions.

The primary reasons for the increasing support costs in and around Tokyo could be directly attributed to several uneconomic aspects of the widely dispersed array of support installations. The scattered facilities demanded frequent transportation and logistic servicing, security police protection, fire and safety protection and all other operations necessary to support isolated communities.




FIGURE 3

Source: 1956 Comm Group, Feb. 1974.

A large portion of the USAF support labor force consisted of local nationals whose wages were necessarily increasing to keep pace with the national economy. The cost of local purchase items was also increasing in this particular area of Japan.

Thus, the USAF basing array in and around Tokyo in 1971 demanded that an immediate and critical review of future support requirements be undertaken. This review would necessarily be directed toward solving the current problem by identifying the alternative actions that might be taken to reverse, or at least abate, the increasing costs of military operations in the Tokyo area. This was a very timely and astute objective in view of the "dollar" and "energy" shocks of the early 1970's and the related impact on foreign based military forces. The obvious area to turn to for possible solutions to the problem was the expensive support areas where the highest operations and maintenance costs were being experienced.

Factors Bearing on the Problem

Kanto Plain manpower strength in 1971 totaled just over 18,000 and included nearly 10,000 local nationals (Fig. 4).⁶ The size of this military community was also viewed by the Japanese as excessive in terms of their national security requirements considering that there was at the time little evidence of a real threat to the home islands of Japan.⁷ Although the USAF had effected a sizeable population reduction when the tactical fighter wing departed Yokota in the spring of 1971, the increasing Tokyo population caused the metropolitan area to expand and encompass practically all of the




FIGURE 4

USAF installations. This, in effect, gave the Japanese a heightened impression of a greater U.S. military presence. As the people of Tokyo became more aware of the U.S. military presence they began to express more and more dissatisfaction as world opinion became increasingly vocal against America's role in the "unpopular" war in Indochina. Needless to say, the strength of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) waned as a large U.S. military presence in Japan provided fuel for the fires of the opposing political parties.⁸

Another factor favoring a detailed survey of all USAF facilities within the Kanto Plain was the fact that most physical structures on practically all of the USAF installations were far outdated. Most of these structures had been built in the early 1950's. The majority of these old facilities had long since become rundown and difficult to operate economically since they had been originally constructed to last only five to ten years. Maintenance and repair costs on these facilities were continuing to rise with each passing year. For example, Tachikawa Air Base which was by far the oldest facility, had originally been built by the Japanese in the mid 1930's and by 1972 it was costing the USAF over four and one half million dollars per year to operate (see Fig. 5).

FIGURE 5

Fiscal Year 1972 Facility Operations and Maintenance Costs	
Facility	O & M Costs
Tachikawa Air Base (includes Yamato A.S.)	\$4,593,000.00
Fuchu A.S. and Kanto Mura Family Housing Area	\$3,688,000.00

Source: 475th Air Base Wing Comptroller

Considering the economic pressures of rising support costs and dwindling budgets, counterbalanced by a need for a continued USAF presence in the Tokyo area for political as well as military reasons, the need for a plan to cut costs and reduce U.S. military presence had become obvious.

The preliminary guidelines for a review plan were specified by

USAF Headquarters. USAF Headquarters tasked the Pacific Air Forces Headquarters (PACAF), in FY 1970, to develop a plan that would result in reducing the then current population of 18,000 manpower spaces down to 7,500 by the beginning of Fiscal Year 1975.⁹ This specified goal resulted from a earlier feasibility study conducted by Fifth Air Force which concluded that sizeable manpower reductions could be achieved provided the number of USAF operating locations on the Kanto Plain was significantly reduced. It was apparent that the solution would be achieved primarily by consolidating the residual Kanto Plain missions on as few installations as possible.

Since a multitude of U.S. military and U.S. government agencies were to be affected by such a plan, development of the plan would necessarily include all known U.S. requirements. The initial step in formulating the plan was to obtain a complete inventory of current physical assets. Secondly, unit missions would have to be screened and equated to space requirements. Following this effort each USAF unit mission statement would have to be challenged in order to insure that pure raw data in terms of manpower and space requirements could be obtained. It was hoped that from this screening procedure the resulting data would illuminate the alternative solutions to the problem.

A secondary objective was a phased reduction over the time period allowed (FY 1972 to FY 1975) so that the drawdown would not hinge on a massive destabilizing withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from Northeast Asia. At this time the period of plan activation

was perceived as occurring in a timeframe when Southeast Asia activities were still expected to maintain priority considerations for air movement of both personnel and equipment.

Approach to Solution

The studied review of the Kanto Plain problem was performed at Headquarters 5AF during the early months of 1971 and published in March 1971 as The Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan (KPCP). The plan concluded that if sufficient community and functional facilities could be added to Yokota Air Base a majority of the other isolated facilities on the Kanto Plain could be closed and in turn released back to the government of Japan (GOJ) for their use.¹⁰ The study also recommended that facility realignments be presented to the GOJ with the intention of asking the GOJ to finance the construction of required replacement facilities on Yokota in exchange for the installations and areas that would become excess to the USAF's needs.

The rationale behind this recommendation was based on previous U.S. military negotiating successes with the GOJ for small replacement facilities dealing on a quid pro quo (one-for-one) basis. The projected success of the original plan depended on either a successful negotiation with the GOJ or obtaining U.S. funding for the facilities necessary to accommodate a residual population of approximately 9,500 manpower spaces.¹¹

Shortly after publication of the KPCP another objective was added which required a slight but overall re-study of the entire spectrum

of possible solutions. This objective, put forth by the Secretary of the Air Force, required all major headquarters elements be located on active flying installations.¹² A separate study concluded, inter alia, further reductions in forecast residual manpower spaces were possible if facilities could be obtained to house the dual headquarters at Yokota.¹³

If the plan were successful and completed as outlined, the benefits to the U.S. could be expected to be quite substantial. Again, the key assumption to the plan's success was GOJ acceptance of the proposal and actual realization of the replacement facilities. The foreseen advantages and benefits of the plan can be summarized briefly as follows:¹⁴

- The elimination of many isolated, costly and inefficient outlying USAF facilities.
- An estimated annual savings of approximately \$100 million to the USAF budget without major change to required and pre-stated mission capability.
- Accommodate the long-standing GOJ objective of significantly reducing U.S. military presence in the crowded metropolitan Tokyo area.
- An improved and upgraded quality of physical facilities on Yokota Air Base, the USAF's last remaining major flying facility on main island Japan.
- Establish a dual commitment to Northeast Asia regional security on the part of both governments. Such an agreement

implies that the U.S. would maintain a token presence to meet its obligations under the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Government of Japan acceptance of the terms of such an agreement implies they too intend for the U.S. to maintain a continued, though reduced, presence in Japan.

The discussion thus far has focused on the situation in order that the reader can better appreciate the evolution of the KFCP.

The chapters to follow have three basic purposes: first, the plan's historical development and particularly its record of execution are worthy examples of successful military resource management; secondly, the complexity of the undertaking provides valuable insight into key areas of the decision-making process at all levels of military command; finally, the case study itself points out solutions to a problem that is contemporary and portends to be a continued one for military leaders -- that is, how to imaginatively manage scarce resources without seriously degrading mission capability.

CHAPTER II
DEVELOPING THE PLAN

As a first step toward developing the consolidation plan, it was necessary that total space requirements be precisely identified. To accomplish this task it was necessary to identify and precisely locate each U.S. military and government agency, unit and sub-unit, as well as small groups of individuals performing official U.S. government functions on USAF installations in the Kanto Plain area. Once the manpower strength of these various elements were verified and each mission explained in sufficient detail, a data base was calculated in terms of type and quantity of living and working space required. These manpower and space determinants were subsequently tabulated as total requirements.

As mentioned earlier, a preliminary Kanto Plain Facilities study had been performed to determine the total facility space assets available. Because of mission differentials, it was necessary while developing the facility data base to go beyond linear footage tabulation and determine the condition of each type of structure. From this facility data base, judgements had to be made as to the expected life and utility of each existing structure. This additional step was necessary so that actions such as building modifications and/or facility condemnation could be established. Once the data base of both assets and requirements began to take shape the next phase of the study effort was initiated.

Organizing the Data

The next step was to refine the data base so that specific requirements could be matched against the existing assets. The screening of mission statements received detailed scrutiny so that manpower requirements could be more precisely determined. This was accomplished using the given mission forecast for the beginning of fiscal year 1972. Once the manpower requirements were known and verified for the starting position of the study, USAF standards for space requirements could be applied. These requirements were then applied against existing space assets to identify overages and shortfalls by category of building space.

The tactical fighter wing departed Yokota in the Spring of 1971. This move opened functional space on Yokota and housing space at other installations. Thus, the initial study showed an excess of facility space. Subsequent iterations considered the vacated floor space on Yokota AB as being available for outlying functions thereby identifying the first positive step toward consolidation of functions. As units and functions were identified for relocation to Yokota AB work space, the community housing shortfalls were calculated and documented. It was at this point that community support area deficiencies were extracted from the study. This housing data was then used for entering preliminary negotiations with the government of Japan to determine if Japan would agree to build, on Yokota, the necessary community housing and support facilities to accept a sizeable population increase.¹ The exchange properties

identified for this purpose were two military family housing areas, Green Park and Grant Heights.²

In this initial agreement, the USAF asked the GOJ to construct a total of 1050 family housing units plus community support facilities. It included schools, bachelor enlisted and officer's quarters, service stores, theater, commissary, exchange, chapel, dispensary, and recreation facilities. This request was proffered to the GOJ in exchange for the two old community housing areas which consisted of 364 acres, over 1700 family housing units/quarters, and over 3 million square feet (SF) of community support building space. The GOJ accepted this agreement in August of 1971 indicating that the construction schedule would be stretched over a four year period beginning in April 1972.³ This schedule, indicating that the completion of all construction projects could be expected by 31 March 1976, was acceptable to both sides. The success of this first agreement meant that the USAF had set the stage for further development of the overall consolidation plan. This agreement was called "The Green Park/Grant Heights (GP/GH) Agreement" and was only expected to provide the necessary community living space on Yokota AB that would enable follow-on consolidations of outlying functional activities.⁴

This initial agreement with the GOJ was only in the negotiating stage in the spring of 1971, therefore it was only considered an assumption during the development of the total KFCP. The next phase of the study was to identify a time schedule for consolidation of

activities. This timephasing effort provided further opportunities for potential manpower reductions. For example, as individual installations could be forecast for phasedown toward eventual closure, certain manpower reductions could be immediately identified in numerous support functions like post offices, exchange services, civil engineering activities (base facility upkeep), security police forces, supply services and many others.⁵ When the data was completely accumulated, calculations of a new requirements base could be developed and applied once again against a revised listing of available assets.⁶ This new data was collected and formulated, then forecast against the timephased, pre-established mission responsibilities. At this point the plan took parametric shape with an identifiable beginning and an end. The intervening timeframe of the plan was then used to develop an incremental drawdown of personnel and forecast the anticipated closure dates for specific facilities.

