DPRK (North Korea) Chronology for 2004

1/1/04:
Gary Samore: “In the case of North Korea the Libya model is unrealistic. It is not plausible that the North Korean regime, given their perception of the world, will give up their missiles, chemical, biological and nuclear programs in exchange for better relations. They view them as essential for their survivability. The best you can do is to achieve limits.” (Michael R. Gordon, “Giving Up Those Weapons: After Libya, Who Is Next?” New York Times, January 1, 2004, p. A-10)

1/2/04:
North Korea has agreed to allow a U.S. delegation to visit its nuclear complex at Yongbyon next week ahead of likely negotiations with its neighbors and the United States. The delegation would be the first to see the site since North Korea expelled foreign weapons inspectors a year ago. Members of the U.S. delegation say it includes Sig Hecker, director from 1985 to 1997 of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, which produced the first U.S. nuclear bomb and still constructs weapons. Hecker has been told he can visit Yongbyon, where the North Koreans restarted a reactor last year and may have reprocessed used fuel to make plutonium for a half-dozen bombs. (Barbara Slavin, “North Korea Oks U.S. Visit to Complex,” USA Today, Janaury 2, 2004) President Bush read article. “I didn’t authorize this,” he told NSA Condoleezza Rice. “Shut it down.” Rice called SecState Powell, who called Senator Joseph Biden (D-DL) to pass along the message. But in a later call to Biden, Powell said he told the White House he didn’t have the authority to block the trip, but the White wanted it shut down. “Are you, sir, saying that it would be unhelpful for them to go,” asked Biden. “No, I can’t say that. I’m just telling you what I’m told to communicate,” replied Powell. “Fine,” said Biden. “They’ll go.” (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 198)

1/6-10/04:
Sig Hecker, John Lewis and Jack Pritchard in Yongbyon: “This is not a U.S. government-sponsored trip, said someone involved in the planning. “The U.S. government has no say. Nor were they asked to say yes or no to the trip itself.” J. Adam Ereli, DOS spokesman: “There’s a limit to what I can say, simply because it’s not our deal. … Any efforts that complicate prospects or undertakings to reconvene the six-party talks and to achieve forward movement in dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program aren’t helpful.” Keith Luse and Frank Jannuzi go at same time. (Steven R. Weisman, “Private Group Prepares Visit to North Korea,” New York Times, January 3, 2004, p. A-1) “When a US congressional delegation’s visit to North Korea was proposed in October last year, the North Korean side had prepared to show on the spot, through an inspection of Yongbyon nuclear facilities in accordance with the delegation’s wish, the finished reprocessing process of nuclear fuel rods and how the plutonium acquired from this process was being used. Although the congressional delegation’s visit to North Korea was cancelled due to White House opposition, the deferred inspection of Yongbyon nuclear facilities is expected to take place during the current visit by nuclear experts.” Chosun Sinbo (Tokyo) “U.S. Delegation of Nuclear Experts Visits the DPRK,” January 8, 2004) D.P.R.K. FoMin spokesman characterized the visit as “an opportunity to confirm the reality and ensure transparency. … The United States compelled the DPRK to build [a] nuclear deterrent. We showed this to Lewis and his party this time.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for the D.P.R.K. FM on U.S. Professor’s Visit to Yongbyon Nuclear Facility,” January 10, 2004) Told “at Yongbyon you will see the importance of a freeze,” they were shown the reactor in operation and the cooling pond empty of spent nuclear fuel. Hecker was handed two glass jars of what his hosts said was plutonium. First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan categorically denied it had a program to make highly enriched uranium, however. The D.P.R.K. “has nothing to do with any HEU program,” he said. “We have no program, no facilities you are talking about, or scientists trained for this purpose.” (Keith Luse and Frank Jannuzi, “North Korea: Status Report on Nuclear Program, Humanitarian Issues, and Economic Reforms,” A Staff Trip Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 23, 2004) He expressed willingness to explain any “data” on enrichment that the United States presented, a stance the North reaffirmed in talks with China. Pritchard briefing on nine hours with Kim Gye-gwan: “First of all was a flat denial that they ever had a program, don’t have a program, and then said that’s a topic they certainly were willing to talk about once the United States sat down with them. But he went further in his denial in terms of the clarity of it, saying that not only do we not have any program; we have no equipment and we don’t have any scientists, we never had scientists trained in that area, we rely on the natural uranium and the plutonium program that they have.” On the freeze, “Vice Minister Kim’s point in this was we recognize this not the endgame, but quite clearly there has to be some initial steps.” “You may recall through press reporting over the past year that the North Koreans have consistently in advance told the United States, and then later publicly, what they intended to do with their nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. To begin with, they were going to ask the I.A.E.A. inspectors to leave. They were going to unseal the seals, remove the cameras, restart the reactor, remove the spent fuel rods, reprocess them. At one point they came back and said, we initially intended to reprocess the spent fuel rods for safety reasons, but now, because of the hostile U.S. policy, we are going to do that to extract plutonium to make a nuclear deterrent.” “We went to the spent fuel pond storage facility. This is where the 8,017 or so spent fuel rods had been canned and safeguarded by the I.A.E.A. until a year ago in December. … The spent fuel storage pond was empty. There are no spent fuel rods there. … The canisters were empty.” “They did make a comment … saying in the case of Libya and Iran, both initially said, no, we don’t have a WMD program, and the U.S. said, yes, you do. And he said in this case we’re saying, yes, we do have a WMD program; the United States is saying, no, you don’t” [Laughter] “China had set a goal for the second meeting of reaching an agreed statement on the North Korea nuclear problem. … In the end, the United States and North Korea could not find a set of words that would overcome their profound substantive differences and corrosive mutual mistrust. So China signaled a couple of weeks ago that the talks could proceed even if a statement was not possible at this time.” North says they already have a security alliance with Russia and China: “There is, however, a tactical element here where the North Koreans, in preparation for eventual discussions with the United States, are increasing the value of the freeze that they have put out there, and at the same time attempting to decrease the value of what the United States is potentially prepared to offer in terms of a multilateral security guarantee.” “Time is not on the U.S. side,” he quotes Kim Gae-gwan as saying. “The lapse of time will result in the quantitative and qualitative increase in our nuclear deterrent.” Kim also said, “How is that we can prove that we don’t something we don’t have?” (Transcript, “The North Korea Deadlock: A Report from the Region,” Brookings Institution, January 15, 2004) Hecker testimony: “We confirmed that the 5 MWe reactor is operating now. … “We drove past the 50 MWe reactor site twice. We confirmed there is no construction activity at this site. There were no construction cranes on site. The reactor building looks in a terrible state of repair. The concrete building structure shows cracks. The steel exhaust tower was heavily corroded, as was other steel equipment at the site. The building was not closed up and resembled a deserted structure. … We immediately confirmed the fact that all fuel rods were no longer in the pool because many of the canisters were missing and many were open. … When I expressed concern that some of the canisters were still closed, they took the extraordinary step of allowing me to pick one at random [all done under water in the pool] to demonstrate that there were no fuel rods remaining even in the closed canisters. …Although we could not see the plutonium glove box operations, they took the extraordinary step of showing us the ‘product’ from what they claimed to be their most recent reprocessing campaign. In a conference room following the tour, they brought a metal case that contained a wooden box with a glass jar they said contained 150 grams of plutonium oxalate powder and a glass jar they said contained 200 grams of plutonium metal for us to inspect. The glass jars were fitted with a screw-on metal lid and were tightly taped with transparent tape. (The plutonium’s alpha radiation is easily stopped by the glass jar.) The green color of the plutonium oxalate powder is consistent with plutonium that has been stored in air for some time. The plutonium metal … that they claimed was scrap from a casting from this reprocessing campaign. …The glass jar (very thick-walled) was reasonably heavy and slightly warm …. It was radioactive … Even if we could confirm that the product we were shown is plutonium, we would not have been able to confirm that it came from the most recent campaign without additional, more sophisticated isotopic measurements that would let us identify the age of the plutonium. The director of the NSC confirmed this by stating, “you would have to measure the americium to plutonium-241 ratio to determine its age.” (Prepared testimony of Siegfried Hecker, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, January 21, 2004) Explaining the rationale for the visit, a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman’s statement said “transparency serves as a basis of realistic thinking and, at the same time, a basis for solving the issue.” It went on, “We never employ a sleight of hand. Whenever an opportunity presented itself, we opened to the public our fair and aboveboard nuclear activities as they were and informed the U.S. side of them through a diplomatic channel.” (Oberdorfer and Carlin, The Two Koreas, p. 399)

1/4/04:
Kan Naoto, leader of opposition DPJ, proposes that government invite Kim Jong-il to Japan to “know whether they wasn’t to resolve” the abduction and other issues. (Kyodo, “DPJ Head Calls for Inviting N. Korea Leader Kim to Japan,” January 4, 2004)

1/5/04:
Poll of 800 adults find 39% call US biggest threat to peace in Korea, 33% North Korea, 12% China and 8% Japan, compared to 1% US, 44% North Korea, 15% Japan and 4% China in 1993 survey. Those in their 20s broke down 58% US and 20% North Korea; in their 30s 47% and 22%; in their 40s 36% and 34%, in their 50s 18% and 52%. (Chosun Ilbo, “US More Dangerous Than NK? Most Seem to Think So,” January 12, 2004)

EU Chamber of Commerce establishes office in Pyongyang. (Seo Jee-yeon, “EU Opens Office in Pyongyang,” Korea Times, January 13, 2004)

1/6/04:
KCNA on freeze: “The DPRK advanced a productive proposal to put into practice measures of the first phase if the U.S. found it hard to accept the package solution all at once. These measures are for the U.S. to delist the DPRK as a sponsor of terrorism, lift political, economic and military sanctions and blockade on it and for the U.S. and neighboring countries of the DPRK to supply heavy oil, power and other energy resources to the DPRK in return for its freeze of nuclear activities. The DPRK is set to refrain from test and production of nuclear weapons and stop even operating nuclear power industry for a peaceful purpose as first-phase measures of the package solution.” (KCNA, “KCNA Urges U.S. Not to Shun Core Issue at Six-Way Talks, January 6, 2004)

SecState Powell says North Korea’s latest offer “was an interesting statement. It was a positive statement. They, in effect, said they won’t test and they implied they would give up all aspects of their nuclear program, not just weapons program.” (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Remarks with Tunisia’s Foreign Minister Habib Ben Yahia, January 6, 2004)

Kim Un-yong, MDP National Assemblyman and former IOC vice president, tells investigators he provided $1.1 million to North to facilitate athletic cooperation. (Chosun Ilbo, “Kim Un-yong: US$1.1. Million Went to North Korea, January 6, 2004)

In Democratic presidential debate, Howard Dean says, “This president is about to allow North Korea to become a nuclear power. The danger is not that the North Koreans will immediately attack us. The real danger is that they will do what Pakistan is accused of: they will sell that weaponry to terrorist or other countries like Libya or Pakistan for hard currency. That is a major national security threat, and this president is not defending this country the way he ought to by refusing to engage in these kinds of deliberations because the hard-liners in this administration believe that somehow North Korea is going to fall.”

Kim Guen-tae, floor leader of the Uri Party wants Kim Dae-jung to be special envoy to the North: “How glad the nation would be if Mr. Kim, a man of great wisdom and wide experience were to work to help bring peace to the peninsula.” (Ryu Jin, “Kim Dae-jung Courted As Special Envoy to N. Korea,” Korea Times, January 7, 2004)

1/7/04:
China’s Fu Yong in a meeting with Japan’s Yabunaka Mitoji and South Korean officials in Seoul last week said China is not convinced of U.S. claims that North Korea has a clandestine program to enrich uranium, say U.S. officials who have been briefed on the discussions. Chas Freeman says the administration is paying the price for its Iraq claims: “Post-Iraq, the credibility of U.S. intelligence is not very high” around the world. Sun Weide, spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Washington, said, “China has never taken part in DPRK’s nuclear program. We have no knowledge of DPRK’s nuclear program or its capabilities. We do not know if DPRK has a HEU program. According to our understanding, the Japanese are not completely aware of the situation, either.” (Glenn Kessler, “Chinese Not Convinced of North Korean Uranium Effort,” Washington Post, January 7, 2004, p. A-16)

Senior ROK FoMin official: “I think the North keeps presenting the proposal as the North believes it is constructive, but there is still a rift among concerned countries on the steps to settle the nuclear tension. Washington refuses to be seen to offer compensation or rewards to Pyongyang by agreeing to the North’s demands for a package deal.” (Seo Hyun-jin, “N.K. Repeats Offer to Freeze Nukes,” Korea Herald, January 7, 2004)

White House official: “Our ultimate goal is a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID). If North executes it, we can talk about ‘the possibility’ to ease its worries. The guarantee of the North Korean regime is possible even at an early point in the negotiating process. Supply of energy will [follow] a bit later when tangible progress has been made. It is also possible for North Korea to establish diplomatic relations and conclude peace treaties with the countries concerned, including the U.S. However, the door of [the] nuclear issue must be opened first to reach the goal.” (Dong-A Ilbo, “The U.S.’ Nuclear Policy: Current Strategy Revealed by the White House,” January 7, 2004)

Sam Brownback (R-KS) in speech in Tokyo says abduction issue “has to be part of any six-way talks” and calls on Japan to continue raising it. (Sato Takeshi,” U.S. Senator Urges Japan to Raise Abductions at 6-Way Talks,” Kyodo, January 7, 2004) In interview, he says, “Appeasement has gotten us nowhere. That’s why I suggest a different route.” “The Chinese leadership is growing in their frustration with North Korea — it’s a weight on them. It’s important Japan push China on this. China’s growth is dependent on foreign investment. North Korea doesn’t play well into that equation because they threaten several nations that are major investors in China.” (Hirayama Ayako, “Brownback: China Has Key Role in Fixing North Crisis,” Yomiuri Shimbun, January 8, 2004)

NSA Rice carries out Bush’s demand for six-party rather than direct talks: “I’m not going to spend time tying to manage what level four at State and Defense think about our North Korea policy,” she said of lower-level officials. (Elisabeth Bumiller, “A Partner in Shaping an Assertive Foreign Policy,” New York Times, January 7, 2004, p. A-1)

Rodong Sinmun signed article “calls on the north and the south to take practical actions to settle the Korean nation’s confrontation with the U.S. in its struggle to defend peace on the Korean peninsula and achieve the country’s reunification. The U.S. is chiefly to blame for the harassed peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, the article says, adding: The U.S. does not want the Korean peninsula to be reunified and it is not pleased with the improved inter-Korean relations.” (KCNA, “Rodong Sinmun on Practical Ways for Peace and Reunification of Korea,” January 7, 2004)

1/8/04:
North Korea sought a secret meeting in Beijing with Nagakawa Shoichi, minister of economy, trade and industry, as well as his predecessor, Hiranuma Takeo late last year, sources close to bilateral affairs say. The request was delivered to LDP lawmaker Hirasawa Katsuei. “I have not heard anything about a request for a meeting,” says Nakagawa. “It would be quite absurd if North Korea is harboring such an idea.” (Japan Times, “Pyongyang Sought Talks with Trade Chiefs,” January 8, 2004)

China has come up with a new draft that six parties accept an initial freeze which can then be turned into “complete abolition,” negotiation sources say, by including both phrases, “freezing of the nuclear program” and “denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.” (Kyodo, “China Proposes N. Korean Nuclear Freeze as 1^st Step,” January 8, 2004)

SecSt Powell: “What is absolutely essential is for us to move forward. We need a clear statement from the North Koreans that they are prepared to bring these programs to a verifiable end. We have made it clear in response to North Korean concerns and the comments we have received from our colleagues that security assurances are appropriate, and we believe we have good solid ideas on how to provide those assurances. That’s the opening step, and that’s what we’re anxious to see in the next round of talks, then we can get into how one goes down that road and what the needs of the North Korean people are and how those needs can be addressed. But what we can’t do is say, ‘You have been doing things that are inconsistent with your obligations, and now we’re going to pay you to stop doing it.’ We have to begin with, ‘We’re not going to do it, and we’re not going to do it in a verifiable manner.’ And in return for that, we will describe the kind of security assurances we will give. And they also have to make it clear that what they’re doing is permanent because we don’t want to have this — see this movie again.” (State Department transcript, January 8, 2004)

1/9/04:
DPRK FoMin spokesman on Libya model: “United States is hyping recent developments in some Middle East countries, cases orchestrated by itself. It is seized with hallucination that the same would happen on the Korean peninsula and some countries echo this ‘hope’ and ‘expect’ some change. This is nothing but a folly of imbeciles utterly ignorant of the DPRK’s independent policy. …To expect any ‘change’ from the DPRK stand is as foolish as expecting a shower from clear sky. Explicitly speaking, the recent developments in those countries only reinforce the DPRK’s firm belief in the validity and vitality of its Songun policy. It is the historical truth that peace is won and defended only with strength.” (KCNA, Spokesman of DPRK FM Dismisses Any Change from DPRK as Ridiculous,” January 9, 2004)

1/11-12/04:
US-led PSI exercise Sea Saber in Arabian Sea mimics 12/02 seizure of NK Scuds

1/12/04:
TV broadcast of FoMin spokesman: “We would like to make clear one more time that if the Bush administration truly intends to resolve the nuclear issue with simultaneous actions in accordance with a package deal and is will to agree on compensation in return for freezing as first-phase measures, we are also willing to freeze our nuclear activities based on graphite-moderated reactors as a starting point for denuclearization.” (FBIS, East Asia, “DPRK-TV Carries DPRK FMS Remark on ‘Willing to Freeze’ ‘Nuclear Activities,’” January 12, 2004)

1/13/04:
North’s Red Cross asks South for half million tons of fertilizer, increase of 200,000 tons. (Chosun Ilbo, “N. Korea Asks for Record Amount of Fertilizer,” February 6, 2004)

1/14/04:
At press conference, Pres Roh response to criticism from unnamed diplomats, “These officials will be replaced so there will no longer be obstacles to pursuing my foreign policy.” Cho Hyun-dong, director of the North American Division, was discovered to have made comments critical of the president and “Taliban.” Vice FM Kim Jae-sup and Wi Sung-lac, North American Affairs Bureau dir-gen could also be replaced. (Kim So-young, “Roh Vows to Replace Officials on U.S. Policy,” Korea Herald, January 14, 2004) FM Yoon Young-kwan resigns, taking responsibility. “Some MOFAT officials have failed to break with [U.S.]-dependent policy practices and did not fully understand the spirit and direction of the new government’s independent diplomatic policy,” said Jeong Chan-young, Roh’s personnel affairs manager. (Dong-A Ilbo, “Foreign Minister Forced to Resign Over ‘Independent Diplomacy’ Controversy,” January 15, 2004) “I have emphasized the importance of the Korea-U.S. alliance because it is a very useful tool for peaceful relations between North and South Korea, said Yoon in a farewell speech. “Some legislators referred to this as knee-jerking. However, kowtowing to the U.S. must be distinguished form utilizing the U.S. as a diplomatic asset.” Brent Choi, JoongAng Ilbo: “It started with Cho Hyun-dong, a director in the North American Affairs bureau under Yoon making an extremely offensive remark against the incumbent president Roh: ‘Once President Roh and his Our Open Party fail in the April General Election the president could revert back to just taking care of two ministries (Ministry of the Science and Technology and the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries).’ President Roh enraged at such remarks (and more) went to confirm the rumor and in the process, the media caught on. The president expected Yoon to reprimand the official in question but he did no such thing thus, leading the Blue House to take the matter into its own hand and discharge Yoon instead.”(Brent Choi, “Don’t Misunderstand the Firing of South Korean Foreign Minister” NAPSNet, February 4, 2004) [Last straw was Yoon’s failure to give credit to Roh for negotiating Yongsan base agreement.]

1/13-17/04:
Four Japanese FoMin officials in Pyongyang to discuss abduction issue, first visit since 2002. (AFP, “Japanese Officials Visit North Korea to Discuss Kidnap Issue,” January 14, 2004) Cover story is they take custody of Japanese man held by Pyongyang for drug-smuggling. (Japan Times, “Officials in Pyongyang for Suspect,” January 15, 2004) At around same time, cabinet secretariat official in charge of abduction issue who is close to Nakayama Kyoko, special adviser to the secretariat for abduction affairs and had worked for Abe Shinzo secretly visited Pyongyang. (Asahi Shimbun, Abduction Aide Made Secret Trip to North,” February 5, 2004)

1/15/04:
Kanagawa prefecture police arrest president of trading company in Niigata on suspicion of trying to export an inverter to North Korea on board Man Gyong Bong-92 on August 4. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “2 Probed over N. Korean Ship,” January 15, 2004)

1/16/04:
Ruling coalition and DPJ agree to enact revision of foreign exchange law, authorizing government to stop remittances and restrict trade to North Korea without U.N. sanction. (Kyodo, “Japan’s N. Korea Sanctions Bill to Pass through Diet,” January 16, 2004)

Ban Ki-moon replaces Yoon as ROK foreign minister.

1/17/04:
ROK, U.S. agree 7,000 U.S. troops and families will redeploy from Seoul. (Reuters, “U.S. Troops to Pull Out of Seoul,” January 18, 2004)

1/18/04:
In confirmation Rice says North Korea among “outposts of tyranny.” (Department of State, Opening Remarks by Secretary of State-Designate Condoleezza Rice, Senate Fopreign Relations Committee, Janaury 18, 2004)

1/19/04:
Kim Jong-il tells Wang Jiarui, head of CCP central committee, there arte “positive movements” in relations with Japan. (Takahara Kanako, “China Relays Pyongyang Overture,” Japan Times, January 24, 2004)

1/20/04:
Amnesty International reports public executions of North Koreans for stealing food. (Associated Press, “Amnesty Blasts North Korea on Food Report,” January 20, 2004)

1/21/04:
Bush cites Libyan example in State of the Union: “Nine months of intense negotiations involving the United States and Great Britain succeeded with Libya, while 12 years of diplomacy with Iraq did not. And one reason is clear: For diplomacy to be effective words must be credible — and no one can now doubt the word of America.” A longtime Republican adviser to Bush says the impact of “axis of evil” speech and Iraq invasion was “dramatically overblown” and that Qaddafi had begun moving to end his isolation several years ago when he turned over suspects in the Lockerbie airplane bombing case. (David E. Sanger and Neil MacFarquhar, “Bush to Portray Libya As Example,” New York Times, January 20, 2004, p. A-1)

IISS report says it is “impossible” to reach firm conclusion about nuclear capability but “it would be imprudent to conclude that North Korea does not have nuclear weapons.” (AFP, “’Imprudent’ to Think North Has No Nukes: IISS,” January 21, 2004; text of Samore CFR briefing, January 23, 2004)

Japanese official quotes FoMin Kawaguchi as telling Pres Roh, “I believe North Korea has sent several positive signals recently.” (Reuters, “Japan Says North Korea Sending Positive Signals,” January 21, 2004)

1/22/04:
TCOG in Washington. Discuss six-party talks. (James L. Schoff, Tools for Trilateralism (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), p A11) Deputy FM Lee Soo-hyuck describes conclusion: “If North Korea freezes its nukes and agrees that it will dismantle its nuclear programs, South Korea, the United States and Japan are willing to take corresponding measures according to our coordinated steps.” (Seo Soo-min, “’Six-Way Talks Must Include NK’s Uranium Program,’” Korea Times, January 25, 2004)

Chinese academics taking part in a government-run project release documents claiming Goguryeo as ancient ethnic kingdom of China. “The Chinese are trying to use a novel claim on history as an insurance policy for the future of its border with Korea,” said Yeo Ho-kyu, Hankuk University historian. (Anthony Faiola, “Kicking Up the Dust of History,” Washington Post, January 22, 2004, p. A-15)

1/28/04:
North, Nigeria agrees to “program of cooperation that includes missile technology.” (Glenn McKenzie, “Nigeria Makes Missile Deal with N. Korea,” Associated Press, January 28, 2004) Delegation led by Yong Hyong-sop, vice president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly discussed memorandum of understanding with Vice President Atiku Abubakar. (Nicholas Kralev, “North Korea Offers Nigeria Missile Deal,” Washington Times, January 29, 2004)

Biden (D-DL) in speech at Arms Control Association: “The administration’s inattention and ideological rigidity has left America less secure today than it was three years ago. … We have to assume they [8,000 fuel rods] have been reprocessed and that could provide plutonium for six to eight more nuclear weapons. … It’s time to get serious about negotiations. … North Korea must dismantle its nuclear programs and stop selling missile technology. But we won’t achieve that unless the president instructs his officials to negotiate in goods faith and gives them the leeway to do so.” (Barry Schweid, “Biden Urges Consideration of Nonagression Pact to Halt North Korea Nuclear Program,” Associated Press, January 28, 2004)

1/29/04:
Dep SecState Armitage in Beijing

Lower house of Diet authorizes sanctions against North Korea. “Having a diplomatic card like this would not necessarily negatively affect the future course of the six-party talks,” says negotiator Yabunaka Mitoji. (Takahara Kanako, “Japan Turns up Heat on North Korea as Sanctions Bill Clears Lower House,” Japan Times, January 30, 2004)

1/30/04:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Dismissing this as a wanton violation of the DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration in which both sides committed themselves to observe international law and not to do any act of threatening the security of the other side, the statement continued … Japan is pushing the DPRK-Japan relations to an unpredictable phase by legislating on economic sanctions against the DPRK as a state policy. Its move will not be confined to this. This development will bring peace and stability in Northeast Asia to a catastrophic phase and further deteriorate the situation on the Korean peninsula that has grown tense due to the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the US. … As Japan sows so shall it reap. The DPRK will not remain a passive onlooker to Japans act of seriously infringing upon its sovereignty and putting Tokyo’s hostile policy into practice through economic sanctions and blockade while talking about its participation in the six-way talks, but take necessary counter-measures against it. It is the DPRK’s mettle to return retaliation for retaliation and react against the hard-line policy with the toughest measure.” (KCNA, “DPRK FM Blasts Japan’s Adoption of ‘Amendment to Law on Foreign Exchange,’” January 30, 2004)

Roh replaces NSA Ra Jong-yil with Kwon Chin-ho, former deputy head of NIS. Advisor for national defense, Kim Hee-sang, who had sought to send more troops to Iraq, also replaced with Yoon Kwang-ung, head of the Emergency Planning Committee. Deputy chief Lee Jong-seok, who favors foreign policy more independent of U.S., fortified. (Shim Jae-yun, “S. Korea to Move Further from US,” Korea Times, January 30, 2004)

U.S. confirms Libya’s missiles were North Korean Scud-Cs. (Dong-A Ilbo, “U.S. Says, ‘Libyan Missiles Are Like N.K.’s,” Janaury 30, 2004)

Rodong Sinmun signed commentary: “While advocating a diplomatic and peaceful solution to the nuclear issue, the U.S. let loose a string of provocative remarks that the ‘nuclear crisis in north Korea is an issue that might be referred to the UN Security Council and it might prompt the SC to discuss the possibility of sanctions against it’ … The nuclear issue between them is a direct product of the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK. It deteriorated as the United States threatened the DPRK, a non-nuclear state, with nukes and attempted to mount a preemptive nuclear attack on it. However, the U.S. has delayed and obstructed the solution to the issue, insisting on its assertion that ‘the DPRK should abandon its nuclear program first.’ If the U.S. truly stands for a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue, it should not insist on its unreasonable assertion but accept the DPRK-proposed package solution based on the principle of simultaneous actions.” (KCNA, “Double-Dealing Tactics Can Never Work on DPRK,” January 30, 2004)

Australian delegation in Pyongyang. FM Downer says on February 4 that Vice FM Kim Yong-il “confirmed that North Korea’s offer to ‘freeze’ its nuclear activities in return for certain ‘reciprocal measures’ was only the first step in a process which would lead to the eventiual dismantlement of its nuclear-weapons program.” (Nicholas Kralev, “U.S., North Schedule 6-Way Nuke Talks in Beijing,” Washington Times, February 4, 2004)

KEDO executive decides to protest North Korea’s refusal to let it remove construction equipment from Kumho. In statement, KEDO says, “As we have made clear, we see no future for the light-water reactor project.” (AFP, KEDO Holds Board Meeting on Suspension of N. Korean Nuclear Project,” January 31, 2004)

2/1/04:
David Fouse, Japan’s Post-Cold War North Korea Policy: Hedging toward Autonomy? Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, February 2004

BBC-TV airs documentary on “lethal chemical weapons tests against civilians,” says Lord Alton, chair of British-North Korea parliamentary group. FO minister Baroness Symons says, “We have made representations yesterday as a result of the program to the embassy here in London. The embassy has denied that any such activities take place in North Korea. They have refusted all the allegations made.” The minister added, “Until we can engage properly on the nuclear issue, we are very unlikely to make some real progress on the issues around human rights.” (Andrew Evans, “North Korea Challenged on ‘Civilian Chemical Weapons Tests,’” Scotsman, February 3, 2004)

2/2/04:
Rumsfeld plans to dismantle U.N. Command, USFK, Combined Forces Command, 8^th Army, USFJ as poart of global realignment of forces. Disbanding CFC “would reduce the misperception that the U.S. controls the Korean ilitary,” said an officer. (Richard Halloran, “U.S. Pacific Command Facing Sweeping Changes,” Washington Times, February 2, 2004)

Sharon A. Squassoni, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: How Soon an Arsenal? Congressional Research Service, Februay 2, 2004: “In 3 years, it could generate 14-18 kg of plutonium, enough for 2-3 weapons.”

Pres candidate John Kerry calls Bush admin refusal to negotiate directly “a reckless act” in invw with Time, February 9 edition. (Chosun Ilbo, “Kerry Calls Bush’s N. Korea Policy ‘Reckless,’ February 2, 2004)

During Kelly visit to Seoul, senior U.S. official says, “Our assessment of the uranium enrichment did not come from what the North Koreans said. There is no doubt in the U.S. government there has been important work going on for a long time, on a significant scale, on uranium enrichment. … We firmly and quietly want to see some progress on that as well as on other parts of the problem as the six-party talks unfold.” (Lee Jae-hak, “U.S. Dismisses Denials by North Korea on Uranium,” Chosun Ilbo, February 2, 2004)

Alexei M. Mastepanov, deputy director of Gazprom, and Viktor N. Minakov, general director of Vostokenergo, subsidiary of state electric utility United Energy Systems, outline plans for natural gas pipeline from Sakhalin and electricity power line from Vladivostok at regional energy forum in Niigata. “They do not have to be part of a package; they could be separate,” said diplomat Yevgeny Afanasiev. “But think of private investors, think of the high political risk — would you invest?” Yonghun Jung of Asia Pacific Energy Research Center in Tokyo said, “The Russians basically believe that South Koreans will pay for it.” (James Brooke, “Two Energy Plans for North Korea,” New York Times, February 3, 2004, p. W-1)

2/3/04:
North Korea agrees to hold next round of six-party talks on February 25. “Judging from the current situation, no matter how long the winter may be, spring will eventually arrive,” says DPRK’s Kim Ryong-song, in Seoul for 13^th ministerial. “The fact that the U.S. is coming to the talks at all seems to indicate that it has reached a certain understanding about our basic demands.” (Christopher Marquis and Norimitsu Onishi, “North Korea Agrees to Resume Talks with U.S. Over Arms,” New York Times, February 4, 2004, p. A-3) Kim adds, “The outcome of the second round of six-nation talks will depend on what the United States thinks about our basic positions and what measures they bring to the talks.” Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Agrees to Hold Nuclear Talks,” Associated Press, February 3, 2004)

2/4/04:
In 13^th ministerial, Kim Ryong-song said South “could not refuse the U.S. request to slow down North-South talks.” If trends goes on, he warns, North may abandon Mt. Kumgang tourism altogether. (Seo Soo-min, “Seoul Presses Pyongyang to Yield at Nuke Talks,” Korea Times, February 4, 2004) “The United States has not at all changed its demand that we first give up our nuclear programs,” Kim said. “We demand the United States take corresponding measures in return for a freeze as a first step. Based on this ‘reward-for-reward’ principle, the issue must be settled at the coming six-way talks.” (AFP, “North Korea to Demand Rewards for Nuclear Freeze at New Talks,” February 4, 2004; Lee Soo-jeong, “North Korea Prepares for Nuclear Talks,” Associated Press, February 4, 2004) Kim urged the South to “support (the North’s) proposal for ‘freeze in return for compensation’ so that it can be realized and take positive actions to make the United States also come foreward in response.” (Kang Yi-ruk, “Attention Being Drawn to South’s Attitude in the Second Round of Six-Way Talks,” Chosun Sinbo (Japan, February 23, 2004, FBIS February 23, 2004)

David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps, U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, February 2004

FM Ban Ki-moon: “A nuclear freeze alone is not enough, but if that is a short stage leading towards the elimination of the nuclear programs and is accoimpanied by verification, we are willing to take corresponding measures.” “We are willing to guarantee North Korea’s security and provide energy and other economic assistance.” (Seo Soo-min, “Seoul to Reward NK Nuclear Freeze,” Korea Times, February 5, 2004)

North prepared to freeze reactor, reprocessing plant in Yongbyon, allow IAEA inspectors back, in return for just resumption of heavy fuel oil shipments, not all the three conditions it attached in December statement, sources here said. (Sakajiri Nobuyoshi, “Pyongyang to Propose Nuclear Program Freeze,” Asahi Shimbun, February 6, 2004)

2/5/04:
Pres Musharraf pardons A.Q. Khan. (John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, “Pakistani Scientist Is Pardoned,” Washington Post, February 5, 2004, p. A-1)

2/6/04:
13^th N-S Ministerial ends with agreement to hold high-level military talks, “cooperate for fruitful results at the second six-way talks,” begin full development of Kaesong, family reunion in March, next ministerial in May. (Seo Soo-min, “Two Koreas Agree to Open High-Level Military Dialogue,” Korea Times, February 6, 2004) South promised million tons of rice. (Kim So-young, “Seoul Offers Rice Aid to N. Korea,” Korea Herald, February 7, 2004)

2/7/04:
Armitage: “The president has already told PM Junichiro Koizumi that we are going to stand by Japan on the question of abductees.” (Asahi Shimbun, “Interview/Richard L. Armitage: U.S. Won’t Relent on North Korean Nuke Issue,” February 7, 2004)

2/8/04:
Hwang Jang-yop invw with Tokyo Shimbun: “In 1996, I heard from Jon Pyong-ho, a party secretary in charge of logistics industries, that Pyongyang needed to buy plutonium to be used in making nuclear weapons.” Jon later went to Pakistan for a month and after returning said North Korea no longer needs plutonium because it can now make nuclear weapons with uranium-235. (Yoo Dong-ho, “Old Hand to Lead NK Delegation to Six-Way Talks,” Korea Times, February 8, 2004)

2/9/04:
Upper house of Diet enacts law allowing sanctions. “This is meaningful in that it widens Japan’s options,” says PM Koizumi. (Natalie Obiko Pearson, “Japan Passes Law on North Korea Sanctions,” Associated Press, February 9, 2004)

2/7-10/04:
Kim Gye-gwan at China’s invitation, met with FM Li Zhaoxing and Executive Vice FM Dai Bingguo, says DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Both sides had an exhaustive discussion of a series of issues of mutual concern including the issue of bilateral relations, nuclear issue and the issue of six-way talks. They admitted the reasonability of the package proposal of simultaneous actions for the solution of the nuclear issue and the DPRK-proposed ‘reward in return for freeze,’ the first-phase measure, and agreed to take joint actions to make substantial progress in the next round of the six-way talks.” KCNA, “DPRK and China to Take Joint Action in Upcoming Six-Way Talks,” February 10, 2004) Kim Gye-gwan also showed understanding of “the need to eliminate suspicions” by having talks cover HEU. (Kyodo, “N. Korea Hints at Alllowing Inspections of Nuclear Facilities,” February 21, 2004)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The United States is now hyping the story about the ‘transfer of nuclear technology’ to the DPRK by a Pakistani scientist in a bid to make the DPRK’s ‘enriched uranium program’ sound plausible. This is nothing but a mean and groundless propaganda. This is so sheer a lie that the DPRK does not bat an eyelid even a bit.” [Not the tech transfer but the program] (KCNA, “DPRK FM Spokesman Refutes U.S. Story about “Transfer of N- Technology” to DPRK,” February 10, 2004)

2/10/04:
WFP cuts food aid to North until end of March because it got just 140,000 tonnes instead of 485,000 it sought and has just 3,000 tonnes left of 40,000 it needs in a month. (James Kynge and Guy Dinmore, “Food Aid to N Korea Cut Amid Anger over Arms,” Financial Times, February 10, 2004, p. 6) Massod Hyder says WFP has enough on hand to feed 100,000 of the 6.5 million it normally feeds. (Edward Cody, “Food Shortages Plague N. Korea,” Washington Post, February 14, 2004, p. A-22)

Keith Luse: “We need to know whether North Korea transfers nuclear know-how to the military government of Myanmar and how the construction of nuclear reactors in Myanmar is going.” (Dong-A Ilbo, “Concerns over Nuclear Cooperation between North Korea and Myanmar,” February 10, 2004)

2/11/04:
Bush calls on other regimes to follow Libya: “Colonel Ghadafi made the right decision, and the world will be safer once his commitment is fulfilled. We expect other regimes to follow his example. Abandoning the pursuit of illegal weapons can lead to better relations with the United States, and other free nations. Continuing to seek those weapons will not bring security or international prestige, but only political isolation, economic hardship and other unwelcome consequences.” He expands mission of PSI to “direct action against proliferation networks”: “America will not permit terrorists and dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most deadly weapons. … “We’re determined to confront these threats at the source. We will stop these weapons from being acquired or built. We’ll block them from being transferred. We’ll prevent them from ever being used.” (White House, “Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation,” National Defense University, Fort McNair, February 11, 2004)

After talks in Bangkok, North to resume repatriation of Korean War remains for first time in five years. (Dong-A Ilbo, “North Korea Agreed to resume Repatriation of American Soldiers,” February 13, 2004) KPA Panmunjom Mission spokesman says “the US is misleading the public opinion by asserting that the talks served as a platform where its unilateral demand was met. At the talks the DPRK side did not meet the requests of the US side to transport the equipment and materials to be used for excavation and remains by its military transport plane for a security reason but allowed its overland transport of them via Panmunjom. The DPRK side did not have any discussion on the issue of American survivors raised by the US side after ruling it out.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for KPA Panmunjom Mission Refers to Results of DPRK-US Talks on Remains of US Soldiers,” February 20, 2004)

2/11-13/04:
Japanese delegation led by Tanaka Hitoshi in Pyongyang including Yabunaka Mitoji,met with Kang Sok-ju, Kim Gae-gwan, agree to continue dialogue. (Asahi Shimbun, “Japan, N. Korea Near Accord on Next Round,” May 3, 2004) A senior MOFA official: “The only thing they said was the five abductees must return to North Korea.” DPRK FoMin spokesman: DPRK “said if the Japanese side raises again the ‘abduction issue’ at the next round of six-way talks the DPRK side will resolutely shut out Japan’s participation in the talks as requested by the army and the people of the DPRK and this will bring everything to a collapse. … As regards the abduction issue, the DPRK side branded the detention of five abductees in Japan by the Japanese side in breach of the promise it had made to the DPRK … It clarified its stand that the issue of the dead admits of no further argument as it has already been probed. (KCNA, “Statement of the Spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Vantage Point, March 2004, pp. 53-54) The North severely criticized Japan saying it betrayed Pyongyang by refusing to return the five abductees. It threatened to refuse Japan’s participation if it raised the abduction issue in six-party talks. Kang Sok-ju told them, “You came here after you passed your sanctions bill, didn’t you?” (Funabashi Yoichi, “Poitn of View: North Korea’s Ninja Tricks Have Their Limits,” Asahi Shimbun, February 24, 2004)

2/12/04:
Michael Green: North Korean commitment to CVID the goal, “not a partial pretend” like a freeze. The freeze is their way of trying to avoid a commitment to CVID. PSI is a “clear source of pressure. “We are not taking the Libya model and superimposing it on North Korea, but there are useful lessons.” Kim Jong-il thinks he can retain his weapons and still get benefits. We’re forcing him to confront this choice. Sticks that U.S. has are very big. Carrots can’t be delivered: Congress won’t approve. In October 2002 it was clear that bilateral talks won’t work. [Because Japan and South Korea didn’t buy it?] Condi called some of us in and said we had to have multilateral talks. “This came from the Oval Office. It didn’t percolate up from the bureaucracy.” Kaesong gives them a vision of but Jeong Se-hyun told them they won’t move forward until nuclear issue resolved.[?] We made clear in talks we don’t have a policy on regime change. “We are not prepared to promise them normal relations up front.” We studied all the security assurances and found the Ukrainian useful because it was a statement of political intent. Chuck Jones will represent NSC at the 2^nd round.

