DPRK (NORTH KOREA) CHRONOLOGY FOR 2019
Compiled by
Leon V. Sigal
Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project
Contact:
1/1/19:
Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s leader, said today that he was willing to have a second summit meeting with President Trump, but he paired the offer with a threat that if international sanctions against his country were not lifted, the North would “have no choice” but to return to nuclear confrontation. “I am willing to meet the United States president at any time for the betterment of our international community,” Kim said in his New Year’s Day speech, broadcast on North Korea’s state-run television. “However, if the United States does not keep its promise in our international community and misinterprets our patience and intention and continues with the sanctions, then we have no choice for the sake of our national interest and peace of the Korean Peninsula but to come up with new initiatives and new measures.” Wearing a suit and tie and sitting in an overstuffed leather armchair in a book-lined room, Kim offered a largely motivational speech about the need to strengthen the North Korean economy. But he took the opportunity to reiterate a demand that South Korea cease all military drills with “other foreign sources.” “Those should be completely stopped,” Kim said. “That is our stance.” Kim said the country would not be willing to take further steps toward removing its nuclear weapons unless the United States reciprocated. “The statements and agreements after the summit with the United States were that we are going toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and that is my resolute commitment,” he said. “We will not make nuclear weapons and we will not proliferate nuclear weapons, and I have said this, and I will say this again now. If the United States can show corresponding measures, the relationship between the two countries will, through many processes, accelerate for the better. But if the counterpart continues with its past habits, it won’t be good, but I hope they stop this.” Kim also indicated that the North wanted a peace declaration formally ending the Korean War. In declaring that he would not make nuclear weapons, Kim was going further than anything he said at his summit meeting with Trump in Singapore in June. North Korea made no explicit promise to “freeze” its program, and American intelligence officials have said that they believe North Korea has continued to produce the fuel for nuclear weapons — and likely the weapons themselves. The distinction is a relatively minor one, because once the fuel is produced, fashioning it into weapons is no longer much of a challenge, as the North has proved through a series of nuclear tests that ended 13 months ago. Kim’s demand that the United States begin to lift sanctions before North Korea takes any steps toward dismantling its nuclear infrastructure is essentially a return to the state of affairs when Trump took office early in 2017. Trump entered the White House vowing he would not repeat the mistakes of his predecessors, who lifted some sanctions. Trump and his aides said the North would have to dismantle everything first and trust that sanctions would be lifted later. Since the Singapore meeting, Trump has occasionally seemed to waver on the question of lifting some sanctions before the North dismantles its facilities and gives up its weapons and missiles. Now, with Kim’s demand, he must decide whether to back down — and take steps similar to those of his predecessors. Analysts noted that Kim did not specify what exactly he wanted the Trump administration to do but was suggesting that removing some sanctions and moving toward a formal peace declaration to end the Korean War might prod the North to take certain steps toward denuclearization. “Previous public and private comments from Kim and other North Korean officials suggest they would be willing to decommission the Yongbyon nuclear complex under expert supervision,” said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, referring to a plutonium reactor, spent fuel reprocessing facility and uranium enrichment plant. Kim’s remarks followed a recent escalation of rhetoric from the North suggesting that he was losing patience with the diplomatic stalemate and the sanctions that have remained in place since his meeting with Trump in Singapore. This month, the North Korean Foreign Ministry warned that the United States’ continued hardline sanctions policy might “block” any chance of denuclearizing the country. A few days later, the North said through its official news agency that it would not dismantle its nuclear weapons program until the United States agreed to shrink its military presence on and near the Korean Peninsula. North Korea is “very good at playing hard to get. They are always saying, ‘We could go back to our old ways,’” said Lee Sung-yoon, a professor of Korean studies at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. Lee, who said Kim had shrewdly tempered his rhetoric, said he did not believe the North Korean leader intended to abandon his nuclear weapons program. “He came across as more peace-prone, reform-minded and denuclearization-prone, which I think is a ruse,” Lee said. “A nation doesn’t spend 50 years in building the bomb and just give it up for the empty privilege of shaking hands with the U.S. president. But it’s in his interest to play this game for the time being.” In his New Year’s speech, Kim praised the progress toward further cooperation that the two Koreas had made over the previous year. “North and South Koreans have to continue resolving our tensions in the skies, waters and land in and surrounding the peninsula, through carrying out practical measures based on already agreed upon inter-Korean agreements,” he said. He also suggested that South Koreans who once worked at the Kaesong industrial complex, which was run jointly by North and South Korea and shut down in 2016, should be allowed to return. The North, he suggested, would accommodate them unconditionally. “We should all be proud that we are moving together, North and South, as Koreans,” he said. “We should expand our inter-Korean cooperation so that we can actually see changes.” Over the weekend, Kim sent a rare personal letter to the South Korean leader, Moon Jae-in, saying he hoped to visit Seoul in the new year. Analysts expect he may also try to meet China’s president, Xi Jinping, and Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin. One of the distinguishing factors of this year’s speech was its more casual delivery. By giving the speech live and in what appeared to be his library, Kim projected a more relaxed demeanor that was largely intended for his domestic audience. Kim’s “presentation to his own people was a leader who’s authoritative and decisive, but also very comfortable and familiar,” said Jean H. Lee, a former Associated Press bureau chief in Pyongyang who is now a global fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington. (Motoko Rich and David E. Sanger, “North Korean Leader Warns U.S. to Drop Sanctions, or Relations ‘Won’t Be Good,’” New York Times, January 1, 2019, p. A-6)
Full text of the New Year Address made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un on January 1, 2019: “ … The year 2018 was a historic year, in which remarkable changes took place in the internal and external situations and our socialist construction entered a new stage thanks to our Party’s line of independence and strategic decision. The Third Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Party Central Committee held in April last year constituted an occasion of pivotal significance in developing our revolution onto a new stage and continuing to speed up the advance of socialism on the basis of the great victory of the line of promoting the two fronts simultaneously. … Thanks to our proactive and positive efforts, a peace-oriented current was created on the Korean peninsula and the international prestige of our Republic continued to be raised, and in the midst of this we celebrated the 70th anniversary of the founding of the glorious DPRK in splendor with great dignity and self-confidence. … The munitions industry, in hearty response to our Party’s militant call for concentrating all efforts on economic construction, produced a variety of farm machinery, construction equipment, cooperative products and consumer goods, thereby giving an impetus to economic development and the improvement of the people’s living standards. … True to the decision of the April Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee on bringing about a revolutionary turn in science and education, the sector of science and technology presented valuable research findings conducive to accelerating the growth of hi-tech industries and revitalizing the national economy; the efforts to make education modern and scientific gained momentum, the teaching conditions and environment being updated at many universities, colleges, middle and primary schools across the country. … Every sector in the national economy should give impetus to hitting the targets of the five-year strategy for national economic development. We should direct primary efforts to relieving the shortage of electricity to make a breakthrough in revitalizing the national economy. One of the most important and pressing tasks in socialist economic construction for this year is to radically increase the production of electricity. By focusing state investment on the electric-power industry to maintain and reinforce its existing foundation and making maximum and effective use of it to renovate and modernize one by one badly needed sectors and projects, we can, for the present, raise power generation to the peak year level. We should take the problem of easing the strain on electricity as an undertaking of the whole state, step up the construction of hydroelectric power stations including Orangchon and Tanchon power stations and create a capacity for generating tidal, wind and atomic power under a far-reaching plan. Provinces, cities and counties should develop and utilize in an effective way various energy sources available in their local areas. … Improving the people’s standard of living radically is a matter of greatest importance for our Party and state. … Last year was a stirring year which witnessed a dramatic change unprecedented in the history of national division spanning over 70 years. With a determination to usher in an era of national reconciliation, peace and prosperity by putting an end to the abnormal state on the Korean peninsula which had suffered a constant war crisis, we took proactive and bold measures to effect a great turn in north-south relations from the outset of last year. It is unprecedented that three rounds of inter-Korean summit meetings and talks were held in a year amid great expectations and interest of peoples at home and abroad, and this clearly showed that north-south relations entered a completely new stage. The Panmunjom Declaration, the September Pyongyang Joint Declaration and the north-south agreement in the military field, which were adopted by reflecting the firm resolve and will to usher in an era of peace in which war exists no longer on the Korean peninsula, are of great significance as a virtual nonaggression declaration in which north and south have committed themselves to terminating fratricidal war based on force of arms. While sportspersons of north and south displayed the wisdom and strength of the nation by jointly entering international competitions, artistes came and went to Pyongyang and Seoul to fire the enthusiasm for national reconciliation and reunification. We took the significant first step towards common prosperity of the nation by promoting cooperation projects in various fields including railways, road, forestry and public health while resolutely overcoming manifold obstacles and difficulties. The surprising changes which took place in inter-Korean relations last year convinced all the fellow countrymen that when they join minds and efforts, they can turn the Korean peninsula into the true home of the nation, which is the most peaceful and will prosper forever. Though it was the initial step, north and south pooled intentions and wisdom to surely reverse inter-Korean relations in the utmost extremes of distrust and confrontation to those of trust and reconciliation and make in a short time eye-opening achievements which were unimaginable in the past. I am very satisfied with that. In the New Year 2019 we should make greater strides in our efforts to boost inter-Korean relations, achieve peace and prosperity and reunify the country on the basis of the priceless achievements we made last year which was wonderfully adorned with unprecedented events. All the nationals should hold high the slogan “Let us usher in a heyday of peace, prosperity and reunification of the Korean peninsula by thoroughly implementing the historic north-south declarations!” It is our steadfast will to eradicate military hostility between north and south and make the Korean peninsula a durable and lasting peace zone. North and south, as they agreed, should take practical measures proactively to remove military hostility on the whole of the Korean peninsula, including the ground, airspace and sea, as a follow-up to its ending in the areas of confrontation. Given that north and south committed themselves to advancing along the road of peace and prosperity, we maintain that the joint military exercises with foreign forces, which constitute the source of aggravating the situation on the Korean peninsula, should no longer be permitted and the introduction of war equipment including strategic assets from outside should completely be suspended. It is also needed to actively promote multi-party negotiations for replacing the current ceasefire on the Korean peninsula with a peace mechanism in close contact with the signatories to the armistice agreement so as to lay a lasting and substantial peace-keeping foundation. All the fellow countrymen should unite as one, being conscious that the master of peace on the peninsula is our nation, in order to wage a powerful struggle to check and frustrate all the moves that wreck peace and incite military tension on this land. Inter-Korean cooperation and exchanges should be expanded and developed in an all-round way so that national reconciliation and unity can be consolidated and all the fellow countrymen can practically benefit from improved north-south relations. For the present, we are willing to resume the Kaesong Industrial Park and Mt Kumgang tourism without any precondition and in return for nothing, in consideration of the hard conditions of businesspersons of the south side who had advanced into the Kaesong Industrial Park and the desire of southern compatriots who are eager to visit the nation’s celebrated mountain. When north and south join hands firmly and rely on the united strength of the fellow countrymen, no external sanctions and pressure, challenges and trials will be able to hinder us in our efforts to open a broad avenue to national prosperity. We will never tolerate the interference and intervention of outside forces who stand in the way of national reconciliation, unity and reunification with the design to subordinate inter-Korean relations to their tastes and interests. North and south should not pass up the favorable atmosphere of today when all the nationals’ interest in and aspiration for reunification are growing unprecedentedly, but actively try to find a peaceful reunification plan based on nationwide agreement and direct sincere efforts to this end. All the fellow countrymen in north, south and abroad should further accelerate in high spirits the nationwide advance for implementing the north-south declarations, and thus glorify this year as a historic one when another radical change is brought about in the development of inter-Korean relations and implementation of the cause of national reunification. Comrades, Last year, our Party and the government of our Republic exerted responsible efforts to safeguard the peace and security of the world and expand and strengthen friendship with different countries. The three rounds of our visit to the People’s Republic of China and the Cuban delegation’s visit to our country were remarkable events in boosting strategic communication and traditional ties of friendship and cooperation among the socialist countries. Last year, frequent visits and exchanges were made on Party, state and government levels between the DPRK and many countries of the world, with the result that they deepened mutual understanding and confirmed the stand and will to promote sound development of the international community. The historic, first-ever DPRK-US summit meeting and talks brought about a dramatic turn in the bilateral relationship which was the most hostile on the earth and made a great contribution to ensuring peace and security of the Korean peninsula and the region. It is the invariable stand of our Party and the government of our Republic and my firm will to establish a new bilateral relationship that meets the demand of the new era as clarified in the June 12 DPRK-US Joint Statement, build a lasting and durable peace regime and advance towards complete denuclearization. Accordingly, we declared at home and abroad that we would neither make and test nuclear weapons any longer nor use and proliferate them, and we have taken various practical measures. If the US responds to our proactive, prior efforts with trustworthy measures and corresponding practical actions, bilateral relations will develop wonderfully at a fast pace through the process of taking more definite and epochal measures. We have no intention to be obsessed with and keep up the unsavory past relationship between the two countries, but are ready to fix it as early as possible and work to forge a new relationship in line with the aspirations of the two peoples and the requirements of the developing times. As evidenced by the reality of north-south relations that made rapid progress last year, nothing is impossible to a willing heart, and dialogue partners will reach the destinations that are beneficial to each other without fail if they put forward fair proposals on the principle of recognizing and respecting each other by abandoning their dogged insistence broadmindedly and conduct negotiations with a proper stand and the will to settle issues. I want to believe that our relations with the United States will bear good fruit this year, as inter-Korean relations have greeted a great turn, by the efforts of the two sides. I am of the opinion that, while meeting and holding talks beneficial to both sides with the US president in June last year, we exchanged constructive views and reached a consensus of understanding for a shortcut to removing each other’s apprehensions and resolving the entangled problems. I am ready to meet the US president again anytime, and will make efforts to obtain without fail results which can be welcomed by the international community. But if the United States does not keep the promise it made in the eyes of the world, and out of miscalculation of our people’s patience, it attempts to unilaterally enforce something upon us and persists in imposing sanctions and pressure against our Republic, we may be compelled to find a new way for defending the sovereignty of the country and the supreme interests of the state and for achieving peace and stability of the Korean peninsula. The stabilized situation on the Korean peninsula and in the region is never something that has been created with ease, and the countries that are truly desirous of peace have the common responsibility for setting great store by the current situation. The neighboring countries and international community have to support our sincere stand and efforts for promoting the positive development of the situation on the Korean peninsula and fight against all practices and challenges that wreck peace and run counter to justice. Our Party and the government of our Republic will continue to bolster up unity and cooperation with the socialist countries and develop relations with all countries that are friendly to us under the ideals of independence, peace and friendship. … This year, too, we will face constant obstacles and challenges in our progress, but no one can change our determination and will and stop our vigorous advance and our people will successfully achieve their beautiful ideals and goals without fail. Let us all work energetically and with one mind and will for the prosperity and development of the genuine people’s country, the socialist motherland.” (KCNA, “New Year Address of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un,’ January 1, 2019)
1/2/19:
Future denuclearization talks should pay attention to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s comments on the possible development of nuclear energy to tackle the country’s electricity shortage, according to Unification Minister Cho Myoung-gyon. In a television show tonight, Cho said the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was guaranteed in exchange for the development of a resolution of the nuclear weapon issue in the agreement of the six-party talks, in which South Korea, the United States, China, Russia and Japan participated in 2005. “Our basic stance is that North Korea’s nuclear power development for peaceful use should be discussed after the North’s denuclearization,” he said. His remarks came after the North Korean leader hinted at using nuclear power as part of the country’s plans to increase electricity supply during his New Year’s speech. “We should take the problem of easing the strain on electricity as an undertaking of the whole state, step up the construction of hydroelectric power stations, including Orangchon and Tanchon power stations, and create a capacity for generating tidal, wind and atomic power under a far-reaching plan,” he said. His comment has prompted speculations that the North could refuse to demolish uranium-enrichment facilities in order to supply fuel for a light-water reactor at Yongbyon in negotiation with the US President Donald Trump. In the speech, Kim reiterated his determination to achieve complete denuclearization while calling on his country to seek economic development and modernize its defense industry. “The potential nuclear power capability could be discussed with progress on denuclearization in the future through talks such as negotiations between the North and the US,” a Unification Ministry spokesperson said today. “For the time being, we should focus on making efforts for the joint goal of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” (Park Han-na, “Unification Minister: N.K.’s Nuclear Energy Development Could Be Discussed in Denuclearization Process,” Korea Herald, January 2, 2019)
President Donald Trump said that he is ready to help North Korea reach its “tremendous economic potential” after revealing today at the White House that he received a letter from the North’s leader Kim Jong-un. “I just got a great letter from Kim Jong-un,” Trump told reporters at his first Cabinet meeting of the new year. He displayed what appeared to be a three-page letter without elaborating its content, which he said he has shown to only a “few people.” In his New Year’s address Tuesday, Kim said he is ready to meet with Trump again “anytime.” Kim reiterated his commitment to “complete denuclearization” and pledged that North Korea will not make, test, use or proliferate nuclear weapons. “We had our meeting six months [ago] in Singapore,” said Trump, recalling his first summit with Kim on June 12. “We’ll probably now have another meeting. He’d like to meet, I’d like to meet.” “I look forward to our meeting with Chairman Kim,” said Trump. “We’ll be setting it up in the not-too-distant future.” Trump did not elaborate on how the letter from Kim was conveyed to the White House. “They’ve never written letters like that,” Trump said. “We’ve made a lot of progress with North Korea and Kim Jong-un.” While denuclearization talks have been at a deadlock, there has been continued communication behind-the-scenes between the United States and North Korea. Trump said that he and Kim have “established a very good relationship.” Trump also appeared to acknowledge Kim’s ambition for the economic development of his country, a key policy the North Korean leader prioritized in his New Year’s address. The North’s economic development is currently being hindered by the international sanctions campaign against it. In his speech, Kim also warned against continued strong U.S. sanctions on his country, as Washington is maintaining its strong economic pressure on Pyongyang. “We have somebody that I really think wants to get on to economic development and making a lot of success and money, frankly, for his country,” Trump said on Kim. “North Korea has tremendous potential, and we’ll help them out too.” During the Cabinet meeting, Trump had a poster on his desk that featured a photo of himself that read: “Sanctions are coming,” apparently a reference to the HBO television show “Game of Thrones.” The poster previously appeared last year when the administration planned to re-impose sanctions on Iran after Washington withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran. Trump further added that he is not looking for “speed” in nuclear negotiations, words that could help assure Pyongyang. Officials in his administration initially floating the notion that North Korea’s denuclearization should occur by the end of Trump’s first presidential term early next year. “I’m not in any rush,” said Trump. “All I know is there’s no rockets, there’s no testing.” He pointed out that the alternative to the current denuclearization talks led by his administration and the North could have been a “nice big fat war in Asia.” “That could have been a World War III, to be honest with you,” Trump said. “A lot of people would have to get involved in that all over Asia, then it spreads beyond Asia.” In a turnaround from a year ago, when Trump threatened nuclear war with North Korea, he said that, “Instead of that, we’re getting along fine.” For a second Trump and Kim summit to proceed smoothly, diplomatic observers have pointed out that North Korea and the United States still have to reach a compromise. Pyongyang is calling for sanctions relief and economic support in return for its steps toward denuclearization. Even while pointing out that “a deal’s a deal,” Trump said. “They really want to do something.” Trump mentioned PBS NewsHour’s coverage of Kim’s speech in a Twitter post on Tuesday. “I was watching PBS, and they really covered it accurately,” said Trump. “They said that in Chairman Kim’s speech, he really wants to get together, he wants to denuclearize and a lot of good things are happening.” Kim Eui-kyeom, South Korea’s Blue House spokesman, said in a briefing Thursday that, “We look forward to Chairman Kim Jong-un’s letter playing a positive role in enabling the complete denuclearization and the establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.” (Sarah Kim, “Trump Gushes over Kim’s Letter to Him,” JoongAng Ilbo, January 3, 2019)
Ruediger Frank: “ … The very first sentence in the actual text already points at what is perhaps the most important message of the whole speech. Kim uses the formulation “undeletable deep historical footprint. In other words, Kim regards the achievements of 2018 as irreversible, no matter what the enemy—namely, the US and conservative forces in South Korea—will do. If we look at this together with the key sentence in the whole speech—the warning that “we even might find ourselves in a situation where we have no other choice but to find a new way) for defending the sovereignty of the country and the supreme interests of the state and for achieving peace and stability of the Korean peninsula,” we see an almost exuberant confidence. It is tempting to interpret this “new way” as being a thinly veiled threat of more nuclear tests, or as a reminder that North Korea in late 2017 claimed to have achieved the status of a nuclear power that can reach US territory with nuclear-armed ICBMs. However, none of this is “new.” Rather, Kim’s confidence stems from the expectation of growing and reliable support by China. The three summits with Xi Jinping in 2018 seem to have made Kim Jong Un very optimistic. The ongoing trade war between Beijing and Washington, including the arrest of a top manager of Chinese telecom giant Huawei in Canada, creates the impression among strategists in Pyongyang of a Cold War 2.0 situation. Like in the decades before the collapse of the Soviet Union, supporting smaller allies could again become a matter of principle for the Big Powers even if these allies step out of line occasionally. The not unfounded hope of Kim Jong Un is that in such a strategic setting, China would be willing to provide protection and economic support while abstaining from too massive direct interference. Forcing the US out of Korea, and out of East Asia, is more important to Beijing than reigning in on a self-confident or even provocative North Korea. I thus interpret Kim’s threat of “finding a new way” not as a hint at more nuclear tests, but rather as a message to Donald Trump: You are not our only option for security and economic development. If you refuse to be cooperative, we will ignore you and turn to China. Oh, and we will take South Korea along. It remains to be seen how realistic such a threat is, as it always takes two to tango. It is not at all certain that China would indeed provide full support to such an unreliable and difficult ally as North Korea. Furthermore, Pyongyang would not feel very comfortable with expanding its already overwhelming dependency on China. But the North Koreans have in the past been masters of tactical flexibility and used even the slightest weakness of their opponents—in other words, everybody else—to their advantage. In his 2019 New Year’s address, by pointing at “finding a new way,” Kim Jong Un has thus threatened to start a new round of the old balancing game that Kim Il Sung had played with Beijing and Moscow in the 1950s during the Cold War. Even if his demands are not fulfilled, Kim Jong Un will not give up on cooperation with Washington permanently, because it can be nicely used as a tool to extract concessions from China. He might hope to be able to do the same with Donald Trump, just the other way around. And in case the two Big Powers refuse to play, he can, unlike the situation in the 1950s, use his nuclear threat to force them to pay attention. South Korea must be careful not to become a pawn in this game.” (Ruediger Frank, “Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Day Speech: Dropping a Strategic Bombshell,” 38 North, January 2, 2019)
1/3/19:
Pompeo: “Q: We’re talking about Central America, but you’ve had a pretty busy year. We have the talks with North Korea, talk about denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We have issues now with China. We also have issues with the Middle East, new alliances, opportunities hopefully emerging, certainly with Israel, with the Iranian deal being drawn back. Where do you see on the world stage, where is America different now? Because I don’t think the President gets a lot of credit for a lot of progress around the world. POMPEO: Oh, Sean, we have made fundamental changes in American foreign policy that enormously benefit the American people. I could tick through the same list of places that you spoke about. The previous administration had decided that the world’s largest state sponsor of terror was the partner in the Middle East, Iran. We have fundamentally flipped that. We know that that is a real threat to the world and to America, and so we have developed relationships with Arab countries and Israel. We’ve brought them together to develop a coalition to keep Americans safe from things going on in the Middle East. You spoke first, I think, about North Korea. Lots of work that is left to be done, but I am confident that in the next short period of time President Trump and Chairman Kim will get the chance to meet again and truly create a much better, safer America with less threat of not only nuclear weapons being launched at us but nuclear proliferation as well. These are real risks and real changes from the previous administration’s policies. Q: All right, let’s talk specifically about North Korea. So the President has been hinting and saying that there’s going to be another meeting with Kim Jong-un. Will that be about and will there be the potential at that meeting of the denuclearization of the entire peninsula? Obviously, missiles aren’t being fired, remains have been sent back, hostages have been released, so a lot of progress. Is this where you might close that deal? POMPEO: Sean, I’d be surprised if we get all the way home in this meeting, although it would be fantastic if we did. I don’t want to tell you exactly what our negotiating strategy is, but suffice it to say I think we have set the conditions where we can make real progress when Chairman Kim and President Trump meet and take down the threat to the United States and to the world that has been, frankly, holding America hostage for so long in North Korea. It’ll be good for South Korea. It’ll be good for Japan. It’ll be good for all of the world.” (DoS Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Interview with Sean Hannity on Hannity, Fox News, January 3, 2019)
1/5/19:
A security policy advisor to South Korean President Moon Jae-in said that “bold” action by North Korea and partial U.S. sanctions relief could help address a perceived deadlock in negotiations over Pyongyang’s denuclearization. Moon Chung-in, a Yonsei University professor, made the remarks as Seoul seeks to advance its peace initiative by creating fresh momentum for the apparently stalled dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang. “A breakthrough may emerge should the North take bold action and the U.S. partially lift sanctions at the same time,” Moon said during an internet broadcast. “But it is not easy to demand that one of them give ground first,” he added. Moon also pointed out the need for the U.S. and North Korea to “take action rather than just exchanging verbal pledges” to make progress in their peace efforts. Touching on the rumors that the North Korean leader has delayed his plan to visit Seoul due to his advisors’ opposition, Moon said the rumors are true. “Chairman (Kim) has made that decision to come (to Seoul), though his people, including Kim Yong-chol, the vice chairman (of the Workers’ Party), asked him not to do so,” he said. The presidential advisor also said that even if he decides to visit Seoul, Kim may not be able to achieve a resumption of operations at the shuttered inter-Korean industrial complex in the North’s border city of Kaesong or of tour programs to Mount Kumgang due to the current sanctions regime. (Yonhap, “Moon’s Adviser Says ‘Bold’ N.K. Action, Partial U.S. Sanctions Relief Needed for Breakthrough,” January 5, 2019)
1/8/19:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea and chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, is to visit China on Jan. 7-10, Juche 108 (2019) at the invitation of Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and president of the People’s Republic of China. Supreme Leader of the Party, state and army Kim Jong Un left Pyongyang with his wife Ri Sol Ju on Monday afternoon to visit the PRC. He was accompanied by Kim Yong Chol, Ri Su Yong, Pak Thae Song, Ri Yong Ho, No Kwang Chol and other leading officials of the Party, government and armed forces organs. He was warmly seen off by leading officials of the Party, government and armed forces organs at the railway station. He said good-bye to the officials before boarding the private train. The officials warmly saw Kim Jong Un off, wholeheartedly wishing him good successes in his visit to China and a safe trip. (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Leaves Pyongyang for China,” January 8, 2019)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has issued a veiled warning to President Trump with his surprise visit to China this week: He has other options for economic and diplomatic normalization if their rapprochement falters. Kim and Trump are planning a follow-up meeting to their historic summit in Singapore in June. But there are misgivings on both sides about each other’s sincerity and commitment to improving their bilateral relations. Against this backdrop, Kim, joined by his wife and an entourage of officials, arrived in Beijing today for his fourth summit meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in less than a year. He will remain here through January 10, making this the longest of his trips. It is the North Korean leader’s 35th birthday — a government spokesman declined to say whether there would be a party — but also the second day of talks between American and Chinese trade negotiators aimed at finding a way through their fractious trade war. It was almost as if Kim and Xi had picked a date that would hammer home their messages to Trump most forcefully.” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang said it was just a coincidence. China had a “wonderful and rich” diplomatic schedule, so it was inevitable that events would sometimes overlap, he said. “It’s very normal for us to maintain friendly exchanges,” Lu said. Xi has yet to visit North Korea. Analysts, however, saw a deeper significance in Kim’s arrival. “Kim Jong Un is not feeling confident about his second summit with Donald Trump, so he is trying to court his Chinese counterpart,” said Zhao Tong of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center in Beijing. “This sends a message to the U.S. that, even if the U.S. does not cooperate, even if they keep the economic sanctions, North Korea can still do well with China’s support.” For his part, Xi appears eager to make progress to resolve the trade war between China and the United States. The dispute has been rumbling on for nine months, and during that period China’s economy has begun to slow sharply. Independent economists expect the growth rate to decelerate to about 6 percent this year, the slowest since 1990. Reminding Trump that he can be helpful when it comes to dealing with North Korea could be a way for Xi to broker a better trade deal, analysts said. “This could undermine the United States’ coercive leverage over North Korea,” said Zhao of Carnegie-Tsinghua. “This would make the U.S. nervous. Washington would hate seeing China having a much closer relationship with North Korea and therefore having much greater regional influence.” It was the American president who first made this connection. During the early days of the trade war, Trump repeatedly suggested that tariffs could be slapped on China if it did not do everything in its power to rein in its errant neighbor. More than 90 percent of North Korea’s trade goes to or through China, giving Xi enormous leverage over Kim. North Korea has long resented China’s influence over it, and Kim had been trying to reduce its dependence on its much larger neighbor by diversifying markets within the constraints of the sanctions. But now China can prove helpful. “The United States started this trade war and has been using every possible means to put China in a difficult situation and to contain China,” said Xuan Dongri, director of the Institute of Northeast Asia Studies at Yanbian University in northern China. “Against this background, it is useful for China to have a friend like North Korea when dealing with the United States.” With preparations for Trump and Kim’s second summit proceeding, Kim’s visit could also be seen as preparation for the meeting with Trump, Xuan said. Kim visited Xi immediately before and after the June summit with Trump. “As a young leader dealing with the United States alone, he needs a country like China to offer advice,” Xuan said. “After all, China deals with the United States all the time.” For years, dating back to when Kim’s grandfather and father were in power, China has tried to nudge North Korea down a path of economic reforms similar to the ones the Chinese visionary Deng Xiaoping began at the end of 1978. But the Kims, afraid that opening North Korea to outside information would spell the end of their authoritarian dynasty, resisted. Some Chinese analysts are hopeful that this might be starting to change. Since returning from his summit with Trump, Kim has turned his attention almost entirely to developing North Korea’s decrepit economy. That has prompted Wang Sheng, researcher at the Co-Innovation Center for Korean Peninsula Studies at Jilin University, to speculate that 2019 could be for North Korea what 1979 was for China. Deng’s economic reforms really began in 1979, starting with the liberalization of agricultural production and greater autonomy for managers in China’s industrial sector. China also established diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979. “Since then, over the past 40 years, China has achieved great things,” Wang said. “Likewise, North Korea also needs a safe and stable external environment for its development. North Korea has seen China’s achievements and learned from the experience.” (Anna Fifield, “In Kim’s China Visit, a Message to U.S.,” Washington Post, January 9, 2019, p. A-13)
1/10/19:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and chairman of the State Affairs Commission (SAC) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), visited the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from January 7 to 10, Juche 108 (2019) at the invitation of Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and president of the PRC. Supreme Leader of the Party, state and army Kim Jong Un was accompanied by his wife Ri Sol Ju. Among his entourage were Ri Su Yong, Kim Yong Chol, Pak Thae Song, members of the Political Bureau and vice-chairmen of the C.C., WPK, Ri Yong Ho, member of the Political Bureau of the C.C., WPK and minister of Foreign Affairs, and No Kwang Chol, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the C.C., WPK and minister of the People’s Armed Forces, Kim Yo Jong, alternate member of the Political Bureau and first vice department director of the C.C., WPK, Ri Il Hwan and Choe Tong Myong, department directors of the C.C., WPK, and other leading officials of the C.C., WPK and the SAC of the DPRK. … Kim Jong Un arrived in Beijing at 11 a.m. Beijing time on Jan. 8. He was greeted at Beijing Railway Station by Wang Huning, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and Cai Qi, member of the Political Bureau of the C.C., CPC and secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee. DPRK Ambassador to China Ji Jae Ryong was also there to greet him. As Kim Jong Un and Ri Sol Ju got off the train, children presented them with bunches of flowers. Kim Jong Un exchanged warm greetings with senior party and government officials of China and headed for the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse. He met Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People at 5 p.m. on Jan. 8. Upon arrival at the Great Hall of the People, Kim Jong Un and Ri Sol Ju were warmly greeted by Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan. Being so pleased to meet again at the beginning of the New Year, Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping gladly shook their hands with each other and had a souvenir photo taken. Warmly welcoming Kim Jong Un who started his external activity in the New Year by visiting China, Xi Jinping said the current visit will offer a specially important occasion in successfully guiding the development of the China-DPRK relations. Kim Jong Un expressed thanks to Xi Jinping for sparing time to detail the itinerary and pay deep attention despite his tight schedule at the beginning of the New Year. Kim Jong Un and Ri Sol Ju had a souvenir photo taken with Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan with the flags of the two countries for a background. A ceremony for welcoming Kim Jong Un’s visit to China was held grandly at the Great Hall of the People. The welcome ceremony was followed by talks between Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People. Present there from the DPRK side were Ri Su Yong and Kim Yong Chol, members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK and vice-chairmen of the WPK Central Committee, and Ri Yong Ho, member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and minister of Foreign Affairs. Present there from the Chinese side were Wang Huning, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and member of the CPC Central Committee Secretariat, Ding Xuexiang, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Secretariat and director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, Yang Jiechi, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the CPC Central Committee, Wang Yi, state councilor and minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, and Song Tao, head of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee. Exchanging greetings with each other again in a comradely, sincere and friendly atmosphere, the top leaders of the two parties and two countries had an in-depth and candid exchange of views over the issue of further boosting the friendship and unity, exchange and cooperation between the two parties and the two countries as required by the times and over the international and regional issues of mutual concern, the joint study and coordination of the management of the situation of the Korean peninsula and the denuclearization negotiations, in particular, and expressed mutual understanding, support and solidarity to the independent stands preserved by the parties and governments of the two countries in the external relations. Expressing thanks to Xi Jinping and the friendly comrades of the Chinese party and government for warmly inviting him at the beginning of the New Year despite their busy schedule and enthusiastically according cordial hospitality to him with all sincerity, Kim Jong Un conveyed the best wishes from the Party and the government of the DPRK and all its people to them. Saying that his current visit would play a very important role in putting the DPRK-China friendship on a firmer stage and promoting it to more developed relations also this year of weighty significance marking the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations in the wake of last year which was recorded as a year that opened a brilliant page in the history of the DPRK-China friendship and unity, Kim Jong Un said that his visit would also offer an occasion in strikingly demonstrating to the world the invariability and invincibility of the DPRK-China friendship. The DPRK-China friendship was forged and developed by the leaders of the elder generations of the two countries and is now further brilliantly developing under the special situation, he said, stressing that the WPK and the DPRK government will as ever act in unity with the Chinese side and make fresh efforts to continuously develop the friendly relations by inheriting the tradition of close cooperation between the two parties and the two countries. Noting that he was encouraged by the confident Chinese people keeping to the path of socialism with the Chinese characteristics in the new era and the reality of China developing with each passing day under the seasoned leadership of the CPC, Kim Jong Un expressed the firm belief that the Chinese party and people will achieve new successes and great victory in the efforts for creating a new miracle of the Chinese nation. Xi Jinping once again warmly welcomed Kim Jong Un’s China visit on behalf of the Chinese party, government and people, saying that the visit at the outset of New Year 2019 is of very special and important significance in terms of time and shows importance attached to China-DPRK friendship and deep confidence in the Chinese party and people. In-depth exchanges of views with Kim Jong Un, close comrade and friend of the Chinese people, helped promote active exchanges and cooperation in different fields including party and culture, and also helped the friendly relations between the two parties and two countries gain historic development and promotion, Xi Jinping said. He said that last year Kim Jong Un put forward the new strategic line of concentrating all efforts on socialist economic construction and took several important measures by making bold and wise decision, thus showing the international community the hope and expectation of the DPRK loving peace and aspiring after development. This has commanded increased international influence, and also great support, understanding and warm welcome from the whole world, he added. This proves that Kim Jong Un’s strategic decision was correct and it was in line with the Korean people’s interests and the trend of the times, Xi Jinping said, highly praising the Workers’ Party of Korea and government of the DPRK for registering admirable successes at home and abroad. He said that, as a comrade and friend, he is convinced that the WPK would achieve greater and fresh successes in accomplishing the socialist cause under the leadership of WPK led by Kim Jong Un, and expressed his best wishes with sincerity. Both sides had in-depth exchanges of views on international and regional matters of mutual concern. Both sides highly appreciated that the top leaders of the two countries brought about and promoted beneficial development of the situation on the Korean peninsula through close communications, open-hearted exchanges of views and tuning, thereby defending mutual interests. They unanimously agreed on continuously preserving the stand for final and peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula to meet the interests of the international community and all sides around the peninsula by properly managing the situation on the peninsula that has entered an important and vital time. Kim Jong Un said that the DPRK remains unchanged in its main stand to keep the goal of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, sincerely implement the joint statement adopted at the Singapore DPRK-U.S. summit talks and seek negotiated peaceful solution, referring to the difficulties and concern arising in the course of the improvement of the DPRK-U.S. relations and the negotiations for the denuclearization and the prospects of resolving them. Xi Jinping said that he fully agreed that the principled issues suggested by the DPRK side are deserved requirements and its reasonable points of concern should be resolved properly, adding it is a correct choice for the parties concerned to prioritize and reasonably tackle them. He said that the Chinese side would as ever play a positive and constructive role for the defense of the fundamental interests of both sides and the stability of the situation on the peninsula as the reliable rear, resolute comrades and friends of the Korean comrades. The top leaders of the two parties and the two countries agreed on the new plans to maintain, expand and develop the traditions of high-level visits in political, economic, military, cultural and other fields in the new year marking the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Kim Jong Un invited Xi Jinping to make an official visit to the DPRK at a convenient time and the latter accepted the invitation with pleasure and informed Kim Jong Un of the plan. The talks proceeded in a warm, comradely and friendly atmosphere from beginning to end. Xi Jinping gave a grand banquet at the Great Hall of the People on the evening of Jan. 8 in welcome of the China visit by Kim Jong Un. Present there at invitation were Ri Su Yong, Kim Yong Chol, Pak Thae Song, members of the Political Bureau and vice-chairmen of the WPK Central Committee, Ri Yong Ho, member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and minister of Foreign Affairs, No Kwang Chol, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and minister of the People’s Armed Forces, Kim Yo Jong, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and first vice department director of the WPK Central Committee, Ri Il Hwan and Choe Tong Myong, department directors of the WPK Central Committee, and other leading officials and retinue accompanying Kim Jong Un. Also invited there were Ji Jae Ryong, DPRK ambassador to China, and his embassy members. Seen at the banquet were Wang Huning, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, Ding Xuexiang, member of the Political Bureau, member of the Secretariat and director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, Yang Jiechi, member of the Political Bureau and director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the CPC Central Committee, Guo Shengkun, member of the Political Bureau, member of the Secretariat and secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the CPC Central Committee, Huang Kunming, member of the Political Bureau, member of the Secretariat and head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, Cai Qi, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, Wang Yi, state councilor and minister of Foreign Affairs of PRC, Song Tao, head of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee, Li Jinjun, Chinese ambassador to the DPRK, and other Chinese party and government officials. Kim Jong Un and Ri Sol Ju entered the banquet hall, being guided by Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan. Xi Jinping made a congratulatory speech at the banquet. Saying that Kim Jong Un and Ri Sol Ju visited China again with deep friendly feeling of the Party, government and people of the DPRK toward the party, government and people of China in the auspicious and fine period greeting the new year to open up a historic prelude to the development of China-DPRK relations for this year, Xi Jinping warmly welcomed their China visit. He said Kim Jong Un’s three China visits within 100 days last year and his visit to China at the beginning of the new year fully showed that he values much the traditional China-DPRK friendship and cherishes friendly feeling toward the Chinese people. Xi Jinping stressed that he would make efforts together with Kim Jong Un to write a new history of visits between China and the DPRK. Saying that this year marks the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the DPRK, he proudly noted that for the past seven decades the two parties, two countries and two peoples have advanced while supporting and encouraging each other and achieving great successes in socialist construction of the two countries after forging the lips-and-teeth relations. The China-DPRK relations have already opened a page of new history and entered a new stage of development, and the party and government of China have attached high importance to the traditional relations between China and the DPRK, he said, clarifying once again that it is the consistent and steadfast stand of the Chinese party and government to defend, consolidate and develop the China-DPRK relations on good terms. Saying that he was pleased to witness remarkable successes achieved by the WPK and the people of the DPRK in the socialist revolution and construction, he expressed his conviction that they would surely carry out the new strategic line set forth at the Third Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the WPK under the leadership of the WPK headed by Kim Jong Un and thus achieve signal successes by powerfully accelerating the cause of socialist construction in the DPRK. Kim Jong Un made a reply speech. He said that he visited China as his first political schedule for the new year with the firm will to gain overall prosperity of the DPRK-China friendship, as required by a new great history and brilliant era of the DPRK-China relations, greeting the new year after seeing out the last year full of epochal events unprecedented in the history of the development of the relations between the two parties and two countries. He expressed his profound thanks for the warm hospitality and deep attention of the party and government of China on his visit made at the beginning of the new year and extended heartfelt New Year greetings to Xi Jinping, all the members of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people on behalf of the members of the Workers’ Party of Korea and the Korean people. Saying that last year the meetings between the top leaders of the two parties and the two countries served as a firm foundation and a powerful engine to develop the relations between the DPRK and China as required by a new era, he expressed his will to go on writing a beautiful epic of the DPRK-China friendship to be envied by the world and handed down generation after generation by joining hands with comrades of China and firmly defend peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and the region by the concerted efforts of the DPRK and China this year, too. He sincerely wished the fraternal Chinese people endless success in the long journey for attaining the “Two Century Goals” and realizing the dream of China, i.e. great prosperity of the Chinese nation, united close around the CPC with Xi Jinping as the core this year marking the 70th anniversary of the birth of new China. The banquet proceeded in a warm atmosphere overflowing with the feelings of friendship and fellowship. A special art performance was given by the Chinese artistes in honor of the historic visit of Kim Jong Un to China at the banquet. Kim Jong Un and Ri Sol Ju mounted the stage with Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan to express their thanks to the performers and had a photo session with them. Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping met again at Beijing Hotel on Wednesday. Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan warmly greeted Kim Jong Un and Ri Sol Ju as they got to the hotel. Kim Jong Un had a candid conversation with Xi Jinping, further deepening special comradeship and close relations. Having a luncheon provided by Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan, Kim Jong Un and Ri Sol Ju had a pleasant chat in an amicable and familiar atmosphere. Kim Jong Un expressed his deep thanks to Xi Jinping for sincerely hosting the luncheon once again at a special place in a special atmosphere. At the end of the luncheon Kim Jong Un shared farewell greeting with Xi Jinping. Kim Jong Un expressed satisfaction over making a fine and worthwhile visit without any inconvenience thanks to the special care and hospitality given by Xi Jinping, before thanking him. Kim Jong Un and Ri Sol Ju said goodbye to Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan, promising to have another meeting. Kim Jong Un visited a branch pharmaceutical plant of the Beijing Tongrentang Co. Ltd. together with accompanying officials and entourage that morning. Accompanying him were Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Song Tao and Li Jinjun. He was warmly greeted by the board director of the Beijing Tongrentang Co. Ltd. who is also its party secretary, the general manager of the company who is also its vice-secretary and leading officials of the plant. Kim Jong Un watched the goods in production, while looking round the production processes at the plant. Touring the production site, he highly appreciated that the plant has undergone a good development by registering many achievements in production and technical upgrading through enterprising and determined efforts, and wished it bigger successes in its business management in the future. Kim Jong Un successfully finished his historic visit to China and left Beijing at 3:00 p.m. Beijing time on Wednesday. He received a good sendoff from Wang Huning, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and member of the CPC Central Committee Secretariat, and Cai Qi, member of the Political Bureau of the C.C., CPC and secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC, at Beijing Railway Station and Song Tao, head of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Lu Dongfu, general manager of the China Railway Corporation, and Li Jinjun, Chinese ambassador to the DPRK, traveled together with him to Dandong Railway Station to see him off. Before leaving Dandong Railway Station, Kim Jong Un sent a personal letter of thanks to Xi Jinping for his splendid and warm welcome, sincere and good hospitality during the visit.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Visits China,” January 10, 2019)
Xinhua: “Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Chinese president, on Tuesday held talks with Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), who arrived in Beijing on the same day for a visit to China. In a cordial and friendly atmosphere, the two leaders had an in-depth exchange of views on China-DPRK relations and issues of common concern, and reached important consensus. The two sides agreed to make joint efforts to push for continuous new development of China-DPRK relations in the new era, constantly advance the political settlement process of the Korean Peninsula issue, bring more benefits to people of the two countries, and make positive contribution to peace, stability, prosperity and development of the region and the world. Xi pointed out that Comrade Chairman’s visit to China at the beginning of 2019, which marks the 70th anniversary of the establishment of China-DPRK diplomatic relationship, fully embodied the great importance Comrade Chairman attaches to the two countries’ traditional friendship and Comrade Chairman’s friendship with the CPC and the Chinese people. “I highly appreciate it, and, on behalf of the CPC, the Chinese government and the Chinese people, extend sincere festival greetings to the WPK and the government and the people of the DPRK, “Xi said. Xi stressed that with concerted efforts of both sides, the China-DPRK relations opened a new historic chapter in 2018. The two sides, with concrete actions, have demonstrated the strong vitality of the China-DPRK friendship and displayed the resolute determination of the two countries to jointly advance the political settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue. This year marks the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the China-DPRK relationship and bears great significance to the efforts of building on past successes to further advance bilateral relationship. “I am willing to work with Comrade Chairman to make sound efforts to guide the future development of China-DPRK relationship,” Xi said. He said the two sides should maintain high-level exchanges, strengthen strategic communication, deepen friendly exchanges and cooperation, and promote the long-term, healthy and stable development of China-DPRK relations. Kim said he was grateful to General Secretary Xi for taking time from a busy schedule at the beginning of the year to receive the DPRK delegation. He extended festival greetings to the CPC, the Chinese government and the Chinese people on behalf the WPK, the government and the people of the DPRK. “Under the utmost care of Comrade General Secretary, the DPRK-China relations last year were elevated to a new height and a new chapter was written,” he said. Kim said with this visit, he hoped to take the opportunity of the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries to conduct deep exchanges of views with Comrade General Secretary on consolidating the DPRK-China traditional friendship and stepping up the DPRK-China exchanges and cooperation, and to push for the DPRK-China friendly ties to be consolidated and improved with each passing day. On the situation of the Korean Peninsula, Xi spoke highly of the positive measures taken by the DPRK side to maintain peace and stability and promote the realization of denuclearization on the peninsula. He said major progress was made in the process of a political solution to the Korean Peninsula issue last year with joint efforts of China, the DPRK and relevant parties. Noting that a general trend of peaceful dialogue on the peninsula has taken shape, Xi said it has become the international community’s common expectation and consensus for the dialogue to continue and yield results. The political settlement of the Peninsula issue faces a rare historic opportunity. China supports the DPRK’s continued adherence to the direction of denuclearization on the peninsula, supports the continuous improvement of inter-Korean relations, supports the DPRK and the United States holding summits and achieving results, and supports relevant parties resolving their respective legitimate concerns through dialogue, Xi said. China hopes that the DPRK and the United States will meet each other halfway, Xi said, adding China stands ready to work with the DPRK and relevant parties to play a positive and constructive role in maintaining peace and stability and realizing denuclearization on the peninsula and lasting peace and stability in the region. Kim said the Korean Peninsula situation has been easing since last year, and China’s important role in this process is obvious to all. He said the DPRK side highly and sincerely appreciates the Chinese efforts. The DPRK will continue sticking to the stance of denuclearization and resolving the Korean Peninsula issue through dialogue and consultation, and make efforts for the second summit between DPRK and U.S. leaders to achieve results that will be welcomed by the international community, Kim said. Kim said he hoped that relevant parties will attach importance to and positively respond to the DPRK’s legitimate concerns, and jointly push for a comprehensive resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue. The two sides informed each other of their respective countries’ situations. Xi said this year marks the 70th anniversary of the founding of New China. In the past seven decades, the CPC has led the Chinese people in achieving a historic leap: they have stood up, grown rich, and are becoming strong. The CPC has the resolve and confidence to unite and lead people of all ethnic groups in China to overcome all difficulties, obstacles, risks and challenges and forge ahead towards the realization of the two centenary goals and the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. Xi said positive results have been achieved since the WPK implemented the new strategic line in the past year, demonstrating the WPK and DPRK people’s strong will of loving peace and pursuing development, and receiving wholehearted support from the DPRK people and positive comments from the international community. The Chinese side firmly supports Comrade Chairman in leading the WPK and the people to implement the new strategic line and focus on developing economy and improving people’s wellbeing. “We believe that the DPRK people will surely and constantly make new and greater achievements in the cause of socialist construction, “Xi said. Kim said that having visited China four times in less than a year, he was deeply impressed by the achievements made in China’s economic and social development as well as the Chinese people’s spirit and character of striving for the country’s prosperity. The DPRK side considers China’s development experience most valuable and hopes for more trips to China for study and exchanges, he said. Kim said he believes that under the leadership of the CPC with Comrade General Secretary at the core, the Chinese people will continuously make fresh great achievements on the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era, and successfully realize the two centenary goals and the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. The WPK will lead the DPRK people to continue their great efforts to implement the DPRK’s new strategic line and create a favorable external environment for this endeavor, Kim said. Prior to the talks, Xi held a welcome ceremony for Kim at the Great Hall of the People. After the talks, Xi and his wife Peng Liyuan hosted a welcome banquet for Kim and his wife Ri Sol Ju, and they watched an art performance together. On Wednesday morning, Xi met with Kim at Beijing Hotel. Xi spoke positively of the significance of Kim’s visit to China this time and looked back on the history of friendly exchanges between China and the DPRK. Xi said China is willing to make joint efforts with the DPRK to safeguard, consolidate and develop relations between the two parties and two countries, jointly write a new chapter of development of relations between the two countries, and jointly make new contributions to regional peace, stability, development and prosperity. Kim said the DPRK highly values the sound momentum of continuous development of DPRK-China relations, and is willing to work with China to earnestly implement the important consensus reached between the two sides and continue writing a more glorious future of friendship from a new starting point. Peng Liyuan and Ri Sol Ju attended the meeting. After the meeting, Xi and his wife held a luncheon for Kim and his wife. On Wednesday, Kim also visited a Tong Ren Tang pharmaceutical plant in Yizhuang, Beijing, where he inspected relevant processing and production lines of traditional Chinese medicine that use traditional and modern techniques. Related activities were also attended by Wang Huning, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee; Ding Xuexiang, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee; Yang Jiechi, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the CPC Central Committee; Guo Shengkun, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Commission for Political and Legal Affairs of the CPC Central Committee; Huang Kunming, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee; Cai Qi, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee; and State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Ri Su Yong, member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee, vice-chairman of the WPK Central Committee and director of the International Department; Kim Yong Chol, member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee, vice-chairman of the WPK Central Committee and director of the United Front Department; Pak Thae Song, member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and vice-chairman of the WPK Central Committee; Ri Yong Ho, member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and foreign minister; No Kwang Chol, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and minister of People’s Armed Forces; and Kim Yo Jong, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and first vice director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, accompanied Kim Jong Un on his China tour and attended related activities.” (Xinhua, “Xi, Kim Hold Talks, Reaching Important Consensus,” January 10, 2019)
Moon Jae-in New Year speech: “ … In the past year, the people opened up a path toward peace. We have become a main player on issues regarding the Korean Peninsula. We have overcome power politics and taken the lead in forging our own destiny. We have experienced and confirmed before our own eyes that our efforts can bring us peace. The path toward peace on the Korean Peninsula still continues to expand even at this moment, and it will speed up even more this year. It was very comforting to hear that the remains of 13 soldiers killed during the Korean War were found during the operation to remove land mines on Arrowhead Hill. Along with the remains, we could regain the spirit of reconciliation that has laid buried in our battlegrounds. When we initiate an operation to locate other remains in April, we will be able to fulfill the duty of the nation by excavating many more of the fallen. The second North Korea-United States summit — to take place soon, and a reciprocal visit to Seoul by Chairman Kim Jong Un of North Korea will be other turning points that will firmly solidify peace on the Korean Peninsula. We will not loosen our guard until the promise to denuclearize the Peninsula is kept and peace is fully institutionalized.
Peace can drive economic growth. The desire to prosper lies in the people of both South and North Korea. The connection of railroads and roads between the two Koreas will help find new breakthroughs for our economy. The Kaesong Industrial Complex and tourism in Kumgangsan Mountain were beneficial to both South and North Korea. We welcome North Korea’s intention to resume their operation without conditions or compensation. As such, the prerequisites for the two Koreas resuming operation of the Complex and Kumgangsan tourism have essentially been met already. My Administration will cooperate with the international community, including the United States, to resolve the remaining issues such as international sanctions as soon as possible. Peace on the Korean Peninsula is expanding northward and southward. We will move forward to create economic and security communities in Northeast Asia through the New Northern Policy. We will diversify our trading destinations through the New Southern Policy and create a people-centered community of peace and prosperity with countries in those regions. This year marks the 100th anniversary of the March First Independence Movement and the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea. In the past century, we have built an independent democratic republic based on popular sovereignty by breaking free of colonial rule and dictatorship. We are now dreaming of building a peaceful, prosperous and powerful country and overcoming division. We are now passing the last crucial moment of realizing our dream. Before long, permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula and an innovative, inclusive nation where everyone prospers will arrive before us.” (Korea Herald, “Full Text of President Moon’s New Year Speech,” January 10, 2019)
President Moon Jae-in of South Korea said today that the visit to China this week by the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, heralded an imminent second summit meeting between Kim and President Trump to negotiate the terms of denuclearizing the North. “I think both sides know what the other side wants,” Moon said during his nationally televised New Year’s news conference. “But they don’t trust each other because of the mistrust that has accumulated between them for a long time, and they are insisting on the other side moving first.” But Moon said Kim’s trip to Beijing “indicates that a second North Korea-U.S. summit has come close.” He said he expected North Korea and the United States to soon resume long-stalled, high-level government talks to finalize the preparations for a second summit meeting. Moon said he believed that North Korea and the United States had narrowed their differences considerably in recent months. “If they agree to hold a second North Korea-U.S. summit in a not-too-distant future, we can see this as a rather optimistic sign that both sides have narrowed their differences on this issue,” Moon said. Moon said that South Korea was willing to reopen the joint inter-Korean factory park in the North Korean city of Kaesong, as well as South Korean tours to the North’s Diamond Mountain. But the projects cannot resume until international sanctions are eased, and Moon vowed today to discuss removing the obstacle with Washington as soon as possible. (Choe Sang-hun, “U.S.-North Korea Meeting Near, South’s Leader Says,” New York Times, January 11, 2019, p. A-4)
The U.S. government has revised its policy on humanitarian engagement towards North Korea and will work to better facilitate the flow of private individuals and aid to the country, multiple people engaged in discussions with the U.S. Department of State told NK News on Thursday. Individuals representing American and international NGOs, the United Nations, and U.S. government departments attended a meeting with U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun yesterday in Washington D.C. to discuss a review of policy announced late last year. Among some of the changes the U.S. would be making, according to those at the meeting, is the easing of granting special permissions for American citizens seeking to travel to the DPRK to conduct humanitarian work. Additionally, the U.S. will work to ease or push through humanitarian exemption requests at the national level through the granting of special licenses and at the UN level via the 1718 Committee, in order to facilitate increased shipments of aid to North Korea, one attendee said. According to the attendee, who wished to remain anonymous, representatives from the U.S. Department of the Treasury were also present at the meeting to hear the policy changes as well. The effort to include Treasury officials, the individual said, appeared to be to ensure that the appropriate level of scrutiny would be applied by the U.S. government towards exemptions requests, without impeding humanitarian work. While the U.S. says it will work to make such changes, Biegun also asserted, according to the source, that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s authorization of the policy review and easing of humanitarian engagement was not to be considered a diplomatic concession or a “quid pro quo” deal with the DPRK. According to the source, Biegun added that while the U.S. government will continue to abstain from providing humanitarian aid to North Korea directly, NGOs are free to do so and — by doing so — would showcase “the best from the U.S.” “We are pleased that the U.S. government has reconsidered its stance on humanitarian engagement with DPRK,” Jennifer Deibert of the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), which was confirmed to have had a presence at the meeting with Biegun, told NK News today. “I feel hopeful MCC will receive permissions necessary to continue building on more than 23 years of engagement with DPRK through the delivery of aid to vulnerable people.” Keith Luse, Executive Director of the National Committee on North Korea (NCNK) — an organization representing several American NGOs — was also present at the meeting. “Yesterday’s meeting between Special Representative Biegun and U.S. humanitarian NGOs and UN officials was a continuation of the earlier dialogue with the humanitarian community initiated by Mr. Biegun,” he told NK News today adding that there would be a third meeting in early spring to continue the dialogue. According to another informed source in the NGO community who wished to remain anonymous, the developments were seen as very positive and raised NGO hopes that normal activities could be resumed. September 2017 saw the U.S. State Department impose a ban on U.S. citizens traveling to the DPRK in response to concerns “over the serious risk of arrest and long-term detention” in North Korea. The ban, which was extended in August 2018 for a further 12 months, allows for exemptions to be granted for humanitarian workers and other groups such as journalists, diplomats, and those “working in the national interest.” However, in 2018, American humanitarian workers increasingly complained that their applications for exemptions were being rejected by the State Department. As many as five NGOs told NK News in October that they had been affected by travel rejections the month prior. According to an attendee at the meeting, Biegun said that the State Department would adopt a more “expansive” view of the requests for such exemptions and encouraged those who were previously rejected to resubmit. “A clear takeaway from the session was that Secretary Pompeo is committed to a process of providing timely consideration to humanitarian workers’ requests to visit North Korea while concurrently factoring State Department concern for the safety of Americans traveling anywhere in the world,” NCNK’s Luse told NK News. Deibert, who along with her boss had been denied travel exemptions in 2018, told NK News she was hoping to once again “receive Special Validation Passports as we have received in the past.” Humanitarian workers, however, would still need to make a case for the exemptions and include details about how they would monitor aid deliveries or activities, it was communicated at the meeting according to one attendee. Additionally, international humanitarian groups had complained that sanctions on North Korea were impeding the delivery of humanitarian goods to the country throughout 2018. While UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions state that they are not intended or designed to impede humanitarian activities, organizations and workers have reported encountering adverse consequences and an increasingly complex operational environment due to sanctions. In order to better facilitate such deliveries, the UNSC in August agreed to adopt new guidelines to streamline the process of obtaining humanitarian exemptions from international sanctions via the UN’s 1718 Committee. Currently, there are only two active exemptions in effect through this channel, with UNICEF and the Eugene Bell Foundation receiving permission to transport goods to North Korea on October 19 and November 20 of 2018 respectively. According to an attendee at Wednesday’s meeting, Biegun acknowledged there was a backlog of exemption requests currently facing the 1718 Committee and that these would now be pushed forward. Throughout 2018 as negotiations stalled, the U.S. was widely seen by American NGOs to be impeding humanitarian work in, or aid deliveries to, North Korea. As a result, the government increasingly came under public criticism from such NGOs, DPRK watchers and former government officials for what was seen by some as a policy of including humanitarian aid as an element within the “maximum pressure” strategy towards North Korea. In a statement to NK News in October, however, the State Department denied such assertions and said that the rejections were “not part of a broader pressure campaign.” “Special validations are reviewed on a case by case basis taking into account a range of factors,” an official said at the time. In particular, the U.S. continued to “have grave concerns over the serious risk of arrest and long-term detention in the DPRK, as well as the diversion and misuse of humanitarian assistance by the DPRK regime for its weapons programs,” the official added. And in evaluating what constitutes “the “national interest” factor under the (travel ban),” the U.S. remained “very focused on preventing the diversion and misuse of humanitarian assistance by the DPRK regime” the official told NK News. But while a U.S. policy shift towards better facilitating humanitarian engagement appears to be taking place, the informed source in the NGO community stressed this does not mean that barriers to humanitarian work are being dismantled. “The significant legal/administrative hurdles (largely erected in 2017/18) have not magically disappeared overnight — we still face very intense scrutiny and high administrative/legal burdens for our work,” the source said via email, referencing U.S. Department of Commerce, State, and Treasury restrictions. However, the source added, the largest change appears to be that “the presumption is now more towards approval for humanitarian support/engagement, rather than a presumption of denial.” “We remain concerned about payment issues (international banking) vis a vis purchases made in third countries, and customs clearance,” the source said, adding however, that the policy shift was a hopeful first step. (Hamish MacDonald, “U.S. to Ease Humanitarian-Related Travel, Shipments to North Korea,” NKNews, January 11, 2019)
1/12/19:
Pompeo: “Q: And North Korea, that always seems to be a part of the discussions. In his New Year’s address, Kim Jong-un floated a production cap and a pledge not to transfer arms in exchange for sanctions relief. Can you rule that out as a possibility, because that would be sanctions relief before the complete, verifiable denuclearization? POMPEO: The good news is our conversations with North Korea continue. They’re out in the public light, they are going to remain so, so I won’t share with you this morning things that are being discussed in our negotiations. But we’re moving forward in these conversations, lots of ideas about how we might continue to decrease the risk to the American people. Remember, Rich, at the end that’s the objective; it’s the security of American people. And so reducing the threat from North Korea, whether that’s by our success to date in stopping their missile testing, stopping their nuclear testing, those are the important elements. We’ve got to get to full and final denuclearization. We’ve been unambiguous when we speak with Chairman Kim and other Korean interlocutors. I am hopeful that in the year ahead we can make substantial progress on that, including getting another summit between the two leaders. Q: And the position is still the same: They must give up their nuclear weapons in order to get sanctions relief from the United States? POMPEO: I don’t think there has been a single variant from the core proposition, which is the fully denuclearized North Korea as verified by international experts, is the objective of this administration. We intend to achieve that.” (DoS, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, Interview with Rick Edson of Fox News, Cairo, January 11, 2019)
1/13/19:
President Donald Trump suggested holding the anticipated second summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Vietnam in mid-February, Yomiuri Shimbun reported today. North Korea appears to review the US proposal but has not yet give a response, citing officials familiar with the matter. For the second meeting, Vietnam, Singapore and Hawaii had been mentioned as possible venues for the bilateral summit. But experts thought Vietnam and Singapore held higher possibilities as they have North Korean embassies, while Hawaii does not. Vietnam reportedly has delivered messages to both South and North Korea that it wishes to host the envisioned summit in its resort town of Danang. Robert Gallucci, a former U.S. nuclear negotiator with North Korea said the summit was likely to take place at the end of this month or next in an interview with a US news outlet, Radio Free Asia, yesterday (US time). Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reiterated their stance on a “full” and “final” denuclearization while expressing hope that the US and North Korea make “substantial progress” this year. “Reducing the threat from North Korea, whether that’s by our success to date in stopping their missile testing, stopping their nuclear testing, those are the important elements. We’ve got to get to full and final denuclearization.” he said in an interview with Fox News on Friday (US time). “I don’t think there has been a single variant from the core proposition, which is the fully denuclearized North Korea as verified by international experts, is the objective of this administration. We intend to achieve that.” (Jo He-rim, “Trump Suggests Vietnam for U.S.-N.K. Summit: Report,” Korea Herald, January 13, 2019)
South Korea will receive its first F-35A stealth fighters in March, a milestone in the country’s effort to boost its defense capabilities despite a diplomatic thaw with its nuclear-armed neighbor North Korea. A South Korean military official said the first two jets would be “combat-deployed in April or May” and that 10 jets would be ready for deployment by the end of this year. The jets and their pilots have been put through their paces at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona, a training facility for the state-of-the-art jet fighter. South Korea is among a handful of US allies to buy the jet, including Japan and Australia. However, the jet program, which launched in 2001, has been plagued by cost overruns and technical problems. South Korea approved a deal in September 2014 to acquire 40 F-35As for about 7.3 trillion won (US$6.8 billion). “By the end of 2021, all of the 40 F-35A strike fighters will be deployed, combat-ready as planned”, the military official said. The F-35A is one of three variants of the aircraft, including the F-35C used aboard aircraft carriers. The jets have radar-evading capabilities and can perform ground-attack and air-superiority missions with a variety of precision weapons. That would give it a significant advantage over North Korea’s air defenses and fleet of ageing combat aircraft. However, it remains undecided whether South Korea will want to give its new F-35A jets a high-profile welcome ceremony when they are delivered in March. It may instead consider something lower key to avoid provoking the North following months of rapprochement that includes three inter-Korean summits and a meeting between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. North Korea reacted angrily after high-ranking South Korean officials attended a ceremony in March last year for the first jets to roll off the assembly line at Lockheed Martin’s production facility in Fort Worth, Texas. “The South’s war maniacs are indulging in a spending spree to buy F-35A Stealth jet fighters. This stems from an adventurous plot to stage a pre-emptive strike against us that goes along with US attempts to start a war,” the ruling Worker’s Party daily, Rodong Sinmun, said at that time. South Korea, meanwhile, is pushing ahead with its 2019-2023 midterm defense project known as “Defense Reform 2.0” to help to counter potential threats from North Korea and elsewhere. South’s defense ministry plans to spend 32 trillion won during this five-year period, up 30 per cent from the previous five-year period, the defense ministry said. This program includes the F-35As, tactical surface-to-surface guided missiles, the upgrading of Patriot air-defense missile systems and strengthening other assets with surveillance and strike capabilities. “The most outstanding point in the Defense Reform 2.0 is the shift of focus from threats from North Korea to overall security threats (including those from other countries)”, the ministry said. South Korean President Moon Jae-in last month called for a “strong defense capability” all the more although negotiations have been underway with the North. “Peace is being made on the Korean peninsula but it is still a precarious peace”, he said, urging the military not to lower its guard. (Park Chan-kyong, “South Korea to Get its First F-35A Stealth Fighter Jets in March. How Will the North React?” South China Morning Post, January 13, 2019)
North Korea has told Japan it could raise the subject of wartime forced labor during Tokyo’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula in any future bilateral talks, diplomatic sources have said. According to the sources, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho warned his Japanese counterpart, Kono Taro, via a Mongolian diplomat in mid-December, that he would have “no choice” but to bring up the matter if Tokyo insists on pursuing the issue of Pyongyang’s abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. Ri met with Mongolian Foreign Minister Damdin Tsogtbaatar in Ulan Bator on December 8. According to the sources, Ri asked Tsogtbaatar to relay the message that Japan was being illogical by asking for the return of individuals it identifies as abductees who have already died or never entered North Korea in the first place. Ri also said that should Tokyo continue to focus on the abductions, he would bring up the issue of the “more than 8.4 million Koreans who were forced to work” under Japanese colonial rule, the sources said. Japan passed the National Mobilization Law in 1938, during the Second Sino-Japanese War, allowing it to begin requisitioning workers at home the following year and later on the Korean Peninsula. Abe said last week that his government is “using various channels” to communicate with North Korea, including over a potential summit with leader Kim Jong Un. Asked by a reporter about meeting Kim, Abe said last June’s summit in Singapore between Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump meant the “situation has greatly changed” and as both sides work toward further talks, “I think next time around I will also have to face Kim Jong Un.” (Kyodo, “North Korea Tells Japan It Will Raise Wartime Labor Issue If Japan Keeps up Pressure on Abductees,” Japan Times, January 13, 2019)
1/14/19:
North Korean authorities may be increasingly open to dialogue and engagement with the United Nations on human rights, the UN’s Special Rapporteur said on the issue in a recent interview in Seoul. Speaking to NK News as he wrapped up a five-day visit to the South Korean capital on Friday, Tomás Ojea Quintana reported that he believed an ongoing diplomatic detente with the DPRK may be making Pyongyang more open to cooperation with the UN on human rights. “In regards to North Korea, it seems they are exploring different possibilities to engage on human rights, especially in Geneva,” he said, adding that the DPRK’s requirements under the UN’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of member states’ human rights records may offer a good “starting point.” This could involve “technical cooperation, or capacity building of their officials on specific human rights issues.” Space for engagement with the North Koreans on the human rights issue could also lie in discussion of what he described as “less controversial” rights. “You can start with social rights, labor rights,” he said, pointing to the potential reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) — agreed to by the two Koreas in September last year — as offering room for that discussion. “The human rights people will need to put the point and say ‘what about labor standards, what about wages’… that’s a starting point,” he said. “Of course, it’s not going to be a discussion on political prison camps, that’s out of reality… to start discussing that on the negotiations table.” The Special Rapporteur also pointed to some phrases from Kim Jong Un’s recent New Year’s speech as suggesting the country’s leadership is increasingly open to discussing the issue. “It’s the head of state saying this… there are a couple of things that have to do with human rights,” he said, pointing to the DPRK leader’s calls for the ruling party to “lend an ear to the sincere opinions” of the people as a sign that attitudes may be changing. Nonetheless, the Special Rapporteur stressed that the situation on the ground remains “extremely serious,” and that interviews last week with recently-defected North Koreans had offered little sign that change is taking place. “The fact is that with all the positive developments the world has witnessed in the past year, it is all the more regrettable that the reality for human rights on the ground remains unchanged,” he said in a statement to press ahead of his interview with NK News. How, then, to engage with a country which typically dismisses any discussion of the issue as part of a “hostile policy” against it, and which has refused to allow Ojea Quintana to visit the country? “You always have to have a starting point,” Ojea Quintana said. “There’s always a starting point… even in the worst situation.” “North Korea has different options in addition to my mandate, to show at least willingness or progress on human rights,” he said, pointing to Pyongyang’s decision in 2017 to allow a visit by the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities Catalina Devandas-Aguilar. “There may be some other thematic rapporteurs who may be able to engage with North Korea and even visit North Korea,” he suggested, while urging Pyongyang to “engage with me as a matter of priority.” Increasing inter-Korean engagement may also be providing an opening for a visit by the Special Rapporteur, he said, adding he was in contact with a number of South Korean organizations who are in regular discussions with North Korean counterparts. Among these are the South Korean Red Cross, which held frequent meetings with DPRK counterparts ahead of reunions of families separated by the Korean War last year. “They are very supportive of my mandate and they are good interlocutors to convey my message,” Ojea Quintana said. Asked to comment on the fate of the six South Korean citizens believed to be imprisoned in the North, the Special Rapporteur said that government officials had not provided any update on when they will be released — or whether Seoul has sought to pressure Pyongyang on their continued detention. “They haven’t shared any information on that,” he said. “I hope that their detention is not being subject to negotiations… what they do deserve is first fair trial, if they are being accused of committing a crime and, if not, they should be released.” The South Korean government previously claimed President Moon Jae-in had raised the issue with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at their summit in April last year, though did not comment on the reply given by Kim. So, with a fourth Moon-Kim summit on the horizon in the coming months — this time in Seoul — will the South Korean leader use the meeting to raise human rights? “I don’t think that’s on the agenda,” Ojea Quintana said. (Oliver Hotham, “North Korea ‘Exploring’ Ways to Engage on Human Rights, Says UN Special Rapporteur” NKNews, January 14, 2019)
1/15/19:
Senior North Korean and U.S. officials may meet in Washington later this week for consultations on a second summit, a diplomatic source in Seoul said today. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is expected to greet Kim Yong-chol, a top aide to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The source pointed out that the two sides are resolved to have face-to-face negotiations. “Given Secretary Pompeo’s other commitments, it’s true that (he’s) available for the talks on January 17-18,” the source said. Chosun Ilbo also reported today that Kim Yong-chol will likely travel to the U.S. capital for a two-day trip starting in two days. There has been no related announcement yet by either Pyongyang or Washington. South Korea’s foreign ministry said that there has been diplomatic contact between Washington and Pyongyang regarding their high-level talks, but it is inappropriate to comment on it. “When the date and venue for the follow-up negotiations between the North and U.S. are fixed, there will be a public announcement on that,” Noh Kyu-duk, the ministry’s spokesman, said during a regular press briefing. Speculation has been raised in Seoul that the Trump administration might have moved the goal post or lowered its expectations in its bargaining with Pyongyang. Trump said his administration won’t rush to make a deal. In a recent Fox News interview, Pompeo said, “We’re moving forward in these conversations — lots of ideas about how we might continue to decrease the risk to the American people.” He added, “Reducing the threat from North Korea, whether that’s by our success to date in stopping their missile testing, stopping their nuclear testing — those are the important elements.” Some South Korean news outlets construed the remarks as suggesting a shift of Washington’s focus toward the elimination of Pyongyang’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) away from complete denuclearization, apparently a more difficult aim. Meanwhile, Choe Son Hui, North Korea’s vice foreign minister, arrived at an airport in Beijing on Tuesday. Asked about her destination, Choe answered, “I am going to an international conference in Sweden.” A South Korean foreign ministry official told reporters there is nothing to share about the visit for now. The official also said that Seoul and Washington are in talks to hold a video conference of their “working group” this week. The group was launched late last year to coordinate the allies’ approaches on Pyongyang’s denuclearization, sanctions enforcement and inter-Korean cooperation. But the latest session may not be related to the highly anticipated North-U.S. talks, the official added. (Yonhap, “N. Korea, U.S. May Hold High-Level Talks This Week: Source,” January 15, 2019)
A letter was delivered from President Donald Trump to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un over the weekend, a source familiar with the ongoing denuclearization talks between Washington and Pyongyang told CNN. The letter comes as the two sides negotiate details of a second meeting between the two leaders. It was flown to Pyongyang and delivered by hand, the source said. According to the source, North Korea’s former spy chief Kim Yong Chol could visit Washington as soon as this week to finalize details of the upcoming summit. (Will Ripley, “Trump Sends Letter to North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un,” January 15, 2019)
Kim Gye Gwan, first vice-minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, press statement: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, made a strategic decision to put an end to the unpleasant history of the DPRK-U.S. relations and met Pompeo, U.S. secretary of state, for two times during his visit to our country and took very important and broad-minded steps for peace and stability in the Korean peninsula and the world. In response to the noble intention of Chairman Kim Jong Un, President Trump stated his position for terminating the historically deep-rooted hostility and improving the relations between the DPRK and the U.S. I appreciated the position positively with an expectation that upcoming DPRK-U.S. summit would be a big step forward for catalyzing détente on the Korean peninsula and building a great future. But now prior to the DPRK-U.S. summit, unbridled remarks provoking the other side of dialogue are recklessly made in the U.S. and I am totally disappointed as these constitute extremely unjust behavior. High-ranking officials of the White House and the Department of State including Bolton, White House national security adviser, are letting loose the assertions of so-called Libya mode of nuclear abandonment, “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization”, “total decommissioning of nuclear weapons, missiles, biochemical weapons”. etc, while talking about formula of “abandoning nuclear weapons first, compensating afterwards.” This is not an expression of intention to address the issue through dialogue. It is essentially a manifestation of awfully sinister move to impose on our dignified state the destiny of Libya or Iraq which had been collapsed due to yielding the whole of their countries to big powers. I cannot suppress indignation at such moves of the U.S., and harbor doubt about the U.S. sincerity for improved DPRK-U.S. relations through sound dialogue and negotiations. World knows too well that our country is neither Libya nor Iraq which have met miserable fate. It is absolutely absurd to dare compare the DPRK, a nuclear weapon state, to Libya which had been at the initial stage of nuclear development. We shed light on the quality of Bolton already in the past, and we do not hide our feeling of repugnance towards him. If the Trump administration fails to recall the lessons learned from the past when the DPRK-U.S. talks had to undergo twists and setbacks owing to the likes of Bolton and turns its ear to the advice of quasi-“patriots” who insist on Libya mode and the like, prospects of upcoming DPRK-U.S. summit and overall DPRK-U.S. relations will be crystal clear. We have already stated our intention for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and made clear on several occasions that precondition for denuclearization is to put an end to anti-DPRK hostile policy and nuclear threats and blackmail of the United States. But now, the U.S. is miscalculating the magnanimity and broad-minded initiatives of the DPRK as signs of weakness and trying to embellish and advertise as if these are the product of its sanctions and pressure. The U.S. is trumpeting as if it would offer economic compensation and benefit in case we abandon nuke. But we have never had any expectation of U.S. support in carrying out our economic construction and will not at all make such a deal in future, either. It is a ridiculous comedy to see that the Trump administration, claiming to take a different road from the previous administrations, still clings to the outdated policy on the DPRK — a policy pursued by previous administrations at the time when the DPRK was at the stage of nuclear development. If President Trump follows in the footsteps of his predecessors, he will be recorded as more tragic and unsuccessful president than his predecessors, far from his initial ambition to make unprecedented success. If the Trump administration takes an approach to the DPRK-U.S. summit with sincerity for improved DPRK-U.S. relations, it will receive a deserved response from us. However, if the U.S. is trying to drive us into a corner to force our unilateral nuclear abandonment, we will no longer be interested in such dialogue and cannot but reconsider our proceeding to the DPRK-U.S. summit.” (Uriminzokkiri, “Press Statement of First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs,” January 15, 2019)
Pound for pound, the deadliest arms of all time are not nuclear but biological. A single gallon of anthrax, if suitably distributed, could end human life on Earth. Even so, the Trump administration has given scant attention to North Korea’s pursuit of living weapons — a threat that analysts describe as more immediate than its nuclear arms, which Pyongyang and Washington have been discussing for more than six months. According to an analysis issued by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey last month, North Korea is collaborating with foreign researchers to learn biotechnology skills and build machinery. As a result, the country’s capabilities are increasing rapidly. “North Korea is far more likely to use biological weapons than nuclear ones,” said Andrew C. Weber, a Pentagon official in charge of nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs under President Obama. “The program is advanced, underestimated and highly lethal.” The North may want to threaten a devastating germ counterattack as a way of warding off aggressors. If so, its bioweapons would act as a potent deterrent. But experts also worry about offensive strikes and agents of unusual lethality, especially the smallpox virus, which spreads person-to-person and kills a third of its victims. Experts have long suspected that the North harbors the germ, which in 1980 was declared eradicated from human populations. Worse, analysts say, satellite images and internet scrutiny of the North suggest that Pyongyang is newly interested in biotechnology and germ advances. In 2015, state media showed Kim Jong-un, the nation’s leader, touring a biological plant, echoing his nuclear propaganda. But compared to traditional weapons, biological threats have a host of unsettling distinctions: Germ production is small-scale and far less expensive than creating nuclear arms. Deadly microbes can look like harmless components of vaccine and agricultural work. And living weapons are hard to detect, trace and contain. The North’s great secrecy makes it hard to assess the threat and the country’s degree of sophistication. Today, the North might well have no bioweapons at all — just research, prototypes, human testing, and the ability to rush into industrial production. Still, Anthony H. Cordesman, a former Pentagon intelligence official now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the North “has made major strides” in all technical areas needed for the production of a major germ arsenal. In unclassified reports, the Trump administration has alluded to the North’s bioweapons program in vague terms. President Trump did not broach the subject of biological weapons during his meeting with Kim in Singapore, according to American officials. The lack of detail and urgency is all the more surprising given that John R. Bolton, Trump’s national security adviser, has long described it as a regional and even a global threat. In 2002, as undersecretary of state for arms control and international security in the George W. Bush administration, Bolton declared that “North Korea has one of the most robust offensive bioweapons programs on Earth.” Last century, most nations that made biological arms gave them up as impractical. Capricious winds could carry deadly agents back on users, infecting troops and citizens. The United States renounced its arsenal in 1969. But today, analysts say, the gene revolution could be making germ weapons more attractive. They see the possibility of designer pathogens that spread faster, infect more people, resist treatment, and offer better targeting and containment. If so, North Korea may be in the forefront. South Korean military white papers have identified at least ten facilities in the North that could be involved in the research and production of more than a dozen biological agents, including those that cause the plague and hemorrhagic fevers. United States intelligence officials have not publicly endorsed those findings. But many experts say the technological hurdles to such advances have collapsed. The North, for instance, has received advanced microbiology training from institutions in Asia and Europe. Bruce Bennett, a defense researcher at the RAND Corporation, said defectors from the North have described witnessing the testing of biological agents on political prisoners. Several North Korean military defectors have tested positive for smallpox antibodies, suggesting they were either exposed to the deadly virus or vaccinated against it, according to a report by Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Starting three years ago, Amplyfi, a strategic intelligence firm, detected a dramatic increase in North Korean web searches for “antibiotic resistance,” “microbial dark matter,” “cas protein” and similar esoteric terms, hinting at a growing interest in advanced gene and germ research. According to the Middlebury Institute analysis, at least 100 research publications that were jointly written by North Korean and foreign scientists have implications for military purposes, such as developing weapons of mass destruction. The collaborations may violate international sanctions. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., a North Korean [focused] military analyst, said it is entirely likely that the North has already experimented with gene editing that could enhance bacteria and viruses. “These are scientists, and scientists love to tinker,” he said. Western concerns about the North’s program jumped in June 2015, after Kim posed in a white lab coat alongside military officers and scientists in a modern-looking pesticide facility called the Bio-Technical Institute, his arms outspread toward shiny lab equipment. The plant allegedly produced pesticides. The photos showed enormous fermenters for growing microbes, as well as spray dryers that can turn bacterial spores into a powder fine enough to be inhaled. Kim was beaming. Melissa Hanham, a scholar who first identified the site’s threatening potential, said equipment model numbers showed that the North had obtained the machinery by evading sanctions — laundering money, creating front companies or bribing people to buy it on the black market. She said the evidence suggests the North succeeded in building a seemingly harmless agricultural plant that could be repurposed within weeks to produce dried anthrax spores. Arms-control analysts say intrusive inspections are needed to see whether a facility is intended for peaceful aims or something else. “A nuclear weapons facility has very visible signals to the outside world,” Bermudez said. “We can look at it and immediately say, ‘Ugh, that’s a nuclear reactor.’ But the technology for conducting biological weapons research is essentially the same as what keeps a population healthy.” Americans felt the sting of bioweapons in 2001 when a teaspoon of anthrax powder, dispatched in a handful of envelopes, killed five people, sickened 17 more and set off a nationwide panic. The spores shut down Congressional offices, the Supreme Court and much of the postal system, and cost about $320 million to clean up. Federal budgets for biodefense soared after the attacks but have declined in recent years. “The level of resources going against this is pitiful,” said Weber, the former Pentagon official. “We are back into complacency.” Dr. Robert Kadlec, the assistant secretary for preparedness and response at the Department of Health and Human Services, said, “We don’t spend half of an aircraft carrier on our preparedness for deliberate or natural events.” The National Security Council’s top health security position was eliminated last year, so biological threats now come under the more general heading of weapons of mass destruction. Still, on the Korean Peninsula, troops gird for a North Korean attack. According to the Belfer report, American forces in Korea since 2004 have been vaccinated against smallpox and anthrax. Recently, Army engineers sped up the detection of biological agents from days to hours through Project Jupitr, or the Joint United States Forces Korea Portal and Integrated Threat Recognition, a Department of Defense spokeswoman said. The comptroller general of the United States, after a request from the House Armed Services Committee, is currently conducting an evaluation of military preparedness for germ attacks. “If you’re a country that feels generally outclassed in conventional weapons,” Hanham said, a lethal microbe such as anthrax might seem like a good way “to create an outsized amount of damage.” Such an attack would maximize casualties, she said, while terrorizing the uninfected population. For North Korea, Hanham added, “That would be the twofold goal.” (Emily Baumgaertner and William J. Broad, “The Threat in North Korea’s Germ Ambitions,” New York Times, January 15, 2019, p. D-1)
1/16/19:
Multiple official sources confirmed this to me, as well as South Korean reports that U.S. special envoy Stephen Biegun will travel to Stockholm for a planned meeting with North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui, who is attending an international conference there. (Josh Rogin, “North Korea Spy Chief’s Visit to Washington Shrouded in Mystery,” Washington Post, January 16, 2019)
President Trump could announce a second summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un as soon as Friday, following an expected meeting at the White House with a North Korean envoy, U.S. and Asian diplomats said today. Kim’s lead negotiator, former spymaster Kim Yong Chol, is expected to carry a letter from the North Korean dictator to Trump when he travels to Washington this week. He is expected to meet the president in two days, in what would be a repeat of an unusual diplomatic move ahead of the first summit between the two leaders in June. The administration has not announced the envoy’s visit, which comes amid wrangling within the administration over terms for a second Trump-Kim meeting and the promised eradication of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. If announced soon, the summit would probably take place in March or April, with Danang, Vietnam, seeming to be the most likely venue, according to people familiar with the flurry of diplomatic activity over the past month. Trump and Kim have exchanged letters in recent weeks, two people briefed on aspects of the diplomacy said. “We are working to make progress on our goal of achieving the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea, and the president looks forward to meeting Chairman Kim again at their second summit at a place and time yet to be determined,” said a White House spokesperson. Kim Yong Chol, who is scheduled to arrive tomorrow night, is also expected to meet with CIA Director Gina Haspel, who has become more involved in matters related to Pyongyang’s nuclear threat in recent months. If the two sides make progress, U.S. officials are hoping to establish the first working-level talks between America’s special representative to the negotiations, Stephen Biegun, and his North Korean counterpart, Vice Foreign Minister Choi Sun Hee. North Korea has repeatedly given Biegun the cold shoulder and denied meetings with him, but people familiar with the deliberations said the two could meet shortly in Western Europe if Kim Yong Chol’s visit goes well. Biegun, through a State Department spokesperson, said: “We have no meetings to announce at this time.” Pompeo is expected to meet the North Korean official on this visit, but it’s clear Pyongyang’s goal is to speak directly with Trump, diplomats and others who follow the rogue regime closely said. “I think the North Koreans have come to the conclusion that the only one they can deal with is Trump,” said Ken Gause, a North Korea expert at the Center for Naval Analysis. “They believe this is a leader-to-leader relationship and the only reason that they would be meeting with Pompeo or even Biegun is to set up logistics.” Trump has overridden concerns among aides, including national security adviser John Bolton and former defense secretary Jim Mattis, about North Korea’s sincerity in getting rid of nuclear weapons, people familiar with the diplomacy said. “Different parts of the administration have different views on the path forward,” a person familiar with the deliberations said. Bolton and others have argued for maintaining the hard-line articulated last year — the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, that person said. However, U.S. officials have used that language less frequently lately, which some observers take as a sign that the ground may be shifting toward a U.S. concession, with the goal of reaching a deal that Trump sees as otherwise impossible. “There needs to be a starting point for both sides, where both sides get a clear win,” the person familiar with the deliberations said. The administration is debating whether to engage in what many North Korea hawks see as a risky move of offering the regime relief from sanctions or other incentives up front, diplomats and other officials said. “Basically the U.S. position is gravitating toward the North Korea position, which has always been for a phased, reciprocal process that does not involve giving up the nuclear capability on the front end,” Gause said. “The North Koreans are not going to give up something for nothing.” Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, said that the United States is likely to make an announcement soon that the yearly joint military exercises with South Korea have again been scaled back, a move Mattis had opposed. It’s also possible the exercises will be renamed, Kimball said. One possible North Korean move, he added, would be to decommission the Yongbyon nuclear plant to show it is making concessions. Kim Yong Chol’s visit will probably not be a negotiating session, but a necessary step “to discuss and agree on a second summit date, a venue and maybe broad outlines of what corresponding steps the U.S. may be prepared to take,” Kimball said. (Anne Gearan and John Hudson, “Trump Could Announce a Second Summit with North Korean Leader within Days,” Washington Post, January 16, 2019)
1/17/19:
North Korea’s lead negotiator in nuclear talks with the US, Kim Yong Chol, arrived in Washington today, just hours after President Donald Trump rolled out a new missile defense strategy that appears to contradict his own claim that Pyongyang is no longer a nuclear threat. Kim arrived at Washington Dulles International Airport, bringing with him a letter from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un meant for Trump, a source familiar with the denuclearization talks between the US and North Korea told CNN. Lead negotiator Kim was spotted leaving the airport with US Special Representative to North Korea Steve Biegun and Pak Chol, a North Korean official who chairs the Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee. Amid signs the two sides are close to agreeing to a second summit the newly unveiled Missile Defense Review, which Trump personally introduced at the Pentagon, explicitly states that North Korea remains an “extraordinary threat” to the US, an assessment that is consistent with previous findings by US military and intelligence agencies but rarely acknowledged by Trump himself. Vice President Mike Pence said yesterday that the US is still waiting on North Korea to take concrete steps to denuclearize, and the missile defense strategy released today indicates that Pyongyang currently poses a significant threat to the US despite ongoing negotiations. “While a possible new avenue to peace now exists with North Korea, it continues to pose an extraordinary threat and the United States must remain vigilant,” the Pentagon assessment says. “Over the past decade, it has invested considerable resources in its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and undertaken extensive nuclear and missile testing in order to realize the capability to threaten the US homeland with missile attack. As a result, North Korea has neared the time when it could credibly do so,” it says. Trump made little mention of North Korea in his public remarks at the Pentagon Thursday but the underlying missile defense strategy emphasizes efforts to improve protection measures against the existing North Korean arsenal. “The review reflects the fact that the Pentagon still views North Korea as a nuclear threat and states that the United States will enhance its missile defense capabilities to defeat a North Korean missile attack,” according to Kingston Reif, director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association. “The review states that North Korea has yet to achieve the capability to credibly threaten the US homeland. North Korea has not conducted enough tests to establish confidence in a reliable, working missile. But we have to assume that North Korea has a nuclear-armed ICBM that could strike the United States,” he said. “Even if the missile only has a 50% chance of hitting a major US city, that’s enough to establish a modicum of deterrence,” Reif added. Prior to today’s roll out of the Missile Defense Review, a senior administration official was asked specifically whether North Korea still poses a nuclear threat as Trump has previously suggested it does not. “The review does look at the comprehensive environment that the United States faces and our allies and partners face and it does posture forces to be prepared for the capabilities that currently exist and that anticipate in the future,” the official said. (Zachary Cohen, “Kim’s Envoy Arrives in D.C. as Pentagon States ‘Extraordinary Threat’ Posed by North Korea,” CNN, January 18, 2019)
1/18/19:
President Trump will meet with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, in late February, the White House announced, renewing a high-level diplomatic dialogue that has eased tensions with a rogue nuclear state but has shown no progress in eliminating its nuclear arsenal. A White House official said the date and the location of the meeting would be announced later, suggesting either that the Trump administration was seeking concessions from the North Koreans before Trump committed to the meeting or that the two sides were still haggling over the site and other logistical details. Vietnam, Thailand and Hawaii have all been mentioned as potential settings. The announcement came after a 90-minute meeting in the Oval Office between Trump and Kim Yong-chol, a former North Korean intelligence chief, who has acted as the top nuclear negotiator for Kim. Trump, who had made a celebratory appearance after a session with the intelligence chief last June to announce his first meeting with Kim, this time stayed out of sight. But his press secretary, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, told reporters, “We’ve continued to make progress.” The United States, she said, will keep sanctions against North Korea in place until Kim agrees to surrender his arsenal. She added that the North had shown “good faith” in releasing imprisoned Americans. Still, the very fact that Trump agreed to a second meeting with Kim — after North Korea’s failure to begin dismantling its arsenal following their first meeting in Singapore last June — is a sign of how quickly the president has backed away from his initial insistence on swift disarmament by Pyongyang. And it raised anew the question of whether Trump will enter a second summit meeting better prepared than he was in Singapore. While Trump emerged from that meeting brimming with optimism and declared on Twitter that there was “no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea,” American intelligence officials have concluded that the country continues to produce nuclear fuel, weapons and missiles. There have been no substantive working-level negotiations between the two sides since last fall. [?] While Pompeo emerged from a meeting with Kim in October declaring that the North Korean leader told him “he’s ready to allow” inspectors into a nuclear testing site that the North had blown up, that inspection has yet to happen. Larger issues of inspection will hang over the next meeting as well. One subject under discussion with the North, according to officials of several countries briefed on the talks, is whether the country would “freeze” its nuclear fuel and weapons production during negotiations, so that the country’s arsenal does not grow while talks drag on. “But that would require highly intrusive inspections, across the country,” said Jung Pak, a former senior C.I.A. analyst now at the Brookings Institution. “Previous negotiations have fallen apart because of our insistence on those inspections. And who is going to take North Korea’s word on whether it is truly freezing its program?” Some analysts and diplomats said they worried that by agreeing so readily to another meeting, Trump was inviting the same situation as in Singapore — a press extravaganza that produces little in the way of concrete achievements. “You have to be afraid that we are playing into North Korea’s hands,” said Joseph Y. Yun, a former State Department official who has negotiated with the North. “They want to wait, and have as much time as possible elapse when they don’t do anything significant to denuclearize, and become accepted regionally and globally as a nuclear state.” The risk was even greater, some said, because of the multiple political and legal challenges facing Trump, from the government shutdown to the investigation of ties between his presidential campaign and Russia. “The timing is advantageous to the North Koreans, because Trump needs some sort of win now,” said Victor D. Cha, who negotiated with Pyongyang during the George W. Bush administration and was briefly considered by Trump as ambassador to South Korea. Among the potential risks, experts said, is that Trump would accept a deal with Kim that would freeze his nuclear program and dismantle his intercontinental ballistic missiles, but leave in place the North’s arsenal of intermediate and short-range missiles. That would rattle Japan, which lies in range of those rockets. The Japanese are also concerned that Trump, long a critic of the expense of maintaining an American military presence in Asia, would agree to pull troops out of South Korea and Japan. Still, South Korea welcomed the announcement, with a government spokesman saying he expected the second Trump-Kim summit meeting to be “a turning point for solidifying a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.” The first step the North Koreans were expected to take after the June meeting was a detailed inventory of their nuclear assets. That was to include the number of weapons they have produced — variously estimated at 20 to 60 nuclear bombs — the locations of those weapons, any nuclear materials used to produce new weapons and a detailed list of their missiles and missile launchers. The United States wanted to use the list to truth-test the North, comparing it with what American intelligence agencies have gathered over the past 30 years. But the North Koreans have complained that the inventory would amount to a targeting list, guiding the United States on what to attack should Trump ever order a pre-emptive strike. The arrival of Kim Yong-chol, and his stay at a hotel in Dupont Circle, was an unusual spectacle for a senior North Korean, particularly since the United States suspects him in the torpedoing of a South Korean naval ship, and one of the most aggressive cyber takedowns of an American company, Sony Pictures Entertainment. Vietnam appears to be the leading candidate to host the meeting. North Korea maintains diplomatic relations with it, and the United States could point to Vietnam as a country run by former enemies who have turned into trading partners. (Mark Landler and David E. Sanger, “President Plans Talks with Kim for Next Month,” New York Times, January 19, 2019, p. A-1) Before arriving at the White House, Kim Yong Chol met for less than an hour with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at a hotel in Dupont Circle. After Kim’s visit to the White House, he and the rest of the North Korean delegation were scheduled to join Pompeo at the State Department for lunch. U.S. officials want the North to start treating the American envoy for the talks, Stephen Biegun, seriously. The North has repeatedly turned down meetings between him and his counterpart, Vice Foreign Minister Choe Sun Hui. If the talks go well on Friday, Biegun is expected meet Choe for follow-up negotiations in Stockholm over the weekend. (John Hudson , David Nakamura and Simon Denyer, “Trump, Kim Agree to Second Summit,” Washington Post, January 19, 2019, p. A-1)
Pompeo: “Q: On North Korea, there’s plenty of reporting about a delegation here in Washington this weekend planning for a possible second summit. Critics say since that first meeting that North Korea has yet to truly denuclearize as far as giving up weapons, long-range missiles. Some people wonder what is the point of having these conversations anymore. Is there a reason to be optimistic? POMPEO: Yeah. “Critics say” is how you began this question, as I recall. Some critics have said we’ve offered too much. Many critics have said we haven’t offered enough. I don’t have much to add other than the President has made enormous strides in working with North Korea to get their commitment to denuclearize. We now need to execute. We need to implement. We’ve always known this would be a long process. While we do that we need to make sure we reduce risk, and we’ve done that. There aren’t nuclear tests being conducted. There haven’t been missile tests conducted. These are things that were threatening the United States when President Trump took office. We want to reduce that risk, reduce North Korea’s capacity to build out their program. These discussions are an important component for making sure that we do everything we can to deliver on the commitments that were made in Singapore between Chairman Kim and President Trump. Q: Five past presidents have tried the same thing. Is there reason to believe that this time is different? POMPEO: Yeah. It’s the first time a North Korean leader has met with a United States president, looked him in the eye and said I’ll do it.” (DoS, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo with Scott Thuman of Sinclair Broadcasting, January 18, 2019)
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is wishing for a breakthrough in advancing talks aimed at disbanding his regime’s nuclear program as he hopes to avoid more confrontation, a Cheong Wa Dae official told the Korea Times, today. “Kim Yong-chol, Pyongyang’s lead negotiator in denuclearization with the United States, plans to deliver a handwritten letter from Kim Jong-un to U.S. President Donald Trump during his few hours in the United States,” the official said by telephone asking not to be identified. Details of the letter have yet to be known. But the soon-to-be-delivered letter included “more detailed plans” by North Korea toward dismantling its nuclear arsenal and reaffirmation by its leader to move forward with Pyongyang’s roadmap on how to gradually retire its hypersonic and cruise missiles, according to the official. (Kim Yoo-chul, “’Kim Jong Un Hopes Breakthrough in Nuke Talks,” Korea Times, January 19, 2019)
Brig. Gen. Vincent Brooks: “Nick Schifrin: Let’s just talk about the news of the day, first of all. Do you believe it’s a good idea for there to be a second summit? Brooks: I do. I think that the dialogue part of pressure and dialogue is a critical aspect of this. Without conversation, we go right back where we were in 2016 and ’17, with the great potential of miscalculation one another’s actions. So, I think it’s good. It’s important to recognize that any decision made in North Korea about the way forward is going to be made by Kim Jong-un himself. And so the fact that he sent his trusted representative, Kim Yong-chol, to Washington to carry the message that the door is still open, I believe, is a good thing. Schifrin: So let’s talk about Kim Jong-un himself. There’s a debate in Washington, as you know, about his intentions. Do you believe he’s serious about getting rid of his nuclear weapons? Brooks: I do. I think that the dance is going to be very important here, though, as we think about how we go from where we were to where we all want to be. First, we ought to take him at his word. And that’s not an easy thing to accept, especially given the track record of North Korea. But this is a new leader in North Korea. And this is the first episode that he’s gone through with national leaders. And, indeed, there’s evidence that he’s serious about committing to what he said. For example, we have now gone 415 days without a strategic provocation, test or demonstration. I think that’s a signal by itself that Kim Jong-un has moved in a different direction. Schifrin: But, as you know, there are a lot of skeptics of this approach, perhaps that Kim Jong-un is somehow buying time. You called him a new leader. Does he want a new relationship fundamentally with the United States? Brooks: I do believe that Kim Jong-un wants a different relationship. But that’s really at the heart of the pace of the interaction that I believe was perhaps restarted today with this meeting in Washington. And it is, can trust be built sufficiently to overcome so many decades of distrust and expectation of failure? That’s the challenge that is ahead right now. Schifrin: So let’s talk about some of the mechanics of how to rebuild that trust and some of the topics that will be discussed at this second summit. What do you think Kim Jong-un’s priorities are? Is it sanctions relief first, or perhaps a political declaration to end the war, which the U.S. is debating right now? Brooks: I think the broader aim is to have a completely new set of relationships in Northeast Asia. And with that, then there will be subordinate actions, like the specific decisions you made reference to, that will get us toward that. What the sequence is going to be, that’s what I think we have — the significant work to be done ahead. Schifrin: I want to go back to September 2017. The North Koreans had set off a hydrogen bomb. They had launched an intercontinental ballistic missile that could hit the United States. And then we heard from Secretary of Defense James Mattis. Mattis: Any threat to the United States or its territories, including Guam, or our allies will be met with a massive military response. We’re not looking to the total annihilation of a country, namely, North Korea, but, as I said, we have many options to do so. Schifrin: How close were the United States and North Korea to war? Brooks: I would say we were close. Now, but this is the nature of being close to war. And I think it’s important to dig into this one just a little bit, Nick, and that is, the capability to go to war was clearly there. The military preparations were also there. We were posturing in a number of different ways, logistically, policy-wise. The concentration of all of the U.S. military services and the combatant commands was focused on this problem, in the event that we ended up where we didn’t want to be. The greater danger though, Nick, in all this was the potential for miscalculation. And that is that one side would perceive the actions of another or the other in such a way that they presume that there was something hostile and different. Schifrin: What might have been the spark that lit the U.S. decision, so to speak, to go to war? Brooks: The spark could have been any action without explanation or dialogue that was misconstrued. It could have been something as small as ordering all of the noncombatants, those civilians who are in South Korea, either part of families of government, government workers who were not mission-essential, or even those who are expatriates of some sort, ordering their departure from the Republic of Korea. That could have been perceived… Schifrin: You mean a U.S…. Brooks: Yes, U.S. Schifrin: You mean a U.S. decision that would have led to a North Korean decision? Brooks: It could have triggered a North Korean reaction, looking for that signal as a very significant move by the United States that would be preparatory to military action. So that didn’t happen, thankfully. Schifrin: How close was it to happening? Brooks: And, as a result, we didn’t see the spark. Well, it was clearly being discussed in Washington and in other capitals. And, at that time, of course, we didn’t have an ambassador in Seoul. And I spent quite a bit of my own time having discussions with ambassadors, foreign ministers, defense ministers of various countries around — around the world who have citizens in the Republic of Korea, wondering whether this was going to happen or not. Schifrin: Among the scenarios you were considering, did any of them include the U.S. attacking first? Brooks: The entire array was planned. And we made sure we were prepared for whatever decision the two presidents that I was serving made together. And that could include a unilateral decision made by either one of the two presidents. And I think it’s very important to understand that I was a commander serving two presidents during that entire time. Schifrin: Meaning the South Korean president under your joint forces command and the U.S. president. Brooks: Exactly, the South Korean president and the president of the United States, absolutely. Schifrin: The U.S. suspended the major U.S.-South Korean military exercises, Ulchi-Freedom Guardian, as well as a number of smaller exercises. In your opinion, has that degraded readiness? Brooks: Well, in real terms, there’s no substitute for the most credible, realistic scenario that you can train less the conditions of actual combat. So any commander would say yes. The answer is yes. The readiness does get degraded. But let’s put that in context. So there has to be room for diplomatic maneuvering, diplomatic action to occur. And if creating leverage or traction comes from these adjustments to the exercises, then that’s a risk that has to be consciously taken. And it was. And commanders then have a responsibility of finding other ways to maintain readiness, less than the optimum method. And that’s exactly what’s going on. We have got very creative commanders and leaders out there who are going to find ways to keep the edge of this sword sharp, while, at the same time, having been told to put it in the sheath for a period of time, never forgetting how to use it. That’s the way I describe it. And that’s what happened here. But it does create a new challenge for how you maintain that readiness and make sure that the credible threat is still intact.” (PBS NewsHour, Interview with Brig. Gen. Vincent Brooks, Former USFK Commander, January 18, 2019)
When it comes to who should get credit for denuclearization talks with North Korea, South Korean leader Moon Jae-in has specifically pointed the finger toward one man. “President Trump should win the Nobel Peace Prize,” Moon told reporters last April, in one of many moments of flattery toward the U.S. leader. A new poll, however, shows that many South Koreans would not agree. According to a survey, conducted in late December by Hankook Research for the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 31 percent of South Koreans thought that Trump had a greater impact than Moon on bringing North Korea to the table for denuclearization talks. Comparatively, almost 6 out of 10 said that Moon had a greater impact on talks than Trump did; a further 5 percent said they had an equal impact. The Chicago Council poll showed relatively little confidence among South Koreans that either world leaders’ negotiating abilities would lead North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons — 52 percent said they had little or no confidence in Moon’s ability on this front, while 53 percent said the same of Trump. In general, supporters of Moon’s leftist government were more positive about both Trump and Moon, while supporters of the conservative Liberty Korea Party were more skeptical. More than three-quarters of all South Koreans thought that the sanctions on North Korea were what had brought Kim to the negotiating table. There were notable areas of optimism. Forty-two percent of South Koreans thought that the national security situation in the country had gotten better, compared with four years ago, with 30 percent saying it was the same and 23 percent saying it had gotten worse. Another poll conducted last year by the Asan Institute found that 60 percent of the country approved of Moon’s policy toward North Korea. Perhaps because of this, South Koreans’ own desire for nuclear weapons appears to have dipped to 54 percent in favor, compared with 43 percent opposed. Older polls have put the percentage of South Koreans who want nuclear weapons slightly higher, with as much as two-thirds in favor. Despite Trump’s sometimes critical talk about the alliance with South Korea — complaining about the nature of the military alliance with the country and delaying joint exercises last year — most South Koreans seem comfortable with the state of the countries’ partnership. A plurality of 36 percent credited the alliance in general for stopping a wide-scale North Korean attack in past 10 years, while 75 percent said they thought that the United States would defend South Korea in such an attack. Such confidence may be earned. A separate poll conducted in 2017 by the Chicago Council found that 62 percent of Americans supported the use of U.S. troops if North Korea were to invade South Korea — the first time since 1990 that a majority favored backing South Korea in this way. Hankook Research conducted the poll Dec. 26 and 27. The sample size was 1,000 South Koreans ages 19 and older. They were contacted on landline phones. The margin of error is plus or minus 3.1 percentage points. (Adam Taylor, “Most South Koreans Think Moon, Not Trump, Is Leading the Way on North Korea Talks,” Washington Post, January 18, 2019)
1/19/19:
Trump: “So, I’m going to Dover Air Force Base. A very sad occasion. We’ll then be back, and we have a very busy day planned. We had a very good meeting yesterday with North Korea. That was an incredible meeting. It lasted almost two hours. And we’ve agreed to meet sometime probably at the end of February. We’ve picked the country, but we’ll be announcing it in the future. Kim Jong Un is looking very forward to it and so am I. We’ve made a lot of progress that has not been reported by the media, but we have made a lot of progress as far as denuclearization is concerned. And we’re talking about a lot of different things. But we’ve made tremendous progress that has not been reported, unfortunately, but it will be. Things are going very well with North Korea.” (White House Press Office, Remarks by President Trump before Marine One Departure,” January 19, 2019)
1/20/19:
Senior officials from the United States and North Korea have kicked off working-level talks in Sweden to prepare for a second summit between the leaders of the two countries, sources said today. Stephen Biegun, Washington’s special representative for North Korea, arrived in Stockholm yesterday afternoon for four days of meetings with North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui in an effort to break the current deadlock over denuclearization talks. It is the first time that Biegun has met Choe for working-level denuclearization talks since he became the U.S. nuclear envoy in August last year. South Korea’s top nuclear envoy, Lee Do-hoon, also arrived in Sweden on January 18 for possible three-way negotiations with them as a potential mediator in denuclearization talks. While at a retreat 50 kilometers northwest of Stockholm, the nuclear envoys are expected to hold intensive negotiations to break the impasse. The facility is under tight security, with police blocking journalists and outsiders’ access to it. Experts said that the U.S. and North Korea may seek to focus on making some concessions to break the current deadlock. Some have floated an idea of a small package deal that may involve the North shutting down or freezing operations at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and dismantling intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in exchange for Washington’s partial sanctions relief. (Yonhap, “U.S., N.K. Kick off Working-Level talks for Second Summit of Their Leaders,” January 20, 2019)
President Trump’s demands that South Korea take on far more costs for hosting U.S. troops is straining the alliance and potentially playing into North Korea’s hands ahead of a second summit with Kim Jong Un, South Korean lawmakers and experts say. South Korea has about 28,500 U.S. troops on more than 20 sites and paid $855 million last year toward the cost. But the cost-sharing pact expired at the end of last year after 10 rounds of negotiations that left — in the words of one foreign ministry official in Seoul — a “huge gap” between both sides. South Korean lawmakers and experts worry that Trump is so obsessed with Seoul paying more that he could take the previously unthinkable step of withdrawing some troops if a deal is not reached. That would be an indirect gift to North Korean leader Kim, undermining one of the most important cards the United States has during negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program, experts say. “We are experiencing difficulties because the U.S. side abruptly brought up a condition totally unacceptable to our side at the last stage of negotiations,” Chung Eui-yong, national security adviser to South Korean President Moon Jae-in, told reporters earlier this week. Chung said he still believed the two sides could reach a “reasonable deal,” and many experts still expect a crisis to be averted. But there is no doubt the risks are growing, especially if a deal isn’t reached before Trump’s potential summit with Kim. “I am very concerned,” said Chun Yung-woo, a conservative former national security adviser. “The danger of failure of the negotiations is, I think, broadly underestimated.” Lawmakers from the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, which need to approve any deal and have been briefed on the negotiations, said the United States first demanded South Korea nearly double its contribution, to $1.6 billion, but later scaled that back to $1.2 billion. When that demand was also rejected, Washington lowered the money demands but suggested the deal be extended for only one year, instead of the usual five. The United States has also proposed that South Korea cover some “operational costs” for the U.S. military presence in the region, including deploying aircraft carriers. South Korean lawmakers called this demand unacceptable. Lawmakers from both the liberal ruling party and conservative opposition said South Korean public opinion is sensitive to any impression that the United States is bullying them. Moon’s government, meanwhile, cannot afford to look weak in the eyes of its own people. “One trillion won is a psychological barrier,” said Lee Soo-hyuck, a ruling-party lawmaker, referring to an amount in South Korean won equivalent to nearly $890 million. “It would be very difficult to get the consent of the National Assembly if it is over 1 trillion,” Lee added. “We would need some very persuasive argument or logic.” Ruling-party lawmaker Song Young-gil called Trump’s demands “unreasonable and groundless,” while Won Yoo-chul, a conservative member of the foreign affairs committee, fears a backlash that will fuel “anti-American sentiments among the Korean people.” Timothy Betts, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for plans, programs and operations, is leading negotiations. But instructions appear to be coming directly from the White House. Trump has said the United States gets “practically nothing” toward the cost of the troops, while complaining bitterly about South Korea’s trade surplus with the United States — until the two sides signed a new trade deal last September. In “Fear,” Bob Woodward’s account of the Trump White House, the U.S. president is described as being obsessed with the cost of the U.S. troop presence, angrily threatening to pull them out on more than one occasion. At various times, he was talked down by a host of insiders, including former defense secretary Jim Mattis, former secretary of state Rex Tillerson and Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Today, only Dunford remains in his job, with Mattis’s resignation — over the plan to withdraw troops from Syria and the treatment of U.S. allies in general — seen as especially damaging. “It’ll make it much harder,” said Victor Cha, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “There’ll be nothing to filter what Trump wants to do, nothing to filter a very uniformed view on how he wants things done.” Cha said the Trump administration is looking for a “paradigm shift” in military burden sharing and is particularly keen to establish a precedent with South Korea ahead of similar negotiations with Japan and NATO next year. Many members of Moon’s administration began their political careers as left-wing pro-democracy student activists, who were inclined to see the U.S. troop presence as more motivated by American strategic interests than South Korea’s views. “I don’t think they will ever ask the U.S. to withdraw,” said Chun, the conservative former national security adviser, referring to officials in Moon’s entourage. “But if President Trump decides to withdraw because of this cost issue, I don’t think any of them will cry over that kind of decision.” The question of the share South Korea is paying depends on your vantage point. The United States says Seoul pays $855 million out of a total cost of about $2 billion. South Korea says that doesn’t account for the large amounts of land supplied rent-free and calculates it pays more like 70 percent of the cost. Seoul also paid almost the entire cost of building a massive new U.S. base at Pyeongtaek and spent $13 billion between 2013 and 2017 on U.S. military hardware, training and services. Talks have overrun the deadline before. After the last agreement expired in December 2013, a new deal wasn’t implemented until the following June. But Kim Dae-jung, a lawmaker with the left-leaning Justice Party, said the risks are higher this time, given Trump’s “isolationist” tendencies and clear desire to bring more U.S. soldiers home. Many South Koreans, he said, were pleasantly surprised by Trump’s sincere attempt to make peace on the Korean Peninsula but are perplexed by his “coldhearted dealmaking” over the troop-cost issue. In Pyongyang, though, Kim Jong Un is likely happy at any hint of a possible reduction in U.S. forces. “The withdrawal of U.S. troops is the most important card to play in getting North Korea to denuclearize,” Chun said. “What I am most concerned about is that [Trump] will waste the card without using it. If he decides to withdraw troops out of exasperation without thinking of how to link to denuclearization negotiations, this becomes a dead card.” (Simon Denyer, “Trump Faces Dual Demands in Koreas,” Washington Post, January 22, 2019, p. A-8)
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Talks held near the Swedish capital Stockholm that ended today and included representatives from North and South Korea and the United States were constructive, Sweden’s foreign ministry said. “Constructive talks have been held covering issues concerning developments on the Korean peninsula, including confidence building, economic development and long-term engagement,” a ministry spokesman said. A diplomatic source said the Swedish round-table conference, held on the outskirts of Stockholm over the weekend and concluded on Monday, had touched on the planned summit while bilateral talks had also been held on the sidelines. “Different mechanisms for regional security have been discussed, that issue was something to which a lot of time was devoted,” the source said. North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui, U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun and South Korean negotiator Lee Do-hoon took part. (Daniel Dickson, Simon Johnson and Niklas Pollard, “Sweden Holds ‘Constructive’ Talks, Eye o Second Summit,” Reuters, January 21, 2019)
U.S. intelligence officials have met with North Korean counterparts secretly for a decade, a covert channel that allowed communications during tense times, aided in the release of detainees and helped pave the way for President Trump’s historic summit last year with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The secret channel between the Central Intelligence Agency and spies from America’s bitter adversary included two missions to Pyongyang in 2012 during the Obama administration by Michael Morell, then deputy CIA director, and at least one by his successor, Avril Haines, say current and former U.S. officials. The channel appears to have gone dormant late in the Obama administration. Mike Pompeo re-energized it while CIA director, sending an agency officer to meet with North Korean counterparts in Singapore in August 2017. By early 2018, a whirlwind of secret and public talks was underway, which brought together Trump and Kim in a pomp-filled Singapore meeting in June. The intelligence channel played a role. A few details of the contacts have been previously reported. This article represents the most comprehensive description of how it worked. The channel wasn’t the only factor bringing the leaders together. They took risks in pursuing the summit, the first between their countries. North Korea’s improving ties with South Korea helped. But the intelligence channel’s existence reveals a new dimension to what was known about U.S.-North Korean ties, adding texture to the public picture of mutual threats, stymied talks, and, more recently, a top-level summit. Dating to at least 2009, the channel created relationships between the security apparatuses that provided a path to diplomacy. A key interlocutor was Gen. Kim Yong Chol, former head of Pyongyang’s Reconnaissance General Bureau spy agency. Now the senior North Korean negotiator, he met Friday with Trump and Secretary of State Pompeo. Some of the intelligence meetings have been public. When North Korea in 2014 insisted a senior U.S. official visit Pyongyang to obtain release of two detained U.S. citizens, it was James Clapper, U.S. Director of National Intelligence then, who went. There, he met with Gen. Kim. A look inside the secret intelligence channel emerges from current and former Trump and Obama administration officials who describe how the administrations employed it and how the channel helped lead to the historic summit. The CIA, State Department and White House declined to comment on the secret channel, as did a diplomat at North Korea’s U.N. mission in New York. Other officials mentioned in this article or their institutions were given an opportunity to comment. The U.S. and North Korea have long exchanged messages through the North Korean U.N. mission in New York. Some U.S. officials have viewed that channel’s usefulness as limited, saying its primary purpose has been to pass messages to North Korea’s less influential foreign-affairs ministry. In contrast, before the new era of summits, the intelligence channel was a way to communicate directly with regime hard-liners. U.S. officials sometimes called it the “goon channel,” referring to North Korean interlocutors the Americans found distasteful but important in deciding security matters. Some South Korean politicians accuse Gen. Kim of having overseen the 2010 sinking of a South Korean navy ship. The U.S. has accused the spy agency he ran of conducting the 2014 computer hack of Sony Pictures. North Korea has denied responsibility for both. Washington used the intelligence encounters for multiple purposes. They expanded from a way to discuss detained Americans to a potential tool for crisis management, a means of reaffirming the U.S. was prepared to normalize relations in return for denuclearization, and a mechanism to discuss summit plans, culminating in a visit by Pompeo last spring when he was CIA director. “The rationale for using a channel between intelligence agencies would be that in the event of some sort of crisis it could provide a capability to reach people in their system with authority,” says Daniel Russel, a senior State Department and National Security Council official on Asia during the Obama administration. “Generally speaking, in countries like North Korea, the foreign ministry has limited influence, so you need to be able to speak to the guys with the guns.” There are precedents for using spies for sensitive talks with authoritarian regimes. Officers from Britain’s intelligence service and the CIA initiated talks that ended with Libya’s abandoning its nuclear and chemical weapons programs in 2003. The secret intelligence talks began by 2009, when relations were frozen. President Obama’s White House asked Joseph DeTrani to reach out to the North. Nicknamed “Broadway Joe,” with a reputation for a gregarious manner, he was the North Korea “mission manager” for the director of national intelligence, coordinating U.S. spy agencies’ efforts to decipher the hermetic country. DeTrani, who speaks Mandarin and who spent more than two decades at the CIA, was among the few American officials who had extensive interaction with North Korea. He was a negotiator during the ill-fated Six Party Talks, a multicountry effort from 2003 to 2009 to persuade North Korea to abandon nuclear ambitions. “DeTrani thinks that under all circumstances it is worth talking to North Korea so at least we are in communication, we are not misinterpreting what is happening and there is the possibility to grab small openings,” says Dennis Blair, a retired admiral and director of national intelligence during the Obama administration’s first 16 months. DeTrani’s mission was narrow. Obama wanted him to secure release of two U.S. journalists sentenced to 12 years of hard labor. DeTrani held unpublicized meetings in Singapore under tense circumstances: Pyongyang carried out missile tests that DeTrani’s North Korean counterparts declined to discuss. The talks helped lead to former President Clinton’s 2009 Pyongyang visit, when he brought back the journalists. After assuming responsibility in 2010 for the U.S. intelligence community’s counter-proliferation efforts, DeTrani made a secret trip to Pyongyang, warning North Korea against proliferating nuclear and missile systems. He passed the baton for secret meetings to Morell, the CIA’s No. 2. In April 2012, the two officials flew to Pyongyang in a U.S. aircraft from Guam, and DeTrani introduced the CIA deputy director to the North Koreans. The moment was critical. The Obama administration had concluded the “Leap Day agreement” in February under which the North agreed to a moratorium on long-range missile tests and nuclear tests and to shut down its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, including its uranium-enrichment plant there. The U.S. promised to provide food aid. But Washington said North Korea’s plans to launch a satellite would breach the deal. Kim Jong Il, who ruled North Korea for 17 years, had died the previous December, transferring power to Kim Jong Un—making it crucial to keep the communication line open. U.S. efforts to head off that launch failed. Morell, a career CIA officer with Asia experience, returned to Pyongyang the following August with the message that North Korea faced a choice. It could build its nuclear and missile arsenals and suffer diplomatic and economic isolation—or choose denuclearization and become part of the international community. The trip ended in disappointment: He didn’t get the hoped-for audience with Kim Jong Un. Glimpses of the secret channel have occasionally become public. In late 2012, a South Korean newspaper reported mysterious Americans had made two trips to North Korea. The Financial Times reported in January 2018 that Morell had made a secret trip to North Korea in 2012. Morell was succeeded as CIA deputy director by Ms. Haines, whose path to a senior national-security post included a stint as owner of an independent book store. She traveled to Pyongyang during her tenure as the CIA’s No. 2 from August 2013 to January 2015. Despite the paucity of breakthroughs, some former officials say it was useful to have contacts to hardline elements of the regime, who were deemed to be influential and controlled the security apparatus holding U.S. prisoners. Keeping the channel secret also enabled the Obama administration to encourage international partners to isolate Pyongyang diplomatically and economically as part of a pressure campaign to denuclearize. “It’s been the only reliable channel of communications for the most basic of issues,” says a senior Trump administration official. “That is where the North Koreans have been comfortable.” Key officials at the State Department, which continued on a parallel track to work though North Korean diplomats in New York and sent envoys on rare trips to North Korea, were aware of the back channel. Still, skeptics among some former administration officials have questioned whether the covert channel diminished the State Department’s traditional negotiating role. “Keeping channels of communication open is always important, but the messengers and the messages also matter,” says Joel Wit, a former State Department official now at the Stimson Center, a nonpartisan Washington think tank. “Intelligence officers are not trained diplomats, and if they don’t convey the right message it can backfire.” Use of the covert channel appears to have waxed and waned. After 2016 intelligence reports showed North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs were making headway, Washington ratcheted up economic sanctions, including on Kim Jong Un. There appeared to be a hiatus in high-level visits, though it isn’t clear if the channel went dormant entirely. As tension rose in August 2017, the channel was re-energized. That month, Trump threatened North Korea’s leaders with “fire and fury,” U.S.-South Korean annual war games resumed and Pyongyang responded by testing a ballistic missile over Japan. Andrew Kim, a veteran CIA officer and head of the agency’s new Korea Mission Center, traveled to Singapore to meet North Korean officials. Kim, former chief of several CIA overseas stations, was born in South Korea and had longstanding ties to its top national-security officials. Separate efforts, apart from the intelligence channel, also show Trump’s interest in establishing a dialogue. In September 2017, North Korea’s foreign minister invited Jeffrey Feltman, a former American diplomat serving as U.N. undersecretary general for political affairs, to Pyongyang for a dialogue. U.N. Secretary General António Guterres told him to first run the idea by other interested countries, Feltman says, and Trump administration officials advised against the trip. But when Guterres raised the issue with Trump during an Oval Office meeting in October, the president said Feltman should go, Feltman and a U.N. spokesman say. Trump’s personal role in approving the trip hasn’t previously been disclosed. Feltman made the trip publicly. During four days of meetings in December 2017, he says, he told the North Koreans the U.S. wasn’t the only country alarmed at its nuclear and missile tests. He gave North Korean foreign minister Ri Yong Ho a copy of “The Sleepwalkers,” a book about how European nations stumbled into World War I. In a November speech, Kim Jong Un had boasted his country had finished building its nuclear and missile forces. Citing that speech, Feltman urged the North Koreans to redirect their efforts to the coming Winter Olympics in South Korea to seek an opening with South Korea and the West, an idea that officials in Pyongyang may have already had. Kim Jong Un’s 2018 New Year address hinted at change: While underscoring his nuclear capabilities, he offered to send a delegation to the Winter Olympics. Adding to the momentum, South Korean officials began encouraging the idea of a top-level meeting between Trump and Kim, and the idea was explored in the covert channel as well. In March, South Korean officials visited the White House and relayed the North Korean leader’s invitation to meet with Trump. The plan had been for then-National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster and top officials to confer with the South Koreans, discuss the offer and have the South Koreans meet with Trump the next day. Instead, Trump decided to meet the South Koreans then and there, and he immediately agreed to the summit, saying: “Tell them I’ll do it.” The administration still wanted direct confirmation from North Korean leadership that they wanted a summit. The intelligence channel had been active since the August meeting in Singapore, and the U.S. used it to confirm Pyongyang’s summit invitation came from the top and to advance plans for the meeting. At the end of March, Pompeo, then CIA director, flew to Pyongyang. Six weeks later, as Secretary of State, he went again, accompanied by Andrew Kim, and returned with three American detainees. Less than a month later, Messrs. Trump and Kim met in Singapore. U.S.-North Korean diplomacy is now largely in the open and occurring at the highest levels. Intelligence contacts continue. In Washington on Friday, Gen. Kim met unannounced with the CIA’s deputy director, Vaughn Bishop. (Michael R. Gordon and Warren Strobel, “U.S. and North Korean Spies Have Held Secret Talks for a Decade,” Wall Street Journal, January 21, 2019)
Japan has agreed to talks with South Korea over the name of the body of water that separates the two nations — but it intends to resist calls that it be renamed the East Sea. The move by Japan comes amid pressure from the International Hydrographic Organization. However, Japan also says it is uncomfortable with the suggestion the area appear on maps as both the Sea of Japan and the East Sea. It argues that the waters have been known as the Sea of Japan for a century and that the IHO has already recognized that name as the sea’s official title. Based in Monaco, the IHO is tasked with identifying the names of oceans and seas around the world and provides guidelines when nations draw up marine charts that include maritime borders. Tokyo points out that since the organization was set up in 1921, the waters between Japan and the Koreas have been known as the Sea of Japan and that South Korea only raised the issue at the UN, with which the IHO is affiliated, in 1992. Since then, Seoul has insisted that the term Sea of Japan was introduced only as a result of Tokyo’s colonial occupation of the peninsula, between 1910 and 1945. South Korea has continued to apply pressure and the IHO last year informed Tokyo that it reserved the right to revise the name of the body of water without any input from Japan if the government continued to refuse to hold discussions on the matter with Seoul. North Korea, unsurprisingly, has sided with the South on the issue and the IHO wants all three nations to hold talks before the organization holds its next general meeting, in 2020. In a statement issued to the South China Morning Post, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, “As a responsible member of the IHO, Japan intends to make constructive contributions to informal talks. The government of Japan continues to call for its position, that there is no need or reason for changing the name, as the name ‘Sea of Japan’ is the only internationally established name for the sea area concerned.” Okumura Jun, a political analyst at the Meiji Institute for Global Affairs, said: “Koreans appear to be making quite a big deal out of something that is really rather insignificant, which hopefully means that it won’t have a substantive impact on bilateral relations — but it could do.” He said the debate was ironic given that Seoul had steadfastly refused to consider requests from Tokyo for international arbitration over the sovereignty of the South Korean-held islands of Dokdo, which Japan claims and knows as Takeshima. “Conservatives might be angry at this, but I can also see the broader ill will growing over this and other issues and that will have an impact on the real economy, on tourism, for example, on K-pop and we might see TV channels here not renewing Korean dramas for broadcasting,” Okumura said. “But while the Koreans might find it impossible to stand up to China and difficult to resist the United States, standing up to Japan is the easiest thing in the world and something that they know will unite the nation behind them.” The argument over the sea’s name is the latest sore point in bilateral relations. Other recent sticking points have included Seoul’s scraping of an agreement to draw a line under the “comfort women” issue and a ruling by South Korean courts that Japanese companies should compensate former forced laborers, despite a 1956 pact that stated that no further redress need be provided. There are also tensions between the armed forces of the two nations, in particular tit-for-tat allegations over an incident between a South Korean warship and a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft. Seoul denies that its vessel locked its fire control radar onto the Japanese plane and instead insists that the Japanese military performed a dangerous maneuver at low altitudes. Today, the Japanese defense ministry said its “final view” was that South Korea’s claims were “baseless” and that it was impossible to continue talks on the matter. Tokyo is also extremely concerned at Seoul’s apparent willingness to accept North Korean promises on denuclearization and to meet its demands for an end to international sanctions and the provision of economic assistance. “Under the administration of President Moon Jae-in, South Korea is collaborating with North Korea to mount a campaign against Japan about history, and the name of the Sea of Japan is just one part of that,” said Yamada Shoichi, a professor of international relations at Fukui Prefectural University. “Russia and China have never complained about the name and we Japanese have not protested about the Korea Strait, which we know as the Tsushima Strait,” he said. “They’re raising their voices louder and more frequently, but it just comes across as Koreans being neurotic,” he said. (Julian Ryall, “Tokyo to Discuss Sea of Japan’s Name with Seoul. Just Don’t Call It the East Sea,” South China Morning Post, January 21, 2019)
The Center for Strategic and International Studies has identified a secret North Korean ballistic missile base about 160 miles northwest of Seoul that is reportedly the headquarters of the country’s strategic missile force. The report, released today by researchers at the center’s Beyond Parallel project, said the base is one of approximately 20 undeclared missile operating bases, part of Pyongyang’s ongoing ballistic missile program. “While diplomacy is critical, and should be the primary way to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem, any future agreement must take account of all of the operational missile base facilities that are a threat to U.S. and South Korean security,” the report said. “North Korea is not supposed to have these ballistic missile bases,” said Victor Cha, one of the report’s authors. “And of course they have them and have not disclosed them.” “North Korea basically wants to trade away things they won’t do in the future, or to give up things from the past they don’t need anymore, while not negotiating over things like this, their actual capabilities,” Cha, a former National Security Council official focused on Asian affairs, said in an interview. Of the 20 or so undeclared missile bases, CSIS researchers have been able to locate 13. In November, researchers released a report on the first of the 13 bases; Monday’s report describes the second. The Sino-ri base is about 130 miles north of the demilitarized zone, the report said. It served as one of the first bases for the country’s most widely deployed ballistic missile, the Nodong medium-range ballistic missile. The base may also have played a role in the development of the country’s newest ballistic missile, first tested or unveiled in February 2017, shortly after Trump was inaugurated. The base is most often referred to as a missile operating base. But “it has fulfilled broader missions” as an operational test and development site and training facility subordinate to the “Strategic Force of the Korean People’s Army,” the report said. The KPA Strategic Force is responsible for all ballistic missile tests. Unlike other known North Korean ballistic missile operating bases, which are “nestled within narrow and steep mountain valleys,” the main parts of this base are “distributed within a shallow valley and rolling hills,” the report said. The base’s four square miles include several small villages, one for which the facility is named. (Lena H. Sun, “Report Identifies Another N. Korean Ballistic Missile Base, One of 20,” Washington Post, January 22, 2019, p. A-8)
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Bermudez, Cha, and Collins: “Located 212 kilometers north of the DMZ, Sino-ri is an operational missile base that houses a regiment-sized unit equipped with Nodong-1 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM). It is one of the oldest of approximately 20 undeclared missile operating bases and is reported to serve as the headquarters of the Strategic Rocket Forces Nodong missile brigade. It may have also played a role in the development of the newest Pukkuksong-2 (KN-15) ballistic missile first tested or unveiled on February 12, 2017, shortly after Donald Trump’s inauguration as president. The Sino-ri missile operating base and the Nodong missiles deployed at this location fit into North Korea’s presumed nuclear military strategy by providing an operational-level nuclear or conventional first strike capability against targets located both throughout the Korean Peninsula and in most of Japan. The base continues to be defended against preemptive attack by nearby anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air positions. The Sino-ri missile operating base has thus figured prominently in the historical development of the North Korean force serving as one of the first deployments of Scud missiles and later the Nodong medium range ballistic missile. The base has often also fulfilled broader missions as both an operational test and development, and training facility for Korean People’s Army (KPA)’s Strategic Force. Beyond Parallel analysis has found that the missile operating base is complemented by two nearby Strategic Force facilities—the Sobaek-su Academy and Myodu-san training area. North Korean missile operating bases would presumably have to be subject to declaration, verification, and dismantlement in any final and fully verifiable denuclearization deal. North Korea’s decommissioning of the Sohae satellite launch facility, while gaining much media attention, obscures the military threat to U.S. forces and South Korea from this and other undeclared ballistic missile bases. … The Sino-ri missile operating base in Unjon-gun (Unjon County), North Pyongan province … sits 77 kilometers northwest of Pyongyang, 212 kilometers north of the demilitarized zone and 270 kilometers northwest of Seoul. Although most often referred to as simply a missile operating base, it has fulfilled broader missions as both an operational test and development facility and training facility subordinate to the Strategic Force of the Korean People’s Army (KPA). The KPA Strategic Force is responsible for all ballistic missile units. In these latter roles, the Sino-ri base appears to have been involved at different times in validating designs and testing capabilities for new launchers, support vehicles, and specialized equipment, etc. It has also been a site for assisting in the development of operational procedures and tactics; and conducting training for ballistic missile personnel and units. … Located approximately 7.5 kilometers northwest of the Sino-ri missile operating base are the Sobaek-su Academy and Myodu-san training area that are also subordinate to the Strategic Force. Preliminary analysis indicates that while the precise nature of their relationships to each other is unknown, they are likely to be centered around a division of responsibilities—Sino-ri for ballistic missile operations and development, Sobaek-su for higher education of Strategic Force personnel, and Myodu-san for ballistic missile training. … Although there was a KPA barracks and storage area at Sino-ri since at least the 1960s, it was not until the late 1970s when a FROG-7 battalion was first identified as being deployed there that the facility was associated with North Korea’s nascent ballistic missile program.7 A partially declassified report from August 19, 1982, describes these events and the subsequent deployment of at least a second FROG-7 battalion to the base by 1982. “Elements of two FROG-7 tactical surface-to-surface missile (TAC SSM) battalions were observed at Sino Ri BKS [barracks] a WPNS [weapons] test FAC [facility] on 1 August. Six canvas-covered FROG-7 TEL [transporter-erector-launchers] were parked in the open between the two double-secured vehicle sheds in the vehicle storage area. This is the first time that more than two FROG-7 TEL have been seen here. The equipment was probably parked in the open because the roof of one of the two large vehicle sheds had been removed for repair. FROG-7 TEL were last seen here [REDACTED] when two were present. Limited sightings of FROG-related equipment at Sino Ri has indicated the presence of only one FROG-7 battalion. However, the presence of six FROG-7 TEL and sufficient vehicle storage capacity for at least two battalion-sized complements of support equipment indicates that the installation has probably housed at least two battalions since the initial identification of FROG-7 here in 1979. The vehicle sheds that house the FROG-7 equipment have been present since at least 1971. [REDACTED]” This 1982 report is also the earliest known reference to Sino-ri as a weapons test facility—a role that it apparently intermittently played up to the present day. Although FROG units deployed at Sino-ri at this time were located within the KPA’s VIII Corps, they were directly subordinate to the General Staff Department’s Artillery Command.9 The Sino-ri FROG-7 battalions are reported to have trained not only within the base but also in areas throughout North Pyongan province. Training exercises were sometimes conducted jointly with FROG-3/-5/-6 units, as was the case during February 1982 when U.S. intelligence observed a training exercise at the “Komsan-dong Training Area SW 1” (39.757295, 125.023256), 31 kilometers to the northwest of Sino-ri: “At Komsan Dong training area SW 1, the FROG-3/-5 and FROG-7 training underway here [deleted] continues. Equipment includes four FROG-3/-5 transporter-erector-launchers (TEL), two FROG-7 TEL, three FROG-6 trainers, two FROG-3/-5 resupply semitrailers, two FROG-7 resupply vehicles, two truck-mounted cranes, and 19 trucks. Eleven trucks and eight vehicles are in a separate area on the other side of the Tongnae [Tongnae-gang] river immediately northeast of the FROG bivouac.” Sometime about 1983 North Korea acquired the Scud B—its first true short-range ballistic missile system (SRBM). During the mid-1980s it began production of a version of the system known domestically as the Hwasong-5. While production was in its initial stages, a Hwasong-5 unit was reportedly established at Sino-ri. As well as being an operational ballistic missile base, Sino-ri was reportedly involved in evaluating new equipment, developing operational procedures and tactics, and training personnel for soon to be established Hwasong-5 units. As the number of available Hwasong-5 missiles, their associated TELs, and new MELs (mobile-erector-launchers) slowly increased the unit at Sino-ri was expanded to regiment size. A Hwasong-5 regiment was established and deployed south of Pyongyang in 1988 and the construction of additional missile operating bases in North Hwanghae and Kangwon provinces along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) commenced. With the increased deployment of Hwasong-5s (and later Hwasong-6/Scud Cs) at Sino-ri, they displaced the existing FROG-7s, which were apparently redeployed south to bases in the II, III and IV Corps. Available information suggests that by the early-1990s the KPA had improved the missile support facilities at Sino-ri by constructing a small drive-through vehicle shed, three four-bay hardened vehicle shelters for TELs, and a small TEL driver training course—all along the slopes of Obong-san (Obong Mountain). With the development of the Nodong-1 MRBM (Hwasong-7), the process of deploying new missile types to Sino-ri was repeated, and the base became home to the KPA’s first Nodong missile unit during the mid-1990s.16 When U.S. intelligence first identified a field-deployed Nodong-1 TEL at Sino-ri, it precipitated a difference of opinion between US and South Korean intelligence as to the system’s operational status. While the U.S. assessed that the system had been operationally deployed at Sino-ri by the end of 1996, the South Korean side disagreed. By late 1998, both sides had narrowed their differences and reportedly agreed that the KPA had deployed a brigade-sized unit with 12 Nodong-1 TELs at the Sino-ri base by September 1997. Supporting this assessment, reports from the late 1990s indicated that the North had “… manufactured 20 Nodong missiles in 1997 and another 10 by the summer of 1998, and exported some of them to Iran or Pakistan.” According to documents released during September 1999 by the Ministry of National Defense to Representative Suh Chung-won of South Korea’s Grand National Party, the Nodong-1 unit at Sino-ri had 9 TELs with 50 missiles. This represents an approximate regiment-sized unit rather than a brigade as previously reported, and except for one curious set of reports released in 1999, all subsequent reports have cited these same figures. During October 1999, there was a report that a Taepodong-1 battalion with nine launchers was deployed at Sino-ri. However, this report was quickly denied by South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense. This denial makes sense as the Taepodong-1 may have never been operationally deployed. From the late 1990s through 2006, the U.S. did not view the system as being operational, and in 2009, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) dropped it from the intermittently published Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat report. Almost all subsequent references to the Sino-ri missile operating base refer to Nodong (Rodong) missiles: “…the North recently deployed Rodong-1 missiles at four battalion groups in two strategic regions …one at Sino-ri, north of its capital Pyongyang and three other units at Tugol… ‘One battalion is thought to have nine launchers for Rodong-1 missiles’…” … Referencing the Sino-ri missile operating base, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense stated in March 2001 that, “The Rodong battalion, located at Sino-ri, is reportedly equipped with nine missile-launch pads. Considering that each launch pad can contain about four missiles, the battalion is estimated to have a total of 40 missiles at its disposal.” The KPA reportedly conducted its first combined “Command Post Exercise (CPX)” with elements from both the Nodong and SCUD brigades during 2002. As the reported headquarters of the Nodong brigade, it is likely that the units based at Sino-ri participated in this exercise. Such CPXs would subsequently become part of the annual training exercise for KPA missile units. In early September 2004, increased activity was observed at a number of KPA bases around the country. While not initially considered significant, this activity subsequently expanded to include the Sino-ri Nodong unit. “On 21 September 2004, at the Nodong base located in the hills at Sino-ri, Unjon County, North Pyongan Province, 100 kilometers north of Pyongyang, detected was activity such as movement from underground tunnel hangers of several TEL-mounted missiles, communications equipment, trucks loaded with fuel, and troop movements. U.S. reconnaissance satellite and wireless intelligence analysis revealed joint exercises were underway at not only the Sino-ri Base but at Musudan-ri and Wonsan missile launching units and army, navy, and air bases in about 10 locations with Sino-ri Base serving as the combat command center.” This activity was also assumed by some to be an indication of preparations for a Nodong missile training launch. However, no launch took place and this activity was finally assessed as being associated with a larger-than-normal nationwide exercise that included a major ballistic missile component. Four years later, during April 2008, the media again reported activity involving the Sino-ri Nodong unit that suggested an impending training launch. Once again, no launch took place and the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff quickly issued a cautionary statement that “[they had not] confirmed reports of signs of North Korea preparing for a missile launch in Shinori [Sino-ri].” Subsequently, minor infrastructure developments continued at the Sino-ri missile operating base. From 2010 to 2011, excavation for two large structures began 140 meters east of the T-shaped drive-through shed. By 2014, however, only one medium-sized storage shed was built, and this area has remained unchanged since. In September 2012, the Sino-ri missile operating base was once again described as being the headquarters of a Nodong missile regiment. Two years later, a source of uncertain reliability stated that Nodong “…equipment is currently stored in a tunnel located in Sino-ri, Unjon-gun, Pyongbukdo.” Then on March 26, 2014, North Korea conducted a training launch of two Nodong missiles from the Sukchon area 30 kilometers southeast of Sino-ri. A former senior official from South Korea’s National Intelligence Service stated that it appeared that the launch was conducted by elements from the Sino-ri Nodong missile unit. The following year, between February 8 and May 8, 2015, North Korea conducted an extended ballistic missile training/testing campaign launching a total of 13 Hwasong-11 (KN-02), Hwasong-6, and Pukkuksong-1 (KN-11) missiles. In the middle of this campaign, in March, activity was observed at the Sino-ri missile operating base, where a Nodong missile was reportedly loaded onto a TEL. Though this action was thought to be an indicator of a forthcoming launch exercise of the system at the time, no launch was conducted. Most recently, in November 2018, it was suggested that the Sino-ri missile operating base might have a relationship with the development and fielding of the Pukkuksong-2. Such a relationship would appear logical as the TEL for the system was manufactured at the No. 95 Factory, 45 kilometers to the northwest. Additionally, crew and driver training for the TEL and ejection testing of the missile were undertaken at the nearby Iha-ri Driver Training and Test Facility. The relationship, if any, between the Sino-ri missile operating base and the Pukkuksong-2, however, remains to be determined. … Oftentimes detailed organizational information for KPA ballistic missile units is nonexistent or, if available, is inconsistent. Preliminary data suggests that this is not only because of KPA camouflage, concealment, and deception practices (CCD), but also because KPA ballistic missile unit organizational structures do not necessarily neatly fit into Western organizational structures of battalion, regiment, and brigade. Rather, they may fit somewhere in between these Western structures or be organized around a base structure. Regardless, since the late 1990s, the term “battalion” is most often used in reports describing the Nodong unit stationed at Sino-ri. These same reports, however, also cite 9 TELs/MELs, suggesting a regiment-sized unit consisting of a headquarters, service elements, and three missile battalions. Each battalion would thus consist of a headquarters, battery, and three firing batteries—each with a single Nodong-1 TEL/MEL. This would suggest a personnel strength of approximately 550 and 9 Nodong-1 TELs/MELs.” (Joseph Bermudez, Victor Cha and Lisa Collins, “Undeclared North Korea: The Sino-ri Operating Base and Strategic Force Facilities,” CSIS, January 21, 2019)
1/22/19:
Kim Hyok Chol, a former North Korean Ambassador to Spain had accompanied the North’s ruling Workers’ Party’s Central Committee Vice Chairman Kim Yong-chol on his visit to Washington, appearing with the vice chairman in a meeting with President Donald Trump on January 18. His appearance had triggered speculations that he may have come as a new negotiator in charge of U.S. relations. Kim, the North’s former ambassador to Spain, was expelled from the European country in September 2017, after Pyongyang conducted its sixth nuclear test on Sept. 3 and launched a long-range ballistic missile over Japan on September 15. While not much has been revealed about Kim aside from his expulsion, Thae Yong-ho, the North’s former deputy ambassador to the United Kingdom who defected to the South in 2016, claimed Kim is a veteran strategic planner in foreign policy who comes from the elite family of a high-ranking official. According to Thae, Kim majored in French at Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies, and entered the Foreign Ministry there in the early 2000s. Kim was the first ministry official to be promoted to a deputy ministerial rank in his 30s. Kim’s father was a high-ranking official who worked in the international department of the North’s ruling party and served as an ambassador to Cambodia in the early 2000s. “Kim is a strategic figure systematically trained by Ri Yong-ho (North’s foreign minister) and Kim Gye Gwan (North’s first vice foreign minister),” Thae explained in a post on his blog January 25. Regarding Kim’s appearance, experts have differing views on Kim’s role and the communist regime’s direction in the negotiating process with the U.S. “North Koreans have seemed to develop an allergy toward working level talks with the U.S. regardless of counterpart. I think a lot of people are going to see this as a sign of further resistance by North Korea to effective working level engagement,” Scott Snyder, a senior fellow at Council on Foreign Relations, said in an interview with the Voice of America. Gary Samore, a former White House official who participated in the 1994 North Korea nuclear agreement, also told the news outlet that Kim’s appointment was intended to adjust the level of negotiators, saying Choe is a “too senior official.” “Choe outranks Stephen Biegun. I see that (the appointment of Kim) as an indication that the North Koreans have identified an official at Stephen Biegun’s level,” Samore said. Thae, however, stressed that Kim would not be “replacing” Choe, as some claim, but that they would be dividing roles. “Kim is likely to take charge of the bigger approach plans, such as building trust before denuclearization, and Choe will work on the details of each deal that is to be made with the US,” Thae said. The North’s vice foreign minister had attended the bilateral or trilateral working-level meeting with Biegun and Lee Do-hoon, Seoul’s special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, in Sweden on Jan. 19. Hong Min, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, agreed they would both take on duties but said that Kim would be the negotiator dealing with details of the denuclearization process and Choe would take on more comprehensive agenda items. “The denuclearization process is a very sensitive and technical topic and political at the same time. Each sequence of the denuclearization move should be carefully planned for North Korea,” Hong told Korea Herald. “Choe is a veteran negotiator who has participated in big summits from the past, so I believe it is more likely that Choe continues to take charge in drawing the bigger picture for the North while Kim focuses on planning the details of the denuclearization.” (Jo He-rim, “Former N.K. Ambassador Likely to Divide Roles in U.S. Negotiations with Choe: Experts,” Korea Herald, January 27, 2019) Kim Hyok Chol, who is believed to have become the new interlocutor to lead negotiations with the United States, has worked for the country’s State Affairs Commission chaired by leader Kim Jong Un, diplomatic sources said January 28. By entrusting talks with the United States to a senior official belonging to a core state organization, Kim Jong Un appears intent on showing his strong commitment to a planned second summit with President Donald Trump, set to be held as early as next month. The State Affairs Commission, whose chairman is Kim Jong Un, is an organization that discusses and determines key national policies. It was transformed from the National Defense Commission in 2016 following a constitutional revision. Kim Hyok Chol is in his late 40s. In the 2000s, he joined a delegation to the six-party talks. The former Foreign Ministry official was appointed ambassador to Spain at a relatively young age, but he was expelled in 2017 in the wake of international sanctions aimed at stopping Pyongyang’s nuclear weapon and missile development. After returning to North Korea, he started working for the State Affairs Commission, the sources said. (Inoue Tomotaro, “New North Korean Point Man on U.S. Works for Kim Jong Un’s Policymaking Unit,” Kyodo, January 28, 2019)
North Korea has replaced an envoy handling negotiations with the United States ahead of the second summit between their leaders, an informed source said today. The new representative is Kim Hyok Chol, who previously served as the first North Korean ambassador to Spain, according to the source privy to North Korea-Spain relations. “It’s a mystery to us,” the source told Yonhap, referring to the sudden switch of interlocutors. Stephen Biegun’s counterpart was widely believed to be Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui, a seasoned diplomat who played a key role in preparations for last year’s first summit between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Biegun and Choe met for the first time in Sweden over the weekend, presumably for talks on the next summit, planned for late February. It’s unclear whether Choe still has a role in the bilateral negotiations. She and U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Sung Kim held several rounds of talks ahead of the Singapore summit in June to produce an accord for their leaders. Kim Hyok-chol was ambassador to Spain until 2017, when he was expelled from the country over Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile tests. He was part of the delegation that accompanied Kim Yong-chol, a close aide to the North Korean leader, to Washington last week, which raised speculation he is now in charge of protocol or U.S. relations at the North Korean foreign ministry. The apparent switch from Choe to Kim was revealed today by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who told the World Economic Forum in Davos that Biegun had the opportunity to meet with his “newly designated counterpart” during Kim Yong-chol’s visit to Washington. The two men discussed “some of the complicated issues towards achieving what the two leaders laid out back last June in Singapore,” Pompeo said. (Lee Haye-ah, “N. Korea’s Envoy Replaced ahead of 2nd Trump-Kim Summit,” Yonhap, January 23, 2019)
Pompeo: “MR BRENDE: Mr. Secretary, it is with deep appreciation that I welcome you to our annual meeting here in Davos. In the 49-year history of the forum, we have only done video links less than 10 times, always under exceptional circumstances. … We will hear from you for brief opening remarks where we look forward to hearing your vision regarding the future global architecture, which will be followed by a discussion. Secretary, the floor is yours, and welcome. … POMPEO: As you all know, we face many new threats, some of them not so new. They range from North Korea’s nuclear program, to Iran’s foreign adventurism, to China’s state-centered economic model, its belligerence toward its neighbors, and its embraces of a totalitarian state at home. Radical Islamic terrorism remains a persistent threat that we will continue to fight together. In all of these areas we’re making progress. But none of this progress could have happened without beautiful coalitions in which America has played a central role. Collectively, we have exerted maximum pressure on North Korea, and that pressure has gotten Kim to the negotiating table. The United Nations did amazing work, acting as the center of gravity for sanctions that built out this global coalition. We’ve also assembled a global coalition of nations to confront Iran and support the aspirations of the Iranian people. And we’re rebalancing the relationship with China, alongside partner nations in Asia and all around the world. … BRENDE: Thank you, Secretary. We’re very pleased that you have joined us, and it does look brisk there. And you also mentioned China in your short intervention, and I know from all participants here in Davos there is huge interest in the Sino-U.S. relationship. We see that growth is slowing in China. We also know that there will be a trade delegation visiting DC later this year. So from your perspective as Secretary of State, how do you see the role of China in the world today as an emerging regional and global power, and also in relationship to the U.S.-Sino relationship? POMPEO: Borge, there are those who say that conflict, superpower conflict between our two countries, is inevitable. We don’t see it that way. We want to find places where we can work together. You talked about the trade delegation coming. I am optimistic that we’ll receive them well and that we’ll have a good outcome from those conversations. But remember, the course of the relationship will be determined by the principles that America standbys — stands by: free and open seas, the capacity for nations to take their goods around the world, fair and reciprocal trade arrangements where every country has the opportunity to compete on a fair, transparent, and open basis. These principles of democracy, these things that have created so much wealth for the whole globe, will drive the relationship between the United States and China in the years ahead, and we hope that China will adopt policies that are consistent with that. If they do, I am very confident that our two nations can thrive and prosper together. … BRENDE: Secretary, know that you personally have shown a lot of leadership when it comes to North Korea and the DPRK. History was made last June when President Trump met with Chairman Kim Jong-un, which a lot of hope for improvements of the security situation in the Korean Peninsula was established. Expectations, as I said, were high. We know that the President will meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un late in February. I think there is a lot of curiosity. Maybe you can shed some light on the next steps you envisage when President Trump meets again with the chairman, and maybe you can also let us know where it’s going to happen. POMPEO: Borge, I don’t have any news to break today on that front, but I can say this: The negotiations have been underway for some time now. There’s lots of discussions that have taken place. When Kim Yong-chol visited Washington last week, we made further progress not only in the discussions that he had with the President, but Special Representative Biegun had the opportunity to meet with his newly designated counterpart as well, where they were able to discuss some of the complicated issues towards achieving what the two leaders laid out back last June in Singapore. And so we have a handful of weeks before the two leaders will meet together again. A set of discussions that took place in Sweden over the weekend have now wrapped up. Again, a little bit more progress. There remains an awful lot of work to do, but good things have happened already. The North Koreans aren’t conducting missile tests. The North Koreans aren’t conducting nuclear tests. There are many steps yet along the way towards achieving the denuclearization that was laid out in Singapore and in achieving the security and stability and peace on the peninsula that the two leaders agreed to as well. We’re determined to work towards achieving that. I believe at the end of February we’ll have another good marker along the way. BRENDE: Thank you. When Professor Schwab and I met with you in your office in December, planning for your visit here in Davos, we also touched on a possibility for private sector to contribute, if there was a breakthrough. Any further reflections on that? POMPEO: We did have a good conversation about that, Borge. There’s not much role for the private sector today, but if we’re successful, if we can make a substantial step towards achieving the denuclearization and create the right conditions, it’ll be the private sector that sits there, looming in the background, that I know the North Koreans understand they need, whether that’s power for the people of the country, whether it’s to install the infrastructure that is so desperately needed in North Korea. Those things will certainly have a government component to them, but there’ll be an enormous private sector push that will be required to achieve the economic growth in North Korea that will ultimately lead to the stability that we’re all looking for. And so the specter, the specter of private sector companies who are prepared to invest in North Korea and to assist North Korea if we’re able to achieve that full denuclearization that I know the entire world wants, the private sector will be an important player in achieving the final elements of the agreement as well.” (DoS, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, Remarks to the World Economic Forum, Washington, January 22, 2019)
President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia dashed Japanese hopes of a settlement any time soon to a territorial dispute that has festered since 1945, declaring after a meeting with the visiting Prime Minister Abe Shinzo that there was still much “painstaking work” ahead. In his remarks to reporters, Putin gave no sign that Russia might accede to Tokyo’s demand that it relinquish Japanese islands seized by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. He said that any agreement must have support from the public, which in Russia, according to a November opinion poll, is strongly opposed to returning any islands to Japan. Abe, whose father, Abe Shintaro, spent years trying in vain to settle the territorial dispute with Russia while serving as Japan’s foreign minister, has made improving relations with Moscow a priority. But he, too, conceded today that “resolving a problem left unresolved for over 70 years since the end of the war is not easy.” Putin had previously raised Japanese hopes of reclaiming at least a small portion of what it calls its “Northern Territories” and what Russians refer to as the Southern Kuriles, a chain of islands off Japan’s northern prefecture of Hokkaido. But any settlement involving the surrender of territory would collide with the central pillars of Russia’s state ideology under Putin: a commitment to rebuilding Russia as a great power, ceaseless celebration of Moscow’s victory in the war, and rejection of anything that might challenge the outcome of that conflict. Putin, who has met with Abe four times in the past six months, has spoken frequently of his desire to attract more Japanese investment, particularly to bolster the flagging economic fortunes of deprived areas of the Russian Far East. A deal over the Kurile Islands with Japan, which would allow the two countries to finally sign a peace treaty formally ending World War II, would also give Russia other large potential benefits, not least the possibility that Japan, a close ally of the United States, would be more receptive to Moscow’s views on issues like missile defense. While closely allied with the United States, Japan has been far less critical of Moscow than have Europe and America. Putin and Abe have met 25 times and the Russian leader has praised Abe as a “friend,” a term he rarely uses for Western leaders. Osuga Takeshi, a spokesman for the Japanese prime minister’s delegation in Moscow, told reporters late today that the fate of the Kurile Islands had been discussed during talks lasting nearly three hours in the Kremlin, but he declined to say whether Putin had accepted the possibility of returning territory. The prospect that Russia might return two small islands to Japan has outraged hardline Russian nationalists, who gathered in Moscow two days ago to curse Putin and demand that Moscow hang on to all its territorial gains from 1945. “World War II is sacred. The view is that if we got something as a result of the war we can’t give it up because that would only undermine the greatness of our victory,” said Alexander Verkhovsky, the director of the Sova Center, a Moscow research group that monitors Russian nationalist groups. Hardline nationalists, emboldened by the seizure of Crimea but embittered by Putin’s reluctance to grab more territory from Ukraine, have scant popular support. But they still present a potential danger for the Kremlin at a time of growing economic hardship and widespread public anger over the overhaul of Russia’s pension system. “Putin unleashed so many nationalist forces after Crimea he needs to be careful,” said Alexander Gabuev, an Asia expert at the Moscow Carnegie Center. “His hands are really bound by nationalist sentiment and the fact that his ratings are going down.”mong those speaking at the protest rally was Igor Girkin, a former military intelligence officer who helped ignite the Russian-backed separatist rebellion in eastern Ukraine in 2014. Now back in Russia, Girkin, also known as Igor Strelkov, commands a small but noisy following of self-declared patriots committed to expanding Russian territory and resisting, by force if necessary, any accommodation with the West. “I will say just one thing. If the authorities decide, against the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, to hand over to the Japanese two, one, even a piece of the Kurile Islands, we will not stop at any action, lawful or unlawful,” he told flag-waving protesters. A group of demonstrators from The Other Russia, a political party founded by writer Eduard Limonov and whose red flag features a hand grenade, held up a large banner declaring Hokkaido, an integral part of Japanese territory, a “Russian island.” Moscow and Tokyo agreed in 1956 to put an end to their wartime hostility and that two small parts of the territory near Hokkaido — Habomai and Shikotan — would be handed back to Japan after the signing of a formal peace treaty. The treaty, however, was never signed, leaving Russia in control of all the islands. Hopes of a breakthrough rose last year when Putin announced in Vladivostok that the two countries should sign a peace treaty by the end of 2018. Abe, after a November meeting with Putin in Singapore, told reporters that he and the Russian leader had revived peace talks based on the 1956 agreement, suggesting that Moscow might give up two islands. Gabuev, the Moscow-based Asia expert, said that Putin had simply been “toying” with Abe, raising hopes of an agreement in an effort to sow discord between Japan and the United States. Analysts in Tokyo, however, said that a deal might make sense, in the current geopolitical environment, for both nations. “It’s a kind of a compromise solution for the Japanese side,” said Shimotomai Nobuo, a specialist in Russian-Japanese relations at Hosei University in Tokyo. But with the rising power of China, he said, and a new Cold War between China and the United States, “Japan and Moscow have good reason to have a kind of counterweighting relationship with regard to other great powers.” (Andrew Higgins, “Putin Politely Dashes Abe’s Hopes of Ending Island Dispute,” New York Times, January 23, 2019, p. A-8)
1/23/19:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army, met the delegation to the second DPRK-U.S. high-level talks that had visited Washington D.C. of the United States. On January 23, Supreme Leader of the Party, state and army Kim Jong Un met the members of the delegation led by Kim Yong Chol, vice-chairman of the WPK Central Committee, and listened to the results of the visit. He was reported about the details of the visit during which the delegation visited the White House, met the U.S. president and discussed the issue for the second DPRK-U.S. summit and also had negotiations with the U.S. working group on a series of issues to be settled between the two countries. He was presented by Kim Yong Chol a personal letter sent to him by President of the United States of America Donald Trump. Upon receiving the good personal letter sent by President Trump, the Supreme Leader expressed great satisfaction. He spoke highly of President Trump for expressing his unusual determination and will for the settlement of the issue with a great interest in the second DPRK-U.S. summit. Kim Jong Un said that we will believe in the positive way of thinking of President Trump, wait with patience and in good faith and, together with the U.S., advance step by step toward the goal to be reached by the two countries of the DPRK and the U.S. Expressing satisfaction over the results of the talks and activities done by the DPRK delegation in Washington D.C., the U.S., he set forth tasks and orientation for making good technical preparations for the second DPRK-U.S. summit high on the agenda.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Meets Delegation to 2nd DPRK-U.S. High-Level Talks,” January 24, 2019)
The United Nations Security Council has granted sanctions exemptions to four humanitarian organizations for relief activities in North Korea, its website showed today. A U.N. committee handling sanctions on North Korea approved the waiver requests from the organizations — the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Eugene Bell Foundation, Christian Friends of Korea, and the Canadian NGO First Steps Health Society — on January 18, according to its website. The exemptions allow shipments of items to North Korea for the groups’ humanitarian programs, including those to combat tuberculosis and malaria in the impoverished country, according to the website. The list of items approved for UNICEF’s shipment to North Korea includes computers and televisions for hospital use, as well as nine ambulances worth US$205,740. The total items are worth some $520,000. Items approved for the Eugene Bell Foundation include microphones and loudspeakers. Detailed lists of items allowed for Christian Friends of Korea and First Steps Health Society were not immediately available. The latest series of approvals raised the total number of humanitarian exemptions related to North Korea in effect to six. The exemptions are valid for six months. Humanitarian activities are not banned under international sanctions, but related materials are subject to sanctions waivers from the U.N. Aid organizations have said that multilayered sanctions imposed on North Korea for its nuclear provocations are affecting their operations through a disruption of banking channels, a breakdown in supply chains and delays in the transportation of goods. (Yonhap, “UN Grants Sanctions Exemptions for Humanitarian Aid to N. Korea,” January 23, 2019)
1/24/19:
South Korea’s foreign minister Kang Kyung-wha told Reuters at the World Economic Forum in Davos that she is optimistic that North Korea will agree to concrete steps toward abandoning its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, developed in violation of United Nations resolutions. “The (North Korean) leader has promised to his people many times that ‘I’m going to take this country toward economic development’. He has to deliver that, and he’s not going to get the kind of significant assistance unless he takes concrete steps toward denuclearization and somehow eases the sanctions regime,” she said on Thursday. “Given the strong political will on the part of the top leaders of the two sides … I think we will see concrete results.” Kang said she had been heartened by a recent flurry of diplomacy, “I think the Sweden meeting was very useful,” she said. “So I feel much better about the situation.” Despite the slow pace of talks since the June summit, North Korea and the United States could still reach a “comprehensive” denuclearization deal that includes Pyongyang declaring the extent of its nuclear arsenal, Kang said. “Full disclosure has to be a part of the process,” she said, while noting that the implementation of any comprehensive plan would be “step by step”, with each side making corresponding concessions. During his summit with South Korean President Moon Jae-in last September, Kim said North Korea would allow experts to watch the closure of its missile engine testing site and launch pad in the northwestern town of Tongchang-ri. Should there be corresponding action from Washington, the North suggested it could also permanently disclose the Yongbyon facility. “I think we need to take that word, and make sure that that progresses,” Kang said. She said North Korea has yet to take steps that would warrant lifting international sanctions, but that Washington could offer several incentives short of sanctions relief. “We’ve been in close consultations with the U.S. at all levels to see what these steps could be — a big part of this would be security guarantees to North Korea,” Kang said. South Korea has proposed that the United States sign a declaration formally ending the technical state of war, increase humanitarian aid, and establish U.S.-North Korea liaison offices, Kang said. “If we do see real steps that assure us that North Korea is definitely on the denuclearization track, I think we can start thinking about sanctions relief,” she said. “But before that, there are many other things that we can do.” (Soyoung Kim, “South Korea Looks for Kim Nuclear Dismantling Pledge at Next Trump Summit,” January 24, 2019)
U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun held talks with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou following working-level nuclear talks with his North Korean counterpart in Sweden. The meeting of the chief nuclear negotiators of Washington and Beijing has raised the possibility that China will participate in the future nuclear talks where they will also discuss the establishment of a multilateral peace regime. The State Department said today (local time) that Biegun met with Kong Xuanyou in Washington to address “efforts toward advancing the final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD)” of North Korea. It added that the two nuclear envoys discussed the results of the U.S.-North Korea working-level talks held last Friday in Washington D.C. as well as the developments between the United States and the North and the North and China. Biegun and Kong also discussed the importance of continuing UNSC sanctions implementation, the State Department said. Washington seems to have reconfirmed its principle of maintaining sanctions until the North takes concrete steps toward denuclearization while discussing the possible “carrot” for the regime, which is likely to be discussed at a second U.S.-North Korea summit. Kong’s trip to Washington to meet with Biegun apparently signals that China keeps a careful eye on the recent denuclearization talks and wants to engage in the negotiation process. Observers also point out that North Korea appears to have recently replaced Vice Foreign Minister Choi Sun Hee with Kim Hyok Chol, former ambassador to Spain, to negotiate with Washington in an attempt to seek a two-track process for denuclearization and the establishment of a multilateral peace regime. Gary Samore, former White House coordinator for arms control and weapons for mass destruction, said in an interview with Radio Free Asia today that if Trump and Kim, at their second summit, agrees to hold a two-plus-two meeting with South Korea and China to discuss a peace regime, the North is likely to send Choi as a negotiator. (Dong-A Ilbo, “China Brings Itself Closer to Table for Denuke,” January 26, 2019)
1/25/19:
John Bolton: “Tim Constantine: What role has China played in negotiations with North Korea and moving forward, what role should they play? JB: In past negotiations they played a very significant effort, part of the six party talks. President Trump has tried a different approach. The six party talks obviously failed, so he has been negotiating directly with Kim Jong-un. The Chinese tell us that they agree with the press for denuclearization. We certainly say to them on every occasion that we want them to maintain the international economic sanctions against North Korea very tightly. Watch the border, as President Trump says to them, and that is the position we are going to continue to take as we get ready for the second summit between the President and Kim Jong-un. Tim Constantine: That is tentatively set for late February. The President has said we have made significant progress in our talks for denuclearization for North Korea. Can you define what progress we have made? JB: President Trump, I think, has said repeatedly that North Korea has not engaged in nuclear tests. North Korea has not engaged in missile tests. What we need from North Korea is a significant sign of a strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons and it is when we get that denuclearization that the President can begin to take the sanctions off. Tim Constantine: Can we trust Kim Jong-un? JB: It’s the sort of thing where the negotiation really is between the President and Kim Jong-un. He is prepared to engage in this negotiation. If I was Kim Jong-un, I would not think of crossing the President.” (Tim Constantine, “John Bolton Explains Trump’s Strategy on North Korea, China Trade,” Washington Times, January 25, 2019)
1/27/19:
As Donald Trump seeks progress with North Korea at a second summit, the United States has a series of cards it can play including easing sanctions, signing a peace declaration or even pulling troops from South Korea. Washington policymakers are adamant on the need for tangible concessions by Pyongyang on its nuclear program at the sequel meeting, which Trump says will take place around late February, with Vietnam the most likely venue. North Korea watchers believe that Kim’s primary goal is relief from international sanctions and doubt he will suddenly give up his nuclear arsenal, which his dynastic regime has built for decades even through famine. The sanctions “are not strong enough to create serious economic problems in the country, but they are strong enough to make economic growth difficult or unachievable,” said Andrei Lankov, a professor at Kookmin University in Seoul who studied in Pyongyang. “In order to maintain stability in the country and to stay in power, the North Koreans know they will have to end or at least narrow the yawning gap between their economy and the economies of the neighboring countries, especially South Korea and China,” he said. When Kim met Trump, the first-ever summit between the two nations, North Korea was seen as seeking a treaty or at least statement formally ending the 1950-53 Korean War, which ended in an armistice. But Victor Cha, the director of Asian studies at Georgetown University and former U.S. negotiator with North Korea, said a peace declaration was ultimately symbolic. “I don’t think they would say no to it. A peace declaration would be a sign of non-hostile intent. But they want tangible evidence of non-hostile intent, which would be removing some of the sanctions,” Cha said. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has vowed no let-up in sanctions until North Korea denuclearizes. And many U.S. sanctions involve human rights or corruption laws and cannot be lifted without intervention by Congress, which is unlikely to be sympathetic. But Cha said the United States could offer relief indirectly through South Korea’s dovish government, working at the United Nations to remove sanctions that impede the restart of inter-Korean projects such as the Kaesong industrial complex. The US is already preparing to ease restrictions on humanitarian aid and could offer to exchange liaison offices with Pyongyang, a step before diplomatic relations. Trump points to North Korea’s halt of missile and nuclear tests as progress, two years after fears soared of war. US officials want a full accounting of all North Korean weapons sites as well as inspections. But experts fear North Korea will agree only on dismantling outdated facilities while keeping its capacities. In 2008, North Korea invited international media to watch as it blew up a cooling tower at Yongbyon, which remains the regime’s main nuclear site. South Korea and Japan have increasingly wondered if Trump — who has made “America First” his guiding worldview — would focus on ridding North Korea of its fast-moving program of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which threaten the mainland United States. Pompeo in recent interviews has described North Korea diplomacy as a way to protect Americans. “Fairly or unfairly, that’s being interpreted by our allies as a potential US willingness to cut a deal that only protects America and disregards the safety of our allies,” said Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington think tank. The summit also comes amid a prolonged impasse in negotiations on how much South Korea should pay the United States to maintain its 28,500 troops in the country. “There are concerns that Trump may be so eager for a success that he may agree to signing a peace declaration, signing an ICBM-only agreement and even reducing US forces on the peninsula either in return for perhaps a freeze on Yongbyon production or in response to the ongoing stalemate in Seoul,” Klingner said. Trump is a longstanding skeptic on the cost value of alliances and is demanding more from South Korea. But any promise by Trump to Kim to pull out troops would likely meet wide opposition in Congress, fury from Japan’s conservative government and quiet unease from South Korea, where President Moon Jae-in is more supportive of the US presence than previous left-wing leaders. And it is not even a given that North Korea would welcome a withdrawal. Lankov said that Pyongyang saw US forces on the peninsula as a counterweight to China — its closest ally, but which Pyongyang views as a longer-term concern. (Shaun Tandon, “Sanctions, Peace Deal on Card for New U.S.-N. Korea Summit,” January 27, 2019)
1/28/19:
The Trump administration is quietly preparing a special “economic package” designed to entice North Korean leader Kim Jong-un into taking specific steps toward dismantling his nuclear weapons program when he and President Trump meet for their highly anticipated second summit. The initiative, spearheaded by Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun, has already been touted in private working-level talks with the North Koreans and involves creating a kind of escrow account to prove to Kim that the U.S. and its allies are truly committed to rewarding Pyongyang economically if it comes through on denuclearization, The Washington Times has learned. While the State Department has not commented publicly, sources familiar with the plan say it centers on securing guarantees for billions of dollars’ worth of cash contributions from Japan, South Korea, the European Union and others that would go toward North Korean infrastructure and development projects. “These are guarantees that can be waved under Kim’s nose to assure him of the pot of gold waiting for him on the other side of the rainbow,” said one of the sources. Several said there is a consensus within the administration about the need to “incentivize” Kim, following a lack of concrete progress on the reducing the North’s nuclear and missile arsenals after the first Trump-Kim summit last June in Singapore. The administration has weighed the establishment of a pure cash escrow account filled with assets seized through the enforcement of international sanctions against North Korea, but there’s a catch. Analysts say the North Korean state is so poor that such assets don’t amount to the kind of money seized in past sanctions campaigns against other rogue nations — most notably Iran. While U.S.-led sanctions against Iran resulted in more than $1 billion of seized cash assets that were used to lure the Iranian regime into concluding a nuclear deal during the Obama administration, such assets don’t exist when it comes to North Korea. Because of this, the “logical move for the U.S. to follow toward incentivizing Kim is to say, ‘Our allies and friends are willing to put money in a global bank account in escrow with your name on it, Chairman Kim, to be released in exchange for meaningful denuclearization steps,’” said Patrick Cronin, the head of Asia-Pacific Security at the Hudson Institute in Washington. “What those steps ultimately are, along with how much money is actually there,” said Cronin, “are things that can then be negotiated.” Some in the administration have suggested Trump is eager to find ways of encouraging Kim to make a deal. “What we need from North Korea is a significant sign of a strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons, and it is when we get that denuclearization that the President can begin to take the sanctions off,” National Security Advisor John Bolton said in an interview published by The Washington Times on Friday. “It’s the sort of thing where the negotiation really is between the president and Kim Jong-un,” Bolton said. Trump “is prepared to engage in this negotiation.” Enter the behind-the-scenes push by Biegun for U.S. allies to guarantee cash contributions for North Korea. “By setting up an ability to give a substantive promise to the North Koreans in return for action, we are able to stop the problem of giving something to them for nothing,” said David Maxwell, a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel and North Korea expert with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington. “It makes sense that we’re setting up a promise to provide them with what is apparently a huge amount of money and resources, but they have to take substantive action to benefit from that,” Maxwell said. Michael Pillsbury, a long-time regional expert also at the Hudson Institute, praised Biegun’s approach at a moment when Kim himself may be facing challenges from within the regime who fear he is being “tricked by Trump.” “Biegun is a man of action and he’s showing bold creative initiative to fill a vacuum,” Pillsbury said in an interview. “To me, it sounds like he is seeking ways to present incentives that Kim and his entourage will be persuaded by, and that’s a very creative way to seek leverage over the very black box that is Kim and his advisers.” “There is historical precedent for asking the Japanese, South Koreans and Europeans to contribute,” said Maxwell, although he noted the 1994 deal ultimately failed when North Korea was found to have cheated before it was fully implemented. One source familiar with the negotiations said the largest guarantee being sought this time around is from Japan and could value several billion dollars for reconstruction and economic development investments in North Korea. “Japan is being specifically pushed to commit what would be otherwise considered reparation money for North Korea, similar to the way that Japan paid South Korea when those two nations restored diplomatic relations,” the source said. The Japanese reparation funds, which amounted to roughly $500 million given to South Korea in 1964, were designed to foster economic development and compensate for the brutality that marked Japan’s occupation and attempted colonization of the Korean peninsula between 1910 and the end of World War II. If Tokyo were to now promise a similar package for North Korea, it would amount to more than $3 billion when adjusted for inflation. It’s still unclear whether Japan will agree to that kind of money, particularly in light of potential political hang-ups over the emotional, unresolved issue of Japanese citizens abducted by the North Korean regime. “There are still a handful of these abductees known to be in North Korea — people the regime has captured and used to train North Korean intelligence services in Japanese language and culture to prepare to go spy in Japan,” Maxwell said. “This is a very sensitive issue for Tokyo. If it gets resolved, then I believe Japan would be more willing to pay reparations to North Korea.” There are signs Japan is eager for a resolution: Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called Monday for “break[ing] the shell of mutual mistrust in order to resolve the North Korean nuclear and missile issue, and the most important issue of abduction.” “The goal is to settle the unfortunate history with North Korea and normalize diplomatic relations,” Abe said in a speech to Parliament, according to South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency. According to Cronin, Japan and others can be expected to offer substantial cash guarantees for North Korea if they see “serious steps” being taken by the Kim regime. If Pyongyang were, for instance, to dismantle specific missile systems that threaten the Japanese mainland, he said, “then I think Japan would be willing to promise some sizeable money.” But Cronin stressed that talks on a specific deal are still at a very early and limited stage. “Detailed discussions with North Korea right now have been exceedingly difficult,” he said. “I’m concerned that if the Trump administration goes into a second summit without meaningful denuclearization steps already in hand, it will be giving North Korea the advantage.” “In the first summit, in Singapore, the president could get away with breaking the ice,” he added. “With the second summit, you don’t get that pass. If you don’t come away with something really tangible, you really look like you’re being taken for a ride by the Kim family playbook — and I think the administration knows that.” (Guy Taylor, “Team Trump Quietly Filling ‘Pot of Gold’ Encouraging Kim Jong Un to Denuclearize,” Washington Times, January 28, 2019)
The UN Security Council has granted a sanctions exemption for an inter-Korean project to excavate Korean War remains in the Demilitarized Zone, a diplomatic source said today.