The foregoing must be recognized as an oversimplification of the actual process of plan development because within this framework many other avenues of cost-reduction exploration were investigated. For example, one such investigation was a proposal to relocate some of the several large antenna complexes onto retainable installations thereby preparing the former communications sites for release to the COJ. These engineering studies were determined feasible to the U.S. and proffered in the final plan. Like the GP/GH Agreement, these proposals were listed only as assumptions (possibilities) in the original KPCP.

Finalizing the Study

The original Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan was published in March 1971 and submitted to higher headquarters for review and approval. The plan proposed a logical, albeit unilaterally constructed, scheme for incrementally consolidating outlying functions toward and onto Yokota. The initial plan did not consider the relocation of the dual headquarters so it did not achieve the pre-stated manpower goal of 7,500 total USAF manpower spaces by FY 75. The plan did, however, contain a complete listing of all units and organizations on the Kanto Plain that made up the total population so that decision makers at higher levels could decide on possible candidates for deletion or relocation from the area. The original plan was formatted so that further "selective" manpower cuts could be picked as tradeoff candidates in order to attain the manning level objective of 7,500.

Following submission of the KPCP to higher headquarters, the Secretary of the Air Force (Dr. Seamans) announced his desire that all major USAF headquarters elements be located on active flying installations.⁷ This requirement dictated that a new study be performed at Headquarters Fifth Air Force to determine optional strengths and locations for the dual headquarters of Fifth Air Force/U.S. Forces Japan. The reasons for not proposing a relocation of this dual headquarters in the original KPCP can be briefly summarized as follows:

- The location of the headquarters' installation (Fuchu Air

Station) was within the nation's capital city and therefore most convenient to the political center of Japan where frequent business was conducted by members of the Joint Staff (USFJ).

- The Fifth Air Force Operations Center was the command and control hub of all USAF forces in Northeast Asia and therefore the focal point of a huge communications net. Co-located with this USAF control center was the Air Defense control center of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force.
- Fuchu Air Station, a completely self-supporting facility, was a peculiarly designed facility for supporting the headquarters' functions in terms of its community area which consisted of 77 family quarters. Some of these quarters were designed for senior officers and a few for general officer use. Additionally, Fuchu had several officer and airmen dormitories, an exchange, a commissary, and officers' and non-commissioned officers' club facilities.

The Headquarters Relocation Study, completed in May 1971, addressed several optional USAF manning levels (the Joint Staff was considered static) and location potentials for each size option. All of the options studied (Okinawa, Korea, and elsewhere in Japan) were treated in terms of economic as well as the political-military aspects. The study concluded that although the economic benefits would be marginally greater for choosing Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, the dislocation from the political center of Japan would not be

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advisable for the near future.⁸ A Korea location was also considered politically infeasible at that time.

The conclusion that Yokota AB would be the most logical choice of possible headquarters locations was accepted by USAF Headquarters and recommended for incorporation in the original KPCP. A new data baseline was subsequently developed for the KPCP. This new position was then included in a new proposed agreement to the GOJ for replacement facilities. The new proposal (or second agreement) would thus enable the USAF to relocate from two more facilities on the Kanto Plain provided the GOJ would agree to construct on Yokota the necessary functional facilities to accommodate the dual headquarters and its closely associated support functions. As conditions stood upon completion of the two plans (the original KPCP and the Headquarters Relocation Study), the USAF was proposing the reduction of ten of the thirteen installations and forecasting a manpower savings of over 10,000 spaces over a period of four years.⁹ The annual savings to the U.S. Government was estimated at the time to be in excess of \$100 million when the plan was completed.¹⁰

The total plan was at this point so complex that it was expected to require extensive processing time through U.S. Government channels. When the GP/GH agreement was concluded in early August 1971, a major assumption of the original KPCP was validated. This further enhanced prospects that total plan approval would follow immediately through U.S. military and political channels. However, on 15 August 1971 an unforeseen political factor occurred that

bore with it potentially serious problems concerning future negotiations with the Japanese. This was the "economic shock" concerning the abruptly announced 10% surcharge on all imports by President Nixon.¹¹ The plan proceeded toward final approval following complete staffing in USAF channels. The plan was then presented in Joint Service channels so that it could be brought to cabinet level in Washington for Joint, State Department and Defense Department approval to open discussions with the Government of Japan.

The foregoing description is an oversimplification of the overall process. At the local level where the studies were conducted, the frequent small and almost insignificant changes resulted in alterations to the data base of the entire plan. Most of these changes were the result of certain USAF unilateral actions that attempted to fill the facilities vacated earlier by the tactical fighter wing at Yokota. These unilateral actions were the small unit and mission relocations from some of the outlying facilities that were moved early to take advantage of "opportunity" savings as soon as possible. One example of this was the relocation of the 1837th Electronic Installations Squadron from East Tachikawa Air Base into available facilities on Yokota. There were other small consolidation actions occurring as activities were consolidated on Yokota itself which combined to alter the manpower as well as the facility data base of the KPCP. The complexity of the plan thus demanded constant attention so that every opportunity for savings could be taken.

In July 1971 a joint PACAF and 5 AF headquarters briefing team took the revised plan to USAF Headquarters. In a few days time the team managed to explain the intricacies and possibilities of the plan in sufficient detail to obtain Air Force approval "in-principle" with the total plan. This approval was subsequently confirmed in writing by September 1971.¹² But since other military service coordination had to precede the Defense Department approval, final Cabinet level approval of the total plan was not received until late December 1971. Upon receipt of the clearance to brief the GOJ on the proposals of the plan, actions were immediately begun to re-validate the details of the KPCP and effect the necessary downgrading actions in order to declassify the plan's contents. Finally, in January 1971 the government-to-government dialogue concerning the various but generalized base consolidation proposals was reported in the communique following the San Clemente discussions between President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato of Japan.¹³

An immediate response was not forthcoming from Japanese authorities concerning the proposals contained in the plan. The status of GOJ views of the KPCP proposals remained uncertain throughout most of 1972 due to internal GOJ political problems which culminated when Tanaka replaced Sato as Prime Minister. Thus, from February to October 1972 there was no evidence to indicate that the GOJ would accept the proposals. During the first two months of FY 73 (July through September 1972) persistent USAF concern for achieving budget savings began to focus on other possible phase-down options - even a unilateral one.¹⁴

The USAF budget forecasts demanded that further personnel reductions be effected regardless of the status of the U.S. proposals offered to the GOJ. An additional study was performed at this time, based on the continuing reappraisal effort at the 5 AF staff level. This study was titled, Kanto Plain Review.¹⁵ This study, because of its peculiar content, was closely held within USAF channels since it outlined a unilateral KPCP that would in effect achieve the pre-stated manpower level of 7,500 spaces by FY 75. It was necessary that this plan be closely protected while a positive GOJ response remained a distinct possibility. Fortunately, this unilateral plan remained within USAF channels only during the period of GOJ indecision. This unilateral plan was on the brink of activation when the GOJ responded.

Results of Negotiations

The Kanto Plain Review achieved several purposes; the most significant of which was not visualized at the time the review was initiated. This review process did update the data base of facility requirements and manpower strengths which had been altered somewhat by several unit departures during 1972 that had not been considered in the original KPCP. The original KPCP did not include a viable alternative solution in the event the GOJ did not accept the KPCP proposals so the Kanto Plain Review was designed to do this. Basically, the Kanto Plain Review concluded that the USAF could unilaterally pursue the consolidation plan theory provided it accept functional facility shortages and crowded conditions in old facilities. This would necessitate some activities remain at outlying instal-

lations. The Kanto Plain Review was a "worst case" alternative approach to achieve necessary budget reductions; therefore, it was only approved "in-principle" by the USAF with instructions to prepare for implementation upon notice. The real value of the review became known when the GOJ did in fact respond positively to the KPCP proposals in early October 1972 -- almost nine months after the plan had been presented to them.

The positive response by the GOJ, to accept the KPCP consolidation principles, was warmly received by the USAF. However, the acceptance was offered with a stipulation that since the development of the plan had occurred over a year earlier, the GOJ requested that the facility requirements be updated to reflect only that considered essential.¹⁶ Additionally, the GOJ requested that the updated requirements be submitted to them in less than thirty days so that construction monies could be earmarked in the next budget submission for Japan Fiscal Year 1973.¹⁷ The GOJ explained that the detailed KPCP negotiations could subsequently proceed quickly and construction initiation begin as early as the start of the next Japanese fiscal year on April 1, 1973.

U.S. response was fortunately in time since the Kanto Plain Review had pre-accomplished the task the GOJ had requested. The 5 AF Civil Engineer was appointed as chairman for the U.S. negotiating team, and the GOJ selected as their representative, the same individual who had led the negotiations on the GP/GH agreement. A negotiating team Special Working Group (SWG), was established so that the

deliberations could proceed immediately.¹⁸ Specifics of the negotiation proceedings will be discussed in a later chapter; therefore, it is sufficient to note at this point that the outcome was highly successful in meeting the basic USAF desires for replacement facilities. Thus, the agreement negated what had appeared certain -- that the GOJ would not accept the proposal as presented. It was now certain that the USAF could proceed with bilateral consolidation plans which would consider the availability of new facilities.

The results of this second agreement with the GOJ was made public in a joint announcement at the January 1973 meeting of the Security Consultative Committee in Tokyo.¹⁹ The essence of this agreement was that the GOJ would construct for the USAF, over a three year period (1973 to 1976), 1.7 million square feet of additional new facilities on Yokota Air Base in exchange for the release of eight more USAF installations. The U.S. estimated that the facility replacement cost of this (functional) facility construction package, at the time, was approximately \$80 million dollars. This second agreement then meant that the GOJ would provide over \$170 million dollars of new facility construction at no cost to the U.S. taxpayer.

The results of the negotiations, however, were not totally compatible with the original request presented by the U.S. side and so several of the proposals were not accepted by the GOJ in the process of negotiating the plan. Compromises to the agreement were justifiable in many cases, considering that a hard line on minor issues might create an impasse in the negotiations which would possibly jeopardize

the entire USAF plan. One example of this was the proposal mentioned previously concerning communications realignments that would eliminate the need for several communications antenna sites maintained by the USAF. Specifically, the two facilities were located at Onda and Kashiwa (see Fig 2). In the case of these two installations the GOJ maintained that the cost of relocating and consolidating the antenna complexes to other installations would not be cost effective to them. The GOJ rationale for this position was that the land which these antennas presently occupied was not government owned but privately owned, therefore there was no immediate political pressure for its return. The owners of this land were mostly farmers who received rent payments from the GOJ and at the same time USAF policies permitted them to continue to farm and otherwise restrictedly use the land underlying the antennas.

