Special Reports are longer, often more technical, documents consisting of entire articles, government statements, and other documents relevant to security and peace in Northeast Asia.
FRANCE: NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS
BENOÎT PELOPIDAS JUNE 13, 2019 II. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Benoît Pelopidas outlines what is known about French NC3 and identifies discursive, sociological and temporal challenges to assessing the validity of claims on this topic. After reviewing the primacy of presidential nuclear authority, the nuclear chain of command, civilian control over the arsenal, tension […]
Go to the articleDPRK’S NC3 SYSTEM
MYEONGGUK CHEON JUNE 6, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Myeongguk Cheon describes what is known about North Korea’s NC3 system. He concludes: “Regarding the DPRK’s NC3 system, however, many questions remain unanswered, even though it is clearly identified who has the final approval authority and what forces operates delivery systems for the employment […]
Go to the articleSECURITY AT EXTREME SCALES
ERIC GROSSE MAY 30, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this paper, Eric Grosse argues: “Much of the security progress over the past decade has been at large-scale, finding and patching vulnerabilities in widely used applications or defending networks of millions of machines containing high-value data. The lessons there may help military systems, but for the […]
Go to the articleMETHODS FOR REFINING ESTIMATES OF CUMULATIVE DPRK URANIUM PRODUCTION
DAVID VON HIPPEL May 27, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this report, David von Hippel “provides a demonstration of the potential impact of remote sensing methods and testing in the DPRK in reducing uncertainties in cumulative historical uranium production, and thus in fissile materials inventories; and, offers conclusions, resulting from the potential impacts of uncertainty […]
Go to the articleU.S. NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
JOHN R. HARVEY MAY 24, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, John Harvey asserts that the US NC3 system “must seek vastly improved senior leader conferencing capabilities to support decisions that go beyond what some of us call the Cold War’s “multiple choice test”—that is, which major attack option to execute. To support consultations […]
Go to the articleVERIFICATION OF DPRK NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: THE PROS AND CONS OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES (SPECIFICALLY, THE ROK) PARTICIPATING IN THIS VERIFICATION PROGRAM
JOHN CARLSON MAY 19 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, John Carlson argues how a non-nuclear weapons state like the ROK may be involved in verification of nuclear disarmament by the DPRK in a manner consistent with non-proliferation principles. John Carlson was director general of the Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office. He was appointed […]
Go to the articleNC3 IN A MULTIPOLAR NUCLEAR WORLD: BIG STRUCTURES AND LARGE PROCESSES
PAUL BRACKEN MAY 14, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Paul Bracken analyzes the big structures and large processes of nuclear multipolarity. The structures include the national command and control of at least eighteen countries, to include nine nuclear weapon states, “shared” weapons in NATO, missile defense, and key intelligence nodes in select […]
Go to the articleDATA AND MODELING REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTRICITY GRID INTERCONNECTIONS
JAY GIRI MAY 9, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Jay Giri “describes real-time grid management, control center EMS functions and inter-utility data exchange. It also describes the benefits and challenges of inter-utility grid management and examples of international utilities working together. It specifically addresses modeling requirements for international inter-utility operation. Finally, it describes an innovative […]
Go to the articleSYNTHESIS REPORT–NC3 SYSTEMS AND STRATEGIC STABILITY: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW
PETER HAYES, BINOY KAMPMARK, PHILIP REINER, DEBORAH GORDON MAY 5 2019 I. INTRODUCTION This essay is the Synthesis Report of a workshop of fifty NC3 experts held at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University on January 22 to 23, 2019. Nine states have nuclear weapons and fourteen states have nuclear command, control, and communications […]
Go to the articleREDUCING NUCLEAR DANGERS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: BILATERAL VERSUS MULTILATERAL APPROACHES
THOMAS GRAHAM APRIL 8 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Thomas Graham concludes: “As the two Koreas and the great powers, especially the United States, consider their options of the best political and legal framework in which to realize a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, it is prudent to note the strengths and weaknesses of the […]
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