The UNSC made the decision last week as Seoul sought the exemption to ensure that the delivery of equipment into the communist state for the project will not be impeded by anti-Pyongyang sanctions. The Koreas plan to carry out the project in Arrowhead Ridge, a notorious battle site of the 1950-53 Cold War conflict, from April to October under last year’s bilateral military accord aimed at reducing tensions, preventing accidental clashes and building trust. During the “working-group” meeting via videoconferencing on January 17, Seoul and Washington reached a consensus over the sanctions exemption for the project. The excavation project is a key part of the inter-Korean military accord. The accord includes a series of confidence-building and arms control measures, including disarming the Joint Security Area, withdrawing some border guard posts and setting up air, maritime and ground buffer zones. (Yonhap, “UNSC Grants Sanctions Exemption for Inter-Korean Excavation in DMZ,” January 28, 2019)
Seoul and Washington last week confirmed that Pyongyang will scrap its Tongchang-ri missile engine test site and launch pad in the presence of international experts, a South Korean diplomatic source said January 28. That promise was one of several agreements reached by South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un last September in their third and most recent summit. The regime, however, has stayed quiet on the matter, as nuclear talks between the United States were deadlocked. The silence had left Pyongyang watchers wondering whether the regime would actually follow through and destroy the site. The South Korean diplomatic source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said nuclear envoys from the three countries exchanged a to-do list last week in the outskirts of the Swedish capital of Stockholm as they were attending a so-called Track 1.5 international conference on denuclearization. The list was said to have outlined the tasks that each country promised to complete in the three summits between the South and North and the historic summit between the North and the United States last year. In that process, the local source continued, Pyongyang said it was willing to carry out its promise to dismantle the Tongchang-ri missile engine test site and a launch pad while allowing outside experts to view the process. Whether a timeline was mentioned is not known. And Pyongyang also reaffirmed its will to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear plant if the United States offers reciprocal measures, reiterating Kim’s promise to Moon in their last summit. The three envoys agreed to continue further discussions in the near future. The main participant from North Korea in the Sweden talks was Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui. Stephen Biegun, the U.S. special representative on North Korea, and Lee Do-hoon, the South Korean Foreign Ministry’s special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, were their countries’ main interlocutors. (Jeong Yong-soo and Lee Yoo-jeong, “North Korea to Destroy Its Main Missile Test Site,” JoongAng Ilbo, January 29, 2019)
Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo Abe said his goal is to normalize relations with North Korea during his annual speech at the opening of parliament, Jiji Press reported. “I will act with determination and not miss the opportunity to break the shell of mutual distrust to resolve the North Korean nuclear and missile, as well as the all-important issue of the abduction [of Japanese citizens], by meeting directly with Kim Jong Un,” Abe told parliamentarians. The Japanese leader added he will “settle the unfortunate past” with the North and that his government will “closely cooperate with the international community, including the United States and South Korea,” to normalize diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. (Elizabeth Shim, “Shinzo Abe Calls for Normalization of Ties with North Korea,” UPI, January 28, 2019)
1/29/19:
Russian officials made a secret proposal to North Korea last fall aimed at resolving deadlocked negotiations with the Trump administration over the North’s nuclear weapons program, said U.S. officials familiar with the discussions. In exchange for North Korea dismantling its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, Moscow offered the country a nuclear power plant. The Russian offer, which intelligence officials became aware of in late 2018, marked a new attempt by Moscow to intervene in the high-stakes nuclear talks as it reasserts itself in a string of geopolitical flash points from the Middle East to South Asia to Latin America. It’s unclear how President Trump will view Moscow’s proposal. For months, he has embraced an unorthodox approach to the negotiations, but his aides are likely to strenuously oppose any major Russian role in a final agreement. As part of the deal, the Russian government would operate the plant and transfer all byproducts and waste back to Russia, reducing the risk that North Korea would use the power plant to build nuclear weapons, while providing the impoverished country a new energy source. “The Russians are very opportunistic when it comes to North Korea, and this is not the first time they’ve pursued an energy stake in Korea,” said Victor Cha, a former White House staffer whom the Trump administration considered nominating last year to serve as U.S. ambassador to South Korea. “Previous administrations have not welcomed these Russian overtures, but with Trump, you never know because he doesn’t adhere to traditional thinking,” Cha said. During negotiations with the Bush administration, Russia proposed providing a light-water reactor to North Korea in exchange for the dismantlement of the North’s plutonium production facilities, said Cha, who served in the Bush White House. “The U.S. was opposed to this,” he said, because it wanted Pyongyang to accept an alternative energy solution that did not include nuclear power. “I imagine the Russians want to provide a light-water reactor, make money off of it and get a foothold on the energy links in East Asia,” said Cha, who had not been briefed on the Russian proposal. One diplomat who focuses on Russia issues said Moscow’s involvement could help it argue against sanctions placed on it for interventions in Ukraine. “They may be trying to deal themselves back into the global game,” the diplomat said. “‘We helped save the world from North Korean nukes, so why the continued sanctions?’” In the past, U.S. officials have opposed a major role for Russia in the denuclearization process because of a long-standing distrust of Moscow, Cha said. China, a key player in the negotiations, has also opposed a prominent Russian energy role, though that could appeal to Trump. “If this is part of a final deal, Trump could be okay with it if it pokes China in the eye,” said Cha. “The Chinese don’t want the Russians on the peninsula, so if they’re going to be the primary energy supplier, they won’t like it.” Russia’s offer to North Korea, in late October, came as negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang deadlocked over when the North should disclose an inventory of its nuclear program. (John Hudson and Ellen Nakashima, “Russia Secretly Offered North Korea a Power Plant,” Washington Post, January 29, 2019)
The United States and North Korea will likely start preparing a joint statement of their leaders to be issued at their second bilateral summit scheduled for next month, the head of Seoul’s state spy agency said today. Suh Hoon, director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), said he expected the two sides to begin discussing major topics for the proposed summit between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. “I believe they will begin coordinating topics for the summit in order to draft a joint declaration in the North Korea-U.S. working level negotiations, along with their working-level preparations for the second North Korea-U.S. summit such as safety and protocols,” the NIS chief was quoted as telling the parliamentary intelligence committee. (Yonhap, “U.S., N. Korea Expected to Start Drafting Summit Agreement: NIS Chief,” January 29, 2019)
A new American intelligence assessment of global threats has concluded that North Korea is unlikely to give up its nuclear stockpiles and that Iran is not, for now, taking steps necessary to make a bomb, directly contradicting the rationale of two of President Trump’s foreign policy initiatives. Those conclusions are part of an annual “Worldwide Threat Assessment” released today. The 42-page threat report found that American trade policies and “unilateralism” — central themes of Trump’s “America First” approach — have strained traditional alliances and prompted foreign partners to seek new relationships. In testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee linked to the release of the report, the nation’s intelligence chiefs tried to avoid directly questioning administration policies. Yet they detailed a different ranking of the threats facing the United States. The starkest contradiction drawn by the intelligence chiefs was their assessment of North Korea. After his last meeting, in Singapore, Trump tweeted that “there is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea.” Dan Coats, the national intelligence director, described his concerns in opposite terms. He cited “some activity that is inconsistent with full denuclearization,” adding that most of what North Korea has dismantled is reversible. He said the North’s “leaders ultimately view nuclear weapons as critical to regime survival.” Similarly, the threat review declared that “we currently assess North Korea will seek to retain its W.M.D. capability and is unlikely to completely give up its nuclear weapons and production capability.” Trump has often noted, accurately, that North Korea has suspended missile tests; its last major test was 14 months ago. But today, Gina Haspel, the C.I.A. director, said the government in Pyongyang “is committed to developing a long-range nuclear-armed missile that would pose a direct threat to the United States.” Haspel said it was encouraging that North Korea was communicating with the United States. But under questioning by Senator Kamala Harris, the California Democrat, Haspel said the diplomatic objective was still to insist that North Korea fully disclose and dismantle its nuclear program. (David E. Sanger and Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Intelligence Disputes Trump on Global Peril,” New York Times, January 30, 2019, p. A-1)
1/30/19:
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the second summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un will be held in Asia next month. In an interview with Fox News, the top U.S. diplomat reaffirmed the plan to have the summit at the end of February and added, “We’ll do it someplace in Asia.” While media reports have speculated that Vietnam will host the meeting, it’s the first time that a U.S. official has revealed a location. “I am dispatching a team,” Pompeo said. “They’re headed that way now to lay the foundations for what I hope will be a substantial additional step towards the path for not only denuclearization of the peninsula, but a brighter future for the North Korean people and security on the peninsula in a way that no previous administration’s been able to achieve.” A senior official at Seoul’s foreign ministry said that high on the agenda for the upcoming preparatory working-level talks for the Trump-Kim summit may be the proposed dismantlement of the North’s main Yongbyon nuclear complex and the U.S.’ “corresponding measures” in return for that. During his third summit with South Korean President Moon Jae-in last September, Kim agreed to close the nuclear complex should the U.S. take measures correspondingly. “As the North first talked of (the shutdown of the complex), the talks will focus first on the Yongbyon issue and then move to other (issues),” the official told reporters on condition of anonymity. Both Seoul and Washington will view the dismantlement of the complex, the crux of Pyongyang’s nuclear program, as “very significant” progress toward complete denuclearization, the official added. He, in addition, anticipated that the U.S. may take a number of “considerable steps” should the North shutter the nuclear facility. However, the U.S. still remains “adamant” when it comes to sanctions. “Though the U.S. and the North may discuss the whole of the sanctions, I can’t imagine the two sides negotiating over the resumption of the inter-Korean industrial complex in Kaesong,” he said. (Yonhap, “Pompeo Says 2nd U.S>-N.K. Summit to Be Held in Asia,” January 31, 2019)
A former senior North Korean diplomat, known for decades of involvement in dealing with the United States, has been dropped from South Korea’s latest who’s who directory of North Korean officials amid a media report he was sent to a remote mine for ideological re-education. Former Vice Foreign Minister Han Song-ryol, who served twice as deputy chief of the North’s mission at the United Nations in New York, was removed from the directory because he was believed to have been replaced by Choe Son Hui, a unification ministry official said today. Han has been absent from North Korean state media reports since his trip to Sweden in February last year. Today, Chosun Ilbo reported that Han and five other ranking North Korean officials were punished in September for unclear reasons and sent to a mine in South Hamgyong Province for ideological re-education. The paper said that a proposal Han submitted to leader Kim Jong-un with regard to talks with the U.S. might have been a reason for his punishment. But the unification ministry official said that he has no information to confirm the media report. Born in 1954, Han is known as a veteran diplomat handling U.S. affairs. He served as deputy head of the North’s mission to the United Nations twice. Ideological re-education is used in North Korea for punishing senior government officials by sending them to rural areas and forcing them to engage in harsh physical labor. They sometimes get reinstated but, in many cases, those sent for re-education cannot make a comeback. The mine where Han was reportedly sent is one of the toughest re-education places in North Korea, just shy of the brutal conditions of prison camps, the newspaper said, citing an anonymous North Korean defector. (Yonhap, “N.K. Official Handling U.S. Affairs Removed from Seoul’s Info Book amid Punishment Speculation,” January 30, 2019) “Kim is well-versed in nuclear issues, well-trained and a hard work,” said a diplomatic source who met Kim on several occasions during his post in Spain (2014-2017). Unlike other North Korean ambassadors, he is very knowledgeable in nuclear issues and immediately appeared as an expert. “Kim spoke fluent English describing all the terminology related to North Korean nuclear issues and spoke with no hesitation about the range of North Korea’s key missiles, including ICBM,” the diplomatic source explained. When someone commented that “North Korea should suspend provocation and come forward as a normal country,” Kim immediately objected, explaining the reason for North Korea’s nuclear development. Kim previously worked for the Bureau 9, which oversees foreign affairs strategy development, and was quickly promoted by earning trust from North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho. He was known to have said that he was appointed to a key post at a relatively young age. He attended social events with his wife and lived with his children during his stay in Spain. (Gi-Jae Han, “Kim Hyok Chol Is an Expert on N. Korea Nuclear Issues, Sources Say,” Dong-A Ilbo, February 1, 2019)
1/31/19:
A top American diplomat signaled today that the United States might no longer demand that North Korea turn over a complete inventory of its nuclear assets as a first step in the denuclearization process that President Trump is pursuing. The diplomat, Stephen E. Biegun, said in his first public speech that “before the process of denuclearization can be final, we must have a complete understanding of the full extent of the North Korean W.M.D. and missile programs through a comprehensive declaration.” Biegun, appointed in August to be special representative for North Korea, was speaking to a room of North Korea experts at Stanford University. His reference to the timing of North Korea’s releasing a full list of its weapons of mass destruction indicates that the United States could be more flexible than it previously indicated about at what point in the negotiations the list is handed over. If American negotiators drop their demand that the list is an essential first step in denuclearization, that would remove one obstacle that has hampered diplomacy since a summit meeting last June between. Trump and Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader. Based on Biegun’s statement, the requirement now is that North Korea give international officials the list sometime before it ends its nuclear program for good, a process that could take years. Biegun also reiterated the Trump administration’s position that it would “not lift sanctions until denuclearization is complete.” [?] It is unclear what American negotiators would demand as an initial step for Pyongyang to prove it is committed to denuclearization, if the inventory of nuclear assets is delayed. “Sequencing always confounds negotiators,” Biegun said after his speech in a question-and-answer session with Robert Carlin, a former intelligence analyst and policy adviser on North Korea. Last October, the South Korean foreign minister, Kang Kyung-wha, told the Washington Post that it would be better to leave the inventory until later in the process. “If you start with a list and then get into a huge discussion about verification, you’re still working at that level of a lack of trust,” she said. President Moon Jae-in of South Korea supports Kim’s request that the two Koreas and the United States issue an end-of-war declaration, a move that American officials are reluctant to support. The Korean War halted in 1953 with an armistice, and some Korea experts say the lack of an end-of-war declaration and formal peace announcement contributes to the present-day tensions. “Both the South Koreans and the North Koreans have made a very compelling case for starting the process with at least a declaration,” Jean H. Lee, a Korea expert at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, said at a talk there yesterday. (Edward Wong, “U.S. Signals Less Urgency to Inventory Kim’s Arsenal,” New York Times, February 1, 2019, p. A12)
Biegun: “BIEGUN: Good afternoon. Thank you, Dr. Shin, and thank you to Stanford University and to the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center for inviting me here today. I want to add particular thanks to a few representatives of the university community who are here with us today, especially Dr. Sig Hecker, Bob Carlin, and my friend and former colleague, Andy Kim. … For our part, we have communicated to our North Korean counterparts that we are prepared to pursue — simultaneously and in parallel — all of the commitments our two leaders made in their joint statement at Singapore last summer, along with planning for a bright future for the Korean people and the new opportunities that will open when sanctions are lifted and the Korean Peninsula is at peace, provided that North Korea likewise fulfills its commitment to final, fully verified denuclearization. … In addition to the commitments on Tongchang-ri and Punggye-ri, Chairman Kim also committed, in both the joint statement from the aforementioned Pyongyang summit as well as during the Secretary of State’s October meetings in Pyongyang, to the dismantlement and destruction of North Korea’s plutonium and uranium enrichment facilities. This complex of sites that extends beyond Yongbyon represents the totality of North Korea’s plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment programs. Chairman Kim qualified next steps on North Korea’s plutonium and uranium enrichment facilities upon the United States taking corresponding measures. Exactly what these measures are a matter I plan to discuss with my North Korean counterpart during our next set of meetings. From our side, we are prepared to discuss many actions that could help build trust between our two countries and advance further progress in parallel on the Singapore summit objectives of transforming relations, establishing a permanent peace regime on the peninsula, and complete denuclearization. Finally and importantly, in describing to us their commitment to dismantle and destroy their plutonium and uranium enrichment facilities, the North Koreans have also added the critical words “and more.” This is essential, as there is more — much more — to do beyond these facilities to follow through on the Singapore summit commitment to complete denuclearization. Before the process of denuclearization can be final, we must also have a complete understanding of the full extent of the North Korean weapons of mass destruction missile programs. We will get that at some point through a comprehensive declaration. We must reach agreement on expert access and monitoring mechanisms of key sites to international standards. And ultimately, we need to ensure the removal and destruction of stockpiles of fissile material, weapons, missiles, launchers, and other weapons of mass destruction. All of this must be addressed in a roadmap of working-level negotiations that will be essential if we are to put in place the necessary conditions to fundamentally transform U.S.-North Korean relations and establish a peace — a permanent peace — on the Korean Peninsula. And President Trump has made clear that should North Korea follow through on Chairman Kim’s commitment to complete denuclearization, the United States will in return exceed anything previously thought possible. So, with the progress made so far, what remains is where we go next. As I have mentioned, President Trump and Chairman Kim will meet at a second summit at the end of February. President Trump has made clear both to North Korea as well as to our team that he expects significant and verifiable progress on denuclearization, actions that are bold and real, to emerge from that next summit. We expect to hold working-level negotiations with our North Korean counterparts in advance of the summit, with the intention of achieving a set of concrete deliverables, a roadmap of negotiations, and declaration — a roadmap of negotiations and declarations going forward, and a shared understanding of the desired outcomes of our joint efforts. We have that responsibility to our two leaders, who laid out a bold vision when they met in Singapore last year. We also have that responsibility to the people of the Korean Peninsula. When President Trump met with Chairman Kim in Singapore, he showed him a vision of what robust economic development could mean for North Korea. This bright future, driven by investment, external engagement, and trade and built with the incredible resources of the Korean Peninsula is also part of our strategy to plan for success. At the appropriate time, with the completion of denuclearization, we are prepared to explore with North Korea and many other countries the best way to mobilize investment, improve infrastructure, enhance food security, and drive a level of economic engagement that will allow the North Korean people to fully share in the rich future of their Asian neighbors. This prosperity, along with the denuclearization and peace, lies at the core of President Trump’s vision for U.S.-North Korea relations. … As I have mentioned already, United States policy toward North Korea stands on the foundation of final, fully verified denuclearization. This means the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and the means to produce them. But I also want to say again, emphatically, that President Trump’s vision is also much, much more, including, as outlined in Singapore last summer, the transformation of U.S.-North Korea relations and the establishment of a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. The President believes in a bright and more secure future for all the people of the Korean Peninsula, in Northeast Asia, and the world. It is a cliché to say that failure is not an option, but that suggests that failure is a choice rather than a consequence. I have intentionally not focused on the many ways that this could all fail. As the diplomatic record of the past 25 years shows, they are too numerous to count. We need to have contingencies if the diplomatic process fails, which we do. But if we are to avoid failure, it will take the United States, North Korea, and many other nations to make the affirmative choice for a transformed and peaceful Korean Peninsula. The United States has made that choice. It is the promise of closing the door on 70 years of war and hostility on the Korean Peninsula that led President Trump to Singapore last year. His relentless pursuit of that goal has created the space to achieve everything I’ve discussed today. Now is the opportunity. Now is the moment. The United States is ready to turn the vision outlined by President Trump and Chairman Kim at Singapore into reality. Thank you. (Applause.) … CARLIN: We’re going to find out. I just want to say, I’ve been at this a long time, and I feel like an old diplomatic warhorse. I can hear — sort of hear the future thusly, and I’m jealous because the opportunity is the greatest I have ever seen for progress. Our problem in the past has always been the stars have never quite been in alignment with all the players, and as Steve described it, this is the moment, and we can’t afford to lose it, which is why we’re fortunate to have someone like Steve leading the American team. These are some questions to me that maybe the group would be interested in hearing your views on. One thing everyone is going to ask you about, I’m pretty sure, is the testimony in the Congress the other day, which was portrayed as challenging, in effect, the basis of the negotiations. As it was played in the press, it suggested that, no, no, the North Koreans will never give up their nuclear program, and therefore unstated is, well, then therefore, why are we trying? So how do you — how do you see it? BIEGUN: Yeah, thank you, Bob, and thanks for joining me today, and thanks for all of your personal efforts in this regard and also your mentoring since I took on this position six months ago. I’d say that I entirely share President Trump’s frustration with the way this intelligence information was briefed and played out over time, and I don’t know what — to what degree it was responsibility of how we in the administration drafted it versus how it was interpreted or how the media reacted to it. But I think it’s very important to step back and look at this with a broader perspective. First of all, I want to say I have enormous respect for my colleagues in the Intelligence Community. I work on a daily basis with them. They are absolutely partners in the efforts that we’re trying to do to succeed in the diplomacy in North Korea. They have given us uniformly good analysis, including from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and I’m not at all critical of the information. But we also have to understand what intelligence information is. Intelligence information is data and information combined with analysis that’s given to policymakers, and if you take it out of context, you — if you divorce it from policy, then you have a very incomplete picture, and this is really where my frustration is with the story that played out last week. North Korea has a significant and potentially dangerous capacity in weapons of mass destruction. We all know that. North Korea has given us little indication that they have yet made the decision to completely dismantle and destroy that capability. We all know that. Therefore, ‘what’ is the question, and what President Trump has done is directed the Secretary of State to engage diplomatically through a combination of pressure and incentives to see if we can invite North Korea to make a different set of choices. That’s the complete picture. It’s not that we’re deceived, it’s not that we don’t know what’s going on, it’s not that we don’t take the threat with the gravity that it requires. And by the way, we have enormous capacities to deter that threat as well. So if I were presenting this same information, I would say that we have the potential here for a grave threat to the United States of America, and therefore it is all the more urgent that we engage diplomatically with North Korea to see if we can change the trajectory of their policies by changing the trajectory of our own. And that’s what we’re trying to do. So my frustration isn’t with the accuracy of the information. It’s how it’s presented and how it’s interpreted. You cannot divorce the intelligence information from policy. The intelligence information is critical as an underpinning for the policy, but the policy is to address the threat and that’s what my frustration was last week. CARLIN: You said some — you said some things which sound familiar to me and I’m sure some familiar to the North Koreans about essentially if you choose path A, good things will happen, your future will be wonderful. But you’ve said something up here several times, which seems to me to be very different, and I suspect the North Koreans will hear it differently as well. And what you said implied that the United States finally sees a place for North Korea in Northeast Asia. That’s critical, and the question is: What is that place? How does it fit with our alliances? How does it fit with our concept, our strategic concept in Northeast Asia? Doesn’t all that have to be discussed and worked out, obviously internally but also with the North Koreans as well? BIEGUN: Yeah. So I heard some of the criticisms of the Singapore summit — I was in the private sector at the time — not enough preparation before, not enough detail in the agreements coming out. I’ll tell you that as a negotiator, which is my profession largely in corporate and government life, I could not have a better mandate. I have four streams of potential cooperation to discuss with North Korea: transforming our relations, building a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula, denuclearization, and the fourth, which I’ve addressed briefly here, which is the return of remains from the Korean War — doesn’t involve the same level of negotiation, but should emphasize it’s every bit as important that we heal the wound of that war as part of the process of resolving the larger dispute on the Korean Peninsula. And the good news is we’re making a lot of progress in that regard, as I mentioned. But in the other areas, what’s complicit in that is this is — at the core of this is denuclearization. It absolutely — the essential test of this is removing the weapons of mass destruction programs in North Korea. But the issue is much larger than that. It’s something of a trite trick in Washington that when you can’t solve the problem, you enlarge the problem, but here the President has embraced it full on. … I don’t mince my words when I say that he is unconstrained by the assumptions of his predecessors. President Trump is ready to end this war. It is over. It is done. We are not going to invade North Korea. We are not seeking to topple the North Korean regime. We need to advance our diplomacy alongside our plans for denuclearization in a manner that sends that message clearly to North Korea as well. We are ready for a different future. It’s bigger than denuclearization, while it stands on the foundation of denuclearization, but that’s the opportunity we have and those are the discussions we will be having with the North Koreans. CARLIN: You listed all the meetings that the Secretary of State and you have had with a variety of North Korean officials, and they’re usually described in the newspapers as one sentence or so and then people move on. Seems to me it’s critically important, after 2017, that this President was able to meet with Kim Jong Un, the Secretary was able to meet with him as well, you were at the table with him as well. What’s your sense of how important it is they have this third dimension, this personal contact, so that you’re not just reading statements, you really get a sense of the person, where they’re coming from, how they think, how they react? BIEGUN: So I’ll tantalize you a bit. I listed some of our meetings, Bob, not all of our meetings. … But let me also say that there are some things that are very different here. You said you heard some things that are familiar here. One of the sad realities I had to confront about two months ago was I haven’t had an original idea yet on North Korea. Every idea that we’re seeking to pursue has been conceived of by that long line of distinguished diplomats that I described in my speech, including the gentleman sitting next to me. But there are some things different. So if it’s not the combination of possibilities and what our expectations are and what they might arrive at, what’s different about this moment? Well, nothing less important than the leaders and the relationship between the leaders, and that has real tangible consequences on how we execute our diplomacy. President Trump has laid out a vision that’s created a room for maneuver for my team and for the Secretary of State that is probably bigger than any of my predecessors who’ve served in this position in the past, inside the government as well as outside the government. But that’s not inconsequential, especially inside the North Korean system, where Chairman Kim has likewise dictated these things. And so when we see his New Year’s address, where he declares not to us but to the people of North Korea that he has made the decision to denuclearize, that’s creating room for us to begin this discussion in a manner that gives us hope we can get to the goal we seek. When he says to his people that he is shifting the focus of his leadership to developing the economy of North Korea — that we can do together. That’s not an adversarial approach at all. And so that’s very different as well. The messages from the top, the space created by a top-down diplomacy, creates very different potential for how this diplomacy can proceed. And I am hopeful that the same amount of momentum that it has provided to our team is going to be matched with the momentum that our counterparts in North Korea bring to the table. CARLIN: You said that the U.S. is now prepared for or is committed to parallel and simultaneous action with the North Koreans. And I think we’ve heard that from the Secretary of State, actually, before. But that suggests a very different approach than the second line that we hear, which is we’re not going to do anything until you do everything. So it seems to me people would be confused. How should we understand what’s going to be coming down the pike? BIEGUN: Okay, so you’re asking me a question for the benefit of the audience, Bob, because I know you know the answer to this. CARLIN: That’s fine. BIEGUN: Because, among other things, what Bob does for me — with me in discussion — is he reads the North Korean media, and he’s one of the nation’s leading experts on parsing every single word, which is very important when you’re reading the Korean newswire KCNA or their state newspaper Rodong Sinmun. And I would encourage any of you — and you, sir — to apply the same careful attention to the words that we use when we say we will not lift sanctions until denuclearization is complete. That is correct. We didn’t say we won’t do anything until you do everything, but it’s often — it’s often cast as that, and that’s why an opportunity like this today is so important to be able to maybe put a little bit more flesh on the bones of our diplomacy. Let me go back to a larger issue, which is one that confounds negotiators in every dimension, which is sequencing. What do — who — what am I going to do, what are you going to do, and who’s going to act first? And that’s what we’re trying to resolve and get away from. In the past, the shorthand interpretation of our policy is more or less what Bob helpfully laid out as a strawman, which is, you do everything first and then we’ll begin to think about whether or not we’re going to do anything in response, and that is not our policy and has not been our policy. What we’re talking about is simultaneously looking at ways to improve relations, looking at ways to advance a more stable and peaceful, and ultimately, a more legal peace regime on the Korean Peninsula — how we advance denuclearization. And an added dimension that President Trump introduced in Singapore is how do we also proceed toward an end where there’s a brighter economic future for North Korea to support the goals that Chairman Kim has laid out to focus on the economic development of his country. And the goal will be to bring this this all together at the same time, and I have this — I have this perfect outcome moment where the last nuclear weapon leaves North Korea, the sanctions are lifted, the flag goes up in the embassy and the treaty is signed in the same hour. Now, that’s an ideal, I know, and these things are going to move haltingly along different courses. But they also can be mutually reinforcing, because if we’re doing the right thing with each other in relations, it makes it easier to do the right thing with each other on nuclear weapons. And if we’re doing the right thing on nuclear weapons, it makes a lot more conceivable that there would be a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. And so all of it has to work in concert as well. This is an ideal, I know, and as I said earlier in a private conversation, when I hear the words come out of my own mouth, it even sounds slightly Pollyannaish. But I am absolutely convinced, and more importantly, the President of the United States is convinced that it’s time to move past 70 years of war and hostility on the Korean Peninsula. There is no reason for this conflict to persist any longer. CARLIN: I want to ask you a question about normalization, but I want to make a quick observation about reading North Korean media. I was in Pyongyang once and we were having a meeting with the vice foreign minister, and I said to him, “Mr. Vice Foreign Minister, can I ask a favor of you? You can transmit it to the party newspaper Rodong Sinmun,” and he said, “Sure, what is it?” I said, “Could you have them print it with the lines farther apart?” And he said, “Well, why?” And I said, “Well, my job is to read between the lines, and I need more space.” He laughed. BIEGUN: And he fell for it? CARLIN: Yeah, he did. He thought it was funny. Normalization — where does that fit? In your view, in the sequence, how useful of a card is that or is it something that needs to be withheld? Is it going to cause complications or is it something that should just come naturally as we describe to the North Koreans their future? BIEGUN: Yeah, I think it’s only possible if it’s organic and natural. So it has to be a consequence of what we’re doing in the other areas and — but at the same time we can think about steps we’d take along the road in order to get us closer to that point. We have big issues with North Korea on weapons of mass destruction, and that drove the sense of crisis over the past couple of years, over the past generation, but also in working with — in working with North Korea, we have a lot of other issues in the relationship that we have to resolve too. My theory of the case would be that we can resolve issues of disagreement outside of the weapons of mass destruction issue much more effectively through engagement than through the separation that we have right now. I am not kidding when I say it is difficult for us to communicate with each other. Those of you in the room who are seasoned hands of U.S.-North Korea diplomacy know this. It is a convoluted, multistage process simply to get a message from one side to the other. Goodwill and authority from the top can speed that process up for sure — and here I mean on the North Korean side — but still it isn’t easy. And we have to find ways to communicate better with each other, and that’s one of the things we’re certainly focusing on. … CARLIN: Okay. The role or the space for people-to-people, cultural exchanges, things like that with — you see those as a useful adjunct? Is it just sort of fluff? How are you going to integrate it? How important do you think the North Koreans see it? BIEGUN: We have a lot of experience in this because this is a tool that we used — we’ve used for generations in other adversarial relationships. North Korea hasn’t had such a breadth of experience on how to move past tensions with adversaries and become former adversaries, and — but they clearly have an appreciation for it. In case you did miss, there was a cultural performance troupe in Beijing last week, and it’s not lost on the North Koreans either the important role that these type of exchanges play in accepting each other’s cultures and in accepting each other and building the soft sinews of a relationship. And so I’m sure there are plenty of areas that we could explore in this that would build momentum to the other parts of our diplomacy. We’re at an inflection point here because we have been in a campaign of maximum pressure for almost two years now, building up and certainly escalating and peaking in 2017, but there’s still a substantial amount of impediments to any normal exchange of any kind between our two countries. And part of the challenge that we are doing, we have to do is we have to walk and chew gum at the same time. We will sustain the pressure campaign; at the same time, we are trying to advance the diplomatic campaign, and we have to find the right balance between those two. Areas like cultural exchanges or people-to-people initiatives that you described seem to me a very obvious place where we could begin to make progress in that environment. … CARLIN: I deliberately did not talk about the nuclear issue because (a) there are going to be a lot of questions and (b) I think it’s important, from what you said, for people to understand that you view a resolution of the nuclear issue in a broader context — that is, you’re not going to be able to just focus on that and get it done. Lots of things are going to have to come together. Do you want to make a few observations? BIEGUN: Well, let me say first that you are absolutely correct, but that should be in no way interpreted as diminishing the degree to which that is the threshold challenge that we face. The President, Secretary of State, entire administration are devoted to the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea. If we do not address the weapons of mass destruction issue on the Korean Peninsula today, we will have an Asia Pacific nuclear weapons challenge tomorrow, and we all need to keep that front of mind. We already see editorial opinion in regional newspapers calling for governments to begin to think about exactly this outcome. We have to address this, and we have to address it in absolute terms as well as in relative terms. But in relative terms, we’re also not demanding that this be the starting point. As I said, in parallel we’re willing to look at a lot of other things that we can do together that also build the confidence and reduce the sense of risk or threat that would potentially drive a country to want to sustain that kind of capacity. It’s not necessary for North Korea to be a safe and stable country to have weapons of mass destruction. In fact, the one remaining issue that could potentially lead to conflict on the Korean Peninsula is the presence of weapons of mass destruction. … SHIN: So the first one, it’s about terminology of denuclearization. So the question is, “Do U.S. and North Korea share what that means?” BIEGUN: So coming out of the Singapore summit — I’m not telling you anything you don’t know, that there was no detailed definition or shared agreement of what denuclearization entails. Our view is that it entails the elimination of the totality of the weapons of mass destruction programs in North Korea, consistent with the requirements of international law. It also is going to require the means of production of those weapons, as well as the means of delivery, the intercontinental ballistic missiles. Holistically, we want to see North Korea move into a very different posture, but they have to be comfortable moving into that posture as well, and that’s part of the efforts of our diplomacy. So we do not have a specific and agreed definition of what final, fully verified denuclearization or comprehensive, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization — whatever your preferred term of art — is. We do need to have a shared understanding of what the outcome is going to be, and within the space that that creates, we should be able to also agree on the steps necessary to achieve a mutually accepted outcome. We do have a well-developed view inside the United States of America on what this entails, but that’s something that over time you’ll also have to come to agreement with the North Koreans on. SHIN: Okay. They had a lot of concerns in both Washington and Seoul about the future of alliance. The question is: Is the removal of U.S. troops from South Korea an option to give incentive to North Korea for giving up their nukes? BIEGUN: So we are not involved in any diplomatic discussion, full stop, that would suggest this tradeoff. It has never been discussed. The future of the alliance is an important question, and sustaining the future of that alliance is something that both sides have to fully commit themselves to. I have the — I have the assignment to work on North Korea. The alliance management issues affect my work, but they are not my central responsibility. Those are the responsibilities of our East Asia and Pacific director at the Department of State. Let me put in a point of emphasis here that the Secretary of State and the President have nominated a tremendously talented individual in Retired General Dan (sic) Stilwell to lead that effort, and his nomination is still stuck in the Congress. We need our diplomats in place, and we need our diplomats on the field for exactly reasons like this. But the alliance does play an important role and is an important foundation for the success that we hope to achieve in the Korean — on the Korean Peninsula, and I am hopeful that we’ll continue to be able to make progress on that regard. SHIN: Okay. So next question is: Given domestic politics in the United States, so how can you convince North Koreans that any major agreements that you make now can and will continue after Trump leaves office? BIEGUN: Yeah. So one of the things that the Secretary of State has been quite clear with our team on is that we need to plan for success. So part of our planning for success is trying to create a picture of what that bright future looks like if all the endeavors that I’ve described today make the progress that we hope they do. Part of that success also is making those achievements durable, and we spend a lot of time focused on that. For my part, I am a frequent visitor to Capitol Hill. Shortly before I got on the plane Friday to come out here to Palo Alto, I spoke to two senators who had called wanting updates, wanting to know where we are on North Korea. And it’s not just me; it’s our entire team at the department are focused on working closely with the other institutions of government to ensure that we’re bringing everyone along at the same time. And that is ultimately towards that concept of planning for success and making this a durable outcome. One of the benefits of working on the North Korea issues is it is actually one of the more bipartisan issues in Washington, D.C., today. Notwithstanding some of the gotcha culture and some of the reporting that we see, even over the — of events over the past week, for the most part, when I’m on Capitol Hill, whether it’s with Democrats or Republicans, they all want us to succeed. We’re going to have to pass a test of scrutiny from the United States Congress in whatever we ultimately achieve here, and it will be important therefore that this be a meaningful and verifiable outcome. But in the event we’re able to produce that outcome, I have the highest level of confidence there will be strong, bipartisan support, because President Trump isn’t just giving vision to a personal point of view when he looks at a future for the Korean Peninsula that moves past 70 years of war and hostility; I think he’s speaking for the entire country, Democrats and Republicans alike. SHIN: Okay. So how do you see the U.S.-China relations playing out in the U.S.-DPRK relationship? BIEGUN: So it’s well known that United States and China are engaged in some fairly significant areas of disagreement, primarily focused but not exclusively focused around international economics. Even as I sit here today, there’s talks ongoing in Washington, D.C., in attempt to strike an agreement to move forward beyond those disagreements. I have a counterpart in China who is likewise responsible for diplomacy with North Korea, and I’ve had a chance to meet with him on more than one occasion, as I mentioned in my speech. I played host to him and his team in Washington, D.C., just last Wednesday, just a week ago yesterday. What the Chinese have told us is that they will compartmentalize North Korea from the other areas of dispute in U.S.-China relations, and my inclination is to take them at their word until we have evidence to the contrary. And so far I think the track record has been pretty good. The reason why this works is because China isn’t doing anything in North Korea for the United States. China’s policies in North Korea are not a favor to our country. China is doing this because it’s in their interests. China does not want a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. China does not believe that weapons of mass destruction induce the stability over time that we all want on the Korean Peninsula. And China sees the opportunity that would flow from a normalized relationship with North Korea in terms of regional economic engagement. And North-South-China-Russia commerce has potentially enormous benefits, and more so for China in some of the parts of China that are most economically challenged today in the north. So China has plenty of reasons of its own to be working alongside us, and they are. And so — and I’m a big fan of countries acting in their own interests, in the context of values as well, but when the — the core of the Chinese policy is they’re acting in their own interests, and I think we can make a lot of progress. I’ve described it in other settings as this: that China is with us 100 percent some of the way. And that’s what we need from them. … (DoS, Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun, Remarks on DPRK at Stanford University, January 31, 2019)
2/5/19:
Trump: “As part of a bold new diplomacy, we continue our historic push for peace on the Korean Peninsula. Our hostages have come home, nuclear testing has stopped, and there has not been a missile launch in 15 months. If I had not been elected President of the United States, we would right now, in my opinion, be in a major war with North Korea with potentially millions of people killed. Much work remains to be done, but my relationship with Kim Jong Un is a good one. And Chairman Kim and I will meet again on February 27 and 28 in Vietnam.” (White House, President Donald J. Trump’s State of the Union Address, February 5, 2019)
2/6-8/19:
A senior American negotiator arrived in North Korea today to sort out crucial details for a nuclear summit meeting in Vietnam between President Trump and the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, with only three weeks to go before the talks take place. Stephen Biegun, the Trump administration’s special representative for North Korea, arrived in Pyongyang, the North’s capital, around the time that Trump announced in his State of the Union address that he and Kim would meet for a second time on February 27-28 in Vietnam. Biegun’s trip had been announced in advance. Trump now wants “significant and verifiable progress on denuclearization, actions that are bold and real,” Biegun said last week in a speech at Stanford University. But American intelligence agencies recently cautioned that the North was “unlikely to completely give up its nuclear weapons and production capability.” During his Pyongyang visit, Biegun plans to pursue “concrete plans to advance all of the elements of the Singapore joint statement,” he said last week. He said the working-level talks in Pyongyang would be aimed at finding concessions that each side could accept, as well as “a road map of negotiations and declarations going forward, and a shared understanding of the desired outcomes of our joint efforts.” President Moon Jae-in of South Korea has said that Trump’s apparent strong desire to become the American leader who ends the North Korean nuclear threat, along with Kim’s announcement that reviving the North’s economy is his top priority, have increased the chances for a breakthrough in the decades-old nuclear dispute. “We hope that both leaders will take more detailed and concrete steps in Vietnam,” Moon’s spokesman, Kim Eui-kyeom, said today. “Vietnam and the United States once wielded guns and bayonets against each other, but they are now friends,” the spokesman said. “We hope that Vietnam will provide a perfect backdrop as both sides try to write a new history.” Biegun said last week that Trump’s bold approach had allowed more room for maneuver than any of the envoy’s predecessors had. His North Korean counterpart is from the State Affairs Commission, a powerful agency that reports directly to Kim Jong-un. “It’s a positive sign that the working-level teams of both sides are headed by figures who are considered flexible and deeply trusted by their leaders,” said Cheong Seong-chang, an analyst at the Sejong Institute in South Korea. In his speech last week, Biegun acknowledged that the United States and North Korea had yet to come up with “a specific and agreed definition” of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the goal that both leaders pledged in Singapore to work toward. Analysts have long warned that Kim could try to give up just enough of his nuclear weapons program to create the illusion of progress, allowing Trump to claim victory while leaving unchanged the North’s long-term goal of being recognized as a de facto nuclear weapons state. “This is like the train racing ahead without even knowing where its final destination is,” said Cheon Seong-whun, an analyst at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul. “If they produce another half-cooked agreement in the second summit and fail to specify what their final goal is, it would only help make North Korea’s nuclear arsenal a fait accompli.” When Kim met with Moon in Pyongyang in September, Kim said the North was willing to take significant actions toward denuclearization — including the permanent dismantlement of its facilities in Yongbyon, a key site for producing nuclear bomb fuel — if Washington took “corresponding” steps. Biegun said he would discuss those measures while in Pyongyang. He also indicated that the Trump administration was softening its position to make a deal possible. He said the United States was ready to take actions “simultaneously and in parallel” with the North as denuclearization proceeds. In the past, Washington insisted that the North take significant steps of its own, starting with the full disclosure of all of its nuclear assets, before expecting any rewards. But Biegun said last week that a comprehensive disclosure of such assets could come “at some point.” He even indicated that Washington might ease sanctions against the North before the North denuclearizes completely. ”We didn’t say, ‘We won’t do anything until you do everything,’” Biegun said. Leif-Eric Easley, an associate professor of international studies at Ewha Women’s University in Seoul, said one stated goal of Biegun’s trip — a “road map of negotiations and declarations going forward” — was particularly crucial. “Without a negotiated road map, the denuclearization process lacks transparency, accountability and a decent chance of success,” Easley said. (Choe Sang-hun, “U.S. Envoy Preparing for Trump-Kim Talk,” New York Times, February 7, 2019) During the first working-level talks in Pyongyang last week for the upcoming second North Korea-US summit, the North Korean side demanded the partial loosening of sanctions in exchange for allowing inspections of its Yongbyon nuclear facilities, while the U.S. proposed a declaration ending the Korean War as a corresponding measure. The next question is whether the two sides can find common ground going ahead — at a second set of talks scheduled for next week between State Department Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun and North Korean State Affairs Commission Special Representative for U.S. Affairs Kim Hyok-chol, and at the summit in Hanoi at the end of the month. According to a South Korean government source closely acquainted with the North Korea-U.S. talks, Kim reaffirmed the North’s willingness to dismantle its Yongbyon nuclear facilities during the first round of working-level talks in Pyongyang, while demanding the partial loosening of sanctions as a corresponding measure for allowing inspections of the facilities. The North Korean side said it “could offer more generous steps” if the US were to even partially loosen sanctions as a corresponding measure, the source reported. Biegun’s negotiating card reportedly concerned an end-of-war declaration, which the U.S. would offer in exchange once inspections of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities are complete. As in his public statements on the matter, Biegun stated in no uncertain terms that the US would not be able to loosen or lift sanctions. At the same time, he reportedly suggested it may consider loosening sanctions if North Korea were to offer the Yongbyon dismantlement “plus something extra.” The second North Korea-U.S. summit now appears poised to hinge on how much progress the two sides can make in bridging their differences on the US’ “corresponding measures.” It was not confirmed what specific areas the North Korean side mentioned in suggesting the partial loosening of sanctions as a corresponding measure for the Yongbyon inspections. One possibility mentioned among foreign affairs analysts is that it was considering a partial loosening or waiving of sanctions to allow resumption of operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex and tourism at Mt. Kumgang, or lowering of the ceiling on crude oil supplies according to UN Security Council Resolution 2397. (Kim Ji-eun, “N. Korea Demands Partial Relaxation of Sanctions in Exchanges for Yongbyon Inspections,” Hankyore, February 14, 2019)
2/8/19:
President Trump announced that his upcoming summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will take place in Hanoi, ending weeks of speculation over the venue for the two leaders’ second meeting. Trump revealed the decision in an evening tweet. “My representatives have just left North Korea after a very productive meeting and an agreed upon time and date for the second Summit with Kim Jong Un,” Trump said in the tweet. “It will take place in Hanoi, Vietnam, on February 27 & 28. I look forward to seeing Chairman Kim & advancing the cause of peace!” In a second tweet Friday night, Trump predicted that North Korea “will become a different kind of Rocket — an Economic one!” Before their first summit in Singapore last year, Trump had long mocked Kim as “Little Rocket Man.” “North Korea, under the leadership of Kim Jong Un, will become a great Economic Powerhouse,” Trump said in the tweet. “He may surprise some but he won’t surprise me, because I have gotten to know him & fully understand how capable he is.” (Felicia Sonmez and Simon Denyer, “Second Trump-Kim Summit to Take Place in Hanoi,” Washington Post, February 8, 2018)
KCNA, “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army, made a congratulatory visit to the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces on Friday, the 71st founding anniversary of the KPA. Supreme Leader of the Party, state and army Kim Jong Un had a significant photo taken with the KPA commanding officers before the statues of President Kim Il Sung and Chairman Kim Jong Il at the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces. At the conference hall of the ministry, Kim Jong Un sat together with generals and other officers of the ministry and commanders of KPA large combined units and combined units and warmly congratulated them on the Day of Army Founding. He made a highly important speech. … A fundamental key to pushing forward the drive of turning the army into the elite revolutionary armed forces lies in ideological revolution, training revolution, modernization of arms and equipment and establishment of military discipline, he said. He said that all units and subunits of the entire army should raise the three-point hot winds more fiercely to effect a new turn in improving logistic supply and soldiers’ life. He said that the People’s Army should keep holding high the slogan “Let Us Take Charge of Both Defense of Country and Socialist Construction!” and display the stamina of struggle and creation peculiar to the KPA in all fields of socialist construction called for by the Party and thus have a large share this year, a crucial year in carrying out the five-year strategy for national economic development. He specified the ways for successfully carry out important tasks facing the KPA this year including further enhancing the role of party organizations and political institutions of the KPA at all levels and increasing the combat capabilities in every way by braving hardships and difficulties in the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance. So great is the trust of the Party in the commanding officers of the KPA, he said, voicing his expectation and conviction that they would hold full responsibility for their work before the Party, revolution, country and the people and register greater successes in their work. Firm is the determination and will of the Party to shape a new roadmap toward building a powerful socialist country for realizing the wishes of the great leaders and no force can check the dynamic advance of the country, he said, appealing to the entire army to work hard for the accomplishment of the revolutionary cause of Juche in firm unity around the Party Central Committee.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Makes Congratulatory Visit to Ministry of People’s Armed Forces,” February 9, 2019)
2/9/19:
The US envoy for North Korea today cast this week’s working-level talks with North Korea to prepare for the two countries’ second summit late this month as “productive” but said “some hard work” still remains. US Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun flew back to Seoul yesterday evening following a three-day visit to Pyongyang aimed at fine-tuning details for the Feb. 27-28 summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Hanoi, Vietnam. “I would say it was a productive set of discussions over the last few days, and our team engaged on a number of areas of mutual interest, and we’ve agreed to meet again,” he said during a meeting with his South Korean counterpart Lee Do-hoon. “So I think this is a constructive place to be especially in advance of the president’s second summit with Chairman Kim,” he added. During a courtesy call on Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha earlier in the day, Biegun cited “some hard work” to do with the North before the Trump-Kim summit but did not elaborate. “We don’t know where it is going to go, but we are in the midst of a conversation with the North,” he said. “I am confident that both sides stay committed, that we can make real progress,” he added. Giving Seoul’s “full” support for summit preparations, Kang noted that the past week has been a “long and momentous” week for the US negotiator. “I think you’ve come back with outcomes from Pyongyang that we can both build upon, first of all for the very successful second summit between President Trump and Chairman Kim,” she said. (Park Ha-na, “U.S. Envoy Calls Talks with N.K. ‘Productive,’” Korea Herald, February 9, 2019)
2/10/19:
“North Korea and the US have agreed to continue negotiations in a third country in Asia during the week of February 17,” Seoul’s presidential spokesman Kim Eui-kyeom told reporters. (U.S., N. Korea to Continue Summit Talks Next Week: Seoul,” February 10, 2019)
South Korea signed a Special Measures Agreement with the United under which South Korea will pay 1.03 trillion won (US$890 million) for the operation of the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), up from 960 billion won in 2018. It was formally called a “preliminary signing,” as domestic procedures, including parliamentary ratification in South Korea, are required. The U.S. government does not need congressional approval for the accord. South Korea’s defense budgets this year have hiked 8.2 percent from 2018, but inflation has remained at 1.5 percent. The deal put an end to months-long disputes on money between the allies. Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha met with Timothy Betts, the top U.S. delegate to the SMA talks, minutes before the signing ceremony. Betts, deputy assistant secretary of state for plans, programs and operations, had 10 rounds of face-to-face negotiations with Chang Won-sam, a veteran South Korean diplomat, throughout last year. But they failed to strike a deal on how much Seoul would contribute. The previous agreement signed in 2014 expired at the end of 2018. The two sides continued negotiations in the new year and reached a deal on the one-year contract. It’s open to an extension in case of the allies’ agreement, the ministry said. South Korea wanted it to be valid for three to five years, but the Trump administration pushed for a one-year deal, saying a comprehensive review of defense cost-sharing with allies is still underway, according to a diplomatic source. Seoul and Washington also agreed to launch a working group for continued discussions on systemic reform amid criticism about a lack of detailed data and other information on the USFK’s expenditures and standards of calculation. South Korea has largely provided money in a lump-sum method as the U.S. is apparently loath to a “program-project based cost” settlement system. Under the new accord, South Korea will expand its contribution in the form of goods or services, instead of money, for construction and logistical support. At the start of the talks in March last year, the U.S. demanded South Korea pay around 1.4 trillion won a year and later offered 1.1 trillion won, a ministry official told reporters on background. The U.S. had proposed that South Korea cover the “operational support” costs, which include budgets for the deployment of so-called strategic assets to Korea such as aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and strategic bombers, the official added. But Washington retracted the offer as Seoul remained firm on its position that it’s outside the purpose of the SMA. South Korea has shared the financial burden for USFK since the early 1990s. The funds are used to cover the wages of South Korean workers at USFK bases, construction and logistical support. (Lee Chi-dong, “S. Korea to Up Its Financial Burden for U.S. Troops by 8.2 Pct.,” Yonhap, February 10, 2019)
As of today, it will have been three years since the South Korean government, under former president Park Geun-hye, closed the Kaesong Industrial Complex in response to North Korea’s nuclear weapon tests and missile launches. The possibility of resuming operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex and tourism to Mt. Kumgang has emerged as one of the potential corresponding measures the US could take to compensate North Korea for closing its Yongbyon nuclear facilities, leading up to the two countries’ second summit on February 27 and 28. Last month, Rep. Lee Eon-ju, a lawmaker with the Bareunmirae Party, wrote on Facebook that “the creation of the Kaesong Complex moved companies and jobs out of the country” and that “there are strong suspicions that that a portion of the wages paid to workers were used to develop North Korea’s nuclear program.” On his YouTube channel, former Liberty Korea Party (LKP) leader Hong Jun-pyo alleged that the North Korean policy of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations was to give North Korea handouts that were then used to build the North’s nuclear weapons. The argument that the wages paid to North Korean workers at Kaesong led to the development of North Korea’s nuclear program is only an assumption, and no one has provided objective grounds or evidence to back it up. But the narrative about handouts to the North led the international community to conclude that bulk cash had been funneled from the Kaesong Complex into the North’s missile and nuclear weapon development programs, and that belief now functions as an obstacle to reopening the complex. In order for efforts to persuade the international community of the need to reactivate the Kaesong Complex, experts believe, there first needs to be an accurate assessment of the complex’s economic benefits and its impact on inter-Korean relations as well as the formation of a consensus inside South Korea. “Before we take our case to the international community, the ruling and opposition parties need to hash out the conditions under which they’re willing to reopen the Kaesong Complex,” said Shin Han-yong, president of the Corporate Association of Kaesong (Kaesong) Industrial Complex, during a debate on Jan. 24 that was hosted by the Korea Peace Forum. In a recently released report titled “Kaesong Industrial Complex: The Benefits Outweigh the Costs,” the Kaesong (Kaesong) Industrial District Foundation (GIDF) argues that “The debate about the economic costs and benefits of the Kaesong Complex is heating up without an accurate understanding of the complex’s value. We provide an empirical analysis that contradicts the narrative that reopening the complex would be giving handouts to North Korea and demonstrates instead that the complex is highly beneficial for South Korea.” In this article, the Hankyoreh draws upon the foundation’s report, along with data and research from Statistics Korea and various institutes, to ascertain the truth of the claim that the Kaesong Complex is basically a handout to North Korean regime. From the time the Kaesong Complex first opened in 2004 until it was shut down in 2016, the accumulated value of goods produced there amounted to US$3.23 billion. That figure reflects how much subcontractors operating at the complex were paid for the products they supplied to prime contractors. South Korean companies at the complex produced US$4.60 dollars’ worth of output for every dollar of input. When these figures are converted to the final consumer price, it amounts to 20 or 30 times the value of the investment. “Everything except the air and water was supplied by South Korea — not only the raw and subsidiary materials but even the vegetables and seasoning used in the complex cafeteria. North Korea’s toll processing fee only represented about 5% of the complex’s production value, with the remaining 95% going to South Korea,” the Kaesong Complex tenant companies explained. Even though three years have passed since the Kaesong Complex was shut down, the majority of the tenant companies still plan to return to the complex, the GIDF said. Their rationale is the complex’s overwhelming comparative advantage, economically speaking. This comparative advantage largely consists of a skilled workforce available for low wages. As of 2015, North Korean workers at the complex were being paid US$168.50 a month. That’s extremely low compared to China (US$647.90) or even Vietnam (US$261.70). Because these workers are supplied by the North Korean authorities, there’s very little worker turnover, and most of the employees there are skilled workers who’ve been on the job between five and 10 years. Their annual wage increase is capped at 5%. The land that North Korea provided the complex cost US$1 per square meter, with an annual usage fee of US$0.64 per square meter. That’s extremely low, compared to China’s Hebei Province (US$34.8) or the Vietnamese capital of Hanoi (US$2.28-2.64). The Kaesong Complex, which is a duty-free zone, is just 60km from Seoul. This means that vehicles can bring materials into the complex in the morning and then ship finished products out in the afternoon. North Korean workers are highly productive since they share the language and culture of their South Korean counterparts. These are competitive features that are unique to the Kaesong Complex, with no equivalents in other countries. Contrary to the argument advanced by some that the “creation of the Kaesong Complex moved companies and jobs out of the country,” the GIDF contends that the complex sustained South Korean jobs that were on the verge of disappearing and even created new jobs. Over 90% of the tenant companies at the complex are subcontractors that do toll processing. The tenant companies — largely operating on a small scale in a limited group of industries — could no longer compete in South Korea and had been forced to relocate their factories first to China and then to Southeast Asia. When a textile sewing factory sets up a plant overseas, it has to build facilities for creating the raw and subsidiary materials there as well. That causes South Korean producers of those materials to lose customers and may ultimately force them to close. The approximately 120 tenant companies at the Kaesong Complex sourced their raw and subsidiary materials from some 3,800 South Korean suppliers, supporting 80,000 jobs. If the tenant companies had relocated to China and Southeast Asia, South Korean suppliers would have had to close, but those companies’ presence at the Kaesong Complex maintained and created South Korean jobs, the GIDF argued. “Because of ignorant misconceptions about the Kaesong Complex, there’s a growing, completely inaccurate belief that the complex is taking people’s jobs,” the GIDF said. The Kaesong Complex brought major benefits not only to SMEs but also to sizable firms and even large corporations — which were the companies that subcontracted work to the tenant companies at the complex. The toll processing rates at the complex in 2015 were similar to the rates in South Korea in 1995. This basically meant that the firms placing orders were paying 20-year-old fees, saving a good deal of money. For South Korean companies, the GIDF asserted, there isn’t an industrial complex anywhere in the world that’s comparable to the Kaesong Complex in economic terms. Viewed in terms of its economic value, therefore, the complex stands to benefit South Korea much more than the North. The GIDF also argues that the Kaesong Complex can provide relief to challenges faced by the South Korean economy, including sluggish domestic demand, the decreasing competitiveness of the manufacturing sector and unemployment among the youth. “There’s a question I’d like to ask the people who equate reopening the Kaesong Complex with a government handout. What exactly is being handed out, and to whom? There’s no substance to the handouts claim, which fuels a meaningless and counterproductive debate,” said a spokesperson for the GIDF. (Kwon Hyuk-chul, “Experts Rebut Claim That Kaesong Industrial Complex Is a Handout to N. Korea,” Hankyore, February 10, 2019)
2/11/19:
The U.S. envoy for North Korea was quoted as saying that the two sides have yet to narrow their differences on denuclearization ahead of this month’s second bilateral summit. Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun made the remark during a meeting with a visiting South Korean parliamentary delegation, according to the group. Biegun said last week’s meetings were only the first round of preparatory talks, and that while there was agreement on the summit’s agenda they would need more time to understand each other. “With only two weeks until the summit, it will be difficult to resolve all the tricky issues, but there’s a chance if we can agree on a timeline (for denuclearization),” a South Korean delegation member quoted Biegun as saying. (Yonhap, “U.S., N. Korea Yet to Narrow Differences on Denuclearization: Envoy,” Korea Herald, February 12, 2019)
North Korea possesses the capabilities to track and target satellites, posing a challenge to other militaries, according to the report published by the Defense Intelligence Agency, “Challenges to Security in Space.” “Iran and North Korea maintain independent space launch capabilities, which can serve as avenues for testing ballistic missile technologies,” the report said. While North Korea would try to deny an adversary use of space during a conflict, it has demonstrated non-kinetic counterspace capabilities, including GPS and satellite communications jamming, according to the report. “North Korea also has ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles that can reach orbit and could, in theory, be used to target satellites in a conflict,” the report said. “Both (North Korea and Iran) will maintain their ability to conduct (electronic warfare) against adversaries and theoretically could use their missile and (space launch vehicle) advancements to target orbiting satellites.” Pyongyang’s space program is operated by the National Aerospace Development Administration, a state-run civil body. North Korea placed two satellites in orbit in 2012 and 2016, using its Sohae Satellite Launching Station located on the west coast, and has associated space tracking facilities in Pyongyang. An older space launch complex on the east coast has not been used for a launch since 2009, according to the DIA report. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on any celestial body. It also prohibits using celestial bodies for military bases, testing or maneuvers, the DIA report explained. The treaty has been ratified by 107 states, including the United States, China, North Korea and Russia. (Jo He-rim, “North Korea Capable of Tracking, Targeting Satellites: U.S. Report,” Korea Herald, February 15, 2019)
2/12/19:
North Korea has continued to produce bomb fuel while in denuclearization talks with the United States and may have produced enough in the past year to add as many as seven nuclear weapons to its arsenal, according to a study by Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. Siegfried Hecker, a former director of the U.S. Los Alamos weapons laboratory in New Mexico who is now at Stanford and was one of the report’s authors, told Reuters analysis of satellite imagery showed North Korea’s production of bomb fuel continued in 2018. He said spent fuel generated from operation of the 5-megawatt reactor at its main nuclear plant at Yongbyon from 2016-18 appeared to have been reprocessed starting in May and would have produced an estimated 5-8 kg of weapons-grade plutonium. This combined with production of perhaps 150 kg of highly enriched uranium may have allowed North Korea to increase the number of weapons in its arsenal by between five and seven, the Stanford report said. Hecker’s team had estimated the size of North Korea’s arsenal in 2017 at 30, bringing a possible current total of 37 weapons. U.S. intelligence is not certain how many nuclear warheads North Korea has. Last year, the Defense Intelligence Agency was at the high end with an estimate of about 50 nuclear warheads, while analysts have given a range of 20-60. (David Brunnstrom, “North Korea May Have Made More Nuclear Bombs, But Threat Reduced — Study,” Reuters, February 12, 2019)
Bolton: “Staff-level negotiations were scheduled over the weekend in Sweden, and it was there I feared things would start slipping out of control. Indeed, according to press reports, that seemed ever more likely, especially since North Korea had finally named a counterpart to the State Department’s special envoy Steve Biegun, one Kim Hyok Chol, a veteran of the Bush 43–era Six-Party Talks. This was not a good sign. With the summit venue and dates fixed for Hanoi on February 27 and 28, I thought hard about how to prevent a debacle. Remarks by Biegun at Stanford strongly implying that the Administration was prepared to follow the ‘action for action’ formula demanded by North Korea only increased my concern, compounded by the State Department’s reversion to type: uncooperative and uncommunicative on what they were telling the North Koreans. The State Department had done exactly the same thing to the NSC during the Six-Party Talks. It was possible that Pompeo was not fully aware that Biegun’s personal agenda to get a deal was so firm. But whether Pompeo ordered Biegun’s enthusiasm, allowed it, or was ignorant of it was beside the point; the dangerous consequences were the same. Since State’s negotiators seemed to be spinning out of control, overcome by zeal for the deal, and intoxicated by the publicity, I considered what to do with Trump personally to prevent mistakes in Hanoi. I concluded that Trump’s pre-Hanoi briefings needed to be significantly different from those before Singapore, which had had little impact. The first Hanoi prep session was on February 12 in the Sit Room, starting at four forty-five and lasting forty-five minutes. We showed a film, opening with news clips of Carter, Clinton, Bush, and Obama all saying they had achieved great deals with North Korea, then turning to North Korea’s actual conduct since Singapore and how they were still deceiving us. The film ended with clips of Reagan describing his 1986 Reykjavik Summit with Gorbachev. Reagan’s point was that when you held firm, you got better deals than when you gave in.[?] There was a smooth flow of discussion, Trump asked good questions, and the session was remarkably focused. When we finished, Trump himself said the key points he carried away were: ‘I’ve got the leverage.’ ‘I don’t need to be rushed,’ and ‘I could walk away.’ The briefing allowed Trump to conclude that Hanoi was not make-or-break; if no real progress emerged, he could simply proceed as before. I couldn’t have scripted it better. Our economic pressure on North Korea was greater than before, but it was a matter of degree. The sanctions nonetheless gave us a near-term advantage. Kim Jong Un was the one more desperate for the deal because the squeeze, while far from perfect, continued to frustrate his efforts to deliver economic improvement inside his country. Over the long term, time always benefited the proliferator, but my definition of “long term” was now two weeks: getting past the Hanoi Summit without making catastrophic concessions and compromises. If we stalled any rush to make a deal just to say we had, which was the State Department’s every inclination, I would be satisfied. I foresaw the pressure on us to deal declining once we were past the second Trump-Kim summit. We could instead refocus on the very grave threat the North still represented, whether or not they were actively testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. I felt enormously relieved the briefing hadn’t been a disaster and that we might even have made progress with Trump. The second briefing, on February 15, just after two o’clock, again lasted about forty-five minutes. We ran an excerpt from a North Korean propaganda film showing them still engaged in robust war games, even if we weren’t, pursuant to Trump’s orders. He was very interested in the video and asked to have a copy. We focused on the most important point: the meaning of ‘complete denuclearization.’ Trump asked for the conclusions on a single sheet of paper, which we had already prepared. After a good discussion, Trump said, ‘Clean this up and get it back to me,’ which suggested he might hand it to Kim Jong Un at some point. I stressed the importance of getting a full baseline declaration, not the piecemeal approach that the State Department would accept. I thought this second briefing also went extremely well, accomplishing all we could expect to get Trump into the right frame of mind so as not to give away the store in Hanoi.” (Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, pp. 286-87)
2/13/19:
Rodong Sinmun featured a written contribution from an ethnic Korean in Japan saying that nuclear weapons “are [North Korea’s] powerful war deterrent that counters the power of the U.S.” It quoted North Korean leader Kim Jong-un vowing not to “produce, test, use or distribute nuclear weapons.” (Yu Yong-weon, “N. Korea State Media Hint at Freeze of Nuke Program,” Chosun Ilbo, February 14, 2019
Pompeo: “Q: You’ve mentioned Iran’s activities in the Middle East. In some conditions that you introduced last year, you said Iran needs to meet these — POMPEO: A dozen. Q: Yes. Iran needs to meet 12 conditions before it will — before the U.S. would be willing to negotiate a new nuclear deal. Why are there no preconditions for North Korea? POMPEO: We’ve made very clear that these situations are very different. We take each of them where we find them. North Korea today has weapons, nuclear weapons, capable of reaching the United States of America. This is a threat that President Trump said we needed to take on now and take on immediately. The President’s chosen to meet with Chairman Kim. I’ve now met with him several times myself. We’re very hopeful that we can push them back. Remember too, North Korea behaves very differently. They’re not destabilizing Yemen. They’re not destabilizing Syria. They’re not conducting enormous assassination campaigns. These countries’ behaviors are different, therefore, the way America is approaching resolving this. Our goal isn’t to punish the North Korean people. Our goal is not to punish the Iranian people. Our goal, indeed, is just the opposite: It’s to create security, safety, and frankly, prosperity for the people of each of those two countries. Q: And yet, in North Korea, you do see human rights violations such as — POMPEO: Absolutely. Q: — labor camps, forced labor. POMPEO: Yes, ma’am. Absolutely. Q: Are those not issues of concern? POMPEO: Yes, absolutely. Q: So what should be done about that, those — there’s no precondition — POMPEO: We’re — we — we talk about them with great frequency, the same way we talk about human rights violations in every country in which we find them. We have lots of goals. They’re complex; they compete. We try to achieve them all. Q: What are you hoping from the summit? POMPEO: You mean the summit that will be held in Hanoi. Well, look, we hope that we will make a substantial step on each of the four pillars the two nations committed — Chairman Kim and President Trump committed to four primary pillars. We hope to make substantial steps on each one of them: security and peace on the peninsula, denuclearization, the effort to create a brighter future for North Korean people. It’s our intent to make real progress on each of those pillars, and the two leaders are hoping they do that as well. Q: What kind of tangible progress do you need to see? POMPEO: Yeah, I’m not going — I’m not going to talk about specifics. We’ve been engaged in lots of negotiations, not all of them have been public. Many of them more recently have, in fact, been public. You can see the work that’s being done by our two teams. We have a team leaving again this weekend to travel to Asia to continue to prepare for the summit. I’m not going to talk about what it is we hope to achieve, but I’m very hopeful that we’ll get a good outcome. Q: The commander of U.S. Forces Korea has just said that — he said last week he hasn’t seen a change in North Korea’s military capabilities since the last summit that President Trump held with North Korea. How confident are you that North Korea is committed to complete denuclearization? POMPEO: Chairman Kim’s told us that repeatedly. And we’ve also said: trust but verify. We’re going to have to see that he does this. We’re going to have to be able to verify that he does it. And until such time as we do that, the economic sanctions that the whole world has put in place — not American sanctions, not European sanctions, but U.N. Security Council resolutions that every nation in the world supported save for North Korea — every nation saw that this was in the world’s best interest, and it’s our full intention of getting a good outcome in exchange for relieving those sanctions. I’m very hopeful that we can do that. It will be up to Chairman Kim to make this decision. He’s told us that he will, and now it’s time for him to deliver. Q: So first complete denuclearization, verification of complete denuclearization, and then removal of sanctions? POMPEO: Remember, you have to go back to first principles, right? For years the United States has conducted negotiations with the North Koreans, and what we’ve done is we’ve taken a pig in a poke. We’ve said we’ll do something and then we handed them a whole bunch of money or agreed to build them a light water reactor, and the North Koreans didn’t come through on that. President Trump engaged. He’s gotten missile tests stopped. There haven’t been nuclear testing in a substantial period of time. We have the beginning of the effort to return all of the remains. I’ve had a chance to talk to some of those families; it’s been a remarkably good outcome. Now it’s time for us to begin the effort to take the step on denuclearization, and I’m hopeful that this summit will deliver that.” (DoS, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, Interview with Roxana Saberi of CBS News, Sheraton Warsaw Hotel, Warsaw, February 13, 2019)
2/14/19:
Pompeo: “Q: I want to talk to you about a couple more things. One is North Korea. We’re nearly six months after Singapore, obviously heading towards Vietnam. The Vice President acknowledged the U.S. is still waiting on North Korea to take concrete steps to dismantle its weapons. What does the U.S. need to see from North Korea to say there’s progress here on that front? POMPEO: Yeah, I think the Vice President summed it up pretty well, Bret. We’ve had some good things that followed from the Singapore summit. We haven’t had a missile test; there haven’t been the testing of nuclear explosive devices. Those are good things. But the ultimate objective, the complete and final denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, there’s still a lot of work to do. And we hope — I guess it’s only two weeks off now. We hope when the two leaders get together again they can make substantial progress along that objective, which I think the entire world shares. Q: How much does the formal ending of the Korean War factor in? POMPEO: Bret, it’s something we’ve had a lot of talks about. In fact, my team will redeploy to Asia here in a day or two to continue conversations around all elements that were discussed back in Singapore. Remember we not only discussed denuclearization, but we talked about creating security mechanisms, peace mechanisms on the Korean Peninsula. I hope the two leaders have a chance to talk about that as well. I fully expect that they will. We also talked about a brighter future for the North Korean people, if we can successfully get the result that Chairman Kim promised President Trump. Remember he made that commitment that they would denuclearize. And so we hope to make real progress along each of those elements of what the two leaders agreed to back in June.” (DoS, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, Interview with Bret Baier of Fox News, Sheraton Hotel, Warsaw, February 14, 2019)
The State Department announced that it was considering the option of waiving sanctions and the travel ban on relief groups that provide humanitarian aid to North Korea. Responding to a report by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) stating that four out of 10 North Koreans are in a state of malnutrition, a spokesperson for the US State Department said that the US is deeply concerned about North Koreans’ well-being, the Voice of America reported. The spokesperson explained that the policy was being reviewed to ensure that the strict implementation of sanctions was not preventing lawful support from reaching North Koreans. This spokesperson also responded to criticism from some figures that the U.S. government’s position that sanctions must remain in place until denuclearization is complete was hampering humanitarian aid activities. “We expect humanitarian aid organizations to meet international standards related to access and surveillance. The U.S. and the UN continue to carefully consider requests for authorizing aid and for making exceptions to sanctions on North Korea,” the spokesperson said. The spokesperson added that, for the time being, the US government was not planning to get directly involved in humanitarian aid. On February 13, the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea authorized Handicap International and Première Urgence Internationale (PUI), both international aid organizations whose headquarters are located in France, to take humanitarian aid supplies into North Korea. Handicap International is planning to ship a total of 73 items worth 233,363 euros, including construction material for expanding accessibility and support equipment for people with disabilities, including metal crutches and wheelchairs. PUI was given permission to take materials into North Korea for programs aimed at improving nutrition for children at nurseries and kindergartens and for building goat farms in South Hwanghae Province. So far, exemptions from sanctions have been granted to 12 humanitarian aid programs for North Korea. These programs are run by groups including UNICEF, the Eugene Bell Foundation, First Step, the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit under the Swiss Foreign Ministry, World Vision, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (Yoo Kang-moon, “U.S. State Department Considers Waiving Sanctions and Travel Bans for Humanitarian Aid to N. Korea,” Hankyore, February 16, 2019)
2/15/19:
North Korea has informed Japan that Tanaka Minoru, a Hyogo Prefecture native who vanished in 1978, is living in Pyongyang with his wife and children, Kyodo reported, quoting unnamed Japanese government sources. The government claims Tanaka was kidnapped by North Korean agents while staying in Europe. Pyongyang also reportedly told Tokyo that Kaneda Tatsumitu, one of his coworkers at a noodle shop, is also living in Pyongyang with his wife and children. Japanese officials were told that neither Tanaka nor Kaneda intends to return to Japan, according to Kyodo. The government has long suspected that Kaneda, who was 26 when he disappeared, could have been abducted by North Korean agents. Pyongyang has maintained that all issues related to the abductions of Japanese by North Korean spies have already been resolved. Tanaka was 28 when he disappeared. The government added him to the official list of abductees in April 2005. (Japan Times, “Suspected Abductee Alive in Pyongyang, North Korea Reportedly Tells Japan,” February 15, 2019)
Chesser, Wit and Pitz: “…If an agreement to dismantle Yongbyon is reached, implementation will pose enormous political, technical and financial challenges. It would require US-DPRK agreement on a game plan including the possible involvement of other actors such as South Korea, China, Russia, the IAEA and perhaps the European Union. The objective will be to quickly disable, dismantle and decontaminate the plutonium reprocessing facility, the uranium enrichment plant, and the 5 MWe reactor as well as to safely dispose of spent and enriched fuel and nuclear waste products. It will also be necessary to make sure that North Korean personnel involved in the operation of those facilities are not reemployed in Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. Based on previous experience, all options for disablement and dismantlement of the plutonium recovery facilities, uranium enrichment cascades and IRT research reactor will require years of work and millions if not billions of dollars. For example: Rocky Flats: Remediation of the US plutonium recovery plant at Rocky Flats was completed over 14 years at a cost of $7-$10 billion. Rocky Flats, however, involved the demolition of 802 structures and remediation of hundreds of acres of contaminated soil. Over 500,000 cubic meters of radioactive waste was characterized, packaged and transported to radioactive waste repositories off-site. The cost and scope of cleanup at Yongbyon will be far less because it has thousands of fewer acres to remediate and many fewer structures to dismantle. For example, the estimated amount of time required to disable and dismantle Yongbyon’s reprocessing plant is 8-12 years at a cost of $525 million-$1.5 billion, significantly less than Rocky Flats’ 14 years of work totaling roughly $7.7 billion. Belgium: Developing effective and thorough decommissioning techniques for Eurochemic took precedence over urgency. The process took 25 years to complete at a cost of $333.75 million. During that time, nuclear waste and sludge were treated, buildings were demolished, and a research reactor decommissioned. There are far fewer process cells, however, to decommission at Yongbyon and far less area that requires decontamination. Eurochemic’s decommissioning cost is at the lower end of the estimated cost for Yongbyon, but it already had waste storage processes and facilities. These would need to be built and tested at Yongbyon, adding to the cost and processing time. Nonetheless, the experience at Eurochemic can help illustrate effective methods and processes. Three key variables will determine the length of time and cost of disabling and dismantling the Yongbyon facility. 1. The End-Use Objective The extent of remediation and cleanup needed subsequent to the disablement and dismantlement of facilities will dictate the methods, duration and ultimate costs of the decommissioning process. There are three common end-use options: Unrestricted Use: This requires sufficient cleanup to prevent annual radiation doses from exceeding safety standards for the general population for all onsite activities. Since reduced radiation doses will require the transfer of contaminated materials to waste storage facilities, this status will usually cost more and require greater remediation times than the other options. Industrial Use: This would restrict access and use of the area to trained personnel. Restrictions may involve protective measures, regulated exposure times and limited access to regions with unacceptable exposure rates. Radiation-Controlled Area: Time and budget constraints, physical inaccessibility, and inadequate equipment or storage may prevent timely remediation. In these cases, conducting minimal cleanup may only be possible, leaving remaining radiation exposures that are unacceptable for normal human activities. Specific and detailed procedures will need to be followed in these areas to limit radiation exposure. 2. The Timing and Extent of Site Characterization and Remediation Dismantlement of facilities requires comprehensive knowledge of structural challenges, threats to worker and public safety during dismantlement procedures, probable waste volumes, avenues of transport, and workforce required to perform the tasks. Potential health hazards caused by radioactive contamination and standard regulatory practice for nuclear dismantlement will require a thorough site characterization prior to accepting site safety and remediation plans. The characterization would identify potential safety hazards, radiation exposures and alternative dismantlement methods necessary to minimize health risks for workers during dismantlement and future activities at the site. It would also estimate waste stream volumes and processes required to meet the decided end-use objective. Specific work plans are developed to reduce safety concerns to the lowest possible level. However, many potential hazards and radioactive sources may not be readily identified prior to dismantlement. In such cases, structural dismantlement and material characterization may be conducted simultaneously in a staged process. Most regulations also require a post-dismantlement site characterization to document that all hazards have been minimized and that end-use objectives have indeed been fulfilled. If the process of site and facilities characterization were to use DPRK workers, the below chart gives an estimate of the number of workers needed and in which sectors the North Korean workers could be utilized. 3. The Amount of Foreign Involvement in the Project It will be critical to clearly establish which nations and agencies will participate in the disablement, dismantlement, regulatory oversight and advisory activities. The most efficient, but perhaps the costliest process for the US would be to make disablement and decommissioning of Yongbyon facilities a bilateral US-DPRK undertaking. While bilateral participation could expedite nuclear disablement measures, it may be necessary to include international partners to help in sharing the costs. Other nations and international actors, including South Korea, China, Russia and the IAEA could participate in one of the following capacities: Strictly advisory, providing recommendations for work plans, regulatory objectives, and/or verification; Educational, assisting in redirection training given to Yongbyon workers; or Participatory, as full partners in all dismantlement and disposal procedures. Including DPRK scientists and administrators in all processes of safe disablement, dismantlement and disposal of critical facilities will introduce personnel to international agencies and acceptable standards for future actions. Disablement and Dismantlement Options The choices above are not necessarily independent of one another. For example, unrestricted end-use is unlikely to result from rapid disablement and minimal site characterization. Likewise, maximal retraining of key personnel may not be feasible without thorough site characterizations, extensive onsite presence of international experts, and full IAEA technical cooperation. These trade-offs will need to be carefully considered. The US and allies would likely benefit from rapid disablement to meet their short-term objectives, followed by long-term training and onsite verification. North Korea, on the other hand, may suggest gradual completion of retraining and incentive programs prior to an autonomous process of dismantlement and disposal. There are some possible compromises which would allow short-term nonproliferation assurances and retraining of hundreds of key personnel while delaying major portions of dismantlement and disposal until well into the future. A. Rapid Disablement and Dismantlement A large team of experts from the United States would be required to implement this option in compliance with international standards. Rapid disablement can be achieved by filling glove boxes with concrete, removing remote manipulator arms from hot cells, defueling reactors and flooding cooling circuits, steam generators and reactor vessels with concrete. Similar disabling tactics were employed by IAEA inspectors in post-Desert Storm Iraq (although the reactors were disabled by coalition bombing). Nuclear reactors may be further disabled by coating vessel components with neutron absorbing materials such as boron. Uranium enrichment processes are more readily dismantled with less exposure to hazards than plutonium processes. Plasma torches could quickly compromise control rooms and centrifuge functions and disrupt cascade integrity. Nevertheless, skilled technicians would be required for cutting concrete and pipe, removing circuitry, and packing and transporting hazardous materials after disablement. Given the necessary resources, manpower and prior planning, the primary facilities for uranium enrichment and plutonium recovery could be rendered useless in less than a year at a cost of about $4-6 million. At the end of disablement, the facilities would still require careful and prolonged dismantlement to render the areas safe and ready for alternative uses. Rapid disablement would likely complicate subsequent dismantlement of concrete-filled structures. Moreover, the use of concrete will reduce effectiveness of waste minimization, thereby increasing the volume of radioactive waste. Therefore, cost savings realized by quick disablement would likely be offset by higher costs and prolonged time for dismantlement and waste processing over the long-term. Implementation would require the rapid deployment of a team of 50-75 American specialists. This option could also include defueling and disabling the 5 MWe reactor, which is the source of plutonium generation. Of course, this procedure would be carried out only after rejecting any consideration for refurbishing the reactor for peacetime purposes. Ultimate dismantlement of the reactor facility would be delayed allowing a gradual schedule that permits IAEA oversight and inclusion of DPRK personnel. The rapid disablement by defueling and compromising primary and secondary coolant circuits would cost about $3 million (including transport of reactor fuel rods), while subsequent dismantlement and disposal of the structure would be an additional $20-$30 million. The total costs for rapid disablement followed by dismantlement and disposal of the plutonium recovery facilities, uranium enrichment centrifuges, and the IRT reactor would range from $250 million to $1.5 billion. Disablement and dismantlement under IAEA supervision would take 10-20 years at a cost of $525 million-$1.5 billion; without IAEA supervision, 4-10 years and $250 million-$1 billion. B. Disablement and Delayed Dismantlement It may be advantageous to delay the dismantlement of some structures, allowing time for the decay of radioactivity to safe levels for removal and disposal. Neutron-activated materials in reactor vessels and contaminated interiors of hot cells may pose high risks initially, but these will diminish significantly over time. In such cases, the structures may be isolated and surrounded (“cocooned”) by a thick shell of impermeable concrete. The cocooned structures can be more readily removed from the shells after many years and then disposed of in conventional storage facilities. Cocooning has become a common practice for reactor vessels and the projected delay time may be 75-100 years. This procedure would eliminate the high costs of dismantling and storing very radioactive materials. Disablement and partial dismantlement would then be followed by a projected period of sequestration of the remaining structures. The presence of isolated cocoons would probably require “highly restricted” use of the surrounding area. Thus, this option may not be favored at Yongbyon if the area is projected for future public or industrial uses. Also, the initial cost savings may be offset by very expensive dismantlement and disposal at the end of the isolation period. The process of disabling, partial dismantlement, and cocooning Yongbyon’s 5 MWe reactor would cost about $40-$60 million and take over 4-5 years; the subsequent post-cocooning dismantlement and disposal cost would be between $100 and $200 million C. Traditional Disablement and Dismantlement This option would place greater emphasis on adhering to international norms than on achieving rapid progress, requiring a slower, steadier process of disablement and dismantlement. One significant difference between this approach and option one, which would immediately begin work on disablement and dismantlement, is that a much more extensive effort would be made up-front to characterize the radioactive contamination of the facility before any work began. These procedures would include training of North Korean participants and would establish detailed work and safety procedures to be followed throughout the subsequent dismantlement process. All three options would follow international standards but this option places greater emphasis from the very beginning on building a multilateral team and developing North Korean participation. Under this option, the IAEA would be brought into the process at the outset to help establish technical credibility, increase transparency and provide dismantlement training to indigenous experts. This would take much longer, but would reduce costs and liability and safety concerns. Cost and timelines may vary considerably depending on the extent of work performed by indigenous workers and the amount of training required. This approach may prove incompatible, however, with achieving rapid disablement and moving forward quickly on dismantlement, which could be one of the US highest priorities. Of course, U.S. and foreign partners would be needed onsite to verify that agreed standards and conditions are met. This option would be the most expensive and prolonged alternative, requiring 5-20 years and $400 million-$2 billion. Other Considerations There are three other important dimensions to disablement and dismantlement that will drive costs, timelines and outcomes. Disposition of Radioactive Waste Any dismantlement option will require updated facilities for the treatment and long-term storage of radioactive wastes generated by the operations at Yongbyon. Remaining spent fuel and control rods may be returned to the supplying countries or purchased for export to secure storage facilities. Temporary storage of wastes may be accomplished by importing caravans while permanent facilities are designed and constructed. It is anticipated that completion of a radioactive waste treatment and disposal facility will cost in excess of $200 million and require 4-8 years for site selection, design and construction. Environmental Remediation The disablement and dismantlement of Yongbyon will not only focus on the reprocessing and enrichment facilities, but must also address the environmental contamination. Environmental remediation could encompass more than site cleanup and waste disposal, due to North Korea’s long history of poor land-use including forest management, agricultural practices and water and air pollution. Including environmental remediation in the dismantlement process for unrestricted use would require additional planning, time and money. Thus, this option may not be financially feasible for the US or other international actors, and end use may remain either highly restricted or limited to industrial activities. The Scope of Cooperative Threat Reduction The disablement and dismantlement process at Yongbyon would provide many opportunities for various incentive and redirection programs for North Koreans who currently work at the site. These programs should be integrated into a wider discussion of dismantlement and nonproliferation objectives from a long-term perspective. The North Korean government has expressed interest in re-allocating resources from the military to the civilian sector. A robust US-DPRK cooperative threat reduction program, with multinational involvement where it is cost effective, offers tremendous potential for civilian spinoffs that would boost North Korea’s economic development and raise the living standards of the population. Turning Swords into Plowshares The development of civilian spinoffs could begin in parallel with the disablement and dismantlement process. The Yongbyon facility and its workers could potentially support activities such as: Improving Health and the Environment Setting up a medical diagnostics center onsite can initially focus on worker safety at Yongbyon and then expand over time to provide the regional population with medical practices to diagnose patient health and a medical treatment branch for common and debilitating conditions. For example, it could support hospitals and medical practitioners by helping to provide laboratory analysis of blood, urine and tissues, as well as x-rays and other medical imaging. Mobile laboratories could provide these examinations and laboratory diagnostic services on a regular basis. Another possible role would be to maintain medical databases in support of public health and forecasting conditions, as done by the Centers for Disease Control in the United States. This would help set the stage for modernization of health care records and a better understanding of the medical needs of the North Korean people. Along with creating indigenous infrastructure for medical monitoring for radiation detection and worker safety, the process could also develop a national environmental management laboratory that would initially focus on mitigating radiation exposures and impacts. Over time, the laboratory could grow to include water, soil and air quality assessments, along with forest, biodiversity and agricultural management practices. Center for Energy Modernization North Korean scientists and technicians would be trained on topics such as energy surveys and needs assessments, national energy supply-demand modeling, energy efficiency analysis methods and practices (including green buildings), renewable energy systems, up-to-date electricity transmission and distribution systems and other subjects relevant to a modern energy system. Initially, training would be provided by foreign experts (for example, from China, the European Union, Australia and the United States) with North Korean staff eventually training others using the upgraded Yongbyon center as demonstration facilities. A key goal would be to provide workers with alternative, sustainable employment through the center’s nationwide activities, and possibly through exporting services to other countries at a later time. Second, the center could serve as a research and development institute to develop or adapt designs for key energy efficiency and renewable energy devices with the goal of establishing enterprises in the North to manufacture such devices. It could eventually become the equivalent of a North Korean national laboratory. American organizations (including national laboratories) have worked with local officials in China and Eastern Europe to establish similar institutions. Conclusion The decommissioning of nuclear facilities at Yongbyon can take a number of different paths, each offering different end-use objectives, costs, timelines and opportunities for continued nonproliferation programs with North Korea. Decisions on the objectives, remediation methods and training and cooperative programs will determine the methods of dismantlement and disposal necessary to meet those goals. A wide array of experiences in nuclear dismantlement that allow realistic estimates of costs, manpower and time commitments needed to achieve different dismantlement objectives. Negotiations on reducing North Korea’s capacity to produce fissile materials should elucidate the details of nuclear decommissioning and not leave underlying steps open to interpretation. Once the approaches for nuclear dismantlement have been successfully negotiated, attention should be focused on technical developments that will assist North Korea to improve and sustain the quality of life of its population. The more robust economic stimulus programs discussed here will require, however, greater North Korean integration with the global economy and comprehensive contributions from international partners. (Ronald K. Chesser, Joel S. Wit and Samantha J. Pitz, “A How-To Guide for Disabling and Dismantling Yongbyon,” 38 North, February 15, 2019)
Bermudez, Cha and Collins: “The Sangnam-ni missile operating base (40.838977 128.541650) is located within North Korea’s strategic missile belt in Hochon-gun (Hochon County), Hamgyong-namdo (South Hamgyong Province). It sits 310 kilometers northeast of Pyongyang, 250 kilometers north of the demilitarized zone, 390 kilometers northeast of Seoul and 1,130 northwest of Tokyo … .Subordinate to the KPA’s Strategic Force (the organization responsible for all ballistic missile units), the Sangnam-ni missile operating base houses a battalion- or regiment-sized unit equipped with Hwasong-10 (Musudan) intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM). This unit, with its 3,000+ kilometers range Hwasong-10’s, represents an important component of North Korea’s presumed offensive ballistic missile strategy by providing a strategic-level first strike capability against targets throughout East Asia including the major U.S. bases on Okinawa and potentially Guam. Until more is known, however, this capability should be characterized as “theoretical” as the Hwasong-10 was deployed to operational units without testing in an “emergency launch capability” mode during the early 2000s. Later, in 2016, when KPA units conducted a number of training launches with the system it suffered repeated catastrophic failures. These repeated launch/flight failures appear to have resulted in no new launches of the Hwasong-10 since that time. This, in turn, may lead to the Strategic Force’s abandoning the system and replacing it with the more successful Hwasong-12 IRBM or Pukkuksong-2 (KN-15) MRBM. The production status of these newer systems is, however, unknown. Unlike the Sakkanmol or Sino-ri missile operating bases, reliable open source information concerning the development and operations of the Sangnam-ni base is scarce. What is known is that during the late 1980s and early 1990s, in addition to its construction of forward Hwasong-5/-6 missile operating bases north of the DMZ, North Korea developed plans for the construction of a series of strategic ballistic missile operating bases in the northern sections of the country for longer range systems under development. One of the first known public reports concerning these new ballistic missile operating bases became available in March 1999 when a senior South Korean official told reporters of bases being built at Sangnam-ni, Yongjo-rii and Yongnim-up. At that time there were no indications of the types of missiles that were to be deployed at these new bases, however, reports later that year stated that these were “suspected to be Nodong-1 or Taepodong-1 and -2 bases.” Construction of the Sangnam-ni missile operating base began sometime during 1994 using specialized engineering troops from the KPA’s Military Construction Bureau. … Although no open source high-resolution satellite imagery from the mid-1990s is presently available, construction is reliably reported to have proceeded slowly and was initially focused upon road construction, construction of a hardened drive-through facility and the excavation of what is believed to be an underground facility (UGF) approximately 2.6 km up from the base of the valley. Satellite imagery from August 2000 indicates that at this time two new roads had been built into both sides of the southern valley—with the longest being 2.8-kilometers-long. Additionally, major excavation of the potential UGF was likely complete—but may have been continuing internally—as imagery analysis revealed there were no external indications of excavation activity or equipment at the time. Construction of the hardened drive-through facility was also complete and a small number of barracks (likely for worker housing) and support structures was ongoing. Although no large buildings were under construction at this time, initial grading had begun at the intersection of the main and branch valleys where the headquarters would be located. No activity of significance was noted at the village of Togyongdong-ni (40.839840 128.551308), up the branch valley to the east. Reports from mid-2001 state that the base was “…60-80 percent complete in the construction phase.” Analysis of a December 2002 satellite image supports these reports showing a number of significant changes since 2000. At the base of the valley, in the support and headquarters area, an entrance/security checkpoint had been established and minor agricultural support activity was present. In addition, approximately seven new structures were built just east of the entrance, and the grading in the headquarters area was completed and a headquarters/administration building was erected. The road south had now been extended far past the hardened drive-through facility and over the northern slopes of Huisa-bong (Huisa Mountain) by means of a series of large switchbacks. The support area along the east side of the road had been expanded significantly with at least thirteen structures (e.g., barracks, warehouses, vehicle maintenance, etc.) now present. A new building was also constructed on the side of the road at the southern entrance to the base that appears to be a security checkpoint and barracks. No significant changes were noted in the area of the hardened drive-through facility. At the village of Togyongdong-ni some initial grading and several new structures were noted. Agricultural support appears to have been slightly expanded and a small bridge on the road leading to the village was under construction in the headquarters area. During May 2004 new reports stated that the base was now “…70 to 80 percent completed…” Satellite imagery from November of that year tends to support these reports. In the barracks and support area just east of the entrance, a number of new barracks or support buildings had been built. In the headquarters area three additional structures were built and the small bridge on the road leading to Togyongdong-ni was now complete. In the support area along the road south there were continuing changes among the structures, however, the overall number remained relatively constant. Again, no significant changes were noted in the area of the hardened drive-through facility. Along the branch valley east of the headquarters several new structures were built and minor grading continued in the village of Togyongdong-ni. By 2004, reports had also begun to surface that Sangnam-ni, Yongjo-ri and Yongnim-up were being equipped with a “new IRBM” and were “not Scud and Nodong-1 bases.” Shortly afterwards it was confirmed that Sangnam-ni was a missile operating base that housed a battalion- or regiment-sized unit equipped of the KPA’s recently established Hwasong-10 (Musudan) IRBM brigade. It is unclear whether the Sangnam-ni unit participated in the large 2004 Command Post Exercise (CPX) for ballistic missile units, however, from 2006 onwards it is reported to have regularly participated in the annual training cycle. During 2005, minor construction was observed throughout the facility and a new road was built from the barracks, warehouse, and support area 500 meters up the ridge to the west where a new anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) battery position was established. The bridge leading to Togyongdong-ni in the headquarters had been finished and work on improving the road to the village was underway. While a report from August 2006 states that the “…construction of a base in Sangnam-ri is 70 to 80 percent completed” satellite imagery from 2005-2008 suggests that it is likely that the initial phase of construction at the base was essentially complete by the end of 2006. During 2009-2010, a small second phase of construction was undertaken that witnessed an expansion of the headquarters area with the construction of two administration buildings. Aside from these buildings only minor construction activity (e.g., erection of a memorial, removal and construction of small structures) and minimal increases of agricultural support activities were observed in satellite imagery from 2006-2012. Subsequently, during 2013-2015, the existing cultural/education hall within the headquarters area was razed and a new larger hall was built, two new monuments were erected on the east side of the headquarters area, a small orchard was planted, and a greenhouse was built. Analysis of satellite imagery from 2015 until present shows only minor infrastructure changes to the base that are consistent with what is often observed at remote KPA bases of all types. As of December 2018, the base is active and being well-maintained by North Korean standards. Encompassing approximately 3.85 square kilometers, the primary section of Sangnam-ni missile operating base extends 2.9 kilometers up the primary branch valley running southeast and then south on the northern slopes of Huisa-bong (Huisa Mountain). A small secondary branch extends off this valley to the east and the village of Togyongdong-ni that provides agricultural and other support. Most of the area encompassed by the base consists of unoccupied mountains and small agricultural activities that support the base. The small hamlet at the base of the valley, and outside the entrance, does not appear to be directly associated with the base. The base can be functionally divided into four activities—agricultural support (including a greenhouse, small orchards and small terraced fields), main base (including headquarters, barracks, vehicle maintenance, storage, and a variety of small support elements), missile support, and potential underground facilities. As with a number of other KPA missile operating bases located in remote mountainous areas the Sangnam-ni headquarters area is located at the intersection of the eastern and southern branches of the valley. This area consists of the headquarters, cultural/education hall, approximately a dozen small barracks and support buildings, greenhouse, small orchard and a parade ground. There is also a lesser valley that branches off to the east from the headquarters area to the small village of Togyongdong-ni. This village appears to provide agricultural and other minor support to the base. Extending approximately 750 meters south and up the valley from the headquarters area are a number of barracks, warehouses and support structures. Above this area, on a ridge 500 meters to the west, is a light AAA battery position equipped with eight guns. This battery is likely organic to the base as the only access road to it originates at the support area. Located approximately 1.4 km up the valley from the headquarters area is the base’s missile support facility—used for arming, fueling, systems checkout, and maintenance operations. It consists of a hardened drive-through facility measuring approximately 130-meters-by-40-meters overall with two approximately 20-meter-long earth-covered shelters separated by an open bay. Each shelter has an approximately 40-meter-by-15-meter concrete pad running through it. A third approximately 30-meter-by-15-meter concrete pad is on the road side and between the two shelters. The intended purpose of this third concrete pad is unknown, however, it is large enough to support a missile launch under emergency conditions—KPA tactics and doctrine is believed to call for ballistic missile TELs/MELs to disperse from their bases during wartime launch operations. Cut into the mountain slope on the north side of each shelter is an approximately 9-meter-by-6-meter opening that is likely an entrance to an underground storeroom or small UGF. If a UGF, it is likely that the two entrances are internally connected. While sufficient for some trucks and support vehicles to enter, these entrances appear to be too small to be useable by known Hwasong-10 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) or mobile-erector-launchers (MEL). A further 150 meters up the valley is what appears to be the first of two potential UGF entrances. The second potential entrance is a further 100 meters up the valley. Positive confirmation of these entrances is elusive due to the resolution of available imagery and the entrances being cut into a steep western mountain face that is often in shadow. Exploratory measurements suggest that the entrances are at between 10- and 13-meters-wide and large enough to handle any of the missile unit’s TEL/MELs and support vehicles. It is uncertain whether the UGF entrances are internally connected so that vehicles can drive through them. At a minimum, per typical KPA practice, they are linked by small internally connected tunnels. Unlike at other missile operating bases there are no large rock and dirt berms in front of the entrances. This is likely due to the narrowness of the valley at this point, which provides some measure of protection from artillery fire and aerial attack. Due to the fact that the hardened drive-through facility and potential UGF entrances are embedded into the western slope of a narrow tree-lined valley they are frequently hidden from sight in satellite imagery during spring and summer. These structures are just visible during fall and visible in winter after a snow fall—typically when viewed looking west. Approximately 175 meters higher up the valley is a single building that is likely a guard barracks and secures the facility from the south. The dirt road that runs south past this barracks continues over the eastern and southern slopes of Huisa Mountain and terminates in the Pochi-ri area 10 kilometers south of the base. This road is of sufficient quality and design (e.g., wide turns, switchbacks, etc.) to allow missile TELs/MELs to use it during wartime. Potentially, there are additional facilities and UGFs within Hochon-gun (Hochon County) that are either directly associated with the missile unit at Sangnam-ni or tasked to support its operations during wartime. No such facilities, however, have been identified in open source reporting. Detailed organizational information for the KPA ballistic missile unit at the Sangnam-ni missile operating base, other than being part of the Strategic Force’s Hwasong-10 brigade, is essentially nonexistent. From the nature and size of the infrastructure observed in satellite imagery it is likely that it is a battalion- or regiment-sized unit consisting of a headquarters, small service elements and several firing batteries. The number of Hwasong-10 TELs/MELs in the unit is unknown but postulated to be between 2 and 6. Despite the strategic importance of all the KPA’s ballistic missile operating bases and concerns of either pre-emptive or wartime airstrikes against these facilities, and aside from the base’s organic AAA battery, there is only a single additional fixed anti-aircraft artillery position within 10 km of the Sangnam-ni base. It is likely that in addition to the organic AAA battery, the missile unit itself possesses organic air defense elements equipped with both light AAA and shoulder fired SAMs (e.g., SA-7, SA-14, SA-16, etc.). The base is within the air defense umbrella of only a single SA-2 and potentially one SA-5 surface-to-air missile (SAM) bases. The Hwangsuwon-ni Airbase is, however, only 36 kilometers to the southwest.” (Joseph Bermudez, Victor Cha and Lisa Collins, “Undeclared North Korea: Sangnam-ni Missile Operating Base,” CSIS, Beyond Parallel, February 15, 2019)
2/17/19:
An administration source says the U.S. is considering opening a liaison office in North Korea as a corresponding step to maintain progress in negotiations. CNN has previously reported that both sides are open to the proposal, but it is not clear how supportive North Korea is of the decision. Opening joint liaison offices was part of the 1994 Agreed Framework, but was abandoned after North Korea refused to permit the transmission of documents through diplomatic pouches. Although North Korea has said it wants actions for actions, a joint liaison office is not one of its stated desires. During his New Year’s speech, Chairman Kim said that he is more interested in the reopening of the Kaesong industrial complex, and the Kumgang tourist resort. Opening those locations would require relaxing international sanctions, which the Trump administration has not said it will not do. Still, Special Envoy Biegun noted last month before traveling to North Korea: “We didn’t say we won’t do anything until you do everything.” The Trump administration official said that the proposal for liaison offices is just one of a package of possible concessions President Trump and Chairman Kim will discuss at their summit in Vietnam next week. (Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Jeong, “U.S. Weighs Opening Liaison Office in North Korea,” Wall Street Journal, February 18, 2019)
2/18/19:
South Korea’s leader urged President Trump to offer joint North-South economic projects as an incentive for North Korea to denuclearize when he meets with its leader, Kim Jong-un, next week. President Moon Jae-in and Trump spoke on the phone to discuss the planned second summit meeting scheduled to take place in Hanoi, Vietnam, February 27-28. Washington is studying what Trump can offer in exchange for North Korean steps toward denuclearization. Moon urged Trump to give South Korea a role in measures to encourage the North’s denuclearization, said Moon’s spokesman, Kim Eui-kyeom, referring to cross-border economic projects Moon has supported. “President Moon said if President Trump asks, South Korea will be ready to do its part, lessening the United States’ burden,” Kim said. Speaking with reporters today, Trump said that he and Moon had had a broad discussion about the summit meeting, and he reiterated his view that he was in “no particular rush” on denuclearization. He said he would speak about the meeting with the Japanese prime minister, Abe Shinzo Abe, tomorrow. “I would like to see ultimately denuclearization of North Korea,” Trump said, adding, “I really believe North Korea can be a tremendous economic power when this is resolved.” “As long as there’s no testing, I’m in no rush,” the president said. With little more than a week to go before the Hanoi meeting, United States and North Korean officials planned to meet in the Vietnamese capital this week to negotiate a potential deal, to be announced by their leaders next week. Among possible incentives it can offer, Washington has studied exchanging liaison offices with Pyongyang and declaring an end to the 1950-53 Korean War, which was halted in a truce, according to South Korean officials familiar with United States-North Korean talks. North Korea’s top priority is the easing of economic sanctions. But Washington is reluctant to lessen its economic pressure on the North because doing so would weaken the strongest leverage it has to force the country to rid itself of nuclear weapons. Today, Moon appeared to suggest that if Washington could not immediately ease United Nations or bilateral sanctions, it should consider letting South Korea press ahead with inter-Korean collaborative projects, such as the relinking of railways of the two Koreas, as an alternative incentive for the North. North Korea has wanted those projects. During his New Year’s Day speech, Kim called for the reopening of the joint inter-Korean factory park in the North Korean city of Kaesong, as well as South Korean tours to the North’s Diamond Mountain. The Diamond Mountain and Kaesong projects had provided badly needed foreign currency for the impoverished North until they were shut down in 2008 and 2016, amid rising tensions between the two sides … Moon supports broader inter-Korean economic cooperation, arguing that it will help encourage the North to denuclearize by demonstrating the potential economic benefits. But to promote those projects, South Korea needs exemptions from international sanctions that ban investments, joint ventures and other significant economic cooperation with the North. Until now, Washington has been reluctant to help South Korea win such exemptions, insisting that it refrain from joint economic projects until the North takes important steps toward denuclearization. Moon’s critics, including conservative South Koreans, say that an easing of sanctions will only encourage North Korea to drag its feet over denuclearization. They also warn that any exemptions would undermine Washington’s own international efforts to enforce sanctions. China and Russia are already calling for easing the economic restrictions around North Korea. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Proposes Joint Economic Projects with North,” New York Times, February 20, 2019, p. A-12)
Kim Jong Un has exiled, imprisoned or executed suspected opponents of his diplomatic outreach to the U.S. and South Korea, while also targeting his country’s moneyed elite with asset seizures, according to a new report that details a purge of some 50 to 70 individuals. The crackdown, portrayed as an anticorruption campaign in state-run media, suggests Kim is looking to silence critics and shore up his regime’s finances in the face of international sanctions, said U.S. security analysts and former South Korean intelligence officials. Economic sanctions have pinched Pyongyang’s traditional sources of foreign currency, from exports to its access to the global banking system, and the confiscations represent a way for the regime to replenish much-needed funds. The purge takes aim at officials who have used their powerful positions to amass wealth illicitly—albeit on a North Korean scale, according to analysts and the report from the North Korea Strategy Center, a Seoul-based think tank founded by a North Korean defector. The report’s findings are based on interviews with 20 current and former high-ranking members of the Kim regime. In a widely watched New Year’s Day speech, Kim publicly declared a war against corruption—a rare statement by any North Korean leader, according to former South Korean intelligence officials. Party and government organs “should intensify the struggle to eradicate both serious and trivial instances of abuse of power, bureaucratism and corruption, which would wreak havoc…and undermine the socialist system,” Kim said. The remarks came after senior officials of the North Korean Guard Command—responsible for the personal security of the Kim family—were purged late last year when the regime accused them of managing a slush fund valued at tens of thousands of dollars, according to authors of the North Korea Strategy Center report. The Wall Street Journal couldn’t independently confirm specifics of the purge, although South Korean analysts expressed confidence in the authors’ findings about Kim’s new crackdown. The sweep, which took off late last year, seeks mainly to confiscate foreign-cash piles amassed by the North Korean establishment, and is thought to have netted the regime as much as several million dollars, the authors of the North Korea Strategy Center report said. The authors said they interviewed 14 former North Korean officials, six current officials and five additional North Koreans now residing outside the North for their report. “Many of these purges are related to money,” said Kim Jung-bong, a former South Korean intelligence official. Although the North Korean leader has condoned some degree of corruption to satisfy loyalists for the sake of regime stability, sanctions appear to have altered his thinking: Pyongyang now views graft money as wealth taken from increasingly cash-strapped government coffers, the former official said. The crackdown differs from previous ones directed by Pyongyang because it appears aimed at offenses involving unremarkable, if not broadly practiced, types of bribery, said the U.S. and South Korean security analysts. Kim is thought to have purged around 400 individuals among the Pyongyang establishment since taking over from his father in late 2011, according to the authors, with a campaign against his influential uncle in 2013 accounting for about half that figure. Researchers of the Kim regime don’t see the latest crackdown as evidence that Pyongyang is in political disarray, describing Kim’s grip as firm. But in the near term, Kim needs foreign cash as international sanctions block much of the country’s potential trade. In anticipation of eventual sanctions relief, and having publicly stressed the need to develop his economy, Kim wants to clean up rampant graft to ensure economic projects aren’t undone by corruption, these people said. Ken Gause, director of the adversary analytics program at CNA, a Virginia-based nonprofit think tank, said Kim could be concerned that widespread bribery is hurting growth, and in turn his political legitimacy, given his desire to boost the economy. “He is trying to put together, within a country, an economic plan that will actually take root,” he said. “And if you have an environment that is steeped in corruption, whatever you plant in that environment will die.” Among the victims of the latest arrests and executions, according to the North Korea Strategy Center, are senior members of powerful military units that Kim’s father never touched, lest he alienate the most ardent domestic supporters of the family’s rule. It is the first time that a North Korean leader has targeted the 100,000-member Guard Command, according to the authors and other experts on North Korea. The sweep follows similar actions in 2017 against 10 members of the General Political Bureau—the political commissariat of the North Korean military. They were executed for crimes related to “foreign reserves bribery,” according to the NKSC report. (Andrew Jeong and Timothy W. Martin, “Kim Jong Un Purges Wealthy Elite and Opponents of Outreach to U.S.,” Wall Street Journal, February 19, 2019)
2/19/19:
Bolton: “Even another phone call with South Korea’s Moon Jae-in, persistently pushing South Korea’s agenda, on February 19 didn’t cause major damage. Trump proclaimed that he was the only person who could make a nuclear deal with Kim Jong Un. He pressed Moon to let the media know that progress was being made, since they typically tried to put a negative spin on whatever he did. He promised to keep South Korea’s interests in mind, but stressed that Kim wanted a deal. They all wanted deals. Later that morning, Pompeo, Biegun, the NSC’s Allison Hooker, and I yet again had a meeting with Trump, during which he said, ‘If we walk away, it’s okay,’ the main point made in the briefings. To Biegun, Trump said, ‘Tell them [the North Koreans] how much I love Chairman Kim, but also tell them what I want.’ After further discussions, Pompeo and I went back to my office to talk about Hanoi. I stressed again why a baseline declaration by North Korea was the starting point for any intelligible negotiation. I also underlined why we couldn’t give up economic sanctions and why we needed more pressure. Pompeo bristled at my ‘interference’ with his turf, but he didn’t disagree on the substance, which he rarely did when we talked alone. At a Principals Committee later that day on North Korea, the clear weakness Biegun displayed disturbed many of those present, especially Shanahan and Dunford, even Pompeo. Was he managing Biegun or wasn’t he? Dunford wanted to be sure that any ‘end-of-war declaration’ would not have binding legal effect, which of course raised the question of why we were considering it at all. The North had told us they didn’t care about it, seeing it as something Moon wanted.[??] So why were we pursuing it?” (Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, pp. 287-88)
Carlin: “This is an article about the “p” word—process. In some circles, it considered best to speak the word with head tilted slightly back, indicating barely concealed contempt. That way, you can demonstrate that you don’t think the manner and means—i.e., the process—by which agreements are negotiated are important because you are tough-minded and are really only interested in results. Why such an allergy to using the “p” word exists is a good question. How in the world anyone expects to cross the street without putting one foot in front of the other, I don’t know. Negotiations need process—at the simplest level, the where, when, what and who; tables and chairs and coffee breaks for crucial off-line conversations; dinners or lunches sometimes; paper, pencils, a joke here or there to break the tension. And most of all, process is communication—serious, sustained, intense communication of ideas back and forth across the table. That includes listening closely as well as speaking precisely. Perhaps one reason “process” is in ill repute is that from the outside negotiations look like a game where the score can be tallied after each inning. Who won, who lost, what were the errors, and is anyone left on base? From my experience, that is not normally how things have worked with the North Koreans. Quite the opposite. What made negotiations possible, for talks to move forward, was the agreeable fiction that “nothing is decided until everything is decided.” That can sound like an awkward approach, but it had significant advantages. Any single concession in isolation may have been too much for Pyongyang—or Washington, for that matter—to digest. Seen as part of a final structure, however, the pieces could appear logical, practical and necessary. Moreover, with trust in short supply, neither side had to commit fully on any one issue until the entire structure was complete, at which point it became possible to weigh the balance of all the give and take. Whether that approach will work in the current context, starting at top-level meetings and coming back down the mountain to working levels remains to be seen. The intense public and political focus on the US-DPRK “summits”—a word infused with almost mythical importance—may make it much more difficult to hold off scoring the inning, thus depriving the process of its full potential. Negotiations with the North Koreans are widely described as tough, rough, rugged, contentious, and other words suggesting unpleasantness. That may be, and certainly was how many people have felt at the end of a long day sitting across from a DPRK negotiating team. But it is actually a question of where along the arc of the negotiations one looks. The North’s opening positions—certainly those at the beginning of a negotiating process—can be frightful, though they often contain faint clues about movement down the road. The word “impossible,” repeated frequently enough in the North Korean position starts to make the entire exercise seem a waste of time, until, usually late in the talks, what was impossible suddenly becomes possible. Although normally cautious at the outset, there have been times when the North started the talks with a big bang, as in July 1993 when it advanced the idea of trading graphite moderated (plutonium production) reactors for light water reactors. In effect, Kim Jong Un has done something similar along these lines by feeding into the mix important concessions (e.g., announcing a full stop to nuclear and missile tests; putting Yongbyon on the table) even before the negotiations have begun. The North Koreans pay a lot of attention to atmospherics. Generally, they do their best to keep the atmosphere civil and professional, even using humor at times to keep things buoyant. What they expect in return is for the other side to respond in kind. Make no mistake, that isn’t meant to imply that things don’t sometimes get testy, but those moments tend to be the exception rather than the rule. Sometimes they are part of a well-defined tit-for-tat exercise. “If you Americans slam your notebooks down and walk out of the room, then we have to do that, too.” The North Koreans are at their most prickly and defensive when they sense that the other side is toying with them, not taking them seriously. They demand a level playing field at least in terms of respect at the table. Their radars are sensitive to slights of the sort Americans are all too prone to give without even realizing it. That becomes less of a problem when the two teams become accustomed to each other, but it never goes away entirely. North Korean negotiators often nibble at the edges of compromise, giving way on small matters in order to keep up some sense of forward momentum while saving the most difficult issues for last. If they are looking down the road to an eventual resolution of a problem, experience suggests they would rather avoid butting heads too hard too early in the process, or risk putting themselves into tactical corners from which it is hard to get out. In negotiations, speed can kill. Solutions—rarely perfect, it is true—tend to emerge over time. If the DPRK side retreats from a position, it may not be immediately apparent. In some instances, they lay down what is in effect a rhetorical barrage to cover the fact that they have backed up to a new line both easier to defend and easier to abandon when the time comes for a settlement. A key point to remember is that when dealing with the North, diplomacy can change “reality” as it moves; perspectives and options for both sides begin to look different in the light of even incremental progress. As a general rule, North Korean negotiators proceed cautiously, sometimes circuitously. The path to “yes” tends not to come in a straight line. They tend not to drop old positions; what is important is to listen for their description of “changed circumstances” within which they carve out room for flexibility down the line. They don’t, as a matter of course, simply raise new demands when old ones are met, pocketing a concession and asking for more. They often use progress to build more progress, sometimes even expressly matching concession for concession. They insist on a sense of balance and reciprocity at all times, especially in any documents that emerge from talks. Procedure and agenda are seriously important. An American position that starts with “You are the problem, and you have to solve it,” is a good way to get nowhere fast. Americans tend to be impatient, to want rapid and well-defined progress. We are prone to lay down preconditions, either to convince ourselves that the other side is seriously committed, or to wriggle around domestic political pressure. The North Koreans will not accept anything that is expressly identified as or even has the whiff of being a precondition. If the other side insists on preconditions, they will lay down their own, something they understand will obstruct even starting serious talks. Preconditions are, to the North Koreans, a way of bullying them, of seeming to put them on a leash even before negotiations begin. That is something they simply will never accept. The way around this? Diplomats are paid to wrap fish in perfumed silk bags, and a precondition has to be well packaged to pass the smell test in Pyongyang. All, some, or none of the above may be applicable to what goes on in Hanoi at the next summit. Both leaders are free to put aside their briefing books—assuming they even look at them—and move according to their instincts and sense of the possible. Bureaucracies and advisors working with kings, emperors and presidents have known that for centuries. Having the Hanoi talks over two days (February 27-28) may provide useful space for refining and correcting missteps by either side on day one. Many experts would be more comfortable with the working-level process leading, possibly and eventually, to the summit. But we have the reverse, and no one really knows what it will mean to ski downhill from the top of Mt. Everest.” (Robert Carlin, “Negotiating with North Korea,” 38 North, February 19, 2019)
2/20/19:
Trump: “Q Mr. President, you spoke to the Prime Minister of Japan today. PRESIDENT TRUMP: I did. Q How hard is it going to be to get North Korea to completely, verifiably denuclearize, which I think you — TRUMP: Well, I spoke with — this morning, with Prime Minister Abe. I had a long conversation with him. We talked about the trip next week to Vietnam, which will be, I think, very successful. I think the first trip to Singapore was extremely successful. We’ll be meeting with Chairman Kim for two days, and I think we’ll accomplish a lot. We started off with a very good meeting, and I think we’ll continue that along. I don’t think this will be the last meeting by any chance, but I do think that the relationship is very strong. When we started, as you know, there were a lot of problems. There was the missiles going all over. There were hostages that were being held. There were remains that we wanted to get back. There were many, many things. Now there’s no nuclear testing, no missiles going up. And we have a good relationship — a very good relationship, I’d say. So I spoke with Prime Minister Abe of Japan about that, and we compared notes. And I think we are very much on the same wave length. It was a good meeting. A good conversation. Q They seem very reluctant — the North Koreans — to denuclearize. Do you think you’ll be able to make any — TRUMP: No, I don’t think they’re reluctant. I think they want to do something. But I — you know, you’ve been talking about this for 80 years. They’ve been talking about this for many, many years, and no administration has done anything. They’ve gotten taken to the cleaners. And I think we have a really meaningful relationship. We’ll see what happens. The sanctions are on in full. As you know, I haven’t taken sanctions off. I’d love to be able to, but in order to do that, we have to do something that’s meaningful on the other side. But Chairman Kim and I have a very good relationship. I wouldn’t be surprised to see something work out. I really believe that, as an economic power, because of its location in between. I mean, if you look on a map and you see Russia, China, and right in the middle of everything is South Korea, but North Korea right smack in the middle. So you have Russia, China, and then South Korea. And this is right in the middle. Tremendous potential for economic wellbeing, long term. And I think he understands that very well. I think he might understand that better than anybody. So they have a great, great potential as a country, and I think that’s what they’re looking to do. We’ll see. But we’ve made a lot of progress. We’ve made a tremendous amount. That doesn’t mean this is going to be the last meeting, because I don’t believe it will. But we have subjects to discuss which will be very fruitful, I believe.” (White House Press Office, Remarks by President Trump and Federal Chancellor Kurz of the Republic of Austria before Their Bilateral Meeting,” February 20, 2019)
President Trump’s special envoy Stephen E. Biegun arrived here late today on a mission to close substantial gaps with North Korea ahead of the president’s second nuclear summit next week with Kim Jong Un, a daunting task intensified by skepticism over his approach within the Trump administration. The challenge for Biegun in meeting his counterpart, Kim Hyok Chol, will be to try to clinch a detailed agreement that can satisfy Trump’s desire for a historic deal but one that can withstand the scrutiny of detractors, including national security adviser John Bolton and others, who warn that Pyongyang is not to be trusted. Last month, in a lengthy speech at Stanford University, Biegun set out his vision for North Korea to dismantle its plutonium and uranium enrichment facilities in exchange for “corresponding measures” by the United States. Among the incentives Biegun appeared to dangle was a potential peace declaration that would aim to put a formal end to the Korean War, which has been suspended by an armistice since 1953. Hawks such as Bolton have fiercely opposed this “step-by-step” process in favor of maintaining maximum pressure through economic sanctions that would, in theory, force a better deal by eroding North Korea’s resolve. Bolton has fretted privately that Biegun’s team is too eager for a deal, and he continues to believe the negotiations will fail, according to people familiar with the deliberations. He’s not the only one who is concerned. At a recent interagency meeting, senior officials from the Treasury Department and the Pentagon warned Biegun not to loosen sanctions or move too quickly to agree to an end-of-war declaration, according to a person with knowledge of the talks who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe private deliberations. The person said it was “startling” to see the concerns raised in the meeting, adding that Biegun has “one job” — to strike a deal — while others in the administration are intent on maintaining a hard line. Biegun allies outside the administration praised his willingness to press forward on engagement in a difficult environment. “If you don’t like this approach, then I don’t think you’re in favor of diplomacy — period. And it may be that Bolton isn’t,” said Tod Lindberg, a senior fellow at the conservative Hudson Institute. “This is what good diplomacy looks like.” White House aides said there was no friction between Bolton and Biegun, but they declined to elaborate on their relationship. Biegun, 55, a former Ford Motor lobbyist and longtime Republican aide on Capitol Hill, was hired by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in August to take the reins of the lower-level negotiations after Trump’s first meeting with Kim in Singapore. “The dilemma that Steve and the negotiators face is that the North Koreans view Donald Trump as their pot of gold and they are not going to negotiate” with the president’s subordinates, said Michael Green, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies who worked with Biegun at the National Security Council under President George W. Bush. In Biegun’s Stanford address, which came days before he traveled to Pyongyang for a meeting with Kim Hyok Chol, Biegun said he was well versed in the criticism that the Singapore agreement was threadbare. In meetings with former U.S. government negotiators and think tank experts in Washington, Biegun has sought advice over the potential pitfalls of negotiating with the North Koreans, including parsing their often blustery, occasionally opaque language. Biegun acknowledged that there are “no new ideas” after nearly three decades of sporadic U.S. talks with Pyongyang, but he emphasized that his job was to identify openings for progress, said people who have met with him and spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe those conversations. “We have big issues with North Korea on weapons of mass destruction, and that drove the sense of crisis … . But in working with North Korea, we have a lot of other issues in the relationship that we have to resolve, too,” Biegun said at Stanford. “My theory of the case would be that we can resolve issues of disagreement outside of the weapons of mass destruction issue much more effectively through engagement than through the separation that we have right now.” People who have met with Biegun described him as a politically savvy and seasoned negotiator who remains clear-eyed about his challenge and privately acknowledges the steep odds of a successful outcome. Biegun was a well-known GOP aide during 14 years on the Hill, working as a foreign policy staffer for then-Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and, later, as national security adviser for then-Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.). In between, he served on Bush’s NSC from 2001 to 2003 under then-national security adviser Condoleezza Rice. Though Biegun’s foreign policy expertise and background is in Russia, one former colleague recalled Rice bringing him into North Korea-related meetings. In February 2002, when Bush visited the Korean demilitarized zone, his speechmakers were putting together remarks when Biegun lobbied to include the phrase, “Chairman Kim, tear down this wall!” — a pointed rebuke to then-North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il, the current leader’s father. The Bush team, still dealing with the geopolitical fallout of the 43rd president’s “axis of evil” remark in his State of the Union address, nixed that language, said the former colleague who requested anonymity to discuss the private deliberations over the speech. In 2008, Biegun joined the presidential campaign of Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and drew a challenging assignment: briefing his vice-presidential running mate, then-Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin, on foreign policy. “Whether it’s advising Sarah Palin or working on North Korea, it says something very favorable about Steve Biegun that he’s a guy very different people want in situations like this,” said Richard Fontaine, president of the Center for a New American Security, who worked on the McCain campaign with Biegun. Biegun was working as the international government relations director at Ford when Pompeo tapped him for the role as special envoy to North Korea. The job came with significant risk. North Korea reneged on an agreement to suspend missile tests made during the six-party talks in the Bush era, scuttling years of painstaking negotiations with the United States, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia. That collapse probably played a strong role in shaping the views of Bolton, who served in the State Department during the Bush administration. Ahead of the Singapore summit in June, Bolton publicly suggested that North Korea would be expected to pursue the “Libya model” of relinquishing its nuclear program wholesale — a prospect that angered Pyongyang, given that Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi was later overthrown and killed. Bolton has continued to gripe internally about the talks and is said to have complained about Biegun’s approach directly to Pompeo, according to two people familiar with the issue who requested anonymity to discuss the internal discussions. “A lot of critics say nothing works, everything fails, but that’s not true,” said Robert Carlin, a former U.S. intelligence analyst who was involved in North Korea talks during the Clinton administration and has met with Biegun. “A lot of people want to look way ahead, but there are stages and ways to reduce risk but not get to the endpoint right away.” For Biegun, criticism comes with the territory, and it is ultimately muted by Trump’s support. On Christmas Eve, the president offered Biegun a vote of public confidence, tweeting a photo of them together in the Oval Office, along with Allison Hooker, an NSC staffer. “Progress being made,” Trump wrote. “Looking forward to my next summit with Chairman Kim!” (John Hudson and David Nakamura, “Stephen Biegun Tutored Sarah Palin on Foreign Policy. Now He’s Trying to Clinch a Foreign Policy Deal for Trump,” Washington Post, February 20, 2019)
2/21/19:
North Korea has warned that it is facing a food shortfall of some 1.4 million tons in 2019 and has been forced to almost halve rations, blaming high temperatures, drought, floods and United Nations sanctions in a memo seen by Reuters today. The release of the undated two-page memo by the North Korean mission to the United Nations comes ahead of a second summit next week between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. “The DPRK government calls on international organizations to urgently respond to addressing the food situation,” read the North Korean memo, which the country’s U.N. mission described as a follow-up to joint assessment with the World Food Program between November 26 and December 7, 2018. WFP declined to comment. The memo said North Korea’s food production last year was 4.951 million tons, 503,000 tons down on 2017. The United Nations confirmed these figures as official government data provided at the end of January and said North Korea’s food production included rice, wheat, potatoes and soy beans. North Korea said it would import 200,000 tons of food and produce about 400,000 tons of early crops, but that it would still be left with a gap and from January would cut daily rations to 300 grams (10.5 ounces) per person from 550 grams. U.N. officials and aid groups in North Korea were consulting the government to “further understand the impact of the food security situation on the most vulnerable people in order to take early action to address their humanitarian needs,” U.N. spokesman Stephane Dujarric said today. He said the United Nations and aid groups were only able to help one third of six million people estimated to be in need last year due to a lack of funding. A U.N. appeal for $111 million in 2018 was only a quarter funded, Dujarric said. The United Nations estimates a total of 10.3 million people — almost half the population — are in need and some 41 percent of North Koreans are undernourished, Dujarric said. (Michelle Nichols, “North Korea Warns of Food Crisis, Slashes Rations before Next Leaders’ Summit,” Reuters, February 22, 2019)
Bolton: “The third and final North Korea briefing, on February 21, followed a call with Abe the day before that couldn’t have teed it up better. We had prepared a set of ‘wild cards’ that Kim Jong Un might bring to Hanoi to surprise Trump and get him to make unnecessary concessions. Once again lasting about forty-five minutes, the session was a successful conclusion to our briefing efforts. Whether they would suffice to prevent catastrophic concessions to Kim remained to be seen.” (Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, p. 288)
2/22/19:
Senior North Korean and U.S. envoys held hours-long talks in Hanoi today as part of home-stretch preparations for another summit between the leaders of the Korean War foes. Kim Hyok-chol, Pyongyang’s special representative for Washington, left the Vietnamese government’s guesthouse at around 8:50 a.m. (local time). He was accompanied by two other officials: Kim Song-hye, director of the United Front Department’s tactical office, and Choe Kang-il, acting director-general for the foreign ministry’s North American affairs. Their sedan arrived at Hotel du Parc in downtown Hanoi, where Stephen Biegun, the U.S. envoy for North Korea, is staying, about 10 minutes later. The North Koreans returned to the guesthouse at around 2:40 p.m., suggesting the discussions lasted up to five and half hours. Yesterday, the two sides had about four and a half hours of talks to map out a deal that will be finalized at the Trump-Kim summit. Speaking to reporters in Washington in a conference call yesterday, a senior Trump administration official said that a priority is to freeze Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile capabilities, while its “ultimate and overriding” goal is the denuclearization of the communist nation. The official also said that developing a “shared understanding of what denuclearization is” and putting together a roadmap for denuclearization will also be key issues. He stressed a full inventory of Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal would be required, albeit not immediately. “Eventually, we are going to need a full declaration in order to complete the process of denuclearization, though I expect that will come well before the end,” he said.” It’s basically the international standard on how one can go about addressing the issue of elimination of weapons of mass destruction.” He added, “I don’t know if North Korea has made the choice yet to denuclearize, but the reason why we’re engaged in this is because we believe there is a possibility.” South Korea’s chief nuclear envoy, Lee Do-hoon, visited Hanoi today for consultations with Biegun to coordinate a negotiation strategy. Japan’s leading nuclear envoy, Kanasugi Kenji, also headed to Hanoi earlier in the day, according to Kyodo News. (Yonhap, “N. Korea, U.S. Envoys Hold Additional Talks on Summit Agenda,” February 22, 2019)
A former U.S. intelligence official with vast experience dealing with North Korea presented a road map for achieving the U.S. goal of final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD) of the North. Andrew Kim, who retired as head of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Korea Mission Center in December, said Washington’s vision for FFVD starts with the continued suspension of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests. The next step, he said in a lecture at Stanford University, was the inspection of North Korea’s nuclear and missile facilities by international experts. “Pyongyang must declare its facilities,” he continued. “The North must completely dismantle and remove nuclear weapons delivery system facilities and associated materials from the Korean Peninsula on an agreed timeline. The North must provide a comprehensive declaration of its nuclear, ballistic missile, chemical and biological programs.” In return for the North abandoning its nuclear programs, Trump promised security guarantees from the U.S. and committed to build new relations between the countries, as well as lasting peace on the peninsula.