National Assembly approved dispatch of 3,000 ROK troops to Iraq. US-ROK defense consultations begin the next day, spending most of its time on transfer of U.S. command from Yongsan and South Korean assumption of responsibility for Joint Security Area.

2/13/04:
Asst SecState Kelly: “We and the other parties realize that moving away from isolation and estrangement toward openness and engagement will be a major undertaking and we are willing to help. Everyone knows that establishing the grounds for normalcy and peaceful co-existence will be difficult. However, we have no choice but to make every effort to try — and that’s why President Bush at the APEC meeting last October made clear our willingness to document multilateral assurances of security. But, this process of transformation must begin with a fundamental decision inside the D.P.R.K. North Korea needs to make a strategic choice — and make it clear to the world as Libya has done — that it will abandon its nuclear weapons and programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner.” (Kelly, “Remarks to the Research Conference — North Korea: Towards a New International Engagement Framework, Washington, February 13, 2004)

Vice FM Wang Yi says to LDP policy chief Nukaga Fukushiro, “I told North Korean Vice FM Kim Gye-gwan to create a course for resolving the abduction issue between Japan and North Korea before the six-way talks.” (Asahi Shimbun, “Analysis: China, U.S. Pressure on North Led to Two-Way Abduction Talks,” February 16, 2004)

2/15/04:
Investigators have discovered that the nuclear weapons designs obtained by Libya through a Pakistani smuggling network originated in China, exposing yet another link in a chain of proliferation that stretched across the Middle East and Asia, according to government officials and arms experts. The bomb designs and other papers turned over by Libya in November have yielded dramatic evidence of China’s long-suspected role in transferring nuclear know-how to Pakistan in the early 1980s, they said. The Chinese designs were later resold to Libya by a Pakistani-led trading network that is now the focus of an expanding international probe, added the officials and experts, who are based in the United States and Europe. The packet of documents, some of which included text in Chinese, contained detailed, step-by-step instructions for assembling an implosion-type nuclear bomb that could fit atop a large ballistic missile. They also included technical instructions for manufacturing components for the device, the officials and experts said. “It was just what you’d have on the factory floor. It tells you what torque to use on the bolts and what glue to use on the parts,” one weapons expert who had reviewed the blueprints said in an interview. He described the designs as “very, very old” but “very well engineered.”U.S. intelligence officials concluded years ago that China provided early assistance to Pakistan in building its first nuclear weapon — assistance that appeared to have ended in the 1980s. Still, weapons experts familiar with the blueprints expressed surprise at what they described as a wholesale transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to another country. Notes included in the package of documents suggest that China continued to mentor Pakistani scientists on the finer points of bomb-building over a period of several years, the officials said. China’s actions “were irresponsible and short-sighted, and raise questions about what else China provided to Pakistan’s nuclear program,” said David Albright, a nuclear physicist and former U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq. “These documents also raise questions about whether Iran, North Korea and perhaps others received these documents from Pakistanis or their agents.” The package of documents was turned over to U.S. officials in November following Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi’s decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction and open his country’s weapons laboratories to international inspection. The blueprints, which were flown to Washington last month, have been analyzed by experts from the United States, Britain and the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog. Of the many proliferation activities linked to Khan’s network, the selling of weapon designs is viewed as the most serious. The documents found in Libya contained most of the information needed to assemble a bomb, assuming the builder could acquire the plutonium or highly enriched uranium needed for a nuclear explosion, according to U.S. and European weapons experts familiar with the blueprints. At the same time, one of the chief difficulties for countries trying to build nuclear weapons has been obtaining the plutonium or uranium. Libya appeared to have made minimal progress toward building a weapon, and had no missile in its arsenal capable of carrying the 1,000-pound nuclear device depicted in the drawings, the officials said. However, weapons experts noted, the blueprints would have been far more valuable to the other known customers of Khan’s network. “This design would be highly useful to countries such as Iran and North Korea,” said Albright, whose Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security has studied the nonconventional weapons programs of both states. The design “appears deliverable by North Korea’s Nodong missile, Iran’s Shahab-3 missile and ballistic missiles Iraq was pursuing just prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War,” he said. Such a relatively simple design also might be coveted by terrorist groups who seek nuclear weapons but lack the technical sophistication or infrastructure to build a modern weapon, said one Europe-based weapons expert familiar with the blueprints. While such a bomb would be difficult to deliver by air, “you could drive it away in a pickup truck,” the expert said. The device depicted in the blueprints appears similar to a weapon known to have been tested by China in the 1960s, officials familiar with the documents said. Although of an older design, the bomb is an implosion device that is smaller and more sophisticated than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. Implosion bombs use precision-timed conventional explosives to squeeze a sphere of fissile material and trigger a nuclear chain reaction. Pakistan’s first nuclear test in 1998 involved a more modern design than the one sold to Libya. Albright said the Libyan documents “do not appear to contain any information about the nuclear weapons Pakistan has built.” The documents at the center of the investigation were handed over to IAEA inspectors in two white plastic shopping bags from a Pakistani clothing shop. The shop’s name — Good Looks Tailor — and Islamabad address were printed on the bags in red letters. One of the bags contained drawings and blueprints of different sizes; the other contained a stack of instructions on how to build not only a bomb but also its essential components. The documents themselves seemed a hodgepodge — some in good condition, others smudged and dirty; some professionally printed, others handwritten. Many of the papers were “copies of copies of copies,” said one person familiar with them. The primary documents were entirely in English, while a few ancillary papers contained Chinese text. The package also included open-literature articles on nuclear weapons from U.S. weapons laboratories, officials familiar with the documents said. Strikingly, although most of the essential design elements were included, a few key parts were missing, the officials and experts said. Some investigators have speculated that the missing papers could have been lost, or hadn’t yet been provided — possibly they were being withheld pending additional payments. Others suggested that the drawings were simply thrown in as a bonus with the purchase of uranium-enrichment equipment — “the cherry on the sundae,” one knowledgeable official said. Libyan scientists interviewed by international inspectors about the designs said they had not seriously studied them and were unaware that anything was missing. As Libya had no suitable missile or delivery system for a nuclear weapon, the scientists might have decided to delay work on bomb designs until other parts of their weapons program were further advanced, one knowledgeable U.S. official said. U.S. and European investigators said there were many similarities among the other nuclear-related designs and components found in Libya and Iran, suggesting they were provided by the same network. As for who delivered the material to the Libyans, a European official who has studied the question said the connection to the Khan network was indirect. “The middleman is quite invisible. The middleman has covered his tracks very well.” The evidence of China’s transfer of nuclear plans to Pakistan confirms something that U.S. officials have believed since at least the early 1980s. A declassified State Department report on Pakistan’s nuclear program written in 1983 concluded that China had “provided assistance” to Pakistan’s bomb-making program. “We now believe cooperation has taken place in the area of fissile material production and possibly nuclear device design,” the report said. (Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, “Libyan Arms Design Traced Back to China: Pakistanis Resold Chinese-Provided Plans,” Washington Post, February 15, 2004, p. A-1)

2/16/04:
Meeting of Bush’s senior advisers decides to reject freeze, insist on dismantlement of both plutonium and enrichment programs, and not specify the sequence and timing of security assurances. Energy assistance can occur only after North Korea has moved decisively to meet U.S. demands: “If they’ve taken specific steps, and they are crying for help, we’re not going to do it, but other parties could come to us and we’ll talk about it.” South Korean officials have warned U.S. officials that focusing on HEU this round will be asking too much from the North. “The objective is like Libya — not us hunting and chasing [weapons] and working out a partial arrangement about a freeze or working out some kind of pay-as-you-go installment plan for taking apart their weapons program, but a commitment to dismantle the whole thing,” the senior official said. One official says North Korean diplomats have approached Asian diplomats and, while still denying the program, have asked what they could get by disclosing it. “Bold approach” has not been refined beyond the two-page document derived from work of lower-level officials in 2002. “We will not lay down a sheet of paper because it has not been agreed to internally in the U.S. government,” said one official. “We will dangle it out there but with no specifics.” Another official likened the U.S. presentation to Chinese brush painting: “We’ll probably paint in a little more of the painting and answer some of the questions about how this works. But we’re not going to paint them a Western landscape with every detail that is some kind of road map.” (Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Will Stand Firm on N. Korea,” Washington Post, February 16, 2004, p. A-17)

Under SecSt Bolton after meeting with Wang Yi in Beijing: “I don’t think our position has changed from what it’s been for quite some time.… The issue really is whether North Korea is prepared to make the commitment for the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its programs. … I think the Libya case shows how one goes about giving up weapons of mass destruction.” (Stephanie Joo, “U.S.: No Concession to North Korea,” Associated Press, Washington Post, February 16, 2004)

ROK Amb Han Sung-joo: “The second round of talks can make progress even if North Korea does not admit the existence of its nuclear program based on highly enriched uranium.” (Ryu Jin, “’HEU Issue Not to Impede 6-Way Talks,” Korea Times, February 16, 2004)

Playing hardball, Tokyo says no normalization talks unless eight family members of five abductees arrive for permanent stay in Japan. Japan has proposed joint team to establish whereabout of ten Japanese North Korea says are dead and will also inquire about 20 other suspected abductions. “I hope the negotiators push strongly for an unconditional visit,” said Abe Shinzo, LDP secy-gen. (Asahi Shimbun, “Japan Gets Tough on North Korea,” February 16, 2004) Koizumi met with Tanaka Hitoshi and Yabiunaka Mitoji on February 15, told them “I would like to see achievements as soonas possible.” (Japan Times, “Tokyo to Seek Talks in March with Pyongyang,” February 16, 2004)

2/17/04:
LDP panels endorsed outline of a bill to ban designated North Korean ships from entering port but there are doubts whether it will pass because of divided opinion within the ruling LDP-New Komeito coalition. LDP Dietman Yamamoto Ichita says they are trying to create “diplomatic cards.” Abe Shinzo wants bill enacted but PM Koizumi tells reporters pressure alone will not work: “We have to have dialogue and pressure.” Yabunaka Mitoji says, “It is functioning as pressure.” (Kyodo, “LDP Panels Endorse Bill Outline to Ban Entry of N. Korea Ships,” February 17, 2004; Takahara Kanako, “LDP Panels Endorse Bill on North Korea Ship Ban,” Japan Times, February 17, 2004)

2/19/04:
Kelly background briefing: “Once the process is under way, once the commitment is theree, there are lot and lots of steps in between. … There were a variety of terms — simultaneous actions, parallel actions, coordinated steps … And so where we are now is that there’s no particular joint statement that needs to be the solution … but everybody recognizes that this is a process in which words and words will come together and actions and actions will come together towards the goal that I outlined. …The goal of these talks is by no means some kind of freeze or halt because, first of all, such a thing may not be complete; it may or may not be verifiable; and it certainly would be reversible, and we don’t want that. … Security assurances are the sort of detail that come along after, when the process is getting going. I don’t intend to table any details. I do intend to talk about the kind of elements we think would go into a security assurance that would really bear out the commitment the president made last October.” (State Department Background Briefing, text)

DOS spokesman Richard Boucher: “We’ve made clear a freeze might be valuable.” He adds, “Our goal was to eliminate these programs, and indeed, if all the parties accept the goal of a denuclearized peninsula, there’s no way to do that without eliminating all these programs. I think all the parties have recognized that goal and therefore it strikes me as logic that whatever the value of a freeze as a step along the way, that the goal had to be elimination.” (DoS Briefing, February 189, 2004)

Top ROK official: “I am aware that North Korea has expressed its willingness through a third country to discuss the issue of HEU with the United States.” (AFP, “North Korea Willing to Tackle Uranium Issue with US: Report,” February 19, 2004) “This is not a joint proposal with the United States and Japan, but it has been much coordinated with the two countries as we have consulted on specific positions of the respective parties.” (Seo Hyun-jin, “Seoul Details Plan on N.K. Disarmament,” Korea Herald, February 20, 2004)

Senior ROK official: “The Seoul delegation will present more specific terms regarding a nuclear freeze and corresponding rewards, such as the security guarantees towards the North.” (Ryu Jin, “Seoul to Present NK with Specific Rewards,” Korea Times, February 20, 2004) Dep FM Lee Soo-hyuck: “If a nuclear freeze is the beginning of nuclear elimination or a process towards it, then at the point the freeze is implemented, we can provide corresponding measures that North Korea has been demanding.” “Verification is included in the process of a nuclear freeze, so of course its existence will be revealed.” [HEU?] Joining Lee on delegation will be Cho Tae-yong, dir-gen of newly established Task Force on the North Korea Nuclear Issue and adviser Wi Sung-lac, former dir-gen of North American Affairs and now Policy Coordinator for the NSC. (Choi Jie-ho, “Seoul Upbeat Ahead of 6-Way Nuclear Talks,” Joong-Ang Ilbo, February 20, 2004)

Visiting senior Bush admin official [Bolton] says US won’t take North off list of terrorist states as long as the abduction issue is unresolved and will “definitely express support” at 6-way talks for Japan’s stance. (Asahi Shimbun, “N. Korea Stays on Terror List If Abductions Not Solved,” February 20, 2004)

Kim Jong-il asked Park Kwang-sang, president of KBS, on August 12, 2000 for videotapes of documentaries: “I don’t have a recording of the episode about President Park Chung-hee. I want to see it.” He said of Park’s move to make himself president for life: “Under the circumstances, Park had no choice. Democracy is not a good thing if it leads to anarchy.” He lashed out at Park’s successors: “All Chun Doo-hwan did was take over the presidency. Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam wrecked the country.” He told Park Kun-hae he would viosit her father’s grave if he came to South Korea. He praised the economic growth under Park and apologized for the assassination attempt. Former MinUnif Park Jae-kyu says at a meeting in September 2000, Kim told him normalization talks with Japan held just before had gone smoothly and added, “North Korea can get economic assistance if it improves its relationship with Japan.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “North Korean Leader Puzzles the World,” February 20, 2004)

North Korea must agree to dismantle HEU as well as plutonioum program as a prerequisite for any assistance. “Khan’s statements have made it imperative that this program be dismantled right away,” said an administration official. (Steven R. Weisman and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Urges North Korea to End Nuclear Work,” New York Times, February 20, 2004, p. A-8)

“North Korea: Status Report on Nuclear Program, Humanitarian Issues and Economic Reforms,” A Staff Trip Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 108^th Congress, 2^nd Session, February 2004 [Keither Luse, Frank Jannuzi]

2/20/04:
Decision made at the highest levels that “the criteria for success is that the North Koreans don’t walk out,” says a U.S. official. Officials are hoping at best for regular meetings, which could take the form of lower-level working groups. “The motto is ‘Do no Harm.’ This is a placeholder to get us through the election.” (Glenn Kessler, “Hopes Lowered for U.S.-N.Korea Talks,” Washington Post, February 20, 2004, p. A-16)

2/21/04:
China blocked North Korean imports of solvent used in making plutonium after a tip from the United States, Asahi Shimbun reports. (Reuters, “China Stopped North Korea Nuclear Import — Report,” February 21, 2004)

Funabashi Yoichi: “First, Washington became cautious about drawiung a ‘red line.’ Although North Korean nuclear armament remains a red line, the United States made the line somewhat blurry. If it made the line too clear, it could force itself into taking military action against North Korea. Second, it started to attach greater importance to multilateral frameworks, in particular six-party talks that include Japan and Russia. … But the problem is that all of the six parties involved seem content just to hold the talks and lack the drive to seriously reach a settlement. As it is, the United States is too busy dealing with Iraq and doesn’t want to rock the boat before the presidential election in the fall. While China appears to feel the burden of playing the host, it also seems to enjoy appealing to audiences both at home and aborad that it is playing the leading role. Meanwhile, South Korea seems to regard the six-party talks as an attempt to contain U.S. hard-line policy toward North Korea. Russia is mainly interested in building oil and gas pipelines and a railroad from Siberia to the Korean Peninsula. It doesn’t care as llong as it can keep its seat in the six-party talks. … But whenever the United States shows a tough stance, North Korea tends to soften toward Japan. Senior Foreign Ministry officials, including Dep FM Tanaka Hitoshi, visited Pyongyang last week. Talks ended on Friday, but there has been no word about progress made. … Still, it is unlikely that North Korea would walk out of the talks. At least while six-party talks are going on, it can resta sssured that it would not be attacked by the United States. There is a chance that the Democrats could win the presidential election. What better way is there to stall for time than to keep the six-party talks going?” (Funabashi Yoichi, “Point of View: Does Kim Jong-il Want Kerry in the White House?” Asahi Shimbun, February 21, 2004)

2/23/04:
Powell: “They might be able to freeze, but it can’t be a freeze standing alone.” He bars reward for freeze. (Steven R. Weisman and David E. Sanger, “North Korea May Get Aid If It Pledges Nuclear Curb,” New York Times, February 25, 2004)

TCOG in Seoul discusses common position for second round of six-party talks. (James L. Schoff, Tools for Trilateralism (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), p A11)Dep FM Lee Soo-hyuck briefs reporters on ROK three-stage proposal: in phase one, an agreement in principle in which North Korea would declare its willingness to eliminate all its nuclear activities and the United States would declare its willingness to provide security assurances; in phase two, a freeze that, if cast as “a step to dismantlement” and verified, would be accompanied by a “coordinated” response such as resumption of heavy fuel oil deliveries and other compensation; in phase three, verified elimination. Provisional security assurances become permanent as dismantlement is complete. “The fundamental position of the three countries at this round is that all nuclear programs, including the highly enriched uranium program, must be dismantled.” “A freeze is meaningless by itself,” he said. “It is only meaningful when it is the first step to dismantlement.” (Jack Kim, “South Korea Eyes 3-Stage Plan to End North Crisis,” Reuters, February 23, 2004)

Chosun Sinbo (Tokyo): “In early February, immediately after the announcement of opening the second round of six-party talks, the United States expressed an attitude that it was willing to examine the DPRK’s freeze proposal. When the talks were drawing closer, however, [the US] began to bring up the rumor of ‘enriched uranium program,’ which the DPRK has consistently denied. … It is indeed a contradiction in logic that the United States, which claims to be ‘worried’ about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, is focusing on the ‘enriched uranium program, ignoring a force that has become a reality — the nuclear deterrent. If the United States sticks to ‘the dismantlement of the nuclear [program] first’ in the upcoming talks … it is inevitable [for the DPRK] to show off its nuclear deterrent in its physical reality.” (Kim Chi-yong, “Second Round of Six-Party Talks — Showdown for a Volley of Offense and Defense on the Nuclear Issue, February 23, 2004, FBIS, February 24, 2004)

2/24/04:
DCI Tenet: “North Korea is trying to leverage its nuclear program into at least a bargaining chip and also international legitimacy and influence. … The 8000 rods the North claims to have processed into plutonium metal would provide enough plutonium for several more. We also believe Pyongyang is pursuing a production-scale uranium-enrichment program based on technology provided by A.Q. Khan … The multi-stage Taepo-dong 2 — capable of reaching the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload — may be ready for flight-testing.” Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “The Worldwide Threat 2004,” February 24, 2004)

2/25/04:
Second round of six-party talks in Beijing: Kelly: “The U.S. seeks complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of all the DPRK nuclear programs, both plutonium and uranium.” (Karasaki Taro, “N. Korea Offers to Give up Nukes,” Asahi Shimbun, February 27, 2004) Kim said the North was ready to freeze its plutonium program as a step to dismantlement and that the freeze “will be followed by inspections.” He posed two questions: Is the U.S. willing to put in writing the statements of President Bush that the U.S. has no intention to invade North Korea and no hostile intentions? If North Korea carries out complete, irreversible dismantlement of nuclear weapons program, what kind of actions will the U.S. take in response? “Unfortunately, Kelly failed to answer these questions,” a Chinese participant [Yang?] told me. “He just repeated what he said before.” The Chinese concluded, “Kelly came to Beijing with his hands bound. He had no authorization to say any words beyond his guidance. Kim Gye-gwan came to Beijing with greater authority than Kelly did.” (Daniel Sneider, “Dangerous Deadlock,” San Jose Mercury News, March 18, 2004) Kelly reaffirmed Bush’s pledge of multiparty security assurances, but said nothing about putting them in writing or providing electricity.and insisted it would take more than the elimination of nuclear arms and missiles for the United States to normalize relations. “Missiles, conventional forces and human rights concerns could be discussed, and progress could lead to full normalization.” In the plenary session, he said, “We do not have highly enriched uranium.” In a bilateral with Kelly he denied having a program or the materials necessary for a program. (Glenn Kessler and Philip Pan, “N. Korea Repeats Uranium Denial,” Washington Post, February 26, 2004, p. A-14) Kim Gae-gwan said U.S. allegations about the HEU program were “without foundation in fact.” (Philip Pan, “Nuclear Talks Clouded by N. Korea’s Denial of Enrichment Effort,” Washington Post, February 25, 2004, p. A-20) U.S. proposed discussing replacement of armistice with permanent peace mechanism in parallel with normalization talks, but only after North makes steady progress on dismantling. (Kyodo, “U.S. Eyes Permanent Peace Mechanism for Korean Peninsula,” May 2, 2004) “If the US insists on putting forward fictitious calls on a highly enriched uranium program, this will only result in prolonging of the nuclear question,” Xinhua quotes a DPRK spokesman as saying. “If the US administration had not put forward a hostile policy against North Korea, naming it as part of the ‘axis of evil,’ and broken the October 1994 DPRK-US Agreed Framework, then the present nuclear problem would never have emerged.” (AFP, “North Korea Denies Uranium Program, Casting a Pall over Crisis Talks,” February 24, 2004) Kim asked Kelly to show evidence of HEU program. Kelly replied, “If I were to give you all that information it might make it easier for you to conceal it.” Kelly adds, “It was clear by the conclusion of the talks that this is now very much on the table.” (Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 2, 2004) Kelly testified in his opening remarks, “We discussed Libya’s example with our North Korean counterparts, and we hope they understand its significance. Once North Korea’s nuclear issue is resolved, discussions would be possible on a wide range of issues that could lead to an improvement in relations.” Lee Soo-hyuck tabled three-stage ROK proposal. In the first stage, the North would state “its willingness to dismantle its nuclear program” and the United States would state “its readiness to provide security guarantees.” Then “North Korea would take a step towards dismantling its programs by freezing its nuclear activities.” North Korea would then get “energy aid and other rewards” once inspectors have verified the freeze and the North presented “a definite timetable from a freeze to complete dismantlement,” UnifMin elaborated. (Paul Kerr, “Six Nations Square Off over North Korea,” Arms Control Today (March 2004), p. 34) “Russia and China, together with us, clearly expressed their willingness to join in energy aid, Lee later said. “The United States and Japan expressed their understanding and support for this.” (AFP, “N. Korea Offers to Freeze Nuclear Program; US Says Talks Promising,” February 27, 2004) Washington, insisting on elimination, opposed a freeze and refused to join in providing heavy fuel oil, but Kelly, edging beyond his instructions, called the proposal “creative.” (Philip P. Pan and Glenn Kessler, “N. Korea Says U.S. Demand Is Stalling Nuclear Talks,” Washington Post, February 27, 2004, p. A-24.) Kelly said the U.S. “understood and supported” the offer of energy assistance by others. (Joseph Kahn, “U.S. and North Korea Agree to More Talks,” New York Times, February 29, 2004, p. 9) With no U.S. promise of electricity, Kim Gae-gwan backtracked. “We don’t plan to include our civilian nuclear program for peaceful purposes in the freeze and dismantlement.” (Yonhap, Press Conference by Kim Gye-Gwan, February 28, 2004) Kelly, in turn, withdrew the offer of security assurances and, on new instructions from Washington approved by Vice President Dick Cheney, acting in Secretary of State Powell’s absence, said that continued U.S. support for the talks depended on North Korea’s commitment to CVID. If not, U.S. goodwill could run out, he warned, and all options remained on the table. US opposition to reference to security assurances in draft led China to give up trying to get an agreed joint communiqué. Sandbagged by Cheney, Powell struck back. After China said the U.S. would be isolated because the North had agreed to the statement, Powell got Bush to issue new instructions to Kelly to extend the talks for another day and to emphasize U.S. patience and flexibility. (Glenn Kessler, “Bush Signals Patience on North Korea Is Waning,” Washington Post, March 4, 2004, p. A-14; Kyodo, “Wording on Security Assurances Dropped from 6-Party Draft Statement, March 5, 2004) Cheney late on the night of February 26 persuaded President Bush to draft new, more hard-edged instructions for U.S. negotiators in Beijing — which Secretary of State Powell only learned about the next day. The original instructions to the delegation said that any joint statement issued after the talks must include language on a “complete, verifiable irreversible dismantlement” of North Korea’s weapons, known in the diplomatic world by the shorthand of “CVID.” But the North Koreans had rejected that during the talks. The chief U.S. negotiator, Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly, reported back about the impasse, wondering if the delegation instead should try to obtain a bland diplomatic statement short of original U.S. goals. With Powell and his deputy, Richard L. Armitage, away at a black-tie event, Bush drafted new instructions with Cheney’s input. The instructions — which in diplomatic terms suggested the administration’s “continued support” of the six-nation talks was in jeopardy unless the U.S. demands were met — were dictated over the phone by White House official Michael Green to the delegation, bypassing the standard State Department cable system. Powell and Armitage did not find out about the new instructions until they woke up next morning, and Powell began fielding anguished calls from his Asian counterparts. The Chinese foreign minister told Powell the North Koreans were now willing to sign a more generic statement calling for continued talks. That afternoon, Powell pulled Bush aside before a luncheon with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, and argued for accepting a statement that the U.S. government 12 hours earlier said was unacceptable. Bush reluctantly agreed — but, despite Chinese assurances, the North Koreans rejected it anyway. (Glenn Kessler, “Impact from the Shadows,” Washington Post, October 5, 2004, p. A-1) Stephen Yates, Asian affairs specialist on Cheney’s staff, recalls, “There was niggling about what was in the joint statement and not. And it looked like the joint statement was something that could be held up to appear strikingly similar to a return to the Agreed Framework.” He reported that to Cheney. “And he did have a strong opinion that this is no time to show weaknesas. Given the appearance of walking back what standards we would require on counterproliferation was the wrong signal to send. And if that is where the negotiations are going, that’s a mistake.” Deputy SecState Armitage thought he had agreed with Deputy NSA Hadley on the instructions to Kelly, but that is when Cheney met privately with Bush and toughened them up. (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 205) But on Saturday the North offered a last-minute change of its own in the draft, “all parties acknowledge difference remain and agree to narrow those differences in further discussion.” (Daniel Sneider, “Dangerous Deadlock,” San Jose Mercury News, March 18, 2004) At dinner on the 25th hosted by FM Li Zhaoxing, Kim and Kelly had a heated discussion. (Kyodo, “China, U.S., N. Korea Hold Heated Discussion during Dinner,” February 25, 2004) DPRK statement on 25^th [2^nd day] sharply criticizes US hard-line stance: “Although the U.S. bellicose forces are keen to impose tougher economic sanctions on the DPRK while persisting in their political and ideological offensives to isolate and stifle it, it remains unfazed by the threat. Rodong Sinmun Tuesday says this in a signed commentary. It goes on: … There is no need for the DPRK to get anything by threatening someone nor for it to get its ‘system guaranteed’ by someone. Everything is going well in the DPRK.” (KCNA, “DPRK Unfazed by Any Threat of Tougher Economic Blockade,” February 25, 2004) PRC FoMin spokesman Liu Jiancao says, “Right now, the parties are in the process of carrying out intensive consultations on a document, so the hope still exists.” Powell tells Senate Budget Committee yesterday, “The results of the first two days of meetings are positive.” (Jack Kim and Jonathan Ansfield, “North Korea Talks Plagued by Contradictions,” Reuters, February 27, 2004) North proposed last-minute revision to chairman’s statement, adding the clause, “differences remained” into the point that participants “enhanced their understanding of each other’s positions.” (Karasaki Taro, “Talks End with Little Headway Made,” Asahi Shimbun, March 1, 2004) “North Korea is not ready to drop all its nuclear programs,” says Russian dep FM Losyukov. “North Korea is ready to drop its nuclear defense [weapons] program, but some countries are not satisfied with that.” Russia and China are willing to let them conduct “scientific research into nuclear energy.” (Philip P. Pan and Glenn Kessler, “Korea Arms Talks Bring No Agreement,” Washington Post, February 28, 2004, p. A-14) U.S. delegation informed North it “might” be willing to negotiate a “permanent peace mechanism” after resolution of nuclear issue, State acknowledged on May 3, 2004. (Paul Kerr, “North Korea Nuclear Talks: If at First You don’t Succeed, Meet Again,” Arms Control Today, (June 2004), p. 32)

Kim Gye-gwan tells reporters after the talks, “We made it clear that if the principle of package settlement based on simultaneous actions is not possible in a single attempt, ‘word for word’ measures [agreement in principle]can be implemented as a first-step measure. If this is carried out, then we can freeze our nuclear development plan and corresponding measures should be taken. A nuclear freeze is the first step toward denuclearization and figuratively speaking, it can be called a stage of first halting a moving train in order to park it.” On elimination, hints at electricity: “In resolving the nuclear problem, we will not give up peaceful civilian areas as subjects of freeze and dismantlement. Nuclear activities pertaining to nuclear weapons will be abandoned, but we cannot give up atomic energy that is being used in various areas. Why should we get rid of it when it is being used for medical and agricultural [purposes] and must be utilized for electricity? Atomic energy exists among the denuclearized areas in the world, and it is only natural that it is used peacefully in denuclearized areas. The case of denuclearized areas can also be applied to the Korean peninsula.” On HEU: “The HEU issue has nothing to do with us. The reason why the United States emphasizes this is to apply the brakes on the talks’ progress and to rationalize its stance. The United States has again created the nuclear crisis based on unreliable information and the Bush Administration has again raised this issue. [Our] nuclear power policy is based on natural uranium and has nothing to do with enriched uranium. Therefore, there is no enriched uranium. I make it clear that there are neither facilities nor scientists and technicians.”Asked about Pakistan’s aid, he says: “We have dealings with Pakistan in various political and economic areas. There were also missile transactions. It means that there were transactions where missiles were sold for cash to earn foreign currency. However, there was never any transaction in the enriched-uranium area, which is unnecessary.” He accepts verification: “I believe a freeze, if adopted, will be followed by inspections. The problem of who will do it and how will be addressed in future discussions.” On abduction issue: “We believe that the kidnapping issue has been basically resolved. The issue of follow-up settlements can be dealt with in the negotiating process between North Korea and Japan. It was agreed that the next talks would proceed before the end of the second quarter.” (Yonhap, Transcript of Kim Gye-gwan press conference in DPRK Embassy, February 28, 2004) “We do have an atomic power industry which has a lot of purposes, and we cannot give it up,” Kim told reporters. “We need this nuclear energy in different aspects. We need it in medical areas. We need it in agricultural areas as well as for electricity. We cannot afford to forgo all these activities.” (Philip P. Pan, “N. Korea Retreats from Offer on Nuclear Plans,” Washington Post, February 29, 2004, p. A-16)

A U.S. official dismissed the HEU denial: “The DPRK did say and has said that it will dismantle its nuclear programs. The devil, of course, is in the details.” Asked about its willingness to give up its military but not its peaceful nuclear programs, he says, “The problem is, I am not aware of any peaceful programs in the DPRK.” (Teruaki Ueno and Jonathan Ansfield, “N. Korea Talks End with Deep Divisions Laid Bare,” Reuters, February 28, 2004)

Kim and Yabunaka met for about 80 minutes on the sidelines of the talks and agreed to continue government-level dialogue on the abductions. (Kyodo, “6-Nation Talks Begin with Gaps between N. Korea, U.S.,” February 25, 2004) DPRK and Japan held bilaterals all four days. If Koizumi gets kin of 5 too soon, attention will turn to fate the 10. (Kobayashi Kakumi, “Focus: Lack of Progress on Abductions Likely to Hurt Koizumi Govt,” Kyodo, February 28, 2004) Kim told Yabunaka “progress in the abduction issue is correlated with the nuclear issue and U.S. relations.” (Karasaki Taro, “Analysis: Kim’s Abduction Statement Puzzles Tokyo,” Asahi Shimbun, February 27, 2004) U.S. rejected Chinese draft because it did not contain a line on CVID.