The foregoing compromise plus other similar but more minor ones were sufficient to warrant adjustments in the total scheme of consolidation. All of these adjustments were accomplished during the programming of the approved plan. The programming phase of the plan actually began when the GOJ announced that they would entertain the KPCP proposals in October 1972. Before discussing the actual procedures employed in the programming phase it is necessary that the next chapter explain the consolidation theory in greater detail. This will enable the reader to fully appreciate the specific problems experienced during the programming phase of the KPCP.

CHAPTER III

THE PLAN IN THEORY

As noted previously, the basic theory of the consolidation plan was to reduce escalating support costs by eliminating widely scattered USAF facilities in the Tokyo metropolitan area (Kanto Plain). To achieve this end a complete validation process of existing and forecast unit/agency mission statements was conducted. Once residual missions were validated, total manpower requirements by function were determined and subsequently translated into a matrix of space requirements. The size and extent of many functional activities based their total manpower requirements on the size of the population to be supported. Therefore, with each downward adjustment of overall manpower figures, population support activities also had to be recomputed.

The interrelationship of these manpower adjustments and the associated variances of space requirements were the dynamic focus of the consolidation plan. Considering this dynamic aspect of the plan, it can be seen why an end point had to be determined so that the size and type of replacement buildings could be precisely identified for presentation to the GOJ. Once the iteration process of matching manpower and facility requirements was established, data adjustments were easily accommodated. Some of the significant actions which required adjustments to the KPCP were as follows:

- Unplanned for small unit inactivations or relocations out of the Kanto Plain area.

- Mission or manpower increases, i.e., increased emphasis on social actions which necessitated a manpower addition and an expanded control and inspection of air terminal passengers and freight for drug trafficking required additional manpower for security police operations.
- Changes to government housing eligibility criteria, i.e., opening government quarters for accompanied enlisted personnel to the pay grade of E-4 and for U.S. civilian employees of GS-12 ratings or above increased the total Kanto Plain housing requirements.

Some Early Consolidations

Each action or decision which changed projected manning levels or space allocation criteria had an immediate and overall impact on the total consolidation plan. Even though most adjustments that occurred or were forecast to occur were small, they necessitated continual monitoring and adjustment. This constant review process was necessary to insure that progress and momentum toward the consolidation objective could be maintained. The GOJ request that the original plan be updated and revalidated before an agreement on specific facility construction be concluded was quite understandable. This request for revalidation was not surprising since visible USAF consolidation actions had begun immediately following consummation of the earlier GP/GH Agreement.

The early consolidation efforts were performed unilaterally by the USAF in order to respond to budget pressures by reducing manpower

levels as quickly as possible. This accelerated reduction was an attempt to defray the exorbitant support costs of operating installations which had begun to phasedown. Early closeout of the Green Park Housing Annex and the incremental but rapid phasedown of the Grant Heights Housing area were well underway during 1972. These actions, plus others serve as typical examples of the consolidation theory.¹

Unilateral consolidation actions indicated that a few installation closures were possible sooner than expected. However, final closure had to be held in abeyance until a positive response was received from the GOJ concerning the final KPCP proposals. An example of this was the Mito Air-to-Ground range. This range, located on the east coast of Japan's main island of Honshu is approximately 70 miles north of Tokyo (see map on page 31). The range encompassed over 2,800 acres of prime coastal land of considerable interest to the GOJ. The site was viewed as a likely area for a secondary water port terminal to relieve the seaport congestion in Tokyo Bay.

There had not been a continuing requirement for the range facility since the tactical fighter wing had departed from Yokota in the spring of 1971. To protect this large area as a viable bargaining lever for negotiating with the GOJ it had been kept active through periodic use for para-rescue training by a Yokota based air-sea rescue unit.² Under the terms of the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) U.S. military forces are obligated to return to the GOJ any land or installation for which they do not have a continuing

* active requirement. For example, Mito Range as well as other smaller areas were being withheld from early release to increase the attractiveness of the total package to the COJ negotiators.

Unlike Mito Range, some of the lands and areas proposed for release under the terms of the KPCZ were not Japanese government-owned property. Some of the installations that the USAF was proposing for release were privately, corporately, city or prefecturally owned.

Under SOPA terms these areas were being leased by the COJ and provided to the U.S. military on a rent-free basis. Therefore, lumping all of the installations that were being proposed for release significantly increased the attractiveness to the COJ since they could expect to realize a substantial economic and political benefit by accepting the proposal. For instance, the greater portion of the South Camp Drake area (refer to Fig. 2 on page 4) consisted of approximately 280 acres of government-owned metropolitan land, the value of which was roughly estimated to be \$1 million per acre.³ The ability of the COJ to sell parcels of this government land and stop lease payments on other land areas was what would enable the COJ to finance the construction packages requested by the USAF.

The benefits were also politically attractive considering the USAF manpower reduction forecast of almost 10,000 American military personnel and their dependents as well as the return of large land areas in their capital city. The Liberal Democratic Party was highly receptive to this aspect of the consolidation plan and recognized an opportunity to regain some political popularity. Once agreement

was achieved with the GOJ on the KPCP the USAF could begin to finalize its long-range consolidation effort.

Two Theories in One

The consolidation theory consisted of two distinct phases of execution. The first, as already mentioned, was unilateral consolidation actions that were taken to re-occupy the facilities at Yokota vacated by earlier unit withdrawals.⁴ The subsequent phase of consolidation required the availability of new replacement facilities to be constructed by the GOJ. As soon as forecast construction schedules could be obtained from Japanese negotiators at the Special Working Group (SWG) meetings, further consolidation actions were programmed against the forecast availability of individual facilities.⁵ Small unit relocations were also integrated into the schedule. These small units are listed in Appendix A and the majority of them required only small amounts of office space. Most of these small units and agencies were programmed to move into existing Yokota facilities. This same scheme of consolidation also applied to personnel and family relocations. As housing units became available, personnel with sufficient retainability were programmed for relocation to either Yokota or the large housing area on the west side of Tachikawa Air Base.⁶ The basic rationale for using Tachikawa throughout the period of the plan was that its proximity to Yokota (3 miles) permitted this community to avail themselves of the support facilities on Yokota.

The consideration of Yokota and Tachikawa as a single community area also permitted further reduction of some support services at

Tachikawa.⁷ The overall flow of relocations across the Kanto Plain continued away from the metropolitan center. These moves toward the city periphery where land was less densely populated significantly reduced the time and cost of day-to-day travel for the residual U.S. military population.

The two agreements with the GOJ promised to add nearly 4 million square feet of facility space within the existing Yokota Air Base boundaries.⁸ No additional land space was requested nor would have it been granted considering the scarcity of land resources throughout Japan. Thus, the increased vertical structure density of Yokota land space necessitated that some departures be made from a normal air base development plan. One such departure occurred in the case of family housing unit construction.

Engineering Aspects

Land space limitations on Yokota necessitated that the U.S. side accept a majority of the requested housing in the form of high-rise apartment buildings.⁹ Although this was not a desirable solution, it was the only recourse available under the circumstances and conditions of the agreement. Negotiations concerning the housing aspects of the agreements were quite difficult and U.S. arguments against high-rise apartment buildings particularly so. This was because the Japanese had been for some years learning to live and accommodate to high-rise living, and in far less total living space than the average American.

The concessions obtained from the GOJ on this housing issue in-

cluded the provision that each family unit in the high-rise buildings would have three bedrooms, a separate balcony, accessible stairwells, and two elevators to each apartment building.¹⁰ Additionally, every part of the design of the buildings was to meet or exceed established engineering standards specified by USAF directives. It should be readily discernible that the civil engineering role throughout the development and execution of the KPCP was a highly significant one.

Fifth Air Force civil engineers were constantly involved in keeping pace with the design and construction schedule aspect of the negotiations. The main focus of this effort was directed at following a master plan for re-developing Yokota Air Base. This master plan was necessary to insure construction activities were attuned to the total needs of the base as well as providing an outline for the orderly flow of continuous day-to-day construction activity that would not disrupt the continuity of on-going base activities. Added to this was the "in-house" effort for modifying and removing older structures to respectively accommodate the units, personnel, and other activities that would be arriving from the outlying facilities. The pacing of construction was therefore critical to the entire plan.

Aside from the new facilities construction, there was a host of other requirements that the GOJ agreed to provide. These additional provisions included a realignment of Yokota's existing utilities' systems, modifications to existing roads and pavements, and destruction of dilapidated structures to make way for the new buildings.

The GOJ also agreed to provide additions or modifications to some facilities such as the base telephone exchange and officers and enlisted club facilities. There were other construction preparatory actions required of the GOJ. For instance, the largest increment of housing was to be constructed on East Yokota which previously had served as an ammunition, bomb, and weapons storage area that had been operational when the tactical fighter wing was based at Yokota. Dismantling and removing these weapons storage bunkers was required before it could accept approximately 1000 new housing units.¹¹ Since this old weapons storage area was to accommodate a completely new mini-community, it would require a new utility support system including water, sewage treatment, and electrical subsystems. All community support facilities necessary to serve the population increase were also developed for Yokota and submitted for construction (see Appendix B for total listing).

Because of the complex and extensive nature of the total construction program, and because it would necessarily extend over a period of several years, the construction schedules were broken down into separate phases. This enabled the GOJ to budget various engineering cycles and proceed toward completing the construction package in a more orderly manner. In other words, to completely construct a bulk number of family quarters without first finishing such projects as utility systems or other important community service facilities would serve little purpose to the USAF unless the completed facilities could be activated and utilized as soon as they were

accepted. Quality control of the overall construction projects had to be monitored closely by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to insure specifications and standards were met by the Japanese construction companies.¹²

Fortunately for the U.S., construction negotiations were conducted on the basis of type and size of facility required and not on a dollar cost basis at the time of agreement. Between 1972 and 1974 construction materials and labor in Japan experienced an annual inflation rate of 22%. This means that the originally agreed to construction package, estimated by the U.S. to cost the GOJ approximately 170 million U.S. dollars, probably exceeded \$200 million by the end of 1974. It was this inflation rate in construction costs and the energy crisis of late 1973 that caused most of the problems that threatened to jeopardize the final stages of the consolidation plan.

Problems With Construction Delays

After accomplishing all possible unilateral consolidation actions, the USAF was obliged to await the completion of each phase of GOJ construction before proceeding with further consolidations. The amount of financing for Japan Fiscal Year (JFY) budgets for KPCP construction did not sufficiently account for the inflation being experienced. Consequently, protracted delays were experienced in all construction projects. Large projects, such as the high-rise apartment buildings, fell behind the original schedule by as much as eight months. As the GOJ began the preparation of their 1974 budget in November 1973, it became obvious to U.S. negotiators that certain functional facilities

such as the replacement facility for the dual headquarters and others would not receive funds in sufficient amounts to insure completion in the calendar year 1974. If this particular facility were delayed it would negate the opportunity for the USAF to achieve its goal of reducing to 7,500 manpower spaces in FY 75. As soon as it became apparent that the GOJ might stretch out the construction schedule, USAF planners initiated a study to determine how this delay could be offset.