“At the end they need to rejoin the NPT for verification and confirmation as part of the process,” the former CIA official said, referring to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Pyongyang withdrew from in 2003. North Korea, for its part, seeks the removal of all United Nations sanctions on the regime, according to Kim, who was a key member of the U.S. team handling preparations for the first Trump-Kim summit in Singapore in June. It also wants the resumption of inter-Korean projects, such as the industrial complex in North Korea’s Kaesong and tours to its scenic Mount Kumgang, he said. North Korea is also after a declaration to formally end the 1950-53 Korean War. “The North wants to be recognized as a nuclear state,” Kim elaborated. “The North wants to improve its relations with the U.S. toward eventually establishing a diplomatic relationship. North Korea wants to put in place a long-lasting peace mechanism … that assures the continued rule of the Kim family.” (Yonhap, “Ex-CIA Official Lays out Complete Roadmap for Denuclearization,” Korea Times, February 23, 2019) Andrew Kim: “In early April 2018, I accompanied then-CIA Director Pompeo to Pyongyang to meet with Chairman Kim. Our main objective was to confirm one single most important point that the South Korean special envoy relayed to us a couple of weeks prior. According to the South Korean envoy, Chairman Kim stated to the South Korean delegation that he is willing to denuclearize. When Director Pompeo asked Chairman Kim directly whether the Chairman intended to denuclearize, the Chairman said that he is a father and husband and he does not want his children to live their lives carrying nuclear weapons on their back.” (Andrew Kim, Remarks Delivered at Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, February 22, 2019)
Pabian and Liu: “Commercial satellite imagery of North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center from February 2019 indicates that despite recent assertions that the 5 MWe reactor is running, there are no obvious indicators that it or the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) are operating. Commercial satellite imagery from February 11 and 21, 2019 of the 5 MWe plutonium production reactor shows no indicators that the reactor is operating. There is no steam venting from the generator hall, nor is there any hot water effluent at the cooling water outfall pipe. The last time such activity was observed was in November 2018, when a small outfall was noted, though was likely due to the transfer of residual heat from previous reactor operations. There is, however, continued movement of vehicles and personnel around the reactor over the last few weeks; roads have been swept clean, showing that the reactor site is being well maintained. Dredging continues near the 5 MWe reactor’s secondary cooling system, where piles of dredged material now effectively block the river channel that serves the system’s pump house. The purpose of this activity is still unclear.” (Frank V. Pabian and Jack Liu, “North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Facility: No Indications Plutonium Production Reactor Is Operating,” February 22, 2019)
As U.S. diplomats prepare for the second summit between President Trump and Kim Jong-un next week in Hanoi, senior Democrats in the House and Senate, joined by a few Republicans, have been sounding alarm bells, warning that South Korean President Moon Jae-in is moving too fast in reconciling with North Korea by seeking a premature lifting of sanctions on the nuclear-armed state. They are also expressing strong reservations about the U.S. and South Korean negotiations with Kim and warning Trump not to budge on his “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign until Kim has completely dismantled North Korea’s nuclear-weapons and missile program. Kim temporarily halted the program nearly 500 days ago by suspending all testing of his “nuclear force.” The congressional actions have been fueled by a steady stream of pessimistic and often misleading studies from Washington think tanks, eagerly embraced by US media hostile to the peace process, alleging that Kim is “playing” Trump and that both Moon and Trump may stop short of demanding North Korea’s immediate denuclearization by embracing a more incremental approach. Last week, Senator Bob Menendez, the ranking Democrat on the powerful Foreign Relations Committee, joined Republican Ted Cruz in sending a strongly worded letter to Trump that directly attacked President Moon’s push for closer economic ties with North Korea. They urged the White House to rein in the U.S. ally by committing “the full weight of the U.S. government to ensuring the integrity of the sanctions regime.” Senator Menendez is also the author of a resolution, now under consideration in the Senate and House, promoting the trilateral military alliance between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, which is highly unpopular among Koreans. It comes as Tokyo and Seoul are locked in a bitter dispute over Japan’s use of “comfort women” as sex slaves during World War II and its refusal to provide restitution to thousands of Koreans forced to labor in Japanese mines and factories during that time. The resolution, which was introduced in the House by Democratic Representative Eliot Engel, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, is widely seen in Seoul as a way to pressure President Moon to back off and settle the dispute. The most dramatic moment of congressional impatience with South Korea came last week, when House Speaker Nancy Pelosi met with a high-level delegation of South Korean lawmakers from both the ruling and opposition parties. The group, which was led by Representative Moon Hee-sang, the speaker of South Korea’s National Assembly, came to Washington to seek support for the inter-Korean peace process started by President Moon during the “Olympic Truce” of January 2018. According to Korean reporters who were briefed on the meeting, the session was uncomfortable from the start and had to be extended “as the talks grew intense.” Pelosi, citing her own visit to Pyongyang in 1997, reportedly told her visitors not to trust the North and asserted (apparently with prodding from Representative Na Kyung-won, the floor leader of the right-wing opposition Liberty Korea Party) that North Korea’s “real goal isn’t its own denuclearization but South Korea’s demilitarization.” At one point, Pelosi insisted that last June’s summit in Singapore—the first-ever meeting between a U.S. president and a North Korean leader—was “nothing but show.” The implication was that the South Koreans, who have had extensive discussions on economic, political, and military issues with their Northern counterparts over the past year, are naive and don’t understand the threat to their own country. Representative Moon, in an interview with Fox 11 in Los Angeles, said he responded to Pelosi that the second summit in Hanoi “is of great importance to the Korean people and it will determine the fate of our country. That’s how important it is.” The congressional pressure on South Korea to end its dispute with Japan also contributed to the tension. The issue of Japan’s wartime crimes is particularly sensitive for Representative Moon, who recently suggested that the Japanese emperor apologize to his country for its war crimes against Koreans. Later, he called Japan a “brazen thief” for demanding that he retract his comments. After hearing Pelosi express her concern about the dispute between South Korea and Japan, Speaker Moon told Korean reporters that the House speaker was essentially lobbying for Abe Shinzo’s Liberal Democratic Party government in Tokyo. “I think Japan told her to have a word with [us] before the meeting, or in other words, scold us,” he said, according to the Joongang Ilbo. Pelosi’s press office did not return phone calls or e-mails seeking comment and clarification. Still, Pelosi’s comments rattled many Koreans, who are hoping for a successful summit so they can proceed with their plans to eliminate tensions with the North. “Reconciliation and peace between North and South Korea is a gravely historic matter that should be for the Korean people to decide,” Simone Chun, a Korean scholar and activist who has spoken to congressional staffers about the peace process, told The Nation. “It cannot be allowed to be reduced to a bargaining chip in the struggle for one-upmanship between Republicans and Democrats.” Chun was also critical of Representative Na of the Korean opposition party for raising fears during her visit to Washington about a North Korean nuclear attack and opposing an end-of-war declaration at the upcoming summit. “What Pelosi did was to legitimize the ultra-right-wing views expressed by Na,” she said. Hwang Joon-bum, the Washington correspondent for Hankyoreh, South Korea’s largest progressive daily, wrote an op-ed about the House speaker’s remarks. “Pelosi is just one person who reflects the dominant viewpoint in the American political establishment, the mainstream media and think tanks,” he said. “There was never any chance” that the lawmakers’ tour “would reverse the deep-rooted distrust of North Korea and the antipathy to Trump both inside and outside of the US political establishment.” The US critics, he added, “aren’t impressed by North Korea’s suspension of nuclear and missile testing since Nov. 2017, its willingness to demolish its Yongbyon nuclear facility and [Kim Jong-un’s] focus on an economic line.” The Menendez letter showed little appreciation for South Korea’s efforts to help the North improve its economy. Menendez and Cruz listed a series of South Korean actions they consider troublesome, including moves by Korean banks to “pursue investments and operations” in the North and the participation of “multiple business executives” in President Moon’s summit in Pyongyang last September to discuss reopening the Kaesong Industrial Zone just north of the DMZ and tours of Mount Kumgang, a tourist site beloved by South Koreans. They also complained about President Moon’s recent calls to lift sanctions on the North “as soon as possible” and plans by both Koreas to break ground on a new cross-border rail project “within this year.” They added that North Korea’s “opacity” and its “well-documented efforts of evading sanctions” makes it impossible to ensure “that economic engagement with the North—regardless of intent to contribute to positive diplomatic progress on denuclearization—would not violate U.N. Security Council resolutions or be used for illicit activities prohibited by U.S. sanctions.” Meanwhile, in another move that could constrain both South Korea and the United States in their negotiations with the North, Representative Tom Malinowski, a newly elected Democratic congressman from New Jersey, joined Republican Representative Mike Gallagher in introducing a bill that would restrict the US government and the Pentagon from reducing US troops in South Korea from their current level of about 28,000 to 22,000 or less unless the secretary of defense could assure Congress it would not have an “adverse” impact on US security. The bill, H.R. 889, states that a “withdrawal or significant reduction” of US forces, which could happen eventually if a peace deal is reached, “may risk upsetting the military balance” in the Asia region. It also uses language similar to the Menendez letter concerning the US alliance with Japan, saying that the trilateral ties between the United States, Japan, and South Korea “form the bedrock of regional stability.” Malinowski, a former director of Human Rights Watch, was the assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor during the Obama administration. In 2017, he wrote an article for Politico titled “How to Take Down Kim Jong Un” that essentially called for a campaign that would “lead to the end” of the North Korean regime “and its reason to exist as a country.” The Democratic Party’s current approach was established last June, one week before the Singapore summit, in a letter to Trump from Senate minority leader Chuck Schumer and signed by Senators Menendez, Dick Durbin, Dianne Feinstein, Sherrod Brown, Mark Warner, and Patrick Leahy. It laid out a series of demands, including North Korea’s “dismantlement and removal” of its chemical and biological weapons, which are not currently part of the talks, and urged the White House to “maintain a tough approach to China” throughout the peace process. The Schumer letter also rejected any incremental steps by the US government in its dealings with Kim. “Any deal that explicitly or implicitly gives North Korea sanctions relief for anything other than the verifiable performance of its obligations to dismantle its nuclear and missile arsenal is a bad deal,” the Democratic senators declared. Chun, the scholar-activist, said in a recent e-mail to peace activists that the Schumer letter “completely overlooked the recent progress toward peace evinced by the inter-Korean summit and the Panmunjom Declaration and discounted the overwhelming support for the peace process by Koreans. It also offers no alternative vision for peace on the Korean Peninsula and considers Korean interests only insofar as they serve the narrow political agenda of the Democratic Party.” After the Schumer letter went out, according to activists who spend time on Capitol Hill, Representative Pelosi and other House Democratic leaders told their caucus “not to speak supportively” of the Singapore summit, which happened to coincide with a week of advocacy on Korea by peace groups. “Many of our folks lobbying on the Hill were stunned at how hostile many Dems were,” one activist told The Nation. But now, with the Trump-Kim negotiations in full swing, a few Democrats are ready to take a new approach. A group of lawmakers from the Congressional Progressive Caucus plan to announce an action next week to express support for the Korea peace process and call on the United States to finally end the Korean War through a peace agreement. That would be most welcome, said Kevin Martin, president of Peace Action and national coordinator of the Korea Peace Network. “Democrats should support diplomacy, and remember the most important president in this process is Moon Jae-in, not Donald Trump,” Martin said. “Moon’s persistent leadership toward reconciliation and diplomacy with North Korea represents the fervent desire of the Korean and Korean-American people for peace. Members of Congress from both parties should understand that and support it, skepticism about Trump and Kim notwithstanding.” (Tim Shorrock, “Why Are Democrats Trying to Torpedo the Korea Peace Talks?” The Nation, February 22, 2019)
2/24/19:
Bolton: “Flying toward our refueling stop in Anchorage, we received a draft US–North Korea statement. the NSC’s Allison Hooker said Biegun had ‘table-dropped’ it at a meeting with the North, without previously clearing it. It read as if drafted by North Korea, enumerating all Trump’s prior ‘concessions’ to Kim Yong Chol in the Oval Office without seeking anything in return beyond another vague statement that North Korea would agree to define ‘denuclearization.’ It was a complete mystery to me why Pompeo would allow such a text. What if the North Koreans simply accepted it word for word? This was another massive process foul, and a political time bomb. I had Kupperman show the draft to Mulvaney and Stephen Miller in Washington, and Mulvaney agreed it was both a first-magnitude political mistake and a deliberate violation of the established interagency process. They were flying with Trump to Hanoi on Air Force One and explained the problems to him en route. Trump was completely unaware of the draft, so Biegun had no authority from on high. I also called Pence on Air Force Two, as he flew back to Washington from the Lima Group meeting in Bogotá, and he had the same reaction to the Biegun draft that I did.’ (Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, pp. 288-89)
2/26/19:
A country once at war with the United States cozies up to its former enemy. Market reforms galvanize its economy, even as the Communist Party remains firmly in control. As Vietnamese officials play host to the summit meeting between President Trump and Kim Jong-un of North Korea this week, they are offering up the hope that the North Koreans could somehow mirror Vietnam’s trajectory — transforming from a closed society strangled by central planners to a bustling nation full of capitalist enterprise. Ideological fraternity has long bound Vietnam and North Korea. Now, as Kim is expected to tour Vietnamese industrial zones filled with foreign-invested factories, Vietnam has advice that might sound surprising from a nation that ejected American forces from its soil more than 40 years ago. “The success of the Vietnamese economy is due to its decision to normalize relations with the United States in 1995,” said Maj. Gen. Le Van Cuong, the former director of the Institute of Strategic Studies at the Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security, noting that the United States is the top destination for Vietnamese exports. “I would say to our North Korean friends that as long as they have a conflict with the United States, they will not be able to develop their economy properly,” he added. “China will try every possible tactic to keep North Korea in its arms because it wants a country to control,” General Cuong said. “Luckily, North Korea has the necessary conditions to escape China’s grip if it deepens its relationship with America.” (Hannah Beech, “Vietnam Shows the Value of Burying the Hatchet with the U.S.,” New York Times, February 27, 2019, p. A-11)
Elleman: “President Donald Trump on Sunday [February 24], during an address to state governors, said, “I’m not in a rush, I don’t want to rush anybody, I just don’t want testing. As long as there’s no testing, we’re happy.” For those hoping to see a concrete agreement with North Korea that verifiably denuclearizes North Korea in the near future and in one comprehensive step, Trump’s statement comes as a disappointment. However, the value the president assigns to the absence of nuclear and missile testing is not misplaced and supports a phased approach to denuclearization. Without additional testing, North Korea’s capacity to threaten the United States with nuclear weapons is unreliable and questionable. …The administration should therefore use the upcoming US-DPRK summit in Hanoi to negotiate a formal, verifiable long-range missile test ban with Pyongyang. Such a ban, if implemented fully, would limit the viability of North Korea’s long-range strike capacity, strengthen US security commitments to South Korea and Japan, and protect American lives. It would also provide momentum for bolder, more ambitious steps toward a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. Ballistic missile development requires flight testing. Without extensive testing, neither the missile’s designers, nor its end-users, can have a high degree of confidence that the new system will perform as expected under a full spectrum of operational conditions. The number of flight tests needed for the development of a country’s first- or second-generation strategic missiles depends on the level of confidence required by the end-user. The U.S. and Soviet Union conducted roughly three dozen flight tests for their respective first- and second-generation long-range missiles. France’s strategic missiles were subjected to roughly two dozen flight tests, and although publicly available test records seem incomplete, China appears to have relied on about a dozen test launches. North Korea has conducted only two test flights of its Hwasong-14, and only a single launch of its more capable Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs. How Many Flight Tests are Required? There is no fixed answer to this question, as it is partially subjective and depends on the missile’s design criteria, most notably the performance and reliability requirements as specified by the end-user. A detailed study of early-generation, long-range missile development in the Soviet Union and United States reveals interesting and consistent trends that illustrate what is required before a system is deemed combat ready. The flight-test records of 10 missiles have been evaluated here. On average, across nine of the missiles examined, the tests failed more often than they succeeded during the initial ten launches. As one might expect, the success rate over the second batch of ten tests improved to 74%. Overall, after 20 flight tests each missile performed successfully just 61% of the time. A deeper look at the available launch data indicates that consistent improvement in reliability begins after roughly 16 flight tests, on average, though the number varies across each of the nine systems. Over a span of ten years, beginning in 2006, Pyongyang launched five three-stage, liquid-fueled Unha-type rockets attempting to place a satellite into low-earth orbit. The first three failed, and the fourth succeeded in orbiting an object, though the satellite was tumbling and inoperable. The fifth attempt succeeded in achieving an orbit, but the satellite appears to have malfunctioned. Failing three of five times is consistent with available data on similar systems. In 2016, North Korea test launched up to eight Musudan (Hwasong-10) intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), with all but one failing catastrophically. A year later, the first three Hwasong-12 launch attempts ended in failure; the subsequent three appear to have been successful, with the last two launches employing a standard, rather than highly lofted trajectory. The North Korean experience is reasonably consistent with the test histories experienced elsewhere. The Hwasong-14 and -15 ICBMs appear to have broken the trend seen elsewhere and in North Korea itself. How does one explain the apparent successes of the first two flight tests of the Hwasong-14, and the only test of the Hwasong-15 ICBM? First, without access to telemetry and tracking data it is impossible to assess the overall performance or success of each ICBM flight test. In fact, there are no public reports indicating that North Korea positioned observation or telemetry-collection ships near the re-entry vehicle impact zones in the East Sea. Moreover, ground-based sensors stationed within North Korean territory to collect flight data would be unable to see the final 20 km of descent, where the most severe thermal and mechanical loads on the re-entry vehicle would occur. Hence, it is not possible to determine from available information if the missiles performed to their respective design specifications. Notably, we do not know, and North Koreans may not know, if the mock warheads survived re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere or impacted near their projected aim points. (There is some evidence that the re-entry vehicle for one of the tests did not survive, and that it likely did not contain a mock warhead.) North Korea cannot be certain, therefore, that it has a survivable re-entry vehicle design for its ICBMs. And perhaps equally critical, North Korean engineers have not yet collected empirical data on the thermal and mechanical loads experienced during atmospheric re-entry of a warhead traveling at ICBM velocities of more than 7 km per second. Without such data, engineers will be forced to make educated guesses when establishing the nuclear bomb’s design criteria, particularly the ruggedness of the bomb design. Consequently, North Korea would need to over-design the re-entry vehicle’s protection systems and hope the bomb itself is rugged enough to withstand the extreme re-entry environment. Second, the Hwasong–14 or -15 were flight tested using very steep trajectories, which minimized the ground-path distance traveled. Delivering a nuclear weapon to US territory requires a much flatter trajectory. The static and dynamic loads the missile experiences during the boost phase for a steep trajectory are quite different from those faced during a standard flight path. While the applied stresses of a standard trajectory can be modeled by North Korea’s engineers, without empirical flight data, considerable uncertainty remains, and must be factored into performance and reliability estimates of the missiles deployed without further flight testing. The history of missile development elsewhere and in North Korea shows that there is no reason to conclude after so few tests that North Korea has an operationally viable ICBM capability. Many unknowns remain, and without additional testing Pyongyang’s leadership cannot be certain that its ICBMs would succeed more often than they would fail if launched during a crisis. Given that the North is likely to field a small number of ICBMs, perhaps six of each type (i.e., Hwasong-14 and -15) the risk that none of its ICBM warheads will reach the continental US is a real, finite possibility. Figure 1 depicts the probability that at least one North Korean warhead strikes US territory under five potential circumstances, assuming no more flight tests are performed, and ICBM reliability is 0.4 (i.e., a success rate of 40 percent). The solid-blue curve shows that North Korea would need to launch three ICBMs to expect an 80 percent chance (i.e. a probability of 0.8) of landing an ICBM warhead on US soil, assuming the failure modes across the missiles launched are independent. If the failure mode for the Hwasong-14 or -15 missiles is systemic, affecting each missile launched, then obviously no missiles would reach US territory. There is a finite probability that a failure mode for ICBMs flown on a standard trajectory is applicable to all North Korea’s long-range missiles, as the Hwasong-14 and -15 have never been tested under such conditions. The curves shown in Figure 1 also assume the nuclear warhead is 100 percent reliable, which after just six test detonations may be an optimistic projection. If one further assumes that U.S. missile defenses have some efficacy against a small number of first-generation ICBMs, the odds of North Korean success in landing a warhead on US territory decline dramatically. To date, the Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) protecting the US homeland have an unimpressive test record, with only about half of the intercept attempts succeeding. If we accept that each interceptor has a 50 percent chance of destroying a North Korean ICBM, the probability of at least one Hwasong-14 or -15 striking the US homeland can be calculated and depicted by the dotted-blue line. In the case a single interceptor is launched at each inbound ICBM, North Korea must fire between seven and eight missiles to have an expectation that 80 percent of the time at least one warhead lands on US soil. Three ICBM launches are needed before Pyongyang could expect a 50 percent chance of success. Curves corresponding to the assignment of two and four GBIs to each incoming threat are also depicted. Current missile-defense doctrine calls for four interceptors committed to each threat missile. Under that condition, North Korea must fire about nine missiles to have a one in five chance that at least one warhead strikes America. In other words, Kim Jong Un would need to launch a substantial fraction of his ICBMs to have a modest expectation, about 20 percent, of one striking the U.S. If North Korea more fully matured Hwasong-14 and -15 development by flight testing each more than a dozen times, a reliability of about 80 percent might be achievable. As shown by the solid-red line in Figure 1, doubling ICBM reliability to 80 percent provides nearly 100 percent chance of success when just two missiles are launched in the absence of missile defenses. If the standard practice of committing four interceptors to each ICBM is assumed, the seven North Korean missiles must be launched to achieve a 50 percent chance of striking the US. And only two ICBMs need to be launched to achieve the 20 percent chance of success, compared to the roughly nine launches of the 40 percent reliable ICBMs needed to achieve the same performance expectation. Very clearly, it is in the U.S. interest to prevent North Korea from further testing its Hwasong-14 and -15 ICBMs. The potential threat to the US homeland posed by Pyongyang’s ICBMs would be substantially reduced if no additional tests are conducted. The reduced threat to the US would help Washington more fully reassure its allies in South Korea and Japan that it will meet its security commitments. If a verifiable moratorium on long-range missile tests can be successfully concluded, the next step might include a ban on all missile testing, including the short- and medium-range missiles that threaten Japan and South Korea. Such a ban would substantially impede full development of the submarine-launched Pukguksong-1 and land-based Pukguksong-2. A flight ban would also severely degrade North Korea’s ability to perfect the terminal guidance systems for its Scud-type missiles, thus preventing the development of highly accurate short- and medium-range systems that would have military utility even when armed with conventional warheads.” (Michael Elleman, “Why a Formal End to North Korean Missile Testing Makes Sense,” 38 North, February 26, 2019)
2/27/19:
President Trump offered a public embrace of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un as they opened a two-day nuclear summit here, referring to the brutal authoritarian ruler as “my friend” and stating that he is “satisfied” with the progress of their negotiations. “Some people would like to see it be quicker. I’m satisfied; you’re satisfied,” Trump told Kim before a private, one-on-one meeting, followed by a social dinner with a small group of aides at the luxurious, five-star Metropole hotel. “We want to be happy with what we’re doing.” Trump said he believed their first summit in Singapore was a success and added that their meetings in Hanoi “will be equal to or greater than the first.” He held up Vietnam as a model for economic growth for North Korea, which he said has “unlimited” potential. “I look forward to watching it happen, and we will help it happen,” Trump said, sitting next to Kim in front of a row of American and North Korean flags. The president wore a dark suit and striped tie, while Kim wore his traditional Mao-style suit. At the dinner, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and acting White House chief of staff Mick Mulvaney joined Trump and Kim, along with two senior North Korean aides, Kim Hyok Chol and Ri Yong Ho, and two interpreters. “Disbelief and misunderstandings were everywhere, and old hostile habits were getting in our way, but we’ve overcome it well, come face to face and walked all the way to Hanoi in 260 days,” Kim Jong Un said in the photo op with Trump. “I think it’s been a time period that took me more agony, effort and patience than ever. I am confident a great result will be produced this time to be welcomed by everyone, and I will do my best toward that goal.” Ahead of meetings with Vietnamese officials earlier today, Trump praised Vietnam on Twitter as “thriving like few places on earth” and said North Korea has a chance to do the same “very quickly.” “The potential is AWESOME, a great opportunity, like almost none other in history, for my friend Kim Jong Un,” Trump wrote. “We will know fairly soon — Very Interesting!” “Vietnam is thriving,” said Trump, who signed a bilateral trade deal with Hanoi to purchase U.S.-made plane engines and other equipment. Referring to Kim Jong Un, Trump added: “We both felt very good about having this very important summit in Vietnam because you really are an example of what can happen with good thinking.” Trump administration officials, led by the State Department, have worked over the past two weeks to try to nail down specific commitments from Pyongyang to advance the process, but progress has been slow, according to U.S. and South Korean officials familiar with the talks. The U.S. said is said to be seeking a detailed timeline and verification process for Pyongyang to close its primary nuclear processing facility at Yongbyon — but North Korean negotiators have resisted agreeing to specifics. Yet Trump at times appeared distracted. Retiring to his hotel for several hours of downtime before his dinner with Kim, Trump unleashed a Twitter broadside on Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), mocking him as he has before over questionable statements that Blumenthal has made about his military service. “I have now spent more time in Vietnam than Da Nang Dick Blumenthal, the third-rate Senator from Connecticut (how is Connecticut doing?),” Trump wrote. “His war stories of his heroism in Vietnam were a total fraud — he was never even there. We talked about it today with Vietnamese leaders!” In another tweet this afternoon, Trump appeared to take aim at critics who have warned that he could wind up giving unwise concessions to Kim by easing economic sanctions too quickly. “All false reporting (guessing) on my intentions with respect to North Korea,” the president wrote. “Kim Jong Un and I will try very hard to work something out on Denuclearization & then making North Korea an Economic Powerhouse. I believe that China, Russia, Japan & South Korea will be very helpful!” Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) in a statement called last year’s Trump-Kim summit a “complete disaster” and discounted the North’s testing moratorium as a meaningful step forward. “North Korea has a long history of pretending to comply in order to get what it wants — giving just enough to get something important in return, but never actually walking back its nuclear program,” he said. Murphy also criticized Trump for lavishing “syrupy praise” on Kim, whose regime, like those of his father and grandfather, has imposed brutal rule, with more than 100,000 citizens held in hard-labor camps. In 2017, Trump had denounced North Korea as a “hell no person deserves,” but he has touted a personal rapport with Kim since their first summit. “The Democrats should stop talking about what I should do with North Korea and ask themselves instead why they didn’t do ‘it’ during eight years of the Obama Administration?” Trump wrote in another tweet Wednesday morning. (David Nakamura and Simon Denyer, “Trump Offers Public Embrace of Kim Jong Un as Summit Begins,” Washington Post, February 27, 2019)
Bolton: “We then trooped to another room set up to brief Trump for the day’s events. Trump was still on fire because of the Time article but started by telling Pompeo he didn’t like Biegun’s comments, which were “too much,” referring to the draft statement Kupperman and Mulvaney had shown him on Air Force One. The import was clear to everyone in the room. … Trump again criticized Biegun, repeating what he had said just minutes before. (For the record, when he saw Biegun the next morning, he didn’t recognize him.) Trump said he saw three possible outcomes: a big deal, a small deal, or ‘I walk.’ He immediately rejected the “small deal” because it would mean weakening the sanctions. The “big deal” wasn’t going to happen because Kim Jong Un remained unwilling to make a strategic decision to renounce nuclear weapons. The idea of ‘I walk’ came up repeatedly, which meant Trump was at least prepared for it, and might even prefer it (ditch the girl before she ditches you). There would be criticism no matter what he did, Trump said with a shrug, so I mentioned Reagan’s walking away at Reykjavik and the important boost that gave to later negotiations [?] (ironically, on the INF Treaty, which we were leaving). Trump mused about what he would say at the concluding press conference (“We still like each other; we’ll keep talking”) and, looking at me, said, ‘You should go out and defend it.’ Trump seemed consumed by the coming testimony in Washington of Michael Cohen, one of his former lawyers, a rare occasion when I saw his personal problems bleed into national security. I was relieved the earlier briefings were still top of mind and that the option of walking away was live. We spent the rest of the day in meetings with Vietnam’s top leadership, up until Trump’s dinner with Kim Jong Un. By that time, morning in Washington, the news coverage was all Michael Cohen. The North Koreans excluded me from the dinner, with only Pompeo and Mulvaney attending with Trump, following a one-on-one with the two leaders. I didn’t like it but figured it was a cost of doing business. Mulvaney called me to his room after the dinner ended at nine p.m. to debrief with Pompeo and others. Trump had wanted to avoid substance until the next morning, but as the dinner was ending, Pompeo said Kim had proposed that the North give up its Yongbyon nuclear facilities, in exchange for the lifting of all post-2016 UN Security Council sanctions. This was a typical ‘action for action’ ploy, giving them economic relief they desperately needed but giving us very little, since even without Yongbyon, it was publicly well known that North Korea had many other facilities with which to continue its nuclear program. I asked if Kim Jong Un had something else up his sleeve, but Pompeo didn’t think so. I also asked if Trump had raised the Japanese-abductee issue, which he had, meaning he had fulfilled his commitment to Japan. ’ (Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, pp. 289-90)
Woodward: Kim was ready to give up one of his nuclear sites, but he had five [??] “Listen one doesn’t help and two doesn’t help, and three doesn’t help and four doesn’t help,” Trump said. “Five does help.” “But it’s our biggest,” Kim said, referring to the Yongbyon center. “Yeah, but it’s also your oldest,” Trump said. Because I know every one of those sites. I know all of them, You understand that.” (Bob Woodward, Rage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020), p. 175)
2/28/19:
As President Trump settled into the dining room of a French-colonial hotel in Hanoi this morning, the conversation with Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader with whom he had struck up the oddest of friendships, was already turning tense. In a dinner at the Metropole Hotel yesterday evening, Kim had resisted what Trump presented as a grand bargain: North Korea would trade all its nuclear weapons, material and facilities for an end to the American-led sanctions squeezing its economy. An American official later described this as “a proposal to go big,” a bet by Trump that his force of personality, and view of himself as a consummate dealmaker, would succeed where three previous presidents had failed. But Trump’s offer was essentially the same deal that the United States has pushed — and the North has rejected — for a quarter century. Intelligence agencies had warned him, publicly, Kim would not be willing to give up the arsenal completely. North Korea itself had said repeatedly that it would only move gradually. Several of Trump’s own aides, led by national security adviser John R. Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, thought the chances of a grand bargain for total nuclear disarmament were virtually zero. Some questioned whether the summit meeting should go forward. As Trump and Kim parted company, nearly a year of optimism and flattery was left poolside at the Metropole, steps from a meeting room with two empty chairs and flags that had been carefully prepared for a “signing ceremony.” Trump and senior diplomats say they hope negotiations will continue, though nothing has been scheduled. Kim has promised not to resume weapons testing, and the Pentagon continues to hold off on large-scale military exercises with South Korea. In interviews with a half-dozen participants, it is clear Trump’s failed gambit was the culmination of two years of threats, hubris and misjudgment on both sides. Trump entered office convinced he could intimidate the man he liked to call “Little Rocket Man” with tough talk and sanctions, then abruptly took the opposite tack, overruling his aides and personalizing the diplomacy. Kim also miscalculated. He bet Trump might accept a more modest offer that American negotiators in Hanoi had already dismissed: The North would dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear complex, three square miles of aging facilities at the heart of the nuclear program, for an end to the sanctions most harmful to its economy, those enacted since 2016. It is unclear whether Trump was tempted to take that deal, which could have turned headlines away from the damaging testimony of his former lawyer, Michael D. Cohen, in Washington. But Pompeo, who knew the details of the North Korean program intimately from his days as C.I.A. director, opposed it. The president was told that if he settled for Yongbyon alone, he might appear to have been duped by the young leader of a country renowned for hiding pieces of its nuclear program in tunnels around the country. Pompeo said later that Kim’s offer “still leaves missiles, still leaves warheads and weapons systems” — and a senior State Department official argued that sanctions relief would fund the production of more weapons. It also would have let the North continue to produce uranium, a key ingredient for nuclear weapons, at a hidden enrichment center near the capital, Pyongyang — one of several suspected nuclear sites beyond Yongbyon that the United States has been monitoring from afar for nearly a decade. “I think that they were surprised that we knew,” Trump said. In the end, the president took a brief walk with Kim around the hotel’s pool, shook his hand and then canceled lunch in a glassed pavilion. “This kind of opportunity may never come again,” Ri Yong-ho, North Korea’s foreign minister, told reporters later that night. For a president who often complains that his predecessors only let the North Korea problem fester, the 8,000-mile trek from Washington to Hanoi was a crash course in why those past presidents failed. Many around Trump believe he will, too. North Korea was the first international crisis of the Trump administration, and discussion about how hard to press the country sometimes got heated. At one point, aides said they heard Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, the national security adviser, and Jim Mattis, the defense secretary, shouting at each other behind closed doors. Gen. McMaster was intent on signaling to both North Korea and allies that Trump was serious about enforcing sanctions and that he would not tolerate a nuclear North Korea. In a series of Situation Room meetings, the administration reviewed options to ramp up sanctions and covert operations, including an Obama-era program of cyber sabotage against North Korean missiles. War plans were rewritten, and Gen. McMaster spoke openly about the possibility of a “preventive war” if the threat grew. The shouting was prompted by Gen. McMaster’s insistence that Mattis intercept North Korean ships on the high seas to determine whether they were engaged in sanctions busting. But Mattis resisted, worried that the outbreak of a firefight at sea could quickly escalate out of control. Kim, for his part, turned up the pressure, launching missile after missile, including new intercontinental ballistic models that appeared capable of hitting the United States. There was also another nuclear test, which some experts believe may have been a hydrogen bomb, as the North claimed. After that first summit meeting in Singapore in June, the talk of hostilities ended. “There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea,” Trump declared on Twitter, despite the absence of any timetable for denuclearization. Some of his aides, starting with Bolton, the new national security adviser, were appalled. But with Trump repeating that he should be awarded a Nobel Peace Prize, no one wanted to argue. Bolton told colleagues not to worry. The negotiations, he said, would collapse on their own. Pompeo flew to Pyongyang in early July to turn the Singapore discussion into a timetable for the North to produce an inventory of weapons, the first step toward disarmament, but Kim declined to see him. Instead, Pompeo met with Kim Hyok Chul, a former spy chief with hardline views on the United States. After the visit, the North said the Americans had pushed a “unilateral and gangster-like demand for denuclearization.” But it also said Kim Jong-un still wanted to build on the “friendly relationship and trust” with Trump. The message was clear: A real breakthrough was only possible if the two leaders got together again. The North Koreans seemed to believe Kim could get a better deal from Trump than they could from his State Department negotiators. Then in August, Trump abruptly canceled a trip by Pompeo to Pyongyang, saying there had not been enough progress in the talks. This stymied the new special envoy, Stephen E. Biegun, who had planned to accompany Pompeo. Meanwhile, diplomacy between South Korea and North Korea was progressing quickly. The result was the Pyongyang Declaration, which outlined a peace process for the peninsula — and dangled a potential concession by North Korea. The North, it said, would agree to dismantle the Yongbyon complex if the United States took “corresponding measures.” Suddenly, Yongbyon was in play. But what did North Korea want? Some analysts said they believed then that the North was seeking an end-of-war declaration as a prelude to legally replacing the armistice that halted the Korean War, an idea that Trump told Kim in Singapore he supported. And Moon was pushing for the end-of-war declaration. American officials were worried it could lead too quickly to a peace treaty and then negotiations to draw down the 28,500 American troops on the peninsula — a longtime goal of the North. Then, a few days before the midterm elections in the United States, North Korea released a belligerent statement that said the country would return to a policy of strengthening its nuclear force if the United States did not lift sanctions. In retrospect, it was an important message that was obscured by the discussion of an end-of-war declaration. What really mattered to Kim were the sanctions, which, after three new rounds in 2017, were strangling his nation’s already pitiful economy. The United States had even cut off critical humanitarian aid to the country by barring American aid groups from traveling there. With diplomacy stalled, Trump decided to weigh in again. Bolton announced in December that Trump wanted another summit meeting in early 2019 because North Korea had “not lived up to the commitments” it made in Singapore. To some diplomats and analysts, that seemed like a reason not to meet again. The North Koreans appointed a former ambassador to Spain, Kim Hyok-chol, to lay the groundwork with Biegun, 55, a pragmatic former senior aide to Condoleezza Rice in the Bush administration who had been passed over for the national security adviser position in favor of Bolton. The first meetings in Pyongyang did not go smoothly. And when the two sides met in Hanoi starting six days before the summit meeting, the North Koreans kept demanding that the five most recent rounds of sanctions imposed by the United Nations since March 2016 be lifted. These sanctions, imposed to punish Pyongyang for new weapons tests, differed from previous restrictions that were focused on weapons and nuclear-related equipment. Instead, they covered entire export sectors, including minerals, metals, coal, agriculture and seafood. They also banned energy sales to North Korea. Altogether, they held back billions of dollars of trade, a senior State Department official said. The far-reaching nature of the sanctions — and the suffering they were causing — were exactly why hardline administration officials wanted to keep them up. After Trump’s surprise decision at Singapore to suspend military exercises with South Korea, these officials worried the United States was losing leverage. That camp, led by Bolton, regarded Pompeo and his diplomats with suspicion. Would they give away too much for too little? Would they give in to the North Korean entreaties to loosen sanctions? A Stanford speech by Biegun in January appeared to the hawks to be a red flag: He suggested then that North Korea might not need to immediately hand over a complete declaration of nuclear assets, which American officials had demanded as a first step. But behind closed doors, Biegun and his team told the North Koreans that giving up the aging facilities at Yongbyon was not nearly enough for such extensive sanctions relief. At the same time, the North Korean negotiators were inconsistent about which of the facilities inside Yongbyon they were offering to dismantle — at one point saying that only Kim Jong-un could decide. The negotiating teams were still deadlocked even as Kim boarded a train for a two-day journey to Vietnam and Trump took off on Air Force One. The American team thought their North Korean counterparts would warn Kim that the demand to lift the five sanctions was a non-starter, so the two leaders would work on hashing something else out during the summit meeting. But soon after the two men arrived at the Metropole, the North Korean leader began arguing for relief from the five rounds of sanctions in exchange for Yongbyon. While North Korea had suspended operations at Yongbyon under agreements in 1994 and again in 2007, and later offered various moratoriums that were never fully executed, Kim’s proposal appeared to go further than ever toward dismantling the entirety of the complex, officials said. But the exact terms were still vague. Trump countered with the grand bargain. The divide was underscored by the fact that, at one point, he presented Kim with a document laying out his definition of denuclearization. Kim objected that there was not enough trust between the two countries to give up everything at once. At a rare news conference shortly after midnight, Ri argued that his country mostly needed “security guarantees” related to American military forces on the peninsula, and portrayed the sanctions-for-Yongbyon trade as a step to build trust. In the end, Trump flew back to Washington with nothing — no agreement on a peace declaration, and no ban on producing more nuclear fuel — meaning the North’s arsenal will keep expanding while the two sides argue. There were only promises to keep talking. (David E. Sanger, “Trump-Kim Talks Undone by Big Egos and Bad Bets,” New York Times, March 3, 2019, p. A-1) President Donald Trump gave North Korean leader Kim Jong-un “several alternatives” when they met to try to strike a deal on denuclearizing the regime, National Security Adviser John Bolton said today. On what the alternatives were, Bolton didn’t elaborate. “President Trump gave him several alternatives, what he called the big deal: North Korea gives up all of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and in exchange, there’s a very bright economic future for North Korea,” he said in a radio interview with the conservative Breitbart News. “In many respects — in Hanoi and even before that, in Singapore — what the president did was hold the door open for North Korea, to say, ‘You can have this future but you’ve got to give up your weapons of mass destruction,'” he said. “So far, the North Koreans haven’t walked through it.” Asked to explain what victory would look like for the U.S., Bolton reaffirmed that the main objective is a denuclearized North Korea. “And we gave them a definition. The president actually handed over a piece of paper, two pieces really, one in English and one in Korean to Kim Jong-un that describes our definition of denuclearization,” he said. “0nce that happens, the president, you know, he sees these things sort of in real estate terms. He says, ‘Look at North Korea’s position there between China, Russia, South Korea. It’s a great location. It could have a great economy.’” (Yonhap, “Bolton Says Trump Gave N. Korean Leader ‘Several’ Options,” March 21, 2019) On the day that their talks in Hanoi collapsed last month, President Donald Trump handed North Korean leader Kim Jong Un a piece of paper that included a blunt call for the transfer of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and bomb fuel to the United States. Trump gave Kim both Korean and English-language versions of the U.S. position at Hanoi’s Metropole hotel on February 28, according to a source familiar with the discussions. It was the first time that Trump himself had explicitly defined what he meant by denuclearization directly to Kim, the source said. Now seen by Reuters, the document’s existence was first mentioned by White House national security adviser John Bolton in television interviews he gave after the two-day summit. Bolton did not disclose in those interviews the pivotal U.S. expectation contained in the document that North Korea should transfer its nuclear weapons and fissile material to the United States. The document appeared to represent Bolton’s long-held and hardline “Libya model” of denuclearization that North Korea has rejected repeatedly. It probably would have been seen by Kim as insulting and provocative, analysts said. The document was meant to provide the North Koreans with a clear and concise definition of what the United States meant by “final, fully verifiable, denuclearization,” the source said. Aside from the call for the transfer of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and bomb fuel, the document had four other key points. It called on North Korea to provide a comprehensive declaration of its nuclear program and full access to U.S. and international inspectors, to halt all related activities and construction of any new facilities, to eliminate all nuclear infrastructure, and to transition all nuclear program scientists and technicians to commercial activities. (Lesley Wroughton and David Brunnstrom, “With a Piece of Paper, Trump called on Kim to Hand over All His Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons,” Reuters, Japan Times, March 30, 2019)
President Donald Trump reaffirmed his commitment to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through dialogue today, hours after his second summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ended without an agreement. In a telephone conversation with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, the U.S. president also asked Moon to “actively” help mediate future dialogue with the North Korean leader. “While expressing disappointment over the failure to reach an agreement in the summit, President Trump reaffirmed his determination to resolve the issue through dialogue with North Korea in the future,” Moon’s presidential office Cheong Wa Dae said of the phone conversation. His call to the South Korean president was made from his Air Force One plane en route to the United States. Cheong Wa Dae earlier expressed disappointment but said the US and North Korean leaders have already made more progress than ever. Trump asked Moon to help mediate future dialogue with the North. “In addition, (Trump) asked President Moon to actively perform the role of a mediator that may entail talking with Chairman Kim and letting him know the outcome of his dialogue,” the Cheong Wa Dae spokesman said in a press release. “President Trump suggested they work closely together so North Korea would actively implement its denuclearization commitment,” he added. (Yonhap, “Trump Reaffirms Commitment to Dialogue with N. Korea in Talks with Moon,” February 28, 2019)
Trump: “THE PRESIDENT: Well, thank you very much. I want to begin by thanking the Prime Minister and President of Vietnam. We’re in Hanoi. It’s an incredible city. What’s happened over the last 25 years has been incredible for the people of Vietnam, the job they’ve done — economic development. Really something special. So I want to thank all of the people of Vietnam for having treated us so well. … On North Korea, we just left Chairman Kim. We had a really, I think, a very productive time. We thought, and I thought, and Secretary Pompeo felt that it wasn’t a good thing to be signing anything. I’m going to let Mike speak about it. But we literally just left. We spent pretty much all day with Kim Jong Un, who is — he’s quite a guy and quite a character. And I think our relationship is very strong. But at this time — we had some options, and at this time we decided not to do any of the options. And we’ll see where that goes. But it was a very interesting two days. And I think, actually, it was a very productive two days. But sometimes you have to walk, and this was just one of those times. And I’ll let Mike speak to that for a couple of minutes, please. SECRETARY POMPEO: Thank you, Mr. President. We had been working, our teams — the team that I brought to bear, as well as the North Koreans — for weeks to try and develop a path forward so at the summit we could make a big step — a big step along the way towards what the two leaders had agreed to back in Singapore, in June of last year. We made real progress. And indeed we made even more progress when the two leaders met over the last 24, 36 hours. Unfortunately, we didn’t get all the way. We didn’t get to something that ultimately made sense for the United States of America. I think Chairman Kim was hopeful that we would. We asked him to do more. He was unprepared to do that. But I’m still optimistic. I’m hopeful that the teams will get back together in the days and weeks ahead, and continue to work out what’s a very complex problem. We have said, since the beginning, that this would take time. Our teams have gotten to know each other better. We know what the limits are. We know where some of the challenges are. And I think as we continue to work on this in the days and weeks ahead, we can make progress so that we can ultimately achieve what it is that the world wants, which is to denuclearize North Korea, to reduce risk for the American people and the people all around the world. I wish we could have gotten a little bit further, but I’m very optimistic that the progress that we made — both in the run-up to this summit, as well as the progress that the two leaders made over these past two days — put us in position to get a really good outcome. And the President and Chairman Kim both felt good that they had made that progress but couldn’t quite get along the line any further to make a deal that would have been bigger at this point. I hope we’ll do so in the weeks ahead. Thank you, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Q Mr. President — THE PRESIDENT: All right, Major, please. Q Has this process been more difficult than you thought? And was the North Korean demand for lifting of some sanctions the real sticking point here — THE PRESIDENT: Yeah. Q — in that you did not want to do that and they did? And will there be — THE PRESIDENT: It was about the sanctions. Q Will there be a third summit, Mr. President? THE PRESIDENT: Basically, they wanted the sanctions lifted in their entirety, and we couldn’t do that. They were willing to denuke a large portion of the areas that we wanted, but we couldn’t give up all of the sanctions for that. So we continue to work, and we’ll see. But we had to walk away from that particular suggestion. We had to walk away from that. Q Will all the sanctions that are currently in existence remain, sir? THE PRESIDENT: They’re in place. You know, I was watching as a lot of you folks over the weeks have said, “Oh, we’ve given up.” We haven’t given up anything. And frankly, I think we’ll end up being very good friends with Chairman Kim and with North Korea, and I think they have tremendous potential. I’ve been telling everybody: They have tremendous potential. Unbelievable potential. But we’re going to see. But it was about sanctions. I mean, they wanted sanctions lifted but they weren’t willing to do an area that we wanted. They were willing to give us areas but not the ones we wanted. John? Q As we know, I mean, there’s an incredibly complex set of issues that are at play here in terms of lifting the sanctions and what denuclearization is. THE PRESIDENT: Right. Q Did you get any distance toward sort of what Kim’s vision of denuclearization is? THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we did. We did. Q Because there is a lot — a line of thinking that he wants to keep some nukes. THE PRESIDENT: Yeah. Q I mean, would you allow him to do that? And if you can’t — THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don’t — John, I don’t want to comment — Q If you can’t get — THE PRESIDENT: Excuse me, I don’t want to comment on that exactly, but he has a certain vision and it’s not exactly our vision, but it’s a lot closer than it was a year ago. And I think, you know, eventually we’ll get there. But for this particular visit, we decided that we had to walk, and we’ll see what happens. Okay? Oh, look, we have a gentleman nobody has ever heard of. Sean Hannity — what are you doing here, Sean Hannity? Should we let him do a question? I don’t know. Yeah, John, go ahead. Q If I could just follow up. THE PRESIDENT: Yeah. Q So if he wants the sanctions completely off, and you want more on denuclearization, how can you bridge that gap between now and the next time you might sit down with him? THE PRESIDENT: With time. It’ll be bridged, I think, at a certain point. But there is a gap. We have to have sanctions. And he wants to denuke, but he wants to just do areas that are less important than the areas that we want. We know that — we know the country very well, believe it or not. We know every inch of that country. And we have to get what we have to get, because that’s a big — that’s a big give. Yeah, Sean. Please. Q I work in radio and TV. The mic is on. Mr. President, thank you. Mr. Secretary, good to see you. Mr. President, if you could elaborate a little bit more. We have some history. President Reagan walked away in Reykjavik. A lot of condemnation at the time. And it ended up working out very well in the end for the United States. Was this mostly your decision? Or — and what message would you want to send Chairman Kim, as he’s listening to this press conference, about the future and your relationship? THE PRESIDENT: Well, Sean, I don’t want to say it was my decision, because what purpose is that? I want to keep the relationship, and we will keep the relationship. We’ll see what happens over the next period of time. But, as you know, we got our hostages back. There’s no more testing. And one of the things, importantly, that Chairman Kim promised me last night is, regardless, he’s not going to do testing of rockets and nuclear. Not going to do testing. So, you know, I trust him, and I take him at his word. I hope that’s true. But, in the meantime, we’ll be talking. Mike will be speaking with his people. He’s also developed a very good relationship with the people — really, the people representing North Korea. I haven’t spoken to Prime Minister Abe yet. I haven’t spoken to President Moon of South Korea. But we will, and we’ll tell them it’s a process and it’s moving along. But we just felt it wasn’t appropriate to sign an agreement today. We could have. I just felt it wasn’t very appropriate. Yeah, Jonathan. Q Thank you, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Q Two questions, if I may. First, did you learn anything new about Chairman Kim, through this meeting? And secondly, of course, while this was going on, the drama back in Washington, your former lawyer, Michael Cohen — who worked for you for 10 years; his office right next to yours, right by yours at Trump Tower — he called you a liar, a conman, a racist. What’s your response to Michael Cohen? THE PRESIDENT: Well, it’s incorrect. And, you know, it’s very interesting, because I tried to watch as much as I could. I wasn’t able to watch too much because I’ve been a little bit busy. But I think having a fake hearing like that, and having it in the middle of this very important summit is really a terrible thing. They could’ve made it two days later or next week, and it would’ve been even better. They would’ve had more time. But having it during this very important summit is sort of incredible. And he lied a lot, but it was very interesting because he didn’t lie about one thing. He said no collusion with the Russian hoax. And I said, “I wonder why he didn’t just lie about that, too, like he did about everything else?” I mean, he lied about so many different things, and I was actually impressed that he didn’t say, “Well, I think there was collusion for this reason or that.” He didn’t say that. He said, “No collusion.” And I was, you know, a little impressed by that, frankly. Could’ve — he could’ve gone all out. He only went about 95 percent instead of 100 percent. But the fact is, there is no collusion. And I call it the “witch hunt.” This should never happen to another President. This is so bad for our country. So bad. You look at this whole hoax — I call it the Russian witch hunt. I now add the word “hoax.” It’s a very, very bad thing for our country. But I was impressed with the fact that he — when — you know, because the most important question up there was the one on collusion. And he said he saw no collusion. So we’ll see what happens. But it was pretty shameful, I think. Yes, ma’am. Please. … Q Thank you, President Trump. Jane Tung (ph) from (inaudible) Television. What was the atmosphere like when you walked away from the negotiation table? And — THE PRESIDENT: I think it was very good, very friendly. This wasn’t a walk away, like you get up and walk out. No, this was very friendly. We shook hands. You know, there’s a warmth that we have, and I hope that stays. I think it will. But we are — you know, we’re positioned to do something very special. This has been going on for many decades. This isn’t me. You know, this was — this should’ve been solved during many presidential runs. And, you know, people talked about it; they never did anything. I get a kick out of so many people from past administrations telling me how to negotiate when they were there, in some cases, for eight years; they did nothing. But I think the relationship was very warm, and when we walked away it was a very friendly walk. Mike, you might want to speak to that for a second. SECRETARY POMPEO: No, I agree. I talked with my counterparts as well. But we hope we can do more, but everyone is very focused on how we continue to build on this. We are certainly closer today than we were 36 hours ago. And we were closer then than we were a month or two before that. So real progress was made. I think everyone had hoped we could do it just a little bit better. But the departure was with an agreement that we would continue to work on what has been an incredibly difficult problem. Both sides are resolved to achieve it, and everyone walked away in that spirit. Q And may I add: You and Chairman Kim are from very different political systems. You are from different generations. And what do you find — THE PRESIDENT: It’s a very different system. I would say that’s true. Q How do you find, you guys, in common? Because we saw the atmosphere — THE PRESIDENT: We just like each other. I mean, we have a good relationship. Yeah. It’s a totally different system, to put it mildly. But we like each other. A good relationship. Go ahead. In the back. Go ahead. Q Mr. President, do you think it was premature to have held the summit when all these things had not been tied down? I mean, in the White House schedule last night, it said signing agreement today. And I wonder whether — as a follow-up question, whether you could sketch out what the next few months look like. Thank you. THE PRESIDENT: You always have to be prepared to walk. I could’ve signed an agreement today, and then you people would’ve said, “Oh, what a terrible deal. What a terrible thing he did.” No, you have to be prepared to walk. And, you know, there was a potential we could’ve signed something today. I could’ve 100 percent signed something today. We actually had papers ready to be signed, but it just wasn’t appropriate. I want to do it right. I’d much rather do it right than do it fast. Yes, please. Go ahead. Go ahead. Go. First. Go. Yeah. Q (Inaudible.) THE PRESIDENT: You have to speak up. Q I’m a reporter from South Korea, and I appreciate your effort to advance denuclearization in Korean Peninsula. And could you elaborate on the options and the various ways that you discussed with Chairman Kim to advance denuclearization? Could you specify? THE PRESIDENT: We discussed many ways. And the denuclearization is a very important — it’s a very important word. Become a very well used word. And a lot of people don’t know what it means, but to me it’s pretty obvious: We have to get rid of the nukes. I think he’s got a chance to have one of the most successful countries — rapidly, too — on Earth. Incredible country, incredible location. You’re right between — if you think of it, you have, on one side, Russia and China, and on the other you have South Korea, and you’re surrounded by water and among the most beautiful shorelines in the world. There is tremendous potential in North Korea, and I think he’s going to lead it to a very important thing, economically. I think it’s going to be an absolute economic power. Yes. Go ahead. Please. Go ahead. Yeah. Q Mr. President, David Sanger from the New York Times. THE PRESIDENT: I know, David. Q Six months ago, when you spoke — or eight months ago, in Singapore, you said, if you didn’t have something in six months, we should come back and ask you about it. In that time, you have seen Chairman Kim increase the number of missiles he’s produced and continue to produce more nuclear material. And that’s been a pressure point on you, because he’s showing you the arsenals getting larger while this is going on. THE PRESIDENT: Well, some people, David, are saying that, and some people are denying that. They have shots from above — way above — and some people are saying that and some people aren’t. But I could’ve taken that out today, but I think you and others would’ve said we didn’t get enough for what we’d be giving up. So — and, you know, don’t forget, we’re partners with a lot of countries on this, if you think about it, with the sanctions. We have a whole big partnership with the United Nations and many countries, including Russia, China, and others. And then, of course, South Korea is very important to this whole thing, and Japan. I don’t want to do something that is going to violate the trust that we’ve built up. We have a very strong partnership. Q So can you just give us a little more detail? Did you get into the question of actually dismantling the Yongbyon complex? THE PRESIDENT: I did. Yes. Absolutely. Q And does he seem willing, ultimately — THE PRESIDENT: Totally. Q — to take all of that out? THE PRESIDENT: Sure. Totally. Q He does? He just wants all the sanctions off first? THE PRESIDENT: He would do that, but he wants the sanctions for that. And as you know, there’s plenty left after that. And I just I felt it wasn’t good. Mike and I spent a long time negotiating and talking about it to ourselves. And just — I felt that that particular, as you know, that facility, while very big, it wasn’t enough to do what we were doing. Q So he was willing to Yongbyon, but you wanted more than that? I assume — THE PRESIDENT: We had to have more than that, yeah. We had to have more than that because there are other things that you haven’t talked about, that you haven’t written about, that we found. And we have to have — that was done a long time ago, but the people didn’t know about. Q Including the uranium — THE PRESIDENT: And we brought — yeah. Q Including the second uranium enrichment plant? THE PRESIDENT: Exactly. And we brought many, many points up that I think they were surprised that we knew. But we had to do more than just the one level. Because if we did the one level, and we gave up all of that leverage that’s been taking a long time to build. And I want to tell you, by the way — Q So he was not willing to take out that second — THE PRESIDENT: David, I want to take off the sanctions so badly, because I want that country to grow. That country has got such potential, but they have to give up, or we could’ve done that deal. Mike, you want to speak to that? SECRETARY POMPEO: Only, David, there are also timing and sequencing issues that were associated with that as well, which we didn’t quite get across the finish line as well. But remember, too, even that facility, even the Yongbyon facility and all of its scope — which is important, for sure — still leaves missiles, still leaves warheads and weapons systems. So there’s a lot of other elements that we just couldn’t get to. Q And the listing of all of them. SECRETARY POMPEO: Yes, sir. And a declaration. So, all of those things, we couldn’t quite get there today. THE PRESIDENT: That’s right. Go ahead. Q Thank you, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Q I just wanted to clarify, when you talk about what you would willing to give up all of the sanctions for, are you still thinking that you want North Korea to give up everything to do complete, verifiable denuclearization — THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don’t want to say that to you — Q — before you lift sanctions? THE PRESIDENT: Yeah. Yeah. It’s a good question. I don’t want to say that to you because I don’t want to put myself in that position, from the standpoint of negotiation. But, you know, we want a lot to be given up. And we’re giving up. And we’ll have to — you know, we’ll be helping them along economically, us and other — many other countries are going to be helping. They’re going to be in there. They’re prepared to help. I can tell you: Japan, South Korea, I think China. So many. And speaking of China, we’re very well on our way to doing something special, but we’ll see. I mean, I am always prepared to walk. I’m never afraid to walk from a deal. And I would do that with China, too, if it didn’t work out. Q Are you concerned, if you’re not able to reach an agreement, that the testing will start again? Or that while all of this time is happening by — THE PRESIDENT: Well, he said the testing — yeah. Q — they are continuing to develop their program? THE PRESIDENT: He said the testing will not start. He said that he’s not going to do testing of rockets or missiles or anything having to do with nuclear. And all I can tell you is that’s what he said. And we’ll see. Yes, go ahead. Please. Go ahead, please. In the back. Red. In the red. Q Thank you. Thank you, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you. Q Jessica Stone from CGTN. I have a question about China, as you were talking about. You talk about China being willing, potentially, to help economically. And the fact that you’ve talked — or will talk to Presidents Moon and Prime Minister Abe, how would you describe China’s role in facilitating the engagement that’s happened, so far, between Pyongyang and Washington? THE PRESIDENT: I think China has been a big help. Bigger than most people know. On the border, as you know, 93 percent of the goods coming into North Korea come through China. So there’s a great power there. At the same time, I believe — I happen to believe that North Korea is calling its own shots. They’re not taking orders from anybody. He’s a very strong guy. And they’re able to do things that are pretty amazing. But 93 percent still come in from China. China has an influence, and China has been a big help. And Russia has been a big help too. As you know, there’s a pretty small part of the border, but nevertheless significant — about 28 miles. And things can happen there too. And they’ve been a help. Yes, go ahead, please. Q Thanks, President. Jen Chen with Shenzhen Media Group of China. In your meeting with Chairman Kim this morning and yesterday, did the topic of China come up? If so, what can you share with us today? And you probably will have the (inaudible) of Mar-a-Lago summit in March with Chinese President Xi Jinping. What would you like accomplished with your agenda regarding China at that time? Thank you. THE PRESIDENT: We did talk about China today a lot. And he’s getting along with China and so are we. And we are — you know, we’re — we’re, right now, you look at what’s happened to our country; we’ve picked up trillions and trillions of dollars of net worth. Our stock market is almost at its all-time high. Our economy is incredible. Our unemployment numbers are among the best we’ve ever had in our history. Individual groups like African American, women — you just take a look at any group; Hispanic, you saw that just came out — the best in history; African American, best in history. So many different numbers are coming out so good. So we have the strongest economy, probably, possibly that we’ve ever had. Fiat Chrysler just announced that they’re going to spend $4.5 billion right next to Detroit, in Michigan. They’re building a tremendous plant. It’s actually an expansion of another plant. It’s going to be — it’s going to double up their jobs, and even more than that. A lot of great things are happening. And with China, they’re having some difficulty, as you know. But I think that a lot of the difficulty is because of the tariffs that they’re having. And in addition to that, we’re putting a tremendous amount of money; you saw trade deficits went down last month. Everybody was trying to find out why. Well, we’re taking in a lot of tariff money, and it’s going right to the bottom line and it has reduced the trade deficits. So we’ll see what happens with China. I think we have a very good chance. Their numbers are down. But I don’t want that. I want their numbers — I want them to do great. But we’ve been losing anywhere from $300- to $500 billion a year with China for many, many years. And again, like other things, many Presidents should have done this before me, and nobody did. So we’re doing it. Go ahead. Go ahead, please. Right here. This gentleman. Q Chad O’Carroll from NK News, (inaudible) with North Korea News. What’s your message for President Moon, who has effectively reached the glass ceiling, as far inter-Korean cooperation is concerned, due to sanctions? And what’s next for U.S.-ROK military drills? THE PRESIDENT: Well, I like President Moon very much. We have a great relationship. Believe it or not, I have a great relationship with almost every leader. A lot of people find that hard to understand, but I do. But some take advantage of our country like you wouldn’t believe. And when they know I know it — which I know in every case — maybe it sort of freezes them up a little bit. But we do; we have a lot of good relationships. We’ll be calling President Moon very soon, as soon as I get by the phone, on the plane. And he’ll be one of the first calls. I’ll be calling Prime Minister Abe of Japan, telling him about where we are and what we’re doing. But I’ll be making those calls. No, he’s working very hard. President Moon is working very hard. He’d love to see a deal and he’s been very helpful. Okay? Thank you. Go ahead, please. Q Thank you, Mr. President. I’m (inaudible), reporter from Global Times China. I would like to ask you, what are you expecting China to do in the next step to mediate your relationship with North Korea? Thank you. THE PRESIDENT: To use China? Q Yeah, from China. THE PRESIDENT: Well, we do. I mean, China has been very helpful. President Xi is a great leader. He’s a highly respected leader all over the world and especially in Asia. And he’s helped us — Mike, I would say he’s helped us a lot, right? SECRETARY POMPEO: He has. THE PRESIDENT: We’ve — I actually called him just recently to say, “Hey, you know, whatever you can do on this.” But he has been very helpful at the border, and he’s been very, very helpful with, I think, North Korea generally. Could he be a little more helpful? Probably. But he’s been excellent. Go ahead, please. No — yeah, please. Q (Laughs.) (Inaudible) next. THE PRESIDENT: That’s okay. You’re friends. Q Thanks, Mr. President. Could you — did you commit with Chairman Kim to a next summit during your term? THE PRESIDENT: No, we haven’t — no. Q Okay. THE PRESIDENT: We’ll see. If it happens, it happens. I have not committed. Q They are, at this point, some would say, a nuclear power. Do you accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, at least for the time being? And are you thinking about re-imposing the military exercises with South Korea, or will you keep it a freeze-for-freeze? THE PRESIDENT: Well, you know, the military exercises, I gave that up quite a while ago because it costs us $100 million every time we do it. We fly these massive bombers in from Guam. And when I first started, a certain general said, “Oh, yes, sir, we fly them in from Guam. It’s right next door.” Well, right next door is seven hours away. And then they come and they drop millions of dollars of bombs, and then they go back and — But we would spend — I mean, we spent hundreds of millions of dollars on those exercises, and I hated to see it. I thought it was unfair. And, frankly, I was, sort of, of the opinion that South Korea should help us with that. You know, we’re protecting South Korea. I think they should help us with that. So those exercises are very expensive. And I was telling the generals — I said: Look, you know, exercising is fun and it’s nice and they play the war games. And I’m not saying it’s not necessary, because at some levels it is, but at other levels it’s not. But it’s a very, very expensive thing. And you know, we do have to think about that too. But when they spend hundreds of millions of dollars on those exercises and we don’t get reimbursed — we’re spending a tremendous amount of money on many countries, protecting countries that are very rich that can certainly afford to pay us and then some. And those countries — by the way, and those countries know that it’s not right, but nobody has ever asked them before. But I’ve asked them and we’re doing — we’re gaining a lot of money. We’ve picked up over a $100 billion just in NATO over the last two years. A hundred billion dollars more has come in. And we’re doing that with a lot of countries. You’ll be seeing that a lot. Yes, sir. Please. Q Mr. President, sir — THE PRESIDENT: Yeah, one second, please. Q Yes, thank you, Mr. President. You have a personal relationship — and I believe Vice President Pence does — with the family of Otto Warmbier. THE PRESIDENT: I do. Q I’m wondering — you’ve talked about, this week, about Kim Jong Un being “my friend” — you called him on Twitter. You said you have a great relationship. Have you, in Singapore or here, confronted Kim Jong Un about Otto Warmbier’s death — THE PRESIDENT: I have. I have. Q — and asked him to take responsibility? And what did he say to you? And why do you call him your friend? THE PRESIDENT: I have. And I have, and we have talked about it. And I really don’t think it was in his interest at all. I know the Warmbier family very well. I think they’re an incredible family. What happened is horrible. I really believe something very bad happened to him, and I don’t think that the top leadership knew about it. And when they had to send him home — by the way, I got the prisoners back. I got the hostages back. And Otto was one of the hostages, but Otto came back in shape that was not even to be talked about. I find it — I thought it was horrible. Now, the others came back extremely healthy. But Otto came back in a condition that was just — just terrible. And I will — I did speak about it, and I don’t believe that he would’ve allowed that to happen. Just wasn’t to his advantage to allow that to happen. Those prisons are rough. They’re rough places. And bad things happened. But I really don’t believe that he was — I don’t believe he knew about it. Q Did he say — did he tell you that he did not — did Kim Jong Un tell you — THE PRESIDENT: He felt badly about it. I did speak to him. He felt very badly. But he knew the case very well, but he knew it later. And, you know, you got a lot of people. A big country. A lot of people. And in those prisons and those camps, you have a lot of people. And some really bad things happened to Otto. Some really, really bad things. But he tells me — Q Why are you (inaudible) THE PRESIDENT: He tells me that he didn’t know about it, and I will take him at his word. Yes, ma’am. Go ahead. Please. Please. Go ahead. In the back. Q Me? THE PRESIDENT: No, in the back. Behind you. Thank you. Q Mr. President, (inaudible), Sputnik News Agency. Have you discussed the issue of possible inspections to North Korea’s nuclear sites during your negotiations? THE PRESIDENT: You’re going to have to speak a little louder. And where are you from? Where are you from? Q Russia’s Sputnik News Agency. Have you discussed the issue of possible inspections to North Korea’s nuclear sites during your talks with the Chairman? THE PRESIDENT: Why don’t you answer that, Mike? I can’t — Q Inspections. THE PRESIDENT: Good. Q Inspections. Inspections of nuclear sites. THE PRESIDENT: I was worried about my hearing. Q Inspections, sir. THE PRESIDENT: Oh, inspections. Q International inspections. Yes. THE PRESIDENT: Oh, inspections. Inspections on North Korea? Oh, we’d be able — yeah. Q Yeah. Inspections to the nuclear sites. THE PRESIDENT: We’d be able to do that very easily. We have that set up, so we would be able to do that very easily. The inspections on North Korea will take place and we’ll — if we do something with them — we have a schedule set up that is very good. We know things that, as David was asking about certain places and certain sites — there are sites that people don’t know about that we know about. We would be able to do inspections, we think, very, very successfully. … THE PRESIDENT: Yeah, go ahead. Please. Sir. Q Mr. President, I’m from China. My question is: Do you still believe it is possible that the North Korea and U.S. relation could be like the U.S. and the Vietnam relation in the future? THE PRESIDENT: You have to go again. Q Do you believe — do you still believe that is it is possible that the relation between U.S. and North Korea, in the future, could be like the relation between U.S. and Vietnam? THE PRESIDENT: Yeah. I think we’re going have — yeah. I mean, we have very, very good relations. And, by the way, speaking of — you mentioned Japan — we have a lot of good things happening Japan. We have trade talks started. For years, Japan has been sending millions and millions of cars in, and as you know, it’s not been a very fair situation for the United States. We’re starting trade talks with Japan. They actually started about three months ago, and I think we’ll have a very good deal for the United States. But that’s been a very unfair situation. Prime Minister Abe understands that, and that’s fine. Yes, sir. Please. Back there. Q Thank you, Mr. President. I’m (inaudible) with Shanghai Media Group. Do you think the next meeting could be soon, or might take some time? THE PRESIDENT: Well, I can’t tell you. I mean, it might be soon. It might not be for a long time. I can’t tell you. I would hope it would be soon. But it may not be for a long time. I could’ve done — I could’ve done a deal today, but it would’ve been a deal that wouldn’t have been a deal that — it would’ve been something that I wouldn’t have been happy about, Mike would not have been happy about. We had some pretty big options. But we just felt it wasn’t appropriate, and we really want to do it right. Yes, in the back. In the back. Yes, ma’am. Please. Q Debi Edward, ITV News. At which point did it become clear to you that you wouldn’t be getting a deal here in Hanoi? The language from yourself and Kim Jong Un was very positive last night and even this morning. And therefore, was it a mistake to come here? THE PRESIDENT: No, I think the language was good all throughout. The language has been good even now. But, you know, I don’t go by language, because we had probably the toughest language in the history of diplomacy — if you call it diplomacy — at the beginning, and yet, we became very friendly. I don’t believe there was any tougher language ever than that. But, again, this was something that should’ve been handled by other Presidents long before me and long before they had the kind of power that they have. But it wasn’t. It should’ve been done by many — I’m not just blaming the Obama administration, which, by the way, it did nothing. Nothing. Did absolutely on North Korea. It allowed things that happened, and to happen, that were very inappropriate. But I’m not blaming the Obama administration. I’m blaming many administrations. Something should’ve happened. But I don’t think the rhetoric has been bad at all. Initially, it was horrible, but now it’s been very good. All right, one more. How about you? Go ahead. Please. Please. Go ahead. Q (Inaudible) from South Korea, (inaudible) South Korean media outlet here. I’d like to ask you: You said that we do not particularly know when there will be — North Korean leader will be willing to come to the table and take the actions that’s been required. If that’s the case, would the U.S. be willing to strengthen the sanctions and perhaps put the pressure on North Korea to move forward? THE PRESIDENT: I don’t want to comment on that. I can just tell you this: that we have very strong sanctions. I don’t want to talk about increasing sanctions. They’re strong. They have a lot of great people in North Korea that have to live also. And that’s important to me. And I would say this: My whole attitude changed a lot because I got to know, as you know, Chairman Kim very well. And they have a point of view also. So I don’t really want to talk about that. I just think that, hopefully, for the sake of South Korea, for the sake of Japan, and frankly, for the sake of China — I was talking to President Xi, who really is a man that gets the respect of a lot of people — I say, “You can’t love having a nuclear state right next to China.” And he doesn’t. He really doesn’t. I will tell you, he would like to see that problem solved, too. So that’s it. Well, ladies and gentleman, I’m about to get on a plane and fly back to a wonderful place called Washington, D.C. So, thank you very much.” (White House Press Office, Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, JW Marriott Hotel Hanoi, February 28, 2019)
Pompeo: “So the President gave a pretty good description of the summit, how it ended, the progress that we made, and progress we didn’t make. … Q: Sir, I have two questions, just related — POMPEO: Yes, sir. Q: One, what gave you, the White House, the administration, the confidence to announce on Wednesday night that there would be a joint agreement signed on Thursday afternoon? Did you think you would reach an agreement? And what does this summit show about the pluses and minuses of trying to resolve fundamental issues at the leader level instead of trying to clear away the brushwork in advance of the meeting? POMPEO: Yeah, we — we’re coming at it from both ways, right, saw it on both ends of the train. We cleared away a lot of brush over the past, apparently, 60, 90 days at the working level, then we were hoping we could take another big swing when the two leaders got together. I think we did. We made some progress, but we didn’t get as far as we would have hoped to have gotten. And when you’re dealing with a country that is the nature of North Korea, it is often the case that the most senior leaders have the capacity to make those important decisions. We got some of them on this trip, but you don’t know which ones you’re actually going to get until the two leaders actually have a chance to get together. So there was a lot of preparatory work. We were prepared for the potentiality of this outcome as well, and tomorrow we’ll get right back at it. Q: But going back to what happened overnight, because you guys did announce that there was going to be a signing ceremony, so — POMPEO: Yeah, you all shouldn’t get hung up on things like that. You all — a lot of process. I watched predictions overnight from the media, people who acted like they knew what was going on. You should go back and look. And if any of you did that and said things that turned out to be wrong — I saw an NBC report that said oh, we’d given up on a declaration — you should all go back and correct your reporting. That’d be really important. I think that’d give you a lot more credibility to the world than going out and saying silly things that you know nothing about and speculating. … No, but I’m just — this is important because I saw some of it. I read some of it. It was radically uninformed and now I think can be proven incorrect, and so you ought to go fix it. And so we were continuing to work. We worked through the night. We were very hopeful we’d make enough progress that it would justify a signing statement at the ultimate concluding, and we didn’t. The President made that decision. Q: But Secretary, to be clear, that was the White House public schedule. That wasn’t — POMPEO: Yeah. No, it’s a schedule. Yeah, we were scheduled to leave seven minutes earlier than we did too. Yeah. The world has a way of having an impact. And so, but we were hopeful even this morning. We all went back and tried to shore up our vessels and see if we couldn’t get a little further, and we actually did. But still, look, it’s a long ways. We’ve known it was a long ways. There’s still a lot of work to do. … Q: Thank you so much for coming back. How did you leave it with Kim Jong-un, Kim Yong-chol, in terms of when the next working-level meeting will occur? Days from now or — POMPEO: Yeah, we haven’t set a date. We haven’t set a date. Q: What’s your sense? POMPEO: My sense is it’ll take a little while. We’ll each need to regroup a little bit. But we’re hopeful that Special Representative Biegun and that team will get together before too long. But we’ll see. Look, there has to be a reason for the conversations. There has to be a theory of the case about how to move forward. I’m confident that there is one. I’ve seen enough congruence between what the two sides are trying to accomplish. I saw the goodwill between the two leaders. So I hope we can come up with that. Chairman Kim reiterated on his trip he is fully prepared to denuclearize. He recommitted that they will not conduct missile tests, that he will not conduct nuclear tests. Those are good things. Those remain as a pillar, as a foundation. You heard the President say that he is committed still not to conduct the major exercises. So there’s still a basis for believing that we can move forward to solve what’s been now a problem going on for an awfully long time. Q: Do you think the pressure on him back on Pyongyang might be just too great for him to move at the speed that we have the patience for? POMPEO: I try to do less psychoanalysis — Q: I’m talking about internal political pressure from military elites who don’t want to give up nuclear weapons. POMPEO: Yeah. I just — I know what they’ve told us. I know the things we’re working on. I know the things where they’ve said, hey, this is really important to them, their priority set. I think we do understand that better than we did even just a few weeks ago, so I think I know where there’s real room today. But as time goes on, the economic sanctions remain in place. This has been the President’s policy since the beginning. You’ve heard him reiterate maintaining those sanctions. And I think — so as time goes on, I think we’ll continue to see that we can make some progress. Q: Were there last-minute changes to what they were willing to commit to? I mean, I know that you said you couldn’t quite get them where you wanted to be. POMPEO: No. It’s been a steady stream of progress towards getting to where we want to be. We just didn’t get far enough. Q: So that — the demand that Kim gave to you about full sanctions relief in exchange for Yongbyon, was that something that they had made clear throughout the process but you felt that this was the summit where you could — the President could come in and crack that, or was that something that they sprung on you at the last minute and it was a surprise? POMPEO: Yeah, I don’t want to get into the details. I’ve always not talked about the details or the ins and outs of the negotiations. There have been lots of ideas proffered over the course of the last months, some by us, some by them, what might be a reasonable — set a path forward, right, a roadmap for what might be forward. And I will say we haven’t been surprised by much of anything. The team did really good work. Q: But did you feel that there — I mean, obviously, you didn’t — that there was a lot of speculation beforehand? This gets to your earlier point about the possibility of liaison offices, a peace declaration. … Did you feel that there was — why did you feel there wasn’t room to sort of pin down those, a possible agreement there, and call the whole thing off? POMPEO: I don’t understand your question. Q: But why not make — come to an agreement on those other issues, perhaps as a sort of basis for future discussions, rather than call the whole thing off? POMPEO: Yeah. You should not assume that we didn’t come to agreement on a whole number of issues. But we’ll all go back and continue to work on that. There have been lots of things that we’ve moved forward on, and I think we have a set of shared common understandings. But look, the big issue here, right, is achieving the denuclearization. That’s the objective of the conversations and in turn to provide peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and a brighter future for the North Korean people. On those things there’s still a lot of work. … Q: Yes. My question is when you were CIA director you talked about — POMPEO: Oh, now you’re testing my memory. Okay. (Laughter.) Q: Well, you famously said the threat was just a handful of months away. And now we’re more than — POMPEO: That’s not what I said, actually. Q: What did you say? Months away … . POMPEO: I didn’t say the threat was months away. Q: Well, now it’s been more than a year. Is the position that the testing means that it was frozen? POMPEO: I don’t understand your question. Q: Has the threat receded? When you were saying that it was just months away — POMPEO: The reason we’re having these conversations is because we’re concerned about the threat to the world. It’s the reason the UN Security Council placed the sanctions that are in place, right. The whole world voted for these sanctions there because of the risk, the concern that the North Koreans will act in a way that presents real risk to the world. That’s the reason we’re after this. It’s the reason we continue on this project. … Q: Can I just ask a clarifying question? POMPEO: Sure. Q: So you cited the reporting being incorrect about not asking for the full list of their nuclear program. POMPEO: Yeah. QUESTION: So did you, in fact, ask for that? SECRETARY POMPEO: We’ve been working on that since almost a year ago, when I made my first trip, when I was in a different role. Yeah. Q: But it was a formal ask? POMPEO: I don’t know what “formal” means. What does “formal” mean to you? Q: You ask Kim Jong-un can you — can we have a full accounting of your nuclear program. POMPEO: Yes. And that is not a new request from us. But it’s important to have that kind of understanding. You can’t figure out when you’re done until you know what complete looks like. So yes, we’ve had this conversation now for an extended period of time. Q: You repeated that request at this summit? POMPEO: Yes. Yes, I’ll repeat it again. Yes, we repeated it at this summit as well. So if you’ll get NBC to take that story down, that’d be useful. Q: Not our story. POMPEO: Yeah, it’d be good.” (Secretary of State Remarks Michael R. Pompeo, Remarks with the Traveling Press, ERT Manila, Philippines, February 28, 2019)
Ri Yong Ho: “The heads of states of North Korea and United States carried out a sincere meeting this time with magnificent patience and self-restraint for two days. In accordance with the new constitution of faith and principle of phased resolution that were established under a joint recognition during the first North Korea-US summit meeting and talks held last June in Singapore, we presented a realistic proposal at this talks. And that is, if the United States lifts a part of the United Nations [UN] sanctions, in other words, the provision of sanctions that impact the civilian economy and people’s living standards, then we will permanently, completely dismantle entire nuclear materials production facilities of Yongbyon area, including plutonium and uranium, through a joint work of technicians from both countries in the presence of US experts. What we proposed was not the complete lifting of sanctions, but their partial lifting. In particular, out of the 11 UN sanctions resolutions all together, we proposed the lifting of the five groups first from those that were adopted from 2016 to 2017, especially the articles that impede the civilian economy and the people’s livelihood among them. Given the current level of trust between the two countries of [North] Korea and the United States, this is the biggest stride of denuclearization measure that we can take at the present stage. Even though the security guarantee is originally a more important issue in implementing denuclearization measures, we understood that it could be more difficult for the United States to take measures in the military field yet; so we proposed the partial lifting of sanctions as corresponding measures. During the meeting, we expressed our intent to make a commitment on a permanent suspension of nuclear testing and long-range rocket launch tests in writing in order to lower the concerns of the United States. If we go through this level of trust building measure, then we will be able to accelerate the process of denuclearization.
However, during the talks, the United States held out for a claim until the end that one more thing, other than the measure for dismantlement of the nuclear facilities of the Yongbyon area, needs to be done and thus, it became clear that the United States is not prepared to accommodate our offer. At this stage, it is hard to say here whether a better agreement, than what we have offered, could be reached. It may be difficult even to encounter this kind of opportunity again. For a journey toward complete denuclearization, this first step in the process is certainly unavoidable and a process of realizing the maximum measure, which we have put out, will certainly need to be gone through. Our principled position, as stated, will not change in the slightest and even at times when the United States brings up a negotiation again in the future, there will be no change in our measure.” (DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho, Press Conference, Hanoi, February 28, 2019, Yonhap transcript)
President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un abruptly cut short their two-day summit today, with talks collapsing amid differing accounts of why both leaders walked away without an agreement or a clear plan on how to keep the dialogue alive. The fundamental disagreements rested on the trade-offs between sanctions relief by the United States and North Korea’s steps to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Trump said the main impediment to a deal was Kim’s requirement that the United States lift all economic sanctions on North Korea in exchange for the closure of only one nuclear facility, which still would have left Pyongyang with a large arsenal of missiles and warheads. Hours later, North Korea’s foreign minister, Ri Yong Ho, offered a slightly different take at a rare news conference, arguing that Kim’s regime sought only “partial” sanctions relief in return for dismantling the North’s main enrichment capabilities for fissile material. In a separate news conference, North Korea’s vice foreign minister, Choe Son Hui, suggested Kim had “lost the will to engage in deal-making” as the talks unraveled. The United States, she said, was missing a “once in a lifetime opportunity,” and said no future meetings between the two sides were planned. At a news conference before he left Vietnam to return to Washington, Trump said he and Kim parted ways on positive terms. But Choe, North Korea’s vice foreign minister, was less optimistic. “The impression I got observing this summit from the side, was that our chairman seems to have difficulty understanding the U.S. way of reckoning,” she said. “I felt that our chairman has lost the will to engage in deal-making, with the U.S. saying that even a partial lifting of sanctions for the civilian economy is hard.” The United States says U.N. sanctions cannot be unwound until North Korea fully denuclearizes. But it had left open the door to some marginal relief of unilateral U.S. sanctions if North Korea took steps in the right direction. North Korea’s foreign minister said the North had sought an end to “sanctions that hamper the civilian economy, and the livelihood of all people in particular,” citing five out of 11 sanctions packages imposed by the United Nations Security Council. While not total sanctions relief, that would have amounted to a very significant easing of the pressure on North Korea. Ri Yong Ho later confirmed that the North would be willing to “permanently dismantle all the nuclear material production facilities” at the main Yongbyon nuclear site, and would allow U.S. nuclear experts to observe. But he did not mention uranium enrichment facilities at other sites, leaving serious doubts about the North’s sincerity in the talks. “It is difficult to say whether there might be a better agreement than the one based on our proposal at current stage,” said Ri. “Our principal stance will remain invariable and our proposal will never be changed even though U.S. proposes negotiation again in the future.”(Philip Rucker, Simon Denyer and David Nakamura, “North Korea’s Foreign Minister Seeks Only Partial Sanctions Relief, Contradicting Trump,” Washington Post, February 28, 2019) Ri added that, specifically, North Korea asked “to lift five of the sanctions imposed between 2016 and 2017,” out of a total 11 UN Security Council sanctions. (Sarah Kim, “North Denies Trump’s Take on Summit Failure,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 2, 2019)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un made a failed last-ditch attempt to stop President Donald Trump from walking away from their meeting in Vietnam without reaching a deal on the easing of sanctions, CNN reported March 6. With Trump preparing to leave a Hanoi hotel last Thursday after cutting short the two-day summit, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui rushed over to the U.S. delegation with a message from Kim, CNN said, citing two senior administration officials and another source. The message offered a deal on “some” sanctions relief in exchange for dismantling North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear complex. U.S. and North Korean officials had been haggling over a shared definition of the sprawling, three-square-mile site, and the last-minute overture sought to advance Pyongyang’s proposal for dismantling it, according to CNN. But Kim’s message did not make clear that Pyongyang shared Washington’s expansive definition of Yongbyon, and U.S. officials asked for clarity. Choe rushed back to get an answer and Kim replied that it included everything on the site, CNN said. But the U.S. delegation was unimpressed and did not want to resume the negotiations, a development that led to the cancellation of a planned working lunch and joint agreement-signing ceremony. (Kyodo, “N. Korea’s Kim Made Failed Bid to Stop Trump from Leaving Summit: CNN,” March 6, 2019)
Bolton: “Having stayed up well into the night watching Cohen testify, Trump canceled the preparatory briefings. I worried that his every instinct would be to do something to drown out Cohen’s hearings in the media, which he could only do with something dramatic and unexpected. Walking out would certainly achieve that objective. So too, however, would making a deal he could characterize as a huge success, even if it was badly flawed. The flaws wouldn’t catch up until later. Trump had Mulvaney, Pompeo, and me ride with him to the Metropole hotel in the Beast. He had heard from someone that we should ask the North Koreans to give up their ICBMs, which I thought secondary to dismantling the nuclear warheads. Eliminating just the ICBMs would not reduce the dangers to South Korea, Japan, and our deployed forces, nor protect against shorter-range, submarine-launched missiles fired just off our coasts, which the North was pursuing. Trump was irritable and frustrated, asking whether it was a bigger story if we got a small deal or if we walked away. I thought walking away was a far bigger story, if that was what he was looking for. Trump wondered how to explain taking a walk, and Pompeo offered a line: ‘The teams had met, we had made progress, there was still no testing, and we would meet again notwithstanding the failure of this summit,’ which Trump liked. It made me gag, but as long as Trump was comfortable with the explanation and walked away, I was not going to complain. He was moving in the right direction, but a fluttering leaf could have turned him 180 degrees. As we arrived at the Metropole, I had no sense of how the rest of the day would play out. Trump and Kim had a one-on-one at nine a.m., which broke after about forty minutes. They went to an inner courtyard, where they were joined by Pompeo and Kim Yong Chol for what was intended to be a short, perhaps ten-minute, break. Kim Jong Un did not like the heat and humidity, so they went inside a greenhouse-type structure in the inner courtyard used as a café, undoubtedly air-conditioned. The discussion continued, as we watched it through the greenhouse windows. My take was that Kim did not look particularly happy. His sister stood stoically outside in the heat and humidity, while the Americans, needless to say, went inside nearby where it was air-conditioned. After about an hour, this meeting broke, and Trump came into the main structure of the hotel for what was described as a thirty-minute break. In the holding rooms allocated to us, Trump immediately switched on Fox News to see how the late-night shows were covering Cohen’s testimony, as well as events in Hanoi. Pompeo said the discussion that had just concluded, like the one at dinner, had been all about North Korea’s closing down Yongbyon in exchange for sanctions relief, which wasn’t going anywhere. Kim Jong Un, he said, was ‘very frustrated’ and was ‘getting angry’ that Trump wasn’t giving him what he wanted. There had been no talk of ballistic missiles; the rest of the North’s nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons programs; or anything other than Yongbyon. Trump was visibly tired and irritated. It was clear he too was frustrated no satisfactory deal was at hand. That told me we were still in perilous territory. It was never over with Trump until he announced it at a press conference, and sometimes not even then. He still seemed comfortable walking away; there was no ‘big deal’ in sight, and he could not sustain a ‘small deal’ politically. I believed Trump’s ‘head for the barn’ instincts were kicking in; he wanted to get it over with and return home (after, of course, the big press conference). The larger meeting (Trump, Pompeo, Mulvaney, and I on our side of the table; Kim Jong Un, Kim Yong Chol, and Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho on their side; plus interpreters) was scheduled for eleven a.m. We arrived first, then the North Koreans, and we all shook hands. I said to Kim Jong Un, “Mr. Chairman, it’s very nice to see you again,” which I hoped would be true. The press mob came in and out, and Trump asked Kim, ‘Does the press give you a hard time?’ Somewhat stunned, Kim said, “That’s an obvious question. I don’t have that burden,” and laughed. On human rights, Trump said happily we could say we talked about human rights because the press asked Kim a question. Another laugh-fest. Turning serious, Trump asked what Kim had come up with during the break. Kim was unhappy that he had traveled all the way to Hanoi with a proposal he claimed was incomparable to all those put on the table by all of their predecessors, and even so Trump was not satisfied. This went on for some time. While Kim was talking, Trump asked me for the definition of ‘denuclearization’ we had discussed in the Washington briefings, and also for what we called the ‘bright future’ page, which I gave him. [Libya solution] He handed both pages to Kim, and offered to fly him back to North Korea, canceling his evening in Hanoi. Kim laughed and said he couldn’t do that, but Trump observed happily that that would be quite a picture. He asked what North Korea could add to its offer; he knew Kim didn’t want him to look bad because he was the only one on Kim’s side. Kim readily returned the compliment, since he was the only one on Trump’s side. Doubtless without intending the pun, Trump observed that Kim called the shots in North Korea. Kim seemed surprised that Trump saw things that way, but said that even a leader who controlled everything still could not move without providing some justification. Trump said he understood Kim wanted to achieve consensus. Kim stressed again how significant the Yongbyon6 “concession” was for North Korea and how much coverage the idea was getting in the US media. Trump asked again if Kim could add something to his offer, such as asking only for a percentage reduction in the sanctions rather than completely removing them. This was beyond doubt the worst moment of the meeting. If Kim Jong Un had said yes there, they might have had a deal, disastrously for America. Fortunately, he wasn’t biting, saying he was getting nothing, omitting any mention of the sanctions being lifted. Trump tried changing the subject, asking about prospects for reunifying North and South Korea, and what China thought. Kim, growing tired of diversions, asked to get back to the agenda. Still trying to improve Kim’s package, Trump suggested he offer to eliminate his long-range missiles, the ones that could hit the United States. I saw this as an obvious dismissal of what I said earlier about the concerns of Japan and South Korea for the short- and medium-range missiles that could hit them. Then came the unexpected from Trump: ‘John, what do you think?’ I wasn’t going to miss the chance. We needed a full baseline declaration of North Korea’s nuclear, chemical, biological, and ballistic-missile programs (echoing the paper Trump had given Kim Jong Un), I said. This was a traditional step in arms-control negotiations, and prior negotiations had failed without one. Trump responded that what I had just said was a little complicated, but looked to Kim for his reaction. Kim wasn’t buying, urging that if we went step by step, that would ultimately bring us a comprehensive picture. He complained, as he had in Singapore, that North Korea had no legal guarantees to safeguard its security, and Trump asked what kind of guarantees the North wanted. There were no diplomatic relations, seventy years of hostility and eight months of personal relations, Kim answered, obviously unwilling to respond with specifics. What would happen if a US warship entered North Korea territorial waters? he asked, and Trump suggested Kim call him. After more back-and-forth, Trump acknowledged that they had reached an impasse that it was politically impossible for him to resolve in the current meeting. Kim now looked visibly frustrated, but I was worried. After sustained efforts to explain to Trump how dangerous North Korea’s nuclear threat was, we were reduced to hoping that the politics of avoiding a mass Republican Party revolt was enough to stop a bad deal. Trump turned to Pompeo, asking him to repeat what he had said in the Beast on the way to the Metropole, which Pompeo rendered as, ‘The takeaway is the progress we have made; we understand each other better; we trust each other more; there was real progress made here. We can hold our heads high.’ I was glad I didn’t have to say it. We turned to closing statements, which Kim wanted to be one joint document. Trump initially preferred separate statements, then decided he didn’t. This went back and forth until Trump said again that he wanted to do a complete deal. Kim said flatly that the most he could do was what he had already proposed, which obviously wasn’t going to happen. He asked instead for a ‘Hanoi Statement’ to show that progress was made, perhaps mentioning that we were thinking about Yongbyon. This was now going in the wrong direction again, but I had been shot down earlier by Trump for saying that a joint statement risked showing we hadn’t achieved anything. ‘I don’t need risks. I need positives,’ Trump responded. Pompeo wanted to talk about progress: ‘We have made progress in the last eight months, and we will build on that.’ Even Kim wouldn’t accept that, saying that we had obviously not reached a good point. Trump interjected emphatically that if we accepted Kim’s proposal, the political impact in the United States would be huge, and he could lose the election. Kim reacted quickly, saying he didn’t want Trump to do anything that would harm him politically. Oh great. Kim kept pushing for a joint statement, but lamented that he felt a barrier between the two leaders, and felt a sense of despair. Kim was smartly playing on Trump’s emotions, and I worried it might work. Trump said Kim shouldn’t feel that way, and then, fortunately, we all laughed. Kim again stressed how important the Yongbyon package was. I said North Korea had already repeatedly promised to denuclearize, starting with the 1992 Joint North-South Declaration, so they already knew to a great extent what was required of them. Trump asked what had happened to the Joint Declaration, and I explained that Clinton had shortly thereafter negotiated the 1994 Agreed Framework. Trump lamented that it was Kim’s proposal to lift the sanctions that was the deal breaker. Kim agreed that it was a shame, because he had thought the deal would receive a lot of applause. Instead, inside the room, there was total silence for several seconds, as we all thought the meeting had come to its end. But it hadn’t ended, as Kim kept pushing for some reference to Yongbyon that showed he and Trump had made progress beyond what their predecessors had achieved. I jumped in again, and pitched hard for two separate statements. I said if they were looking for a positive ending, we could each be positive in our own way. Kim said he didn’t want his own statement, which brought several more seconds of silence. Trump said he wanted Kim to be happy. No words for that. Trump made it clear he wanted a joint statement, assigning it to Kim Yong Chol and Pompeo to draft. With that, the North Koreans trundled out, leaving the US delegation alone in the room. While we were milling around, Trump asked me how we could be ‘“sanctioning the economy of a country that’s seven thousand miles away.’ I answered, ‘Because they are building nuclear weapons and missiles that can kill Americans.’ ‘That’s a good point,’ he agreed. We walked over to where Pompeo was standing, and Trump said, ‘I just asked John why we were sanctioning seven thousand miles away, and he had a very good answer: because they could blow up the world.’ ‘Yes, sir,’ said Pompeo. Another day at the office. Trump went back to his holding room, and Pompeo told me that this larger meeting had been essentially a replay of the earlier, smaller meeting, with Kim’s relentlessly pushing the Yongbyon deal, hoping Trump would fold. In the holding room, we found Trump tired, but he expressed the correct insight that ‘walking away’ in Hanoi made clear to the world he could do it elsewhere, such as in the China trade negotiations. Beyond that, however, he had no appetite for anything else, even lunch, which was canceled, along with the joint signing ceremony tentatively on the calendar.” (Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, pp. 291-95)
3/1/19:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea and chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, met again and had talks with Donald J. Trump, president of the United States of America, on Thursday. Supreme Leader of the Party, state and army Kim Jong Un met again with USA President Donald J. Trump at Metropole Hotel in Hanoi at 9:00 a.m. Hanoi Time and then had one-on-one talks before having extended talks with their aides attending. The top leaders of the two countries highly appreciated at the one-on-one talks and extended talks that a remarkable progress has been made in the historic course of implementing the Singapore joint statement. They had a constructive and candid exchange of their opinions over the practical issues arising in opening up a new era of the improvement of the DPRK-U.S. relations on the basis of the progress. At the talks they shared the common understanding that the efforts made by the two sides and proactive measures taken by them to defuse tensions and preserve peace on the Korean peninsula and completely denuclearize it were of great significance in building mutual trust and making a fundamental turn in the decades-long bilateral relations characterized by mistrust and antagonism. The top leaders listened to each other’s views on the issues to be resolved without fail at the present phase in order to carry out the joint goals specified in the Singapore joint statement, and had an in-depth discussion of the ways to do so. They expressed the conviction that though a high barrier of antagonism and confrontation stands due to over 7 decades-long hostile relations and there exist inevitable hardships and difficulties on the road to writing a new history of the DPRK-U.S. relationship, they could create a significant advance in the DPRK-U.S. relations as desired by the peoples of the two countries if they firmly join hands to overcome hardships and difficulties with wisdom and patience. The top leaders of the two countries appreciated that the second meeting in Hanoi offered an important occasion for deepening mutual respect and trust and putting the relations between the two countries on a new stage. They agreed to keep in close touch with each other for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the epochal development of the DPRK-U.S. relations in the future, too, and continue productive dialogues for settling the issues discussed at the Hanoi Summit. Kim Jong Un expressed his thanks to Trump for making positive efforts for the successful meeting and talks while making a long journey and said goodbye, promising the next meeting. .” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, President Rump Hold Second-Day Talks,” March 1, 2019)
Yesterday afternoon, South Korean President Moon Jae-in was on the phone to Trump offering his services as mediator and even suggesting they meet in person in the near future for more “in-depth” discussions. Trump said he had no plans to meet Kim again for a third summit. But today, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the United States was “anxious to get back to the table so we can continue the conversation that will ultimately [lead] to peace and security, a better life for the North Korean people and a lower threat.” China, a neighbor keenly interested in the success of the talks, hoped there would still be a way to find a compromise. “As an old Chinese saying goes, the road to happiness is strewn with setbacks. However, I believe that a bright future awaits,” said Foreign Minister Wang Yi. North Korea, meanwhile, called the summit “successful” — although nothing that Kim ever does could really be described any other way — and the state news agency said the two men had agreed to “keep in close touch with each other for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” But perhaps a more revealing insight into the minds of the North Korean negotiators came at an extraordinary news conference held by the country’s foreign minister and deputy foreign minister after midnight in Hanoi. “The impression I got observing this summit from the side was that our chairman seems to have difficulty understanding the U.S. way of reckoning,” Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui told reporters. “I felt that our chairman has lost the will to engage in deal-making, with the United States saying that even a partial lifting of sanctions for the civilian economy is hard.” Different versions of the breakdown were presented by both sides, but the fundamentals of what North Korea was prepared to agree to were beginning to emerge a day after the failed summit. Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho said North Korea had offered to close down the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, a large complex that covers more than three square miles and includes about 300 buildings. Yongbyon is the site of North Korea’s main, aging nuclear reactor, which has been the regime’s only source of plutonium, although satellite imagery suggests that the reactor was largely not operating last year, possibly because of maintenance work. It is also home to a new light water reactor that has never been inspected as it is not thought to be operational yet, experts say. Choe said North Korea also offered to close a facility to enrich uranium that was shown to nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker in 2010. “They were pretty expansive with respect to what they were prepared to do at Yongbyon, but there was still not complete clarity with respect to the full scope of what they were prepared to offer,” Pompeo said in Manila. A senior State Department official said it was important to be precise about what exactly is being done at Yongbyon, but “the North Koreans struggled to give us a precise definition.” He characterized the North Korean offer as the closure of a “portion” of Yongbyon. Experts and intelligence officials say they believe North Korea has other covert sites to enrich uranium in other parts of the country. Closing Yongbyon entirely would slow North Korea’s ability to produce fissile material for bombs but not stop it entirely. To achieve that goal would require a complete declaration of all fissile material sites in the country, and the ability to conduct extensive, and intrusive, inspections at short notice. That is not something North Korea has ever agreed to. Closing Yongbyon would also leave North Korea’s arsenal of nuclear weapons and missiles intact. In return, Trump said North Korea had basically asked for sanctions to be fully lifted. Ri, the foreign minister, took issue with that characterization, arguing that Pyongyang wanted only a “partial” lifting of sanctions and citing the most recent five out of 11 sanctions packages imposed by the United Nations Security Council. But the senior State Department official said the sanctions request included “metals, raw materials, transportation, seafood, coal exports, refined petroleum imports, raw petroleum imports.” The official added: “It was basically all the sanctions except armaments.” In effect, the United States was being asked to give up almost all of its leverage in return for an offer that would not prevent North Korea from making new bombs and missiles and would leave its current arsenal untouched. It would have given Kim the economic rewards he sought and left North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapons state. “The dilemma that we were confronted with is the North Koreans at this point are unwilling to impose a complete freeze on their weapons of mass destruction programs,” the State Department official said. “So to give many, many billions of dollars in sanctions relief would in effect put us in a position of subsidizing the ongoing development of weapons of mass destruction in North Korea.” Ri, meanwhile, said it was “difficult to say” if there would be a better offer than the one presented in Hanoi. “Our principal stance will remain invariable and our proposal will never be changed, even though the U.S. proposes negotiation again in the future,” he said. Joseph Yun served as the U.S. special representative for North Korea from October 2016, under the Obama administration, to March 2018, under Trump. He says the negotiations may have hit a fundamental roadblock. “Trump is beginning to realize that North Korea’s not going to completely denuclearize, not now and probably not ever. I think he will have a tough time over that realization,” he said. “Both men have lost face.” That may make it even harder for working-level negotiators to get traction. (Simon Denyer, “After U.S.-North Korea Nuclear Summit Fails, All Sides Scramble to Salvage the Talks Despite Differences,” Washington Post, March 1, 2019) The meeting in Vietnam ended in shambles today when Kim insisted on a full lifting of sanctions, according to Trump, and would not agree to dismantle enough of his nuclear program to satisfy American demands. The North Koreans later contradicted Trump, saying they had demanded only a partial lifting of sanctions, but they confirmed that they had offered to dismantle their main nuclear site, at Yongbyon. The split underscored the risk of leader-to-leader diplomacy: When it fails, there are few places to go, no higher-up to step in and cut a compromise that saves the deal. In this case, the price may be high — especially if Kim responds to the failure by further accelerating his production of nuclear fuel and a frustrated Trump swings from his expressions of “love” for the North Korean dictator and back to the “fire and fury” language of early in his presidency. “No deal is better than a bad deal, and the president was right to walk,” said Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations. “But this should not have happened,” he said. “A busted summit is the risk you run when too much faith is placed in personal relations with a leader like Kim, when the summit is inadequately prepared, and when the president had signaled he was confident of success.” The outcome today took everyone by surprise. Trump was so convinced a deal was in the offing that the White House had announced that a “signing ceremony” would be held immediately after a warm lunch between the two leaders. But no one ever sat down at the elegantly set table in the century-old Metropole Hotel, and there was no signing ceremony because there was no communiqué to sign. For his part, Kim seemed to think he had Trump exactly where he wanted him: desperate for a deal, and in need of a headline-making victory after the devastating testimony on February 25 of Michael D. Cohen, Trump’s former lawyer and fixer. If so, Kim clearly miscalculated. “Trump could have had a small deal,” Joseph Yun, the former State Department special envoy for North Korea, said after the collapse on Thursday. “Close a few sites, and lift a few sanctions. But because of Cohen, the president needed a big deal” — one that traded sanctions relief for the mass dismantlement of nuclear infrastructure that it took the North Koreans the better part of 40 years to construct. The risk now is that having placed their personal imprimatur on the negotiations, Trump and Kim will be tempted to raise the pressure on each other. In retrospect, there were warning signs that things were going south. When Secretary of State Mike Pompeo went to Pyongyang to turn a vaguely worded agreement to pursue denuclearization struck at the June meeting in Singapore into reality, Kim declined to see him. When he returned, he got an audience — but no inventory of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, its production facilities and its missiles. Without that, there was no way for the two sides to agree on a timetable for dismantlement. For months, the North declined to deal with the State Department’s special envoy, Stephen Biegun. And when the North Koreans did, they explored many options, but made clear sanctions relief had to come first. Trump made his own situation worse. He kept repeating that there was “plenty of time” to reach an agreement, taking all the urgency out of the issue. When the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal reported on satellite evidence and expert analysis suggesting that the North was still producing nuclear material and expanding missile bases, Trump said on Twitter that there was no news in those reports. He blamed the media for making a big deal of it — rather than having used the moment to remind the North Koreans that its activities were being intensely monitored, and not just by spy satellites. And last night, when the two men met again at the Metropole, it was clear from the body language that something had changed since their first warm embrace in Singapore eight months ago. Trump, who said over the weekend that he would be happy just to have a continued ban on missile and nuclear testing, realized that if he acceded to Kim’s demand for an end to sanctions, he would lose whatever leverage the United States possessed. “I’d much rather do it right than do it fast,” the president told reporters before leaving Hanoi early. One of the most telling obstacles in the negotiations was over a facility called Kangson, which the North Koreans have never publicly acknowledged. Detected by American intelligence agencies nearly a decade ago, the site, in a suburb of the capital, Pyongyang, is believed to be a secret nuclear enrichment plant. Trump’s team of negotiators believed that the North’s willingness to let inspectors into the plant, and ultimately shutter it, would be a good test of Kim’s commitment to denuclearization. For years, the American knowledge of the site was highly classified, and never discussed. But when asked by a reporter at a news conference on today whether Kim had been unwilling to deal with its fate, Trump acknowledged that was one of the problems, along with other facilities “they were surprised we knew.” “I think it is very positive that the Trump administration sought constraints at previously undisclosed facilities outside Yongbyon,” Robert J. Einhorn, one of the senior arms control experts who worked for the administrations of Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. Preventing North Korea from producing new fuel, he said, “would be a much better indication of North Korea’s willingness to go down the denuclearization track than simply closing Yongbyon, which would not halt their production of all bomb-making nuclear material.” By Trump’s account, Kim would not take up such issues until the world lifts the economic pressure on North Korea. “He wants the sanctions off,” he said. Now the question is whether Trump will continue his form of personal-relationship diplomacy or decide that the risks are too great, and that he should return to the step-by-step approach most of his predecessors used. “Look, there has to be a reason for the conversations,” Pompeo told reporters late Thursday, on his way to the Philippines. “There has to be a theory of the case of how to move forward. I’m confident there is one.” He just didn’t say what it was. (David E. Sanger, “Collapse of Talks Exposes Perils of 1-to-1 Diplomacy,” New York Times, March 1, 2019, p. A-1)
Choe Son Hui: “Regarding the Yongbyon area, the proposal we put out this time, as our Foreign Minister had stated — we have made a historic proposal for the permanent disposal of the whole of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, and within that, all of the plutonium and uranium facilities, including all nuclear facilities altogether in the presence of U.S. experts. In return, we have demanded — as our Foreign Minister has stated — of the sanctions resolutions, the five sanctions related to the people’s livelihood and the civilian economy we asked to be lifted. … About this proposal, I think the U.S. side missed the opportunity of a lifetime by not accepting it. … Despite the proposal we put out regarding the dismantlement of the entire Yongbyon nuclear complex, which will not be offered in the years to come, the United States disregarded it. While seeing the U.S. side’s response that a partial lifting of only those sanctions related to the civilian economy might be difficult, I got the feeling that our Chairman Kim has been a little discouraged about the future of dealings with the United States. … So, it is hard for me to guarantee whether this sort of opportunity for the U.S. will be forthcoming in the future.” (Press Conference with Choe Son Hui, Hanoi, NCNK translation, March 1, 2019)
Background Briefing: “SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Okay, so on background, as the President said in his press conference, he had an excellent set of talks with Kim Jong-un. They were productive, they were constructive, and we made progress in a number of areas between the two sides. It was worth the time to have the two leaders together. During the course of the discussions, the North Koreans made clear that any future steps on denuclearization would require the lifting of sanctions. As the President said in his press conference, the North Koreans basically asked for the lifting of all sanctions. Now, Ri Yong-ho, the foreign minister of North Korea, clarified their position overnight in a press conference, and I just want to clarify what he was saying. The — what the North Koreans asked, and what they have been asking for several weeks in our working-level negotiations, is the lifting of the United Nations Security Council sanctions imposed since March of 2016. Q: All of them? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I’ll clarify that. In the course of those discussions, they qualified their ask by saying that they wanted the sanctions lifted, that, as they said — as Ri Yong-ho said in his press conference last night — sanctions that impede the civilian economy and people’s livelihood among them. We culled through the sanctions and we asked the North Koreans during the working-level negotiation for a definition of what that included, and if you review the UN Security Council resolutions you’ll see that includes — the sanctions themselves include a broad range of products, including metals, raw materials, transportation, seafood, coal exports, refined petroleum imports, raw petroleum imports. We asked the North Koreans to clarify for us what they meant by these — this — their qualification, and it was basically all the sanctions except for armaments. Q: Except for what? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Armaments, weapons — except for weapons. And so we went through that and we did our own calculation, and it tallies up to the tune of many, many billions of dollars. We have — Q: When did they make the demand? During the working-level talks? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: They first surfaced this request during the working-level negotiations in the week leading up to the summit, and we evaluated it closely and explained to them that that wouldn’t work. What they had offered in return was the dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, but Yongbyon nuclear complex is also an important entity to define, because the Yongbyon complex since the early 1990s has been at the center of the North Korean nuclear weapons program and it involves many institutions, buildings, outbuildings. It’s a substantial set of facilities on a single property and it’s important to be very precise about that, and the North Koreans struggled to give us a precise definition of what that was. Leaving aside those process questions that are still very much in discussion between the two sides, I want to say that the dilemma that we were confronted with is that the North Koreans at this point are unwilling to impose a complete freeze on their weapons of mass destruction programs, so to give many, many billions of dollars in sanctions relief would in effect put us in a position of subsidizing the ongoing development of weapons of mass destruction in North Korea. Now, they didn’t ask us to do that, but that is effectively the choice that we were presented with. The President in his discussions challenged the North Koreans to go bigger. The President encouraged Chairman Kim to go all in, and we were going to go — we were prepared to go all in as well, and that’s where we are. So the good news is it was very constructive discussions. We’re not — we’re not shy about saying that, and it is absolutely true. And we ended on a very good note between the two sides. We just couldn’t get there on the agreement at this point but within the discussions on this agreement we got to a level of detail that has eluded us for quite a while, certainly since the Singapore joint statement, including things like what is the definition of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, which is a very important issue for us as we look to disassemble the entire weapons of mass destruction program in North Korea. So we’re in an okay place. We didn’t get a deal because the deal wasn’t there to be had, but we are prepared to continue talking. I was very reassured to see the official press release from the North Koreans this morning that they’re actually taking the exact same tone that President Trump took in his press conference yesterday. They were constructive discussions. There’s room to continue talking. The two leaders have a personal relationship that both of them believe will yield benefits for the development of our plans here, and for my part — well, I shouldn’t say this because I’m on background, but let me just say the United States very much looks forward to engaging further with the North Koreans as soon as they’re prepared. … Q: The North Korean foreign minister said that they were prepared to get rid of their plutonium-producing facilities at Yongbyon and/or HEU facilities in the presence of UN inspectors. Is that an accurate description of what they offered? That’s what they said publicly. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: That is what they have discussed with us, and that is actually what they first raised in September — on September 19th of 2018 in the joint statement between Chairman Kim and President Moon Jae-in after their summit in Pyongyang. It’s not a new offer. It is only part of the Yongbyon nuclear complex. It’s — Q: What part is not included? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Some of that I can’t discuss. Q: The tritium? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I can’t discuss all the parts of it, but the Yongbyon nuclear complex is a sprawling, three-square-mile site. Q: The light water reactor? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It’s a sprawling, three-square-mile site with more than 300 different, separate facilities located on it, all of which are dedicated to supporting the nuclear weapons program of North Korea. Q: Are they looking to keep open a civilian nuclear energy production option? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: They — MODERATOR: Can you talk about that, or — all right. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. Yeah, yeah. We’re in the middle of negotiations on a number of issues, but we are not negotiating the civilian nuclear energy capability. … Q: We know that you want to shut down — Q: [Senior State Department Official], I’m Nick Wadhams with Bloomberg. Two questions. One, are you any closer to a shared definition of what denuclearization means? And then also, in your Stanford speech, you referenced Yongbyon but then also these other plutonium enrichment facilities beyond Yongbyon. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Uranium. Q: Sorry? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Uranium. Q: Sorry, uranium. Well, plutonium, and — you said “destruction of North Korea’s plutonium and uranium enrichment facilities. This complex… extends beyond Yongbyon.” SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Okay. Q: So were they — were those other facilities also on the table? Or were they offering to — SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: What the North Koreans proposed to us was closing down a portion of the Yongbyon complex. Q: So only Yongbyon? And then how about on denuclearization? Are you any closer to a shared definition? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: On the definition of denuclearization, it’s a matter that we discussed at length in the working-level negotiations, but it wasn’t in the North Korean proposal yesterday. Q: What does that — SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: They haven’t agreed to it. Q: [Senior State Department Official], who else was in the working-level talks in the week leading up to the summit other than Kim Yong-chol? Did they have — was — SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: They have a delegation, about five people, representing the ministry of foreign affairs, what they would call the Asia Pacific Peace Commission, and the State Affairs Commission, which is effectively the — would be the equivalent of the White House. State Affairs Commission are the people who work directly for Chairman Kim in their structure. On our side, we had a delegation of 16 experts, including international law experts, nuclear fuel cycle experts, missile experts, trade sanctions experts, economists. We were prepared to evaluate any proposal that they put forward, and we did so with great seriousness, and I want to say we welcomed their proposals, Gus, but we didn’t have a deal that the President could agree to at this point. Q: When — sorry — were there any considerations for making smaller incremental agreements at this summit, like liaison or IAEA inspectors as a stepping stone and an example of goodwill and further trust building, or it’s basically all or nothing? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It’s not all or nothing, but our view is that all these pieces fit together and they have to move in parallel. Q: So you are not disputing the North Korean account of the conversation, just to be clear? You’re just clarifying that those sanctions — SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: No. I think they’re parsing words. What they were asking for was basically the lifting of all sanctions. That’s what they were asking for. MODERATOR: As the President said. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: As the President said. So — .Q: And were there — sorry — and were there any other sites that were discussed other than Yongbyon and their — SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I think I want to be a little bit protective of the President and Chairman Kim and the discussion they had, but they had a good discussion. Q: So when they say — just to clarify, because — that they wanted five out of eleven of the sanctions, these are comments that are made subsequent to Hanoi that were not actually what they said at the summit? They — at the summit they were talking about (inaudible), and now they’re saying, oh, we only wanted five out of eleven? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Right. The bulk of the sanctions — basically virtually all the sanctions, other than the ones directly related to the technology and equipment that support the weapons of mass destruction program — basically all the sanctions were imposed since March 16th of 2016. Q: Right. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: You go back and look at the UN Security Council resolution, you see that’s where all the value of the sanctions were imposed. Q: Right. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Sanctions prior to that point were largely targeted on depriving the North Koreans of specific technologies that aid their weapons of mass destruction program. So the economic benefit of this, the pressure campaign that sanctions represent, would have been eviscerated with the lifting of sanctions in exchange for — Q: But basically it’s all since March 2016. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes. Q: But now they’re coming out and saying five of eleven, but the way they do that is they’re counting things from prior to March ’16? Is that what they’re doing? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes, exactly. And I would hasten to add that these sanctions are actually layered on top of each other, so they’re actually tied together. They’re not severable. One of the things that you might potentially hear them say is they stopped testing, therefore all sanctions that were imposed because they were testing should be lifted. That’s another thing that you would hear, but that testing was part of a process of developing nuclear weapons, and the weapons themselves need to be on the table. It’s not the testing of the weapons, it’s the actual presence of the nuclear weapons — and, by the way, likewise in the case of missile testing, the ICBMs as well that are central to this discussion. So we can quibble about the words, and a little bit of this is parsing on the part of our counterparts, but I want to go back to the positives, too. We’re in a discussion with them on things that we really want to be discussing with them. They’re — the fact that the foreign minister of North Korea was out doing a press avail last night is an important sign, and the fact that some of you — I don’t know if you were in the room, but the media had the opportunity for the first time to have an open exchange with the North Korean delegation on these issues. We’re actually encouraged by where we’re going. Q: So what’s next? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We didn’t get close enough at this summit, but we’re encouraged with the opportunities ahead of us. … Q: Would you have been willing to take an agreement in which there were a fewer number of those sanctions lifted? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Kylie, what we were negotiating is the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea. We still have a lot of work to do to get there. Q: Do you know what’s next, when your next meeting will be, or — because it just seems like — SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We need to let the dust settle a little bit, but as I said, the North Korean press reports of their version of the summit last — that came out today in KCNA was actually quite constructive as well, and suggests to me that, like us, they feel that there’s still ample opportunity to continue the talks. So I think I’m going to wrap it up there. MODERATOR: Yep. Wrap it up right there.” (DoS, Senior State Department Official, Remarks to the Traveling Press, Peninsula Hotel Manila, Philippines, March 1, 2019)
China said today it believed some sanctions relief was still justified. “The U.N. Security Council should relaunch discussions on reversible clauses of the resolution and readjust sanctions accordingly, based on the principle of simultaneous reciprocity,” spokesman Lu Kang told a regular news conference. That appeal is set to fall on deaf ears in Washington, with the United States almost certain to veto any attempts to ease sanctions. Lankov, who is also a director of the NK News service, said he expected China to ease up on the implementation of sanctions but not ignore them entirely. “China wants to position itself as the guardian of the international law and international norms when Donald Trump is so eager to break them,” he said. “So for China, it’s not a good idea to openly violate sanctions. They will do whatever is possible within plausible deniability limits. (Simon Denyer, “North Korean Leader Leaves Vietnam with a Grin and a Wave, but Empty Hands,” Washington Post, March 1, 2019)
During the State of the Union address in 2018, Fred Warmbier and his wife, Cindy, stood and wept while Trump spoke of the “menace” of North Korea and gave tribute to their son, who died days after his release. Today, the Warmbiers emerged into the public eye again, this time with a blistering statement directed at the president. They said they could no longer be silent after the summit meeting this week with Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, and after hearing Trump say that he believed Kim’s claim that he did not know what had happened to Otto Warmbier while he was in custody. “We have been respectful during this summit process,” the Warmbiers said in a statement. “Now we must speak out. Kim and his evil regime are responsible for the death of our son Otto. Kim and his evil regime are responsible for unimaginable cruelty and inhumanity. No excuses or lavish praise can change that.” The outrage went far beyond the Warmbiers, as American political leaders, including members of Trump’s own party, joined the family in condemning Kim for Warmbier’s death. “Americans know, the world knows, Kim Jong-un knows, and most importantly, the Warmbier family knows that Otto suffered a cruel death inflicted by a brutal regime serving Kim Jong-un,” Representative Warren Davidson, Republican of Ohio, said on Twitter. Senator Sherrod Brown, an Ohio Democrat, said in an email: “North Korea murdered Otto Warmbier and the president of the United States has a responsibility to make sure they face the consequences. Anything short of that is unacceptable.” The Warmbiers filed a federal lawsuit last year in the United States against the autocratic government, and they were awarded over $501 million in damages, though it is unlikely that they would receive the full amount from North Korea. Trump said on Twitter today that his remarks had been “misinterpreted.” “Of course I hold North Korea responsible for Otto’s mistreatment and death,” he said, adding: “I love Otto and think of him often!” (Julie Bosman and Keith Williams, “Grief Turns to Rage over Trump’s Trust of Kim, New York Times, March 2, 2019, p. A-1)
3/2/19:
U.S. and South Korean officials announced today that they will end longtime military exercises that had riled North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s regime and drawn criticism from President Trump. The Pentagon disclosed the decision Saturday evening after a phone call between acting defense secretary Patrick Shanahan and his South Korean counterpart, Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo. The officials agreed “to conclude” the exercises and replace them with “newly designed Command Post exercises and revised field training program,” according to a Pentagon statement. “The Minister and Secretary made clear that the Alliance decision to adapt our training program reflected our desire to reduce tension and support our diplomatic efforts to achieve complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a final, fully verified manner,” the statement said. A U.S. military official said that the newer, scaled-back operation will be held March 4-12 and will entail a computer exercise. It will be called “Dong Maeng,” which means “Alliance,” the official said. The official also said the new exercise will include thousands fewer troops. Another U.S. defense official said Shanahan had hoped to find a solution that would allow the U.S. and South Korean militaries to continue the elements of the exercises focused on maintaining joint readiness while foregoing elements that in the past had been intended as a show of force. Those elements, the Pentagon leadership has concluded, could be viewed as saber-rattling at a time when the military looks to support diplomacy with North Korea, the official said. The plans to scale back the exercise could have some impact on readiness, officials said, but it’s not clear how much. Both the Foal Eagle series of exercises held in the spring and the Key Resolve exercises traditionally held in the summer will conclude. They focused on preparing for the possibility of war with North Korea, and involved thousands of troops. At times, they included U.S. bombers, submarines and other displays of force. The announcement of the change, which NBC News first reported yesterday, comes two days after Trump cut short a summit with Kim after they were unable to agree to terms on how to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. As he had previously, the president spoke warmly of Kim and with disdain for the exercises. “I was telling the generals — I said: Look, you know, exercising is fun and it’s nice and they play the war games,” Trump said, referring to the exercises by a phrase the Pentagon has typically avoided. “And I’m not saying it’s not necessary, because at some levels it is, but at other levels it’s not. But it’s a very, very expensive thing. And you know, we do have to think about that, too.” (Dan Lamothe, “U.S. and South Korea End Military Exercises That Riled North,” Washington Post, March 3, 2019, p. A-16)
3/3/19:
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un wasn’t prepared to accept President Donald Trump’s “big deal” at their summit in Hanoi last week, National Security Adviser John Bolton said today. “I don’t consider the summit a failure,” he said in an interview with CBS. “I consider it a success defined as the president protecting and advancing American national interest.” “The issue, really, was whether North Korea was prepared to accept what the president called ‘the big deal,’ which is denuclearize entirely under a definition the president handed to Kim Jong-un, and have the potential for an enormous economic future,” Bolton said. In a separate interview with Fox News, the adviser said Trump had tried to persuade Kim “to take the big deal that really could make a difference for North Korea.” When that didn’t work, the president walked away. “I think he made a very important point to North Korea and to other countries around the world about negotiating with him,” Bolton said. “He’s not desperate for a deal, not with North Korea, not with anybody, if it’s contrary to American national interest.” (Yonhap, “N.K. Wasn’t Ready to Accept Trump’s ‘Big Deal’: Bolton,” March 4, 2019)
Bolton: “MARGARET BRENNAN: We had different versions of the story as to why this summit failed to produce any results. Why was the president unable to negotiate a breakthrough? BOLTON: Well I don’t consider the summit a failure. I consider it a success defined as the president protecting and advancing American national interest. There was extensive preparation for this meeting. Extensive discussions between the president and Kim Jong Un and- and the issue really was whether North Korea was prepared to accept what the president called “the big deal,” which is denuclearize entirely under a definition the president handed to Kim Jong Un and have the potential for an enormous economic future or try and do something less than that which was unacceptable to us. So the president held firm to his view. He deepened his relationship with Kim Jong Un. I don’t view it as a failure at all when American national interests are protected. BRENNAN: But to be clear, North Korea still has not agreed to denuclearize as the U.S. defines it. BOLTON: Not as we have defined it although they have committed in public in prior regimes in North Korea — four or five times in writing to denuclearize and that’s something— BRENNAN: So that doesn’t mean much to you. AMBASSADOR BOLTON: — We expect them to do if they reach an agreement with us. BRENNAN: Well on the specifics, a senior State Department official spoke to reporters and said that what the North Koreans proposed specifically was about dismantling the three-mile Yongbyon complex which he defined as quote, “the totality of North Korea’s plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment programs in exchange for lifting all sanctions except those on the weapons programs.” Did the U.S. make a counter offer? BOLTON: Well, the counter offer has been there from the beginning — from- from the very first summit back in Singapore, which is if North Korea commits to complete denuclearization — including its ballistic missile program and its chemical and biological weapons programs, the prospect of economic progress is there. The president — BRENNAN: But that’s not what North Korea put on the table — BOLTON: That’s not what they — MARGARET BRENNAN: They put on this narrow definition. BOLTON: A very limited concession by the North Koreans involving the Yongbyon complex which includes an aging nuclear reactor and some percentage of their uranium enrichment plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In exchange, they wanted substantial relief from the sanctions. Now, one thing President Trump has said beginning in the 2016 campaign is that he’s not going to make the mistakes of prior administrations and get into this action for action kind of arrangement which benefits — BRENNAN: So there was no counter offer. BOLTON: — the North Koreans. Our counter offer was where we have been where the president has exercises persuasive abilities on Kim Jong Un to take the big deal and they weren’t willing to do it. BRENNAN: But what made the president stake out this maximalist position? AMBASSADOR BOLTON: It’s not — BRENNAN: You negotiated with the North Koreans before, going back to 2002. Did you see the same pattern playing out now? BOLTON: I think the difference that President Trump has articulated to the North Koreans is the future for them once they make the strategic decision to denuclearize. What they’ve done before is promise to denuclearize, get economic benefits in return and then renege on the deal. What the president was trying to get them to do is look at what was possible for them overall. And I think he remains optimistic that this is possible. Kim Jong Un himself said in our last meeting, you know we’re going to go through many stations on- before we achieve this deal. The meeting in Hanoi was one such station. So the president is ready to keep talking. BRENNAN: Are you expecting North Korea to come back with an offer? BOLTON: I don’t know what they’re going to do. I think the president himself said that he expects they’ll want to go back and re-evaluate what happened certainly we will- we’ll look at continuing the economic sanctions against North Korea which brought them to the table in the first place. We’ll see what happens next. BRENNAN: But in the meantime, North Korea can still produce nuclear fuel. BOLTON: And they have been doing it. Yes, they have. That’s exactly correct. BRENNAN: So they’re a growing threat. BOLTON: Well, I think our objective remains to find a way to get them to denuclearize. The president’s trying this negotiation but his objective has always been denuclearization. BRENNAN: Is the window for diplomacy about to close here? I mean this is- this seems like an open- ended timeline. BOLTON: I wouldn’t- I wouldn’t say it that way. Look, the president opened the door for North Korea in Singapore and they didn’t walk through. He kept the door open — BRENNAN: Eight months ago. BOLTON: He kept the door open during that eight-month period. He kept it open in Hanoi. The North Koreans can walk through it, it’s really up to them. That’s the diplomatic window. BRENNAN: When you were on this program last July though you said the plan was to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear facilities and have it turn over its weapons of mass destruction within a year. BOLTON: What — MARGARET BRENNAN: Is that still a realistic timeline? AMBASSADOR BOLTON: No, the question you asked then was operationally how long would it take. There was some dispute within the U.S. government over a period of time, once North Korea made the strategic decision to give up its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, how long would it take to conduct that dismantlement and with a few exceptions our judgment was we could finish it within a year. Once the process started. BRENNAN: So you still think it’ll take a year to dismantle it? BOLTON: This is — BRENNAN: But you acknowledged they haven’t even agreed to denuclearize — BOLTON: No, no they have not agreed. Exactly. BRENNAN: — and there’s no expiration date on this offer to continue to negotiate? BOLTON: There- there is no expiration date. As I say, the president is fully prepared to keep negotiating at lower levels or to speak to Kim Jong Un again when it’s appropriate. BRENNAN: But aren’t they a growing threat if they can continue to develop nuclear fuel? Doesn’t the leverage get reduced on our end? BOLTON: I don’t think the leverage gets reduced because I think we will keep the maximum pressure campaign in place even before the summit. We were looking at ways to tighten it up to- to stop for example the ship to ship transfers that the North Koreans are using to evade the sanctions, to talk to other countries to make sure they tighten up on North Korea. It was the sanctions that brought the North Koreans to the table. It’s the sanctions they want relief from and relief they can get if they denuclearize. BRENNAN: Before the president went to Hanoi was the U.S. aware that North Korea would not allow anything beyond the Yongbyon complex? I mean the second uranium enrichment site that the president nodded to in his press conference. Did you know that was not on the table? BOLTON: Well we don’t know what’s on the table from — from North Korea until it comes out of the mouth of Kim Jong Un, the chairman. He’s calling — BRENNAN: Well that’s the diplomats are supposed to be laying the groundwork for. So the president doesn’t walk away with a failure. BOLTON: He — he didn’t walk away with a failure. Unless you’re prepared to say that it would be better to accept a bad deal than to walk away from no deal, to me that’s a success. BRENNAN: So you thought that nothing else was on the table. You were just testing the prospects by sending the president to Hanoi? BOLTON: No, no, no. We- we honestly didn’t know. I mean it’s- it’s not unusual in these circumstances to find that there are additional concessions that the other side might make. But we’ve tried to make it clear to them- as again the president has said this repeatedly we’re not going to make the mistakes of past administrations. We’re not going to make the mistake that Obama made in the Iran nuclear deal. What we want is denuclearization broadly defined as the president himself laid out for Kim Jong Un in the paper that he gave him. BRENNAN: So- but you’ve tested this proposition now of what it’s like to negotiate top down? BOLTON: Well we’ve had two- we’ve had two meetings. BRENNAN: This is now the — what — fourth commander in chief to try to do this? There’s a very different approach but the success rate hasn’t been anything more than in the past. BOLTON: Well the success rate in the past was zero. So that’s not a hard bar to overcome. There’s a- there’s an argument that proceeding deductively rather than inductively makes a lot of sense. We’ve had two meetings. We-we’ll see what happens next. BRENNAN: But in the meantime, as we say, they can still produce nuclear fuel. And as you saw after the president left Hanoi, Kim Jong Un stayed there. I mean he was walking around touring hot spots in Vietnam. He no longer looks like a pariah. Didn’t he gain from this? BOLTON: I don’t think that’s the president’s view at all. BRENNAN: He sat across from the president almost as if an equal. BOLTON: He- he did that in Singapore. The president’s view is he gave nothing away. BRENNAN: But do you actually believe that? BOLTON: The president’s view is he gave nothing away. That’s- that’s what matters, not my view. As I’ve said before, I guess I can’t get people to listen so I’ll try it one more time, I’m the national security advisor. I’m not the national security decision maker. BRENNAN: Well- well your views have been well documented in the past. BOLTON: Usually by me. I mean I’ve written a lot- I’ve written a lot in the past — BRENNAN: You’ve been skeptical for — BOLTON: And — BRENNAN: — many, many years. BOLTON: And as I’ve said, those- those views are out there. Anybody can read them. BRENNAN: Right. AMBASSADOR BOLTON: My job now is to help the president, give him his advice, give him my advice. He’ll make the decisions. BRENNAN: And to be clear the administration still is no longer advocating regime change? BOLTON: The position of the administration is we want denuclearization of North Korea and that’s the objective we’re pursuing. BRENNAN: And you still believe that Kim Jong Un can deliver on that? BOLTON: I think he is the authoritative ruler of that country and if he were to make the strategic decision to denuclearize, we think it would happen. BRENNAN: The president was asked about this American student Otto Warmbier who died tragically after being released after some brutal treatment in North Korean captivity. When was it that the president actually brought up his case to Kim Jong Un? BOLTON: Well, that was in one of the meetings in- on- on- the second day, I think, and look — BRENNAN: In Hanoi? BOLTON: In Hanoi. The president’s been — BRENNAN: Is that the first time he brought it up? AMBASSADOR BOLTON: No I think it’s been brought up before. I think it was brought up in Singapore. But the president’s been very clear he viewed what happened to Otto Warmbier as barbaric and unacceptable and I think the best thing North Korea could do right now would be to come up with a full explanation of exactly what happened to him. BRENNAN: But it seemed to suggest that the president, since he said he took Kim Jong Un at his word, was willing to put aside these egregious human rights abuses and basically the killing of an American while in captivity. AMBASSADOR BOLTON: Listen, I’ve heard the president talk about Otto Warmbier on any number of occasions in the Oval Office. And I know how strongly he feels about it. I have no doubt of that whatever.” (CBS, “Transcript: National Security Adviser John Bolton on “Face the Nation,” March 3, 2019.
3/4/19:
South Korea President Moon Jae-in today urged the US and North Korea to quickly resume denuclearization talks after their Hanoi summit last week ended without a deal. “We hope that both countries will continue their dialogue and that their leaders meet again quickly to reach an agreement that was held off this time,” Moon said during a security meeting in Seoul. “While I believe the North-US talks will produce an agreement in the end, I ask officials to work hard for the resumption of working-level talks between the US and the North as it is not favorable to have a long absence or stalemate in talks.” “I ask that we find out the exact gap between the two sides that led to a no-deal at the Hanoi summit and explore ways to narrow down that gap,” Moon said. Yongbyon is not believed to be the North’s only uranium enrichment facility and closing it down would not in and of itself signal an end to the country’s atomic program. However, Moon said that if all Yongbyon facilities were “terminated in entirety, it should be considered the North’s denuclearization has entered an irreversible stage.” (AFP, “S. Korea’s Moon Urges New Denuclearization Talks,” March 4, 2019)
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said he was hopeful the United States would send a delegation to North Korea in the coming weeks, after a summit between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ended with no deal. The leaders’ second summit, held last week in the Vietnamese capital Hanoi, failed to produce any agreement or immediate plan for follow-up negotiations. “I am hopeful, although I have no commitment yet, that we will be back at it, that I’ll have a team in Pyongyang in the next couple weeks,” Pompeo told the Iowa Farm Bureau. “I’m continuing to work to find those places where there’s a shared interest,” he said. (Makini Brice and Hyonhee Shin, “Pompeo Sees More North Korea Talks, Seoul Faces Limits in Mediator Role,” Reuters, March 5, 2019)
3/5/19:
North Korea stopped the operation of its 5-megawatt reactor at its mainstay nuclear complex in Yongbyon, north of Pyongyang, late last year with no signs of reprocessing activities there, South Korea’s spy agency said. During a briefing to the National Assembly’s intelligence committee, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) also said that the underground tunnels of the North’s nuclear test site in Punggye-ri remain shut down and unattended since their destruction in May last year, according to lawmakers of the committee. On a jarring note, the NIS said that it detected signs of the North restoring part of the Dongchang-ri missile launch site it tore down. “(The North) appears to be putting back a roof and a door (to a Dongchang-ri facility),” the NIS was quoted as saying. The NIS also said that the military authorities of South Korea and the United States have run a “thorough” monitoring system to keep track of the North’s nuclear and missile facilities, including its uranium enrichment sites that were apparently brought up in nuclear negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang. “The U.S. information is the same as ours, but we can’t comment on what facilities are located where,” the NIS was quoted as saying during the briefing. (Yonhap, “N.K. Keeps Yongbyon Dormant Since Last Year: NIS,” March 5, 2019)
North Korea has started rebuilding the facilities it uses to launch satellites into orbit and test engines and other technologies for its intercontinental ballistic missile program, according to American military analysts and South Korean intelligence officials. It could be a first sign that North Korea is preparing to end its moratorium on missile tests, which President Trump has claimed as a major diplomatic achievement. North Korea began dismantling the Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Tongchang-ri near its northwestern border with China last summer, after the June summit in Singapore. It partially took down an engine test site, a rocket launchpad and a rail-mounted building used by engineers to assemble launch vehicles and move them to the launchpad. The North did not completely dismantle the facilities, and when Kim Jong Un met with President Moon Jae-in of South Korea in September, he offered to destroy them in the presence of American experts. In Hanoi, Kim asked for the removal of punishing United Nations sanctions in return for the dismantling of its Yongbyon nuclear complex north of Pyongyang, the North’s capital, as well as the Tongchang-ri facilities. Trump rejected the demand, calling the lifting of sanctions too high a price to pay for partial moves toward denuclearization. Although the Yongbyon complex has been used to produce nuclear bomb fuel, North Korea is believed to have other fuel-making facilities elsewhere, as well as fissile materials, nuclear warheads and missiles that it keeps in secret locations. The news of rebuilding at Tongchang-ri first emerged hours after Kim returned home on yesterday from Hanoi. Speaking to lawmakers behind closed doors at South Korea’s National Assembly today, officials from its National Intelligence Service indicated that North Korea had been rebuilding the Tongchang-ri facilities even before the Hanoi summit meeting, South Korean news media reported. North Korea may have wanted to rebuild them in order to make their dismantling more dramatic if the Hanoi summit produced a deal with the Americans, the intelligence officials were quoted as saying. Or it may have wanted the option to resume rocket tests if the Hanoi talks broke down, they said. The Tongchang-ri facilities have been vital to North Korea’s space and missile programs. The country has used the facilities there to launch satellite-carrying rockets. The United States has called the satellite program a front for developing intercontinental ballistic missiles. Reports published on the rebuilding at Tongchang-ri were based on satellite images obtained March 2, but analysts said the work could have begun as early as mid-February. “Based on commercial satellite imagery, efforts to rebuild these structures started sometime between February 16 and March 2, 2019,” 38 North, a website specializing in North Korea analysis, said in a report about the Tongchang-ri facilities today. “On the launchpad, the rail-mounted transfer building is being reassembled,” it said. “At the engine test stand, it appears that the engine support structure is being reassembled.” Beyond Parallel, a website run by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, published a report with similar assessments today. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Koreans Start to Rebuild Launching Site,” New York Times, March 6, 2019, p. A-4)
The second North Korean nuclear site that President Donald Trump wanted eliminated were the covert underground highly enriched uranium facilities at Bungang, just a few kilometers away from Yongbyon, according to multiple sources familiar with last week’s summit in Hanoi. In a post-summit press conference, Trump said the United States knew about “every inch” of North Korea and that at the summit he “brought many, many points up that [he] think[s] the North Koreans] were surprised that we knew,” in reference to U.S. demands for denuclearization measures from Pyongyang that went beyond dismantling the nuclear complex at Yongbyon. Ri Yong-ho, the North’s foreign minister who took part in the closed-door discussions at the summit, also confirmed the Americans had demanded “one more measure” in addition to scrapping the Yongbyon facilities which they could not accept. Disagreement on demolishing a second plant is believed to have been a crucial sticking point in Hanoi. According to sources, the additional site flagged by the United States is the previously unreported underground facilities just west of Bungang Station, located in the same county as the well-known Yongbyon nuclear complex in North Pyongan Province. “The Bungang complex is situated just northeast of the existing Yongbyon complex,” one source said. “The North Koreans appear to have built an underground highly enriched uranium factory there to prevent detection from abroad.” The sources attest that the United States assumed Bungang would be included in the North Koreans’ promise to dismantle the Yongbyon complex, as it is just adjacent to the sprawling enrichment facilities there. But the North, apparently surprised at the United States’ knowledge of the site if Trump was to be taken at his word, did not accept Bungang as part of that deal, given that it is technically separate from Yongbyon despite being only a few kilometers away. The episode evidently demonstrates that the United States and North Korea have different views about the scope of the Yongbyon complex. The sources added that the facilities at Bungang are much bigger than those the North Koreans showed Dr. Siegfried Hecker — a Stanford professor and former director of the Los Alamos weapons laboratory in New Mexico — during his visit to the Yongbyon site in 2010.