Instead of joint statement, Wang Yi issues chairman’s statement summarizing the parties’ points of accord: “1. The second round of six-party talks was held in Beijing among the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America from 25th to 28th of February, 2004. 2. The heads of delegations were Mr. Wang Yi, vice minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC; Mr. Kim Kye-gwan, vice minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DPRK; Ambassador Mitoji Yabunaka, director-general for the Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Ambassador Lee Soo-Hyuck, deputy minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the ROK; Ambassador Alexander Losiukov, vice minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia; Mr. James Kelly, assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States Department of State. 3. The Parties agreed that the second round of the six-party talks had launched the discussion on substantive issues, which was beneficial and positive, and that the attitudes of all parties were serious in the discussion. Through the talks, while differences remained, the Parties enhanced their understanding of each other’s positions. 4. The Parties expressed their commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula, and to resolving the nuclear issue peacefully through dialogue in a spirit of mutual respect and consultations on an equal basis, so as to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and the region at large. 5. The Parties expressed their willingness to coexist peacefully. They agreed to take coordinated steps to address the nuclear issue and address the related concerns. 6. The Parties agreed to continue the process of the talks and agreed in principle to hold the third round of the six-party talks in Beijing no later than the end of the second quarter of 2004. They agreed to set up a working group in preparation for the plenary. The terms of reference of the working group will be established through diplomatic channels. 7. The delegations of the DPRK, Japan, the ROK, Russia and the USA have expressed their appreciation to the Chinese side for the efforts aimed at the successful staging of the two rounds of the six-party talks.” (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Chairman’s Statement for the Second Round of Six-Party Talks,” February 28, 2004 [NAPSNET text]) Japanese official says agreement to take “coordinated steps … to address related concerns” is a reference to abductees. (Sato Takeshi, “No Breakthroughs at 6-Way Talks, But Dialogue to Continue,” Kyodo, February 28, 2004)

2/27/04:
Los Alamos experts say samples from 1998 Pakistan nuclear test contained plutonium, not HEU that Pakistan said they used to make weapons, and say it may have come from North Korea in return for help from A.Q. Khan. “It could only have come from one of two places: China or North Korea,” said one intel official. “And it seemed like China had nothing to gain.” Robert Einhorn says it was “speculation” that North Korea provided plutonium for the test. “It’s conceivable that Pakistani testing was providing data that was benefit to the North Koreans but hard evidence doesn’t exist on it.” A senior Clinton administration defense official disagreed. “We thought the most plausible explanation was that it was a joint test,” he said. “But there was nothing that formed compelling evidence.” (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Pakistan May Have Aided North Korea A-Test,” New York Times, February 27, 2004, p. A-10)

2/29/04:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The U.S. again insisted on its old assertion about the DPRK’s abandoning its nuclear program first, saying that it can discuss the DPRK’s concerns only when it completely scraps its nuclear program in a verifiable and irreversible manner. … This threw a big hurdle in the way of the talks. It also absurdly asserted that it can not normalize relations with the DPRK unless missile, conventional weapons, biological and chemical weapons, human rights and other issues are settled even after its abandonment of all its nuclear programs. …Any further six-way talks will not prove helpful to the solution of the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. unless the U.S. shows its will to make a switchover in its policy toward the DPRK. …In spite of this situation we consented to the time to open the next round of the six-way talks and to the issue of organizing a working group proceeding from the sincere and patient stand to seek a negotiated peaceful solution of the nuclear issue at any cost. …The U.S. seems to waste time in a bid to attain its political purpose but any delay in the solution of the nuclear issue would cause nothing unfavorable to the DPRK. This would give us time to take all necessary measures with an increased pace.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-way Talks,” February 29, 2004)

In Democratic presidential debate, Dan Rather asks about North Korea. Kerry: “There is a deal to be struck. And what is quite extraordinary is that this administration did not follow up on the extraordinary work of Bill Perry, of … President Clinton, and the work that they did to actually get inspectors and television cameras into the Pyongyang reactor. Now they’re gone. Edwards: “I will go back immediately to dialogue.” Rather: Would you be prepared to subdue North Korea if we learn unequivocally they have nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them? “I would never take that option off the table. … But the problem is, we weren’t leading the discussions. … The South Koreans were making proposals; others were making proposals. We weren’t leading.” (Text)

3/1/04:
In televised speech to the nation, Roh says, “Whether we are pro-U.S. or anti-U.S. cannot be the yardstick to assess ourselves. Step by step, we should strengthen our independence and build our strength as an independent nation.” (Choe Sang-hun, “S. Korean Chief Seeks Less U.S. Reliance,” Associated Press, March 1, 2004) “If there’s one piece of advice I’d give to Japan, it’s that while citizens and one or two politicians engrossed in their own popularity may frequently make reckless statements that hurt us, at least national leaders shouldn’t.” (Chosun Ilbo, “Roh Slams Japanese PM in March 1^st Speech,” March 1, 2004)

South to give North 200,000 tonnes of fertilizer (worth $60 million) it requested, set aside $40 million for infrastructure in Kaesong. (AFP, “South Korea Gives North Korea Fertilizer, Construction Aid,” March 1, 2004)

Annual report on International Narcotics Control Strategy says it is “highly likely, but not certain, that Pyongyang is trading narcotic drugs for profit as state policy,” citing seizures by Australia of 125 kilos of heroin on Pong Su and 50 kilos of metamphetimines in Pusan on Chinese ship in June. (AFP, “US Attacks North Korea’s ‘State’ Drugs Trafficking Policy,” March 1, 2004)

Kim Sa-nae, wife of Kang Thae-yun, DPRK economic counselor in Islamabad and a leading arms dealer, shot to death by North Koreans near A.Q. Khan’s home in 1998, ten days after Pakistan nuclear test, was part of 20-member delegation of engineers and scientists invited to witness the test say former staff members at Khan’s lab. “She was in fact killed by the North Koreans on the grounds that she was in touch with certain Western diplomats,” says an Indian official. The cargo plane carrying her body home on was owned by the Pakistani air force and had P-1 and P-2 centrifuges, technical data and uranium [hexafluoride] on board. (Paul Watson and Mubashir Zaidi, “Death of N. Korean Woman Offers Clues to Pakistani Nuclear Deals,” Los Angeles Times, March 1, 2004)

3/2/04:
Departing from his prepared text, Powell underscored U.S. patience and flexibility in a speech at the Heritage Foundation in an effort to keep the talks from breaking down: “The United States, South Korea. Japan, China and Russia have made it clear to North Korea that a better future awaits them, that none of these nations is intent on attacking them or destroying them or exhibiting hostile intent toward them; instead, we want to help the people of North Korea who are in such difficulty now, but it must begin with North Korea’s understanding that these programs must be ended in a verifiable way. And if North Korea takes the necessary steps, as we move forward, North Korea will see that the other members of the six-party group and the rest of the world will welcome them and do everything we can to help them.” (Reuters, “Powell Appears to Dangle Carrot to North Korea,” March 2, 2004; Powell, Text of Annual B.C. Lee Luncheon Lecture to the Heritage Foundation)

In an impromptu meeting with FM Ban Ki-moon, according to North American Affairs Bureau chief Kim Seok, Bush asked four questions: how Korea views the last round of six-party talks (Ban saw some positive signs), whether Korea thinks the North will abandon its nuclear programs (ultimately it will), whether the Korean people are still uneasy about the U.S. troop redeployment (they are), and whether the North and South can communicate by telephone (Ban told him there were 38 official contacts last year). (Chosun Ilbo, “Bush Meet with FM Ban,” March 3, 2004)

Ruling coalition to introduce bill authorizing ban on North Korean ships calling on ports. A senior New Komeito official says, “A law stipulating a ban would be a bargaining chip in talks with North Korea. The government should decide whether to use the law or not.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Coalition to Submit Legislation Allowing Ban on N. Korea Ships,” March 2, 2004)

In letter to Brownback, AFSC, Mercy Corps and others says his bill “politicizes and complicates urgent humanitarian issues” and “could put refugees at risk.” (Text of Letter dated March 3, 2004)

Tom Malinowski, Human Right Watch: “The most difficult challenge lies in whether more direct efforts can be made to ease repression inside North Korea itself. In facing this challenge, the first conclusion I come to is that further isolation of North Korea will not help. …The more outsiders we can get into North Korea … the better. Such contact could help break through the wall of isolation and disinformation the North Korean government has built between its people and the world. It could help to create among North Koreans a consciousness that a different existence is possible. This is the essential first step if there is to be any internal pressure for change in the country.” (Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, March 2, 2004)

3/2-5/04:
8^th Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee talks take place in Seoul. (Ryu Jin, “N. Korean Delegation Visits Seoul for Economic Talks,” March 2, 2004) “They made the proposal that we should start thinking about cooperating on electric power in Kaesong, but we don’t think the time is appropriate,” says UnifMin spokesman Han Sang-il. (Jack Kim, “North’s Proposal to Discuss Electricity Rebuffed,” Reuters, March 3, 2004)

3/3/04:
Asst SecState Kelly: “The D.P.R.K. needs to make a strategic choice for transformed relations with the United States and the world — as other countries have done, including quite recently — to abandon all of its nuclear programs. We also made clear that there are other issues that, as the nuclear issue begins to unfold, can be discussed with the U.S. Missiles, conventional forces, and serious human rights concerns could be discussed, and progress could lead to full normalization. … The North Koreans came to the table denying a uranium enrichment program. It was very clear by the conclusion of the talks that this is now very much on the table.” (Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, March 3, 2004; Korea Herald, “Bush Confident of N.K. Nuclear Settlement,” March 3, 2004)

Keith Luse and Frank Jannuzi report sees problems with relying too much on China in six-party talks. “China may be sugar-coating messages transmitted to the United States and North Korea to keep everyone happy and on board,” they write. “China may be papering over very significant differences that only come to light when the six parties come together, and then the revelations come as a jolt to both sides.” (Carol Giacomo, “Caution Raised about China Role with North Korea,” Reuters, March 3, 2004)

At House Budget Cmte meeting, New Komeito’s Urushibara challenges Koizumi over sanctions, “There is no point in giving the government a new sword if they are never willing to draw it.” Koizumi replies, “Using swords isn’t the only way to defeat one’s enemies. It would be best to move forward without drawing our sword.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Govt Wary over Pressure on N. Korea,” March 5, 2004)

3/4/04:
Roh releases security policy calling for transfer of OPCON, revision of SOFA, turning six-party talks in to a regional security forum. (Chosun Ilbo, “Gov’t Makes Public Future Security Policy,” March 4, 2004) Roh tells reporters, “In fact, the United States wants us to join it in severing dialogue and exchanges with North Korea and putting pressure on the North. … We, however, think it is more favorable for us to adopt a strategy of dialogue and engage North Korea concurrently. … We will begin a program for North Korea’s economic development and opening which will enhance cooperative relationships in Northeast Asia, help consolidate a regime of peace, and establish an economically cooperative network or community in the region.” (Nelson Report, March 4, 2004)

Kerry speeches broadcast by Radio Pyongyang, prompting speculation Pyongyang is waiting for election. (Andrew Ward and James Harding, “North Korea Warms to Kerry Presidential Bid,” Financial Times, March 4, 2004)

3/4-5/04:
New CIA estimate briefed to White House concludes A.Q. Khan sold North Korea “the complete package,” said a senior US official, all it needed to make weapons from uranium hexafluoride and centrifuges to one or more wahead designs. “What we are getting is second-hand accounts, which means the Pakistanis may be editing it,” said one senior US diplomat. Khan’s transactions traced to the early 1990s under Benazir Bhutto. US intelligence does not know where the site or sites are or when it would be operational. North Korea may only be assembling a few hundred centrifuges a year. “The best guess is still in the next year or two, but it is a guess,” said one senior US official with access to the report. North Koreans worked at Khan’s lab in the late 1990s. A lengthy timeline of transfers included some shipments on Pakistani military aircraft. US satellites repeatedly photographed Pakistani cargo planes at an airfield in Pyongyang then believed to be picking up missile parts. “We suspected there was a quid pro quo, and there was a lot of speculation on the nuclear side. But there was no evidence.” By the late 1990s Khan had converted the one way trade in missile technology to two-way trade involving uranium hexafluoride and centrifuges. The estimate was disclosed to closest allies, including Japan. (David E. Sanger, “U.S. Widens View of Pakistani Link to Korean Arms,” New York Times, March 14, 2004, p. 1)

In Diet debate on legislation to bar North Korean ships from Japanese ports, Koizumi had an exchange with an opposition party lawmaker who argued, “There is no point giving the government a new sword if [it is] never willing to draw it.” Koizumi parried the blow, “Using swords isn’t the only way to defeat our enemies. It is best to move forward without drawing the sword.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Government Wary Over Pressure on N. Korea,” March 5, 2004)

3/5/04:
New IRBM based on Soviet SS-N-6 technology has improved range and accuracy. Widespread speculation holds that North has developed smaller nuclear warheads. Andrew Feickert, “Missile Survey,” Congressional Research Service, March 5, 2004)

Powell: “There is no sense of urgency.” Jack Pritchard says Pyongyang would rather take its chances with Kerry than negotiate with Bush. Nicholas Eberstadt of AEI says, “The administration is presuming it will have more options concerning North Korea further down the line.” (George Gedda, “Newsview: U.S., N. Korea Decide to Wait,” Associated Press, March 10, 2004)

3/8/04:
Rodong Sinmun: “At the talks the U.S. repeated its assertion of ‘scrapping nuclear program before dialogue,’ while making no positive change in its stand. The DPRK cannot but call into question the U.S. insistence on ‘complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of nuclear program.’ … The U.S. demand for ‘complete dismantlement of nuclear program’ is an essential ambition to wrest the nuclear deterrent force from the DPRK free of charge to disarm it and overthrow its system. In other words, it is a brigandish logic for ‘scrapping nuclear program before overthrowing the DPRK’s system.’ …Now that the U.S. is persistently forcing the ‘complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of nuclear program’ upon the DPRK,turning aside from the latter’s elastic and most magnanimous proposal, the DPRK cannot but demand the U.S. completely withdraw its troops from south Korea in a verifiable way and make the ‘complete, verifiable, irreversible security assurance’ guaranteeing the adoption of peace agreement and normalization of relations.” (KCNA, “Rodong Sinmun on Key to Settlement of Nuclear Issue,” March 8, 2004) Minju Joson: “The delay in the settlement of the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. will be unfavorable to the U.S. alone. During the time given, the DPRK will take all necessary measures with an increased pace.” (Reuters, “North Korea Making Good Use of Talks Delay — Daily,” March 9, 2004)

Powell in invw: A few FSOs are not as “dedicated as I would like” them to be. Jack Pritchard “is an example in point. Jack was here for a couple of years. He was an expert in these matters, and he thought we ought to be moving in another direction, and I said, ‘No, the president wants us to do it this way.’ And he left, and now he’s writing long, tortured articles about how we are doing it wrong. Fine — you do it on the outside. But if you are here, do it our way.” Nicholas Kralev, “Diplomats Fight Their Stuffed-White-Short Image,” Washington Times, March 8, 2004)

DCI Tenet asked at Senate Armed Services Committee if North Korea will follow Libya’s lead, said, “Low likelihood at this point. It’s a good example but I don’t know that others will follow the lead.” (Kyodo, “N. Korea Unlikely to Follow Libya’s Example, CIA Chief Says, March 11, 2004)

3/9-12/04:
KEDO in DPRK asks Pyongayng to allow removal of reactor construction equipment. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “KEDO to Ask N. Korea to Let It Remove Construction Materials,” March 8, 2004)

3/10/04:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The United States is advertising that the six-way talks achieved a ‘success’ in a bid to calm down the bitter domestic and foreign criticism of its act of hamstringing the settlement of the nuclear issue and prevent an atmosphere unfavorable to the forthcoming presidential election from being created. The recent talks could not yield any results due to the fundamental difference between the DPRK and the U.S. in their stands. The U.S. talked about ‘talks without any precondition’ whenever an opportunity presented itself. But at the recent talks the U.S. only repeated the assertion that ‘the DPRK should scrap its nuclear program first’ with which it came out at the tripartite talks and the six-way talks held last year, refusing to show any will to make a switchover in its policy. … Refuting the groundless accusation made by the U.S. against the DPRK over ‘enriched uranium program,’ he said the DPRK has never admitted it. The U.S. far-fetched assertion about this program is intended to attack the DPRK under that pretext just as it did against Iraq, he noted, and continued: The U.S. reckless stance only pushes the DPRK to further increase its nuclear deterrent force.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK FM Denounces U.S. Reckless Stand at Six-Way Talks,” March 10, 2004)

Christopher Hill, current ambassador to Poland, will replace Thomas Hubbard. (Choi Jie-ho, “U.S. Reported Set to Replace Seoul Envoy,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 10, 2004) [Rumsfeld says to Hill, “I hope you’re not another one of those whiny ambassadors.”DG 7/22/04]

3/11/04:
KCNA: “A rumor is afloat on the international arena that the DPRK is driving the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. to a quagmire in the hope that if Bush is voted down, it would be possible to settle the nuclear issue more favorably. The Washington Times on March 6 in an article titled ‘North Korea hopes Bush to resign’ said that north Korea is hoping President Bush from the Republican Party to fail in the U.S. presidential election slated for November and step down. We do not care where such opinion came from. But we cannot but clarify that this is nothing but sheer misinformation as it is an expression of utter ignorance of the independent nature of the DPRK’s diplomacy. It is clear that this misinformation is aimed to serve the purpose of speaking for the present U.S. administration which finds itself in a difficult position after being bitterly censured at home and abroad for driving the DPRK-U.S. relations to the lowest ebb and coming out to the second round of the six-way talks without any proposal. … The DPRK does not care at all whether a candidate from the Democratic Party is elected or a candidate from the Republican Party is elected in the United States because it is a matter to be decided by the U.S. voters. … Whoever elected U.S. president should be willing to make a switchover in its policy toward the DPRK, drop the hostile policy toward it and express readiness to coexist with it. This is a main point.” (KCNA, “KCNA on U.S. Foolish Way of Thinking,” March 11, 2004)

3/12/04:
National Assembly impeaches Roh; PM Goh Kun assumes his duties. (Park Song-wu, “National Assembly Impeaches Presdent Roh,” Korea Times, March 12, 2004) In poll 72.8% of Koreans say impeachment is “wrong” or “very wrong.” Only 11.1% say Roh should step down right away. (Ryu Jin, “7 Out of 10 Oppose Impeachment,” Korea Times, March 12, 2004)

Reiss: “The United States and our partners expect an unambiguous indication from North Korea’s representatives to the Six-Party Talks that their country is committed to permanent non-nuclear status and is prepared to completely dismantle all its programs, subject to international verification. …We want North Korea to understand one thing: The United States is committed to achieving a more “normal” relationship with a “normal” North Korea. But we cannot even begin the journey toward improved relations so long as the North clings to its nuclear programs. …As the President and Secretary Powell have stated, we are prepared to join our partners in documenting a multilateral assurance to North Korea in the context of its implementation of an effective verification regime that will assure us that its nuclear program will not be reconstituted. But is North Korea equally prepared to explain to us just why it wants this assurance? And above all, precisely why our providing a document will lead it to alter its legacy of bad — and often illegal — behavior? …Why, then, does Pyongyang expect us to believe that assurances have such value? Are we to believe that it will surrender its tangible nuclear weapons program for an intangible promise of security? North Korea must recognize that the very best guarantee of its security is not a piece of paper, but a strategic determination to join the mainstream of the region — with all of the myriad trade, diplomatic, and cultural contacts this would entail. …Consider North Korea’s demands for economic assistance, food, energy, and recognition. We are prepared to help on all these fronts if North Korea is responsive to our concerns. But what is North Korea doing to make it possible for the international community to help with any of these things? The North says it wants financial assistance? Well, then, what further economic reform and restructuring measures is it prepared to take? The wage and price reforms that North Korea finally initiated in July 2002 were a start. But they have led to high inflation and created other social problems. Is the North prepared to remake its capital markets? To reform outdated Leninist modes of economic management? Will it right the extremely inappropriate imbalance between guns and butter that has long characterized the very essence of the North Korean state? Without adopting international standards, North Korea cannot possibly expect international lenders to assist it in reforming its economy. The North says it wants more food aid? Well, then, is it prepared to allow the World Food Program to apply the same monitoring and access conditions it applies to other recipients? Will it allow Korean-speaking international staff to conduct on-site inspections without days of advance notice? Will it allow access to all counties throughout North Korea? We are not making special requests here. These are WFP’s standard operating procedures for countries all over the world. The North says it wants energy assistance? Well, then, is it prepared to explain how it would manage supply and demand? To ensure fairness in the distribution and management of energy? To manage its grid? To adequately promote conservation? To wean politically-favored units off of the excess use of limited power? The North says it wants us to recognize its sovereignty? Well, then, is it prepared to welcome the presence of foreign diplomats into North Korea? To allow them to walk the streets of Pyongyang, Kaesong, and Wonsan without official minders and function the way they do in nearly every country around the world? To meet and speak with ordinary North Koreans?” (Mitchell Reiss, Director of Policy Planning, DOS, “Remarks at Heritage Foundation,” March 12, 2004)

Information from A.Q. Khan suggests he supplied “equipment for centrifuges for over a decade ending in 2001,” said one senior official. Another says it is unclear he supplied centrifuges that far back, but there was “information exchanges” and discussions about “parameters of cooperation” on HEU as far back as 1991, said another. (Carol Giacomo, “N. Korea Nuclear Program Older Than First Believed,” Reuters, March 12, 2004)

3/15/04:
Junior minister Bill Rammell of UK FCO asks visiting Supreme National Assembly delegation to improve the North’s human rights record. (Chosun Ilbo, “British Foreign Office Insists on Improvement of Human Rights in N. Korea,” March 19, 2004)

3/17/04:
LDP and Komeito agree to submit bill to Diet banning North Korean ships from Japan’s ports intended as a “negotiating card” with the North. (Kyodo, “Ruling Parties to Submit N. Korea Ship Ban Bill to Diet,” March 17, 2004)

KCNA says, “The U.S. is chiefly to blame” for impeachement. “The U.S. egged [on] the South Korean political quacks, obsessed by the greed for power, to stage such an incident in a bid to install an ultra-right pro-U.S. regime there.” (Reuters, “North Korea Says U.S. Egnineered Roh Impeachment,” March 17, 2004) UnifMin Jeong Se-hyun said, “It is very regret[able] that the North is trying to portray that the United States is behind the impeachment.” (Ryu Jin, “Seoul Regrets Pyongyang’s Remarks on Impeachment,” Korea Times, March 18, 2004)

3/19/04:
3,600 ROK troops to deploy to Najaf, not Kirkuk. (Ryu Jun, “Troop Dispatch Delayed with Changed Location,” Korea Times, March 19, 2004)

Pm Kopizumi says he will explain to the Japanese people that Japan needs U.S. help in dealing with threats from North Korea so they will understand why he supports the United States over the war in Iraq. (Kyodo, “Koizumi to Tell People N. Korea Threat Led Him to Back U.S.,” March 19, 2004) Senior LDP official: it was a deal: Japanese troops to Iraq in exchange for U.S. support for Japan’s position of dealing with North Korea. (Asahi Shimbun, Kokuren yori Bei’ no meian,” March 19, 2004)

3/22/04:
North delays N-S talks on linking rail lines over Foal Eagle/Reception, Staging, Onward Movement exercises. “A dialogue can never go on with a war maneuver,” says Rodong Sinmun. (AFP, “North Korea Pushes Back Inter-Korean Talks over US-South Korea Exercise,” March 22, 2004)

3/24/04:
FM Li Zhaoxing meets with KJI, first Chinese FM in Pyongyang in five years. (AFP, “Chinese FM Meets with North Korea’s Kim Jong-il,” March 24, 2004) “The two sides agreed to work together to poush forward the process of six-party talks and use dialogue to peacefully settle the issue,” Li told reporters. FoMin spokesman Kong Quan said, “They have reached extensive consensus.” [on draft joint statement?] Ning Fukui, China’s new envoy to the DPRK, said, “North Korea also hopes that the working groups can be set up soon to solve some concrete problems.” (Associated Press, “China: N. Korea Willing to ‘Push Forward’ on Nuke Talks,” USA Today, March 25, 2004) FM Li quoted as saying, “I learned the North said it had an intention to give up its ‘nuclear power industry’ as well as its nuclear weapons, if corresponding measures are appropriately provided to them.” (AFP, “North Korea Willing to Give Up All Nuclear Facilities,” April 4, 2004)

North Korea Human Rights Act introduced by Jim Leach (R-IA) (Text)

3/25/04:
Powell: “Success in diplomacy is often most advantageous when it’s incomplete. That may sound strange, but all I mean is that it’s possible to overdo things — that there are ways of winning that can turn victory into defeat. Examples of overreach fill history books. Fortunately, there are also examples in those books of getting it right. Another way to put this principle is that an adversary needs an honorable path of escape if we’re to achieve our main policy goals without using force. Some adversaries will never take that avenue of exit, of escape — Saddam Hussein being a perfect example. A cornered adversary may lash out, and our eventual success at arms, if it comes at all, could be a pyrrhic victory. The diplomacy of the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrates this. By offering to remove U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey that we’d scheduled for removal anyway, President Kennedy gave Chairman Khrushchev a way out. He took it. Our success was incomplete. We didn’t get the Soviets altogether out of Cuba at that time. We didn’t get Fidel Castro out of power, as we know. …The DPRK North Korean leadership has been trying to generate a crisis atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula. It’s part of a pattern of extortion that the DPRK has practiced over many years. It wouldn’t be diplomatic for me to lay out all of our tactics in dealing with North Korea, but it’s telling no secrets out of school to say that the President’s been very patient. All options remain on the table, but we’ve focused our efforts on persuasion, so we get back to principle number one.” (Colin Powell, “Remarks at the 2004 Annual Kennan Institute Dinner, Woodrow Wilson Institute for International Scholars, March 25, 2004, DOS Text)

Matthew Daley, DAS for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at DOS, tells House East Asia Subcommittee , “We have reason to believe that the DPRK has offered surface-to-surface missiles” to Myanmar. “We have raised this issue of possible missile transfers with senior Burmese officials and registered our concerns in unambiguous language.” Keith Luse, Lugar aide, had warned last month of need to pay “special attention” to the North’s growing relationship with Myanmar. (AFP, “US Accuses North Korea of Seeking to Sell Missiles to Myanmar,” March 25, 2004)

3/29/04:
9^th round of family reunions held at Mt. Kumgang; 147 South Koreans meet 494 North Korean kin. (Joint Press Corps and Yoo Dong-ho, “S-N Families Reunited at Mt. Kumgang,” Korea Times, March 29, 2004) Reunions halted when an inexperienced ROK official jokes about a slogan engraved on a large rock praising Kim Jong-il. (Yonhap, Inter-Korean Family Reunion Halted by N. Korean Authorities,” April 2, 2004) “I sincerely apologize over the halting of the reunions which was caused by inappropriate remarks made by our official while exchanging pleasantries with North Korean officials,” UnifMin Jeong Se-hyun said on April 3. (AFP, “North Korea Pulls Plug on Family Reunions over Joke on Kim Jong-il,” April 3, 2004)

3/30/04:
US, DPRK recently agreed to hold five rounds of MIA excavations this year. (Yonhap, “N.K., U.S. Agree on Searches for Remains of U.S Troops This Year,” March 30, 2004) Preliminary work begins April 12. (DoD Press Release, “Remains of U.S. MIAs to Be Recovered in North Korea,” April 12, 2004; Cf., Ashton Ormes, Memorandum on Areas in Which US-DPRK Joint Reocvery Operations Have Been Conducted, 1996-2004, NAPSNET, April 8, 2004)

Bolton testimony contradicts Reiss on “other issues of concern”: “We do not raise these issues because we want to set the bar higher for any negotiated settlement with North Korea. While our long-term goal remains the peaceful reunification of the the peninsula, we know that any interim solution will require a comprehensive change in North Korean behavior.” Rep. William Delahunt (MA) asked about a recent New York Times article that reported “the most active exchange of nuclear missile technology between North Korea and Pakistan occurred between 1998 and 2002.” Bolton said, “I’m not going to comment on newspaper reports about intelligence assessments, particularly when they are wrong.” (Testimony by Under Secretary of State John Bolton to the House International relations Committee, March 30, 2004)

3/31/04:
LaPorte testimony: “There is little evidence that any significant threat to the regime exists.” USFK Commander Gen. Leon J. LaPorte, Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 31, 2004)

North Korean engineer says documents on alleged gas chamber experiments he smuggled out were fake. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea: Alled Gas Chamber Witness Says He Lied,” Associated Press, March 31, 2004)

46.1 percent of South Koreans polled say aid to the North should be maintained, 16.9 percent say increase it, 32.7 percent say reduce it. (Ryu Jin, “6 of 10 Support Assistance to NK,” Korea Times, March 31, 2004)

4/1-2/04:
Yamasaki Taru, Koizumi confidante, and Hirasawa Katsuei of LDP in Dalian meet in secret with Jong Thae-hwa, DPRK representative in normalization talks. Hirasawa, sec-gen of Rachi Giren, bipartisan Diet group on abduction issue, who had also met with Jong in December, is forced to resign as parliamentary secretary at Ministry of Home Affairs for acting without authorization. (Kyodo, “Hirasawa Gives up Post; Yamasaki Sees Early N. Korea Talks,” April 2, 2004) In interview, Hirasawa says five abductees do not have to return to North for kin to be released. (Asahi Shimbun, “N. Korea Drops Provisos on Return of Abductee Families,” April 5, 2004) LDP Sec-Gen Abe Shinzo says resumption of working-level talks by month’s end a “high probability.” Hirasawa tells kin of abductees that major progress has been made. North says Japan had breached Tanaka Hiroshi promise that abductees would return after visit. (Kyodo, “Abe Expects Talks with N. Korea to Resolve Abduction Issue,” April 3, 2004) Koizumi says on April 5, “It was not that I or the Foreign Ministry asked” Yamasaki and Hirasawa to meet the North Koreans. [Did Fukuda?] “It therefore does not make it double-track [track two] diplomacy.” (Kyodo, “Koizumi Denies N. Korea Sees 2-Track Approach in Diplomacy,” April 5, 2004) In dinner meeting with Diet members joined by Koizumi on April 7, Yamasaki reveals Jong told him North Korea will allow abductees’ kin to go to Japan unconditionally. (Kyodo, “N. Korea Offers to Allow Abductees’ Kin to Go to Japan Freely,” April 8, 2004) Jong warned if Japan enacts bill to prevent port calls by North Korean ships, it would be unable to resolve the abduction issue for twenty or thirty years. “It is clear that they intended to have Mr. Yamasaki convey this message to Prime Minister Koizumi,” says Abe Shinzo. “But regardless of whether a working-level meeting between Tokyo and Pyongyang is held, the bill must be debated throroughly according to prescribed rules and enacted during the current Diet session.” (Yomirui Shumbun, “N. Korea Issued Threat over Bill to Ban Port Calls,” Yomiuri Shimbun, April 4, 2004) Yamasaki also delivered a personal message to Koizumi from Kim Jong-il, “I want to normalize relations by resolving all nuclear, abduction and missile issues in two and a half years, while Koizumi is in office as prime minister.” (Asahi Shimbun, “Yamasaki: North Korea Will Let Abductees’ Families Leave,” April 9, 2004)

4/2/04:
Rodong Sinmun signed commentary: “Recently the United States and some other countries concerned came out with a ‘conception of the Northeast Asian Security Organization’ with the six-way framework for the solution to the nuclear issue in mind. But it is a premature idea as it is far removed from the reality. …The immediate task for security in Northeast Asia is to build bilateral confidence among the regional countries through the removal of hostile relations and mistrust. The debate on creating the Northeast Asia security organization is an issue which may be taken up in a distant future when this crucial task has been carried out. … The DPRK will not pay any attention to ‘the conception of the Northeast Asian Regional Security Organization’ far removed from the reality but make every possible effort to increase the capacity for self-defence to effectively cope with the U.S. and Japan’s immediate threat of aggression.” (KCNA, “’Conception of Northeast Asian Security Organization’ Termed Premature,” April 2, 2004)

“Japan should not be partial to the United States,” Kono Yohei, speaker of the lower house, said in interview, but “needs to discuss matters more thoroughly with its Asian neighbors and make diplomatic efforts to settle problems. I’m not sure the country really made enough effort to do that.” (Hayano Toru, “Koizumi Needs to Listen to Those around Him,” Asahi Shimbun, April 3, 2004)

4/5/04:
FM Kawaguchi Yoriko agrees with FM Li Zhaoxing to hold regular trilateral meetings owith South Korea. (Japan Times, “Japan, China Agree on Regular Meeting Including South Korea,” April 4, 2004)

4/7-8/04:
TCOG in SF. Discuss agenda for six-party talks. Agree on need to start working groups (James L. Schoff, Tools for Trilateralism (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), p A11)

4/10-15/04:
Cheney in Tokyo, Beijing, Seoul to seek backing for U.S. stance. He tried to get China to act. Signalling U.S. impatience, he said “time is not on our side.” He told the Chinese U.S. will offer no concessions. Chinese urged flexibility. (Glenn Kessler, “Cheney to Reassert U.S. Position on Taiwan’s Status,” Washington Post, April 14, 2004, p. A-20) In speech at Fudan University, he warns of arms race in Asia. “We worry that, given what they’ve done in the past and given what we estimate to be their current capability, that North Korea could well, for example, provide [nuclear weapons] to, say, a terrorist organization.” (Doyle McManus, “Cheney Makes Clear U.S. Is Not Willing to Bend on North Korea,” Los Angeles Times, April 16, 2004) According to a source familiar with Cheney’s discussions, the immediate problem in North Korea’s slowness in agreeing to form working groups unless it gets aid from China and South Korea. Beijing had earlier delivered about $50 million in aid, including heavy fuel oil and a promise of a glass factory, as an inducement to attend the February round. The probable focus of the next round would be a North Korean offer to suspend, not dismantle, its nuclear program and insistence that any suspension be understood as the first step to dismantlement. (Edward Cody and Anthony Faiola, “N. Korea’s Kim Reportedly in China for Talks,” Washington Post, April 20, 2004, p. A-13) “The mission of the trip was to urge the Chinese to lean a bit more forward on things related to North Korea,” recalled Cheney’s Asia staffer Stephen Yates. (Chiinoy, Meltdown, p. 208)

4/12/04:
A.Q. Khan has told interrogators he saw three nuclear devices in secret underground plant in North Korea five years ago. Cheney had been briefed and was expected to cite intelligence in meeting with Chinese. He provided a “shopping list” of everything it needed to produce thousands of centrifuges. “We think they’ve pretty much bought everything on the list, with the possible exception of a few components,” said one U.S. official. “Asia can ignore a lot of things when it deems it convenent,” said Kurt Campbell. “But these reports make it very hard for the regional powers — China, South Korea, and Japan — to pretend publicly that North Korea dioesn’t already have a significant nuclear capability.” If the country already has a few nuclear weapons, some administration officials say, a few more would not make a strategic difference, but Samuel R. Berger says, “It’s an untenable argument. There’s a difference between two or three and eight, and it’s called the market in weapons for global terrorists.” (David E. Sanger, “Pakistani Says He Saw North Korean Nuclear Devices,” New York Times, April 13, 2004, p. A-12) Cheney “brought to the attention” of Chinese leaders the Times report and warned “time is not necessarily on our side,” says senior administration official. (Joseph Kahn, “Cheney Urges China to Press North Korea on A-Bombs,” New York Times, April 14, 2004, p. A-3) He conditions support for six-party on “real results.” (New York Times, “North Korean and Chinese Leaders Meet,” April 14, 2004, p. A-6)

4/13/04:
U.S. will turn over Outpost Ouellette inside DMZ to ROKs. (Kim Hyung-jin, “U.S. Troops to Stop Patrolling DMZ, Ending 50-Year Role,” Yonhap, April 13, 2004)

4/15/04:
In sharpest shift in four decades, Uri Party gains majority in National Assembly elections as impeachment backfires. Uri wins 152 seats of 299, had 49, GNP drops from 137 to 121, MDP from 59 to 9. Democratic Labor Party gets 10 seats, a first. (Anthony Faiola, “Korean Vote Shifts Power in Assembly,” Washington Post, April 16, 2004, p. A-14) Centrists like chairman Chung-Dong-young, Shin Ki-nam, Chuun Jung-bae, Chiung Sye-kyun, Han Myung-sook, Lee Kye-an, and Kim Jin-pyo, remain the biggest faction in Uri with 80 seats. Former dissidents like Kim Guen-tae, Lee Hai-chan, Lim Chae-jung, and Shin Geh-ryoon are a second faction, which includes 23 former activists from the 386 generation like Kim Young-choon, Im Jeok-seok, and newly elected Woo Sang-ho and Bok Ki-wang. (Kim So-young, “News Analysis: Uri Party Spectrum Widens after General Election,” Korea Times, April 22, 2004)

(Sharon Squassoni, “Globalizing Cooperative Threat reduction: A Survey of Options,” CRS Report, April 15, 2004)

The EC-DPRK Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004

4/18/04:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “According to press reports, Cheney pulled up the DPRK, asserting that it poses a threat to peace and it is so dangerous as to spread nuclear and missile technology to such terrorist organizations as ‘Al Qaeda.’ He also blustered that the U.S. remains unchanged in its stand to demand ‘north Korea completely dismantle its nuclear program in a verifiable and irreversible manner,’ it is a top priority to put pressure upon north Korea to abandon its nuclear program and it will be an effective alternative to apply economic sanctions against it if it goes ahead with its nuclear program. These outcries are nothing new to the DPRK. It considered Cheney as a mentally deranged person steeped in the inveterate enmity towards the system in the DPRK long ago as he is the boss of the neo-conservative forces in the U.S. … It is quite understandable that the U.S. can not sleep in peace, terror-stricken by ‘Al Qaeda,’ but its unreasonably linking the DPRK to such organization is an expression of total ignorance and nothing but a far-fetched attempt to justify its hostile policy towards the DPRK. Action is inevitably followed by reaction. The DPRK is seriously contemplating a measure to counter the U.S. off-repeated demand that it scrap its nuclear program first.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts Cheney’s Anti-DPRK Remarks,” April 18, 2004)

John Kerry: “Within weeks of being inaugurated, I will return to the U.N. and I will literally, formally rejoin the community of nations and turn over a proud new chapter in America’s relationship with the world, which will do a number of things. Number one, change how we’re approaching North Korea.” (NBC, “Meet the Press,” transcript, April 18, 2004)

4/19/04:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The DPRK resolutely denounces the resolution, which does not deserve even a passing note, as a product of the U.S.-orchestrated political plot to isolate and stifle the DPRK. The resolution is, in essence, a product of politicization and selectivity of human rights. As already reported, the EU at a session held last year unilaterally abandoned the favorable process of all forms of dialogue and cooperation with the DPRK in the field of human rights and passed a resolution on human rights abuses in the DPRK all of a sudden. This year again it railroaded another resolution full of lies and fabrication through the session, interfering in the internal affairs of the DPRK.