The new study revealed that it was possible to accelerate part of the consolidation plan, thereby reducing manpower as much as possible without having to wait for the new headquarters facility to be constructed. The study determined that the only way the plan could be accelerated and returned to near the original consolidation schedule was for the USAF to once again unilaterally take action and move the remaining functional missions from outlying Kanto Plain facilities into interim facilities on Yokota until the new buildings could be completed. This interim move plan would permit the closure of two additional housing areas (Kanto Mura and Fuchu) and an almost complete phasedown of Fuchu Air Station.

An economic analysis of this alternate plan revealed that if a one year wait in interim facilities could be expected, the accelerated move would save the USAF \$20 million in military pay and operations and maintenance costs. On the balance sheet, however, was the fact that the interim move would cost the USAF approximately \$2 million for facility preparation and duplicate communications

equipment. When this proposal was submitted to higher headquarters for approval, the logic was acknowledged but the required dollar amount was determined insurmountable considering the U.S. budgetary climate at that particular time.¹³ Fortunately, the solution to this problem was much simpler and less costly than anticipated.

When GOJ officials were briefed that the USAF was planning to make an interim move into temporary headquarters facilities on Yokota, they appealed for a re-negotiation of the construction schedule priorities. They believed, at the working level group as well as at higher ministerial levels, that if the U.S. made an interim consolidation move the political efficacy of the situation would precipitate further financial and political problems with the program. The reason for this was that the political opposition parties would have added ammunition against the LDP for apparently constructing something for the U.S. Forces that they did not really need - a headquarters building. The principle of replacement-in-kind for continued mission performance would be, at least superficially and visibly, derogated.

The USAF was quite relieved with the prospect of re-negotiation since the interim move plan, although feasible, would have been detrimental to efficient operation of the headquarters' elements since they would be splintered and dislocated in scattered and crowded facilities all across the length and breadth of Yokota. Disassociated work and living centers would also have necessitated that a large part of the headquarters personnel travel long distances from

outlying areas to Yokota. This travel time and distance through congested traffic conditions was precisely one of the things that the consolidation plan was trying to eliminate.

The result of the re-negotiation was that the headquarters facility, the general officer quarters (GOQs), and other minor but necessary projects would be accelerated by the GOJ. This, however, was not without concession since the Japanese budget for the year had already been set. In effect, the GOJ solution required that projects of a less critical nature be deferred for financing later so that the funds previously earmarked for these projects could be applied to the projects critical to the consolidation plan. Even this procedure took time, but in the end the program got underway in December 1973 and the estimated completion date was set for mid-summer of 1974.

The USAF planners were now able to translate the new time schedule into planning and programming actions. It was now necessary to finalize the consolidation program since all major actions could now be identified. The next chapter describes the final actions of the plan and how effective they were toward achieving the objectives of the KPCP.

CHAPTER IV

THE PLAN IN ACTION

The approval process of the Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan, as noted previously, was a lengthy and dynamic exercise in itself. Process of the plan was followed by a Japanese review of the plan. Periodic alterations to the original demanded that re-approval of specific alternative actions be obtained through appropriate channels.¹ Although this process of minor adjustment recurred frequently, the level of approval was seldom above USAF Headquarters. Nevertheless, approval at each appropriate Air Force level had to be obtained for most of the specific actions before any firm programming outlines could be developed. Review of other U.S. military service or government agency manning was not managed within PACAF; therefore, they were accepted as inflexible data for the purposes of the study. This particular non-USAF manpower data was primarily used only to determine space and support requirements.

Computing Personnel Reductions

For Air Force units, however, PACAF had been authorized by Headquarters USAF to be the single arbiter and action coordinator between itself and other USAF major air commands (MAJCOMS).² This was a convenient and workable arrangement since most of the major manpower reductions were being made to PACAF strengths rather than to tenant organizations of other MAJCOMS. The exception to this reduction pattern for support operations was in determining population support requirements that were responsibilities of the tenant commands. The

reason for this exception was due to the localized development of the incremental drawdown of personnel which could forecast the time-phased population decline. Some examples of the areas of other MAJCOM support responsibility are as follows:

- Telecommunication services for telephones, radios, and teletypes when not required due to personnel reductions or facility closures. This had a corresponding impact on the Air Force Communications Service (AFCS) manpower strength.
- Similarly, Postal and Courier Service (AFPCS) facility closures and population reduction and/or relocations eliminated the need for outlying post office services; accordingly, these reductions were accounted for by manpower experts involved in the study. There were also other "population" oriented operations supported by units and agencies of other MAJCOMS, such as OSI and the Army Air Force Exchange Services.

For every reduction of a manned position there was also a need to re-apply the appropriate manpower factors to determine the subtractive factor for PACAF base operating support (BOS) personnel.³

Several separate reviews of headquarters manning levels also occurred between 1971 and 1974 which affected the manpower data base. These investigative reviews were in addition to the reductions proposed in the Headquarters Relocation Study. Each such effort combined to effect a sizeable cutback of Headquarters Fifth Air Force

strength.⁴ The final analysis of the headquarter's manning reviews revealed that some savings were possible if certain non-essential headquarters elements were "dual-hatted" with the host organization (475 Air Base Wing) at Yokota.⁵ These reductions were believed to be possible without further derogating the mission capabilities of either the numbered Air Force or the air base wing organization.

Along with the continual drawdown of personnel, particularly rated officer personnel, there was also a comensurate reduction programmed for the numbers of support aircraft. Each aircraft reduced corresponded to a downward adjustment in aircraft maintenance functions. Once the manning reviews were proven feasible, another justification analysis of allotted space received equal attention. This was necessary to insure full utilization of existing assets. This constant iterative review process was necessary to preclude the GOW challenging pre-stated facility requirements. When facilities were determined unessential to the residual missions, they were closed and utilities service was terminated to conserve energy resources.

Activating the plan was a complex process and one which demanded constant focus on the original goal. There was also a need for flexibility in the consolidation program to account for certain undefinable aspects of the construction schedules.

Building the Program

Programming the required actions was done incrementally, yet in an orderly, step-by-step process. As graphically depicted at Figure 6,




FIGURE 6

the program was designed to preserve and maintain the momentum and flexibility necessary toward achieving the plan's objective. Basically, the development of the specific program actions involved separating the required actions into a categorical activity listing for each year in which the action was to occur. For example, the categories in systematic progression were normally as follows:

Relocations - such as unit or functional movements on or to Yokota.

Phasedowns - such as reducing support activities at out-

lying installations.

Reductions - such as preparing facilities and installations for return to the GOJ by removing real (reclaimable) properties, etc.

Closures - formal release of the installation or area to the GOJ.

Once the guidelines and specific timephased actions could be precisely determined, an Outline Programming Plan (OPP) was developed and published. The OPP was intended to provide sufficient information and direction to enable subunits below PACAF, and in some cases below 5AF, to develop specific Programmed Action Directives (PADs) that would explain in detail specific timephased (prioritized) actions required to achieve the objective. The guidance in the OPP enabled the tasked organizations to then develop each PAD so that specific functional areas could identify their own action responsibilities. The precise sequence of these actions was critical to achieving the overall objective in an orderly and timely manner. The PADs thus functioned as effective tools for managers responsible for the program's success. Each PAD action could be monitored to insure that the consolidation and reduction process proceeded along the pre-planned schedule.

The first OPP was a 5AF document titled, "5AF Outline Programming Plan 1-72" and was published in July 1971. This document addressed only FY 72 "unilateral" actions on the Kanto Plain. Follow-on OPPs were smaller in scope due to the vagaries of proposed

actions which resulted from schedule slippages of Yokota construction projects.⁶ In late 1972, instructions were issued by USAF to the host unit at Yokota (475th Air Base Wing) to develop the appropriate PADs for the phasedown and closure of several major installations during calendar year 1973. Although not officially designated as an OPP, these instructions contained essentially the same type of planning information.

The 475th ABW had by this time become proficient in formulating the specific procedures for closing installations and proceeded with the actions necessary to close and release the following six installations in the first six months of 1973: (see Fig. 2, pg. 4 for location)

- Green Park Family Housing Annex
- Johnson Air Base Family Housing Annex
- South Camp Drake (golf course)
- Yamato Air Station (high school)
- Mito Air-to-Ground Range
- East Tachikawa Air Base (partial land release)

An additional installation, Grant Heights, was phased down and closed by the end of September 1973. These closure actions saved the USAF over \$40 million from the FY 73 budget. It is also worth noting that the timeliness of these closure actions avoided what would have been considered a budget overrun as a result of the energy crisis which occurred in late 1973.

In May 1973, subsequent to the COJ decision to accelerate the construction of the critical facilities for the headquarters' move, sufficient planning data was available for USAF planners to proceed with the formulation of another PAD. This PAD was for the final

major consolidation action remaining on the Kanto Plain - - the relocation of the dual headquarters of USAF/USFJ.

The relocation of the dual headquarters to Yokota would permit the subsequent phasedown of Fuchu Air Station to a communications site and the closure of the large housing area nearby at Kanto Mura. The only consolidation actions that would remain subsequent to this major action were considered minor in scope since they were dependent on the availability of other new facilities to be constructed later (FY 75 and 76) by the GOJ. Briefly, these construction projects consisted of such facilities as:

- The hospital addition which would permit the relocation of the USAF Hospital from East Tachikawa to Yokota.
- The U.S. Army mortuary at Tachikawa.
- The completion of the Japan Regional Exchange warehouse and administrative facility would permit that function to be relocated from Tachikawa permitting the entire eastern half of Tachikawa to be closed and released to the GOJ.
- The construction of a replacement facility for the Far East Network radio station, and a bakery facility would permit closure of the facilities previously isolated at South Camp Drake.
- And finally, the remainder of the agreed-to housing (expected to be the last facilities to be constructed) which would eventually permit the closure of the west half of Tachikawa Air Base.

All of the foregoing listed actions were dependent on construction schedules, therefore, the relocation actions attendant to these functions would be relatively minor in scope. Because these actions were in the definite future they could be deferred for later PADS when specific completion dates for each of the facilities could be precisely forecast by the construction engineers.

The Problem of Isolation

One aspect of the consolidation process mentioned only briefly so far was the procedure of isolation. Since the GOJ did not agree to relocate certain communications functions, and because some new facilities preceded others by a considerable period of time, it was necessary that the GOJ provide for the isolation of certain residual operations in outlying areas. Most of these isolation actions were to be temporary while others were to be permanent. The following discussion concerning specific installations serves to illustrate this "isolation" theory and the associated problems.

The east half of Tachikawa is an industrial area consisting primarily of maintenance and warehousing facilities. Peculiarly, there were a few functions sited on East Tachikawa that demanded special types of facilities. First, a U.S. Army mortuary and secondly, a large USAF hospital which was a regional medical facility serving all USAF personnel in the Northeast Asia area. Finally, there was the Japan Regional Exchange complex consisting of a headquarters and administrative element, depot warehousing, catalogue sales and storage facilities, and vehicle and machine maintenance facilities.