Hecker, one of the leading experts on North Korea’s nuclear program who visited Yongbyon four times, estimated that around 2,000 centrifuges — through which uranium is enriched — were in operation at the complex. In comparison, intelligence officials in South Korea and the United States estimate that the nearby Bungang complex could be housing over 10,000 centrifuges. “The [facilities at Bungang] are older than those seen by Dr. Hecker,” one source said, “but it appears U.S. intelligence officials have been slow to identify them due to their covert location underground.” The only other public mention of Bungang dates back to a 2010 article by Dong-A Ilbo published shortly after Hecker’s visit to Yongbyon that raised the possibility the North was covertly operating another reprocessing center underneath a nearby mountain in Sowi-ri — in a place the North calls the Bungang laborers’ district. Intelligence agencies in South Korea and the United States in 2008 had already identified Sowui-ri as a possible uranium enrichment plant, the report read. Officials in South Korea on Tuesday, however, appeared to have stepped back from JoongAng Ilbo’s exclusive report on Bungang. Seoul’s Defense Ministry said Bungang merely referred to another area of Yongbyon County separate from where key nuclear facilities were located, implying it did not contain a covert plant. The head of Seoul’s spy agency, Suh Hoon, said at a closed-door briefing to legislators that South Korean and U.S. intelligence officials were “looking into” any further nuclear related facilities in North Korea in detail, but added the 5 MW reactor at Yongbyon had been inactive since the end of last year and no further reprocessing activities appeared to be taking place. “The Punggye-ri nuclear test site also shows no notable activity since its dismantlement last May,” Suh said. (Jeong Yong-soo, Baek Min-jeong, and Shim Kyu-seok, “North Korea’s Secret Enrichment Site Is Right Next to Yongbyon: Sources,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 6, 2019)
National Security Adviser John Bolton has warned that North Korea will face tougher sanctions if it continues to refuse to denuclearize, a remark that risks renewing tensions with Pyongyang. Despite a failure to strike a summit deal in Hanoi last week, he emphasized, time is on Washington’s side. “If they’re not willing to do it, President (Donald) Trump has been very clear they’re not getting relief from the crushing economic sanctions that have been imposed on them,” he said in an interview with the Fox Business Network this evening. “And we’ll look at ramping those sanctions up, in fact.” Bolton said the U.S. wouldn’t “buy the same pony that they’ve sold to previous administrations” and urged North Korea “to go back and reassess their strategy.” He said if Trump had accepted Kim’s offer, it would have “given North Korea a lifeline, giving them a chance to get their breath back economically while potentially still concealing a lot of nuclear weapons capabilities, missiles and the rest of it.” He added the ball is in North Korea’s court, reiterating that the U.S. still wants dialogue and will wait for positive signs from Pyongyang. “We’re going to see a lot of potential decisions coming out of North Korea, whether they’re serious about the talks, whether they want to get back into them and fundamentally whether they’re committed to giving up their nuclear weapons program and everything associated with it,” he said. Bolton, known to be hawkish on North Korea, said Trump did “the right thing” in Hanoi but remains open to nuclear talks with Kim. Speaking separately to Fox News Radio, the official said, “He’s still got the door open, they could have a bright, economic future — just give up all your weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.” Bolton earlier said that he “submitted a large document with the requirements for denuclearization,” written in both Korean and English, to North Korea — the so-called “big deal” document. (Yonhap, “Bolton Warns N. Korea of Tougher Sanctions,” March 6, 2019)
: UN Panel of Experts: “The nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remain intact and the country continues to defy Security Council resolutions through a massive increase in illegal ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products and coal. These violations render the latest United Nations sanctions ineffective by flouting the caps on the import of petroleum products and crude oil by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as well as the coal ban, imposed in 2017 by the Security Council in response to the country’s unprecedented nuclear and ballistic missile testing. In addition to information provided to the Panel by several Member States on ship-to-ship transfers, one Member State indicated, while queried by another, that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had already procured over 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum products in 2018. Global banks and insurance companies continue to unwittingly facilitate payments and provide coverage for vessels involved in ever-larger, multi-million-dollar, illegal ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products, as well as an increasing number of ship-to-ship coal transfers and attempted transshipments. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continues to violate the arms embargo and has attempted to supply small arms and light weapons and other military equipment to Houthi rebels in Yemen, as well as to Libya and the Sudan, via foreign intermediaries, including Syrian arms trafficker Hussein al-Ali in the case of the Houthi rebels. The Panel continued investigations into designated entities and individuals in Asia who clandestinely procured centrifuges for the nuclear program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and attempted to sell a wide range of military equipment to armed groups and Governments in the Middle East and Africa. The Panel investigated the involvement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in gold mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the construction of a military camp in Sierra Leone and the sale of fishing rights in the waters surrounding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as well as activities of designated entities and other prohibited activities around the world. The Panel also investigated the acquisition by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of leading luxury brand goods, such as Rolls-Royce, Mercedes-Benz and Lexus vehicles. The world’s largest container shipping line continued to unwittingly transport prohibited items later seized by Member States. Financial sanctions remain some of the most poorly implemented and actively evaded measures of the sanctions regime. Individuals empowered to act as extensions of financial institutions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea operate in at least five countries with seeming impunity. The Reconnaissance General Bureau continues its international financial operations by transferring funds from accounts closed in the European Union to those held at financial institutions in Asia. The global operations of Glocom and the Malaysia-Korea Partners Group of Companies (MKP) continue despite the Panel’s past reporting on their illicit activities and show the ongoing use of overseas companies and individuals to obfuscate income-generating activities for the regime of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel also investigated companies acting as possible cooperative entities or joint ventures, some of which are officially registered as joint ventures and others that more actively conceal the nature of their collaboration with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. A number of these entities have also violated other provisions of the resolutions, including by maintaining links to designated entities. The Panel also investigated the sophisticated cyberattacks carried out by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea against multiple Member States to evade financial sanctions. Ship-to-ship transfers involve increasingly advanced evasion techniques. The disguising of vessels through ship identity theft and false Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions is not being taken into account by most global and regional commodity trading companies, banks and insurers, whose due diligence efforts fall extremely short. The manipulation of vessel AIS transmissions remains an overarching feature of illegal transfers, contrary to International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations governing safety of life at sea, which require that AIS be in operation at all times. This highlights weak monitoring by flag States. In addition, insurers do not monitor the AIS of the vessels for which they provide coverage and services. Other methods of evasion include physical disguise of tankers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the use of small, unregistered vessels, illegal name-changing and other forms of identity fraud, night transfers and the use of additional vessels for transshipment. In addition to evading sanctions, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its maritime fleet are systematically violating the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, routinely engaging in double-flagging and providing safe harbor for hijacked ships. The Panel inspected seized vessels engaged in prohibited coal trades, documenting ship identity laundering, whereby the owners had deceived IMO into providing new vessel identity numbers to avoid repeat detection. The Panel found that ports and airports in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were being used for rampant violations of the resolutions, ranging from illegal oil imports and coal exports to the smuggling of bulk cash by nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Furthermore, the Panel found that the country was using civilian facilities, including airports, for ballistic missile assembly and testing with the goal of effectively preventing “decapitation” strikes. Diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continue to play a key role in sanctions evasion. While some Member States have limited the number of bank accounts of the country’s embassies and diplomats as required by the resolutions, the latter are evading this provision by controlling accounts in multiple countries, including those to which they are not accredited. Diplomats and representatives of designated entities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea also circumvent the assets freeze and the limit on the number of diplomatic bank accounts by holding accounts in the name of family members and front companies and by establishing accounts in multiple jurisdictions. Diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continue to travel under false accreditation in their passports and have also facilitated the country’s efforts to illegally export large quantities of coal through transshipment to disguise the origin. Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations have expressed concern that despite the exemption provisions in the resolutions and the Committee’s efforts, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations continue to experience difficulties in meeting critical life-saving needs of vulnerable populations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. … Ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products by foreign-flagged vessels using flags of convenience … have increased in scope, scale and sophistication, with more than 50 vessels and 160 associated companies under investigation. … On 17 September 2018, the United States informed the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) that “at least an additional 59 tanker deliveries to the DPRK have occurred from June 1 through to August 18 bringing the 2018 total to at least 148 deliveries, all of which involved deliveries to North Korean ports to unload refined petroleum products procured through UN-prohibited STS transfers. … While the Panel lacks the definitive evidence to conclude that the cap has been breached, since September 2018, it has nevertheless obtained evidence of the increasing frequency of ship-to-ship transfers and of one unprecedented prohibited petroleum product transfer comprising 57,623.491 barrels alone, worth $5,730,886. … The Panel found that the prohibited transfer by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its fishing rights, as clarified in resolution 2397 (2017), continued throughout 2018, acting as a potential source of income for the country. The Panel analyzed two Member State reports, noting that during the period from January to November 2018, they had inspected more than 15 Chinese fishing vessels that were found to be carrying fishing licenses of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. … (UN, Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), S/2019/171, March 5, 2019)
Sigal: “The Hanoi Summit failed because both US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un overreached, demanding too much and offering too little. Yet each side put enough on the negotiating table for the makings of a deal. The need now is to resume talks—the sooner the better, perhaps with South Korea’s help—with the aim of having both sides offer a little more for a little more. The summit story is now trickling out. In a useful first draft of history, the right-hand lead story in The New York Times by David Sanger and Edward Wong on Saturday, March 2 reveals the crux of the collapse: “In a dinner at the Metropole Hotel [on February 27]…Mr. Kim had resisted what Mr. Trump presented as a grand bargain: North Korea would trade all its nuclear weapons, material and facilities for an end to the American-led sanctions squeezing its economy…Mr. Kim also miscalculated. He bet Mr. Trump might accept a more modest offer that American negotiators in Hanoi had already dismissed: The North would dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear complex, three square miles of aging facilities at the heart of the nuclear program, for an end to the sanctions most harmful to its economy, those enacted since 2016.” It is essential to unpack what Sanger reported. Some were quick to blame summitry. Sanger made this case explicit in his story a day earlier: “The split underscored the risk of leader-to-leader diplomacy: When it fails, there are few places to go, no higher-up to step in and cut a compromise that saves the deal. In this case, the price may be high—especially if Mr. Kim responds to the failure by further accelerating his production of nuclear fuel and a frustrated Mr. Trump swings from his expressions of “love” for the North Korean dictator and back to the “fire and fury” language of early in his presidency. ‘No deal is better than a bad deal, and the president was right to walk,’ said Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations. “But this should not have happened,” he said. ‘A busted summit is the risk you run when too much faith is placed in personal relations with a leader like Kim, when the summit is inadequately prepared, and when the president had signaled he was confident of success.’” Similar stories appeared throughout the news media, along with relief in some circles that President Trump didn’t give away the store for the sake of just any deal. Yet leader-to-leader diplomacy had its benefits as well as risks. North Korea is not like other states. It is extremely centralized. All authoritative decisions come from the very top down and anyone who contravenes them does so at his peril. Secretary of State Pompeo understood this rationale for summitry: “And when you’re dealing with a country that is the nature of North Korea, it is often the case that only the most senior leaders have the capacity to make those important decisions.” Kim Jong Un’s engagement is critical to moving a sclerotic policy process. The US system is very different, but summitry still serves a useful purpose. With its dispersion of power and intense political rivalries, especially in the chaotic Trump administration, the president’s interest in a second summit meeting created an action-forcing process that engaged the time and attention of his senior officials, leading to many useful changes in the US negotiating position in the weeks leading up to the summit. This process made advances possible. Given the intense establishment, partisan and bureaucratic opposition to various inducements, a comprehensive package solution was politically impossible to muster, which made a detailed road map to denuclearization out of the question. Instead, Washington adopted a step-by-step approach that, if implemented, would engender a modicum of mutual trust. Critics have focused on the rushed last-minute preparations for the second summit. That critique ignores the preceding months of meetings between the two sides’ diplomatic and intelligence officials, which gave Washington a better appreciation of Pyongyang’s bottom line: US movement to end enmity and reconcile with it in order to reduce its political and economic dependence on China. Sanctions relief alone would not satisfy the North; the overall relationship will have to be addressed, including its security needs. That was clear from the Singapore Summit last June, when both sides pledged in the joint statement to “establish new US-DPRK relations” and “build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.” Hanoi was an especially suitable locale for underscoring the end of enmity given Vietnam’s fraught history with China and its postwar reconciliation with the United States. “The success of the Vietnamese economy is due to its decision to normalize relations with the United States in 1995,” Maj. Gen. Le Van Cuong, former director of the Institute of Strategic Studies at the Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security, told the Times. “I would say to our North Korean friends that as long as they have a conflict with the United States, they will not be able to develop their economy properly,” General Cuong said, adding, “China will try every possible tactic to keep North Korea in its arms because it wants a country to control.” “Luckily, North Korea has the necessary conditions to escape China’s grip if it deepens its relationship with America.” On the way to the summit, Washington moved to address Pyongyang’s concerns. The first step was suspension and then scaling down of large-scale joint exercises on the Korean Peninsula, which was done at the president’s behest. The next step came during Pompeo’s return visit to Pyongyang in October 2018. At an earlier meeting that July, as Sanger reports, “Mr. Kim declined to see him.” Sanger does not say why, but a likely reason is that Pompeo was not authorized to put on the negotiating table US willingness to commit to declaring an end to the Korean War, as Kim had been led to expect at the Singapore Summit, so Kim snubbed him. Without that commitment, Pompeo’s next planned visit that August was called off, lest it result in another failed mission and no meeting with Kim. Without that commitment, the North Koreans would also not meet with the newly named US Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun. Finally, in early October, after word reached Pyongyang that Washington was prepared to make that commitment, Pompeo returned to put the end-of-war declaration on the negotiating table and spent over five hours with Kim. In the course of those meetings, Biegun told an audience at Stanford University, Kim, in an unprecedented offer, committed “to the dismantlement and destruction of North Korea’s plutonium and uranium enrichment facilities…‘and more.’” Kim, however, told Pompeo he was unwilling to provide a complete inventory of nuclear and missile assets and their locations, lest they be attacked. In another useful step, Washington then decided to phase in the inventory declaration instead, as Vice President Mike Pence hinted on November 15. Critics may carp but the administration is right to phase in that inventory declaration, starting with the location of its plutonium reactors, reprocessing and enrichment sites. Before seeking an accounting of fissile material and number of weapons, it is prudent to seek access to these locations as well as the North’s nuclear-weapons test sites, its uranium mines, its ore refining plants, and its uranium hexafluoride plant to take various measurements that better enable it to assess how much fissile material the North could have produced. This nuclear archeology will reduce uncertainty. Since US intelligence estimates vary widely, any number the North would turn over of its stockpiled fissile material is certain to be controversial, as was the case in the initial declaration to the IAEA in 1992, which is now nearly forgotten but for years complicated efforts to contain the growing security threat posed by North Korea’s continued fissile material and missile production and testing. During the run-up to this year’s summit, the United States also offered to exchange liaison offices in the two countries’ capitals, which Kim accepted in Hanoi. And it had scaled back joint military exercises on or near the Korean Peninsula. Where Washington fell short was sanctions relief. It had recently approved several exemptions from UN Security Council sanctions for NGOs to resume delivery of humanitarian aid. It was also prepared to relax some US sanctions, or as Biegun hinted at Stanford, “We didn’t say we won’t do anything until you do everything.” While it was willing to offer some of what Pyongyang wanted, as Biegun laid out, Washington still demanded a lot more in return. It wanted the verifiable suspension of all fissile material production throughout North Korea with a commitment to dismantle the production sites after measurements of production were taken. It sought a halt to production of ballistic missiles that could reach Japan and beyond. And it wanted access to other sites for nuclear archeology. On the eve of the summit, US negotiators narrowed their focus to suspending all the fissile material production with a written commitment to their ultimate dismantlement, as Kim Jong Un told Pompeo. But DPRK negotiators fell short of offering that while seeking excessive sanctions relief in return. As Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho explained in a post-summit press conference in Hanoi: “[I]f the United States lifts a part of the United Nations [UN] sanctions, in other words, the provision of sanctions that impact the civilian economy and people’s living standards, then we will permanently, completely dismantle entire nuclear materials production facilities of Yongbyon area, including plutonium and uranium, through a joint work of technicians from both countries in the presence of US experts. What we proposed was not the complete lifting of sanctions, but their partial lifting. In particular, out of the 11 UN sanctions resolutions all together, we proposed the lifting of the five groups first from those that were adopted from 2016 to 2017, especially the articles that impede the civilian economy and the people’s livelihood among them.” Ri seemed to rule out a missile production halt or access to other sites for now, never mind a grand bargain, by saying, “Given the current level of trust between the two countries of [North] Korea and the United States, this is the biggest stride of denuclearization measure that we can take at the present stage.” He also cast doubt on shutting down a suspect uranium enrichment site: “[D]uring the talks, the United States held out for a claim until the end that one more thing, other than the measure for dismantlement of the nuclear facilities of the Yongbyon area, needs to be done and thus, it became clear that the United States is not prepared to accommodate our offer. At this stage, it is hard to say here whether a better agreement, than what we have offered, could be reached.” A background briefing by a senior State Department official offered an expansive, perhaps excessive, interpretation of the North Korean demands on sanctions: “[I]f you review the UN Security Council resolutions you’ll see that includes—the sanctions themselves include a broad range of products, including metals, raw materials, transportation, seafood, coal exports, refined petroleum imports, raw petroleum imports. We asked the North Koreans to clarify for us what they meant…and it was basically all the sanctions except for armaments.” The situation seems to have changed during the summit after the DPRK’s offer fell short of what Kim had told Pompeo last October. Some attribute the shift to Michael Cohen’s testimony before Congress. “Trump could have had a small deal,” Joseph Yun, the former State Department special envoy for North Korea, told Sanger. “Close a few sites, and lift a few sanctions. But because of Cohen, the president needed a big deal.” In either event, it was an opening for President Trump to up the ante and ensure the rejection of a deal. The senior State Department official hinted that the US ask included chemical and biological weapons: “[T]he dilemma that we were confronted with is that the North Koreans at this point are unwilling to impose a complete freeze on their weapons of mass destruction programs…The President in his discussions challenged the North Koreans to go bigger.” The summit was a disappointment, not a disaster. With both sides wanting far more than they were prepared to concede in return, the gap between them widened. Now the task is to close that gap. Shutting down all the fissile material production facilities in Yongbyon is not enough. The North will have to suspend fissile material production at all sites and commit to dismantling them once measurements are taken to gauge how much they might have produced. Pyongyang will also need to do what they were prepared to do in Hanoi. As Foreign Minister Ri revealed, “During the meeting, we expressed our intent to make a commitment on a permanent suspension of nuclear testing and long-range rocket launch tests in writing in order to lower the concerns of the United States.” Carrying out these commitments will, in turn, require much more sanctions relief than Washington has yet offered, including an exemption for reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex jointly operated by the North and South and resumption of South Korean tourism at Mount Kumgang in the North, an increased UN quota for oil imports to the North, and ending the US Trading with the Enemy Act sanctions, which previous presidents eased and then re-imposed. The administration needs to test whether relaxing sanctions will yield more than tightening them, making North Korea more dependent on South Korea than on China for a change. In short, the makings of a first stage deal are there. As Secretary of State Pompeo put it, “There has to be a theory of the case of how to move forward. I’m confident there is one.” He did not say, but going back to a step-by-step approach is essential. Washington needs to stop swinging for the fences and remember that singles and doubles drive in many more runs. (Leon V. Sigal, “Picking up the Pieces from Hanoi,” 38 North, March 5, 2019)
3/6/19:
President Trump expressed his displeasure at the prospect of new testing. “I would be very disappointed if that were happening,” the president said at the White House on Wednesday when asked about reports on the North Korean missile facilities. “It’s a very early report, and we’re the ones that put it out. But I would be very, very disappointed in Chairman Kim. And I don’t think I will be, but we’ll see what happens. We’ll take a look. It’ll ultimately get solved.” Officially, both sides remain committed to dialogue, with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo expressing hope that the United States will send a delegation to North Korea “in the next couple weeks.” And this week, Washington canceled two major joint military exercises with South Korea to keep the diplomatic momentum alive. (Choe Sang-hun, “Sanctions’ Burn May Force Kim Back to the Table,” New York Times, March 7, 2019, p. A-1)
Liu, Buck and Town: “Commercial satellite imagery from March 6 of North Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launching Station (Tongchang-ri) indicates construction to rebuild the launch pad and engine test stand that began before the Hanoi Summit has continued at a rapid pace. Given that construction plus activity at other areas of the site, Sohae appears to have returned to normal operational status. At the launch pad, work on the rail-mounted transfer structure appears to have been completed by March 6 and the structure may now be operational. The cranes have been removed from the pad and the overhead trusses that were being installed on the roof have been covered. The mobile structure is now situated at the far end of the launch pad adjacent to the checkout building. Several vehicles are parked near the gantry tower and the exhaust pit and debris remains on the launch pad to be cleaned up. At the engine test stand, poor imagery resolution prevents a clear assessment. However, progress has been made on rebuilding the support structure for the stand, the materials that were there as of March 2 are now gone and debris remains littered across the service apron. At other areas of the site, activity has also picked up. Vehicles can be seen at the horizontal assembly building and the security administration building. There is also a vehicle parked near the observation building. It is not possible to determine the purpose of these vehicles. “(Jack Liu, Irv Buck and Jenny Town, “North Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launch Facility: Normal Operations May Have Resumed,” 38 North, March 7, 2019)
3/7/19:
The U.S. still believes the “fully verified denuclearization” of North Korea is possible by the end of President Donald Trump’s “first term,” a senior official said Thursday, despite warnings a key rocket launch site appears to have resumed operations. The official confirmed that Washington would seek from Pyongyang “clarifications on the purposes” of rebuilding the site, adding so far the US has not reached “any specific conclusion about what’s happening there.” “We’re watching in real time, as you are, the developments at Sohae,” he explained, adding: “We don’t know why they are taking these steps.” Kim had agreed to shutter Sohae at a summit with the South’s President Moon Jae-in in Pyongyang as part of confidence-building measures, and satellite pictures in August suggested workers were dismantling the engine test stand. Trump equivocated when asked today if he was disappointed about the news. “We’ll see,” he said. “We’ll let you know in about a year.” The president had declared that it was “too early” to tell if a previous report about activity at the site was true, but said he would be “very, very disappointed in Chairman Kim” if the intelligence checked out. US media had speculated over whether Trump might tighten the thumbscrews on Pyongyang following the Vietnam summit, by ratcheting up an already crippling sanctions regime. State Department spokesman Robert Palladino affirmed Washington’s commitment to stay engaged with Kim, however, telling journalists today the administration was ready for “constructive negotiation.” Palladino would not say if Washington had been in contact with Pyongyang over Sohae, situated on North Korea’s northwest coast, or the aborted summit. And despite the apparent setback, the senior official insisted “we still believe this (denuclearization) is all achievable within the president’s first term.” Unless re-elected, Trump’s term will end in January 2021. “We have sufficient time,” they said, without mentioning a deadline for reaching an agreement so the goal could be met. “Where we really need to see progress and we need to see it soon is meaningful and verifiable steps on denuclearization as quickly as we can,” the official added. “We are mindful that every day the challenge is greater, the threat posed … is not going away.” (Francesco Fontemaggi, “U.S. Positive on Denuclearization despite ‘Operational’ Rocket Site,” AFP, March 7, 2019) President Donald Trump is open to more talks with North Korea over denuclearization, his national security adviser said today, despite reports it is reactivating parts of its missile program. White House National Security Adviser John Bolton, who has argued for a tough approach to North Korea, said Trump was still open to more talks with the country. “The president’s obviously open to talking again. We’ll see when that might be scheduled or how it might work out,” he told Fox News, adding it was too soon to make a determination on the reports of the North Korean activity. “We’re going to study the situation carefully. As the president said, it would be very, very disappointing if they were taking this direction.” Asked today if he was disappointed about recent North Korean activity, Trump told reporters: “It’s disappointing,” while adding without elaborating: “We’ll see. We’ll let you know in about a year.” North Korea’s state media, which had focused its reporting on the “constructive” talks between the leaders, reported for the first time on March 8 that the summit ended with no agreement. Rodong Sinmun accused Japan of trying to “disturb” North Korea’s relations with the United States and said Japan had “applauded” the breakdown of the summit while the rest of the world regretted it. A senior State Department official told reporters today that Washington was keen to resume talks as soon as possible, but North Korea’s negotiators needed to be given more latitude than they were ahead of the summit. He said no one in the U.S. administration advocated the incremental approach that North Korea has been seeking and the condition for its integration into the global economy, a transformed relationship with the United States and a permanent peace regime, was complete denuclearization. “Fundamentally, where we really need to see the progress, and we need to see it soon, is on meaningful and verifiable steps on denuclearization. That’s our goal and that’s how we see these negotiations picking up momentum.” The official said the U.S. side still saw North Korea’s complete denuclearization as achievable within Trump’s current term, which ends in January 2021. While the official said he would “not necessarily share the conclusion” that the Sohae site was operational again, any use of it would be seen as “backsliding” on commitments to Trump. “We are watching in real-time developments at Sohae and we will definitely be seeking clarification on the purposes of that,” he said. South Korean spy chief Suh Hoon told lawmakers in Seoul that cargo vehicles were spotted moving around a North Korean ICBM factory at Sanumdong recently, JoongAng Ilbo reported. The paper also quoted Suh as saying North Korea had continued to run its uranium enrichment facility at the main Yongbyon nuclear complex after Trump and Kim’s first summit in Singapore last June. The Sanumdong factory produced the Hwasong-15 ICBM, which can fly more than 13,000 km (8,080 miles). After a test flight in 2017, North Korea declared the completion of its “state nuclear force” before pursuing talks with South Korea and the United States last year. Some analysts see the work as aimed at pressing Washington to agree to a deal, rather than as a definite move to resume tests. A U.S. government source, who did not want to be identified, said North Korea’s plan in rebuilding the site could have been to offer a demonstration of good faith by conspicuously stopping again if a summit pact was struck, while furnishing a sign of defiance or resolve if the meeting failed. Yesterday, Bolton warned of new sanctions if North Korea did not scrap its weapons program. Despite his sanctions talk, there have been signs across Asia that the U.S. “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign against North Korea has sprung leaks. In a new breach, three South Korean companies were found to have brought in more than 13,000 tons of North Korean coal, worth 2.1 billion won ($2 million) since 2017, South Korea said. The Chinese government’s top diplomat, State Councillor Wang Yi, referring on Friday to international tension over North Korea, said a “resolution could not be reached overnight”. “All parties should have reasonable expectations on this,” Wang told a news briefing. (David Brunnstrom and Hyunhee Shin, “U.S. Open to North Korea Talks despite Missile Program Activity,” Reuters, March 8, 2019)
Biegun background briefing: “SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: … The Singapore summit does remain very relevant to our discussions because that summit joint statement laid out the framework that we’ve been using to pursue negotiations with the North Koreans over the past many months. We went through a bit of a holding pattern with the North Koreans in the fall of last year, but we’ve been at a pretty active pace — in fact, the most robust pace — of diplomacy between the United States and North Korea in many, many years, since the — since Christmas and through the new year. I, myself, have made several trips to the region. I have had the opportunity, with the Secretary of State, to participate in discussions that we had here in Washington, D.C. in mid-January with Kim Yong-chol, the Secretary of State’s counterpart in the North Korean diplomacy. We have had working-level negotiations between the United States and North Korea on several occasions now, most recently in the run-up to the Hanoi summit. A team of U.S. negotiators has made a trip to Pyongyang, where over several days in-depth discussions took place in early February. And we had quite a bit of interaction between our North Korean counterparts and the U.S., as I said, in the days leading up — in the week leading up the President’s summit with Kim Jong-un. Throughout those negotiations, it’s largely been the same set of parties on both sides involved in these discussions. And as the President and the Secretary of State summed up at the end of the Hanoi summit, we have managed to close gaps on a number of issues in the U.S.-North Korea relationship. There are still important areas for us to progress, none more so than in the area of denuclearization. But the summit itself also provided us a very important opportunity at the senior levels of government to have an important exchange that lays out at least the options that we have to move forward on this issue, although ultimately at the conclusion of the summit, the ball was in North Korea’s court. And it is going to be up to the North Koreans, to some extent, to decide to engage on meeting some of the expectations that are out there on denuclearization. I think I’ll leave that, leave the framing at that, and then I’m going to ask [Moderator] if [Moderator] would help me here to call on questions, since [Moderator] is much more familiar with you than me. MODERATOR: Point of clarification. Singapore summit was in 2017. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: What year did I say? It’s 2018. It was June of 2018. … Q: Andrea Mitchell from NBC. There have been satellite images — two more identified today. Two think tanks are saying that it shows that a particular site that had been discussed in Singapore, and which the North Koreans, according to the President, had agreed to dismantle in Singapore and had been dormant since August is now fully operational — no sign of anything being put on a launchpad, but operational, that there had been a lot of activity in recent days or weeks. They are interpreting this to mean a symbol — a signal that — SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Who’s “they?” Q: These experts at CSIS and at 38 North are interpreting this to mean that Kim Jong-un wants to send a message — he knows we’re watching; it’s commercial satellite imagery — that he’s angry about not getting more sanction relief offered, and that it’s a response to Hanoi. Do you interpret this imagery the same way? Do you interpret the — Kim Jong-un’s response at all, and has there been any discussions about this issue? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So we are familiar and well aware of what you’re describing. We obviously watch very closely developments in North Korea, both in open source and sensitive areas, and we have seen the open source reporting on this issue. We have not drawn the same conclusions that you cited, although it remains to be seen what exactly the purpose is of this activity. I think you heard the President’s comments yesterday that he would be disappointed, very disappointed, if this was in any way backsliding against commitments that the North Koreans have made to date, and we would very much see it as that if they use this facility in any capacity, because it is one that they have cited their intention to dismantle. I have also seen in that open source analysis — and I wouldn’t contradict it — that it’s likely that these steps were happening prior to this summit in Singapore … and were that the case, it would be very difficult to establish a causality between the outcome of a summit in which the North Koreans came to the table very much expecting a certain outcome and any steps that were taken. That’s not to rule out the possibility. We simply haven’t reached any specific conclusion about what’s happening there, nor would we necessarily share the conclusion — at least, I don’t have information that would support that that site is at this point, quote, “operational,” unquote. Q: Would — can I just clarify about what your conclusion is? Would you accept the conclusion that there is a lot of activity that was not seen during months of it being dormant? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We watch all of — we watch as much of North — as the President has said, we watch as much of North Korea as we can see, and we are not always able to explain activity that happens. We have not — we clearly see in the commercial satellite photography that there is some level of reassembly going on in these buildings, so I’m not disputing what’s in plain sight. Why it’s happening, for what purpose it’s happening, are areas that we’re not ready yet to reach a conclusion, but suffice it to say the President has spoken quite clearly on this, that he would be disappointed — in fact, I think he said very disappointed — if this, in fact, did turn out to be backsliding on commitments that had been previously made to him. MODERATOR: Let’s go to Michael Gordon. Q: Sir, just to clarify, would you interpret a launch of a space launch vehicle to be a violation of North Korea’s self-declared moratorium on missile launches? I ask that in light of the U.S. experience with the Leap Day Accord, where the North Koreans interpreted a space launch as consistent with a moratorium on missile launches. And have you conveyed that to them? Have you told them that if they launch a space launch vehicle, it would be considered to be a breach of their missile launch moratorium? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So I won’t — I’m not going to elaborate on things that we might have discussed in privately with the North Koreans, but let me just say in our judgment, launch of a space launch vehicle from that site in our view would be inconsistent with the commitments that the North Koreans have made. MODERATOR: Let’s go to New York Times, David Sanger. Q: Thanks very much for doing this. Good to see you. If — just following on Andrea and Michael’s question here, you suggested that a lot of this activity had been going on prior to the summit, which seems reasonable, given all of the other reports we were seeing over the months from — between Singapore and the Hanoi summit. So first of all, in your view, did any of the activity that you were seeing on the satellites run counter to any commitments that you had gotten in Singapore or in your conversations with them since? And — SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: On the satellites, to deal — Q: Right, so from the satellites what you’ve seen are expansions of missile bases. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: You mean from the commercial photography? Is that what you’re referring to? Q: The commercial photography, right. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Okay. Q: Okay. So the first question is: did you — was any of this inconsistent? Second, have the North Koreans in any way explained this activity, even if to say we never told you we would stop doing this? And thirdly, the President, during the press conference, talked a bit about the second enrichment facility, which was obviously outside of Yongbyon and therefore a concern, given the Yongbyon proposal that President Kim made. Have you addressed that particular issue? Because that is obviously the one that would continue production in a significant way even if they closed Yongbyon. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So, David, first let me correct your characterization of what I said to Andrea. I said that we have also seen in the open-source reports suggestions that this activity had started prior to the Singapore — prior to the Hanoi summit. Q: And you agree with that? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: That’s — I’m just telling you what I saw. I saw the reports, and that’s what they suggest. So that’s what we’re talking about here. Obviously, I’m not going to talk about intelligence information in this setting. As far as your second question, the President communicated to the North Koreans yesterday — the President suggested publicly, in front of the entire world, that he would be disappointed, very disappointed, if they were taking steps that would represent backsliding from commitments previously made. The North Koreans in fact not only mentioned the disassembly and dismantlement and destruction of this site, which is variously known as Sohae, or Tongchang-ri, or in some cases (inaudible) — the President not only received that commitment from Kim Jong-un in Singapore, but likewise Chairman Kim made that commitment to President Moon Jae-in at the Pyongyang summit on September 19th, when the North-South summit occurred, and specifically declared a North Korean intent to destroy that facility and allow access to international — what they said at the time was international inspectors to the facility. We have pressed the North Koreans on moving forward with that step. I should say that the Tongchang-ri rocket engine and missile test site is not a critical part of North Korea’s nuclear infrastructure, but it is an important location where they tested many of their early ICBMs, and it is certainly a facility that, as part of our efforts on denuclearization, we would like to see completely dismantled and destroyed in a verifiable manner. You will know this from your previous coverage, that many of the more recent tests that the North Koreans made with their nuclear — excuse me, with their ICBMS — were actually from mobile launchers, or in sites outside of Tongchang-ri, or Sohae. So this is — I don’t want to under — I don’t want to diminish the concern that we would have if there is North Korean backsliding on commitments to dismantle and destroy Tongchang-ri, but I also don’t want to exaggerate the effect on their missile programs if we were to permanently disable and destroy it. It’s part of that infrastructure, but it is not a critical part of that infrastructure at this point. Q: Just to be clear on this, they never did allow the inspectors into Tongchang-ri, and they have committed as well, if I remember right, to the Secretary during one of his trips to Pyongyang that they would allow inspectors to the nuclear test site where they had blown up the entrances, that they would allow inspectors there, I think the Secretary said publicly. Did that ever happen? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, so that was Punggye-ri site, and your citation is correct; that was during Secretary Pompeo’s trip to Pyongyang. And in that case they declared in the meeting to the Secretary that they would do that in the presence of U.S. inspectors. I’m not sure there’s a consequence between the two constructs they used, but in the case of Punggye-ri they have also not yet permitted the admission of experts to confirm the destruction. Needless to say, these places are in open view and commercial satellite photography has achieved a level of excellence in which it’s possible, even for a reporter from The New York Times, to monitor developments at those sites. But in terms of destroying and dismantling those in a manner that’s fully verifiable and to our satisfaction, in neither case have those occurred yet. They haven’t used the facilities to date, but they also haven’t completed to our satisfaction the destruction or dismantlement. Q: So no inspectors at either location that they have committed to? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Correct. MODERATOR: Margaret Brennan. Q: Hi, thank you for doing this. Margaret Brennan from CBS. Two questions. One: Can you clarify what the President meant today when he said we’ll see in a year? He was asked in the Oval Office by some reporters shouting questions about North Korea, he said we’ll see in a year. And sort of part two to that is: Can give you us a sense of your timeline here? John Bolton has said it would take a year from the point that the North Koreans agree to our definition of denuclearization to actually dismantle everything. That was the timeline he said the U.S. had worked out. How much time do you have for the diplomacy to get to that point? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So, Margaret, I have been in a communications cocoon all day and I have no idea what was discussed today or what might have been in the news today. I’d suggest on that one you go to the White House and ask them for an explanation. I wasn’t part of that discussion. I — this is the first time — Q: You don’t know anything about a one-year limit on any of your work? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, what I would say more generally, and this is to your second question, is that we still believe this is all achievable within the President’s first term, and that’s the timetable we’re working on. We have discussed extensively the outlines of the calendar that allow us to do that, and it is doable. The — ultimately, the ultimate driver of this is not going to be the amount of days it takes. It’s going to be the degree to which we can satisfactorily achieve the steps that we feel are necessary to finally and fully verify the denuclearization of North Korea. That’s what we’re working for, but I fully believe at this point we have sufficient time in the President’s first term to do that. That’s a little more than a year. Originally, we set out the aggressive timetable for this to happen in a year, but we also aren’t at a starting point yet where I think you could reasonably begin to run that clock. We’re not going to be held to a limit of 365 days to get this done. It’s the job that’s going to drive the outcome, not the timing. But in our view it is still doable within the President’s first term, and that’s what we’re pushing very hard with our North Korean interlocutors to achieve. Q: But to be clear, you don’t know that the one year the President referred to was the dismantlement? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I don’t know — I don’t know what the President said at all. I could neither clarify nor contradict what the President said because I — this is the first time I’ve heard it. MODERATOR: David Brunnstrom. Q: Yeah, David Brunnstrom from Reuters. Thanks for doing this. I — have you been in direct contact yourself or have any of your colleagues been in contact with the North Koreans since the summit? And is there any possibility, as Secretary Pompeo suggested, that you could go back to Pyongyang in a couple of weeks? And also, do you agree with the suggestion by John Bolton that new sanctions may be necessary against North Korea to push this forward? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So on the communication and on the trips, to the extent that we have anything to say on those points, we will say them largely after the fact, not before the fact. But let me say that in terms of where we are with the North Koreans, we had a very constructive discussion with them in Hanoi and we left on very good terms. I think both sides agreed that the door remains open. Ultimately, the proof will be in the pudding. The North Koreans have only been — the North Korean delegation has only been back in Pyongyang for approximately 48 hours at this point. Because keep in mind, while many of us who were there flew back on our U.S. Government aircraft, the North Koreans spent an additional two days in Vietnam conducting a bilateral visit with their Vietnamese hosts, and that was followed by a 60-plus-hour train ride through China back to Pyongyang. So there will necessarily need to be a period of reflection here. Both sides are going to have to digest the outcome to the summit. We ourselves have thought through some next steps to build on the progress that we were able to make in the discussions over the last several weeks, and quite frankly, in the President’s discussions with Kim Jong-un as well. But there’s a lot of work that’s left to be done as well, particularly around the central issue for us, which is an agreement on the denuclearization that allows us to get to the end state that we aspire to. As far as what it would take, the sanctions remain in place. Whether the President ultimately decides to expand those sanctions is a decision I think would ultimately rise to the President’s level, but at this moment I would say the sanctions are still in place. I think they’re still having a crushing effect on the North Korean economy, and we continue to put our full efforts into policing and enforcing those sanctions because, as we all know well, there is a certain amount of leakage and evasion that has taken place with those sanctions. We’re looking to many of our international partners to work closely with us in that effort, and we are certain that we can maintain the economic pressure against North Korea that will make clear to the entire North Korean Government, but to Chairman Kim specifically, that there’s a clear choice to be made here, and if they choose to go in the direction that the President laid out to them in an expansive manner at the summit in Hanoi, then they can — they have a very bright future ahead of them. Otherwise, the pressure campaign will be maintained and if the President decides, the sanctions will be increased. MODERATOR: Let’s go to CNN. Q: Hi. Quick question just following up on two things that you’ve said. You said that it remains to be seen what the purpose of this activity is at Sohae. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: At Sohae. Mm-hmm. Q: Yeah. So how will you make that determination? Is it based on U.S. intelligence? Is it based on you straight up asking the North Koreans that are your counterparts? How will that determination be made? And then, my second question is you said that this all is achievable within the President’s first term. What exactly is “this all?” The deal or denuclearization of North Korea writ large? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So we’re watching in real time, as you are, developments at Sohae and we will definitely be seeking clarification on the purposes of that, and we’ll definitely be continuing to seek the admission of U.S. inspectors to the site to verify the permanent dismantlement and destruction. That’s our operating plan, and we’re going to continue to move forward with that regardless of what we see happening right now. The intent of the North Koreans in this matter is known only to them at this point. We don’t know why they’re taking these steps. We don’t know what they intend to do with it. But suffice it to say we’re watching closely and we expect them to abide by the commitments that they’ve made to the President of the United States. In terms of your second question, it was what? Q: You said, “We believe this all is achievable within the President’s first term.” SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, it’s quite — writ large, what I’m talking about is the finally, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea. That means taking out all their key — parts of their nuclear fuel cycle, removing all their fissile material, removing their nuclear warheads, removing or destroying all their intercontinental ballistic missiles, permanently freezing any other weapons of mass destruction programs, and moving them on a course to reorient their economy towards civilian pursuits in order to make this a permanent direction for their country. In exchange for that, what the North Koreans will be able to enjoy is integration into the global economy, a transformed relationship with the United States of America, a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and a closure to a 70-year relationship characterized by hostility and warfare between our two countries. … MODERATOR: Let’s go Washington Times. Q: Thanks so much for agreeing to interact with the free press. Can you say confidently — SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Grudgingly. (Laughter.) Q: No, we appreciate it. Can you say confidently that all of the different members of President Trump’s advisory team on the negotiations with North Korea were in agreement with the all-or-nothing strategy the President ultimately embraced in Hanoi? And I ask because there’s the appearance that Mr. Bolton may have had the most influence over the President’s decision not to embrace a more step-by-step approach that others on the team had advocated for in the weeks leading up to this summit. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So nobody in the administration advocates a step-by-step approach. In all cases, the expectation is a complete denuclearization of North Korea as a condition for all the other steps being — all the other steps being taken. It has very much been characteristic of past negotiations to take an incremental approach to this that stretches it out over a long period of time, and quite honestly, has failed on previous occasions to deliver the outcome that both sides at least ostensibly committed to. This would be in the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiations as well as in the Six-Party Talks. So we’re trying to do it differently here. The President has made abundantly clear to Chairman Kim that he’s personally invested in taking North Korea in this direction if North Korea gives up all of its weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivery. That’s a position that is supported by the entire interagency, … Q: Yeah, regarding the Yongbyon plus alpha, and the big deal that the U.S. suggested at the Hanoi, it’s not quite clear, because what North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho said was the U.S. side asked for one more. And South Korean media quoting sources say that this “one more” was (inaudible), the underground highly enriched uranium facility. And National Security Advisor John Bolton says that what the U.S. side offered was biochemical and all the WMD. So can you be more clear on what the U.S. side offered? Was it one more uranium facility or the entire WMD? And my second question is South Korea President Moon Jae-in told the National Security Council to speed up efforts to start tourists to Mount Kumgang and Kaesong Industrial Complex after the breakdown of the Hanoi summit. So is the State Department currently considering giving exemptions to the inter-Korean projects? Thank you. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So on your first question, I can’t clarify what Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho meant in his presentation, but I can certainly affirm what the President proposed to Chairman Kim, which was the complete elimination of their weapons of mass destruction program. So I’m not sure what Foreign Minister Ri meant by “one more thing,” but I will say that — to be clear too, the President’s vision wasn’t simply invested in what the North Koreans needed to do. The President likewise laid out an expansive vision for a brighter future that would be available for North Korea were it to make the right choices in this regard. I’m sorry. Your second question was? Q: Is the State Department currently considering giving exemptions to inter-Korean economic projects? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Okay. Yeah, I got it. No. MODERATOR: Please, right there. Barbara. … Q: Yeah. Just again to clarify your answer to this last question, the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction program means chemical, biological, and nuclear; is that correct? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes. Q: And then also, there have been reports today of a tremor, 2.1 degrees on the Richter scale, coming out of a mine shaft, and I wondered if you’re aware of the reports and what’s your take on them? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I saw the press reports. It’s nothing that is causing us any particular alarm right now … but we’ll continue to watch it. MODERATOR: Rich from Fox. Q: Thank you very much. In your conversations and lead-up to the Hanoi summit, did you feel as though you had exhausted your conversations with the North Korean team and reached an impasse? And with the lack of a written agreement in Hanoi, where does that leave you, and are you confident in hopefully having more discussions with the same North Korean team that you were speaking with prior to the summit? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So thank you. The discussions — the negotiations, really, with the North Koreans in the run-up to the summit were very productive. We covered a lot of areas. The area that we fell most short was on denuclearization and it was clear to us that our North Korean interlocutors had very little authority to move on the set of issues that were, in our view, central to the success of this outcome. We have a lot of areas that we can continue to discuss with the North Koreans, and we will continue to discuss with them when we next engage. But fundamentally, where we really need to see the progress and we need to see it soon is on meaningful and verifiable steps on denuclearization. That’s our goal and that’s how we see these negotiations picking up momentum. The — one of the — I suppose every system of government is unique, but the North Korean system is particularly different, and in that system, virtually any position that’s going to be explored in the course of negotiations is going to be driven from the top down. There’s no clever think tanks or op-ed writers or experts or former government officials who are going to float ideas that people might cling to or think about. The system very much is driven from the top down and the President understands this very much, and that’s why he seeks to direct engagement with Kim Jong-un to invest him in a shared vision of that brighter future that could happen if they denuclearize. In order for our North Korean counterparts to have more latitude, it’s clear they’re going to have to get direction and space from the top. They will not do that on their own. They will not test ideas at the negotiating table. So there’s an important interplay between the President’s summit meetings and the President’s direct engagement between summit meetings with Kim Jong-un and the amount of latitude that the negotiating teams at the working level are entrusted with in order to breathe life into some of these agreements. We need the North Korean negotiators to have much more latitude than they did in the run-up to the summit on denuclearization, but I’m confident that if they get that direction from the top of the North Korean Government, we can make quick progress with them. MODERATOR: Last, we’re going to go to The Guardian, AFP, and then we’re done. Please. Q: Thank you. Julian Borger from The Guardian. You said the talks in Hanoi were productive and you said that the two leaders were on good terms. Why, then, was it cut short? Why didn’t they stay for lunch? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So I think that’s a bit of a mischaracterization. It’s not yours. I’ve seen it reported many times. I know that. I think the amount of time that the President spent with Kim Jong-un equaled or exceeded what was the original plan. We worked through break times, we worked through scheduled lunches, we worked right up until the point where the President was previously scheduled to move back to his location where he was doing his press conference. So I think the schedule proceeded in a manner that was different than the planned structure, but in terms of the discussions themselves, they went on at quite some length and went on until the President, I think, was convinced that we weren’t going to be able to fully close the gap at this meeting. So a little bit different take on it, but they had more than sufficient time to explore in depth the possibilities here, and ultimately for the President to reach the conclusion he did at the conclusion of the summit. MODERATOR: Please, AFP. Q: Thank you. Francesco Fontemaggi for AFP. What would be for you the deadline to reach an agreement in order to get this done, the denuclearization done by the end of the first term? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, so we are certainly engaged in a forward-leaning way to get there as quickly as we can, because we are mindful that every day the challenge gets greater. The threat posed by North Korea is not going away, and we recognize that fact, but we’re not going to be driven by any artificial timeline. Certainly, as I said, we have a confirmed belief that we can achieve our goals for final, fully verified denuclearization in the course of the President’s first term. The sooner we get that started, the higher my level of confidence we’ll actually do that, but we’re not bound to any specific timeline. Q: Excuse me, if I just can add you said that in Stanford, just before the summit, that you didn’t even have an agreement on the definition of denuclearization. Do you now have one with the North Koreans? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We have the elements of one. We have closed some of the gaps on what that would be, and as we have closed some of the gaps on other issues, like declarations and freezes. Some of that is an accumulation of the issues we have discussed in the course of our discussions over the first three months of this year. Some of the ideas are still ours and remain to be accepted by the North Koreans. It’s a grinding process to negotiate with the North Koreans. Part of it is the nature of their system; part of it is that they’ve been at this for a very long time. We’re not as far long as we would like to be, but we are making progress, and the door remains open to continue those negotiations as soon as possible.” (DoS, Special Briefing, Senior State Department Official on North Korea, Washington, March 7, 2019)
Sokolsky: “The attention of the US media, nonproliferation experts, pundits and policymakers has been fixated on denuclearization; hardly any attention has been paid to conventional threat reduction and demilitarization of North Korea. This tunnel vision is short-sighted. A “bolt out of the blue” North Korean nuclear attack on the United States, which would be suicidal for the Kim dynasty and his country, is a fantastical scenario. The most likely trigger for any large-scale conventional conflict between North Korea and combined US/ROK forces, which could escalate to a nuclear exchange, has always been a local incident or accident that spins out of control. If and when it occurs, positive movement towards North Korean denuclearization should not be conflated with progress toward building an enduring peace and security regime on the Korean Peninsula. The two are not the same. Capping and rolling back North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities are necessary for permanent peace on the peninsula and North-South reconciliation. But they are not enough. It is hard to visualize this end state if it does not include substantive CBMs to reduce the risk of surprise attack or an inadvertent conflict and reductions in and restrictions on the North Korean conventional forces. In the early 1990s, North and South Korea held serious discussions about how to reduce military tensions through the negotiation of CBMs. They agreed to resolve differences peacefully through dialogue and negotiation, pledged not to use force against one another, and established a North- South Joint Military Commission to discuss and implement steps to lower tensions and achieve conventional force reductions. These measures included the mutual notification and control of large-scale military maneuvers and exercises; the peaceful utilization of the demilitarized zone (DMZ); exchanges of military personnel and information; phased arms reductions; and verification of weapons destruction. Together, these steps would have significantly reduced the risk of surprise attack or a conflict arising from crisis, miscalculation, and miscommunication. For a variety of reasons, however, they were never implemented. At last year’s Pyongyang Summit, South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un made significant progress toward lowering tensions, building trust, and reducing the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula, with a heavy emphasis on the two most serious flash points for conflict: The DMZ and the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea (Yellow Sea). In a far-reaching agreement to implement the April, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, North and South Korea agreed to: establish no-fly zones along the border and halt artillery and other military drills close to the DMZ; withdraw and eventually destroy all guard posts within the DMZ under agreed procedures for mutual verification; demilitarize the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom, including the removal of all mines; and create a maritime peace zone in the West Sea. Over the past five months, the two countries have made significant progress in implementing and verifying all these commitments, though important technical details, for example, the shape of the buffer zone the two sides agreed to establish in the West Sea, remain to be worked out. And real progress on resolving competing North and South Korean boundary claims in the West Sea remains elusive, creating the potential for a military incident like the one that happened recently over the disputed territory of Kashmir between India and Pakistan. These CBMs are positive steps, but more can be done to protect both countries from an inadvertent conflict, surprise attack and the threat of a large-scale, deep conventional invasion. As the two countries gain more trust in each other—and confidence that the commitments they made in Pyongyang are being faithfully implemented—they should focus on more ambitious CBMs in two areas: 1) greater transparency and information sharing on military plans, programs, movements, and deployments; and 2) restrictions on peacetime military operations. Together, the measures outlined below, many of which are based on the CBMs that Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) countries agreed to in Vienna Document 90, as well as those existing between India and Pakistan, would reduce both the risk of surprise attack and miscalculations or miscommunications that could trigger a crisis that might escalate into conflict. Greater Openness and Transparency A menu of options in this basket could include the following measures: Prior notification of an annual calendar of major military activities above a defined threshold and invitations to outsiders to observe and monitor these exercises under procedures established by the Inter-Korean Military Committee. These rules would alleviate fears of North Korean use of major military exercises as a cover for an attack and mitigate the risk of US and ROK overreaction to or misunderstanding of major military movements. • An annual exchange of military information on the command organization, location, personnel strength and major conventional weapons and equipment of active combat forces. Sharing this information could reduce uncertainty and alleviate fears about capabilities and intentions and create greater predictability. • An exchange of information on defense policy, force planning, military budgets and procurements, and force modernization plans. As part of this dialogue, the two sides should also discuss how they might adjust defense spending and modernization to reduce the burdens of defense expenditures and make it more difficult to conduct short-notice, large-scale military operations. • Reciprocal observer visits by military officers to military exercises, air bases and demonstrations of new weapons systems or equipment and more regular contacts between members of the North and South Korean armed forces. These measures would foster greater understanding and trust between the two militaries and potentially alleviate worst-case planning. • Creation of joint aerial monitoring arrangements to verify mutual compliance with restrictions established on military activities in buffer zones on both sides of the military demarcation line. Such a scheme for unarmed aerial surveillance flights could be implemented under the auspices of the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee and patterned after the Treaty on Open Skies. Its geographic coverage eventually could be broadened to permit gathering of information about military forces and activities of concern to each party across their entire territory or to verify compliance with other CBMs that might be established. Restrictions on Military Movements Changing the way North Korean forces conduct peacetime operations and exercises—sometimes referred to as operational arms control—can reinforce greater transparency. Seoul and Pyongyang should consider the following measures: The establishment of “red lines” beyond which large military forces should not move; when developing this no-go zone, the two Koreas, taking geographic constraints into account (e.g., the proximity of the two capitals to the DMZ), should pull back their forces from the DMZ—40-50 km for the North and 10-20 km for the South. Any measures that push North Korean forces farther from the DMZ, especially artillery and other direct fire systems, would increase warning time of an attack and allow the Combined Forces Command (CFC) to better prepare for an attack. Pulling South Korean artillery back from their forward positions along the DMZ would also improve their survivability. The Inter-Korean Military Agreement signed in Pyongyang prevents exercises within 10 km of the DMZ. The two sides could extend the range of this ban; in addition, they could also agree to limit the duration of exercises and ban the use of live ammunition in them. These measures would mitigate the risk of an incident that could spark a crisis as well as build greater mutual confidence in the peaceful intentions of both sides. Rigorous Compliance Ensuring that both sides fulfill the obligations they have incurred in the Inter-Korean Military Agreement is, in itself, an important confidence and trust building measure. The agreement to reinvigorate and elevate the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee is a welcome step, but it needs to be given teeth to help ensure that agreements that are entered into are actually carried out. Thus, in addition to its enhanced role in military communications and crisis management, it should also be empowered to investigate charges that either side is violating the letter or intent of agreed upon CBMs and to enforce compliance with these measures by holding both sides accountable for violations. Implementing measures that have already been accepted by the two countries is an important barometer of intentions and the credibility of commitments. Both sides should establish a solid record of compliance before they move forward with more ambitious plans for CBMs and actual reductions in or restrictions on the movement of conventional forces. The implementation of the Pyongyang Summit commitments is an encouraging development. Conventional Arms Control Conventional force reductions could play an important role in reducing not only tensions and the risk of inadvertent conflict, but also in making it more difficult for North Korea’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) to launch a devastating conflict.2 The Pyongyang Summit and the improvement in inter-Korean cooperation provide a positive political atmosphere and thus an important opportunity to pursue more ambitious measures. The failure of the Hanoi Summit to impart momentum to the goal of creating a comprehensive peace and security regime on the peninsula adds even greater weight to the importance of getting conventional arms control discussions off the ground. The overwhelming majority of North Korea’s roughly 950,000 active ground forces are deployed in three echelons—a forward operational echelon of four infantry corps; a second operational echelon of two mechanized corps, an armor corps and an artillery corps; and a strategic reserve of the two remaining mechanized corps and the other artillery corps. These forces are garrisoned along major north-south lines of communication that provide rapid, easy access to avenues of approach into South Korea. The KPA has positioned massive numbers of artillery pieces, especially its longer-range systems, close to the DMZ that separates the two Koreas. This is a force that is structured for high-speed, large-scale offensive operations with little or no warning. Over the past several years, North Korean officials have hinted that a transformational change in US-DPRK relations could pave the way for negotiations on conventional force reductions with South Korea. Both countries, in fact, have strong incentives to achieve this goal. Kim wants to reduce the overall size of his military to free up resources for development of the civilian economy. Moon will face not only growing popular support for cuts in ROK defense spending if North-South reconciliation continues but also economic pressures. The South Korean population is about to dramatically shrink. In anticipation of these demographic changes, the Moon government recently announced that it planned to cut 120,000 troops by 2022. Ideally, these reductions would be paralleled by comparable reductions in the size of the North Korean army. The readiness and combat effectiveness of North Korean ground forces may have declined over the past decade due to maintenance and morale problems, and the quality of the North’s mostly vintage Soviet-era equipment is outclassed by the far more sophisticated weapons systems operated by South Korean and US forces. But the North still maintains frightening short-warning invasion capabilities because of the thousands of artillery pieces, rockets and missiles that are poised to attack Seoul from just outside the DMZ. The North also possesses geographic advantages and has developed a broad range of military options as part of a larger asymmetric military strategy that leverages special capabilities like cyber weapons, special operations forces and electronic warfare. Although South Korean forces enjoy qualitative superiority over North Korean forces in weapons/equipment, training and command and control, questions persist about the training, readiness and morale of ROK forces, and some experts worry about the “hollowing out” of the Army. Moreover, a large number of South Korean artillery pieces are deployed along the DMZ, and that makes them vulnerable to North Korean artillery pieces, which are all buried underground and outrange South Korean artillery pieces. The North’s military strengths and the South’s military shortfalls notwithstanding, most experts believe that combined US and South Korean forces would ultimately prevail in an all-out conventional war with North Korea, but with horrific casualties and destruction of property. Such a war, moreover, significantly increases the risk of nuclear escalation, which would be catastrophic. In addition to geographic restrictions described above on where the North and South can station their forces, the two sides should also consider the elimination of major weapons and equipment. In the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), NATO and the Warsaw Pact set equal ceilings on key armaments essential for conducting surprise attacks and high-speed, large-scale offensive operations. The five major categories were: tanks, artillery pieces, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. Because the Warsaw Pact had numerical superiority in all five areas, the reductions to equal ceilings had an asymmetrical impact on the forces of the Soviet Union and its allies. To further limit the readiness of armed forces and thus their ability to mount large-scale attacks with little or no warning, the treaty: 1) set equal ceilings on equipment that could be deployed with active units and required that some ground equipment had to be placed in designated permanent storage sites; and 2) established regional limits to prevent destabilizing force concentrations of ground equipment. To meet required troop ceilings, equipment had to be destroyed or, if possible, converted to non-military purposes. The treaty also included unprecedented provisions for detailed information exchanges and on-site inspections and monitoring of destruction and conversion of treaty-limited equipment. A Joint Consultative Group was established to deal with questions related to compliance with provisions of the treaty. North and South Korea should draw on the CFE experience if Pyongyang and Seoul continue to make significant progress on normalization and peace and security building. A notional force reductions scheme would consist of the following elements: The optimal step for the US and South Korea would be North Korean agreement to reduce its forces to levels equal to or possibly lower than the current total of South Korean and US forces across the same five categories embodied in the CFE Treaty. (See Figure 1 below.) This outcome would require highly asymmetrical North Korean reductions, and Pyongyang would almost certainly demand compensatory moves by Washington and Seoul to reduce those capabilities Pyongyang finds most threatening. Whether North Korea’s longer-range ballistic missile systems should be part of this equation will require careful study of the trade-offs that would be involved. The highest priority should be placed on eliminating North Korea’s massive edge in heavy artillery and short-range missiles and mortars (which would go beyond the CFE Treaty). Reductions in ground force capabilities, specifically heavy armor designed for deep penetration into South Korean territory, should also be accorded high priority. North Korean combat aircraft and attack helicopters are of much less military concern; in fact, the US and South Korea, if they’re looking for trade space, could offer asymmetrical reductions in these two categories—especially since aircraft moved off of the peninsula can be easily moved back in—to secure greater asymmetrical cuts in North Korean land forces. The US and South Korea, if necessary, could sweeten the pot by having the US take the greatest hit on combat aircraft, for example, by removing a tactical air squadron and making a token withdrawal of a ground force battalion (which could perhaps be re-located and forward deployed elsewhere in PACOM). Weapons and equipment would be destroyed or converted under agreed monitoring provisions to ensure that it could no longer be put to military uses. The ROK and perhaps the US could provide technical assistance to the North, if needed, to convert this equipment for use in the civilian economy. Figure 1. Estimated Deployments of US, ROK, and DRPK Forces on the Korean Peninsula
| MAIN BATTLE TANKS | ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS | HEAVY ARTILLERY (155mm+) | COMBAT AIRCRAFT | ATTACK HELICOPTERS | MILITARY MANPOWER (Active forces only) | ||||||||
| NORTH KOREA | 3,500+ | 2,500+ | 21,100+ | 5454 | 80+ | 1,280,000 | |||||||
| 3OUTH KOREA | 2,614 | 2,790 | 4,238 | 603 | 96 | 625,000 | |||||||
| UNITED STATES | 140 | 170 | 70 | 81 | 70 | 28,500 | |||||||
| COMBINED US/ROK FORCES | 2,754 | 2,960 | 4,308 | 684 | 166 | 653,500 | |||||||
Sources: “The Military Balance 2018,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018; and Anthony Cordesman, “The Military Balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017.
North and South Korea have rebuilt a certain amount of trust as a result of President Moon’s “Nordpolitik,” and that has created a political climate conducive to agreement on threat reduction measures. That said, at present it remains uncertain how much appetite the North Koreans have for CBMs beyond what they agreed to in last September’s Comprehensive Military Agreement with the South—for example, observations of exercises, bases, and demonstrations of weapons systems—because it could expose North Korean weaknesses they would prefer to conceal. Similarly, North Korean thinking on conventional arms control is also opaque and there is no evidence that the South Korean government is thinking about structural arms control. It is certainly possible, when Seoul begins to debate the merits of arms control negotiations with the North, that it will have concerns about the impact of conventional force reductions on its ability to deter threats from North Korea and China. Moreover, the US and South Korea will need to come to agreement on several important issues before further engaging with the North Koreans on more ambitious and militarily significant CBMs and conventional threat reduction measures that have the potential to impinge on US forces in the South. These include the pace at which negotiations on CBMs should proceed; the relationship between CBMs and arms control talks and US-North Korean negotiations on denuclearization—specifically, whether the two processes should be linked or proceed independently of one another; the implications of different CBMs and conventional force reduction options for US and ROK planning for the defense of South Korea against a North Korean attack; the timing and sequencing of discussions on CBMs and conventional force reductions, i.e., whether talks on these two baskets should be held sequentially or simultaneously; and lastly whether there is a role for third-party involvement in verifying, monitoring, or implementing CBMs and conventional force reductions. All these issues underscore the importance of close US-ROK consultations. Conclusion CBMs and conventional arms control measures, if properly crafted, would significantly mitigate the risks of a large-scale, surprise attack by North Korea as well as the danger that an incident, accident or miscalculation could spark a crisis and increase the risk of military escalation. Until there is a true transformation in North-South relations and an effective peace and security regime on the Korean Peninsula, CBMs and arms reductions would constitute an effective hedge against a return to tensions and confrontation between the US and North Korea or the collapse of the US-North Korean diplomatic process. The US should encourage further North-South progress on tension and threat reduction measures, while Washington and Seoul forge a consensus on future conventional force reductions and their implications for the future of both US force structure, operations, and planning for the defense of the peninsula and, more broadly, the US-South Korean alliance—the subject of the next installment in this special report series.” (Richard Sokolsky, “Conventional Threat Reduction on the Korean Peninsula,” 38 North, March 7, 2019)
3/8/19:
Rodong Sinmun: “South Korea and the U.S. reportedly started a joint military drill under new codename Alliance from March 4. South Korea and the U.S. announced that the drill Alliance is the one replacing the former Key Resolve and it will continue until March 12. As for joint military drill Foal Eagle, they said they would stage it without codename round the year in the form of small-scale field mobile drill involving units smaller than battalion. They said that the on-going drill aims at examining wartime operation plan through computer-aided simulation of “the north’s all-out invasion of the south” and increasing the capabilities to fight a war. The ill-boding moves of the south Korean military authorities and the U.S. are a wanton violation of the DPRK-U.S. joint statement and the north-south declarations in which the removal of hostility and tensions were committed to, and an open challenge to the aspiration and desire of all Koreans and the international community for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.” (Rodong Sinmun, “S. Korea and U.S. Start New Joint Military Drill,” March 8, 2019)
Rodong Sinmun: “The whole world sincerely hopes to see smooth peace process on the Korean Peninsula and earlier improvement of the DPRK-U.S. relations. The public at home and abroad that had hoped for success and good results from the second DPRK-U.S. summit in Hanoi are feeling regretful, blaming the U.S. for the summit that ended without an agreement. But only the Japanese reactionaries have gone spiteful, applauding it, just as if they had heard good news, … The aim sought by Japan going desperate to interrupt the relations between the DPRK and the U.S. is to get rid of its deplorable situation being left out of the discussion of peace on the Korean Peninsula and the region. They are utterly detestable just like those who deserve slap on the face. The Abe group has now gone impudent as to knock at the door of Pyongyang, claiming now is the time for Japan to come out and set up a bridge. Japan committed too much crime to be dealt with by the DPRK and nothing can gain from the dwarfs clinging to the coattail of the U.S. Japan must not dream of dealing with the DPRK unless it clears itself of all the black-hearted intention and makes full reparation for its past crimes and drops ambition for becoming a military giant. Deserted Japan is fated to wait for a moment to be vanished from history.” (KCNA, “Japan Rebuked for Trying to Disturb DPRK-U.S. Relations,” March 8, 2019)
President Trump was forced to publicly acknowledge this past week what American intelligence officials said they had long been telling the White House: Even during eight months of blossoming diplomacy, Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, was steadily adding to his weapons arsenal and nuclear infrastructure. Three times, Trump told reporters that he would be “very disappointed” if North Korea was preparing to launch a space rocket that intelligence officials believe could help Kim perfect the means to heave a nuclear warhead across the ocean. [?] Satellite imagery taken Friday, and analyzed by the Beyond Parallel program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, shows that the North has “continued preparations” on the launching pad at Sohae consistent with readying for “the delivery of a rocket.” American officials said the reconstruction there began long before Trump left Washington in late February for a summit meeting with Kim in Hanoi, Vietnam, where talks abruptly ended. The rebuilding at Sohae was not the only work underway. While North Korea blew up the entrances to its major underground testing site at Punggye-ri in May, it never allowed in inspectors, as promised, to determine whether the facility had actually been destroyed. Commercial satellite photographs suggest the buildings containing the control rooms and computers used to trigger and study the explosions were carefully mothballed. And in the time between Trump and Kim’s first meeting, in Singapore in June, and their second in Hanoi, intelligence estimates suggest that North Korea produced enough uranium and plutonium to fuel a half-dozen new nuclear warheads. [reprocessed?] The evidence that North Korea was moving ahead with its weapons program was clear, according to American intelligence officials familiar with the briefings provided to Trump. But the president sought to soften it in public to avoid imperiling negotiations, the officials said. At a news conference late last month in Hanoi, Trump was still in that mode, suggesting the evidence that North Korea was adding to its ability was ambiguous. “Some people are saying that and some people aren’t,” he said. But for an administration that regularly acknowledges or dismisses intelligence findings to fit the moment, North Korea has served as a comeuppance. Trump’s aides have been forced to back away from his now famous tweet, issued soon after the Singapore meeting, that “there is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea.” On March 7, a senior administration official told reporters that the United States remained open to continuing discussions with North Korea. But the official asserted that sanctions would not be lifted until all the threats were removed — which he defined as the North’s entire nuclear program, complex of road-mobile missiles and chemical and biological weapons programs. That is a far broader demand than the Trump administration has previously detailed in public, and was at the core of the collapse of the discussions in Hanoi. Kim had offered to close an aging nuclear plant at Yongbyon in exchange for the lifting of some of the toughest sanctions imposed on North Korea. To his surprise, Kim was told that the United States would not lift all sanctions until the North surrendered its entire weapons program. By all accounts, Kim believed Trump was desperate for a deal and would accept a more gradual approach — a partial disarmament leading to partial sanctions relief. Unable to bridge the gap, they walked away, though Trump insisted they agreed to continue talking. No further negotiations have been scheduled. North Korea, for its part, is using its continued production of nuclear material to pressure Trump — making clear its ability to pose a threat will only grow unless the United States eases its demands. “For all the talk, nothing has really changed,” said Victor Cha, whom Trump considered appointing as American ambassador to South Korea. “They are playing the same old game of putting pressure on the U.S.” The White House and State Department say that is not the case. The continued moratorium on nuclear and missile tests, officials said, has slowed Kim’s progress and kept him from demonstrating that North Korea could launch a warhead that could hit an American city. Some independent analysts agree with the Trump administration’s rationale, but worry the moratorium may be coming to an end. North Korea’s satellite launching site at Sohae, on the Yellow Sea, offers a case study in the deep ambiguity of the dismantlement and denuclearization claims by both sides. The site is important because the North has test-fired powerful rocket engines there on a giant experiment stand and, at the nearby launching pad, successfully cast two satellites into space. The United States has declared that space launches violate the commitment that Kim made to Trump in Singapore, and later to President Moon Jae-in of South Korea, to suspend all missile and nuclear tests. In June, after the summit meeting in Singapore, Trump declared that Kim had told him the North was “already destroying” the sprawling site. “That’s a big thing,” he told reporters. “The site is going to be destroyed very soon.” Challenged by reporters about the North’s past record of broken promises, Trump added: “Honestly, I think he’s going to do these things. I may be wrong. I mean, I may stand before you in six months and say, ‘Hey, I was wrong.’” “I don’t know that I’ll ever admit that,” he said with a smile, “but I’ll find some kind of an excuse.” That enthusiasm proved premature. For the next eight months, analysts poring over satellite images of the densely wooded site at Sohae found little evidence of dismantlement. No major structures were changed, destroyed or disassembled. Instead, the images showed the opposite: evidence that North Korea was completing work on an extensive building complex next to the launching pad at Sohae. Rather than disassemble the site, as Kim had promised, it was expanding. “We all watched it go up and kept wondering, ‘What is it?’” recalled Jenny Town, a senior official at 38 North, a research project and website of the Stimson Center, a Washington think tank, which tracks political and technical developments in North Korea. They are still wondering. No one is certain about the purpose of the structure — or if it has an intent other than to stoke fear in the United States. This past week, 38 North and Beyond Parallel reported that reconstruction at the Sohae site had greatly accelerated. “Based on commercial satellite imagery, efforts to rebuild these structures started sometime between February 16 and March 2, 2019,” 38 North said in its report on March 5. The summit meeting in Hanoi began on February 27 — suggesting the construction was intended to give Kim some leverage in his talks with Trump. As of yesterday, administration officials were telling allies they still did not know if North Korea planned to resume missile launches at Sohae. But Trump no longer denounces news reports of expanded missile bases or revived test sites as “fake news,’’ as he did before the meeting in Hanoi. In late January, the president even called in the director of national intelligence, Dan Coats, and the director of the C.I.A., Gina Haspel, to demand they pull back recent public declarations that North Korea was not likely to ever give up its entire weapons arsenal and production facilities. Two days later, Trump said the problem lay not in the intelligence officials’ testimony but in the news coverage about it. One senior official later said the deflection was “all about avoiding criticism of Kim.” The official spoke on the condition of anonymity because the president’s meeting with the intelligence chiefs was intended to be private. Town said the satellite site expansion and rebuilding at Sohae reminded her of a similar episode at the Yongbyon nuclear research center, the main known site for the processing of fuel for nuclear weapons. Last year, North Korea finished building a large facility across from Yongbyon’s experimental light water reactor. Analysts believe the reactor could double the North’s supply of weapons-grade plutonium, producing more fuel for its nuclear arsenal. “Why do that if it’s on the bargaining table?” Town said of the construction at Yongbyon, which Kim had offered to close if the United States agreed to lift sanctions. “There are a few of these cases where it could be part of a hedging strategy.” Then there are the headquarters at Punggye-ri’s mountainous atomic test site — a mile-high peak full of tunnels where North Korea has set off its nuclear detonations. In November, 38 North analysts reported that, contrary to reports of the site’s destruction and abandonment, the two largest buildings at Punggye-ri’s command center remained intact, as did nearby support facilities for personnel and security forces. The lack of dismantlement, the analysts concluded, suggested that the site “may only be mothballed, with reactivation possible.” (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Kim’s Arms Buildup a Comeuppance for Trump,” New York Times, March 10, 2019, p. A-4)
Kim Yeon-chul, who was tapped as the new unification minister, has more than 20 years of experience dealing with inter-Korean and unification issues as a policy adviser and scholar. Currently, Kim serves as the president of the Korea Institute for National Unification, a government-funded think tank, and teaches at the Department of Korea Unification of Inje University. Kim is one of seven new ministers nominated by President Moon Jae-in. In 2018, he advised the preparatory committee for the inter-Korean summit between President Moon and North Korean leader Kim. While working as a policy adviser to former Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, Kim participated in the six-party talks and a meeting between Chung and the late North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in 2005. He earned a doctoral degree in political science and diplomacy from Sungkyunkwan University. (Park Han-na, “Kim Yeon-chul Tapped as New Unification Minister,” Korea Herald, March 8, 2019)
3/10/19:
Bolton: “ … RADDATZ: OK, let’s back track a bit. At the Singapore summit, North Korea committed only to, quote, “work towards complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”. How do you define that, how do they define that? BOLTON: Well, again, they have committed to denuclearization in a variety of forms several times in writing, solemn international agreements that they have happily violated. We define denuclearization as meaning the elimination of their nuclear weapons program, their uranium enrichment capability, their plutonium reprocessing capability. From the beginning we’ve also included chemical and biological weapons in the elimination of their weapons of mass destruction, this is important to us because of our deployed forces in South Korea. It’s important to South Korea and Japan. And of course we want their ballistic missile program ended as well. That is — RADDATZ: But they didn’t sign onto that. BOLTON: They — well they have signed on to elements of that in the 1992 joint North-South denuclearization agreement, and we’ve made it clear the president handed Kim Jong-un a piece of paper — actually two pieces of paper, one in English, one in Korean, that laid it out. RADDATZ: That said, all of what you just said and more, can you tell us exactly what that said? And who wrote that? BOLTON: Well, I can’t tell you in Korean, but … RADDATZ: Try with the English. We’ll settle for the English. BOLTON: I think I just did. RADDATZ: It’s just that? That’s exactly what was said in that piece of paper? BOLTON: I’m not going to tell you it was word for word, and I don’t have the piece of paper in front of me to check it, but that is in the substance what it said. RADDATZ: And who authored that proposal? BOLTON: It was written at staff level and cleared around as usual. RADDATZ: And Steve Biegun, the special envoy to North Korea, said in a speech in January that he hoped the two sides could move simultaneously and in parallel through a road map of concrete deliverables. That sounds like step by step, you do something, we do something. Is that how you see it? BOLTON: Look, the president, as I mentioned before, is determined to avoid the mistakes prior presidents have made, and one of those mistakes is falling for the North Korean action for action ploy. And the reason that that doesn’t work, is that what North Korea needs, and it needs it very much right now, is economic relief. I think it’s very much on Kim Jong-un’s mind. He wants the economic sanctions released. And to get that, he is prepared to give up some part of his nuclear program, perhaps at a declaratory level, even a substantial part. But the marginal benefit to North Korea of economic relief is far greater than the marginal benefit to us of partial denuclearization. So that’s why action for action almost inevitably in the past three administrations has worked to North Korea’s benefit. And as I say, over a 25-plus year period they never seem to get to denuclearization, isn’t that interesting? RADDATZ: But you also talk about strategic patience. The president said that era was over, and yet just the other day, he said a year. Ask me in a year. You really give him a year? You yourself have said that time is on the side of the proliferator. BOLTON: Time — the historical lesson is time is inevitably on the side of the proliferator in the long run. Right now I think it’s the president’s judgment, and I think it’s correct, that the economic leverage that we have because of the sanctions, puts the pressure on North Korea. And it’s one reason why all of the pundits and all of the experts predicting a deal in Hanoi were wrong, because the leverage is on our side right now, not on North Korea’s … .“ (ABC News, “This Week” Transcript: White House National Security Adviser John Bolton, March 10, 2019)
Spanish police and intelligence have linked an attack on the North Korean Embassy in Madrid on February 22 to the US Central Intelligence Agency, El Pais reported. At least two of the 10 assailants who broke into the embassy, tied up staff and stole computers and cellphones have been identified to have connections to the CIA, according to the newspaper. The CIA has denied any involvement, but Spanish government sources said their response was “unconvincing,” El Pais said, adding that should the CIA be proven to have been behind the attack, it could lead to a diplomatic row between Madrid and Washington. The newspaper quoted unnamed Spanish government sources as saying that it would be “unacceptable” for an ally to violate international conventions that protect diplomatic delegations on Spanish soil. Spanish investigators ruled out the possibility that the attack was by common criminals as the attackers knew what they were looking for, taking only computers and cellphones. The operation was perfectly planned as if carried out by a “military cell,” sources close to the investigation were quoted as saying by the newspaper. El Pais said that sources believe the attack was intended to get information on former North Korean Ambassador to Spain Kim Hyok-chol, who negotiated nuclear disarmament plans with US special envoy Stephen Biegun ahead of the US-North Korea summit in Hanoi February 27-28. (Kim So-hyun, “NK Embassy in Spain Attackers Linked to CIA: Report,” Korea Herald, March 14, 2019) Days before President Trump was set to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Vietnam, a mysterious incident in Spain threatened to derail the entire high-stakes nuclear summit. In broad daylight, masked assailants infiltrated North Korea’s embassy in Madrid, tied up the staff, stole computers and mobile phones, and fled the scene in two luxury vehicles. The group behind the late February operation is known as Cheollima Civil Defense, a secretive dissident organization committed to overthrowing the Kim dynasty, people familiar with the planning and execution of the mission told the Washington Post. The group’s alleged role in the attack has not previously been reported, and officials from the governments of North Korea, the United States and Spain declined to comment on it. But in recent days, rumors about the motivations behind the attack have swirled in the Spanish media, including a report in El Pais alleging that two of the masked assailants have ties to the CIA. People familiar with the incident say the group did not act in coordination with any governments. U.S. intelligence agencies would have been especially reluctant to be involved, given the sensitive timing and brazen nature of the mission. But the raid represents the most ambitious operation to date for an obscure organization that seeks to undermine the North Korean regime and encourage mass defections, they say. “This group is the first known resistance movement against North Korea, which makes its activities very newsworthy,” said Sung-Yoon Lee, a North Korea expert at Tufts University. Any hint of U.S. involvement in an assault on a diplomatic compound could have derailed the talks, a prospect of which the CIA would likely be mindful. “Infiltrating a North Korean embassy days before the nuclear summit would throw that all into jeopardy,” said Sue Mi Terry, a former Korea analyst at the CIA. “This is not something the CIA would undertake.” The agency declined to comment. According to Spanish media reports, the assailants tied up the embassy staff with rope, put hoods over their heads and asked them questions. They spoke in Korean and appeared to be Asian. More than an hour into the raid, a woman reportedly escaped, and her screams for help alerted a neighbor, who contacted police. When authorities arrived at the embassy, a man opened the door and told them there was no problem. Moments later, the embassy gates opened, and the assailants dashed out to two embassy cars and sped away, according to local reports. The vehicles were found abandoned on a nearby street. Though the incident has attracted a flurry of Spanish media attention, no police reports were filed by the embassy or the victims, according to the reports. Experts say the computers and phones seized in the raid contain a treasure trove of information that foreign intelligence agencies are likely to seek out from the group. “It could have contacts and documents related to North Korea’s efforts to bypass sanctions and import luxury goods from Europe, which was one of the key assignments for Kim Hyok Chol, the former North Korean ambassador to Spain,” Lee said. Recently, Kim Hyok Chol was reassigned as North Korea’s point man for the nuclear negotiations with the United States, making any information about his previous activities especially coveted by foreign governments looking to gain an edge in the negotiations. The assailants also possess a video recording they took during the raid, which they could release anytime, said one person who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive and illegal operation. The Cheollima group, which also goes by the name Free Joseon, drew attention in 2017 after it successfully evacuated the nephew of Kim Jong Un from Macau when potential threats to his life surfaced. The nephew was the son of Kim Jong Nam, the North Korean leader’s exiled half-brother who was assassinated in a nerve-gas attack in a Malaysian airport that same year. Kim Jong Nam was widely believed to have been killed by the regime, making his son a likely target. Members of the Cheollima group transported Kim Han Sol out of Macau with the help of the governments of the United States, China and the Netherlands, which provided travel and visa assistance, the group told the Wall Street Journal in 2017. For safety reasons, the leader of the group does not disclose his name, and his identity is known only to a small group of people. In March, the group published a manifesto calling on North Koreans inside and outside the country to resist Pyongyang in ways big and small. “To those within the system who hear this declaration: We call on you to defy your oppressors. Challenge them openly or resist them quietly,” the declaration said. “To those of like-mind and like-spirit of our diaspora: We call upon you to join our revolution.” Since the attack on the embassy in Spain, the group has asserted responsibility for the defacing of the North Korean Embassy in Malaysia’s capital, Kuala Lumpur, on March 11. Authorities said four men who wore hats and masks painted the graffiti. The group has not claimed responsibility for the raid in Madrid. “In its messaging, the group said they have formed a provisional government to replace the regime in Pyongyang,” said Terry, who is a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “They have now shown the seriousness of their intent and some capabilities to carry out operations. We will see in the coming months the extent of their capabilities.” (John Hudson, “N. Korean Dissidents Allegedly Raided Embassy in Madrid,” Washington Post, March 16, 2019, p. A-6) The revolutionary group that carried out a brazen daytime raid of North Korea’s Embassy in Spain last month has shared information about the incident with the FBI, said people familiar with the meeting. The decision by the group to engage federal authorities thrusts the U.S. intelligence community into a sensitive international investigation led by Spanish authorities, who have not publicly identified any suspects in the mysterious February 22 operation. Any substantive ties between the group and U.S. authorities could complicate the nuclear negotiations given the organization’s stated mission of overthrowing and replacing North Korea’s Kim dynasty. The secretive group calls itself Free Joseon, but is also known as Cheollima Civil Defense. Today, the group released a video of one of its members destroying portraits of North Korea’s founder, Kim Il Sung, and his son and successor, Kim Jong Il. The captions of the 34-second clip exclaim “Down with Kim family rule!” and claim it took place on “our homeland’s soil,” suggesting the footage was possibly shot inside the North Korean Embassy in Madrid. Any desecration of the leaders’ image is punishable by death in North Korea, given the Kim family’s self-ordained godlike status and could invite a harsh response from Pyongyang. The raid on the embassy generated international headlines last week after Spanish authorities released details about the incident, telling reporters it was carried out by 10 masked assailants who entered the embassy with fake firearms, tied up the staff and interrogated them. Reports said the assailants stole computers, documents and other items before speeding away in two cars with diplomatic license plates that were later abandoned on a nearby street. A spokeswoman with the FBI, when asked about its contacts with the secretive group, said “it is our standard practice to neither confirm nor deny the existence of an investigation. However, the FBI enjoys a strong working relationship with our Spanish law enforcement partners that centers on information sharing and regular cooperation around matters of mutual assistance.” A spokeswoman for Spain’s Embassy in Washington confirmed that Spanish authorities have launched an investigation into the incident but did not offer details. Free Joseon has not publicly asserted responsibility for the raid and on March 17 urged the international news media to refrain from identifying the names of its members for fear of being targeted by North Korean hit teams. “The regime does not hesitate to conduct assassinations on foreign soil,” the group said in a statement published on its website. Experts say the documents and computers seized in the raid would probably contain a treasure trove of information valuable to foreign intelligence agencies. The former North Korean ambassador to Madrid was Kim Hyok Chol, the country’s current point man for the nuclear negotiations with the United States. Details about Kim’s activities during his time there contained in the stolen materials could prove useful for governments seeking an edge in the negotiations. It is unclear why the group reached out to U.S. authorities, but its published statements indicate it is fearful of a punitive response from the North Korean regime. “The group most likely does not have an unlimited supply of funds or a vast logistical network. Approaching the U.S. government with the assets retrieved in Madrid would possibly secure the group some protection,” said Sung-Yoon Lee, a North Korea expert at Tufts University. The FBI does not have jurisdiction over foreign intelligence gathering, but it regularly passes information along to the CIA if it is relevant to the organization. The CIA declined to comment. Free Joseon first drew wide attention in 2017 after it reportedly evacuated the nephew of Kim Jong Un from Macau when potential threats to his life surfaced. The nephew was the son of Kim Jong Nam, the North Korean leader’s exiled half-brother who was assassinated in a nerve-gas attack in a Malaysian airport that same year. Kim Jong Nam is widely believed to have been killed because he was viewed as a threat to Kim Jong Un’s grip on power. Members of the Free Joseon group transported the nephew out of Macau with the help of the governments of the United States, China and the Netherlands, which provided travel and visa assistance, the group told the Wall Street Journal in 2017. In March, the group published a manifesto calling on North Koreans inside and outside the country to resist the Kim dynasty. (John Hudson, “Group Shares Details of Raid at North Korean Embassy with FBI,” Washington Post, March 22, 2019, p. A-12) The leader was Adrian Hong Chang, a well-known North Korea human rights activists who associates say have links to U.S. intelligence. According to a person familiar with the matter, Hong had contact with U.S. intelligence agents and has urged North Korean defectors to work with the CIA against Pyongyang. The Spanish court report tells of ten assailants who entered the embassy on February 22 and held staff hostage for almost five hours before stealing electronic devices and fleeing to Portugal and then, in several cases, to the U.S. They beat bound, and covered the heads of embassy residents and dragged So Yun Sok to the basement and demanded that he defect. He declined. In its March 26 statement the group said it had shared “certain information of enormous potential value with the FBI” but that their “mutually agreed terms of confidentiality” appeared “to have been broken.” (Edward White and Kang Buseong, “FBI Offered Stolen Data after Activists Raid North Korean Embassy in Madrid,” Financial Times, March 30, 2019, p. 3)
Liu, Makowsky and Town: “Recent commercial satellite imagery of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station (Tongchang-ri) shows no changes to the launch pad or engine test stand between March 8 and March 13. In imagery from March 8, the construction observed over the past few weeks seemed to have been completed and the two facilities had been cleared of debris. At the launch pad, the rail-mounted transfer/processing structure had been moved to the edge of the pad and the environmental cover had been closed around the gantry tower. In imagery from March 13, the transfer structure remains in the same position and the environmental cover still conceals the gantry tower. At the engine test stand, by March 8, construction on the engine support structure seemed to be complete and the rail-mounted environmental shelter (which conceals transfer of rocket engines from the service apron) had been rebuilt and positioned adjacent to the vertical engine test stand. Furthermore, construction materials and debris had been cleared from the service apron leaving only a few fuel/oxidizer tanks in place. Imagery from March 13 shows the environmental shelter remains in the same position. …” (Jack Liu, Peter Makowsky and Jenny Town, “North Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launch Facility: No New Activity Since March 8,” 38 North, March 13, 2019)
Squassoni: “Before the Hanoi Summit, President Trump suggested in remarks that he was in no rush for denuclearization as long as North Korea wasn’t testing missiles or nuclear weapons. It’s a good thing, too, since denuclearization didn’t happen at the Hanoi Summit. Did Trump simply seek to dampen expectations for the summit ahead of time? Or did this reveal a superficial understanding of what’s important for actual denuclearization? In any event, the all-or-nothing position Trump favored over a step-by-step denuclearization process made the best the enemy of the good by squandering an opportunity to begin the process of capping and eventually eliminating North Korea’s fissile material production. As nuclear weapons experts appreciate, testing is one of the last steps in a complex industrial program to build bombs and their delivery systems. And once testing has proven design concepts, its value diminishes. To limit North Korea’s true nuclear weapons capacity, there has to be a verifiable end to its fissile material production—the weapons-grade enriched uranium and plutonium whose atoms split apart in the process of fission, releasing the tremendous amounts of energy in nuclear weapons. Without monitoring the end of production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, it’s impossible to irreversibly eliminate North Korea’s current arsenal. Arms control and disarmament experts have long sought a global fissile material production cutoff treaty precisely for this reason—it is a way to cap the world’s stockpile of weapons-grade material on the path towards disarmament. Pyongyang, if media reports are correct, was ready to offer the shutdown of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, home to its known fissile material production. Yongbyon hosts the 5 MWe production reactor that transmutates natural uranium into plutonium; a reprocessing plant that separates plutonium from uranium and radioactive waste; at least one centrifuge uranium enrichment facility; a fuel fabrication facility; a spent fuel storage facility; a small research reactor (IRT-2000-type pool reactor) for producing medical radioisotopes that uses 80 percent highly enriched uranium fuel; and, an experimental light water reactor (ELWR) under construction, as North Koreans tell us, to produce electricity. North Korea likely also has facilities for transforming weapons-grade material into weapons-ready shapes and forms. Metal conversion, casting and machining all precede assembly into warheads. It is not clear where those facilities are, but it’s a good bet they are somewhere on or near the Yongbyon site. Even in a well-crafted denuclearization process, North Korea might choose to simply destroy such facilities rather than submit them to verification. For the purposes of verifying that North Korea is no longer producing fissile material for weapons, those facilities are less important because they are only relevant to the weapons fabrication process. Who knows what Pyongyang had in mind when it offered to shut down Yongbyon? The best case would have been a process in which North Korea declared all its facilities and provided their records, put all of its inventory under international safeguards, shipped it out of the country, or processed it so it could not be used for weapons, and then dismantled the site altogether. These tasks would take years to complete properly. North Korea probably had something less comprehensive in mind. To be sure, even a complete dismantlement of everything at Yongbyon would not have been the end of the story since there are almost certainly other facilities connected to fissile material production that are hidden. Some experts contend there is a second uranium enrichment plant at Kangsong. Any agreement worth signing would need a mechanism to provide confidence that North Korea’s stockpile was not growing anywhere in the country. The “go for broke” strategy employed by the Trump administration is sacrificing the good for the best. Whatever happens to negotiations now, North Korea’s fissile material production is the key to the size of its arsenal and well worth targeted efforts to cap and eventually eliminate. What are some of the steps worth taking? 1. Moratorium on fissile material production A declaration of no more fissile material production hardly seems worthwhile, but Russia, the US, the UK and France all declared moratoria on producing fissile material for nuclear weapons two decades ago and have not resumed production. A simple declaration by North Korea would be the quickest, easiest and cheapest action to take. This would be a confidence-building measure by North Korea that would bring it into line with established nuclear weapon state behaviors, with the exception of China. A multilateral approach to North Korea with all nuclear weapon states reaffirming their commitments and China joining in could be a “win” not just on the Korean Peninsula but also globally. At a time when all the nuclear weapon states have modernization programs and there is a potential risk of a new arms race between the US and Russia, it wouldn’t be a bad idea for these countries to reaffirm their commitments to cap fissile material production. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has been watching North Korea from afar since its inspectors were last kicked out ten years ago, recently confirmed that the 5 MWe reactor and the reprocessing plant have not been operating. Satellite imagery and other techniques to monitor environmental signals from operations can help provide confidence that this is the case. Should the North begin to operate its experimental light water reactor, the pattern of operations can help establish whether it is operating to produce weapons-grade plutonium or electricity. Of course, Pyongyang could provide additional confidence by asking the IAEA to apply safeguards to the civilian reactor. It would need to rejoin the IAEA and pay its dues, but then potentially receive technical assistance to ensure the reactor was safe, secure and optimized for efficient electricity generation. The country might also consider, for similar reasons, inviting the IAEA to apply safeguards to its IRT research reactor. A moratorium on uranium enrichment would be impossible to monitor remotely without North Korea’s cooperation. Ironically, it might prefer providing assurances of no enrichment at all rather than attempting to show it is not producing highly enriched uranium because of the intrusiveness of measures in the latter case (think “Iran”). For example, North Korea could allow verification of the absence of key equipment (e.g., feed and withdrawal units) or inputs (uranium hexafluoride). There would still be uncertainty about undeclared enrichment sites, which would need to be addressed. 2. Monitored production or closure North Korea’s permission to allow monitoring of either production or closure of facilities would be better than a simple, declared moratorium. The generally accepted approach for verifying a global fissile material production cutoff treaty is to apply IAEA safeguards to uranium enrichment and reprocessing plants to ensure that material produced is not diverted for weapons purposes. Production reactors might or might not be subject to verification. Material accounting and control at operating plants would be a minimum requirement, while non-operating (closed, decommissioned or dismantled) plants would be subject to a set of measures specifically designed to ensure that they were no longer operating. To eventually achieve complete denuclearization, North Korea’s existing fissile material needs to be accounted for. Verifying the end of fissile material production for weapons can focus exclusively on the production facilities. By contrast, a monitored end of production could appeal to North Korea for its potential to provide technical assistance (in accounting, safety and security), to keep some facilities operating and workers engaged, and to preserve a future civilian nuclear energy option. However, like other nuclear weapon states, North Korea might also find it useful to safely close down, clean out and decommission if not dismantle its reactor and reprocessing plants to keep monitoring to a minimum. On the uranium side, Pyongyang might be less inclined to verifiably shut down the country’s facilities, reasonably arguing that its enrichment plant could be used to make fuel for the experimental light water reactor and research reactors for civilian uses. However, the only way to verify the facility’s exclusively peaceful activities would be to apply IAEA safeguards, perhaps with new measures developed within the context of the Iran nuclear deal, like continuous enrichment monitoring techniques. 3. Disable/dismantle Verifiably disabling or dismantling entirely North Korea’s reactor, enrichment and reprocessing plants would eliminate uncertainties at declared facilities. Examples of disabling actions at the 5 MWe reactor include removing fuel, draining pipes, pouring concrete into steam tanks and/or the reactor vessel, and other actions (like applying boron to prevent neutron flux) to make the reactor inoperable. Alternatively, North Korea could ask for assistance in preparing the reactor for interim safe storage before decommissioning. “Cocooning” reactors strips the facility down to their radioactive core (eliminating 80 percent of the auxiliary structures) and sealing them shut against the environment. The United States has “cocooned” six of the eight reactors at the Hanford plutonium production site, at a cost of about $21 million each. Disabling activities at the reprocessing plant could include removing (and destroying) hot cell equipment, glove boxes and mixer-settlers, and cutting pipes and removing key items like controllers from cells. Examples at the uranium enrichment plant include draining all vacuum and feed lines, disabling and removing control mechanisms and circuitry, cutting and removing gas feed lines, and disassembling centrifuge cascades. Dismantling is a much more extensive and expensive process, but does not require long-term monitoring once it is completed. In all of these approaches, the wildcard is whether North Korea has hidden capabilities, equipment or facilities. Measures that go beyond traditional IAEA safeguards (as in the Iran nuclear deal) will likely be necessary to build confidence in the country’s intention to no longer produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. The Trump administration rejected a step-by-step approach in Hanoi, but without any fallback options, North Korea’s nuclear program will continue to grow in size and sophistication. Closer to the 2020 election, the stakes will be higher both for Trump and for Kim Jong Un to cut a deal. A verifiable halt in fissile material production needs to be the highest priority until then. (Sharon Squassoni , “North Korea’s Fissile Material Production: How to Know It’s All Gone,” 38 North, March 13, 2019)
3/11/19:
Stephen Biegun told a conference in Washington that although U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un parted on good terms after their February 27-28 summit in Hanoi, big gaps remained between the two sides and North Korea needed to show it was fully committed to giving up its nuclear weapons. Biegun, the U.S. special representative for North Korea, stressed that U.S.-led sanctions, which Pyongyang wants dropped, would stay in place until North Korea completed denuclearization. He rejected an incremental approach sought by Pyongyang, and said that easing sanctions for partial steps would amount to subsidizing North Korea’s weapons programs. As Biegun spoke at the Carnegie Nuclear Conference, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank issued a new report on activity at North Korea’s Sohae rocket launch site, in which commercial satellite images from March 6 and 8 showed North Korea had continued preparations on the launch pad at its Sohae launch facility and at the engine testing stand there. “Based on past practices, these activities could be consistent with preparations for the delivery of a rocket to the launch pad or engine to the test stand; or they could be North Korean coercive bargain tactics,” it said. Biegun said Washington did not know what the activity spotted in North Korea meant. He said the Trump administration took it “very seriously” but cautioned against drawing any snap conclusions. “What Kim Jong Un will ultimately decide to do may very much be his decision and his decision alone,” Biegun said, adding that Trump had made clear last week he would be “very disappointed” if North Korea were to resume testing. An authoritative U.S. government source familiar with U.S. intelligence assessments said they did not conclude that a launch was imminent, given North Korea’s apparent desire to keep negotiations going with the United States. However, the source said Pyongyang appeared to want to make clear it retained the capability to resume launches at any moment. “Diplomacy is still very much alive,” Biegun said. He offered no specifics on when new talks might be held and did not say whether any talks had taken place since the summit, which collapsed over differences on U.S. demands for Pyongyang’s denuclearization and North Korea’s demand for sanctions relief. “It’s certainly our expectation that we will be able to continue our close engagement,” Biegun said. The State Department has declined to say whether there has been any direct engagement between the two sides since the summit. A national security adviser to South Korean President Moon Jae-in said on March 12 the United States should seek the gradual denuclearization of North Korea because an “all-or-nothing” strategy will not help break the impasse in talks. To bridge the gap, Moon could pursue an unofficial inter-Korean summit as he did last year before the first summit between Trump and Kim, and then visit Washington, the adviser said. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Andrea Thompson told the Washington conference she thought there would be another summit. Asked if there would be a third meeting, she said Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Trump had “been very clear that they remain open to the dialogue. They haven’t got a date on the calendar but our teams continue to work towards that.” Thompson said it was “incredibly important” that all countries continued to maintain U.N. sanctions on North Korea until it gave up its nuclear weapons. “We are not letting the foot off the gas. We are going to continue with the pressure campaign,” she said. At the White House, spokeswoman Sarah Sanders scoffed at reports that China was wary of holding a summit with Trump on trade after he walked out of his meeting with Kim without a deal. “We’ll see what happens with North Korea the same way we’re going to see what happens in the negotiations with China. They’re ongoing,” she said. Trump on Friday stressed again his belief in his personal rapport with Kim. (David Brunnstrom and Matt Spetalnick, “U.S. Says North Korea Diplomacy ‘Very Much Alive, but It’s Watching Rocket Site,” Reuters, March 12, 2019)
Biegun: “HELENE. COOPER [New York Times]: … In your Stanford speech, back in January, you seem to suggest that you, the United States was totally open to confidence building steps. And there is certainly — one of the things, you know, as soon as, I’ve been getting a lot of tweets from people and questions from people wanting to direct to you the whole idea of whether or not the American stance is hardening, because in your Stanford speech you said, “From our side we are prepared to discuss many actions that could help build trust between our 2 countries and advance further progress in parallel on the Singapore summit objections — objectives of transforming relations, establishing a permanent peace regime on the Peninsula and complete denuclearization,” you said that. And that sounds totally — that sounds like a — an opening for negotiations. But last week a senior administration official said this at the State Department, “Nobody in the 1 administration advocates a step-by- step approach. In all cases expectations is complete denuclearization of North Korea as a condition for all other steps. That’s a position supported by the entire inter-agency.” Which is it? MR. BIEGUN: It’s — so the semantic differences I have to say escape me. All four of these priorities are linked. The United States is interested in transforming relations with the DPRK. United States is interested in advancing a permanent peace regime with North Korea. United States is absolutely interested in pursuing denuclearization with North Korea. And the fourth pillar, as I mentioned, the return of remains very much remains a high priority for us as well. They’re all linked. They’re all proceeding in parallel. The United States has discussed many initiatives in each of these areas with the North Koreans, but as is so often the case that nothing can be agreed until everything is agreed. That’s a clear principle that has permeated our negotiations on both sides with the North Koreans. That’s not to say that we can’t take steps to build confidence between the two countries. But the foundation of this policy is denuclearization. And until we can get to some point where we have the same traction on that issue that we have on the other issues, that makes it very difficult for us to move forward. You’ve heard the President himself talk about many of the issues that would build confidence. And most recently at the summit he had an exchange in front of the press on this very point. These are issues that we have explored in detail with our North Koreans in parallel with denuclearization. But we’re just not there on denuclearization, and that’s — that was the issue at the summit that really challenged us to move forward with a more complete agreement. We’ve closed some gaps. As the President and the Secretary said, we had a very constructive discussion, but we’re not there yet. And that’s the place where we need to, really need to exert the most effort to see if we can advance an agenda that achieves all of these issues in parallel, not just in isolation. MS. COOPER: But I think that’s where there’s some confusion. Are you saying then that you — that the United States is going to do this incrementally? And if you don’t do this incrementally how can you get it all done? Why should North Korea believe that at the end of this rainbow we’ll get a pot of gold? MR. BIEGUN: Yeah. We are not going to do denuclearization incrementally. The President has been clear on that and that is a position around which the U.S. government has complete unity. Our goal, our objective is the final fully verified denuclearization of North Korea. One of the reasons we were unable to reach a final agreement in Hanoi was, as the President laid out, the North Koreans had offered a portion of their nuclear program in a sense in exchange for lifting basically all the sanctions against North Korea. In effect, that would have put us in a position where we and presumably the international community, because these are United Nations Security Council sanctions, not United Nations sanctions, we would be in a position where we would be lifting all the economic pressure that’s been imposed upon North Korea for the totality of its weapons of mass destruction programs. We’d lift that pressure, but in exchange for only a portion of those weapons of mass destruction programs. That would have put us in a position, a very difficult position of essentially subsidizing what would potentially be ongoing development of weapons of mass destruction in North Korea. We need a total solution. This is why the President, this is what the President brought to the table and this is what the President has sincerely conveyed to Chairman Kim Jong-un. The United States is ready to go down this road with North Korea to transform relations, to create a permanent peace regime, to denuclearize and also to close some of the humanitarian issues like the return of remains, but North Korea has to be committed. And what the President — as the President said at his press conference, he challenged Chairman Kim to go big, to buy into the vision, to do this together with us. I know the North Koreans found that difficult to accept. Obviously we didn’t get to a point at the summit in Hanoi where we could have reached an agreement on that broad framework. But we’re prepared to continue trying. The door is open to diplomacy. We want a very different future for the United States and North Korea on the Korean Peninsula. And the President is 100 percent supportive of us remaining engaged diplomatically to try to achieve that goal. The gap is still just a little bit too large for us to get there today. MS. COOPER: I’m going to try this one — a slightly different way because you are certainly aware that there is a narrative that is out there right now that National Security Advisor John Bolton has now got a hold of the process and that the United States’ position has hardened considerably. Are you saying that we — the Trump administration position has not hardened? MR. BIEGUN: No. The Trump administration position is not hardened. From the very beginning the U.S. view has been to achieve the final fully verified denuclearization of North Korea. The President on down (phonetic) have said that the lifting of sanctions will come with attaining that goal. That’s not to say that we can’t continue to talk with the North Koreans and that there aren’t other areas we can explore outside of the lifting of sanctions that can potentially advance all the Singapore commitments the two leaders made, but there has absolutely been no difference in — or distinction in the U.S. policy on denuclearization. I will say that I have — I am acutely aware that I inherited a portfolio that for 25 years has been mired in political disagreements, in policy differences and also has a fairly miserable record of achievement. We started this diplomacy with North Korea with the agreed framework in the early 1990s and one can debate why each subsequent initiative failed and who was at fault, but you can’t deny the outcome. … MS. COOPER: Okay. What do the North Koreans mean when they say close Yongbyon? There is some confusion about what exactly that might mean. I mean you had working level talks in Hanoi before Trump arrived. How do you think that — do you — do both sides agree on what exactly, do both sides have a clear understanding of what exactly that means? MR. BIEGUN: So we have no agreement to close Yongbyon. Let me just state that upfront. So there is no agreed approach to anything related to Yongbyon at present. But that’s a good question and it’s the right question you asked, because Yongbyon can be many different things. MS. COOPER: Yes. MR. BIEGUN: Yongbyon in the 2008 declaration as part of the six-party talks was a plutonium reactor and a plutonium reprocessing facility. We also know that at — over the course of that decade that the North Koreans had developed a undeclared highly enriched uranium capability at Yongbyon. And so obviously the production of fissile material at Yongbyon comes from both a uranium facility as well as a plutonium facility, both of which are usable in the development of nuclear weapons. The Yongbyon is much more than that too. Yongbyon is a whole industrial complex involved in the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear weapons development in North Korea. Consists of dozens if not hundreds of facilities spread across a large area that is generically referred to as Yongbyon. What we’re asking the North Koreans to do in the process of denuclearization is to eliminate all dimensions of the nuclear fuel cycle and the nuclear weapons program. And so our definition of Yongbyon would be quite expansive. In our discussions with the North Koreans — I won’t go into every detail of how they have chosen to describe Yongbyon, but let me just say, you know, in general it’s been shifting. Things like this are why 11 it is so important that in the denuclearization process you also have an accompanying declaration. We need to agree on the definition of the North Korean weapons programs. We can begin some elements of the denuclearization before that declaration is complete. In the case of the 2008 declaration it took approximately 9 months to generate it. And if the North Koreans are willing to proceed immediately with steps to begin addressing elements of their weapons of mass destruction program, we won’t hold up for that. But we do have to have a complete declaration. An industrial site like Yongbyon 1 illustrates exactly why it’s so important that we agree 2 on the full set of capabilities and also the hold — 3 what they hold as a consequence of their complex of 4 weapons of mass destruction. … MS. COOPER: Okay. Some of the reporting that came out of Hanoi suggested that we’ve now added chemical and biological weapons developments at the table in the negotiations, have we? And again this again gets back to the whole moving the goal post thing that we keep — I keep harping on? MR. BIEGUN: Yeah. So since the day I arrived and adopted this portfolio, the effort to bring a more permanent peace to the Korean Peninsula has involved the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. It would hardly make sense to remove the threat of nuclear weapons from North Korea and endorse the continued presence of chemical and biological weapons. It would be unacceptable to us, it would be unacceptable to North Korea’s neighbors, including Russia, China, Japan and South Korea. But also it — to suggest it’s moving the goal post is in defiance of the factual history of the issue of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs. If you read the UN Security Council resolutions, they are as pointed on the issues of chemical and biological weapons as they are on nuclear weapons. And ultimately the process of final fully verified denuclearization is to set the antecedent for the lifting of those sanctions. Those sanctions, which are international sanctions imposed unanimously by the UN Security Council would also look to the elimination of biological and chemical weapons programs as part of the complete process that we’re undertaking. So this issue is one that we’ve discussed with the North Koreans, it is not new, and it would be a very serious oversight on our part to leave any weapons of mass destruction out of the equation if we truly are going to be successful in transforming the Korean Peninsula in order to have a much more peaceful and engaged relationship, not only between the United States and North Korea, but between North Korea and all of its neighbors. You know, Helene, we talk a lot about the challenges of the diplomacy, about the need to decipher opaque messages that are sent to us and also about the complexities that are involved in this process which generically is called denuclearization, but really is the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. But I also think we need to focus just as much on the positive possibilities too. The diplomatic engagement between the United States and North Korea since June of last year has not been without its results. Yes, the President has frequently cited the moratorium the North Koreans have on nuclear missile tests as well as the partial dismantlement of Sohae and Tongchang or Tongchang-ri as it’s called and also Punggye-ri. And while these steps aren’t permanent and irreversible as the news accounts for the last few days have sent us, they also are not inconsequential entirely. They offer some insight into the direction that we believe North Korea is willing to take. And what we need to see them do is go further down the road. But outside that there has been much else as well. The United States is more engaged with North Korea diplomatically right now than we have been in the past decade. We are deeply engaged in a regularized contact that I laid out a little bit in my framing remarks upfront. And the North Koreans are also involved in outreach with their neighbors, with China, with a halting discussion with Japan, and with South Korea. And the South Koreans and the North Koreans are working very closely also to try to lower hostilities on the Korean Peninsula and create an opening for the full vision that President Trump laid out at Singapore to come fruition. I have traveled recently to the demilitarized zone in North Korea. The demilitarized zone was affected by a number of confidence-building measures that were negotiated between Chairman Kim and President Moon Jae-in of South Korea late last year in consultation with the United Nations Command and the U.S. Forces Korea. They’ve done a number of — taken a number of steps around the demilitarized zone in order to lower tensions. The elimination of all weapons has been implemented in the joint security area around Panmunjom village. It’s a remarkable thing. And for those of you who are in Korea or have the opportunity to visit the DMZ, I would strong commend it. I think some of the details are still being worked out in the final arrangements in the DMZ. I had heard from someone recently that it’s not so easy to travel there until all the remaining issues are implemented around this set of agreements. But I was able to visit. And I’ll tell you, just palpable difference from anything I’ve seen since I first visited the DMZ in 1988. Over those 31 years we have gone from a feeling of two armies brisling with weapons poised on a very narrow buffer on the Korean Peninsula to a more calm and orderly and engagement. There is regular communications between the North, South, and between — and with the UN Command in the DMZ. You know these are not inconsequential changes that have taken place on the Korean Peninsula. So as we focus on the urgency of this particular issue or the crisis or potential crisis du jour, I think we also need to step back and realize that over the past 8 months President Trump’s diplomacy with North Korea and South Korea’s diplomacy with North Korea have created space for many constructive things to happen. And while we’re a long way away from where we need to be, and as I said at the beginning of my remarks, we’re not nearly as far long on denuclearization as I would have hoped we are. You know, we’re making progress. We’re still engaged diplomatically, the door remains open, the President was emphatic on this point coming out of the Hanoi summit. The conversations were constructive. They ended without an agreement, but they didn’t end badly. And so I don’t want to lose sight of the positives in this environment as we focused on the particular issues or controversies or semantics of the moment. MS. COOPER: That’s a lovely wrap-up. … But in the meantime, you brought up steps that we’ve taken, one of them, you know, I couldn’t sit here as a Pentagon reporter and not ask you about the suspension, the continued suspension of military exercises with — between the United States and South Korea in the peninsula. President Trump himself has called them expensive and provocative. How do you see this continued suspension playing part or — what kind of role do you think that this continues to put in your negotiations? You know the people at the Pentagon don’t like this. MR. BIEGUN: Yeah. So what the President said is — and this is a unilateral policy, but the President is committed to it, it is that he has suspended major joint military exercises between the United States and South Korea and — or as he would refer to them as war games. And that remains the policy. The President reaffirmed it from the podium — MS. COOPER: The war games thing really got them at the Pentagon because they really don’t like that. MR. BIEGUN: The President reaffirmed that point from the podium in Hanoi when he did his press conference. But I will also say that I think the Pentagon has done a fantastic job of working within the parameters of that policy — MS. COOPER: Because we continue to do the military exercises, we just don’t call them that. MR. BIEGUN: To make sure we do the necessary military training that any responsible decision-maker at the Pentagon would want to undertake. You know, we do — militaries have to train. We have 28,500 U.S. soldiers on the Korean Peninsula and they need to be prepared always to defend the mission that’s been assigned to them. … My job from the Department of State is to give them the diplomacy they deserve. General Robert Abrams, our commander of U.S. Forces Korea and the head of United Nations Command, his job is to make sure they’re ready. President’s job is to set the policy for the United States of America. And the President has done that clearly, unambiguously. And notwithstanding what you’re hearing, my view is that he’s fully supported by his advisors and that they have within the parameters of that developed an approach to training our forces that is acceptable. So, you know, I think we’re in a good place. … MS. COOPER: Kay Huyen (phonetic). “You mentioned that the U.S. despite not being open to incremental denuclearization is open to pursuing confidence-building measures. Could you give a few examples of these confidence-building measures?” MR. BIEGUN: The — certainly we’re very interested in getting inspectors into North Korea. And as part of that we’re going to need some sort of permanent liaison with the North Koreans in order to be able to look out for the welfare and the rights of our people who are there. You’ve heard the President in fact at the summit in Hanoi, there was an exchange in front of the cameras between President Trump and Chairman Kim on this very issue. We’re not there yet, we’re not able to establish a liaison office, but this is just one that’s been mentioned in public. There are a lot of other initiatives that we have discussed in private with the North Koreans that I would be loathed to lay out in public because they are the subject of private discussions and negotiations between us. But we’ve discussed a lot of ideas and we will continue to engage with them diplomatically to see if there is an opportunity to engage and reach agreement on some of these. … ” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, A Conversation with U.S. Special Representative Stephen Biegun, 2019 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, March 11, 2019)
Samore: “This article assesses the significance of dismantling nuclear facilities at Yongbyon for constraining North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities. Reportedly, North Korea has not yet specified exactly which facilities in Yongbyon would be dismantled. It may seek to spare some facilities to employ scientists and continue civilian operations, such as radioisotope production. For the sake of simplicity, in this article, I assume that a dismantlement deal will include all the major nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, including the 5 MWe gas-graphite reactor and related reprocessing facility, the IRT-2000 Soviet-supplied research reactor and related hot cells, the 25 MWe experimental light water reactor (under construction), the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility and (suspected) Lithium-6 enrichment facility, as well as related fuel cycle facilities for conversion and fuel fabrication. In addition, any spent fuel that has not been reprocessed would be removed. There are three central uncertainties in evaluating the significance of dismantling Yongbyon. The first uncertainty concerns plutonium. Dismantling the 5 MWe reactor and reprocessing facility at Yongbyon and disposing of any spent fuel would eliminate North Korea’s only known source for producing additional plutonium. However, the impact of capping plutonium supplies on the number and type of nuclear weapons in North Korea’s arsenal is difficult to determine. If plutonium is an essential requirement for North Korea’s thermonuclear weapons (presumably the device tested in September 2017), then the limit on plutonium supplies would limit the number of such weapons in North Korea’s arsenal to the quantity of plutonium on hand divided by the amount of plutonium used per weapon. For example, if the total amount of available plutonium is 20 to 40 kilograms and 4 to 6 kilograms of plutonium are required for each weapon, then the total arsenal would be in the range of 3 to 10 thermonuclear weapons. Of course, this is a rough estimate because the total quantity of plutonium available and the amount used in each weapon is not publicly known. If, however, North Korea manufactures thermonuclear weapons without using plutonium, then the limit on plutonium supplies would not prevent North Korea from building additional thermonuclear weapons as long as additional supplies of weapons-grade uranium are available. For advanced nuclear weapons states, plutonium is the material of choice for thermonuclear weapons to reduce size and weight, but thermonuclear weapons can also be made entirely with weapons-grade uranium. It is necessary to know the details of North Korea’s thermonuclear weapons design to determine the significance of ceasing plutonium production in North Korea. The second uncertainty involves tritium. Tritium gas is widely used in modern nuclear weapons to increase yield for a given quantity of fissile material (plutonium or weapons-grade uranium) in fission weapons. This technique is also used to reduce the overall weight and size of nuclear warheads. Because tritium has a short half-life of 12.3 years, a source of fresh supply is necessary to maintain the gas charge in a “boosted” fission device. Tritium is commonly produced by irradiating Lithium-6 targets in a nuclear reactor and then separating the tritium in a radiochemical laboratory. However, tritium can also be produced in a linear accelerator or even purchased in small quantities on the open market because tritium is used for a variety of non-nuclear civilian uses. With respect to North Korea, dismantling the 5 MWe reactor and the IRT-2000 and associated radiochemical facilities would certainly eliminate the most obvious sources for tritium production. However, it would not necessarily prevent North Korea from acquiring or producing additional tritium, for example, from a linear accelerator (if one exists in North Korea). In any event, the importance of tritium to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program depends on whether North Korea uses tritium gas in its more advanced fission and fusion weapons. Tritium gas is not essential for thermonuclear weapons or even boosting. The final uncertainty—and the most important—concerns enriched uranium. Dismantlement of the enrichment facility at Yongbyon would not prevent North Korea from continuing to produce weapons-grade uranium at undeclared enrichment facilities outside Yongbyon; without knowing the output capacity of its enrichment facility relative to the capacity of undeclared enrichment facilities, it is not possible to calculate the significance of ending enrichment at the site. For example, if its enrichment facility represents a small fraction of North Korea’s overall enrichment capability, then shutting it down would not substantially reduce North Korea’s ability to produce additional nuclear weapons. Even if the enrichment plant there represents a more significant portion of North Korea’s overall enrichment capacity, dismantling the plant would have little long-term effect if North Korea is free to increase its capacity at undeclared enrichment facilities. In sum, determining the significance of dismantling nuclear facilities at Yongbyon requires detailed knowledge about the design and construction of North Korea’s more advanced nuclear weapons, as well as accurate information about the country’s entire enrichment complex, both within and outside Yongbyon. This information is not publicly available. In a worst-case scenario, dismantlement of Yongbyon might have no effect on the North’s ability to produce additional thermonuclear weapons; alternatively, dismantling the complex might prevent or limit further production of thermonuclear weapons. In any event, North Korea could continue to produce weapons-grade uranium for additional fission weapons at undeclared enrichment facilities outside of the Yongbyon complex. At best, dismantlement of the Yongbyon enrichment plant could reduce the rate of production of fission weapons, but would not stop it. In my experience, North Koreans often begin negotiations by asking a very high price for a very small give on their part. If that initial offer is rejected, the North Koreans are not shy about coming back to the bargaining table to discuss proposals to give more and get less in return. Thus, the failure at Hanoi may turn out to be a prelude to a more realistic North Korean negotiating posture. On the American side, the proposal to eliminate all of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs in a single grand bargain is obviously not achievable. Having experienced failure first hand, President Trump may be amenable to a more modest incremental process of denuclearization that would stretch out over many years. If so, US-DPRK negotiations are likely to focus on proposals to curtail or cease fissile material production in North Korea to “cap” or “freeze” its nuclear weapons arsenal, as a first step towards reduction and eventual elimination. The benefits of a US deal with the North to dismantle Yongbyon should not be dismissed, but they should also not be oversold. If the US decides to buy it, the administration shouldn’t pay too much for the prize. Washington needs to preserve as much bargaining leverage as possible to achieve a real freeze on fissile material production, which would require North Korea to allow international inspections to verify that secret facilities outside Yongbyon are shut down and dismantled. Equally important, the US should not allow North Korea to drag out the dismantlement of Yongbyon for years. Technically, the key facilities at Yongbyon can be “dismantled” (or rendered virtually unrepairable) within months, using various inelegant shortcuts that would probably not be approved by the Environmental Protection Agency. During this period of dismantlement, US and DPRK negotiators should try to hammer out the difficult and intrusive measures necessary to verify a comprehensive freeze on fissile material production, including a North Korean declaration of its secret fissile material production facilities. In other words, a deal to dismantle Yongbyon could begin a process that would eventually lead to the more technically significant step of shutting down and dismantling all of North Korea’s fissile material production facilities. Ideally, an agreement to dismantle Yongbyon would be part of a bigger package that includes the next step of implementing a comprehensive freeze and effective verification system within a specific time frame. The package would also have to specify the additional measures that the US will take once a comprehensive freeze has been implemented, such as further sanctions relief and steps towards normalizing political and economic relations with the US. Finally, a bigger diplomatic package needs to include North Korean agreement that a freeze on fissile material production is a first step towards reduction and elimination of its entire nuclear and missile program and forces. Correspondingly, the US should not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state but should continue to work towards achieving peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. Obviously, the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea won’t happen any time soon. The country has had a nuclear weapons program for over 30 years and probably nuclear weapons for over a decade; Pyongyang has spent billions of dollars to develop these capabilities while exacting tremendous sacrifices from the North Korean people. It won’t give them up quickly or easily—and certainly not until it stops seeing the US as a threat to its survival. The strategy, therefore, should be to impose as many limits as possible on North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities and establish a long-term political process that might eventually create the conditions for disarmament by fundamentally transforming the US-DPRK relationship. In the meantime, the US and its allies will need to maintain a strong mutual defense of South Korea to deter North Korean use of both conventional and nuclear weapons and to prevent South Korea and Japan from deciding to build their own nuclear weapons.” (Gary Samore, “How Significant Is the Dismantlement of Yongbyon?” 38 North, March 11, 2019)
3/4-12/19:
South Korea and the United States wrapped up their new, weeklong combined defense exercise on March 12, amid worries that the apparent downsizing of their springtime drills could hurt military readiness. The allies launched the Dong Maeng command post exercise on Monday last week, replacing the Key Resolve exercise to support ongoing diplomacy to denuclearize North Korea and foster lasting peace on the divided peninsula. Dong Maeng is the Korean word for alliance. The computer simulation exercise was half the duration of the usually two-week Key Resolve. It apparently focused on bolstering the combined defense capabilities with a counterattack portion of its predecessor removed. The exercise involved members from the South Korean defense ministry, Joint Chiefs of Staff and operations commands of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and those from the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces Korea and Indo-Pacific Command. (Yonhap, “S. Korea, U.S. Wrap up Joint Exercise,” March 12, 2019)
3/12/19:
UN sanctions monitors are investigating Kim Jong Un’s luxury purchases of a Rolls-Royce, Mercedes-Benz limousines and Lexus four-wheel-drive vehicles rolled out during the North Korean leader’s recent international meetings, the head of the panel told AFP Tuesday. Kim drew the attention of sanctions experts when he turned up at a meeting with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in Pyongyang in October in a brand-new Rolls-Royce Phantom limousine. At the Singapore summit with President Donald Trump in June, Kim’s entourage was ferried in a fleet of Mercedes-Benz luxury cars, none of which had license plates. And a number of Lexus LX570 all-wheel drive luxury vehicles were used by the North Korean delegation at an inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang in September. “The North Koreans procure what they want. They get the best when they need it,” said Hugh Griffiths, who for the past five years has been the coordinator of the UN panel of experts investigating sanctions-busting by North Korea. The sale of luxury goods including high-end cars, yachts and jewelry to North Korea has been banned since 2013, and the list of lavish items has been extended in subsequent sanctions resolutions. The use of the swanky, expensive cars at summits was seen as a brazen display by Kim of his defiance of international sanctions, at a time when North Korea has appealed for UN help to deal with food shortages. “Violating sanctions is bad behavior and such obvious violations at international events aren’t helpful, in my view, for enforcing of sanctions,” Griffiths said. “You don’t want to make a mockery of the sanctions.” The UN panel released a report today that detailed highly-sophisticated evasion tactics used by North Korea to circumvent the sweeping sanctions imposed for its nuclear and ballistic missile tests. After providing Rolls-Royce with photos of the Phantom, the company said it appeared to have been produced between 2012 and 2017 at its British plant in Goodwood, the report said. The investigation continues to determine how the Phantom, listed at a price of about $450,000 in car trade publications, was shipped to Pyongyang. The fleet of Mercedes-Benz vehicles was sent from a U.S. port in California to Hong Kong at the direction of a Chinese businessman, George Ma, whose company Seajet has ties to North Korea’s Air Koryo national airline. Asked about the Lexus vehicles, Toyota told the panel that it had not exported them to North Korea and that the vehicles probably were bought through back channels. Despite the loopholes, Griffiths said the sanctions — the most comprehensive imposed on any country by the Security Council — had put Kim “in a box” and forced him to expend major efforts to circumvent the restrictions. “They are getting around them, but it’s not sustainable,” said Griffiths, who will be leaving his post next month. One of North Korea’s key weapons in battling sanctions is its fleet of vessels, which have been renamed, placed under foreign flags and disguised to avoid detection of illegal cargo. Pyongyang has been able to continue selling banned commodities such as coal and to secure deliveries of fuel through ship-to-ship transfers in international waters, according to the panel’s findings. “It’s crazy what is happening in international waters now. It’s essentially anarchy,” said Griffiths. The panel has recommended that governments put pressure on commodity traders, insurers, flag-states and global banks to keep closer watch over vessels used in sanctions-busting. (Carol Landry, “UN Says North Korea Violated Sanctions with Luxury Vehicles,” AFP, March 12, 2019)
The list of members elected to the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) was announced on the sate-run Korean Central Television broadcast, this afternoon, two days after a nationwide election. A total of 678 deputies have been elected, one from each constituency. Kim Yo-jong, Kim Jong-un’s sister and first director of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), was elected to constituency No. 5 in the capital Pyongyang’s Mangyongdae district, considered the home neighborhood of the country’s founder, Kim Il-sung. Kim Yo-jong has been assisting her brother on the country’s diplomatic stage with South Korea as well as with the U.S. The North’s Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho and Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, who played an active part behind the scenes of the Hanoi summit between Kim Jong-un and President Donald Trump, were elected as SPA members for the first time. Other diplomatic figures newly elected to the SPA included Ri Su-yong and Kim Yong-chol, vice chairmen of the WPK central committee, as well as North Korea’s ambassador to the United States Kim Song, and Ri Son-gwon, chairman of the North’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland. According to an analysis of the North’s election results by the South’s Ministry of Unification, Tuesday, 50 percent of the SPA members have been replaced. The ministry said it was noteworthy that Kim Jong-un’s name was off the list. “This is the first time since the foundation of the North Korean regime that the country’s leader has not been named as a member of the Supreme People’s Assembly,” the ministry said. “Further observation is needed to figure out the specific situation behind it.” (Jung Da-min, “North Korea Gives Senior Diplomats Supreme Assembly Seats,” Korea Times, March 13, 2019)
3/13/19:
For the first time since 2007, Japan will not take part in the submission of a draft joint resolution condemning North Korea’s human rights abuses to a U.N. panel, the government said, in a conciliatory gesture apparently aimed at convincing Pyongyang to hold talks with Tokyo. The turnaround reflects Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s desire to settle the issue of Pyongyang’s past abductions of Japanese nationals — a top priority of his administration, according to government sources. Tokyo has jointly presented such a motion with the European Union to the 47-member U.N. Human Rights Council for the last 11 years. “We have reached this decision based on a comprehensive examination of the outcome of the second U.S.-North Korean summit and the situations surrounding the abduction and other issues” related to the North, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide told a news conference. “There is no change in (Japan’s) stance to closely work together with the international community, including the United States, and fully implement U.N. Security Council resolutions” imposed over the North’s nuclear and missile programs, the top government spokesman said. The decision “would not hamper Japan’s effort to keep in step with the international society” and Tokyo will continue to urge Pyongyang to improve its human rights situation, Suga added. Trump has said he raised the abduction issue in the meeting with Kim, but the official newspaper of North Korea’s Workers’ Party slammed Abe for asking the U.S. president to take up the issue. The Foreign Ministry has told senior lawmakers of the ruling bloc comprising Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party and its partner, Komeito, that Tokyo’s softer position on Pyongyang at the U.N. committee would signal its intention to resume bilateral talks, especially when the North has shown signs of being nervous over international criticism of its human rights record, the sources said. Abe’s government hopes to alleviate concerns among ruling bloc members and conservative supporters over the softening of its policy by stressing its resolve to make progress on the long-standing issue, they said. Whether this strategy will work as Tokyo wishes, he said, remains to be seen. In a meeting with Abe yesterday, Chimura Yasushi, 63, who was repatriated in 2002 along with his wife after both were abducted in 1978, urged the prime minister to settle the issue through direct talks with Kim. Tokyo officially recognizes 17 citizens as having been kidnapped by North Korea and suspects the country’s involvement in many more disappearances. Among them, five, including the Chimuras, returned to Japan in 2002 after Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro held talks with Kim’s father, Kim Jong Il, in Pyongyang earlier that year. Abe accompanied Koizumi as deputy chief Cabinet secretary. (Kyodo, “Japan to Opt out of U.N. Motion Condemning North Korea’s Rights Abuses in Apparent Bid for Talks on Abductions,” Japan Times, March 13, 2019)
Days before President Trump was set to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Vietnam, a mysterious incident in Spain threatened to derail the entire high-stakes nuclear summit. In broad daylight, masked assailants infiltrated North Korea’s embassy in Madrid, tied up the staff, stole computers and mobile phones, and fled the scene in two luxury vehicles. The group behind the late February operation is known as Cheollima Civil Defense, a secretive dissident organization committed to overthrowing the Kim dynasty, people familiar with the planning and execution of the mission told the Washington Post. The group’s alleged role in the attack has not previously been reported, and officials from the governments of North Korea, the United States and Spain declined to comment on it. But in recent days, rumors about the motivations behind the attack have swirled in the Spanish media, including a report in El Pais alleging that two of the masked assailants have ties to the CIA. People familiar with the incident say the group did not act in coordination with any governments. U.S. intelligence agencies would have been especially reluctant to be involved, given the sensitive timing and brazen nature of the mission. But the raid represents the most ambitious operation to date for an obscure organization that seeks to undermine the North Korean regime and encourage mass defections, they say. “This group is the first known resistance movement against North Korea, which makes its activities very newsworthy,” said Sung-Yoon Lee, a North Korea expert at Tufts University. Any hint of U.S. involvement in an assault on a diplomatic compound could have derailed the talks, a prospect of which the CIA would likely be mindful. “Infiltrating a North Korean embassy days before the nuclear summit would throw that all into jeopardy,” said Sue Mi Terry, a former Korea analyst at the CIA. “This is not something the CIA would undertake.” The agency declined to comment. According to Spanish media reports, the assailants tied up the embassy staff with rope, put hoods over their heads and asked them questions. They spoke in Korean and appeared to be Asian. More than an hour into the raid, a woman reportedly escaped, and her screams for help alerted a neighbor, who contacted police. When authorities arrived at the embassy, a man opened the door and told them there was no problem. Moments later, the embassy gates opened, and the assailants dashed out to two embassy cars and sped away, according to local reports. The vehicles were found abandoned on a nearby street. Though the incident has attracted a flurry of Spanish media attention, no police reports were filed by the embassy or the victims, according to the reports. Experts say the computers and phones seized in the raid contain a treasure trove of information that foreign intelligence agencies are likely to seek out from the group. “It could have contacts and documents related to North Korea’s efforts to bypass sanctions and import luxury goods from Europe, which was one of the key assignments for Kim Hyok Chol, the former North Korean ambassador to Spain,” Lee said. Recently, Kim Hyok Chol was reassigned as North Korea’s point man for the nuclear negotiations with the United States, making any information about his previous activities especially coveted by foreign governments looking to gain an edge in the negotiations. The assailants also possess a video recording they took during the raid, which they could release anytime, said one person who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive and illegal operation. The Cheollima group, which also goes by the name Free Joseon, drew attention in 2017 after it successfully evacuated the nephew of Kim Jong Un from Macau when potential threats to his life surfaced. The nephew was the son of Kim Jong Nam, the North Korean leader’s exiled half-brother who was assassinated in a nerve-gas attack in a Malaysian airport that same year. Kim Jong Nam was widely believed to have been killed by the regime, making his son a likely target. Members of the Cheollima group transported Kim Han Sol out of Macau with the help of the governments of the United States, China and the Netherlands, which provided travel and visa assistance, the group told the Wall Street Journal in 2017. For safety reasons, the leader of the group does not disclose his name, and his identity is known only to a small group of people. In March, the group published a manifesto calling on North Koreans inside and outside the country to resist Pyongyang in ways big and small. “To those within the system who hear this declaration: We call on you to defy your oppressors. Challenge them openly or resist them quietly,” the declaration said. “To those of like-mind and like-spirit of our diaspora: We call upon you to join our revolution.” Since the attack on the embassy in Spain, the group has asserted responsibility for the defacing of the North Korean Embassy in Malaysia’s capital, Kuala Lumpur, on March 11. Authorities said four men who wore hats and masks painted the graffiti. The group has not claimed responsibility for the raid in Madrid. “In its messaging, the group said they have formed a provisional government to replace the regime in Pyongyang,” said Terry, who is a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “They have now shown the seriousness of their intent and some capabilities to carry out operations. We will see in the coming months the extent of their capabilities.” (John Hudson, “N. Korean Dissidents Allegedly Raided Embassy in Madrid,” Washington Post, March 16, 2019, p. A-6)
3/15/19:
Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui, addressing a meeting of diplomats and foreign media, including The Associated Press, in Pyongyang said the North was deeply disappointed by the failure of the two sides to reach any agreements at the Hanoi summit between Kim and President Donald Trump. She said Pyongyang now has no intention of compromising or continuing talks unless the United States takes measures that are commensurate to the changes it has taken — such as the 15-month moratorium on launches and tests — and changes its “political calculation.” Choe said Kim was puzzled by what she called the “eccentric” negotiation position of the U.S. She suggested that while Trump was more willing to talk, an atmosphere of hostility and mistrust was created by the uncompromising demands of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Adviser John Bolton. She said statements by senior Trump advisers since the summit have further worsened the climate. Even so, she said personal relations between the two leaders are still good “and the chemistry is mysteriously wonderful.” She said it was entirely up to Kim whether to continue the launch and test moratorium, and said she expects he will “clarify his position” within a short period of time. “On our way back to the homeland, our chairman of the state affairs commission said. ‘For what reason do we have to make this train trip again?'” she said. “I want to make it clear that the gangster-like stand of the U.S. will eventually put the situation in danger. We have neither the intention to compromise with the U.S. in any form nor much less the desire or plan to conduct this kind of negotiation.” Choe questioned the claim by Trump at a news conference after the talks in Hanoi broke down that the North was seeking the lifting of all sanctions against it, and said it was seeking only the ones that are directed at its civilian economy. Choe said it was the U.S. that was being too demanding and inflexible and called the demand that denuclearization come before sanctions are eased “an absurd sophism.” She added that while South Korean President Moon Jae-in has tried to help bring the U.S. and North Korea together to talk, the South is “a player, not an arbiter” because it is an ally of Washington. She said even though the people, military and officials of the munitions industry have sent Kim thousands of petitions to never give up the nuclear program, he went to Hanoi to build trust and carry out mutually agreed commitments “one by try and step by step.” “What is clear is that the U.S. has thrown away a golden opportunity this time,” she said. “I’m not sure why the U.S. came out with this different description. We never asked for the removal of sanctions in their entirety.” “This time we understood very clearly that the United States has a very different calculation to ours,” she added. She refused to comment directly when asked by one of the ambassadors about news reports the North may be preparing for another missile launch or satellite launch. “Whether to maintain this moratorium or not is the decision of our chairman of the state affairs commission,” she said, using one of Kim’s titles. “He will make his decision in a short period of time.” (Eric Talmadge, “N. Korean Official: Kim Rethinking U.S. Talks, Launch Moratorium,” Associated Press, March 15, 2019) North Korea threatened to suspend negotiations with the Trump administration over the North’s nuclear arms program and said its leader, Kim Jong-un, would soon decide whether to resume nuclear and missile tests. Addressing diplomats and foreign correspondents at a news conference in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui said that personal relations between Kim and Trump were “still good and the chemistry is mysteriously wonderful.” But she said that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and John Bolton, rump’s national security adviser, had created an “atmosphere of hostility and mistrust” that thwarted the top leaders’ negotiations in Hanoi, Vietnam, last month. After the Hanoi meeting ended without a deal, the North Korean leader had serious doubts about the merits of continuing negotiations with Trump, Ms. Choe said. “We have neither the intention to compromise with the U.S. in any form nor much less the desire or plan to conduct this kind of negotiation,” said Choe, according a report from Pyongyang by The Associated Press. She also said the North might end its self-imposed moratorium on tests of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. “Whether to maintain this moratorium or not is the decision of our chairman of the state affairs commission,” she said. “He will make his decision in a short period of time.” The office of South Korea’s president, Moon Jae-in, who did much to broker the talks between the North and the United States, said it was closely monitoring the situation. “Whatever the situation, our government will try its best to help resume North Korea-US. negotiations,” it said in a statement. North Korea insisted, as it has before, on moving in phases. In Hanoi, Kim offered to dismantle the plutonium, uranium-enrichment and other facilities at its Yongbyon site, north of Pyongyang, and demanded that Washington in return lift crucial sanctions that have been imposed on the North since 2016. Trump rejected the offer, demanding more substantial steps toward denuclearization. North Korea is widely believed to run at least one other uranium-enrichment plant outside Yongbyon, as well as keeping other elements of its nuclear program in secret locations around the mountainous country. Officials from both countries have said that North Korea asked the United States at the Hanoi talks to lift five rounds of sanctions that have been imposed since May 2016. American officials are concerned that pulling back from major sanctions would diminish their leverage over North Korea, and at least one official has said that the North would use any new revenue to subsidize its nuclear weapons program. United Nations sanctions currently ban all of the North’s key exports, including coal, and drastically cut back its fuel imports. By avoiding direct criticism of Trump and blaming the Hanoi talks’ breakdown mainly on his aides, Choe appeared to signal that North Korea still hoped Trump might soften Washington’s position. “On our way back to the homeland, our chairman of the state affairs commission said, ‘For what reason do we have to make this train trip again?’” Choe said, according to A.P. “I want to make it clear that the gangster-like stand of the U.S. will eventually put the situation in danger.” She said the United States had thrown away “a golden opportunity” in Hanoi, adding that the North was no longer interested in negotiating unless Washington changed its “political calculation.” (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Threatens to Scuttle Talks with U.S. and Resume Tests,” New York Times, March 15, 2019) President Donald Trump was open to easing sanctions on North Korea provided there was a ‘snapback’ clause if the North restarted nuclear activities, according to South Korean media reports of a North Korean statement. The new statement from a March 15 news conference by North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui said Trump had a “flexible position” on the issue during his summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un last month. However, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and national security adviser John Bolton “created an obstacle”, South Korean news agencies Yonhap and Newsis reported late on March 25. The second U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi broke down without resolution but North Korea has continued to speak positively about Trump. Choe said relations between the two leaders were still good and that “the chemistry is mysteriously wonderful”, according to news reports from the media conference in Pyongyang. News reports at the time did not mention Choe saying Trump had been flexible about easing sanctions on North Korea provided there was a ‘snapback’ clause. There was no explanation for the apparent omission. (Joyce Lee, “North Korea Says Trump Was Open to Easing Sanctions with ‘Snapback’ Clause: South Korean Media,” Reuters, March 25, 2019) President Donald Trump was open to easing sanctions on North Korea at last month’s summit with Kim Jong-un, but was thwarted by his top aides, according to a senior Pyongyang official. Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui made the remarks at a press conference in the North Korean capital on March 15, which was widely reported on for her threat to abandon denuclearization negotiations with the U.S. Yonhap obtained a copy of her opening remarks. “When we tabled a realistic proposal, President Trump was of the flexible position that a deal could be possible if it contained a reference to the fact that sanctions removal would be reversible in the event that North Korea resumed nuclear activities,” she said. The vice foreign minister continued that a “meaningful outcome” was not reached because U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton “created an obstacle in the constructive negotiation efforts of the two leaders with extant hostility and mistrust.” Choe’s accusations against Pompeo and Bolton were previously reported and subsequently denied by both men. If Trump’s alleged openness to a “snapback” clause is true, it could explain his decision last week to hold back on additional sanctions on North Korea. Choe also claimed that Kim has tried to negotiate with the U.S. despite “much opposition and challenge” within his own country. “Our people, and especially our military and munitions industry, are writing thousands of petition letters to our State Affairs Commission Chairman Comrade to urge against giving up our nuclear (program) at any cost,” she said. (Yonhap, “Trump Was Open to Easing Sanctions at Summit: N.K. Official,” March 25, 2019)
Pompeo: “MR PALLADINO: We have time — the Secretary has time for a few questions. Let’s go to Associated Press, Matt. … Q: Just very briefly on the ICC decision, are you doing this today because they haven’t closed or dropped the pending Afghanistan investigation or is there some other reason? And then secondly, I’m wondering if you’ve had a chance to see and if you could respond to what the North Korean deputy foreign minister said overnight about the U.S. giving up a golden opportunity by walking away in Hanoi and blaming you personally and Ambassador Bolton for creating this atmosphere of hostility. POMPEO: … I did have a chance to see the remarks overnight from Choe Son-hui. In Singapore, after a great deal of work, the two leaders came together and began a course of action which has led to the toughest sanctions that have existed against North Korea — global sanctions, UN Security Council resolution sanctions that remain in effect. The demands of those sanctions are the complete denuclearization of North Korea, the missiles, the weapons systems, the entire WMD program. That’s the requirement laid out by the United Nations Security Council. The two leaders met. Chairman Kim made a commitment to denuclearize. We continued to work between Singapore and Hanoi to deliver on that. We’ve had hostages return. We have them having stopped missile testing and nuclear testing. We are hopeful that we can continue to have conversation, negotiations. I saw the remarks that she made. She left open the possibility that negotiations would continue for sure. It’s the administration’s desire that we continue to have conversations around this. As the President said when he was in Hanoi, the offer that they made simply didn’t rise to the level that was acceptable given what they were asking for in exchange for that. MR PALLADINO: Let’s go to BBC, Barbara. Q: Just a quick follow-up on North Korea: What’s the next step, then? Because there has also — she also hinted that Kim Jong-un would make a statement possibly lifting the moratorium on tests. And then secondly, if I could on Golan, the human rights ambassador said on Wednesday that removing the word “occupation” or “occupied” from the Golan and the West Bank was not a policy change, but we know that Israel is afraid of Iran and Hizballah threatening Israel from the Syrian side of the Golan, so in your view, does that strengthen the Israeli case for annexing the occupied bit? POMPEO: So I don’t have anything to add about the change in language that we used. It was characterized properly. There is a real risk. The proxies that are in the region, in southern Syria and in the vicinity of the Golan Heights, are presenting risk to the Israelis, and we’ve made clear the Israelis have a right to defend themselves. With respect to what was said last night about Chairman Kim potentially considering ending the moratorium, I can say only this: In Hanoi, on multiple occasions, he spoke directly to the President and made a commitment that he would not resume nuclear testing, nor would he resume missile testing. So that’s Chairman Kim’s word. We have every expectation that he will live up to that commitment. MR PALLADINO: CNN, Michelle. Q: Thanks. This week — on North Korea again — the State Department has said that talks have continued with North Korea. On what level have they continued? POMPEO: Yeah, I’m not going to talk about the negotiations. They’re ongoing. … MR PALLADINO: Last question. Washington Post, Carol Morello. Q: Sir, do you think the attacks on you personally made by the North Koreans will hamper your ability to continue negotiations or do you think you’re going to have to pull back in some way? Because they clearly are accusing — clearly, they flatly accused you of creating an atmosphere of mistrust and hostility. POMPEO: Yeah. Well first, they’re wrong about that, and — I was there. I have — my relationship with Kim Yong-chol is professional. We have detailed conversations. I expect that we will continue to do that. He’s the counterpart that the North Koreans have put forward for me. It’s not the first time — I have a vague recollection of being called “gangster-like” from a visit that I took one time previously, and following that we continued to have very professional conversations where we tried our best to work together and represent our respective sides. I have every expectation that we’ll be able to continue to do that.” (DoS, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, Remarks to the Press, Press Briefing Room, Washington, March 15, 2019)
President Trump’s claims that reduced tensions with North Korea resulting from his personal diplomacy with Kim Jong Un demonstrated progress toward a nuclear deal were undercut today as Pyongyang lashed out at the administration’s “gangster-like” tactics and blamed his top aides for the failed summit last month. The threat came amid evidence that the regime had recently rebuilt a space-rocket and missile-launch site and raised doubts about the future of the negotiations. Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui emphasized at a news conference in Pyongyang that the two leaders maintain a good relationship after the summit ended without a deal. And U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo played down tensions, responding in Washington that he expected that the two sides would continue “very professional conversations.” Yet behind the scenes, Trump aides have struggled to articulate a path to bridge the wide gaps between Washington’s demands that the North fully dismantle its nuclear weapons program and Pyongyang’s insistence that the United States ease punishing economic sanctions in exchange for incremental steps. In a private briefing in Washington this week, one White House official told foreign-policy analysts that Trump’s talks with Kim last month convinced the president that the regime is unwilling to surrender its nuclear program, said Sue Mi Terry, a Korea expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies who attended the briefing. “What he was saying is that everybody knew North Korea would not give up its nukes, but Trump was not sure,” she said. “And, most significantly, that Trump finally gets that fact, and it’s not easily solvable.” That realization throws into question Trump’s strategy of abandoning the precedent of past U.S. administrations that rejected presidential-level talks, choosing instead to engage in direct negotiations with Kim — without a clear road map for how a denuclearization process would work. Some foreign-policy experts suggested that the sharp language from Choe was typical of Pyongyang’s negotiating tactics and were aimed at winning leverage rather than scuttling talks. The vice minister accused Pompeo and national security adviser John Bolton, both of whom accompanied Trump to Hanoi, of creating an atmosphere of “hostility and mistrust,” but she did not directly criticize Trump. “The chemistry is mysteriously wonderful,” Choe said of Kim and Trump’s relationship. Bolton called Choe’s characterization of the Hanoi talks “inaccurate,” while Pompeo noted that he had been the focus of North Korean umbrage after a trip he made to Pyongyang last July. U.S. officials said the president’s willingness to walk away without a deal would help empower the administration’s negotiating team, led by special envoy Stephen Biegun, who has been frustrated in working-level meetings with his counterparts in Pyongyang. During an appearance this week at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Biegun emphasized that the administration would not lift sanctions until the North completely dismantled its nuclear program and ballistic missiles. Asked whether Kim might resume missile testing after a 16-month moratorium, Biegun replied: “The short answer is: We don’t know. What Kim Jong Un will decide to do may very much be his decision and his decision alone.” Trump “indicated that nuclear and missile testing really is a red line. He basically said that as long as they’re not testing, he’s happy, even though behind the scenes they continue to perfect their arsenal,” said Bruce Klingner, a former U.S. intelligence official who is now a Northeast Asia analyst at the conservative Heritage Foundation. A test “certainly closes the book on diplomacy,” Klingner added. “I think the U.S. is trying to figure out where to go. The president is now less optimistic.” After returning from Hanoi, Trump aides sought to shore up political support, briefing lawmakers on Capitol Hill and other stakeholders and making the case that the president had showed his negotiating fortitude by holding a hard line on sanctions and being willing to walk away without a deal on his top foreign-policy initiative. At one briefing, according to one person in the room who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the private meeting, Biegun told congressional staffers that the North Koreans were not creative in their thinking and did not appear to have a “plan B” after the United States rejected a proposal to lift most sanctions in return for the closure of some of the Yongbyon nuclear site, the country’s main production site for fissile materials. Yet Biegun also took pains to emphasize that he had not assumed his job until last fall, well after the first Trump-Kim summit, which some lawmakers and staffers interpreted as a signal that he felt he had inherited a difficult portfolio and did not want to be blamed for the breakdown in talks. “I honestly don’t know what they do next. I think this has devolved even from the week we sat down” for the briefing, said the person who was at Biegun’s briefing. “The more that Pyongyang is demonstrating its resolve and the more we make hardline statements that demonstrate our resolve, the harder it is to figure out how to get back to the negotiating table.” After the administration’s outreach efforts, a bipartisan coalition of lawmakers offered public praise last week for Trump’s approach, affirming his decision to reject Pyongyang’s offer in Hanoi. But former U.S. officials who have negotiated with the North Koreans said the tougher rhetoric since the summit was evidence that the engagement process was showing signs of collapsing. “I worry this could all get worse before it gets better,” said Victor Cha, who served as a high-ranking Asia policy official in the George W. Bush administration. “There do not seem to be any tangible diplomatic pieces to pick up after Hanoi. They’ve both taken extreme positions.” (David Nakamura, “Path for Nuclear Talks Is Elusive as U.S.-N. Korea Tensions Mount,” Washington Post, March 16, 2019, p. A-6)
The past three weeks may have been the toughest of Moon Jae-in’s presidency. The centerpiece of the South Korean leader’s rule, rapprochement with North Korea, is in tatters after the breakdown of the summit between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Opinion polls released this past week show his popularity falling to its lowest level since his inauguration nearly two years ago, while on Friday, North Korea threatened to pull out of negotiations with the United States entirely if Washington didn’t drop its “gangster-like” demands. Hours after the Hanoi summit broke down, Trump spoke to Moon by telephone and asked him to “play an active role as a mediator” by talking to Kim, South Korea’s presidential Blue House said. But if Moon’s skills as mediator have perhaps never been more in demand, his credibility as a neutral intermediary have seldom been more questioned. In the National Assembly last week, conservative opposition leader Na Kyung-won caused a furor by suggesting that Moon was embarrassing the nation by acting as “the chief spokesman of Kim Jong Un.” But the attacks have come not just from his domestic political foes, but also from Washington and the United Nations. Moon, a former human rights lawyer, has faced persistent criticism for downplaying North Korea’s abysmal human rights record in the interests of the peace process. Yesterday, the U.S. State Department said his government had put “direct and indirect” pressure on North Korean defector organizations to reduce their criticism of North Korea. “This pressure allegedly included, for example, the termination of 20 years’ funding support for the Association of North Korean defectors in December 2017, police blocking groups’ efforts to send leaflets into North Korea by balloon, and police visits to organizations and requests for information on financial and other administrative matters,” the State Department wrote in its annual human rights report. North Korean refugees were also reportedly asked “not to participate in public-speaking engagements that might be perceived as critical of the Moon administration’s engagement with North Korea,” the report said. Earlier in the week, a report by a U.N. panel of experts said Seoul should have informed the United Nations of the transfer of more than 300 tons of petroleum products to North Korea in 2018. Although the transfers were made to support inter-Korean engagement projects and were of no “economic value” to North Korea, the transaction should still have been reported to the United Nations’ sanctions committee, the report said, in what was an embarrassing oversight for a key U.S. ally. Moon has also been criticized for cozying up to Kim and failing to ask him tough questions — for example, about how Kim defines denuclearization — so as not to upset the talks process. But it seems that his efforts have not been entirely appreciated in Pyongyang, either. On Friday, North Korea’s vice foreign minister, Choe Son Hui, described South Korea as “a player, not an arbiter” because it is an ally of Washington, the Associated Press reported. To some extent, that’s a reflection of the difficult job Moon faces. “A South Korean progressive mediating between a Republican president and North Korean communists — that’s not easy,” said John Delury, an associate professor at Yonsei University in Seoul. Delury says there is no obvious next move for Trump and Kim, with neither wanting to lose face and both having to deal with hard-liners at home. In that sense, Moon might have the best hope of unlocking the impasse, perhaps by inviting Kim to visit Seoul, he argues. “I’m not overflowing with optimism, but he’ll try” to mediate, Delury said. “Who else will get Kim Jong Un back into play? They do seem to have a good relationship, and some level of trust is there.” Others are more skeptical. North Korea’s uncompromising behavior in recent weeks partly reflects the limits of Moon’s capacity to mediate, said Christopher Green, senior adviser for the Korean Peninsula at the International Crisis Group. That means “the praise heaped upon his diplomatic skill in 2018 was somewhat misplaced,” he said. With Moon’s reputation staked so heavily to the peace process, it is not surprising to see the impasse reflected in public opinion. The Realmeter polling agency said the drop in Moon’s approval rating, to 45 percent, was partly attributable to growing skepticism over North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization after the failure of the Hanoi summit. There have also been persistent reports of tensions between Seoul and Washington over Moon’s enthusiasm for fostering closer economic ties with North Korea, despite the lack of progress toward denuclearization. Chun Yung-woo, a South Korean conservative who represented his country in talks over North Korea’s nuclear program from 2006 to 2007, says Moon now needs to prove he is able not just to convey U.S. positions to Kim, but also to have a “candid discussion” and persuade Kim to do what needs to be done to get the dialogue process back on track. “If Washington believes President Moon and his administration are blind, and are only interested in marketing North Korea’s position, that their goal is to resume inter-Korean economic projects even at the expense of denuclearization — in short, if President Trump believes President Moon is on North Korea’s side — his role as a moderator will be constrained,” Chun said. Tong Zhao, a fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing, said it was “increasingly puzzling” to figure out what Moon really thinks — whether he really believes that Kim is willing to denuclearize, or is just playing along with the idea to achieve his own goal, ending the war that is technically not yet ended on the Korean Peninsula. Tong and others appear increasingly doubtful that Moon’s confidence-building approach is still the best way forward. “We have a lot of things going on and somebody has to take the helm, but I’m not sure that South Korea’s approach, which is continue with inter-Korean economic engagement, is the right answer,” said Jung H. Pak, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies. (Simon Denyer, “Moon’s Credibility as U.S.-N. Korea Mediator Is on the Line,” Washington Post, March 17, 2019, p. A-20)
3/17/19:
North Korea is expected to accept an offer of talks from South Korea, but progress will depend on how much Seoul can do to persuade the United States to lower its demands in denuclearization talks with Pyongyang, experts said March 18. Yesterday, a high-ranking official of the presidential office Cheong Wa Dae said that it is time for South Korea to push for talks with North Korea amid mounting uncertainty following the breakdown of last month’s summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump. “We helped North Korea and the U.S sit down for talks last year, and through the June 12 Singapore summit (between the North and the U.S), President Trump helped us hold inter-Korean summits,” he told reporters on condition of anonymity. “It now appears to be inter-Korean talks’ turn,” he said. The official also said the so-called “all-or-nothing” strategy on North Korea should be reconsidered, apparently urging Washington to change its approach of focusing on reaching a big deal, in contrast to Pyongyang’s push for step-by-step denuclearization. (Koh Byung-joon, “N.K. Likely to Accept Seoul’s Dialogue Offer, But Can Seoul Deliver What Pyongyang Wants?” Yonhap, March 18, 2019)
3/18/19:
South Korea’s top diplomat said the United States wants a deal with North Korea on a “big picture” roadmap to get rid of its nuclear and missile programs. On the other hand, in the Hanoi talks held in late February, Pyongyang limited its immediate denuclearization steps to the Yongbyon nuclear complex, according to Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha. “Both the U.S. and South Korea think that a comprehensive roadmap is necessary,” she said at a National Assembly session on her ministry’s affairs. “It appears that the U.S. took part in the summit with that position.” Asked to elaborate, the minister said it means starting the full-fledged denuclearization process with a “big picture” to deal with all elements related to North Korea’s nuclear and missile facilities and capabilities. The U.S. maintains the stance that it will be able to lift sanctions on Pyongyang if complete denuclearization if achieved, she said. “Clearly, the time to discuss such a lifting of sanctions will come some day,” she added. “For that, it’s necessary to pull off slightly bolder denuclearization measures.” With a timetable in hand, the U.S. may be open to an incremental formula for the negotiation of details including methods of implementation, Kang said. In a report to lawmakers, Kang’s ministry earlier said Trump focused in Hanoi on clarifying the definition of denuclearization, freezing all weapons of mass destruction programs run by Pyongyang and crafting a roadmap. But Kim was more interested in striking a deal on measures Pyongyang can take “at the current stage,” it added. Kim’s approach reflects his country’s call for a step-by-step, action-for-action formula, versus Washington’s big deal scheme. But Trump’s plan does not mean North Korea won’t get anything if it does not agree to the “big picture,” Kang explained. “The U.S. stance is that the negotiation must come with the big picture in mind. It does not mean ‘all or nothing,'” she said. “A comprehensive deal comes first and then we can talk about going step by step. (Washington) has learned its lesson from past negotiations with Pyongyang that a one-by-one approach before anything else won’t work.” Kang, meanwhile, made clear that South Korea is a “core party concerned” in the denuclearization process and is apparently troubled by the Hanoi summit having ended with no breakthrough. “There’s no denying that we play an active role in (resolving) this problem directly linked to our national security and interest,” Kang emphasized. She said sending a special envoy to North Korea may be an option and also agreed with the view that holding another inter-Korean summit could be conducive to revitalizing denuclearization talks. Doubts have grown about South Korea’s role in the process. In recent weeks, South Korean officials have formally described Seoul’s role as that of “facilitator,” instead of using the words “mediator” or “arbiter.” North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui played down Seoul’s stature, reportedly saying it is just a “player, not an arbiter.” Speaking to some foreign reporters in Pyongyang last week, she was also quoted as saying Kim will decide soon whether to continue dialogue in consideration of Washington’s attitude. Seoul’s top nuclear envoy, Lee Do-hoon, also said his nation is a “key player” in the push for denuclearization and lasting peace. Heading to Russia for consultations on North Korea, Lee said, “At this moment, I think, it’s important to have close consultations with other countries, join hands and resolve the problem.” He is scheduled to meet with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov, who doubles as the country’s top nuclear negotiator, in St. Petersburg on Tuesday (local time). (Lee Chi-dong, “Minister: U.S. Seeks ‘Big Picture’ Master Plan to Handle N. Korea’s Nuclear, Missile Programs,” Yonhap, March 18, 2019)
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the United States and North Korea are trying to get the “sequencing” right in talks to end the regime’s nuclear weapons program and open a brighter future for the country. Pompeo made the remark in an interview with KCMO, a radio station based in Mission, Kansas, his home state, in the wake of North Korea’s threat to abandon the talks. “I can’t say much about the details of the negotiation as those are important private conversations,” the top U.S. diplomat said, when asked about the failure to produce an agreement at last month’s summit between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. “But it’s clearly a range of issues around timing and sequencing and how it is we achieve this.” He said Trump’s commitment to a brighter future for the North Korean people is “very, very real.” “But it must follow — it has to follow the verified denuclearization of North Korea,” he said. “And getting that sequencing right and getting it laid out in a way that each of the parties can agree to and take down the tension level along the North and South Korean border, it matters to the people of Japan and South Korea, our important partners, and it matters to the whole world.” In a press conference in Pyongyang last week, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui said the regime is reviewing whether to continue the talks and maintain its self-imposed moratorium on missile and nuclear tests. “We believe we’re still moving forward. It’s certainly difficult — we knew it would be,” Pompeo said in an interview with Kansas radio station B98 FM. “We made a little bit more progress in Hanoi, now three weeks back, when President Trump traveled there to meet with Chairman Kim. We’ll re-engage with him,” he said. In an interview with Kansas radio station KQAM, he admitted, “we still haven’t made the progress we need to make on denuclearization.” “The conversations certainly continue. I hope we can achieve that,” he added, noting that was Kim’s “promise” to the world at his summit with Trump in Singapore. (Yonhap, “U.S., N. Korea Trying to Get ‘Sequencing’ Right in Nuclear Talks: Pompeo,” March 19, 2019)
3/21/19:
President Donald Trump gave North Korean leader Kim Jong-un “several alternatives” when they met last month to try to strike a deal on denuclearizing the regime, National Security Adviser John Bolton said today. On what the alternatives were, Bolton didn’t elaborate. “President Trump gave him several alternatives, what he called the big deal: North Korea gives up all of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and in exchange, there’s a very bright economic future for North Korea,” he said in a radio interview with the conservative Breitbart News. “In many respects — in Hanoi and even before that, in Singapore — what the president did was hold the door open for North Korea, to say, ‘You can have this future but you’ve got to give up your weapons of mass destruction,'” he said. “So far, the North Koreans haven’t walked through it.” Asked to explain what victory would look like for the U.S., Bolton reaffirmed that the main objective is a denuclearized North Korea. “And we gave them a definition. The president actually handed over a piece of paper, two pieces really, one in English and one in Korean to Kim Jong-un that describes our definition of denuclearization,” he said. “0nce that happens, the president, you know, he sees these things sort of in real estate terms. He says, ‘Look at North Korea’s position there between China, Russia, South Korea. It’s a great location. It could have a great economy.'” Bolton noted the importance of China as North Korea’s dominant trading partner and the need for Beijing to tighten enforcement of sanctions on Pyongyang. “China’s always said, going back over 20 years now, they don’t want to see North Korea with nuclear weapons,” he said. “And I think they have good reason not to want to see North Korea with nuclear weapons because China ultimately doesn’t want to see Japan get nuclear weapons. So China could really hold the key to this here if they press North Korea hard enough.” (Yonhap, “Bolton Says Trump Gave N. Korean Leader ‘Several’ Options,” March 21, 2019)
The Trump administration sanctioned two Chinese shipping companies suspected of helping North Korea evade sanctions — the first targeted actions taken against Pyongyang since its nuclear negotiations with the U.S. in Hanoi last month ended without agreement. “The maritime industry must do more to stop North Korea’s illicit shipping practices,” Trump’s national security adviser John Bolton tweeted. “Everyone should take notice and review their own activities to ensure they are not involved in North Korea’s sanctions evasion.” The White House says the sanctions are evidence that the U.S. is maintaining pressure on North Korea in an effort to coax its leader, Kim Jong Un, to give up his nuclear weapons program. The Treasury Department sanctioned Dalian Haibo International Freight Co. Ltd. and Liaoning Danxing International Forwarding Co. Ltd. for using deceptive methods to circumvent international and U.S. sanctions and the U.S. commitment to implementing existing U.N. Security Council resolutions. Calls to the two companies rang without response Friday or were answered by people who immediately hung up the phone. Treasury, in coordination with the State Department and the U.S. Coast Guard, also updated a North Korea shipping advisory, adding dozens of vessels thought to be doing ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean tankers or exported North Korean coal in violation of sanctions. Two senior administration officials, who briefed reporters only on condition of anonymity to discuss U.S. policy on North Korea, said illegal ship-to-ship transfers that violate U.S. and international sanctions have increased and not all countries, including China, are implementing the restrictions. They said the deceptive practices include disabling or manipulating ship identification systems, repainting the names on vessels and falsifying cargo documents. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in a statement that fully implementing the U.N. resolutions is key to getting Kim to give up his nuclear weapons program. “Treasury will continue to enforce our sanctions, and we are making it explicitly clear that shipping companies employing deceptive tactics to mask illicit trade with North Korea expose themselves to great risk,” Mnuchin said. (Deb Riechmann, “U.S. Targets Chinese Firms for Alleged N. Korea Sanctions Dodge,” Associated Press, March 22, 2019)
Joseph Yun, a former U.S. special representative for North Korea policy, said the U.S. needs a step-by-step approach to denuclearization instead of an “all-or-nothing” tactic. “I do believe they could have salvaged something, and to me it is a regretful situation that they salvaged nothing,” Yun said. “To say no deal is better than a bad deal is rhetoric only.” Yun suggested for the U.S. to lift some of the sanctions placed on the North to help ease Kim into the idea of dismantling his nuclear arsenal in return. This includes the Yongbyon reactor complex, which was a central point of contention at the summit, as well as accounting for nuclear weapons and fissile material that Pyongyang is still believed to be hiding, he said. “We need to see a step-by-step approach … there is no other possible approach,” Yun said in an interview with KBS World Radio. He said the two countries are in “a tough spot.” The Hanoi breakdown and the standoff between Washington and Pyongyang make it difficult for lower-level officials “to gloss over their differences.” Yun said he found it “a little disturbing” concerning North Korea’s suspected restoration, instead of dismantlement, of its Tonchang-ri missile test site after the Hanoi talks. But he downplayed the possibility that either side would provoke each other, namely Pyongyang with nuclear and missile tests, and the U.S. resuming large scale joint military exercises with South Korea. “As long as these two things don’t take place, I think we can maintain this standoff situation,” he said. Yun urged working-level diplomats on both sides to re-start building a process and not to repeat the huge spike in tensions as seen in 2017, saying they “have to get together, try to salvage what was on the table, and improve on it a little bit as far as both sides are concerned.” “For the American side, this would mean giving up somewhat on sanctions, and for the North Korean side, it would mean increasing the offer on denuclearization, not just Yongbyon, but perhaps through a declaration that would consist of an accounting of nuclear weapons and fissile material,” he added.