This glaringly proves that the EU has openly joined the U.S. in its moves to achieve its sinister political purpose to slander the inviolable social system in the DPRK and force it to change its political system, instead of seeking genuine dialogue and cooperation with it in the field of human rights.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts EU’s Anti-DPRK Resolution,” April 19, 2004)

4/19-20/04:
Kim Jong-il secretly visits Beijing, has lunch with President Hu. (Reuben Staines, “NK, China Discuss Nuclear Crisis, Aid, Korea Times, April 19, 2004) He meets with Hu a second time and tours Zhingguancun Technology Park in Beijing, China’s “Silcon Valley.” (Ryu Jin, “China Tells NK to Negotiate with US,” Korea Times, April 20, 2004) International Department of CPC Central Committee announces visit on April 21: in “a friendly and candid atmosphere” they agreed on “jointly pushing forward the six-party talks process, so as to make contributions to the eventual peaceful solution.” Kim “said the DPRK side sticks to the final nuclear weapons-free goal.” (Text) Kim told Chinese, say Japanese government sources, he would not accept calls for “complete scrapping” but would continue “carrying out nuclear programs for peaceful purposes.” He went to talks to “discuss ways to compensate North Korea for its freeze on the nuclear development program.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Kim: North Won’t End Nuclear Program, May 10, 2004) He ate Peking duck with Jiang Zemin at a restaurant near Tiananmin Square. “I don’t think China likes this kind of diplomacy,”Yan Xuetong, director of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University, said on keeping the visit secret. “This must be at the request of North Korea. They haven’t gotten used to public diplomacy.” (Jim Yardley, “North Korea to Continue Arms Talks,” New York Times, April 21, 2004, p. A-6) Nporth agrees to working group meetings in mid-May and third round in late June, a Chinese diplomat source says. (Chosun Ilbo, “Kim, Hu Agree to Dates for NukeTalks,” April 22, 2004) He agrees to working-level talks shortly after visit. (Yoo Choonsik, “North Korea Agrees to Nuclear Talks, Wants Rewards,” Reuters, April 29, 2004) “I’ve heard that during his visit to Beijing,” says a high-level U.S. official, “North Korean Leader Kim Jong-il told the Chinese Guidance Division of the Communist party, ‘I’m concerned that the U.S. stance toward us will be aggravated following next November’s presidential election.’ … We are focusing on whteher or not it is true and the origin of the rumor.” (Dong-A Ilbo, “Kim Jong-il Worries about U.S. North Korea Policy Post-Election,” April 29, 2004)

4/20/04:
Bush: “The only way to convince Kim Jong-il to disarm is to get China very much involved in the process, which we have done. It wasn’t easy because China felt it was the U.S. responsibility and they really didn’t want to have equity in the process.” (Annual Convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 21, 2004, FDCH E-Media text)

“This year’s North Korea nuclear crisis has been postponed — to be rescheduled at a date more conventient for the political calendar.” “It’s like they are just going through the motions,” says Charles L. Pritchard. “They have merely obtained their interim goal which is to keep Korea off the front pages.” “The North Korean reading is that the political tea leaves have changed. They are hoping for a Kerry victory, and in the meantime, they are moving toward becoming a nuclear power,” says Donald Gregg. “It matches Bush’s belief that he will be reelected and that the revalidation of a reelection will allow him to move toward a tougher policy on North Korea. This creates a dangerous situation.” (Barbara Demick, “N. Korean Nuclear Issue Simmers on the Back Burner,” Los Angeles Times, April 20, 2004) “The administration is just trying to kick this can down the road,” says Jonathan Pollack of the Naval War College. “In a fiunny way, I thik both we and the North Koreans are waiting for November.” (Nicholas D. Kristof, “The Real Nuclear Danger,” New York Times, April 21, 2004, p. A-23) [right on Bush, wrong on DPRK]

South will supply electricity to Kaesong instead of building generation there. (Yonhap, “Seoul to Directly Supply Power for N.K. Industriual Complex,” April 20, 2004)

4/21/04:
Visiting North Korean, Jo Sung-su, North American affairs director, told U.S. scholars, “If the U.S. shows us that iti is ready for co-existence, the nuclear problem can be resolved.. Why would we need nuclear weapons if we no longer feel threatened. It is as simple as that.” (Selig Harrison, “Time for a Fresh Start on North Korea,” Financial Times, April 21, 2004, p. 13)

4/22/04:
Explosion at Ryongchon station, 12 miles from Chinese border, kills as many as 3,000. Kim Jong-il reportedly passed through station hours earlier, en route home from Beijing. (Sang-hun Choe, “Report: Trains Explode in North Korea,” Associated Press, April 22, 2004) DPRK asks for help, acknowledged disaster. Ann O’Mahoney, Irish aid worker briefed by the government, says more than 150 died, over 1,000 injured, 800 residences destroyed by explosion sparked when railroad workers “got caught in the overhead wiring.” (James Brooke, “North Korea Appeals for Help after Railway Explosion,” New York Times, April 24, 2004, p. A-3) GNP, Uri join hands in aid. (Paul Shin, “Train Accident in N. Korea Helps Bridge Political Schism in S. Korea,” Yonhap, April 26, 2004) Chief cabinet secy Fukuda announces $100,000 in medical aid “as an exceptional and humanitarian measure.” (Kyodo, “Japan May Give More Aid to N. Korea for Accident Victims,” April 26, 2004) South offers $20.3 million. (Kim Kwang-tae, “Seoul to Offer $23.4 Bln Won in Aid to N.K. Blast Victims,” Yonhap, April 28, 2004) KCNA announces arrival of aid from South Korean Red Cross. (KCNA, “First Batch of Relief Goods from South Side Here,” April 29, 2004) “This weekend we heard first-hand reports about the devastation and loss of life caused by a train accident in North Korea on April 22, 2004. We are saddened by these reports. Our thoughts and prayers are with the victims of the incident and with the families that have suffered terrible loss. We have received the findings of an international assessment team, and will provide $100,000 through the Red Cross to purchase supplies for those left homeless by the accident. We are also prepared to provide medical supplies and equipment, as well as a team of specialists in emergency medicine to work with the North Koreans, if they are needed. We provide all humanitarian aid in disasters based on need without regard to political issues.” (White House, Statement by the Press Secretary, April 26, 2004) Chargé Mark Minton says aid offered through the New York channel. Han Song-ryol says he accepted, “The United States expressed its intention to provide through the International Red Cross $100,000 in funds to purchase necessities for the victims of the Ryongchon accident.” Han adds, “In that the basic problem in the relationship between the U.S. and the DPRK is mistrust and misunderstanding, if we can builkd trust through contacts like this, it will help.” (Chosun Ilbo, “N. Korean Aiud May Improve DPRK-U.S. Ties: N. Korean UN Ambassador,” May 5, 2004) Officials investigating the accident now believe it was an assassination attempt triggered by a mobile phone. “They still don’t know who planted the explosives, oif indeed there were any,” said one official. “It’s very difficult to find any sign, as they would have used only a small amount to detonate a huge amont of ammonium nitrate. You don’t even need TNT to detonate it — it is just enough just to create a high temperature.” (Sergey Soukhorukov, “Train Blast Was ‘a Plot to Kill North Korea’s Leader,’” Daily Telegraph (U.K.), June 13, 2004) In the weeks after the mysterious Ryongchon train explosion that killed a dozen Syrian weapons scientists in North Korea on April 22, 2004, the Canadian Office of Foreign Affairs announced they were investigating reports that an Israeli Mossad spy travelling on a stolen Canadian passport was in North Korea around the time of the blast. Zev William Barkan was last seen in late April in Pyongyang, North Korea, after travelling there from Beijing using a Canadian passport issued under the name Kevin William Hunter, according to the Toronto Globe and Mail and other media reports. “The Canadian passport of Kevin William Hunter was said to have been reported stolen in the southern Chinese city of Guangzhou on April 11, 2004”—11 days before the massive blast, measuring 3.6 on the Richter scale, at Ryongchon. “Israel Mossad agent in North Korea?” read the headline in the August 4 Jerusalem Post, adding “New Zealand passport scam takes Canadian twist.” The Canadian Press reported “Federal officials are investigating whether a suspected Israeli spy is travelling in Asia on a stolen Canadian passport.” It said “agencies are checking allegations that Zev William Barkan — embroiled in a New Zealand espionage caper — is using a Canadian passport issued under the name Kevin William Hunter.” “That part of the story’s being checked,” said Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Reynald Doiron. “All of that being put together, we should have a clearer picture.” Foreign Affairs spokesman Reynald Doiron told Canadian CTV television that “We are checking the information. We know some of the answers but not all of them and we are determined to get to the bottom of this.” Barkan was at the time wanted by police in New Zealand in an espionage scandal that had erupted in the weeks before the North Korean train explosion. The rare public spy scandal captured New Zealand headlines on April 17 when two Israeli Mossad agents were charged with attempting to illegally obtain New Zealand passports for the use of the Mossad operative Zev Barkan. When two other Mossad operatives were arrested, Barkan, who was in New Zealand between March 3 and 20th, vanished. As part of the plot, Barkan attempted to assume the identity of a severely disabled New Zealand man with cerebral palsy. In an effort to secure the passport, Barkan obtained the man’s birth certificate and applied for a passport under his name, but his American accent raised the suspicions of a New Zealand official which sparked authorities to investigate. New Zealand Foreign Minister Phil Goff told New Zealand radio that Barkan was a former Israel Defence Force diver and diplomat assigned to Israeli embassies in Vienna and Brussels between 1993 and 2001. New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark has said there was “no doubt whatsoever” that the men were spies. Secret cable from the American embassy in New Zealand confirmed U.S. officials knew the arrested men were Mossad agents. “We have very strong grounds for believing these are Israeli intelligence agents,” the cable, released in 2009 by WikiLeaks, said. “While Prime Minister Helen Clark would not confirm which service employed the men, she noted that if one were to lay espionage charges then one would have to be prepared to offer the kind of evidence in court which our intelligence agencies do not like coming forward to display.” One New Zealand news organization reported that “Barkan is being investigated by Macau and Chinese Immigration for his movements in April/May. The investigation includes his alleged use of the U.S. passport in the name of Zev Barkan and a second Canadian passport in the name of Kevin Hunter — which was stolen in Guangzhou China on April 11th.” The court arraignments on April 16 revealed that two Israeli’s were arrested on charges of attempting to obtain a New Zealand passport and Zev William Barkan had “fled the country and authorities concede they would not know where to find him.” But soon reports placed Barkan in Pyongyang, North Korea in late April, according to the Sydney Morning Herald and others, travelling on a stolen Canadian passport. And the unlikely saga only became more curious in the ensuing weeks and months. New Zealand, Canadian, Israeli and Australian media reported that Mossad agent Zev William Barkan was reported seen in Pyongyang working “as a security adviser for the North Korean government” where he was negotiating a contract to build a security wall along the border with China with Israeli-manufactured motion detectors and night vision equipment. Unconfirmed accounts citing an “Asian-based NGO closely linked to New Zealand intelligence networks” at a conference in Japan on issues of North Korean refugees, said “Israeli agents, including Barkan, had entered into North Korea under the guise of security consultants” in April. New Zealand news site scoop.com quoted “a senior NGO chief executive with Global-Protect All Children” as saying “Barkan is there negotiating details of an extensive contract for design and technical equipment to support a security wall project, including- but by no means limited to — Israeli produced motion sensors and night vision equipment.” “Barkan flew from Beijing to Pyongyang at the end of April. He was allegedly travelling on a Canadian passport issued in the name of Kevin Hunter, which had been reported stolen at the Canadian Consulate in the Southern Chinese city of Guangzhou in mid April.” The account said Israeli experts were conducting a “feasibility study on a security fence along the 1500 KM North Korea China border.” New Zealand believed Barkan “was trying to secure a ‘clean’ passport for use in a sensitive Israeli undercover operation in the region, less risky than a forged passport,” according to the Sydney Morning Herald. Canada was already sensitive to Israel’s spy services carrying out black espionage operations under the cover of fraudulent Canadian passports. The Israeli government officials offered no comment on the case, but the Canadian investigation of Barkan followed another investigation Canada carried out only the previous week to determine why one of the two Israeli’s convicted in the passport scandal had used a Canadian passport, rather than an Israeli one, to enter New Zealand in 1999. During his 2004 visit to New Zealand, he entered the country using his Israeli passport. Canadian authorities concluded that the arrested Mossad agent was a “legitimate citizen,” a dual Canadian-Israeli national, and that the Canadian passport he held was “genuine.” But in 1997, seven years earlier, Israel-Canadian relations were rocked after two Mossad agents carrying Canadian passports were caught trying to kill Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal in Jordan. Mashal was injected in the ear with a poisonous toxin. Jordan immediately seized two Mossad agents posing as Canadian tourists and surrounded another six who had fled to the Israeli embassy. Under the threat of execution and an embarrassing public spectacle after being caught red handed, an Israeli doctor was dispatched by airplane to Amman with an antidote for the poison which was administered to the murder target Khaled Mashal, who survived. The deal forced Israel to release from prison Hamas founder Sheik Ahmed Yassin. After that diplomatic embarrassment, Israel promised Canada in 1997 that it would cease using Canadian passports. After the Canadian Foreign Ministry announced they were investigating reports that Barkan was travelling on a Canadian passport in North Korea, New Zealand’s foreign minister, Phil Goff, said: “I have read with interest the Canadians are following up allegations he may have traveled at some point on a stolen Canadian passport. When he came to New Zealand my understanding was he was travelling on a U.S. passport. Clearly there would be co-operation between police forces in different countries to try to get to the bottom of these things.” “The passports that Mossad agents tried to obtain illegally might have been reserved for an assassination operation in a third country, which would have caused irreparable damage to New Zealand,” Foreign Minister Phil Goff was quoted speculating to Ha’aretz. In July 2004, a New Zealand media outlet reported a detailed, but unconfirmed account of how the fugitive Mossad agent, Barkan had fled New Zealand to North Korea. In an article headlined “NGOs Claim Wanted Israeli Agent Barkan In North Korea”, the report said “Zev Barkan the suspected Israeli Mossad agent on the run from New Zealand Police has been sighted in North Korea, according to an Asian-based NGO closely linked to New Zealand intelligence networks.” The account went on to allege, “Zev William Barkan turned up in Pyongyang as an Israeli security adviser in April, within weeks of fleeing from New Zealand prior to a suspected Israeli spy ring being sprung for attempting to illegally acquire a New Zealand passport.” The reports of the pilfered Canadian passport in Guangzhou, the Chinese city near the North Korean border, was only 11 days before the blast at the Ryongchon train station. On April 22, 2004, a massive explosion tore through the train station in Ryongchon, North Korea, nine hours after North Korean ruler Kim Jong-il passed through returning from a trip to China. Wide speculation that the blast was a botched assassination attempt has lingered for years. A number of sources say that North Korean investigators had concluded the explosion was an attempt on the leaders life, but more logical evidence points to sabotage directed at the cargo of sophisticated missile components destined for Israel’s enemies in Syria. The explosion destroyed 40 percent of the town and had the fingerprints of an Israeli intelligence operation. It was later discovered that a rigged cell phone triggered the blast, which also killed a dozen Syrian missile technicians working for the Syrian Center for Scientific Research. Meanwhile, on May 24, 2004, Chosun Ilbo reported that a North Korean official visiting China said the North Korean National Security Agency had “concluded that rebellious forces had plotted the explosions.” The paper quoted North Korean sources saying security agencies had determined “that cell phones had been used in triggering the explosion and reported to the North Korean leader that the use of cell phones should be banned for the sake of the leader’s safety.” On May 19th, North Korea abruptly halted the entire nationwide mobile phone service and confiscated all the 10,000 cell phones in the country. Mobile phone service was not resumed for another five years. Reports emerged in the following days that North Korean investigators had found a damaged cell phone wrapped in duct tape near the site of the blast. In July, the two Israeli men were convicted in a New Zealand court of the Israeli intelligence passport acquiring scam and sentenced to six months imprisonment by the Auckland High Court and ordered to pay NZ $100,000 to a cerebral palsy charity. New Zealand High Court Judge Justice Judith Potter said: “It’s difficult to see why anyone would want a false New Zealand passport unless it was intended to be used in a way ancillary to some other offending (law).” She said: “That offending is likely to be serious or perhaps very serious.” The New Zealand judge may have been prescient. In January 2010, Zev Barkan was again fingered by authorities, this time the government of Dubai, in a highly publicized scandal when Mossad operatives were caught on video carrying out the assassination of a senior Hamas leader. One of the 32 men named for the Dubai murders was Zev Barkan, who was still wanted in New Zealand for the passport scandal six years earlier. “Former Israeli diplomat to New Zealand Zev William Barkan leads a life akin to that of novelist Frederick Forsyth’s Jackal — emerging from the shadows only to be named by authorities in connection with various crimes before again disappearing,” wrote New Zealand’s Fairfax Media in July 2011. Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Mabhouh was killed in a Dubai luxury hotel room in January 2010 by Mossad operatives using Australian, British, Irish, French and Dutch passports, many of them apparently surreptitiously copied from unsuspecting travelling tourists who now had warrants for their arrests for murder. The killers were all caught on hotel video cameras, some dressed in wigs and sports attire carrying tennis rackets as they stalked the guerrilla leader from the lobby to the elevators to the hallway outside his room. Within an hour of the assassination, all 32 had departed Dubai airport for different cities in Europe. Barkan, born in 1967 in Washington, D.C. and holds dual U.S. and Israeli citizenships, entered New Zealand on a American passport. He was cited by the Sydney Morning Herald as trafficking in passports stolen from foreign tourists in Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar and was said to operate a security business in Thailand. Barkan had an American accent, according to New Zealand officials, and told people he came from Washington, D.C., where his family was in the “windows and doors” business. The Sydney Morning Herald also reported he was born in the U.S. and his given name was Zev Bruckenstein, where his father was director of religious studies at a synagogue in Washington, D.C. Other aliases he has used include Zev William Barkan, Ze’ev William Barkan, and Lev Bruckenstein. He told aquantances in New Zealand that he was an American and his name was Jay. Dubai officials believe he was travelling on a fraudulent French passport using the name Eric Rassineux. In 2005, the year after the New Zealand passport scandal and the train explosion in North Korea, Barkan was back in the news. “‘He goes to Laos, Cambodia, Burma and Thailand and deals with gangs who rob tourists of their valuables and passports,” an aid worker told the Sydney Morning Herald in 2005. ‘Barkan is mostly interested in passports and there have been a number of Australian passports.” After disappearing from New Zealand, unsubstantiated media reports from Cambodia accused Barkan of running a studio making snuff and porn movies in a town on the Mekong River North of the capital, Phnom Penh, where students and tourists from New Zealand and Australia were lured by promises of movie stardom. New Zealand Foreign Minister Phil Goff told the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz that “The passports that Mossad agents tried to obtain illegally might have been reserved for an assassination operation in a third country, which would have caused irreparable damage to New Zealand.” New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark said “The New Zealand government views the act carried out by the Israeli intelligence agents as not only utterly unacceptable but also a breach of New Zealand sovereignty and international law. The Israeli agents attempted to demean the integrity of the New Zealand passport system and could have created considerable difficulties for New Zealanders presenting their passports overseas in future.” She added: “New Zealand condemns without reservation these actions by agencies of the Israel government. The Israel government was asked for an explanation and an apology three months ago. Neither has been received.” When reporters for the New Zealand Herald tracked down Ze’ev Barkan’s family in October 2004, they were not well received. Ze’ev Barkan is married to a woman called Irit and they live the village of Shoham, 15 miles from Tel Aviv. The woman who answered a reporter’s telephone call identified herself as Irit, but said she did not know a Ze’ev. His father, Yossef Barkan was more direct. “Stop calling here, you hear me. I’ve nothing to do with this business. Goodbye.” (Nate Thayer, “The Odd Case of a Lone Israeli Spy and North Korea,” NKNews, June 20, 2013) A report from the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported, the explosion came from “contact of two wagon trains carrying ammonium nitrate with a wagon containing fuel oil. Each wagon contained 40 MT [metric tons] of eammonium nitrate en route to a construction site for the Pakma-cheolsan irrigation project. This resulted in a massive explosion creating a large crater and leveling everything in a 500 m [meter] radius.” (Oberdorfer and Carlin, The Two Koreas, p. 402)

4/25/04:
KPA says it “will comprehensively examine the issue of security in the Joint Security Area and all the provisions of the Armistice Agreement related to security” because the U.S. “announced suddenly that it will completely withdraw its forces from the JSA and DMZ and deploy soldiers of the South Korean army, which is neither a signatory to the Armistice Agreement nor a member of the ‘allied forces,’ in disregard of the agreement and points agreed upon between the two sides.” (Korea Times, “NK Threatens Overhaul of JSA Provisions,” April 25, 2004) US, ROK officials say North misconstrued position. The US has no intention of giving uo command in the truce village. (Martin Nesirsky, “N. Korea Says U.S. Ditching Truce and Raising Tensions,” Reuters, April 25, 2004)

4/28/04:
New NIE to be completed within a month will raise estimate of North’s nuclear weapons from “possibly two” to at least eight, say U.S. officials involved in preparing it. Intell officials have broadly concluded HEU program will be operational by 2007. (Glenn Kessler, “N. Korea Nuclear Estimate to Rise,” Washington Post, April 28, 2004, p. A-1)

John Kerry statement: “Today’s report that North Korea has significantly increased its nuclear weapons capability under this administration’s watch underscores how their failed policies have made America less safe. Even after the North Koreans made their intentions clear over a year ago by ejecting international nuclear inspectors, the administration dithered and blustered while Kim Jong-il has reportedly quadrupled his nuclear arsenal. There is simply no excuse for the administration’s unwillingness to take realistic steps to address this growing threat. While President Bush says he’s running out of patience with the North Koreans, we are running out of patience with his complete lack of progress in getting the North Koreans to disarm. It is past time for the administration to put aside its failed approach and engage in meaningful negotiations that will lead to a comprehensive resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis.”

4/29/04:
Working-level talks scheduled for May 12. (Ralph Jennings, “China Announces N. Korea Working Group Talks to Start in May,” Kyodo, April 29, 2004)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “As already known, the DPRK side advanced the flexible proposal ‘reward for freeze’ as the first-phase measure at the last round of the six-way talks taking into consideration the fact that there exists no confidence between the DPRK and the U.S. and Washington is not yet ready to accept the proposal for a package solution based on the principle of simultaneous actions all at once.

A bright prospect will be opened for the solution of the nuclear issue if Pyongyang commits itself to scrap its nuclear weapons program in return for Washington’s announcement of its commitment to renounce its hostile policy toward the former on the principle of ‘verbal commitment’ and ‘action for action’ and the U.S. and the countries concerned make compensation for Pyongyang’s freeze of its nuclear program.

The U.S. seems to stick to its stand to demand Pyongyang’s CVID of its nuclear program. But that will only throw a higher hurdle in the way of the talks.

The U.S. is putting pressure upon the DPRK, talking about ‘irreversible’ or something like that although it is not a defeated nation. If the U.S. insists on this stand, the DPRK does not feel any need to sit at the negotiating table with it.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Meeting of Working Group of Six-Way Talks,” April 29, 2004)

2003 annual report on Patterns of Global Terrorism cites abduction issue for the first time as an issue. In briefing the press, Cofer Black, DoS Coordinator for Counterterrorism says the U.S is “deeply concerned” about the abductees. “We are very mindful of the abduction issue, and we are pressing the North Korean government to resolve this and to present all the information that they know. (Kyodo, “U.S. Mentions Abdutions for the First Time in Terrorism Report,” April 29, 2004) QUESTION: Sung Kim of the SBS, Korea. Was there any particular reason why the Japanese abduction issue was included in the North Korea section for the first time this year, despite the fact that the issue was ongoing for like several years? Was there any request from the Japanese Government or anything like that? AMBASSADOR J. COFER BLACK: The United States, the Department of State thought it was important; it was a key issue; and that’s why we included it. We also — we feel great sympathy for those that were abducted, for their families. It’s a tragic, sad story of heartbreak, and we thought it was important to put in there also as a vehicle that we would use in our interaction with the North Koreans to continue to press them for — to make a complete accounting in terms of the relatives of these abductees that remain behind in Korea. (DoS, Briefing by J. Cofer Black, Coordinator,m Office of the Coordinator for Terrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism, Foreign Press Briefing Center, April 29, 2004

GNP tug-of-war pits center-right reformers Win Hee-ryong, Nam Kyung-pil, Choung Byoung-gug Kim Hee-jung, Lee Sung-won, and Park Seung-hwan against right wing. Moderate conservatioves Maeng Hyung-ku, Ahn Sang-soo, and Park Jin oppse Lee Jae-oh, Hong Joon-pyo, Chung Hyung-geun, and Kim Yong-kap on the right.(Joo Sang-min, “News Analysis: Power Struggle Brewing at GNP over Future Course,” Korea Times, April 29, 2004)

4/30/04:
GNP leader Park Guen-hye says she’d consider serving as “special envoy” help resolve nuclear standoff. (Park Song-wu, “GNP Leader May Visit NK as Sepcial Envoy,” April 30, 2004)

Annual report on global terrorism mentions abductees. “Japan appreciates the move,” MOFA spokesman Takashima Hatsuhisa says. [Japan multilateralizing issue] “Kyodo, “Japan Welscomes U.S. Mention of Abduction in Terrorism Report,” April 30, 2004)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “It is preposterous for the U.S. to cite the DPRK as a ‘sponsor of terrorism’ in the report raising again the ‘issue of abducted Japanese.’ This once again, convinces us that the hostile policy of the Bush administration towards the DPRK remains unchanged and can never alter. The ‘abduction issue,’ which the U.S. is talking about as a new ‘subject for discussion about terrorism,’ is an issue between the DPRK and Japan and it had already been solved through the publication of the DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration. It is, therefore, none of its business.” (KCNA, “U.S. Accusations against DPRK over ‘Issue of Terrorism’ Denounced,” May 3, 2004)

5/4/04:
Kim Yong-nam: “We don’t think he [Bush] is at all serious about resolving the nuclear issue with us in a fair way, since we obviously can’t accept ‘CVID first.’ My feeling is he is delaying resolution of the nuclear issue due to Iraq and the presidential election. But time is not on his side. We are going to use this time 100 per cent effectively to strengthen our nuclear deterrent both quantitatively and qualitatively. Why doesn’t he accept our proposal to dismantle our program completely and verifiably through simultaneous steps by both sides?” In step one, said Kim Gye-gwan the North would freeze its plutonium program in exchange multilatersal energy aid, an end to U,S. economic sanctions, and removal from the U.S. list of terrorist states.”This would be the first step toward complete dismantlement,” Kim said, “if the U.S. becomes our friend.” Inspectors would be granted the access necessary to confirm how much plutonium had been reprocessed; the plutonium could then be placed under controls and further reprocessing could be prohibited. Initially he excluded the reactor from the freeze, but later said that that was negotiable. Kim Yong-nam: “The only reason we are developing nuclear weapons is to deter American preemptive attack. After all, we have been singled out as the target for such an attack and we are the justification for the development of a new generation of U.S. nuclear weapons. We don’t want to suffer the fate of Iraq. … We make a clear distinction between missiles and nuclear material. We’re entitled to sell missiles to earn foreign exchange. But in regard to nuclear material, our policy past, present and future is that we would never allow such transfers to al Qaeda or anyone else. Never.” Paik Nam-soon: “Let me make clear that we denounce al Qaeda, we oppose all forms of terrorism and we will never transfer our nuclear material to others. Our nuclear material is solely for our self-defense. We denounce al Qaeda for the barbaric attack of 9/11, which was a terrible tragedy and inflicted a great shock to America. Bush is using that that shock to turn America against us, but the truth is that we want and need your friendship.” One of my interlocutors said Pyongyang might reconsider its demand for a binding security guarantees if a new administration proved less hostile than the present one. The presence of U.S. diplomats and businesses inPyongyang might be a better guarantee against a preemptive strike that a paper security assurance.Kim Yong-nam: “There’s no deadline in the negotiations. We’re patient. But if the United States doesn’t alter its position, we can’t foresee what will happen and we’ll have to decide about testing when the time comes.” Asked about the deterrent, KimGye-gwan said, “That’s a confidential military matter. But remember that the bomb dropped by the U.S. at Nagasaki was made after four months of preparation. It’s now a half century later, and we have more up-to-date technologies, so you can come to your own conclusions on the matter.” Paik Nam-soon: “I don’t think mere devices and the possession of nuclear material constitutes a genuine deterrent. When we say deterrent, we mean a capability that can deter attack.” (Selig Harrison, “Inside North Korea: Leaders Open to Ending Nuclear Crisis,” Financial Times, May 4, 2004, p. 3)

Mohamed El Baradei told the Council on Foreign Relations, “What I worry about with North Korea is that it sends the worst signals to would-be proliferators: that if you want to protect yourself, you should accelerate your [nuclear] program — because then you are immune in a way. People will sit around the table with you. And if you do not do that fast enough, you might be subject to preemption” — referring, of course to the military action in Iraq. (Mohamed El Baradei, The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times (New York: Henry Holt, 2011), p. 94)

5/4-5/04:
Tanaka Hitoshi and Yabunaka Mitoji in Pyongyang meet with Jong Thae-hwa, not Kang Sok-ju as hoped. Koizumi says he wants to set out a plan for normalizing relations. (Kyodo, “Japan, N. Korea to Resume Talks on Abductions,” May 3, 2004) Koizumi offers to visit the North if it permits repatriation of abductees’ kin. (Japan Times, “Koizumi Could Visit N. Korea over Abductions,” May 5, 2004) Koizumi says Japan unlikely to raise abductions in working group meeting, “Basically, it is a bilateral issue.” (Kyodo, “Koizumi Does Not Rule out Another Trip to N. Korea,” May 6, 2004) Yabunaka tells reporters, “Last time [in February], we just repeated our respective principles. But this time, we discussed in considerable depth how to resolve the issue.” (Asahi Shimbun, “Pyongyang Drops Hint It Will Let Kin of Abductees Come to Japan to Settle,” April 5, 2004) LDP secy-gen Abe Shinzo says, Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang would be “a very grave decision” by Japan. (Kyodo, “Abe Wary about Koizumi’s Pyongyang Visit to Pick up Abductees’ Kin,” May 9, 2004) Sankei Shimbun quotes government source, “Koizumi approved the plan of supporting North Korea with medicine and food in case the return to Japanese families remaining in North Korea is resolved.” (Dong-A Ilbo, Koizumi Considering Call on North Korea around May 23,” May 9, 2004) On May 11 Abe again urged caution about Koizumi’s going to Pyongyang just to reptraite the abductees’ kin. “It means using the strongest card for the nation,” he said in a speech in Iwakuni. “If there is no prospect for really resolving the overall abduction issue, it will not lead to a visit soon.” (Kyodo, “Senior Lawmakers Urge Caution on Koizumi, N. Korea Trip,” May 11, 2004)

5/?/04:
Fukuda resigns as chief cabinet secy after Yamasaki end-run on abductees. (James L. Schoff, Political Fences and Bad Neighbors (Cambridge: IFPA, June 2006), pp. 8-9)

5/5/04:
North is building two underground launch sites in Yangduk, western Pyeongan and in Hocheon in northeast Hamgyong for an IRBM capable of 4,000-mile range, reach Guam, even Hawaii. (Joo Sang-min, “News Focus: North Korea Builds up Missiles,” Korea Herald, May 5, 2004) “We presume these bases to be for a new kind of ballistic missiles — not Nodongs or Scuds,” a ROK official told Chosun Ilbo. (Barbara Demick, “N. Korea May Have a Missile That Can Hit Guam,” Los Angeles Times, May 6, 2004)

North also is preparing to test missile engines. (Kim Min-seok, “North Appears Set to Test New Missile Engines,” JoongAng Ilbo, May 5, 2004)