The peculiar replacement facilities required to accommodate the foregoing functions were agreed to by the GOJ, but because of funding priorities these particular functional facilities were not scheduled to be completed until the final phases of GOJ construction. All functional activities other than the three just mentioned had been relocated from East Tachikawa during the USAF unilateral phase of consolidation in 1972 and 1973. This meant that a major portion of East Tachikawa would lie idle and require USAF housekeeping maintenance (the cost of which was continually rising) for a period of at least two, and possibly three years. It was obvious to the USAF that if the residual functions of the mortuary, hospital and JRE could be isolated from the rest of the east half of Tachikawa, a considerable savings could be achieved. The rationale was that if these activities could be isolated, the remaining structures and a majority of land space could be immediately returned to the GOJ.

The GOJ initially agreed to perform the isolation actions, but later reneged when the scope and cost of fencing and utilities realignments were precisely defined. The problem of facilities isolation was an extremely serious one for both sides. The USAF was anxious to cut the high cost of maintaining areas and facilities which were no longer required or used. Also, if these facilities and areas were not maintained and secured they would become fire hazards and pest infested. On the other hand, the GOJ insisted that the cost associated with meeting the specific isolation requirements would be exorbitant and in most cases would only be required for an interim period of time. The constant dialogue concerning isolation of

areas received an inordinate amount of time in the frequent negotiating meetings.

In most cases concessions were necessary on the part of both sides in seeking resolution to the isolation problem. In some cases the USAF conceded that the areas be only minimally isolated by the GOJ with the proviso that the responsibility for security and fire protection be assumed by the GOJ. In other cases, however, full security protection was provided by the GOJ. Similar isolation problems were negotiated with respect to Johnson Air Base and South Camp Drake installations. The isolation actions for Fuchu Air Station were slightly different in that the USAF residual communication function would be permanent instead of temporary as in the case of the others. At Fuchu a complete isolation of the USAF residual function and the Japanese Air Self Defense Forces (JASDF) area would not be necessary since both organizations would jointly occupy a small area. The remainder of the installation would then be given back to the GOJ for release to the local suburban Tokyo city of Fuchu.

Timephasing the Actions

The programmers' challenge is to translate a plan in "theory" to a plan in "action." The planner can usually ignore reality to a certain degree because he deals with the indefinite future while the programmer must address the situations of day-to-day reality. In order to properly program the incremental consolidation actions, each step had to allow for a large degree of latitude. This "flexibility factor" always had to be considered so that options were always available to maintain progress toward the established goals of




FIGURE 7

Source: 5AF Plans and Civil Engineers

consolidation.

The best illustration of this was the development of the time-phasing information for the relocation of the Fuchu based headquarters and its support elements. In brief outline, the pacing factors are graphically presented at Figure 7.

The key action of the PAD to close Kanto Mura and phase down Fuchu was the relocation of the dual headquarters. The relocation of the headquarters command element was therefore the pacing factor for each identifiable attendant action. The completion of the new

headquarters facility was considered a critical planning factor if the USAF was to proceed toward consolidating functions on Yokota with the expected result of attaining the 7,500 manpower goal. The GOJ finally agreed that they would try to complete the facility by mid-summer 1974. However, past experience with the GOJ construction schedules indicated that they could be far wrong with this estimate.⁷ Actually, by late 1973, or six months after the GOJ stated the forecast of mid-1974, the ground had not yet been broken. Despite the vagueness of the situation, the program had to be built considering the best information available because the USAF fully intended to achieve the pre-set consolidation goals.

The flexibility factor employed in developing this consolidation program was a R-Day, or relocation day schedule to designate the date the headquarters would physically be intact and operational at Yokota.⁸ This R-Day time schedule was built in June 1973 based on the 31 July 1974 completion date for the replacement facility. Because the headquarters relocation was the end objective of this particular program there were many other associated and preparatory actions that had to be accomplished. An early publication of the PAD was necessary to accommodate a lengthy approval process and to provide sufficient time to obtain all of the communications equipment for the headquarters. The PAD effort was designed to span the entire calendar year of 1974, provided the GOJ made the forecast facility construction schedule. Directly linked to the relocation of the headquarters was the movement of assigned personnel as well as

numerous small headquarters' support elements.

The next step in program development after identifying the total timeframe was the selection of separate movement times for the relocation of the individual headquarters elements. Before the total movement schedule could be developed, it was necessary to poll all elements of both headquarters in order to obtain information concerning the logistical and security aspects of moving each individual office from Fuchu to Yokota. The survey recounted the headquarters' personnel and office equipment that would be relocating as well as the size and type of classified materials to be relocated. From this information a movement schedule for the headquarters' functional elements was developed considering an already limited transportation capability.⁹ The relocation of each critical staff element was determined considering that the Headquarters Command element would move the day before R-Day and all elements would move incrementally by days before or after R-Day. For instance, some of the headquarters' staff elements were not tied as closely to the command element as others so they were normally scheduled to move first. Other offices were tied more closely to either the 5AF or USFJ command element and therefore their movement date was closer to R-Day. Larger staff agencies whose day-to-day business did not demand the entire staff be co-located, were designated to move to Yokota in separate increments.


When the R-Day schedule was completed it was coordinated with all affected organizations and staff elements with instructions on

how to determine and report the possible movement periods for the dependent families of assigned personnel. This was necessary since not all personnel would be relocating to Yokota. Some personnel were in positions which would be deleted while others would be curtailed due to the forced move in-theater.¹⁰ The relocation of approximately 500 families dictated that a housing program and movement schedule be developed to insure the orderly movement of sponsors and dependents. The time selected for this move (provided sufficient housing would be available) was determined to be during the summer months of 1974 (June-August) while the school vacation was in progress. Analyses of both housing availability and school capacities were also developed to insure personnel turmoil would be minimized to the maximum extent possible during the period of the relocation and consolidation toward Yokota.

Besides the families of the personnel serving the headquarters and the headquarters elements, there were other people connected with a host of smaller (official) organizations and agencies on Fuchu Air Station that also had to be relocated. These small units included a district office of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), the district field offices of the University of Maryland, a U.S. Coast Guard detachment, and the Far East offices of the Defense Communications Agency. From an accumulation of all data, the program at Figure 8 was developed. The PAD to support the KPCF final consolidation program was written in June 1973, published in July as a PACAF document and received USAF approval on 10 October 1973.¹¹

During the early months of 1974 the actual housing situation was reviewed once again to insure that all eligible families would receive housing assignments and not be forced to relocate from government quarters to off-base housing which was rapidly becoming scarce as well as exorbitantly priced. The result of the Housing Analysis (Appendix C) pointed out that sufficient housing was available but that careful management of these assets would be critical until such time as the total USAF population numbered less than 7,500. An interim plan to use West Tachikawa housing, until the COJ finished the agreed-to replacement housing, was an important

FIGURE 8. Source: USAF DCS/Plans, 1973



factor. Tachikawa's proximity to Yokota enabled the USAF to use it as a "housing swap" to insure that all eligible families could be accommodated in some form of government housing until the new housing on Yokota could be completed.¹²

By late calendar year 1974 the majority of the major consolidation actions on the Kanto Plain had been successfully completed on schedule. The remaining consolidation actions will be accomplished later as each new functional facility is completed on Yokota.¹³ For example, when the hospital, the mortuary, and the Regional Exchange facilities are accepted from the GOJ these functions will relocate from East Tachikawa Air Base and that installation closed and released to the GOJ. Comparatively speaking, the remaining consolidation actions are relatively minor in scope considering the overall extent of the KPCP and its execution. This is already perceivable in terms of savings that have accrued to the USAF. Considering that most of the KPCP is finished, it is possible at this point to recap some of the major lessons learned. The next chapter will highlight some of the lessons learned and present a summary of the plan's achievement in terms of resource savings.

CHAPTER V

THE PLAN IN RETROSPECT

The management of diminishing resources is one of the most difficult challenges facing most military leaders today. This challenge requires a total awareness of the precise extent of available resources as well as a keen perception of how they can be best managed to produce the maximum benefit in terms of the operational mission assigned to the command. With the KPCP the primary effort was to cut back on every identifiable expenditure in an effort to reduce a huge support complex of bases and units so that greater shares of the budget allowance could be devoted to mission activities.

Even though the KPCP will continue to be operative until approximately 1976 or perhaps beyond (depending on the progress of the GOJ construction schedules), it is possible to draw some conclusions concerning the Plan itself and the extent of its achievements. One aspect of the Plan's development and execution worthy of review at this juncture is to recount some of the lessons learned.

Some Lessons Learned

One lesson of particular note concerns the methodology of determining manpower projections. Manpower scrutiny was a key factor throughout the timeframe of the KPCP. Beyond the pure mechanical calculations of manpower estimating, there was often a necessity to develop innovative methods for determining residual manning levels. For instance, standard manpower factors were not available for application to certain functional activities, while other acti-

vities were easily related to some definable quantity of population or productive activity. The OSI or postal and courier service deal generally on a population basis for service within a geographic area. On the other hand, some functions such as a U.S. Forces radio station in a foreign country, normally operate on a 24 hour basis regardless of large population reductions.

The overall KPCP objective was to achieve maximum reduction of manpower and support costs. The attainment of the KPCP objective demanded full cooperation and an extra measure of effort at all levels. A willingness to self-reduce manpower strengths was recognized as being counter to "normal" organizational protectionist attitudes. Many actual reductions of manpower were made willingly and cooperatively by managers at all levels of supervision. Innovation for streamlining operations had to be found in support functions, as well as in other areas.

One area that was looked at carefully by manpower specialists was new facility maintenance contracting versus direct hire. The theory behind this was that new facilities were much easier to maintain than old ones and therefore an annually renewable contract for building maintenance could be proven more cost effective if amortized over a period of years.

Another lesson learned concerned people affected by the draw-down. In that the Plan affected all U.S. personnel on the Kanto Plain, it was necessary that they be kept constantly informed of what was in store for them. Personal fears and uncertainty during

the tumultuous drawdown period was expected to precipitate some erroneous and demoralizing impressions that the KPCP was going to be detrimental to individual well-being and security. Therefore, it was deemed necessary by commanders that all personnel be apprised of information relating to them as soon as it was available and appropriately declassified. Informative programs were subsequently widely disseminated to convince each individual that he or she was a part of the program and a sense of mission was made clear throughout the tenure of the Plan. A public relations program was developed to inform affected sponsors and their dependents of the details of the plan and how it would impact on their lives. Personnel were advised through every forum and media available that they were contributing toward achieving goals set by the Air Force so that greater budget shares could be devoted toward force modernization and a better USAF for tomorrow.¹

Another problem that was discovered during the incremental drawdown was a time lag in personnel actions. This delay occurred between the time a manpower space was identified for deletion and the actual time the person would depart for the next base of assignment. The problem existed when facilities were not vacated as quickly as possible. Consequently, an attitude of "it can't be done" became commonplace. This feeling prevailed with each major installation phasedown and worked toward delaying timely withdrawal plans. The problem was overcome by actions which began in the summer of 1973 when actual positions for deletion were pre-identified and personnel actions were begun immediately to curtail and relocate the affected personnel.