Commenting on South Korea’s mediation between the U.S. and Pyongyang, Yun urged Seoul to be clandestine, especially in forging sanctions exemptions related to inter-Korean projects. “Many ideas coming from Seoul are good, but they should be kept on quiet channels, they should not be announced publicly, so that differences are obvious to see,” he said. “I’m afraid right now there is too much public discourse accentuating differences rather than the unity between the two alliance partners.” (Yi Whan-woo, “Ex-U.S. Negotiator Opposes Trump’s North Korea Approach,” Korea Times, March 22, 2019)
Kumkhop Trading Co. President Ri Jong Ho sweeps his hand over a table full of foods produced at his factory. There’s a bowl of assorted candies and rice cakes, a plate of sausages and ham, slices of a French baguette and Russian dark bread. “We are doing fine,” he says with a confident smile. “Just look.” But while model North Korean factories like Ri’s, replete with a rooftop swimming pool ringed by banana trees, are filling the shelves of department stores in Pyongyang and elsewhere with ever better and fancier snack foods and sugary drinks, government officials and international aid organizations warn the nation could be on the verge of a major food shortage. North Korea’s ambassador to the United Nations, Kim Song, issued an unusual appeal for “urgent” food assistance last month. North Korea blames the shortfall on a combination of bad weather and “barbaric” international sanctions. Critics argue the North is simply trying to use the situation to undermine support for sanctions without addressing the nuclear issues that led to them in the first place or the government’s systemic economic problems. Potential donors, meanwhile, face the old but still controversial question: should the world help a government that seems determined not to help its own people? Kim, the ambassador to the U.N., said record-high temperatures, drought and flooding last year shaved more than 500,000 tons off of the 2018 harvest from the nearly 5 million tons produced in 2017. He said North Korean farmers have been hamstrung by “dreadful” restrictions on imports of everything from tractors, harvesters and sowing machines to chemical fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides and imports of refined petroleum. He also claimed that sanctions, or the fear of running afoul of them, are blocking or delaying legitimate assistance from possible donors and international organizations. Humanitarian assistance from the U.N. agencies is “terribly politicized,” he said, and sanctions against North Korea are “barbaric and inhuman.” North Korea claims it is now “channeling all its efforts” to importing food and increasing the output of early and basic crops such as wheat and barley in coming months. Even if Pyongyang achieves its targets of importing 200,000 tons of food and producing 400,000 tons of early crops, supplies will still fall short by 1.486 million tons. Hazel Smith, a North Korea expert at the University of London, believes food supplies in 2019 from all sources will only suffice to feed about three quarters of the population at the most basic survival level. But the shortage’s severity likely won’t be clear until July or August. “Without substantial external aid … it is difficult to see any outcome other than large-scale deaths from malnutrition-related causes this year,” she wrote in a commentary earlier this month for the Pacific Forum policy research institute. North Korea informed international organizations of the potential crisis in January. Praveen Agrawal, the U.N. World Food Program’s representative in Pyongyang, said the WFP and the U.N.’s Food and Agriculture Organization are opening their own field assessment to determine if the North’s figures are credible. Sanctions have had both “indirect” and “unintentional” effects on the situation, he said. Aid groups are hamstrung for a lack of support. The WFP, for example, has only gotten about $26 million for its operations in North Korea, less than half of its budget. Humanitarian aid is explicitly exempted from sanctions, but getting virtually anything through customs has become slower and more cumbersome. North Korea is chronically vulnerable to shortages. In its statement to the U.N., the government said it has cut its average food ration per capita for a family of blue- or white-collar workers to 300 grams from the target 550 grams per person per day. Agrawal said the government has never achieved that 550-gram target — reaching closer to just 380 to 400 grams. With a population of about 25 million and food production that even at its peak in 2016 was only about 5.8 million tons, it has never had enough to go around. “The situation can only get worse if they don’t revisit and re-prioritize or help to address some of the issues through their ministries and technical areas,” he said. Smith, the North Korea watcher at the University of London, said North Korea has made progress in improving food security since the famines of the 1990s, and now has malnutrition levels well below those of much richer Asian countries, including India. Agrawal said he has also seen more openness to engage and provide statistics over the past year as Kim has reached out to Beijing, Seoul and Washington. Smith believes the claim that the North doesn’t deserve humanitarian help is fundamentally flawed. “In all cases where humanitarian aid — to stop people dying of starvation, disease and malnutrition-related illness — is given everywhere in the world, it is given to the population precisely because of the failure of their government,” she said in an email to The AP. “No government ‘deserves’ humanitarian aid — but people do.” All seem to agree the problem is real. “Forty percent of this population is malnourished — 11 million people,” Agrawal said in an interview at his office in Pyongyang’s diplomatic quarter. “That’s a fact.” Back in the food factory, company president Ri said that over the past three years his directions have been to produce more, and better, products. Kim has visited personally, twice, to drive that point home. “The leader cares a lot about the dietary food problems of the people,” he said. The ramped-up output of factories like Ri’s, which produces 40-50 tons of food each day, shows in supermarket and department store shelves stocked with a surprising variety of inexpensive, colorfully packaged and tasty — if not terribly healthy — chips, sodas and sweets. Opponents of sending aid to North Korea note the irony. While the WFP is focusing on making nutritious biscuits for pregnant women and infants, Ri boasts his factory is now North Korea’s most important maker of sports drinks. His group is doing so well that it’s set up a processing plant across the border in Dandong to produce foods for the Chinese market. One of its most popular products is chocolate “moon” pies. (Eric Talmadge, “North Korea, Seeking Food, Links Shortage to Sanctions,” Associated Press, March 22, 2019)
Bolton: “I sensed Trump beginning to worry he had been too tough in Hanoi, which manifested itself in several ways. He began saying again, ‘We shouldn’t spend ten cents on war games,’ referring to our exercises with South Korea. On the other hand, he never relented in supporting the economic ‘maximum pressure’ campaign against North Korea. I held a Principals Committee on March 21 to assess whether the campaign was as ‘maximum’ as it could be and to consider how to stiffen it up. The major issue for discussion was whether the United States should do more to inhibit ship-to-ship transfers at sea, coal being exported from North Korea and oil being imported. Through the ship-to-ship transfers, the North obviously hoped to escape surveillance, and I wanted to see if there were steps short of using force that would make it harder for these exchanges to take place. There was no discussion of additional sanctions against North Korea, only how to better enforce those already in place. The next day, a Friday, we were in Mar-a-Lago … Trump pulled me and a few others into the “library” (really a bar) off the lobby lounge and said he wanted recent Treasury enforcement actions against two Chinese companies for violating North Korea sanctions rolled back. We had approved these decisions—all of which had been signed off on personally by Pompeo, Mnuchin, and me—which were enforcement measures under existing sanctions, not ‘new’ sanctions broadening or enlarging what was already there. After Singapore, we had expressly reviewed this distinction with Trump. He agreed strict enforcement of existing sanctions would continue, and pursuant to that understanding, we had, in over nine months since Singapore, penalized a significant number of companies and individuals for violations. Why Trump wanted to roll back these latest enforcement actions was anybody’s guess, other than that he was feeling Kim Jong Un’s pain. Trump dictated a tweet that could only be read as reversing the Treasury Department’s recent announcement. I argued as strenuously as I could not to do so, with which Mulvaney fully agreed. We had no effect. The whole point, said Trump, was that the tweet was “for an audience of one” with whom he was trying to make a deal. ‘It won’t affect anything else,’ he said, ignoring my obviously futile efforts to explain that lots of other people would also see this tweet and would inevitably interpret it as weakening the sanctions and a public repudiation of his own advisors, especially Mnuchin. Trump simply didn’t care. He wanted to send a message to Kim Jong Un, just as he had wanted to send a message to Xi Jinping when he rolled back Ross’s ZTE sanctions after they had been publicly announced. Sanders asked what to say about why Trump had tweeted, and he replied, ‘I like Kim Jong Un, and these sanctions were unnecessary.’ The tweet went out. After we concluded with the Caribbean leaders, discussing common regional challenges, and headed for the airport, we saw media reports that Trump’s North Korea tweet did not refer to what Treasury had announced on Thursday but to other, unspecified future sanctions that weren’t yet public.” Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, pp. 298-99)
3/22/19:
Trump letter to Kim Jong Un: “Thank you again for making the long journey to Hanoi. As I said to you when we parted ways, you are my friend and always will be.” (Woodward, Rage, p. 176)
North Korean officials withdrew from an inter-Korean liaison office in the country’s border city of Kaesong as the peace and denuclearization process reached a deadlock following last month’s no-deal summit between the North and the United States. The North notified the South during a liaison officers’ meeting earlier in the day that it would pull out of the office, in accordance with a directive from the higher-ups, and then all North Korean officials, totaling about 15, left the building, the South’s unification ministry said in a statement. The North said it will not care about whether South Korean officials remain or withdraw from the office, the ministry said. Vice Unification Minister Chun Hae-sung said that 25 South Korean officials will staff the office over the weekend. Chun said the North gave no reason for the decision. South Korea expressed regret. “The government considers this withdrawal decision regrettable and hopes the North will return at an early date so that the office will be operated normally,” Chun said during a press briefing. Chun also said that all other inter-Korean communication channels are operating normally and the government will comprehensively review the situation and contemplate follow-up measures. He also said that no unusual signs have been detected over the past week, but the weekly liaison meeting between Chun and his North Korean counterpart, Jon Jong-su, has not been held since the breakdown of the summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump late February. The office of President Moon Jae-in said that Chung Eui-yong, Moon’s top security advisor, presided over a meeting of the National Security Council to discuss the North’s decision and its possible repercussions on inter-Korean relations. Analysts said that the North’s decision appears to be aimed at pressuring South Korea to do more to persuade the U.S. to lower its demands in the stalled denuclearization negotiations. “They appear to be pressuring our government to play a more active role in narrowing differences over denuclearization and sanctions relief,” Lim Eul-chul, a professor at the Institute for Far East Studies at Kyungnam University, said. “I think their message is that there should be a meaningful agreement between the North and the U.S. in order for the liaison office to be operated normally,” he said. South Korea had been pushing to hold video reunions of families separated by the 1950-53 Korean War in a follow up to an agreement the leaders of the two Koreas reached in their September summit. “It is true that it became difficult to consult with the North over the video reunions of the separated families,” the vice minister said. “We will continue our efforts to resume consultations on such issues before too late.” (Choi Soo-hyang, “N. Korea Withdraws from Inter-Korean Liaison Office,” Yonhap, March 22, 2019)
President Trump undercut his own Treasury Department with a sudden announcement that he had rolled back newly imposed North Korea sanctions, appearing to overrule national security experts as a favor to Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader. The move, announced on Twitter, was a remarkable display of dissension within the Trump administration. It created confusion at the highest levels of the federal government, just as the president’s aides were seeking to pressure North Korea into returning to negotiations over dismantling its nuclear weapons program. “It was announced today by the U.S. Treasury that additional large-scale Sanctions would be added to those already existing Sanctions on North Korea,” Trump tweeted. “I have today ordered the withdrawal of those additional Sanctions!” The Treasury Department announced new sanctions on today against Iran and Venezuela, but not North Korea. However, economic penalties were imposed yesterday on two Chinese shipping companies suspected of helping North Korea evade international sanctions. Those penalties, announced with news releases and a White House briefing, were the first imposed against North Korea since late last year. It was initially believed that Trump had confused the day that the North Korea sanctions were announced, and officials said they were caught off guard by the president’s tweet. Asked for clarification, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, the White House press secretary, declined to give specifics. “President Trump likes Chairman Kim, and he doesn’t think these sanctions will be necessary,” she said. Hours later, two officials familiar with Trump’s thinking said the president was actually referring to additional North Korea sanctions that are under consideration but not yet formally issued. That statement sought to soften the blow that Trump’s tweet had dealt to his most loyal aides. Steven Mnuchin, the Treasury secretary, personally signed off on the sanctions that were issued yesterday and hailed the decision in an accompanying statement. He described the sanctions as part of an international campaign “The United States and our like-minded partners remain committed to achieving the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea,” Mnuchin said in the statement. against North Korea that “is crucial to a successful outcome.” John R. Bolton, the president’s national security adviser, had also hailed the earlier action against North Korea in a tweet yesterday: “Everyone should take notice and review their own activities to ensure they are not involved in North Korea’s sanctions evasion.” Officials at the Treasury and State Departments, including career staff members and political appointees, spend months carefully drafting sanctions based on intensive intelligence gathering and legal research. The North Korea sanctions were no different, and the White House held a formal briefing yesterday afternoon to explain the rationale behind the actions. During the briefing, senior administration officials pushed back on the idea that the sanctions sought to increase pressure on North Korea. Instead, they said, the new measures were meant to maintain the strength of existing sanctions. But one of the senior administration officials strongly rebutted any suggestion that the administration would ease some sanctions as confidence building, or in return for smaller steps by North Korea. “It would be a mistake to interpret the policy as being one of a step by step approach, where we release some sanctions in return for piecemeal steps toward denuclearization” said the administration official, who spoke to reporters on the condition of anonymity. “That is not a winning formula and it is not the president’s strategy.” While it is not unusual for the White House to have comment and even final approval of major sanctions, both Republican and Democratic lawmakers have expressed doubts about Trump’s ability to execute sanctions policy responsibly. The reversal on the North Korea sanctions drew swift condemnation today from Democrats, who accused the president of being reckless with national security. “Career experts at the Treasury Department undertake a painstaking process before imposing sanctions,” said Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon, the top Democrat on the Finance Committee. “For Donald Trump to overturn their decision via tweet because he has an inexplicable fondness for one of the world’s most brutal dictators is appalling.” He added, “Without a well-conceived diplomatic strategy, Trump is simply undermining our national security by making clear that the United States is not a trusted foreign policy partner.” Some Republicans also pushed back against the president, with Senator Cory Gardner of Colorado saying that North Korea sanctions should be imposed. “Strategic Patience failed,” he tweeted. “Don’t repeat it.” Trump’s decision stunned current and former Treasury Department officials, some of whom wondered if the move was planned in advance as a gesture to Kim. Others feared that America’s vaunted sanctions regime had been compromised. “For an administration that continues to surprise, this is another first — the president of the United States undercutting his own sanctions agency for imposing sanctions on Chinese actors supporting North Korea,” said John E. Smith, the former director of the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, who left the department last year. “It’s a win for North Korea and China and a loss for U.S. credibility.” Sarah Bloom Raskin, who was deputy Treasury secretary under President Barack Obama, said the sudden backtracking on a decision that would normally be made with comment from intelligence agencies and the National Security Council was perplexing. “Reversing sanctions decisions within hours of making the announcement that you would impose them in the first place is a head-spinner,” she said. “This reversal signals the injection of some peripheral consideration or factor that only the president seems to know about and that may have nothing to do with national security.” (Alan Rappeport, “A Defiant Trump Mutes North Korea Sanctions,” New York Times, March 23, 2019, p. A-1) Administration officials said Trump is determined to prevent his more hawkish advisers from undercutting what he considers his biggest foreign policy accomplishment: reducing tensions with North Korea and creating the opportunity for a historic deal. Others said the incident underscores the dysfunctional nature of the White House’s policy process, which seems driven more by presidential tweets than deliberative collaboration. “Usually a national security process exists to make policy decisions AND agree on rollout and messaging,” Alyssa Ayres, a former State Department official, said in a tweet. Trump has remained fixated on his negotiations with the rogue state, telling senators, visitors and others that he can still make a deal — and that he believes Kim will eventually agree to his demands, according to administration officials who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the president’s thinking. Trump has sought to project to Kim that while some in his administration are skeptical, he is the ultimate decider and remains eager to reach a landmark agreement, officials said. “Trump doesn’t want the situation to unravel, and by putting out this tweet, he’s sending a signal directly to Kim that he wants to keep a good working relationship,” said one official familiar with the negotiations. But the move created confusion today as White House and Treasury officials could not immediately explain which sanctions Trump had rescinded. The day before, Bolton tweeted that the new Treasury sanctions were “important” and that other nations “should take notice and review their own activities to ensure they are not involved in North Korea’s sanctions evasion.” Questions have long been raised about whether Trump’s hawkish advisers are making decisions that reflect the president’s wishes. Bolton’s differing views on North Korea have not been lost on the president or his staff. During the summit last month, officials kept Bolton from attending Trump’s dinner with Kim because of concerns that he could hurt the discussions, two administration officials said. (John Hudson and Josh Dawsey “Halting New N. Korea Sanctions, President Creates Confusion,” Washington Post, March 23, 2019, p. A-1) President Donald Trump intended to reverse sanctions imposed on two Chinese shipping companies accused of violating North Korea trade prohibitions — until officials in his administration persuaded him to back off and then devised a misleading explanation of his vague tweet announcing the move. For hours, officials at the White House and Treasury and State departments wouldn’t explain what he meant. The president in fact intended to remove penalties Treasury had announced the day before against two Chinese shipping companies that had helped Pyongyang evade U.S. sanctions, according to five people familiar with the matter. Trump hadn’t signed off on the specific measures before they were announced but had given Treasury discretion to decide some sanctions as it saw fit, according to one person familiar with the matter. Later today, in the wake of Trump’s tweet, the administration sought to explain away the move with a statement — initially requesting no attribution to anyone — that said the penalties against the Chinese companies hadn’t been reversed but the U.S. wouldn’t pursue additional sanctions against North Korea. There were no additional North Korea sanctions in the works at the time, according to two people familiar with the matter. The people asked not to be identified in order to candidly describe the events and the administration’s attempt to provide a cover story for the president. The sanctions on the two Chinese shipping companies were the subject of a National Security Council principals meeting last week, according to two people familiar with the matter. Robert Blair, a national security aide to White House Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, warned that he didn’t think Trump would support issuing the measures. But National Security Adviser John Bolton, a North Korea hawk, disagreed and argued he knew Trump better than Blair, the two people said. Senator Cory Gardner, a Colorado Republican facing re-election in 2020, blasted the Trump administration’s handling of North Korea sanctions at a Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the morning of March 26. “We now have sanctions that are being waived by the president after Treasury, by law, issues them,” he said. “This body ought to be growing more and more frustrated with the U.S. continuing to change our policy while Kim Jong Un sits back and continues to develop fissile material, nuclear weapons without doing a doggone thing except watch the United States change its negotiating position.” Victor Cha, a North Korea expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies who was considered to be Trump’s ambassador to South Korea, said at the Foreign Relations Committee hearing that Trump’s tweet “reinforces the worst tendencies which have actually led us to where we are now. “The North Korean leader made clear what mattered to him in Hanoi,” where Trump and Kim met in February for their second summit. “He had his time with the president and the one thing he focused on was sanctions relief.” (Saleha Mohsin, Jennifer Jacobs, and Nick Wadhams, “Trump Tried to Undo North Korean Penalty, Contrary to U.S. Account,” Bloomberg, March 26, 2019)
3/23/19:
North Korea today escalated its attempt to create a rift between South Korea and the United States, as Washington sent mixed signals over whether it would tighten or relax sanctions on the North. Ever since the summit meeting in Hanoi, North Korea has ceaselessly urged South Korea to distance itself from the United States and to push ahead with joint economic projects that have been held back by American-led United Nations sanctions. President Moon Jae-in of South Korea remains eager to boost inter-Korean economic ties, raising fears at home and abroad that he may steer his government away from international efforts to enforce sanctions against the North. But in reality, Moon’s hands are tied unless the United States and North Korea reach an agreement on denuclearizing the North and Washington helps to ease sanctions. DPRK Today, a North Korean government-run website, accused Moon’s government of reneging on its promise to improve inter-Korean ties and giving priority to “cooperation with a foreign force” over “cooperation among the Korean nation.” “The South Korean authorities’ behavior is deeply deplorable,” it said. “The only things the South will get from cooperating with the U.S. will be a deepening subordination, humiliation and shame.” North Korean state media has been issuing similar messages in recent days, even denigrating Moon’s efforts to mediate talks between his “American boss” and North Korea, and advising Moon’s government to throw its policy “in a garbage can.” Moon suffered another slap in the face when the North abruptly withdrew its staff from a joint inter-Korean liaison office yesterday. The South’s authorities can’t do anything without approval or instruction from the United States, so how do they think they can be a mediator or facilitator?” the North Korean website Meari said yesterday. “They should know their place.” After Trump tweeted that he ordered his government yesterday to withdraw “additional large scale sanctions” against the North, the tweet raised hopes among Moon’s supporters, who took Trump’s latest move as a sign that Washington did not want to antagonize North Korea with new sanctions. “By withdrawing additional sanctions against North Korea, President Trump showed his firm will to continue dialogue to realize the denuclearization of North Korea,” Lee Hae-sik, a spokesman of Moon’s governing Democratic Party, told reporters. But the main opposition Liberty Korea Party said that Moon has been used as “a pawn” by Kim and had ended up creating a fission in the alliance with Washington. “President Moon Jae-in and his Blue House still don’t grasp the reality and have a delusional belief that he is a mediator or facilitator,” Jun Hee-kyung, a spokeswoman for the opposition party, said in a statement. By dropping North Korea-related sanctions, Trump was trying to defuse growing tensions between Washington and Pyongyang after the Hanoi breakdown, said Harry J. Kazianis, director of Korean studies at the Washington-based Center for the National Interest. Recently, Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui of North Korea threatened to suspend negotiations with Washington and said that Kim would soon decide whether to resume nuclear and missile tests, which it has not carried out in more than a year. “Trump’s canceling out of sanctions might have been a bid to get North Korea to change its thinking,” Kazianis said. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Urges South Korea to Leave U.S., Alone” New York Times, March 24, 2019, p. A-4)
Bolton: “On Saturday morning at about seven thirty, I called Mulvaney, who had stayed at Mar-a-Lago. Mnuchin had called him Friday afternoon to speak with Trump, to urge that pulling down the new Treasury sanctions would be embarrassing to him. Mulvaney put the call through, and Mnuchin gave Trump the same analysis I had. Trump agreed, hours after disagreeing with precisely the same points, to keep the decisions in place. Hearing this, I asked Mulvaney if I had not been clear about this the day before. “You were very clear about it,” said Mulvaney, “but sometimes it takes two or three tries to get it through.” As for the “future” sanctions, Mulvaney said this was merely Treasury’s “ham-fisted way of explaining things.” He and I decided to conference Mnuchin in. Mnuchin said he was trying to protect Trump from embarrassment by saying we wouldn’t do additional sanctions, although he agreed that the rest of the world could conclude we were receding from “maximum pressure.” We all agreed, however, that correcting the correction (our new synonym for “reversing”) would only make things worse. Although I didn’t initially like Mnuchin’s cover story, as the day wore on, I couldn’t think of anything better. We, or more accurately, Trump, might have appeared confused, but at least we didn’t look too weak. I spoke later to Pompeo, and he also agreed we should just let matters lie. In any other Administration, this affair would have been a major story, but for us, it passed almost unnoticed. The release of the Mueller report, which ended the “Russia collusion” issue, dominated news coverage. On Monday, with Pompeo and me in the Oval with Trump, and Mnuchin on the phone, we reaffirmed what we had decided after Singapore, namely that enforcement actions would continue, but that we would not impose additional prohibitions on North Korea without Trump’s approval. If Trump had simply listened on Friday, all this drama could have been avoided.” (Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, p. 300)
3/25/19:
North Korea restored some personnel to an inter-Korean liaison office in its border city of Kaesong, a unification ministry official said, just three days after the regime withdrew all its staff from there. Four or five North Korean officials returned to the office earlier in the day and held a meeting with their South Korean counterparts, according to the ministry official. “The North Koreans said that they came down (to the liaison office) to take their shift as usual,” the official told reporters on condition of anonymity. “Accordingly, the representatives of liaison officers (of the two Koreas) held a meeting in the morning and plan to operate (the office) as usual.” “They said that the North’s commitment remains unchanged for the liaison office to carry out projects in line with the North-South joint declarations,” he said, apparently referring to the agreements that their leaders reached in their three summits last year. The new statement also says Kim “faced much opposition and challenges” from within North Korea in order to make the second summit happen. “ … our people, especially our military and munitions industry, are saying we must never give up nuclear capabilities”, it said, according to Yonhap. (Koh Byung-joon and Choi Soo-hyang, “N. Korean Staff Return to Inter-Korean Liaison Office,” Yonhap, March 25, 2019)
President Donald Trump was open to easing sanctions on North Korea provided there was a ‘snapback’ clause if the North restarted nuclear activities, according to South Korean media reports of a North Korean statement. (Joyce Lee, “North Korea Says Trump Was Open to Easing Sanctions with ‘Snapback’ Clause: South Korean Media,” Reuters, March 25, 2019) President Donald Trump was open to easing sanctions on North Korea at last month’s summit with Kim Jong-un, but was thwarted by his top aides, according to a senior Pyongyang official. Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui made the remarks at a press conference in the North Korean capital on March 15, which was widely reported on for her threat to abandon denuclearization negotiations with the U.S. Yonhap obtained a copy of her opening remarks. “When we tabled a realistic proposal, President Trump was of the flexible position that a deal could be possible if it contained a reference to the fact that sanctions removal would be reversible in the event that North Korea resumed nuclear activities,” she said. The vice foreign minister continued that a “meaningful outcome” was not reached because U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton “created an obstacle in the constructive negotiation efforts of the two leaders with extant hostility and mistrust.” Choe’s accusations against Pompeo and Bolton were previously reported and subsequently denied by both men. If Trump’s alleged openness to a “snapback” clause is true, it could explain his decision last week to hold back on additional sanctions on North Korea. Choe also claimed that Kim has tried to negotiate with the U.S. despite “much opposition and challenge” within his own country. “Our people, and especially our military and munitions industry, are writing thousands of petition letters to our State Affairs Commission Chairman Comrade to urge against giving up our nuclear (program) at any cost,” she said. (Yonhap, “Trump Was Open to Easing Sanctions at Summit: N.K. Official,” March 25, 2019)
The Pentagon said that a test today of a new tactic for intercepting missiles aimed at American cities was a success, in an exercise that appeared intended to simulate how the United States would defend against an adversary like North Korea. The test, the first in nearly two years, was conducted over the Pacific Ocean. It fired two “interceptors” from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California against a mock warhead launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. “The system worked exactly as it was designed to do,” Air Force Lt. Gen. Samuel A. Greaves, director of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency, said in a statement. “This test demonstrates that we have a capable, credible deterrent against a very real threat.” Evaluating the success of missile interceptions is difficult. In the past, the Missile Defense Agency has been accused of exaggerating its “kills” in order to quiet critics who say a 50 percent successful interception rate is far from satisfactory. The new system was intended to boost the success rate by launching multiple interceptors — one to hit the target or knock it off its trajectory, and the next as a backup — at a single warhead. In today’s test, the Pentagon said the incoming warhead was destroyed by the first interceptor, and that the second went after the largest remnant. The number of interceptors that can be fired at a single warhead is classified, but officials have been quoted as saying that they ultimately hope to direct three or four at each incoming warhead. Over the decades, the United States has spent more than $300 billion on the antimissile goal, according to a tally conducted by Stephen I. Schwartz, an independent consultant who studies the cost of military projects. The program is expensive because the problem is so difficult. Warheads fired by intercontinental missiles travel faster than four miles a second. Overall, the rate of success for attempted interceptions has been so unimpressive that President Barack Obama stepped up a program called “left of launch,’’ designed to sabotage missiles before they are launched. The secret program was used against North Korea in Obama’s second term. The more public program is based on ground-based interceptors. They race skyward and release speeding projectiles meant to destroy incoming warheads by force of impact — what experts call hitting a bullet with a bullet. After exiting a treaty with Russia that banned antimissile systems, the administration of President George W. Bush began deploying a bullet-on-bullet system in Alaska and California, largely to defend against North Korean warheads. Since then, the system has undergone 10 costly flight tests against mock warheads. Five of the tests failed. The most recent test, in May 2017, successfully smashed the mock target, and was declared a success. Today’s statement said the lead interceptor “destroyed the re-entry vehicle, as it was designed to do.” The trailing interceptor, it added, then looked at the debris and remaining objects. Not finding any other mock warheads, it selected the next “most lethal object” in the debris it could identify, the statement said, and struck that. The test was not announced beforehand and the statement on the outcome was released late in the day, which seemed to suggest that the test had encountered problems. The statement also introduced a note of hesitancy. “Initial indications show the test met requirements,” it said. “Program officials will continue to evaluate system performance based upon telemetry and other data obtained during the test.” The mock target at Kwajalein, not far from where the United States once conduced nuclear tests, was launched more than 4,000 miles from the California coasts. The interceptors were on the same base where the United States keeps a part of its antiballistic missile fleet. (William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Pentagon Claims Success in Test of New Method to Intercept Missiles,” New York Times, March 26, 2019, p. A-8)
3/27/19:
The commander of US forces in South Korea warned lawmakers today that the US might not have sufficient intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities on the Korean peninsula to see an attack coming if denuclearization talks between Washington and Pyongyang fall apart, causing hostilities to flare up again. “As we look to the future as conditions might change, if they change negatively then our stance, our posture is not adequate to provide us an unblinking eye to give us early warning and indicators,” Gen. Robert Abrams, commander of US Forces Korea told the House Armed Services Committee. “Suffice it to say we are short to do that if things start to turn bad,” he added. Abrams also said that North Korean activity observed by the US is “inconsistent with denuclearization,” making it necessary for the US to “maintain a postured and ready force to deter any possible aggressive actions.” “I remain clear-eyed about the fact that despite a reduction in tensions along the demilitarized zone and a cessation of strategic provocations coupled with public statements of intent to denuclearize. Little to no verifiable change has occurred in North Korea’s capabilities,” he said. “Further, North Korea conventional and asymmetric military capabilities along with their continued development of advanced conventional munitions and systems all remains unchecked. These capabilities continue to hold the United States, South Korea and our regional allies at risk,” Abrams added. Those remarks come after Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford last week called himself a “glass half-empty guy when it comes to North Korean capabilities,” and said Kim Jong Un’s ballistic missile and nuclear arsenal still poses a threat. “I still see a potential although as yet undemonstrated the capability to match a nuclear weapon with an intercontinental ballistic missile, and I think it’s incumbent on the United States military to be prepared to defend the homeland and our allies from that eventuality,” he said at an event at the Atlantic Council in Washington. (Zachary Cohen, Barbara Starr and Jamie Crawford, “Top General Warns U.S. May Not See a North Korean Attack Coming,” CNN, March 27, 2019)
3/29/19:
North Korea has almost completed restoration work on its key long-range rocket launch site in Dongchang-ri, on the west coast, South Korea’s spy agency said. Pyongyang launched work to restore the launch pad there in February, before the United States and North Korea held a summit later that month in Hanoi, lawmakers quoted the National Intelligence Service (NIS) as saying at a meeting of the parliamentary intelligence committee. “The North started the reassembly work before the Hanoi summit. We cannot verify what that means,” the NIS said. The NIS added North Korea appears to be keeping its uranium enrichment facility in its mainstay nuclear complex in Yongbyon, north of Pyongyang, in “normal operation.” North Korea stopped the operation of a five-mega-watt nuclear reactor at the Yongbyon complex late last year, it noted. (Yonhap, “N.K. Almost Completes Work to Restore Long-Range Rocket Site: NIS,” March 29, 2019)
Donald Trump reaffirmed that he would stop new sanctions on North Korea, saying the country was suffering and he valued his relationship with its authoritarian leader Kim Jong Un. “They are suffering greatly in North Korea. They’re having a hard time in North Korea,” he told reporters at his Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida. “And I just didn’t think additional sanctions at this time were necessary. Doesn’t mean I don’t put them on later but I didn’t think additional sanctions at this time were necessary,” he said. Trump said he got along “very well” with Kim, adding: “We understand each other.” “I think it is very important you maintain that relationship at least as long as you can,” Trump said. Trump’s announcement last week on the sanctions raised eyebrows as he said he was reversing sanctions that had been announced that day but which had not. Answering a question today, Trump said the sanctions had been set to be announced at the time but that he stopped them. (AFP, “Trump Says N. Korea Suffering, Doesn’t Need New Sanctions,” March 29, 2019)
Senior South Korean officials, including President Moon Jae-in, are launching a series of meetings with U.S. counterparts, in a bid to jumpstart stalled denuclearization talks with North Korea and mend fraying ties in their alliance. Moon will hold a summit meeting with President Donald Trump in Washington on April 11 to discuss North Korea and other alliance issues, the White House. Ahead of the Trump-Moon summit, South Korea said it was sending its foreign and defense ministers, and other senior officials, to meetings in Washington. Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha is set to meet U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Friday to discuss ways to move forward after the failed Trump-Kim summit. Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo will meet the U.S. acting secretary of defense, Patrick Shanahan, on Monday, the ministry said. The lack of progress with North Korea has become a domestic problem for Moon, who has staked much of his political capital on improving relations with Pyongyang. A Gallup poll on Friday showed Moon’s approval ratings at a record low of 43 percent as respondents complained about the stalemate with the North while the economy suffers. (Josh Smith and Hyonhee Shin, “South Korea’s Moon to Meet Trump over Stalled North Korea Talks,” Reuters, March 29, 2019)
3/31/19:
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s “answer to a question put by KCNA on March 31 as regards the recent assault on the DPRK Embassy in Spain: A grave terrorist attack occurred on February 22, where an armed group assaulted the DPRK Embassy in Spain and bound, beat and tortured the Embassy staff and extorted the communication apparatus. An illegal intrusion into and occupation of diplomatic mission and act of extortion are a grave breach of the state sovereignty and a flagrant violation of international law, and this kind of act should never be tolerated over the globe. We are following the rumors of all hues now in the air that FBI of the United States and the small fry of anti-DPRK “body” were involved in the terror incident, and so on. We expect that the authorities concerned in Spain, a place of incident, carry out an investigation into the incident to the last in a responsible manner in order to bring the terrorists and their wire-pullers to justice in conformity with the relevant international law, and we will wait for the result in patience.” (KCNA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Urges Responsible Investigation into Assault on DPRK Embassy,” March 31, 2019)
4/1/19:
The defense chiefs of South Korea and the United States have reaffirmed their commitment to closely coordinating to support last year’s inter-Korean military accord aimed at reducing border tensions and building trust, their offices said. During their talks in Washington on Monday (local time), Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo and acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan also reiterated their will to closely cooperate to expedite the fulfillment of conditions needed for Washington’s envisioned transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) to Seoul. Jeong and Shanahan met face to face for the first time since the latter took the Pentagon post in January. “The secretary and the minister assessed that implementation of the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) has contributed to the easing of military tension and confidence building on the Korean Peninsula,” Seoul’s defense ministry and the Pentagon said in a press release. The Koreas’ defense chiefs signed the CMA at the close of the third summit between President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang last September. It entails a series of trust-building and arms control measures under a broader scheme to halt all hostile acts against each other. Jeong and Shanahan underscored their will to further reinforce the alliance through the “synchronized” efforts of their militaries amid ongoing peace efforts with North Korea. “The secretary and minister affirmed that the U.S.-ROK alliance is ‘ironclad’ and ready to face an evolving security environment,” the press release reads. ROK stands for South Korea’s official name, the Republic of Korea. “The two sides reaffirmed the commitment to maintain an unwavering combined readiness posture while continuing to support the ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve complete denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula,” it added. Gen. Robert Abrams, the commander of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, gave the defense chiefs an evaluation of the allies’ new exercise staged last month. He said that it has strengthened the militaries’ combined readiness and contributed to the groundwork for the OPCON transfer. Abrams was referring to the Dong Maeng command post exercise that replaced the Key Resolve exercise. Dong Maeng is the Korean word for alliance. (Yonhap, “S. Korea, U.S. Reaffirm Commitment to Support Inter-Korean Military Accord,” April 2, 2019)
4/4/19:
Lee Do-hoon, special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, told a conference in Seoul, one week ahead of President Moon Jae-in’s summit with President Donald Trump in Washington, “Sanctions are a means to deter North Korea from making bad decisions, but sanctions themselves cannot fundamentally resolve our problem. North Korea persisted in its nuclear development through decades of sanctions and pressure. To believe that stronger sanctions and more pressure would make North Korea suddenly give up its entire nuclear program is an illusion.” Despite the breakdown of the summit, Lee said “considerable progress has been made” and that on certain issues, the U.S. and North Korea had narrowed their differences “almost to the point of reaching an agreement.” The envoy said the top-down approach “armed with political determination” and backed by “meaningful working-level interaction” is the only feasible way to find a breakthrough in the current negotiating deadlock. “Some argue that the Hanoi summit concluding without an agreement demonstrates the limits of the top-down approach, but looking back at what we have done in the past year, it is clear that the top-down approach is still very valid and the limitations do not outweigh the merits,” Lee said. Still, he made it clear that more substantive working-level discussions are necessary, noting that officials failed to “fully discuss and fine-tune denuclearization and corresponding measures” ahead of the Hanoi summit. Lee also emphasized the importance of promptly producing outcomes “large or small” in the process of denuclearization talks, citing “blind suspicions against North Korea and skepticism toward dialogue” as one of the biggest challenges facing the peace efforts. “When the dialogue resumes, the substantive early harvest is of utmost importance,” Lee said. (Yonhap, “Envoy Says Sanctions Alone Won’t Lead North Korea to Give up Nuclear Program,” April 4, 2019)
In one of the clearest signs of just how much Kim Jong Un wanted an agreement at what became the failed Hanoi summit in February with President Donald Trump, CNN has learned that the North Korean leader gave specific orders to his generals to not carry out any unplanned activity in the days and weeks leading up the meeting, according to a senior South Korean official and a U.S. defense official. The U.S. official added that Kim was worried any inadvertent movement of his military units would raise tensions leading up to the summit. He issued specific orders that forces stay in place in a passive status, without any indication they were moving in the field. His goal was to ensure existing military confidence building measures would remain in place, especially in the demilitarized zone between North Korea and South Korea, with the aim of helping him convince Trump to ease sanctions on the regime. The previously undisclosed orders by the North Korean leader and the subsequent failure to convince Trump to agree to a partial lifting of sanctions without a move towards denuclearization have underscored the assessment by the U.S. that Kim thought he could convince Trump to agree. “He underestimated the President,” the official said. North Korean forces subsequently returned to their regular deployment status. The orders did not involve missile and nuclear sites which are always under Kim’s strict controls, according to the official. The orders issued by Kim prior to the summit would have significantly reduced the ability of the units affected to suddenly fire their weapons. The US saw no evidence that North Korea was intending any provocation using its conventional forces, suggesting Kim’s order may have had more to do with his worries about a sudden mistake in the field. Several senior U.S. military officials continue to say, for now, they see no evidence Kim is planning any satellite or missile launch, or nuclear test, all of which would be seen by the US as a major provocation. (Barbara Starr and Kylie Atwood, “Officials Say Kim Warned His Generals ahead of Summit,” CNN, April 4, 2019)
4/5/19:
Pompeo: “Q: I want to turn now to North Korea because you have been heavily involved in this. You’ve met more with Kim Jong-un, the leader, than just about anybody else. President Trump’s second summit with the North Korean leader failed to produce an agreement to declare and denuclearize their nuclear weapons. Will there be a third summit with North Korea? POMPEO: I’m confident there will be. Q: When? POMPEO: I don’t know. Q: Soon? POMPEO: I hope so. Look, we came out of Hanoi with a deeper understanding of each other, the positions that the two sides had. The two leaders were able to make progress in that respect. We didn’t get as far as the world is demanding. These are global sanctions that are on North Korea today. Q: Are you disappointed? POMPEO: It’s a negotiation, and we’ve always known this was going to take a while, so I don’t know that I was disappointed. You always hope you’ll make progress faster, better. You know that in every interaction you have. We’re determined; I’m convinced the North Koreans are determined as well. Chairman Kim has promised me, he’s promised President Trump he will denuclearize. Now it’s the mission of my team to make sure that that happens. Q: And so this is really going to come to a head next week, again, because the President of South Korea, Moon Jae-in, is coming to the White House to meet with President Trump and you. Will you agree to some easing of economic sanctions to continue the momentum on these talks with the North Koreans? POMPEO: President Trump has been unambiguous. Our administration’s policy is incredibly clear: Economic sanctions, United Nations Security Council sanctions, will not be lifted until we achieve the ultimate objective that we set out now almost two years ago. Q: So it’s my understanding that the South Koreans are really pushing the U.S. to try and open some of these economic sanctions — the Kaesong manufacturing park, the reopening of tourism in North Korea — they want to continue this. You’re saying the U.S. is going to say, no, we’re not going there? POMPEO: I talk to my South Korean counterpart a lot. She’s a delightful, capable minister for their country. They’re neighbors with the North Koreans. Many North — South Koreans have family members there. I understand the sentiment, but they’ve been great partners, and we have worked closely together to enforce these sanctions. We appreciate what they’re doing. Q: And just to give the context of why I’m asking that question is because it’s my understanding the South Koreans are pushing for that because the diplomatic channels have gone cold. Have the diplomatic channels gone cold? POMPEO: Nope. Q: They’re still open? POMPEO: Yes. Q: With the North Koreans? POMPEO: Yes. Q: Between the U.S. and the North? POMPEO: Yes. QUESTION: And the South and the North? POMPEO: Yes. Q: Those diplomatic — okay. POMPEO: Yes, we have had conversations after Hanoi about how to move forward. Q: And again, the significance of next week, April 11th, the day that the South Korean president will meet with President Trump, it’s a big day in North Korea … is my understanding, that Kim Jong-un is going to give a big speech there. What are you watching from in that speech? Are we expecting some sort of surprise out of North Korea next week? POMPEO: It is a big day. It’s something that’s an annual event where the leader of North Korea speaks to his people. We’ll watch very closely what he says. I don’t expect there’ll be great surprise, but I do hope that he will share his sentiment, his sentiment that says: We — I believe, as the leader of North Korea, I believe the right thing to do is for us to engage with the United States to denuclearize our country, and that we’ll have a brighter future for the North Korean people. We hope that’s what he’ll talk about with his people, and we’ll be watching it very closely.” (DoS, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, Interview with Norah O’Donnell of CBS This Morning, New York, April 5, 2019)
4/10/19:
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said the country should strengthen its self-reliance and deliver a “telling blow” against countries imposing sanctions in an attempt to force concessions over his nuclear program. The comments, reported by North Korean state media, represent Kim’s first official, defiant response to the breakdown of the second U.S.-North Korea summit in February. They also come as South Korean President Moon Jae-in was in Washington to meet President Trump. Moon is seeking a way to mediate between the United States and North Korea and restart a stalled dialogue. Kim, in remarks delivered to a plenary session of officials from the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea, underlined the need to “vigorously advance socialist construction” based on North Korea’s own “efforts, technology and resources.” Kim called for the country to unite “under the uplifted banner of self-reliance, so as to deal a telling blow to the hostile forces who go with bloodshot eyes miscalculating that sanctions can bring the DPRK to its knees.” “Kim is showing that he’s confident enough not to feel any urgent pressure under the sanctions,” said Lim Eul-chul, an expert on the North Korean economy at Kyungnam University in Seoul. “Indeed, North Korea has beefed up significant resilience against sanctions over a long period of time,” he added. “His latest message is that North Korea will further develop self-reliance rather than give in to Washington’s demands.” Over the past week, Kim made four publicized visits to economic-related projects, including a beach resort, department store and more. Although Kim extended the deadline for the completion of the Wonsan-Kalma resort until April 2020, experts said the trips were designed to demonstrate the resilience of North Korea’s economy. Yesterday, Kim also stressed the need to maintain the party’s strategic line of focusing on economic development with a “spirit of self-reliance,” given what he called the current “tense situation,” according to KCNA. “The Supreme Leader urged the need for leading officials to fully display a high sense of responsibility and creativity, and the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and fortitude in an attitude befitting the masters of the revolution and construction under the prevailing tense situation and thus follow through on the new strategic line of the party,” he told his ruling Politburo. Although sanctions have undoubtedly made it more difficult for Kim to deliver on his public pledge to provide economic development for the people of North Korea, few experts believe he will cave to external pressure to surrender his nuclear arsenal. But some say the carrot of economic development may encourage him to limit the size of that arsenal and eventually submit to limited international inspections. Yesterday in Washington, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo offered some wiggle room in the U.S. government’s long-standing insistence that sanctions on North Korea will be lifted only once the country fully denuclearizes. “I want to leave a little space there,” Pompeo told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. “From time to time, there are particular provisions, if we are making substantial progress, where one might think it’s the right thing to do.” “But yes, the enforcement regime, the core U.N. Security Council resolutions, need to remain in place,” he added. (Simon Denyer and Min Joo Kim, “Kim Jong Un Vows Pyongyang Will Withstand Sanctions Pressure, Prove Its Self-Reliance,” Washington Post, April 11, 2019)
KCNA: “The 4th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) took place at the headquarters building of the C.C., WPK on Wednesday. Kim Jong Un, chairman of the WPK, guided the plenary meeting. Attending the meeting were members of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee, members and alternate members of the Political Bureau, members and alternate members of the WPK Central Committee and members of the Central Auditing Commission of the WPK. Vice directors of some departments of WPK Central Committee and other members were on hand as observers. Kim Jong Un chaired the meeting upon authorization of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee. The plenary meeting discussed agendas as follows: On holding higher the banner of self-reliance in the socialist construction. On the plan of formation of state leadership bodies to be presented to the First Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly. Organizational affairs. There was discussion on the first agenda at the plenary meeting. Kim Jong Un made a report on the first agenda. He in his report made a scientific analysis of the changed international landscape and the peculiarities of the present situation becoming daily acute and clarified the main tenor of the recent DPRK-U.S. summit talks and the Party’s stand towards it. He underscored the need to more vigorously advance socialist construction by dint of self-supporting national economy suited to the specific local conditions of our country based on our efforts, technology and resources under the uplifted banner of self-reliance, so as to deal a telling blow to the hostile forces who go with bloodshot eyes miscalculating that sanctions can bring the DPRK to its knees. He reviewed and analyzed the successes and faults in the struggle for speeding up the socialist construction under the uplifted banner of self-reliance after the 7th Congress of the WPK, and set forth immediate objectives and tasks to be carried out without fail in further demonstrating the might of the self-supporting economy. He referred to the great achievements for socialist construction made in all the fields and regions and by units through the indomitable offensive under the banner of self-reliance and self-sufficiency in recent years. He noted that a great progress was registered in the struggle to make the national economy Juche-based and self-supporting and the reserved strength of the DPRK and tremendous potential of its independent economy were vividly demonstrated at home and abroad, adding that through the remarkable successes achieved in socialist construction he could keenly feel that our line was right over and over again. Self-reliance and self-supporting national economy are the bedrock of the existence of our own style socialism, the motive power of its advance and development and the eternal lifeline essential to the destiny of our revolution, he stressed. Noting that the first and foremost issue arising in accelerating socialist construction under the uplifted banner of self-reliance is to secure a sure guarantee for putting the national economy on a new phase of growth by expanding and reinforcing the foundation of self-supporting economy, he clarified in detail the immediate tasks for sectors of the national economy. Officials in all the fields and units should do their best for the development of science and education, bearing in mind that the success of relevant fields and units as well as the present and future of socialist construction depend on the thorough implementation of the Party’s policy of attaching importance to science and education and talents, he said. He put special stress on decisively enhancing the role of the Party organizations in the struggle to vigorously speed up the socialist construction under the uplifted banner of self-reliance.” (KCNA, “Report on 4th Plenary Meeting of 7th Central Committee of WPK,” April 11, 2019)
North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, one of Pyongyang’s top negotiators with the United States, was named a key member of the ruling party, state media reported, despite the collapse of February’s summit between the two countries. Choe was included in a list of officials “directly appointed” as members of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea’s Central Committee during its plenary session today, according to KCNA. The “direct appointment” indicates that Choe became a member of the Central Committee without being an “alternate member” first. (Yonhap, “N. Korean Negotiator Named Key Party Member despite Summit Breakdown,” April 11, 2019)
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo appeared to signal some flexibility in Washington’s position in negotiations with Pyongyang over its nuclear weapons program. Speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Pompeo was asked by Sen. Cory Gardner (R-CO) whether he agrees that no sanctions should be lifted until North Korea demonstrates a commitment to complete and verifiable denuclearization. “I want to leave a little space there,” he answered. “From time to time, there are particular provisions that if we were making substantial progress that one might think that was the right thing to do to achieve. Sometimes it’s visas. I want to leave a little room.” Pompeo added that Gardner’s point was well taken. “The enforcement regime, the core U.N. Security Council resolutions, need to remain in place until the verification of denuclearization has been completed,” he said. Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA) called for still stronger sanctions on North Korea, saying Trump’s recent withdrawal of additional sanctions sent the wrong message to both North Korea and the rest of the international community. Moreover, he said, a U.N. panel recently reported massive increases in ship-to-ship transfers of oil to North Korea in defiance of sanctions. “You may think the enforcement regime is ineffective, but you should move to the outskirts of Pyongyang because those folks think it’s very effective,” Pompeo said. “I don’t know about massive, but let me assure you, there’s less coal, less fuel, less resource there today than there was when President Obama was in office,” he added. (Yonhap, “Pompeo Leaves ‘a Little Room’ in Sanctions Regime against N.K.,” April 11, 2019) Pompeo offered no clear road map to reopening nuclear negotiations with North Korea nearly six weeks after the collapse of the Hanoi summit, leaving the Trump administration with dwindling options to salvage the talks. At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Pompeo struggled to answer basic questions, including whether the two sides have agreed on a definition of complete and verifiable “denuclearization.” “I can’t answer that question yes or no,” Pompeo told Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Md.). “We’ve had extensive conversations with North Korea about” that question. When Cardin noted the North had yet to turn over an accounting of its nuclear arsenal, Pompeo replied: “There is still a great deal of work to do.” Democrats pressed Pompeo over whether the administration was being manipulated. “My perspective is that Kim merrily rolls along with development of his nuclear program,” Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) told Pompeo at the hearing. “I see Kim Jong Un trying to play out the string until the end of your administration with absolutely no results that can be pointed to in reducing the nuclear threat.” Pompeo defended the administration’s actions. Countering suggestions from lawmakers that economic sanctions on the North are faltering, Pompeo said: “You should move to the outskirts of Pyongyang, because those folks think it’s very effective.” Behind the scenes, however, administration officials have said Trump’s negotiating team, led by Stephen Biegun, the State Department’s special representative for North Korea, has had little communication with Pyongyang. The U.S. side has sent the message that it is prepared to resume working-level talks, but the negotiators have heard “nothing back,” said one Asia policy expert in Washington who was briefed by administration officials. The expert, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss private conversations, added that the Trump team is running out of time. “Realistically, if we’re not in a serious negotiation process by this summer, this will collapse, and then you’re in the 2020 [campaign] cycle,” the expert said, adding the North probably will want to wait to see whether Trump wins reelection. “We have about three or four months to get sustainable traction and momentum. They may do it, but I see no reason to think they’re going to get there.” At the Senate hearing, Pompeo also appeared to offer a bit of wiggle room on sanctions relief. “I want to leave a little space there,” he told the lawmakers. “From time to time, there are particular provisions, if we are making substantial progress, where one might think it’s the right thing to do . .. But yes, the enforcement regime, the core U.N. Security Council resolutions, need to remain in place.” (David Nakamura, “No Meetings, Little Contact: Trump Administration Faces Dwindling Options on Stalled North Korea Nuclear Talks,” Washington Post, April 10, 2019)
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo acknowledged that he saw North Korean leader Kim Jong-un as a “tyrant,” potentially throwing cold water on dialogue with a regime that considers its supreme leader unassailable. Speaking to the Senate Appropriation Committee, Pompeo’s comments came as an affirmative answer to a senator’s question on whether he considers Kim a “tyrant” in the likes of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. “Sure. I’m sure I’ve said that,” Pompeo replied. Pompeo also said at the hearing to assess the State Department’s budget request for 2020 that the administration remained committed to a “final, fully-verified denuclearization of North Korea,” and that sanctions would continue to be enforced on Pyongyang until it was reached. This unwavering stance by the United States could be a problem for South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who, at the time of hearing, was en route to Washington to nudge Trump toward some kind of compromise to revive the stalled negotiations with Pyongyang. While a Blue House official yesterday said that both Seoul and Washington remained aligned in regards to the “end state” of North Korea’s denuclearization, Lee Do-hoon, the South’s top official in charge of negotiations on the North, earlier this month brought up the idea that some kind of an “early harvest” was necessary. The analogy, according to Lee, was meant to highlight the necessity of showing progress, big or small, in the dialogue, likely a reference to Seoul’s preference for a phased approach in which Pyongyang is given gradual economic incentives to encourage it to scrap its nuclear and missile programs. The North, for its part, appears to be bracing itself for the long game, with a series of national-level political events taking place ahead of today’s first plenary meeting of the country’s newly-elected rubber stamp legislature, the Supreme Peoples’ Assembly. It opened a plenary meeting of the central committee of its ruling Workers’ Party, a day after Kim Jong-un called for self-reliance from party members in the face of a “prevailing tense situation” faced by the country. Presiding over an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the party’s central committee yesterday, Kim made a “deep analysis of the matters pending urgent solution in the party and state” and called on officials to follow through on a “new strategic line” for the party with an attitude of “self-reliance and fortitude,” according to a KCNA report. The new strategic line is believed to refer to Kim’s call for a concentration of all the country’s efforts toward “socialist economic construction,” raised during the third plenary meeting of the party’s seventh central committee last April 20. In that meeting, Pyongyang officially announced it had completed its parallel pursuit of nuclear weapons development and economic growth, termed the “byongjjn line,” and would henceforward solely focus on the economy. Kim’s renewed affirmation of this agenda suggests the North may refrain from nuclear and missile tests to avoid losing the hard-won diplomatic gains reached through engagement with Seoul and Washington. (Shim Kyu-seok, “Pompeo Admits Kim’s a ‘Tyrant,’” JoongAng Ilbo, April 11, 2019)
A ranking Cheong Wa Dae official said Moon and Trump will likely discuss whether the countries should offer phased rewards to the North when they meet this week, apparently acknowledging a possible gap between the allies and what should be offered to the North in exchange for its denuclearization, and the timing of those concessions. The Cheong Wa Dae official refused to call the Hanoi meeting a failure, calling it “a part of a long process that helped both sides identify what the other side needs and what their future negotiations should look like.” (Byun Duk-kun, “President Heads to U.S. for Meeting with Trump over North Korea,” Yonhap, April 10, 2019)
Once Air Force One was wheels-up from Hanoi, Vietnam, last February, the American president phoned his South Korean counterpart and asked for help. Donald Trump had just walked out on nuclear negotiations with North Korea’s leader, but he hadn’t given up on diplomacy just yet. Trump told Moon Jae-in that “you need to talk to Kim Jong Un,” recalled a senior South Korean official who was aware of what was said during the call. Trump said “‘call him’ … something like six times.” Then, as the call was wrapping up, the U.S. president extended an invitation: “After that, come over to Washington, D.C. Let’s have lunch. We’ll talk about stuff, moving ahead.” A different South Korean official, the presidential adviser Moon Chung-in, said that Trump had another request during the phone call. He wanted President Moon to persuade Kim to embrace the “big deal” that the United States proposed at the Vietnam summit, involving complete denuclearization in exchange for peace and economic transformation, rather than North Korea’s smaller offer to dismantle its Yongbyon nuclear facility in return for the lifting of most sanctions. The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment about the Trump-Moon call. It’s not immediately clear whether the Moon-Kim call took place. Regardless, the South Korean president is now in Washington, on a mission to first persuade Trump, not Kim, to consider a compromise between the big and small deals. After meeting with Trump, President Moon is likely to hold a fourth summit with Kim, or send envoys to Pyongyang, according to four South Korean officials. President Moon’s biggest potential obstacle in his meeting with Trump concerns economic sanctions against North Korea. U.S. officials such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Adviser John Bolton argue that maintaining sanctions is the key to compelling Kim to make a deal, while South Korean officials contend that easing sanctions could encourage the North Korean leader to strike an agreement. This is a fundamental philosophical difference that will have to be resolved for negotiations to progress. The senior South Korean official who spoke about the Trump-Moon call suggested that Trump’s decision to walk away from the Vietnam summit was a response to political pressures back home to not strike a bad deal. The official noted that in Hanoi, the United States and North Korea had “strong agreement” on formally declaring an end to the Korean War, opening liaison offices in the other country’s capital, and providing North Korea with an economic-incentives package. U.S. negotiators, however, “crushed North Korea with their maximalist position” that Pyongyang completely give up not just nuclear weapons but also its biological and chemical weapons. “A small deal is not a bad deal,” the senior South Korean official argued. If the Yongbyon complex were to be dismantled, North Korea would be eliminating its sole facility for producing plutonium and tritium for use in nuclear bombs, the official said. (The North has other suspected sites for producing highly enriched uranium and plenty of warheads and delivery systems for those bombs, which would all still exist if Yongbyon were destroyed. Experts disagree on how substantial a component Yongbyon is in the entire North Korean nuclear program.) Taking the facility out means “critically crippling North Korea’s nuclear capacity,” the official said. While the Trump administration might want North Korea to swiftly dismantle its weapons of mass destruction ahead of the 2020 election, and Kim might favor a longer timeline, the South Korean government might seek a middle ground, said Moon Chung In, who is also a professor at Yonsei University in Seoul and said he was speaking in an unofficial capacity. He offered an example: “Within three years, major decisions to dismantle [the North Korean nuclear program] and normalize” relations, and then, over the “much longer term,” the “verifiable, complete, and permanent dismantling of nuclear facilities, materials, and weapons.” Another aspect of the good-enough deal is jump-starting this process through an “early harvest.” (President Moon is headed to Washington not just with a phalanx of advisers, but also with plentiful buzzwords.) The harvest could include North Korea allowing foreign experts to inspect the destruction of a nuclear test site or missile-engine test site that it had promised to scrap. Or it could entail dismantling the North’s signature Yongbyon nuclear facility, plus what South Korean officials cryptically refer to as “alpha”: some additional denuclearization steps that the parties have yet to determine. In return, North Korea would receive political and economic benefits from Washington. South Korean officials have been signaling that President Moon is likely to encourage Trump to be flexible on sanctions if the harvest is bountiful enough. “Sanctions are a means to deter North Korea from making bad decisions. But sanctions themselves cannot fundamentally resolve our problems,” said Lee Do Hoon, South Korea’s lead nuclear negotiator, at a conference last week in Seoul, in his first public speech since the Hanoi summit. In an apparent rebuke of U.S. hard-liners such as Bolton, Lee added, “North Korea has persisted [with] nuclear development through decades of sanctions and pressure. To believe that stronger sanctions and more pressure alone would make North Korea suddenly give up its entire nuclear program is an illusion.” “I believe President Moon may suggest the idea that the United States ease sanctions on North Korea,” Moon Hee-sang, the speaker of South Korea’s National Assembly and a member of Moon’s party, told me. While the United States and South Korea are aligned on their goals for denuclearization and peace, he noted, they have some differences on how to achieve those objectives. Moon Chung-in said that Kim needed to deliver on his promises to dismantle his other nuclear test sites and missile-engine test sites in the presence of outside inspectors. If he were to do so, Moon reasoned, the Trump administration could permit some “relaxation of sanctions … not U.N. Security Council sanctions per se, but at least the U.S. can tolerate some kind of inter-Korean economic exchange and cooperation” or humanitarian assistance. (Reopening two of the most prominent inter-Korean projects, a resort and an industrial complex in North Korea, would require a raft of complicated exemptions to international sanctions.) If the United States continues to take the position that it won’t lift sanctions until North Korea’s complete denuclearization, then “incremental implementation won’t work,” he conceded. And so, after what the senior South Korean official described as “a very harsh internal debate” within the Moon administration about which aggrieved party to consult first, the South Korean president has gone to Washington. Asked whether President Moon had talked with North Korea’s leader about his plans for getting nuclear talks back on track, Moon Chung-in responded, “I don’t think so.” Lee Soo-hyuck, a member of Moon’s party and of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, also told me he didn’t think that Moon and Kim had been in contact. The senior South Korean official would not confirm whether the two leaders have spoken since the Vietnam summit, though the official added that the South Korean government has been sending messages to North Korea through various means—including an inter-Korean military channel and liaison office, along with the Chinese and Russian governments—to “calm down” in the aftermath of Hanoi and not “do anything stupid,” such as abandoning negotiations or ending its suspension of nuclear and missile tests by launching a rocket. “Some people have been arguing that President Moon should meet Kim Jong Un first—that is what President Trump wanted—and then go to Washington. But we can talk with the American president much more easily because we’re allies,” Moon Chung In said. He added that North Korea “wouldn’t accept” meetings with South Korean envoys if those envoys couldn’t speak to why Trump walked out of the Hanoi summit and what he now wants from North Korea. President Moon is eager to meet with Trump “because the mood in Washington is getting worse,” and he’s trying to “separate” the president, who still seems to favor dialogue, from more and more vocal hard-liners around him, Joon Hyung Kim, a former foreign-policy adviser to Moon’s presidential campaign and a professor at Handong Global University, told me. Whether he’ll succeed in his mission is uncertain, but at the very least, Moon will seek to limit the damage from the Vietnam summit’s collapse. Since the abrupt end of the Trump-Kim Vietnam meeting, military relations between the Koreas are “not as great as we had hoped,” another senior South Korean official observed. Whether they are good enough, the official did not say. (Uri Friedman, “The Plan to Resurrect the North Korea Talks,” The Atlantic, April 11, 2019)
4/11/19:
President Trump signaled he remains open to an incremental deal with North Korea that would help further the negotiations over nuclear disarmament, but he emphasized his administration remains focused on “the big deal.” Ahead of a bilateral meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae-in in the Oval Office, Trump told reporters that there are “various smaller deals that maybe could happen,” and that the two leaders would be discussing potential increases in humanitarian aid, including food assistance, to the North. But he also emphasized he expects economic sanctions to remain in place until Pyongyang agrees to a deal to eliminate its nuclear weapons. Asked if he would accept a “smaller deal” that fell short of that goal to keep talks going, Trump responded: “I’d have to see what the deal is. There are various smaller deals that could happen. . .. You could work out step-by-step pieces, but at this moment we’re talking about the big deal. The big deal is we have to get rid of nuclear weapons.” The president said that a third summit “could happen,” but he did not offer a timeline and added that the negotiations are “step-by-step” and “not a fast process.” “I enjoyed the summits. I enjoyed being with the chairman,” Trump said of Kim. “They’ve been really productive. But this is not going to go fast. . . . If it goes fast, then it’s not the proper deal.” In brief remarks, Moon said the Hanoi summit was “not a source of disappointment,” suggesting that it was part of a longer negotiation process that could lead to a “bigger agreement.” He added that there will be “no daylight” between the United States and South Korean governments, attempting to dampen reports of friction. Moon invited Trump to visit Seoul “in the near future,” according to a summary of the meeting released by South Korea’s Blue House, but there was no announcement that such a trip was being scheduled. Trump is tentatively scheduled to make two trips to Japan in the next two months — to Tokyo for a ceremony marking the changing of the emperor in May and the Group of 20 summit in Osaka in June — where he will meet with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who has more conservative views on North Korea. (David Nakamura, “Trump Signals Openness to Smaller Deal with North Korea,” Washington Post, April 12, 2019, p. A-4) South Korean President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump agreed to maintain their strategy of personally persuading North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to give up nuclear arms at their seventh official meeting in Washington. Moon told Trump of his plan to hold a fourth summit with Kim in the near future, while Trump left open the possibility of a third summit between him and Kim. “The two leaders agreed that the top-down approach will continue to be crucial in the process of the Korean Peninsula’s peace,” Chung Eui-yong, head of the National Security Office of the Blue House, said after the summit. “In that regard, President Trump stressed that the door for dialogue with Kim is always open. “Moon explained his plan to push forward an inter-Korean summit soon,” Chung said. “He also reaffirmed his intention to closely cooperate with Trump so that the next North-U.S. summit will serve as a new milestone in the denuclearization negotiation.” While the two leaders agreed to continue their personal diplomacy with Kim, they appeared to have disagreed on strategies. Moon has pitched an idea that the United States accept smaller deals to keep the process going, but Trump made clear before the summit that he wants a comprehensive, one-shot deal to denuclearize the North, as he presented to Kim in the failed Hanoi summit. “At this moment, we’re talking about the big deal,” Trump said before the summit. “The big deal is we have to get rid of the nuclear weapons.” He still left some room. “There are various smaller deals that maybe could happen,” he said. “Things could happen. You can work out, step by step, pieces.” Trump also said it was premature to give the North economic concessions, such as restarting an inter-Korean industrial complex in Kaesong or cross-border tours to Mount Kumgang. “This isn’t the right time,” he said. “But at the right time, I’d have great support with North Korea.” Trump made clear he has no intention of easing sanctions on the North to revive talks. “And frankly, I had the option of significantly increasing them. I didn’t want to do that because of my relationship with Kim,” he said, referring to additional sanctions that were withheld a couple weeks ago. “I think that sanctions are, right now, at a level that’s a fair level,” he said. “And I really believe something very significant is going to happen. We could always increase them, but I didn’t want to do that at this time.” Instead of easing sanctions to allow inter-Korean economic projects, Trump said he is willing to offer humanitarian aid to the North. “Well, we are discussing certain humanitarian things right now, and I’m okay with that, to be honest,” he said. “And South Korea is doing certain things to help out with food and various other things for North Korea.” Seoul and Washington are discussing a plan to send a South Korean $8 million aid package through the United Nations Children’s Fund and World Food Program to support children and mothers in the North. “Moon said during the summit that after he returns to Korea, the South will contact the North and try to arrange an inter-Korean summit as soon as possible,” a senior Korean government official said. “The time and venue are yet to be decided.” “At the end of the summit, Trump asked Moon to inform him as soon as possible about the North’s position that the South has grasped through an inter-Korean summit or other inter-Korean contacts,” he said. The official said Moon and Trump had a candid discussion on specific plans for a third North-U.S. summit. He also said their talks removed various uncertainties raised after the collapse of the Hanoi meeting. “We confirmed the U.S. intention to have follow-up talks with the North,” he said. Meanwhile, Trump repeatedly stressed before the summit that he will discuss with Moon Korea’s arms purchases from the United States. “President Moon and South Korea have agreed to purchase a tremendous amount of our military equipment, from jet fighters to missiles, to lots of other things,” he said. “I look forward to talking about other things also, and in particular, all of that equipment that you’re buying,” Trump also said. “We like that in the United States. We like that you buy our great equipment. So again, thank you very much. And thank you for your leadership.” A senior Seoul official, however, said no agreement was made at the summit for Korea to make any new purchases of U.S. arms. (Ser Myo-ja, “Moon, Trump Discuss the Way Forward,” JoongAng Ilbo, April 12, 2019)
Trump: “ … We are discussing many, many important things, including, obviously, North Korea, the relationships with North Korea. I had, in many respects, a very good meeting. We did not fulfill what we wanted to, but in many ways, we — certain things were agreed to. My relationship is very good with, as you know, Chairman Kim. And I think that it will go on that way. We’ll see. We’ll probably know. But we’ll be discussing that. We’ll be discussing trade, military, military purchases. South Korea buys a great deal of equipment from us, especially military equipment. We’ve just recently completed a new and very, very large trade deal with South Korea, and it’s just now going into effect. And it will very much increase trade both ways between our two countries. It’s a very important transaction and something we’ve been working on for quite a while. I know that, for years, they’ve been working on trying to redo it. And we have a new deal and it’s been, I think, very, very good for both our countries. Big difference. President Moon and South Korea have agreed to purchase a tremendous amount of our military equipment, from jet fighters to missiles, to lots of other things. And we make the finest equipment in the world by far, and we appreciate the purchase. It’s a very large purchase. And we always appreciate that. I think I can say that our relationship has never been better. Our relationship is, on a personal basis, very, very close. Our First Ladies, likewise — extremely close. And I think that that will continue to for a long time into the future — forever. So we’ll be having individual meetings later on and all throughout the day with different people from different departments and representatives. The President and myself will be meeting right now in the Oval Office. Then we’ll meet with our groups in the Cabinet Room, as you know. And I think it’ll be very productive. It’s going to be a very productive day. I just do want to tell you that great progress has been made and a great relationship has been made in North Korea too. Kim Jong Un has been, really, somebody that I’ve gotten to know very well and respect, and hopefully — and I really believe that, over a period of time, a lot of tremendous things will happen. I think North Korea has a tremendous potential, and I believe that President Moon agrees with that. And we will be discussing that and even potential meetings, further meetings, with North Korea and Kim Jong Un. So I want to extend my warmest wishes to the people of South Korea, and I think indirectly I can truly say I want to extend my warmest wishes to Kim Jong Un and the people of North Korea. I think the relationship has become far different and far better than it was when I first took office or at the end, certainly, of the Obama administration. And it’s a great honor to be with you, Mr. President. And thank you very much. PRESIDENT MOON: (As interpreted.) Mr. President, I would like to thank you for inviting our couple to the White House and also warmly welcoming us. In particular, last night at the Blue House, I saw the flowers — the beautiful flowers that you had sent — with a personally signed card. I was really moved by your meticulous care, and especially my wife was moved. In particular, I have two accounts on which I would like to express my gratitude to the United States. First, recently, there was a big forest fire in Korea, in the province of Gangwon. At the time, the USFK supported us through the provision of many helicopters, and this really helped us put out the fire. … MOON: (As interpreted.) And after you had met Chairman Kim in Singapore on June 12th, last year, we have witnessed a dramatic turnaround regarding the political situation on the Korean Peninsula. Previously, because of the repeated nuclear and missile test from North Korea, we saw that the military tension at the time had been at its greatest, and we were in a very precarious situation. However, since you met Chairman Kim and you initiated personal diplomacy with him, we saw the dramatic, significant reduction of military tension on the Korean Peninsula, and now peace has prevailed. And also, in terms of North Korean nuclear problem, all Korean people have now — now we believe that you will be able to solve this problem through a dialogue. So I have to say that this dramatic turnaround that we have witnessed is solely down to your strong leadership. TRUMP: Thank you very much. MOON: (As interpreted.) Well, in this sense, I believe that the Hanoi Summit is not actually — was not a source of disappointment, but it is actually the part of a bigger process that will lead us to a bigger agreement. So the important task that I face right now is to maintain the momentum of dialogue and also express the positive outlook, regarding the third U.S.-North Korea Summit, to the international community that this will be held in the near future. So, in this regard, I’d like to express my high regard for how you have continued to express your trust towards Chairman Kim. And also, you have made sure that North Korea does not deviate from the dialogue track. I would like to express my gratitude for this. And let me reiterate that the Republic of Korea is absolutely on the same page when it comes to the end state of the complete denuclearization of North Korea. And I can reassure you that we will remain in such great collaboration with the United States. There will be no daylight until we achieve our ultimate goal. TRUMP: Thank you very much. I have to go just one step further and I want to thank China, who’s really helped us a lot at the border. I also want to thank Russia because they have helped us, and they’ve helped us quite a bit more than people think, at the border. So both China and Russia have really been quite good. That doesn’t mean they can’t get better, but they’ve been quite good at the border. And I just want to thank both of those countries. As we’ve said, a lot of progress has been made. We will have further dialogue and I look forward to it. My relationship with Kim Jong Un has been a very strong relationship. I’ve had some very strong relationships with others, but I have a very, very good relationship with Kim Jong Un, and I think you see that. And we’ll see what happens. Hopefully, it will end up in a great solution for everybody, and ultimately a great solution for the world. Because it is about the world. It’s more than just this area. It’s about the world. And, frankly, the world is watching. I want to thank you for your leadership. Your leadership has been outstanding. And I look forward to talking about other things also, and in particular, all of that equipment that you’re buying. We like that in the United States. We like that you buy our great equipment. So again, thank you very much. And thank you for your leadership. Q Mr. President, on economic projects for South Korea and North Korea, are you willing to allow some leeway in relaxing sanctions so that South Korea can pursue some more economic projects with North Korea? TRUMP: Well, we are discussing certain humanitarian things right now, and I’m okay with that, to be honest. I think you have to be okay with that. And South Korea is doing certain things to help out with food and various other things for North Korea. And we’ll be discussing different things inside. Again, the relationship is a much different relationship than it was two years ago — you remember what that was all about — and certainly during the Obama administration, where nuclear weapons were being tested often, where rockets and missiles were being sent up, in many cases, over Japan. And we are in a much different situation right now. So we’ll be discussing that very much, actually. … Q Mr. President, do you have the third summit with North Korea’s Chairman in mind? And does that also include — TRUMP: It could happen. A third summit could happen. And it’s step by step. It’s not a fast process; I’ve never said it would be. It’s step by step. I enjoy the summits. I enjoy being with the Chairman. I think it’s been very productive. And it really is — it’s a step by step. It’s not going to go fast. I’ve been telling you that for a long time. If it goes fast, it’s not going to be the proper deal. Q Is a three-way summit with the leaders of the two Koreas also (inaudible)? TRUMP: Well, that could happen also. I think that would be largely dependent on Chairman Kim, because President Moon will do what’s necessary. I know President Moon has been fighting this battle for a long time. He’s done an excellent job. I consider him a great ally. And a lot of good things are happening. A lot of good things are happening in the world. Our economy is the best it’s ever been. Our employment numbers — unemployment and employment — are the best they’ve ever been. We have more people working right now in the United States than we’ve ever had before — almost 160 million people. And likewise, South Korea is doing very well. Their economy is doing very well, and I think our trade deal has helped that process. So, we’re sitting on two great countries right now, and we’re leading two great countries. And we think that — I can speak for myself, and I think I can speak for President Moon: We think that North Korea has tremendous potential and, really, potential under the leadership of Kim Jong Un. Let’s see how it all works out. Q Mr. President, have you communicated with Kim Jong Un in the last few weeks since you told us — TRUMP: I don’t want to comment on that. But we have a very good relationship. … Q Yes. Shared defense cost with South Korea — are you thinking a long-term agreement instead of year by year? TRUMP: No, we’re talking about long term, and we always talk about long term. We want to have long term. Our relationship South Korea is extraordinary, and we only think in terms of long term with South Korea. Okay? Q (As interpreted.) How much do you support my President’s push for economic concessions, which include the resumption of the joint inter-Korean industrial complex and perhaps even the (inaudible)? TRUMP: Well, at the right time, I would have great support. This isn’t the right time. But at the right time, I’d have great support with North Korea. Great support. I think that South Korea, and I think Japan, and I think that the U.S. — I think a lot of countries will be helping. China, I really believe, will help. I think that Russia will help. I think a lot of countries will help. When the right deal is made, and when the nuclear weapons are gone, I just think that North Korea has potential as great as anything I’ve ever seen in terms of potential. They have an unbelievable location — surrounded by sea on two sides, and on the other side, Russia, China, and over here, South Korea. You just can’t do better than that. And they have magnificent land. It has tremendous potential. Q (As interpreted.) If North Korea actually submits a roadmap regarding complete denuclearization, are you two — are the two Presidents — will you be discussing this issue at the summit meeting today? TRUMP: Yes, we will. We will be discussing it, certainly. That’s a very prime topic for our meeting today. And we hope that’s going to happen. Q Is your position still that sanctions should stay in place on North Korea until there is denuclearization? Or are you willing to consider easing sanctions to keep the talks going? TRUMP: No, we want sanctions to remain in place. And frankly, I had the option of significantly increasing them. I didn’t want to do that because of my relationship with Kim Jong Un. I did not want to do that. I didn’t think it was necessary. As you know, a couple of weeks ago, I held it back. But I think that sanctions are, right now, at a level that’s a fair level. And I really believe something very significant is going to happen. We could always increase them, but I didn’t want to do that at this time. Q Mr. President, would you accept smaller deals to “keep the process going,” as President Moon called it? TRUMP: I’d have to see what the deal is. There are various smaller deals that maybe could happen. Things could happen. You can work out, step by step, pieces. But, at this moment, we’re talking about the big deal. The big deal is we have to get rid of the nuclear weapons.” (White House Press Office, Remarks by President Trump and President Moon Jae-in before Bilateral Meeting,” April 11, 2019)
In one of the biggest leadership shake-ups in years, North Korea named a new nominal head of state and a new premier, and gave leader Kim Jong Un a new title, state media reported on Friday, moves analysts said solidify Kim’s grip on power. In an expected move, Kim Jong Un was re-elected as chairman of the State Affairs Commission at a session of North Korea’s rubber-stamp legislature that took place today, KCNA said. For the first time, however, state media referred to Kim as “supreme representative of all the Korean people.” That title was approved by special decree in February, according to the Associated Press, but has not been used publicly until now. It’s unclear whether the changes will be codified in the constitution, but analysts said the shake-up shows Kim has fully come into his own, eight years after he inherited rule from his father, Kim Jong Il. “The transition and power consolidation of the Kim Jong Un regime is complete,” said Michael Madden, a nonresident North Korea leadership expert with the Stimson Center, a Washington-based think tank. “This is probably the largest party-government shake-up in many years,” he said. Choe Ryong Hae was named President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea, replacing Kim Yong Nam. The person holding that position is constitutionally considered North Korea’s head of state and usually represents the country at diplomatic events, though experts say real power remains concentrated in Kim Jong Un’s hands. Kim Yong Nam, who was born in 1928, has been one of the longest serving senior officials, having held the position since it was created for him in 1998, Madden said. His replacement, Choe, was subjected to political “re-education” in the past, but in recent years appeared to be gaining more influence since he was promoted in October 2017 to the party’s powerful Central Military Commission, South Korean intelligence officials previously said. Choe was one of the three officials sanctioned by the United States in December over allegations of rights abuses. Several officials who have played leading roles in negotiations with the United States were also promoted, including Choe Son Hui, who was named first vice foreign minister and a member of the State Affairs Commission. North Korea also replaced the premier of its cabinet, an official at the center of efforts to jumpstart the economy. Pak Pong Ju had served his current post as premier since 2013. According to analysts at NK News, a website that monitors North Korea, Pak helped oversee a process of “radical reform” in the economy that enabled it to survive sanctions. Among those reforms were loosening control of state-run enterprises, allowing them to operate more freely in the market and to seek private investment, according to a 2017 profile of Pak in NK News. Some of those reforms earned the ire of Kim Jong Un’s father, Kim Jong Il, who led North Korea at the time. But the younger Kim has more openly embraced many of those market changes, and North Korea has sought to ease sanctions and attract more private investment. Pak will now serve as a vice chairman of the ruling party, meaning that those economic reforms are still being embraced, said Hong Min, senior researcher of Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul. “It means Pak Pong Ju-nomics, or Pak Pong Ju-style economic reform is continuing,” he said. There is little known about Pak’s replacement, Kim Jae Ryong, who has been serving as a party leader in Jagang Province, a mountainous area home to some munitions factories. The province is known within North Korea, however, for having a spirit of overcoming hardship, which may fit with Kim Jong Un’s message of persevering under sanctions, Hong said. (Joyce Lee and Josh Smith, “Kim Jong Un Consolidates Power as North Korea Shuffles Leadership,” Reuters, April 12, 2019) In the parliamentary meeting, North Korea’s nominal head of state, Kim Yong-nam, was replaced by Choe Ryong-hae. The 91-year-old Kim had served as president of the Presidium of the SPA since 1998. Choe, known as No. 2 and a close aide to leader Kim, will also take the post of first vice chairman of the SAC, apparently bolstering his influence on the country’s diplomacy. Under his wing come top nuclear negotiator Kim Yong-chol and others involved in February’s summit with the U.S., who were elected as members of the SAC. Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui has been promoted to first vice foreign minister, signaling she will have greater clout in diplomacy with the U.S. going forward despite the breakdown of February’s summit between leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump. Choe was also elected as a member of the State Affairs Commission (SAC) and the SPA’s foreign affairs commission. She is believed to have replaced Kim Gye Gwan as first vice foreign minister. Kim, a 76-year-old veteran diplomat involved in negotiations with the U.S., was excluded from the list of the parliamentary foreign affairs commission, spawning speculation that he might retire from work due to age and health issues. Experts see the North’s latest personnel reshuffle as focusing on strengthening the lineup of its nuclear negotiating team in preparations for future talks with Washington on its nuclear weapons program. “This appears to reflect leader Kim’s intention to actively pursue negotiations with the U.S. aimed at easing sanctions going forward,” Cheong Seong-chang, vice president at the Sejong Institute think tank, said. (Koh Byung-joon, “N.K. Leader Re-Elected as Chairman of State Affairs Council,” Yonhap, April 12, 2019)
4/12/19:
KCNA: “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un made a policy speech “On Socialist Construction and the Internal and External Policies of the Government of the Republic at the Present Stage” at the First Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Friday. … In fear of the security of its own land in the face of the rapid development of the nuclear armed forces of the DPRK, the U.S. floated the idea of improved relations and peace at the negotiations and on the other hand, made desperate efforts to create the conditions for forcing the DPRK to drop arms and toppling its social system after making it run off its way through persistent application of economic sanctions. Now that the U.S. describes its demands running counter to the fundamental interests of our country as conditions for the lift of sanctions, the stand-off with the U.S. will naturally assume the protracted nature and sanctions by the hostile forces will also continue. Sanctions come to be a last resort for those forces finding it hard to bring down the DPRK by force, but constitute an intolerable challenge to the DPRK that can never be overlooked but must be weathered and foiled. As the protracted nuclear threats were done away with nuclear weapons, it is necessary to sweep away the whirlwind of sanctions by the hostile forces with the hot wind of self-supporting and self-reliance. The strategic policy maintained by our party and the DPRK government in socialist economic construction is to put the national economy on a Juche, modern, IT and scientific basis. The independent and Juche character of the national economy have to be augmented in every way. We have to definitely turn the country’s economy into knowledge-based economy through an active drive for putting it on a modern and IT basis. It is required to develop local economy and activate external economic affairs. The economy of the country has to be carried out under the unified control, strategic operation and command of the state. Talents and science and technology serve as key engines for the development of self-supporting economy. The political and military might of the country has to be further increased. The DPRK government should train all the members of society to be genuine Kimilsungists-Kimjongilists and further consolidate the politico-ideological unity and cohesion of the country by giving definite precedence to the political and ideological work as required by the intrinsic nature of the socialist society. It has to perfect the legal system of the country and strengthen the role of laws in the state activities and social life. Self-reliant national defense capabilities constitute a powerful treasured sword for defending the sovereignty of the country. The climate of peace that began settling in the Korean peninsula is not durable and the hostile forces’ attempt at invasion of the DPRK has not gone. We have to always keep in mind that peace can be ensured only by powerful military capabilities, and firmly maintain the principle of self-defense and keep increasing the defense capabilities of the country. … Noting that our historic struggle for the reunification of the country, the long-cherished desire of the nation, has now entered a new phase, he continued: The three historic north-south summit meetings and talks and the adoption of north-south declarations last year meant a great event of exceptionally huge significance that turned back the serious situation from inching close to a war and declared the start of a new journey toward national reunification. Now the entire nation ardently hopes that the historic Panmunjom Declaration and the September Pyongyang Joint Declaration would be thoroughly implemented to lead to the continued peaceful atmosphere on the Korean peninsula and the steady improvement of the north-south ties. However, the conservative forces of south Korea are responding to the desire of the nation and the unanimous expectation of the international community with untrustworthy words and acts and making desperate struggle to turn the north-south ties back to those in the period before the publication of the Panmunjom Declaration. The U.S. is openly forcing the south Korean authorities to “control speed” and moving in every way to subordinate the implementation of the north-south agreement to its policy of sanctions and pressure on the DPRK. Because of this, we now face a serious situation of whether to defuse tension and keep maintaining the atmosphere of improving the north-south ties or to go back to the past when the ties plunged into a catastrophe with the danger of a war increasing. I make it clear once again that it is my unwavering determination, as clarified before, to turn the north-south ties into those of durable and lasting reconciliation and cooperation by holding hands with the south Korean authorities and to write a new history of the nation, peaceful and co-prosperous, as wished by all the fellow countrymen. In order to give further momentum to the good atmosphere of improved relations which the north and the south provided with much efforts after putting inglorious situation under control and to lead them to the meaningful result of peace and reunification, we have to put an end to the nature of sycophancy tarnishing the spirit of independence and the policy of relying on outsiders damaging the interests common to the nation, and subordinate everything to the improvement of the north-south ties. I think that the south Korean authorities should come back to their stand at the time of the Panmunjom meeting and the September Pyongyang meeting and fulfill their responsibility before the nation through the sincere implementation of the north-south declarations if they truly wish for the improved north-south ties and peace and reunification. The south Korean authorities should not act an officious “mediator” and “booster” that adopt a vacillating stand depending on the trend and engage themselves in an array of visits, but be a party advocating the interests of the nation with its own spirit and voice, being part of the nation. It is our consistent stand that in order to give further momentum to the atmosphere of improving the north-south ties, it is prerequisite to foil the moves of hostile forces against reunification and peace at home and abroad. It is important to understand before it becomes too late that it will be hard to expect any progress in the north-south ties and any result of peace and prosperity as long as the war-like south Korean military forces are left intact in their disguised persistent hostile acts including the resumption of the joint military exercises with the U.S. in other codenames, though they were agreed to be stopped, and unless a fundamental liquidation is put to the anachronistic arrogance and hostile policy of the U.S. which creates a deliberate hurdle in the improvement of ties while coming forward with unilateral gangster-like demands. All the Koreans in the north and the south and abroad have to resolutely foil the moves of the U.S. and the south Korean conservative forces challenging the historical trend toward the improvement of the north-south ties and peace and reunification, for the sake of the destiny and future of the nation. If the south Korean authorities have a true intent to head for the improvement of the north-south ties and peace and reunification, they have to sympathize with our stand and will and keep pace with them and take a bold decision proving their sincerity in practical acts, not in words. The Singapore DPRK-U.S. summit and talks that were held in June last year for the first time in history in the limelight of the world served as an eventful occasion that instilled the hope of settlement of peace on the Korean peninsula where the exchanges of fire had been observed, and the June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement commanded full support and approval by the international community desirous of peace as it marked a historic declaration that communicated to the world that the two countries DPRK and U.S. would write a new history of relations. The DPRK took the first step of confidence-building, a key to defusing the hostile relations between the DPRK and the U.S. through crucial and meaningful measures like a moratorium on the nuclear test and test-fire of ICBM, and demonstrated its will to sincerely follow through on the June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement, a landmark in establishing the new DPRK-U.S. relations through such a bold measure of facilitating the repatriation of the remains of GIs as requested by the U.S. president. But the second DPRK-U.S. summit in Hanoi in February became an occasion which aroused a strong question if we were right in taking the steps with strategic decision and bold resolution, and evoked vigilance as to the U.S. true willingness to improve its relations with the DPRK. At the second DPRK-U.S. summit, we expressed our decision to take more prudent and trustworthy measures after setting stages and courses indispensable for the implementation of the June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement and expected a response from the U.S. to it. But the U.S. came to the talks, only racking its brains to find ways that are absolutely impracticable. In a word, the U.S. did not ready itself to sit face to face with us and settle the problem nor had a clear direction and methodology. If it keeps thinking that way, it will never be able to move the DPRK even a knuckle nor gain any interests no matter how many times it may sit for talks with the DPRK. There are now open hostile moves running counter to the June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement, as exemplified by the U.S. recent test simulating the interception of ICBM from the DPRK and the resumption of the military exercises whose suspension was directly committed to by the U.S. president. These seriously rattle us. As wind is bound to bring waves, the U.S. open hostile policy toward the DPRK will naturally bring our corresponding acts. Now the U.S. is strongly suggesting its thinking of holding the 3rd DPRK-U.S. summit talks and the settlement of the issue through dialogue. Yet, it is still shunning the withdrawal of its hostile policy, the fundamental way of establishing the new DPRK-U.S. relations, and miscalculating that it can bring us to our knees if it puts maximum pressure on us. Of course we also attach importance to the settlement of the issue through dialogue and negotiations, but American-style way of dialogue to impose its unilateral demand upon the dialogue partner does not suit our constitution and we have no interest in it. The U.S. is further escalating the hostility to us with each passing day despite its suggestion for settling the issue through dialogue. It is as foolish and dangerous an act as trying to put out fire with oil. Given the existence of deep-rooted hostility between the DPRK and the U.S., in order to implement the June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement it is necessary for both sides not to table their unilateral demands but find out a constructive solution to meeting each other’s interests. To this end, it is essential for the U.S. to quit its current calculation method and approach us with new one. The U.S. is now talking a lot about the 3rd DPRK-U.S. summit meeting, but the resumption of such summit as the Hanoi summit is not inviting to us nor [do] we have an intent. But as President Trump keeps saying, the personal ties between me and him are not hostile like the relations between the two countries and we still maintain good relations, as to be able to exchange letters asking about health anytime if we want. If the U.S. adopts a correct posture and comes forward for the third DPRK-U.S. summit with a certain methodology that can be shared with us, we can think of holding one more talks. However, what I feel now is if there will be any need to keep an attachment to the summit with the U.S. just because of the issue of sanctions relief. Anyway, we will wait for a bold decision from the U.S. with patience till the end of this year but I think it will definitely be difficult to get such a good opportunity as the previous summit. Only when there provided written content favorable for the interests of both sides and acceptable to each other, I will sign the agreement without reserve and this depends on in what position and with what calculation method the U.S. would come forward. What is clear is that if the U.S. persists in its present political calculation method, the prospect of settling the issues will be gloomy and very dangerous. I anticipate that the U.S. would make a wise decision at the crucial moment today and hope that the second hand of the confrontation between the DPRK and the U.S. brought to a stop with much effort will not run again forever, he said. He emphasized that the DPRK government would develop friendly and cooperative relations with all the countries that respect the DPRK’s sovereignty and are friendly to it and join hands with the world peace-loving forces in order to establish a lasting and durable peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula. He called for making a general advance to successfully accomplish the cause of building a powerful socialist country in close unity around the Party and the government of the Republic under the uplifted banner of great Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at First Session of 14th SPA,” April 13, 2019)
4/15/19:
President Moon Jae-in of South Korea said that he wanted to meet again with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, making the overture three days after Kim dismissed Moon’s mediating efforts between the North and the United States as “officious.” “Now is the time to begin the preparations in earnest for an inter-Korean summit,” Moon said. “As soon as the North becomes ready, I hope the two Koreas will be able to sit down together, regardless of venue and form, and hold detailed and substantive talks on how to achieve further progress that goes beyond the previous two summits between Chairman Kim and President Trump.” Moon has repeatedly argued that a nuclear disarmament deal is possible, insisting that Kim is willing to give up his weapons and focus on economic growth should Washington provide the right incentives. Trump said that while he was willing to meet with Kim for a third time, he was in no hurry. United States officials hope that the tightening vise of international sanctions will eventually force North Korea back to the negotiating table with a more palatable offer. “It’s not going to go fast,” Mr. Trump said. “If it goes fast, it’s not going to be the proper deal.” On April 12,speaking to his country’s rubber-stamp parliament, Kim ridiculed Moon’s efforts. He said South Korea should abandon its “sycophancy” toward the United States and “subordinate everything to the improvement of North-South ties.” Kim added, “The South Korean authorities should not act as officious ‘mediators’ and ‘boosters’ that adopt a vacillating stand depending on the trend and engage themselves in an array of visits, but be a party advocating the interests of the nation with its own spirit and voice, being part of the nation.” Moon did not respond to Mr. Kim’s characterization of his efforts as “officious.” Instead, he put a positive spin on Mr. Kim’s speech, in which the North Korean leader also expressed his “unwavering determination, as clarified before, to turn North-South ties into those of durable and lasting reconciliation and cooperation.” Moon expressed “high regard for Chairman Kim’s unwavering commitment” in considering a third summit meeting with Trump. He even interpreted Kim’s speech as declaring “his firm commitment toward achieving denuclearization,” although Kim did not use the word “denuclearization” in his address. Moon said keeping dialogue open and building peace on the Korean Peninsula was “a matter of survival” for South Koreans, and he defended his diplomatic role. “As the architect of the peace process on the Korean Peninsula, we have done what we have to and what we can do in a way that befits our status as the master of the fate on the Korean Peninsula,” he said. “My government will not shrink from this responsibility.” Moon also benefited from North Korea’s decision not to stage a military parade on Monday to mark the birthday of Kim Il-sung, Mr. Kim’s late grandfather and the founder of North Korea. But with inter-Korean economic projects still frozen, Kim may see little incentive to meet with Mr. Moon anytime soon. “It is not clear if what South Korea can offer under the sanctions regime is enough to entice North Korea back to talks,” said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Ewha Woman’s University in Seoul. (Choe Sang-hun, “Seeking Another Summit, Even After a Snub,” New York Times, April 16, 2019, p. A-8)
4/16/19:
Activity has been detected at North Korea’s main nuclear site, suggesting Pyongyang may be reprocessing radioactive material into bomb fuel since the collapse of a summit with Washington, a US monitor said today. The Center for Strategic and International Studies said satellite imagery of the Yongbyon nuclear site on April 12 showed five railcars near its uranium enrichment facility and radiochemistry laboratory. “In the past these specialized railcars appear to have been associated with the movement of radioactive material or reprocessing campaigns,” the Washington-based monitor said. “The current activity, along with their configurations, does not rule out their possible involvement in such activity, either before or after a reprocessing campaign.” (AFP, “Activity Detected at North Korea Nuclear Site: U.S. Monitor,” April 16, 2019)
4/17/19:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the Armed Forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, supervised and guided a test-fire of a new-type tactical guided weapon conducted by the Academy of Defense Science on Wednesday. Looking round the new-type tactical guided weapon, Kim Jong Un was told by officials concerned of the Academy of Defense Science about the formation of the weapon system and its operation mode. Saying that the completion of the development of the weapon system serves as an event of very weighty significance in increasing the combat power of the People’s Army, he noted that it is a very good thing that the field of national defense science has waged a dynamic struggle for attaining core research goals set forth by the Party at the 8th Conference of Munitions Industry and thus conducted brisk activities for developing our own style weapon system which embodies four elements. He mounted an observation post to learn about a plan of the test-fire of the new-type tactical guided weapon and guided the test-fire. The design indexes of the tactical guided weapon whose advantages are appreciated for the peculiar mode of guiding flight and the load of a powerful warhead were perfectly verified at the test-fire conducted in various modes of firing at different targets. After watching the power of the new-type tactical guided weapon, he pointed out that our national defense scientists and workers in the field of the munitions industry performed another great work in increasing the country’s defense capabilities, saying with pride that he had always been struck with admiration at them in the period of developing strategic weapon and our scientists, technicians and workers are, indeed, great and there is no weapon impossible to make when they are determined to do. He set the phased and strategic goals for keeping munitions production going on and putting national defense science and technology on cutting edge level and indicated detailed tasks and ways to attain them. He was accompanied by Kim Phyong Hae, O Su Yong, Jo Yong Won, Ri Pyong Chol, Kim Jong Sik and other senior officials of the Party Central Committee and commanding officers of the Korean People’s Army including Kim Su Gil, Ri Yong Gil, No Kwang Chol, Pak Jong Chon and Pak Kwang Ju. (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of New-Type Tactical Weapon,” April 18, 2019)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversaw the testing of a new tactical guided weapon, state media said on April 18, the North’s first public weapons test since a second summit with the United States ended without agreement in February. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) did not describe exactly what weapon was tested, including whether it was a missile or another type of weapon. “Tactical” implies a short-range weapon rather than the long-range ballistic missiles that have been seen as a threat to the United States. Kim Dong-yub, a military expert at Kyungnam University’s Institute of Far Eastern Studies in Seoul, said the description that the test was “conducted in various modes of firing at different targets” likely meant that it could be launched from the ground, sea and air. “It’s highly likely that it’s a short-range cruise missile that can be transformed into a surface, an air-to-surface, an air-to-ship, a ship-to-ship, as well as a surface-to-surface cruise missile,” Kim Dong-yub said. Kim Jong Un also oversaw the test of an unidentified tactical weapon in November that could protect North Korea like a “steel wall”, according to state media. It was not clear whether it was the same weapon tested this week. Experts said in November it was part of Kim’s initiative to shift the mainstay of the North’s conventional military power from a nearly 1.3 million-strong army to high-tech weapons. Kim Jong Un said in April 2018 North Korea would stop nuclear tests and launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) because Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities had been “verified”. “This does serve as a useful reminder of one critical fact: Chairman Kim Jong Un never promised to stop testing all weapons in his military arsenal, just nuclear weapons and ICBMs that have the potential to hit the U.S. homeland,” said Harry Kazianis of the Washington-based Center for the National Interest. A U.S. official said that, according initial information, U.S. Northern Command and Strategic Command did not detect a missile launch from North Korea. Further checks were underway, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. A White House official said: “We are aware of the report and have no further comment.” Spokesman Army Lieutenant Colonel Dave Eastburn said the Pentagon was also aware of the report. There was no immediate response to a request for comment from the U.S. State Department. Kim Jong Un’s visit to the tactical weapon testing site came after he visited the North Korean Air and Anti-aircraft Force on Tuesday, according to KCNA, where he inspected a flight drill and expressed “great satisfaction” at their combat readiness. Kyungnam University’s Kim Dong-yub said the latest test appeared to be a message to the United States that North Korea would not bow to sanctions and go its own way. “That’s part of it, but it’s also an internal message to the North Korean people and to the military” to instill trust in their own security by reinforcing conventional weapons, Kim Dong-yub said. (Reuters, “North Korean Media: Kim Oversees New Tactical Weapons Test,” April 18, 2019)
4/18/19:
KCNA: “Kwon Jong Gun, director general of the Department of American Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, gave the following answer to a question raised by the KCNA {today] as regards the fact that Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of the State, is letting loose reckless remarks and sophism of all kinds against us every day: In his historic policy speech at the First Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly, Comrade Kim Jong Un, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, has clarified the principled stand on the DPRK-U.S. relations and settlement of the nuclear issue and said he would wait in patience till the end of this year to see whether the United States makes a courageous decision or not. Everyone has a clear interpretation of his speech which says that the U.S. should change its way of calculation and come up with responsive measures before the end of this year. Just at this time, only Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of the State, is talking nonsense that its meaning is to finish the working level negotiation between the DPRK and the U.S. by the end of the year, which subjects him to public ridicule. We cannot be aware of Pompeo’s ulterior motive behind his self-indulgence in reckless remarks; whether he is indeed unable to understand words properly or just pretending on purpose. However, it is a very dangerous situation if he really did not grasp the meaning. If his behavior is intended, I think it is none other than silly calculation to be free from the constraint that the U.S. should make a move until the end of the year, misrepresenting the meaning of our requirement as the finalization of the working level negotiation by the end of the year by help of his talented skill of fabricating stories like a fiction writer. As our Chairman of the State Affairs Commission has clarified, the U.S. cannot move us one iota by its current way of thinking. In his previous visits to Pyongyang, Pompeo was granted audiences with our Chairman of the State Affairs Commission for several times and pleaded for the denuclearization. However, after sitting the other way round, he spouted reckless remarks hurting the dignity of our supreme leadership at Congress hearings last week to unveil his mean character by himself, thus stunning the reasonable people. I would like to take this opportunity to make clear once again to Pompeo the meaning of the stand towards the U.S. clarified by our Comrade Chairman of the State Affairs Commission in his policy speech. The meaning is that the U.S. should get rid of the root cause that pushed us into a nuclear state and obstacles on the way to denuclearization by its own hands; otherwise no one can predict how the situation on the Korean peninsula will turn out. While Pompeo is fabricating stories after his own taste and trying to raise his publicity stunt at the sacrifice of the DPRK-U.S. relations as a whole, it is fortunate that the personal relationship between our Chairman of the State Affairs Commission and President Trump is on good terms as usual and our Chairman is pleased to get on well with President Trump. Hanoi summit gives us a lesson that whenever Pompeo pokes his nose in, the talks go wrong without any results even from the point close to success. I am afraid that, if Pompeo engages in the talks again, the table will be lousy once again and the talks will become entangled. Therefore, even in the case of possible resumption of the dialogue with the U.S., I wish our dialogue counterpart would be not Pompeo but other person who is more careful and mature in communicating with us.” (KCNA, “U.S. Secretary of State Slammed,” April 18, 2019)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will visit Russia later this month, the Kremlin said Thursday, in a meeting that offers President Vladimir Putin an opportunity to emerge as a broker in the long-running nuclear standoff and raise Russia’s profile in regional affairs. The Kremlin said in a brief statement that Kim will visit Russia “in the second half of April” on Putin’s invitation, but gave no further details. (Vladimir Isachenkov, “Kremlin Says Kim Jong Un Will Visit Russia This Month,” Associated Press, April 18, 2018)
4/19/19:
2+2: “FOREIGN MINISTER KONO: (Via interpreter) Today’s 2+2 was held at an extremely critical timing for deciding the future direction of diplomacy and defense of Japan and U.S. … Against this background, by next week Prime Minister Abe will visit U.S. and next month President Trump is expected to come to Japan as the first state guest after the accession to the throne of our new emperor. … DEFENSE MINISTER IWAYA: (Via interpreter) … Regarding the North Korean issue, we agreed to work towards complete, verifiable, and irreversible abolishment of all of weapon of mass destruction and all ballistic missiles of all range. Japan and U.S. will be the linchpin in the effort to fully implement the UN Security Council resolution, including measures against ship-to-ship transfer and work with other nations. … MS ORTAGUS: Okay, we’re going to start with questions. Shaun from AFP. Q: Hi, thank you. Secretary Pompeo, the other day North Korean state media had some rather choice words about you. I presume you’ve seen them. I can repeat them if you want to, but I want to see your reaction to that. Do you think — what do you think was the motivation behind them? And as far as their demand itself, would you actually be willing to step aside for the negotiations if North Korea prefers that or wants to deal with President Trump directly only? And if I can ask a similar question on North Korea to Minister Kono, asking about the — you mentioned about the abduction issue, and looking at the results of the Hanoi summit, how optimistic are you right now for the future of an agreement between Japan and North Korea specifically? … POMPEO: So, yes, first question to me. Nothing’s changed. We’re continuing to work to negotiate. I’m still in charge of the team. President Trump’s obviously in charge of the overall effort, but it will be my team and Special Representative Biegun will continue to lead the U.S. efforts to achieve what Chairman Kim committed to do back in June of last year, which was to denuclearize. As I’ve said before, he’s made that commitment to President Trump multiple times. He’s made it to me personally half a dozen times, and I’m convinced we still have a real opportunity to achieve that outcome, and our diplomatic team will continue to remain in the lead. KONO: (Via interpreter) President Trump has raised this abduction issue vis-a-vis Kim Jong-un at Hanoi. Well, this is an issue between Japan and North Korea, so eventually the prime minister, if there’s a chance, will see Kim Jong-un and talk about these issues. Japan is ready to normalize the relationship with North Korea when this missile, nuclear, and abduction issues are taken care of, and our position has not been changed. So at this moment, there is no set schedule for the summit meeting between Japan and North Korea, but we will continue to work with — on this issue with the United States. … MS SHINO: (Via interpreter) Mr. Niwa from Kyodo. Q: (Via interpreter) Thank you. Niwa of Kyodo News. Minister Kono and Secretary Kono, my question is about North Korea. In addition to criticizing Secretary Pompeo, Chairman Kim is reported to have observed the launch test of a new tactic: a guided weapon. Do you take it as provocation? And nuclear missile abandonment to ask North Korea — is it necessary to further strengthen the sanctions? Plus, Secretary Pompeo, in Japan the most important issue is the abduction of national — Japanese nationals. In Vietnam, in the Hanoi summit, President Trump did raise the matter to Chairman Kim, but what was the reaction of Kim Jong-un? Prime Minister Abe and Kim Jong-un — Kim Jong-un is interested in direct communication? KONO: The United States and Japan have agreed that we need to implement Security Council resolution until North Korea CVID all the weapons of mass destruction and the missile of all ranges. And we agree that we need to take care of the issue of ships-to-ship transfer, and we need to work with the other partner countries to prevent this ships-to-ship transfer. I will not comment on so-called the new weapons of North Korea, but unless they take concrete steps towards the CVID of nuclear weapons and missiles, there are going to be no bright future for North Korea. Thank you. SECRETARY POMPEO: So I’d actually — I want to comment on the question you asked Foreign Minister Kono. We agree with that, that the mission set remains the same. The United States and Japan are deeply connected, and we’ve talked about that. South Koreans as well. The mission set to denuclearize North Korea, nothing has changed, nothing that’s changed from Singapore to Hanoi, or Hanoi to now. That is, we’ve made progress, but our mission set has not changed a single bit. With respect to the issue that President Trump raised, he not only raised it with Chairman Kim, he’s raised it in every conversation that we’ve had. We know the importance of this to Japan; it is — therefore it’s important to us as well. I don’t want to talk about the response that was given, but suffice to say I think he was aware of this issue before it was raised. He acknowledged the issue, and you should know that the United States will continue to raise this issue each time we have a conversation. MS ORTAGUS: Rich Edson, Fox News. Q: Thank you very much. Mr. Secretary, you just commented that the United States, the world will continue enforcing sanctions against North Korea. Chairman Kim has repeatedly and publicly demanded that there be some sanctions relief ahead of full denuclearization. Do you think this process can continue to move forward absent the U.S. or the West giving some sanctions relief to North Korea? And also, the Russian Government has just commented that it’s not possible that Russia interferes in the affairs of other states. Your response to that? And will you discuss the findings of the special counsel’s report with the Russian Government? Thank you. Oh, and also to Mr. Foreign Minister: Would Japan rule out a relaxation of sanctions ahead of full denuclearization? Thank you. POMPEO: Yes. Your — to your first question. … KONO: Let me reiterate that our international community need to fully implement Security Council resolutions until North Korea CVID weapons of all — all the weapons of mass destruction and all their missile — no change at all.” (DoS, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, Remarks With Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono, and Japanese Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya at a Joint Press Availability for the U.S.-Japan 2+2 Ministerial, Ben Franklin Room, Washington, April 19, 2019)
U.S. authorities have made the first arrest related to the mysterious raid of North Korea’s Embassy in Spain in which masked assailants tied up staff, stole computers and fled to the United States, according to two people familiar with the matter. Yesterday, federal authorities arrested Christopher Ahn, a former U.S. Marine and a member of Free Joseon, a group dedicated to the overthrow of North Korea’s Kim Dynasty. He appeared in a federal-district court in Los Angeles today where his attorney requested that the case be sealed. The court ruled in the attorney’s favor over the government’s objections, a Justice Department spokesman said. Separately, federal agents raided the apartment of Adrian Hong, the leader of Free Joseon, said people familiar with the incident. A spokesman with the FBI deferred questions on the case to the Justice Department. “We will not comment on this particular matter at this time,” said Nicole Navas Oxman, spokeswoman for the Justice Department. In a statement to the Washington Post, Hong’s lawyer, Lee Wolosky, said he was “dismayed that the U.S. Department of Justice has decided to execute warrants against U.S. persons that derive from criminal complaints filed by the North Korean regime.” “The last US citizen who fell into the custody of the Kim regime returned home maimed from torture and did not survive,” he said, referring to Otto Warmbier, a U.S. college student who was imprisoned in North Korea in 2016 and died shortly after being flown back to the United States in a coma in 2017. We have received no assurances from the US government about the safety and security of the US nationals it is now targeting,” Wolosky said in the statement. The Justice Department spokeswoman noted that “extradition treaties generally provide that an individual who has been extradited to another country to face criminal charges cannot thereafter be extradited to a third country without the consent of the original country.” Ahn, who appeared in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, was involved in the group’s 2017 evacuation of the nephew of Kim Jong Un from Macau when potential threats to his life surfaced, according to Wolosky. (John Hudson, “U.S. Authorities Make First Arrest in Mysterious Raid of North Korea’s Embassy in Spain,” Washington Post, April 19, 2019)
China said leaders from 37 nations and North Korean representatives will attend a summit for its Belt and Road Initiative next week as it hit back at criticism of the massive trade infrastructure project. Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi said at a press briefing, “China’s neighbor North Korea” will be sending a delegation. “This is very normal because it is an economic cooperation initiative … but (no countries) have the right to prevent others from participating,” he said. He did not say whether leader Kim Jong Un, who will meet President Vladimir Putin in Russia this month, would participate. While some see the project as a geopolitical power play, Beijing has insisted that the Belt and Road is open to everybody. “I want to emphasize that this sort of partnership is not a geopolitical tool, but a platform for cooperation,” he added. (AFP, “China Invites North Korea to Belt and Road Summit,” April 19, 2019)
4/20/19:
Choe Son Hui, first vice-minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, “answer to the question raised by KCNA on April 20, in the light of the fact that John Bolton, national security adviser of the White House, gave himself airs with his own remarks on the 3rd round of DPRK-U.S. summit: Bolton, national security adviser of the White House, in an interview with Bloomberg on April 17, showed above himself by saying such a nonsense that the U.S. needs to see a real indication from north Korea that it has made a strategic decision of giving up its nuclear weapons before the 3rd DPRK-U.S. summit and that it should be ready to discuss what President Trump talked on a “Big Deal.” As it was before, we have never expected that adviser Bolton would ever make a reasonable remark. For all that, if he is a White House national security adviser, he should at least have understood about what kinds of substantive communications are made between the top leaders concerning the 3rd round of summit before he had ever opened his mouth. But Bolton’s remarks make me wonder whether they sprang out of incomprehension of the intentions of the top leaders of the DPRK and the U.S. or whether he was just trying to talk with a certain sense of humor for his part, with its own deviation. All things considered, his word has no charm in it and he looks dim-sighted to me. In this remark of Bolton, I can hardly find the tact and logic of the American style so common in American lingo. I warn you that it would do yourself no good if you continue to throw away such remarks devoid of discretion and reason.” (KCNA, “Answer by First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of DPRK,” April 20, 2019)
4/23/19:
A senior North Korean official involved in talks with the United States has been replaced as chief of a key espionage agency handling inter-Korean affairs, an official of the parliamentary intelligence committee said today. Kim Yong-chol, head of the United Front Department, was recently replaced by Jang Kum-chol, according to the official. Kim was one of top negotiators involved in leader Kim’s February summit with President Donald Trump in Hanoi. His absence in leader Kim’s entourage that arrived in Russia’s Far East city of Vladivostok later in the day for a summit with President Vladimir Putin raised speculation over his possible replacement. It is the first time that he has not accompanied the leader on an overseas trip. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Replaces Official Involved in Negotiations with U.S.,” April 23, 2019)
4/24/19:
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s armored train rolled in to the Tsarist-era station in Vladivostok today, where the summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin will take place tomorrow. The talks, only confirmed at the last minute, will be Kim’s first face-to-face meeting with another head of state since negotiations with President Donald Trump in Hanoi collapsed in February. “I hope this visit will be successful and useful,” Kim told Russian television in the border town of Khasan, where women in folk costumes welcomed him with bread and salt in a traditional greeting. “I hope that during the talks … I will be able to have concrete discussions on resolving situations on the Korean Peninsula and on the development of our bilateral relationship,” Kim said. Russian and North Korean flags were flying on lamp posts on Vladivostok’s Russky Island, where the summit is expected to take place at a university campus. The island is connected to the rest of Vladivostok by a bridge built in 2012 that crosses a harbor used for commercial and naval ships. Kim plans to stay on in Vladivostok tomorrow for a series of cultural events, including a ballet and a visit to the city’s aquarium, Russian media reported. The talks follow repeated invitations from Putin since Kim embarked on a series of diplomatic overtures last year. Kremlin foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov told a briefing yesterday: “The focus will be on a political and diplomatic solution to the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula. Russia intends to help consolidate positive trends in every way,” he said, but added that no joint statement or signing of agreements was planned. (Anna Malpas, “North Korea’s Kim in Russia for First Talks with Putin,” AFP, April 24, 2019) Russia has not ruled out changing its previous position and asking that economic sanctions on North Korea be lifted. Wary of a possible Russian turnaround, the State Department sent its envoy for North Korea, Steve Biegun, to Moscow last week to push for the country’s full denuclearization. In response, Russian officials said they would expel North Korean laborers in December when their residence permits expire, potentially limiting a key source of cash revenue for the North, people familiar with the discussions said. (Amie Ferris-Rotman and Simon Denyer, “’In Russia’s Far East, Kim Jong Un and Putin Seek to Send Messages to U.S.,” Washington Post, April 23, 2019)
Sigal: : “It’s not just the economy stupid. Sure, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has promised his people prosperity and sanctions are impeding his country’s economic growth. But pundits who claim that Kim mainly wants sanctions relief are missing a larger point. And so is President Donald Trump when he holds out a vague vision of a brighter economic future for the North Korean people. Kim will not be bribed by a pot of gold at the end of a rainbow. Yet Trump, while asking Kim to “go bigger” and surrender not just his nuclear weapons but all his weapons of mass destruction first, is not even thinking of putting nearly enough sanctions relief on the negotiating table—never mind what Kim really wants. To Kim, like his forebears, sanctions are the embodiment of U.S. enmity. As Kim made clear again in speeches on April 12, he seeks an end to that enmity and he needs to hear directly from Washington—not through Seoul—that America is willing to take steps to reconcile before he resumes talks. Kim’s vision of reconciliation is far-reaching. North Koreans have long been telling their American interlocutors they want an alliance like the one the United States has with South Korea—even including a “nuclear umbrella.” Secretary of State Michael Pompeo may have been reflecting what President Trump heard Kim say in Singapore when he told a Japanese interviewer on June 7, 2018, “We want to achieve a fundamentally different strategic relationship between our two countries.” Yet the administration has yet to put anything like that on the negotiating table. Nor has Pyongyang been willing to discuss in detail all the steps to complete denuclearization. Until the two sides do so, no comprehensive roadmap is possible. Why does North Korea want the United States as an ally? In a word, China. Pyongyang has never trusted its next-door neighbor and now, more than ever, Kim wants to hedge against Beijing’s growing power. Hanoi was a logical locale to underscore this aim in view of Vietnam’s fraught history with China and its postwar reconciliation with the United States. “The success of the Vietnamese economy is due to its decision to normalize relations with the United States in 1995,” Major General Le Van Cuong, former director of the Institute of Strategic Studies at the Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security, told the New York Times. “I would say to our North Korean friends that as long as they have a conflict with the United States, they will not be able to develop their economy properly,” General Cuong said. “China will try every possible tactic to keep North Korea in its arms because it wants a country to control.” He concluded, “Luckily, North Korea has the necessary conditions to escape China’s grip if it deepens its relationship with America.” What better way for Pyongyang to assure its security without nuclear weapons than to ally with Washington? An alliance does have its downsides, however. It is unlikely to gain a favorable reception in Congress, which would have to approve that arrangement. Such a fundamental improvement in relations would mean living with an autocratic and brutal regime. And what of South Korea? The North Koreans have said the United States can have two allies at once. Conservatives in Seoul are unlikely to regard that prospect with equanimity. Nor will Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who until recently opposed negotiations by anyone with North Korea. A reversal of alliances by North Korea, especially if U.S. troops remain as guarantor on the Korean peninsula, would alter the balance of power in Northeast Asia, which is likely to arouse suspicion, if not outright antagonism in Beijing. That would not enhance security for anyone in the region. A better way to accommodate their security concerns might be a comprehensive security approach that would involve all the region’s actors in parallel negotiations leading ultimately to a security partnership with the United States: Begin a three or four-party peace process on the Korean Peninsula with an end-of-war declaration committing to negotiate a peace treaty. Declare non-hostility and move to improve relations. Gradually relax sanctions. Set up a six-party Northeast Asian Security Council. Establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone which would provide a legally binding multilateral way to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. This could also serve as an alternative to an alliance by including a guarantee to the North, once it is verifiably free of nuclear weapons, that it will not be the subject of a U.S. threat or use of nuclear weapons and will be defended against attack by any other nuclear-armed power or ally of such a state. It will take time and patience to convince Pyongyang that Washington is committed to such a fundamental change in their relationship. That will not happen in a year or two. In the meantime, the two sides can each commit to confidence-building measures that move denuclearization and reconciliation part of the way forward. Skeptics are certain that the North will never give up its nuclear weapons, alliance or no alliance. How does anyone know for sure? The only way to find out is to sustain negotiations and test whether progress toward denuclearization can be made through mutual confidence-building. By contrast, going for broke is a sure way for the Trump administration to end up bankrupt.” (Leon V. Sigal, “A U.S. Alliance with North Korea?” The National Interest, April 24, 2019)
4/?/19:
CNS: “ … North Korea’s missile-production complex is estimated to include nearly two dozen sites. Its ICBM program alone hosts at least nine such sites. These facilities are scattered all around the country, and many of them are embedded within civilian structures or are underground complexes. The clandestine nature of this geographic spread highlights the complexity of the verification problem, especially when it comes to a production freeze on only certain types of North Korean missile systems. Such facilities will need to be part of any initial declaration, production freeze, and on-site inspection regime. … North Korea’s solid-fuel program has expanded since 2017 to include a large manufacturing complex at the Chemical Material Institute to produce wound carbon-fiber casings for their newer generation of solid-propellant missiles. Solid-propellant sites are centered around the greater Hamhung area, in contrast to the liquid-propellant program, which is spread across the country and includes a series of large underground production complexes. … To be confident that missiles will perform reliably, a missile program involves a series of steps culminating in flight tests. So far, North Korea has conducted at least 117 flight tests or space launches over the course of its program, using a wide variety of launch sites. Another important step in missile development is the ground testing of liquid-propellant engines (LPEs) or solid rocket motors (SRMs). LPE test stands are vertical, while SRM test stands are typically horizontal. North Korea currently has four known sites for ground testing: three for LPEs—the Sohae Vertical Test Stand (also known as Tongchang-ri or Yunsong), which is North Korea’s largest known vertical test stand; the Tonghae Vertical Test Stand; the Chamjin Vertical Test Stand; and North Korea’s only identified horizontal test stand to date, at Magun-po. Ground testing for ICBM-class LPEs has taken place at Sohae. The Chamjin Vertical Test Stand has also been used for testing at least one reentry vehicle by placing it under an LPE’s exhaust, to simulate the intense heat of re-entry. If a testing freeze were to exclude North Korea’s shorter-range missile systems, eliminating or modifying larger test stands that are capable of supporting the testing of LPEs or SRMs suitable for longer-range missile systems could help ensure that the development of longer-range systems does not continue. The large test stand at Sohae was partially dismantled starting in July 2017, in keeping with an oral, undocumented agreement at the US-North Korea summit in Singapore in June 2018; it has since been reassembled. The metal structure of the test stand was disassembled, leaving its concrete base in place. These changes were detectable in space imagery, making the temporary disassembly an example of a transparency measure verifiable with national technical means (NTM), a concept discussed further below. North Korea has two submersible ballistic-missile testing barges, one at Sinpo and the other at Nampo. The first such barge appeared during 2014 at Sinpo South shipyard; this barge has supported the development of the Pukguksong-1 SLBM. A submarine for this same purpose is also stationed at Sinpo, as is a land-based ejection test stand. Another such land-based test stand at the Kusong Vehicle Proving Ground has been dismantled. The DPRK has numerous missile operating bases. During a crisis or armed conflict, launch vehicles could disperse from these bases to specially prepared tunnels, bunkers, or other locations where they would remain hidden until ordered to return to their base, to move again, or to launch. Launches would take place at pre-surveyed launch sites anywhere in the surrounding area; essentially any firm, flat surface should be adequate. In recent years, ballistic-missile tests and exercises in North Korea have involved launches from paved roads, from airfields or airports, from a ground-vehicle testing facility, and even from small patches of concrete. … Verification of the North Korean missile program (and its WMD program as a whole) would require in-depth knowledge of the facilities, materials, manufacturing capability, personnel, and expertise involved. Such a comprehensive verification system for an entire missile program is almost uncharted territory; the main exception is the international inspections regime in Iraq: the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and its successor, the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). … Based on its intrusive mandate, UNSCOM had access to valuable information, sensing technologies, and aerial vehicles that allowed it to gain incredible insight into the Iraqi missile program; it also received information from foreign intelligence agencies, export manifests from companies that export WMD-related technologies and equipment to Iraq, and access to Iraq scientists to complement its work. … However, there are also many key differences in monitoring Iraq compared to North Korea. First, the North Korean program has grown far larger and more successful than Iraq’s. North Korea has successfully developed medium-, intermediate-, and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, which require a more sophisticated program, more developed facilities, and intensive support and infrastructure. North Korea has successfully established both LPE and SRM research, development, and production infrastructures. Second, unlike UNSCOM or UNMOVIC, any future inspectors in North Korea are not likely to be a forced disarmament or with a mandate for unfettered access to the facilities, personnel, or documentation of North Korea’s missile program. North Korea has long resisted or avoided entering into agreements that allow inspectors to move around freely, preferring to allow inspectors/observers at specific sites of their own choosing at particular times and under particular conditions. For the foreseeable future, any verification regime in North Korea can be expected to operate under strict conditions and a limited mandate. Under UNSCR 687, Iraq was prohibited from producing or having missiles with a range exceeding 150 km, while North Korea is unlikely to voluntarily give up its short- and medium-range systems, which appear to be considered especially important to its national defense requirements. This will constitute a significant challenge for negotiators. In addition, there will be difficulties in distinguishing between missiles that can carry weapons of mass destruction payloads and those that cannot. Except for North Korea’s CRBMs, the KN-02 and KN-SS-X-09, all of North Korea’s missiles appear to be large enough to carry what is believed to be its smallest nuclear warhead, i.e., the spherical device it displayed in its news media in March 2016. … Of the first requirements suggested for a future verification regime is the “knowledge and understanding of activities and related equipment.” This consists of knowledge of past, present, and future plans and requires inspections of facilities and access to detailed information and personnel associated with the program. The data provided by the inspected state must be in the form of formal declarations and will need to be both “site-based” and “project-based.” The role of baseline inspections will be to verify that the data obtained in the field is consistent with declarations made. In that sense, the declarations form a baseline from which inspections and confidence-building measures can start. Another requirement of the verification regime is tracking and identifying imports and exports of sensitive equipment, such as missile parts and their subcomponents. UNSCOM and UNMOVIC had produced a list of missile items deemed too sensitive for importing into or exporting from Iraq. This list included items from the MTCR annex (a list of items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology related to ballistic-missile programs) that should be used to monitor the import and export of sensitive items. … Another important lesson learned from the UNMOVIC experience is that the introduction of “critical points” may be “less intrusive and more efficient.” The idea is similar to material balance areas in nuclear safeguards, which are used to determine the quantity of nuclear material transferred into and out of the area and the physical inventory of nuclear material. In this case, the purpose of critical points are key points in missile programs that can’t be avoided or bypassed and involve technologies, processes, or equipment that are necessary for a successful outcome. Monitoring only critical points can provide the required data for verification purposes “just as effectively as a comprehensive monitoring approach.” Key critical points in a program may be also points where various steps in the process converge or when significant equipment is used at key locations. Critical points differ according to the objectives of the project. For example, for successfully executing the production of a liquid propulsion system, key critical points could include balancing of the turbo-pump rotor assembly, vacuum brazing of crucial engine components, and other steps. The INF verification mechanism combined OSIs and cooperative verification measures with the use of NTM, most notably satellite technology. For example, each party could request a certain number of missile exhibitions or parades per year, one missile facility at a time. Upon request, each party would have to open the roofs of any fixed structures at facilities, remove all missiles and their launchers from concealment, and display them out in the open for an agreed-on number of hours. This permitted satellite verification of the numbers and, to some extent, the type of missiles at each base without making the missile force as a whole vulnerable to pre-emptive attacks. In the North Korean case, if certain longer-range missiles were to be banned, missile parades at missile operating bases would enhance confidence that banned missiles have not been relocated. In addition to these parades, the INF introduced a set of OSIs that were designed to reinforce and enhance the information gained through NTMs and to provide additional evidence of compliance in a setting of mistrust between treaty signatories. The Treaty’s requirement of ten years of OSIs after the last elimination of banned missiles—instead of five years, which became the norm in later arms-control treaties—reflects the air of mistrust in which the INF treaty was negotiated. A memorandum of understanding was appended to the treaty, declaring the numbers and locations of all treaty-related items. These declarations were the baseline numbers against which compliance would be judged through OSIs and NTM. A treaty database was derived from these declarations and updated every six months. The technical specifications of these missiles required verification through baseline inspections before regular treaty inspections could start. The United States and the Soviet Union used their Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers for continuous communications on all treaty information, notifications, declarations, and updates. The communication demands imposed by the treaty were unprecedented for the United States and the Soviet Union, and their success indicates that a similar arrangement can be realistically envisioned for North Korea. Inspections under the INF Treaty, listed below, were also unprecedented in their intrusiveness and can set a baseline for future inspections of North Korean missile and space-launch vehicle testing, production, and storage facilities.
- Baseline inspections verified the location and number of all initially declared items and allowed the comparison of declarations against parties’ own intelligence estimates;
- Elimination inspections verified the complete and irreversible destruction of banned missile and missile launcher types;
- Closeout inspections confirmed that a facility was free of INF systems;
- Short-notice inspections were meant to ensure compliance with the treaty and as a deterrent against cheating. These inspections continued for thirteen years. For the first three years, each party was allowed twenty inspections per year; for the next five years and the final five years of the period involving inspection activities under the treaty, the parties were allowed fifteen and ten inspections per year, respectively. Only upon arrival at a point-of-entry to the inspected (host) country did the inspectors have to declare which site was to be inspected. The inspected party then had nine hours to transport the inspection team to the site, where the inspection could last up to twenty-four hours. Within one hour of the announcement of the inspection, the inspected party had to cease the movement of any treaty-limited items.
- Permanent Production Monitoring of one INF solid-fuel rocket motor production facility on each party’s territory, meant to confirm that production of INF missiles had ceased. The United States stationed up to thirty inspectors by the Votkinsk facility in the Ural Mountains, while the Soviets were permitted to station themselves at a plant in Magna, Utah, though they ultimately chose not to continue implementation of this treaty provision past 2001 for financial reasons. While inspectors could not enter the plants, they could monitor the perimeter and portals continuously, 24/7, for thirteen years. Both parties could stop, weigh, and measure all vehicles or containers leaving the facility that were large and heavy enough to contain an INF system. The United States could operate approved sensors to verify that the container did not hold a system banned under the treaty. The agreed practices at the portal reflected a carefully negotiated balance of considerations. According to a former US inspector at Votkinsk, the United States employed a CargoScan X-ray machine at the portal. The scanner would be allowed to image a single horizontal “slice” of the container, chosen by the Americans. The inspectors made a practice of selecting the point where they expected a permissible type of SRM inside a container to “turn down,” that is, where the sides of the object start curving toward its end; this served as a consistent reference point for measuring the diameter of the SRM in order to confirm its type. The Soviets, in turn, sought to protect sensitive design information by placing a support for the SRM at this point inside the container, obscuring certain details in the scan. Since baseline declarations were the cornerstone of the INF, and, considering the validity of any declarations is bound to be an issue with the DPRK, it is useful to discuss how confident the United States and the Soviet Union were that the other side was not hiding a number of banned INF missiles. In fact, an air of mistrust clouded the INF negotiations in much the same way it has stalled progress in talks with North Korea. It was necessary for each INF state party to continue using the full extent of its NTM, in combination with the other verification measures, to ensure the compliance of the other side beyond a reasonable doubt. … The United States and South Korea have, over several decades, negotiated and periodically updated an agreement on “missile guidelines,” limiting the capabilities of ROK missile forces as a condition of bilateral defense-technology cooperation. Until a recent agreement that removed the limit on payloads, the guidelines allowed Seoul to develop and deploy ballistic missiles with a range of up to 800 km and a payload of up to 500 kg. The first set of guidelines were agreed in 1972 but were not officially endorsed as agreements by both states until 1979; these early guidelines limited South Korea’s missiles to a 180-km range limit and a 500-kg payload maximum on South Korea’s missile arsenal. Significantly for this discussion, in 1995, Washington agreed to increase the missile range to 300 km, matching the export guidelines associated with the MTCR, in exchange for allowing US inspections of missile-development facilities to make sure that South Korea was not secretly working on longer-range missile systems that could contribute to a regional arms race. The agreement included the following limitations:
- US inspections of ROK missile-production facilities;
- Full transparency in South Korea’s provision of information at each step of its missile development and prior to research,
- No ROK research on missile systems with a range greater than 300 km; and
- Disclosure of information on ROK civilian rocket research.
- The absence of tested SRMs [solid rocket motors] in the SRBM, IRBM, and ICBM categories (primarily affects survivability);
Currently, the largest missiles for which North Korea has been able to develop SRM cases are the Pukguksong-1 SLBM and Pukguksong-2 MRBM. North Korea also possesses solid-propellant CRBMs—the KN-02 and KN-SS-X-09—although these missiles do not appear capable of carrying nuclear payloads (because of their small diameters). Preventing North Korea from developing larger-diameter SRM cases would ensure that any North Korean IRBMs and ICBMs remain liquid-fueled, limiting their survivability. Furthermore, although North Korea has exhibited what appeared to be solid-propellant SRBMs in a parade, it is not known to have flight-tested any yet.
- The relatively recent expansion of production facilities for SRMs (affects survivability and BMD penetration);
The renovation of North Korea’s solid-propellant production facilities near Hamhung and the establishment of new production facilities at a nearby R&D center that has developed new SRM case technology are recent developments. The Pukguksong-1 and Pukguksong-2 may not yet have entered full-scale production; if they have, the planned numbers may not yet have been achieved. - The relatively recent development of locally produced mobile launchers for SRBMs and MRBMs (affects BMD penetration);
An armored-vehicle-production facility at Kusong appears to have developed a new family of mobile missile launchers suitable for SRBMs and MRBMs, including the Pukguksong-2, working in conjunction with a production line for large diesel engines established at the January 18 Machine Plant. These new mobile launchers may not yet have entered full-scale production; if they have, the planned numbers may not yet have been achieved.
- The early stage of the ballistic-missile submarine program (affects survivability and BMD penetration);
A single ballistic-missile submarine (SSB) with a single vertical launch tube is present at the Sinpo South Naval Shipyard, where it has been used for SLBM testing. It appears to lack significant operational capabilities, but one or more larger, more capable SSBs may be under production inside the nearby construction halls. - Limited flight-testing for SRBMs with a maneuvering RV (affects BMD penetration);
A single Scud SRBM with a MaRV was flight-tested once in 2017; no other tests of this type of RV have been reported. A joint DPRK-Syrian program to develop this type of RV appears to have been cancelled over a decade ago. - Limited flight-testing for newer types of SLBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs (affects reliability).
Pukguksong-1 SLBMs, Pukguksong-2 MRBMs, Hwasong-12 IRBMs, Hwasong-14 ICBMs, and Hwasong-15 ICBMs all made their initial appearance in recent years, and have only limited flight-test records. In April 2018, North Korea pledged to “suspend” further ICBM flight tests, but has offered no similar assurances about other types of missiles, at least in public. An additional complicating factor is North Korea’s space-launch program. While North Korea has not conducted a space launch since February 2016, it has made no public pledges to discontinue the program. The dual-use character of this technology means the space program could provide opportunities to test LPEs or SRMs suitable for ICBMs, but under civilian cover. … Three main options are discussed below: a freeze on missile testing; a freeze on deployment of new missiles; and a freeze on the production of certain missiles, launchers, and platforms. These options may be considered individually, jointly, or sequentially as negotiations progress. In addition, a further set of options is presented with broader goals in mind. These additional options may play a supporting role in building confidence in a freeze.
A freeze on ballistic-missile flight-testing can be verified with high confidence through NTM. The rocket plume from a launch will be detected by infrared sensors in orbit as soon as a rocket booster passes through cloud cover (if any). Surface-based radars will also detect the flight. Electronic listening posts also may detect the broadcast of telemetry from a missile being flight-tested. This form of verification is ideal, since it involves capabilities already in place, and does not involve any intrusive measures.
A freeze on the ground testing of LPEs or SRMs can also be verified through NTM, although cloud cover may interfere. As long as there is not excessive cloud cover, infrared sensors will capture tests at North Korea’s open-air test stands. In the absence of cloud cover, imagery satellites can also capture activity at these sites, including burn scars on the ground after a test. Radar satellites can capture activity at these sites, and are immune to cloud cover, but since they are relatively scarce, they may not be available for this purpose at all times. Additional assurance of the absence of ground tests could be gained by requesting the partial or complete dismantlement of all of North Korea’s known test stands. Dismantlement can be confirmed with imagery or radar satellites; no presence on the ground is required, although OSIs may be useful to build confidence.
A freeze on deployment of new types or additional numbers of missiles would be significantly harder to verify than a freeze on testing; however, the INF Treaty has detailed protocols on verifying the deployment freeze and even dismantlement of missiles, which could be adapted to new settings. North Korean cooperation through transparency measures will be essential to monitoring any freeze on deployment, especially given the road-mobile nature of North Korea’s missile launchers. First, a declaration on the numbers, types, and locations of deployed missiles would be required, along with notice of any change to those numbers. It is notoriously difficult to verify the accuracy of any declaration. This raises the need for baseline inspections. As discussed in the INF section, it will be necessary to use both NTM and extensive OSIs to ensure that the DPRK’s declarations are valid. A second option is a periodic parade of missiles, along the lines of the arrangement that existed under the INF Treaty, which used satellite imagery for some verification instead of OSIs. In the DPRK case, the negotiating partner could request a certain number of “parades” each year from each North Korean base with controlled missile types. With a few hours’ notice, North Korea would have to open the roofs of any deployment structures, remove all missiles and launchers from concealment, and display them in the open for a certain number of hours to allow imagery satellites to confirm the numbers and types. This option can also be used in verifying dismantlement projects for any obsolete or outdated missile stocks or for intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missiles. These types of arrangements will be demanding to negotiate. A deployment freeze could therefore not be put in place quickly, and should probably not be seen as an early step.