UnifMin Jeong Se-hyun in N-S ministerial calls for general officer talks this month to head off skirmishes in crabbing season. (Yoo Dong-ho, “Seoul Presses N. Korea for Early Military Talks,” Korea Times, May 5, 2004) North demands halt to military drills in South first. (Joint Press Corps and Choi Soung-ah, “South, North Take Opposing Views,” Korea Herald, May 6, 2004; KCNA, “14^th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks Open,” May 5, 2004) South proposes liaison offices. (Joint Press Corps and Yoo Dong-ho, “Seoul Proposes Establishment of S-N Liaison Office,” Korea Times, May 6, 2004) Kwon-Ho-ung announces acceptance of talks in last-minute reversal: “Our military authorities have given their consent to holding the meeting.” (Joint Press Corps and Yoo Dong-ho, “Seoul, Pyongyang Agree to Hold Defense Talks,” Korea Times, May 7, 2004)

5/6/04:
GNP Chair Park Geun-hye signaled GNP shift on North Korea when she said recently: “The GNP’s goal in politcies toward the North is to secure peace and achieve inter-related development.” A Chosun Ilbo poll of GNP lawmakers found 65% in favor of maintaining the sunshine policy. (Lee Jo-hee, “News Analysis: Is GNP Calling a Truce with North Korea?” Korea Times, May 6, 2004)

“This administration has adamantly refused to deal directly with North Korea, and they are not going to make any progress until that happens,” Jack Pritchard said in an interview. “And there have been no red lines. We have never said ‘if you do this here are the consequences.’ Now they may have developed as many as six nuclear weapons to add to the two that they confirmed that they have.” As James Kelly, the State Department’s top official on Asia, prepared for the three-party talks, Pritchard said he had drafted negotiating instructions that would allow Kelly to engage in “pull-aside,” or informal discussions, with the North Koreans. The proposal for pull-aside discussions, he says, were cast aside after Kelly convened an interdepartmental meeting and hard-liners from Vice President Dick Cheney’s staff and the Defense Department objected. Pritchard was later asked to help organize the current six-party talks. Those negotiations do allow for informal side conversations between American and North Korean officials, but they stop short of the fuller dialogue Prichard believes is necessary to produce an agreement rolling back North Korea’s nuclear program. (Michael Gordon, “Warnings Go Unheeded over North Korean Threat,” International Herald Tribune, May 7, 2004)

Lew Kwang-chul, “Don’t Just Trust, Verify — Dismantling North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” Arms Control Today, May 2004)

5/8/04:
KCNA lengthy memorandum on nuclear issue in Japan: “Japan has long pursued nuclear weaponization … taking advantage of its focus of attention to the nuclear issues in other countries. Japan’s nuclear weaponization has been pushed ahead at the phase of practical implementation, going beyond the stage of discussion. … In 1976 Japan got the U.S. approval for the development of nuclear energy for civilian use in return for signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Then it was privileged to get the supply of highly enriched uranium under more loose inspection system than that applied to other allies. Finding it unable to develop other nuclear reactors due to the U.S. control over the nuclear development, Japan squandered a colossal amount of money in developing new type conversion reactor which relies on raw uranium shipped from Canada as major fuel and has operated it without stop since 1979. This made Japan relatively independent of the U.S. control in the field of nuclear development. Since the early 1980s Japan’s nuclear reactors have become indigenous 100 per cent and acquired the technology of nuclear fission and fusion. In fact, it clawed its way up to the status of quasi-nuclear weapons state. According to the ‘white paper on nuclear energy’ issued by the Japanese government in 1993, Japan had 16 nuclear power plants and 46 reactors in operation. This put Japan next to the U.S. and France in terms of general designing capability of nuclear equipment. A particular mention should be made of the fact that the Japanese reactionaries put Monju, the first fast breeder reactor capable of massively producing nuclear-capable plutonium, on a normal operation on April 5, 1994. Moreover, it has operated a new uranium enrichment plant in Rokkashomura, Aomori Prefecture, since May 1992. It is now stepping up the construction of a big spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plant capable of reprocessing 60 per cent of the total amount of nuclear waste churned out from across the country. … It is a serious miscalculation and foolish dream if Japan thinks it can hide truth behind its nuclear issue and achieve its wild ambition for nuclear armament by hyping other’s ‘nuclear issue,’ it concluded.” (KCNA on Truth about Japan’s Nuclear Issue,” May 8, 2004)

5/9/04:
Administration official says allies have their own reasons for talking to North. “I think we’re not too far out of line here,” noting working group talks would offer “tremendous opportunities” for direct talks. “I thInk there is opportunity enough for dialogue. We don’t think that has been a major obstacle to moving on.” The U.S., Japan and South Korea are “in the same bed but with different dreams,” said Takesada Hideshi, professor at the National Institute for Defense Studies. “Japan and the U.S. are united, but there is a gap between those two countries and South Korea,” he said. “North Korea has already suceeded in drawing South Korea to the North’s side. … Now it’s trying aggressively to hammer a wedge between Bush and Koizumi.” (Anthony Faiola, “South Korea and Japan Reaching Out to North Korea,” Washington Post, May 9, 2004, p. A-25)

5/10/04:
Panama, world’s leading shipping registry joins Liberia in permitting flag ships to be boarded under PSI. (Judith Milller, “Panama Joins Accord to Stem Ships’ Transport of Illicit Arms,” New York Times, May 11, 2004, p. A-11)

National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea issues statement critical of possible second Koizumi visit to Pyongyang without getting prior agreement from families because of differences among kin. (Karasaki Taro, “Insight: Talk of Koizumi Visit to North Korea Divides Families,” May 12, 2004)

5/12/04:
Dep PermRep Han Songryol in invw says a treaty is needed to end U.S. “hostile policy” which motivated North to develop nuclear weapons. Only than can North “negotiate disarmament issues” because otherwise the U.S. can “reverse” any security assurances while it is disarming. All other bilateral issues could be addressed at that point. (Paul Kerr, “North Korea Nuclear Talks: If at First You don’t Succeed, Meet Again,” Arms Control Today, (June 2004), p. 31)

5/12-15/04:
Working group of six parties meets, with Saiki Akitaka, deputy director of MOFA’s Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Joseph DeTrani, special envy for peace on the Korean Peninsula, Ning Fukui of China, Li Gun, North American affairs bureau chief , Cho Tae-yong of ROK, Valery Sukhinin of Russia. Talks focus on “corresponding measures” or what North calls “compensation” for freeze. (Ryu Jin, “Allies Seek Breakthrough in Nuke Talks,” Korea Times, May 12, 2004) “Their positions are even tougher than they were several days ago,” says Sukhinin. (Reuters, “North Korea, U.S. Tougher at Nuclear Talks — Russia,” May 12, 2004) “There are still some major disagreements,” said Chinese FoMin spokesman Liu Jianchao. (Chosun Ilbo, “China: Major Disagreements Surface at N. Korean Nuclear Talks,” May 14, 2004) Vice FM Dai Bingguo meets with six-party delegation heads. “According to our delegation, all sides agreed to meet again, but no concrete date for a second working group meeting has been set and it will be decided through diplomatic channels,” an East Asian diplomat close to the talks said. “The Chinese side will coordinate.” Li Gun says, “We have had serious discussion at the talks. We confirmed that a common view has been formed that there would be reward for us in return for freezing the nuclear weapons program.” People’s Daily quotes a North Korean official, “Without aid and security guarantees, North Korea cannot consider the U.S. demand for complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of its nuclear program.” (AFP, “China Vows to Coordinate New Talks on NKorea Despite Lack of Progress,” May 15, 2004) DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The DPRK’s proposal of ‘reward for freeze’ commanded support and sympathy from the majority of the participants in the meeting for its justice and fairness. However, the U.S. again pressurized the DPRK, not a defeated country, to accept CVID. … If the U.S. persistently seeks to waste time, pressurizing the DPRK to change its political system and disarm itself under the signboard of ‘peaceful talks,’ the DPRK will be left with no option but to use it as a means for building stronger nuclear deterrent force.” (KCNA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Working Group Meeting of Six-Party Talks,” May 15, 2004) When asked which nuclear facilities it would freeze, Li Gun reportedly said, “We know that you’re interested in that particular matter.” He was noncommittal. “If we do freeze one of the facilities, what would you offer in return?” The others were noncommittal, including South Korea, which did not repeat its offer of electricity. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Can Koizumi, Kim Break North N-Impasse?” May 18, 2004) In a meeting with Li Gun, Joseph DeTrani said provide the LWR could be “one element” of a U.S. response if the North abandoned their nuclear program. “The North Koreans raised it,” said one official. “They said, ‘If we address the [HEU] program, what would that mean for the light-water reactor program?” A U.S. official familiar with the talks who is opposed to providing the LWR says, “We’ve been that route before,” adding that DeTrani went beyond his talking points. “There is no way we should be going back to this,” Henry Sokoloski says. “We were good enough to unplug this.” (Bill Gertz, “U.S. Considers Reactor Deal with North Korea,” Washington Times, May 19, 2004) A “total and complete lie,” an administration official says. “There was no hallway conversation.” (Nelson Report, May 19, 2004) South Korea proposed replacing CVID. “North Koreans have a knee-jerk reaction to the expression CVID and feel threatened by it,” an official familiar with the talks said. (Ryu Jin, “Seoul Seeks Softer Line on Nuke Issue,” Korea Times, May 24, 2004; Choi Soung-ah, “Seoul seeks Eased N.K. Nukes Terms,” Korea Herald, May 24, 2004) DOS official says the U.S. delegation “clarified its position quite a bit” during bilateral contacts. PRC FoMin spokesman sees “new contents in the statements of all parties” although “parties still have different views on the scope of denuclearization and the ways of verification.” (Paul Kerr, “North Korea Nuclear Talks: If at First You don’t Succeed, Meet Again,” Arms Control Today, (June 2004), p. 31)

North agrees to N-S first general-level military talks since war. (AFP, “Two Koreas to Hold Military Talks on May 26: Official,” May 12, 2004)

In speech to OECD, Kim Dae-jung says, “Because there is a lack of trust between the two countries, they must both act simultaneously or in parallel.” (Yoo Dong-ho, “DJ Calls for Direct NK-US Dialogue,” Korea Times, May 12, 2004)

Generations differ toward reconciliation with the North among Korean-Americans in Los Angeles. (Sara Lin, K. Connie Kang and Eric Slater, “Views on North Korea Split Generations,” Los Angeles Times, May 12, 2004)

In response to question by Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), “Isn’t the budget for underground nuclear weapons going way further than just a simple research?” SeDef Rumsfeld responds, “North Korea, Iran and other countries are building nucl;ear facilities underground and as a countermeasure, we give priority to conventional methods; however, it is also worth studying additional methods.” (Dong-A Ilbo, “Research on Nuclear Weapons to Destroy Bunker Is Necessary,” May 13, 2004)

Rodong Sinmun commentary: “The U.S. Department of State recently released an ‘2003 annual report on terrorism,’ in which it listed again some countries including the DPRK as ‘sponsors of terrorism’ and even brought forward the ‘issue of abducted Japanese’ to obtain a lever to put pressure upon the DPRK. The ‘issue of kidnapped Japanese’ over which the U.S. is making quite a noise is the one between the DPRK and Japan which was already solved through the publication of the Pyongyang declaration between the two countries and, therefore, it is none of its business. Nevertheless, the U.S. is trying to internationalize it and egging Japan, a junior ally, on … This proves that as long as the U.S. pursues the hostile policy toward the DPRK, it would cook up other case than the ‘abduction issue’ to attach the label of terrorism to the DPRK and justify its moves to internationally isolate the latter.” (KCNA, “Rodong Sinmun on U.S. Persistent Anti-DPRK Moves,” May 12, 2004)

5/13/04:
Dep PermRep Han Song-ryol, in Interview, says peace treaty among “all the countries with troops on the Korean peninsula” would be way to resolve nuclear standoff. “Back-channel, secret or any kind of direct talks in my opinion could produce tremendous significant differences,” he said. (Barbara Slavin, “North Korea Suggests Peace Treaty to Settle Nuclear Dispute,” USA Today, May 13, 2004, p. 8)

Japan prepares for talks with DPRK on May 15. Abe Shinzo, LDP gen-sec. urges Koizumi to be cautious. (Kyodo, “Japan Ready to Hold Dialogue with North Korea on Saturday,” May 13, 2004)

5/14/04:
Koizumi to see Kim Jong-il May 22, chief cabinet secy Hosoda Hiroyuki says. “As summit will be held, I think we can certainly expect progress.” Eight kin may return with on plane with him. (Kyodo, “Koizumi to Visit N. Korea May 22 to Meet Kim Jong-il,” May 14, 2004) “This Koizumi visit to Pyongyang is motivated by the upper house elections and to lessen the impact of the pension problem,” said Nishioka Tsutomo, a leader of an abductee support group. “Why does he have to go now?” (Anthony Faiola, “Japan, N. Korea to Hold Talks,” Washington Post, May 15, 2004, p. A-12) Japan asks U.S. to pardon Robert Jenkins, who defected in 1965 and later married an abductee, Soga Hitomi. (Japan Times, “Japan Asks U.S. to Pardon Abductee’s American Husband,” May 16, 2004) Some diplomats think he should be promised a minimal prosecution as a favor to Japan. “If the guy had gone off to Canada and lived a full and wonderful life, that would be one thing,” says Jack Pritchard. “But the chances of this guy having had anything but a miserable life are very slim.” (Barbara Demick, “From GI to Pawn in 39 Years,” Los Angeles Times, May 17, 2004) One high-ranking Foreign Ministry official said: “The prime minister’s decision leapfrogs the scenario of events we had envisioned.” That scenario was based on talks in Beijing on May 4-5 by Dep FM Tanaka and dir-gen Yabunaka, which envisioned Tanaka visiting Pyongyang next weekend to resume talks with Kang Sok-ju. If those talks produced signs of a comprehensive resolution, Koizumi was then to have visited the following weekend. (Asahi Shimbun, “Return to North a Big Gamble,” May 17, 2004) Koizumi gained Bush’s support for his planned visit in talks by telephone, chief cabinet secy Hosoda told an evening television talk show. He had been expected to discuss “special consideration” for Jenkins, Japanese government sources said. (Kyodo, “Bush Backs Koizumi’s Plan to Revisit N. Korea,” May 17, 2004) He will also ask that four hijackers of JAL plane in 1970 be extradicted. Tokyo believes they were involved in abduction of Arimoto Keiko in 1983 in Europe. (Kyodo, “Koizumi to Renew Call for N. Korea’s Extradiction of Ex-Hijackers,” May 18, 2004) Koizumi will tell Kim Jong-il he’ll try to normalize relations before his term ends if abduction issue resolved. He will propose commission to clarify what happened to ten other abductees. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Koizumi to Tell North Korea He Will Try to Normalize Ties,” May 19, 2004) Forensic medicine expert accompanies Koizumi. (Asahi Shimbun, “Forensic Expert Will Also Go to N. Korea,” May 21, 2004) Koizumi had planned to go in March, but he wanted to wait for Kim’s reaction to communications sent in February before deciding. On February 9 the Diet enacted the revised Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law, authorizing sanctions. Still, when Tanaka and Yabunaka went to Pyongyang on February 11, a senior official said, “North Korea intended to accept his visit.” But soon the North reconsidered and opposed the visit. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Koizumi’s Long Road to Pyongyang Talks,” May 25, 2004)

Constitutional Court strikes down impeachment, restoring Roh to presidency. (Anthony Faiola, “Court Rejects S. Korean President’s Impeachment,” Washington Post, May 14, 2004, p. A-12) “The decision was made by the ‘Constitution Court’ but in fact it was prompted by the south Korean people,” the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland said in a bulletin. “This clearly shows again that the U.S. colonial rule and pro-American flunkyist act of the conservative forces can no longer work in south Korea and no force on earth can block the will and desire of the people for independence, democracy and reunification.” (KCNA, “CPRF Secretariat on Decision to Reject ‘Motion on Impeachment,’” May 16, 2004)

Reiss, dir of policy planning: “Even as we seek progress in these talks, we also have an historic opportunity to build on them, and thus capture the promise of cooperation among the region’s major powers. Whether it is energy security or environmental pollution, shared transnational and economic interests increasingly bind at least five of these Six Parties together. If the 20th century was marked by the struggles among the powers, we now have an opportunity to define a new pattern of cooperation in Northeast Asia, while addressing common challenges as a group. By building on our experience with the North Korean nuclear issue, we five can hold out to Pyongyang the prospect of joining in this cooperation if it makes the right strategic choice — to embrace the economic dynamism that has transformed the rest of the region while passing North Korea by.” (Mitchell Reiss, “Remarks to the Asia Foundation,” May 14, 2004)

Choe Yong-kun, DPRK Vice-Min of Construction and Building Materials, and six other economists to vist Seoul this month, Unif Ministry announces. (Choi Jie-ho, “North Korea Is on Political and Economic Offensive,” Joong-Ang Ilbo, May 14, 2004)

5/17/04:
U.S., R.O.K. agree to redeploy U.S. 2^nd Brigade of 2^nd Infantry from Korea to Iraq. (Ryu Jin, “U.S. Will Deploy 4,000 Soldiers Here to Iraq,” Korea Times, May 17, 2004) Dep PermRep Han Song-ryol: “Analysts view the announcement on the U.S. redeployment in Korea as being aimed at a preemptive strike against the North, raising the potential for a second Korean war.” (Kang Chan-ho, “North’s Rhetoric Rises over Shift,” Joong-Ang Ilbo, May 20, 2004)

Kim Yong Nam, chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly and No. 2 to Kim Jong Il, told me that “we don’t think Mr. Bush is at all serious about resolving the nuclear issue with us in a fair way, since we obviously can’t accept ‘CVID first.’ My feeling is, he is delaying resolution of the nuclear issue due to Iraq and the presidential election. But time is not on his side. We are going to use this time 100 percent effectively to strengthen our nuclear deterrent, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Why doesn’t he accept our proposal to dismantle our program completely and verifiably through simultaneous steps by both sides?”

How would a phased deal work? In step one, explained Foreign Minister Paik Nam Soon and his aides, North Korea would freeze its plutonium program in exchange for multilateral energy aid, an end to U.S. economic sanctions and the removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of terrorist states, which would open the way for World Bank and Asian Development Bank aid. The terms of the freeze, they said, would depend on what the United States is prepared to do in return. Thus, if the payoff in energy aid is big enough, inspectors could have the access necessary to confirm how much plutonium has been reprocessed, and the plutonium could then be placed under controls. Further reprocessing could be prohibited, and formal pledges not to transfer nuclear material or to test a nuclear device could be written into the agreement. North Korea has suggested that negotiations on the freeze begin in Beijing during the May 12 meeting, said Paik. But that doesn’t seem likely. The United States wants the agenda restricted to CVID.

Could the United States and its allies ever be sure that a closed society like North Korea actually lives up to a denuclearization agreement? I told my North Korean interlocutors that no U.S. president could give Pyongyang the binding “no attack” pledge it has sought. To my surprise, one of them said that Pyongyang might reconsider its demand for a security guarantee if a new administration proved less hostile than the present one. After all, the presence of U.S. diplomats and businessmen in Pyongyang after the normalization of relations might be a better guarantee against a pre-emptive strike, he said, than any agreement written on paper. “If you really end your hostility, and give up the goal of regime change,” he added, “the formalities will no longer be important.” (Selig Harrison, “Riding a Tiger in North Korea,” Newsweek, May 17, 2004)

Roh names Lee Ju-heum, dep dir-gen for FoMin Asian Affairs Bureau as one of 16 secretaries. (Korea Herald, “Presidential Office Appoints Secretaries,” May 18, 2004)

Rep Mark Kirk (R-IL): “If we reach agreement on visiting North Korea, we will discuss measures of expanding food provisions, supporting hospitals and medical resources, and providing help in the agricultural area.” He adds, “I also hasd a discussion with President Bush on the issue, explaining that food provisions should not be discontinued. This plan to visit North Korea came from consultation with other government officials.” (Radio Free Asia, “U.S. Legislators Seek North Korea Visit,” May 17, 2004)

5/18-19/04:
Vice FM Kung Sok-ung and Amb to Britain Ri Yong-ho attend IISS conference in London.

5/20/04:
Vice FM Kung Sok-ung in London for talks with junior minister Bill Rammell. (Kim Sengupta, “Britain Urges North Korea to Take ‘Gaddafi Route’ on WMD,” The Independent, May 20, 2004)

UN special envoy Maurice Strong in Pyongyang.

A May 19-22 poll by the Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification finds 49.1 percent of university students believe U.S. the biggest barrier to unification, 35.7 say Japan. China was seen as most in favor of unification. 87.1 per cent complained about unequal relationship with U.S. but more than seven of ten supported keeping U.S. troops in Korea. (Yoo Dong-ho, “Many Students Believe US Big Barrier to Unification,” Korea Times, June 2, 2004)

5/21/04:
KCNA: “At the meeting, the DPRK side put forward the reward for freeze proposal as the first phase action to attain the general goal to denuclearize the Korean peninsula and maintained a sincere stance to solve the issue at all costs. It proposed to have an in-depth discussion on the specific and practical issues related to the nuclear freeze including the objects to be frozen, the duration of freeze and the method to verify it andthe time to freeze facilities. This proposal includes the core issues that should be implemented at the first phase for the solution of the DPRK-U.S. nuclear issue. The U.S. side, however, again insisted that the DPRK abandon its ‘nuclear program’ first, i.e. CVID, and argued it would not discuss the ‘reward for freeze’ proposal or other offer unless the latter accepts the former’s demand. This attitude brought the discussion to a failure. As the U.S. assertion was rebuffed at the meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Powell talked rubbish that the U.S. would put increased international pressure upon north Korea to disarm itself. … The increasing U.S. nuclear threat to the DPRK, not a defeated nation, compelled it to build a nuclear deterrent for self-defence. For the U.S. to force the DPRK to dismantle its “nuclear program” first is, therefore, little short of a brigandish demand for laying down arms and unconditionally submitting to it and scrapping all its nuclear plans for a peaceful purpose. The DPRK-U.S. nuclear issue was caused by the United States and has become complicated in the historic process. Its solution is, therefore, possible only when the U.S. will drop its hostile policy toward the DPRK and accepts the latter’s offer for reward for freeze the first-phase action.” (“KCNA Urges U.S. to Accept DPRK’s Proposal,” May 21, 2004)

Wada Haruki, “Japan-North Korea Diplomatic Normalization and Northeast Asian Peace,” Zmag, May 21, 2004): “In advancing their anti-North Korean campaign, one that it soon tied to national sentiments, weekly magazines such as Shukan bunshun, which invariably criticized North Korea and opposed the negotiations leading to Japan-North Korea diplomatic normalization, joined monthly magazines such as Shokun! (published by Bungei shunshu) and Seiron (published by the Sankei shinbun company) in their attack on the Foreign Ministry, the Prime Minister’s office, and the ‘pro-North Korean faction.’ The leaders of this movement, NARKN represented by Sato Katsumi, and AFVKN represented by Hirosawa Katsuei, comprised a third element. These groups were shocked by both the September 2002 Koizumi-Kim summit held in Pyongyang and the Pyongyang Declaration that the two leaders signed. They immediately sought to reclaim their influence over North Korean policy matters. [They] accused the government of failing to examine the death reports on the eight deceased abductees, and insisted that they may still be alive. They further attacked Hitoshi Tanaka, the Foreign Ministry official who conducted the negotiations that led to Koizumi’s eventual visit to Pyongyang. These two groups wielded a heavy influence over the Diet, political parties, and the mass media. … Opposed to Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro’s 1992 statement of apology to Korea, NARKN chairman Sato Katsumi formed a national committee around the belief that “Japan is not an invading country” [Nihon wa shinryaku kuni dewa nai]. In his March 2002 book, Why is Japanese foreign policy toward the Korean Peninsula weak? Sato directly criticized Tanaka Hitoshi’s tenure as head of the Northeast Asia Bureau for admitting that “in the past Japan made mistakes.” Araki Kazuhiro, then the National Council’s First Secretary General and subsequently Special Representative for Investigations of Missing People, parroted the words of the Korean Kim Wan Seop’s In defense of the pro-Japanese that Araki translated, by claiming that Japan’s colonial occupation contributed to Korean welfare. Abe Shinzo was the Deputy Secretary General of the “Diet Members League for Commemoration of the 50^th Anniversary of the War’s End” when the League blocked the Diet Resolution of Remorse and Apology drafted in 1995 to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the war’s end. The Diet League’s Chairman Okuno Seisuke and Secretary General Itagaki Tadashi (son of Itagaki Seishiro, prominent military figure in the Japanese invasion and occupation of Manchuria from 1931) reasoned that the previous war was ‘one fought for Japan’s survival and prosperity as well as for Asian peaceful liberation.’ He opposed any reflection or compensation by Japan. Abe opposed the Diet resolution and did not participate in the vote held at the plenary session. There is also little doubt that he opposed Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi’s views on this matter. In 1997 Abe formed the “Association of Young Diet Members Concerned with Japan’s Prospects and History Education”. This group declared that there was no comfort women issue. Thus, not only was Kono Yohei’s August 1993 statement calling for reflection and compensation mistaken, but the comfort women issue should be stricken from school textbooks. Later, NARKN chairman Nakagawa Shoichi served as the Association’s chairman, and Abe its secretary general. … Slander and attacks directed toward those who had supported and worked toward realizing Japan-North Korea normalization succeeded in casting normalization in negative terms. This negative campaign began in the weekly magazines. An article that appeared in the October 3, 2002 issue of Shukan Bunshun, titled “To the politicians, bureaucrats, and analysts who left the eight to die: apologize for every single death attributable to your great crime” accused those who turned their backs on the abductee issue of “trampling on the desperate appeals of the families.” The article directly named Anami Koreshige and Yokota Kunihiko of the Foreign Ministry, Kanemaru Shin, Kato Koichi, Nonaka Hiromu, and Nakayama Masaki of the LDP, Kan Naoki, Ishii Hajime, and Hatoyama Yukio of the DPJ, Social Democratic Party (SDP) leader Doi Takako, as well as Yoshida Yasuhiko, and Wada Haruki. This became the prototype. Bungei Shinju‘s November issue, which appeared on the newsstands in October, carried an article by Sankei shinbun reporter Ishii Hideo on the “New pro-North Korean intellectuals: A record of non-reflective reckless statements.” Ishii wrote: “It is not just that the Japanese government lacks a policy; it is also that the politicians, intellectuals, and newspapers have been dragging their feet.” Specifically named in his article were Doi Takako, Fuwa Tetsuzo, Nakayama Masaki, as well as Yoshida Yasuhiko, myself, and the Asahi shinbun.”

5/22/04:
2^nd Koizumi-Kim summit — NK invites Koizumi to lunch but instead brings own lunchbox, offending NK so that summit lasts just 1 hour — Kim tells Koizumi “I would like to sing a song in a duet with President Bush to the limit of my voice.” (Yomiuri Shimbun 12/30/04; Yoshida Yasuhiko, East Asian Review, March 2005, p. 41 “I told [Kim] face to face, ‘If you compare what you gain from nuclear wepons and what you gain from dismantlement of your own nuclear program, there would be difference of heaven and earth.” Kim replied he was committed to eventual denuclearization. He said he wanted others in the six-party talks “to play music” so the DPRK and U.S. “can dance well.” He wanted his negotiator ti talk to the United States so much that the envoy’s “voice will become hoarse.” (Kyodo, “N. Korea’s Kim Told Koizumi He Is Eager for Talks with U.S.,” June 22, 2004) After 90-minute meeting with Kim Jong-il, a pledge of $10 million in medical supplies and 250,000 tons of food, no meal or communiqué, PM Koizumi wins the right to have eight kin rejoin abductees in Japan, flies home with five children of abductees on board. Soga Hitomi was free to go but “Jenkins was very concerned that if he went to Japan he would be handed over to America,” Koizumi said. “I said I would make the best efforts for them to live as a family in Japan, but Jenkins wasn’t persuaded.” Koizumi will arrange for his wife and two children to meet him in a third country. (Akiko Yamamoto and Philip Pan, “N. Korea Frees 5 Children of Kidnapped Japanese,” Washington Post, May 23, 2004, p. A-18) “I emphasized strongly to Kim Jong-il that there is very little to gain in terms of energy aid or food aid by possessing nuclear weapons,” Koizumi told reporters in Pyongyang. He added, “We must normalize our abnormal ties. It is in the interests of both countries to change our hostile relation into a friendly one, our confrontational ties into cooperative ties. That is why I went to North Korea a second time.” (James Brooke, “North Korea and Japan Sign a Deal on Abductions,” New York Times, May 23, 2004, p. A-11) Critics cite failure to get any further account of ten abductees the North said had died. “This is the worst result. …I feel betrayed,” says Yokota Shigeru, a spokesman for the abductees. “I am aware of the criticism that I did not meet expectations,” Koizumi told relatives of the abductees, “But instead of deciding not to go because I could not solve everything, I decided to go.” (Barney Jopson, “North Korea Visit Fails to Lift Koizumi,” Financial Times, May 24, 2004, p. 3.) Koizumi promises not to impose sanctions if North abides by the Pyongyang Declaration. (Kawata Takuji, “Kim Trumps Koizumi in Summit Card Game,” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 23, 2004) “North Korea broke its promise over the nuclear weapons issue. In that sense, the country has not honored the Pyongyang Declaration,” says Abe Shinzo. “Therefore, Japan should impose economic sanctions.” He and other senior LDP and DPJ Diet members vow to enact bill banning North Korean ships for Japan’s ports. A LDP leader on abductee issue, Hiranuma Takeo says, “It is necessary to impose sanctions if North Korea doesn’t make any move to normalize diplomatic ties after we pass the bill.” Ozawa is critical: “It’s obvious that the aid was linked to the family members coming to Japan. It has created a bad precedent for future negotiations.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Politicians Blast Koizumi Trip,” May 23, 2004) Kim cancelled an afternooin meeting. “It was their say when the talks would end,” deputy chief cabinet secy Yamazaki Masaaki tells a television talk show. (Kyodo, “N. Korea Took Lead in Summit, Says Koizumi Aide,” May 23, 2004) “We need to make a breakthrough in stalled talks,” he said on his departure. (Kanako Takahara, “Nation Waits As Koizumi Jets to Pyongyang,” Japan Times, May 22, 2004. Koizumi had originally scheduled the meeting in March but it was postponed at Pyongyang’s behest. Yomiuri Shimbun, “Koizumi’s Long Road to Pyongyang Talks,” May 25, 2004) Kim Jong-il reaffirmed what his diplomats had said at the last round, no more: “He clearly stated that the objective was denuclearization. He further stated very clearly that freezing of the nuclear program is to be accompanied by verification.” Koizumi was upbeat, “I felt personally that North Korea is interested in moving forward in a positive way with six-party talks.” (David Pilling, “N. Korea ‘Ready to Abandon Nuclear Arms’ — Koizumi,” Financial Times, June 8, 2004, p. 8) “We agreed to conduct another investigation into the ten [other abductees], with Japanese officials involved this time, and try to gain results as soon as possible.” The North agreed to allow Japanese forensic experts to be involved. (Yomiuri Shumbun, “Abductees’ Kin Arrive in Japan; 5 Reunited with Parents,” May 23, 2004) They also agreed to resume talks on normalizing relations. Kim Jong-il was similarly upbeat. He spoke of “the historic mission facing us politicians to improve the abnormal D.P.R.K.-Japan relationship” and saw “no insoluble problems if the two countries … buckle down to settling them.” Kim underscored his aim in normalizing relations with Japan was to coax the United States into ending enmity. “Progress in improving the bilateral relationship would largely depend on what attitude and stand the ally of Japan would take.” (KCNA, “Report on Meeting and Talks between Kim Jong-il and Koizumi,” May 22, 2004) Poll shows 63 percent of Japanese approved Koizumi trip but 70 percent did not like the outcome. (Yomiuri Shumbun, “63% Support Koizumi-Kim Talks, Says Poll,” May 24, 2004) Kyodo poll shows 68 percent approved trip; 54 percent oppose Koizumi’s saying Japan would not impose sanctions. (Kyodo, “68% Positive on Koizumi’s Trip, 84% Say Abductions Unresolved,” May 24, 2004) Talks can resume unconditionally without new information on the whereabouts of ten abductees, Koizumi tells Diet. “A full account of the ten mission people will be sought in normalization talks.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Koizumi: Normalizing Ties Independent Issue,” May 27, 2004) Kim harshly accused Japan of “rehashing the abduction issue, which had been settled” and remarked sarcastically, “I thought the Japanese prime minister was stronger.” The visit and Yasuki are both examples of Koizumi’s identity politics: to “reover Japan.” When identity politics become too emotional it is difficult to reconcile with neighbors. (Funabashi Yoichi, “Koizumi’s Trip a Poor Showing Rich in Meaning,” Asahi Shimbun, May 27, 2004)

5/?/04:
In a telephone conversation with President Bush, Koizumi passed along Kim’s request for direct talks and urged him to accept, but Bush demurred. (Won-Jae Park, “Bush, ‘Kim Jong-il Is a Liar,’” Dong-A Ilbo, June 16, 2004) Koizumi tells reporters on June 7 Kim “clearly stated that the objective was denuclearization. He further stated very clearly that freezing of the nuclear program is to be accompanied by verification.” Prodding Bush, he adds, “I believe North Korea wants this to happen. It is up to the U.S. to make a decision of what sort of approach it should take. It could be either in the form of six-party talks or a more discreet way of talking to each other.” (David Pilling, “N Korea ‘Ready to Abandon Nuclear Arms’ — Koizumi,” Financial Times, June 8, 2004, p. 8) [James Brooke, “Japan Leader Calls on North Korea to Dismantle Nuclear Program, New York Times, June 8, 2004, p. A-5 misses the point completely]

5/23/04:
North Korea “secretly provided Libya with nearly two tons of uranium in early 2001,” in the form of uranium hexafluoride, says an unidentified senior U.S official, passing on information from Pakistanis who had supplied nuclear technology to Libya and North Korea and who made the claim in interviews with the International Atomic Energy Agency. [They had a interest in deflecting blame from themselves. Two days before publishing an apologia for its flawed coverage of Iraq, the New York Times was again making the very same mistakes.] The intelligence community is having a “heated debate” on “how far North Korea had progressed” in its nuclear programs. [A critical issue in the debate is whether North Korea has a facility to turn the ore into uranium hexafluoride. Otherwise, Pakistan could have shipped UF6 to Yongbyon to test its centrifuges, after which the North could have returned the cask to Pakistan, where it was refilled for Libya, and hence have telltale traces of North Korean Pu.] “International atomic inspectors suspect that the Libyan shipment of uranium hexafluoride may have come from such a facility,” the Times notes, “though it is possible it was processed elsewhere, European diplomats and American officials say.” [Pakistan] The uranium hexafluoride was enriched to one percent U-235, two tons of which would yield enough U-235 for one bomb. [The uranium hexafluoride was not enriched. “The agency has analyzed samples of the UF-6 from both cylinders,” reports the I.A.E.A., “and has confirmed that one is natural uranium and the other depleted (0.3 percent U-235).” The uranium hexafluoride provided to Libya, if enriched, would not yield enough U-235 for a bomb.] (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Evidence Is Cited Linking Koreans to Libya Uranium,” New York Times, May 23, 2004, p. A-1) A U.S. official told AP that U.S. intelligence was “still pursuing” the alleged North Korean link “to see how much truth there is to it” and needed more information to “disprove” that Pakistan was the source. (George Jahn, “N. Korea’s Role in Nuke Market Questioned,” Associated Press, May 23, 2004)

Mercy Corps’ Ellsworth Culver leads philanthropists, entrepreneurs to Pyongyang. (Mark Larabee, “Mercy Corps Leads Food Mission to North Korea,” The Oregonian, May 21, 2004)

5/24/04:
North to repatriate 19 sets of remains of U.S. soldiers on May 27. (Associated Press, “Korea to Return 19 U.S. Soldiers’ Remains, May 24, 2004)