This method of accelerated departures enabled the timely phasedown and closure actions to proceed unencumbered by residual personnel occupying quarters and requiring support while they awaited re-assignment orders.

One lesson that was learned proved beneficial during the negotiations with the GOJ for replacement facilities. The KPCP negotiating process was a long and tedious process, albeit critical to the needs of the USAF. Because of this, only highly capable people were selected to participate. Negotiating problems and delays were noted to occur whenever either side changed regular participants. Therefore, once capable USAF people were identified and devoted to this project they were permitted to remain in this capacity so that a stable and familiar presence at the negotiating forum could be maintained. This innovation helped to develop a feeling of mutual trust between the opposing negotiators. Also, the U.S. negotiating team chief (SAF Civil Engineer) was permitted a relatively wide latitude in achieving the desired results, thus enabling him to truly negotiate the details, provided the result adhered closely with the original design of the plan. However, when differences were considered significant to warrant a substantial change to the pre-set and outlined objectives, higher headquarters approval was solicited. These negotiating procedures proved extremely successful and permitted many proposals to be explored at sub-levels of decision making prior to formal presentation at appropriate approval levels. Alternatives were also allowed to be explored using

this informal screening process, thus saving time and proving beneficial to both sides of the negotiation. Examples of this successful informal procedure were discussed earlier. These were the isolation agreements, construction siting and the headquarters acceleration.

Programming problems frequently occurred when adjustments were made to the GOJ construction schedule. Any such delay precipitated a corresponding readjustment of the USAF consolidation program. Sometimes these adjustments were minor but occasionally they caused a complete reshuffle of the program. One such incident occurred subsequent to the conclusion of the final agreement that the GOJ signed and announced in January of 1973.²

One Final Problem

The key facility in this final agreement was the provision of the new headquarters building. However, delays were experienced in initiation of the headquarters building which under the terms of the original understanding with the GOJ was to have begun in early August 1973. The Government of Japan stated that the reasons for the delay in the contract award was the rising cost of construction labor and materials was causing extreme problems in the GOJ Finance Ministry. By this time (fall 1973), the concluding programmed consolidation effort was outlined and approved for implementation beginning in January 1974. Without benefit of the headquarters facility and a few other key facilities (such as an expansion to the telephone exchange to handle the increased load of a headquarters

complex and three general officer quarters) the entire plan would have to be slipped and additional funding requested to accommodate the slippage. Only through arduous discussion between senior U.S. officials and high ranking GQJ officials was an agreement reached to readdress facility priorities in favor of the timeframe required by the USAF.


The result, however, necessitated a compromise on several financing issues that would stretch out construction schedules for follow-on KPOF facilities. The GQJ accepted the challenge to begin the key facilities immediately by reprogramming funds to earlier key projects to cover the escalated costs of these facilities. The result was that the headquarters building construction was finally begun in late December 1973. The expected completion date for this building was once again to be by late July 1974. Completion of this facility at that time would barely afford the USAF the opportunity to proceed with its earlier schedule. The most negative aspect of this problem solution to the USAF was that some of the follow-on community support facilities would be deferred to a later completion date thus requiring the USAF to rely more on the retention of Tachikawa for a longer period to make up the difference in community support facilities.³

Accrued Benefits

The entire planning process could not have been handled so quickly with the GQJ had the local commander (5AF/USFJ) not been afforded the latitude to deal directly with the GQJ concerning the content

and progress of the overall plan. Neither would the plan have proceeded toward a logical and beneficial conclusion had not the GOJ been willing to cooperate so fully, in spite of the inflation trends, throughout the tenure of the plan. The accrued benefits, in terms of resource savings, are reflected on the charts and tables that follow (figs. 9, 10, and 11).

FIGURE 9 Source: USAF Office of Manpower and Organization



12
3
~240M




FIGURE 10.

Source: 5AF Comptroller, Jan 74.

KANTO PLAIN FACILITIES STATISTICS

Fiscal Year	Facility Releases				Green Pk./Grant Hgts & KPCP Facility Gain	
	no. of Facilities Released	Space (sq. ft)	Family Qtrs.	Area Size (acres)	Space (sq. ft)	no. of FAM. Qtrs.
1973	6	4.5 mil.	1,595	3,772	1.2 mil.	610
1974	1	1.4 mil.	774	257	.8 mil.	300
1975-76	3	9.5 mil.	1,909	1,806	1.7 mil.	415
TOTAL	10	15.4 mil.	4,278	5,835	3.7 mil.	1,325

NOTE: Data to right of double line reflects total facilities construction package agreed-to by the GOJ in exchange for those areas and facilities listed to the left of the double line. No additional land or facilities were requested by the U.S. since a much reduced USAF population was forecast to perform the residual mission of the USAF in Japan.

FIGURE 11

Source: 5AF Civil Engineer

To the United States, other subsequent benefits of the consolidation plan can be summarized as follows:

- Maximum closure of facilities prior to the energy crisis of October 1973.
- Majority of personnel closer to work centers, thus significantly reducing the time and distance personnel travel through increasingly more difficult traffic congestion on Tokyo's thoroughfares.
- Consolidation of numerous small operations enabled them to operate more efficiently with less manpower than before.
- Administrative support costs for aerial (helicopter) and ground transportation is now significantly reduced since the Headquarters' relocated to Yokota Air Base.
- The consolidation of support facilities also permits the USAF to allocate scarce resources (manpower and budget) to sustain the mission units and facilities which are vital to the defense mission in Northeast Asia.

To the Government of Japan, the major benefits of the KPCP can be summarized as follows:

- The KPCP permitted the release of a large amount of valuable land in the metropolitan Tokyo area to the people of Japan.
- Reduced the total presence of U.S. Forces personnel which had previously been scattered throughout metropolitan Tokyo.

the nation's capital city.

- Eased the gold flow situation between U.S. and Japan, thereby reducing pressures on U.S. - Japan trade discussions.
- Demonstrated to the U.S. that the GOJ is willing to share the burden of the U.S. defense commitment to Japan.
- The improved utility systems of the new construction has helped reduce the USAF's ecological impact on the environment in Japan.

Besides realizing a significant monetary savings, the USAF has gained an extended utility of a key contingency base in Northeast Asia for which a large share of the credit can deservedly be attributed to the Government of Japan. This, plus the multi-service benefits in the offing on Okinawa which, as it appears at this point, will be financed by the GOJ, will constitute a sizeable regional defense expenditure, significantly contributing to the defense and stability in the Northeast Asia region.

Perhaps this case study of a successful USAF plan and program will serve some useful purpose in future U.S. force posturing in that it records the methodology employed for achieving a significant cost-savings through dedicated and persevering efforts in effective resource management.

APPENDIX A

KANTO PLAIN CONSOLIDATION PLAN

SMALL UNIT RELOCATIONS

APPENDIX A

SUBJECT: Small Unit/Agency Relocations in accordance with the provisions of the Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan.

Source: Pacific Air Forces Program Action Directive, 74-1, July 1973, pp. D1-3.

The following list is not a complete compendium but rather a sample of the types of units/agencies that existed on the Kanto Plain and for which the USAF was responsible for supporting.

UNITS RELOCATING FROM FUCHU TO YOKOTA.

41 Aerial Rescue/Recovery Wing, Operating Location Alpha.
746 Air Force Band.
20 Weather Squadron.
Hqtrs Office of Special Investigations (OSI), District 46.
1956 Communications Group.
Electronic Systems Division (ESD), Detachment 11.
6004 Management Engineering Squadron, Det. 2, (Manpower and Organization).
Defense Communications Agency (DCA).
USAF Postal and Courier Service (USAFPCS), Det. 10.
Military Amateur Radio Station (MARS).
U.S. Coast Guard Detachment
District Office of the University of Maryland (responsible for off-duty military education).
Pacific Exchange (Army & Air Force) Procurement Office.

UNITS RELOCATING FROM TACHIKAWA TO YOKOTA

Pacific Exchange (PACEX) Airline Catering Service.
Furniture and Appliance Repair Workshop and Warehouse.
Housing Supply Administration Offices.
USAF Civilian Personnel Office.
Royal Thai Air Force Detachment (United Nations Command).
Federal Aviation Agency
Department of Defense Schools District Office.
DOD Schools Supply Warehouse and Curriculum Center.

APPENDIX B

KANTO PLAIN CONSOLIDATION PLAN

CONSTRUCTION PACKAGE

GRANT HEIGHTS/GREEN PARK
QUID PRO QUO

PHASE I

<u>FACILITY</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>COST (\$000)</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
Family Housing	256 units	\$9,530.0	Completed Sep 72
Telephone Exc	9,630 SF	1,308.0	Completed Aug 72
Dog Kennel Pac	2,539 SF	88.7	Completed Mar 72
Utility Plts/Sys	LS	7,216.0	Completed Aug 72
Total Phase I Cost:		\$18,142.7	

PHASE II

<u>FACILITY</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>COST (\$000)</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
Family Housing	340 units	\$13,720.0	Completion Apr 72
Senior Off Housing	14 units	1,289.0	Completion Apr 72
Elementary School	38,252 SF	790.0	Completion Apr 72
High School	54,118 SF	1,570.0	Completion May 72
Gym	21,261 SF	654.0	Completion May 72
Commissary	52,400 SF	1,600.0	Completed Mar 72
Utility Plts/Sys	LS	6,161.0	Completion Apr 72
		\$25,784.0	

PHASE III

<u>FACILITY</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>COST (\$000)</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
Hi-Rise Units (Fam Hsg)	210 units	\$11,400.0	ECCD: Mar 74*
Family Housing	90 units	3,800.0	ECCD: Oct 73
Dispensary	49,560 SF	2,900.0	ECCD: Mar 74
Multi-Purpose/Svc	28,000 SF	950.0	ECCD: Feb 74
Kindergarten	3,703 SF	84.0	ECCD: Nov 73
Utility Plt/Sys	LS	4,344.6	ECCD: Mar 74
		\$23,478.6	

*ECCD: Estimated Construction Completion Date

PHASE IV

<u>FACILITY</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>COST (\$000)</u>	<u>STATUS (ECCG)</u>
Airmen Dorm	48 mn	\$389.0	May 74
BOQ	56 mn	976.0	May 74
CE Admin	9,630 SF	254.0	May 74
Supp Hse	31,500 SF	527.0	Mar 74
Chapel	22,000 SF	1,166.0	Aug 74
Nursery	3,450 SF	99.0	Mar 74
Hi-Rise Apartments	140 units	8,620.0	Oct 74
Retn Workshop	15,000 SF	623.0	Apr 74
Bleachers/Fld Hse	1,800 seats	220.0	Mar 74
Theater	19,300 SF	635.0	Aug 74
Officers Club	26,700 SF	1,432.0	Jun 74
Security Police Ops	3,700 SF	146.0	Apr 74
CE Maint Shop	15,000 SF	519.0	Mar 74
CE Stor Fac	8,150 SF	130.0	Mar 74
Auto Maint/Admin	15,680 SF	543.0	May 74
Supply Shed	8,730 SF	85.0	Feb 74
B X Garage	16,400 SF	127.0	Mar 74
Small Arms Range	11,526 SF	317.0	Mar 74
Pyrotechnic Storage	5,459 SF	110.0	Jun 74
Youth Center	16,700 SF	597.0	May 74
Post Office Addn	720 SF	97.0	Mar 74
Softball Fld	1 ea	78.0	Mar 74

PHASE IV
(continued)

<u>FACILITY</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>COST (\$000)</u>	<u>STATUS (ECCD)</u>
Rect Courts (Outdoor)	2 ea.	36.0	Mar 74
Golf Driving Runge	1 ea	110.0	Unk
Veh Parking/Roads	LS	638.0	Oct 74
Utility Plants/Sys	LS	4,600.0	Oct 74
		<u>\$23,074.0</u>	

Note: Estimated start of design of Phase IV items by GOJ is 10 June 1973.