A total freeze on production at particular facilities for making missiles, launchers, ballistic-missile submarines, or their key components will be easier to verify than a selective freeze. If North Korea agrees to halt all such production, then NTM should be sufficient to confirm the absence of activity at specific facilities, perhaps supplemented by confidence-building site visits.38 However, this approach will require a declaration of all production facilities. Some sort of challenge inspection provisions will be desirable in order to rule out suspected sites. The difficulty of reaching such an arrangement with North Korea may dictate that, at least initially, a declaration consistent with intelligence assessments should be considered acceptable. Even in the best case, not all missile-production facilities are likely to be included. The two parties are likely to reach restrictions only on missiles greater than a certain range, so as not to impinge on North Korea’s legitimate defense requirements. The 300-km range limit associated with MTCR guidelines may provide a useful point of reference; this figure is also the upper limit of the CRBM category used by the US government. Since North Korean CRBMs appear to be too small to carry nuclear warheads, this may be an attractive option. Other potential reference points include the 500-km lower limit of the INF Treaty, or the 800-km limit under the present version of the US-ROK missile guidelines. A 500-km limit would exclude the production of additional missiles capable of reaching either Japan or the Beijing area from North Korean soil. If a single facility produces both permissible and forbidden types of missiles, verification will become a substantially more complex task. The portal monitoring system pioneered under the INF Treaty for the Votkinsk facility provides a point of comparison for understanding the general requirements, although the specific details are likely to differ. North Korea’s willingness to accept the standing presence of foreign inspectors at the Yongbyon nuclear facility in the past suggests that they are possibly open to re-entertaining the idea of continuous portal monitoring at one or more of their production facilities. Facilities producing liquid-propellant engines and solid rocket motors would be main candidates for such a portal-monitoring system, as those are critical points that cannot be bypassed in the production of North Korea’s larger missiles. Given the complexity of negotiating and implementing on-site monitoring arrangements, a selective prohibition of this type within any single facility would not be a realistic first step. In addition to a deployment freeze, North Korea’s negotiating partner can seek the verified dismantlement and elimination of some missile stocks, especially with obsolete or outdated missiles. This would be a valuable confidence-building exercise. Additionally, satellite verification of missile parades can also assist in confirming the destruction of these stocks. The INF Treaty’s protocols on elimination procedures provide guidance on this issue. OSIs to verify dismantlement may also be necessary and can be discussed along the lines of the INF Treaty, Articles IX and X. Verifying the transfer of missiles will be difficult, and their expertise even more so, as these transfers are usually inferred after the fact, such as in the case of the Pakistani Ghauri MRBM, which closely resembles the North Korean Nodong MRBM. Nonetheless, it is important to have clear prohibitions outlined in any missile control agreement. The monitoring of exports of missiles and their components will largely depend on intelligence agencies, as it does now. A further ban on the production of missiles would give the international community greater confidence about an export freeze. Still, in order to attempt to verify that North Korea is not exporting missile technology and expertise, it would be necessary to maintain the intensive monitoring of North Korean vessels, cargo aircraft, and other export activities. Although North Korea’s news media has been silent on the subject of space launches since late 2017, it seems unlikely that North Korea will be eager to accept limitations on its space program over the long term. It is safe to assume that North Korea will want to maintain at least the “perception of parity” in space capabilities with South Korea. Were it to insist on developing and operating its own satellites, the DPRK would rely on foreign launch services, which would send DPRK satellites into orbit without having to fly over Japan. Additionally, foreign satellite companies could assist North Korea in developing remote-sensing satellites for environmental management and disaster monitoring and relief. Satellite imagery can be very useful in helping North Korea address its nutrition problems by improving the management of land and crops, especially in times of natural disasters. Projects in Nigeria, Vietnam, Egypt, Kazakhstan, and many others show the utility of satellite cooperation in urban mapping, land management, irrigation and water use, crop production, and road and railway development, to name a few. North Korea can similarly gain access to these services without maintaining a launch capability and even without building and owning its own satellites. Instead, North Korea can build partnerships to acquire such data from other countries and then develop its own domestic expertise in using that data. In fact, North Korea has already received access to low-resolution Landsat imagery and has a Landsat interpretation center funded and equipped by the UN Development Program and China. This creates a plethora of opportunities for further expansion in sharing satellite data and services. One approach would be to set up a consortium that works with North Korea to develop its technical satellite expertise and to design, build, and launch a satellite, as well as set up the ground stations needed for operation. Even if using North Korean launch capabilities, at least it would be better monitored as part of an international project and ideally launched from a location that does not antagonize Japan, such as Russia or China. Another option would be a group of countries to buy or heavily subsidize a small geosynchronous satellite for North Korea for communications or remote sensing. These satellites can be built using commercially available components to keep costs minimal. Lastly, North Korea can be integrated into regional space organizations to support its satellites and space-exploration programs. Some of these organizations are the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, the Satellite Technology for the Asia-Pacific Region Program, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Subcommittee on Space Technology and Applications. Designing a freeze on the North Korean missile program will require policy makers to evaluate trade-offs and make value judgments; actually implementing a freeze will require reaching and carrying out an agreement with the North Korean authorities. For these reasons, we offer no single recommendation, but instead seek to clarify some of the trade-offs involved. As a rule, the more intrusive verification measures are, the less acceptable they will be to the North Koreans, and the more expensive for the parties responsible for their implementation. At the same time, the more intrusive these measures are, the greater security benefits they provide. There are at least two ways to approach the options described here. One approach is to try to optimize the trade-offs by selecting and pursuing the single “best available” option. Another approach is to consider the options as a sequence of steps that can be pursued cumulatively as trust improves, relaxing some of the constraints associated with intrusive verification measures. The passage of time without any freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of missiles also will tend to erode some of the security benefits of negotiating a freeze at a later date; a freeze is always most beneficial at the earliest possible date. Even in the absence of wider security benefits, however, a verifiable freeze on these types of activities can always contribute to the general reduction of tensions. A brief discussion of the trade-offs associated with each freeze option follows. The current freeze on flight tests is minimally intrusive, and primarily helps to prevent North Korea from improving the reliability of its current missile force, improving its survivability by developing new types of solid-propellant missiles, or improving its ability to penetrate BMD by improving its MaRV capabilities. Adding a freeze on ground testing, preferably with the dismantlement of ground test facilities to improve verifiability, would help to reinforce most of these benefits. As described above, a freeze on new deployments of missiles to operational bases would involve much more intrusive verification measures than a freeze on testing, potentially involving the types of declaration, inspections, and displays associated with the INF Treaty. One major benefit would be to prevent North Korea from improving its ability to penetrate BMD by launching larger salvoes. To the extent that recently tested classes of missiles are not yet deployed, however, this type of freeze could also prevent North Korea from extending the effective range of its missile arsenal or improving its survivability by deploying solid-propellant missiles. A production freeze that shutters particular facilities can be verified with NTM, much like a freeze on ground testing, and is therefore not necessarily highly intrusive. A freeze on the production of new missiles, launchers, and/or platforms could have many of the same benefits as a freeze on new missile deployment. A selective freeze on production, allowing the facilities in question to continue operating while not producing certain systems, would be significantly more intrusive and challenging to negotiate. A full-time onsite presence, perhaps similar to the portal-monitoring arrangements established under the INF Treaty, might be required. Verifiably dismantling obsolete systems, either on its own or in conjunction with a production or deployment freeze, would help to assure that North Korea could not improve its ability to penetrate BMD by launching larger salvoes. If dismantlement takes place at one or more designated sites that are not otherwise sensitive, the intrusiveness of verification measures would be limited. A freeze on North Korean missile exports and assistance does not address the immediate security benefits emphasized in this paper, although it would contribute to global nonproliferation objectives. It would not require highly intrusive measures on North Korean soil. Efforts to inspect North Korean cargoes abroad have been an occasional source of tension, but this would not represent a fundamentally new development. All-source intelligence appears to be the most viable means of verifying such a commitment. This option can be considered a “sweetener” to help remove justifications for the continued development of technology applicable to ICBMs inside North Korea. Although it might be expensive for participants, it would not have its own verification requirements. Combined with other measures, it could help to prevent the enhancement of the reliability of North Korean ICBMs and the development of more survivable types.” (Joshua H. Pollack, Miles Pomper, Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, Joy Nasr, and Dave Schmerler, Options for a Verifiable Freeze on North Korea’s Missiles, CNS Occasional Paper 46 (April 2019)
The United States demanded these extensive verification measures from South Korea because it had found evidence of noncompliance with earlier limits. The guidelines were further revisited in October 2012 as the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs advanced. While the payload limit remained at 500 km, Seoul was allowed ballistic missiles with ranges up to 800 kilometers, covering all North Korea, but without threatening China or Japan. Nonetheless, Seoul could still load warheads weighing up to one metric ton (1,000 kg) on ballistic missiles with shorter ranges. In November 2017, Washington agreed to drop all payload limits from the guidelines. This decision implies a newfound degree of trust, since the substitution of a lightweight payload could extend the range of an otherwise permitted missile beyond the agreed limit. Some complications might arise if the precise terms of the US-ROK bilateral missile agreement were used as a baseline for an agreement on the control of North Korea’s missiles, as the North is likely to refuse more restrictive guidelines than South Korea’s. This would mean accepting North Korea’s short-range ballistic missiles up to 800 km in range while banning longer-range systems. Doing so would leave Beijing and westerly parts of Japan in range from North Korean soil. However, if North Korea were unwilling to accept verification measures as intrusive as those associated with the US-RoK guidelines, then it might be prepared to accept stricter limits on range and payload instead. Using the US-ROK guidelines as a point of departure for controlling North Korea’s space program could also be difficult. For the most part, United States policy on Seoul’s space program has been neither to support nor obstruct it; the United States has denied requests to export space technology to South Korea, but has not intervened with other suppliers. After two failed launch attempts, South Korea successfully placed a satellite in orbit in January 2013. North Korea’s space-launch program has been a sticking point in previous missile-freeze attempts, as the DPRK is unlikely to give up pursuit of a national space program. However, if North Korean space launches remain unacceptable to the international community in view of their overlap with long-range missile technology, alternative arrangements may be possible to sustain a North Korean space program without a national launch program. Models may include hiring launch services, e.g., in Russia or China, or regional or inter-Korean cooperation on space launches involving North Korean payloads on other states’ launch vehicles. The MTCR is a voluntary, informal arrangement, dating back to 1986, in which participant states, now numbering thirty-five, agree to adhere to common export-policy guidelines to slow the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) capable of delivering WMD. The guidelines call on each partner country to exercise restraint when considering transfers of equipment, technology, or assistance that would provide or help a recipient build a missile capable of delivering a 500-kg warhead to a range of 300 km or more. The warhead weight limit intends to limit transfers of missiles that could carry a relatively simple nuclear warhead. The MTCR guidelines outline two categories of controlled items. Category I items are highly sensitive in their dual-use nature and are subject to “a strong presumption to deny such transfers.” Partner countries have greater flexibility in deciding on transfers of Category II items. Category I items include complete rocket systems including ballistic missiles, SLVs, and UAV systems, production facilities for such systems, and major subsystems, including rocket stages, re-entry vehicles, rocket engines, guidance systems, and warhead mechanisms. Category II items are other less sensitive, dual-use missile components that could be used to develop a Category I system, as well as complete missiles and major subsystems of missiles capable of delivering a payload of any size to a range up to 300 km. … The greatest security benefits from a freeze are naturally found in those areas where the program appears to be relatively immature. These include, notably:
4/25/19:
President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia made a public show of support for North Korea on nuclear disarmament, seeming to undermine President Trump’s approach to nuclear diplomacy, as Mr. Putin and Kim Jong-un today wrapped up their first summit meeting. Russian officials have long insisted they wanted to support Trump’s efforts at one-on-one nuclear negotiations with Kim, the North Korean leader. But speaking to reporters after the meeting in Vladivostok, on Russia’s Pacific Ocean coast, Putin said that North Korea needs security guarantees from more nations than just the United States before abandoning its nuclear arsenal. Putin also reiterated Russian backing for a gradual process of trading disarmament for sanctions relief. “If we take one step forward and two backward, then we would fail to achieve the desired result,” Putin said. “But it will eventually be possible to achieve this goal, if we move forward gradually and if we respect each other’s interests.” In his first trip abroad since the talks in Vietnam, Kim sought to stress his friendly relations with the Kremlin as a counterweight to the hardline tactics of the Trump administration. “It is my and my government’s firm strategic position that the strategic and traditional friendly relations between North Korea and Russia be strengthened and improved ceaselessly to fit the needs of the new century,” Kim said after the meeting. Kim added that the two leaders had a “very meaningful one-on-one exchange of opinions on issues of mutual interest and current issues.” Putin suggested Russia might welcome a revival of multilateral talks on North Korea, known as the six-party negotiations, which have been dormant for a decade and were previously derided by Trump. The Russian leader added that the United States and Russia have a common interest in preventing nuclear proliferation, in North Korea and elsewhere. But he also hinted at a longtime Russian argument that past American military action against governments at odds with the United States, like those of Iraq and Libya, made it hard today to persuade North Korea to disarm. “The most important thing, as we have discussed today during the talks, is to restore the rule of international law and revert to the position where global developments were regulated by international law instead of the rule of the fist,” Mr. Putin said. “If this happens, this would be the first and critical step toward resolving challenging situations such as the one on the Korean Peninsula.” Putin said Kim had asked him to share the details of the talks with the United States and China, saying there were “no secrets” at the negotiations. Before they collapsed in 2009, the six-party talks among China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, the United States and Russia had produced agreements to halt North Korea’s nuclear program, but the North later abrogated them. Any Russian attempt to revive them now is bad news for Trump, who has repeatedly cited them as the prime example of the failed tactics of previous administrations. He has claimed that his own leader-to-leader diplomacy with Kim stood a far better chance of bringing about the North’s denuclearization. Russian foreign policy has a different starting point. “In Moscow’s thinking, Kim Jong-un has learned from the fates of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi that for an authoritarian regime, the only safeguard against U.S. military intervention is the possession of nuclear weapons capable of hitting the American mainland,” Aleksandr Gabuev, a fellow at the Moscow Carnegie Center, wrote. Believing for this reason that North Korea is unlikely ever to wholly disarm, Russians have instead leaned toward supporting gradual disarmament as the only achievable goal, he wrote, suggesting Russia is not so much a “spoiler” in the talks as following its own analysis. On the other hand, Gabuev wrote, Russia’s position is not very important because, “the tools Russia has at its disposal are too limited to have an impact.” Putin mentioned the promise of long-stalled Russian proposals to foster peace along by building trans-Korean railroads, natural gas pipelines and electricity transmission wires, but said the United States has dissuaded South Korea from signing on. South Korea, Mr. Putin said, has a “deficit of sovereignty.” (Andrew E. Kramer and Choe Sang-hun, “After Meeting Kim, Putin Backs Him (Not Trump) on Disarmament,” New York Times, April 26, 2019, p. A-4) Putin emerged from his first summit with Kim Jong Un today saying that North Korea needs international security guarantees, not just U.S. pledges, to consider giving up its nuclear arsenal. Putin’s call for more multinational involvement — presumably reflecting views by Kim — contrasts sharply with President Trump’s strategy of one-on-one dialogue with the North Korean leader. It also reinforced North Korea’s attempt to link security and sanctions relief as twin demands in negotiations over its nuclear program. Meeting in the city of Vladivostok in Russia’s Far East, Putin raised the option of reviving international talks with North Korea if Kim was not satisfied with U.S. positions on security issues. “They [North Koreans] only need guarantees about their security. That’s it. All of us together need to think about this,” Putin told reporters after the talks with Kim. North Korea has pushed for a peace declaration to formally end the Korean War, which ended in an armistice in 1953, without a peace treaty. Kim also has denounced past U.S.-South Korea military exercises as a provocation. Trump called off some war games and dangled the possibility of a Korean War peace-signing in the future, but direct U.S. pledges of support for the Kim regime’s hold on power are highly improbable, experts say. Putin said he would press the security issue on Kim’s behalf with Beijing and Washington. “We do share interests with the United States. We stand for full denuclearization,” Putin told reporters after his meeting with Kim, which lasted longer than expected. For the Kremlin, eager to play a part in high-stakes nuclear talks, the flashy summit shows Russia’s growing political role around the globe. It would be a mistake, Putin said, not to involve regional players such as Russia and China, and instead rely on the United States and South Korea to try to resolve the situation on the Korean Peninsula. “It’s unlikely that any agreements between two countries will be enough,” he said. At a banquet following the talks, Kim raised a glass of wine to Putin, saying, “I had a frank and substantive exchange of opinions with Mr. Putin on the development of Russian-Korean relations and the provision of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.” Dressed in his usual Mao-collared black outfit, Kim sat down for an intimate dinner with a handful of people, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, at Far Eastern Federal University, whose main halls were decorated with flags of both countries. According to Russian state media, the one-on-one meeting between Putin and Kim lasted almost two hours, much longer than the 50 minutes allotted. After their meal, the leaders attended a Russian dance and choir concert involving North Korean performers. Putin was scheduled to leave Vladivostok soon after his talks with Kim for a summit in Beijing. (Amie Ferris-Rotman and Simon Denyer, “Putin Urges Multilateral Approach to North Korea,” Washington Post, April 26, 2019, p. A-9)
KCNA: “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un had talks with Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, president of the Russian Federation, on April 25. Present at the talks from the DPRK side were Ri Yong Ho, foreign minister, and Choe Son Hui, first vice foreign minister, and from the Russian side were Sergei Lavrov, foreign minister, Yuri Trutnev, deputy prime minister and presidential envoy to the Far East Federal Region, Dmitri Peskov, deputy head of the Presidential Administration and president’s press secretary, Yuri Ushakov, assistant to the president’s foreign policy, Yevgeny Dietrich, minister of Transport, Alexandr Kozlov, minister of Development of the Far East and Arctic, Anatoli Yanovski, vice-minister of Energy, Oleg Belozerov, president of the Russian Railways Company, and Alexandr Matsegora, Russian ambassador to the DPRK. At the talks, President Putin expressed deep thanks to Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un once again for accepting his invitation and visiting Russia, and stated the firm stand and will of the Russian government to carry forward and develop the history and tradition of the Russia-DPRK friendship. Kim Jong Un said he was very pleased to visit Russia, the friendly neighboring country, at the invitation of President Putin and that the meeting came to be a special important occasion in reaffirming the invariable trend of the history of the DPRK-Russia relations and further developing the friendly relations between the two countries in a more solid and progressive way. Saying it is a due responsibility before the times and history to put the DPRK-Russia relations on a new high stage as required by the new century, he expressed his determination to usher in a new heyday of the DPRK-Russia relations true to the intention of the preceding leaders. Made at the talks was a discussion on further expanding and developing the bilateral cooperation in various fields. The top leaders of the two countries had a discussion on boosting high-level visits including top-level meeting and contact and developing cooperation, exchange and collaboration between the governments, parliaments, regions and organizations of the two countries in various forms. Both sides agreed to take positive measures in several fields in order to further energize the work of the DPRK-Russia Intergovernmental Committee for Cooperation in Trade, Economy, Science and Technology and put the equally beneficial economic and trade relations between the two countries on a higher stage. They analyzed and assessed the trend of the situation on the Korean peninsula that has faced a crucial moment and had an in-depth discussion on the ways for the two countries to promote the strategic communication and tactical collaboration in the course of ensuring peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the region. Kim Jong Un said that the situation on the Korean peninsula and the region is now at a standstill and has reached a critical point where it may return to its original state as the U.S. took a unilateral attitude in bad faith at the recent second DPRK-U.S. summit talks, and added that peace and security on the Korean peninsula will entirely depend on the U.S. future attitude, and the DPRK will gird itself for every possible situation. At the talks both sides agreed to more closely promote mutual understanding and bonds and boost strategic collaboration for ensuring regional peace and security in the future. Kim Jong Un invited Putin to visit the DPRK at a convenient time and the invitation was readily accepted.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Holds Talks with Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin,” April 26, 2019)
North Korea issued a $2 million bill for the hospital care of comatose American Otto Warmbier, insisting that a U.S. official sign a pledge to pay it before being allowed to fly the University of Virginia student from Pyongyang in 2017. The presentation of the invoice — not previously disclosed by U.S. or North Korean officials — was extraordinarily brazen even for a regime known for its aggressive tactics. But the main U.S. envoy sent to retrieve Warmbier signed an agreement to pay the medical bill on instructions passed down from President Trump, according to two people familiar with the situation. The bill went to the Treasury Department, where it remained — unpaid — throughout 2017, the people said. However, it is unclear whether the Trump administration later paid the bill, or whether it came up during preparations for Trump’s two summits with Kim Jong Un. The White House declined to comment. “We do not comment on hostage negotiations, which is why they have been so successful during this administration,” White House press secretary Sarah Sanders wrote in an email. Trump, as recently as September 30, asserted that his administration paid “nothing” to get American “hostages” out of North Korea. Warmbier, who was 21, fell into a coma for unknown reasons the night he was sentenced to 15 years in prison with hard labor in March 2016. Fred Warmbier, Otto’s father, said he was never told about the hospital bill. He said it sounded like a “ransom” for his late son. After his sentencing, the North Koreans held onto the comatose student for another 15 months, not even telling American officials un til June 2017 that he had been unconscious all that time. News of his condition sparked a frantic effort led by Joseph Yun, the State Department’s point man on North Korea at the time, to get Warmbier home. Yun and an emergency medicine doctor, Michael Flueckiger, traveled to Pyongyang on a medical evacuation plane. They were taken to the Friendship Hospital in the diplomatic district, a clinic where only foreigners are treated, and found Warmbier lying in a room marked “intensive care unit,” unresponsive and with a feeding tube in his nose. Flueckiger examined Warmbier and asked the two North Korean doctors, who bore a thick pile of charts, questions about the lab work, scans and X-rays they had done. Afterward, they went to a meeting room where the talks to free Warmbier began. “I didn’t realize what a negotiation it was going to be to secure his release,” said Flueckiger, who is medical director of Phoenix Air Group, an aviation company based in Cartersville, Ga., that specializes in medical evacuations. North Korean officials asked the doctor to write a report about his findings. “It was my impression that if I did not give them a document that I could sign off on, that would cause problems,” Flueckiger said in an interview. But the American said he did not have to lie in his report. Whatever had happened to put Warmbier into that state, it was “evident” that he had received “really good care” in the hospital, he said. The doctors had done “state-of-the-art resuscitation” to revive Warmbier after he suffered a catastrophic cardiovascular collapse, and it was “remarkable” that he had no bedsores, Flueckiger said. “Would I have lied to get him out of there? Maybe I would have,” he said. “But I didn’t have to answer that question.” Yun, however, was faced with a more difficult predicament. The North Korean officials handed him a bill for $2 million, insisting he sign an agreement to pay it before they would allow him to take Warmbier home, according to the two people familiar with the situation. Yun called then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and told him about the bill. Tillerson called Trump. They instructed their envoy to sign the piece of paper agreeing that he would pay the $2 million, the two people said. Flueckiger discussed the medical aspects of Warmbier’s evacuation but said he was not authorized to discuss the diplomatic negotiations. A State Department spokesman and Yun, who retired in early 2018, both declined to comment. Having signed the documentation and secured Warmbier’s release, Yun and Flueckiger flew to Cincinnati to return the young man to his parents. Otto Warmbier died six days later, but the cause of his severe brain damage has never been ascertained. North Korea insisted that Warmbier became sick after eating pork and spinach, but it also said he had a severe allergic reaction to the sedatives he was given. The director of North Korea’s Friendship Hospital said the family’s accusations that Warmbier died as a result of torture were a “total distortion of the truth.” “The American doctors who came . . . to help Warmbier’s repatriation acknowledged that his health indicators were all normal and submitted a letter of assurance to our hospital that they shared the diagnostic result of the doctors of our hospital,” state media quoted the unnamed hospital director as saying in October last year. (Anna Fifield, “N. Korea Gave U.S. a Bill for Warmbier,” Washington Post, April 26, 2019, p. A-1)
KCNA: The south Korean military kicked off a provocative combined aerial drill with the U.S. forces against its dialogue partner DPRK on April 22, with the involvement of a number of warplanes like F-15K, KF-16, F-16. A spokesman for the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country (CPRC) of the DPRK in a strongly-worded statement [today] blasted the drill as an outright challenge to the historic April 27 Panmunjom Declaration and the September Pyongyang Joint Declaration reflecting the unanimous will of the entire nation for peace and prosperity of the Korean peninsula, and an open violation of the agreement on the military field in which the north and the south committed to make joint efforts for the ease of military tension and removal of hostility. … The acts of perfidy on the part of the south Korean authorities have greatly disappointed us, as they, far from trying to keep to preserve the valuable spark of peace, reconciliation and cooperation, have gone against the trend toward the reconciliation on the peninsula which the north and the south nurtured by their joint efforts for the past one year. While staging the large-scale combined aerial drill, the south Korean authorities claim that Max Thunder was thrown into the history and they reduced the scope of the drill by taking into consideration the situation on the Korean peninsula. They are seriously mistaken if they think they can give relief to us and stay clear of the public criticism at home and abroad with such trite nonsense. In March also, the south Korean authorities held a joint military drill under the codename of Alliance that replaced Key Resolve which was agreed to be suspended, and now it mulls going ahead with it in the future, too. They can never conceal the aggressive, offensive and confrontational nature of their hostile acts no matter how hard they may try to give impression about “reduction in scope” by replacing the codename. Wind naturally brings wave. Now that the south Korean authorities get undisguised in their military provocation against the DPRK together with the U.S., there will be corresponding response to it from our army. Whatever steps we take, the south Korean authorities can never make any complaint, and if they cavil at, that will render the issue and the situation further complicated to let it go out of control. The south Korean authorities have to behave with discretion, mindful that their open perfidy to the DPRK at the crucial moment of whether to preserve the atmosphere of the improvement of the north-south ties may put the overall bilateral ties at risk.” (KCNA, “CPRC Warns S. Korea against Acts of Perfidy,” April 25, 2019)
4/30/19:
Choe Son Hui, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK “answer to a question put by KCNA on April 30, as regards the sophistry let loose by Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State concerning the issue of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula: At an interview with CBS on April 24, Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State, talked about so-called “change paths.” This is a foolish and dangerous idea designed to bring down our system at any cost even by resorting to the military means, as their maximum pressure and economic blockade are not working against us. In his historic policy speech made at the First Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly, Comrade Kim Jong Un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, articulated the stand that the United States needs to put aside the current method of calculation and approach us with a new method of calculation and we would wait until the end of this year to see whether the U.S. makes a courageous decision or not. In other words, he set a time limit for the settlement of nuclear issue which could be possible if the U.S. comes up with a proper method of calculation before the end of this year. At the DPRK-Russia summit talks held on April 25, Comrade Chairman of the State Affairs Commission strongly berated the unilateral and dishonest attitude of the United States and stated that the peace and security of the Korean peninsula will be entirely dependent on the future American attitude and the DPRK will be prepared to deal with every possible scenario. Our determination for denuclearization remains unchanged, and when the time comes, we will put it into practice. But, this is possible only under the condition that the U.S. changes their current method of calculation and formulates a new stand. As for the so-called “change paths” talked about by the United States, it is not a privileged right that pertains only to the U.S., but it could also be our choice at our own will. In case the U.S. is messing the problem and wandering along the other road like now, and would not formulate their position anew within the time frame set by our side, they will indeed face an undesired consequence. We are well aware of the road we are to follow but we are merely holding back our decision because we have provided the time frame for the U.S. The United States might better choose their path ahead, taking deep to their hearts the meaning behind the year-end time frame provided by our side.” (KCNA, “First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Flays Sophistry by U.S. Secretary of State,” April 30, 2019)
5/1/19:
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo said in an interview with the Sankei Shimbun, “I want to meet Chairman Kim Jong Un unconditionally and talk with him frankly with an open mind.” Abe, seen as a foreign policy hawk, has recently softened his rhetoric toward Pyongyang, calling for a summit with Kim to resolve an emotional row over past kidnappings of Japanese nationals by North Korean agents. “It is more than important for our country to be proactive in tackling the issue,” Abe also said in the interview. “We can’t break the shell of mutual distrust between Japan and North Korea unless I directly face Mr. Kim,” he said. “I hope that he is a leader who can make a decision strategically and flexibly on what is best for his nation.” (AFP-JIJI, Kyodo, “Abe Ready to Meet Kim Jong Un ‘Unconditionally’ to ‘Break the Shell of Mutual Distrust,” Japan Times, May 2, 2019)
5/2/19:
“The US is taking a comprehensive approach (to the talks) and looking for comprehensive dialogue,” Seoul’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Kyung-wha said today at a meeting with the local media. Kang was responding to a question on which side — the North or the US — should alter its position to enable denuclearization talks to make progress. “I think that North Korea should take a wider scope, and approach the matter with a more comprehensive view.” Kang’s statement hints at Seoul taking the position that North Korea should make concessions to resolve the deadlock with the U.S. The U.S. favors a “big deal” in which sanctions remain until denuclearization is achieve, while Pyongyang calls for an action-for-action process. “I think that the North is analyzing the situation since Hanoi, and various signals from the US with regards to its (future) actions,” Kang said referring to the second US-North Korea summit in Hanoi at the end of February. “The key point is to make a ‘good deal’ that is mutually satisfactory to the North and the U.S.” Regarding humanitarian aid to the North, Kang said the matter is unrelated to the current political situation, but an international consensus is needed. At the meeting, Kang also said that diplomatic efforts for denuclearization and establishing peace on the peninsula continue despite the lull in US-North Korea negotiations, and hinted at Seoul taking a more active role in facilitating dialogue. “Many measures are under consideration, including special envoys (to the North),” she said, adding that the US and North Korea appear to be using public messages to raise pressure on each other. (Choi He-suk, “Seoul Foreign Minister Says North Should Change Stance in Talks with U.S.,” Korea Herald, May 2, 2019)
5/3/19:
Four in ten North Koreans are chronically short of food and further cuts to already minimal rations are expected after the worst harvest in a decade, the United Nations said today. Official rations are down to 300 grams — under 11 ounces — per person per day, the lowest ever for this time of year, the U.N. said following a food security assessment it carried out at Pyongyang’s request from March 29 to April 12. It found that 10.1 million people were suffering from severe food insecurity, “meaning they do not have enough food till the next harvest,” U.N. World Food Program spokesman Herve Verhoosel said. North Korea’s population is around 25.2 million, according to its Central Bureau of Statistics, the report said. Verhoosel said the word “famine” was not being used in the current crisis, but it might come to that in a few months or years. “The situation is very serious today — that’s a fact.” For its assessment the WFP, one of only a few aid agencies with access to the country, gained widespread entry to farms, households, nurseries and food distribution centers. Verhoosel blamed a combination of dry spells, heat waves and flooding for the new crisis, which the U.S. State Department said was the government’s fault. “The DPRK regime continues to exploit, starve, and neglect its own people in order to advance its unlawful nuclear and weapons program,” a Department spokeswoman said, adding that it could meet its people’s needs if it redirected state funds. Its agricultural output of 4.9 million tonnes was the lowest since 2008-2009, leading to a food deficit of 1.36 million tonnes in the 2018/2019 marketing year, the WPF report said. Prospects for the 2019 early season crops of wheat and barley were worrisome. “The effects of repeated climate shocks are compounded by shortages of fuel, fertilizer and spare parts crucial for farming,” Verhoosel said. The WFP plans to make another assessment during July and August. (Tom Miles, “North Korea Faces Food Crisis after Poor Harvest, U.N. Says,” Reuters, May 3, 2019)
President Donald Trump urged Russian President Vladimir Putin today to help keep pressure on North Korea until it dismantles its nuclear weapons program, Trump’s spokeswoman said. The two leaders spoke by phone and discussed nuclear agreements, trade, and the political situations in North Korea, Ukraine and Venezuela, according to White House press secretary Sarah Sanders. “They spoke about North Korea for a good bit of time on the call and reiterated both the commitment and the need for denuclearization,” Sanders told reporters at the White House. “And the president said several times on this front as well the need and importance of Russia stepping up and continuing to help and put pressure on North Korea to denuclearize,” she said. “And that was again the focus of the president’s comment on that front.” Trump noted his phone call with Putin in a tweet. “We discussed Trade, Venezuela, Ukraine, North Korea, Nuclear Arms Control and even the ‘Russian Hoax,'” he wrote. “Very productive talk!” Putin has suggested reviving six-party talks on North Korea’s denuclearization to break the impasse in U.S.-North Korea talks. “I think it’s not just what our preference is,” National Security Adviser John Bolton said in an interview with Fox News Sunday. “I think Kim Jong-un, at least up until now, has wanted the one-on-one contact with the United States, which is what he has gotten,” he said. (Yonhap, “Trump Urges Putin to Keep Pressure on N. Korea,” May 4, 2019)
5/4/19:
North Korea fired several short-range projectiles off its east coast today, in a move likely to raise tensions as denuclearization talks with the United States remain stalled. The North fired the projectiles between 9:06 a.m. and 9:27 a.m. from near Wonsan, a coastal town east of Pyongyang, the capital, the South Korean military said in a statement. They flew 70 to 200 kilometers before landing in the sea between North Korea and Japan, the statement said. An earlier statement from the military said the North had fired a single missile, but the later statement used the vaguer term “projectile.” The military has used that term in the past to describe North Korean missile launches when it was too soon to determine exactly what kind of missile had been deployed. “We are aware of North Korea’s actions tonight,” the White House press secretary, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, said on Friday night in Washington. “We will continue to monitor as necessary.” A Pentagon spokesman, Chris Sherwood, said officials there were looking into the launch and were not yet able to confirm anything. A missile test would be the North’s first since 2017. In mid-April, the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attended a test of what the country called a new type of “tactical guided weapon.” That, along with Saturday’s test, signaled that Kim intended to escalate tensions in an attempt to gain leverage with the United States. Mike Pompeo, the American secretary of state, spoke by telephone after the launch with the foreign ministers of South Korea and Japan. Kang Kyung-wha, the South Korean minister, Pompeo agreed to respond “with caution,” her ministry said. North Korea has vowed not to buckle under international pressure even if its people have to survive on “water and air only,” state media said, and it has repeatedly said it would find “a new way” to defend its national interests if Washington did not ease sanctions. Analysts have speculated that the North might resume weapons tests. “Clearly, Pyongyang is frustrated with the conclusion of the recent summit with Washington in Vietnam that did not produce any breakthrough,” said Harry J. Kazianis, the director of the Washington-based Center for the National Interest. “It also seems clear that North Korea is angry over what appears to be a lack of flexibility in the Trump administration’s position on relieving sanctions, sticking to a policy of ‘maximum pressure.’” The launch on Saturday did not violate Mr. Kim’s moratorium because it did not involve an intercontinental ballistic missile, but American officials were sure to be concerned. “We should keep in mind that Kim had only pledged to not test nuclear weapons or long-range missiles,” said Abraham Denmark, director of the Asia Program at the Wilson Center in Washington. “So while this latest test would not technically violate Kim’s pledge, it does raise questions about how much President Trump will tolerate, and how far his trust of Kim Jong-un can stretch.” The North’s launch followed dire news hours earlier from the United Nations, which said that the country had suffered its worst harvest in a decade, putting about 40 percent of the population in urgent need of food aid. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Detects Firing of Projectiles by the North,” New York Times, May 4, 2019, p. A-7)
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, guided the strike drill of defense units in the forefront area and on the eastern front which took place in the East Sea of Korea on Saturday. The purpose of the drill was to estimate and inspect the operating ability and the accuracy of striking duty performance of large-caliber long-range multiple rocket launchers and tactical guided weapons by defense units in the frontline area and on the eastern front and the combat performance of arms and equipment and to more powerfully arouse the entire army to the movement for becoming crack shots with the drill as an occasion and thus put it at combat readiness posture all the time. At the observation post Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un learned about the strike plan of the striking means of different calibers and inspected the fire readiness including the advance to and deployment of large-caliber long-range multiple rocket launchers and tactical guided weapons in fire positions. After setting the sequences and methods of strike, the Supreme Leader gave an order of firing. Praising the People’s Army for its excellent operation of modern large-caliber long-range multiple rocket launchers and tactical guided weapons, he said that all the service members are master gunners and they are capable of carrying out duty to promptly tackle any situation as a result of full knowledge of modern weapon system and intensive training. He spoke highly of the successful striking drill though it was organized without an advance notice. Expressing great satisfaction with the rapid response ability of those defense units in the frontline area and on the eastern front to keep them fully ready to go into combat action immediately upon the issuance of order any moment, he gave important instructions for improving and strengthening the operation and combat drill of the People’s Army. He stressed the need for all the service members to keep high alert posture and more dynamically wage the drive to increase the combat ability so as to defend the political sovereignty and economic self-sustenance of the country and the gains of revolution and the security of the people from the threats and invasion by any forces, bearing in mind the iron truth that genuine peace and security are ensured and guaranteed only by powerful strength. Watching the drill together with him were cadres of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea including Kim Phyong Hae, O Su Yong, Ri Pyong Chol and Jo Yong Won.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guide Strike Drill of Frontline Defense Units in Frontline Area and Eastern Front,” May 5, 2019)
Bolton: “Unfortunately, North Korea continued testing missiles, not the ICBMs Kim had promised Trump he would not test, but short- and medium-range missiles that threatened much of South Korea and Japan. Some were launched in salvos, approximating wartime conditions, the first of which I heard about on the evening of Friday, May 3 (Saturday morning Korea time). I immediately called Pompeo and Shanahan after learning of the first launch, to give them a heads-up. Shortly thereafter, more launches were reported. After speaking with Dunford, I decided to call Trump to tell him what we knew. The missiles were short range, so there was no immediate threat, but you never knew with the North Koreans. I called Trump a second time a bit later, after still more launches, to say it looked like things were finished for the night. He said, in a somewhat agitated voice, “Keep it calm, play it down, play it down,” obviously worried people might think his friend Kim Jong Un was a touch dangerous. By then, based on public statements by the South Korean Ministry of Defense, press stories were appearing in South Korea, which had more to worry about from short-range missiles. Since State would inevitably be drafting something on our reaction, I concluded, just to be sure, that I needed to check with Trump first. I called him for the third and last time that night about an hour later, and as I suspected, he wanted no statement at all. He ended with “Okay, man,” one of his usual ways of saying he was relaxed about how we’d concluded a particular issue. Statement or not, these ballistic-missile tests, whatever the ranges, violated the Security Council resolutions forming the basis of the international sanctions against North Korea. Not that I was concerned about some inviolable status for council resolutions, but I worried pragmatically that if we dismissed clear violations as immaterial, other nations would learn the wrong lesson and start characterizing significant sanctions violations as de minimis. This was more than a little risky. Just to confirm my fears, when I relayed the latest information to Trump the next morning, he said, “Call it artillery,” as if labeling it something it wasn’t would make it disappear. He had also tweeted, in part, “[Kim Jong Un] knows that I am with him & does not want to break his promise to me. Deal will happen!” Trump obviously thought these tweets helped him with Kim, but I worried they reinforced the perception he was desperate for a deal and that only his destructive advisors (guess who) stood in the way. We had all given up any idea of stopping the tweeting; all we could do was live with it. Interestingly, South Korea’s government was also now calling the rockets “projectiles” to minimize the story. All this because of a regime in Pyongyang that was beseeching the world for food for its supposedly starving people but still had enough spare change to engage in missile and nuclear-weapons development. Others weren’t so resigned.” (Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, pp. 304-05)
Elleman: “On May 4, under the watchful eye of Kim Jong Un, North Korea launched a series of projectiles featuring two types of large-caliber, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and a new short-range ballistic missile. A few days later, North Korea released photographs of tested projectiles, which provides a basis for preliminary evaluations. The 240 mm and 300 mm diameter MLRS systems are not new to North Korea, nor do they alter the country’s battlefield capabilities. The short-range ballistic missile, depending on its origins, may significantly enhance Pyongyang’s capacity to conduct strategic strikes against targets in South Korea. The 240 mm diameter rocket has been part of the DPRK’s arsenal for several decades. It has an estimated range of about 40 to 50 km and carries a relatively small warhead of about 45 kg. Photographs reveal that it relies on a smokeless, double-base solid fuel that is common to most battlefield rockets. The larger 300 mm diameter rocket, designated by US intelligence as the KN-09, is a newer, more capable MLRS. The rocket was first tested in 2013, with subsequent tests performed in 2014 and 2016. It has a reported range of 190 to 200 km and carries a light, conventional warhead. It is powered by a standard composite-type solid fuel. Photographs show that the rocket is steered during flight by four small canard fins mounted at the rocket’s front end, near the warhead section, which provides for precision strikes if the guidance unit includes a satellite navigation receiver to update the inertial navigation components. The opaque exhaust plume indicates a composite-type solid fuel. Note the small canards positioned near the warhead section. These fins, when combined with a satellite-aided navigation system result in a precision-guided munition capable of striking key, fixed targets at distances approaching 200 km from the launch location. The KN-09 is fielded on a six-wheeled truck equipped with two launch pods, each having four launch tubes. Its primary mission is to strike rear echelon targets, some 50 to 100 km behind the primary line of battle. The KN-09’s origins are unclear. It may be a modified version of a Chinese WS-1B rocket, or another similar system from the Weishi family of rockets originally developed by the China National Precision Machinery Corporation (CPMIEC). The new missile tested by North Korea outwardly appears to be a Russian Iskander (9M723, SS-26), short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) which has a range of about 280 km when carrying a 450-500 kg warhead. There are several versions of Iskander, including the Iskander-E which was specifically designed and produced for export. Moscow is permitted to export the Iskander-E because its range and payload characteristics fall below the performance thresholds established by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Iskander flies on a flattened trajectory, never exceeding an altitude of about 50 km. The R-17 (Scud-B) ballistic missile, by comparison, reaches a peak elevation of 80 to 90 km when covering a ground distance of 280 to 300 km. At altitudes below 50 km the air is dense enough to facilitate aerodynamic steering using the four small fins mounted at the Iskander’s tail end. In other words, Iskander can alter its flight path after the boost phase, and over its entire trajectory. When aided by satellite-navigation, receivers such as GPS or GLONASS (Globalnaya Navigazionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema), Iskander can make course corrections and reliably land within 20 to 50 meters of its designated target. Such accuracy allows Iskander to destroy targets dependably when armed with a conventional warhead, making it a very effective military weapon. In-flight maneuverability, in addition to substantially enhancing accuracy, also complicates and compromises ballistic-missile defenses. Defenses can no longer precisely predict Iskander’s post-boost flight path, making it more difficult for the fire-control radar to calculate an anticipated interception point, without which the interceptor cannot be aimed with precision. Instead, the interceptor must fly to an approximated intercept point and rely on its kill-vehicle to make larger adjustments than would be otherwise needed as it makes a final approach to the target. The added unpredictability reduces intercept probabilities. Finally, Iskander can exploit gaps in South Korean and American missile-defense coverage. While the exact numbers are secret, Patriot missile-defense interceptors are believed to have an engagement ceiling of about 40 km. The upper-tier or exo-atmospheric interceptors employed by THAAD and Aegis missile defenses have an engagement floor of roughly 50 km attitude. This creates a 10-km interceptor effectiveness seam at altitudes between 40 and 50 km. The seam almost perfectly coincides with Iskander’s flight path prior to its sharp dive toward ground-based target. Current missile defenses may struggle to intercept Iskander missiles reliably. The origin of the short-range ballistic missile tested by North Korea is unknown. There are three possibilities: 1) North Korea imported Russian-made Iskander missiles; 2) the tested missile is an Iskander clone produced by another country and transferred to Pyongyang; or 3) North Korean engineers either acquired technical documentation for the Iskander, or otherwise copied the Iskander’s design and produced the missile indigenously, with or without foreign technical assistance. Photographs of the missile look remarkably like those of a Russian-produced Iskander, suggesting that North Korea imported the missile either directly from Moscow, or through a third party. However, the tested missile is also very similar to two other known systems, the Hyunmoo-2 fielded by South Korea and the Ukrainian Grom (sometimes Hrim), which is reportedly under development. All four missiles appear to share the same external dimensions and features, with only minor differences in the shape of the nose cones. Iskander is known to be equipped with at least three different nose cones, so the variations across the four missiles may not be determinate. The four missiles featured have nearly identical dimensions and external features. Only the nose cones exhibit minor differences. But, as shown in the schematic drawings (right) the original Iskander is fitted with a variety of warhead sections (i.e., nosecones). It seems highly probable that the Grom, Hyungmoo-2 and DRPK missiles were at a minimum inspired by the Russian Iskander. Procuring the Hyunmoo-2, which was reportedly designed and developed by South Korea with technical assistance from Russia, seems highly improbable for obvious reasons. Acquiring the Grom from Ukraine is distinctly possible, although the Ukrainian version of Iskander reportedly remains in early development. Nonetheless, this possibility cannot be dismissed, despite it being unlikely. This leaves scenarios one and three as the more probable explanations. North Korea is already known to have produced prototypes for the Pukguksong-1 and -2 missiles, both of which are solid-fuel systems. It would not be too surprising if its engineers ventured to develop a smaller, shorter-range missile resembling Iskander. However, there are no reports of development activity for such a missile, casting some doubt on this explanation. Further, the first suggestion that North Korea was interested in a missile like Iskander was seen during a February 2018 military parade in Pyongyang, where mockups of a missile of similar size and shape were unveiled. The mockups, however, were quite crude, as were the transporter erector launchers (TELs) carrying them. Iskander is a very sophisticated missile, one that would require years of development and testing. The missile tested last week, if domestically designed and produced, even with extensive foreign assistance would be in an early development phase, years away from operational deployment, and years removed from being a precision-guided missile. The more likely explanation relates to the direct import of Iskander from either Russia or a third party. Pictures from the test launch support this explanation. As shown in Figure 5, and highlighted originally by German missile-specialist Markus Schiller, the debris generated by the launch in North Korea is a virtual match of a launch of Iskander conducted by Russia. This coincidence is compelling and fully consistent with the importation of a Russian-produced Iskander. If North Korea did in fact import Iskanders from Russia, it has an existing capacity to deliver warheads to targets in South Korea with great precision, and an ability to penetrate existing missile defenses deployed in the South. Regardless of the origins of North Korea’s newest short-range ballistic missile, its appearance and testing provide convincing evidence that Pyongyang continues to seek greater military and strategic capabilities. This is not surprising, as Pyongyang perceives itself to be under threat of aggression by the United States. Kim Jong Un very likely has other strategic weapons projects underway, whether foreign procurement efforts or indigenous development programs. If little progress is made in the negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang in the near to mid-term future, expect to see the unveiling of more, increasingly capable strategic weapons and capabilities.” (Michael Elleman, “North Korea’s Newest Ballistic Missile: An Initial Assessment,” 38 North, May 8, 2019)
President Donald Trump expressed confidence today that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un will keep his promise on denuclearization despite Pyongyang’s firing of unidentified projectiles. “Anything in this very interesting world is possible, but I believe that Kim Jong Un fully realizes the great economic potential of North Korea, & will do nothing to interfere or end it,” Trump tweeted. “He also knows that I am with him & does not want to break his promise to me. Deal will happen!” (Yonhap, “Trump Voices Confidence in Kim despite N. Korea’s Projectile Launch,” May 4, 2019)
Pompeo: “Q: Yesterday, North Korea fired what it is calling short-range projectiles. But the question is — and let’s put these up on the screen — were they, in fact, North Korea’s new short-range ballistic missiles? And if so, did they violate North Korea’s moratorium on missile tests since 2017? POMPEO: Here’s what we know so far. The launches — and there were several — were of a short range. I don’t want to say exactly how long. We’re still working to ensure that we have the data set right. We have high confidence that they were not intermediate-range missiles, that they were not long-range missiles or intercontinental missiles. We are continuing to evaluate that data set. But we want to put it in the larger context. We still have every intention of negotiating a good resolution with North Korea to get them to denuclearize. We’ve known it would be a long path. We’ve known it wouldn’t be straightforward. But I have extended our negotiating hand to the North Koreans since Hanoi. We’ve heard back from them. I extend my hand to continue those negotiations. We want to continue to work towards a peaceful resolution to achieve denuclearization, fully verified, in North Korea. Q: You — I just want to make it clear. Were they, in fact — those that we just put up on the screen — the new North Korean short-range ballistic missiles? POMPEO: I didn’t see the list on the screen. I’m going to let the Department of Defense make announcements about what they ultimately determine these to be. I can tell you what we have ruled out with certainty. Q: And you don’t, or do you, see it as violating their moratorium on missile tests? POMPEO: We’ll have to take a look. We know our objective. The moratorium was focused, very focused, on intercontinental missile systems, the ones that threaten the United States for sure. Q: North Korean officials — you talk about wanting to continue talks — have gone after you recently. I want to put some of this on the screen. They said you have a, quote, “mean character;” you should be replaced by someone, quote, “more careful and mature in communicating with us;” and you talk about changing — your talk about changing paths if diplomacy fails — their quote, sir, not mine — is “stupid and dangerous.” I guess the question I have is: The President says, even in a tweet yesterday, the deal will happen. It sure seems like diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea is in trouble. POMPEO: It always seems that way until it’s successful, Chris. And as for the North Korean comments, the immaturity thing I’m not so sure about. The rest of it I’ll let the world decide. Q: There were some moments in this conversation when I thought mean might be correct. POMPEO: Fair enough. The President gets to choose who his negotiators are. He’s leading the effort. We are — we want to maximize the possibility and keep open to the maximum extent possible that we can achieve the outcome that President Kim himself told President Trump in June in Singapore that we’ll achieve, and we’re working to do that. That’s what the State Department’s mission is.” (DoS, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, Interview with Chris Wallace of Fox News, Washington, D.C., May 5, 2019)
5/6/19:
North Korea’s recent launch of projectiles could have been a move to pressure rival states and may not be a signal that it wants to break off negotiations, South Korea’s spy agency told lawmakers during a parliamentary briefing today. Pyongyang also appears to be adjusting the intensity of the message it is sending to the U.S., Rep. Lee Hye-hoon, head of the intelligence committee, told reporters after a parliamentary session with the National Intelligence Service here. North Korea fired multiple projectiles from its east coast town of Wonsan into the East Sea two days ago. The South’s spy agency also said the projectiles appear to have been launched from a ground-to-ground weapons system. Seoul’s Defense Ministry had previously said the projectiles appeared to include a new tactical guided weapon and 240-millimeter and 300-mm multiple rocket launchers. The projectiles flew between 70 kilometers to 240 kilometers, the ministry added. Yesterday, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reiterated the desire to reach a “peaceful resolution” of North Korea issues, as Seoul and Washington appear cautious over confirming details of projectiles launched by the North last week. Although they are still determining details of the projectiles, Pompeo said they are highly confident they were neither intermediate-range nor intercontinental missiles. “I extend my hand to continue those negotiations. We want to continue to work towards a peaceful resolution to achieve denuclearization, fully verified, in North Korea,” Pompeo said in an interview with Fox News. “We’ll have to take a look. We know our objective. The moratorium was focused, very focused, on intercontinental missile systems, the ones that threaten the United States for sure,” Pompeo said when asked whether Pyongyang has violated its self-imposed moratorium. If the projectile proves to be a ballistic missile, Saturday’s launch would be the first ballistic missile test or drill conducted by Pyongyang since 2017. With the U.S. and South Korean governments yet to confirm the exact nature of the projectiles launched, experts have raised the possibility that the weapon may be similar to — or is — the Iskander, a Russian tactical ballistic missile. If North Korea did launch its own version of the Iskander, it could be in violation of the UN Security Council resolution that bans Pyongyang from all kinds of ballistic missile launches. The sudden launch also appears to be a clear warning to the United States, experts say, amid stalled talks on denuclearization. The latest summit between Trump and Kim ended without striking an accord. (Jo He-rim, “North Korea’s Projectiles Ploy to Pressure U.S. in Negotiations: Spy Agency,”” Korea Herald, May 6, 2019)
Bolton: “Abe called on Monday, May 6, to say Kim was getting ever-more irritated over the sanctions’ effects on North Korea, because they were working effectively, and that these new launches were intended to turn the situation in his favor by undermining international unity over the sanctions. Abe said he would completely support Trump’s outstanding policy of aiming for a deal and maintaining sanctions and a robust military posture, a posture he still holds publicly. I understood what Abe was trying to do, but I wondered if constantly telling Trump his strategy was brilliant didn’t in fact decrease Abe’s ability to keep the Trump train on the rails. In fact, Trump suggested Abe put out a statement that Japan and the United States were totally allied so that North Korea would see unambiguously that Japan was with us. He concluded by committing to keep Abe informed, but not to worry, because the launches were short-range and not really missiles. If he said it enough times, perhaps it would become true. The next day, Moon called Trump to speak about the weekend launches. Moon was, unsurprisingly, eager to play down the significance of the issue, about which Trump had already persuaded himself. As Moon rambled on about Kim Jong Un’s dissatisfaction with the joint US–South Korea military exercises, Trump observed that Moon seemed to have lost his relationship with Kim, who was now not traveling to South Korea as once envisaged. Trump didn’t see this breakdown as Moon’s fault, but obviously something had happened. Moon conceded there still had been few if any substantive discussions with North Korea since Hanoi. Somehow Moon was able to turn that into an argument the US should be giving direct food aid to the North, instead of simply allowing the South to provide it through UNICEF and the World Food Program. Trump answered by saying that he would surprise Moon by giving his complete blessing to releasing the aid through the UN agencies, and asked Moon to let North Korea know that he had suggested it to him. Trump said he was doing this despite hard-liners who opposed it because he had a good relationship with Kim, and the timing was good. So much for consistency. North Korea could conclude, “We fire missiles and get free food.” This was a terrible signal, showing again how eager Trump was for a deal. I stressed to Pottinger and Hooker to make clear to South Korea that we weren’t going to be providing any food ourselves. We were simply not objecting to its providing resources, but also insisting that food aid distributed in the North required very careful monitoring.” (Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, pp. 305-06)
Carlin: “Pyongyang has reported that on May 4, Kim Jong Un observed an east coast firing drill of “large-caliber long-range multiple rocket launchers and tactical guided weapons.” That would seem to undercut considerable speculation in US and South Korean media that this was either a move to protest the failure of the US-DPRK summit in Hanoi in February or to signal Washington a tougher policy on Kim’s part. It is much more likely that the drill was the “corresponding measure” that Pyongyang had warned of in an April 25 statement by the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country (CPRC), blasting Seoul for continuing military exercises and other activity the North claims is contrary to inter-Korean agreements reached since the first inter-Korean summit in April 2018.” (Robert Carlin, “DPRK Firing Drill: Message to Blue House,” 38 North, May 6, 2019)
For John Bolton, the national-security adviser, the summit represented a conundrum. Two months before he entered the White House, in April, 2018, he had called for preemptive war with North Korea. During the past two decades, Bolton has established himself as the Republican Party’s most militant foreign-policy thinker—an advocate of aggressive force who ridicules anyone who disagrees. In an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, he argued that Kim’s regime would soon be able to strike the United States with nuclear weapons, and that we should attack before it was too late. “The threat is imminent,” he wrote. “It is perfectly legitimate for the United States to respond to the current ‘necessity’ posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons by striking first.” Since the early two-thousands, Bolton has told anyone who would listen that North Korea will never seriously consider giving up its nuclear weapons, no matter what threats or inducements the Americans present; negotiations only bought the regime more time. Privately, he told aides that the summit in Hanoi was unlikely to succeed. “It’s hard to find people here who aren’t deeply skeptical,” an Administration official said to me. “But this is something the President wants to try, and Bolton has promised to support him.” When I saw Bolton in his office, on a frigid winter day, he was mild-mannered and spoke in a reedy voice that belied his ferocious opinions. His long face seems assembled around his mustache, a bushy walrus that evokes the late German author Günter Grass. When I asked Bolton about the contrast between his views and Trump’s, he said, “The President knows where I stand on all the issues, because he watched me on Fox News. You have to know in advance the President’s views are not always yours. When you enter government, you know that you aren’t going to win everything.” In North Korea, he told me, Trump believed that the situation had changed enough to justify negotiations. He noted the combination of crushing economic sanctions and the ascension of Kim Jong Un, in 2011. Bolton argued that Kim, whose grandfather and father built a state based on terror and scarcity, was so eager to revitalize the economy that perhaps he could be persuaded to give up his weapons. Bolton wasn’t very convincing, after a career spent scoffing at such talk, but he went on gamely. “Kim told us, ‘I’m not like my father or the Founder.’ He has an ability to see another future that his country could have,” he said. To help persuade Kim, Trump had made a four-minute video extolling the possibilities of Western investment—an ersatz movie trailer, billed as a Destiny Pictures Production. In Hanoi, the two sides gathered at the Metropole, a grand hotel built during the French colonial era, where they met in a conference room by the swimming pool. Trump brought six aides, Kim two. According to White House officials, the negotiations stalled when Kim offered to shut down the Yongbyon plutonium-manufacturing plant, which represents only a fraction of the country’s nuclear program, in exchange for a near-total lifting of U.S. sanctions. American negotiators had warned their North Korean counterparts beforehand that they would not consider such a proposal. “It was a preposterous position—preposterous—and they had no fallback,” a senior Administration official told me. After four and a half hours, it became clear that the meeting had failed. As the two leaders stood up, Trump told Kim, “Let’s keep talking.” Within hours, suspicious activity—possibly construction—had been spotted around the Yongbyon facility. For Bolton, the outcome of the summit vindicated a twenty-year argument that the North Korean regime wouldn’t be moved by negotiations. But, even though he was now in the White House, it seemed that the rest of his argument—that America needs to strike immediately—was having little effect. A Western diplomat who knows Bolton told me, “The trouble for Bolton is, Trump does not want war. He does not want to launch military operations. To get the job, Bolton had to cut his balls off and put them on Trump’s desk.” Bolton was born in a working-class neighborhood, the son of a firefighter and a homemaker, neither of whom finished high school. He is often referred to as a neoconservative—a former liberal who endorses a hawkish foreign policy and wants to spread democracy abroad. In fact, he has been a conservative his whole life. His father, though a member of the firefighters’ union, was a steadfast Republican, and Bolton absorbed his values early. As a teen-ager, at the McDonogh boarding school, which he attended on scholarship, he volunteered to support Barry Goldwater during his run for President, in 1964. Goldwater, a Republican from Arizona, pitched himself as an unapologetic conservative, fighting for foundational liberties against “the Eastern establishment.” Bolton was enthralled. “I cheered when Barry said we should cut off the eastern seaboard and let it drift out to sea,” he wrote in his memoir, “Surrender Is Not an Option.” Goldwater lost, in one of the most lopsided electoral defeats of the twentieth century, but Bolton only grew more inspired. “If the sustained and systematic distortion of a fine man’s philosophy could succeed, abetted by every major media outlet in the country,” he wrote, “it was time to fight back.” In the fall of 1966, Bolton started at Yale, on scholarship. He was a working-class kid among the upper class—at the time, twenty per cent of freshmen came from just five exclusive boarding schools—and a conservative on a liberal campus. (Bolton’s was the last all-male class at Yale; he opposed coeducation.) Yale was riven by the Vietnam War, which Bolton supported, at least rhetorically. In May, 2001, Bolton was named Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. The terror attacks of September 11, 2001, came a few months later, and the State Department and the White House were often in conflict about how to react: Dick Cheney, the Vice-President, urged an assertive use of military power abroad, while Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, was more restrained. Lawrence Wilkerson, Powell’s chief of staff, told me that Bolton was appointed to his position only at Cheney’s insistence. “Everyone knew that Bolton was Cheney’s spy,” Mark Groombridge, an aide to Bolton at the time, told me. George W. Bush’s Administration had vowed to attack any “rogue nation” that developed weapons of mass destruction, and Bolton began a public crusade against America’s enemies, real and presumed. In May, 2002, he spoke at the Heritage Foundation, where he accused the Cuban government of developing an ambitious biological-weapons program and of collaborating with such pariah states as Libya and Iran. As he prepared to give similar testimony to Congress, Christian Westermann, an analyst at the State Department’s internal intelligence bureau, told him that the bureau’s information did not support such a view. (Westermann declined to comment for this story.) Bolton, according to several officials, threatened to fire him. “He got very red in the face and shaking his finger at me, and explained to me that I was acting way beyond my position for someone who worked for him,” Westermann later testified. “I told him I didn’t work for him.” Bolton began excluding Westermann’s supervisor from daily briefings and, after an unsuccessful attempt to fire him, tried to transfer him to another office. Carl Ford, who oversaw the intelligence bureau, complained to Powell that Bolton was misrepresenting the views of its officials. Powell decided to have Ford brief Congress in Bolton’s place. Bolton was angry enough that he didn’t speak to Ford for six months. Then, as Ford was preparing to retire, Bolton called him on the phone. “He told me he was glad I was leaving,” Ford said. (Bolton denies making this call.) Bolton’s immersion in the arcana of weapons of mass destruction encouraged an absolutist view. “The first thing he thinks about in the morning is protecting Americans from nuclear weapons,” Sarah Tinsley, who has worked as an aide to Bolton since the eighties, told me. In 2003, as he prepared testimony for an appearance before Congress, he described Syria’s efforts to produce nuclear and biological weapons as an urgent threat—an assessment that intelligence agencies thought was exaggerated. A bitter internal debate ensued; the accusations endangered the Syrian government’s cooperation in hunting suspected terrorists. “We were getting some of our best, if not our best, intelligence on Al Qaeda from Damascus,” Lawrence Wilkerson told me. Richard Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State, took Bolton aside and “told him to shut up,” Wilkerson said. Before Bolton testified to Congress, much of his language was diluted. Armitage reached out to a team of intelligence officers who vetted public statements made by State Department officials, and asked them to give special scrutiny to Bolton’s. “Nothing Bolton said could leave the building until I O.K.’d it,” Thomas Fingar, who led the team at the time, told me. As the Bush White House made the case to invade Iraq, Bolton came into conflict with José Bustani, who was in charge of overseeing the Chemical Weapons Convention—a treaty, endorsed by the U.S. and a hundred and ninety-two other countries, that bans the production of chemical weapons. Bustani, a former senior diplomat from Brazil, was negotiating with the Iraqi government to adopt the treaty, which mandated immediate inspections by outside technicians. He thought that, if inspectors could verify that Iraq had abandoned its chemical-weapons program, an invasion wouldn’t be necessary. But, he told me, when the Iraqis agreed to accept the convention, the Bush Administration asked him to halt his negotiations. “I think the White House was worried that if I succeeded it would mess up their plans to invade,” he said. Not long afterward, Bustani recalls, Bolton showed up at his office in The Hague and demanded that he resign. When Bustani refused, Bolton said, “We know you have two sons in New York. We know your daughter is in London. We know where your wife is.” (Bolton has denied this.) Bustani held firm, and the White House, determined to remove him, convened an extraordinary session of the Convention’s members—in many cases, Bustani said, paying the travel expenses of delegates to insure that they attended. The group voted forty-eight to seven, with forty-three abstentions, to cut short Bustani’s term. Later that year, Bustani was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, for his work against chemical weapons. When U.S. troops moved into Iraq, they found no evidence of weapons of mass destruction. Commentators across the political spectrum have decried the invasion—even Trump calls it “a big, fat mistake”—but Bolton hasn’t changed his view. In 2015, he told the Washington Examiner, “I still think the decision to overthrow Saddam was correct.” Bolton had some successes at the U.N. Most notably, he helped persuade the Security Council to impose its first economic sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear-weapons programs. But when his post expired, after sixteen months, the Democrats had won back the majority in Congress, and it was clear that Bolton would not be confirmed. On December 31, 2006, he stepped down. A few months later, Bolton appeared on Fox News to warn viewers that their government was intolerably complacent. “Six years after 9/11, people are simply not focusing the way they should,” he said. “I hope it is not going to take another 9/11 to wake us up—particularly not a 9/11 with weapons of mass destruction.” Bolton, for years a favored guest on Fox, became a paid commentator. During the next decade, he made hundreds of appearances, often arguing that America needed to act urgently to counter threats from abroad. He spoke in favor of military strikes on Iranian training camps (“This is not provocative or preemptive—this is entirely responsive”), forced regime change in North Korea (“the only solution”), and punitive measures against Vladimir Putin for sheltering the intelligence leaker Edward Snowden (“We need to do things that cause him pain”). In his bid for Secretary of State, Bolton had support from populist conservatives. According to a former senior Administration adviser, the Mercer family “pushed hard for him.” But his candidacy was derailed by members of the Republican establishment. Robert M. Gates, the former Secretary of Defense, and Condoleezza Rice, the former Secretary of State, suggested that Trump appoint Rex Tillerson, an oil C.E.O. with experience in international business. “I wanted to recommend someone who would be good,” Gates told me. Tillerson got the job. One weekend in 2017, Bolton and General H. R. McMaster were invited to Mar-a-Lago, the President’s Palm Beach mansion, to audition to become national-security adviser. McMaster won. A decorated veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with a reputation as an iconoclast, he came to Mar-a-Lago in full-dress uniform. According to the former senior Administration adviser, McMaster had support from Jared Kushner, who thought that his appointment would play well in the press. Trump admired Bolton’s Fox appearances—he has praised him as “a tough cookie.” But the former senior Administration adviser told me that Trump, who prefers that his officials look the part, was put off by Bolton’s mustache—and, more significant, by his interventionist mind-set. “Trump had big reservations,” the official said. “John wants to bomb everyone.” If Bolton was disappointed at being passed over, McMaster’s experience in the White House might have reassured him. McMaster was sorely out of place: a seasoned navigator of international institutions working for a President who often seemed determined to tear them down. The chemistry between McMaster and Trump was never good. “H.R. is intense, and he would try to tell the President as best he could the consequences of his decisions,” a former senior Administration official told me. McMaster also clashed with Secretary of Defense James Mattis. On numerous occasions, current and former officials say, Mattis tried to block White House initiatives, leaving McMaster caught in the middle. In the fall of 2017, McMaster was planning a private session to develop military options for the possibility of conflict with North Korea: a war game, with Trump in attendance, at the Presidential retreat in Camp David. McMaster asked Mattis to send officers and planners. Mattis ignored him. “He prevented the thing from happening,” the former senior Administration official told me. Later, Mattis kept General John Nicholson, the commander of American forces in Afghanistan, from meeting with Trump. Administration officials speculate that Mattis was trying to avoid a war, or that he simply wanted to control the flow of information, so that the President could not make ill-advised decisions. “There are a lot of people in the Administration who want to limit the President’s options because they don’t want the President to get anything done,” the former senior Administration official told me. Mattis declined to comment for the record, but a former senior national-security official told me, without confirming any incidents, that a strategy had evolved. “The President thinks out loud,” he said. “Do you treat it like an order? Or do you treat it as part of a longer conversation? We treated it as part of a longer conversation.” By allowing Trump to talk without acting, he said, “we prevented a lot of bad things from happening.” In 2017, Mattis and his staff helped forestall a complete withdrawal of American forces from both Afghanistan and Syria. Mattis’s obstinacy inspired deep frustration in the White House. “Who the hell elected Mattis President of the United States?” a former aide said to me. When Trump felt that he was being ignored, he sometimes blamed McMaster. “The President thought it was H.R. who was blocking him,” the former senior Administration official said. The atmosphere grew so tense that at one-point Mattis, visibly agitated, walked into McMaster’s office and asked if there was a problem between them. McMaster excused his aides and shut the door. Over the sound of a turned-up television, the two men engaged in what one-person present described as an “animated discussion.” In March, 2018, according to a former Administration official, the President called McMaster and asked what he would think if Bolton became the new national-security adviser. It was clear to McMaster that he was being fired, but less clear that the President was certain Bolton was the right replacement. The official, who overheard Trump’s side of the conversation, recalled that the President ended the call with an uncomfortable joke: “Bolton is a hawk like you. He’s going to get us into a war.” When Bolton took over, he quickly demonstrated an unsentimental style: he told Trump that he could not work with McMaster’s former aide Keith Kellogg, a seventy-three-year-old veteran who had won a Silver Star in Vietnam. Trump decided to send Kellogg to work for Vice-President Mike Pence. The former senior Administration official told me that there was widespread sympathy for Bolton: “Kellogg doesn’t have all of his faculties. He’s like the crazy uncle at Thanksgiving. But Trump liked him, so Pence had to take him.” McMaster had set up a rigorous process for discussing issues with staff members, making recommendations to the President, and disseminating decisions through the bureaucracy. Under Bolton, there are fewer meetings, less collaboration; he often disappears into his office to immerse himself in documents. “H.R.’s door was always open—Bolton’s is closed,” a former national-security official told me. “He reads the memos. There just isn’t a lot of feedback.” Some former officials believe that Bolton’s insularity could be dangerous, particularly in a crisis, when various arms of the government and the military have to mount a quick and coordinated response. “It’s chaos under Bolton,” the former senior national-security official told me. “The national-security adviser is supposed to facilitate the President’s directives and coordinate national policy among the various government agencies. That process has completely broken down.” The official added, “Bolton hasn’t set any priorities. No one knows what the policies are—what’s important, what’s less important. The head is not connected to the body.” Principals’ meetings—crucial gatherings involving the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the heads of intelligence agencies—have become rare. “I don’t remember the last time there was a fucking principals’ meeting,” the official said. When I raised the issue with Bolton, he seemed unconcerned. He pointed to an oil painting on his office wall which depicted George H. W. Bush with a small group of close aides, including Brent Scowcroft, his national-security adviser. “That’s decision-making,” he said. The comparison to the first Bush Administration doesn’t go far. Scowcroft and Bush were temperamentally similar—both reflective, cautious members of the establishment. Trump is restless and impulsive; Bolton, who goes to bed at nine-thirty every night and rises at three-thirty in the morning, is known for his lawyerly focus. Scowcroft and Bush were close friends before they began working together; Trump and Bolton were only vaguely acquainted. As national-security adviser, Bolton has unrivalled proximity to the Commander-in-Chief. But he described their relationship as businesslike. “I don’t socialize with the President, I don’t play golf with him—I see him in the morning and I talk to him at night,” he told me. In addition to giving Trump a rundown of potential national threats each morning, Bolton attends the President’s Daily Brief, a top-secret meeting with Gina Haspel, the head of the C.I.A., and Dan Coats, the director of National Intelligence. Trump prefers to hold these meetings just two or three times a week, and is famously susceptible to distractions—people walking into the office, telephone calls, even houseflies. Aides have found that detailed briefings provoke impatience; graphics and bullet points work better, and relatable photographs better still. “Bolton gets to the point very fast,” a senior Administration official told me. “He’s very brief, and the President appreciates that.” Groombridge, the former aide, said, “John is thinking, To the extent I can modify or mollify the President’s actions, I will. He is truly a patriot. But I wonder how he goes into work every day, because deep in his heart he believes the President is a moron.” Trump’s foreign policy, to the extent that he has one, tends toward isolationism, while Bolton’s is expansive but heavily unilateral, spurning allies when necessary. At times, though, unilateralism can sound a lot like America First. Both Bolton and Trump are dismissive of the international architecture of treaties and alliances, which was largely constructed by the United States following the Second World War. At the 2018 G-20 summit, in Buenos Aires, a gathering of the world’s largest economies, Bolton instigated a confrontation over the communiqué that announced the meeting’s results. As the document was being drafted, according to an American official who was present, one of Bolton’s aides began taking out phrases—“gender equality,” “multilateral institutions,” “rules-based international order.” The official told me, “He would point to a phrase and say, ‘This won’t pass the Bolton test.’” Bolton’s unilateralist approach permeates the N.S.C. “‘The post-World War Two rules-based global order’?” a Bolton staffer said to me. “What does that mean?” The Western diplomat told me that Bolton differed from other White House advisers, such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who reflexively agree with the President. “Pompeo is really interested not in foreign policy but in what is good for Trump. When you are out of the Trump field, he has nothing to say,” the diplomat told me. “When you meet Bolton, it’s a real conversation on any issue, no matter how obscure.” The former senior national-security official told me, “Trump feels aligned with Bolton. He talks tough—he’s a hawk. Trump likes that.” Still, it’s not clear how much influence Bolton—or any senior adviser—has over the President. In April, 2018, during Bolton’s first week in office, Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria dropped chemical weapons—probably chlorine gas—into a densely populated suburb of Damascus. The gas caused agonizing deaths for at least forty-nine people and sickened at least six hundred and fifty others, many of them women and children. The previous year, Trump had responded to a similar attack by ordering a strike, in which fifty-nine missiles were fired at a government airbase. This time, when Bolton asked the Pentagon for options, Mattis gave only one, a limited strike with cruise missiles. Bolton was furious, a person familiar with his thinking told me: “Mattis is an obstructionist. He seemed to forget that it was the President who was elected.” After some modifications, Trump authorized the attack. But Bolton wanted more; he believed that the U.S. needed a more enduring military presence in Syria. When McMaster was the national-security adviser, he had carefully limited the scope of the mission in Syria, maintaining a deployment of some two thousand troops, dispatched by Obama in 2014. Their orders were to kill ISIS fighters and to train local soldiers, but not to fight Assad’s government, his Iranian and Russian backers, or their proxies in Hezbollah, the Lebanese armed group and political party. An adviser on Middle East issues told me that senior officials at the Pentagon and in national security had regarded the deployment as highly successful. “We were trying to follow the President’s guidance that this force was there to destroy ISIS, and that’s it,” the adviser said. Last summer, at a meeting with officials involved in Syria, Bolton announced that the mission was being expanded. According to the adviser on Middle East issues, who attended the meeting, Bolton told the group, “I don’t care about Syria, but I do care about Iran.” He said that the American forces would stay in Syria until the Iranians left—potentially for years. Bolton told his aides to communicate the new policy to the Russians, and he declared it publicly in September, 2018. Trump had been suggesting for months that the mission in Syria was nearly concluded. “We were very successful against ISIS,” he told a group of Eastern European leaders that April. “We’ll be successful against anybody militarily. But sometimes it’s time to come back home.” Now he was saddled with an open-ended military commitment, of a kind that he had repeatedly vowed to avoid. Bolton told me that he had secured the President’s permission to expand the mission, but the adviser on Middle East issues disagreed: “What’s obvious is that Bolton does not speak for the President.” In July, 2017, after Kim Jong Un test-fired a new missile, Trump posted an arch tweet: “Does this guy have anything better to do with his life?” But, that summer, there was evidence that the White House was concerned. As the regime launched a series of ballistic-missile tests, Trump ordered the Pentagon to begin removing the spouses and children of military personnel from South Korea. (“Mattis just ignored it,” the Administration official told me.) Since then, Trump has alternated between belligerent tweets and attempts to find a diplomatic solution. At the summit in Hanoi, he was seeking “the big deal”—the denuclearization of the country at one stroke. Shortly before joining the White House, Bolton described a grimly constrained set of options, which seemed to preclude diplomacy. “You’re getting down fairly quickly to a binary choice: live with a North Korea with nuclear weapons, or look at military force,” he said. “These are not attractive options, but that’s where we’re headed.” In fact, Bolton has believed for decades that these are the only two choices. In the early two-thousands, as the Bush Administration was negotiating to limit North Korea’s nuclear program, Bolton stridently advocated war. Wilkerson, Powell’s chief of staff, was so concerned that he brought Bolton into a private meeting on the consequences of military strikes: “I gave him a ten-minute brief on what a war with North Korea would look like—a hundred thousand casualties in the first thirty days, many of them Americans. The Japanese that would die. The Chinese that would die. The fact that Seoul, one of the most modern and forward-looking cities in the world, would probably be reduced to the Dark Ages. I told him, ‘That’s Passchendaele, John. That’s Ypres.’ ” He said that Bolton was unmoved: “John looked at me and said, ‘Are you done? Clearly, you do war. I don’t do war. I do policy.’” Bolton’s skepticism about negotiating with North Korea has largely been confirmed; several successive Administrations have failed to talk the regime into giving up its nuclear program. Now that the problem has fallen to the Trump Administration, though, Bolton is in the same position as the officials he’s been deriding for twenty-five years. The failure of the talks in Hanoi means that the North Korean regime can work toward a nuclear weapon capable of hitting the United States. “They haven’t demonstrated that capacity yet,” the Administration official said. But even a medium-range weapon would pose a threat to much of Asia. The Administration official, like others, was reluctant to speak about what might happen if North Korea does not back down. A strike to destroy the country’s nuclear capability would have catastrophic effects throughout the region. Even if the United States could cripple North Korea’s nuclear facilities, it could not eliminate its conventional weapons quickly enough to prevent them from being used. These include thousands of artillery pieces and mortars near the border with South Korea. Seoul, which has a population of ten million, including some two hundred thousand Americans, could suffer tens of thousands of casualties. In 2017, Mattis told reporters that a conflict on the Korean Peninsula would be “probably the worst kind of fighting in most people’s lifetimes.” Even in the White House, there seems to be a growing realization that military force is not a realistic option. “I think we could have destroyed the North’s nuclear program in the nineteen-nineties—it was more concentrated, and we knew where everything was,” the Administration official told me. “Not anymore. It’s too big and too dispersed.” But Bolton still believes that such a strike is possible, the source familiar with his thinking said: “We can still do it. We know where most, if not all, of their weapons are—we could destroy their nuclear capability. There are ways to deal with their artillery.” When I asked about potential casualties, he said that Bolton “wishes we weren’t at this point. But the military option remains viable.” The primary negotiating tool that remains is economic sanctions. The senior Administration official told me that the fiscal pressure on North Korea is greater than ever. Kim, the official said, has repeatedly told the North Korean people that their years of suffering and hardship will finally end. “We think that he has raised expectations, and now he has to follow through,” he said. Not long after the summit, Kim complained in a speech that the American team had come to Hanoi with “completely unrealizable plans.” Unless Trump changed his thinking, Kim said, “the U.S. will not be able to move us one iota even if they sat with us a hundred, a thousand times.” He added, however, that he was open to a third summit—extending an eighteen-month sequence of insults and meetings, during which the North Korean regime has continued to refine its weapons. In response, Trump described his relationship with Kim as “excellent.” In April, North Korea test-fired another missile. Bolton was nonplussed by Kim’s test. “That was their way of giving us the little finger,” the source familiar with his thinking said. “Not the big finger—just a little one.” The big finger came a week later: Kim held a summit with Vladimir Putin to discuss the nuclear situation. Afterward, Putin called for a return to “international law, instead of the rule of the fist.” People who have worked with Bolton say that he is focused less on North Korea than on Iran, where his vigilance can sometimes seem out of proportion to the apparent threat. “There are only two countries that can really threaten the United States—China and Russia,” the former senior national-security official said. “But Bolton has had this anal focus on Iran for twenty years. I don’t know why.” When I asked Bolton about it, he said, “I care about Iran because I care about nuclear weapons.” (Dexter Filkins, “On the Warpath,” The New Yorker, May 6, 2019, pp. 32-45)
5/7/19:
Despite North Korea’s recent weapons tests, including of a possible new short-range ballistic missile, President Trump said he supported South Korea’s humanitarian aid for the North to help alleviate its food shortages, the office of President Moon Jae-in of South Korea said. Trump expressed his support for humanitarian aid for North Korea when he and Moon talked on the phone tonight to discuss how to bring the North back to the negotiating table for nuclear disarmament, Moon’s office said in a statement. Trump and Moon discussed the recent joint report by the World Food Program and the Food and Agriculture Organization, released last week, in which the United Nations relief agencies warned that about 40 percent of North Korea’s population was in urgent need of food aid after the country suffered its worst harvest in a decade. “The two leaders discussed how to prevent North Korea from veering off the track of dialogue for denuclearization and how to resume the dialogue as early as possible,” said Mr. Moon’s spokeswoman, Ko Min-jung. “President Trump assessed that South Korea’s humanitarian food aid for North Korea would be a very timely and positive step, and supported it.” Both American and South Korean officials said they were still analyzing flight data to determine what types of weapons were tested. Defense analysts in South Korea said the new projectile may have been based on the design of the Iskander, a solid-fuel short-range ballistic missile from the Russian military. Both South Korea and the United States had used humanitarian aid shipments in the past as an incentive for North Korea to reduce tensions and return to dialogue. In recent years, American officials have been increasingly skeptical about the approach, arguing that the North should have bought food for its own people with the money it spent on building nuclear weapons. Nor did humanitarian aid help persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons development, they said. But when Moon met him at the White House on April 11, Trump said he and the South Korean leader were discussing humanitarian aid for the North. “I’m O.K. with that, to be honest,” he told reporters at the time. “South Korea is doing certain things to help out with food and various other things for North Korea.” (Choe Sang-hun, “U.S. Supports Food Aid for North Korea despite Recent Tests,” New York Times, May 8, 2019, p. A-9)
5/8/19:
DPRK FoMin spokesman “answer to a question put by KCNA on May 8 with regard to the fact that some forces are making an issue of the DPRK’s recent military drill. As has already been reported, a strike drill was conducted in the East Sea of Korea on May 4, the purpose of which was to check the operating ability of large-caliber long-range multiple rocket launchers and tactical guided weapons, the accuracy in mission fulfilment and the combat performance of military equipment of the defense units in the frontline area and on the eastern front and, on this occasion, to further galvanize the entire army into the movement for becoming crack shots and make thorough preparations for combat mobilization at all times. The drill once again confirmed the rapid reaction capability of those defense units in the frontline area and on the eastern front that are fully prepared to go immediately into combat under any orders and at any moment. Some forces, however, are making spiteful remarks on this routine and self-defensive military drill conducted by the DPRK. There are some countries that have become totally mute so far on the proactive measures of crucial and strategically decisive nature taken by the DPRK for peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and on the maximum patience demonstrated by the DPRK concerning the impasse created in the course of implementing the June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement because of the absence of due corresponding response to the said measures. These countries are now impertinently making spiteful remarks on our recent military drill of regular and self-defensive character. The recent drill conducted by our army is nothing more than part of the regular military training, and it has neither targeted anyone nor led to an aggravation of situation in the region. Any country carries on military drills for national defense and this kind of very normal drill is obviously different from the war exercises waged by some countries against other sovereign states. In last March and April alone, the U.S.-south Korea joint military exercise “Dong Maeng (Alliance) 19-1” and joint aerial military drill were conducted in south Korea, and war drill plans aiming at us continue to be worked out even at this very moment. For unknown reasons, however, there is only dead silence on these provocative military drills and war exercises. Only our regular and self-defensive military drill is branded as provocative, and this is an undisguised manifestation of the attempt to press the gradual disarmament of our state and finally invade us. We think this is very much unpleasant and regrettable, and we sound a note of warning. Those forces would be well-advised that if they attempt to deny our sovereignty and self-defensive right by making baseless allegations against us at anyone’s instigation, it might produce a result of driving us to the direction which neither we nor they want to see at all. We will watch the future words and deeds of those forces.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Criticizes Some Forces for Making Issue of Its Routine and Self-Defensive Military Drill,” May 8, 2019)
The U.S. Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA), which works to recover missing American troops around the world, said that it had not heard from North Korean officials since the second U.S.-North Korea summit, held in Hanoi in February, ended with no agreement. “As a result, our efforts to communicate with the Korean People’s Army regarding the possible resumption of joint recovery operations for 2019 have been suspended,” DPAA spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Hoffman said in a statement. “We have reached the point where we can no longer effectively plan, coordinate, and conduct field operations in (North Korea) during this fiscal year, which ends on September 30, 2019.” Hoffman said the DPAA is still trying to determine whether new recovery operations might be possible. “We are assessing possible next steps in resuming communications with the KPA to plan for potential joint recovery operations during Fiscal Year 2020,” he said. (Josh Smith, “Pentagon Suspends Efforts to Recover Troops’ Remains as North Korea Talks Stall,” Reuters, May 8, 2019)
5/9/19:
North Korea fired what were believed to be two short-range missiles today, South Korea’s military said, just five days after the communist nation launched a barrage of projectiles into the East Sea. The projectiles were launched from the northwestern area of Kusong in an easterly direction, one of them at 4:29 p.m. and the other at 4:39 p.m., and flew about 420 kilometers and 270 km, respectively, before landing in the East Sea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said. “Our military has strengthened surveillance and vigilance in case of a further launch from North Korea, and has maintained a full-fledged posture in close coordination with the United States,” the JCS said. The JCS had earlier said the projectiles were fired from the Sino-ri area, where the North has a base holding medium-range Nodong missiles. Kusong is about 40 km north of Sino-ri, officials said. The JCS did not elaborate further and did not specify where the projectiles landed or exactly what types the missiles were, only saying that the South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities are analyzing details of the projectiles. Shortly after the first firing, Japan said no North Korean projectile had landed in its territorial waters. “At the moment, we don’t see any situation that would immediately impact on Japan’s security,” its Ministry of Defense said in a statement. South Korea’s presidential office said it is keeping a close eye on the current security situation. Chung Eui-yong, head of Cheong Wa Dae’s National Security Office, is “keeping close tabs” on the situation, communicating with the Ministry of National Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) via video conference, at the national crisis management center, according to its spokesperson, Ko Min-jung. The latest projectile fire came after the North launched a volley of projectiles, including what it claimed were newly developed “tactical guided weapons” off the east coast six days ago, in an apparent show of frustration over the stalled nuclear talks with the United States. The latest launches also coincided with a visit to Seoul by the U.S. special representative for North Korea, Stephen Biegun, and annual trilateral defense talks between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan. Biegun met with his South Korean counterpart, Lee Do-hoon, earlier today, and is scheduled to hold meetings with other top officials, including Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha and Unification Minister Kim Yeon-chul, tomorrow. (Oh Seok-min, “N. Korea Fires Two Short-Range Missiles: JCS,” Yonhap, May 9, 2019)
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, guided the strike drill of defense units of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in the forefront area and on the western front on Thursday. At the command post Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un learned about a plan of the strike drill of various long-range strike means and gave an order of start of the drill. The drill for mobility and assault strike designed to inspect the rapid response of the defense units in the forefront area and on the western front successfully showed the might of the units which were fully prepared to proficiently carry out any operation and combat in the flames of the practical actual maneuvers kindled by the Party. Expressing satisfaction with the mobility, deployment and assault strike, Kim Jong Un said that some days ago, the defense units on the eastern front perfectly carried out their strike mission and today’s drill showed the full preparations of the defense units on the western front and the excellent ability of the units in the forefront area to carry out the task of strike, in particular. He stressed the need to further increase the capability of the defense units in the forefront area and on the western front to carry out combat tasks and keep full combat posture to cope with any emergency as required by the prevailing situation and in keeping with the Party’s strategic intention. Noting that the genuine peace and security of the country are guaranteed only by the strong physical force capable of defending its sovereignty, he stressed that the People’s Army should reliably defend the socialist country and the people’s heroic struggle for creation by force of arms of revolution in the future, too. He set forth important tasks for further increasing the strike ability of the defense units of the KPA in the forefront area and on the western front. Watching the drill together with him were leading officials of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea including Kim Phyong Hae, O Su Yong and Jo Yong Won.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Defense Units in Forefront Area and on Western Front,” May 10, 2019)
U.S. authorities announced it seized a North Korean ship allegedly used to sell coal in violation of international sanctions, the first such move by Justice Department officials as they ratchet up enforcement efforts against the regime in Pyongyang. Justice Department officials confirmed that the vessel, the Wise Honest, was approaching U.S. territorial waters in American Samoa, in coordination with the U.S. Marshals Service and the Coast Guard. “This sanctions-busting ship is now out of service,” Assistant Attorney General John C. Demers said in announcing the seizure. The 17,601-ton, single-hull bulk carrier ship is one of North Korea’s largest, and U.S. authorities said it was part of a network of North Korean vessels illicitly shipping coal from that country and bringing back heavy machinery in violation of U.N. and U.S. sanctions. Last year, Indonesian authorities stopped the ship on suspicion of violating sanctions. More recently, they allowed the ship to offload its coal cargo onto another vessel, which departed for Malaysia. After U.N. monitors raised alarms, Malaysia denied that ship, the Dong Thanh, entry to one of its ports, said Hugh Griffiths, who until last month led a team of U.N. monitors tracking North Korea sanctions. The Dong Thanh is anchored just off the coast of Malaysia, “unable to unload its cargo of coal anywhere,” Griffiths said. The announcement came just hours after North Korea launched a pair of short-range missiles, the regime’s second such test in the past week, and marked an escalation of U.S. government pressure on Pyongyang — even as President Trump has spoken glowingly about North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Geoffrey Berman, the U.S. attorney in New York whose office filed the complaint against the Wise Honest, said that “there’s no connection at all” between the missile strikes and the vessel’s seizure. Separately today, U.S. military officials conducted a scheduled launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile from an Air Force facility in California. It was the second test of the U.S. Minuteman III missile this month and the third this year, though the Air Force maintains that such activity is scheduled years in advance and not in response to world events. Trump told reporters today that the U.S.-North Korea relationship “continues, but we’ll see what happens. I know they want to negotiate. They’re talking about negotiating, but I don’t think they’re ready to negotiate.” The papers filed in federal court in New York said shipments by the Wise Honest and other North Korean vessels “provide a critical source of revenue” for North Korea’s government and companies based there. “Large quantities of coal were exported from North Korea … in violation of United Nations Security Council prohibitions,” the 32-page filing said. “In return, large shipments of heavy machinery were returned to North Korea using the same vessels.” The court filing says payments for improvements to the Wise Honest were conducted via U.S. banks, also in violation of sanctions. Experts have said that to evade sanctions, North Korea conducts its illicit trading with a fleet of ghost ships that have false names painted on their hulls, steal identification numbers from other vessels and execute their trades via ship-to-ship transfers at sea to avoid prying eyes at ports. Demers said the United States would like to seize other ships used by North Korea to violate sanctions. In the case of the Wise Honest, a globe-trotting North Korean salesman arranged the 2018 shipment by holding meetings at North Korea’s embassy in Jakarta, then paid an Indonesian broker through bank transfers facilitated by JPMorgan Chase, according to bank documents and other evidence gathered by sanctions monitors. Griffiths, the former U.N. monitor, said the Wise Honest has links to a North Korean network previously caught attempting to smuggle arms. Until 2017, the ship was partly owned by a Hong Kong-registered company called Vast Win (Hong Kong) Ltd., according to the Justice Department complaint. Vast Win owned a separate ship seized by Egyptian authorities in 2016 for carrying an illicit cargo of 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades manufactured in North Korea, Griffiths said. Ownership of the Wise Honest was transferred, he surmised, because the arms seizure in Egypt probably rendered Vast Win “no longer a good company to use for North Korean smuggling and vessel ownership.” Attempts to contact representatives of Vast Win were unsuccessful. North Korea was vexed by the Wise Honest’s seizure in Indonesia and tried to dispatch Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui to Indonesia earlier this year to inspect the ship and discuss its return, according to a person familiar with the matter. But the Indonesians told Western diplomats they intended to deny her a visa, and she never visited, the person said. Indonesian officials did not immediately respond to a request for comment. U.N. monitors say sanctions enforcement is dependent on the willingness of other countries to assist in seizures and charges when violations are discovered. (Devlin Barrett and Jeanne Whalen, “U.S. Authorities Seize North Korean Coal Ship, Accuse Pyongyang of Violating International Sanctions,” Washington Post, May 9, 2019)
South Korean President Moon Jae-in said today that, while he is concerned about North Korea’s launch of what is presumed to be a short-range missile, the North isn’t trying to sabotage dialogue. Moon also expressed the need for food aid to North Korea and suggested that the leaders of the ruling and opposition parties meet to discuss that issue. Moon made the remarks in an interview with KBS, which took place at the Sangchunjae reception hall at the Blue House on Thursday evening, which was the second anniversary of his inauguration as president. “I think that the launch of a ballistic missile, even a short-range one, could have violated UN Security Council resolutions,” Moon said. But alongside those concerns, he also emphasized that “North Korea is also showing us that it’s trying not to sabotage dialogue.” Moon went on to say he thinks that the South Korean government’s decision to provide food aid to North Korea “will have the effect of breaking through the deadlock [in the denuclearization talks]. President Trump expressed his active support on that point.” “President Trump asked me to share that we have his absolute blessing for providing humanitarian aid to North Korea and that he thinks this is a really good development,” Moon said, referring to his telephone call with US President Donald Trump on May 7. Moon said that Trump had responded to North Korea’s launch of projectiles on May 4 by saying he wasn’t very worried about it. “President Trump said that he likes Chairman Kim Jong-un and that they have a good relationship. He said he expects this will be cleared up through dialogue with Chairman Kim,” Moon said. “The issue of food aid to North Korea naturally came up” while the two leaders were discussing ways to speed up dialogue, Moon explained. When asked about the possibility of the South Korean government providing food aid directly, Moon said, “South Korea’s stockpile of rice exceeds domestic demand, costing about 600 billion won each year in storage costs alone. We can’t ignore the serious famine in North Korea, and I think we’re obliged to provide food to the North both because of humanitarian concerns and because of our love for our fellow Koreans.” “I think this could also have the effect of breaking through the deadlock in the dialogue. That was what President Trump was thinking about when he expressed his full support [for food aid to the North],” Moon went on to say. “The inter-Korean cooperation fund has to be used [for food aid to North Korea], and we would have to report that to the National Assembly as well at a later point. The ruling and opposition parties are currently in a state of gridlock over the question of fast-tracking legislation. But even if that issue is resolved separately, I think it would be best for me, as president, to get together with the ruling and opposition parties to deliberate this,” Moon said. Given North Korea’s repeated projectile launches, Moon also mentioned the need for “the support and consensus of the people” for food aid to North Korea, as well as for “adequate debate between the ruling and opposition parties.” Moon also talked about the deadlock in North Korea and the US’ negotiations about denuclearization. “The two sides are in complete agreement about the ultimate goal of the denuclearization talks. The U.S. wants North Korea’s complete denuclearization, and North Korea wants a complete guarantee of their security. While North Korea, the U.S., and even South Korea are in agreement on those points, this isn’t something that can be traded all at once, in a single moment. That’s why we need a roadmap for that process, and that’s where the disagreement comes in,” he said. When asked about efforts to set up an inter-Korean summit, Moon said, “We aren’t pressing North Korea to hold a fourth inter-Korean summit yet. North Korea wasn’t able to talk with us because it needed time to work out its own position and because of Chairman Kim’s summit with [Russian] President [Vladimir] Putin. But since the North’s circumstances now permit it to engage in dialogue, we’re planning to keep proposing talks with the North and guiding them to dialogue.” Moon also said that “Chairman Kim expressed his commitment to denuclearization very candidly” in the conversation the two had on a footbridge during their first inter-Korean summit in Panmunjom last year. “Chairman Kim expressed his commitment by pointing out that the North would have no reason to go to all the trouble of acquiring nuclear weapons in the face of sanctions if it could achieve security without them. He also asked for my advice about what he should do in talks with the US, since his advisors had little experience with that while he had no experience at all,” Moon said. “The conservation mostly consisted of Chairman Kim asking me questions, which I would then answer. It was a good opportunity for the two of us to have a candid conversation, and it was really great not to need interpreters since we’re from the same nation and speak the same language,” Moon recalled. (Park Min-hee, “Moon Says N. Korea Isn’t Trying to Sabotage Dialogue,” Hankyore, May 10, 2019)
Trump: “ … Q Mr. President, on the North Korea missiles — THE PRESIDENT: Yeah. Q — what message do you take from them? THE PRESIDENT: Well we’re looking at it very seriously right now. They were smaller missiles — short-range missiles. Nobody is happy about it, but we’re taking a good look and we’ll see. We’ll see. The relationship continues, but we’ll see what happens. I know they want to negotiate. They’re talking about negotiating. But I don’t think they’re ready to negotiate because we have to either do it — it’s very much like China. The Vice Premier is coming here today. We were getting very close to a deal, and then they started to renegotiate the deal. We can’t have that. We can’t have that. … Q Mr. President, are you satisfied with the advice you receive from John Bolton THE PRESIDENT: Yeah. John is very good. John is a — he has strong views on things, but that’s okay. I actually temper John, which is pretty amazing isn’t it? (Laughter.) Nobody thought that was going to — I’m the one that tempers him, but that’s okay. I have different sides. I mean, I have John Bolton and I have other people that are a little more dovish than him. And, ultimately, I make the decision. No, I get — I like John. I get very good advice from John.” (White House Press Office, Remarks by President Trump on Ending Surprise Medical Billing, May 9, 2019)
President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un shattered more than a year of relative tranquility today with the U.S. seizure of a North Korean vessel and the isolated regime’s launch of two short-range ballistic missiles. The renewed tensions followed a series of internal battles Trump and Kim fought with their own subordinates in the process of striving for a historic disarmament deal. “Nobody’s happy about it,” Trump told reporters in Washington in some of his most downbeat remarks concerning the relationship to date. “They’re talking about negotiating, but I don’t think they’re ready to negotiate.” It was the first time the United States had seized a North Korean cargo vessel for violating international sanctions, the Justice Department said, and the first confirmed missile test by Pyongyang in more than 500 days. The return of tit-for-tat provocations demonstrated the limits of the personal relationship between Kim and Trump that the president has touted as key to overcoming decades of mistrust. Last month, Trump sent Kim a “happy birthday” letter commemorating the birth date of his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, and expressed interest in future engagements following the collapse of their meeting in February in Hanoi. “He sends him pictures. He sends him letters. I don’t know how President Trump can be more forthcoming in his efforts to have a good relationship with Kim Jong Un,” national security adviser John Bolton told PBS NewsHour. In building a rapport, Trump and Kim have talked about basketball, pop culture and even video games, U.S. officials said, while slapping down hawkish advisers who disappoint them. In April, Kim demoted his point man for the nuclear talks, Kim Yong Chol, rebuking a prominent hard-liner and former spy chief who exasperated U.S. negotiators with his stubborn demands and aloof demeanor, two State Department officials said. Trump also has battled with his top advisers to preserve a positive atmosphere for a deal. Two days ago, Trump told South Korea’s president in a phone call that he supports aid for North Korea to ease food shortages, despite the concerns of some U.S. officials that it might ease internal pressure on the regime. In March, he ruled out future sanctions against North Korea in a meeting with Bolton and reacted angrily after learning that previous sanctions were imposed without his approval, U.S. officials said. “What’s really striking is how in both systems, the bureaucracies aren’t always moving in the same direction as the leaders are signaling,” said Scott Snyder, a Korea expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. Kim’s decision to fire off missiles after a long hiatus appears to signal impatience with the Trump administration’s hard-nosed negotiating tactics, analysts said. “The problem is: How do Trump and Kim overcome this stalemate?” said Sue Mi Terry, a North Korea scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former CIA analyst. “There doesn’t appear to be a way forward.” Trump has grown frustrated with public criticism of his administration’s tactics and complained privately that Kim makes for a tough and mercurial negotiating partner. “It’s not like [I’m] dealing with the president of France,” Trump said at a recent private gathering of supporters, according to a person present during the conversation, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe internal discussions. The president told the group a graphically detailed story in which he said Kim had killed his uncle Jang Song Thaek and displayed his head for others to see, the person present said. The claim about Kim displaying Jang’s head is a curiosity. Though North Korean state-run media announced in 2013 that Jang had been executed, there are no public reports of a corpse exhibition and he is believed to have been killed by firing squad. The blame game over the impasse in the talks has scrambled the usual alliances of hawks and doves in Washington. Top conservative think tank scholars at the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute have criticized the administration and called for even more economic sanctions. By contrast, many advocates of engagement and nonproliferation have offered cautious support for a step-by-step process that trades partial sanctions relief for partial denuclearization. “Trump’s instincts on engaging the North Koreans have been sound,” said Robert Carlin, a longtime Korea scholar at Stanford University and a former State Department official. “The reemergence of Bolton’s all-or-nothing approach put us back in the hole.” During the Hanoi summit, Trump kept Bolton away from a dinner with Kim and told other White House officials that his adviser would not help broker a deal because he viewed the regime so negatively, the officials said. When asked about his satisfaction with his adviser, the president said Thursday that “John’s very good” but that he has to counterbalance his views. “He has strong views on things, but that’s okay. I actually temper John, which is pretty amazing isn’t it?” Trump said at an impromptu briefing. “I have other people who are a little more dovish than him, and ultimately I make the decision.” National Security Council spokesman Garrett Marquis said Bolton is “pursuing the president’s national security agenda, and he has repeatedly emphasized that the president has opened the door for North Korea to enter into a very bright economic future.” Despite his private frustrations, the president has instructed his advisers to keep a positive outlook. After North Korea launched short-range projectiles last week, Trump maintained that demeanor. “I believe that Kim Jong Un fully realizes the great economic potential of North Korea, & will do nothing to interfere or end it,” Trump tweeted. “He also knows that I am with him & does not want to break his promise to me. Deal will happen!” Still, the launch of even short-range missiles is a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, raising questions about how the United States will decide to engage North Korea from here on out. A key factor was Kim’s irritation at being caught off guard when Trump chose to leave Hanoi without an agreement, said diplomats familiar with the negotiations. Before the summit, Kim Yong Chol had provided optimistic assessments on the status of the talks, and the North Korean leader believed Trump would accept an interim deal that traded partial economic sanctions relief for partial denuclearization. Kim has now appointed Jang Kum Chol as the new head of the United Front Department. Meanwhile, he promoted Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui, who offered him more cautious assessments on the status of the negotiations, and awarded her with membership on the State Affairs Commission, said the diplomats. Choe and her boss accompanied Kim to a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok on April 25, while Kim Yong Chol did not. Though no one’s position is assured, the shake-up appears to swap a group of hardened intelligence officers who irritated U.S. negotiators for diplomats with more experience hammering out technical agreements. “Choe Son Hui knows Americans well and has worked on these issues for decades,” said Joel Wit, a North Korea expert at the Stimson Center, noting Choe’s participation in six-party talks involving the United States, North Korea and other nations during the George W. Bush administration. “She’ll have a good feel for whether an agreement is possible or not.” Besides blaming his own subordinates, Kim has directed his aides to lash out at Trump’s top advisers for enforcing a hard line in the negotiations, said diplomats familiar with the matter. Choe has accused Pompeo and Bolton of creating an “atmosphere of hostility and mistrust” despite the “mysteriously wonderful” chemistry between Trump and Kim. The one U.S. adviser who has escaped the ire of the North is Special Representative Steve Biegun, a former Ford executive who has tangled with Bolton and other hawkish aides in his efforts to find a diplomatic solution. Biegun is viewed by many diplomats as the best hope for a breakthrough in the talks, but commanding the attention of Pyongyang has been a struggle for him. Since the shake-up, Biegun has asked Choe for a meeting but has not received a response, said diplomats familiar with his correspondence. Biegun told the Washington Post that the “working-level discussions” involving less-senior diplomats in Hanoi helped the two sides “narrow the gap on a number of issues” and stressed that those lower-level talks should take priority before another presidential summit. “President Trump’s summit with Chairman Kim in Hanoi was a very productive meeting, though the time was not right to sign a deal,” he said. “We believe working-level talks are the best way to make progress at this time.” Supporters of Trump’s push for a diplomatic solution to the crisis hope that Biegun and Choe can find a way to move the talks forward. “We’re hoping to be able to develop and build that trust between [them],” Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallstrom said in an interview at the Swedish Embassy in Washington. “Biegun impressed us.” Sweden played host to Biegun and Choe in January, but at the time, the two diplomats mostly “sounded each other out,” rather than negotiating specifics, Wallstrom said. North Korea’s lack of response to Biegun could be because of its own deliberations over who his proper counterpart should be. “They’re trying to figure out if Choe or someone else should be working with him,” Wit said. It could also demonstrate, however, North Korea’s disinterest in negotiating with anyone except Trump. The intentions of North Korea’s leader are never plainly clear, but Kim has stressed the importance of moving quickly to conclude a deal, saying in a recent speech that he would wait only “till the end of the year” for the United States to take a more flexible approach on sanctions relief. “From Kim’s perspective, Trump is the only person he can get a good deal out of,” said Terry, the former CIA analyst. “Any other leader would go with a bottom-up diplomatic process. But with Trump it’s top-down and he’s willing to sign a peace treaty and put alliance equities on the table. That’s why Kim wants to see a deal and why traditional Korea analysts get nervous.” Trump, too, appears eager for an agreement. Given Trump’s enthusiasm, his aides have been careful to keep him up to date, but some more than others. In March, after the U.S. imposed new North Korea sanctions and was considering future measures, White House aide Robert Blair warned Bolton that Trump was never notified and might not want them, U.S. officials said. Bolton said he knew what Trump wanted and would handle the issue. But Bolton’s confidence, first reported by Bloomberg News, appeared to be misplaced. The next day, Bolton told Trump about the sanctions and the possibility of more in the future. Trump responded angrily, said two officials familiar with the meeting, and said he didn’t want future or previous sanctions. “I don’t want to do it,” Trump repeated. Faced with the unusual prospect of canceling just-announced sanctions, Trump and his aides engaged in a tense back-and-forth that included an intervention by Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to defend the earlier sanctions. Eventually, Trump agreed to keep the previous round but insisted that he didn’t want future sanctions. The White House punctuated the decision in a statement designed to keep the talks alive and assure one young world leader above all others that Trump understands him. “President Trump likes Chairman Kim,” White House press secretary Sarah Sanders said. “He doesn’t think these sanctions will be necessary.” (John Hudson and Josh Dawsey “Trump and Kim Both Sparred with Advisers,” Washington Post, May 10, 2019, p. A-1)
Cha and Bermudez: “The Yusang-ni missile operating base (39.449886 126.259682) is located within North Korea’s operational missile belt in Unsan-gun (Unsan County), Pyongan-namdo (South Pyongan Province) and sits 63 kilometers northeast of Pyongyang, 150 kilometers north of the demilitarized zone, 220 kilometers northeast of Seoul and 1,255 west-northwest of Tokyo. Disambiguation of references to reported missile bases or an ICBM base in Unsan-gun or the Sunchon area indicates that they are actually referring to the Yusang-ni missile operating base. This facility is sometimes referred to as the Milchon-ni missile operating base due to its proximity to the small village of that name (39.483333 126.233333) 4.5 kilometers to the north-northwest. Subordinate to the Korean People’s Army (KPA) Strategic Force (the organization responsible for all North Korean ballistic missile units), the Yusang-ni missile operating base appears to house a unit of brigade-size or larger—likely with support units. What missile system(s) the unit at this base is equipped with is unclear. Reports from 2016 indicate that the base was equipped with a version of the Hwasong-13 (KN-08) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Subsequent reports from 2018 state that the unit was equipped with the Hwasong-14 (KN-20) or Hwasong-15 (KN-22) ICBMs. These reports should be viewed cautiously as the development and production status of these systems is unknown. Regardless, if ICBMs are based at the Yusang-ni missile operating base they would represent an important component of North Korea’s presumed offensive ballistic missile strategy by providing a strategic-level first strike capability against targets located throughout East Asia, the Pacific, and the continental United States. These systems undoubtedly represent crucial components of North Korea’s political bargaining strategy with the United States. … Analysis of Landsat commercial high-resolution satellite imagery indicates that construction of the Yusang-ni missile operating base likely began sometime between May and August 2003. … Satellite imagery indicates that while construction has proceeded steadily over the course of the past sixteen years, the majority of the essential infrastructure was completed by 2016. Some minor construction (e.g., of single buildings) is continuing as of April 2019. While it is uncertain, a significant portion of the construction is likely to have been undertaken by specialized engineering troops from the KPA’s Military Construction Bureau that had become available with the completion of work on other ballistic missile operating bases. … Large Underground Facility: In the hill mass immediately south of the headquarters area, work on a large UGF began during 2003. A September 2004 image shows that roads had been built and construction was simultaneously underway on two UGF entrances on the opposite sides of the hill with large piles of spoil being deposited outside each entrance. … Hardened Drive-Through Missile Support Facility: During April 2008, excavation for what would become a two-bunker hardened drive-through missile support facility was observed approximately 250 meters to the east of the southern UGF entrance. By September 2011, the construction work was generally complete, bunkers covered, trees planted, and a gravel road had been extended to the southern UGF entrance. … Sang-dong Support Area: Approximately 650 meters southwest of the headquarters area is the Sang-dong 39.444985 126.254429) support area. Prior to 2004, this area consisted of small agricultural fields. By 2004, as part of the broader Yusang-ni missile operating base construction project, a support area was built consisting of approximately 60 housing, shop, agricultural support, maintenance, and warehouse structures of varying sizes. With the exception of the addition of approximately 12 new structures, the Sang-dong area remained relatively unchanged until September 2013 when all the existing structures were razed. These were replaced, during the next year-and-a-half, by seven large greenhouses and 27 barracks, housing, and support structures were built. This work would be essentially complete by 2015. With minor exceptions, the Sang-dong area has remained relatively unchanged since that time. … The Yusang-ni missile operating base encompasses approximately 7.1 square kilometers and, as with many other Strategic Force missile operating bases, is centered on the intersection of the several valleys—in this case three primary valleys with several branch valleys. The … Yusang-ni missile operating base can be functionally divided into six areas—headquarters and support area, underground facility, drive-through facility, Sang-dong support area, Tapkol housing area, and Kochon housing area. However, the headquarters area, underground facility, and hardened drive-through facility are the most significant. Within the headquarters and support area is the main headquarters consisting of nine large buildings (including headquarters and administration buildings, barracks and support buildings, a cultural/education hall completed in 2018, and a new building that began construction during 2018), a large parade ground (also used as a soccer pitch and other sports), and a large greenhouse. Located in the small branch valley extending northwest from the main headquarters area is a large four-story building and entrance to a UGF. This UGF is likely significantly smaller than the one immediately to the south of the headquarters judging from the smaller amount of spoil and an entrance that is approximately 6.5-meters-wide—still large enough to accommodate all presently known strategic Force ballistic missile equipment. Given its location and layout it would appear to be for storage or support equipment/vehicles. In the branch valley leading north is a road tunnel, approximately 1,100 meters the headquarters area, that was apparently built to permit unhindered movement of large vehicles (TELs, MELs, etc.). While entrances to UGFs are frequently found in tunnels within North Korea, it is unknown if there is one within this tunnel. A large excavation created during tunnel construction, is located adjacent to the southern entrance for unknown purposes. As of April 2019, it remains incomplete. … Located in the hill mass immediately south of the headquarters area is the base’s primary UGF with two entrances—one each on the north and south slopes of the ridgeline, approximately 400 meters apart. Their positioning and the amount of spoil produced during construction strongly suggests that this is a substantial UGF. Additionally, the presence of three small structures along ridgelines above the UGF, first observed during 2013, suggest that these cover air-handling shafts that would likely be required for a large UGF. The northern entrance is an approximately 9-meter-wide shaft, while the southern entrance initially appeared to consist of two shafts but eventually would be a single approximately 9-meter-wide shaft. Both entrances are large enough to accommodate all presently known Strategic Force ballistic missile equipment. As noted above, in one of the more curious developments at the Yusangni missile operating base sometime between September 2011 and September 2013, two buildings were erected directly on each of the access roads leading to both UGF entrances. From all appearances these block vehicle access to the UGF. Speculation concerning this development is ongoing; however, a detailed examination shows that the smaller of the two buildings—likely a shed—is relatively small (approximately 4meters-by-4-meters and 5-meters-by-3.5-meters, respectively) and could be removed with little effort when required. This may lead to the assumption that their construction may be a rudimentary camouflage, concealment, and deception effort (CCD) by the Strategic Force. Regardless, the open area immediately outside the northern entrance and the protected area in front of the southern entrance are large enough accommodate all known Strategic Force TELs and MELs and permit missiles the launching of ballistic missiles. Positioned immediately outside the southern UGF entrance and at the end of the 1kilometer-long road extending east from the Sang-dong support area is a hardened drive-through missile support facility—used for arming, fueling, systems checkout, and maintenance operations. It measures approximately 180-meters-by-13-meters overall with two approximately 35-meter-long earth-covered shelters separated by an open bay. On the north side of the open bay is an approximately 5-meter opening that is likely an entrance to an underground storeroom or small UGF. On the south side of the open bay is a small, approximately 12-meter-by-7-meter revetment—likely for support vehicles or equipment. No detailed open source organizational information is available for the KPA ballistic missile unit at the Yusang-ni missile operating base, other than that it is part of the Strategic Force. Reports from 2016 state that the unit based here would be equipped with a version of the Hwasong-13 ICBM, while reports from 2018 state that the unit is equipped with the Hwasong-14 or Hwasong-15 ICBMs. All these reports should be viewed cautiously as the development and production status of these systems is unknown. From the nature, size, and distribution of the infrastructure (large number of housing units, number of barracks and support facilities, large and smaller UGFs, hardened drive-through facility, etc.) observed in satellite imagery it is likely it is a brigade- or larger-sized unit consisting of a headquarters, service and support elements, and several launch battalions. Despite the strategic importance of all the KPA’s ballistic missile operating bases and concerns of either pre-emptive or wartime airstrikes against them, there are no known fixed anti-aircraft artillery positions within 10 kilometers of the base. It is likely that the missile unit based here possesses organic air defense elements equipped with both light AAA and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SA-7, SA-14, SA-16, etc.). The base, however, is within the air defense umbrella of three SA-2 and two SA-5 surface-to-air missile bases. Additionally, the Pukchang-ni Airbase (housing a MiG-23 air regiment) is only 28 kilometers to the northwest and the Sunchon (housing MiG-29 and Su-25 air regiments) Airbase is 31 kilometers to the west.” (Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha, Undeclared North Korea: The Yusang-ni Missile Operating Base, CSIS Beyond Parallel, May 9, 2019)
5/11/19:
Policy Research Director of the Institute for American Studies of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs “answer to a question put by KCNA on May 11 with regard to the press statement released recently by the U.S. Department of State for the purpose of tarnishing the DPRK’s human rights situation on the occasion of so-called “North Korea Freedom Week.” The press statement of the U.S. State Department is nothing but a sophistry full of falsehoods and fabrications, which stems from a sinister political purpose to tarnish the dignified image of the DPRK. What should be taken more serious is the fact that the United States, turning its back on the June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement committing to establish new bilateral relations, is taking the lead of hostile actions against the DPRK by instigating the anti-DPRK plotting agencies embedded with the inveterate repugnance for the DPRK. This has laid bare the American ulterior intention that it does not want the improved DPRK-U.S. relations really, but seeks only to overthrow our system. The latest release of press statement by the U.S. State Department is clear evidence that the present Administration follows in the footsteps of the previous Administrations in regard of the policy hostile to the DPRK. Although the U.S. is making desperate and foolish efforts to bring us down by clinging to the “human rights” racket along with the “maximum pressure” aimed at destroying our system, it should bear in mind that such an attempt will never work against us but instead push us dynamically to a direction where the U.S. does not want to see. The time when the U.S. was presumptuously acting as a “human rights judge” is gone long ago, and it would better be obsessed with its own business, rather than poking its nose into others affairs.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Censures U.S. for Releasing Anti-DPRK Press Statement,” May 11, 2019)
5/14/19:
DPRK FoMin spokesperson’s statement: “The United States committed an unlawful and outrageous act of dispossessing our cargo ship by forcibly taking it to Samoa (U.S.), linking the ship to the “sanctions resolutions” of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its domestic “sanctions acts”, all being imposed against the DPRK. The UNSC “sanctions resolutions” on the DPRK, which the U.S. has employed as one of the grounds for its dispossession of our cargo ship, have flagrantly infringed upon the sovereignty of our state, and therefore, we have categorically rejected and condemned the whole of them all along. Moreover, the United States’ impudent act of forcing other countries into observance of its domestic law is indeed a wanton violation of the universally accepted international laws which make clear that in no case can a sovereign state be an object of jurisdiction of other countries. The latest U.S. act constitutes an extension of the American method of calculation for bringing the DPRK to its knees by means of “maximum pressure” and an outright denial of the underlying spirit of the June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement that has committed to establish new bilateral relations. The U.S. should ponder over the consequences its heinous act might have on the future developments and immediately return our ship. The time when the U.S. held sway over the world at its own free will is gone long ago, and it would be a biggest miscalculation if the U.S. thought that the DPRK is among the countries where the American-style logic of “strength” might work for. We will carefully watch every move of the United States hereafter.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hit out at Outrageous Act of U.S.,” May 14, 2019)
5/14/19:
IFANS: “[T]he most likely scenario is that the launches were meant as Pyongyang’s focus on the ‘Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain … the core application of the inter-Korean military agreement is to transform the conduct of military deterrence aimed at each other from ‘escalation dominance’ into ‘escalation management.’ Escalation management is a strategic approach to controlling the scale of escalation at lower levels and keeping capable adversaries deterred at lower levels of conflict with calculated measures such as communication rather than changing the adversary’s cost-benefit analysis with the prospects for massive retaliation at any given escalation level based on overwhelming military force. … Pyongyang’s idea is that if Seoul considers short-range missile tests, the South should suspend planned military exercises or weapon system acquisition projects. … Although the U.S. and the South scaled back their joint military exercises, their continued presence serves to legitimize Pyongyang’s long-range artillery and short-range missile tests. One thing worth noting is that North Korea tested the multiple rocket launchers, self-propelled artillery, and short-range missiles without the presence of Kim Rak-gyom, the head of North Korea’s Strategic Force. This appear to be North Korea’s attempt to show that short-range missiles are not part of its strategic assets as the Strategic Force is in charge of test-firing missiles while the North Korean People’s Artillery Command is in charge of rocket launcher and artillery tests. … Pyongyang is demanding Seoul to choose between accepting its short-range missile tests and ending the U.S.-ROK joint military exercises altogether, which were already scaled back last year.” (Hwang Ildo, “North Korea’s Latest Short-Range Missile Tests: Intentions and Calculations,” IFANS Focus, May 14, 2019)
5/17/19:
North Korea is experiencing its worst drought in over a century, official media reported today, days after the World Food Program expressed “very serious concerns” about the situation in the country. The isolated, impoverished North — which is under several sets of sanctions over its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs — has long struggled to feed itself, and suffers chronic food shortages. It recorded its worst harvest for a decade last year, according to the United Nations, down by 500,000 tonnes as natural disasters combined with its lack of arable land and inefficient agriculture to hit production. In the year to March 15 the North received just 56.3 millimeters of rain or snow, Rodong Sinmun reported today, the lowest since 1917. Water was running out in the country’s lakes and reservoirs, said the paper, the official mouthpiece of the ruling Workers’ Party, adding: “The ongoing drought is causing a significant effect on the cultivation of wheat, barley, corn, potatoes and beans.” “The issue of food aid should be considered from a humanitarian perspective as fellow Koreans, regardless of the security issues,” said South Korea’s National Security Advisor Chung Eui-yong. (AFP, “North Korea Is Seeing Worst Drought in a Century: State Media,” May 17, 2019)
South Korea decided to donate US$8 million to international agencies for aid projects in North Korea and allow a group of businesspeople to visit a shuttered joint industrial complex in the communist nation. “The government decided to approve the business people’s trip to North Korea as part of efforts to protect their property rights,” the unification ministry said in a press release. “We will make necessary efforts to make their trip to the Kaesong industrial complex go smoothly without any problem.” Seoul is also formulating plans to send food aid to the impoverished North. “We also plan to provide $8 million through international agencies such as the WFP and UNICEF for projects to support the nutrition of children and pregnant women and their health,” it added, referring to the World Food Program and the United Nations Children’s Fund. On April 30, 193 businesspeople who used to operate plants in the North’s border town of Kaesong asked for approval of their travel plans in their ninth attempt to visit the complex to check the condition of the equipment they left behind when it was closed. Their previous requests were rejected as the government apparently worried that it could signal that the two Koreas are preparing to reopen the industrial park despite Washington’s push to keep crushing sanctions in place against North Korea amid little progress in denuclearization talks. “We have shared with the United States details of the nature and purpose of their trip, which is to check their property, and I can say that the U.S. side sufficiently understands our stance,” Lee Sang-min, spokesperson of the unification ministry, told reporters in a press briefing. Lee added that the government will seek necessary consultations with North Korea to coordinate the visit. (Koh Byung-joon, “S. Korea Decides to Donate $8 mln. for N.K. Aid Projects, Allow Biz People to Visit Kaesong Complex,” Yonhap, May 17, 2019)
5/19/19:
President Donald Trump in an interview with Fox News said that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un wanted to remove only one or two of the five nuclear sites in his country during their summit in Hanoi in February. “When I left Vietnam where we had the summit, I said to Chairman Kim … And I think very importantly I said, look, you are not ready for a deal because he wanted to get rid of one or two sites,” Trump said. “But he has five sites … I said what about the other three sites. That is no good,” he added. (Yonhap, “Trump Says Wanted to Remove 1 or 2 of Five Nuclear Sites during Hanoi Summit,” May 20, 2019)
Every weekday for five years, U.S. military officer Daniel McShane waited patiently for North Korean soldiers to return his calls. When they finally did, his team struggled to find the right phone. They had never heard it ring before. Now, Lt. Cmdr. McShane or another member of a United Nations Command team staffed mostly by the U.S. military, speaks twice a day with North Korean counterparts 125 feet away on the other side of the Demilitarized Zone. The phone link reopened in July for the first time since 2013 as part of an inter-Korean agreement aimed at reducing the risk of a war on the heavily armed border. The calls, in English and Korean, take place on a decades-old pink touch-tone phone at 9:30 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. Cmdr. McShane says he has developed enough rapport with his eight North Korean counterparts that they have discussed their shared passion for baseball and his beloved Los Angeles Dodgers. One North Korean soldier shared that he had a wife and two children. Cmdr. McShane mentioned his girlfriend is Korean, and the soldier responded with astonishment: “Ooooha!” The North Koreans often simply say they have no message. The exchanges are among the few regular lines of communication between the former combatants and a sign front-line tensions have been dialed down. The routine continued even after North Korea fired short-range missiles this month, signaling displeasure with the pace of nuclear negotiations with the U.S. “If they’re talking, they’re not shooting,” says Cmdr. McShane, 49, who speaks Korean and goes by “Dan-o.” He and his team of six Americans and one New Zealander, as part of the U.N. Command, help enforce the 65-year-old cease-fire. Their spartan office, the size of a studio apartment, sits 40 feet from North Korea at the intensely guarded Joint Security Area. The JSA is the only place where North and South Korean troops stand face-to-face. Since October, they have done so unarmed. The teams operating the phones on each side have met a few times since the Koreas agreed to tone down military hostility in September. During one visit, Cmdr. McShane says, a North Korean colonel expressed amazement when a U.S. military officer showed him how FaceTime video calls worked. The North Koreans showed great interest in Doritos and South Korean snacks called Choco Pies brought from the nearby U.S. commissary. The Americans were told about their counterparts’ holiday-dinner plans and learned they shared an affinity for cigarettes and whiskey. North Korea’s calls come at the second-floor office, the “Watch Floor,” where U.N. Command personnel watch camera feeds monitoring the JSA. Since July, the Command has exchanged 164 official phone messages, coordinating issues including the handover of soldiers’ remains, logistics of removing mines from the zone and the arrival of helicopters. Tech Sgt. Keith Jordan, 40, helps handle calls, and North Korean counterparts recognize him by name. “I worried about a communication barrier, but there are times when I think, ‘Wow, your English is better than mine!’ ” says Sgt. Jordan, who grew up in the Bronx and has served in Iraq and Afghanistan. One morning this month, Cmdr. McShane called his counterparts on schedule and let the phone ring eight times. No answer. Three North Koreans stood atop a nearby hill, video recording South Korean soldiers. Soon, the pink phone wobbled with the return call. “Yeoboseyo?” Cmdr. McShane said, a Korean greeting in the Charlotte, N.C., native’s slight Southern accent. Then, in English: “Do you have any message traffic for us?” The answer was no. He didn’t have anything to convey, either. “Nope, I’m sorry, I have no message,” he said. “No message. Correct.” The interaction lasted 74 seconds. “It was a very typical call,” Cmdr. McShane says. Pyongyang stopped answering the hotline after the U.N. imposed sanctions in March 2013 following North Korea’s third nuclear test. When the phone rang again last year, Cmdr. McShane wasn’t in the room to help his team figure out what it was—none had been there when it rang last. A team member came out and told him “North Korea wants to talk to you,” he says. “Quite a surprise.” (Timothy W. Martin, “U.S. Officer on a Pink Phone Dials Down North Korea Tensions,” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2019)
5/21/19:
North Korea’s ambassador to the United Nations held a rare news conference to warn the United States that its seizure of a North Korean cargo ship could imperil any future disarmament negotiations between the two countries. The United States Justice Department authorized the seizure of the North Korean ship, the Wise Honest, after having determined that it was used to export North Korean coal in violation of American and international sanctions. The American move, announced on May 9, came amid rising tensions over continued North Korean missile launchings. In his brief appearance before the U.N. press corps, North Korea’s ambassador, Kim Song, called the seizure “an outright denial of the underlying spirit” of a June 2018 joint statement between North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, and President Trump, in which, among other things, North Korea committed to working toward complete denuclearization. “The United States should deliberate and think over the consequences its outrageous acts might have on the future developments,” the North Korean ambassador said at the news conference. He also reiterated his government’s demand for the return of the North Korean vessel. (Michael Schwirtz, “North Korea Envoy Warns U.S. over ‘Outrageous’ Ship Seizure,” New York Times, May 21, 2019)
5/24/19:
DPRK FoMin spokesperson “answer to a question put by KCNA on May 24, as regards the attempt revealing within the United States to impute to the DPRK the cause for the rupture of the Hanoi DPRK-U.S. summit talks: As we have stated before, the underlying cause of setback of the DPRK-U.S. summit talks in Hanoi is the arbitrary and dishonest position taken by the United States, insisting on a method which is totally impossible to get through. For the sake of building confidence, a main key to an alleviation of the DPRK-U.S. hostile relations, we took crucial and meaningful measures of a strategically decisive nature including the discontinuation of nuclear test and test-fire of intercontinental ballistic missile, and we also took a broadminded step towards the realization of the repatriation of the American POW/MIA remains. However, the United States did not respond to our goodwill measures in the same manner, but deliberately pushed the talks to a rupture by merely claiming the unilateral disarmament of the DPRK. Notwithstanding the above facts, the United States attempts to ascribe the setback of the DPRK-U.S. summit talks in Hanoi to a completely irrelevant issue and to impute the responsibility for the ruptured talks to the DPRK. Such American ulterior intention definitely needs to be brought to the attention. We hereby make it clear once again that the United States would not be able to move us even an inch with the device it is now weighing in its mind, and the further its mistrust and hostile acts towards the DPRK grow, the fiercer our reaction will be. Unless the United States puts aside the current method of calculation and comes forward with a new method of calculation, the DPRK-U.S. dialogue will never be resumed and by extension, the prospect for resolving the nuclear issue will be much gloomy. The U.S. would be well advised to wake up to reality and learn anew how to have dialogue and negotiation.” (KCNA, “U.S. Is Accountable for Rupture of Hanoi Summit Talks: DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesperson,” May 24, 2019)
5/26/19:
President Trump appeared to contradict his national security adviser on foreign soil in an early morning tweet, noting that while some in his administration were “disturbed” by North Korea’s testing of ballistic missiles earlier this month, the president himself was unbothered. In the missive, “North Korea fired off some small weapons, which disturbed some of my people, and others, but not me,” Trump wrote. “I have confidence that Chairman Kim will keep his promise to me.” Trump also used North Korean leader Kim Jong Un as a foil against a domestic political rival — former vice president Joe Biden — and complicated his relationship with Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo on the first full day of visit here. Trump’s tweet was a direct rebuke of his national security adviser, John Bolton, who yesterday had warned reporters here that there is “no doubt” North Korea’s missile tests violated United Nations Security Council resolutions, adding that Trump is determined to maintain sanctions pressure on the regime until it backs down. Bolton’s comments marked the first time a senior administration official has confirmed that North Korea launched ballistic missiles in contravention of U.N. resolutions, with officials appearing reluctant until now to make such a clear statement, in order to demonstrate their willingness to restart dialogue. The small weapons Trump referred to were short-range ballistic missiles, one of which flew nearly 300 miles before landing in the sea. That is a direct threat to U.S. ally South Korea, while medium-range missiles would also put Japan in range. Japan also described North Korea’s last test as short-range ballistic missiles, in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, but noted that they did not land with Japanese waters or directly threaten its security. But Trump’s tweet, at roughly 7:30 a.m. seemed to undo Bolton’s tough talk, and undermined his national security adviser. Bolton and Trump have disagreed on a number of issues in recent weeks, including just how hawkish a stance to take in conflicts with Venezuela and Iran, and that friction has recently spilled into public view. The Twitter missive is also likely to complicate Trump’s visit with Abe. The Japanese have long argued for a tougher line against North Korea, with Abe pushing hard for no sanctions relief for North Korea, as well as a resolution to the Japanese abducted by the North Koreans. The president has significantly tightened sanctions on North Korea, but in a March tweet that unsettled Tokyo and sparked confusion across Washington — including among the president’s own aides — Trump also cancelled a new round of sanctions from his Treasury Department. Trump is also expected to meet with the Japanese families of the abductees on his visit — something Japanese diplomats said was deeply important to Abe. In his Sunday tweet, Trump also misspelled Biden’s name — incorrectly writing “Bidan” — and weaponized his friendship with Kim for campaign leverage over Biden, the Democratic presidential candidate on whom Trump and his allies are most focused. The president said in the tweet that he had appreciated a recent comment by North Korea state media calling Biden a “low IQ idiot” whose candidacy should not carry high expectations. Trump wrote that he “also smiled when he called Swampman Joe Biden a low IQ individual, & worse. Perhaps that’s sending me a signal?” Trump later corrected the misspelling. North Korea conducted two sets of missile tests earlier this month, with Bolton describing them as “close-range ballistic missiles,” as well as “more standard SRBMs, short-range ballistic missiles.” U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1695, specifically prohibits North Korea from launching any ballistic missiles, he said, adding: “I know that because I wrote it.” “In terms of violating Security Council resolutions, there’s no doubt about that,” Bolton told reporters on Saturday, hours before Trump was due to land and be greeted by Abe. “I think the prime minister and the president are going to talk about making sure the integrity of the U.N. Security Council resolutions is maintained,” he said. Two days ago, North Korea’s foreign ministry again blamed the United States for deliberately causing the collapse of the Hanoi summit between Trump and Kim Jong Un by making unilateral and impossible demands. Dialogue between the two countries will never be resumed unless the United States changes its “calculation,” an unnamed foreign ministry spokesman told KCNA, “and the further its mistrust and hostile acts toward the DPRK grow, the fiercer our reaction will be.” “God knows what they said this time,” Bolton said when asked about the latest comments. “After many years of being called human scum by North Korea, I take most of what they say with a grain of salt.” But he made clear the Trump administration was not about to change its stance. “The North Korean leadership well knows the president’s view,” he said, which he said concurs with that of Abe: “keeping sanctions in place and in force until North Korea shows it has made a strategic decision to give up its nuclear weapons.” “I don’t think that’s going to change,” he added. Bolton rejected suggestions he was behind a hardening of the U.S. negotiating position in Hanoi, arguing it had been Trump’s consistent position, dating back to the campaign trail as well as last year’s Singapore summit with Kim, that North Korea can have a bright future if it surrenders its nuclear arsenal. “The president’s opened the door to North Korea, and we’re just waiting for them to walk through it,” he said. Bolton said Stephen Biegun, the U.S. special representative for North Korea, “can’t wait” to meet his North Korean counterpart again, “but they haven’t responded,” adding that Biegun was ready to get on a plane and go “anywhere, any time.” “We really haven’t heard much from the North Koreans since the Hanoi summit, nor has President Moon of South Korea,” he said. Facing North Korean stonewalling, Bolton said he welcomed Abe’s recent offer to hold unconditional talks with Kim Jong Un. In the past, Abe had insisted he wanted to see progress on the return of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea decades ago, but he has recently dropped that demand in a bid to persuade Kim to talk. “The president has held two unconditional meetings with Kim Jong Un, so I wouldn’t see anything untoward if Prime Minister Abe had an unconditional meeting,” Bolton said. Abe had spoken about the abductees almost every single time he spoke with Trump on the phone or in person since Trump took office, Bolton said. The U.S. president raised the issue with Kim several times in Hanoi and recommended he talk to Abe directly. “The president is aware of the priority Japan places on it,” Bolton said. “We are waiting to see some response from the North Korean regime.” Given the importance of the abductee issue and Japan’s interest in the elimination of North Korea’s weapons program, an Abe-Kim summit “could be of substantial assistance,” Bolton said. For now, though, the prospect of such a summit appears even more remote than a third Trump-Kim meeting, experts say. Before he left the United States, Japanese diplomats expressed indifference to the prospect of Trump unleashing a string of freewheeling tweets while abroad, saying that domestic politics is the president’s business. But in weighing on North Korea, as well as a Democratic political rival, in a single tweet, Trump yet again undermined the Japanese’s careful preparations, in which they hoped to flatter Trump into affirming the important relationship between Japan and the United States. (Simon Denyer and Ashley Parker, “Trump Appears to Contradict Bolton on North Korea, Expresses Confidence in Kim,” Washington Post, May 25, 2019)
5/27/19:
DPRK FoMin spokesperson “answer to a question put by KCNA on May 27 as regards the fact that U.S. National Security Adviser has taken the issue over our regular military drill: Bolton, U.S. National Security Adviser has taken the issue over the regular military drill of our army, claiming that it is a violation of the “resolutions” of the United Nations Security Council. His claim is indeed much more than ignorant. As for the UNSC “resolutions” which Bolton recklessly referred to, we have neither recognized nor bound by them, because those “resolutions” are illegal and outrageous ones that completely deny the rights to existence and development of a sovereign state, as we have already stated several times. If any object is launched, it is bound to fly in trajectory. What the U.S. is taking the issue is not about the range but the prohibition of the launch itself using ballistic technology. This is, after all, tantamount to a demand that the DPRK should give up its self-defensive right. Our military drill neither targeted anyone nor endangered the surrounding countries, but Bolton makes dogged claims that it constitutes a violation of the “resolutions”, impudently poking his nose into other’s internal matters. It takes little insight to determine that Bolton clearly does have a different mental structure from ordinary people. Bolton, as he confessed himself, played a “hammer” to “shatter” the 1994 DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework, and he is well-known as an anti-DPRK “war maniac” who fabricated various provocative policies such as designation of our country as “axis of evil”, preemptive strike and regime change. Worse still, Bolton stood in the forefront of leading the Iraqi War and abrogating the INF Treaty that has served to ensure peace in Europe for decades, and he is now gaining notoriety as a warmonger for his obsession with other wars in the Middle East and South America. It is not a mere coincidence that criticisms are now being heard in the U.S. that Bolton is a warmonger whispering war to the President when he himself evaded military service, saying he had no desire to die in a Southeast Asian rice paddy. After all, it will be fit to call Bolton not a security adviser striving for security but a security-destroying adviser who is wrecking peace and security. It is not at all strange that perverse words always come out from the mouth of a structurally defective guy, and such a human defect deserves an earlier vanishing.”” (KCNA, “Spokesperson for Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DPRK Slams U.S. National Security Adviser,” May 27, 2019)
Trump-Abe summit: “PRIME MINISTER ABE: (As interpreted.) … At the summit talk today, bearing in mind of the latest North Korean situation, we spent a good amount of time in better aligning our policies. The positions of Japan and the United States in this regard are completely on the same page. President Trump and Madam Melania continue to meet the family members of the abduction victims. Just like two years ago, when they visited Japan, they encouraged and gave comfort to the members of the victims. Toward the resolution of the most important abduction issue, at the earliest possible timing, is what I am hoping for and I’m determined that I have to face Chairman Kim Jong Un, myself, directly. Without any conditions, I will meet with the Chairman, and I would like to have a discussion frankly, in complete candor. President Trump has expressed strong support to my determination as such by saying that he would support me totally and would not spare any efforts in assisting me. Continuously, we will have the close collaboration between the two countries. We shall miss no opportunities and look toward the early resolution of the abduction issue. We will act resolutely. … PRESIDENT TRUMP: … The Prime Minister and I continue our close consultation in pursuit of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. The essence of our approach is peace through strength. And this is a strong alliance indeed. The U.S.-Japan alliance is steadfast and ironclad. We want peace and we want stability. We continue to hope that Chairman Kim seizes the opportunity to transform his country through denuclearization. It is a country with tremendous economic and other potential. The United States also remains committed to the issue of abductions, which I know is a top priority for Prime Minister Abe. Earlier today, I met for the second time with a group of Japanese families, who have suffered the unthinkable heartbreak of having their loved ones abducted by North Korea. The United States will continue to support Japan’s efforts to bring these abductees home. … Q (Inaudible) from (inaudible) Newspaper. I have a question to Prime Minister Abe on abduction. Japan-Korea Summit meeting: Do you think that the problem would be resolved in one-time meeting with Chairman Kim? Or do you have to go through plural number of meetings in order to seek solution? By what timeframe would you like to realize the summit talk? Is it going to happen by the end of this year? In that sense — in that case, could there be tripartite discussion involving U.S. as well? ABE: (As interpreted.) Regarding the relationship with North Korea, first of all, I have to note the fact that President Trump cracked open the shell of this trust with Chairman Kim Jong Un; shared the bright future beyond the denuclearization, and urging North Korea to act. It’s a new approach. I’d like to pay tribute to his new approach. Most important thing is resolution of abduction issue, and it means that I’m resolved that I have to directly see Chairman Kim face to face without attaching any conditions. I meet him, and then, frankly, and I must have discussion in complete candor. At the summit talk today, to my resolution as such, President Trump expressed that he will give all-out support. He will spare no efforts in rendering assistance to my efforts. It was a very strong support. President Trump and family members of abducted victims had a meeting, and President Trump would look into the eyes of the family members directly. And he was listening to the remarks very seriously. We have to resolve this abduction issue. This is the thought that I have, which was shared by President Trump. Once again, looking toward the resolution of abduction issue, I’d like to pay tribute and gratitude to the lavish understanding and support. Now, including the points that you asked on the topic of a summit talk between Japan and North Korea, as of now, there is no specific goal in sight. But based upon the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, we want to solve comprehensive issues — pending issues like abduction, nuclear missiles. We must come to terms with the unfortunate past, and we must normalize the diplomatic relations. This line is unchanged. Abduction issue is the most important issue for Abe administration. Family members of abductees have advanced in their age. As the President of LDP, I have a certain term — your question sort of implied. And also, a one-time meeting could resolve the issue? You asked. Irrespective of my term in office, I have to do everything I can, all-out efforts of myself, for the resolution of this issue. As the Prime Minister, I have responsibility as such. Going forward, I will discharge this responsibility. And in order to do that as the Prime Minister, day in and day out, I will do my best, and all-out efforts I will endeavor. MS. SANDERS: The United States’ first question will go to Vivian Salama of the Wall Street Journal. Q Thanks, Sarah. Mr. President and Prime Minister. Mr. President, I hope you’ll indulge me with two questions since we’re far from home. The first one is: So if Kim Jong Un is not violating his promise to you by firing small weapons, as you said in your tweet yesterday, what would you consider a violation exactly? TRUMP: Well, first of all, let me say that I think that Kim Jong Un, or Chairman Kim, as some people say, is looking to create a nation that has great strength economically. I think he’s very much — I talk to him a lot about it, and he’s very much into the fact that — he believes, like I do, that North Korea has tremendous economic potential like perhaps few other developing nations anywhere in the world. And I think that he is looking to develop that way. He knows that, with nuclear, that’s never going to happen. Only bad can happen. He understands that. He is a very smart man. He gets it well. So I think that he is — he is going to try, at some point. I’m in no rush at all. The sanctions remain. We have our hostages back. We, as you know, are getting the remains — continuing to get the remains. A lot of good things are happening. And, very importantly, there’s been no nuclear testing for two years. I looked at a chart the other day. During the past administration, there were many numbers that were very high, like 10 and 12 and 18, having to do with missile launches and nuclear testing. And for the last two years, on the bottom, it had zero and zero. So, I am very happy with the way it’s going. And intelligent people agree with me. Q You’re not bothered at all by the small missiles? TRUMP: No, I’m not. I am personally not. … MS. SANDERS: The United States’ second question goes to Jeff Mason of Reuters. … Q And, Mr. President, a follow-up on North Korea. You tweeted about North Korea yesterday. Do you believe that they violated U.N. resolutions with the short-range missile launch? And does it give you pause at all to be appearing to side with a brutal dictator instead of with a fellow American — the former Vice President Joe Biden? TRUMP: Well, Kim Jong Un made a statement that Joe Biden is a low-IQ individual. He probably is, based on his record. I think I agree with him on that. But, at the same time, my people think it could have been a violation, as you know. I view it differently. I view it as a man — perhaps he wants to get attention, and perhaps not. Who knows? It doesn’t matter. All I know is that there have been no nuclear tests. There have been no ballistic missiles going out. There have been no long-range missiles going out. And I think that someday we’ll have a deal. I’m not in a rush. Tremendous sanctions being put on the country of North Korea. And, again, Kim Jong Un understands the unbelievable economic potential that country has. It’s located between Russia and China, on one side, and South Korea on the other. And it’s all waterfront property. It’s a great location, as we used to say in the real estate business. And I think he sees that. And I have to tell you — one other country — I really believe that Iran would like to make a deal. And I think that’s very smart of them. And I think that’s a possibility to happen also. Q But in terms of criticism that you’re sort of supporting a dictator instead of an American Vice President? TRUMP: Well, when I look at what’s been done by our Vice President and the President, when I look at the horrible Iran deal that they made — look what happened since I terminated the Iran deal. Look what has happened to Iran. Iran, when I first came into office, was a terror. They were fighting in many locations all over the Middle East. They were behind every single major attack, whether it was Syria, whether it was Yemen, whether it was individual smaller areas, whether it was taking away oil from people. They were involved with everything. Now they’re pulling back because they’re got serious economic problems. We have massive — as you know, massive sanctions and other things. I mean, we just said the other day: steel, copper, different elements of what they used to sell. The oil is essentially dried up. And I’m not looking to hurt Iran at all. I’m looking to have Iran say, “No nuclear weapons.” We have enough problems in this world right now with nuclear weapons. No nuclear weapons for Iran. And I think we’ll make a deal. I think Iran — again, I think Iran has tremendous economic potential. And I look forward to letting them get back to the stage where they can show that. I think Iran — I know so many people from Iran. These are great people. It has a chance to be a great country, with the same leadership. We’re not looking for regime change. I just want to make that clear. We’re looking for no nuclear weapons. If you look at the deal that Biden and President Obama signed, they would have access — free access — to nuclear weapons, where they wouldn’t even be in violation, in just a very short period of time. What kind of a deal is that? So we can’t have that. Plus, there were many other things they did that were very bad. So I don’t take sides as to who I’m in favor or who I’m not, but I can tell you that Joe Biden was a disaster. His administration, with President Obama, they were basically a disaster when it came to so many things, whether it was economy, whether it was military, defense. No matter what it was, they had a lot of problems. So, I’m not a fan. Q One question for the Prime Minister, sir. Do you share President Trump’s optimism about North Korea and his position about the recent missile launches? … ABE: (As interpreted.) President Trump conducted summit meeting with North Korea together with Chairman Kim. He agreed on the denuclearization of Korean Peninsula and he signed the document. There was great significance in that. He cracked open the shell of distrust so that a future — bright future — can be shared and urge North Korea to act accordingly. This was a new approach, which I welcome. Of course, North Korean denuclearization — for many years, this was not achieved. But precisely because it was not achieved, difficult as it is, President Trump just said that he will make a challenge with a new approach. So we are neighbor to North Korea. We are most threatened among countries. So, as the Prime Minister of such a country, such act of a Prime Minister — of President Trump and policy, I have a trust in it, and I would like to support it. In this context, the abduction issue is of paramount importance. In Hanoi — at the summit talk in Hanoi, President Trump, on behalf of my thinking, he conveyed and communicated my thinking to Kim Jong Un. And I, as well as the country of Japan, are thankful. A moment ago, President Trump met with the family members of the abductees, and the family members were very appreciative of President Trump. So his approach is something that everybody wants to have hope. So that was the view of the families of abductees. Now, the launching of the missiles this time: On the 9th of May, North Korea launched a short-range ballistic missile. This is violating the Security Council resolution. So my reaction is, as I said earlier on, it is of great regret. But at the same time, between Kim Jong Un and President Trump, certain new approach was taken, and that is something that I would like pay tribute to. In any event, denuclearization of Korean Peninsula is the goal. So, U.S., Japan, South Korea, and Europe, and other countries will act in cooperation so that the U.S.-North Korean process would be supported. … (White House, Remarks by President Rump and Prime Minister Abe of Japan in Joint Press, Conference, Akasaka Palace, Tokyo, May 27, 2019)
David von Hippel: “ … Barring past or future imports of uranium or plutonium, the total uranium production over time (meaning since the beginning of significant mining) in the DPRK serves to set an upper limit on the DPRK’s potential production of nuclear materials for weapons. Calculating cumulative DPRK uranium production, however, requires the knowledge of a number of factors, many of which, as indicated above, are uncertain. The key uncertainties involved are summarized below. Once a uranium ore deposit has been identified and mine development has taken place, the quantity of ore produced by the mine is a determinant (but not the only one) of the amount of uranium extracted. In the case of the DPRK, … there are uncertainties as to how many mining sites have seen significant production, what the capacity of many of the sites are (although we have some estimates for major mines), and how much, on average, the mines have operated relative to capacity (average capacity factor) over the years. All of these factors are required for an accurate total estimate of the volume of ore removed, and thus should be the focus of various on-the-ground and remote methods of reducing uncertainty. … There are a wide range of reported ore quality (fraction of uranium per unit weight of ore) in the DPRK. If the average is indeed closer to 0.8 to 0.9 percent, as opposed to 0.2 percent or lower, the amount of uranium mined when a given volume of ore is removed could be a factor of four or more higher. As such, obtaining a better understanding of the ore quality in the DPRK, probably through sampling of ore bodies, mined ore samples, and/or ore processing wastes, is likely to be required to reduce this uncertainty. Also uncertain is what fraction of the uranium in the ore mined in the DPRK remains in the product yellowcake. Uranium ore can be processed in a number of different ways, with the choice of technology depending on factors including the concentration of uranium minerals in the ore, the composition of the other minerals in the ore, and, of course, the technologies and other inputs (such as chemicals for processing) available. Different processing approaches, and the way that processes are operated, yield different levels of uranium losses, that is, different amounts of uranium end up in tailings and other wastes, as opposed to the product yellowcake. Uranium losses during processing can range from 10 to 30 percent, and reducing the uncertainty as to the loss rate is helpful in identifying, how much ore has been processed and how much concentrated uranium has been produced, particularly if measurements of the uranium content of tailings and other wastes are an input to the determination. Also unknown is how much of the DPRK’s uranium, whether as ore, yellowcake, or uranium hexafluoride (UF6) might have been exported. It has been reported that the DPRK shipped 1.6 tons of (UF6) to Pakistan, which was later shipped on to Libya, and likely provided at least technology for the Syrian plutonium production reactor destroyed by Israel in 2007, though whether the DPRK provided uranium for that reactor is not clear. Various analysts suggest that these known instances of nuclear cooperation with other nations are only a part of the DPRK’s trade in nuclear technologies. As such, unreported trades of uranium, beyond the few recorded “on books” trades and the several sales of ore to Russia, China and others, as described above, would affect the possible inventories of fissile material that remain in the DPRK. The DPRK may have uranium in storage as ore, or, more likely, as yellowcake or other forms of uranium concentrates, which requires a much smaller storage volume, and is easily concealed. To the extent that these stores exist, they could complicate efforts to understand the DPRK’s holdings of uranium. Although uranium in storage would presumably be accounted for if an accurate understanding of ore produced and processed could be obtained, in practice it is likely that the uncertainties in ore volumes produced and processes will accommodate a large range of potential volumes of concentrated uranium in storage. Given that the uncertainties identified above are multiplied with each other when one attempts to use data from the uranium production and use chain to help calculate the uranium that the DPRK (or another nation) has on hand, it is desirable to reduce uncertainties as much as possible at each level. Some of the methods for doing so are discussed below. Some uncertainty reduction methods can be undertaken through the use of satellite images, but others will require access to uranium-related sites. In a recent summary of satellite and other remote methods of assessing uranium mining and milling, Jeffrey Lewis and co-authors include the use of changes of geographical features seen in series of satellite images over time, using Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) to look at small changes in elevation over time, and in some cases to see inside structure, and using “hyperspectral imagery” to possibly identify specific minerals. Mining activity, and in particular underground mining, typically results in the accretion of piles of spoil—the rock in which ore is found—in the vicinity of the mine. Satellite images of an area over time can be used to identify areas where mining is active, and, in some cases, estimate the volume of material removed, though sometimes such estimation is complicated by complex terrain and other factors. Additionally, uranium milling releases tailings, the minerals remaining as waste after uranium (and in some cases, other valuable metals, such as vanadium) are removed. These tailings may end up in piles or ponds near the mill, and can be tracked from space. Lewis used these techniques in a 2015 paper looking at recent DPRK uranium mining and milling activity. Others at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies have used these techniques to estimate the capacity of the DPRK’s Pyongsan uranium milling facility, obtaining estimates of between 273 and 885 tonnes of uranium per year, depending on assumptions about ore grade and on the number of counter current decantation units assumed to be contained in buildings (and therefore not visible in images) at the Pyongsan site. An extension of human analysis of satellite images is to use detection algorithms to screen series of images for changes indicative of mining activity. To use detection algorithms, a researcher would identify a physical area of interest within a satellite image, then use one (or hybrids) of a range of techniques to analyze the digital data in the satellite image to detect changes in that area over a temporal series of images. Some of the analytical techniques that can be employed to look for differences occurring in an area over time include image differencing, ratio of means, change vector analysis, inner product and spectral correlation analysis, and multi-variate correlation detection. Synthetic Aperture Radar is capable of imaging areas with resolution to the tens of centimeters, and is sometimes capable of seeing through thin roofing material to detect and size equipment within buildings. It can also be used to detect changes in piles of material, such as mine spoils or tailings, or change in roads or other infrastructure. Hyperspectral sensor capture light reflecting from objects over a wide range of spectra, in both the visible and non-visible ranges. Hyperspectral images, together with processing software, can be used to look at “dozens or hundreds” of spectral bands, and thus to discern between different types of ground cover and minerals. A recent review of the use of hyperspectral remote sensing for mineral exploration includes the following description: “Hyperspectral remote sensing combines two sensing modalities: imaging and spectroscopy. An imaging system captures a picture of a remote scene related to the spatial distribution of the power of reflected and/or emitted electromagnetic radiation integrated over some spectral band… [at the same time] spectroscopy measures the variation in power with the wavelength or frequency of light, capturing information related to the chemical composition of the materials measured. The instrumentation used to capture such spectral information is called an imaging spectrometer or a hyperspectral sensor…”. The spectral information from surface features is compared with the known spectral properties of minerals—for example, uranium or the minerals in which uranium is found in or with—and the spatial distribution of the minerals of interest are mapped through the analysis of the acquired hyperspectral data. … Hyperspectral analysis has been used to evaluate uranium deposits in Australia on a test basis. Case studies of the large Ranger uranium mine matched spectra of known minerals with those found in hyperspectral images of known mines, and a case study of uranium/rare earth element deposits in Queensland used techniques such as Spectral Angle Mapper, Mixture Tuned Matched Filtering. Additional details on these investigations can be found in the source references. At present, the drawback of this technology is that adequate hyperspectral coverage is not currently available by satellite, as NASA’s Hyperion orbital sensor, the most readily available source for such data, functioned from 2000-2017. New images thus require flyovers by planes or drones fitted with suitable detectors, which is only possible in some circumstances (not, currently, in the DPRK). A technical issue is moving the large amounts of spectral data from space to earth-based receivers. Several ventures, are working on the data transfer problem for a variety of potential applications of hyperspectral data. All three of these approaches—evaluation of conventional satellite images, of SAR data, and of hyperspectral data—can be combined with machine learning (including “deep convolutional neural networks”) and ground truthing at known facilities to develop and refine algorithms that allow computers to process image data to identify potential sites and changes in sites over time. Research in this area is ongoing. In addition, satellite imagery can be used to preliminarily identify sites that should be visited on the ground to confirm or rule out the presence of uranium-related activities such as mining or refining (and possibly enrichment. For those sites determined to be related to uranium fuel cycle activities, satellite imagery can be used to help guide direct physical measurements, for example of mine spoil piles or of tailing dumps from uranium refining, as well as sampling, for example, of uranium contents and for concentrations of related decay-chain isotopes. Satellite imagery can also be used to help identify places that should be asked about in interviews of DPRK scientists, and about which information should be sought in documentation provided by DPRK officials as part of a denuclearization agreement. In a 2015 study, three Indian authors researched methods of using satellite images to identify the capacity of known uranium mills. Measuring the diameter of the Counter Current Decantation (CCD) units that are common to uranium mills (these are also sometimes called thickeners in common parlance) from satellite images of mills around the world where the mill capacity was fairly well known, these authors developed a “methodology for estimation of an appropriate production function”. The methodology estimates annual mill production capacity as a function of ore grade (effectively, % U in ore), the number of CCD units present, and the area of CCD units. CCD units are among the common features of a uranium mill, and are among the features most likely to be visible from space. They then used the methodology to check the individual prediction for the throughput capacity of the known mills sites included in their database, and to estimate the capacity of a known uranium mill in Pakistan. The authors note that the accuracy of their methods depend greatly on having accurate data on the actual quality of ore used both in the mills that form their database and in the mills to which the methodology is applied. They also note that an estimate of the capacity of a mill is only one input to understanding its output, as the mill may not operate at full capacity. A first step to applying the type of methodology these authors developed is to identify a site as definitively being a uranium mill, as opposed to a mill used to process some other mineral, such as copper. Mineral processing mills designed to concentrate different metals often use equipment that, at least from space, looks similar. In a separate paper, the same three authors described means of determining whether minerals refining mills are or are not uranium mills, based in part on, for example, the presence of equipment, such as smelters, that would not typically be a part of uranium milling facility, and of equipment that would be present at a uranium facility but not elsewhere. Measurements of ore slag piles located near mines can help to identify the volume of material removed from the mine, including both overburden/slag and ore, which can in turn, along with information about ore uranium content, help to determine the amount of ore removed. The use of core sampling techniques can be used to indicate the variation in ore content of slag over the period in which the slag was deposited, providing indications of how the ore quality in the deposit may have varied over time. In addition, there are many potential DPRK uranium mines where little if anything is known about the production capacity, history of production, or indeed whether the mine has ever operated. Site visits and on-site measurements at these locations will help to reduce the spread of uncertainty as to overall DPRK ore production capacity and output Expert evaluation of the structure of a mine itself can provide information about the expected ratio between ore and overburden that would have been (or is being) extracted, and can be used together with on-site measurements of slag piles to help to estimate the amount of ore taken from a mine over time. Isotopic examination of samples from ore slag piles for long-lived uranium decay products such as protactinium-231, thorium-232, and radium-230 could provide clues as to the concentration of uranium in the original ore. Evaluation of the uranium content of ore samples by mine can help to determine at least the current average uranium content of ore being extracted, and in combination with information about mine output (tonnes of ore), can help to indicate the amount of uranium being produced in a given year. To the extent that older ore samples that are both dated and representative of average ore mined can be tested, additional information about the history of mine output may be available. It is possible that testing ore present in older, no longer mined, sections of a mine can also help to determine the history of uranium production at a given location. When ore is processed to remove and concentrate uranium the resulting uranium-depleted slurry is typically dumped in waste ponds. Measuring the volume of these “tailings” can help to establish the volume of ore processed over time in a given mill. Samples, including core samples, are taken from tailings, and evaluating those samples for uranium content, which would typically be related to the concentration of uranium in the ore, depending on the way that the process is/has been operated, may provide clues as to the original concentration of uranium in the incoming ore. Core samples of tailings piles and waste pond sediments provide a way of going “back in time”, as the samples farther down in the core represent material deposited earlier in the life of the uranium processing facility. Slices of a given core sample are tested for content of uranium, and the resulting concentrations are evaluated based on where in the core a given sample is taken. In addition, using techniques such as gamma and alpha spectrometry can help to determine the relative concentration of uranium isotopes and other radionuclides within sediments in waste ponds, which can help to determine when the ore was processed and its original U concentration, as well as which mines the ore came from.38 In this way, isotopic examination of tailings samples for long-lived uranium decay products should also provide clues as to the concentration of uranium in the original ore. Other types of analyses, including raman spectroscopy, can track minerals associated with uranium in ores, and thus also help to determine which mines or ore bodies the uranium processed at the facility originally came from. The uranium ore and uranium concentrate produced from a given mine has characteristic non-uranium impurities and isotopic composition that can be traced from mine to yellowcake, and thus help to determine the origin of uranium used in the nuclear fuel cycle, and by extension, help to determine the output of a given mine. Examples of the types of measurements that can be made of ore and uranium concentrate include measurement of the abundance of rare earth minerals as a reflection of the geochemical conditions in the mine, other trace element measurements of the impurities in processed uranium and in mines, and measurements of uranium/lead (Pb) and lead/lead isotope ratios, both as an indicator of mine identity and to date the uranium deposit, itself also an indicator of mine identity. As noted above, only a very few trades of ores containing uranium and thorium appear in at least aggregate trade statistics in recent years. Piecing together more of a history of the DPRK’s trade in uranium ores (and/or metals) will therefore depend first on a thorough search of literature including, for example, available historical Soviet and Eastern Bloc diplomatic communications, as well as detailed trade statistics showing firms involved, quantities, values, and related information from, for example, Russia, China, and other nations thought to be or have been importers of DPRK ore. Next might come requests to possible importer nations for information on historical trades with the DPRK, although one imagines that in perhaps the majority of cases, such information will not be forthcoming. Finally, information on past exports could be sought from the DPRK itself as a part of a denuclearization deal. Requests for information on uranium exports should be accompanied by requests for information from at least the DPRK, and possibly other nations, on imports of uranium by the DPRK, though we assume that such trades, apart from, for example, imports of enriched uranium in small quantities from Russia for the DPRK’s small research reactor at Yongbyon, are unlikely to have taken place in significant volume. … An exhaustive estimate of the total uranium produced by the DPRK, and thus of an upper bound on the amount of fissile material available to the DPRK (assuming no or insignificant imports of same) would in theory require determined values or estimates for a number of different parameters. These parameters would include: The average capacity of DPRK uranium mines, ideally by historical period; The average capacity factor of DPRK uranium mines, also by historical period; The capacity of uranium mills, and/or the fraction of uranium ore milled to produce natural uranium; The fraction of uranium ore (or other forms of uranium) exported to other nations, also ideally by historical period; The average fraction of uranium in uranium ore (which may have changed over the history of DPRK uranium production); The efficiency with which uranium mills convert uranium to yellowcake (U3O8). Estimates of the amount of fissile materials produced from the DPRK’s uranium output would further require: Estimates of the efficiency of conversion of uranium in yellowcake to uranium hexafluoride and back to uranium oxide for reactor fuel; Estimates of the fraction of purified forms of natural uranium (UF6, UO3, uranium metal) retained in storage, versus the fraction undergoing enrichment or conversion to natural uranium reactor fuel (for example, for use in Yongbyon “5 MWe” reactor); Estimates of the fraction of uranium remaining in uranium “tails” (depleted uranium) from enrichment to HEU and LEU; Estimates of the fraction of Pu in reprocessed fuel prior to reprocessing; Estimates of the efficiency of Pu recovery during reprocessing. We have undertaken what must be considered initial estimates of the amount of uranium that may have been mined and milled over time in the DPRK using two different procedures. The first, which might be called “top-down” starts with the estimates of the amount of fissile materials thought by others (as described above) to be held by the DPRK and/or have been used in weapons tests, and calculates the volumes of uranium and uranium ore implied to have been produced. The second approach starts with estimates of the DPRK uranium mining capacity and estimates overall uranium ore and refined uranium production. Comparison of the differences between the two estimates, including sensitivity analysis with the second approach, is used to try and determine what types of information should be sought, either on the ground or by remote means, to try and narrow down the estimates of uranium available to the DPRK as a part of nuclear weapons/nuclear materials verification in support of a denuclearization agreement. Below, and in the annexes that follow, we present the methods and results of our estimates. Starting with the ranges of estimates of enriched uranium and plutonium production prepared by others, and summarized above, and selecting “central” estimates from those ranges, we estimate that on the order of 200 to 800 tonnes of natural uranium (as U, not uranium oxides) would be required to produce the ranges of enriched uranium—as HEU for weapons (or possibly some for the Yongbyon research reactor) and as LEU for the DPRK’s ELWR—and plutonium described above. A central estimate is 400 tonnes uranium. These calculations are shown in Annex 1. Please note that in both Annex 1 and 2, although results are shown for convenience to many digits, the figures shown should probably not be considered accurate to more than one significant figure. Using a range of average uranium concentrations in DPRK ore of 0.15 percent to 0.9 percent, with a central estimate of 0.25 percent, we get uranium ore requirements implied by the production estimates above ranging from about 20 thousand to 600 thousand tonnes, with a central estimate of somewhat under 200,000 tonnes. Note that these are cumulative, not annual figures. Note also that these figures do not include any estimates of the amount of uranium in processed or ore form that the DPRK may have in storage. We would consider the possibility of significant amounts of ore being held in storage less likely than storage of processed uranium, as to the bulk of ore that would have to be stored would be on the order of one hundred to (more likely) over one thousand times the volume of processed yellowcake with the same uranium content. Starting with estimates of DPRK uranium mining capacity, and implicitly assuming that most, if not all, mined uranium is processed to yellowcake (and that therefore the processing capacity is sufficient to more or less keep up with ore production), we estimate that between about 200 and 7,000 tonnes of natural uranium (tonnes U) has been produced by the DPRK, with a central estimate of about 800 tonnes U. Note that this estimate excludes uranium that may have been exported (mostly as ore, but possibly in small part in refined form) and thus remains in the country in some form—as yellowcake or other uranium oxides, uranium metal, UF6, HEU, LEU, depleted uranium or as Pu produced from uranium. The lower end of this estimate starts with mine capacity of 29,000 tonnes of ore per year, which is the sum of the estimates for two major mines described by Yoon (ibid). The higher end of the estimate is capacity doubles that estimate, and a central value was chosen as 38,000 tonnes/year, which assumes that the other mines (that is, apart from Pyongsan and Woong-gi) that have been noted in various articles sum to a capacity of about 10,000 tonnes of ore annually. Using the same range of ore concentrations—from 0,15% U to 0.9% uranium—implies total cumulative uranium ore output (net of exports) of about 200,000 to 1 million tonnes of ore, with a central estimate of about 400,000 tonnes. … A key input assumption in these calculations are the annual average capacity factors for different periods (each a decade or more) in which the DPRK produced uranium. These annual capacity factors are our rough estimates and range from 5 percent—of what are assumed to have been the highest capacities achieved by the DPRK over the years—in the early years of production, to up to 50 percent in the 1990s. The ranges of the top-down and bottom-up estimates of natural uranium and uranium ore produced above do not match up entirely, but do overlap. Particularly at the low end of the range, for total uranium production as expressed as tonnes of elemental U, the two estimates are relatively close, at near 200 tonnes uranium. The estimates diverge somewhat in going from the “minimum” end of the range through central estimates to the “maximum” values, which could imply uranium in storage as natural (probably refined) uranium. We prepared a rough calculation of the amount of space that might be required to store all of the refined (for example, as yellowcake) uranium produced by the DPRK (net of exports, but including all forms of uranium, and uranium and plutonium that has been used in weapons tests. The space required for uranium storage ranges from 1000 square meters (smaller than the buildings on site at the known uranium refining facilities in the DPRK) to about 40,000 square meters (several such buildings), but in either case is not so large that it would be difficult for the DPRK to conceal the stored uranium. Direct sampling and satellite image analysis can be used together to reduce the range of uncertainty in a number of key parameters. Perhaps the most important among these is the average ore content of uranium mined in the DPRK. Our guess is that the average value for ore quality is much more likely to be near 0.2 percent than 0.9 percent, as the latter would be quite high and seems to be contradicted by the typical ore qualities in the nations in the area, as well as by Russian reports of ore quality (see above). Although multi-band analysis of satellite imagery may provide some way of assessing the ore quality in uranium mine spoil or in piles of ore waiting to be processed, it is likely that direct access and sampling (of ore, mine spoil, and mill tailings, for example) will be needed to reduce uncertainty in the range of historical uranium output. Satellite techniques for assessing the growth in spoil piles and tailings dumps would ideally be combined with on-the-ground measurements, including cores, to attempt to determine the rate of ore production and uranium refining over time. Sensitivity analysis of degree sampling/satellite analysis would reduce range of estimates of existing uranium. … Differences in each of the parameters was reduced by 5 to 50 percent. A reduction of 50 percent in the difference between the minimum and central estimates of uranium mine capacity decreases the difference in uranium production net of export (as U) by about 10 percent, and in uranium ore by about 30 percent. (A reduction in the difference between minimum and central annual capacity factors for mines would have had a similar impact). A reduction of 50 percent between the central and maximum estimates for mine capacity would reduce the difference in tonnes of uranium and uranium ore available for domestic use by about 60 and 40 percent, respectively. Reduction in the differences between the estimates for ore quality by 50 percent reduce the volume of ore needed for non-exported production by about 20 percent (for minimum to central estimates) and by 80 percent for central to maximum estimates. The reduction in the latter is particularly pronounced because the difference between the central and maximum values we assumed for ore quality is large. Based on the above, total historical uranium production (net of export) in the DPRK is estimated to be in the range from about 200 to 1000 tonnes of uranium as U, with ore production in the range from tens of thousands of tonnes to up to a million tonnes, with hundreds of thousands of tonnes being more likely, in our opinion. It will be crucial to obtain a better understanding of ore quality in the DPRK in particular, so sampling of ore bodies, waste piles, and tailings ponds/piles at identified major mines and at uranium processing facilities will be crucial, and should be a part of any negotiated agreement. Satellite image analysis will provide a useful addition to data acquired on the ground, but likely cannot, particularly in the short term, substitute for direct sampling. There are, of course, a wide range of issues associated with reducing the uncertainty of uranium production estimates. These include (but are not limited to): Site access—that is, whether the DPRK will allow access to all identified and suspected sites involved in uranium production and processing. Hidden facilities, including underground facilities, are widely expected to exist for a variety of military installations, with uranium processing and enrichment among them. Sampling error or bias, caused by not being able, through physical or access impediments, or to lack of equipment, manpower, and/or time, to sample all of the relevant parts of a given uranium-bearing stratum, spoils pile, tailing pile, or other input to our output of the uranium industry. Access to mining and processing records at all the sites and facilities involved in uranium mining, processing, enrichment, and fabrication. Maximizing access to sites and records and making arrangements that will allow the minimizing of sampling errors and of missed hidden facilities, as well as reducing, to the extent possible, any other issues likely to limit the effectiveness of verification testing, will be a goal of negotiations on verification protocols.” (David von Hippel, Methods for Refining Estimates of Cumulative DPRK Uranium Production, NAPSnet, May 27, 2019)
5/29/19:
DPRK FoMin’s Institute for American Studies Policy Research Director’s statement: “It has now become disclosed that the United States conducted the 29th subcritical nuclear test at the nuclear test site of Nevada on February 13, and this arouses grave concern and denunciation of the international society. What should be taken serious is the fact that the subcritical nuclear test was carried out just prior to the Hanoi DPRK-U.S. Summit that would discuss the issue of building a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. has thus showcased its ulterior intention that it seeks a strength-based solution of the issues, though outwardly it advocates for dialogue. That intention can be fully justified by the political, economic and military hostile acts committed by the U.S. against the DPRK, its dialogue partner, since the historic Singapore DPRK-U.S. Summit Talks. Even after the U.S. committed to an “establishment of new DPRK-U.S. relations” in the June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement, Bolton, White House National Security Advisor, Pompeo, Secretary of State, and other high-ranking officials of the U.S. diplomacy and security circles have insulted the dignity of our supreme leadership and spitted out abusive language to the DPRK, calling it as “rogue regime”, and unveiled their hostile scheme to stifle us by force, saying that the U.S. would “change its path” if the DPRK does not give in to the former’s demand for dismantlement of the nuke first. At the same time, the U.S. has continued to pursue its strategy of “maximum pressure” against us and attempted to suffocate us economically. Since August 2018, the U.S. has imposed arbitrary sanctions for 11 times on more than 40 entities and individuals from several countries including the DPRK, China, Russia, Singapore and South Africa, continued to change the regulations on the anti-DPRK sanctions and made public “advisories” of all hues on several times in order to force an interruption of the financial and shipping transactions with us. The U.S. even committed a crime of dispossessing our cargo ship under the preposterous ground that we had violated the heinous American sanctions acts. At present, the U.S. is moving in a crafty manner to impose additional sanctions on our ships, organizations and individuals and restrict even the legitimate activities of our diplomats, by employing the anti-DPRK sanctions committee of the United Nations Security Council. The U.S. has also militarily threatened the DPRK by staging Marine Corp Joint Exercise, “Dong Maeng (Alliance) 19-1”, Joint Aerial Combat Drill and other various war games with south Korea in November last year and in March-April this year. During the period between March and May this year, the U.S. conducted a missile interception test simulating the interception of the DPRK’s ICBMs at the air force base in California, test-launched ICBM “MinuteMan-3” and SLBM “Trident-2 D-5” targeted at the DPRK and its surrounding countries and also increased the reconnaissance flights over the DPRK. The U.S. now maneuvers to forward-deploy sophisticated landing crafts in Japan and even deploy SLCMs that could mount nuclear warhead, around the Korean peninsula. All the above clearly shows that the June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement is not within the consideration of the United States and there is no change at all in the American evil ambition to conquer the DPRK by force. When cloud is frequent, rain will follow. The U.S. should better bear in mind that its hostile acts will only bring about the result of adding tension to the already unstable Korean peninsula and inviting adverse current. Use of strength is not at all a monopoly of the United States.” (KCNA, “Use of Strength Is Not at All Monopoly of U.S.: Director of Institute of American Studies, FM of DPRK,” May 29, 2019)
North Korea’s top negotiator ahead of the failed summit with the U.S. in February was executed a month later, while leader Kim Jong-un’s erstwhile right-hand man Kim Yong-chol was sent to a labor and reeducation camp, a source said. Kim Hyok-chol, who was the counterpart of U.S. Special Representative Stephen Biegun in the run-up to the summit, was shot at Mirim Airport in March with four other senior officials on charges of spying for America, the source said. Kim Jong-un is believed to have ordered the purge, which also swept up other officials in the negotiations, to contain internal unrest and mounting public dissatisfaction over the failed summit. The source said Kim Yong-chol was sent to hard labor in Jagang Province, while Kim Song-hye of the United Front Department was sent to a political prison camp. Kim Jong-un’s interpreter at the summit, Shin Hye-yong, was accused of “tarnishing the authority” of the leader for an interpreting error and is also believed to have been sent to a prison camp. The North Korean leader’s younger sister, Kim Yo-jong, was told to lie low. “Kim Yo-jong has not been spotted in public since the Hanoi summit,” a government official here said. Rodong Sinmun, meanwhile, took aim at “anti-party, anti-revolutionary acts” against the leader. “Acting like one is revering the leader in front but dreaming of something else when one turns around is an anti-party, anti-revolutionary act that has thrown away the moral fidelity toward the leader, and such people will not avoid the stern judgment of the revolution,” it thundered. “There are traitors and turncoats who only memorize words of loyalty toward the leader and even change according to the trend of the time.” The last time expressions like “anti-party,” “anti-revolutionary” and “stern judgment” appeared in the official party paper was when Kim Jong-un executed his uncle Jang Song-taek in 2013. (Kim Myong-song, “Kim Jong UN “Brutally Purged Officials after Failed Summit,” Chosun Ilbo, May 30, 2019) Responding to the report from the conservative Chosun Ilbo, Cheong Wa Dae said it could not confirm whether it was true. “It is not proper for us to make any rash comments on the report,” a presidential aide told reporters, asking not to be named. “We have nothing to say, even though we keep track of any unusual signs from the North.” The unification ministry declined to comment. (Lee Min-hyung, “North Korea Officials, Diplomats Purged: Report,” Korea Times, May 30, 2019) Asked at a news conference in Berlin on May 31 about the Chosun Ilbo report, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said American officials were looking into it. Rumors of North Korean negotiators being executed at the orders of Kim have been floating around Washington for weeks, and Pompeo has been asked about them before. Each time, he has said the United States is looking into the reports. No American officials have spoken publicly of any intelligence they might have seen that would confirm or refute the rumors. Diplomats in Washington from other countries have also acknowledged hearing the rumors, but have said they have no confirmation. But some signs in recent weeks have led analysts in South Korea to speculate that Kim may be engineering a reshuffle or a purge of his negotiating team in the wake of the summit meeting, held in February in Hanoi, Vietnam. The meeting was widely seen as a huge embarrassment for Kim, who is supposedly seen as infallible in his totalitarian state. Also sent to a prison camp was Kim Song-hye, a senior female nuclear negotiator who teamed up with Kim Hyok-chol in working-level negotiations ahead of the Kim-Trump summit, the South Korean newspaper said. North Korea even sent a summit translator to a prison camp for committing a translation mistake, it said. Kim had to return home empty-handed, without the sanctions relief that he badly needed to help ease his country’s deepening economic isolation. Outside analysts have since wondered whether Kim’s negotiating team had failed to prepare him for such a breakdown in the talks or considered how Kim might react. Kim Yong-chol, the Workers’ Party leader, has seemed to disappear from state news media in recent weeks. Although he retained some of his top posts during a parliamentary meeting in April, he was replaced as head of the United Front Department, a key party agency in charge of relations with South Korea and the North’s intelligence affairs. Even Kim Jong-un’s sister and adviser, Kim Yo-jong, did not accompany Kim to the meeting with Putin, although she has been a fixture in high-profile summit meetings with American, Chinese and South Korean leaders. Chosun Ilbo said the sister may have been reprimanded by Mr. Kim or may be sick with pneumonia. Jung Chang-hyun, head of the Korean Peace and Economy Institute, a research group affiliated with South Korea’s Moneytoday news media group, said he had heard that four North Korean Foreign Ministry officials were executed by firing squad around March, not because of the breakdown of the Hanoi summit meeting, but rather for a separate corruption scandal. It remained unclear whether the four officials included Kim Hyok-chol, said Jung, an expert on the North Korean regime and author of books on the North. But Jung said that officials under Kim Jong-un’s sister were also involved in the corruption scandal and that as a consequence, Ms. Kim was put on probation by her brother. Jung said he acquired the information from third-country sources who meet or communicate with North Korean officials through China. (Choe Sang-hun, “Report Says North Korea Executed Its Envoy to the U.S.,” New York Times, May 31, 2019, p. A-9) While North Korea hasn’t used its propaganda services to comment, the report in the conservative Chosun Ilbo could be true. North Korea has previously executed scapegoats to atone for high-profile political flops. But it’s important to note that both South Korean media and the government in Seoul have a history of reporting scoops about the inner workings of North Korea that turn out to be wrong. Supposedly executed officials have later appeared trotting alongside Kim on state TV. Today’s report is based on a single, unidentified “source who knows about North Korea” — with no details about where that source got its information. The report so far hasn’t been matched by any major media in Seoul or confirmed by government officials, even anonymously. That the report has been snapped up by global media reflects the hunger for any details about what’s going on in North Korea as diplomatic efforts falter between Washington and Pyongyang, which tightly controls its media and both local and foreign access to information. Seoul’s spy service said it could not confirm Friday’s report, while the presidential Blue House said that “it’s inappropriate to make hasty judgments or comments.” (Foster Klug and Kim Tong-hyung, “Amid Report of N. Korea Purge, There Are Reasons for Caution,” Associated Press, May 31, 2019)
6/3/19:
Kim Yong-chol, a former North Korean spymaster and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s counterpart in recent diplomatic contacts between the North and the United States, resurfaced in public this week, undermining a South Korean newspaper’s report that he was banished to forced labor in a re-education camp. KCNA today included Kim Yong-chol’s name on a list of officials who accompanied Kim Jong-un to an art performance given by the wives of military officers on yesterday. But on a roster of officials attending the event, Kim Yong-chol’s name was listed 10th among 12 officials named. In North Korea’s opaque regime, an official’s status is commonly gauged by his name’s ranking in leadership rosters carried by the state-run news media. In another telltale sign of his declining influence, Kim Yong-chol was not seen next to Kim Jong-un, as he often used to be, in photos carried by KCNA today. South Korean media scrutinizing the photos identified the man seated five seats to the left of Kim Jong-un as Kim Yong-chol. Key members of Kim Yong-chol’s team — including the North’s special envoy to the United States, Kim Hyok-chol, and Kim Song-hye, both of whom accompanied Kim Yong-chol when he visited Mr. Trump in the Oval Office in January — have since disappeared from the North’s state-run news media. They led working-level negotiations with United States officials ahead of the Hanoi summit. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korean Official Blamed for Failure of Trump Summit Reappears in Public,” New York Times, June 4, 2019, p. A-12)
South Korea and the United States agreed today to name a separate Korean four-star general to lead their envisioned future joint command and relocate its headquarters, currently in Seoul, to an American base south of the capital, Seoul’s defense ministry said. Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo and Acting U.S. Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan made the agreement during talks in Seoul. The agreement ended speculation that Seoul may have the chairman of its Joint Chiefs of Staff or chief of the Ground Operations Command double as the chief of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC). Currently, a four-star U.S. Army general helms the CFC. After Seoul retakes wartime operational control of its forces from Washington, a South Korean general is supposed to command the CFC. To flesh out detailed procedures for the CFC relocation, the two sides agreed to run a joint working group. In addition, they agreed to beef up cooperation over preparations for a combined command post exercise that will replace the summertime Ulchi Freedom Guardian as part of a reorganization of major exercises aimed at supporting peace efforts with the North. The allies have sought to stage the exercise in August during which they will test Seoul’s initial operational capability (IOC) in a first step to verify whether Seoul is on course to meet the conditions required for the OPCON transition. The allies have agreed on a “conditions-based” OPCON transition. The conditions are the South’s capabilities to lead the allies’ combined defense mechanism, its capacity for initial responses to the North’s nuclear and missile threats and a stable security environment on the peninsula and in the region. (Song Sang-ho, “Allies to Name South Korean General to Lead Future Command, Relocate CFC to Pyongtaek,” June 3, 2019)
6/4/19:
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s press statement: “The DPRK-U.S. summit meeting and talks held in Singapore in June last year for the first time in history was a momentous occasion of great significance in promoting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region and advancing the historic trend of reconciliation and cooperation. The June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement adopted at the DPRK-U.S. summit meeting and talks enjoyed full support and approval of all countries and peoples across the world, as it proved in practice that even the countries with the most hostile relations could lay out an avenue for establishing new relations once they make politically decisive steps to defend peace and stability, giving these issues a top priority. As is acknowledged by the international society at large, the government of the DPRK has exerted ceaseless efforts over the past year to establish new DPRK-U.S. relations, build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean peninsula and achieve denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, as has been stipulated in the June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement, and also made every possible endeavor such as taking practical initiatives that require strategically decisive measures. However, it is regrettable to see that the United States has become ever more undisguised during the past year in its scheme to annihilate us by force while deliberately turning its face away from the implementation of the DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement and only insisting on our unilateral surrender of nuclear weapons. At the second DPRK-U.S. summit talks held in Hanoi amid the great interest and expectation of the entire world, the United States made the biggest mistake of having missed a lifetime opportunity by insisting on “dismantlement of the nuke first.” This overshadows the future of the DPRK-U.S. talks. Had the United States done anything of a little help in addressing the issues on the basis of serious position and sincere attitude for implementing the DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement, the issue of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula might also have seen much progress. In his historic policy speech, Comrade Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea said that given the persistence of deep-rooted hostility between the DPRK and the U.S., it is necessary for implementation of the June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement that both sides give up their unilateral demands and find a constructive solution which would meet each other’s interest. And he said that to this end, it is requisite for the U.S. to fold its current method of calculation and approach us with a new one. The June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement is the commitment which the two countries have pledged to the world and the humankind, and it is the task both sides should be jointly accountable for. The DPRK remains unchanged in its stand and will to cherish and implement in good faith the June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement personally signed by the supreme leaders of the DPRK and the U.S. at the first-ever DPRK-U.S. summit talks. However, if the U.S., a dialogue partner, fails to carry out its obligation and keeps resorting to anti-DPRK hostile policy, the fate of the June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement will not be promising. Whether the June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement will remain effective or turn out to be a mere blank sheet of paper will now be determined by how the U.S. would respond to our fair and reasonable stand. Nearly one year now since the declaration of the historic June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement, the U.S. should duly look back on the past one year and cogitate about which will be a correct strategic choice before it is too late. The U.S. would be well-advised to change its current method of calculation and respond to our request as soon as possible. There is a limit to our patience. .” (KCNA, “Fate of DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement: Spokesperson for Foreign Ministry of DPRK,” June 4, 2019)
6/5/19:
South Korea set into motion a donation of $8 million to the World Food Program (WPF) and UNICEF for emergency nutritional and medical assistance to North Korea. The Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council, an inter-ministerial body under the South’s Unification Ministry, voted today afternoon to approve a plan to pull the donations from the inter-Korean cooperation fund, Seoul’s 1.5 trillion won ($1.2 billion) fund maintained to provide financial support for cross-border exchanges. Unification Minister Kim Yeon-chul signed off on the aid, which will be transferred to the two organizations’ accounts within the next three or four days, according to a senior ministry official. Around $4.5 million will go to the WFP, which will use the money to supply fortified biscuits or cereals to children or pregnant women through distribution centers it has in places like nurseries, orphanages and children’s hospitals in 60 counties across the country’s nine provinces. The remaining $3.5 million will go to UNICEF, which announced last month that it had been granted sanctions exemption to conduct relief programs worth $5.75 million. Welcoming Seoul’s donation, a UNICEF spokesman said the money would be used to provide medical assistance like antibiotics to around 2.8 million people in the North, according to a Voice of America report. (Shim Kyu-seok and Jeong Yong-soo, “Seoul Sign off on $8M in Aid,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 6, 2019)
6/6/19:
Cheon: “ … Immediately after the third test, the Supreme People’s Assembly legislated the “nuclear weapons state law” in April 2013 and declared the legitimacy of nuclear weapons development, the role of nuclear weapons, and so forth. This seems to have been done in preparation to deal with the various political, diplomatic, military, and social issues that follow field deployment. Article 4 of the “nuclear weapons state law” mentions that when deterrence fails and nuclear weapons are to be used, “it can only be used by the final command of the Highest Commander.” Hence, the law is the first official document and legal foundation to stipulate the command and control system for DPRK’s nuclear forces. However, no document seems to articulate the specific chain of command or communications system in regard to nuclear forces, or the delegation of command and control authority in case of emergency. Additional measures should have taken place after 2013; however none have been reported. The Strategic Forces Command created in 2014 seems to have benchmarked the military organization of major nuclear states with Kim Jong-Un’s nuclear force operation in mind. No official document that endows such authority to the Strategic Forces Command has been found. Yet, comments by the spokesperson for the Strategic Forces Command and North Korean media reports allude to this. On March 7, 2017, the DPRK’s central news agency reported that the ballistic launch exercises held on March 6th were aimed to evaluate the warhead employment procedures of the Strategic Forces Command’s Hwasong Artillery and ability to conduct speedy operations. This implied that the mandate of the Strategic Forces included operating nuclear warheads, and that procedures to evaluate exercises and ability to conduct speedy operations were in place. In August 2017, the spokesperson for DPRK’s Strategic Command mentioned that an attack against Guam using Hwasung-12(IRBM) will be undertaken at a random time and instantaneously by the order of Kim Jong-Un. This showed that the Strategic Forces Command were to follow Kim’s orders. It is unclear whether North Korea has built a NC3 system that technically supports Kim Jong-Un’s absolute control authority over the nuclear forces. … The North Korea military is known to have tried to build a C3 system that can technically support the command and control of the Highest Commander since the Kim Jong-Il era. Nevertheless, according to the statements of defectors who were once DPRK people’s army officers, the use of an automated C3 system based on computer is yet limited. It seems that DPRK Joint Chiefs of Staff and Corps-level commands use a computer-based C3 system, but lower echelons do not have such a system. Main means for the command and control of the DPRK’s military consist of telephony, radio, and couriers, and the most common is telephony. For telephony, cable and fiber optic cable are available but cable is more widely used. Underground fiber optic cable is known to be used for connectivity between the forward deployed echelons and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Based on the defectors’ statement that they had never exercised with an automated C3 system during their military service, the use of an automated C3 system seems to be still limited. Underground fiber optic cable is likely used for the connectivity from the Highest Command to missile and warhead storage bases and from bases to dispatch sites for transporter erector launchers (TELs). If North Korea military has already been using it for its conventional C3 system, then sharing it with its NC3 system would be natural. If not, North Korea is expected to adopt it for its NC3 system installation. Of course, other means like radio or courier could be employed as a backup for contingency. If there is no prior delegation of fire authority, some delivery options such as surface and submarine vessels could be unlikely used for warhead delivery systems due to the restriction of communication. If one assumes that the Highest Commander specifies a target and an attack time in advance, those options could be considered for nuclear employment although it would be a great challenge to cancel the mission order. This kind of C2 restriction could often be utilized by an irrational leader for brinkmanship and thus for rendering his opponent difficult to properly counter. Several missile units of DPRK’s Strategic Forces have been likely designated for warhead delivery mission and communication lines connecting the Highest Command with those units that have been likely installed with fiber optic cable. The final admission of the Highest Commander could be transmitted through the lines along with a cord to activate a warhead. Given the different chain of command between the nuclear forces and conventional forces, it is likely that a new, independent NC3 system has been built. Particularly, to prevent unauthorized use of nuclear forces and only approve use by the final command of the Highest Commander, a separate NC3 system seems desirable. In addition, considering potential cyber and electronic attacks by South Korea and the US, a modernized NC3 system that guarantees survival is likely to have been built. … NC3 system may include the approval of nuclear weapon use, the spread and delivery of order, authority related to the implementation of order and the employment of nuclear weapon, organization, communication networks, and alert system. Among those, a key component is who exercises authority for the final approval of nuclear weapon use. Regarding the type of authority exercise, it could be categorized in two types and depends on the strategic priority of a country that possesses and employs nuclear weapons. Assertive type is when a country gives the authority to the highest political leader only. On the other hand, delegative type is when a country allows others to exercise the authority under a certain condition. Regarding the command and control of nuclear forces, DPRK’s “nuclear weapons state law” shows that nuclear weapons can only be used by the final order from the Highest Commander of DPRK’s forces. It could imply that DPRK does not allow any commander to order the use of nuclear weapons. “Nuclear weapons state law” does not show any article related to the delegation of authority for nuclear weapons employment. It seems that Kim Jong-Un gives a final order for the launch of a nuclear missile. He does not delegate others his authority. Such a command and control system implies that Kim Jong-Un does not fully trust his military commanders. … On the other hand, Ham (2009) had speculated that DPRK could have a possibility that adopts a delegative type for the command and control of its nuclear forces when it gets threatened by ROK-US first attack and it acquires sufficient warheads and delivery systems. It seems a reasonable option that could offset ROK-US conventional superiority and enhance the credibility of DPRK’s nuclear deterrence strategy. He, however, had predicted that DPRK would not adopt such a delegative system in peacetime in order not to allow unapproved use of nuclear weapons. The establishment of an assertive nuclear command and control system by Kim Jong-Un could be desirable because it could reduce the likelihood of unauthorized or unintended use. Such an assertive system helps make the management of nuclear arsenal easier in peacetime and assures that nuclear weapons are employed only for the predetermined purpose. With such an assertive system, it is highly likely that warheads and delivery means are managed separately. Because, if both are under the control of a certain military commander, there is some risk that the commander could use a nuclear weapon by his own decision and the power of the commander could increase unnecessarily. Regarding this matter, Lee (2017) asserts that the Central Military Committee of DPRK Labor’s party takes care of warheads in peacetime, and, when the Highest Commander (Kim Jong-Un) decides to use a nuclear weapon in wartime, it is transferred to the military. In detail, a special institute under the direct control of the Central Military Committee stores and manages warheads, and when a decision to employ nuclear weapons is made, warheads could be transferred to a special unit such as a nuclear ordnance squadron, and then the special unit convoys and mounts warheads on the ballistic missiles of the Strategic Forces. Finally, by the order of the Highest Commander (Kim Jong-Un) the nuclear missile is launched. Lee’s assertion seems reasonable when considering the characteristics of DPRK’s regime that the authority of Labor’s party is beyond that of the military. Although the DPRK’s system relies on direct command and control over its nuclear forces by the Highest Commander and the separative management system of nuclear warheads contributes to enhancing the stability of warhead management and reducing the risk of unintended use of nuclear weapons, it also has challenges. First, it is difficult to make a timely decision when the Highest Commander is suddenly dead or some technical problem occurs in the communication networks connecting the Highest Commander to a missile unit. Furthermore, DPRK’s military leaderships could be high on the targeting list of ROK-US combined forces in wartime. Also, the powerful capability of ROK-US ally’s electronic warfare could pose a major challenge to the communication between the Highest commander and the Strategic Forces. Under such circumstances, it might be a challenge to assure the authority of the Highest Commander for nuclear employment. Another issue of the separative warhead management system is that a rapid nuclear response is uneasy in a wartime that requires a fast and well-organized nuclear employment. While a nuclear ordnance squadron is transferring warheads to a missile unit, various unfavorable situations could happen such as accidents, ambush, and seizure. Lastly, in the case that a functional problem is discovered on a warhead, it could be difficult to identify who is responsible. Institutes/units involved in managing, monitoring, delivering, mounting, and launching could blame each other for the problem. DPRK could likely prepare a contingency plan describing who has the authority of the command and control over its nuclear forces and how to exercise it when Kim Jong-Un cannot exercise his authority. Regarding convincing candidates who would success Kim Jong-Un, Lee (2017) pointed out Kim Seol-Song, elder sister of Kim Jung-Un, and Kim Yeo-Jung, younger sister of Kim Jong-Un. Kim Jung-Un does not trust anybody but his family. In that sense, two sisters who have been deeply involved in DPRK’s internal politics since Kim Jong-Il died are considered as trustful members of Kim’s family. Kim Jong-Un could select one of two sisters as his successor. … Assembled warheads are stored, monitored, and managed under the control of the Central Military Committee of Labor’s party in peacetime. When the Highest Commander gives an order to employ unclear weapons, a special unit like “nuclear ordnance squadron” receives warheads from the institute under the control of the Central Military Committee and convoys warheads to missile units and mounts them on the missiles with warhead delivery mission. … The primary framework is the DPRK’s state law adopted in 2012, the text of which follows below. (Art.1) DPRK’s nuclear weapons are justifiable defensive measures to inevitably counter hostile policies and nuclear threats which have been constantly raised by the United States. (Art.2) Until the global denuclearization is accomplished, DPRK’s nuclear forces shall deter and defeat attacks and invasions across the country and retaliate against a stronghold of invasions. (Art.3) Preparing against the danger of attacks and invasions by the hostile forces, DPRK shall take measures to qualitatively reinforce the nuclear deterrent and nuclear retaliatory capability. (Art.4) In case that the hostile nuclear weapon states attack or invade the republic, DPRK’s nuclear weapons shall be used only by the final order of the Highest Commander of DPRK’s Forces in order to repel and retaliate against the attack. (Art.5) DPRK shall not use nuclear weapons against and threaten non-nuclear-weapon states as long as they do not engage in the attack that opposes DPRK. (Art.6) DPRK shall strictly achieve compliance with safe management of nuclear weapons and guarantee stability of nuclear tests. (Art.7) DPRK shall establish orders to assure that nuclear weapons, technology, and materials will not be leaked or stolen illegally. (Art.8) As the hostile relations with nuclear weapons states are resolved, the republic shall participate in international efforts for nuclear non-proliferation and to manage nuclear materials safely. (Art.9) DPRK shall mitigate risks of a nuclear war, fight for the world without nuclear weapons, oppose nuclear arms race, and support international efforts on nuclear disarmament. (Art.10) Appropriate authorities shall prepare practical measures to enforce these articles.” (Myeongguk Cheon, “DPRK’S NC3 SYSTEM”, NAPSNet Special Reports, June 6, 2019)
6/10/19:
Kim letter to Trump: “Like the brief time we had together a year ago in Singapore, every minute we shared 103 days ago in Hanoi was also a moment of glory that remains a precious memory. Such a precious memory that I have in my unwavering respect for you will provide an impetus for me to take my steps when we walk towards each other again someday in the future. I also believe that the deep and special friendship between us will work as a magical force. Your Excellency Mr. President, I still respect and lay my hopes on the will and determination that you showed in our first meeting to resolve the issue of our unique style that nobody had ever tried, and to write a new history. Today’s reality is that without a new approach and the courage it takes, the prospects for resolution of the issue will only be bleak. I believe the one day will come sooner or later when we sit down together to make great things happen, with the will to give another chance to our mutual trust. Such a day should come again. It may well be recorded as yet another fantastic moment in history.” (Woodward, Rage, pp. 176-77)
Carlin: “Since mid-May, there have been signs of a high-level policy discussion in Pyongyang over how to proceed with diplomatic engagement with Washington. On one hand, there has been a positive shift in DPRK commentary on US-DPRK negotiations both from the North Korean Foreign Ministry and via the pro-DPRK paper in Japan, Choson Sinbo. Externally, Pyongyang appears to be signaling that it would welcome a U.S. gesture allowing the two sides to resume engagement. Internally, however, there seems to be opposition to this course, or at the very least serious warnings about proceeding along the same lines that Pyongyang took from January 2018-February 2019. As usual, no single statement or commentary unambiguously tells the story. Rather, it is in combination—along with the shadings of language, topics omitted and even the choice of audience—that suggest Pyongyang is moving beyond its immediate post-Hanoi policy reevaluation and into a new phase. The positive shift began with a May 18 Choson Sinbo commentary—authored by Kim Ji Yong—breaking with the North’s standard portrayal of the February US-DPRK Hanoi Summit as a failure, and instead emphasizing positive aspects of the summit. Over the years, Kim Ji Yong has appeared to be an especially well plugged-in journalist for the pro-NK paper in Japan. Simply put, he does not write his commentaries off the top of his head, and often either directly transmits or at least accurately conveys thinking in some circles in Pyongyang. In his May 18 commentary, Kim reached back to a February 28 KCNA report on the Hanoi talks (an extremely upbeat report apparently released before the extent of the failure was fully digested) as having resulted in the DPRK and US leaders gaining “in each other greater respect and trust.” To nail down that image, Kim repeated this positive portrayal of Hanoi elsewhere in the piece: “Eventually, the President himself will have to make a resolute decision based on the trust built during the past two summit talks.” (Author’s emphasis added.) Kim even suggested that DPRK First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Choe Son Hui’s April blast at US National Security Advisor John Bolton was actually meant to make a positive point, that despite Bolton’s position, at Hanoi the two leaders actually had reached “a common understanding”: “North Korea’s unilateral nuclear disarmament or “big deal” was never set as the prerequisite for the holding of the third summit talks…rather, between the leaders of North Korea and the United States, there was a common understanding about continuing the dialogue and finding the methodology for resolving the issue, which would satisfy the interests of both parties and be acceptable to each other.” The latter formulation—“finding the methodology for resolving the issue, which would satisfy the interests of both parties and be acceptable to each other”—is especially noteworthy since it virtually repeats the position Kim Jong Un put forth in his April policy speech, and more than that, implies that the two leaders had, in fact, already agreed on that position: “Only when there provided written content favorable for the interests of both sides and acceptable to each other, I will sign the agreement without reserve and this depends on in what position and with what calculation method the U.S. would come forward.” The references to President Trump in the May 18 commentary are all positive. Utilizing an approach central Pyongyang media had regularly used pre-Hanoi, all the blame was placed on “hardliners” in the administration. In letting the President off the hook, Kim Ji Yong’s commentary also seemed to open a path for fixing the problem, i.e., having the president somehow acknowledge the key point in Kim Jong Un’s April speech: “It is unclear how deeply President Trump understood the policy determination in the [April] speech on administrative policy. The hardliners who wedged themselves into the negotiation team could have emphasized only the validity of the previous line without properly explaining the gist of the speech to the President.” Kim Ji Yong subsequently returned to the fray with two additional commentaries on May 24 and June 1. The latter significantly expands his earlier positive portrayal of the possibility of putting negotiations back on track. In fact, it even appears to have been a set up for the first clearly positive statement from Pyongyang itself—a June 4 Foreign Ministry spokesman’s statement that made a point of noting Kim Jong Un’s personal commitment to the process of engagement. Significantly, the statement was broadcast to the domestic audience. Earlier, negative statements on the state of the dialogue had only been transmitted to international consumers. Complicating this positive picture, only two days after the May 18 Kim Ji Yong piece, Rodong Sinmun carried an editorial board special article—a rare, highly authoritative form of comment—that espoused at length (it took up the entire first page of the party newspaper) an orthodox view of the dangers of dealing with big powers (presumably including China). The special article warned that: “Lessons from Iraq, Libya, and other countries starkly show that no amount of fawning upon powers should be enough to avert the eventual fate of falling into a bloody civil war and national calamity.” In what looks to be an argument against giving up the nuclear program, the special article asserted: “The powerful physical strength to firmly defend the country’s rights to sovereignty, survival, and development has been put in place under a strategic decision to end the imperialists’ long-running nuclear threats with nuclear weapons and under our party’s steely belief that our state advancing on the back of our own strength will stay invincible in the face of an oncoming million-strong great enemy and all kinds of hardships piling up.” The main thrust of the article, however, appears aimed at those in the leadership who see the nuclear negotiations as a means of pressing ahead with economic development, possibly with outside assistance: “Following someone else’s road and relying on someone else will never make anyone join the ranks of powerful states. The building of a powerful state must be based on development and creation, not replication, and based on self-support and self-development, not handouts or foreign capital. …Tribal conflicts are intensifying and economic chaos is deepening in many countries currently, and the reason is none other than their blind acceptance of a Western model.” (Emphasis added.) The editorial board article was followed up by several Rodong Sinmun articles espousing similar warnings against following a capitalist path. A May 31 article raised a hoary conservative argument that the collapse of the Soviet Union and East European socialist countries came about because “people came to fall into foolish illusions about capitalism.” There are a number of ways to interpret these mixed signals. Kim Jong Un himself may be straddling the fence, and perhaps encouraging both sides of the argument for the moment. His appearances at two military firing drills in early May, and then his flurry of guidance visits to heavy industry factories in the northwest seemed to signal internally at least a slight shift in emphasis away from his themes of 2018 when he downplayed the national defense sector. Kim himself has not explicitly, publicly backed away from the more forward leaning sections of his April speech. The editorial bureau special article, however, seems to do that. Kim may have decided it is time to move back to an engagement track, but wants it clearly understood internally that negotiations with the U.S. will be drawn out and may, in fact, not succeed. As a result, there must be no expectation of near-term positive developments in the economic situation, and no one in Pyongyang should take seriously Washington’s talk of economic inducements or visions of a bright future. There may be a debate underway over broader policy, not simply diplomatic strategy but also questions of resource allocation and economic reforms that could be seen by some to have gone too far. At this point, there is not enough evidence to be sure what the shape of the internal discussion might be. The appearance of so unusual and authoritative a vehicle as an editorial bureau special article, however, suggests this is not a minor discussion being conducted off in the corners of the regime.” (Robert Carlin, “Mixed Signals on Engagement,” 38 North, June 10, 2019)
6/11/19:
Trump said he had received a “beautiful letter” from Kim. “I can’t show you the letter obviously, but it was a very personal, very warm, very nice letter,” Trump told reporters outside the White House. Trump, who has tried to convert what he feels is a warm personal relationship with Kim into a diplomatic breakthrough, gave no details, but repeated that he believed North Korea had “tremendous potential”. “I think that something will happen that’s going to be very positive,” he said. (Josh Smith, “Trump and Kim One Year on: A ‘Beautiful Letter,’ Stalled Diplomacy,” Reuters, June 12, 2019)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un sent flowers and a message of condolence today for the funeral of former South Korean first lady Lee Hee-ho, whose late husband held a historic summit with Kim’s father in 2000. Senior South Korean officials traveled to the border village of Panmunjom to receive the wreath and letter delivered by Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, a senior official of North Korea’s ruling party, who called for the Koreas to honor Lee’s legacy with further cooperation, a South Korean presidential official said. (Associated Press, “N. Korea Sends Condolences for Former S. Korean First Lady,” June 12, 2019) The brief meeting between Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, and the South’s national security adviser, Chung Eui-yong, who received the letter, was a rare high-level contact between the Koreas at a time when talks over the North’s nuclear program have stalled, although there was no indication that the two had held substantial discussions. The former first lady, At the meeting today, Ms. Kim expressed hope that the two Koreas would “continue cooperation to honor the will of the late first lady Lee Hee-ho, who dedicated herself to inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation,” Chung told reporters. He said Ms. Kim did not bring a message from her brother, nor did the South’s president, Moon Jae-in, use the contact to send one to Kim. During a state visit to Finland this week, Moon said he believed that official dialogue would resume soon and that preparatory contacts were underway. “There have been fears that dialogue remained stalemated since the Hanoi meeting ended without an agreement,” Moon said. “But President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un continue to express mutual trust and a willingness for dialogue.” (Choe Sang-hun, “Kim Jong-un’s Sister Delivers Condolence Letter to Southern Border,” New York Times, June 13, 2019, p. A-6)
South Korean President Moon Jae-in voiced hope today that he will meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to the peninsula at the end of this month. “I think it’s desirable (for me) to meet Chairman Kim Jong-un, if possible,” before Trump’s trip to South Korea, Moon said after delivering a keynote speech on his “Peace for the People” vision at the Oslo Forum. Trump is scheduled to attend the two-day G-20 summit to open in Osaka, Japan, on June 28. He plans to travel to South Korea as well during the upcoming Northeast Asia tour. No exact schedule has been announced yet, while observers expect him to visit Seoul on his way back home. Moon reiterated that he’s ready to hold a fourth summit with Kim at any time and that the decision is up to Kim. On Kim’s latest letter to Trump, Moon said he was aware of it in advance. He was responding to a question from Laura Bicker, a BBC correspondent in Seoul, who moderated the post-address Q&A session joined by Norwegian Foreign Minister Ine Eriksen Soreide. Despite no formal dialogue between the two Koreas and between North Korea and the U.S., Moon said, such letters are being exchanged among their leaders. He said he knew of Kim’s plan to send the letter to Trump, and he was informed by Washington of it later as well. He said he was also briefed on its contents as the allies usually share such information. Now that the leaders continue to trade such “warm letters,” Moon said, dialogue momentum is being maintained. However, he warned that it could lose steam if the current, apparent stalemate in denuclearization and peace talks is further drawn out. “I am calling for an early meeting between Chairman Kim and President Trump,” he said. In Korea, the North’s leader delivered his condolence message and flowers to the bereaved family of Lee via his younger sister, Kim Yo-jong, who is a senior Workers’ Party official. Kim said Lee’s dedication and efforts for peace have become a “precious foundation” for the ongoing inter-Korean relationship, which is “moving toward the path of self-reliant unification, peace and prosperity.” Addressing the conference at the University of Oslo, Moon presented his longer-term peace vision, a follow-up to his landmark Berlin speech in 2017, in which he proposed a new peace initiative for the peninsula. He vowed non-stop efforts to resolve “structural violence” that Koreans have suffered due to division. “Norway has never faltered on the journey for peace, as evidenced by the peace that exists today. Likewise, the Korean government will stride forward unwaveringly, to achieve peace without fail,” he said. He referred to the “positive peace” concept formulated by a famous Norwegian sociologist, Johan Galtung. “It is important to peacefully resolve the structural violence that the people of the two Koreas have suffered because of division,” he said. “I would like to name it as ‘peace for the people.'” The two Koreas must first address the damage frequently reported in their border areas, especially in and around the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), Moon said, adding that the “permanent legations” laid out in the 1972 German Basic Treaty can be an example. East and West Germany “took advantage of these permanent legations to make swift and joint responses to fires, floods, landslides, infectious diseases, insect damage and water contamination occurring in border areas,” he noted. What is most important is to deepen mutual understanding and trust, thus strengthening the will for dialogue, the president said. He underlined the significance of broadening public support for the peace initiative on the basis of the people’s confidence that they will benefit from it. “If we are to bring together positive thinking that peace is a good thing that improves the quality of life, it will heal the division in the hearts of people who have been separated by different ideology and views,” he said. Moon noted that bringing lasting peace to Korea is no easy task. “The time needed will not be short. However, when mutual understanding allows enmity to dissolve, like the snow that melts and flows to the ocean, peace on the Korean Peninsula will also reach its goal,” he said. (Yonhap, “Moon Hopes to Meet Kim Jong Un before Trump Visits Seoul in Late June,” Korea Times, June 13, 2019)
6/12/19:
Trump letter to Kim: : “It is hard to believe that a full year has passed since our historic first meeting in Singapore. It was on that day, one year ago, that you and I made a number of extraordinary commitments to one another — you committed to completely denuclearize, and I committed to provide security guarantees. We both committed to establish new relations for our two countries and to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean peninsula. I completely agree with you. You and I have a unique style and a special friendship. Only you and I, working together, can resolve the issues between our two countries and end nearly 70 years of hostility, bringing an era of prosperity to the Korean peninsula that will exceed all our greatest expectations — and you will be the one to lead. It will be historic!” (Woodward, Rage, pp. 176-77)
6/13/19:
The Chinese government recently reported its crude oil exports to the UN Panel of Experts, the first time Beijing made the data publicly available since it stopped reporting the shipments in late 2013. China is obligated to make its crude deliveries known in line with Resolution 2397 passed in December 2017, which caps oil exports to North Korea and places reporting requirements on the exporters. “Pursuant to the reporting clause contained therein, the Russian Federation reported that there were no declarations or exports of crude oil to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from January to June 2018,” the PoE wrote in their report published this year. “China reported that the amount of the supply of crude oil by China to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was 150,500 tons from December 2017 to February 2018; 147,900 tons from March to May 2018; 108,500 tons from June to August 2018; and 118,100 tons from September to November 2018.” The combined reported amount from December 2017 to November 2018 comes to 525,000 tonnes, the exact limit outlined in Resolution 2397, indicating that Chinese supplies accounted for entire yearly quota. Had any other member state provide crude oil to the DPRK in the same time period, the shipments would have exceeded the 525,000 tonne (or four million barrel) restriction. “The Russians haven’t supplied much crude in a while, in large part because the refinery at Sonbong hasn’t been operational,” David Von Hippel, a senior researcher at the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability told NK Pro. “The Chinese crude declaration is most interesting because it’s the first time in five years they have declared a volume, to my knowledge, at least in terms of crude oil deliveries to the DPRK reported in Chinese customs statistics.” Beijing’s numbers also answer a question which has been lingering over the North Korean economy for nearly six years, showing that despite the absence of crude oil from Beijing’s trade data, it’s likely been business as usual for China’s crude oil export facility in Dandong and the North Korean refinery its attached to via pipeline. But Beijing’s crude oil report highlights how the limit in UN Resolution 2397 may not be very limiting, roughly aligning with China’s historical yearly crude oil exports to North Korea. “The effective annual volume they are stating is on the order of what was in customs statistics annually before they stopped reporting,” Von Hippel told NK Pro. Prior to China’s supposed crude oil cut off, the country would typically export around 500,000 tonnes of crude oil to the DPRK, with average crude shipments between 2001 and 2013 weighing in 533,135 tonnes per year, according to figures from the ITC Trade Map. It’s also reasonable to suggest that China continued the crude oil shipments in the intervening years when reported exports were zero, instead of resuming the shipments in an era of stricter international sanctions, highlighting the economic crutch that Beijing continued to provide despite North Korea’s aggressive weapon testing schedule in 2016 and 2017. North Korea’s oil import picture becomes more complex when factoring in the large quantities of refined petroleum products North Korea is importing off the books. The Panel of Experts (PoE) noted how the DPRK had expanded its smuggling operations in 2018, transferring oil between vessels at sea in order to occlude the trade and keep it away from the prying eyes of customs authorities. “The country continues to defy Security Council resolutions through a massive increase in illegal ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products and coal,” the PoE wrote in the opening paragraphs of their 2019 report. Estimating total inflows is subsequently challenging, though Washington generated an approximate set of figures after observing illicit transfers and deliveries at Nampho over a period five months at the beginning of last year. “The United States stated that if each of the below 89 port calls delivered only one-third of each vessel’s capacity, the associated volume would exceed the annual cap for 2018 by 30 May 2018,” the PoE wrote. “Fully loaded, the DPRK tankers could have exceeded the cap nearly three times over with an estimated total of 1,367,628 barrels.” Washington noted how if accurate, the figure would have significantly breached the 500,000 barrel limit on refined oil products laid out in Resolution 2397. But the number also indicates that the combined UN resolutions may have resulted in no scarcity of oil products of any kind in the DPRK. Assuming that North Korea imported no further refined oil products for the remainder of 2018, the yearly total for crude and refined products would come to 5,367,628, barrels. Using an approximate conversion from barrels to tonnes, the resulting oil flows in 2018 look much like those in previous years. With the addition of the consistent crude supplies being refined at North Korea’s Pongwha Chemical Complex, the smuggled oil likely accounts for the apparently stable cost of oil in the North Korean capital. Data gathered by NK Pro indicates that prices at the pump in Pyongyang show none of the volatility that should come in the event of supply shocks, with only relatively small fluctuations in price since the implementation of the UN’s stricter sanctions regime. “The revelation in the Panel of Experts report that China continued to export oil to the DPRK at roughly the same rate after UNSCR 2397 goes a long way in explaining the apparently levitating North Korean economy,” Marcus Noland, Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, told NK Pro. “Now the mystery is whether China demanded payment, if so, on what terms, and how North Korea financed these imports.” While the exact quantity of North Korea’s smuggled oil is unknown, Washington now appears convinced that it breaches the total UN prescribed limit of 500,000 barrels. On Wednesday, AFP and a number of other outlets reported that the U.S. has voiced concern about the fuel cap again at the UN, claiming it had detected a further 70 illicit fuel transfers in the first quarter of 2019. “The United States and its partners remain gravely concerned about the degree of UN Security Council resolution violations that are occurring in relation to North Korea’s import of refined petroleum products,” a report seen by AFP reads. If the U.S. estimates are accurate, they indicate that North Korea has successfully eroded one of the pillars of Washington’s maximum pressure campaign, made all the less effective by China’s continued crude oil shipments. (Leo Byrne, “China’s Crude Oil Exports to North Korea: What the Data Shows,” NKNews, June 13, 2019)
6/17/19:
Three months before his second summit with President Donald Trump, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un told high-ranking military officials that he aimed to make North Korea recognized as a nuclear-capable state, according to a report by Voice of America (VOA) released today. Kim reportedly told generals and senior military officials of the North Korean People’s Army of his plans to meet with Trump for “the ultimate nuclear talks” and that they would be “the first step to elevating North Korea’s status as a global nuclear-capable state.” Such plans were outlined in an allegedly confidential document dated to November 2018 published by the Chosun Workers’ Party Publisher and distributed to ranking North Korean military officials, which was recently obtained by VOA. It ordered that special lessons based on the plans in the document to build up North Korea as a nuclear state be taught to lower-ranking military officers through the second week of December, leading up to the second North-U.S. summit in Hanoi, Vietnam, in February.