Poneman and Gallucci: “So why should we offer Pyongyang another deal? …Three lessons from the last nuclear crisis might help find a way. Go after the bomb material. Septmeber 11 showed that Cold War doctrines of containment and deterrence won’t work. U.S. diplomats must go after the North Korean program urgently, not just watch it crank out bomb-grade material as they negotiate about how to negotiate. Present a clear choice. We should offer the North security assurances and energy assistance if it verifiably gives up its nuclear program under more ambitious monitoring than in 1994. As with Libya, showing a path to improved relations could prove pivotal. We should also tell the North that failure to accept that offer will result in international sanctions, and enlist the Chinese and other key players to help enforce them. Design a package that leaves us better off, even if Pyongyang cheats.” (Daniel Poneman and Robert Gallucci, “U.S. Should Offer a Deal to N. Korea,” Los Angeles Times, May 24, 2004)

5/25/04:
LDP, DPJ agree to introduce bill barring North ships from calling on Japan’s ports. (Kyodo, “Ruling Bloc, DPJ, Agree on Bill to Ban N. Korean Ships,” May 25, 2004)

WFP announces it is short of food for North Korea, has to halt supply this month. (JoongAng Daily, “World Food Program Short of Aid for North,” May 25, 2004)

“News that North Korea may have joined an international black market selling uranium hexafluoride to Libya, was a Page 2 article on Monday for South Korea’s five most influential newspapers. Instead, journalistic excitement here is vibrating around a meeting on Wednesday between a North Korean general and a South Korean general, the first such meeting since the Korean War, half a century ago. Once again, Seoul and Washington are separated by a deep panic gap. [how about a fact gap?] While the United States struggles to ascertain whether North Korea is crossing an invisible line concerning its nuclear activities, South Korea struggles to keep the peace on the peninsula. … With few voices critical of North Korea heard on television, radio or in schools in recent years, South Koreans increasingly tell pollsters that they do not see North Korea and its nuclear arms programs as threats. … some critics see South Korea slowly moving to a neutralist policy toward North Korea. … Kyodo contended on May 15 that when South Korea joined talks with Jpaan and the United States, ‘the topic of Khan-related intelligence was not put on the table, apparently due to fears it could end up in Pyongyang through Seoul.’” (James Brooke, “South Korea Stakes Its Future on Keeping Peace with North,” New York Times, May 25, 2004, p. A-3)

5/26/04:
N-S military talks end with nothing more than agreement to meet again on June 3. South had a one-star navy officer, Commodore Park Chung-hwa, as chief delegate in hopes of negotiating CBMs along NLL in the West Sea. (AFP, “Two Koreas End High-Level Military Talks, Agree to Meet Again,” May 26, 2004) South proposed a direct phone line between naval commanders, a common radio frequency to be used by vessels of both coast guards, establishing visual signals for both sides to use, information exchange pon fishing activities, and enforcing discipline on fishing boats. The North demands an end to propaganda broadcast on DMZ loudspeakers. The DPRK delegation was led by Read Adm Ahn Ik-san, director of policy. (Kim Min-seok and Choi Jie-ho, “Stars Meet in the North, JoongAng Ilbo, May 26, 2004)

“All negotiation presupposes that the adversary’s position is taken into consideration. However, in the ‘arm-wrestling contest’ between Washington and Pyongyang, that is far from the case. Without in any way whatsoever exonerating the regime for its violations of fundamental rights, the least that one can say is that North Korea’s position is either unknown, ignored, or dismissed as “irrational”. The ‘criminal state’ rhetoric and demonizing hyperbole lead to an underestimation of the coherence of North Korea’s position. … Seen from Pyongyang, Bush’s objective is the collapse of the regime through military coercion and economic strangulation. Nuclear weapons would therefore be the regime’s only deterrent and only ‘trump card’ in negotiations. Washington asserts that the Clinton administration entered into this kind of a deal with the 1994 agreement (a freeze on North Korean plutonium production in exchange for oil deliveries and two of the light water nuclear generators more difficult to divert to military purposes), but that Pyongyang violated its word by starting up a secret uranium enrichment program. … But for the moment, at issue is a pilot, not an operational program. Why? At the end of the 1990s, North Korea had every reason to feel it had been ‘duped’ by the 1994 agreement. The generators’ construction was four years behind schedule and Washington had not kept its side of the bargain: to refrain from resorting to nuclear weapons threats, to begin to normalize relations between the two countries, and to lift sanctions. Thinking that the regime would founder before it would have to honor the agreement, Washington made a calculation that proved to be mistaken and that has paralyzed American policy for several years.” (Philippe Pons, “The Iraq ‘Lesson’ Also Applies to Pyongyang,” Le Monde, May 26, 2004 )

5/27/04:
North has established a crack contingent of hackers “with a view to stealing a wide range of information from our government agencies and research bodies,” Lt-Gen Song Young-geun, Defense Security Command chief, tells Defense Information Security Conference. (Ryu Jin, “North Korea Operates Hacking Unit,” Korea Times, May 27, 2004)

5/28/04:
Lim Dong-won lecture to Korean Council for Unification Education: “Unless there is trust, complete verification is never possible and it will take too much time. The nuclear standoff will be resolved when there is a security environment which calls for no nuclear weapons.” He was under instructions not to include a visit to Kim Il-sung’s resting place at Kumsusan Memorial Palace on the itinerary. Kim Jong-il notified us as he was going to a dinner hosted by Kim Dae-jung that Kim did not have to pay homage. He whispered in Lim’s ear, “You won.” (Yonhap, “Remittance to N. Korea Result of Intelligence Maneuvering: Ex-NIOS Chief,” May 28, 2004)

Kerry prefigures June 1 West Palm Beach speech, “New Strategies to Meet New Threats” with two interviews May 28: Bush’s “almost myopic” focus on Iraq has made Americans “less safe” by letting North Korea and Iran speed up their nuclear programs. (David E. Sanger and Jodi Wilgoren, “Kerry Says Focus on Iraq Endangers U.S.” New York Times, May 30, 2004, p. 10) 2^nd: Six-party talks are a “fig leaf” to cover lack of a coherent policy on North Korea. “I would do the six-party, but I would engage in bilateral discussions,” he said. “I would keep them both going.” Advisers like Perry and Berger “had no illusion that Kim Jong-il was probably cheating over here and [creating] trouble over there, but they were getting the process of dialogue to get a verification structure,” he added. “You are better off engaged in that effort than disengaged.” (Glenn Kessler, “Kerry Sauys Security Comes First,” Washington Post, May 30, 2004, p. A-1)

5/29/04:
KCNA: “The New York Times on May 22 carried a false story that north Korea sold weapon grade uranium to Libya in early 2001 and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently obtained clear evidence that it was provided by north Korea. There has been, in fact, no deal in enriched uranium between the DPRK and Libya. The U.S. much ado about the DPRK’s illegal sale of uranium hexafluoride is a sheer fabrication.” (“KCNA Refustes Information about ‘Illegal Sale of Uranium Hexafluoride,’” May 29, 2004)

6/1/04:
Kim Jong-il quoted by KCNA as telling workers at Kosong Machine Tool Factory, “It is very gratifying that this plant has abided by the principle of profitability.” (James Brooke, “Signs That North Korea Is Coming to Market,” New York Times, June 3, 2004, p. W-1)

Kerry speech in West Palm Beach: the administration “essentially negotiated over the shape of the table while the North Koreans allegedly have made enough new fuel to make six to nine nuclear bombs. …We must be prepared to talk directly to North Korea. This problem is too urgent to allow China, or others at the table, to speak for us” (John Kerry, “New Strategies to Meet New Threats,” speech in West Palm Beach, June 1, 2004)

6/2/04:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The top leaders of the DPRK and Japan at a summit meeting and talks on May 22 exchange wide-ranging views on all the issues arising between the two countries including the issues of implementing the DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration and restoring the bilateral confidence. In this regard the DPRK is taking note of a series of practical and constructive moves taken by the Japanese side recently. The DPRK favorably appreciates a congratulatory message sent by Prime Minister Koizumi to the 20^th Congress of the General Association of Korean Residents in Jaoan, in particular, in which he expressed his intention to make the utmost effort to normalize Japan-DPRK ties.” (KCNA, DPRK FM Spookesman on Stand to Implement Spirit of DPRK-Japan Summit,” June 2, 2004)

Perry at Cheongju University: “The administration said it would ‘not tolerate’ a nuclear weapon program in North Korea but in the last 16 months since the Kelly meeting in Pyongyang, they have taken no action to stop the North Korean program. The six-power meetings have been at the initiative of the Chinese and the Americans have not demonstrated any sense of urgency in those meetings.” (Korea Herald, “Perry Urges Joint Stance on N. Korea,” June 2, 2004)

North prepares to install barbed wire along border with China and began confiscating mobile phone of officials and individuals in late May. (Joo Sung-ha, “North Korea Sets up Barbed Wire along Chinese Border,” Dong-A Ilbo, June 2, 2004)

Goethe Institute opens library, cultural center in Pyongyang. (Hugh Williamson and Andrew Ward, “North Korea Lets in Chink of EWestwern Light with Opening German Library,” Financial Times, June 2, 2004)

National Human Rights Commission criticizes National Security Law saying it served “as a chief tool to instill into citizens’ consciousness that thoughts that deviate from government-prescribed political thinking should be punished.” Ko Ran and Min Seong-jae, “Rights Body Says Security Law Should Be Changed,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 2, 2004)

6/3/04:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Bush was reported to have said ‘Mr.,’ politely addressing our headquarters of revolution at a press conference held at the White House on May 31. We take note of this. We keep a tab on a string of vituperation let loose by high-ranking officials of the U.S. administration against the DPRK even some days ago. If Bush’s remarks put an end to the scramble between the hawkish group and the moderate group in the U.S., which has thrown the Korean policy into a state of confusion, it would help create an atmosphere of the six-party talks.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for Foreign Ministry on Bush’s Remarks,” June 3, 2004)

Diet lower house passes bill barring port visits of North Korean ships.

Koizumi’s diplomacy shows moderate pressure on North Korea works — and can be used to limit not only weapons development but also drug trade. Threat to curtail trade got release of kin. North is likely to become target of regional initiative to restrict drug trade. (Victor Cha and Chris Hoiffmeister, “North Korea’s Drug Habit,” New York Times, June 3, 2004, p. A-27)

China proposes next round of six-party talks on June 23-25. (Park Shin-hong, “Nuclear Talks Are Planned for June 23,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 3, 2004)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “It is well known that the Bush administration announced the measure to stop the provision of heavy oil to the DPRK on November 14, 2002 under the pretext of the non-existent issue of ‘enriched uranium program’ and halted the LWR construction on December 1, 2003. In this regard the DPRK, considering that the Bush administration unilaterally and completely scrapped the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework adopted in October 1994, took a corresponding measure and additional measures are now expected to be taken. … The point is why the U.S. is now talking about the issue of LWR construction again though it is long since it discarded the issue by itself. … There can be no relationship based on confidence with the U.S. administration as it scrapped the AF whose core issue is the provision of LWRs, throwing away the document signed by its president like a pair of old shoes. It is necessary to settle any issue with the U.S. through a one-to-one agreement on the principle of simultaneous actions. That was why the DPRK put forward a formula calling for a simultaneous package solution to the nuclear issue and a ‘reward for freeze’ proposal as the first phase action.” (KCNA, “Sophism of U.S, and KEDO about ‘Fate’ of LWRs under Fire,” June 3, 2004)

6/3-4/04:
After marathon 21 hours of N-S general officer talks, agree to each side’s agenda, set up hotline, open a common radio frequency to avoid incidents at sea, stop propaganda activities along the DMZ and withdraw billboards. Implementation talks to follow. (Joo Sang-min, “Koreas Agree to Ease Tensions,” Korea Herald, June 4, 2004) KCNA: “An agreement on the prevention of accidental conflicts in the West Sea, the suspension of propaganda in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and the removal of propaganda means was reached at the talks Friday. The agreement said:

     The Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces of the National Defence Commission of the DPRK and the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Korea held the second round of the north-south general-level military talks on Mt. Solak resort on June 3 and 4, 2004 and agreed upon the following points:

1. Both sides have agreed to exert joint efforts to achieve military detente and lasting peace on the Korean peninsula.
2. Both sides have agreed to take the following measures from June 15, 2004 to prevent accidental conflicts in the West Sea:

        First. Both sides shall strictly deter vessels from standing in confrontation with each other in the West Sea.
        Second. Both sides shall refrain from taking any unreasonable physical actions against each other’s warships and civilian vessels in the West Sea.
        Third. Both sides shall use 156.8,156.6MHz ultrashort mobile radios with a view to barring their ships from standing face to face with each other due to navigation error, ship wreck and rescue, etc. and wiping off mutual misunderstanding.
        Fourth. Both sides shall institute and apply regulations on flags and light signals as necessary supplementary means.
        Fifth. Both sides shall share the view that accidental conflicts may occur in the course of intercepting and inspecting fishing boats of third countries illegally catching fish in sensitive waters of the west sea and shall cooperate with each other in the efforts to seek a diplomatic solution to this issue and exchange information about the movements of the illegal fishing boats.
        Sixth. Views on the matters raised in the west sea shall be exchanged for the time being through telecommunication lines available in the west coastal area.

        In order to ensure smooth and swift telecommunications to prevent conflicts in the west sea, both sides shall extend the communication lines from the existing telecommunication lines in the west coastal area to have in place their separate lines in the areas under the control of the north and the south till August 15 in order to set up telecommunication liaison offices in each other’s areas and cooperate with each other in the efforts to modernize them.

3. Both sides decided to stop propaganda in the areas along the MDL and remove its means from there in order to defuse the military tension on the Korean peninsula and dispel mistrust and misunderstanding between the armies of the two sides.

        First. Both sides shall stop all propaganda activities through loud-speakers, bulletin, leaflets, etc. in the areas along the MDL from June 15 which marks the fourth anniversary of the historic June 15 North-South Joint Declaration.

        Second. Both sides shall remove all the propaganda means at three phases from the MDL area till August 15, 2004.

             a. Both sides shall remove those things in the section from MDL Marker No. 0001 to No. 0100 including the area under the control of the north and the south in the west coastal area and Panmunjom area on a trial basis at the first phase (from June 16 to 30).

          b. The second phase (from July 1 to 20) shall include those things in the section from MDL Marker No.0100 to No. 0640.
          c. At the third phase (from July 21 to August 15) all the propaganda means shall be eliminated from the section from MDL Marker No. 0640 to No. 1292.

     Third. Upon the completion of the phased removal of the propaganda means, both sides shall inform each other of its results, inspect and confirm the results of their removal in each other’s area. They may verify the results each other, if necessary.

     Fourth. Upon the completion of the phased removal of those means both sides shall open it to the media.

     Fifth. Both sides shall in no case set up again such propaganda means and resume propaganda activities in the future.

4. Both sides have agreed to hold military talks as a follow-up measure to implement the above-said agreed points to the letter.”

(KCNA, “Second North-South General-Level Military Talks Held,” June 4, 2004)

6/3-6/04:
N-S economic talks agree to open roads across DMZ by October, test two rail lines in October, set up joint agency to run Kaesong by the end of June. KEPCO will complete power lines to Kaesong by late September, South to provide 400,000 tons of rice. (AFP, “Two Koreas Agree to Open Cross-Border Roads, Test-Run Railways,” June 6, 2004) North Korea’s delegation drove to the meeting through the DMZ. (Dong-A Ilbo, “North Korea’s Delegation Heading for South through Donghae Road,” Jine 3, 2004)

6/4/04:
North Korea has the right to peaceful nuclear program if it fulfills all IAEA requirements, says Russia‘s first deputy FM Vyacheslav Trubnikov tells Itar-Tass. (Itar-Tass, “North Korea Has the Right for Peaceful Nuclear Program — Trubnikov,” June 4, 2004)

North Korea patrol boats briefly cross NLL in West Sea. (Ryu Jin, “NK Patrol Boats Briefly Cross NLL,” Korea Times, June 4, 2004)

Perry invw: after election Bush will seek support of other parties for regime change. (Chosun Ilbo, “Perry Expects Changes in U.S. North Korea Policy,” June 4, 2004)

6/5/04:
US plans to withdraw one-third of 37,000 troops in Korea before the end of next year as part of Global Posture Review, ASD Richard Lawless informs ROK Sunday night. (Anthony Faiola and Bradley Graham, “U.S. Plans Major Cut of Forces in Korea,” Washington Post, June 8, 2004, p. A-1) In June 3 poll 52.6 percent of South Koreans say pullout won’t affect security. 57.5 percent oppose sending ROK troops to Iraq. (Yoon Won-sup, “Most Koreans Unconcerned by US Troop Pullout: Poll,” Korea Times, June 8, 2004) South Korean official with vast experience in U.S. relations says, “The problem is not how many troops are cut. The greatest problem is that such an extremely important decision was made without adequate policy coordination between the United States and South Korea.” Asked about a new joint declaration on security by U.S., Japan, ROK, a South Korean says, “If the three countires strengthen cooperation, it could split the six-party talks into China-Russia-North Korea and Japan-U.S.-South Korea camps.” .(Funabashi Yoichi, “Japan-US-South Korea Joint Declaration on Security: A New Framework for a New Era,” Asahi Shimbun, June 8, 2004)

6/6/04:
In speech on anniversary of outbreak of war Roh calls for bolstering “independence” in security. (AFP, “South Korean Leaders Moots New Security Roadmap,” June 6, 2004)

6/7/04:
KCNA: “The ‘bill banning the entry of specified foreign ships into port’ was railroaded by the Liberal Democratic Party, the New Komeito Party and the Japanese Democratic Party through Japan’s House of Representatives on June 3, according to a news report. …What matters is that such bill was passed through the House of Representatives at a time when there has been an atmosphere of positive change in the relations between the two countries since the DPRK-Japan summit meeting on May 22. This move of the Japanese right-wing conservatives, therefore, can not be interpreted otherwise than a deliberate sinister attempt to spoil the hard-won positive atmosphere, displeased with it. …It is by no means fortuitous that Chief Cabinet Secretary Hosota at a press conference on June 1 said that the policy of the Japanese government is not to invoke the law banning the entry of specified foreign ships into Japan even after its adoption so long as north Korea implements the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. His remark can be interpreted as a reflection of the Japanese people’s desire to support the outcome of their prime minister’s Pyongyang visit and see the restoration of the bilateral confidence.” (“KCNA on Japan’s Legislation on Sanctions against DPRK,” June 7, 2004)

6/8/04:
Koizumi tells Bush, “I have confirmed that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has a more [keen] recognition of the acquirable profits from a policy of nuclear abandonment than in the past,” a high-level White House official disclosed. Kim also explained, “North Korea has occasionally stated things like ‘we don’t really want to have nuclear weapons, but we are forced to because of the hostile poicy of the U.S.’ The important thing is that Kim Jong-il has [directly] stated that he doesn’t want nuclear weapons at this time.” (Dong-A Ilbo, “U.S.-Japan Summit Discusses North Korean Nuclear Problem,” June 9, 2004) “I told him face to face, ‘If you compare what you gain from nuclear weapons and what you gain from dismantlement of your own nuclear program, there would be a difference of heaven and earth.” (David E. Sanger, “About-Face on North Korea: Allies Helped,” New York Times, June 24, 2004, p. A-12) A Japanese official provided a slightly different version of what Koizumi told Bush over lunch, that when Koizumi pressed Kim that giving up his weapons would be beneficial, Kim replied that “he sees the point but he feels unease about U.S. intentions and the use of threatening words by the U.S., as North Korea and Kim Jong-il interprets them.” Kim added that “in order to solve this lack of communication, he wants to hev direct dialogue with the United States.” The U.S. official said Koizumi agreed with Bush that “we’d throw away all the leverage we have on them” by holding bilateral talks. (Glenn Kessler, “N. Korea May Be Relaxing Position,” Washington Post, June 9, 2004, p. A-16) Kim told Koizumi he wants other participants in six-party talks “to play music” so North Korea and the U.S. can “dance well.” He wants the North to talk to the U.S. so much that his negotiator’s “voice will become hoarse.” (Kyodo, “N. Korea’s Kim Told Koizumi He Is Eager for Talks with U.S.,” June 12, 2004) “He [KJI] is an untrustworthy liar,” Bush tells Koizumi. “I cannot trust such a country. I will only talk to them if there are witnesses.” (Dong-A Ilbo, “Bush: ‘Kim Jong-il Is a Liar,’” June 16, 2004)

Koizumi says “I intend to touch on” issue of Jenkins when he meets Bush at G-8 summit, in Sea Island, Ga. (Japan Times, “Koizumi to Discuss Jenkins with Bush,” June 8, 2004) He asks for leniency for Jenkins. Bush, noncommittal, expressed “real sympathy.” (Eric Talmadge, “Japan Wants Leniency for U.S. Fugitive,” Associated Press, June 9, 2004)

Source says, “Stressing that the United States and North Korea remain far apart, China is suggesting the possibility of postponing a third round of six-party talks.” (Teruaki Ueno, “Six-Party North Korea Talks May Be Delayed — Sources,” Reuters, June 8, 2004)

In invw, Dep FM Zhou Wenzhong says, “We know nothing about the uranium program. We don’t know whether it exists. So far the U.S. has not presented convincing evidence of the program.” “The United States is accusing North Korea of having this or that, and then attaching conditions” to negotiations, he said. “So it should really be the U.S. that takes the initiative.” The North Koreans “argue they cannot do all this for nothing and feel they must be compensated,” he said. “The U.S. still insists on CVID, and there are some problems in this area.” (Joseph Kahn and Susan Chira, “Chinese Official Challenges U.S. Stance on North Korea,” New York Times, June 9, 2004, p. A-12)

ASD Lawless invw: “They were the first to complain about the plan to relocate our forces and realign our forces south of the Han River,” he said of the Norht Koreans. “Thye suggested that we would be adding to our combat power by doing that.” The U.S. one official said, has “no good military options” against the North. The 12,500 cut was a net reduction. “At the same time that folks would be flowing out of South Korea, different types would be flowing in.” John Bolton said of delay in six-party talks in invw: “I’m just hoping the North Koreans haven’t com to the conclusion that they are going to wait until the end of November to get serious.” (Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Defends Plan to Reduce Forces in South Korea,” New York Times, June 9, 2004, p. A-?)

6/9/04:
A foreign diplomat says North last month successfully tested a Taepo-dong 2 missile engine. U.S. intel agencies think the size of the combustion trace and the amount of liquid fuel used suggest it was a Taepo-dong 2, the source said, adding the test may have been conducted for negotiating leverage at six-party talks. (Lee Young-jong and Brian Lee, “North Succeeds in Missile Tests, Diplomats Say,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 9, 2004)

FM Ban Ki-moon appeals for Uri party to support ROK troops dispatch to Iraq. Rep. Jung Chung-rai says, “Do we have to strengthen the Korea-US alliance for another 50 years? Is it not enough with the unequal partnership over the past half century?” (Korea Herald, “Uri Party Agonizes over Troop Dispatch,” June 9, 2004)

Lim Dong-won says Kim Jong-il had planned to visit Seoul in the spring of 2001 but called it off, Kim told him, because he was told George Bush would take a hard-line policy that would threaten the North Korean regime. (Chosun Ilbo, “Former NIS Head Says N. K. Leader Had Planned S.K. Visit in 2001,” June 9, 2004)

U.S. official [Lawless]: “I think our failure to reach an agreement is frustrating for us because we are mindful of our timeline because of the new National Assembly.” (Choi Jie-ho, “U.S. Is Irked at Breakdown of Base Talks,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 9, 2004)

North Korea’s economy grew at 1.8% last year, according to Bank of Korea. (JoongAng Ilbo, “North Korea’s GDP Growth Estimated at 1.8%,” June 9, 2004)

Lee Bok-gu, missile engineer who defected in 1997, enters U.S. from ROK via Canada on June 9 seeking asylum, but wife was arrested on June 25 and held near Syracuse. (Dong-A Ilbo, “Missile Techniocian Couple Who Escaped form North Korea Asks for Refuse in America,” July 4, 2004)

6/10/04:
Minju Chosun says if U.S. keeps pressuring North on CVID, it will demand U.S. troops withdrawal from South Korea. (Kim Hyung-jin, “Koreas Hold Working-Level Military Talks amid High Hopes,” Yonhap, June 10, 2004)

6/11/04:
Nam Sung-u, dep chmn of General Assn of Korean Residents, informally named to North’s delegation for normalization talks. (Kyodo, “Chonryon Member to Be Part of N. Korean Team in Talks with Japan,” June 11, 2004)

Roh names Moon Chung-in chair of presidentioal commission for the Northeast Asia Era. (Shim Jae-yun, “Roh Names 3 Scholars to Key Positions,” Korea Times, June 11, 2004)

6/12/04:
South Korea is drawing up a “comprehensive plan” for it and others to provide North Korea substantial energy aid if it dismantles its nuclear program, says an ROK official. “But we must first convince the United States and Japan of the need for assistance at this point.” In a speech in London this week, Dep FM Lee Soo-hyuck said, “When, and under what conditions, North Korea gives up nuclear ambitions depends on the contents of reciprocal measures that the country can win in exchange for abandoning nukes.” (Choi Soung-ah, “Seoul May Offer Energy Aid to N.K.,” June 12, 2004)

6/10-12/04:
One day after its Navy command issued a strongly worded statement accusing the South of increasing the number of warships along the NLL, North Korea showed a “sincere attitude” on first day of working-level N-S military talks in Kaesong, says UnifMin Jeong Se-hyun. (Kim Hyung-jin, “Koreas Hold Working-Level Military Talks amid High Hopes,” Yonhap, June 10, 2004) North and South sign agreement on concrete measures to avert accidental clashes on land and sea, including a hotline between naval vessels and end propaganda broadcasts. (AFP, “Two Koreas Agree Measures to Avoid Accidental Armed Clashes,” June 12, 2004)

6/13-14/04:
TCOG in Washington. Kelly differs with Lee, Yabunaka on CVID, freeze, HEU. (James L. Schoff, Tools for Trilateralism (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), p A11) South Korea sought softening of CVID language. “The U.S. has consistently asked the North to take the first step, but this time if the U.S. accepts the [South’s] three-step proposal, it will take a simultaneous approach,” says Yu Suk-ryul of IFANS. (Reuben Staines, “US Eyes Progress in 6-Way Talks,” Korea Times, June 7, 2004) Seoul urges three Tokyo to separate abductions issue from six-party talks, start with a freeze and allow nuclear power for peaceful purposes, and as denuclearization proceeds, have KEDO support the North’s energy supply. (Funabashi Yoichi, “Japan-US-South Korea Joint Declaration on Security: A New Framework for a New Era,” Asahi Shimbun, June 8, 2004)

6/15/04:
North agrees to new round of six-party talks on June 23-26. Okayuma Jiro, Japan FoMin spokesman: “We have no indication to demonstrate that the U.S. has become more flexible.” Japan “closely shared” U.S. stance and would continue pressing for CVID. (Anthony Faiola, “N. Korea to Resume Nuclear talks; Neighbors Not Optimistic,” Washington Post, June 16, 2004, p. A-16)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “As we have declared on several occasions, it is important for the U.S. to abandon its policy for isolating and stifling the DPRK and take a bold political decision to co-exist with the latter if the six-party talks are to yield practical results and open a landmark phase for the settlement of the nuclear issue between them. The U.S. attitude toward the DPRK-proposed ‘reward for freeze’ will become a touchstone discerning the U.S. real intention for the settlement of the nuclear issue. The prospect of the settlement of the issue entirely depends on the U.S. Nothing will be expected from the forthcoming talks if the U.S. persistently insists that the DPRK accept CVID, a demand which can be forced on a defeated country only. (KCNA, Spokesman for DPRK FM Ministry on Third Round of Six-Party Talks, June 15, 2004)

On fourth anniversary of N-S summit, Pres Roh breaks with CVID to promise huge infusions of aid: “Inter-Korean cooperation will be accelerated if the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved, and we are preparing comprehensive and concrete plans for that.” South will help it “build infrastructure and enhance industrial production capacity, which will develop North Korea’s economy in an epochal manner.” (International Herald Tribune, “Seoul Vows Major Aid If North Cedes Arms,” June 16, 2004)

Ri Jong-hyuk, vice chmn of Asia Pacific Peace Cmte, in Seoul for conference marking summit, meets with Pres Roh, Kim Dae-jung. Shim Jae-yun, “Roh Offers Aid If N. Korea Scraps Nukes,” Korea Times, June 16, 2004, p. 1) Ri: “An allied relationship is important, but more important is North and South relations,” he told conference marking anniversary. “Cooperation with a friendly country is possible but the basis of all should be national cooperation.” KDJ: “the point of the six-party talks is the U.S. and North Korea, the two main parties, must come to an agreement. …Because there is a great deal of distrust between the two, both should act simultaneously, or in parallel.” (Yoo Dong-ho, “DJ Calls on US to Guarantee NK’s Security,” Korea Times, June 16, 2004, p. 4) Ri visits IT facility lines of Samsung Electronics and SK Telecom along with a digital TV broadcasting center. (Chosun Ilbo, “Chief N.K. Delegates Uses Visit to Tour Major IT Facilities,” June 17, 2004)

“We are in danger of shattering this alliance by our own policies. This is the United States jeopardizing political support for alliance in a democratic country,” Sigal told The Korea Herald. Sigal pointed to a series of U.S. policies toward the North that “do not make sense” as the key threat to the alliance and said there has been a long standing difference between the Bush administration and the government of South Korea. “There is a profound change underway on the Korean Peninsula and it is irreversible. So I think there are benefits in security terms to Korea, Japan and the United States by going the cooperative route. Now the Bush Administration obviously didn`t see it that way and all they succeeded in doing was getting the North Koreans stepping up their nuclear armament programs.” “The North Koreans have said a lot of interesting things at the negotiating table but the United States seems to have its ear plugs on. Everyone`s gotten it except for the Americans. So it`s time for the Americans to play and play seriously at the negotiating table,” Sigal said. On the issue of growing anti-American sentiment in South Korea that may possibly hinder the future of the Seoul-Washington alliance, Sigal said the situation is “very serious” and began with the Korean public’s dislike of American policies. “If we don`t change policy within the next year or so, I think this is going to turn into a very different kind of circumstance in which increasingly America will be seen as a country that is an impediment to reconciliation between North and South.” Donald Gregg saw the alliance at one of its “most difficult times” because of differences over North Korea. “A number of things that happened, including a generation change on the attitude toward North Korea and the overall changes to South Korea’s perception of the North, allowed Korea to be more into ‘rehabilitation’ than ‘punishment’ for the Kim Jong-il regime,” Gregg told The Korea Herald. “But the U.S. perception of North Korea is still ‘dangerous’ and now, with continued trouble in Iraq, Washington is more committed to getting what they want out of North Korea with a stronger position.” (Choi Soung-ah, “N.K. Issues ‘Jeopardize’ Korea-U.S. Alliance: Experts,” Korea Herald, June 16, 2004)

Sankei Shimbun, quoting military source well-acquainted with news on North Korea, reports six representatives including Iranian nuclear physicist and computer experts visited North Korea last month to prepare joint experiment of nuclear triggering device. “The experient is to investigate the fluctuations of highly dense neutrons that cause nuclear disruption,” it said. “Data obtained through this experiemtn is vital in manufacturing nuclear bombs.” (Dong-A Ilbo, “Japanese Newspaper: ‘North Korea-Iran Preparing a Joint Nuclear Detonation Experiment,” June 15, 2004)

6/16/04:
Cui Yingjiu, North Korea specialist at Beijing University: “If the United States can agree or can accept that some fuel oil or other aid can be gioven by other parties, in exchange for North Korea announcing a freeze on iits nuclear weapons program and its acceptance of IAEA inspections, then this would be a step forward. This is a possibility.” (AFP, “North Korea Could Accept IAEA Inspections in Six-Party Talks: Analysts,” June 16, 2004)

DOS spokesman Richard Boucher: “We don’t have any intention of rewarding North Korea for things it never should have done to begin with.” (Ryu Jin, “Seoul Seeking Real Progress in Nuke Talks,” Korea Times, June 16, 2004) U.S. official says, “There are some battles still going in” within the administration but a decision has been made to stick with CVID. Donald Gregg: “The longer the U.S. refuses to enter into negotiations, the higher the price becomes for [improved relations with Pyongyang], while the dangerous prospect of North Korea becoming a permanent nuclear power steadlily increases.” (Guy Dinmore and Andrew Ward, “US ‘Will Keep up Pressure’ on N Korean Atom Projects,” Financial Times, June 16, 2004, p. 2)

Gov. Bill Richardson on trip to Seoul and Tokyo calls for U.S. compromise on freeze. He says he has been in touch with North Korean officials in Pyongyang as recently as two weeks ago. “If we don’t reach an interim agreement to suspend the [re]processing, they could have ten nuclear weapons, and the talks may break down by this time next year.” “If you talk to the Chinese, they are especially growing frustrated with this process. They want to see results next week,” he said. If there is no clear progress, we don’t know if the nations involved will stick with the framework” of six-party talks. (Anthony Faiola, “Richardson Urges Shift in U.S. Tack on North Korea,” Washington Post, June 17, 2004, p. A-26)

6/18/04:
Vaclav Havel op-ed: “Now is the time for the democratic countries of the world — the European Union, the United States, Japan, South Korea — to take a common position. They must make it clear that they will not offer concessions to a totalitarian dictator. They must state that respect for basic human rights is an integral part of any future discussions with Pyongyang. Decisiveness, perseverance amnd negotiations from a poisitoin of strength are the only things that Kim Jong-il and those like him understand.” (Vaclav Havel, “Time to Act on N. Korea,” Washington Post, June 18, 2004, p. 29)

Japan has approached Indonesia to allow deserter Charles Jenkins to reunite with his kin there. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “’Soga Family Reunion Set for Indonesia,’” June 18, 2004) Kim Gye-gwan, Yabunaka Mitoji agree to “cooperate as necessary” on “a reunion of the family in a third country at an early date,” a Japanese official told reporters. (Elaine Kurtenbach, “Japan, North Korea Eye Ex-Kidnap Victim,” Associated Press, June 24, 2004; Japan Times, “Japan Presses N. Korea Again on Soga,” June 27, 2004) Indonesian FM Hassan Wirajuda, after talks with FM Paek Nam-sun in Jakarta says, “The North Korean government welcomes it if the Jenkins family decides to have a reunion in Indonesia.” (Reuters, “N. Korea Happy to See Abductee, American Reunion,” June 29, 2004) “Mr. Jenkins has agreed to meet his family in Indonesia,” says FM Kawaguchi Yoriko. (Associated Press, “Alleged U.S. Army Deserter to Meet Wife,” July 1, 2004)

6/?/04:
David Asher, Kelly aide, who began working on North Korea’s illicit activities in 2003, drafted a memo to create an interagency task force to target these activities. The idea was thrashed out with Kelly and Armitage, who recalled, “We could do this and we can really hurt the elitre on this ithout further hurting the people. And will you support this? Kelly was there in my office, and I said basically, ‘Yeah, let’s write it up.’ And we took it toPowell and told him and he said, ‘Yeah.’” David Straub and Jim Foster who succeeded him on the Korea desk were both opposed. Powell rushed aside their objections, “You couldn’t push this stuff under the table and say we can’t do anything about this because it would affect the negotiatios. These guys were counterfeiting our money, they were running drugs, they were doing a lot of illicit things. And so it seemed like we had them cold and we had to use it, and we did.” Setephen Yates, Cheney’s aide on Asia, recalled, “Part of the psychology of what was going on was the State Department team — Powell, Armitage, and the people who worked for them — saying ‘We know we’re tough, we can handle this, we’re the policy-makers and implementers, just get out of hair, trust us, trust where we’re going.’” John Bolton and Bob Joseph opposed the scheme, said Lawrence Wilkerson, Powell’s chief of staff. “I think Bolton and some others thought this was a threat to PSI because it had every prospect of being effective.” Armitage recalled, “We had a little trouble seliing it in the NSC and others. In fact, I went and sold it with [Deputy NSA Stephen] Hadley at a deputies meeting. And Hadley didn’t like Asher, andothers there, particularly the non-pro [non-proliferation] people didn’t like him very much. And I told David, ‘Sit in the back and don’t say a fucking word on this. If anyone else asks anything, don’t answer,’ because David is his own worst enemy sometimes.” They kept the Illicit Activities Initiative top secret and held meetings at a secure room at the State Department. (Chinoy, Meltdown, pp. 212-15)