TOTAL GH/GP COST

Phase I	\$18,142,700
Phase II	25,784,000
Phase III	23,478,600
Phase IV	23,074,000
	<u>\$90,479,300</u>

<u>KPCP</u>			
<u>PHASE I</u>			
<u>FACILITY</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>COST (\$000)</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
Hq 5AF/USFJ	87,000 SF	\$4,800.0	*
GOQ	3 units/15,000 SF	600.0	*
Hospital/Maint Shop	75,900 SF	6,400.0	*
OO	150,300 SF	4,570.0	*
Kindergarten/Elem School	20,300 SF	500.0	*
NCO Club	36,000 SF	2,160.0	*
JRE Warehouse/Maint Shop	292,000 SF	5,830.0	*
JRE Admin	23,000 SF	1,040.0	*
Mortuary	10,000 SF	600.0	*
Utility Pits/Sys	LS	9,000.0	*
		<u>\$35,500.0</u>	

Note: * Design start date is o/a 10 June 1973 for Phase I line items. Construction is estimated to start in September and November 1973. Completion dates have not been provided by GOJ.

<u>PHASE II/III</u>			
<u>FACILITY</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>COST (\$000)</u>	<u>STATUS (**)</u>
Hi-Rise Units/Fam Hsg	272 units	\$17,000.0	
Temp Lodging Qtrs	53,400 SF	1,600.0	
Gymnasium	31,000 SF	1,150.0	
Gymnasium	9,800 SF	363.0	
JRE Bakery	20,000 SF	1,000.0	
Community Center	20,000 SF	600.0	
Fire Station	5,000 SF	250.0	
Far East Network	*30,000 SF	1,800.0	

KPCF
PHASE II/III
(continued)

<u>FACILITY</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>COST (\$000)</u>	<u>STATUS (**)</u>
Security Police Fac	2,900 SF	130.0	
LN Dining Hall	7,000 SF	224.0	
CB Admin	8,200 SF	357.0	
CB Maint	29,000 SF	882.0	
CB Covered Storage	27,400 SF	313.0	
Supp/Transp Whse	95,800 SF	1,960.0	
Med Whse/Food Insp	39,600 SF	950.0	
Lounge Dayroom	11,800 SF	295.0	
Auto Parts & Serv Sta	11,400 SF	750.0	
Gas Station	600 SF	40.0	
Theater	10,300 SF	515.0	
Theater	6,900 SF	345.0	
Auto Hobby Center	4,900 SF	196.0	
Chapel	8,000 SF	508.0	
Bank	3,500 SF	225.0	
Base Exchange	6,600 SF	264.0	
In-Flight Kitchen	5,500 SF	400.0	
Admin (Mgt Det Ctl)	7,000 SF	450.0	
Outdoor Rctn Fac	LS	290.0	
Alterations	118,700 SF	1,190.0	
Utility Pits/Sys	LS	10,200.0	
		<u>\$44,247.0</u>	

*Scope is USAF estimate only and currently under negotiation.
 **Status of Phase II and III line items are not known at this time.

TOTAL KPCP COST

Phase I	\$35,500,000
Phases II & III	<u>44,247,000</u>
	\$79,747,000

APPENDIX C

KANTO PLAIN FAMILY HOUSING ANALYSIS

APPENDIX C, Chart 1.

"Kanto Plain Housing Analysis - FQ 3/74 thru FQ 4/76"




CHART EXPLANATION

1. Ninety Garden Apartments from Phase III construction of GH/GP.
2. Completion of first three Hi-Rise Apartment Buildings (70 quarters/)
3. Demolishment and removal of 82 old quarters to make room for new.
4. Kanto Mura Closure and Fuchu Phasedown.
5. Second increment of Hi-Rise apartments (140 family quarters).
6. Completion of final housing increment of 4 Hi-Rise buildings (272 family quarters).
7. Phasedown and closure of West Tachikawa Housing Area.

- - Housing Assets excess to total requirements.
- ⊖ - Forecast housing deficit on-base. (68 family quarters)

Source: USAF DCS/Plans, 10Jan74.

APPENDIX D

PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF CONCLUDING AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE GOVERNMENT OF

JAPAN CONCERNING THE KANTO PLAIN

CONSOLIDATION PLAN

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96328

FILE
R.



23 JAN 1973.

TO: All USAF Personnel - Kanto Plains Area

In a previous letter to you I promised that when more detailed information was releasable concerning the consolidation of Air Force activities in the Kanto Plain, I would keep you advised.

The attached Fact Sheet represents the situation as it exists now. No target dates for actual relocation or closure actions are firm as of now. A special working group of U.S. and Japanese Government representatives has been established to determine time tables for construction of the facilities needed at Yokota for completion of the consolidation by 1976.

Every effort will be made in our planning to lessen the personal inconveniences of moving to new quarters and duty locations. Particular attention will be paid to the problems associated with interruptions in dependent school terms.

Once again, I wish to caution you on the imprudence of believing the rumors and, especially, the speculative articles in the press which will continue to appear. I assure you the firm dates of actions to be taken will be disseminated to you as soon as they are known and verified.

Robert E. Pursley
ROBERT E. PURSLEY, Lt General, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
Fact Sheet

FACT SHEET

REALIGNMENT AND CONSOLIDATION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FACILITIES IN JAPAN

The consolidation and relocation actions announced in the Security Consultative Committee joint statement of January 23, 1973, which are scheduled to begin in the near future and to be completed by March 1976, will involve reduction and shifts of facilities, U.S. personnel and Japanese employees of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army in Japan; and will involve the relocation and construction by the Government of Japan of certain facilities within other areas which the U.S. will continue to retain.

A breakdown of the consolidations, realignments and reductions is as follows:

1. U.S. AIR FORCE

a. Facilities to be completely returned to the Government of Japan:

- (1) Tachikawa Air Base
- (2) Yamato Air Station (which is part of Tachikawa Air Base)
- (3) Kanto Mura Family Housing Annex
- (4) Mito Air-Ground Range (Ibaragi Prefecture)

b. Facilities - major portions of which will be returned to the

Government of Japan:

- (1) Fuchu Air Station
- (2) Johnson Family Housing Annex
- (3) Camp Asaka (South Camp Drake)

c. Personnel reductions involved (approximate):

(1) U.S. Air Force Military Personnel	2,100
(2) U.S. Civilian Employees	500
(3) Japanese Employees	2,600
(4) U.S. Air Force Dependents	7,500

NOTE: Dates and timetables of personnel releases and reductions and of relocations and consolidations of facilities and areas will be determined by the Governments of Japan and the United States within the existing structure of the Joint Committee, established by Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement.

d. Total area to be returned to the Government of Japan:

About ^{5,500}~~5,500~~ acres of land (about ^{22,13,333}~~22,133,333~~ square meters) and about 12,900,000 square feet (about 1,200,000 square meters) of floor space.

e. Facilities to be retained by the United States:

(1) Yokota Air Base: Yokota Air Base will remain as the only major U.S. Air Force installation in the Kanto Plain. The return of facilities and areas listed above will involve the relocation and construction by the Government of Japan at Yokota Air Base of additional housing and administrative, medical, logistical, maintenance, transportation, recreational and community service facilities, and related utilities. Certain costs involved in the moving of household goods, supplies and equipment from returned areas and installations to Yokota Air Base will be funded by the U.S. Government.

- (2) Tokorozawa Transmitter Site (in support of Yokota Air Base)
- (3) Tama Service Annex (in support of Yokota Air Base)
- (4) Part of Fuchu Air Station (in support of Yokota Air Base)
- (5) Part of Johnson Family Housing Annex (in support of Yokota Air Base)

2. U. S. ARMY


Facilities to be completely returned to the Government of Japan:

Camp Fuchinobe (163 acres or 659,636 square meters): Certain facilities from Camp Fuchinobe will be relocated at Camp Zama and at Sagami-hara Family Housing Annex, ~~consisting of and of the government on relocation plans consisting of about 400,000 square meters of floor space (15,000,000 square meters).~~

APPENDIX E

"YOKOTA MASTER PLAN for NEW CONSTRUCTION"

"YOKOTA MASTER PLAN FOR
NEW CONSTRUCTION"



APPENDIX B "YOKOTA MASTER PLAN for NEW CONSTRUCTION"

LEGEND (continued):

1. Tower Apartments
2. Elementary School
3. Kindergarten/Elementary School
4. Gymnasium
5. Community Center
6. Garden Apartments
7. Dispensary/Hospital
8. High School and Gymnasium
9. Japan Regional Exchange Warehouse
10. Base Supply Warehouse
11. Civil Engineering Storage
12. Civil Engineering Administration
13. USFJ/5AF Headquarters
14. General Officer's Quarters
15. Civil Engineering Maintenance
16. Base Gymnasium
17. Non-commissioned Officer's Club
18. Bachelor Officer's Quarters
19. Hobby Shop
20. Youth Center
21. Chapel Center
22. Bachelor Officer's Quarters
23. Officer's Club
24. Commissary
25. Child care Center
26. Theater
27. Base Exchange Garage
28. Main Base Exchange
29. Family Housing
30. Tower Apartments
31. Basketball courts
32. Tower Apartments
33. Far East Network Radio Station

FOOTNOTES

NOTES ON CHAPTER I

1. Fifth Air Force History, FY 71, (1 July 1970 - 30 June 1971) Vol. I, Headquarters Fifth Air Force, Office of History Fuchu Air Station, Japan, January 1972, pp. 10-39. SECRET. Hereafter cited as 5AF History, FY 71.

2. "JAPAN," World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 11, Chicago, Ill.: Field Enterprises Educational Corp., 1973, p. 42. Source cites the Kanto Plain as being, "Japan's greatest lowland ..." The Kanto Plain spreads east from the mountains of central Honshu to the Pacific Ocean. Metropolitan Tokyo, the nation's capital and largest city, takes up a good portion of the Kanto Plain. In 1972, Tokyo recorded a population of 11,408,071 in the greater metropolitan area of 827 square miles.