The document, according to VOA, read that Kim said the United States is “afraid” of its nuclear capability and has been trying to negotiate on the next stage “in order to take away our nuclear weapons.” He said that whatever the results of the negotiations with the United States, all hardships will be overcome and that North Korea should solidify its nuclear power to “obtain the ultimate result” of being recognized as a global nuclear state. The VOA report indicates that Kim’s objective for the Hanoi summit may have been to obtain recognition of North Korea as a nuclear state. (Sarah Kim and Baek Min-jeng, “Kim Told Brass He Aimed for Nuke Recognition,” Joong Ang Ilbo, June 18, 2019, p. 2)
North Korea increased its nuclear arsenal by at least ten more weapons since last year, according to a study by a Sweden-based arms control think tank released today, despite ongoing negotiations between Pyongyang and Washington. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) found in its latest study that North Korea in 2018 possessed 10 to 20 nuclear warheads, and this number increased to 20 to 30 by January of this year. (Sarah Kim, “North Made at Least 10 More Nukes Last Year,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 17, 2019, p. 1)
6/18/19:
The U.S. is in contact with North Korea in various ways, South Korea’s chief nuclear negotiator Lee Do-hoon said today, raising hopes for the resumption of stalled nuclear talks between the two countries. “I believe various forms of contact are being made. I can tell you that we’re going in the direction where we can revive the momentum for dialogue,” he told reporters at Incheon Airport before boarding a plane bound for Washington. (Park Han-na, “U.S. in Contact with Pyongyang to Revive Talks: Envoy,” Korea Herald, June 18, 2019)
Russia and China today delayed a U.S. request for a U.N. Security Council sanctions committee to demand an immediate halt to deliveries of refined petroleum to North Korea over accusations Pyongyang violated a U.N. cap, diplomats said. The United States, backed by dozens of allies, told the committee last week that there had been at least 79 illegal deliveries of fuel in 2019 — mainly through transfers between ships at sea — and concluded that North Korea had breached an annual U.N. cap of 500,000 barrels imposed in December 2017. (Michelle Nichols, “Russia, China Delay U.S. Push for Halt to North Korea Fuel Imports,” Reuters, June 18, 2019)
Two of the four North Korean fishermen rescued from the East Sea last week expressed a desire to defect to South Korea, while the two others were sent back to the North according to their wishes, the unification ministry said today. South Korea returned the two crew members at the border village of Panmunjom earlier in the day after notifying the North of the incident via their joint liaison office in Kaesong on Monday, a ministry official said. “Based on their free will, two have clearly expressed their intent to return and the other two said they want to stay,” the official said. Their boat, known to be a 2-ton wooden one, was found adrift in waters near the port of the east coast city of Samcheok on the morning of June 15 after an engine failure. The site was about 150 kilometers south of the Northern Limit Line, the de facto maritime border between the two Koreas. According to related authorities, the boat was found quite close to a seawall after drifting undetected across the maritime border, and a civilian first spotted it with his naked eye and reported it to the Coast Guard. Such circumstances have sparked criticism that maritime border defense appears to have loosened. Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). acknowledging that its radar operation system has “elements that need to be complemented,” the military vowed to come up with measures, including the improvement of its radar and other surveillance system in order to prevent recurrences. It was the second time in less than a week that a North Korean fishing boat has been rescued in the South. On June 11, six North Korean crew members on another fishing boat were found stranded south of the NLL in the East Sea and were sent back home on humanitarian grounds. In the latest case, the North asked the South via a naval hotline for help in rescuing the boat. (Yonhap, “2 N.K. Fishermen Express Desire to Defect, 2 Others Sent Back,” June 18, 2019)
Following Xi’s trip to the North, Stephen Biegun, the U.S. special representative for North Korea, is reportedly visiting Korea next week ahead of Trump’s visit to Korea after the G-20 summit.
Diplomatic sources have said he wants to have contact with North Korean officials, in particular Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, in Panmunjom to start talks to arrange a third summit between Kim and Trump. (Ser Myo-ja an You Sang-chul, “Xi Jinping’s Trip Starts Hectic Diplomacy,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 18, 2019, p. 1)
6/19/19:
U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun said that “the door is wide open” for negotiations with North Korea, while admitting that US-North Korean diplomacy has been in a “holding pattern” since the summit between President Donald J. Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Hanoi in February. “For both countries, denuclearization sits at the center of this discussion,” Biegun said, adding: “Our expectations have been made quite clear to the North Koreans, but Chairman Kim has also signaled to us during the course of [the Hanoi summit] how important this issue is to him.” He added that the goal of US-North Korean diplomacy is to change the security environment that led North Korea to develop weapons of mass destruction in the first place. “We don’t have that agreed definition of what denuclearization is and we do consider that to be a very important starting point,” Biegun admitted. “We will never get to our destination if we don’t know where we are going, so it is very important for us to agree upfront on what that destination is.” Biegun spoke at 2019 Atlantic Council-East Asia Foundation Strategic Dialogue at the Atlantic Council in Washington. Lee Do-hoon, South Korea’s special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, also participated in the conference at which he delivered his first public remarks in the United States. Biegun disagreed with the prevailing view that the Hanoi summit had been a failure and said the outcome underscored the necessity for sustained working-level negotiations between the United States and North Korea. But he recounted that in meetings ahead of the Hanoi summit, US negotiators quickly realized that their North Korean counterparts were not empowered to negotiate on denuclearization; that was an issue that Kim controlled exclusively. “The [North Korean] negotiators, when they meet with us again, must be empowered to be able to negotiate on all of the issues,” said Biegun. “It is not enough for us to talk about transforming relations or advancing peace on the peninsula or the humanitarian issues we have discussed around the recovery of remains or other issues that could help heal the wounds of the Korean War sixty-six years ago. We also have to talk about denuclearization.” Asked by Michael J. Rogers, an Atlantic Council board member and a Republican former US representative from Michigan, whether talking about denuclearization would be a precondition for working-level meetings, Biegun replied: “No, but it is definitely the pathway to success for us.” “We can’t make enough progress without meaningful, verifiable steps on denuclearization. It is absolutely the core of this,” he said, adding: “It will be met by equal vigor on our part to address in parallel all of the other commitments our two leaders made in Singapore.” “Both sides understand the need for a flexible approach… We have to go beyond the formulas that for the past 25 years have failed to resolve this problem,” Biegun said. “We have made clear that the U.S. is looking for meaningful and verifiable steps on denuclearization and we understand that in the North Korean view this is possible, but needs to proceed in context with broader discussions of security guarantees and improved overall relations.” This position, Biegun noted, is not different from the Singapore agreement. “In short, to regain our momentum in our negotiations, it would behoove us to go back to… the four basic areas of agreement in the joint statement that came out of the Singapore summit,” he said. In the joint statement following the Singapore summit, Trump and Kim agreed to four points: the United States and North Korea would establish new relations “in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity”; the United States and North Korea would “join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula”; reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration that followed the meeting between Kim and South Korean President Moon Jae-in, North Korea would commit to “work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”; and the United States and North Korea “commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.” Responding to rumors that senior North Korean nuclear negotiators had been executed and imprisoned for their role in the failed Hanoi summit, Biegun described such accounts as “overblown” noting that “so much of what happens inside North Korea is opaque to us.” He described the North Korean negotiators as “capable and effective.” “The fact that we didn’t reach an agreement in Hanoi… isn’t a failure, but it wasn’t our preferred outcome,” he added. Biegun admitted: “It is no secret that since Hanoi, the U.S.-North Korean diplomacy has been in something of a holding pattern.” But, he added, “in the past week there has been an uptick in activity.” The US president recently declared that he had received a “beautiful letter” from Kim in which the North Korean leader had offered a “reset” in relations. Biegun added that when it comes to a policy toward the Korean Peninsula “China agrees with us 100 percent, some of the way.” “China is not doing this as a favor for the United States of America. This is China’s national interest, and in this case Chinese national interests and American national interests coincide. That’s a pretty durable foundation for cooperation and we have every expectation that President Xi will continue to send constructive and appropriate messages during the course of the next two days in Pyongyang,” said Biegun. Speaking in Sweden last week, Moon urged North Korea to re-engage in dialogue with the international community. Lee reiterated that message. He said North Korea has two incentives to come to the negotiating table—first, to ensure security guarantees if it gives up its nuclear programs, and second, to realize the possibility of a sanctions-free future. “A strategic decision by North Korea will drastically improve its global image and the livelihood of its people,” Lee said while describing such a decision as historic. “But in order to make history North Korea must have the courage to grab the opportunity when it presents itself,” he added. Lee said South Korea is awaiting another important decision by Kim and quoted a recent letter from the North Korean leader on keeping “the flow of inter-Korean relations on the path towards peace, prosperity, and reunification.” He said Kim should accept Moon’s invitation to an inter-Korean summit, preferably before Trump visits South Korea next week. South Korea’s North Korean policy, Lee said, is based on the following principles: Seoul will not resort to the use of force on the Korean Peninsula, but it remains committed to enforcing international sanctions until complete denuclearization has been achieved; it will pursue complete denuclearization and the establishment of a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula; it will maintain a top-down approach to nuclear diplomacy; and it will cooperate closely with Washington on this issue because “it is a matter of life and death” for South Korea. Lee, noting that Trump, Kim, and Moon have all set their sights on denuclearization, said this presents a “golden opportunity.” “North Korea is on the front burner in the White House for the first time ever,” he said, adding “Never before has the leader of North Korea expressed his willingness for complete denuclearization in person and on camera for the world to see. And the current administration in [Seoul] is playing a far more proactive role than ever before,” he added. What’s more, Lee pointed to “the personal trust” between the three leaders and a “genuine meeting of minds between the working level negotiators.” (Ashish Kumar Sen, “’Door Is Wide Open’ for Negotiations with North Korea, U.S. Envoy Says, Atlantic Council, June 19, 2019)
The United States and North Korea are preparing for a new denuclearization agreement, according to Unification Minister Kim Yeon-chul. “The North and the United States are preparing for a new agreement based on the results of the Hanoi summit between their leaders,” the minister said at the start of a forum titled “Korea Global Forum for Peace,” held at the Westin Chosun Hotel in Seoul, and cohosted by the ministry and the Sejong Institute, a local think-tank. Kim stressed nuclear negotiators from Seoul, Washington and Beijing are exploring ways to narrow the stances of the two and restart multilateral nuclear diplomacy before a possible third North Korea-United States summit. According to Kim, Washington and Pyongyang “need a certain period of time to narrow technical differences, but more specifically, it is important for them to resume talks as soon as possible.” (Park Ji-won and Kim Yoo-chul, “’N. Korea, U.S. Readying for New Agreement,’” Korea Times, June 19, 2019, p. 1)
South Korea said it will send 50,000 tons of rice in aid to North Korea via a U.N. agency as part of efforts to help the impoverished state cope with its worsening food shortages. The aid will be transported by the World Food Program (WFP), which will also be in charge of its distribution and necessary monitoring in North Korea, according to the unification ministry. It marks the first time for South Korea to provide rice to North Korea since 2010, when it sent 5,000 tons to support its efforts to recover from flood damage. It will also be the first time Seoul has sent locally harvested rice to the North through an international agency. “In close cooperation with the WFP, the government decided to provide 50,000 tons of domestically grown rice to the North Korean people in need,” Unification Minister Kim Yeon-chul told reporters during a press briefing. “We expect the food assistance to be delivered to the North Korean people as soon as possible.” “The timing and scale of additional food assistance to North Korea will be determined in consideration of the outcome of the aid provision this time,” Kim added. The minister noted that the government will do its best to deliver the aid by the end of September. The decision will be finalized after a government committee overseeing inter-Korean exchange approves it. Once approved, the necessary rice will be purchased from the local market and transferred to the WFP, which will spearhead its shipment to the North. The government expects to spend around 127 billion won (US$107.9 million) to secure the rice. North Korea has been faced with worsening food shortages apparently caused by crushing global sanctions and years of unfavorable weather conditions. In February, North Korea’s top envoy to the U.N. requested emergency food assistance, saying that his country will suffer a food shortage estimated at around 1.5 million tons this year. The WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization recently reported, based on a visit to North Korea, that the country’s crop output last year hit the lowest level since 2008, adding that an estimated 10 million people, about 40 percent of the population, are in urgent need of food. The decision on the provision of rice came after Seoul recently donated $8 million to the WFP and the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) for their projects in North Korea to support the nutrition of children and pregnant women and address their health problems. Critics objected to Seoul’s push for food assistance to North Korea, citing its short-range missile tests in May. The Seoul government said politics should not play a role in dealing with such humanitarian issues. The government expects that food assistance to North Korea could boost the cross-border reconciliatory mood and help advance inter-Korean relations, which have been in limbo apparently affected by a lack of progress in denuclearization talks. (Yonhap, “Seoul to Send 50,000 Tons of Rice to Shut down,” June 19, 2019)
6/20/19:
Xi-Kim summit: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said he will maintain “patience” in efforts to resolve the Korean Peninsula issue, in an expression of willingness to continue nuclear talks despite the lack of “active response” to Pyongyang’s efforts to ease tensions. Kim made the remark during his summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, who arrived in Pyongyang earlier in the day on a landmark two-day trip to his communist ally. “Over the past year, North Korea has taken active steps to ease tensions, but they have failed to draw active response from the relevant country. This was not what I wanted to see,” Kim was quoted as saying by China’s state-run CCTV. “The DPRK will maintain patience,” Kim said. “I hope the relevant country will see the DPRK face-to-face and address each other’s issues of interest so as to resolve the Korean Peninsula issue.” Xi pledged to play an active role in realizing the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and voiced his support for the “political” resolution of peninsula issues. He also said that China will help address North Korea’s security concerns. “China will provide every possible support for North Korea to address security and development issues of reasonable concern,” Xi was quoted as saying. (By Koh Byung-joon and Song Sang-ho, “Kim Voices Desire to Continue Talks to Resolve Nuclear Issue,” Yonhap, June 20, 2019) Kim said he was awaiting a desired response from the U.S. to unlock stalled nuclear talks, as he welcomed Xi on his first state visit to Pyongyang, “North Korea would like to remain patient, but it hopes the relevant party will meet halfway with North Korea to explore resolution plans that accommodate each other’s reasonable concerns.” He added, “The international community expects the U.S. and North Korea to commit to talks and achieve results.” (Christian Shepherd, Edward White, and Kang Bu-seong, “North Korean Leader Asks U.S. President to Meet Him ‘Halfway’ on Nuclear Talks,” Financial Times, June 21, 2019, p. 6) Outward signs seemed to suggest a patching-up of the tattered relationship between two allies and neighbors, as North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, hosted President Xi Jinping of China this week. It was the first time a Chinese leader had stepped onto North Korean soil since 2005. But behind the public bonhomie, there was little to suggest that the visit — which lasted barely 24 hours — heralded any real change in the relationship between the North and its one major ally. Both leaders were seeking leverage in their separate disputes with the United States, analysts said, and the meeting seemed hastily arranged to precede Mr. Xi’s expected talks with President Trump in Japan next week. Kim, for his part, had a longer-term goal: a good relationship with the United States that would free the North of its economic dependence on China, said John Delury, an associate professor of Chinese studies at Yonsei University in Seoul. “Kim is trying, like the rest of the region, to move North Korea between China and the United States,” Delury said. “Like everyone else, he is afraid of China’s rise.” Though the carefully choreographed state news media images from Xi’s visit gave the impression of friendship, its brevity suggested that all was not so smooth, or at least that the two had not had much to talk about, Delury said. “It took 14 years for China’s leader to take the two-hour flight to the capital of its closest ally,” he said. “North Korea has long schemed to survive as an independent entity rather than be China’s sidekick.” In the last 15 months, Kim has made a show of independence, shucking the old image of North Korean leaders as ruling a hermit kingdom. Besides Mr. Xi and Mr. Trump, he has met several times with South Korea’s president, whom he hosted in Pyongyang last year, as well as the leaders of Singapore, Vietnam and, most recently, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. The short duration of Xi’s trip underscored the limits of what he could accomplish with Kim, said Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University. Shi said the Chinese leader’s first order of business was narrow in scope: to improve the relationship after the acrimony of 2017, when the North, against China’s advice, tested a series of missiles and what it said was a hydrogen bomb. That goal of friendlier ties was probably accomplished with the promise of substantial deliveries of rice to the North, he said. Xi’s ability to influence Mr. Kim’s decision making on a potential nuclear deal with the United States is restrained by China’s support for those sanctions, Shi said .Kim wants them lifted, but China has indicated that it will abide by them, allowing just enough unofficial trade to satisfy a modicum of the North’s energy and other needs. “The No. 1 game on Kim’s part is the nuclear game with the U.S., and Kim would not be willing to talk much on that except with the Americans,” Shi said. “So, a very short visit by Xi Jinping.” Still, there were some signs that Xi had tried to play the role of mediator on Mr. Kim’s behalf, days before Xi and Trump are expected to meet in Osaka, Japan, at a Group of 20 summit conference, where they are likely to discuss their bitter trade conflict. Before Xi landed in Pyongyang today, American officials said they expected him to try to secure Mr. Kim’s promise to take steps on nuclear weapons that might appeal to Trump, in hopes of gaining leverage for China in the trade dispute. Xi signaled as much in a televised session with Kim on his first afternoon in Pyongyang, when he emphasized the need for the North and the United States to revive talks that broke down in Vietnam in February, when Kim and Trump last met. “The international community hopes that North Korea and the United States can talk and for the talks to get results,” Xi said, sitting across a table from Kim. Xinhua said today that China still backed a “suspension for suspension” proposal put forward by Foreign Minister Wang Yi several years ago, in which the North would suspend nuclear testing while the United States and South Korea halted joint military exercises. That, more or less, is the current situation. Both sides “need to have reasonable expectations and refrain from imposing unilateral and unrealistic demands,” Xinhua said. (Jane Perlez, With Xi Visit, China and North Korea Reach out But Do Not Necessarily Embrace,” New York Times, June 22, 2019, p. A-7)
The Treasury Department slapped sanctions on a Russian financial company for allegedly assisting North Korea evade sanctions, while Washington’s top nuclear negotiator called for dialogue with Pyongyang with no conditions attached. The Russian Financial Society is accused of opening multiple bank accounts since at least 2017 on behalf of Dandong Zhongsheng Industry & Trade, a company owned and controlled by the North Korean Foreign Trade Bank, Pyongyang’s primary foreign exchange bank. “Treasury continues to enforce existing US and UN sanctions against individuals and entities in Russia and elsewhere who facilitate illicit trade with North Korea,” Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Sigal Mandelker said in a press release. (Park Han-na, “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Russian Bank for Helping North Korea,” June 20, 2019)
Carlin: “The debate roiling the leadership in Pyongyang is in its fourth week and appears to have heated up. That the Chinese leader Xi Jinping should go to North Korea in the middle of this tense situation is extraordinary and suggests a level of concern that the situation in Pyongyang is close to getting out of hand. At the same time, the visit could also be a calculated effort by Kim Jong Un to pull in heavy artillery to defend his position. Both sides of the debate have used the party daily Rodong Sinmun to advance their positions. Those who are on the attack (for convenience we’ll call them the “orthodox” forces) appear to have the upper hand in that regard, having published two very lengthy, high-level “special articles” on the front page of the paper over the past several weeks (May 20 and June 12). By contrast, those forces—for want of a better term, the “loyalists”—on the other side of the debate appear, so far, forced to defend their position indirectly, without forthrightly pushing back or laying out their case. As an example of this indirect approach, a long article in Rodong Sinmun on June 10—not by accident the same day as Kim Jong Un’s latest letter to President Trump—lavishly praised Kang Sok Ju, the former first vice foreign minister who negotiated the 1994 Agreed Framework and guided the North’s diplomacy through to what had been considered a major breakthrough with the US in October 2000. By implication, the appearance of this article on Kang was an effort to push back against the orthodox criticism of diplomacy as compromising the country’s principles and security. This article on Kang was the second such paean in Rodong Sinmun to a deceased senior party figure. The first had appeared on May 8. Though not clear at the time, in hindsight it appears that this earlier article’s appearance was a sign that the debate was already going on beneath the surface, but had not yet flared so dramatically in public at that point. This early May article focused on Kim Yong Gon, a senior party official who served under both Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un. Kim Yong Gon, a favorite of Kim Jong Un, had been in charge of inter-Korean relations as well as the party’s International Department. When he died in December 2015, reportedly in a car accident, he was replaced by General Kim Yong Chol, an official with a very different career and apparently much tougher approach than Kim Yong Gon. It is worth noting that as of the date the article appeared, Kim Yong Chol had been out of sight for nearly a month. He did not surface in public until June 2, looking somewhat the worse for wear. The loyalists’ difficulties may be inferred from the appearance on June 11 in the pro-North Korean paper in Japan, Choson Sinbo, of an extremely unusual commentary referring to Kim Jong Un’s April 2012 speech. That speech had contained the stunning promise that the people would “no longer have to tighten their belts”—in other words, a signal of a shift of resources away from the military to the civilian sector. The author of this particular Choson Sinbo article was the well-connected journalist Kim Jiyong, who has authored a number of commentaries over the past month seemingly reflecting efforts by pro-diplomacy elements in the North Korean leadership to reengage the US. In this latest article, Kim Jiyong dramatically portrayed that key part of the young leader’s speech as literally stunning those who heard it. This reference to a pivotal moment in DPRK policy at the beginning of Kim Jong Un’s reign is an unmistakable effort by the loyalists to reassert that reformist economic policy line, the line that, in fact, was the basis for the turn to diplomacy and Pyongyang’s summits with the ROK and the US in 2018. Yet the fact that they had to resort to media outside the country to feed back into the debate one of their most potent symbols raises the possibility that the loyalists were, at least at that point, on the defensive. On June 12—the first anniversary of the Singapore Summit—it is striking that there was nothing in the party daily to mark the occasion. Instead, the paper carried a second orthodox attack in the form of a lengthy, high-level “special article” savaging economic reform and diplomacy. This article bluntly argued that, “War can be prevented not by diplomacy or begging, but only through powerful physical strength.” It beat the drums on the dangers of economic interdependence and opening, arguing that: ‘In today’s world, an economy that is tied to another country’s technology and funds, or a subcontractor economy, is in a precarious state and cannot protect the livelihood of its own country’s people let alone their dignity.’ In language that could be read as an attack on the Singapore Summit but equally on Chinese pressure on the North—significant in view of the announcement of Xi Jinping’s visit—the article warned about the “[T]emptation of hegemonic powers who offered ‘prosperity’ in return for ‘changing the path.’” The reference to “prosperity” looks to be a barely disguised reference to Washington’s oft stated promises of a bright future for the North if it gives up with WMD programs. The article veiled its attack on current DPRK policy in extravagant praise for the leader: ‘The diplomatic stage is an acute ground where a country’s dignity and status are demonstrated. Our party’s offensive spirit is the fundamental key to grand victory in independent diplomacy. Even prominent politicians are raising their voices of respect and heavy praise for the respected and beloved Comrade Supreme Leader’s blitz-like ways of diplomatic activity unbound by convention, his endlessly humble, infinitely frank, universally attractive power of influence, and his principled position which allows not even the slightest concession when it comes to issues related to the state’s dignity.’ Yet it speaks volumes that this passage—ostensibly praising Kim Jong Un’s diplomatic skills—appeared on the anniversary of the Singapore Summit but made no direct reference to that event. In subtle and not so subtle ways the article made clear the orthodox preference for restoring the military to its previous positions of status and influence. In several places the article lists military issues before economic issues. It even goes so far as to describe Kim “openly sitting knee to knee with national defense scientists” and “seeking ways to increase military spending in the shortest possible time;” and only then does it go on to include a seemingly minor reference to Kim’s concern with economic matters. That suggests advocacy of a complete reversal of the new strategic line of “everything for the economy,” announced at a party plenum in April 2018. In a curious passage that raises the specter of cutting back Kim Jong Un’s grip on power, the article noted: ‘The respected and beloved Comrade Supreme Commander is also human and loves everyday life more than anyone. Even our marshal needs a rest when mental and physical overwork is accumulated.’ Referring to the leader’s fatigue caused by relentless commitment to the people’s welfare is not unprecedented. In the current context, however, it may have more than routine significance.” (Robert Carlin, “North Korea: The Pot Still Boiling,” 38 North, June 20, 2019)
6/22/19:
South Korean maritime forces drove out a North Korean fishing boat today, hours after the ship crossed into South Korean waters off the east coast. A patrol aircraft of the naval force found the five-ton boat adrift 114 kilometers northeast of the South’s easternmost islets of Dokdo at around 9 a.m. The South’s Korea Coast Guard then dispatched a 1,500-ton patrol ship to send the North Korean vessel back to its territorial waters. At around 12:10 p.m., a North Korean naval force contacted its southern counterpart to ask for help in sending back the ship, according to the coast guard. It said the ship was presumed to be a squid fishing boat with seven North Korean sailors on board. The maritime security force tried to find out why the ship was adrift in South Korean waters, but North Korean sailors declined to comment and rejected assistance from the South’s coast guard. The South Korean patrol vessel kept watch in case the North Korean ship tried to return after it drove it away to North Korean waters at around 8 p.m. today. “The Navy and the coast guard kept exchanging information upon notification of the incident and coped with the situation by reporting the case to the government’s crisis management center in real time,” an official from the coast guard said. The latest incident came about a week after another small wooden North Korean boat was able to dock at a South Korean port in Samcheok, Gangwon Province, on June 15. This sparked controversy over the South’s lax security management in its waters, as the boat crossed into the waters in the South and even went undetected until it was reported by a citizen. Last week, Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo apologized over the incident, pledging to sternly punish those responsible for neglecting the duties in guarding the maritime border area. (Lee Min-hyung, “Naval Forces Drive out North Korean Fishing vessel,” Korea Times, June 22, 2019)
6/23/19:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, received a personal letter from President of the United States of America Donald Trump. After reading the letter, the Supreme Leader of the Party, the state and the armed forces said with satisfaction that the letter is of excellent content. Appreciating the political judging faculty and extraordinary courage of President Trump, Kim Jong Un said that he would seriously contemplate the interesting content.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Receives Personal Letter from U.S. President Donald Trump,” June 23, 2019)
6/24/19:
Crisis Group: “ … As this report shows, this inter-Korean manufacturing zone, which operated from December 2004 to February 2016, was more economically beneficial, in particular for the South, than was recognized at the time. Reopening Kaesong as part of a package of mutual steps — including proportionate North Korean measures to circumscribe nuclear and missile capabilities — could therefore have multiple benefits. Not only might it generate badly needed momentum for stalled peace talks, but it also could begin bringing the economies of North and South closer, serving as an ongoing reminder to key constituencies in both countries of the benefits of building a sustainable peace on the peninsula. … In 2013, following its third nuclear test, Pyongyang closed the Complex’s doors for five months for reasons that remain unclear. In 2016, as tensions on the peninsula mounted in the wake of the North’s fourth nuclear test, South Korea shuttered the Complex altogether. But another reason the picture for South Koreans is clouded may be the paucity of data analysis showing how the Complex benefited the South Korean firms that invested in operations there. In this report, Crisis Group seeks to fill that gap. The analysis presented here shows how — despite deepening political challenges and even as other engagement efforts fell by the wayside — the Complex offered meaningful economic benefits to the South as well as the North. Focusing on the period 2007-2014, this report demonstrates that South Korean firms with subsidiaries operating at Kaesong showed average annual increases in revenues (by 8 per cent), fixed assets (by 26 per cent) and profits (by 11 per cent). These growth figures are all the more striking given that during the same period other South Korean firms in the same industries were in decline. … Taking steps where feasible to expand direct communication between managers in North and South Korea, allowing South Korean firms greater control over hiring and training, and increasing protections for workers would make the Complex work more fairly, efficiently and profitably — and help it become a model and driver of peaceful cooperation between two nations struggling to leave war behind. … Premised on the notion that economic cooperation could help achieve Korean peninsula stability, the Complex operated from December 2004 to February 2016, straddling the transition from liberal (1998-2008) to conservative (2008-2017) rule in the South. … Its original proponent was Chung Ju-young (1915-2001), founding chairman of the Hyundai Group. Chung and his fifth son Chung Mong-hun (1948-2003) met then-North Korean leader Kim Jong-il on 29 June 2000, two weeks after the first inter-Korean summit on 15 June. The same year, Hyundai Asan (a newly formed arm of the Hyundai Group), the Korea Land Corporation (a South Korean state-owned entity) and the North Korean government agreed upon the details of the joint industrial venture. In November 2002, North Korea enacted the Kaesong Industrial Complex Act, creating a formal legal basis for the Complex, and in April 2004, the South Korean Ministry of Unification officially approved the project. The Complex opened later that year on North Korean land leased by Hyundai Asan for a period of 50 years. The concept behind the Complex was that the South would bring technology, capital and materials — as well as the electricity, communications, transportation and banking services necessary for its firms to operate inside North Korea — and the North would provide land and labor. Pyongyang was to provide the land free for the first ten years, with Hyundai Asan paying modest rent thereafter. It was also to recruit the workers, who were to be paid approximately $55 per month in 2006, the first year of full operations, rising by approximately 5 per cent per year thereafter to reach $170 per month in 2015. Twelve South Korean firms operated in the Complex at first, employing approximately 6,000 North Korean workers. … The original Complex plan foresaw a project that would cover four geographical “sections” — all contiguous regions of one site in Kaesong — that would be developed in three stages. The first developmental stage (2003-2007) involved the physical construction of the factories and a residential area in the first section. The second stage (2007-2009) was to have seen the Complex expand geographically into additional sections and link its relatively simple production activities to more complex operations in South Korean industrial zones around Seoul and Incheon, which would use Kaesong’s low-cost outputs to make goods at more attractive margins. The third stage (starting in 2009 and continuing indefinitely) was to have involved bringing into the Complex multinational companies with an emphasis on those working on information and communication technologies. The project never moved past the first section and the first stage. After North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006, President Roh Moo-hyun’s administration recoupled inter-Korean economic exchange and humanitarian assistance to domestic and international security concerns. The South essentially froze and ultimately abandoned plans to expand the Complex. … The Complex thus weathered the turbulence surrounding Kim Jong-il’s death in 2011 and his son Kim Jong-un’s subsequent rise to power. It even grew, expanding from 18 firms employing 6,013 North Korean workers in 2005 to 123 firms with 53,448 workers on the payroll by 2012. Even as unilateral South Korean sanctions (known as the 5.24 Measures because they were enacted on 24 May 2010) closed off all other inter-Korean trade following the Cheonan sinking in 2010, business at Kaesong continued. This resilience in the face of political pressure was a particular strength of the Complex. … [A]lthough the Complex survived the 2013 interruption with its political support in the South seemingly intact, there was a price to pay over the longer term. Many in the South came to see the Complex as a hostage to political fortune, which over time had a corrosive effect on elite and public opinion even though the Complex continued to expand. (As detailed below, by 2016 it was playing host to 125 South Korean firms with combined revenues of $560 million and employing 55,000 North Korean workers.) With North Korea already having set a precedent for closing the Complex on seemingly political grounds, and in light of Seoul’s persistent concerns that the North was using hard currency revenues to fund its nuclear and missile programs, the Park administration decided to close the doors. In so doing, Seoul lamented that the Complex had been created “with a view to assisting the lives of the North Korean people, providing impetus to lifting the North Korean economy and achieving the shared progress for both South and North Korea”, but that “the efforts of our government have ultimately been wrongly harnessed in the service of upgrading North Korea’s nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.” … During the years when the Complex was operational, the number of South Korean firms there grew from eighteen in 2005 to 125 in 2015. It stands to reason that most of these firms must have been turning a good profit or others would not have been eager to join them. Yet past surveys of Complex firms reported that the majority barely broke even or operated at a loss. This report resolves this inconsistency. It uses firm-level data that have recently become available to provide the first credible statistical estimate of the magnitude of benefits to South Korean firms participating in the Complex. We find that on average these “Complex firms” gained significantly in terms of revenue, capital and profit, as compared to similar firms not operating in the Complex. Previous studies have underestimated the economic benefits to Complex firms due to inadequate data analysis. That analysis tended to overlook that rigorously assessing the Complex’s impact on South Korean firms requires combining financial data from both inside and outside the Complex. A combined perspective is necessary because firms entering the Complex were required by Seoul to set up wholly owned subsidiaries — with separate income and financial statements — that transferred finished goods to their parent companies at artificially low prices. The parent firms would then resell the goods at market prices. The profitability of Complex firms’ operations was thus reflected on the parent companies’ balance sheets, not the subsidiaries.’ … South Korean managers saw several advantages to operating in the Complex that appear to explain the significant positive effects for their businesses. Importantly, their firms were often seeking to reduce labor costs (which many saw as imperative for remaining competitive and in business during this period). Kaesong allowed them to do this. The alternative would have been moving to China, Myanmar or Vietnam — all countries where workers received lower wages than in South Korea. In 2014, however, average wages in China were 2.9 times the wages paid to workers in the Complex, and in Myanmar and Vietnam about 1.9 times. Moreover, while in the abstract, lower wages might be expected to reflect workers’ lower productivity, such was not the case in the Complex. Most South Korean managers interviewed by Crisis Group found the North Korean workers to be disciplined, hard-working and extremely quick learners. The fact that employees and managers all spoke the same language may have boosted productivity as well, though this effect is hard to verify. Another important advantage was geographic proximity. The Complex is only 64km from Seoul, and goods could be transported to South Korean production and export facilities within an hour. … To be sure, conditions within Kaesong firms were far from perfect. In particular, laborers were not permitted to unionize, and it is unlikely that they had the right to refuse overtime demands if accepted by their North Korean managers. Yet, the working conditions and perks were comparable to or even better than those available in South Korea (to say nothing of the abysmal standard of North Korean firms beyond the Complex fence). South Korean firms provided meals, snacks, infant care, commuter buses to transport workers from local towns and villages to the Complex and even medical services — unheard of in North Korean manufacturing facilities and far from ubiquitous even in South Korea, especially in the directly comparable small and medium-sized enterprise sector. Finally, the production facilities were new, and there was good lighting and air conditioning. While the overall effect of its operations on the South Korean economy was tiny — it represented less than o.o2 per cent of South Korean gross domestic product — if it were to reopen and expand the magnitude of positive effects could be greater. Aside from generating sizeable surpluses at the firm level in the ways that our analysis has shown, expanded Complex operations could create a modest number of jobs in the South and more in the North. Though Complex firms marginally reduced the number of employees in the South over time, they did so much less than comparable non-Complex firms in the same industries. And an expansion of Complex-style joint ventures would likely lead the participating South Korean firms to hire more people in the South to complement their production in the North, especially in managerial positions. … In addition to these direct potential economic effects of a reopened and expanded Complex, North Korean economic growth could create a multiplier effect in the North that ultimately redounds to the benefit of the South. Specifically, the infusion of capital and technology from the South could — if Pyongyang permits Complex workers to retain some discretionary income — lead to higher levels of domestic consumption in the North and contribute to economic growth that generates many times the amount of the original investment in terms of value. This could create useful popular support for inter-Korean economic engagement in the North and in general foster stronger affinity there for the South. The primary economic benefit North Korea drew from the Complex was straightforward: hard cash. The Complex provided a relatively small but meaningful income stream denominated in U.S. dollars that went directly to the state, while the operational costs North Korea incurred were low. The Complex was a unique — in North Korea — example of an advanced manufacturing base, one that could have been scaled up under tightly controlled conditions, leading to greater cooperation with South Korean firms and advantages for the North Korean economy without sacrificing what the North views as its national security needs. If the Complex had reached the scale intended in the original plans, the income for Pyongyang would have been very significant. The North Korean state made money from the Complex by receiving workers’ salaries in hard currency directly from South Korea. The state then taxed this income, de facto, at a high rate and redistributed the remainder to the workers in domestic currency, coupons and kind. The Kaesong Municipal People’s Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party exercised full control over the North Korean workers in the Complex. … Accurate, verifiable data regarding North Korean earnings from the Complex are impossible to come by given the regime’s opacity, so it is necessary to make assumptions in order to assess the level of hard currency receipts that it generated for the North. The total wages of North Korean workers in the Complex in 2015, the year before it closed, were approximately $123 million. This figure is based on the data in Tables 1 and 2, calculated by multiplying the number of workers by the average monthly wage inclusive of social insurance over the course of a year. Given that salaries were paid directly to the North Korean government, North Korean state receipts from the Complex would have approached 100 per cent of that level. Complex firms and the Ministry of Unification have claimed, however, that Pyongyang retained only 30 per cent of worker earnings in the form of tax, with the remaining 70 per cent split again on a 70/30 basis (with 70 per cent of that remaining sum allocated to the workers in the form of essential foodstuffs and coupons for purchases at state-run discount stores and 30 per cent provided in local currency at an artificially low official exchange rate to the dollar). There is no reliable way to verify this claim, however, based on available information. Besides earning the state hard currency, the Complex offered a way for North Korea to regularly interact with South Korea, to the benefit of both. Correctly or not, many South Koreans took comfort in seeing it remain open, supposing that as long as the two Koreas continued to cooperate there, war could not be imminent. The Complex was also a source of information on socio-economic conditions below the 38th parallel for non-security arms of the North Korean state that would not ordinarily have access to standard sources such as South Korean media. At the same time, Complex security was manageable from the North’s perspective. Because workers remained on North Korean territory, the regime could maintain control over them, while South Korea bore the costs of many of the workers’ needs, such as medical care. Anecdotal evidence suggests that North Koreans greatly preferred working in the Complex to most other forms of employment. According to one defector-migrant from an east coast city, “Everyone in North Korea knew that Kaesong was the best place to work”. According to South Korean managers, workers’ health and nutrition markedly improved once they started working in the Complex. Though other sources of hard currency — coal and ore exports to China, garments processing around Pyongyang, and remittances from North Korean expatriate workers in China, Russia and the Middle East — came to vastly exceed the value of payments received from the Complex, the Complex’s contribution to North Korea’s hard currency resources was significant. To be sure, even if the state retained close to 100 per cent of the estimated income of $123 million of hard currency wage receipts in 2015, its yield would have represented only about 10 per cent of income from coal exports to China. But the Kaesong earnings were nevertheless important to one of the world’s least developed economies and to a regime that needed all the cash it could get. … Complex firms also were not permitted to negotiate wages directly with the workers, making it impossible for firms to encourage high performance at work with the promise of pay raises or bonuses. Instead, South Korean managers gave production instructions and requests to the North Korean managers, and the two governments set uniform wages through regular negotiation. These limitations on Complex firms’ tools for motivating higher productivity were exacerbated by the fact that — in contravention of South Korea’s own law governing Complex operations — the firms transferred wages directly to the North Korean government, not to the workers themselves. Moreover, South Korean managers had no say in human resource matters, other than to state to their North Korean interlocutors the total number of workers that they required for operations. Centralized North Korean control of labor allocations made it hard for firms to get the number of workers they needed. North Korea also rotated workers out without warning, and occasionally hindered production at the Complex by reassigning workers when it needed labor for regime-mandated public works projects. The North Korean regime’s longstanding ban on internal migration made the situation worse. In the latter years of its operations, the labor demands of the Complex exceeded the capacity of the city of Kaesong, which has a population of fewer than 300,000, and surrounding towns and villages to meet them. The state bussed in supplemental workers from elsewhere, two or three hours each way, but it never permitted them to reside in the Complex or the city or even stay overnight. Anecdotal evidence suggests that even with bussing the number of workers was inadequate for staffing needs once Complex operations hit their stride. Complex firms responded logically, but inefficiently, by requesting as many workers as possible, as early as possible, in anticipation of future growth. But the gravest challenge for the Complex was political uncertainty. Although both elite and public support for the Complex in both Koreas was in some ways surprisingly resilient, every incident of political and military confrontation came at a price. … Looking at all 125 firms that eventually operated in the Complex, we see in Table 1 that these firms were on average larger than other processing firms in the same industry. The average revenue of Complex firms (column 1) was 2.6 times as large as average revenue of other firms in the same industry (column 2). The complex firms also had more workers (in South Korea, not counting those workers in the Complex), though their revenue per worker was on average similar to that of others in the same industry. They also had similar average amounts of fixed assets (or capital stock), but they had higher profits on average (nearly three times). What this information tells us is that, overall, from the potential pool of entrants (that is, all South Korean processing firms in sewn apparel, fashion accessory, leather goods and shoes), the firms that entered the Complex were larger and more profitable firms than their peers. This finding is not surprising, since offshoring of manufacturing activities involves significant upfront costs, and large and productive firms are more likely to generate a net benefit from offshoring. The first two columns of Table 1 also show that Complex firms’ revenue, revenue per worker, fixed assets and profits all grew faster between 2007 and 2014 than those of the other firms in the same industry. In particular: The average revenue per worker of a Complex firm in 2014 was 60 per cent higher than those in the same industry in 2014 (265 million Korean won ($239,000) vs 163.1 million won ($147,000)), though it was much closer to the same in 2007 (166.6 million won ($180,000) vs 144.7 million won ($157,000)). Likewise, Complex firms and the others in the same industry had on average the same amount of fixed assets in 2007 (442.7 million Korean won ($480,600) vs 397.8 million won ($431,900), but by 2014 Complex firms had nearly four times as much as the others on average (960.4 million won ($867,000) vs 249.4 million won ($225,100)). Furthermore, the average profit of Complex firms grew by about six per cent per year between 2007 (331.1 million Korean won ($359,400)) and 2014 (480.5 million won ($433,700)), while the average profit of the other firms in the same industry declined from 2007 (112.6 million won ($122,200)) to 2014 (102.9 million won ($92,800)). By way of context, between 2007 and 2014, the Korean manufacturing sector lost nearly 40 per cent of firms, and hence the figures for 2014 reflect a large degree of survivor bias. In the apparel, fashion accessory, leather goods and shoes industries, the number of firms shrank by 65 per cent over the same period. The Complex firms’ growth is even more remarkable against this backdrop. By contrast, the data comparing the Complex firms to the average firm in the entire South Korean manufacturing sector (column 3) tells a different story, with the average South Korean manufacturing firm showing higher levels of growth in the categories for which data are available.” (International Crisis Group, The Case for Kaesong: Fostering Korean Peace through Economic Ties, June 24, 2019)
6/25/19:
President Donald Trump has recently mused to confidants about withdrawing from a longstanding defense treaty with Japan, according to three people familiar with the matter, in his latest complaint about what he sees as unfair U.S. security pacts. Trump regards the accord as too one-sided because it promises U.S. aid if Japan is ever attacked, but doesn’t oblige Japan’s military to come to America’s defense, the people said. The treaty, signed more than 60 years ago, forms the foundation of the alliance between the countries that emerged from World War II. Even so, the president hasn’t taken any steps toward pulling out of the treaty, and administration officials said such a move is highly unlikely. All of the people asked not to be identified discussing Trump’s private conversations. While Trump’s repeated criticism of security pacts around the world has alarmed allies from Seoul to Paris, he hasn’t moved to withdraw from such agreements the way he has with trade deals. Exiting the pact would jeopardize a postwar alliance that has helped guarantee security in the Asia Pacific, laying the foundation for the region’s economic rise. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide today in response to a question about the Bloomberg News report that the security framework was at the core of the country’s alliance with the U.S. “There is no talk at all of a review of the Japan-U.S. security alliance as has been reported in the media,” Suga said, echoing a statement by the foreign ministry. Scrapping the treaty would risk ceding security of the Western Pacific to China and potentially spurring a fresh nuclear arms race, if Japan decided it needed to protect itself from nuclear-armed neighbors. It would also call into question the U.S.’s military commitments to Australia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and a host of other allies around the world. The president will make his second trip to Japan in a matter of weeks on Wednesday when he travels for the Group of 20 summit in Osaka. He’s expected to again meet with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who enjoys as good a relationship with the mercurial and unpredictable American president as any foreign leader. Trump regards Japan’s repeated efforts to move a large U.S. military base in Okinawa as a sort of land-grab, the people said, and has raised the idea of seeking financial compensation for American forces to relocate. Trump’s focus on the U.S. defense pact with Japan may foreshadow broader scrutiny of American treaty obligations across the world, two people familiar with the matter said. The White House communications staff declined to comment last night. The president has said in private conversations previously that he has Japan’s back and is aware of the U.S.’s obligations under the treaty. But, as with his stance on other multilateral agreements, he wants the relationship to be more reciprocal. “The U.S.-Japan alliance has never been stronger,” Trump told sailors and Marines last month aboard the USS Wasp, an amphibious assault ship at the naval base in Yokosuka, shared by the U.S. and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. “This remarkable port is the only one in the world where an American naval fleet and an allied naval fleet headquartered side by side, a testament to the ironclad partnership between U.S. and Japanese forces,” he said. The U.S. defense treaty with Japan was first signed in 1951 along with the Treaty of San Francisco that officially ended World War II. The defense pact, revised in 1960, grants the U.S. the right to base military forces in Japan in exchange for the promise that America will defend the island nation if it’s ever attacked. For decades after the war, Japan refrained from developing offensive capabilities such as long-range bombers, aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons. But Abe, a relatively hawkish leader, believes his nation should take a more robust role in its own defense. He pushed through a controversial interpretation of the constitution to allow Japanese forces to come to the aid of allies. Japan is buying advanced F-35 fighter planes from the U.S. and will fly some of them off warships effectively refashioned as aircraft carriers, its first since the war. In May, the country’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party recommended the government eventually raise defense spending to about 2% of gross domestic product, in line with NATO recommendations for its members and a threshold Trump has said should be a minimum for U.S. allies. There are currently about 54,000 U.S. military personnel based in Japan, a permanent troop presence that allows the U.S. to more easily project force across the Pacific. U.S. Forces, Japan, calls the arrangement “the cornerstone of peace and security in the Pacific” on its website. It isn’t clear how those forces would be affected if Trump withdrew from the treaty. (Jennifer Jacobs, “Trump Muses Privately about Ending Postwar Japan Defense Pact,” Bloomberg News, June 25, 2019)
6/26/19:
DPRK FoMin spokesperson’s statement: “We now see an unusual move of the United States whereby it gets ever more undisguised in its hostility towards us. Recently, the U.S. viciously slandered the DPRK in its “Trafficking in Persons Report” and “International Religious Freedom Report”, both of which are based on all kinds of falsehoods and fabrications, and it also decided to continue for another one year the “National Emergency” that calls for defining us as its enemy and imposing further sanctions. The U.S. State Secretary Pompeo especially made reckless remarks when asked in a press conference about a possibility of the DPRK-U.S. working-level talks that it is important for everyone to remember that today some 80-plus percent of the North Korean economy is sanctioned, and he let loose a sophistry as if the sanctions are rendering the bilateral talks possible. If the U.S. sanctions are affecting 80-plus percent of our economy, as Pompeo mentioned, the question is whether the U.S. target is to raise it up to 100 percent. This is an outright challenge to the DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement adopted at the DPRK-U.S. summit talks held in Singapore and a manifestation of the most extreme hostile acts by the United States towards the DPRK. All these speak clearly to the fact that the wild dream of the U.S. to bring us to our knees by means of sanctions and pressure has not changed at all but grows even more undisguised. As for the “National Emergency” strongly advocated by the U.S., it is nothing less than the product of the heinous policy hostile to us, because it was designed to persist with the anti-DPRK sanctions by continuously terming us as an enemy when the U.S. administration had to remove us from the targets of the “Trading With The Enemy Act” in June 2008. Even though the supreme leaders devote their all for establishing new DPRK-U.S. relations, it would be difficult to look forward to the improvement of the bilateral relations and denuclearization of the Korean peninsula as long as the American politics are dominated by the policy-makers who have an inveterate antagonism towards the DPRK. The United States should not be mistaken. As Comrade Chairman of the State Affairs Commission said, we would not thirst for a lifting of sanctions. Our state is not a country that will surrender to the U.S. sanctions, nor are we a country which the U.S. could attack whenever it desires to do so. If anyone dares to trample over our sovereignty and the right to existence, we will not hesitate to pull a muscle-flexing trigger in order to defend ourselves.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Condemns U.S. Hostile Acts,” June 26, 2019)
The United States is in behind-the-scenes talks with North Korea over a possible third summit and has proposed working-level negotiations that have been stalled since the second such meeting in February, South Korean President Moon Jae-in said today. Moon, in written answers to questions posed by visiting foreign journalists, said there was no reason to talk of a “stalemate” just because there had been no official dialogue, aimed at the denuclearization of North Korea. “Both sides have been engaged in dialogue in regard to a third summit,” Moon said. “It’s noteworthy that the behind-the-scenes talks have been preceded by the mutual understanding of each other’s position gained through the Hanoi summit.” The United States had made a proposal for working-level talks, Moon said, urging North Korea to return to the negotiating table “at the earliest date possible.” Moon did not specify when and how the U.S. proposal was made. But U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on June 23 that a recent exchange of letters between Trump and Kim boosted hopes for a restart of talks, calling it a “very real possibility.” Trump is considering visiting the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, where Kim and Moon had their historic first summit last year, a South Korean official said. But a U.S. official said yesterday that Trump had no plans to meet Kim during his trip and declined to comment on whether Trump would go to the DMZ. “The resumption of negotiations between North Korea and the United States will take it to the next level. I believe everything has now fallen into place for that to happen,” Moon said. Moon said Kim had told him he wanted to “finalize a denuclearization process as soon as possible and to concentrate on economic development.” Moon called for the North to scrap the “passive stance” it has presented since the Hanoi summit and take action on its past promises. “By responding to the U.S. proposal for working-level negotiations, it can also show its determination to denuclearize,” he said. The questions for the written interview were provided by Reuters, AP, AFP, Yonhap, Kyodo, Xinhua and Tass ahead of a symposium on the Korea peace process hosted by Yonhap in Seoul tomorrow. (Hyonhee Shin, “U.S., North Korea in ‘Behind-the-Scenes’ Talks over Third Summit, Moon Says,” Reuters, June 26, 2019)
Moon Jae-in written interview: “Q1. Despite South Korea’s active, aggressive role as a mediator, nuclear diplomacy between North Korea and the U.S. has been deadlocked since the Hanoi summit. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has since demanded that the U.S. come up with a new proposal to salvage the diplomacy by the end of this December. As a man who was behind the two summits between the U.S. and North Korea, do you have any specific plans to put their nuclear diplomacy back on track? What efforts or measures will the South Korean government take in the future to push forward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula? Q1-1. Do you intend to meet North Korean leader Kim again or send a special envoy to North Korea? If so, when do you think that a fourth summit with Kim or sending an envoy to North Korea would be appropriate? (AP, Xinhua and AFP) A1: First and foremost, I want to highlight the fact that, even though there has been no official dialogue between North Korea and the United States since the Hanoi summit, their leaders’ willingness to engage in dialogue has never faded. Proof of this can be seen in the exchange of personal letters between the two leaders. President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un continue to express unwavering trust in each other. Moreover, both sides have been engaged in dialogue in regard to a third summit. It’s noteworthy that the behind-the-scenes talks have been preceded by the mutual understanding of each other’s position gained through the Hanoi summit. Also underway is dialogue between the South and the North through diverse channels to sustain inter-Korean talks. Dialogue and efforts for dialogue are crucial factors in the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. That’s because complete denuclearization and a permanent peace regime on the Peninsula are tasks that cannot be achieved overnight. There’s no reason to regard the current situation as a stalemate in the peace process on the Peninsula just because the pace has remained slow. Chairman Kim sent a personal letter to President Trump and also expressed condolences to the South on the passing of former First Lady Lee Hee-ho through First Vice Department Director of the Workers’ Party Central Committee, his sister, Kim Yo-jong. All of this sends a meaningful message. Last week, Chairman Kim reaffirmed his resolve for dialogue at a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, which also backs up this analysis. There has already been considerable headway made in the peace process on the Korean Peninsula, and it is still making steady progress. The resumption of negotiations between North Korea and the United States will take it to the next level. I believe everything has now fallen into place for that to happen. A1-1: It depends on Chairman Kim Jong-un. I am ready to meet with Chairman Kim at any time. As I explained before on several occasions, my determination remains the same that I am prepared to meet with Chairman Kim in person at any given moment without being restrained by time, place or formalities. Q2. You have offered to play a mediator role between the United States and North Korea, and ahead of the Hanoi summit, you said that South Korea was willing to ease the burden of the United States by providing economic concessions to North Korea, raising expectations for a deal. Are you feeling responsible for the breakdown of the summit? What do you think of the view that South Korea failed to convey U.S. positions to the North properly, and this is reflected in North Korean state media’s ongoing criticism toward the South? (Reuters) A2: The peace process on the Korean Peninsula is literally a process. An unfolding phenomenon should be viewed as part of a process, not as one specific cross-section; this should become the premise. The first North Korea-United States summit held last year was a historic event in itself and also a historic milestone in terms of related agreements. North Korea agreed to give up its nuclear program completely, and the United States, in return, agreed to put an end to hostile relations with the North, guarantee its security and normalize North Korea-U.S. relations. In accordance with these agreements, the North should scrap its nuclear program, and the United States should provide conducive conditions by taking reciprocal measures. As these steps should be taken reciprocally between them, I proposed to President Trump that the ROK’s role, including inter-Korean economic cooperation, could be fully utilized as corresponding measures to induce the North to take denuclearization steps. It is not appropriate to define this proposal as economic concessions to North Korea. I’d like to discuss inter-Korean economic cooperation from two perspectives. First, in terms of inter-Korean relations, my Administration seeks coexistence and mutual prosperity between the South and the North. It is not something that can be accomplished by means of unilateral concessions from one side. The pursuit of both Koreas’ economic prosperity is a crucial part in the process of advancing inter-Korean relations. With this understanding as a foundation, I have shared a future vision of various economic aspects with the North Korean side, including the New Economic Map Initiative for the Korean Peninsula. Of course, I understand well the fact that full-fledged economic cooperation will be possible only when peace is settled on the Korean Peninsula together with complete denuclearization. An improvement in inter-Korean relations and economic cooperation will also be conducive to negotiations for denuclearization. The advancement of inter-Korean ties is a driving force that can speed up denuclearization. History has shown that North Korean nuclear threats diminish when inter-Korean relations are good. Economic exchanges are what it takes to help connect people with people and lives with lives. The more close-knit and stronger economic cooperation becomes, the harder it becomes to regress back to the past confrontational order. Revitalizing inter-Korean economic cooperation will contribute to creating a new cooperative order that can boost peace and prosperity in East Asia beyond the Korean Peninsula. When assessing the Hanoi summit, I don’t see it as a failure even though an agreement could not be reached. The success of denuclearization and the peace process on the Korean Peninsula cannot be determined by a summit or two. The Hanoi summit served as a chance for both North Korea and the United States to put everything they want on the negotiating table for candid discussions and come to better understand one another. What was discussed at the Hanoi summit will become the basis for the next phase of negotiations. Both sides clearly understand the necessity for dialogue. Q3. Following the U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi in February, skepticism has been growing about the North’s commitment to denuclearize. Do you think North Korea is willing to give up its nuclear weapons? Has Kim Jong-un ever made explicitly clear to you that he is willing to give up North Korea’s existing nuclear weapons without a change in either the South’s security alliance with the U.S. or the U.S. military presence in South Korea, Japan, or elsewhere in Asia or the Pacific? (Kyodo and AFP) A3: Chairman Kim Jong-un’s unequivocal resolve is to move from the past to the future by opting for economic development instead of a nuclear arsenal. During the three inter-Korean summits with me, Chairman Kim expressed his intent to finalize a denuclearization process as soon as possible and to concentrate on economic development. Besides, he has never linked denuclearization with the ROK-U.S. alliance or a pullout of the United States Forces Korea. I believe in Chairman Kim’s determination for denuclearization. Not only myself but other leaders who have met him in person, including Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, all speak of their trust in Chairman Kim’s promise. Trust can be said to constitute a precondition for dialogue. Together with the confirmation of North Korea’s determination to achieve denuclearization, it’s important to create an environment where the North can focus on taking relevant steps. Chairman Kim should be helped along the path toward that goal in a way that sustains his commitment to nuclear dismantlement. In my several talks with Chairman Kim Jong-un, I could sense that he is quite a flexible yet resolute person. For instance, the results of the first inter-Korean summit were announced through a joint press conference broadcast live around the world, which was unprecedented. The original plan was to announce them through a written document such as a joint statement, but I suggested a press conference, considering the historic significance of the summit and its agreements, and Chairman Kim instantly accepted the proposal. I look forward to Chairman Kim demonstrating this kind of flexible determination during denuclearization negotiations as well, and I believe this can be possible. I think creating a security environment where Chairman Kim can decisively act on nuclear dismantlement without worries is the fastest way to achieve denuclearization diplomatically. Q4. Since the breakdown of the Hanoi summit, South Korea has expressed skepticism about the chances of a big deal that would resolve everything all at once and instead called for smaller “good-enough deals” or “early harvest deals” that could get the process rolling again. But Seoul hasn’t provided any specific examples of about how such deals would look. What are the potential deals South Korea has in mind? (AP) A4: North Korea and the United States have already reached an agreement on the ultimate goal of denuclearization talks. In summary, North Korea’s complete denuclearization was to be exchanged for a security guarantee for the North’s regime and an end to their hostile relations. This agreement is still valid. The task at the current stage is to decide how to implement the promises made to each other: the procedures and sequencing. This has something to do with the level of trust they have in each other. As their hostile relations have persisted for more than 70 years, it will be difficult to cross a sea of mistrust all at once. In addition, this process is inevitable because it is impossible to implement what has been agreed upon between the two sides in one stroke at any given moment. For this reason, my administration has put emphasis on the structure of a virtuous cycle between negotiations and trust. It is all about building trust through dialogue and negotiations and, again, enabling that trust to produce positive results of dialogue and negotiations. This is no doubt the quickest and most solid path to achieve denuclearization. Q5. You said in your recent speech at the parliament in Sweden that North Korea must substantially show to the international community its commitment to completely dismantling its nuclear weapons and to establishing a peace regime. Can you elaborate what such “action” is? Q5-1. You also said during a trip to Europe in October last year “if North Korea’s denuclearization action is judged to enter an irreversible phase, its denuclearization should be further facilitated by easing U.N. sanctions.” What’s your definition of the irreversible stage? What would be the appropriate level of sanctions if the North actually reaches that irreversible stage? (AP and Yonhap) A5: Last year North Korea dismantled its nuclear test site in Punggye-ri as media from around the world watched. For its part, North Korea has taken the initial step toward complete denuclearization. In addition, the North promised to permanently dismantle its missile engine testing site and launch pad in Dongchang-ri in the presence of experts from the relevant countries. It also revealed its intention to dismantle its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. All of this should be noted, but I still would like to point out that North Korea must come to the dialogue table at the earliest date possible in order to convince the international community of its willingness for complete nuclear dismantlement. By responding to the U.S. proposal for working-level negotiations, it can also show its determination to denuclearize. If Pyongyang leaves behind the passive stance it has adopted following the summit in Hanoi and strives to reach agreements in future negotiations while carrying out past promises, this will help it win the trust of the international community. A 5-1: At the Hanoi summit, the complete dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear complex was discussed. The Yongbyon complex is the mainstay of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. If all of the nuclear facilities in the complex, including the plutonium reprocessing facilities and the uranium enrichment facilities, are completely demolished and verified, it would be possible to say that the denuclearization of North Korea has entered an irreversible stage. Although an agreement was not reached last time in Hanoi, I expect that there will be substantive progress if the two sides continue negotiations based on what was discussed in Singapore and Hanoi. If substantive progress is made in North Korea-U.S. talks and in the denuclearization process, inter-Korean economic cooperation — such as the resumption of operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex — will gain momentum. Such progress could also help the international community seek a partial or gradual easing of the U.N. Security Council sanctions. If the denuclearization negotiations resume in earnest going forward, the key to the negotiations will be to determine what kind of measures that the North will have to complete to say that substantive denuclearization has been achieved — in other words, to regard the North as having entered an irreversible stage. It will be linked to the definition of denuclearization being clarified, upon which an agreement was not reached at the Hanoi summit. The key is trust. That’s why I underscored trust for the sake of peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula in my speech before the Swedish parliament. As the parties have already sought to resolve relevant issues through dialogue, they must engage in dialogue while trusting each other. In particular, North Korea must trust the promise of the international community to ensure its security and a bright future, provided that it abandons its nuclear program. Trust, of course, must be reciprocal. This is why North Korea has to actively engage in dialogue with the international community, not only through the denuclearization talks with the United States, but also through other bilateral and multilateral discussions. Dialogue will help enhance confidence, and confidence will in turn keep the dialogue going. It’s also crucial to continue exchange and cooperation projects that were agreed upon by the two Koreas. The implementation of agreements demonstrates the power of trust to create peace. I will remain committed to working together to help restore trust between North Korea and the international community. Q 6. Next year (2020) marks the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, and many wish for a complete end to the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula by June 25 (the day of the war outbreak) of the anniversary year. Please give us an overview of your road map to peace on the Korean Peninsula that includes North Korea-U.S. denuclearization talks, the declaration of an end to the Korean War, the complete denuclearization and the signing of a peace treaty. What goals do you want to achieve during your term in office for the settlement of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula? You mentioned “peace for the people” and “positive peace that changes everyday life” in your Oslo Forum speech in Norway. What are your specific thoughts on this? (Yonhap) A 6: The Korean Peninsula peace process is about dismantling the last vestige of the Cold War rivalry on Earth and — at the same time — is a long journey the leaders of both Koreas and the United States are taking together. The overriding goal is to achieve complete denuclearization through negotiations and establish a permanent peace regime through declaring an end to the War and concluding a peace agreement. Notably, all of this together constitutes a new path that no one has ever taken before. For this reason, we’re doing all we can to make earnest, sincere efforts at every moment and every stage. I am convinced that this is the right way. The goal we have to reach is also unequivocal. The negotiations by the concerned parties will result in a roadmap that lists the detailed implementation measures needed to achieve the goal as well as a time table. The Korean Peninsula has been under a state of armistice for over 65 years. Although an atmosphere of reconciliation and cooperation was created thanks to painstaking efforts last year, there’s still a possibility that the everyday lives of our people could be disrupted. Peace at the moment is provisional. With this interim peace now, however, we can clearly see the preciousness of peace once again. For me, the president of the only divided nation on Earth that saw a full-blown Cold War-induced conflict, peace is a historic obligation and a responsibility entrusted to me by the Constitution as well. It will not be possible to accomplish everything during my term in office, but the rivers of peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula are already flowing. Thus, I hope that the flow will make headway to the extent that it cannot be reversed at least before the end of my term. A 6-1: Peace on the Korean Peninsula means the dissolution of the world’s last remaining Cold War structure and a release from the ever-present threat of war. To this end, we are now making all-out efforts to achieve complete denuclearization and establish a permanent peace regime. Moreover, the concept of peace has to be further broadened. The Korean Peninsula needs to take the path toward common prosperity as one unified community. It has to move toward not only resolving political and military issues but also toward enriching the lives of all of its members in all aspects of the economy, society and culture. That is “peace for the people.” Efforts to jointly pioneer the future of economic growth and prosperity, to share and enjoy higher cultural values and to cope with disasters and diseases together will help the everyday lives of all the people in both Koreas. If such endeavors are built up, the persistent feelings of antipathy instilled in the hearts of the people due to the long-lasting confrontational order will be eliminated, allowing them to realize the preciousness of peace in their everyday lives. Q 7. Last year we have seen easing of military tensions on the peninsula. Recently, the DPRK has made several tests which, however, did not lead to a serious escalation. How do you think the situation will develop in the coming year? What steps is the Republic of Korea going to take? (TASS) A 7: The easing of military tension on the Korean Peninsula will be carried out on two tracks: one through denuclearization linked to North Korea-U.S. talks and the other through the alleviation of military tension caused by conventional weapons, a task for both Koreas. Through the Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018, the two Koreas have taken rudimentary measures to reduce military tension. As of now, in line with that inter-Korean agreement reached in the military domain, both Koreas have completely stopped hostile acts in areas along the Military Demarcation Line, demilitarized the Joint Security Area, withdrawn guards posts from the DMZ, exhumed the remains of war dead and surveyed waterways for the joint use of the Han River estuary. The inter-Korean agreement in the military domain is particularly important in the process of denuclearization since it dramatically reduces the possibility of an accidental military skirmish between the two Koreas, thereby creating an environment conducive to dialogue concerning denuclearization. It can also be said that, thanks to this agreement, the North’s firing of short-range missiles has neither led to a sudden hike in tensions on the Korean Peninsula nor a breakdown of the denuclearization dialogue. If inter-Korean agreement in the military domain is properly implemented, it will allow us to proceed to the stage of further enhancing transparency concerning military postures by exchanging pertinent information through the inter-Korean joint military committee and observing military drills and training. Furthermore, in line with progress in denuclearization, we will be able to advance to the point of disarming threatening weapons such as the long-range North Korean artillery targeting our capital Seoul and the short-range missiles that both Koreas possess. Q 8. Does the South still think trading the resumption of inter-Korean economic projects (Kaesong factory park, Mount Kumgang tours) with the closure of the Yongbyon complex would be a fair exchange that could build trust and momentum for bigger things? One of the main components of a comprehensive settlement of the situation on the peninsula is inter-Korean relations and cross-border economic projects. Some say that their development is now difficult because of the deadlock in the negotiations between the United States and the DPRK. How do you see the prospects for the further development of such projects? (AP and Tass) A 8: I’ve never contended that the resumption of inter-Korean economic cooperation projects had to be exchanged for the dismantlement of the North’s Yongbyon nuclear complex. However, inter-Korean economic cooperation projects, such as the resumption of operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, are appealing to both Koreas and the United States as well in that they could help reduce the burden of the international community, including the United States, and present a look ahead to the kind of bright future that could greet the North should it complete denuclearization. This is why I proposed to President Trump that he actively utilize inter-Korean economic cooperation as one of the corresponding measures to North Korea’s substantive denuclearization steps. For the proper development and elevation of inter-Korean relations, various economic cooperation projects have to ensue. To this end, international economic sanctions must be lifted, and there has to be substantive progress in North Korea’s denuclearization before sanctions can be removed. All the ongoing inter-Korean cooperation projects carried out so far have been done in compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions without a single violation. The Government of the Republic of Korea maintains the direction of its policy that aims to facilitate North Korea-United States dialogue by advancing inter-Korean relations within the framework of sanctions. In order to continue the long journey to realize complete denuclearization and establish permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula, it is indeed necessary to flesh out an initiative for mutual prosperity. The Government of the Republic of Korea will endeavor to create such circumstances as quickly as possible. Q 9. With political divisions mounting and the ruling party and opposition at loggerheads, do you feel your term in office so far has fulfilled the hopes and aspirations of the candlelight protestors? What about your promises of a change to South Korean politics? What do you know now that you wish you had known when you were sworn in? Whatever happened to chaebol reform? (AFP) A 9: All of the achievements of the Republic of Korea have been made by the people’s strength, and the candlelight rallies symbolize that strength. My Administration was launched with the people’s aspiration reflected in the light of those candles. It’s still the driving force that helps my Administration move forward. Many changes have started to take place and are now underway. At the heart of these changes lie the spirit of popular sovereignty and the value of fairness and justice. Many changes have been achieved in the process of normalizing the law enforcement authorities that used to lord over the people and, moreover, by the anti-corruption reforms that eliminated the deceit and privilege that destroyed the people’s lives as well as other unreasonable practices. By overcoming the past practices in which social and economic opportunities and benefits were concentrated in the hands of a few people, we are endeavoring to build a country where everyone prospers together. Today, the world’s main interests lie in overcoming structural low growth, economic polarization and inequality. In these aspects, Korea aims to build an innovative, inclusive nation and seek changes in various areas. A case in point is the reform of conglomerates to build a fair economic order. Conglomerates and large companies in Korea have led Korea’s high economic growth and will continue to play a significant role in its economic growth. What we intend to reform is the opaque and unfair side of the economy resulting from a system dominated by conglomerates. This constitutes making our democracy broader, deeper and more solid by realizing democracy in the economy as well. The people’s aspirations expressed through the candlelight rallies cannot be realized all at once. However, the Korean Government will continue to devote itself to the tasks and missions given to it until they are completed in the type of democratic and mature manner demonstrated during those nightly rallies. Q 10. Is the South Korean government considering asking the International Court of Justice to rule on the matter of compensation for Korean victims of forced wartime labor, asking victims’ lawyers to postpone seizure of Japanese companies’ assets, or forming a foundation? Will you be making any proposal on the issue to Japanese Prime Minister Abe during the G-20 summit? (Kyodo) A 10: I have repeatedly expressed my thoughts concerning Korea-Japan relations on several occasions. First, Korea-Japan ties are very important, and they should continue to advance in a more forward-looking way. Second, the governments of our two countries have to pool our wisdom to prevent historical issues from damaging forward-looking cooperative relations. In this regard, I don’t believe that the Japanese Government’s position differs from our own. History issues are not of my Government’s own making. Rather, they stem from the unfortunate history that actually existed in the past. Even though Korea and Japan signed treaties, the wounds from the past are surfacing anew as international norms develop and awareness of human rights is enhanced, and, above all, it should be accepted that the victims are still suffering from the pain. At the end of the day, our two countries’ wisdom has to be focused on how to actually heal the victims’ pain. Recently, the Korean Government came up with a viable solution to the issue of forced labor during World War II and conveyed it to the Japanese Government. As the Government of a democratic nation, we respected the verdict rendered by the Supreme Court in the process of formulating the proposal and compiled the opinion of various groups within the society that have maintained longstanding interest in this issue, including requests from the victims. This is a measure that will help foster reconciliation between the stakeholders and move Korea-Japan relations one step forward. For my part, the door is always open for dialogue between our two leaders in order to advance Korea-Japan relations, including over the issue mentioned above. Whether we can take advantage of the opportunity presented by the G-20 summit depends on Japan. Q 11. There is some optimism that Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to North Korea will help break the deadlock in the denuclearization negotiations. On the other hand, some analysts say China will use North Korea’s nuclear issue as leverage in its tense relations with the U.S., which will solidify the Beijing-Pyongyang alliance and weaken South Korea’s position. Cheong Wa Dae earlier said it has closely discussed Xi’s North Korea visit with China. Was there any message exchanged between the two Koreas on denuclearization via the Chinese leader? If so, what was the substance of the exchange? What role do you expect China to play in the North’s denuclearization through Xi’s visit? (Yonhap) A 11: Since March 2018, Chairman Kim Jong-un took part in 13 bilateral summits: five with China, three with the South, two with the United States, and one each with Russia, Singapore and Vietnam. My Government welcomes the fact that North Korea is expanding the scope of its contact with the international community. North Korea becoming a part of the international community constitutes the process of establishing peace. The ROK and China frequently consult with each other about ways to achieve complete denuclearization and establish permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese Government fully understands my Administration’s approach to the Korean Peninsula peace process, and we are in close cooperation. In this context, my government expressed its opinion that it would be desirable for President Xi Jinping to visit North Korea first before a ROK-China summit. It is to create new momentum amid a lull after the North Korea-United States summit in Hanoi. I hope that President Xi’s visit to North Korea last week will be a turning point that can help resume dialogues between the two Koreas and between North Korea and the United States. At the upcoming G-20 summit, I will be able to meet with President Xi in person and hear about the results of his visit to the North. Q 12. What kind of mediator roles do you plan to ask of the leaders of the U.S., China, Russia, Japan and other relevant countries at the G-20 summit amid the deadlocked nuclear negotiations between North Korea and the U.S.? (Kyodo) A 12: The Korean Peninsula peace process has always progressed amid the cooperation and support of the international community. This is still true today. Denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula constitute a historic paradigm shift that demolishes the world’s last remaining Cold War rivalry. In that sense, I take cooperation with the international community very seriously, especially that with the countries directly concerned. The Republic of Korea and its ally the United States are coordinating a common stance by closely exchanging opinions on all fronts, such as ways to resume dialogue with North Korea at an early date, denuclearization measures that North Korea has to take and corresponding measures to be taken in response. During President Trump’s visit to the Republic of Korea scheduled right after the G-20 summit, there will be more in-depth discussions taking place. China and Russia have continued to play constructive roles so far to peacefully resolve the Korean Peninsula issue. I hope that China and Russia will play specific parts in helping the North resume dialogue at an early stage. Normalization of North Korea-Japan relations is a must in the process of establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula. My Government supports the Japanese Government’s stance of pursuing dialogue with the North without preconditions and will actively provide support and cooperate to ensure that a North Korea-Japan summit takes place. Q 13. Many foreign countries say South Korea has high economic potential. What is your opinion on such assessments? Please explain how you think the Korean Peninsula peace process will help realize the country’s economic potential, promote prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and change the blueprint for the nation’s future? (Yonhap) A 13: The Republic of Korea is a dynamic country. The country advanced its economy, and at the same time democracy, in a very short period of time on the ruins of war. What is undermining and constraining that dynamism is the structure of the division. This is because conflict and confrontation caused by the division and the Cold War have countenanced corruption, privilege and injustice that put ideology above everything else. This is also because it restricts the people’s living space and imagination. The Korean Peninsula peace process is a new opportunity that can reinforce the dynamism inherent in the history of the Republic of Korea. I am convinced that peace drives the economy. The Korean Peninsula peace process will greatly expand Korea’s economic territory by connecting the continent and ocean. Moreover, if the two Koreas develop into a single economic bloc, it will be able to form a single market with 80 million people, surpassing that of the United Kingdom, France and Italy and standing on par with Germany’s. It will be an opportunity for huge growth for the economy of not only the two Koreas but of the world. The Republic of Korea has strong economic fundamentals and attractive investment conditions. “The Korea discount” brought on by the long political and military tension on the Korean Peninsula has been dissolving after the inter-Korean summits last year. Global credit rating agencies are maintaining the ROK’s sovereign credit rating at the country’s highest level. The spreads on the country’s foreign exchange equalization bonds are at historic lows while the credit risks of many countries are rising due to the global economic slowdown. Inbound foreign direct investments also hit a record high. The revitalization of inter-Korean economic exchanges will contribute to creating a new order of cooperation that leads to peace and common prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and, moreover, into East Asia. The East Asia Railroad Community initiative encompassing six Northeast Asian nations and the United States, which I proposed last year, was developed based on this idea. The Railroad Community will be able to further develop into an energy community, an economic community and a mechanism for multilateral peace and security for East Asia.” (Yonhap, “Full Text of President Moon Jae-in’s Joint Written Interview with Yonhap, Six Global News Agencies,” June 26, 2019)
6/27/19:
KCNA: “Kwon Jong Gun, director-general of the Department of American Affairs of the DPRK Foreign Ministry, released the following statement on Thursday: The United States is now talking much about the DPRK-U.S. dialogue, but in reality, it is becoming more and more desperate in its hostile acts against the DPRK. The DPRK-U.S. dialogue would not open by itself though the U.S. repeatedly talks about resumption of dialogue like a parrot without considering any realistic proposal that would fully conform with the interests of both sides. As Comrade Chairman of the State Affairs Commission has already declared in his historic Policy Speech, the U.S. should come out to the table for the DPRK-U.S. dialogue with a correct method of calculation and the time limit is until the end of this year. Even though we are to think of holding a dialogue with the U.S., we need first to see a proper approach towards the negotiation on the part of the U.S. Negotiation should be conducted with a counterpart who has a good sense of communication, and it could also be possible only when the U.S. comes up with a proper counterproposal. In case the U.S. intends to sit with folded arms like today, time might be enough. However, if the U.S. is to move towards producing a result, time will not be enough. The U.S. would be well advised to bear in mind that our repeated warning is not merely an empty word. I would also take this opportunity to say a word to the south Korean authorities who are trying to refurbish their image by giving a publicity as if they are “mediating” the DPRK-U.S. relations. The south Korean authorities are now stirring up public opinion as if a sort of dialogue is being held between the north and the south, in order to find their own place to stand while affecting to make their presence felt by taking a share in the process. In the true sense of the word, parties to the DPRK-U.S. dialogue are none other than the DPRK and the U.S., and in view of the origin of the DPRK-U.S. hostility, the south Korean authorities have nothing to meddle in the dialogue. As is globally known, the DPRK-U.S. relations are moving forward on the basis of the personal relations between Comrade Chairman of the State Affairs Commission and the U.S. President. If we have anything to liaise with the U.S., it will be simply done through the liaison channel already under operation between the DPRK and the U.S., and the negotiation, if any, will be held face to face between the DPRK and the U.S. Therefore, there will be no such a happening where anything will go through the south Korean authorities. The south Korean authorities are now giving a wide publicity as if the north and the south are having various forms of exchanges and closed-door meetings, but the reality is the contrary. The south Korean authorities would better mind their own internal business.” (KCNA, “Director-General of Department of American Affairs Issues Statement,” June 27, 2019)
6/28/19:
The U.S. special envoy for North Korea reaffirmed today that Washington is ready to hold talks with the North, South Korea’s government said, as North Korea escalates its calls for the U.S. to make new proposals to resolve the impasse in their nuclear diplomacy. During a visit to Seoul, Biegun told his South Korean counterpart that Washington is prepared for “constructive” talks with North Korea to implement the commitments made during the Singapore summit “simultaneously and in parallel,” according to Seoul’s Foreign Ministry. (Hyung-jin Kim, “Seoul: U.S. Ready for Talks with N. Korea on Denuclearization,” Associated Press, June 28, 2019)
KCNA Commentary: “The U.S. and the south Korean authorities have become intent on the preparations for joint military exercises Alliance 19-2 which they agreed to hold this coming August. In April they made a tentative decision to hold Alliance 19-2 from August 11 to 20 to replace Ulji Freedom Guardian. Now they build up the public opinion to justify the exercises after making them an established one. As part of the moves, the acting U.S. Defense secretary during his recent visit to south Korea had talks with the south Korean Defense minister where he announced to go ahead with Alliance 19-2 as scheduled, claiming “south Korea and the U.S. are ready to counter any act of the north disturbing stability.” This indicates their sinister intention to proceed with the exercises in defiance of the repeated warnings from the DPRK. This, therefore, amounts to a wanton challenge to the desire and expectation of all the Koreans and the international community for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and an act to create the atmosphere of confrontation and danger of war again. Now the entire Korean nation and the international community earnestly hope that durable and lasting peace would settle on the peninsula through the thorough implementation of the historic Singapore DPRK-U.S. joint statement, north-south declarations and the north-south agreement in military field. The U.S. and the south Korean authorities, however, are intent to press for the war exercises against the DPRK, calling them “verification exercises for the return of wartime operation control and low-intensity exercises.” As was reported by the south Korean media, Alliance 19-2 is aimed to get proficiency in the procedures for judging the scale of the U.S. reinforcements needed for sort of “deterrence and repulse” and requesting them in case of emergency on the Korean peninsula under the signboard of “combined crisis control”. The exercises are, in fact, a war rehearsal to get familiar with preemptive strike and attack at the DPRK and light the fuse of the war of aggression against it any moment. One cannot but be dubious as to the difference of the projected exercises from Ulji Freedom Guardian in their program and essence. Ulji Freedom Guardian was about mounting a preemptive attack with the conventional armed forces and nuclear strike means once the north’s military move is detected, Intolerable is to veil the north-targeted joint military exercises with different name despite the demand for “dialogue and peace.” The south Korean authorities should stop harmful acts at once, mindful that their reckless military provocations in reliance on the U.S. will divest them of the valuable opportunity for the improvement of the north-south relations. A complete stop to the U.S.-south Korea joint military exercises is the unanimous demand of the entire Korean nation and the international community.” (KCNA, “KCNA Commentary Urges U.S., S. Korean Authorities to Stop Planned Joint Military Exercises,” June 28, 2019)
6/29/19:
President Donald Trump expressed his willingness during an upcoming trip to South Korea to “shake hands” with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the Demilitarized Zone on the border of the two Koreas, eliciting a positive response from Pyongyang. If he meets with Kim, it would be a casual meeting rather than a formal summit, Trump suggested at a press conference after the Group of 20 summit in Osaka concluded. But he added he is still not sure whether the meeting will take place. Trump also said he would feel “very comfortable” stepping into North Korea by crossing the DMZ if he meets with Kim. Earlier in the day Trump said in a Twitter post, “While there, if Chairman Kim of North Korea sees this, I would meet him at the Border/DMZ just to shake his hand and say Hello(?)!.” North Korea quickly responded to Trump’s offer, with KCNA quoting a diplomat as saying that although no official proposal has been received, the U.S. president made a “very interesting suggestion.” Trump, who is slated to make a two-day visit to South Korea for talks with President Moon Jae-in later today, said Pyongyang reacted “very favorably.” Trump’s DMZ visit would most likely take place at the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom, where Moon and Kim met for talks twice last year. At the outset of talks with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman in the morning in Osaka, Trump, confirming that he plans to visit the DMZ, said that if Kim comes, “We’ll see each other for two minutes. That’s all we can. But that will be fine.” “It’s good to get along. Because frankly if I didn’t become president, we’d be right now in a war with North Korea. You’d be having a war, right now, with North Korea. And by the way, that’s a certainty. That’s not like, maybe.” Later in the day, Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui said that if Trump and Kim really meet at the DMZ, “it would serve as another meaningful occasion in further deepening the personal relations between the two leaders and advancing the bilateral relations.” But North Korea has “not received an official proposal in this regard,” said the diplomat in charge of Pyongyang’s diplomacy with Washington in an English statement carried by KCNA. South Korea’s presidential office, meanwhile, said Saturday no arrangements have been made for a meeting between Trump and Kim. (Kyodo, “Trump Offers to ‘Shake Hands’ with N. Korean Leader Kim at DMZ,” June 29, 2019) In a post on Twitter as he started the second of two days of meetings in Osaka, Japan, Trump said that during his next stop, in South Korea, he would be happy to greet Mr. Kim across the line that has divided Korea for nearly 75 years. “I will be leaving Japan for South Korea (with President Moon),” the tweet said. “While there, if Chairman Kim of North Korea sees this, I would meet him at the Border/DMZ just to shake his hand and say Hello(?)!” North Korea indicated today that it would welcome such a meeting. “I consider this a very interesting suggestion, but we have not received any official proposal,” Choe Son-hui, North Korea’s first vice foreign minister, said in a brief statement carried by KCNA. “I believe that if a North Korea-U.S. summit is realized on the line dividing Korea, as President Trump wishes, it will become another opportunity to deepen the friendship that exists between the two heads of state and to improve relations of the two nations,” Ms. Choe said. Trump’s tweet caught the diplomatic corps in Asia and the president’s own advisers off balance, since no serious preparations have been made for an encounter tomorrow. (Peter Baker, “Trump Invites Kim to Meet at the Demilitarized Zone,” New York Times, June 29, 2019, p. A-17)
Trump letter to Kim Jong Un: “As you may have seen, I am traveling today from Osaka, Japan to the Republic of Korea, and since I will be so close to you, I would like to invite you to meet me at the border tomorrow afternoon. I will be near the DMZ in the afternoon and propose a meeting at 3:30 at the Peace House on the southern side of the military demarcation line. I have no specific agenda for our meeting, but think it would be great to see you again since we will be so close to each other. Hope to see you tomorrow!” (Woodward, Rage, pp. 177-78)
Trump: “ … I’ll be leaving now, as you know, for South Korea. Some of you will be coming with us. I understand that we may be meeting with Chairman King — Kim. And we’ll find out. We spoke with the people. Kim Jong Un was very receptive. He responded. And so, we’ll see. Because tomorrow we’re going to the DMZ. I said, “While I’m there, I’ll shake his hand.” We get along. There’s been no nuclear tests. There’s been no long-range ballistic tests. Gave us back our hostages, which was great. And a lot of good things are happening over there. So I let him know we’ll be there, and we’ll see. I mean, I don’t — I can’t tell you exactly, but they did respond very favorably. … So, with that, we’ll take a few questions and then I’m heading out to South Korea. And I may or may not see Kim Jong Un. But we’ll be heading out to South Korea; spend about a day and a half there with President Moon, who is a really good guy. He was here too, as you know. I saw him. I met with him also. And we’ll see what happens. Please, John. Q … And if you do meet Kim Jong Un at the DMZ tomorrow, would you step across the border into North Korea? THE PRESIDENT: Sure, I would. I would. I’d feel very comfortable doing that. I would have no problem. … Q Thank you, Mr. President. I’m Ching-Yi Chan with Shanghai Media Group. … And also, if I may, another quick question on North Korea. Do you think it’s possible that there will be a third one-on-one summit with Chairman Kim — THE PRESIDENT: Oh, sure. Q — within this year? THE PRESIDENT: Oh, it might happen tomorrow. I mean, to be honest. We won’t call it a summit. We’ll call it a handshake, if it does happen. I don’t know that it will, but it could happen. I know I think he’d like to do it, and I wouldn’t mind doing it at all. I’m going to be — I’m literally visiting the DMZ … Q Mr. President, Steve Herman from the Voice of America. After your discussions with Prime Minister Abe here, are you still thinking about withdrawing from the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty? And what did the Prime Minister say to you about that? THE PRESIDENT: No, I’m not thinking about that at all. I’m just saying that it’s an unfair agreement. And I’ve told him that for the last six months. I said, “Look, if somebody attacks Japan, we go after them and we are in a battle — full force in effect.” We are locked in a battle and committed to fight for Japan. If somebody should attack the United States, they don’t have to do that. That’s unfair. That’s the kind of deals we made. That’s — every deal is like that. I mean it’s almost like we had people that they didn’t either care or they were stupid. But that’s the kind of deals we have. That’s just typical. But I have been — I told him — I said we’re going to have to change it. Because — look, nobody is going to attack us, I hope. But, you know, should that happen — it’s far more likely that it could be the other way — but should that happen, somebody attacks us, if we’re helping them, they’re going to have help us. And he knows that. And he’s going to have no problem with that. … Jon. Q Thank you, Mr. President. First a quick follow-up. You’ve made this very public invitation to Kim Jong Un. Will it be a bad sign if he doesn’t show up? THE PRESIDENT: No. Of course, I thought of that because I know if he didn’t, everybody is going to say, “Oh, he was stood up by Chairman Kim.” No, I understood that. It’s very hard to — he follows my Twitter. Q He does? THE PRESIDENT: And it’s very hard — Q He follows you on Twitter? THE PRESIDENT: I guess so, because we got a call very quickly. (Laughter.) A lot of people follow it. But, you know, they’ve contacted us and they’d like to see if they can do something. And we’re not talking about for, you know, extended. Just a quick hello. And we get along. I get along with him and I get along with other people. Like, you know, for instance, on Jim’s question, it’s a fair question, but I really have great relationships with everybody. I think — you know, I said a long time ago that maybe I’ll be a sleeper on foreign policy.” (White House Press Office, “Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, Osaka Japan,” Imperial Hotel Osaka, June 29, 2019)
Bolton: Trump’s “brief discussion with Germany’s Merkel touched on North Korea and his post-G20 visit to the South. Trump complained that the US had soldiers everywhere but didn’t get anything out of it. He suggested he might meet Kim Jong Un, whose relationship with him was unparalleled, at the DMZ, because Kim wanted to do something but didn’t know how to get it started. This, I think, was the first reference to Trump’s wanting to meet Kim at the DMZ that anyone in the US delegation heard. We also heard about it Saturday morning, waiting to brief Trump for the day ahead. Mulvaney showed me a tweet on his cell phone, asking if I knew about it, which I did not:
After some very important meetings, including my meeting with President Xi of China, I will be leaving Japan for South Korea (with President Moon). While there, if Chairman Kim of North Korea sees this, I would meet him at the Border/DMZ just to shake his hand and say Hello(?)! j y ( )
Mulvaney looked just as flabbergasted as I was. I thought the tweet was a throwaway. In the early afternoon, in the midst of the usual flurry of bilaterals, Mulvaney pulled Pompeo and me aside to say the North Koreans had said the tweet didn’t constitute a formal invitation, which they wanted, and which he was preparing. Mulvaney was then off to something else. Pompeo said to me alone, “I have no value added on this. This is complete chaos,” which was true for both of us. But the next thing I knew, Trump had signed the “formal” letter of invitation that the North Koreans had asked for. Pompeo had succumbed yet again. He had also been managing Moon’s attempts to get into what seemed increasingly likely to be a Kim-Trump meeting. Trump wanted Moon nowhere around, but Moon was determined to be present, making it a trilateral meeting if he could. I entertained the faint hope that this dispute with Moon could tank the whole thing, because it was certain Kim didn’t want Moon around. Because we had different planes, we traveled from Osaka to Seoul separately, meaning I couldn’t make it to a dinner Moon hosted. When I reached our hotel in Seoul, I saw that preparations for the DMZ looked more and more like a done deal. As far as I was concerned, any actual Trump-Kim meeting should be limited to a handshake and a photo, although I had no doubt Trump was already thrilling at the expectation of what the morrow would bring. No way would it end quickly. I had not then made any decision on whether to go to the DMZ and travel later to Mongolia on a long-scheduled trip, or just proceed straight to Ulan Bator. I had not originally planned to join the Trump DMZ visit (rescheduled because bad weather had prevented a visit on his first trip to South Korea). I felt sick that a stray tweet could actually result in a meeting, although I took some solace from believing that what motivated Trump was the press coverage and photo op of this unprecedented DMZ get-together, not anything substantive. Trump had wanted to have one of the earlier summits at the DMZ, but that idea had been short-circuited because it gave Kim Jong Un the home-court advantage (whereas we would fly halfway around the world), and because we still hadn’t figured out how to ensure it was just a Trump-Kim bilateral meeting. Now it was going to happen. North Korea had what it wanted from the United States and Trump had what he wanted personally. This showed the asymmetry of Trump’s view of foreign affairs. He couldn’t tell the difference between his personal interests and the country’s interests.” (Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, pp. 309-10)
6/30/19:
President Trump became the first sitting American commander in chief to set foot in North Korea as he greeted Kim Jong-un, the country’s leader, at the heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone and the two agreed to send their negotiators back to the table to seek a long-elusive nuclear agreement. Met in the middle by a beaming Kim, Trump stepped across a low concrete marker at 3:46 p.m. local time and walked 20 steps to the base of a building on the North Korean side for an encounter carried live on international television — an unprecedented, camera-friendly demonstration of friendship intended to revitalize stalled talks. “It is good to see you again,” a seemingly exuberant Kim told the president through an interpreter. “I never expected to meet you in this place.” “Big moment, big moment,” Trump told him. After about a minute on officially hostile territory, Trump escorted Kim back over the line into South Korea, where the two briefly addressed a scrum of journalists before slipping inside the building known as Freedom House for a private conversation. Trump said he would invite Kim to visit him at the White House. “This has a lot of significance because it means that we want to bring an end to the unpleasant past and try to create a new future, so it’s a very courageous and determined act,” Kim told reporters. “Stepping across that line was a great honor,” Trump replied. “A lot of progress has been made, a lot of friendships have been made and this has been in particular a great friendship.” The encounter in Panmunjom was cast as a brief greeting, not a formal negotiation, but the two ended up together for a little more than an hour. After emerging, Trump said he and Kim had agreed to designate negotiators to resume conversations in the next few weeks. The American team will continue to be headed by Stephen Biegun, the special envoy, but it remained unclear who would be on the North Korean side of the table. Kim accepted Trump’s unorthodox invitation, posted on Twitter just a day earlier, and both sides scrambled over the past 24 hours to manage the logistics and security required for such a get-together. Trump was already scheduled to make an unannounced visit to the DMZ during his trip to South Korea, and while he portrayed the idea of meeting with Kim while there as a spontaneous one, he had actually been musing out loud about it for days in advance. “There are 35 million people in Seoul, 25 miles away,” Trump said before Kim’s arrival, gazing into the distance as he was shown the line from the observation deck. “All accessible by what they already have in the mountains,” he added, an apparent reference to the massive North Korean artillery firepower built up within range of Seoul over several decades. “There’s nothing like that anywhere in terms of danger.” Even in this symbolic moment of reconciliation, Trump seemed to dwell on his grievances about his media coverage, repeating complaints he has made several times over the last day that he has not received enough credit for de-escalating tensions on the peninsula. “There was great conflict here prior to our meeting in Singapore,” he said, referring to his first encounter with Kim a year ago. “Tremendous conflict and death all around them. And it’s now been extremely peaceful. It’s been a whole different world.” “That wouldn’t necessarily have been reported, but they understand it very well,” he said, referring to the news media. “I keep saying that for the people who say nothing has been accomplished. So much has been accomplished.” Critics said the greeting at the DMZ was nothing more than a glorified photo opportunity by a president who himself ratcheted up the conflict with North Korea in his first year in office by making “fire and fury” threats to destroy the small Asian country if it threatened American security. “At this point I’m not sure what it is that President Trump is trying to accomplish, because while all this engagement has gone on, there has been no decline in the stockpile of North Korean nuclear weapons or missiles; in fact they have increased them,” Joseph Yun, who was the United States special representative for North Korea policy under President Barack Obama and Mr. Trump, said on CNN. “Yes, it’s true that tensions are down, but remember that tensions were built up because of all the fire and fury in 2017.” On the other hand, Sue Mi Terry, who served as a National Security Council aide specializing in Korean affairs under both President George W. Bush and Obama, said it could yield progress if Trump proves willing to accept a partial accord short of a comprehensive agreement. “This meeting could lead to a more substantive meeting down the road, later in the year,” she said in an interview. “I do think Kim could offer just enough on the negotiating table such as the Yongbyon nuclear facility plus yet another suspected nuclear facility in order to secure an interim deal with Trump and at least some sanctions relief.” American officials have said they did not think a third meeting between Trump and Kim should be arranged unless a substantive agreement could be negotiated beforehand to avoid another setback. “It’s just a step,” Trump said earlier today. “It might be an important step or it might not.” He added: “There’s a good feeling, so it could be very good. As far as another meeting, let’s see what happens today before we start thinking about that.” President Moon Je-in, who has staked his presidency on improving relations with the North, showered Trump with praise for reaching out, declaring that “the flower of peace is truly blossoming” and describing himself as “very overwhelmed with emotion” about the development. “President Trump is the maker of peace on the Korean Peninsula, you really are the peacemaker of the Korean Peninsula,” Moon said. “I hope that this meeting with Chairman Kim at Panmunjom will bring hope to the people of South and North Korea and it will be a milestone in the history of humankind toward peace.” (Peter Baker and Michael Crowley, “Trump Steps into North Korea and Agrees with Kim to Resume Working-Level Talks,” New York Times, June 30, 2019)
Trump letter to Kim Jong Un: “Being with you today was truly amazing. Even the media, which always like to say that everything is bad, is giving you accolades for inviting me into your country. They said you demonstrated great foresight and courage in accepting a meeting on such short notice and very public notice. Most importantly I thought our meeting went very well. The potential of your country is truly limitless, and I am confident that incredible prosperity awaits you and your people in the future as we continue to work together.” Attached was a copy of The New York Times front page with a four-column picture of Trump and Kim. “Chairman Kim, great picture of you, bi time,” Trump added in magic marker. (Woodward, Rage, p. 179)
Bolton: “On Saturday, June 30, I awoke to the surprise that Pompeo was listed as attending the DMZ meeting. I e-mailed to ask if he had decided to go, and he replied, “Feel like I need to be there.” I didn’t think anyone needed to be there, but I concluded that if he went, I would go too. After a breakfast with South Korean and US business leaders at the hotel, we motorcaded over to South Korea’s Cheong Wa Dae (“the Blue House”) for meetings with Moon and his team. I learned on the way that North Korea didn’t want a large bilateral after the photo op, but instead preferred a leader-plus-one meeting for about forty minutes. Shortly thereafter, I was told they planned to have Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho as their “plus one,” meaning Pompeo would be the “plus one” on our side. Thus, since I wouldn’t be in the substantive meeting with Kim Jong Un, I veered toward simply leaving for Ulan Bator, to get us there at a reasonable hour. I had no desire to be standing around in the DMZ while Trump and Kim met, and I had no faith any advice I gave Trump beforehand would take. I filled Mulvaney in, and he said it was up to me. Meanwhile, at the Blue House, at a very restricted bilateral meeting, Moon asked about the plan for the DMZ. Trump said we didn’t know what the plan was. Contrary to reality, Trump said Kim had asked to meet him, but suggested he and Moon go to the DMZ and meet together so it would look great for Moon. This, of course, contradicted what Trump had been telling us, so Pompeo interrupted to describe the latest arrangements with North Koreans, including the format for the Trump-Kim meeting. In response to a Trump question, I seconded Pompeo’s account. Trump said we would find out shortly, perhaps we would meet, perhaps not. Moon said the paramount issue for Trump was to have the meeting. However, when Kim entered South Korean territory, it wouldn’t look right if Moon wasn’t present, suggesting that he greet Kim and then hand him over to Trump and depart. Pompeo interjected again that we had presented Moon’s view the night before, and the North Koreans rejected it. Trump said he would much rather have Moon present, but he could only pass along what the North’s request was (a completely fanciful account). Moon persisted, recalling that there had been several instances of Presidents visiting the DMZ, but this was the first time South Korean and US Presidents would be there together. Trump said he didn’t want to miss this big opportunity, because he naturally had some things to say to Kim, and he could only pass along what the Secret Service said, since they were arranging the trip (another fantasy). Moon changed subjects, saying working-level negotiations with North Korea were always very difficult, but with a patient approach, results were possible. Trump responded, out of nowhere that he might ask that the next US–North Korea summit be after the US elections. At this point, Trump motioned to Tony Ornato, the head of his Secret Service detail, I thought perhaps to ask about the DMZ meeting. Instead, it turned out he asked why Jared and Ivanka were not in the meeting (for which there was a perfectly good reason) and for Ornato to bring them into the room (for which there was no reason at all). Even the South Koreans were embarrassed. Trump sailed on, saying he thought he understood at least a bit how Kim Jong Un thinks, and he knew Kim wanted to see him. Perhaps, Trump suggested, Moon could send him off to the DMZ from Seoul, and then they could meet again at Osan air base during the meet-and-greet with US soldiers. Moon wasn’t having any of that, pressing that it was better if he accompanied Trump to OP Ouellette (a DMZ observation post named for a US soldier killed in the Korean War), then they could decide what to do next. Trump said anything Moon wanted to do was fine with him, and they could go to OP Ouellette together. In response to another Trump question, I assured him that that was the plan. … During lunch, after the press had exited, Trump repeated that Kim wanted to meet very badly. Trump asked the US side again about the arrangement for Moon, wondering disingenuously in my opinion, why Kim would not want South Korea represented. Moon answered that there had not been meaningful talks between the two Koreas because of North Korea’s rigidity, based on the North’s perception that because the South was taking the US side, the North would be at a disadvantage. Trump said that in his bilateral meeting, he would stress the aid that the South was providing, and would tell Moon everything that happened between him and Kim. Trump was happy that the world had been going crazy over the meeting, and that it had taken over the G20 (in his mind). Kim had agreed to cross the border and wanted working-level negotiations right afterward, so Trump wanted to leave the lunch early. All of this was nonsense. There was no doubt who wanted to meet badly, and that was the one doing the talking. Trump restated that the discussion about base costs was very important, and that he was assigning me to it, asking whom I had dealt with before, and suggesting I find someone else, which couldn’t have made Chung very happy. Then he was off riffing on Chinese currency manipulations. Moon tried to get the discussion back to Kim’s wanting security guarantees for his regime. Trump agreed that Kim wanted a guarantee only from the US, not from China or Russia. Trump said we guaranteed the safety of South Korea already but got nothing out of it. He thought he would have a short but very successful meeting with Kim, which would be very good for Moon. Moon said the Korean people respected and liked Trump, who preened that he knew he was popular. He explained how Korean women in his clubs came up and hugged him, then lectured on how different things were in Korea since he became President. He thought it was a big sign that Kim had agreed to meet based on a tweet. No one else knew how to get him. Moon confessed that the South had set up a hot line to Chairman Kim, but it was in the Korean Workers Party headquarters, and Kim never went there. Nor did the phone work on weekends. Although the working lunch started twenty minutes late, Trump said, five minutes before its scheduled ending at 1:00 p.m., that he wanted to leave right then. … As foreshadowed by his earlier comments and the irresistible photo op presented, Trump walked into North Korea, with Kushner and Ivanka nearby. Kim looked delighted in the pictures, as he should have. What an incredible gift Trump had given him, coming to the DMZ for the personal publicity. The whole thing made me ill. It didn’t get better later when the media reported Trump had invited Kim to the White House. The Kim-Trump meeting itself lasted about fifty minutes, and the two leaders agreed working-level talks should resume again quickly. Of course, Biegun did not yet have a new counterpart ,,, After a day of meetings in Ulan Bator on July 1, I left for Washington, reviewing news coverage on the DMZ meeting. Most of it was what I expected, but one story in the New York Times stood out as particularly bad. Our policy had not changed at the DMZ, but the briefing the Times reported, discussing a ‘nuclear freeze,’ closely resembled exactly the road to trouble Biegun had followed before Hanoi. I thought we had buried that approach when Trump walked out, but here it was again, as bad or worse than before. There were other media stories where I thought I detected Biegun’s fingerprints, but this one was beyond the pale, in my view, both substantively and in process terms. I asked Matt Pottinger what could have justified this media offensive, concluding Trump hadn’t authorized a ‘nuclear freeze’ after the Kim Jong Un meeting, although he was obviously excited about resuming working-level negotiations. Trump wrote Kim yet another letter, which was essentially fluff, but at least it didn’t give anything away or provide any basis for what had been briefed to reporters. Biegun had taken Trump’s enthusiasm as a license to shape the next talks with North Korea in ways that had consistently failed for thirty years. Biegun initially denied to Hooker and Pottinger that he was the source for the Times story, although the ‘denial’ was carefully phrased, and was in any event discredited when we received from a friendly reporter a transcript of his briefing. So much for interagency coordination. He was out of line, whether with Pompeo’s blessing or not. I thought it important to correct the impression we were on the road back to prior Administrations’ failed policies before things got out of hand. I knew it was risky to say anything publicly, but it was time to take risks. Besides, if I had to resign, it wouldn’t be the end of the world. After some careful drafting, I tweeted the following just before wheels up in Tokyo, where we refueled:
I read this NYT story with curiosity. Neither the NSC staff nor I have discussed or heard of any desire to ‘settle for a nuclear freeze by NK.’ This was a reprehensible attempt by someone to box in the President. There should be consequences.
I never heard word one from Trump about this tweet. And I was happy to see Lindsey Graham retweeted it soon after I sent it out:
Glad to see National Security Advisor Bolton push back hard against the NY Times narrative stating the Administration would accept a nuclear freeze as an acceptable outcome by North Korea.
On July 3, I spoke with Pompeo on several subjects, and he raised the Times story and my tweet, complaining bitterly. ‘Why didn’t you call me?’ he asked. ‘What Biegun said’—so much for Biegun’s denials—’is a lot closer to the President than you are.’ This was chilling, if true. I replied that I could ask the same question about him and Biegun: Why hadn’t they called me? My tweet still represented official Administration policy, while Biegun’s briefing did not, which Pompeo did not dispute. I said I wasn’t aiming at him and that we would both be more effective if we stuck together on substance, which he agreed with. He said, laughing, ‘Our teams like this stuff, but we’ll do our best if we grow up, which I at least am still struggling to do.’ It was a good clearing of the air, but I thought Pompeo mostly worried I had criticized him publicly from the right, which Graham’s tweet had reinforced. More seriously, Pompeo said he feared Trump was back to leaving the Peninsula entirely, which was what fundamentally concerned me about the whole base costs issue, and which echoed what Trump said randomly about Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Africa, and sundry other locations. Nonetheless, Pompeo believed ‘we didn’t let anything out of the bag with Kim,’ meaning nothing would emerge publicly to compromise our position. On the other hand, Pompeo said he had tried to walk Trump back after the DMZ, urging, ‘We don’t want to do what John Kerry would do.’ Trump answered, ‘I don’t give a shit, we need a victory on this,’ although he also repeated he was ‘in no rush.’ Despite our conversation, however, within days Pompeo was telling Biegun not to participate in NSC meetings on North Korea, as before, exhibiting the same proprietary behavior over North Korea he had done repeatedly on Afghanistan. I understood the imperatives of turf in government affairs, but I could never understand why Pompeo didn’t seek allies on these issues. When his policies went off the rails, not only would it be bad for the country, but Pompeo, along with Trump, would be solely identified with them. But, I figured, ultimately that was Pompeo’s problem. How did Trump see the DMZ party? ‘Nobody else could do what I did. Obama called eleven times and never got an answer,’ he said later that day.” (Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, pp. 311-17)
Pompeo: “Q: Well, when talks resume, where do you — what’s the next step? Where do you start? Would you start where you left off or — POMPEO: Yeah, so I think so. And so I think one of the things that hadn’t been written about is even in Hanoi we’d made progress, all right? And so we think we do have a jumping-off point for these discussions, which have put us in a place where we can truly evaluate if there is a clear path forward. I’ve been listening to Chairman Kim today. I think there is. Steve will be leading the exercise. We’ll have the foreign ministry as our counterpart. I don’t know exactly who from the foreign ministry, but it’s likely to be one of a couple people. And it’ll happen — I guess it’s the end of the June still — yep, this month, starting tomorrow. So sometime in July, probably in the next two or three weeks, probably around the middle of the month would be my guess, at a place yet to be determined. But the teams will gather and they’ll start working. They’ll start exchanging ideas. We were hopeful — I think I’d said to some of you, or maybe I said it from the podium a few weeks back — we thought there might be this opportunity. And the President, by getting together with Chairman Kim today, broke through and was able to get us the opportunity to get back to the negotiating table, which I’m excited about. It’s good for North Korea; it’s good for America, good for the world. Q: Wasn’t that a gamble, the way he did it? POMPEO: It worked. (Laughter.) Q: Mr. Secretary, what did you hear from Chairman Kim that makes you think they’re ready to deal? SECRETARY POMPEO: Well, I don’t want to say too much about that. I’ll leave the President to talk about the substance of the conversation since it was, from the American side, just he and I in the meeting. I’ll leave it to him to talk about the things he didn’t share already. But I left there with the recognition, I think, that Chairman Kim really wants to get something done, something very significant, that we want to do so in a timely way. The President said we’re in no hurry. I think that’s true. Q: In no hurry? POMPEO: Yeah. Q: Yeah. POMPEO: The President said that repeatedly. I think Chairman Kim shares that view. But we’ll proceed with — what’s the — what was it? — all deliberate speed (inaudible). MS ORTAGUS: Jennifer. Q: Mr. Secretary, did you reach any sort of working shared agreement on denuclearization to move forward (inaudible)? POMPEO: We didn’t, but we’ve worked on this on a lot so we’re not at square one. We have a sense of their expectations and for a range of ways this might move forward. This is what conversations and dialogue are about. We don’t know what path it’ll head down. But it’s not the case that we’re where we were — goodness, Steve, when did you start. BIEGUN: A year ago. POMPEO: A year ago. We’re not where we were 12 months ago. We’re further along than that.” (DoS, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo Remarks to Press, June 30, 2019)
Meeting with reporters after the North Korea-U.S. dialogue today, Trump said he had told Kim, “At the right time, you’re going to come over [to the US].” “I said, any time he wants to do it,” he added. Trump also said Secretary of State Mike Pompeo would be spearheading the creation of a working-level team in the next two to three weeks to engage in negotiations, signaling the beginning of working-level denuclearization talks and negotiations toward a third North Korea-US summit. Explaining that the two sides had agreed to designate representatives to hold comprehensive negotiations toward an agreement, Trump said that while some “pretty complicated” issues remain, the US would continue watching the working-level discussions. Trump went on to say that State Department Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun would be designated to lead the working-level negotiations, adding that Pompeo had a list of the team’s members. In terms of the new team’s significance, Trump said it would be holding better dialogue with new counterparts. When asked by a reporter if the members of the previous North Korean negotiation team are still alive, Trump replied, “I can tell you the main person is. I would hope the rest are too.” Speaking about economic sanctions against North Korea, Trump said, “At some point, [ … ] I’m looking forward to taking them off.” “At some point during the negotiations, things can happen,” he added, suggesting the possibility of sanctions relief.
At the same time, Trump emphasized that he would not rush working-level negotiations going ahead. Stressing that the two leaders had had a good conversation, he said, “This was a very legendary, very historic day. It was quick notice, nobody saw this coming.” Arguing that there was no need to rush, Trump said, “Speed is not the object,” explaining that rushing can lead to limited results. “We want to see if we can do a really comprehensive, good deal,” he said. As if conscious of the favorable climate for dialogue, Trump shared remarks that appeared to reflect consideration for South and North Korea. When asked about North Korean short-range projectiles test-launched following the suspension of bilateral dialogue, he said, “These are missiles that practically every country tests.” “I mean, these were very [small] — we don’t consider that a missile test,” he added. “But we’re talking about ballistic missiles, long-range ballistic missiles, and [Kim Jong-un] hasn’t even come close to testing,” he continued. “And most importantly, there were no nuclear tests,” he said, adding, “I think we’re on a very good path.” Referring to Kim’s acceptance of his proposal to meet, Trump said, “I also want to thank Chairman Kim because [ … ] knowing the [US] press, like I do, had he had decided not to come, you would have hit me.” (Seong Yeon-cheol, “Trump Extends White House Invitation to Kim,” Hankyore, July 1, 2019)
Steve Biegun, the Trump administration’s North Korea negotiator, told reporters in an off the record briefing that the administration wanted a “complete freeze” of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction program while they are negotiating with the U.S. Between the lines: Biegun’s off the record remarks, made aboard Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s plane during the return trip to Washington from Korea, signaled he’s willing to be more flexible with North Korea than the hardliners in the Trump administration. Biegun said the administration isn’t ready to lift the sanctions against North Korea if it freezes its weapons program, but that it could give Kim other concessions, such as humanitarian relief and improved diplomatic ties. “What we are looking for is a complete freeze of WMD programs,” Biegun told reporters as he was returning to Washington on Sunday from the Korean Peninsula, according to notes from two sources familiar with his remarks. “Stop making things.” (Axios was not on the plane and therefore did not enter into any off the record agreement with the administration. The quotes in this story are from notes taken as Biegun spoke.) Biegun went on to say that the administration wanted “a freeze and an idea of an end state, and then within that we have a discussion of a roadmap” towards North Korea giving up their nuclear weapons. Biegun signaled several times in the off the record conversation that he was open to some give and take along the way to that goal, according to one of the sources. Biegun insisted, however, the administration hasn’t abandoned its goal of “complete denuclearization.” Behind the scenes: Biegun said in the off the record conversation that “in the abstract we have no interest in sanctions relief before denuclearization,” according to one of the sources familiar with the conversation. But Biegun also signaled that the U.S. negotiating team was open to being flexible with the North Koreans in other ways. There are “things we can do in the meantime” to make concessions towards Kim, such as “humanitarian aid, expanded people-to-people talks, presence in each other’s capitals.” “Let’s say they give us 20 nuclear weapons,” Biegun speculated, according to source notes. “What can we get? I’m confident that I’d go to the Secretary and he’d go to the President and he would consider that. What we want to do is take pieces off the board.” A State Department spokesperson declined to comment to Axios. (Jonathan Swan and Erica Pandey, “Trump’s Negotiator Signals Flexibility in North Korea Talks,” Axios, July 2, 2019)
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, had a historic meeting with President of the United States of America Donald Trump at Panmunjom on Sunday afternoon at the suggestion of Trump. The Supreme Leader of the Party, the state and the armed forces of the DPRK accepted the opinion of President Trump that he would like to meet Chairman of the State Affairs Commission Kim Jong Un in the Demilitarized Zone during his June 29-30 visit to south Korea and went to the south side portion of Panmunjom to have a surprise meeting with him. Kim Jong Un stepped out of the Panmun Pavilion on Sunday afternoon and had a historic meeting with Donald Trump just before the demarcation line at Panmunjom amid the worldwide attention. In 66 years since the Armistice Agreement in 1953 there happened such an amazing event of the top leaders of the DPRK and the U.S. exchanging historic handshakes at Panmunjom, place that had been known as the symbol of division. Kim Jong Un exchanged compliments with Trump about meeting him after about 120 days and guided him toward the north side portion of Panmunjom. The two leaders stepped toward just before the Panmun Pavilion in the north side portion of Panmunjom where they held their hands again, leaving the historic moment of the sitting U.S. President setting his foot on the soil of the DPRK across the Military Demarcation Line for the first time in history. They headed for the “House of Freedom” in the south side portion of Panmunjom, the venue of the talks, exchanging a pleasant chat. President Moon Jae In greeted Kim Jong Un outside the House. Kim Jong Un exchanged warm greetings with Moon Jae In. Then there were a one-on-one chat and talks between the top leaders of the DPRK and the U.S. They explained issues of easing tensions on the Korean peninsula, ending the inglorious relations between the two countries and making a dramatic turn and also issues of mutual concern and interest which become a stumbling block in solving those issues, and voiced full understanding and sympathy. The top leaders of the two countries agreed to keep in close touch in the future, too, and resume and push forward productive dialogues for making a new breakthrough in the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and in the bilateral relations. Kim Jong Un said that it was the good personal relations with President Trump that made such a dramatic meeting possible at just a one day’s notice, noting that the relations would continue to produce good results unpredictable by others and work as a mysterious force overcoming manifold difficulties and obstacles in the future, too. Present at the talks from the DPRK side was Ri Yong Ho, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, member of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK and foreign minister, and from the opposite side U.S. State Secretary Mike Pompeo. The top leaders of the two countries expressed great satisfaction over the results of the talks. After the talks Kim Jong Un exchanged parting words with Trump. Trump and Moon Jae In saw Kim Jong Un off up to the demarcation line at Panmunjom.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Has Historic Meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump at Panmunjom,” July 1, 2019)
From a seemingly fanciful tweet to a historic step into North Korean territory, President Trump’s largely improvised third meeting today with Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, was a masterpiece of drama, the kind of made-for-TV spectacle that Trump treasures. But for weeks before the meeting, which started as a Twitter offer by the president for Kim to drop by at the Demilitarized Zone and “say hello,” a real idea has been taking shape inside the Trump administration that officials hope might create a foundation for a new round of negotiations. The concept would amount to a nuclear freeze, one that essentially enshrines the status quo, and tacitly accepts the North as a nuclear power, something administration officials have often said they would never stand for. It falls far short of Trump’s initial vow 30 months ago to solve the North Korea nuclear problem, but it might provide him with a retort to campaign-season critics who say the North Korean dictator has been playing the American president brilliantly by giving him the visuals he craves while holding back on real concessions. While the approach could stop that arsenal from growing, it would not, at least in the near future, dismantle any existing weapons, variously estimated at 20 to 60. Nor would it limit the North’s missile capability. The administration still insists in public and in private that its goals remain full denuclearization. But recognizing that its maximalist demand for the near-term surrender of Kim’s cherished nuclear program is going nowhere, it is weighing a new approach that would begin with a significant — but limited — first step. American negotiators would seek to expand on Kim’s offer in Hanoi in February to give up the country’s main nuclear-fuel production site, at Yongbyon, in return for the most onerous sanctions against the country being lifted. Trump, under pressure from his secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, and his national security adviser, John R. Bolton, rejected that proposal, because so much of the North’s capability now lies outside the vast Yongbyon complex. The idea now is to get Kim’s new negotiating team to agree to expand the definition of the Yongbyon site well beyond its physical boundaries. If successful — and there are many obstacles, including the North accepting intrusive, perhaps invasive inspections — it would effectively amount to a nuclear freeze that keeps North Korea from making new nuclear material. But a senior U.S. official involved in North Korean policy said there was no way to know if North Korea would agree to this. In the past, he said, its negotiators have insisted that only Kim himself could define what dismantling Yongbyon meant. To make any deal work, the North would have to agree to include many facilities around the country, among them a covert site called Kangson, which is outside Yongbyon and is where American and South Korean intelligence agencies believe the country is still producing uranium fuel. It would help Trump argue that he is making progress, albeit slowly, on one of the world’s most intractable crises. And it would be progress after three face-to-face meetings — first in Singapore a little more than a year ago, then in Hanoi, then in an hourlong discussion at the DMZ today — that have produced warm exchanges but no shared definitions of what it meant to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. This evening, the State Department’s envoy to North Korea, Stephen E. Biegun, said that this account of the ideas being generated in the administration was “pure speculation” and that his team was “not preparing any new proposal currently.” “What is accurate is not new, and what is new is not accurate,” he said. Presumably, Trump’s freeze would have to be a permanent one, or he will have gotten less from Kim than President Barack Obama got from Iran in a deal Trump dismissed as “disastrous.” And even a successful freeze would constitute a major retreat from the goal of the “rapid denuclearization of North Korea, to be completed by January 2021,” as Pompeo put it last fall. But it does have the benefit of being vastly more achievable. More than two years ago, on his first trip to Seoul, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson rejected a similar idea. He said it would “leave North Korea with significant capabilities that would represent a true threat, not just to the region, but to American forces, as well.” In fact, this approach has been attempted before: It bears strong similarities to the nuclear freeze President Bill Clinton negotiated with Kim’s father in 1994. The North broke out of it in 2003. George W. Bush negotiated a partial freeze at Yongbyon in 2007; it too fell apart. The approach raises the larger question of whether Trump really cares about striking a tough denuclearization deal, or whether, as many critics charge, he is mainly interested in the illusion of progress to present himself to voters as a peacemaker. “The president constantly takes credit for the fact that the prospect of war has receded,” said Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, who was involved in the Bush administration’s confrontations with the North. “But it went up not because North Korea was doing anything differently, but because the administration was threatening war. And it went down not because the threat had lessened, but because the administration seemed content with the chimera of denuclearization.” Trump’s more limited expectations may, however, mesh perfectly with Kim’s plans. While Kim is eager to shed all the economic sanctions on his country, some North Korea analysts believe he would happily accept only partial sanctions relief along with lowered expectations that he might actually surrender his arsenal. “I do think Kim could offer just enough on the negotiating table, such as the Yongbyon nuclear facility plus yet another suspected nuclear facility, in order to secure an interim deal with Trump and at least some sanctions relief,” said Sue Mi Terry, who served at the C.I.A. and the National Security Council under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Kim “may calculate that this is still not a bad deal because it would allow the North to keep its nuclear and missile arsenal — and it would give Trump an opportunity to claim he had achieved something none of his predecessors had,” Ms. Terry said. At the core of Trump’s argument is that his friendship with Kim alone constitutes diplomatic success; on Sunday, the president asserted that the “tremendous danger” from North Korea he inherited when he took office has passed. “We’re a lot safer today,” Trump said before a meeting with South Korea’s president, Moon Jae-in. Adam Mount, a senior fellow at the Federation of American Scientists, said, “Several times he spoke as if friendship with Kim Jong-un is an end in itself.” Trump may once have warned of “fire and fury” if Kim failed to surrender his weapons, but he “now embraces that these meetings aren’t about getting to denuclearization but instead having a good one-to-one relationship with Kim Jong-un,” said Van Jackson, a former senior country director for Korea at the Department of Defense during the Obama administration. “That’s legitimation of a nuclear state,” Jackson said. If so, the outline of the next year or so of negotiations may be taking shape. Trump was ushered into the Demilitarized Zone by President Moon of South Korea — who then sat outside while Trump and Kim met. It was a stunning bit of symbolism for those who argue the South has been sidelined in these talks. Despite the imagery, Moon’s government sounded optimistic, at least officially. “Through their meeting today, the South and North Korean leaders and the American leader made history,” Yoon Do-han, Moon’s chief presidential press secretary, said in a statement following the border meeting. (Michael Crowley and David E. Sanger, “Eyeing Arms ‘Freeze’ to Ease New Talks,” New York Times, July 1, 2019, p. A-1)
7/1/19:
As President Trump reveled in his historic weekend stroll into North Korea, administration officials were sharply at odds over what demands to make of Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, while preparing to restart negotiations on a nuclear deal. Pushing an internal debate into the open, John R. Bolton, the national security adviser and the most prominent hawk in the administration, reacted angrily to a report in The New York Times about the possibility of a deal to effectively freeze North Korea’s nuclear activity in return for American concessions. “This was a reprehensible attempt by someone to box in the president,” Bolton wrote on Twitter. “There should be consequences.” But some senior administration officials have been discussing the idea of an incremental approach under which North Korea would first close down its nuclear facilities to prevent it from making new fissile material, in effect freezing its program but leaving its existing arsenal in place. In exchange, the Americans would make some concessions that would help improve the living conditions in North Korea, which is under heavy sanctions, or strengthen relations between Washington and Pyongyang. Among those considering such ideas are senior diplomats, say people familiar with the discussions. Trump did not publicly mention full denuclearization during his hour at the border between the two Koreas on Sunday or after talks with South Korean leaders. In April, during a visit to the White House by President Moon Jae-in of South Korea, Trump signaled that gradual concessions by both sides might be necessary. “There are various smaller deals that could happen,” he said. “You could work out step-by-step pieces, but at this moment, we’re talking about the big deal. The big deal is we have to get rid of nuclear weapons.” American officials involved in North Korea policy assert, even in private, that the administration’s long-run goal has been consistent all along: to have Kim, with whom Trump met at the border, give up all of his nuclear weapons and the ability to build more. In the short run, Trump’s public comments — and the showmanship of going to the Demilitarized Zone and stepping over a low concrete barrier to walk with Kim on his soil — is another sign of the limited influence of Trump’s most hardline advisers. Bolton was not at the meeting in North Korea but on a scheduled trip to Mongolia. Last month, Trump at the last minute rejected Bolton’s urging for a military strike on Iran. Today, after Bolton made his statement, Trump spoke effusively on Twitter about his weekend trip to the Koreas without disputing the possibility of a step-by-step approach. “While there, it was great to call on Chairman Kim of North Korea to have our very well covered meeting,” he tweeted. “Good things can happen for all!” Trump has given Secretary of State Mike Pompeo responsibility for restarting negotiations. Bolton and Pompeo had both urged the president to settle for nothing less than a grand deal, but Pompeo now appears open to considering a gradual approach. The State Department declined to comment today. Last night, Stephen E. Biegun, the United States’ special representative for North Korea, told the Times that its account of the ideas being discussed in the administration was “pure speculation” and that his team was “not preparing any new proposal currently.” Some analysts said any approach must start with the United States and North Korea committing to a common definition of denuclearization. Without an ironclad definition, there is greater risk the North Koreans could back out of an interim deal, as they have done under previous American administrations, they said. “There’s a myriad of ways that North Korea can pull it back,” said Jung H. Pak, a former C.I.A. analyst who is now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Though Pompeo is often aligned with Bolton on an aggressive approach to national security issues — Pompeo has also advocated a strike on Iran — the secretary of state is acutely attuned to Trump’s desires and has tried diplomacy with the North Koreans when commanded by the president. In interviews and talks in recent weeks, Pompeo has not mentioned his earlier insistence that North Koreans must first turn over a complete list of nuclear assets, which some experts say is a necessary first step to establishing baselines for full denuclearization. Administration officials say Biegun has been trying to come up with creative ways to get North Korea to at least agree with the Americans on a common definition of denuclearization and to start the process of shutting down its program. American intelligence officials have assessed that Kim will probably never give up all of his nuclear weapons. That is where serious consideration of a step-by-step process comes in. In January, during a speech at Stanford University, Biegun signaled that American negotiators might be willing to push off the demand for an inventory of nuclear assets and engage in a more gradual process. “Sequencing always confounds negotiators,” he said. Trump’s grand-deal gambit in Hanoi upended that thinking. But that summit’s failure has left the door open for other ideas. Negotiators are back at a new starting line, essentially the same place they were after Trump and Kim’s first summit, held in Singapore in June 2018. Doing a year’s long gradual process with a freeze on activity as the initial goal would amount to tacit acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear state. But American officials in both the White House and State Department say sanctions would not be lifted until North Korea completely gets rid of its nuclear weapons and its program. That includes the five sets of sanctions imposed by the Obama and Trump administrations starting in 2016 that North Korean officials say they most want the United States to cancel. In Hanoi, Kim made this demand of Trump. For now, American officials might consider allowing more robust humanitarian aid to enter North Korea or some limited economic exchanges between the North and South, which under Moon has been pushing forward on an inter-Korean peace process. The two sides could also open interest offices in each other’s capitals. In the approaches under consideration, those concessions would happen only if North Korea agrees to halt all its uranium enrichment — not only at Yongbyon, the central site of its nuclear program, but also at Kangson, another site known to American officials. American intelligence officials also suspect there may be a third site, say experts on North Korea’s nuclear program. (Edward Wong, “Split Emerges in Administration Over Approach to North Korea Talks,” New York Times, July 2, 2019, p. A-8) Bolton’s aides obtained a copy of notes taken by State Department reporters during an off-the-record briefing with Biegun discussing the nuclear freeze. Bolton tried to use those notes as a cudgel in the internal policy battle, administration officials said. Details of Biegun’s meeting were leaked to the news outlet Axios. (Peter Baker, “President Ousts Bolton amid Rifts on Foreign Policy,” New York Times, September 11, 2019, p. A-1) Bolton: “I read this NYT story with curiosity. Neither the NSC staff nor I have discussed or heard of any desire to “settle for a nuclear freeze by NK.” This was a reprehensible attempt by someone to box in the President. There should be consequences.”