6/21/04:
Kelly testimony: “The working group met June 21-22, the plenary June 23-26. … We held a two-and-a-half-hour discussion with the D.P.R.K. delegation. Some press accounts indicated that, during that meeting, the North Korean delegation threatened to test a nuclear weapon. The North Koreans said that there were some, not identified, in the D.P.R.K. who wanted to test a nuclear weapon and might presumably do so if there was not progress in the talks. …Under the U.S. proposal, the D.P.R.K. would, as a first step, commit to dismantle all of its nuclear programs. The parties would then reach agreement on a detailed implementation plan requiring, at a minimum, the supervised disabling, dismantlement and elimination of all nuclear-related facilities and materials; the removal of all nuclear weapons and weapons components, centrifuge and other nuclear parts, fissile material and fuel rods; and a long-term monitoring program. We envisage a short initial preparatory period, of perhaps three months’ duration, to prepare for the dismantlement and removal of the D.P.R.K.’s nuclear programs. During that initial period, the D.P.R.K. would: provide a complete listing of all its nuclear activities, and cease operations of all of its nuclear activities; permit the securing of all fissile material and the monitoring of all fuel rods, and permit the publicly disclosed and observable disablement of all nuclear weapons/weapons components and key centrifuge parts. These actions by the D.P.R.K. would be monitored subject to international verification.” (Kelly testimony, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 15, 2004)

6/22/04:
“President Bush has authorized a team of American negotiators to offer North Korea, in talks in Beijing on Thursday, a new but highly conditional set of incentives to give up its nuclear weapons programs the way Libya did late last year, according to senior administration officials. …Under the plan, outlined by American officials on Tuesday evening, in response to pressure from China and American allies in Asia, the aid would begin flowing immediately after a commitment by Kim Jong Il, the North Korean leader, to dismantle his plutonium and uranium weapons programs. In return, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea would immediately begin sending tens of thousands of tons of heavy fuel oil every month, and Washington would offer a ‘provisional’ guarantee not to invade the country or seek to topple Mr. Kim’s government.” (David E. Sanger, “U.S. to Offer North Korea Incentives in Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, June 23, 2004, p. A-3) Bush rejected a proposal by the State Department to offer security assurances when South Korea resumed HFO shipments after SecDef Rumsfeld objected. (Philip P. Pan and Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Offers Plan to End North Korea Nuclear Crisis,” Washington Post, June 23, 2004) The exact wording according to a Hudson Institute report was “a provisional multilateral security assurance that would include no intention to invade or attack, and a commitment to respect the territorial integrity of all parties.” Quoting U.S. officials, the Asian Wall Street Journal reported, “The overture was championed by … Powell, who began pushing for a concrete proposal the week before the talks started, inspired by a draft plan by diplomats from South Korea. But those in the administration who favor taking a tougher line appear to have succeeded in paring back the offer so that it contained little that was entirely new.” (Choi Soung-ah, “U.S. Policymakers in Major Controversy over N.K. Security Guarantee,” Korea Herald, July 2, 2004)

VP Cheney and SecDef Rumsfeld intervene at the last minute to toughen Asst SecState Kelly’s talking points for third round of six-party talks. After Straub had circulated his draft interagency, officials from the ROK NSC met in mid-June with U.S. officials and worked out a joint position calling for an interim freeze. Cheney then told his aides to remove any reference to a freeze — whatever it was called. Rumsfled objected to a six-month dismantlement phase and instead insisted on three months. “For the third round, I drafted an initial presentation that tried to push the envelope a little. … Just shortly before we left, all of a sudden we got a brand-new paper from [NSC counterproliferation director] Bob Joseph [with backing] from the EWhite House. And we were told, ‘This is what you’re going to do.’” (Chinoy, Meltdown. pp. 216-17)

South Korean civilian captured by Zarqawi group found beheaded after South turns down demand to withdraw troops. (Jackie Spinner and Anthony Faiola, “S. Korean Is Beheaded in Iraq,” Washington Post, June 23, 2004, p. A-1)

6/23-25/04:
At third round of six-party talks, U.S. makes first proposal. “We did think it was a good time to offer a proposal because colleagues and allies urged us to do so,” said one administration official. (Joseph Kahn, “North Korea Is Studying Softer Stance from the U.S.,” New York Times, June 24, 2004, p. A-12) Bush made the offer “because he had little choice: his Asian allies, picking up signals that the government of Mr. Kim may finally be willing to make a deal, were quietly beginning to negotiate a separate peace.” “But perhaps just as notable as Mr. Bush’s turnabout is what is missing: the kind of threats that surrounded his confrontation with Saddam Hussein last year. … There is no appetite in Asia or in the White House for such a risk, and the North Koreans know that.” “The turning point came in the last two weeks. Japan’s primeminister … returned from a meeting with Mr. Kim, whom he paid handsomely for releasing the relatives of Japanese kidnapped by North Korea years ago. (David E. Sanger, “About-Face on North Korea: Allies Helped,” New York Times, June 24, 2004, p. A-12) Right up to minuites before the talks opened there was disagreement over the U.S. proposal. State had included an offer to give up efforts at regime change but this was deleted by Rumsfeld and other hardliners, the Asian Wall Street Journal reported on June 27. (Choi Soung-ah, “U.S. Policymakers in Major Controversy over N.K. Security Guarantee,” Korea Herald, July 2, 2004) DOS spokesman Richard Boucher: “Since these talks are about denuclearization and complete denuclearization, the United States felt it important to come forward with a proposal, which we have done in Beijing today, on how to achieve that, on how to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the nuclear programs that have caused so much concern. What we have described in the talks is a practical series of steps to achieve that goal. The process would begin with a North Korean commitment to dismantle all its nuclear programs. The parties would agreed to a detailed implementation plan that would require the supervised disabling, dismantlement and elimination of all nuclear-related facilities and materials, the removal of all nuclear weapons and weapons components, centrifuge and other parts, fissile material and fuel rods, and long-term monitoring programs. The process would involve a short preparatory period for dismantlement and removal which would include the disabling of nuclear weapons components and key centrifuge parts, the permanent and verifiable dismantlement and removal of North Korea’s nuclear programs would follow the brief period. At the same time, the parties would be willing to take steps to ease the political and economic isolation of North Korea. Steps would be provisional or temporary in nature and only yield lasting benefits to the North Koreans after the dismantlement has been completed.” (DOS briefing, June 23, 2004, text) “During this phase [the three-month preparatory period] we would require the DPRK to give a full listing of its nuclear activities,” said senior U.S. official. Asked if North Korea had again denied having a uranium program, the U.S. official said, “That is correct.” (AFP, “U.S. Makes New Proposal in Nuclear Talks; N. Korea Offers Freeze,” June 24, 2004) Under the plan, immediately after North Korea’s commitment to dismantle its programs, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea (but not U.S.) would begin shipping thousands of tons of HFO every month and the U.S. would offer a “provisional” guarantee not to invade or topple the regime and begin direct talks on lifting economic sanctions, providing longer-term aid and retraining of scientists. “Our allies have been telling us that they think Kim Jong-il is ready for a test of his intentions,” one of Bush’s most senior national security aides [Rice] said in a interview June 22. “They probably would reject even a better offer, figuring that after the election they have a chance of dealing with someone other than George Bush,” said one senior Asian allied official who has been urging the White House to make an offer. “And of course they can use the extra time to work on making more bomb fuel, if they haven’t finished that process already.” (David E. Sanger, “U.S. to Offer North Korea Incentives in Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, June 23, 2004, p. A-3) In apparent bid to blunt charges it has been inflexible, U.S. drops use of the term CVID. “It is an acronym that seems to inflame sensibilities, so we don’t feel it’s necessary to use that term,” a senior official said. “Essentially the U.S. side believes it’s time to make some progress.” (Mark Magnier, “U.S. Shows Flexibility in Nuclear Talks,” Los Angeles Times, June 24, 2004) “We envisage a short initial preparatory period, of perhaps three months’ duration, to prepare for the dismantlement and removal of the DPRK’s nuclear programs. During that initial period, the DPRK would: provide a complete listing of all its nuclear activities, and cease operations of all of its nuclear acvtivities; permit the securing of all fissile material and the monitoring of all fuel rods; permit the publicly disclosed and observable disablement of all nuclear weapons, weapons components and key centrifuge parts. These actions by the DPRK would be monitored subject to international verification. …Under our proposal, as the DPRK carried out its commitments, the other parties would take some corresponding steps. These would be provisional or temporary in nature and would only yield lasting benefits to the DPRK after the dismantlement of its nuclear programs has been completed. These steps would include: upon agreement of the overall approach, including a DPRK agreement to dismantle all nuclear programs in a permanent, thorough and transparent manner subject to effective verification, non-U.S. parties would provide heavy fuel oil to the DPRK; upon acceptance of the DPRK declaration, the parties woul provide provisional multilateral security assurances, which would become more enduring as the process proceeded; begina study to determine thhe energy requirements of the DPRK and how to meet them by non-nuclear energy programs; begin a discussion of the steps necessary to lift remains sanctions on the DPRK and on the steps necessary for removal of the DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. … Of course, to achieve full integration into the region and a wholly transformed relationship with the United States, North Korea must take oother steps in addition to maing the strategic decision to give up its nuclear ambitions. It also needs to change its behavior onnhuman rights, address the issues underlying its appearance on the U.S. list of state sponsoring terrorism, eliminate its illegal weapons of mass destruction programs, put an end to the proliferation of missiles and missile-related technology, and adopt a less provocative conventional force disposition.” (Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings: “Dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” Prepared Statement of James Q. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs, July 15, 2004) South Korea, having worked with the Americans on the U.S. proposal, took it a step further. They proposed a “concept paper” of their own which lengthened the period of the freeze to six months and did not preclude nuclear energy or U.S. shipments of heavy fuel oil, suggesting key openings for compromise. Dep FM Lee Soo-hyuck told reporters, “First, North Korea, must, within a certain period of time, report all of its nuclear programs and … outline its freeze. Secondly, it must prove it has stopped all nuclear activities, sealed all its spent fuel rods and submitted to inspections by international agencies. Then, lastly, North Korea must follow through with complete dismantlement in a short time frame.” When Pyongyang agrees to the plan, Washington must take it off the list of state sponsors of terrorism and provide other compensation. (Choi Soung-ah, “S. Korea Offers Energy Aid If N.K. De-Nukes,” Korea Herald, June 24, 2004) Park Sun-won in NCAFP paper: “Within six months of freeze, the doismantlement process shall begin. The parties have agreed to provide provisional security assurance while the nuclear freeze and dismantlement are under way, and to provide more enduring security assurance once the dismantlement is completed. The provisional security assurance will be provided at the beginning of the freeze and it will be given in the form of multilateral declaration that will include no intention to attack, invade, or seek regime change. The parties will provide heavy fuel oil and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK during the freeze period. The parties will launch a study project to determine energy requirements of the DPRK. The US and DPRK will soon begin dialogue on terrorism and economic sanctions for the purpose of the eventual lifting of the sanctions. The parties have agreed to make efforts to remive obstacles on the way towards the normalization of diplomatic relations and will significantly improve the environment for economic cooperation betweenthe DPRK and the international community.” The DPRK said that “all materials converted as a result of reprocessing since its withdrawal from NPT on January 10, 2003 would be subject to a freeze.” (Park Sung-won, senior director, strategic planning bureau, ROK National Security Council, “Where Do We Stand? ROK Perspective,” August 9, 2004) US stance that any energy assistance had to be non-nuclear put it at odds with Seoul, which had already spent substantial sums constructing the nuclear power plants promised the North in the Agreed Framework. As South Korea’s unification minister put it just after the third round, “It is quite a severe demand from the United States that North Korea should give up the use of nuclear power even for peaceful purposes.” (Kyodo, Interview with Jeong Se-hyun, June 28, 2004.) Japan commits to provide energy aid on three conditions: the North discloses information on all its nuclear programs, freezes them and allows inspections. [Not abductions] (Kyodo, “Japan Offers to Give Energy Aid If N. Korea Meets 3 Conditions,” June 24, 2004) The D.P.R.K. offered to exchange “words for words” and “action for action.” Words for words meant an agreement in principle that if Washington “gives up its hostile policy,” it will “transparently renounce all nuclear-weapons-related programs.” Action for action meant phased reciprocal steps starting with a freeze on “all facilities related to nuclear weapons,” a shutdown of its reactor and reprocessing plant at Yongbyon. The freeze covered “even products achieved through reprocessing,” [meaning Pyongyang would put the 1994 plutonium back under inspection]. In return, Pyongyang insisted on “compensation-for-freeze measures.” Hyon Hak-pong: “We once again made it clear that if the United States gives up its hostile policy against us through action, we will transparently renounce all our nuclear weapons-related programs. [We] presented a concrete plan on nuclear freeze, on the premise that if the United States withdraws the CVID demand and accepts our demand for reward. The targets for freeze we are talking about shall include all the facilities related to nuclear weapons. Even products achieved through reprocessing shall be included. Also, the freeze stipulates that nuclear weapons shall no longer be manufactured, transferred, or tested. … Freeze must be accompanied by reward corresponding to it and will be determined depending on whether it is rewarded or not. It is because reward is an indispensable factor of confidence building. At the point of freeze, the United States shall participate in providing energy that has a two million-kilowatt capacity; remove us from the list of the terrorism sponsoring states; lift economic sanctions and blockade against the DPRK. We clearly elucidated that if the United States substantially takes part in providing energy along with other articipating countries, we are willing to show flexibility in our demand related to removing us [DPRK] from the list of terrorism sponsoring states and [lifting] economic sanctions and blockade. (In Kyo-chun, “Full Text of DPRK Spokesman’s 25 June News Conference at Six-Way Talks,” Yonhap, June 25, 2004) “The United States and North Korea were in consultations for more than two hours,” says Cho Tae-yong, ROK delegation dep chief, from 3 to 5:10 p.m. on second day. (Chang Jae-soon, “U.S., N. Korea Hold Private Talks for Over Two Hours,” Yonhap, June 24, 2004) Kim Gye-gwan told Kelly “some persons” in the North want to test,” said a U.S. official. “It was not phrased as a threat, but we made clear that we certainly would not welcome any such thing.” (Kyodo, “U.S. Officials Play Down N. Korea Nuclear-Test Remarks,” June 25, 2004) “Some people in their country said that to get our attention, not to actually threaten us,” said a senior U.S. official [Kelly]. A South Korean official said there was only a suggestion the North might “one day carry out such a test. Our perception is that the remarks did not mean a direct threat,” he said. “Such North Korean references are not new.” (Choi Soung-ah, “No Breakthrough in Nuke Talks: U.S.” Korea Herald, June 26, 2004) Six parties make last-ditch effort to draft a joint statement. Under North Korea’s own freeze, it would “no longer produce, test or transfer nuclear weapons,” said a diplomatic source in Beijing. (Ryu Jin, “6 Parties Make Last-Ditch Effort for Joint Statement,” Korea Times, June 25, 2004) China is trying for joint statement, but Kelly is reluctant, prefers a chairman’s statement. (Kobayashi Kakumiu and Ota Masakatsu, “N. Korea Nuclear-Test Threat Weighs on 6-Country Talks,” Kyodo, June 25, 2004) Chairman’s Statement: The heads of delegations were Mr. Wang Yi, Vice Foreign Minister of China; Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Foreign Minister of DPRK; Ambassador Mitoji Yabunaka, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Ambassador Lee Soo-hyuck, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of ROK; Ambassador Alexander Alekseyev, Special Envoy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia; Mr. James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States Department of State. 3. In preparation of the Third Round of the Six-Party Talks, two sessions of the Working Group were held in Beijing from May 12 to 15 and from June 21 to 22, 2004. The Parties approved the Concept Paper on the Working Group in the plenary. 4. During the Third Round of the Talks, the Parties had constructive, pragmatic and substantive discussions. Based on the consensus reached at the Second Round of the Talks, as reflected in its Chairman’s Statement, they reaffirmed their commitments to the goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and stressed the need to take first steps toward that goal as soon as possible. 5. The Parties stressed the need for a step-by-step process of ‘words for words’ and ‘action for action’ in search for a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue. 6. In this context, proposals, suggestions and recommendations were put forward by all Parties. The Parties welcomed the submission of those proposals, suggestions and recommendations, and noted some common elements, which would provide a useful basis for future work, while differences among the Parties remained. The Parties believed that further discussions were needed to expand their common ground and reduce existing differences. 7. The Parties agreed in principle to hold the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing by the end of September 2004, at a date to be decided through diplomatic channels with due consideration to the proceedings of the Working Group. The Parties authorized the Working Group to convene at the earliest possible date to define the scope, duration and verification as well as corresponding measures for first steps for denuclearization, and as appropriate, make recommendations to the Fourth Round of the Talks.” (“Chairman’s Statement of Third Round of Six-Party Talks,” Xinhua, June 26, 2004) U.S. official describes the talks as “some good, some bad and some ugly.” North promised to “carefully study” the U.S. offer. (Joseph Kahn, “U.S. Cites Scant Progress in Nuclear Talks with North Korea,” New York Times, June 26, 2004, p. A-3) DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Unlike the previous talks each party advanced various proposals and ways and had a discussion on them in a sincere atmosphere at the talks. Some common elements helpful to making progress in the talks were found there. This time the U.S. side said that it would take note of the DPRK’s proposal for ‘reward for freeze’ and seriously examine it. An agreement was reached on such issues as taking simultaneous actions on the principle of ‘words for words’ and ‘action for action’ and mainly discussing the issue of ‘reward for freeze.’ This was positive progress made at the talks. …The reward which the DPRK delegation called for should include such issues as the U.S. commitment to the lifting of sanctions and blockade against the DPRK, the energy assistance of 2,000,000kw through the supply of heavy oil and electricity, etc. The DPRK’s proposal for ‘reward for freeze,’ the first-phase action for a package solution based on the principle of simultaneous actions, is the only way of seeking a step-by-step solution to the nuclear issue as it took into consideration the present conditions in which there is no confidence between the DPRK and the U.S. …The DPRK delegation had exhaustive negotiations with the U.S. side for nearly two and half hours on the sidelines of the talks. …The U.S. side recognized the reward for the freeze and advanced what it called ‘landmark proposal.’ … And it was fortunate that the U.S. did not use the expression of CVID but accepted the principle of ‘words for words’ and ‘action for action’ as proposed by the DPRK. A scrutiny into the U.S. ‘proposal’ suggests that, to our regret, it only mentioned phased demands for disarming the DPRK. Its real intention was to discuss what it would do only when the DPRK has completed the unilateral dismantlement of its nuclear program. A particular mention should be made of the fact that in its proposal the U.S. raised the issue of ‘period of three months’ preparations’ for dismantling the nuclear program but it could not be supported by anyone as it totally lacked scientific and realistic nature.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-Party Talks,” June 28, 2004)

6/24/04:
Moon Chung-in, chair of Presidential Northast Asia Era Committee: “We are planning to build the Northeast Asia Center for Peace and Disarmament as soon as possible, which will produce ideas and policies for institutionalization of a permanent peace regime.” (Yonhap, “Gov’t to Set up Disarmament Center for Regional Peace Regime,” June 24, 2004)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The U.S. made public its plan to cut down part of its troops stationed in south Korea but is massively shipping latest weapons and war means into south Korea under the ‘arms buildup plan’ that calls for spending 11 billion dollars. … This clearly proves that the ‘arms reduction measure’ does not mean any switchover in the U.S. Korea policy but is aimed at retaining a ‘qualitative edge’ to stifle the DPRK by force. … The DPRK … is left with no option but to strengthen the measures to cope with the U.S. ‘qualitative edge.’” (KCNA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman on U.S. ‘Arms Reduction,’” June 24, 2004)

6/?/04:
NSA Rice in Beijing, tells CMC Chmn Jiang Zemin and Pres Hu Jintao “A.Q. Khan was not engaged in academic research” and that “North Korea has a highly enriched uranium program.” (Washington Times, July 14, 2004) (Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation of WMD and Missiles, Congressional Research Service Report, November 15, 2006, p.25)

6/26/04:
Loudspeakers on DMZ dismantled; sign board to be pulled down today. 15,280 South Koreans visited North Korea this year, double the number in 2000. “Ten years ago anyone who went notrth was painted pink. Today, anyone who does not go north isd not a real Korean,” said Kenneth Quinones, director of the Korean Peninsula Program at Action International. “You could call it engagement; you could call it neutrality,” Victor Cha said in Seoul this week. “We don’t know what South Korea’s greand design is.” (James Brooke, “2 Koreas Sidestep U.S. to Forge Pragmatic Links,” New York Times, June 26, 2004, p. A-1)

6/27/04:
Rodong Sinmun signed article gives detailed account of attempts by “U.S. imperialists to mount a nuclear attack on the DPRK during the Korean war.” (KCNA, “Rodong Sinmun on U.S. Attempted Use of Nuclear Weapons during Korean War,” June 27, 2004)

6/28/04:
N-S working-level military talks. (Yonhap, “Two Koreas to Hold Working-Level Military Talks Today,” June 28, 2004)

IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei after meeting with Russian FM Sergei Lavrov” “He is going to North Korea this week. I told him he can tell them I’m ready to come any time and discuss future cooperation.” (Reuters, “ElBaradei Ready to Visit N. Korea for Nuclear Talks,” June 28, 2004)

“We are building energy transmission lines to the North Korean border,” says Sergei Darkin, governor of Pacific Maritime province. If Putin “gives us the task of transmitting energy to North Korea next year, we will be ready to do that.” At a conference in June to discuss energy-sharing, DPRK officials agreed to provide basic data on its electric power system to the Korea Electrotechnology Research Institute, an ROK government body. Russian and Korean energy planners also studying gas pipeline. Selig Harrison says it New York Times, July 4, 2004, p. A-6)

6/29/04:
PM Koizumi in Nihon Keizai Shimbun interview: “If possible, I want to realize the normalization of diplomatic relations within two years.” (Reuters, “Japan PM Wants N. Korea Diplomatic Ties in 2 Years,” June 29, 2004)

Bank of Korea governor meets with North Korean counterpart Kim Wan-soo on the sidelines of Bank of International Settlements annual assembly in Basel last week. (Yonhap, “Top Bankers of Koreas Meet for First Time,” June 29, 2004)

6/30/04:
Kim Dae-jung in meeting with Jiang Zemin, chair of PRC central military commission says, “Even after North Korea’s nuclear issue becomes solved, the six-nation should continue as a permanent cooperative bopdy for the peace of the Koprean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.” (Kang Kap-saeng, “Kim and Jiang Confer on North,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 30, 2004)

Young Koreans see U.S. as “main enemy” by 57.9% in their 20s, 46.8% in their 30s and 36.3% in their 40s. Those over 50 say North Korea by 52.5% in Research & Research and Gallup Korea survey, finds Professor Koh Sang-doo of Yonsei University. (Chosun Ilbo, “For Young Korea, U.S.’Main Enemy,’” June 30, 2004)

PRC Liberation Army newspaper reports China and DPRK singn a border collaboration agreement to ensure border security, “a follow-up to last year’s change of armed police force to the regular army as border guards.” [It calls into question report by Hong Kong newspaper last September that purpose was pressure on North Korea] (Dong-A Ilbo, “North Korea and China Signed a Border Collaboration Agreement,” June 30, 2004)

Aminex PLC, a British oil and gas company, signs deal for oil and gas exploration in DPRK. (Text of press release, September 22, 2004?)

7/1/04:
FM Ban Ki-moon, Paek Nam-sun have one-hour meeting. Ban tells Paek, “I am glad that the foreign ministers of South and North Korea have a chance to meet and discuss ways of cooperating like this after four years since July 2000.” Paek says, “It’s shameful that two people who use the same language and share the same culture had to come to a foreign country to talk to each other.” Ban asks Paek to have one on one with Powell. (Ryu Jin, “Seoul Suggests Direct Diplomatic Channel with NK,” Korea Times, July 1, 2004) Ban suggests establishing a standing diplomatic channel and invites Kim Jong-il to APEC summit in Busan in November 2005. (Chosun Ilbo, “S. Korean Foreign Minister Invites Kim Jong-il to APEC Summit,” July 1, 2004)

In cabinet reshuffle, Chung Dong-young named Unification Minister and Kim Kuen-tae Minister of Health and Welfare. [Consolation prize] (Seo Hyun-jin, “Roh Replaces Three Ministers,” Korea Herald, July 1, 2004)

DPRK economy grew by 1.8% in 2003, compared to 1.2% in 2002, says Bank of Korea. “The economic reforms can be termed relatively successful. The country has manged to face the major challenges and its economy has grown steadily. The energy supply has improved somewhat and efforts have been made to increase production capacity since the implementation of the reforms,” said Park Seom-sam chief economist of the BOK’s North Korean Economic Studies Division.” (Rambabu Garikipati, “N.K. Economy in Better Shape after Reform,” Korea Herald, July 1, 2004)

Mark E. Manyin, “South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations: Cooperation, Friction, and Future Prospects,” CRS Report, July 1, 2004)

Convicted spy Robert Kim returns home after serving seven and a half years for espionage. (Chosun Ilbo, “Biography of Robert Kim Released,” July 23, 2004)

7/2/04:
Powell, acting on his own, arranged a twenty-minute “chance meeting” with FM Paek Nam-sun at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Brunei, the highest-level contact with Pyongyang since the Bush administration took office. (Christopher Marquis, “Powell Meets Foreign Minister of North Korea to Discuss Arms,” New York Times, July 2, 2004, p. A-12) Paek told Powell the DPRK “will not regard the U.S. as a permanent enemy if the U.S. gives up its current ‘hostile policy,’” said DPRK FoMin official Chung Song-il. (Ryu Jin, “US, NK Discuss Nuke Issue,” Korea Times, July 2, 2004) He says Paek told Powell, “If the United States is in a position to improve bilateral relations, the DPRK also will not regard the US as a permanent enemy.” Powell tells press, U.S. is willing to match North “deed for deed,” if North goes first: “As we follow the principle of word for word and deed for deed, we have to see deeds before we are prepared to put something on the table.” (AFP, U.S., N. Korea Inch Closer on Nuclear Standoff As Powell Meets FM,” July 2, 2004) Chung says, “North Korea has no plans to meet Colin Powell for now. But if there is a proposal from the United States to meet with Minister Paek, he will be ready to have a talk.” (Yonhap, “N. Korean Willing to Meet Powell on Sidelines of ASEAN Meeting,” June 30, 2004) Paek began by reading a prepared statement that repeated word for word what Kim Gae-gwan had presented in Beijing. He told Powell, “The [U.S. suspects we would evade dismantlement [of the North’s nuclear program], while we suspect you will attack us if we freeze. If the U.S. takes positive steps to participate in offering rewards, such as supplying energy, lifting sanctions, or taking us off the terrorism list, we will move toward dismantlement. If the U.S. studies our proposal carefully and participates in the rewards, a breakthrough is possible.” Powell replied, “We are studying carefully. My view and the president’s view is that we have made progress buit there is a long way to go. We have no intention to invade or attack and no hostile intent. The U.S. has relations with many countries with whom we have serious differences and with whose ideology we disagree. The U.S. wants to see action.We can enter into a provisional security agreement. A freeze must be linked to dismantlement as well as ultimate removal.” Later Powell told Paek, “Statements that you will test make it more difficult. We need to buld trust and move forward.” Paek replied, “You have convinced me this can be resolved smoothly. If both sides have the attitude of resolving this issue, it can be resolved smoothly. We have never said officially that we would test. We don’t have a uranium enrichment program and we are willing to prove it. If the U.S. renounces its hostile policy, we are willing to clear this issue up.” (Chinoy, Meltdown, pp. 219-20)

Koizumi on normalization on Nippon Television Network: “The sooner the better. It would be good if we can make it within one year.” (Kyodo, “Koizumi to Work towards Normalizing N. Korea Ties in One Year,” July 2, 2004)

7/3/04:
FM Kawaguchi Yoriko meet FM Paek. DPRK official tells press afterward Paek confirmed Charles Jenkins agreed to reunion with his wife Soga Hitomi and family in Jakarta and that North had begun investigation into the whereabouts of ten abductees it had previously said were dead or had not entered the country. (Fukushima Kyoji, “North Takes Lead on Normalizing Ties,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 4, 2004) Washington rebuffs Tokyo’s requests that it not prosecute Jenkins, but Koizumi asks NSA Rice on July 7 to keep discussing the issue. “I undertsand it is a difficult situation,” Koizumi tells reporters. “But given the relationship of trust between the United States and Japan, I think we need to find a path toward a resolution that is satisfying to both parties.” (Mari Yamaguchi, “Former N. Korean Abductee Leaves for Reunion,” Associated Press, July 8, 2004) Soga and Jenkins reunited July 9. Jenkins will visit Japan. “Our current judgement is that Mr. Jenkins’ physical condition is very serious. We will check [it] and provide treatment and surgery as swiftly as possible,” says Chief Cab Secy Hosoda on July 15. “It is possible that we will give him treatment without a final accord [with the U.S.] on the matter. It is … an emergency escape or a life-saving measure.” Jenkins “is classified as a deserter and the U.S. will seek custody as and when he comes to Japan,” says Ambassador Howard Baker on July 15. “Now that leaves several blanks in there. Whether the U.S. will do that, I have no instructions on that.” (Kyodo, “Gov’t to Bring Jenkions, Family to Japan As ‘Emergency’ Step,” July 15, 2004)

7/?/04:
North and Russia held talks in early July to improve Trans-Siberian rail link to Rajin, ROK Unification Ministry official reports. (Park Song-wu, “N.K., Russia Agree to Modernize Rail Link,” Korea Times, October 11, 2004)

KOTRA data shows China now accounts for 18.1 percent of ROK exports and 12.25 percent of imports. (Lee Chang-kyu, “Economic Relations between Korea and China,” KEI External Issues, p. 69)

7/?/04:
Gallucci interview by CFR: “U.S.-China relations are, comparatively, as good as they’ve been in recent memory. I think we should all be happy about that, although I would put a little asterisk there. I have been a little concerned, and I think others have too, aboiut the extent to which the United States has subcontracted a critical security issue in Northeast Asia — North Korea — to the Chinese. This is, for now, diplomatically working out well, but I don’t know if America’s image is as good as it could be when we failed to engage directly and leave the Chinese to take the lead.”

?/?/04:
UnifMin Jeong Se-hyun on “regime transformation”: “I don’t understand why the United States is beginning to say that. If you go from telling someone else, ‘I’m going to kill you,’ to ‘If you become a good guy I might not kill you,’ what will the other guy think …” (Gavan McCormack, “Pyongyang Waiting for the Spring,” February 24, 2005, online)

7/?/04:
U.S. tracks North Korean ship friom Nampo with cargo that includes counterfeit cigarettes. U.S. tells ROK government, which decides not to act, but U.S. Coast Guard contacts ROK Coast Guard, who alerted customs officials. When the ship arrives in Busan, they seize several containers of counterfeit cigarettes. (Chinoy, Meltdown, pp. 220-21)

7/5/04:
In statement released by KCNA, DPRK says it is prepared to repatriate four Japanese Red Army members in 1970 hijacking who sent a letter saying they want to go home. (Andrew Ward and David Ibison, “N. Korea Ready to Hand Back Japanese Terrorists,” Financial Times, July 5, 2004) Song Il-ho, in meeting with lower house member,says North will cooperate in reptriating the four. (Kyodo, “N. Korean Official Receptive to Return of Japanese Hijackers,” July 13, 2004)

Colonel-level N-S talks open. MoD spokesman B-Gen. Nam Dae-yeon urges North to implement tension-reduction agreements along DMZ, NLL. (Yonhap, “Koreas Talk on Hotline Failures,” Korea Times, July 5, 2004)

7/7/04:
Japan has approached DPRK about working-level contacts to resume normalization talks, said a diplomatic source in Seoul. The North hads proposed that the main aganeda be Japan’s pledge to supply 250,000 toins of rice. (Park Shin-hong, “North Korea, Japan Seeking Diplomatic Ties,” JoongAng Ilbo, July 7, 2004)

DefMin Cho Young-kil briefs National Assembly that North Korea is deploying IRBMs with 3-4000 km (1800-2500 mile) range. Sources say it is constructing two bases, one in Yangdok County in South Pyongyang province and the other in Hochon County in North Hamgyong province. (Yoo Yong-won, “N. Korea Has Deployed Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles,” Chosun Ilbo, July 7, 2004; Anthony Faiola, “N. Korea Deploying New Missiles with Longer Range, South Says,” Washington Post, July 9, 2004, p. A-15)

7/9/04:
NSA Rice in meeting with FM Ban Ki-moon quoted as saying “North Korea weill be surprised how much will be possible” if it gives up its nuclear program completely. (Hwang Doo-hyung and Chang Jae-soon, “’So Much Is Possible’ If P’yang Gives up Nuclear Ambitions: Rice,’”Yonhap, July 9, 2004)

NSA Rice in Seoul says U.S. could delay plan to reduce 12,500 troops in South. (Shim Jae-yun, “U.S. May Delay Troop Pullout,” Korea Times, July 9, 2004)

7/10/04:
U.S. senior official: “A guarantee of security to North Korea will become effective after its renouncement of all warheads and long-distance ballistic missiles, Asahi Shimbun reports. (Park Won-jae, “U.S. Asks North Korea to Abandon Ballistic Missiles in Exchange for Guarantee of Security,” Dong-A Ilbo, July 11, 2004)

7/12/04:
LDP loses a seat in upper house elections; DPJ picks up 12. (Anthony Faiola, “Japanese Voters Deal Setback to Ruling Party,’ Washington Post, July 12, 2004, p. A-11)

Dep PermRep Han Song-ryol invw: “Wwe are not interested” in Rice’s offer. “The U.S. offer of ‘nuclear dismantlement first, compensation later’ is not a new issue,” he said. “We have been consistently asking for a simultaneous parallelism.” (Hong Kwon-heui “North Korea ‘Not Interested in Surprising Compensation for Nuclear Dismantlement,” Dong-A Ilbo, July 13, 2004)

Jason Shaplen and James Laney op-ed: Beijing’s role in nuclear talks shows “China’s influence is rapidly rising and America’s is rapidly declining.” While U.S. now acts as counterbaklancer, should not assume regional states cannot cooperate. Northeast Asia security forum building on six-party talks would be appropriate response. (“China Trades Its Way to Power,” New York Times, July 12, 2004, p. A-19)

Senate Intelligence Cmte critique of pre-Iraq intelligence “assumption train” leads to take-it-slow approach to North Korea instead of preemption. “It hurts us, no question,” says a senior aide to Bush. “We already have the Chinese saying to us, ‘If you missed this much in Iraq, how are we supposed to belive the North Koreans are producing nuclear weapons.” (David E. Sanger, “Bush’s Preemptive Strategy Meets Some Untidy Reality,” New York Times, July 12, 2004, p. A-10)

KPA Vice Marshal Kim Il-chol, a member of National Defense Commission, and PLA Col-Gen. Cao Gangchuan, member of the Politburo and chairman of the Central Military Commision, met in Beijing. (KCNA, “Talks between DPRK Minister of PAF and Chinese Minister of Defense,” July 12, 2004)

7/13/04:
Unification Ministry announces 100,000 tons of rice loaned to the North will be delivered overland for the first time. (Yoo Dong-ho, “100,000 Tons of Rice to Be Given to NK,” Korea Times, July 13, 2004)

7/14/04:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The DPRK will dismantle its nuclear weapons program only when conditions for it are created by the U.S. drop of its hostile policy toward the DPRK.