3. 5AF History, FY 71, p. 32

4. The current host unit at Yokota is designated the 475th Air Base Wing and is responsible for the support of all USAF functions on the Kanto Plain. In 1972 the wing organizational structure was as depicted below.

Headquarters Pacific Air Forces

Fifth Air Force

Headquarters 475th Air Base Wing

475th CAM Sqn	475th AB Sqn (Tachikawa)
475th Supply Sqn	USAF Hospital (Tachikawa)
475th Sec. Police Sqn	37th AB Sqn (Fuchu)
475th Transportation Sqn	34th AB Sqn (Grant Heights)
475th Civil Engineering Sqn	6120th Broadcasting Sqn (Drake)
475th Services Sqn	OLAB 475th AB Wing (Misawa AB)* (also a USAF Dispensary)
331st AB Sqn (Johnson AB)	
6123 AB Sqn (Chitose A.S.)* (also a USAF Clinic)	
OIAA 475th AB Wing (Shingu Wells)*	

5. 5AF History, FY 71, pp. 7-11. Fifth Air Force, a USAF subordinate unit under Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (Hickam AFB, HI.), commands two air divisions (designated 313th AD on Okinawa and the 314th AD in Korea) and one air base wing (at Yokota, the 475th ABW). The geographic area of responsibility includes all of Japan and

South Korea with a determined amount of surrounding air and seaspace. The 5AF Commander also functions as the Commander of all U.S. Military Forces in Japan (designated as COMUSFJ), but as such he has no operationally assigned forces. The USFJ Joint Staff consists of approximately 110 officer and enlisted personnel from all branches of the U.S. military. The 5AF staff has approximately 320 USAF military and civilian personnel.

6. This figure includes officers, enlisted, civilian, and local national personnel representing all the USAF manpower spaces authorized at the time the plan was initiated. Source: 5AF Office of Manpower and Organization.

7. Jack W. Davis (GS-12) and Thomas A. Pierce (M/Sgt, USAF), Fifth Air Force History: FY 1973, (1 July 1972 - 30 June 1973) Vol. I, Headquarters Fifth Air Force, Office of History, Fuchu Air Station, Japan, 22 January 1974, pp. 58-59. SECRET. Hereafter cited as 5AF History, FY 73.

8. Frank Langdon, Politics in Japan, New York: Little, Brown & Co., 1967, p. 132.

9. USAF OUTLINE PROGRAMMING PLAN 1-71, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., September 1971, SECRET.

10. "U.S. - Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)," Selected International Agreements, AF Pamphlet 110-20, Department of the Air Force, 1 June 1973. The U.S. - Japan SOFA states that the Japanese Government will provide rent-free facilities and installations to the U.S. military forces in order for them to meet valid military requirements. When no valid requirement exists for such facilities or areas, the U.S. is obligated to return such facilities and areas to the Government of Japan.

11. Pacific Air Forces Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Hickam AFB, HI., 31 March 1971, SECRET.

12. 5AF History, FY 73, p. 58.

13. Jack W. Davis and Thomas A. Pierce, Fifth Air Force History: FY 1972, (1 July 1971 - 30 June 1972) Vol. I, Headquarters Fifth Air Force, Fuchu Air Station, Japan, 25 January 1973, p. 175, SECRET. Hereafter cited as 5AF History, FY 72.

NOTES ON CHAPTER II

1. "Civil Engineering Support," Pacific Air Forces Programmed Action Directive (PAD) 74-1, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces,

Hickam AFB, HI., July 1973, Appendix I to Annex D, p. D-I-1. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Hereafter cited as PACAF PAD 74-1.

2. Green Park Family Housing Annex was a single building (see Fig. 2 on page 4) which was capable of accommodating and supporting 636 families. The Grant Heights Family Housing Area was a much larger installation (330.88 acres) and had 1430 sets of family quarters (two, three and four bedroom sizes) along with a full complement of community support facilities. Source: 5AF Civil Engineering Office.

3. 5AF History, FY 71, p. 32.

4. Ibid. See also Area 6 on the diagram at page 84.

5. The term for such reductions is, "Base Operating Support" or, more commonly, BOS. BOS is calculated to normally be 15 to 18% of a normal installation's military manpower.

6. This iterative manpower and space requirement process proceeds as follows: a reduction in a unit's manpower strength will equal a lower facility space requirement which in turn will net a corresponding reduction in total support requirements (BOS).

7. 5AF History, FY 71, Loc. Cit., p. 58.

8. 5AF History, FY 72, pp. 14 and 175.

9. The reader may wish to refer back to Fig. 4 on page 9 to note again the actual manpower strength at the end of the KPCP.

10. 5AF History, FY 71, p. 79.

11. Ibid.

12. "Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan," USAF Outline Program-
ing Plan 1-72, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington, D. C., September 1972, SECRET. Hereafter cited as USAF OPP 1-72.

13. "Yokota Consolidation Plan," Editorial, ASAHI Daily News, Tokyo, Japan, November 24, 1972, p. 2.

14. 5AF History, FY 72, pp. 178-9.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., p. 180.

17. The Japan Fiscal Year (JFY) referred to in the text runs on a different time schedule than does the U.S. fiscal year. The JFY begins on 1 April and ends on 31 March of the next calendar year.

18. The Special Working Group was primarily comprised of individuals from both sides who were technically knowledgeable in the engineering field.

19. 5AF History, FY 73, p. 75.

NOTES ON CHAPTER III

1. One such reduction action referred to was Honote Village, a small housing annex (only 167 family quarters) situated on South Camp Drake (see fig. 2 on page 4 for location). This housing area did not have many community support facilities, therefore, most of its support services came from Grant Heights, which was close by.

2. This small unit, designated the 36th Air Rescue/Recovery Squadron, possessed HC-130 aircraft and often practiced some of its rescue missions over water area clear zones (ranges). Reference to the map on page 31 will show that Mito Air-to-Ground Range was situated on the coast. Mito therefore proved suitable water area for paratroop training as well as an accessible shoreline for equipment and personnel recovery operations.

3. Dollar amount calculated by Mr. George Nakamura, (CS-12) of the Real Estate Division of the 5th Air Force Civil Engineering Office.

4. The 347th Tactical Fighter Wing was not the only unit to depart Yokota in 1971 and 1972. Though smaller in size by comparison to the tactical fighter wing the other departing units were:

67th Reconnaissance Technical Unit
556th Reconnaissance Squadron
6988th Security Squadron

Source: 5AF History, FY 72, p. 181.

5. The KPCP Special Working Group became the official negotiating committee, co-chaired by a representative of the Japanese Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFMA) and the chief U.S. representative who was the 5AF Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Engineering. Sub-groups were established as required to work out the details of specific requirements of the facility requirements packages.

6. Tachikawa Air Base had a total of 952 family quarters, however, they were mostly old structures. Some of the oldest quarters were demolished or condemned while more serviceable units were preserved for use until the new Yokota housing projects could be completed by the GOJ. At Appendix C is a housing analysis diagram that

depicts the calculated phasedown schedule for the Tachikawa housing.

7. An example of the community support cutbacks was the draw-down of the Tachikawa commissary operation to a 'site branch' (i.e. from a full size grocery store to something similar to a stop-n-shop or curb market store). This action was taken after the new Yokota commissary was opened and available to Tachikawa housed patrons.

8. Kenneth K. Kawanami, History of the 475th Air Base Wing, 1 July to 30 September 1977. Vol. I, Headquarters 475 ABW, Yokota, Japan, October 1973, p. 61.

9. Each hi-rise building was to be nine stories tall, served by two elevators, and contain 70 to 72 three bedroom apartments. A total of nine of these hi-rise structures were finally agreed to by the COJ.

10. The floor space of the hi-rise apartments was calculated to be slightly larger than that of the two story 'garden apartments' due to the absence of stairwell (dead) space.

11. The final total of 1325 new family quarters agreed to for Yokota were of the following types:

3 & 4 Bedroom 'garden' apartments	626*
3 bedroom hi-rise apartments (9 buildings)	682 (5 bldgs = 410 apartments*)
Senior Officer's quarters	14
General Officer's quarters	3
total	1325

* Constructed in the former Weapons Storage Area. See Area 6 on the diagram at pg. 84.

12. In most cases the Japanese construction standards exceeded US Standards due to adherence to absorb and protect against earthquake tremors. Source: JAF Civil Engineers.

13. This forecast dollar requirement was considered prohibitive at this particular time (March/April 1973) due to the on-going outback and withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam.

NOTES ON CHAPTER IV

1. PACAF PAD 74-1, p. 1
2. USAF OPP 1-72, p. 5.
3. Refer back to FN. 5, Chapter II, pg. 88, for an explanation

of BOS (Base Operating Support).

4. 5AF History, FY 73, p. 24. In the last fiscal quarter of 1972, 5AF was cutback from 749 personnel to 319.

5. For example, the following functional areas were eliminated from either the 5AF or the 475th ABW staffs by consolidating all activities of these functions on one facility.

Chaplain
Judge Advocate
Administration

Surgeon
Comptroller

6. PACAF PAD 74-1, p. 2.

7. "Kanto Plain Consolidation," USAF/DFAA Minutes of the Twenty-sixth Special Working Group Meeting, Headquarters 5th Air Force, Fuchu A.S., Japan, 20 April 1973, para. 3. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

8. The 'R'(relocation) Day schedule was designed to permit as much flexibility as possible during the final planning phases of the plan. This was accomplished by taking the GOJ estimated construction completion date (ECCD), adding the time required for the installation and checkout of the Headquarter's command and control communication package and then allowing a two week buffer period for possible miscalculations. The pre-determined date for activating the dual headquarters at Yokota was computed to be in the mid-November timeframe. The original R-Day was tentatively designated to be on 12 November 1974. For planning purposes during formulation of the relocation schedule, all activities that were dependent on the availability of the new headquarter's facility were identified to relocate on a specific R plus or R minus day, i.e. R - 2 would be on 10 November while R + 2 would be on 14 November.

9. Earlier manpower adjustments had severely reduced the 475th ABW Transportation Squadron thus limiting its ability to handle a high volume movement of personnel and equipment over a short period of time.

10. PACAF PAD 74-1, p. B-2.

11. Ibid., p. 1.

NOTES ON CHAPTER V

1. History of the 475th Air Base Wing, Op. Cit., p. 87.

2. Since the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control on 15 May 1972, the GOJ had been pressuring the US to consolidate andre-

X
duce its widespread military activities on Okinawa. The KPCP success indicated that a consolidation of some US military activities on Okinawa could be achieved provided the GOJ would be willing to construct certain replacement facilities for each of the US military services on Okinawa and in other parts of Japan. This program became known as the "Japan Facilities Adjustment Program" and was promising to the US since it would be worth approximately \$237 million in new construction to the benefit of the residual US military forces based on Okinawa.

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