To this end, it wishes to wipe out mistrust and build confidence between the DPRK and the U.S. by implementing the measure of “reward for freeze,” to begin with. The DPRK will naturally return to NPT if the Korean peninsula is denuclearized and those fundamental elements, which compelled the DPRK to pull out of the treaty, are consequently removed. It is the unshakable stand of the DPRK that it can not stop its nuclear activities for a peaceful purpose before this happens. …As already clarified by the DPRK, a freeze is the first phase leading to the final dismantlement of its nuclear program and the freeze is bound to be accompanied by an objective verification. By verification the DPRK means monitoring the state of freeze. The issue of inspection of the nuclear facilities and nuclear substance of the DPRK is something to be discussed only at the phase of dismantling its nuclear program. It is very illogical to argue about inspection from the phase of freeze.” (KCNA, “FM Spokesman on DPRK’s Stand on Nuclear Freeze and Way of Verification,” July 14, 2004)

ROK Navy fires warning shots at DPRK patrol boat that crossed NLL, first crossing since hot line activated. (Chosun Ilbo, Warning Shots Fired at N. Korean Patrol Boat in West Sea,” July 14, 2004) “It is not true that North Korea didn’t respond to our calls,” says B-Gen. Nam Dae-young, MoD spokesman. “We found that the North’s navy had sent radio messages three times stating ‘the approaching ship is not our ship but a Chinese fishing boat.’” Roh instructs DefMin Cho Young-kil to investigate. (Ryu Jin, “Military to Be Probed for Coverup of NK Radio Message,” Korea Times, July 16, 2004) Yoon Kwang-ung, Blue House defense adviser, deplores leak of naval log to imply it trusted North more than ROK navy. (Choi Hoon and Park So-young, “Blue House Angered by Naval Log Leak,” JoongAng Ilbo, July 20, 2004) Lt-Gen. Park Sung-choon fired for omitting radio contact in report on incident and later leaking exchange in which North attempted to mislead South by claiming the intruder was a Chinese fishing boat, not a North Korean patrol boat. (AFP, “South Korea Axes Three-Star General over North Korea Leak,” July 26, 2004) DefMin Cho Young-kil resigns. (Kim Min-seok and Ser Myo-ja, “Defense Chief Resigns; Naval Dispute Goes on,” JoongAng Ilbo, July 27, 2004)

Vice FM Choi Young-jin calls in China’s ambassador, Li Bin, to protest “the distortion of Goguryeo history” by China’s government and press and urged China to “take measures on this matter in good faith so as not to hinder the future of relations.” Chinese scholars who set up a “Northeast Asia Project” in 2002 portrayed it as part of China. Xinhua called it as a “subordinate state that fell under the jurisdiction of Chinese dynasties and was under the great influence of Chinese politics and culture.” The PRC FoMin web site used to read, “The Korean Peninsula before the 1^st century B.C. was ruled by the powers Silla, Baekje and Goguryeo.” The revised version deletes the reference to Goguryeo. (Choi Jie-ho, “Fight over Goguryeo Flares,” JoongAng Ilbo, July 15, 2004)

7/15/04:
Asst SecSt Kelly testifies in SFRC: Lugar opening statement: “I am particularly interested in his [Ashton Carter’s] analysis as whether and how he might apply programs like the Nunn-Lugar Cooperartive Threat Reduction Program to North Korea?” Bidn: “Have you spelled out to the North Koreans just what aspects of a transformed relationship can be expected form each of these steps in addition to the process laid out for disarmament of its nuclear program? In other words, where do diplomatic relationsd, Nunn-Lugar type assistance, trade relations, economic assistance, fit in …”

Carlin: “Footnotes in intelligence community documents are like unpleasant noises at a banquet. As a general rule, they are frowned upon. No one would say so exactly, but everyone knows that taking a footnote—unless it is on a highly technical subject—is a sign of ill breeding. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the Department of State has long been considered particularly ill bred; it takes a lot of footnotes. … Dissenting INR footnotes have often been borne of frustration. No one expected them to change anyone’s mind. They became an effort to speak for the record and, even more important, to preserve some intellectual integrity in the analytical process. That is not always easy to do because of the games that are sometimes played to make a footnote look stupid. Are there instances when the text has been changed after the fact, so that the footnote looks pointless and will have to be removed in a final clearance meeting, not because the point of contention has been resolved, but because the dissent has been out flanked? Could such things happen? Could bears sleep in the woods?” (Robert Carlin, “Told You So: The Life and Times of a Footnote,” unpublished draft)

7/19/04:
New Vice UnifMin Rhee Bong-jo was presidential secy for inter-Korean affairs during 2000 N-S summit. (Yonhap, “North Korea Expert Becomes Vice Unification Minister,” July 19, 2004)

7/20/04:
Dep PermRep Han Sung-ryol says Pyongyang willing to consider U.S. proposal, sees some favorable conditions. Han and Pak Gil-yon attend Korean Peninsula Peace Forum arranged by Korea Society on Capital Hill with Biden, Curt Weldon (R-PA). (Chosun Ilbo, “Pyongyang Seriously Considering U.S. Proposal of Denuclearization,” July 20, 2004)

Under SecSt Bolton in Seoul sees FM Ban but does not talk about PSI, stresses Libya as a model for peaceful resolution, not pressure: “I know both President Roh Moo-hyun and President George W. Buysh are very eager to have a peaceful diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. … The case of Libya has shown concretely the benefits that can flow if North Korean leader Kim Jong-il makes the strategic choice not to invest in WMD.” [Were his talking points cleared by Armitage?] (Ryu Jin, “Bolton Renews Call for Libyan Model for NK Nuke Resolution,” Korea Times, July 20, 2004; Yoo Dong-ho, “Pyongyang Should Leearn Lesson from Libya: Boston,” Korea Times, July 21, 2004)

Kerry staffer interview in July 20 Stars and Stripes: “Senator Kerry opposes withdrawals for now.” (Dong-A Ilbo, “John Kerry to Halt Withdrawal of USFK When Elected,” July 21, 2004)

7/22/04:
At informal summit with Koizumi on Cheju, Roh seeks greater Japanese role in resolving nuclear issue. Koizumi says “If North Korea implements the Pyongyang Declaration in a sincere manner, it [normalization of relations] would be possible within a year.” (Aoki Naoko, “Ties with N. Korea Could Be Normalizaed in One Year: Koizumi,” Kyodo, July 21, 2004) Roh says, “If the North Korean nuclear problem is resolved, we made clear that South Korea and Japan will cooperate” to aid North. (Jack Kim and Masayuki Kitano, “Japan, S. Korea to Aid N. Korea after Nuclear Resolution,” Reuters, July 21, 2004)

House passes North Korea Human Rights Act by voice vote. (Chosun Ilbo, “U.S. House Unanimously Passes North Korea Human Rights Act,” July 22, 2004) It authorizes $2 million for each of next four years for grants to NGOs to promote human rights in North Korea, increases radio broadcast to 12 hours a day, supports humanitarian assistance but only with certification that aid reaches intended beneficiaries, bars USG nonhumantarian assistance without certification of “substantial” human rights progress, full disclosure of all information on Japanese and South Korean abductees, reform of its prison camp system, authorizes $20 million a year for next four years in NGO aid to refugees and migrants, orders facvilitating of asylum for North Korean refugees. (Text)

Li Gun in New York for conference of National Committee on American Foreign Policy expects to meet DeTrani. (Yoo Dong-ho, “NK Negotiator to Visit Washington, Korea Times, July 22, 2004)

Nautilus report: “Options for Rehabilitation of Energy System and Energy Security and Energy Planning in the DPRK”

7/23/04:
Japan to seek interim report on fate of ten abductees — “any movement as soon as possible” — says FM Kawaguchi Yoriko. (Kyodo, “Japan to Urge N. Korea to Present Interim Report on Abductees,” July 23, 2004) Japan proposes five-day working-level beginning August 10. (Kyodo, “Japan, N. Korea Arranging Talks on Abduction Issue in Mid-August,” July 26, 2004)

U.S. will donate 50,000 tons of agricultural commodities to WFP’s 2004 emergency food program for North Korea. (Richard Boucher statement, DoS, July 23, 2004)

7/24/04:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The U.S. ‘landmark proposal’ was nothing but a sham offer. In a word, the U.S. proposal is, in its essence, is a mode of forcing Libya to scrap its nuclear program first, a mode veiled with word ‘landmark.’ The U.S. proposal does not reflect at all the principle of ‘words for words,’ ‘action for action’ which the U.S. had already promised to observe. Moreover, it says nothing of the U.S. commitment to give up its hostile policy toward the DPRK, a stumbling block lying in the way of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, and specific ways to do so. …The goal to denuclearize the Korean peninsula can be achieved only when the U.S. gives up in practice its more than half a century old hostile policy towards the DPRK. In response to the DPRK’s clarification of its goal to denuclearize the peninsula, the U.S. should commit itself to give up its hostile policy towards the former, lift the economic sanctions and blockade against it, delist it as a ‘sponsor of terrorism’ and directly take part in the 2 million kw energy compensation as the first phase measure to fulfill the commitment.

Whether the U.S. takes part in the project to make reward for the DPRK’s nuclear freeze or not is the key to the settlement of the nuclear issue.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Dismisses U.S. Proposal,” July 24, 2004)

7/25/04:
After pulling down the last propaganda billboard on DMZ, the North in last propaganda broadcast says, “We, from one blood and using one language, can no longer live separated. We must ut the earliest possible end to the tragedy of national division.” 216 U.S. troops will soon withdraw from Joint Security Area at Panmunjom and consolidate military installations from 41 to 23. “The South’s new relationsip with the North has change the nature of the South Korean-U.S. alliance, and we are still trying to figure out what the new one will look like,” says Bong Geum-jun, former senior policy adviser in the UnifMin. “The truth is, we have a better relationship with the North and feel less threatened by them. That also means we feel less of a need to rely on the U.S.” (Anthony Faiola, “As Tensions Subside between Two Koreas, U.S. Strives to Adjust,” Washington Post, July 25, 2004, p. A-16)

KCNA: U.S. committed over 1,200 cases of aerial espionage from January to June this year. (KCNA, “Over 1,200 Cases of U.S. Aerial Espionage,” July 25, 2004)

7/26/04:
In 1,100-word letter to U.N. sec-gen Kofi Annan, Col-Gen. Ri Chan-bok, North’s representative at Panmunjom, says, “It is our view that a war in Korea is almost unavoidable as long as the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK goes on.” He adds, “Such a massive arms buildup of the U.S. prompted the KPA side to judge that the U.S. preparations foir a preemptive attack on the DPRK have reached their height.” He adds, “A preemptive attack in such relations of belligerency as those between the two countries cannot be a monopoly of the U.S.” (Reuters, “N. Korea Writes Annan, Demands U.S. Troop Pullout,” July 26, 2004) “If the UN acknowledges itself to be a signatory of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the UN should duly implement Article 60 … and settle the withdrawal of all foreign forces as soon as possible. However, if the UN claims that the US forces used its name only but the actual signatory to the ASrmistice ASgreement was the United States, the UN should take practical actions to dismantle the UN Command established by the United States.” (KCNA, “Full text”)

7/27/04:
230 of 450 [468] North Korean defectors arrive in South Korea [from Vietnam]. (Yoo Dong-ho, “230 NK Defectors Arrive in Seoul,” Korea Times, July 27, 2004) 312 came in 2000, 583 in 2001, 1,139 in 2003, 1,281 in 2003. “Our ministry wants to keep a low-key stance in getting North Korean asylum-seekers to South Korea, considering inter-Korean relations and the next round of six-party nuke talks coming up,” a senior Foreign Minsirty official said, calling it “silent diplomacy.” (Yoo Dong-ho, “Seoul Remains Low Key on NK Defectors,” Korea Times, July 27, 2004) Last month defectors arrived in Seoul only eight days after escaping from the North. (Hwang Yoo-Seong, “Mass Exodus from North Korea,” Dong-A Ilbo, July 28, 2004) Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland denounces it as “the greatest act of hostility intended to crumble the North Korean political system.” (Choi Jie-ho, “North Korea Lashes Seoul over Defectors,” Joong Ang Ilbo, July 29, 2004) DPRK FoMin spoksmn: “We have sufficient material [showing] that Vietnam conspired with the U.S. and South Korean authorities’ enticed kidnapping of our citizens. …We cannot overlook Vietnam’s complicity in this matter.” (Chosun Ilbo, “N. Korea Slams Vietnam for ‘Complicity’ in defections,” August 3, 2004) North Korea cancels ministerial talks scheduled for August 3-6. (Yoo Dong-ho, “Seoul Urges NK to Resume Ministerial Talks,” Korea Times, August 3, 2004) DPRK recalls ambassador to Vietnam. (Andrew Salmon, “North Korea Recalls Ambassador to Protest Handling of Defections,” International Herald Tribune, August 31, 2004)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The bill, setting out the so-called ‘countermeasure,’ went the lengths of mentioning financial and material support to the efforts to topple the DPRK’s system and pressurizing even its surrounding countries to take part in the drive to achieve the aim. …The U.S. regards the nuclear issue and the ‘human rights issue’ as two levers in executing its policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK. It is working hard to ‘change the system’ in the DPRK under the pretext of ‘human rights issue.’…All facts suffice to prove that the U.S. has neither intention to renounce its hostile policy toward the DPRK nor slightest willingness to co-exist with it. Now that the U.S. makes ceaseless political provocations against the DPRK with such bitter antipathy and hostility toward its political system, the DPRK is compelled to ponder over whether there is any need to continue dialogue with the U.S. for the settlement of the nuclear issue at the moment. The reality reinforces our conviction that it is the only way of protecting the sovereignty of the country and defending socialism which guarantees our life to increase its physical deterrent force for self-defence to cope with the U.S. evermore undisguised hostile policy toward it. The DPRK can never overlook the U.S. act of seriously hurting the dignity of the DPRK, a sovereignty state, and interfering in its internal affairs under the pretext of the fictitious ‘human rights issue’ in the wake of its foolish talk about applying the same method to the solution of the nuclear issue as done in Libya.” (KCNA, “DPRK FM Refutes U.S. Accusations against It over ‘Human Rights Issue,’” July 27, 2004)

7/28/04:
Japan is considering a plan to provide 250.000 tons of food aid and $10 million in medicine regardless of abduction issue. (Kyodo, “Japan Mulls Extending Food Aid to N. Korea in August,” July 28, 2004) Japan plans to aid North Korean survivors of Hirshima and Nagasaki bombings. (Japan Times, “Japan Sert to Aid A-Bomb Survivors in North Korea,” July 28, 2004) Cabinet approves aid August 5.

7/29/04:
DeTrani in Beijing to “discuss preparations for the next six-party working-group session,” says DoS spokesman Adam Ereli. China proposes working group for August 11-14 but other prefer August 18-21. (Ryu Jin, “6-Party Working Group Talks Set for Aug. 18-21,” Korea Times, July 29, 2004)

8/2/04:
KCNA: Torrential rains hit North Korea. “At least 100,000 hectares of paddy and non-paddy fields were submerged or washed away and dwelling houses for more than 1,000 families and public buildings destroyed in over 70 cities and counties of South Phyongan, South Hwanghae, Kangwon, Ryanggang and other provinces from July 1 to 25.” (KCNA, “DPRK Hard Hit by Torrential Rain,” August 2, 2004)

Takemi Keizo, LDP chair of Uppper House committee for diplomacy and defense in 2001-02 and leader of bipartisan group calling for new defense policy, in interview: ‘Some say Japan should be like Britian, which almost always goes along with the United States in the arena of intenraitonal politics. …But I think Japan cannot simply copy British diplomacy because Tokyo and Washington may not always share common interests. The Japanese government won’t be able to get the people’s support as long as the country’s interests are different from those of the United States. … Japan should not so easily jump to revise Article 9 of the current Constitution. Pcifism, the backbone of the current Constitution, has wide support among the people and should be respected. … I am concerned that support at the grass-roots level for the current U.S.-Japan alliance has weakened conspicuously while the two countries have lost sight of their strategic goals [Iraq]. If thecredibility of our alliance is undermined, more and mkore Japanese, including left-wingers and liberals as well as young Jpaanese, will advocate Japan’s cutting the alliance with the United States and taking its own approach in international politics. Once that happens, Japan’s possession of nuclear weapons would be in sight. … Whether the United States sides with Japan [over the Senkakus] will be a litmus test of the credibility of the two countries’ alliance.” (Hara Manabu, “A Partnership inReview: Arms Curb, Despite athe Need for Review, the U.S. Alliances Is Vital for a Nuclear-Free Japan as China Rises,” Asahi Shimbun, August 2, 2004)

8/3/04:
NARKN adds another to its list of 32 abductees. Government lists 15. (Japan Times, “Man Missing Since 21976 Possibly Abducted: Group,” August 3, 2004)

Dep FM Lee Soo-hyuck in Washington for two days of consultations, urges U.S. compensation for North disarming. (Reuben Staines, “ROK, US Discuss Reward for NK,” Korea Times, August 4, 2004)

North develops two new missiles, one a land-based road-mobile with a 2-4,000 km range based on R-27 (SS-N-6) SLBM and a sub- or ship-based version. (Janes Defense, “New North Korean Missile Development Threatens the USA,” August 3, 2004) “There is no way this can hit the mainland,” says a U.S. official. (Thom Shanker, “Korean Missile Said to Advance; U.S. Is Unworried,” New York Times, August 5, 2004, p. A-3) Iran is said to be testing the new missiles for the North, says a U.S. official. (Chosun Ilbo, “Iran Tests Missiles for North Korea: U.S. Official,” August 6, 2004)

8/5/04:
US-ROK talks on ROK request to ease restrictions on tech transfer at Gaeseong industrial complex. (Lee Young-jong, “Gaeseong Prompts Tech Transfer Worries,” JoongAng Ilbo, August 5, 2004)

8/6/04:
Christopher R. Hill takes over from Thomas Hubbard as ambassador to ROK. (Korea Herald, “U.S. Amb. Hubbard Leaves Seoul,” August 6, 2004)

“From our point of view, we are ready for any kind of cooperation in any field with North Korea,” Ambassador Uzi Manor said in an interview. “If we get a positive response from them, of course we shall welcome it and we shall try to do our best, the same as we do with other countries.” Israel established relations with South Korea in 1962, but has no formal ties with the North. (Yonhap, “Israweli Envoy Expresses Hope for Diplomatic Ties with North Korea,” August 6, 2004)

8/7/04:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The Japanese government announced on August 3 that it would sponsor a ‘joint naval exercise’ off Tokyo Bay in October according to PSI. …It is clear that the exercise to be staged under the pretext of ‘checking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on the sea’ is a product of the Bush administration’s sinister attempt to escalate its policy to isolate and blockade the DPRK. …It has now become clear that the U.S. seeks to solve the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. by force, not through dialogue and negotiations. This compels the DPRK to take corresponding counter-measures. It cannot but take a serious view of the ‘joint naval exercise’ the Japanese authorities plan to sponsor at the instigation of the U.S. Japan’s behavior diametrically runs counter to the DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration in which both sides committed themselves not to take any action against each other’s security.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK FoMin Blasts ‘Joint Naval exercise’ To Be Hosted by Japan,” August 7, 2004)

8/8/04:
New NIE appears to be written far more cautiously, says it does not know where 8,000 fuel rods are. Samore of IISS says many analysts in the intelligence agencies belive that a “whiff” of nuclear byproduct detected by a U.S. spy plane last year was evidence reprocessing was under way but others note that the experiment was never successfully repeated. “You can’t assume a linear progression,” said one senior U.S. official. “It’s very frustrating,” said one former official who left the administration recently [JP] that it has failed to draw clear red lines. (David E. Sanger, “Diplomacy Fails to Slow Advance of Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, August 8, 2004, p. A-1) “Those who leaked the reports likely want the negotiations to hit an immovable obstacle,” said Peter Hayes. (Reuben Staines, “NK Nuke Talks Stalling ahead of U.S. Elections,” Korea Times, August 11, 2004)

Thai law professor Vitit Muntarbhorn named UN Special Rapporteur for North Korean Human Rights. (Chosun Ilbo, “UN Appoints Human Rights Investigator for North Korea,” August 6, 2004)

8/9/04:
Senior MOFAT official downplays senior Bush administration official’s remark that it would consider “all the tools available” to frustrate the North’s nuclear ambitions. (Ryu Jin, “Seoul Downplays US Rhetofic on NK Nukes,” Korea Times, August 9, 2004)

Li Gun, Han Seong-joo, and Joseph DeTrani meet on margin of NCAFP seminar in New York. Lower-level reps from China and Japan attend the seminar. (Reuben Staines, “Two Korea, US Hold Informal Nuke Talks in NY,” Korea Times, August 10, 2004) Kim Tae-gil, DPRK Institute of Disarmament and Peace, “Regional Security in Northeast Asia,” August 9, 2004, p. 5: “It is essential to change the present armistice system, the constant state of war danger between the DPRK and US, the warring parties into a peace system.” Li Gun: “The U.S. maintains the position of no rewards for freeze because, should the U.S. recognize freeze as an action step, it has to share the burden of taking corresponding measures. …It is only too clear that the situation may go downturn if the U.S. continues to neglect the pragmatic approach in resolving the nuclear issue, but merely … insists on ‘first giving up of nuke.’ …Time is not necessarily working in the U.S. interest. With the passing of time, our internal projects would be continued.” (Li Gun, “Conceptual Points on the Nuclear Issue,” NCAFP, August 9, 2004, pp. 6) U.S. proposes working-level meeting. .” (KCNA, Spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry on Prospect of Six-Party Talks,” August 16, 2004)

8/11-12/04:
Working-level Japan-DPRK talks held in Beijing. North Korea gave Japan a verbal interim report on the abductees. Song Il-ho said on arrival that the investigation is “still going on.” Japanese government sources said it could withhold aid if the North gives insufficient information. (Aoki Naoko, “N. Korea Fails to Give Full Report on 10 Missing Japanese,” Kyodo, August 11, 2004) The report said who was involved in the investigation, ten officials from the police and ten officials from local authorities, and what activities were being undertaken — examination of resident registrations, inspection of related locations and a request for documents from the intelligence agency that carried out the abductions. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “North Korean Inaction Hampers Closer Ties,” September 18, 2004) Saiki Akitaka, dep dir-gen. of MOFA’s Asian and Oceanic Bureau told reporters after the talks, “We are not satisfied with the results of the investigation put forward this time.” Chief Cab Secy Hosoda Hiroyuki said, “There was absoluteluy no progress on concrete details … of their whereabouts … and we can only regard it as insufficient.” The North also indicated it was not opposed to handing over four members of the Japanese Red Army Faction. The other five either died or have already returned home. (Aoki Naoko, “Japan-N. Korea Talks End, Sept. Talks Proposed,” Kyodo, August 12, 2004) Tokyo is wary that further talks might founder on abduction issue. “Now’s not the time to resume bilateral talks for the normalization of diplomatic relations,” said a senior MOFA official. (Miura Makoto, “N. Korea Weighs Opinion in Japan,” Yomiuri Shimbun, August 13, 2004)

8/?/04:
James Schoff, “The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool,” Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis report, August 2004)

8/12/04:
Powell: “They want to believe that if they didn’t have this program, that the United States would not invade them. We’re not going to invade them with this program or without this program. …Now, with respect to North Korean desires, what we have said is that we want to help North Korea but we are not prepared to start putting real benefits on the table in response to a promise to do something. We have seen this kind of tactic with the North Korean negotiators in the past. Now, some of our colleagues in the six-party talks are willing to put forward fuel and maybe other help to the North Koreans. Some of our party — our colleagues are putting forward food now. …This should not be something that is holding up progress. Since other members of the six-party talks have said they would put something up front to assist North Korea with its fuel and energy needs, that should be enough. The United States has said up front as we start down this road we will provide assurances with respect to our lack of a hostile intent and our assertion and statement that we have no plans to invade or attack, and this will all be part of an agreement that we will enter into over time.” (Secretary of State Colin Powell, Roundtable with Japanese Journalists,” August 12, 2004, text)

Goguryeo ancient dynasty controlled upper part of the Korean peninsula and what is now Manchuria from 37 B.C. to 668 A.D. “there seem to be several reasons behind China’s action, but perhaps the mlst important point is that China needs to unify its diverse ethnic groups in preparation for possible changes in Northeast Asia’s security circumstances,” said Lee Myeon-woo of Sejong Institute. “The country is worried that a unified Korea may claim its Manchuria Territory where millions of thnic Koreans reside now. Also, it may be seeking ground to justify its intervention if North Korea collapses or a major change takes place in Northeast Aisa.” (Kim So-young, “News Analysis: Why Hasn’t Korea Gone Hard-Line with China?” Korea Herald, August 13, 2004)

8/14/04:
North and South Korean athletes march together in Athens Olympics opening ceremony. (Yonhap, “Two Koreas Reunited at Olympic Opening Ceremony,” August 14, 2004)

8/16/04:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “As the DPRK has already clarified more than once, the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is the goal the DPRK wants to achieve and its stand to seek a negotiated peaceful solution to the nuclear issue remains unchanged. … The U.S. side clarified its policy stance that there can be no reward for the DPRK’s freeze of its nuclear facilities and is reasserting CVID, reneging on all the agreements and shared understanding reached at the last talks. The U.S. went the lengths of claiming that a military option has not been completely removed from the table, while asserting that the DPRK’s non-existent enriched uranium program and all other nuclear programs should be scrapped and the human rights, missile, conventional armed forces, religious and all other issues should be solved if the DPRK-U.S. relations are to normalize after the settlement of the nuclear issue. The present development stuns and disappoints the DPRK. …Recently the U.S. House of Representatives adopted the ‘bill on human rights in north Korea’ in a bid to provide a financial and material guarantee for the overthrow of the system in the DPRK and force the third country to carry out it. The Bush administration spearheaded the massive abduction of people from the north and is leading the joint naval exercises according to PSI. It is massively shipping into south Korea latest war equipment worth 13 billion dollars under the pretext of “reduction” of the U.S. forces. What is this if it is not a hostile policy? It is clear that there would be nothing to expect even if the DPRK sits at the negotiating table with the U.S. under the present situation. Now that the process of the six-party talks is retracting from the desired direction due to the U.S. attitude and nothing can be expected from the next round of the talks, it is clear such talks for the form’s sake would be helpful to no one. The United States hastily proposed to have a meeting of the working group for the six-party talks in New York when the two sides were having a multilateral exchange of views in New York in the mid-August. This clearly indicates that the U.S. is, in actuality, not interested in making the dialogue fruitful but only seeks to give an impression that it makes efforts to solve the issue.” …A nuclear freeze is possible and it can lead to the dismantlement of the nuclear program only when the situation develops in the direction of the U.S. dropping hostile acts against the DPRK. On the contrary, these acts are escalating. This prevents the DPRK from freezing its nuclear facilities, much less dismantling its nuclear program. As mentioned above, the U.S. has destroyed itself the foundation for the talks, making it impossible for the DPRK to go to the forthcoming meeting of the working group. The U.S. side is spreading a sheer rumor that the DPRK is delaying the talks in anticipation of the results of the U.S. presidential election. This is profound confusing of right and wrong. This rubbish only betrays the utter ignorance of the DPRK. Who will become a next U.S. president is the Americans’ interest. It has nothing to do with the DPRK. …What is urgent at the moment is for the U.S. to clarify its will to participate in the undertaking to make reward and show its willingness to give up in practice its hostile policy towards the DPRK and thus lay down a foundation for negotiations. (KCNA, “Spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry on Prospect of Six-Party Talks,” August 16, 2004)

8/17/04:
Russian media report that next round of six-party talks will begin September 25. (Ryu Jin, “6-Way Nuke Talks to Start Sept. 25,” Korea Times, August 17, 2004)

8/18/04:
President Bush at campaign event in Wisconsin says others in the six-party talks have to say “to the tyrant in North Korea, disarm, disarm.” (White House, President’s Remaks at Ask President Bush Event, August 18, 2004)

PRC FoMin spokesman Kong Quan: “We believe the parties have the willingness to continue to promote the procedure of peaceful talks.” (Hu Xiao, “Nation Calls for Calm to Continue Six-Party Talks,” China Daily, August 19, 2004, p. 1)

8/20/04:
As U.S. pressed to isolate North, Asian and European countries engaged it. U.S. under pressure from others in six-party talks had to make a proposal. “They were drifting away from the U.S.’s line, and the U.S. was becoming isolated,” said Moon Chung-in. “They were fed up with America’s failure to come up with a concrete plan, and the Americans realized it.” Germany led efforts to engage has opened first cultural center in Pyongyang. “We can call this a breakthrough,” said Uwe Schmelter, director of the Goethe Institute in Seoul who negotiated the Goethe Information Center. “For a country that has been labeled as isolated, reclusive and unchanging, a change is a change.” MOFA director of policy planning Moon Ha-yong said, “We hope the [human rights] bill won’t have any bad effect on the Korean peninsula.” Kim Yeon-chul, adviser to the UnifMin, said, “The scope and frequency of our talks have been increasing,” — 38 meetings in 2003 for a total of 106 days. (Norimitsu Onishi, “North Korea Is Reaching Out, And World Is Reaching Back,” New York Times, August 20, 2004, p. A-1)

8/22/04:
Don Gregg, who visited North Korea early this month, says it wants the U.S. to resume providing HFO as a condition for freezing its nuclear weapons program. (Yonhap, “N.K. Demands Heavy Fuel Oil in Return for Nuke Freeze: Ex-Envoy,” August 22, 2004)

8/23/04:
South Korea tells IAEA scientists produced a small amount of near-weapons grade HEU. “It became clear to the South Koreans that there would environmental samples taken and the truth would be discovered,” said a diplomat with knowledge of the disclosure. “So they decided they better disclose it first themselves.” (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “South Koreans Say Secret Work Refined Uranium,” September 3, 2004, New York Times, p. A-1) Chang In-soon, president of Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute, says in invw, laser experiment “purely scientific in nature” tried around three times producing about 0.2 grams with average level of 10 percent enrichment. (Kyodo, “S. Korea Uranium Enrichment Experiment Conducted 3 Times,” September 4, 2004) “We don’t think it was a government policy to develop nuclear arms,” Chief Cab Secy Hosoda Hiroyuki said. “But this suggests that what should have been under tight control of the IAEA was actually not.” (James Brooke, “South Koreans Repeat: We Have No Atomic Bomb Program,” New York Times, September 4, 2004, p. A-3) “It will be difficult to prevent the spreading of an arms race in the region sue to the South’s nuclear experiment,” said Dep PermRep Han Song-ryol. (Yonhap, “NK to Take Issue with SK Uranium Enrichment,” September 8, 2004) On August 19 Cho Chang-beom, ROK amb to IAEA, told U.S. officials it had filed report with IAEA about uranium laser separation but asked them “to help keep the information secret.” The U.S. urged him to disclose the information because it would “for sure be leaked” to the press by IAEA officials. The ROK said it had told IAEA inspectors in the past and the IAEA was interviewing past and present staff to check. The ROK tried to stop the IAEA from reporting it to the Board of Governors, even vaguely threatening to set back El Baradei’s quest for a third term. Once it was clear it would be reported to the Board, Western diplomats said, the ROK urged that the IAEA report only the separation and delay reporting uranium metal conversion or plutonium reprocessing in a hot cell 22 years ago. (Mark Hibbs, “ROK Claimed IAEA Knew of U Work, Pressed for No IAEA Board Report,” Nucleonics Week, September 30, 2004, pp. 1, 7-8, 14-15)

DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Bush during his recent election campaign in Wisconsin state [August 18] again let loose such outbursts as hurling malignant slanders and calumnies at the supreme headquarters of the DPRK. He asserted that it is necessary for the U.S., China, Japan, south Korea and Russia to unite and they are urging ‘the tyrant’ to disarm himself. This can not be construed as remarks made by a politician with sound reason and sensibility to reality but as a base tongue-lashing that can be made only by the stupid. …This clearly proves that the DPRK was quite right when it commented that he is a political imbecile bereft of even elementary morality as a human being and a bad guy, much less being a politician. …The Bush group has betrayed its true colors once again though it is directly responsible for properly laying a foundation for the talks. This made it quite impossible for the DPRK to go to the talks and deprived it of any elementary justification to sit at the negotiating table with the U.S. The reality today substantially convinces the army and people of the DPRK that the Songun policy of the Workers’ Party of Korea is entirely just and heightens their faith and confidence in it.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts Bush’s Reckless Remarks,” August 23, 2004)

8/24/04:
KCNA: “Bush is, in fact, a thrice-cursed fascist tyrant and man-killer as he revived the fascist war doctrine which had been judged by humankind long ago and is now bringing dark clouds of a new Cold War to hang over our planet and indiscriminately massacring innocent civilians after igniting the Afghan and Iraqi wars. It is the greatest tragedy for the U.S. that Bush, a political idiot and human trash, still remains in the presidential office of the world’s only ‘superpower,’ styling himself ‘an emperor of the world.’ In a word, his vituperation discloses his cunning political ploy to mislead the world public opinion and bring down the inviolable political system of the DPRK, come what may. … Bush’s open brigandish demand that the DPRK disarm itself simply reveals the true intention of the U.S. to settle the DPRK-U.S. nuclear issue by bringing down the former’s system, not through dialogue. The U.S. is staging even ‘Ulji Focus Lens-04’ joint military exercise aimed to unleash a war against the DPRK after massively shipping up-to-date war equipment into south Korea, blustering that a military option has not been completely removed from the table. This clearly indicates that the U.S. option is not dialogue but showdown. Now that the U.S. has clearly revealed its true intention, the DPRK can no longer pin any hope on the six-party talks and there is a question as to whether there is any need for it to negotiate with the U. S. any more. …It is the DPRK’s firm resolution and conviction in sure victory to react to confrontation with confrontation and return a preemptive attack with a preemptive strike.” (KCNA Terms Bush Fascist Tyrant,” August 24, 2004)

8/26/04:
Bush invw says he won’t “tolerate” nuclear weapons in North Korea or Iran but declined to say what he meant by “tolerate.” He gave no hint that his patience was limited or that he might try preemption. “I don’t think you give timelines to dictators.” He endorsed diplomacy: “I’m confident that over time this will work — I certainly hope it does.” Kerry invw argued that North Korea “was a far more compelling threat in many ways, and it belongs at the top of the agenda.” (David E. Sanger and Elisabeth Bumiller, “Bush Dismisses Idea That Kerry Lied on Vietnam,” New York Times, August 27, 2004, p. A-1)

Paul Kerr invw with admin official: “We won’t do HFO b/c it’s a vestige of the AF that sits badly with Congress. It’s too much trouble to get support from congress. Avoiding this gives us (exec branch) more control over the process.NK doesn’t care if we do HFO or not, it’s been put forward as an attempt to not respond to the June offer. They know we’ll do future energy assistance. …We have a plan on verification that’s been blessed at the principals’ level. We’re discussing how it would work with others Russia and Japan have best expertise on this. We’re not ready to roll it out yet. Need to get to the fine print. …We have written drafts on them [security assurances]. Conditions are that it not be a treaty, and it not interfere with SK and Japan alliances and it be multilateral not bilateral. We’re willing to discuss it within those parameters. The agreement should anticipate a future agreement to replace the armistice (but not be legally binding).”

8/27/04:
Ebihara Shin, dir-gen of MOFA North American Affairs Bureau, and Iihara Kazuki, dir-gen of Defense Agency’s Defense Policy Bureau in Washington, tell dep undsec def Richard Lawless of “difficulties” in relocating Ist Corps command to Camp Zama, citing possible redeployment of troops out of area despite Article VI of the Japan-US Security Treaty restricting use of facilities “for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Talks on Relaignment of U.S. Forces Bog Down,” December 21, 2004)

WikiLeaks cable: Friday, 27 August 2004, 08:08

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001100

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 08/26/2014

TAGS PARM, PINR, PREL, KNNP, BM, KN

SUBJECT: ALLEGED NORTH KOREAN INVOLVEMENT IN MISSILE