Ending a brief media frenzy, South Korea’s military said it turned out to be a flock of birds that prompted it to launch fighter jets and alert journalists that it had detected an unidentified object flying near the border with North Korea on Monday. The South’s earlier announcement on the flying object left many media outlets scrambling, with the incident coming a day after U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met at a different portion of the heavily fortified Korean border. South Korea’s military has been under fire for a possible security gap after a boat carrying four North Koreans arrived undetected recently at a South Korean port. Observers say the South’s military had likely released the inconclusive information about the flying object to media to avoid similar criticism of its surveillance posture. The South’s Joint Chiefs of Staff had said earlier today that its radar found “the traces of flight by an unidentified object” over the central portion of the Demilitarized Zone, a de facto border between the two Koreas. South Korean media, citing unidentified military officials, quickly speculated that it was likely be a North Korean helicopter flying across the border into South Korea. But pilots of the several fighter jets deployed to the area later found that the object was a group of about 20 birds, a South Korean military official said, requesting anonymity because he wasn’t authorized to speak to reporters on the issue. South Korea sent North Korea a message about its fighter jets’ launches to avoid unnecessary tensions, the official said. The DMZ, which was created after fighting ended in the 1950-53 Korean War, is peppered with an estimated 2 million mines and guarded by combat troops, razor wire fences, anti-tank traps and guard posts on both sides. The two Koreas have occasionally traded exchanges of gunfire there, though animosities have eased since North Korea entered talks on its nuclear program. Last month, South Korean Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo issued a public apology amid criticism that the country’s military failed to detect a North Korean fishing boat that crossed deep into South Korean waters, about 130 kilometers (80 miles) south of the maritime sea border, before reaching a port in Samcheok [east coast] uninterrupted. South Korea sent two of the four North Korean fishermen aboard the boat back to the North, while the other two stayed in the South after expressing their desire to defect. Some experts say the incident occurred because South Korea’s security posture has been weakened under the current liberal government of President Moon Jae-in, which seeks greater rapprochement with North Korea. But others note similar incidents, such as North Korean soldiers fleeing undetected to South Korea via the DMZ, had occasionally happened when South Korea was ruled by conservatives before Moon’s inauguration in 2017. (Hyung-jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, “Birds at Border Prompt South Korea to Launch Jets, Issue Alert,” Associated Press, July 1, 2019)
Ignatius: “In dealing with North Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong Un, President Trump should remember that he is a snake handler, not a snake charmer. (The same advice applies to Kim, but we’ll leave that to pundits in Pyongyang.) The baseline: Kim is a modernizing autocrat who believes his survival will be enhanced by the economic development he wants, in addition to the nuclear weapons he has. If he has decided to resume negotiations, it’s to remove sanctions, put his economy in overdrive and, maybe, keep some of his nuclear arsenal. It’s not because he has a “great relationship” with Trump, as the president’s comments have suggested, but because he’s a rational, if cocky, dictator. This caution doesn’t diminish the importance of what Trump achieved Sunday in stage-managing his reality-diplomacy show at the Korean demilitarized zone. This was a high-risk photo opportunity, but when Trump became the first sitting U.S. president to step into North Korea, he reopened a path to denuclearization and normalization of relations. Trump’s many bad qualities shouldn’t blind us to this good achievement. He successfully played a hunch that Kim wanted to resume talks. The fact that this achievement comes wrapped in Trump’s gaudy, dictator-friendly bunting doesn’t diminish its value. The question is whether this is a real turn toward peace and stability in Asia, as opposed to a survival gambit for Kim and a reelection campaign stunt for Trump. “The idea of a Trump meeting with Kim in the DMZ has been kicking around for some time,” noted Robert Carlin, a longtime CIA analyst on North Korea, in an email message Sunday. Carlin had feared that it was “a diving catch, a Hail Mary pass, betting the farm,” but Trump made the gamble work. What were the precursors of this reopening? First, Kim apparently concluded he had erred at the Hanoi summit in February in expecting that he could get sanctions relief without making any real concessions on denuclearization. He began walking back this mistake in May, “signaling the window was again open for engaging the U.S.,” said Carlin, a careful reader of the North Korean press. A clear public sign that Kim wanted to play ball again came in a June 4 Foreign Ministry statement reaffirming North Korea’s “will to cherish and implement in good faith” the denuclearization pledge Kim made at the Singapore summit in June 2018. The statement urged that “both sides give up their unilateral demands and find a constructive solution.” A shadow play commenced: Kim sent Trump what the president called a “beautiful letter” last month, and Trump responded in kind. Stephen Biegun, the State Department’s special representative for North Korea, said June 19 at the Atlantic Council that the “door is wide open” for renewed negotiations and that the only big obstacle was the lack of an “agreed definition of what denuclearization is.” The State Department quietly announced June 24 that Biegun was traveling to Seoul. And then, on Saturday, came Trump’s seemingly off-the-wall tweet: “If Chairman Kim of North Korea sees this, I would meet him at the Border/DMZ just to shake his hand and say Hello(?)!” A day later, they were shaking hands and Trump was walking across the border. Here’s what to watch carefully in the weeks ahead. Since this diplomatic dance began, the question has been what specific, verifiable steps North Korea will take toward the declared goal of denuclearization. Kim tried to sidestep that in Hanoi by offering to dismantle one big nuclear facility at Yongbyon, which Trump rightly rejected because the United States knows there are other facilities outside the boundary of this compound. Are those other facilities now on the table? Is the United States willing to consider a transitional “freeze” of Pyongyang’s activities? We’ll see. Trump, wisely, seems to have accepted that denuclearization won’t be an immediate disarmament but a gradual, monitored process. He said Sunday that “speed is not the object. We want to see if we can do a really comprehensive, good deal.” That’s the right goal. The personal factor in diplomacy is ephemeral but real. China may have been ready for an opening to America in 1972, but it took President Richard M. Nixon to go to Beijing. Egypt may have been primed for peace with Israel in 1978, but it took President Jimmy Carter to negotiate the Camp David Accords with Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin. Kim and Trump make an unattractive pair, in many respects. But if for their own reasons they’re ready to begin a serious denuclearization discussion, so much the better. (David Ignatius, “Trump’s Korea Gamble: Now What?” Washington Post, July 2, 2019, p. A-17)
7/?/19:
Trump sent a copy of The New York Times‘ front page showing the June 30 DMZ meeting and 22 photos of the day to Kim.
7/2/19:
Trump letter to Kim Jong Un, enclosing 22 photographs: “It was an honor to cross into your country and to resume our important discussion. I have tremendous confidence in our ability to strike a big deal that leads to immense prosperity for you and your people, sheds you of your nuclear burden, and inspires generations to come. These images are great memories for me and capture the unique friendship that you and I have developed.” (Woodward, Rage, p. 179)
The U.N. sanctions committee on North Korea has approved the release of two ships detained for illegal ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products to the communist state, the foreign ministry said today. The U.N. approval allows Seoul to discharge the Hong Kong-flagged Lighthouse Winmore and the South Korean P-Pioneer, the ministry said in a release. The government submitted the request on May 23, and it received approval yesterday (U.S. time). The Lighthouse Winmore has been detained in the southern port of Yeosu since November 24, 2017, and the P-Pioneer was moved to the Busan port on September 4, 2018. The decision was made under the condition that the Lighthouse Winmore not engage in ship-to-ship transfers in the future. The operator of the P-Pioneer has agreed to have its tracking system turned on at all times and to submit its shipping course log at the government’s request. Two other ships — the now stateless Koti and Talent Ace — are said to be still under review. The government is seeking to demolish them, as their breaches of sanctions were likely to have been deliberate, according to sources familiar with the matter. The Koti has been detained in Pyeongtaek since December 21, 2017, and the Talent Ace has been held in Gunsan since January 19, 2018. They are suspected of moving petroleum products to North Korean ships. Once these measures are all carried out for the four ships, it will mark the first case of full implementation of the North Korea sanctions by a U.N. member nation, from seizing, inspecting of vessels suspected of violating the sanctions and imposing necessary measures afterwards, the ministry said. The UNSC adopted additional sanctions resolutions on North Korea in late 2017 following Pyongyang’s launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile in November of that year. Resolution 2397 allows a country to capture and look into a vessel suspected of engaging in illegal activities with North Korea and imposes a blanket ban on the overseas sales of North Korean coal, iron ore and other mineral resources. (Kim Seung-yeon, “U.N. Approves Release of 2 Ships Detained for Illegally Dealing with North Korea,” Yonhap, July 2, 2019)
7/4/19:
North Korea appears to have picked a former ambassador to Vietnam as its new chief nuclear envoy, a diplomatic source said, indicating the regime has effectively rounded out its team for upcoming working-level talks with the United States. During the impromptu summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on Sunday, Pyongyang notified Washington of the makeup of its team to be led by Kim Myong-gil, the source said. Kim Myong-gil, well versed in U.S. affairs, is expected to serve as the counterpart of U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun. He will replace Kim Hyok-chol, who is rumored to have been purged after the no-deal summit between Trump and Kim in Hanoi in February. “I understand that the North and the U.S. notified each other of who will serve as the chiefs of their respective negotiation teams,” the source told Yonhap News Agency on condition of anonymity. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Appears to Have Picked Former Amb. To Vietnam as New Chief Envoy: Source,” July 4, 2019)
7/6/19:
North Korea said today that Alek Sigley, the Australian student whom it deported this past week, had been a spy who admitted to “systematically” collecting information about the isolated country, with a state news agency reporting that he had been “caught red-handed.” Sigley, 29, a graduate student in Korean literature at Kim Il-sung University in Pyongyang, was freed in North Korea on Thursday and deported on the same day. Until now, neither Sigley nor the North’s government had publicly explained why he had been detained. KCNA said Sigley was caught on July 3 while “committing anti-D.P.R.K. incitement through the internet.” “He honestly admitted his spying acts of systematically collecting and offering data about the domestic situation of the D.P.R.K. and repeatedly asked for pardon, apologizing for encroachment upon the sovereignty of the D.P.R.K.,” the news agency said. North Korea expelled him with “humanitarian leniency,” it said. Sigley could not be reached for comment. But after his release, he said as he emerged at Beijing’s international airport on July 4, “I’m O.K., I’m good.” He declined then to address a reporter’s question about why he had been detained. While studying in Pyongyang, he had contributed occasional columns about his life in the North to outside news media, including NK News, which is based in Seoul and specializes in news about North Korea. KCNA said that Sigley had acted at the instigation of NK News and other “anti-D.P.R.K.” news outlets, providing them several times with information and photos he had collected in Pyongyang by making use of his foreign student card. The official news agency did not provide further details about Sigley’s alleged acts of spying. Chad O’Carroll, the head of NK News, said in response to the North Korean claim, “Alek Sigley’s well-read columns presented an apolitical and insightful view of life in Pyongyang, which we published in a bid to show vignettes of ordinary daily life in the capital to our readers.” He added, “The six articles Alek published represent the full extent of his work with us, and the idea that those columns, published transparently under his name between January and April 2019, are ‘anti-state’ in nature is a misrepresentation which we reject.” Prime Minister Scott Morrison of Australia and Sigley have thanked Swedish diplomats for working on Australia’s behalf to help free him. Australia does not have an embassy in Pyongyang and relies on the Swedish Embassy there to protect its citizens in the North. Sigley was the rare Westerner who embraced life in North Korea, offering glimpses into life in Pyongyang through his frequent posts on Twitter and Facebook, as well as his news media columns, which included images of local cuisine, restaurants and shops. As of today, his Facebook page was unavailable. He wrote that he was careful not to comment on politics in North Korea, but in June, his family lost contact with him. While he remained missing, there were worries that he might be facing harsh conditions in the North’s prison system. Western visitors to North Korea are relatively few. But some American and other foreigners have been arrested and given draconian sentences for what to outsiders may appear to be minor infractions, such as handing out proselytizing materials or stealing a government sign. North Korea often releases the American detainees after prominent United States celebrities, like former presidents, pay the country a visit. North Korea is holding at least six South Koreans, three of whom were sentenced to hard labor for life on espionage charges. But so far, the North has appeared to be more lenient toward Australians. In 2014, the North arrested an Australian Christian missionary, John Short, on charges of secretly distributing missionary materials while visiting a Buddhist temple in Pyongyang. He was deported after the North said he had apologized for violating North Korean laws and asked for leniency. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Says Student It Deported Was a Spy,” New York Times, July 7, 2019, p. 12)
7/11/19:
The United States is considering offering a 12- to 18-month suspension of certain sanctions on North Korea in exchange for the dismantlement of its main nuclear facility and a freeze of the entire nuclear program, a source close to White House deliberations on North Korea said The potential offer would see the suspension of U.N. Security Council sanctions restricting North Korea’s exports of coal and textiles — a major source of income for the regime — and mark a compromise between the two countries after the collapse of their second summit in Vietnam in February. The source spoke to Yonhap and two other outlets just days before the expected resumption of U.S.-North Korea negotiations. The date and location of the talks have not been announced yet. “The White House, when working-level talks begin, wants to set the conditions whereby they can begin the process of North Korea’s denuclearization,” the source said, adding that the suspension of sanctions could be renewed if progress in denuclearization “moves at a good pace” but snap back if the North cheats in any way. If it works, the source said, the model could also be applied to facilities other than the main nuclear complex in Yongbyon and move in a step-by-step manner until the entire weapons of mass destruction program is fully closed and all sanctions are lifted. “This is important, as it allows the U.S. and the North to test their intentions and build trust, but in a way that furthers denuclearization and sanctions relief,” the source said. Verifying and inspecting Yongbyon’s dismantlement as well as the nuclear freeze could be tricky, he said, noting the need for a detailed agreement. A freeze would mean not making any more fissile material and warheads. “With the failure of Hanoi, they are mindful that being flexible, while at the same time making a strong offer to North Korea that tests its intentions while building trust, is important,” the source said. “(The new model) does not give North Korea the amount of sanctions relief it wanted and asks a little more in return from the North.” The White House apparently wants to move the ball forward, even if it means offering several other concessions. If North Korea agrees to the dismantlement of Yongbyon and a complete nuclear freeze, the U.S. is considering signing a declaration formally ending the 1950-53 Korean War, according to the source. In addition, it would be willing to establish liaison offices in each other’s capitals and set up a separate channel or office to coordinate the sustained recovery of American troops’ remains from the North. “The White House is open to many ideas to incentivize the North to make what they call ‘a critical first step’ on denuclearization,” the source said. “Their first goal in the talks is to prove to the North that they can trust the U.S. and that Washington wants to do something historic to ensure the hostile intent of both sides is now firmly in the past.” (Lee Haye-ah, “U.S. Mulling 12- to 18-Month Sanctions Relief in Exchange for Yongbyon: Source, “Yonhap, July 11, 2019)
DPRK FoMin’s Institute for American Studies policy research director’s press statement: “The south Korean authorities are about to bring in two “F-35A” stealth fighters from the United States again in mid-July, immediate after introduction of such fighters in March. There is no room for doubt that the delivery of “F-35A”, which is also called an “invisible lethal weapon”, is aimed at securing military supremacy over the neighboring countries in the region and especially opening a “gate” to invading the north in time of emergency on the Korean peninsula. The south Korean authorities have thus challenged head-on the “military agreement to implement the Panmunjom Declaration” which expressly stipulates that the build-up of armed forces against the other side should be completely stopped. The south Korean authorities readily consented to bring in the lethal weapons that would harm the compatriots at a time when positive atmosphere is created on the Korean peninsula thanks to the historic DPRK-U.S. summit meeting in Panmunjom. I can hardly fail to ask the south Korean authorities whether this is an invention from “its imaginative power beyond common sense” clamored for by the south Korean ruler. The south Korean authorities are strange enough to live in such a way as to please the United States, their master, like eating mustard in tears, even though they know well that the bringing-in of the Fighters would prove to be an extremely dangerous action which will trigger our reaction and increase the military tension on the Korean peninsula. Notwithstanding the above, the south Korean authorities are talking loudly about reconciliation and cooperation between the north and the south. They are indeed impudent and pitiful as well. Inter-Korean relations cannot hold any prospect as long as the south Korean authorities do not avoid the fate of depending on outside forces, which compels them to make two steps backwards when the White House pulls down its check-bar while making one step forward when there is any sign of improved DPRK-U.S. relations. We, on our part, have no other choice but to develop and test the special armaments to completely destroy the lethal weapons reinforced in south Korea. The south Korean authorities had better come to their senses before it is too late, shattering the preposterous illusions that an opportunity would come for improved inter-Korean relations if they follow in the footsteps of the United States.” (KCNA, “S. Korean Authorities Slammed,” July 11, 2019)
As he tries to tackle the greatest challenges to American power in Asia, President Trump is overturning policy toward China and North Korea that for decades was as canonical as Confucian ritual. With North Korea, he is engaging with the enemy in hopes that negotiations will yield a surrender of nuclear weapons. With China, Trump says the United States must take a big step back from an economic relationship that has strengthened a formidable rival. The shifts were prompted by internal changes in each country, combined with Trump’s unorthodox instincts and the views of his senior Asia advisers. The administration now has growing bipartisan support in Washington to widen an emerging global conflict with China and build diplomacy with North Korea. This week, American negotiators are pressing forward with the policy transformations. Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin and Robert E. Lighthizer, the United States trade representative, spoke to Chinese counterparts on Tuesday by telephone to continue tough trade negotiations. Meanwhile, Stephen E. Biegun, the special representative for North Korea, was in Brussels and Berlin to discuss diplomatic approaches to North Korea. The meetings follow Trump’s June trip to East Asia, where he met separately with President Xi Jinping of China and Kim Jong-un of North Korea. “The administration has changed the nature of U.S. government interaction in many ways with both North Korea and China,” said James Green, the former senior trade official in the United States Embassy in Beijing. “In both cases the traditional mechanics of diplomacy have been upended.” More important, Trump has smashed the very foundations of longstanding policy. That has alarmed some experts. More than 150 former officials and scholars signed an open letter that the writers posted last week, denouncing the administration’s combative China policy as “fundamentally counterproductive.” “We do not believe Beijing is an economic enemy or an existential national security threat that must be confronted in every sphere,” said the letter, which was organized by scholar Michael D. Swaine. Yet the aggressive approach to China has drawn many supporters, including some Obama administration officials and Democratic leaders like Senator Chuck Schumer. “Hang tough on China, @realDonaldTrump. Don’t back down,” Schumer tweeted in May. “Strength is the only way to win with China.” Since the 1970s, when presidents Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter re-established relations with Beijing, American officials and experts have contended that economic ties between the United States and China would anchor the relationship between the two nations and, perhaps, coax Communist Party leaders toward Western liberalism. But Xi, who took power in 2012, has exercised expansive authoritarian controls. He has detained more than one million Muslims in camps, reinforced the party’s role across strategic industries and expanded the military’s footprint in disputed areas of the South China Sea. One economist who advised Chinese leaders in the 1980s, Janos Korani, wrote this week that Western experts like himself had been Dr. Frankensteins, helping build up China without realizing the eventual consequences for the West. “Now, the fearsome monster is here,” he wrote. Trump administration officials argue that economic engagement without appropriate guardrails created a tyrannical behemoth that could supplant American supremacy. Some call for long-term tariffs to “decouple” the economies of China and the United States by breaking supply chains and other business ties. “We seem to be at a unique confluence of Xi and Trump,” said Bill Bishop, an analyst in Washington who publishes Sinocism, a China briefing. “And Make China Great Again meets Make America Great Again is a recipe for friction.” But Trump rarely if ever talks about strategic concerns and speaks admiringly of Xi, leading China hawks to fear a trade deal with Beijing that relents on national security issues like Huawei. On North Korea, the general policy since the George W. Bush administration has been to avoid bilateral diplomacy and impose economic isolation to force Pyongyang to end its nuclear program. But Trump upended that by doing face-to-face diplomacy with Kim, most recently when the two strolled for a minute in North Korea — the first time a sitting American president had entered the country. It was their third meeting, after a failed Hanoi summit in February and initial talks in Singapore in June 2018. Former officials and analysts increasingly say diplomacy is the only way forward with North Korea, given that it already has an estimated 30 to 60 nuclear warheads. Longtime advocates of rapprochement point optimistically to the shifting consensus in Washington. “My impression is that they are certainly singing in a new key, and it’s a good thing however or why ever they are doing so,” said Robert L. Carlin, a former North Korea analyst at the C.I.A. and State Department. He added that if the foreign policy establishment was “reconsidering the situation, what’s possible, what’s pragmatic and realistic after nearly two decades of feckless policy, that’s all to the good, and maybe just in time.” A notable figure now preaching diplomacy is Michael Morell, the former acting C.I.A. director and host of the “Intelligence Matters” podcast. “A negotiated solution is the only solution to this problem,” he said on CBS News’s “Face the Nation” on June 30. “There isn’t a military option. There’s not a covert action option. So getting back to talks with the North Koreans is important, and I think that’s a good thing.” He also said the United States would have to live with a nuclear North Korea because Kim would not give up his nuclear weapons program — an assessment reached by the intelligence community. “We should push for the whole thing, but the best we can hope for is limits,” he said. “Containment?” asked Margaret Brennan, the host. “Containment,” Morell agreed. In a telephone interview, Morell said the administration’s ability to shift consensus thinking is only possible because of Trump “being the Republican president that he is.” “So political Washington in its entirety has come around to the opinion that talking to North Korea is good,” he said. Trump administration officials stress that the goal of negotiations is to get Kim to give up all of his nuclear weapons. But senior State Department officials are now contemplating intermediate steps — including reaching a freeze of nuclear activity — rather than going for a grand deal, as Trump tried to do in Hanoi. Morgan Ortagus, the State Department spokeswoman, said Tuesday that a freeze would be the “beginning of the process.” Trump could shift the consensus further, if he decides the United States can tacitly accept a nuclear North Korea. Beyond Morell, other analysts are coming to that conclusion — one that would have drawn outrage if mentioned aloud during the Obama administration. “I can’t see Kim giving up his nuclear weapons entirely,” said Jean H. Lee, a Korea expert at the Wilson Center in Washington. “They are his ‘treasured sword’ and all that he has to give him leverage. But he is willing to barter some dismantling of his nuclear program in exchange for concessions.” Under former President Barack Obama, the United States reached a nuclear freeze deal with North Korea in 2012 but quickly backed out when Pyongyang announced a satellite launch. Obama officials stuck to a strategy of pressuring North Korea through sanctions, which the Trump administration is also doing. But Obama did not try face-to-face diplomacy with Kim — something that one senior Obama official, Daniel Russel, called “diplotainment” when done by Trump. “It was something the North Koreans repeatedly requested,” said Russel, a former assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. He said Obama officials considered it, “but immediately recognized that it would be worse than foolish to legitimize Kim with a summit before the groundwork had been laid for a denuclearization deal.” (Edward Wong, “America’s Gamble: Shatter Enduring Strategies on China and North Korea,” New York Times, July 12, 2019, p. A-7)
Kim Jong Un has been formally named head of state of North Korea and commander-in-chief of the military in a new constitution observers said was possibly aimed at preparing for a peace treaty with the United States. The new constitution, unveiled on the Naenara state portal site on Thursday, said that Kim as chairman of the State Affairs Commission (SAC), a top governing body created in 2016, was “the supreme representative of all the Korean people”, which means head of state, and “commander-in-chief”. A previous constitution simply called Kim “supreme leader” who commands the country’s “overall military force”. Previously, North Korea’s official head of state was the president of the titular parliament, known as the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly. “Kim had dreamed of becoming the president of North Korea and he effectively made it come true,” said Kim Dong-yup, a professor at Kyungnam University’s Far East Institute in Seoul. “He has long sought to shake off the abnormal military-first policy the country has stuck to for a long time.” Kim shifted his focus to the economy last year, launched nuclear talks with the United States and moved to revamp his image as a world leader via summits with South Korea, China and Russia. Hong Min, a senior researcher of the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul, said the title change was also aimed at preparing for a potential peace treaty with the United States. “The amendment may well be a chance to establish Kim’s status as the signer of a peace treaty when it comes, while projecting the image of the country as a normal state,” Hong said. The new constitution continued to describe North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. (Hyonhee Kim, “New North Korean Constitution Calls Kim Head of State, Seen as Step to U.S. Peace Treaty,” Reuters, July 12, 2019)
7/12/19:
“We’ve got to make this better for the North Korean people. We’ve got to make sure that the security assurances that they need are in place,” Secretary of State Pompeo said in the interview with Sebastian Gorka of America First. “And if we can achieve these objectives of denuclearizing in a way that we can verify — right, fully and completely — this will be a truly historic accomplishment.” (Jo He-rim, “U.S. Waits for North Korea’s Response on Working-Level Nuclear Talks,” July 14, 2019)
7/15/19:
Pompeo: “Q: What updates can you give us in terms of China and the trade negotiations, and is there any update with North Korea and Kim Jong-un? SECRETARY POMPEO: So on North Korea, the President’s visit to North Korea, where he went across into North Korea for the first time a president had done that, has given us another chance to sit down with them and have another conversation. And I hope the North Koreans will come to the table with ideas that they didn’t have the first time. We hope we can we be a little more creative too. The President’s mission hasn’t changed: to fully and finally denuclearize North Korea in a way that we can verify. That’s the mission set for these negotiations. I hope that the opportunity — I was present when Chairman Kim and President Trump were together. I hope their meeting can put us on the right path to get that deal done.” (DoS, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, Interview with Sean Hannity of the Sean Hannity Show via Teleconference, Fox News, July 15, 2019)
7/16/19:
DPRK FoMin’s statement: “The United States and south Korea are going to defiantly conduct a joint military exercise “Alliance 19-2” targeting us in August. Outwardly, the U.S. is trumpeting that this exercise is a simulation to verify whether the south Korean army is capable of taking over wartime operational control. But, it is crystal clear that it is an actual drill and a rehearsal of war aimed at militarily occupying our Republic by surprise attack and rapid dispatch of large-scale reinforcements under the cloak of “containment” and “counter-offensive” in time of emergency. The suspension of joint military exercises is what President Trump, commander-in-chief of the U.S., personally committed to at the DPRK-U.S. summit talks in Singapore under the eyes of the whole world and reaffirmed at the DPRK-U.S. summit meeting in Panmunjom, where our Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State were also present. Our discontinuation of the nuclear and ICBM tests and the U.S. suspension of joint military exercises are, to all its intents and purposes, commitments made to improve bilateral relations. They are not a legal document inscribed on a paper. In order to implement the DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement, we already took crucial steps, followed by the humanitarian measures without any precondition. Less than a month now since the DPRK-U.S. summit meeting in Panmunjom, the U.S. is going to resume joint military exercise which it directly committed to suspend at the highest level. This is clearly a breach of the main spirit of June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement and an undisguised pressure upon us. We are viewing this matter with vigilance. We really have many things to say about the facts that the U.S., together with Japan, south Korea and other countries, staged the “Proliferation Security Initiative” exercise targeting our country in early July and continues to bring highly sophisticated war equipment into south Korea. With the U.S. unilaterally reneging on its commitments, we are gradually losing our justifications to follow through on the commitments we made with the U.S. as well. I wonder whether there would be such obligation or law that one side alone has to continue to cling to when it is clear that a unilateral adherence would not bring any gains because the other side neither honors nor minds them.” (KCNA, “U.S. Hit for Seeking to Wage Joint Military Exercise against DPRK,” July 16, 2019)
DPRK FoMin spokesperson’s “answer to a question put by KCNA on July 16, with regard to the DPRK-U.S. working-level talks: At present, there are widespread public opinions across the world concerning an opening of the DPRK-U.S. working-level talks. The United States is going to conduct a joint military exercise “Alliance 19-2” with south Korea in contravention of the commitments made at the highest level at a time when the working-level talks between the DPRK and the U.S. are on the agenda, which has been made possible by the DPRK-U.S. summit meeting in Panmunjom. If the military exercise really goes ahead, it would affect the DPRK-U.S. working-level talks. We will formulate our decision on the opening of the DPRK-U.S. working-level talks, while keeping watch over the U.S. move hereafter.” (KCNA, “Spokesperson for the DPRK Foreign Ministry of Working-Level Talks,” July 16, 2019)
Bolton: “ … Pompeo and I spoke about yet another Trump demand to stop a joint US–South Korea military exercise that agitated the ever-sensitive Kim Jong Un. This exercise was mostly a “tabletop” affair, which would once have meant a lot of paper shuffling and moving troop markers around in sandboxes. Today, it was almost all done by computer. Despite repeated assurances that there were no Marines hitting the beaches with B-52s flying overhead, Trump wanted them canceled. I pleaded with Trump to let me make my planned visit to Japan and South Korea to talk about base costs before he made a decision, to which he agreed. More logical arguments, like the need for these and more exercises involving field maneuvers in order to ensure that our troops were at full readiness, able to “fight tonight” if need be, had long since lost their appeal to Trump. Pompeo also told me North Korea was projecting no working-level discussions until mid- to late August, a far cry from the mid-July predictions made by Biegun and others right after the DMZ meeting.” (Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, p. 317)
In a closed-door briefing for the National Assembly’s intelligence committee, Suh Hoon, head of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), said his agency think Kim Hyok-chul, North Korean negotiator, is alive, according to Rep. Kim Min-ki of the ruling Democratic Party. (Yonhap, “N. Korean Envoy Seems Alive despite Reported Execution: S. Korean Spy Agency,” July 16, 2019)
The armored black limousines appear everywhere with Kim Jong-un, sleek Western chariots for the young dictator of North Korea. Flown in from Pyongyang on a cargo plane, the sedans carried Kim through the streets of Singapore, Hanoi and Vladivostok during summit meetings with President Trump and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. Sometimes a phalanx of bodyguards jogs beside them. The cars are top-of-the-line Mercedes-Benzes popular with world leaders — the Maybach S62 and Maybach S600 Pullman Guard, which cost $500,000 to $1.6 million each. And Kim is using them in open defiance of United Nations sanctions intended to ban luxury goods from North Korea. High-end Western goods are making their way to North Korea’s elite through a complex system of port transfers, secret high-seas shipping and shadowy front companies, according to research by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, a nonprofit Washington group that looks at smuggling networks, and an investigation by The New York Times. The evasions point to potential limits of sanctions as a tool for the Trump administration to pressure Pyongyang into serious negotiations to end its nuclear weapons program. American officials say their only real leverage with North Korea is tough sanctions. From 2015 to 2017, as many as 90 countries served as the sources of luxury goods for North Koreans, according to a report released on Tuesday by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies. Moreover, the networks and supply chains run through the territories of some United Nations Security Council member nations and American allies — China, Russia, Japan and South Korea among them. Both President Xi Jinping of China and President Moon Jae-in of South Korea rode with Kim in Mercedes-Benz sedans on recent visits to Pyongyang. For officials seeking to enforce the sanctions, it is important to track the smuggling of luxury goods — especially of rare items such as armored cars — because North Korea uses similar techniques to obtain dual-use technology for its nuclear weapons program, sanctions experts say. “When it comes to sanctions evasions, North Korea relies on a sophisticated but small group of trusted individuals that move any goods required by the state, whether it’s luxury goods or components for missiles, or whether it’s arranging for trade of resources,” Neil Watts, a maritime expert and former member of the United Nations panel on North Korea sanctions enforcement, said, speaking generally about patterns of illicit trade into the country. The journey taken by a pair of armored Mercedes Maybach S600 sedans from Europe to East Asia illustrates how one of the luxury-goods transportation networks operated. The Center for Advanced Defense Studies and The Times traced their path through five countries using open-source material, including shipping records and satellite images. Interviews with officials and business executives confirmed some of the details of the network. In February, South Korean officials seized a Russian-owned ship that had transported the cars. The globe-spanning voyage began in the port of Rotterdam, the Netherlands. In June 2018, two sealed containers, each holding a Mercedes worth $500,000, were brought by truck into a shipping terminal, according to cargo tracking records. They were in the custody of China Cosco Shipping Corporation. It was unclear who had first purchased the cars. Daimler, the parent company of Mercedes, says Mercedes runs background checks on potential buyers of the vehicles to ensure the company is not selling to sanctions violators. The cars traveled by ship for 41 days to Dalian, in northeast China. The containers were off-loaded after the ship’s arrival on July 31. They remained in the port until August 26. They were then put on a ship for Osaka, Japan. From there, they were put on a vessel for a three-day voyage to Busan, South Korea, where they arrived on September 30. Then came the most mysterious part of the passage. The containers were transferred within one day of arrival to the DN5505, a cargo ship sailing under the flag of Togo, a West African nation, and bound for the port of Nakhodka in the far east of Russia. At this point, the cars were consigned to Do Young Shipping, a company registered in the Marshall Islands that owns the DN5505 and one other ship, the Panama-flagged oil tanker Katrin. Do Young’s ownership is not clear from its registration but appears to be tied to a Russian businessman, Danil Kazachuk, documents and interviews show. Executives at Han Trade and AIP Korea, the South Korean shipping agencies that worked with the two ships, said Kazachuk was the ships’ owner. Documents obtained by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies show Kazachuk was listed as the owner of the Katrin for about one month in 2018. The ship with the cars, the DN5505, was originally called Xiang Jin, but it was renamed DN5505 and its ownership transferred from a Hong Kong-registered company to Do Young on July 27, just days before the two sedans arrived in Dalian After leaving Busan on October 1 with the sedans, the ship went dark — its automatic identification system stopped transmitting a signal. That is common practice among ships evading sanctions. The signal stayed off for 18 days. When it came back on again, the ship was in South Korean waters. Now it was on a return trip to Busan, but laden with 2,588 metric tons of coal, which it later unloaded in another South Korean port, Pohang. Customs records in South Korea showed that the ship had taken on the coal in Nakhodka, the report from the Center for Advanced Defense Studies said. That port city is next to Vladivostok, where Kazachuk is based. Ship traffic data and shipping agency executives said the ship had reported Nakhodka as its destination after leaving Busan with the cars. The center’s report did not say with certainty what happened there with the sedans. But the researchers say the cars might have been flown from Russia to North Korea. On October 7, three cargo jets from Air Koryo, North Korea’s state-run airline, arrived in Vladivostok, according to a video online and flight tracking data. (That happened to be the same day Kim drove in a Rolls-Royce through Pyongyang to meet with Pompeo.) It is rare for North Korean cargo planes to fly to Vladivostok. The jets are the exact same airplanes used to transport Kim’s vehicles outside North Korea, according to tail numbers. “Given the heavy lift cargo capacity of the planes and their role in transporting Kim Jong-un’s armored limousines, it is possible that the cargo jets could have loaded the Mercedes,” the report said. Four months later, on January 31, 2019, the same model of Mercedes drove through the streets of Pyongyang to the headquarters of the central committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, according to video footage analyzed by NK Pro. The sedans also appeared that day alongside Kim in a photo session with an art delegation. In a telephone interview, Kazachuk acknowledged that he was responsible for the DN5505, but declined to give details about the shipment of the cars or say how or whether he had transferred them to North Korea. “This is my company’s business secret,” he said. “Why do I need to tell everybody where I bought these cars and to whom I sold the cars?” There is no evidence tying Kazachuk to the movement of military technology or goods to North Korea, but international sanctions experts say the Russian Far East is a common transit point for smuggled goods going to and from North Korea. In February, the South Korean authorities seized the DN5505 and the Katrin in separate actions because of suspected sanctions violations. The DN5505 had docked in Pohang, South Korea, carrying more than 3,200 tons of coal after sailing from Nakhodka. Officials told employees of the South Korea shipping agency handling the ship that it was being investigated for carrying North Korean coal. The other ship, the Katrin, was accused of bringing petroleum products to North Korea. Kazachuk said he as a shipowner was not responsible for what the ships carried. He also said the South Korean authorities were engaged in a “state racket” and might have planted evidence on the ships. “The South Korean police spit from a high bell tower on basic human rights,” he said. There is another tie between his ships and suspected sanctions violations. Last fall, when the DN5505 dropped off its shipment of coal in Pohang, on the return trip after having unloaded the two sedans, a company called Enermax Korea took possession of the coal. The United Nations panel has been investigating Enermax, registered in South Korea, for sanctions violations. The panel’s 2019 report said Enermax appeared to be the final recipient of North Korean coal that was intended to be transferred in April 2018 in Indonesian waters by a North Korean-flagged ship, the Wise Honest, to a Russian cargo ship. The Indonesian authorities detained the Wise Honest around April 1. Enermax had signed a contract to buy the coal from a Hong Kong-registered company, yet told the panel that it was buying Indonesian coal from someone who appeared to be a broker in Indonesia. The sales contract valued the coal at nearly $3 million. In May, the United States announced it was seizing the Wise Honest. In an interview, Enermax executives said the deal with the Indonesian broker fell apart and no money exchanged hands. They also said they had thought the coal delivered to South Korea by the DN5505 both last October — right after the Mercedes-Benzes were unloaded — and this February was Russian in origin. They said Kazachuk had told them the coal was from Russia. The South Korean authorities have seized at least six ships since late 2017 on suspicion of sanctions violations. Last month, it began scrapping the Katrin. Officials said the dismantling was done at the request of Kazachuk, who did not want to continue accruing docking fees for the seized ship. (Edward Word and Christoph Koettl, “How Did That Mercedes End Up in Pyongyang?” New York Times, July 17, 2019, p. A-1)
7/17/19:
Vice President Mike Pence today criticized North Korea’s poor record on religious freedom, calling its treatment of people of faith worse than China’s. Speaking at a State Department conference on religious freedom, the vice president indicated Washington would push the DPRK on its religious persecution record. The vice president’s reference to China comes with Beijing under fire for its treatment of Chinese Muslims, who are currently being held in large numbers in internment camps. “But for all of the challenges that believers face in China, the treatment of people of faith in North Korea is much worse,” Pence said. “So you can be confident, as President Trump continues to pursue the denuclearization of North Korea and a lasting peace, the United States will continue to stand for the freedom of religion of all people of all faiths on the Korean Peninsula.” Pence cited an advocacy group called Open Doors, saying they had “identified North Korea as the world’s worst persecutor of Christians for the past 18 years.” North Korea is typically sensitive of its human rights record, often railing criticism via KCNA. According to the NK Pro KCNA Watch data tool, North Korea criticized the State Department’s Religious Freedom Report last year one June 1. “The U.S. speaks volumes about ‘religious freedom’ but historical facts about religious persecution and abuses in the country prove it is not entitled to say anything about it,” the KCNA report read. “As shown, the annual presentation of reports is just aimed to tarnish the international image of the DPRK and justify its hostile policy toward the latter.” The State Department report for 2018 published on June 21 this year noted that the DPRK’s “constitution provides for freedom of religious belief.” But the report went on to say that according to the UN Commission on Human Rights, “there was an almost complete denial by the government of the rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.” The U.S. vice president’s potentially inflammatory comments come with neither Washington nor Pyongyang making any announcements regarding the resumption of working-level talks, originally scheduled to resume in mid-July. “Leading with human rights does very little (and is actually counterproductive) to getting traction on negotiations with North Korea. They don’t want to hear it. They will likely respond with strong language,” Ken Gause, Director of the Adversary Analytics Program at CNA told NK News. “In this environment where negotiations are going nowhere, Pence’s statements give North Korea more ammunition to get all sanctimonious on how the outside world is treating it.” Gause added that Pence’s comments could make life more difficult for U.S. point man on North Korea Stephen Biegun who is attempting to get North Korea “engaged.” President Donald Trump today also met with victims of religious persecution from numerous countries, including North Korea, at the White House. Trump briefly spoke with a North Korean defector called Ju Illyong who told the president about religious persecution in the DPRK and the underground churches there. The U.S. president responded by telling Ju that he would “bring it up” though did not elaborate further. (Leo Byrne, “North Korea’s Treatment of Religious People Worse than China’s: Pence,” NKNews, July 19, 2019)
7/21/19:
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s ruling coalition won today’s upper house election but his long-held hope of constitutional reform moved further out of reach after pro-amendment forces lost the two-thirds majority needed to initiate it. The coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito, along with like-minded opposition and independent lawmakers, garnered 81 seats in total. Combined with seats uncontested this time, they secured 160, falling short of the 164 needed in the chamber to propose amending the pacifist Constitution. Abe has set his sights on revising the Constitution in 2020 but the pro-amendment camp’s failure to hold on to their two-thirds majority means the LDP leader faces the daunting task of winning support from opposition parties if he wants to achieve his goal. Still, the ruling parties secured 71 of the 124 seats up for grabs in the 245-member House of Councilors — 57 by the LDP and 14 by Komeito — crossing the line of a majority of contested seats set by senior party executives for determining victory. (Kyodo, “Abe Wins Upper House Poll But Suffers Constitutional Reform Setback,” July 21, 2019)
7/22/19:
Pompeo: “Q: And sticking in roughly the same geography, the status of the ongoing talks with North Korea. What reasons should the American people have right now for optimism? Some obviously have been frustrated from the beginning; others are willing to give the President more leeway because there’s been pretty bipartisan failure on this for a while. Why should people think this is going to work? SECRETARY POMPEO: When we came into office, it was in a bad place. President Trump made the decision to engage with them in a serious way. We’re continuing to try to do that. We hope that the working-level discussions will begin in a couple of weeks. The North Koreans have to go fill the promise that Chairman Kim made. He promised that he would denuclearize his country. He did so publicly in a written document; he said so to President Trump. He has told me that half a dozen times personally. They have to make a decision that they’re prepared to go execute that. In exchange for that, President Trump’s been very clear: We’re prepared to provide a set of security arrangements that gives them comfort that if they disband their nuclear program, that the United States won’t attack them in the absence of that; and second, a brighter future for the North Korean people. That’s the outlines of the agreement that Chairman Kim and President Trump have made. We now need the North Korean negotiators to begin to build out on those principles that the two leaders have set forward. Q: Is there clarity on that major point of what denuclearization means? POMPEO: Absolutely. I’ve talked to Chairman Kim about this many, many times. Absolute clarity. There’s no dispute. This is the fully denuclearized, verified effort that we have been talking about for all of this time. I hear people talk about whether there’s ambiguity. There’s no ambiguity.” (DoS, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo with Buck Sexton of iHeartMedia, Sheraton Maria Isabel Hotel Mexico City, Mexico July 22, 2019)
When John Bolton, national security adviser to President Donald Trump, visited Japan on July 21-22, he raised the possibility of the fivefold increase in talks with Foreign Minister Kono Taro and Yachi Shotaro, the head of the National Security Council secretariat, the source said. While Bolton’s proposal may only be an opening gambit by the U.S. side in the expected difficult negotiations over host nation support, Trump has long complained that Japan was not contributing enough to its defense and that the U.S. military was being asked to shoulder an unfair burden. Under an agreement reached with the United States under President Barack Obama, Japan will pay a total of 946.5 billion yen ($8.7 billion) over the five-year period from fiscal 2016 to fiscal 2020. New negotiations on what has also been called the “sympathy budget” are expected to start next year for the period from fiscal 2021. Trump at one time suggested he would remove all U.S. military personnel from Japan if Tokyo refused to cover all of the costs of stationing those troops in Japan. Trump continued complaining when he visited Osaka in late June for the Group of 20 summit. He criticized the Security Treaty between the two nations as unfair and said he had repeatedly pressed Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to revise the treaty. According to a 2004 report by the U.S. Defense Department, Japan that year contributed 74.5 percent of the costs of basing the U.S. military in Japan. The ratio was much higher than those for European nations that also host U.S. military facilities. Given the high level of Japan’s sympathy budget, government officials had generally believed it would be difficult for Washington to request an increase in the amount that Tokyo pays. But Bolton’s proposal shows that Trump remains intent on seeing greater Japanese expenditures for U.S. troops based here. The sympathy budget began in 1978 after the U.S. government faced a fiscal deficit as well as a stronger yen. After his stop in Japan, Bolton had a similar message when he visited South Korea and met with Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha and other officials on July 24. According to government sources from Japan, South Korea and the United States, Bolton asked Seoul to greatly increase its expenditures for U.S. troops based there. In 2018, Seoul paid 960.2 billion won (about 88.2 billion yen) to base U.S. troops in South Korea. For 2019, the figure was increased to 1.038 trillion won (about 95.4 billion yen), and the period covered by the expenditure was reduced from five years to one. Bolton asked for an even greater increase for 2020. Negotiations between the United States and South Korea are also expected to be difficult. (Tosa Shigeki and Makino Yoshihiro, “Bolton Suggests Fivefold Increase in Japan’s Spending on U.S. Military,” Asahi Shimbun, July 31, 2019)
Huawei Technologies Co., the Chinese tech giant embroiled in President Trump’s trade war with China and blacklisted as a national security threat, secretly helped the North Korean government build and maintain the country’s commercial wireless network, according to internal documents obtained by the Washington Post and people familiar with the arrangement. Huawei partnered with a Chinese state-owned firm, Panda International Information Technology Co. Ltd., on a variety of projects there spanning at least eight years, according to past work orders, contracts and detailed spreadsheets taken from a database that charts the company’s telecom operations worldwide. The arrangement made it difficult to discern Huawei’s involvement. The spreadsheets were provided to the Post by a former Huawei employee who considered the information to be of public interest. The former employee spoke on the condition of anonymity, citing a fear of retribution. Two additional sets of documents were shared by others with a desire to see the material made public. Taken together, the revelations raise questions about whether Huawei, which has used American technology in its components, violated U.S. export controls to furnish equipment to North Korea, where the isolated regime has faced extensive international sanctions over its nuclear weapons program and human rights abuses. The Commerce Department, which declined to comment, has investigated alleged links between Huawei and North Korea since 2016 but has never publicly connected the two. Its probe remains active, however. Separately, the Justice Department has charged Huawei with bank fraud and violations of U.S. sanctions on Iran. The company has pleaded not guilty. In a statement, Huawei said it “has no business presence” in North Korea. Spokesman Joe Kelly declined, however, to address detailed questions, including whether Huawei had conducted business there in the past, either directly or indirectly. He did not dispute the authenticity of documents shared with the company, though he also declined to verify them. “Huawei is fully committed to comply with all applicable laws and regulations in the countries and regions where we operate, including all export control and sanction laws and regulations” of the United Nations, United States and European Union, the statement says. A spokeswoman for Panda Group, the state-owned parent company for Panda International, declined to comment.A current senior State Department official, who, like others interviewed for this report, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive information, summarized the administration’s frustration. “All of this fits into a general concern we have about corporate responsibility and a company like Huawei that is not trustworthy because of its company culture and numerous incidents indicating a willingness to evade or outright violate laws,” the official said. “Working with regimes like North Korea, who deprive individuals on a regular basis of their basic human rights, raises concern.” Before 2008, North Korea struggled to find multinational companies willing to build a 3G network in such a risky business environment. That ended with the creation of the wireless provider Koryolink, which emerged from a secret visit in 2006 by Kim’s father, Kim Jong Il, to Huawei’s headquarters in Shenzhen, China. “This was the time that confirmed not only the top leadership’s interest in dealing with Huawei but pretty much revealed a choice of Huawei as the primary supplier of technology,” said Alexandre Mansourov, an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, who in 2011 wrote about North Korea’s digital transformation. “They decided to work with Huawei from that time on.” Koryolink was built through a 2008 joint venture of Orascom Telecom Holding, an Egyptian firm, and the state-owned Korea Post and Telecommunications Corp. Together, they were called CHEO Technology. Attempts to reach CHEO were unsuccessful. A key player was Panda International, part of the storied electronics conglomerate Panda Group that has sometimes served China’s foreign policy. In 2001, for instance, during a visit to Havana, China’s president at the time, Jiang Zemin, gave Cuba 1 million Panda-made TV sets and introduced a company representative to Cuban leader Fidel Castro, who “excitedly shook hands and embraced” him, the firm recounts on its website. Huawei worked closely with Panda, using it as the conduit to provide North Korea with base stations, antennas and other equipment needed to launch Koryolink, internal documents show. For years, Huawei and Panda employees worked out of an inexpensive hotel near Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, according to a person familiar with the arrangement. Huawei was involved in “network integration” and “software” services as well as at least one “expansion” project for Koryolink, the documents show. It also provided “managed service” and “network assurance” services. One current Huawei employee reached by The Post, Yin Chao, said he worked in 2012 and 2013 on Koryolink’s automated callback system, one of several improvements the company offered the North Koreans. According to a 2008 contract, Panda would transport Huawei equipment to Dandong, a town in northeastern China known for cross-border trade. From there, it would be taken by rail into Pyongyang. Internal documents show that Huawei has done business with a separate Chinese company, Dandong Kehua, which in November 2017 was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department for exporting and importing goods to and from North Korea — trade seen by U.S. officials as financing Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Dandong Kehua has not publicly addressed the sanctions. It is unclear what role, if any, Dandong Kehua played in Huawei’s dealings with North Korea and whether Huawei has done business with the company since it was sanctioned. Attempts to contact the firm were unsuccessful. In internal company documents and among employees, Huawei referred to certain countries, such as North Korea, Iran and Syria, by code. North Korea, for instance, was listed as A9 in the project database. “You’d run a query on the projects and you’d see Germany, United States, Mexico. Then instead of a country name, you’d see A5, A7, A9, and you’d say, ‘What’s that?’” said the former employee. “I assume it’s because they didn’t want to say ‘Iran’ or ‘Syria.’ ” In a semiprivate online forum used by Huawei employees, one man reminisced last year about how he helped launch Koryolink in “A9” during the summer of 2008, before rushing back to China to offer tech support for the Beijing Olympics. In parentheses, the man wrote “chaoxian,” which means North Korea, in Roman letters — an apparent effort to avoid mentioning the country by name using Chinese characters. Documents obtained by the Post also illustrate the North Koreans’ concern with foreign spying on regime officials and their family members who would be using Koryolink. In spring 2008, Orascom and Korea Post tasked Huawei with developing an encryption protocol for the network, noting that the government would create its own encryption algorithm, according to the documents. “Both sides had common agreement that the ordinary people will use the international standard mobile phones and special users will use different mobile phones which will contain locally developed encrypted algorithm,” state the minutes of a 2008 meeting, a document signed by Korea Post’s chief engineer and an Orascom board member. An encryption “test bed” was built by Huawei in Shenzhen, the documents show. According to two individuals familiar with the system, North Korea also intercepted and monitored all domestic and international calls. Orascom was bought in 2011 by a Russian company, Vimpelcom, which spun off Koryolink to a newly created subsidiary. That firm is now called Orascom Investment Holding, which did not respond to requests for comment. The original joint venture agreement gave Orascom exclusive license to operate the mobile network through 2015, according to media reports, but the North Korean government launched a rival network, Kang Song, in 2013 using another Chinese telecom equipment supplier, ZTE. Kang Song quickly supplanted Koryolink as the dominant wireless provider in North Korea. In 2014, the Commerce Department banned the export of U.S.-origin components to Panda, alleging it had furnished such parts to the Chinese military “and/or” to countries under U.S. sanctions. Since then, any company to provide Panda with telecom items intended for North Korea and containing at least 10 percent U.S.-origin content without a license would be in violation of the export ban. Several experts, including the supply-chain analysis firm Interos, consider it to be likely that Huawei’s 3G equipment contained American components, though it is difficult to know whether it surpassed the 10-percent threshold outlined in export regulations. Huawei was placed on the same Commerce Department blacklist in May, with officials citing the company’s alleged violations of U.S. sanctions on Iran. Huawei has denied violating export controls with regards to Iran or that it poses a security threat, saying that the Trump administration is targeting it for political reasons. Huawei and Panda vacated their offices in Pyongyang during the first half of 2016, according to people familiar with the matter. In that period, efforts to impose more stringent U.S. and U.N. sanctions against North Korea were gaining momentum. Orascom obtained a U.N. waiver to operate the Koryolink joint venture in September 2018. Koryolink, according to a person familiar with the matter, operates today on aging equipment as Huawei no longer provides upgrades and maintenance. U.S. officials served Huawei with a subpoena in 2016, demanding information on the export of American technology to sanctioned countries, including North Korea. If Huawei was found to have violated U.S. sanctions against North Korea, it could face additional export-control sanctions, civil penalties, forfeitures or criminal prosecution. “North Korea is radioactive in the proliferation world because of international sanctions,” said James Mulvenon, an expert on Chinese economic espionage and general manager at the defense contractor SOS International. “Huawei wouldn’t want to be caught dealing directly with North Korea, so they work through other companies like Panda.” (Ellen Nakashima, Gerry Shih and John Hudson, “Leaked Documents Reveal Huawei’s Secret Operations to Build North Korea’s Wireless Network,” Washington Post, July 22, 2019)
7/23/19:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, inspected a newly built submarine. The submarine built under the meticulous guidance and special attention of Supreme Leader of the Party, state and armed forces Kim Jong Un will perform its duty in the operational waters of the East Sea of Korea and its operational deployment is near at hand. Making a round of the submarine, the Supreme Leader learned in detail about its operational and tactical data and combat weapon systems. He expressed great satisfaction over the fact that the submarine was designed and built to be capable of fully implementing the military strategic intention of the Party under various circumstances. Saying that the operational capacity of a submarine is an important component in national defense of our country bounded on its east and west by sea, he stressed the need to steadily and reliably increase the national defense capability by directing big efforts to the development of the naval weapons and equipment such as submarine. Explaining the Party’s strategic plan for the use of submarine and underwater operation, he elaborated on the immediate duty and strategic tasks facing the field of national defense science and submarine industry to carry out the plan. He said with pride that the successful building of the Korean-style powerful submarine is the fruition of the noble patriotism and loyalty of officials, scientists, technicians and workers in the field of national defense science and munitions factories who have worked hard to boost national defense capability, true to the Party’s policy on attaching importance to defense science and technology, and another great demonstration of the might of our defense industry making a leap forward. He was accompanied by Jo Yong Won, Hong Yong Chil, Yu Jin, Kim Jong Sik, Ri Jong Sik, Choe Myong Chol, Jang Chang Ha and other senior officials of the Party Central Committee and the field of national defense science.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Inspects Newly Built Submarine,” July 23, 2019) North Korea is believed to have decided to limit the operational waters of a newly built submarine to the East Sea in consideration of the resumption of nuclear talks with the United States, a pro-Pyongyang newspaper said July 31. Last week, North Korea said that leader Kim Jong-un inspected the new submarine, which will “perform its duty in the operational waters of the East Sea,” adding that its deployment is “near at hand.” The Japan-based Choson Sinbo said the North Korean state media’s mention of the submarine’s deployment location is noteworthy, claiming that it was a “message” to Washington with the resumption of their negotiations in mind. “Whatever weapons are loaded on the new submarine, the U.S. will for now be able to give a sigh of relief as its operational waters have been decided as the East Sea,” the newspaper said. The paper said the disclosure of the deployment location is “an expression of commitment to sincerely implement the Singapore declaration” signed by Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump in June last year and that it is incorrect to say the North’s move was a low-level provocation against Washington. (Yonhap, “N.K.’s Limiting of Submarine Operational Waters a Message to U.S.: Pro-Pyongyang Newspaper,” July 31, 2019)A newly constructed North Korean submarine seems to be capable of carrying three submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), South Korea’s defense ministry was quoted as saying on July 31. The defense ministry determined that the North’s submarine is ready to be deployed soon, Rep. Lee Hye-hoon, the chief of the parliamentary intelligence committee, told reporters after the ministry’s closed-door briefing. (Yonhap, “New N. Korean Submarines Seen Capable of Carrying 3 SLBMs: S. Korea,” July 31, 2019)
A Russian warplane violated South Korea’s airspace above the East Sea twice today, prompting the Air Force to fire warning shots in the first such airspace violation by a foreign airplane ever, military officers here said. The Russian A-50 early warning and control aircraft trespassed in the territorial sky above the East Sea near South Korea’s easternmost islets of Dokdo earlier in the day for two brief periods in breach of international treaties, according to officers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The incident came right after two Tu-95 Russian bombers and two Chinese H-6 aircraft entered South Korea’s air defense identification zone (KADIZ) without prior notice earlier in the day, the officers said, adding that the two Russian bombers again trespassed on the air defense zone in the afternoon. This marked the first time that a foreign military plane has violated Korea’s territorial sky and South Korea fired warning shots in response. It was also the first time that Russian and Chinese aircraft entered KADIZ simultaneously. South Korea’s foreign ministry summoned Maxim Volkov, the No. 2 diplomat at the Russian Embassy here, to lodge a formal complaint. It also called in Chinese Ambassador to Seoul Qiu Guohong to file a protest. “(The ministry) called in the deputy chief of the Russian Embassy to lodge a stern protest and call for the prevention of a recurrence,” Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Yoon Soon-gu said. The Russian early warning plane first entered KADIZ at 09:01 and flew further into the airspace after 8 minutes. “The Air Force instantly deployed multiple jets, including F-15Ks and F-16Ks, and sent warning messages to it in accordance with operation manuals. But the plane did not respond, so one of our aircraft fired some 10 rounds of flares and 80 warning shots,” a JCS officer said. The Russian aircraft then left the airspace after three minutes, and finally flew out of KADIZ at around 9:15 a.m, he added. At around 9:33 a.m., however, it again encroached upon South Korean airspace. Following stronger military actions involving around 280 rounds of warning shots, the aircraft left the airspace four minutes later. It finally flew out of the air defense zone at 9:56 a.m. Before the airspace infringement took place, two Russian and two Chinese bombers violated KADIZ earlier in the day, according to the officers. At around 6:44 a.m., two Chinese H-6s flew into KADIZ from northwest of South Korea’s Ieodo, a submerged rock south of the southern island of Jeju, and stayed for about 30 minutes. At 7:49 a.m., they re-entered the air defense zone from the south of the eastern island of Ulleung, and stayed there about 30 minutes before leaving the zone heading northward. The Chinese aircraft then joined two Russian TU-50s and flew southward together over the East Sea. The four entered KADIZ at around 8:40 a.m. for a 25-minute flight, according to the JCS officer. Later in the day, at around 13:11 p.m., the two Russian bombers again entered KADIZ and left the zone 27 minutes, he added. Taken all together, the Russian aircraft stayed in KADIZ for about 93 minutes, and the Chinese warplanes stayed there for 85 minutes. “More analysis is needed for their joint flight, which is quite unusual, as well as their intentions and other details,” the officer said, adding that military authorities have not received any responses from the countries regarding the incidents. A military official said that it appears that the Russian and Chinese aircraft have conducted joint military drills, which he said is unusual. The purpose of their joint flight and intentions behind the series of breaches were not immediately clear. Some speculate that Tuesday’s air drills might be intended as a show of force against joint drills between the United States and South Korea scheduled for next month. The latest development coincided with U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton’s arrival in Seoul for discussions with high-ranking officials here on issues expected to include the North’s denuclearization (Yonhap, “Russian Aircraft Violates S. Korean Airspace above East Sea Twice,” July 23, 2019) South Korea said that one of the Russian planes, a Beriev A-50 early warning and control aircraft, flew closer and intruded twice into what the South regards as its territorial airspace, near a cluster of disputed islands that South Korea controls but Japan also claims. Both times, the Russian plane violated that territorial airspace for a few minutes, prompting South Korean F-15 and F-16 fighter jets operating nearby to fire 20 flares and 360 machine gun rounds as warning shots from a half mile away, the officials said. The South Korean jets took the action after the Russian plane did not answer repeated radio warnings, according to the South. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Fired Shots to Ward off Russian Plane,” New York Times, July 24, 2019, p. A-4)
7/24/19:
North Korea is refusing to accept food assistance from South Korea, citing Seoul’s planned joint military exercise with the United States, a unification ministry official said. The North delivered the message during its working-level talks with the World Food Program (WFP), through which Seoul intended to deliver the promised 50,000 tons of rice. “It is true that this message has been delivered in the course of working-level discussions (between the North and the WFP),” the official told reporters. The WFP’s Pyongyang bureau is still in talks with the North’s foreign ministry over the issue, the official said. The government is currently trying to confirm whether the refusal is the North’s final decision, and the preparations for the rice shipment are expected to remain stalled until after the North makes its final call. South Korea’s decision to provide the food aid came amid a series of reports on the worsening food security situation in North Korea. In February, North Korea’s top envoy to the U.N. requested emergency food assistance, saying that his country will suffer a food shortage estimated at around 1.5 million tons this year. The WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization said North Korea’s crop output last year hit the lowest level since 2008, with an estimated 10 million people, or 40 percent of its population, in urgent need of food. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) also estimated the North’s rice production to stand at 1.36 million tons this year, unchanged from last year’s lowest production in a decade and down 17 percent from the five-year average. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Refusing to Accept Seoul’s Food Aid over Allies’ Joint Military Drill,” July 24, 2019)
National Security Advisor John Bolton held a series of meetings with ranking South Korean officials to discuss a set of alliance issues amid Seoul’s trade spat with Japan and fresh tensions involving China and Russia over an airspace intrusion. Bolton held talks with his South Korean counterpart, Chung Eui-yong, Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo and Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha. He arrived in Seoul yesterday for a two-day stay. The meetings took place amid tricky a diplomatic situation facing South Korea, including a row over Japan’s export curbs and a recent intrusion by Chinese and Russian warplanes into the South’s air defense identification zone (KADIZ).As for escalating tensions over Japan’s export restrictions, Bolton highlighted the need to explore diplomatic solutions, according to Seoul’s foreign ministry. In the talks, Bolton reaffirmed the importance of the South Korea-U.S. alliance and trilateral security cooperation to achieve the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and regional peace and security. “(Kang and Bolton) agreed to work closely together for a diplomatic solution through dialogue so that there won’t be any worsening of the situation between Korea and Japan, under the basic understanding that it will suit the interests of every party concerned,” the ministry said. They also reaffirmed that trilateral cooperation between Seoul, Tokyo and Washington is vital to achieving the common goal of complete denuclearization and regional stability on the Korean Peninsula, according to the ministries. After the meeting with Kang, Bolton told reporters that he had “very productive discussions on a wide range of issues and looked forward to cooperation going forward,” without taking any questions. During their meeting, Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo and Bolton vowed cooperation for trilateral ties involving Japan. “The two sides shared an understanding on continued security cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo, and agreed to cooperate closely for the development of such bilateral ties, as well as trilateral relations involving the U.S.,” the defense ministry said in a release. Seoul said earlier it may review a military information-sharing accord with Japan amid a trade feud with Tokyo. The U.S. has voiced strong support for the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) signed in 2016. If Seoul discards the pact, it could be a blow to Washington’s pursuit of stronger trilateral security cooperation involving the two allies. As for the airspace intrusion row, Bolton called for close consultation between Seoul and Washington in the case of a similar incident in the future, according to presidential spokeswoman Ko Min-jung. Some experts raised speculation that the KADIZ row and the trespassing by the Russian plane might have intended to test the trilateral cooperation involving Washington and its allies. But Russia told the Korean government that the air intrusion was not intended and was probably caused by a technical glitch, according to Cheong Wa Dae. As for the matter of defense cost sharing, the allies decided to seek consultations, based on the spirit of the Seoul-Washington alliance in a manner that would be the most “reasonable and fair,” according to Ko. Under the one-year contract signed in March, Seoul will pay 1.04 trillion won (US$883 million) in 2019 for the operation of the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), up from 960 billion won the previous year. The allies need to start negotiations in coming months on sharing USFK costs after the end of this year. Sources said Bolton did not ask Seoul to dispatch troops to join U.S.-led efforts to safeguard shipping in the Strait of Hormuz off Iran. Before his trip, speculation was rampant that Bolton may call for Seoul to join the U.S. initiative by sending troops or naval vessels or contributing funds. But Bolton and Chung agreed to continue discussions over how to cooperate to ensure free navigation through waters off Iran. On the North Korea issue, the allies reaffirmed close coordination and shared the understanding that there should be practical progress for denuclearization talks. The national security advisors of the allies held a working luncheon that also involved their respective aides. (Kim Soo-yeon, “Bolton Meets Top S. Korean Officials amid Seoul-Tokyo Trade Spat, Air Intrusion Row,” Yonhap, July 24, 2019)
7/24?/19:
A North Korean official told a White House National Security Council counterpart last week that working-level talks to revive denuclearization negotiations with North Korea would start very soon, a senior U.S. administration official said July 30. There were no details provided to reporters on when such talks would occur. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has appeared hopeful of a diplomatic way forward despite North Korea test-firing two new short-range ballistic missiles on July 25. Pompeo and North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho had been expected to meet on the sidelines of a Southeast Asia security forum in Bangkok this week, but Ri canceled his trip to the conference, a diplomatic source said. Today, the senior U.S. official also said it appeared Ri would not be in Bangkok. The most recent contact between North Korea and the United States occurred last week, when a U.S. official, in Asia for unrelated talks, traveled to the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas to deliver photographs commemorating the June 30 meeting there between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, the senior U.S. administration official told reporters. Pompeo said July 29 he hoped working-level talks to revive denuclearization talks with North Korea could occur “very soon,” but emphasized that a follow-up leaders’ summit was not planned. (Roberta Rampton, “North Korea Official Tells U.S. Counterpart Talks to Begin Soon: Senior U.S. Official,” July 30, 2019)
7/25/19:
North Korea fired two short-range missiles toward the East Sea in what appears to be a move designed to put pressure on the United States and draw more concessions ahead of its possible nuclear talks with Washington. “North Korea fired one short-range missile at around 5:34 a.m. and the other at 5:57 a.m., from Hodo Peninsula near its eastern coastal town of Wonsan into the East Sea,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said. One missile flew around 430 kilometers and the other traveled around 690 km, a JCS officer said, adding that both flew at an altitude of around 50 km. “We’ve found some features that indicate that the second one could be a new type, which requires more analysis and assessment,” the officer said. They were presumed to have been fired from a transporter erector launcher (TEL) and landed in the East Sea. “We believe that (North Korean leader) Kim Jong-un has recently stayed in the region, and summertime military drills are now under way in the North,” he noted. The test came 77 days after Pyongyang’s short-range missile launch in early May. Experts have said Thursday’s launches appear to have involved the North’s version of Russia’s Iskander, a short-range, ground-to-ground ballistic missile known as KN-23, as it test-fired in May. On May 4, the North launched a fusillade of projectiles, which involved “a new type of tactical guided weapon” and 240-millimeter and 300-mm multiple rocket launcher systems. The projectiles flew about 70 km to 200 km, according to the JCS. The North later said that they were “routine” and “self-defensive” drills that were not intended as provocations. Five days later, it fired a barrage of projectiles, including two short-range missiles that flew 270 km and 420 km. “This time, North Korea appears to have adjusted the weight of its warhead to make it fly farther,” said Chang Young-keun, a professor of aerospace and mechanical engineering at Korea Aerospace University. Since its first launch in May, North Korea was known to have improved the capabilities of the new weapon. Iskander has several versions, and detailed specifications of Pyongyang’s Iskander were not known. But the solid-fuel missiles can fly as far as 500 km to put the entire Korean Peninsula within their range. Due to its relatively low peak altitude, Iskander could neutralize the advanced U.S. anti-missile defense system (THAAD), and it is nearly impossible to prevent their launches due to their mobility, according to experts. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Fires 2 Short-Range Missiles into East Sea: JCS<” July 25, 2019) The short-range missiles that North Korea test-fired this week were a new type of ballistic weapon similar to Russia’s Iskander, the military authorities here said July 26, citing the projectiles’ unique flight pattern. North Korea fired two short-range missiles into the East Sea from near the eastern coastal town of Wonsan, and both flew around 600 kilometers at an altitude of around 50 km, according to an officer at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). “Differing from a general parabolic trajectory, the Iskander shows a complicated flight pattern and what North Korea fired yesterday showed a similar one,” the officer noted. It is the first time that the military authorities have officially offered such an assessment, though experts have said North Korea has tested its version of the Iskander, a ground-to-ground short-range ballistic missile, since May. The two missiles were initially presumed to have flown 430 km and 690 km, respectively, but “further analysis conducted jointly with the United States showed that the missiles added the so-called pull-up maneuver in the dive phase,” the officer said. In the reentry phase, the Iskander pulls up to fly horizontally and then dives to attack its target with a near 90-degree falling angle, which aims to avoid interception, according to experts. This analysis is in line with a report by KCNA, which said that its new tactical guided weapon system has the specific features of a “low-altitude gliding and leaping flight orbit.” The KCNA also said that the launches gave “satisfactory verification once again to the efficiency” of the weapons system, suggesting the missile’s development has neared completion for field deployment. In fact, the South Korean radar system reportedly failed to detect their terminal-phase moves. “Such a gray area is due to the curvature of the Earth, and North Korea’s firing of the missiles northeastward from its east coastal region made the zone wider,” the officer said, adding that if the weapon is fired southward, South Korean assets can detect it. The JCS officer said that the military authorities see it as very likely that this new type of missile is similar to those fired in May, adding that those launches “appear aimed at testing the new weapon.” On May 4, the North launched a fusillade of projectiles involving “a new type of tactical guided weapon” and 240-millimeter and 300-mm multiple rocket launcher systems. The projectiles flew about 70 km to 200 km, according to the JCS. Five days later, it fired a further barrage of projectiles, including two short-range missiles that flew 270 km and 420 km. Pyongyang showed off its version of the Iskander for the first time during a military parade in February 2018, but did not test-fire it until May. “Since its first launch in May, North Korea is believed to have improved the capabilities of the new weapon,” a military source said. (Yonhap, “N. Korea’s ‘New’ Missile Similar to Russian Iskander: JCS,” July 26, 2019)
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, guided the power demonstration fire of a new-type tactical guided weapon Thursday. Supreme Leader of the Party, state and armed forces Kim Jong Un personally organized and guided the fire of the new-type tactical guided weapon as part of the power demonstration to send a solemn warning to the south Korean military warmongers who are running high fever in their moves to introduce the ultramodern offensive weapons into south Korea and hold military exercise in defiance of the repeated warnings from the DPRK. Watching the preparatory processes for launch at the fire position together with leading officials in the field of the national defense science, he learned in detail about the operating mode of the guided weapon system to be newly deployed for operation. Then he mounted the observation post and guided the power demonstration fire. The power demonstration fire gave satisfactory verification once again to the efficiency indicators of the system. And it must have given uneasiness and agony to some targeted forces enough as it intended. Carefully watching the overall process of the fire, he said that today we could understand better the superiority and perfection of the new-type tactical guided weapon system. Saying that he was gratified by the direct confirmation and conviction of the rapid anti-firepower capability of the tactical guided weapon system and the specific features of the low-altitude gliding and leaping flight orbit of the tactical guided missile, which would be hard to intercept, and its combat power, he noted that the fact about the development and possession of such state-of-the-art weaponry system is of huge eventful significance in developing our armed forces and guaranteeing the security of the country by military force. Explaining the accompanying officials and the leading officials in the field of the national defense science the annoying situation in the south of the Korean peninsula, he said that the ultra-modern weapons and equipment which the bellicose forces of the south Korean military are introducing with desperate efforts are definitely offensive weapons and their purpose is absolutely clear. He stressed it is a work of top priority and a must activity for the security of the country to steadily develop powerful physical means and conduct the tests for their deployment for neutralizing those weapons posing undeniable threats to the security of the country immediately and turning them to scrap iron at an early stage when it is considered necessary. He said that the south Korean authorities show such strange double-dealing behavior as acting a “handshake of peace” and fingering joint declaration and agreement and the like before the world people and, behind the scene, shipping ultra-modern offensive weapons and holding joint military exercises. He emphasized that we cannot but develop nonstop super powerful weapon systems to remove the potential and direct threats to the security of our country that exist in the south. Giving the leading officials in the field of the munitions industry and national defense science the direction of researches into important strategic and tactical weapon systems for continued development, he set forth methodological issues for further consolidating the nation’s capabilities for self-defense. He said that his advice to the south Korean chief executive to understand in time the danger the developments will possibly bring, stop such suicidal act as the introduction of ultra-modern weapons and military exercises and come back to the proper stand as in April and September last year is addressed to the south together with the news of the power demonstration fire. The south Korean chief executive should not make a mistake of ignoring the warning from Pyongyang, however offending it may be. The power demonstration fire was watched by officials of the Party Central Committee including Jo Yong Won, Ri Pyong Chol, Hong Yong Chil, Yu Jin, Kim Jong Sik and Ri Yong Sik.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Power Demonstration Fire of New-Type Tactical Guided Weapon,” July 26, 2019)
North Korea’s economy shrank in 2018 for a second straight year, and by the most in 21 years, as it was battered by international sanctions aimed at stopping its nuclear program and by drought, South Korea’s central bank said on Friday. North Korea’s gross domestic product contracted by 4.1% last year in real terms, the worst since 1997 and the second consecutive year of decline after a 3.5% fall in 2017, the South’s Bank of Korea estimated. “Sanctions that were added and strengthened in 2017 had a severe impact as drought hurt the farming sector, which accounts for more than 20% of output,” Park Yung-hwan, head of the Bank of Korea’s National Accounts Coordination Team, told reporters. North Korea’s international trade fell 48.4% in value in 2018 as toughened international sanctions cut exports by nearly 90%, the worst loss in exports since the central bank started publishing data nearly 30 years ago. Output in the mining sector shrank 17.8% because of sanctions on exports of coal and minerals, while the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sector contracted by 1.8% because of drought, it said. North Korea’s population was estimated at 25.13 million and annual income per head at $1,298, the South Korean central bank said. The troubles facing an economy already functioning badly because of inefficiencies and isolation, likely explain North Korea’s efforts to throw off sanctions in it negotiations with the United States. “The economy couldn’t but contract severely given the sanctions that North Korea is under,” said Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, a North Korea economy expert with the U.S.-based Stimson Center. “This suggests that there’s been a massive increase in domestic use of coal and minerals. This is such a crucial export commodity and now that very little of it is being sold abroad, as compared to normal years, domestic industry is probably getting financially doped by cheap energy at the moment given how much of production is still going on,” he said. (Choonsik Yoo, “North Korea’s Economy Tanks as Sanctions, Drought Bite: South Korea,” Reuters, July 25, 2019)
Van Diepen: “North Korea has conducted a total of three apparently successful flight tests of its two intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) but has observed a unilateral moratorium on long-range ballistic missile tests since early 2018. By the traditional missile development and deployment standards of the US, the Soviet Union/Russia, and even China, one or two tests of an ICBM (even if successful) would not establish sufficient confidence in effective wartime operation for deployment as part of the North’s highly critical nuclear deterrent. Rather, these countries have historically conducted from one dozen to three dozen tests of an ICBM system before deployment. The contrast between DPRK claims and these standards raises three key questions that this article will explore: Would North Korea really have deployed nuclear-armed ICBMs based on the current amount of flight testing? How reliable could such an ICBM force be, and what value could it provide? Does an ICBM flight-test moratorium or a future negotiated flight-test ban have value if North Korea has already deployed ICBMs? It is credible that North Korea would deploy nuclear-armed ICBMs based on the current amount of flight testing, given likely North Korean standards. Even so, preventing further flight tests has considerable security value for the US, in part because it will probably prevent the DPRK from improving current ICBM reliability appreciably over time. Steps to induce North Korea to continue its current moratorium, or formalize it as part of a negotiated agreement, therefore, should be a US priority. Despite having conducted so few ICBM launches (and only detonating six nuclear devices), on January 1, 2018, Kim Jong Un essentially claimed to have a deployed, nuclear-armed ICBM force: “The whole of its mainland is within the range of our nuclear strike and the nuclear button is on my office desk all the time; the United States needs to be clearly aware that this is not merely a threat but a reality.” This claim also is consistent with Kim’s April 2018 report to the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee that “…no nuclear test and intermediate-range and inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire are necessary for the DPRK now, given that the work for mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic rockets was finished…” Given that Kim is prone to hyperbole, what are we to make of these claims? It is credible that North Korea would deploy nuclear-armed ICBMs based on the current amount of flight testing. Western assessments of the history of North Korea’s missile program indicate that the DPRK has almost always deployed ballistic missiles after far fewer flight tests than other countries—and in two cases, perhaps with no flight tests: North Korea reportedly deployed its version of the Scud-B short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) in 1986 after some six flight tests (three successful). The Scud-C SRBM was reportedly deployed in 1992 after some two flight tests (both successful). The Nodong medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) was reportedly deployed in 1994-1995 after three flight tests (one successful). There are some reports that the Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) was deployed in the early 2000s, long before its first launch (a failure) in 2016. The missile ultimately was launched eight times, with only one success. The Toksa/KN-02 solid-propellant SRBM was reportedly deployed in 2006-2008, if not earlier, long before flight testing apparently began in 2013. (Since 2013, there have been 20 launches, all apparently successful.) Deployment also is consistent with open-source reports that the DPRK has been producing ICBMs, and building or improving missile bases suitable for ICBMs, since the last flight test. Despite the apparent successful flight tests to date, North Korea’s ICBMs currently are almost certainly not highly reliable. (For example, the missiles were only tested on steep trajectories rather than to full range.) But the DPRK probably regards these ICBMs as sufficiently reliable for the current purposes for which North Korea would be deploying them. At a minimum, Pyongyang would see the advantages to date in forgoing further flight testing as outweighing the limitations this places on its ICBM force. We do not know how reliable the DPRK thinks its ICBMs are; it probably does not really know given the current number of flight tests. One analyst assessed that it could not even be confident of a 50 percent success rate under these circumstances. But the North almost certainly gauges the current value and reliability of its ICBMs using North Korean standards, which probably are significantly lower than those of the US and USSR during the Cold War. This makes sense given the substantial differences in the DPRK’s historic flight testing and deployment practices and its circumstances. Pyongyang probably: Does not perceive a substantial risk of a “bolt from the blue” nuclear attack against itself under day-to-day circumstances; Believes a substantial increase in that risk would be preceded by an identifiable and relatively lengthy period of tension; and Is unlikely to be interested in nuclear warfighting or counterforce targeting during wartime, which demand more reliable ICBMs. We do not know the DPRK’s intended purposes for its ICBMs, how those purposes are affected by reliability, or how reliance on ICBMs with so few tests might affect its future crisis or wartime calculations. But such ICBMs do appear to have value in North Korea’s current situation: “Emergency” Use: ICBMs with a reliability “close enough for [DPRK] government work” would be available for use against large US metropolitan areas if Kim Jong Un believed in the future that his regime’s existence was at stake or confronted other dire circumstances. Neither the regime nor the US could be confident in how many such ICBMs might detonate over their targets, but that might not matter for a regime facing extreme danger—and that might provide cold comfort for the US if even one or two ICBM strikes succeed. The DPRK is highly likely to see this as having significant military utility. Deterrence: This capability for use means that the US must take into account the possibility of being struck by nuclear-armed ICBMs. History suggests that the possibility of incurring nuclear strikes has an inhibiting effect in countries’ calculations. North Korea, which for some 65 years has had to try to deter without any nuclear capability against the US homeland, almost certainly perceives even a limited such capability as worthwhile. Prestige: Kim Jong Un has repeatedly indicated that he views the ICBM program as a source of domestic and international prestige. The North probably has already obtained much of the prestige it can gain from its ICBM force via successful flight tests, exposures to the media, and indications of deployment. Further bolstering the reliability of the ICBM force probably would not add that much more. Diplomacy: North Korea almost certainly views a deployed ICBM force as a fait accompli bolstering its claim for recognition as a “nuclear power,” raising the price it can charge in talks with the US, and increasing the attractiveness to Washington of partial solutions (e.g., ICBM testing or deployment freezes) that would leave the North possessing some nuclear weapons. An ICBM threat to the US homeland also raises Japanese and South Korean concerns about US extended deterrence that North Korea probably relishes being able to exploit. A Basis for Further Flight Testing: The DPRK still can improve ICBM reliability at any time by resuming flight tests, whether by breaking a unilateral pledge or breaking out of any future agreement. The North also can manipulate the threat of resuming or the resumption of flight tests for political purposes, as it has often done in the past (and did again on July 16, 2019).A halt to further ICBM flight tests has considerable security value for the US, even if North Korea has deployed ICBMs based only on a few flight tests. First and foremost, it would presumably reduce the likelihood of ICBM use against the US. The DPRK almost certainly understands that its current ICBM force is not as reliable/effective as it would be if at least a few more flight tests were conducted. Having an ICBM force of its current reliability presumably would incline the DPRK to limit the kinds of provocations and non-retaliatory military operations it chose to initiate compared to having a much more reliable ICBM force. The consequences of ICBM use against the US would also be reduced. If the DPRK did launch its current ICBMs, probably fewer than half would reach the United States. This, in turn, would reduce the number of warheads that would come within range of US missile defenses, increasing the defense’s likely success despite the limit to its effectiveness. In addition, some warheads that made it through the boost phase and US missile defenses probably would not detonate—a proportion that would likely be higher given the North’s limited full-range ICBM testing and nuclear testing to date. Clearly, more DPRK ICBM warheads would be likely to reach US targets and detonate if ICBM testing resumed (and presumably even more if nuclear testing also resumed). Finally, a lack of flight testing will probably prevent the DPRK from improving current ICBM reliability appreciably over time. (We do not know the North’s own assessment on this.) The North can, however, use three broad methods other than flight testing to contribute substantially to maintaining the current level of reliability, or at least in slowing degradation: Static Rocket Testing: Running rocket engines in ground-based test stands contributes importantly to development and successful series production—and in promoting smooth engine operation, a major contributor to ICBM reliability. Static tests would be critical in maintaining reliability, but would not provide a complete solution given the differences from actual flight conditions and the contribution of other ICBM subsystems to overall system reliability. Other Non-Flight Testing: Some limitations of static testing can be addressed by operating other ICBM subsystems (such as guidance and thrust vector control) using simulated inputs from other portions of the ICBM. Even entire ICBMs can undergo such “hardware-in-the-loop” tests. Key ICBM subsystems and components also can be tested in ground facilities that try to duplicate the kinds of temperatures and vibrations they would experience in flight (“shake and bake”). We do not know how many such test capabilities the DPRK has, or how good they are. Regardless, these methods still leave considerable gaps in assessing the full-up ICBM system over the entire regime of operational use. Computer Simulation: Using computers to run ICBM system software under various circumstances, test hardware/software interfaces and test interactions between different missile subsystems all can help, along with the other two methods, to maintain the reliability of an ICBM. It is unclear how capable North Korea is in this area, but its efforts would be significantly limited by the relatively small number of real-world missile tests it has conducted, which provide the underlying basis for effective computer simulations. (North Korea has conducted some 120 of these tests compared to many hundreds for the US or Russia.) It is credible that North Korea would deploy nuclear-armed ICBMs based on the current amount of flight testing. Although such missiles are almost certainly not highly reliable, the DPRK (based on North Korean standards) probably regards them as sufficiently reliable for their current purposes. Preventing further flight tests has considerable security value for the US, even if it has not prevented North Korea from deploying ICBMs, in part because it will probably prevent the DPRK from improving current ICBM reliability appreciably over time.” (Vann H. Van Diepen, “Reliability Is in the Eye of the Beholder: The Value of North Korea’s Freeze on Further Flight Testing,” 38 North, July 25, 2019)
7/26/19:
President Donald Trump said he is not upset by North Korea’s ballistic missile launches earlier this week, signaling a commitment to continuing nuclear talks with the regime. Trump’s remarks came after North Korea test-fired two short-range ballistic missiles in the first such provocation since early May. Asked by reporters if he was upset, Trump said, “Nope, not at all.” “They’re short-range missiles and my relationship is very good with Chairman Kim,” he said at the White House, referring to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. “We’ll see what happens, but they are short-range missiles and many people have those missiles.” “He didn’t say warning to the United States,” Trump said, referring to Kim. “But they have their disputes. The two of them have their disputes. They’ve had them for a long time. But he didn’t say that. But they are short-range missiles, and very standard missiles.” U.N. Security Council resolutions ban North Korea from launching ballistic missiles. But after the previous launches in May, Trump said he was “personally” not bothered by them. He also said in response to National Security Adviser John Bolton’s remarks that they were a violation of the resolutions that he views them “differently.” On the latest launches, Trump told Fox News in an interview yesterday that North Korea hasn’t tested missiles other than “smaller ones, which is something that lots test.” He also warned that although the two countries have been doing “very well,” that “doesn’t mean that’s going to continue.” (Lee Haye-ah, “Trump Says He Is Not Upset by N.K. Missile Launch,” Yonhap, July 26, 2019)
Nearly a month after President Trump became the first sitting U.S. president to walk on North Korean soil, the euphoria from his meeting with Kim Jong Un faded this week as North Korea fired off two short-range ballistic missiles, unveiled a high-tech submarine and rejected foreign food aid for millions of its impoverished citizens. The primary accomplishment of Trump’s June 30 visit to the Korean border was an agreement to relaunch working-level talks in “two or three weeks,” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said at the time. State Department officials had hoped to begin the talks, led by special envoy Steve Biegun, as early as next week, but North Korea’s missile launches are likely to delay those meetings, said a senior U.S. official. U.S. officials say they think North Korea is particularly incensed about South Korea’s acquisition of the F-35 fighter jet, which has stealth capabilities that would challenge the North’s radar systems. Today, North Korea issued a statement saying its missile test was a “solemn warning” to “South Korean military warmongers” for their plans to hold military exercises with the United States in August and introduce “ultra modern offensive weapons,” a probable reference to the F-35. Trump officials played down the launches and said they are continuing to pursue a diplomatic solution. “They really haven’t tested missiles other than, you know, smaller ones, which is something that lots [of countries] test,” Trump told Sean Hannity of Fox News yesterday. Pompeo, meanwhile, also minimized the significance of the regime’s display of Kim inspecting a submarine potentially capable of launching nuclear weapons. “I went to a defense facility,” Pompeo told Fox News yesterday. “We all go look at our militaries, and we all take pictures of them.” North Korea’s pressure campaign began after it alleged that the United States broke an agreement made during the DMZ meeting to halt military exercises with South Korea. “Less than a month now since the DPRK-U.S. summit meeting in Panmunjom, the U.S. is going to resume joint military exercise which it directly committed to suspend at the highest level,” the North said in a statement published by KCNA this month. U.S. officials denied that Trump promised to do away with the exercises completely after already sharply reducing their scope and size as part of the agreement reached in Singapore. “I think we’re doing exactly what President Trump promised Chairman Kim we would do with respect to those exercises,” Pompeo said last week. The only U.S. officials in the room during that meeting, besides interpreters, were Trump and Pompeo. Some U.S. officials say North Korea’s complaints about the exercises are part of a familiar strategy to wring concessions out of the United States ahead of talks. “Everybody tries to get ready for negotiations and create leverage and create risk for the other side,” Pompeo told Bloomberg TV. Other officials said North Korea may be trying to pressure Seoul into breaking with Washington on key issues, such as the size of future military exercises and Kim’s offer to dismantle only the Yongbyon nuclear facility in exchange for substantial sanctions relief. Analysts said it was impossible to know for certain. “North Korea typically has several objectives with every action and statement,” said Duyeon Kim, a Korea expert at the Center for a New American Security. “It seems Pyongyang is trying to enter negotiations from a position of strength, cancel or further shrink U.S.-South Korean drills and establish a pretext to later blame Washington if Pyongyang decides to eventually walk away from diplomacy.” Victor Cha, a Korea expert whom the Trump administration considered to become the U.S. ambassador in Seoul, said that the various theories “are not necessarily inconsistent with each other” and that Pyongyang could be working multiple angles at the same time. The North Korean people, however, could lose out with this strategy. The North’s latest moves have included a decision to reject South Korea’s offer of food aid, including 50,000 tons of domestic rice, said officials familiar with the decision. James Belgrave, a spokesman for the U.N. World Food Program, said the aid is badly needed, given estimates that 10.1 million people are experiencing food shortages in North Korea and that 1 in 5 children have stunted growth caused by malnutrition. “It’s definitely worse than it has been in the last few years,” said Belgrave, who routinely travels to the isolated country. The North’s behavior has chipped away at some of the optimism that followed Trump’s surprise meeting with Kim at the DMZ, where the two leaders shook hands and promised to renew efforts to denuclearize one of the world’s most militarized areas. U.S. officials expressed enthusiasm for Kim’s decision to change his negotiating team, tapping the Foreign Ministry instead of his top intelligence aides, hardened military hawks whom U.S. officials viewed as arrogant and inscrutable. Now that the Foreign Ministry is in charge of the talks, communication has increased between U.S. officials and North Koreans at Pyongyang’s diplomatic mission at the United Nations, otherwise known as the “New York Channel.” Previous discussions occurred via an intelligence channel run through the CIA. But analysts have said the quality of the communication between the two sides is more important than its frequency. Still, Trump appears to be willing to tolerate North Korea’s provocations in the hope that working-level talks can get the two sides closer to a denuclearization deal. “We want to have diplomatic engagement with the North Koreans,” State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus told reporters yesterday. “We urge no more provocations.” (John Hudson, “N. Korean Saber-Rattling Dims Euphoria of Trump’s Historic DMZ Meeting,” Washington Post, July 27, 2019, p. A-8)
7/27/19:
A U.S. citizen imprisoned in North Korea between 2016 and 2018 this month told NK News he had used his access in the country to collect sensitive information for American and South Korean spy agencies. Speaking in his first extended interview with an English-language outlet since his release last year, Kim Dong-chul said he began spying in 2009 and had been recruited due to his unique position as a businessman working in the Rason Special Economic Zone (SEZ). Kim confessed to espionage at a press conference held following his arrest in March 2016, in a statement in which he said he had worked for South Korea’s National Intelligence Agency (NIS) in procuring sensitive information about goings-on in the country. North Korean media later reported he had been apprehended “perpetrating the state subversive plots and espionage against the DPRK.” Now free, he told NK News that the confession was largely truthful, and that he had also worked with the U.S.’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to procure “very significant” information on issues of interest to American intelligence. “I filmed footage with a watch [equipped with a camera] and used electromagnetic wave wiretapping equipment,” he said in an in-depth interview in the South Korean capital earlier in the month, adding that he was asked to work as an “antenna” in the country. “I became a traitor overnight and was locked up in a forced labor camp. I hit rock bottom.” Following his arrest in October 2015, Kim told NK News, he was subject to beating and other forms of torture — abuse that forced him to give up names of his local double agents and that has left some of his body paralyzed. “I was subjected to water torture eight times,” he said. “And I tried a few times to take my own life. But I could not die.” The position also saw him recruit local double agents across the DPRK, Kim told NK News. U.S. intelligence, in particular, had asked him to provide detailed information on the North Korean military and nuclear program. “The CIA detected a suspicious vessel on the Rajin port through satellite imagery… and asked me to take very close-up photos of it and figured out what it was being used for… I delivered that information just before [my arrest],” he said. (Dagyum Ji and Oliver Hotham, “Former Detainee in North Korea Says He Spied for South Korean, U.S. Intelligence,” NKNews, July 29, 2019) Kim Dong-chul, an American businessman in Rason, a North Korean special economic zone near the border with Russia, was leaving a local government office on October 2, 2015, when he was stopped by a 34-year-old army veteran he had hired as a secret informant. “Chairman Kim, here is the information you wanted,” the man said, tossing a yellow envelope into Kim’s car, before rushing away. In the envelope were a computer memory stick, documents and photographs of a ship docked at a nearby port. Kim hadn’t gone several yards before his car was stopped again by an officer from the Ministry of State Security, the North’s infamous secret police. Kim knew he had just been set up, but it was too late. It was the beginning of a 31-month incarceration in North Korea that included torture, a conviction on espionage charges and forced labor in a prison camp. Mr. Kim was the longest-held American in North Korea when Secretary of State Mike Pompeo flew there in May last year. Pompeo returned home with Kim and two other American hostages, a triumphant moment for President Trump. Now, in a memoir entitled “Border Rider,” published in South Korea in June, Kim, 65, recounts how he became a decorated foreign investor in North Korea, then spied for the Central Intelligence Agency and South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, and ended up as Prisoner No. 429. “I try not to blame anyone for what happened to me. I am just lucky to come out of North Korea alive,” Kim said in an interview in the South Korean capital, Seoul. “But I am sorry for those six North Koreans who worked for me as spies and were executed.” Kim was born in Seoul in 1953. In 1980, his father, a civilian worker for the United States military in Seoul, urged him to emigrate to the United States, where Kim eventually became a Baptist pastor and also ran a cleaning business. In 2000, with his wife, an ethnic Korean from China, Kim moved to northeast China as a missionary. The following year, Kim applied for entry into North Korea, using his wife, who had relatives in the North Korean power elite, as a bridge. In 2002, Kim became a resident in Rason, where North Korea was eager to attract foreign investors. Kim poured his entire savings, $2.8 million, into building and operating the five-story, foreigners-only Tumangang Hotel. He quickly learned that to be successful, he had to win the trust of the party and military elites of the brutal totalitarian regime with regular cash donations. He forked over $400,000, a third of his hotel’s annual revenues, to the North Korean government, and partnered with military-run trading companies to help build their fisheries exports. He donated buildings for schools and hospitals. He received three government awards after supplying German-made massage machines, jade beds and other gifts for Kim Jong Il. “I had to do business with them to establish myself among them and realize my true and original goal of missionary work,” said Kim. “But I had a conflict with myself. I was walking the line between the two worlds.” As Kim built his connections as a rare resident American in North Korea, United States and South Korean intelligence agents began approaching him when he traveled to China and South Korea, Kim said. The agents provided him with spying equipment, like a camera hidden in a wrist watch and an eavesdropping device, as well as operational funds, he said. In return, they wanted information on the North’s nuclear and missile programs. Kim paid his informants and leveraged his access to the military elites to find and meet retired nuclear scientists and former and active-duty military officers who served in weapons facilities. “The more I learned about North Korea, the more I was confused and curious, wondering how on earth this kind of regime could ever survive,” Kim said. “I decided to do whatever it took to learn as much as I could, and eventually to share my knowledge with the intelligence officials, never thinking that it might come to this end.” The spying claims. Kim made in his book could not be independently confirmed. Neither the C.I.A. nor the South Korean intelligence agency responded to requests for comments. While he was held in North Korea, Kim, as other hostages often did, appeared in a government-arranged news conference and apologized for his anti-state crimes. But unlike other hostages who denied the statements after their release, saying they were coerced, Mr. Kim said the North Koreans’ findings on him were essentially true, although he also said they had tortured him to uncover his spying activities. Kim was interrogated for nearly seven months, first in Rason and then in a safe house in Pyongyang. His handlers made him kneel at a bathtub, with his hands tied behind his back, and pushed his head into the water. Kim said he passed out twice. Kim was sentenced to 10 years in prison and sent, blindfolded, to a labor camp outside Pyongyang on April 29, 2016. There, as Prisoner 429, he was forced to toil from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m., six days a week. In winter, guards made him dig holes in the frozen ground and then fill them. The prison menu never changed: brown rice, fermented-bean soup and three pieces of pickled turnip. Kim supplemented his diet with berries, roots and even grubs, a source of much-needed protein. “Many times, I wanted to kill myself,” he said. “But it was a place where you could not kill yourself even if you wanted to. How could you, when eight armed guards watched you 24 hours a day, taking turns?” The prison, a ramshackle nine-cell facility, had only two inmates: Kim and Lim Hyeon-soo, a Korean-Canadian missionary sentenced to hard labor for life in late 2015. Only once, when they ran into each other under tall corn stalks while the guards were not watching, could Kim and Lim talk to each other, whispering their names. Then in August 2017, Kim was ordered to clean Lim’s empty cell. A guard told him that Lim, Prisoner No. 36, had been released. “I was happy for him, but I felt as if I had lost an arm or leg,” Kim said. Unbeknown to him, help was on the way, too, for him, as United States officials negotiated to free him as part of their efforts to arrange the first summit meeting between Trump and Kim Jong-un in Singapore in June last year. But Kim had no idea what was happening when guards came to him the morning of May 9 last year and told him to change into his old civilian clothes. He was taken to Pyongyang, where he was ordered to write a statement of apology and escorted to a United States government plane. When he and two other Korean-American hostages, Kim Hak-song and Kim Sang-duk, went onboard, a cheer broke out inside the plane. And when the plane landed at Joint Base Andrews outside Washington early next morning, another surprise awaited: Trump came on board to welcome the hostages home. Until his release, Kim did not know Trump was the president of the United States. Kim and his wife have since resettled in New York, where one of their two daughters’ lives. Kim lost all his investment in North Korea when he was expelled. The torture left him with two crooked fingers, chronic back pain and a limp. The intelligence officials he once worked for have not contacted him since his release. His wife told him to “forget” and move on. Kim planned to publish the English and Japanese editions of his book to help the world better understand the country he said he “both loved and hated.” “It’s neither socialist nor communist,” he said when asked about North Korea. “It’s a country with the tightest dictatorial and slave system you can imagine.” (Choe Sang-hun, “How a U.S. Spy Became Prisoner No. 429 in North Korea,” New York Times, August 10, 2019, p. A-7)
7/29/19:
The United States Department of the Treasury sanctioned a Vietnam-based North Korean, Kim Su Il, who was identified by the Treasury as a member of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea and an employee of its affiliated Munitions Industry Department, which is involved in developing North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction. The MID is under sanctions by the United States and the United Nations Security Council, which found that the group is in charge of North Korea’s weapons research and production, including its ballistic missile program. The MID also oversees Pyongyang’s nuclear program. “Treasury continues to enforce existing sanctions against those who violate United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) and evade U.S. sanctions on North Korea’s unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs,” said Sigal Mandelker, Treasury undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, in a statement. “Kim Su Il has violated UNSCRs and supports North Korea’s weapons program.” Kim Su Il was assigned to Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, in 2016 to perform economic, trading, mining and shipping associated with the MID’s business activities, earning foreign currency for the North Korean regime, the Treasury Department said. (Thomas Maresca, “United States Sanctions North Korean with Ties to Weapons Program,” UPI, July 29, 2019)
7/31/19:
North Korea fired two short-range ballistic missiles off its east coast today, South Korea’s military said, the second such launch in less than a week. The first missile was launched at 5:06 a.m., and the second at 5:27 a.m., from the Kalma area in the North’s eastern port of Wonsan, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Both are estimated to have flown about 250 kilometers at an approximate altitude of 30 km, the JCS said, adding that the South Korean and U.S. militaries are analyzing more details. “Successive missile launches by North Korea are not conducive to efforts to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and we call for a halt to these acts,” the JCS said in a statement. A JCS official told reporters that Wednesday’s missiles were fired from a transporter erector launcher (TEL), as was the case with the launches last week, adding that the launches appear to be a test of the weapons, given their relatively low altitude. He added that the missiles appear to be similar to those launched last week, though the military is analyzing data related to the pattern of their flight. South Korea held a National Security Council (NSC) meeting and expressed “strong” concerns over the launches, urging Pyongyang to stop acts that could heighten tensions and hamper efforts to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula. Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha also said that North Korea’s latest missile firings are not helpful in easing military tensions or in keeping the momentum for denuclearization talks. Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo earlier said that North Korea should be regarded as an “enemy” if it carries out provocations that threaten South Korea. “North Korea’s regime and military are of course included in the concept of an enemy if they threaten and provoke us,” he told a forum held earlier in the day in Seoul. It was the strongest expression he has used to describe the North since taking office last year. The United States responded cautiously. “We are aware of reports of a missile launch from North Korea, and we will continue to monitor the situation,” a State Department spokesperson told Yonhap. The North has also renewed its commitment to talks. According to U.S. news reports, North Korean and U.S. officials held a secret meeting at the truce village of Panmunjom last week, where the North Koreans expressed a willingness to resume working-level nuclear talks very soon. (Koh Byung-joon and Lee Haye-ah, “N. Korea Fires 2 Short-Range Missiles off East Coast,” Yonhap, July 31, 2019)
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, guided a test-fire of newly-developed large-caliber multiple launch guided rocket system on July 31. He was accompanied by Jo Yong Won, Ri Pyong Chol, Yu Jin, Kim Jong Sik and Pak Jong Chon. He was greeted on the spot by Jang Chang Ha, Jon Il Ho and other senior officials in the field of national defense science. The officials, scientists and technicians were filled with great pride and excitement for having developed and making the first test-fire of the new-type guided ordnance rocket, which will play a main role in ground military operations, in a short span of time according to the strategic policy of artillery modernization for the building of armed forces set forth at the Seventh Congress of the WPK. Being briefed on the system, Kim Jong Un, Supreme Leader of the Party, state and armed forces of the DPRK, learnt in detail about its development. The test-fire took place in his presence. The test-fire scientifically confirmed that the tactical data and technical characteristics of the new-type large-caliber guided ordnance rocket reached the numerical values of its design, and verified the combat effectiveness of the overall system. After learning about the result of the test-fire, he said that it is very great and it would be an inescapable distress to the forces becoming a fat target of the weapon. He repeatedly expressed satisfaction over the result of the test-fire and highly appreciated the feats of the working class in the fields of national defense science and munitions industry who has made another wonderful Korean-style multiple launch rocket system of great strategic significance conducive to considerably boosting the combat capability of the People’s Army.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of New-Type Large-Caliber Multiple Launch Guided Rocket System,” August 1, 2019)
National Security Adviser John Bolton said today that the United States is ready to resume denuclearization talks with North Korea, including another summit at the right time. Bolton made the remarks on Fox Business. “We’ve been waiting to hear since June the 30th,” Bolton said. “We’re ready for working-level negotiations. President’s ready when the time is right for another summit. Let’s hear from North Korea.” Bolton emphasized that Trump is committed to helping the North develop its economy if it abandons its nuclear program. “He’s held the door open for Kim Jong-un,” the adviser said. “He’s shown him the brighter and different future North Korea would have if they would make the strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons.” Asked what Trump considers to be the biggest threat to the U.S., Bolton cited the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, saying that is why the president focuses on North Korea and Iran. (Yonhap, “Bolton Says U.S. Ready to Talk to N. Korea,” Korea Herald, August 2, 2019)
Bolton: “Trump remained focused on Kim Jong Un, despite his repeated missile launches and the feud between our two main East Asia allies. On August 1, Trump tweeted three messages:
Kim Jong Un and North Korea tested 3 short range missiles over the last number of days. These missiles tests are not a violation of our signed Singapore agreement, nor was there discussion of short range missiles when we shook hands. There may be a United Nations violation, but … Chairman Kim does not want to disappoint me with a violation of trust, there is far too much for North Korea to gain — the potential as a Country, under Kim Jong Un’s leadership, is unlimited. Also, there is far too much to lose. I may be wrong, but I believe that … Chairman Kim has a great and beautiful vision for his country, and only the United States, with me as President, can make that vision come true. He will do the right thing because he is far too smart not to, and he does not want to disappoint his friend, President Trump!
That was our North Korea policy.” (Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, p. 317)
8/2/19:
North Korea fired unidentified short-range projectiles off its east coast today, South Korea’s military said, the third such launch in about a week. The projectiles were fired at 2:59 a.m. and 3:23 a.m. from Yonghung, South Hamgyong Province, into the East Sea, and both of them flew around 220 kilometers at an approximate altitude of 25 km, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said. The projectiles, which flew at a top speed of Mach 6.9, appear to be a new type of short-range ballistic missiles, but more analysis is needed, the presidential office Cheong Wa Dae said. “We are monitoring the situation in case of additional launches and maintaining a readiness posture,” the JCS said. In Washington, a senior U.S. official said he is aware of the North’s latest launches. “We are aware of public reports of additional missile launches from North Korea today,” the official told Yonhap News Agency. “We continue to monitor the situation and are consulting closely with our South Korean and Japanese allies. “Friday’s launches came just two days after the North fired two projectiles that it claimed was from a new multiple launch rocket system. “What North Korea fired today showed flight patterns similar to those launched on Wednesday, and the South Korean and the U.S. intelligence authorities see them as short-range ballistic missiles, given their trajectories and flight speed,” a Seoul military officer said. Russia’s Iskander, in general, moves at a speed of around Mach 6 and 7, while the North’s 300-mm multiple rocket launcher system shows a far slower speed of about Mach 4, the officer said, adding that South Korea and the U.S. are looking into what North Korea claimed and the photos it released to exactly identify the type of weapons it launched this week. The allies plan to stage a command post exercise starting on August 5 for about five days. They then are scheduled to hold joint sessions for about 10 days aimed at testing South Korea’s operational capabilities for the envisioned transfer of the wartime operational control from Washington to Seoul, the sources said. At the White House, President Donald Trump insisted he had no problem with the launches because there had been no agreement with North Korea on short-range missiles. Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un had agreed during their inter-Korean border meeting on June 30 to resume working-level talks on denuclearizing the regime. “I think it’s very much under control,” he told reporters. Asked if he can still continue denuclearization talks with Kim, Trump said, “Oh, sure, because these are short-range missiles.” “We never discussed that. We discussed nuclear. What we talked about is nuclear,” he said. (Lee Haye-ah and Oh Seok-min, “N. Korea Fires 2 Unidentified Projectiles: JCS,” Yonhap, August 2, 2019)
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, guided again the test-fire of newly-developed large-caliber multiple launch guided rocket system early in the Friday morning. The test-fire was aimed to examine the altitude control flight performance, track control capability and rate of hits of the large-caliber multiple launch guided ordnance rocket. Together with Supreme Leader of the Party, state and armed forces of the DPRK Kim Jong Un, senior officials of the Party Central Committee including Ri Pyong Chol, Yu Jin, Kim Jong Sik and leading officials of the field of national defense science including Jang Chang Ha and Jon Il Ho guided the test-fire. At the fire position Kim Jong Un measured the time of combat deployment of gun carriage and learned in detail about the operation mode of the large-caliber multiple launch guided rocket system before guiding the test-fire at the observation post. The test-fire satisfactorily confirmed the altitude control level flight performance, track changing capability, accuracy of hitting a target and warhead explosion power of the guided ordnance rocket. The Supreme Leader expressed great satisfaction over the result of the test-fire, saying that another Juche-oriented weapon planned and so desired by the Party has been made. He highly appreciated the efforts of leading officials, scientists, technicians and workers in the field of national defense science.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Again Test-Fire of New-Type Large-Caliber Multiple Launch Guided Rocket System,” August 3, 2019)
DPRK FoMin spokesperson’s statement: “On Thursday [August 1] the United Nations Security Council, instigated by Britain, France and Germany, held a closed-door meeting at which it termed the DPRK’s measures for arms modernization the “violation of resolutions.” The DPRK has never recognized UNSC “resolutions” against it and will not recognize them in the future, too as they were illegally fabricated by the UN to its taste. It is an insult, disregard and grave provocation against the DPRK to cook up such “resolutions” that the relevant party does not recognize and to say this or that over a matter related with the sovereignty of a sovereign state. Any projectile has a curved trajectory, not straight one owing to earth gravity. But the UNSC took issue with the DPRK over the firing based on ballistic technology, not the range of the projectile, which means that the DPRK should give up its right to self-defense. The DPRK has not concluded with any country an agreement on limitation of the range of missile and other projectiles and is not bound by any relevant international law. The DPRK’s decision to suspend nuclear test and test-fire of ICBM is an expression of goodwill and consideration for dialogue partner. It is by no means part of acts to recognize and abide by the absurd UNSC “resolutions” against the DPRK. Considerate of the universal expectations of the international community for peace and stability of the Korean peninsula, the DPRK has shown maximum patience of suspending nuclear test and ICBM test-fire for more than twenty months. However, the UNSC is getting on the nerves of the DPRK by groundlessly slandering its conventional weaponry development while turning blind eyes to the war exercises in south Korea and shipment of cutting-edge attack weapons into it. This makes us run out of patience and feel angry with the UN. What’s more ridiculous is that Britain, France and Germany were so meddlesome as to convene a meeting against the DPRK and issue a “joint statement.” We will never allow anyone to try to flout the sovereignty of the DPRK and its right to self-defense, but will settle accounts with them. Those countries that took the lead in convening the UNSC closed-door meeting should properly reflect on their reckless behavior of poking their nose into other’s internal affairs. Britain, France and Germany should realize before it is too late that their recent stupid words and deeds would act as a catalyst for worsening the situation of the Korean peninsula, far from easing tensions. They should no longer make themselves the laughing stock by hosting such a meeting.” (KCNA: “Spokesperson for DPRK Blames UNSC Closed Door Meeting,” August 2, 2019)
Senior DoS Official: “SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: The last two days build on what began last year, which is the launch of a strategic engagement with the region under the heading of the Indo-Pacific strategy. And over the past year, we’ve seen significant advances in complementary moves by other powers in the region, including Japan, India, Australia, but more importantly, among Southeast Asian states, an awareness of the importance of working more aggressively towards regional development, economic integration, and a common position on the key security questions of the day, to include transparent negotiations on a code of conduct for the South China Seas, and an emphasis on diversification and balancing of economic ties and awareness of the danger of embracing China too closely. The discussions that took place over the two days reflected that evolution, with a keen awareness of the importance of keeping the forward momentum going. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: [Senior State Department Official Three], do you have anything to add? No. Okay. Jump in. … Q: Are you hopeful they can de-escalate things before they get out of control? I mean, the South Koreans are talking about ending this intel cooperation agreement and — SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL THREE: Well, clearly that’s the message to them is, as this relationship comes apart — that’s probably overstated — U.S. interests are at stake as well, right, U.S. security interests. … The united front in this case has worked very well, and if it comes apart it will certainly make it more difficult for us to encourage the North Koreans to do — at least to complete what they signed up to do. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Do you want to add anything? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL FOUR: I’d just say that while the current tensions have been described accurately, this doesn’t apply to every dimension of U.S. cooperation with Japan and South Korea. In fact, cooperation on North Korea is uninterrupted and has been unaffected by tensions in other parts of the relationships, demonstrating that both countries, when they see their national interests coinciding, they’re still capable of working together. And we think that’s a very important sign of, hopefully, that we’ve reached the bottom on this. But specifically in regard to North Korea, there is complete openness to work together, as demonstrated this weekend, this week during their meetings with the U.S. on the topic. Q: I’ll shut up after this, but so did they tell you affirmatively in the trilat today that their work on North Korea is not going to be affected by this other thing? And then two, what happened? You guys were — I don’t want to say begging, but you made it very clear that you were open to a meeting with the North Koreans here, and then they didn’t show up. And so is -do you take that as a snub? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL FOUR: So in regard to cooperation on North Korea, the Japanese and South Korean diplomats met with the U.S. special representative today, and it was clear from the course of those discussions that the cooperation between the three parties is going to be uninterrupted by tensions in other parts of the relationship. There’s too much at stake, and all three parties know this. In regards to the non-appearance of the North Koreans at the ASEAN Regional Forum, I think that it was a surprise to the hosts. It was noticed by virtually all the delegations that — with which the United States met. That didn’t keep North Korea from being a major topic of discussion between the special representative and his counterparts and between the Secretary and his counterparts. If anything, the absence of North Korea allowed for a more open and candid discussion on how to achieve the goals of diplomacy that President Trump has laid out. And the missile tests, the two rounds of missile tests that happened during the course of this three-day meeting, actually seemed to have galvanized cooperation in that regard. So not just with countries like Japan and South Korea, who are longstanding allies of the United States, but even in discussions with the Chinese and with the Russians it’s clear that there is strong alignment still, 14 months after we began this process at the summit in Singapore. And it was unfortunate that the North Koreans missed this opportunity, but it probably hurt their own interests. Q: Even if they didn’t appear, is the U.S. still in contact with North Korea? Are you hearing from them? How do you analyze all these missile launches in the past few weeks? Where do you think we are right now with North Korea? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL FOUR: So there is ongoing communications with the North Koreans on a regular basis. While we would like to be further along in restarting working-level negotiations, we are in regular contact with the North Koreans. And I think it’s fair to say that the President and the Secretary of State are expecting that we will be resuming those negotiations relatively soon. We don’t have a time and a location set yet. The unwillingness of the North Koreans to do that in the timeframe that they laid out at the President’s meeting in Panmunjom a month ago was noticed and is not a positive or constructive response by them. But we remain — we expect still that they will resume in working-level negotiations with our special representative, and we’re prepared to do so when they’re ready. Q: And the missile launch are constructive or positive message? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL FOUR: Yeah, obviously, any kind of provocations are unwelcome in this environment, and those provocations, paired with a failure to follow through on their own commitments to reengage in diplomacy, were noticed by virtually every country attending this summit meeting over the last three days. It was a subject of virtually every discussion, and there is a common view that this is a huge mistake and a self-inflicted damage on their own part. And that view isn’t just the view of the United States of America. It’s the view of our Asian allies, even countries with whom we don’t necessarily cooperate on as many matters, like China and Russia. There’s a unified view, a unified message going to the North Koreans, that they need to cease the provocations, reengage in diplomacy to achieve complete denuclearization. … And I think that message is just as strong today, if not stronger, than it was before the Secretary arrived here. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I think in the ministerial today, almost every single country at some point in the remarks — … Q: But just one thing. The President said it’s not a problem, the missile launches. You said it’s a huge mistake and a provocation. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL FOUR: Our goal is — Q: … Or not showing up. SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL FOUR: Yeah. Our goal is the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea. The missile launches, any kind of provocations, are not helpful to advancing the cause of diplomacy, but we are prepared to engage with the North Koreans to achieve the strategic goal that we and virtually every other country that’s present this week here at the ASEAN events is sharing. … SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Let’s get Tracy in. Q: Yeah, just a couple of things. You said that even China believe that — … .And then — and you say there is communication going on. At what level? They have yet to not — to name a team, right? Is that not true? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL FOUR: So on your first question, the — I had an opportunity to — my — excuse me. The Chinese special representative for North Korea is not at this meeting. Because of the way they divide up the portfolio in the foreign ministry, ASEAN summits are actually the responsibility of international organizations entity inside the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and not the Asia portfolio. But the U.S. special representative did have an opportunity to speak by phone during the course of these three days to coordinate more closely with his Chinese counterpart. This is not the first time that they’ve talked. It’s been an ongoing conversation. This is a relatively new person in the ministry replacing a long-time diplomat who’s now moved on to a different post inside the ministry.
Foreign Minster Wang and Secretary Pompeo discussed a broad set of issues during their bilateral meeting, but noteworthy in that was despite several areas of tension and disagreement in the U.S.-China relationship, areas that both sides need to continue to work on, there is one area that is clearly an exceptional case of cooperation between the United States and China, and that’s on North Korea. I am confident that the Chinese would confirm what I will tell you, that — which is that Secretary of State and Foreign Minister Wang had broad agreement on the necessary approach with North Korea and the objectives of our diplomacy. China’s not doing that as a favor for the United States. China’s doing that because it’s in their national interests just as much as it’s in the United States’ national interests. But it was a very good discussion between the Secretary and foreign minister on that issue, and it reaffirms our assumption that this will still be a foundation for cooperation between the United States and China going forward. Q: And the communication with North Korea? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL FOUR: Communication with North Korea happens — to some extent, it continues at the President’s level. You will have seen bits and snatches of some of the communications between the President and Chairman Kim in — even in the few weeks since the two leaders met for a brief meeting at Panmunjom village. But also that communication is happening at levels below the President, including the U.S. special representative and his team. And while we do not yet have a time and a location for the restart of working-level negotiations, it is a subject of discussion between the two sides, and the communications would suggest that both sides expect that to happen in the not too distant future. Q: But they don’t have a team yet? They haven’t (inaudible) as far as you know, as far as it is known? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL FOUR: North Korea generally doesn’t publicize much about its internal decision-making. We know who we’re talking to, and we know — we’re very familiar with the people who are responsible for these issues inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in North Korea. They’ve worked with us for a very long time. We had an opportunity to spend quite a bit of time together in Panmunjom village while the two leaders were meeting with their foreign minister and Secretary of State. So I have — we have confidence that we know the people with whom we’ll be working, and we’re prepared to engage with them as soon as they’re ready. Q. (Inaudible) NHK. So have you ever talked about the standstill agreement with Japan and ROK? And what did the Secretary propose to these two countries at the ministerial?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL THREE: One of the — I’m learning this — one of the key elements in diplomacy is time. Situations that may look intractable currently, right now, as — over time, the situation and background changes, and the relative positions get closer and farther apart. So in any negotiation, time can be an enemy, but in general if there is a problem that we’re just not finding any solutions, generally it’s okay to wait before you take any hard decisions that may put you in a position where you cannot — force you into a position that you didn’t want to be in. Again, not all — I don’t think the business world looks at time the same way. The military world doesn’t look at time the same way. But in diplomacy, time is an important thing, so given enough time, you can find some sort of a resolution to almost anything. So, yeah, there’s — Q: So you don’t deny that the standstill — so-called standstill agreement — SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL FOUR: There’s no such thing as a standstill agreement, so no, no. There’s — but, clearly, a little more time in this case would probably have been helpful so … . Q: Could you just tell us a little bit quickly just your sense of what these provocations actually mean. And is there a point where — I mean, how do you reconcile — sure, there’s still talks happening, but then you see provocations continuing to happen. How does that — how are you in your mind able to reconcile that? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL FOUR: There’s a long history of diplomacy between the international community and North Korea, between the United States and North Korea, and provocations have always been part of the playbook of the North Koreans — provocations and also efforts to feel and find the seams between the interests of other international parties. And one of the very reassuring things that the Secretary of State is leaving this three days in ASEAN with is that, in fact, those efforts are failing. The provocations only further galvanize the international community and its commitment to achieve the goals of complete denuclearization, and international unity is intact and, if anything, as strong as it’s been in a very long time. The close cooperation, consultation between the U.S. special representative and his counterparts in all the countries involved in ASEAN — Japan, South Korea, China, Russia — all continue to show close alignment, and the United States is prepared to work with all of its partners and allies and friends in achieving our shared goals. So whatever the goal is, we don’t know. We don’t know the strategy in Pyongyang. It’s theirs to decide, but it’s not working. Q: Was there anything that would change the posture from diplomatic to other means? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL FOUR: The President’s been very clear that he is committed to a diplomatic process to achieve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, along with complete denuclearization. The — of course there are provocations that would potentially result in more consequential response from the rest of the countries in the world. Other countries, the UN Security Council, have made perfectly clear that there are limits to what they’re willing to accept. But right now, the window’s open for diplomacy. The President is fully committed to that course. He’s directed the Secretary of State and his team to pursue it, and as we said a moment ago, that we’re expecting in the not too distant future we’ll be back — back in a sustained negotiating process with the North Koreans. Q: The missiles are being characterized as new missiles. Are you concerned that North Korea is just buying time while they make advances in their missile program? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL FOUR: We would certainly like to be farther along in our diplomacy in ending all of North Korea’s missile programs and weapons of mass destruction. That’s the goal of the United States. That’s what is clearly laid out in the UN Security Council resolutions, that all ballistic misses, all weapons of mass destruction needed to be — need — that North Korea needs to rid itself of all of them. That continues to be the view of the UN Security Council; it continues to be the view of the United States. And so whatever the strategy is — and we don’t know — we can’t read their minds — whatever it is, it’s not working. Q: So do you believe that time is on their side or our side? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL FOUR: We’re not in a hurry to get a bad deal. The door’s open for diplomacy. The North Koreans are under enormous pressure from international sanctions. Our goal is not to bring them to their knees. The goal of U.S. policy is to give the North Koreans a very clear choice for a brighter future for their country. President Trump is fully committed to that objective, fully committed to achieving that objective through diplomacy. So we’re not in a hurry to achieve this. The President has said that many times. And the door is open for diplomacy. Whatever the North Korean strategy today — it hasn’t worked for them. Q: If I can go back to the Japan and ROK. My name is Atsushi Takemoto with Kyodo News. Good to see you. I’m just wondering if you could talk a little bit about the GSOMIA issue. How much are you concerned of the probability of the South Korea Government eliminating GSOMIA? And how do you assess the impact of that? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL THREE: The — GSOMIA has come up in the conversation, but it’s much broader than that. It’s the relationship itself. Both depend on the other just as much as we depend on them to maintain security in northeast Asia. Individual parts of that cooperation — losing any one of those is important, and it downgrades our ability to defend each other. The attacks can happen on any of the three countries, which is why we — it’s in all of our interests, U.S., Japan, and Korea, to cooperate. The more cooperation the better. There’s no downside to cooperation. And the word from the White House and from U.S. Government all along has been let’s find a way — and it’s between Korea and Japan — find a way to resolve this issue. There is — there are — yes, it’s an emotional issue, certainly on the Korean Peninsula, but also for the Japanese side. But that’s what governments do, is they apply rationality and a long-term view to prevent these things from getting out of hand. So -Q: Did the Secretary during the trilateral share his views on Japan’s recent decision to remove South Korea from its list of preferential trade partners? Did he actually say whether he was disappointed in the decision? Did he take any kind of stand? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL THREE: Well — these meeting behind closed doors for a reason, because as we reveal these — your specific question, then it obviates options and you end up jamming yourself. So I’m not going to talk about exactly what was discussed. But the fact that we all were able to get in the same room together and express each other’s positions and identify the — where each other’s interests are was a key step to getting back together. The U.S. is very interested in this for reasons I described. It touches on the interests of all three. And so — Q: Did I hear you say that the U.S. definitely will not be a mediator in this dispute? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL THREE: There are arbitration and mediation caveats, codicils, in the 1965 agreement. I mean, the process — and there’s other international agreements and such like that. So the U.S. is involved, but there’s no upside to getting in the middle of this. There is no positive outcome to that. This is between Seoul and Tokyo. This is not the first time this has happened. The timing of this is unfortunate, and we need definitely to get past this soon. Certainly don’t need to take any further steps — any further steps need to rebuild the relationship vice take it apart. Q: Well, did you get the sense in the trilat that that was a possibility, or is this something that the foreign ministers can’t really — this is something that’s got to be done at the head-of-state, head-of-government level to calm things down? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL THREE: We were — we did not talk about specific further steps. Q: No, no, no, I know. But I mean, did you get a sense that there was any interest? I mean, it just seemed today like it was one thing after another. It was like, “Screw you,” “No, screw you,” “No, screw you.” And it was just like we were looking at the complete elimination of any relationship, friendly relationship by midnight tonight. Did you get a sense that that — SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: No, both sides are very interested in finding — to resolving this. So I mean, that’s obvious. Q: Well, yeah, but they’re interested in resolving it with the other side capitulating. So I mean, is there any — like — do you get a sense that there’s any attempt to find some kind of middle ground? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL THREE: I think so. I mean, if what you said was true, then we wouldn’t have had the meeting. Both sides would have just said, why — would stand off to the side and not be seen as even trying to resolve this. Q: Was there any reluctance to do the trilateral at all? SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL THREE: We had a meeting. I mean, I think that says it all. … ” (DoS, Background Briefing to the Traveling Press, Bangkok, August 2, 2019)
8/3/19:
Korea will remove Japan from its own list of trusted trade partners and impose tighter regulations on tourism and food imports, a response to Tokyo’s newest economic retaliations announced earlier Friday. Deputy Economic Prime Minister Hong Nam-ki announced Seoul’s countermeasures after Tokyo said it was dropping Korea from its so-called white list of 27 countries that enjoy minimum trade restrictions on strategic goods. Earlier Friday morning, the Japanese cabinet, convened by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, approved the delisting plan, and President Moon Jae-in hosted an emergency cabinet meeting later in the afternoon to decide on Korea’s counteractions. “We will make strong demands that the Japanese government recant the latest measure through various channels,” Hong said in a press conference. “We will also urge Japan to resume bilateral consultations. Although we will continue efforts for a diplomatic resolution, we will also delist Japan from our white list and take steps to tighten our export management,” Hong said. “Furthermore, we also plan to reinforce safeguard measures to protect the people’s safety, starting from tourism, food and waste imports.” At the cabinet meeting, Moon warned about eye-for-an-eye retaliations and condemned Japan for having the malicious intention to “attack and hurt our economy by impeding our future economic growth.” The president’s angry message was aired live, an unprecedented move intended to stress his determination. “The Korean government will resolutely take corresponding measures in response to Japan’s unjustifiable economic retaliatory measures,” Moon said in opening remarks at the cabinet meeting. “If Japan — even though it has great economic strength — attempts to harm our economy, the Korean government also has countermeasures with which to respond,” Moon said. “We will never overlook such circumstances where Japan, the instigator of these wrongs, is turning on us. We will step up our responses in a phased manner according to the measures taken by the Japanese government. As we have already warned, if Japan intentionally strikes at our economy, Japan itself will also have to bear significant damage,” Moon said. Moon made clear that Tokyo was responsible for the current situation. “No matter what pretexts are given, the Japanese government’s decision is undeniable trade retaliation against our Supreme Court’s rulings on Korean victims of forced labor during colonial rule,” Moon said. Korea and Japan share a bitter history, including Japan’s 1910-45 colonial rule. At the end of last year, the Supreme Court ruled that Japanese companies must pay compensation to individual Korean victims of wartime forced labor. While Tokyo insists that the matter was already settled in a 1965 bilateral claims agreement, the Moon administration has said it cannot intervene in a court ruling, citing separation of powers.
Moon said Korea is no longer the weak country it was in the past and is strong enough to withstand the crisis “There may be hardships in the immediate future. However, if we succumb to challenges, history will repeat itself,” Moon said. “If we take the current challenges as an opportunity instead and turn them into a chance to make a new economic leap, we can fully triumph over Japan. Our economy can surpass Japan’s. ”Korea does not want a “vicious cycle of tit-for-tat,” Moon said. “There is only one way to stop this. The Japanese government must withdraw its unilateral and unwarranted measures as soon as possible and take a path toward dialogue.” The Foreign Ministry summoned Japanese Ambassador to Korea Nagamine Yasumasa to condemn Japan’s newest economic retaliation. “Japan’s measure is an act of betraying a friendly, cooperative partner,” Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Sei-young told Nagamine. “Our people will no longer consider Japan as a friend.” Around 10 a.m. today, Abe hosted a cabinet meeting and approved a plan to remove Korea from its list of trusted trade partners, adding new export restrictions on the country. The decision was its second economic retaliation against Korea. Starting July 4, Tokyo imposed tighter export restrictions to Korea on three materials crucial for semiconductor and display manufacturing. Korea was one of 27 countries on Japan’s so-called “white list” that benefit from relaxed export rules for many strategic items, such as so-called “dual use” goods and technology that can be used for both civilian and military applications. “We will formally announce the change on August 7 and start implementing it on August 28,” said Seko after the cabinet meeting. According to the Korean government, 1,194 items are listed as strategic goods in Japan. Among them, 263 are highly sensitive items that require individual export approvals, while trade controls on the remaining non-sensitive items are less tight for countries on the white list. After the delisting takes effect, Korea will have to get individual approval for shipments of all dual-use goods including the non-sensitive items. Kim Hyun-chong, deputy national security adviser of the Blue House, issued perhaps the strongest message today. “Over the past decades, Korea and Japan shared values of liberal democracy and a market economy,” Kim said. “But Japan removed Korea from the white list, citing national security issues. This is an act of public humiliation against Korea.” Kim said it is extremely disappointing that Japan’s action is intended to hamper Korea’s future growth. “Taking into account the future relations of the two countries, I am truly worried,” he said. He said Korea had put all possible diplomatic effort into resolving the situation. According to Kim, Korea dispatched special envoys twice in July and the United States also proposed a so-called standstill agreement between Korea and Japan to stop escalating the tensions and find a diplomatic resolution, but to no avail. Pointing out that Korea has treated Japan as a trusted partner in its policy to reduce tensions between the two Koreas and in the region, Japan has actually obstructed the peace-building efforts, Kim said. “We must seriously think about what a normal country of peace and prosperity that Japan wants to become looks like,” he said. Kim mentioned the possibility that Korea may scrap the bilateral General Security of Military Information Agreement (Gsomia), perhaps the main symbol of trust between Korea and Japan. “The government will take comprehensive measures, such as considering whether it is right to maintain sensitive military intelligence sharing with a country that raised trust and national security issues with us,” Kim said. Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha condemned Japan at a regional forum attended by her Japanese counterpart, Taro Kono. She said Japan’s latest measure was done in a “very unilateral, arbitrary manner” at the foreign ministerial meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Korea, China and Japan in Bangkok. Kono immediately rejected her criticism. “I have not heard any complaints from our ASEAN friends about our export management measures,” he said. Later in the day, Kang, Kono and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo were scheduled to sit down for a trilateral meeting, but a top presidential aide was skeptical that U.S. mediation would end the diplomatic row. “We have to carefully think about why Japan took us off the white list, whether it has an economic purpose or a political purpose or both,” he said. “And taking that into account, we have to seriously consider how possible it will be for the United States to persuade Japan.” (Ser Myo-ja, “Moon Punches Back and Restricts Exports to Japan,” JoongAng Ilbo, August 3, 2019) Japan and South Korea are locked in their own bitter battle, whose roots stretch back over 100 years. The discord stems from Japan’s colonial occupation of the Korean Peninsula before and during World War II, and what, if anything, it still owes for abuses committed during that era, including forced labor and sexual slavery. The long-simmering conflict erupted into a full diplomatic crisis on August 2 when Japan threatened to slow down exports of materials essential to South Korean industries. By the next night, thousands of protesters marched in the streets of Seoul, accusing Japan of an “economic invasion” and threatening an intelligence-sharing agreement that the United States considers crucial to monitoring North Korea’s nuclear buildup. But despite the dangers of a deepening divide between its allies, the Trump administration has been reluctant to get involved to repair the rift. President Trump said he might take some action if asked by both parties, but added that trying to referee the dispute would be “like a full-time job.” And State Department officials had said they want the two countries to work it out on their own. Still, as tensions escalated in recent days, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo attempted on August 2 to orchestrate a reconciliation at an Asian security conference attended by regional foreign ministers. A photo from the conference showed Pompeo flinging his arms wide open to the foreign ministers of the two countries, appearing to invite them to come together. The two ministers stayed far apart, however, with Taro Kono, Japan’s foreign minister, grimacing, and South Korea’s, Kang Kyung-wha, turning away, stone-faced. It was a telling sign not just of the worsening relationship between the two allies, but perhaps more significantly, of America’s diminished leadership role in a region where the United States has often played the part of peacemaker among its allies. In the past, when tensions between the two nations flared, “the U.S. administration sent signals, sometimes privately, that this harms U.S. security interests,” said Michael J. Green, the senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council under President George W. Bush. “I think Pompeo sent that message, but it was late. It came very late from the administration.” “Trump has made it worse,” added Green, a professor at Georgetown. “He himself has done nothing to create a sense that there is a team of allies in Asia.” The latest pressure point between the countries is, on the surface, a trade spat. Japan on August 2 expanded controls over exports to South Korea of items ranging from ball bearings to precision machine tools. The trade action followed an earlier move tightening controls on exports of chemicals used to make advanced semiconductors and digital flat screens — some of the most important products to the South Korean economy. Seeming to wield trade as a political cudgel in the model of Trump, Japan cited unspecified national security concerns and suggested South Korea “mishandled” items that could be used for military purposes. In response, President Moon Jae-in of South Korea vowed “we will never again lose to Japan,” hearkening back to Japan’s colonial occupation. Government officials said South Korea was considering withdrawing from a vital intelligence-sharing deal that the two countries, which both host American military bases, signed in 2016 at Washington’s urging. But the current divide between South Korea and Japan is as much about their painful shared history as it is about trade. Tensions between Japan and South Korea have waxed and waned since Japan’s surrender in World War II brought the occupation to an end. Starting in the 1990s, relations began to warm as South Korea dropped its bans against Japanese videos and comic books. In 2002, the two countries were co-hosts of the World Cup in soccer. Tourists flow between the two countries and its companies are mutually dependent. Still, the wounds of the colonial era have never fully healed. South Koreans argue Japan has not sufficiently apologized for its wartime atrocities while the Japanese argue they have done enough, both legally and politically. Prospects for de-escalation seem bleak. In both countries, polls show public distrust of the other nation at their highest levels in decades. The toll of the dispute is also starting to go beyond the economic damage of the trade standoff. Last month, two South Korean men in their 70s set themselves afire in protest against Japan. Both died. Analysts criticized the two American allies for letting their dispute spin so far out of control. “It’s just insane that Japan and Korea are doing this to each other,” said David C. Kang, director of the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California. “They’re diverting so much energy to this. There are only so many things a government can do at one time.” Over the decades, South Korean leaders have invoked deeply rooted nationalistic sentiments against Japan. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s Liberal Democrats, has also stoked nationalist feelings in Japan with various actions, for example by proposing new language for school textbooks stating there is still a dispute about whether the Japanese Army played a direct role in forcing so-called comfort women from Korea and elsewhere to work as sex slaves for its soldiers. In the current global climate, it may be even easier for these long-existing nationalist sentiments to intensify. “You have an era where international leaders are much more fixated on themselves and their own political agendas and are not willing to step up and sacrifice anything for international leadership, especially here in the United States,” said Susan A. Thornton, the former acting assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific in the Trump administration and a senior fellow at Yale Law School. “Unfortunately,” Thornton added, “it seems to be having some kind of contagion effect.” An agreement in 2015, reached between the governments of Abe and Park Geun-hye, Moon’s impeached predecessor, was meant to settle one of the most searing disputes: how to acknowledge and compensate the Korean women who were forced to work in brothels for Japan’s military during World War II. At the time, the two leaders called the deal a “final and irreversible resolution.” But last November, the Moon government dissolved a foundation established under the settlement, inciting distress in Tokyo. A month earlier, South Korea’s Supreme Court ruled in the first of a series of cases awarding compensation from Japanese companies to victims conscripted as forced labor during Japan’s imperial expansion before and during World War II. Japan argues that the court ruling violates a 1965 treaty that established diplomatic relations between the two countries and provided $500 million in aid and loans to South Korea. The treaty describes all claims arising from the colonial era as “settled completely and finally,” wording that Japan has repeatedly highlighted when arguing the Supreme Court rulings are invalid. The two countries have tussled over various proposals to resolve the dispute, with both sides claiming the other has ignored requests for negotiations. Now both countries seize every opportunity to taunt the other. South Korea has canceled cultural exchanges, and consumers are boycotting Japanese beer and products from companies like Uniqlo. In Japan over the weekend, the governor of Aichi prefecture, an independent who won a recent election with the support of Abe’s governing party, decided to shut down an art exhibition that featured a statue meant to symbolize a Korean comfort woman, citing terrorist threats if the statue was not removed. The tiff has spilled into the military realm. Late last month, when a Russian patrol plane flew into airspace over a cluster of disputed islands that South Korea controls but Japan also claims, South Korea fired warning shots. Japan immediately said that it should have fired the shots, calling the islands “our territory.” Such incidents can unsettle American military planners, who depend on cooperation between the allies to contain North Korea and secure the region. Trump administration officials say they are particularly concerned about the possibility that Seoul will end the intelligence-sharing agreement that Japan and South Korea reached in 2016, a key element of military cooperation that helps the United States. That “would deal a blow to U.S. efforts to strengthen bilateral cooperation and deterrence on the Korean Peninsula,” said Bonnie S. Glaser, senior adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Experts say the two countries will have a tough time finding a face-saving resolution without outside help. But it is not clear that either Seoul or Tokyo want help from President Trump, who dismissed the recent North Korean missile tests as “no problem,” despite the fact that such missiles would pose a direct threat to both South Korea and Japan. A senior Trump administration official did make calls to both Japan and South Korea last week to recommend that each side freeze hostilities. South Korean officials promised to look into the proposal while Japan has denied any knowledge of it. Pompeo had been scheduled to have one-on-one meetings on August 2 with both Kono and Ms. Kang. But both meetings were canceled. Officials from all three countries said the meetings did not take place for scheduling reasons. But another motive may have scuppered the meetings: The Japanese and South Korean foreign ministers were said to be irked by Pompeo’s pressuring them to end their differences, prompting them to take the “unprecedented” step of canceling their meetings, according to Green, the former member of the National Security Council, who cited people briefed on the events. In Japan, where Prime Minister Abe has worked hard to cultivate a close relationship with President Trump, the government may not want to be perceived as a needy underling. “I don’t think it’s good for the two countries that we are always asking big brother or big sister to come in and try to improve our relations,” said Ichiro Fujisaki, a former Japanese ambassador to the United States. “The Americans would probably be very angry if we tried to go in and tell them to be a little nicer to Mexico.” Because of their historical experiences, South Koreans have always considered Japan as a rival to overcome, and they compare everything from the number of Olympic gold medals won to the number of Nobel Prize recipients. While South Koreans take pride in overtaking Japan in industries like shipbuilding and consumer electronics, the current trade dispute provides a painful reminder that the country’s export-driven economy still depends on chemicals and other high-tech materials from Japan. In Japan, Abe, a conservative nationalist, has also been pushing a more aggressive military posture. Given the high passions on display, analysts said they hoped both sides would step back from the brink, with the trade fight between two economic powerhouses possibly upsetting fragile economic relationships across the globe. “This trade dispute may on the surface look like a bilateral tit for tat,” said Wendy Cutler, a former United States trade negotiator. “But given the connected world and deep supply chains, the impact is quickly going to spill over into the region and the rest of the world.” Eventually, the export restrictions imposed by the Japanese government could jeopardize other markets for Japanese companies. President Moon said last week that his government will lessen South Korea’s dependence on Japanese technologies and materials by finding alternative sources for imports. “This is the typical trouble that is caused by nationalism and emotion against a potential enemy,” said Watanabe Tsuneo, a senior research fellow at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Tokyo. “We should be very careful to avoid unnecessary emotional conduct in state-to-state relations.” (Motoko Rich, Edward Wong, and Choe Sang-hun, “As Trade Conflict Worsens Japan-South Korea Relations, U.S. Takes a Step Back,” New York Times, August 5, 2019, p A-1)
Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper said that he was in favor of deploying ground-based missiles to Asia, a day after the United States formally pulled out of a Cold War-era arms treaty that directly limited such weapons. Esper, speaking to reporters on his way to Australia, said he would like to see the deployment within “months” but did not specify an exact timeline, the types of weapons the United States would deploy and where exactly they would be positioned. “These things tend to take longer than you expect,” Esper said. Such a move would be likely to anger China and North Korea, two countries that have long opposed the deployment of American military hardware anywhere near their borders, and would most likely prompt further consternation from allies that Washington was veering dangerously close to starting a new arms race. Esper was careful to say that the deployment of any American missiles to Asia would be “conventional” in nature and within “I.N.F. range.” His pledge to field shorter-range missiles to the region has not stopped the Pentagon from looking toward an I.N.F.-free future in which longer-range ground-based missiles might soon be tested and deployed. But Esper also expressed caution on Saturday over how long those types of weapons would take to reach the field. “I honestly can’t recall if it’s 18 months or longer, but my sense is it would likely take longer,” Esper said. “It’s fair to say, though, that we would like to deploy a capability sooner rather than later.” With China wielding an array of weapons capable of striking Taiwan, Japan, India and Guam, and the recent North Korean tests of short-range ballistic missiles that have been compared to Russia’s nuclear-tipped Iskander ballistic missile, experts say they believe that a new arms race may be on the horizon. One remaining bulwark against such a move is New START, a treaty between the United States and Russia that dictates the number of strategic weapons that can be deployed. But the agreement is unlikely to be renewed when it expires in less than two years. When asked about the fate of New START, Esper said that “we need to take a serious look at the treaty” and make sure that it is still within the United States’ interests. If the United States wants to avoid an arms race, Esper said, efforts should be made to incorporate other countries into the treaty. (Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Defense Secretary Favors Asia Missile Deployment,” New York Times, August 4, 2019, p. A-11)
8/5/19:
Seoul and Washington began annual joint military exercises, defying warnings from Pyongyang that the war games will jeopardize nuclear negotiations between the United States and North Korea. South Korean Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo told parliament that the joint exercise began today, adding that Seoul was “clearly maintaining its readiness posture against any military action by North Korea.” Details about the training have not been disclosed, but a ministry official in Seoul said this year’s exercise will include verifying South Korea’s abilities to take operational control in wartime. The August drills were scaled down earlier this year, Yonhap reported, and have not been named, with an official from Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) telling AFP that they “cannot comment any further” on their designation. South Korean media have dubbed the command post exercise “19-2 Dong Maeng”, indicating the second Dong Maeng exercise of 2019. (Claire Lee and Sunghee Hwang, “U.S., S. Korea Defy North’s Warnings, Start New Drills,” AFP, August 5, 2019)
In his longest letter, Kim expressed his disappointment that US-South Korea military exercises had not fully stopped despite Trump’s announcement that he would end them. Kim: “I’m delighted to receive each and every single picture you specifically chose from that day, which holds special meaning and will remain an eternal memory from that momentous and historic day. Those photographs now hang in my office. I express my appreciation to you, and I will remember that moment forever. My belief was that the provocative combined military exercises would either be cancelled or postponed ahead of our two countries’ working-level negotiations where we would continue to discuss important matters. Against whom is the combined military exercise taking place in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula, who are they trying to block, and who are they intended to defeat and attack? Conceptually and hypothetically, the main target of the war preparatory exercises is our military. This is not our misunderstanding. … As if to support our view, a few days ago the person who they call the minister of defense of south Korea said that the modernization of our conventional commercial weapons was deemed a ‘provocation’ and a ‘threat’ and that if we continue to ‘provoke’ and ‘threaten’ them they will classify my administration and my military as an ‘enemy.’ Now and in the future, South Korean military cannot be my enemy. As you mentioned at some point, we have a strong military without special means, and the truth is that South Korean military is no match against my military. The thing I like even less is that the U.S. military I engaged in these paranoid and hypersensitive actions with the South Korean people. I am clearly offended and I do not want to hide this feeling from you. I am really, very offended. Your Excellency, I am immensely proud and honored that we have a relationship where I can send and receive such candid thoughts with you.” (Woodward, Rage, pp. 179-80)
North Korea has generated an estimated $2 billion for its weapons of mass destruction programs using “widespread and increasingly sophisticated” cyberattacks to steal from banks and cryptocurrency exchanges, according to a confidential U.N. report seen by Reuters today. Pyongyang also “continued to enhance its nuclear and missile programs although it did not conduct a nuclear test or ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) launch,” said the report to the U.N. Security Council North Korea sanctions committee by independent experts monitoring compliance over the past six months. The experts said North Korea “used cyberspace to launch increasingly sophisticated attacks to steal funds from financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges to generate income.” They also used cyberspace to launder the stolen money, the report said. “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea cyber actors, many operating under the direction of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, raise money for its WMD (weapons of mass destruction) programs, with total proceeds to date estimated at up to two billion US dollars,” the report said. The experts said they are investigating “at least 35 reported instances of DPRK actors attacking financial institutions, cryptocurrency exchanges and mining activity designed to earn foreign currency” in some 17 countries. The U.N. experts said North Korea’s attacks against cryptocurrency exchanges allowed it “to generate income in ways that are harder to trace and subject to less government oversight and regulation than the traditional banking sector.” When asked about the U.N. report a U.S. State Department spokeswoman said: “We call upon all responsible states to take action to counter North Korea’s ability to conduct malicious cyber activity, which generates revenue that supports its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs.” The U.N. experts said that despite the diplomatic efforts, they found “continued violations” of U.N. sanctions. “For example, the DPRK continued to violate sanctions through ongoing illicit ship-to-ship transfers and procurement of WMD-related items and luxury goods,” the U.N. report said. (Michelle Nichols, “North Korea Took $2 Billion in Cyberattacks to Fund Weapons Programs: UN Report,” Reuters, August 5, 2019)
8/6/19:
North Korea fired two projectiles believed to be short-range ballistic missiles into the East Sea today, South Korea’s military said, in an apparent show of force against the ongoing joint military exercise between Seoul and Washington. The projectiles were fired at 5:24 a.m. and 5:36 a.m. from North Korea’s southwestern county of Kwail in South Hwanghae Province, and both flew around 450 kilometers across the peninsula before splashing into the East Sea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said. Their maximum altitude was about 37 km, and the top speed was around Mach 6.9, according to the JCS. “South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities believe that these short-range missiles bear similar flight features to the ballistic missiles North Korea test-fired on July 25,” the JCS said, adding that analysis is underway to determine their exact type. “Our military is monitoring the situation in case of additional launches and maintaining a readiness posture,” the JCS noted. The presidential office Cheong Wa Dae held an emergency meeting to discuss the latest launch, according to its spokesperson Ko Min-jung. “We see the launches as a violation of the spirit of the inter-Korean military agreement,” defense ministry spokesperson Choi Hyun-soo told a regular briefing, referring to the Comprehensive Military Agreement signed in September last year. In Washington, a senior U.S. official said it is continuing to monitor the situation and is consulting closely with its allies regarding the matter. It is the fourth such launch in less than two weeks. What makes today’s launches stand out is the fact that they were conducted from a western region and the projectiles flew all the way across the peninsula into the East Sea, while the three previous launches were carried out from the east coast. “Now that North Korea has some level of confidence in the stability of this new weapon after the recent launches, it appears to have brought it to the western region for additional testing by tuning its flight range and altitude,” Kim Dong-yup, a professor at Kyungnam University’s Far East Institute, said. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Fires Two Short-Range Missiles into East Sea: JCS,” August 6, 2019)
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, watched the demonstration fire of new-type tactical guided missiles at daybreak Tuesday. After receiving the report on the plan for demonstration fire of new-type tactical guided missiles at the observation post together with the accompanying officials, Supreme Leader of the Party, state and armed forces Kim Jong Un saw the fire. Two tactical guided missiles launched at the operational airfield in the western area of the country flied across the sky over the capital area and the central inland region of the country to precisely hit the targeted islet in the East Sea of Korea. The demonstration fire clearly verified the reliability, security and actual war capacity of the new-type tactical guided weapon system. Highly appreciating that the demonstration fire was carried out satisfactorily as intended, Kim Jong Un noted that the said military action would be an occasion to send an adequate warning to the joint military drill now underway by the U.S. and south Korean authorities. The Supreme Leader met the leading officials and scientists in the field of national defense science and workers in the field of munitions industry who successfully conducted the demonstration fire, and had a photo taken with them. Accompanying him were Vice-Chairmen of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea Pak Pong Ju, Ri Man Gon, Pak Kwang Ho, Ri Su Yong, Kim Phyong Hae, O Su Yong, An Jong Su, Pak Thae Dok and Pak Thae Song and First Vice Department Directors of the C.C. WPK Jo Yong Won and Ri Pyong Chol and vice department directors of the C.C., WPK. Present there were Army General Ri Yong Gil, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army, and Army General Pak Jong Chon, director of the Artillery Bureau of the KPA.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Watches Demonstration Fire of New-Type Tactical Guided Missiles,” August 7, 2019)
Van Diepen: “ … Some of the press coverage after the launch has focused on the difference between the North Koreans calling the system a “rocket” and the South Koreans calling it a “ballistic missile” (SRBM). This difference appears, in part, political: the North presumably wants to underscore that these tests are not contrary to its apparent “long-range missile” moratorium and are not inconsistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2087’s prohibitions on “any further launches using ballistic missile technology,” while the South wants to highlight the launches as more threatening and as UNSCR violations. From a technical standpoint, however, a “guided” rocket is a “missile” (the presence of guidance is what distinguishes a “rocket” from a “missile”), and a missile that “has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path” is a “ballistic missile.” The new DPRK “guided, multiple launch rocket system” qualifies on both counts, so the South Koreans are correct. The real nub of the issue is that, with the improvement and miniaturization of guidance technology, smaller and smaller rocket systems can be equipped with guidance—making what were just “rockets” into “missiles,” and changing the traditional notion that “rockets” were small while “missiles” were large. This is part and parcel of the increasing utility of ballistic missiles (even large ones) in conventional warfare. The US Intelligence Community tried to grapple with this increasing convergence between “guided, multiple launch rockets” and “ballistic missiles” by converting the lower portion of the traditional zone of “SRBMs” (range up to 1,000 km) into “close-range ballistic missiles” (CRBMs, with a range of less than 300 km). The author always found this quite unsatisfying in terms of accurately conveying information to consumers of intelligence for two reasons: it grouped together guided, multiple launch rockets with systems having much larger diameters and payloads that intelligence consumers typically regard as “SRBMs,” such as the former-Soviet SS-21, the derivative DPRK KN-02/Toksa and the US Army Tactical Missile System; and over time, as guided, multiple launch rockets acquire ranges in excess of 300 km, they will again become “SRBMs” under the new schema and get further confused with “real” SRBMs having much larger diameters and payloads. The military capability of the new DPRK “guided, multiple launch rocket” is a function of a number of characteristics, most of which we currently do not have information on: Range: This is the only attribute for which we currently have data (at least 250 km, based on the ROK announcement). Accuracy: This is critical to the military effectiveness of the system, especially out to longer ranges. Although the new system appears to be “guided,” just as with the KN-09 we do not know what type of guidance is used or how good it is. For comparison, the Chinese WS-2 multiple launch rocket, with an assessed range of 200 km, is assessed to have an all-inertial accuracy of 600 m CEP (circular error probable); using the same guidance system out to 250 km would result in somewhat worse accuracy (a higher CEP), as inertial accuracy degrades as a function of range. (In addition, the DPRK’s guidance system may well not be as good as China’s.) Use of satellite-aided guidance could bring the precision of the new system down to 20-50 m CEP. Thus, the new DPRK system with all-inertial guidance could be useful against area targets in a multiple-rocket saturation attack (what multiple launch rockets were originally intended for anyway), while with satellite-aided or terminal guidance (if available to the DPRK), the new system could directly threaten a wide variety of point targets. Payload Size: This is currently unknown for both the new system and the KN-09. Some assess that the latter is based on the Russian BM-30 Smerch (233-258 kg payload) or Chinese A100 (200 kg payload) multiple launch rocket It is unclear whether the longer range achieved by the new DPRK system required a payload lighter than the KN-09, or whether the apparent larger diameter of the new system permitted increases in both range and payload. For comparison, the 400 mm diameter Chinese WS-2 multiple launch rocket system is assessed to have a 200 kg payload. Payload Types: This also is currently unknown. The North has claimed that the KN-09 can carry “fragmentation-mine” and “underground penetration” munitions. Number of Launch Tubes: We do not currently know how many of the new rockets can be launched from its mobile launcher simultaneously (the KN-09 launcher can fire eight), how many launchers will be in a fire unit for the new system or how many fire units the North will deploy. Number of Rockets: The real contribution of a multiple launch rocket system is to lay down large numbers of rockets over and over, which requires extensive reloading of the launchers. We do not know how many reloads the North will provide for each launch unit of the new system (or for the KN-09 either). Given all of these unknowns, about as much as can be said at this point is that the new system’s apparent longer range gives North Korea the capacity to extend the capabilities the KN-09 already provides at least another 60 km into the ROK—an incremental increase in DPRK capabilities. It also could threaten the same area as the KN-09 while having another 60 km of North Korean territory within which to hide. Longer-range, guided, multiple launch rocket systems like the KN-09 and the new DPRK system will provide a modest increase in the threat by subjecting more US and ROK targets in South Korea to saturation attack. In addition, if the new system is sufficiently accurate, it will threaten more point targets. In both cases, the North will have the ability to use multiple launch rockets to strike some targets previously only vulnerable to KN-02/Toksa, Scud and soon KN-23 “real” ballistic missiles—offering opportunities to hit more targets and for more cost-effective tailoring of weapons to some targets. The added number of rockets from the new system, which can be fired at a higher rate than “real” SRBMs, combined with the new rockets’ use of a lower trajectory than “real” SRBMs and use of guided rockets that change trajectory (presumably the “track changing capability “referred to by Rodong Sinmun), also will increase the challenges for US and ROK missile defenses. Furthermore, the new system and its production technology potentially will be available for export, as is the case with most DPRK missile systems, raising the threat of other adversary states acquiring similar capabilities. North Korea appears to have launched a new, guided, multiple launch rocket system with a range of at least 250 km. This is a “ballistic missile” system. Most of the characteristics of the new system relevant to its military capability currently are unknown; but it has the capacity to extend North Korea’s current 190 km-range multiple launch rocket capabilities at least another 60 km into the ROK. This will subject incrementally more US and ROK targets to attack, (including potentially more point targets), add somewhat to the intensity of attacks, increase the North’s opportunities to choose between multiple launch rockets and “real” SRBMs in tailoring some attacks and further complicate the task of US and ROK missile defenses.” (Vann H. Van Diepen, “North Korea Unveils New ‘Multiple Launch Guided Rocket System,’” 38 North, August 6, 2019)
DPRK FoMin spokesperson’s press statement: “Despite our repeated warnings, the United States and south Korean authorities have finally started the joint military exercise targeting the DPRK. This is an undisguised denial and a flagrant violation of June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement, Panmunjom Declaration and September Pyongyang Joint Declaration, all of which are agreements to establish new DPRK-U.S. relations and build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean peninsula. Although the U.S. and south Korean authorities are playing all sorts of tricks to justify the joint military exercise, its aggressive nature can neither be covered up nor whitewashed in any manner. The first joint military exercise “Focus Lens” was conducted in south Korea in 1954, the year after the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement. All the U.S.-south Korea joint military exercises which have been annually conducted during the past 65 years since then were unexceptionally aggressive war exercises simulating the surprise and preemptive attack on the DPRK. What is more serious is that the U.S. increases hostile military tension against us by deploying a large amount of latest offensive military equipment in south Korea, in disregard of its commitment to suspend joint military exercises made at summit level on such occasions as the Singapore DPRK-U.S. summit and the Panmunjom DPRK-U.S. summit. Even after the Singapore DPRK-U.S. summit, the U.S. and south Korean authorities continuously staged all kinds of aggressive war exercises targeting us, such as Marine Corps Joint Exercise, “Alliance 19-1”, Joint Aerial Drill, “Proliferation Security Initiative”, and the U.S. did not hesitate to conduct the missile interception test simulating an interception of our ICBMs and the test-fire of ICBM “Minuteman-3” and SLBM “Trident 2 D-5.” The U.S. also made clear, in “its nuclear deterrence policy report,” its policy position to oppose the ban on nuclear first use against our country and it dared to expose the repugnance towards us by branding our country as a “rogue state” and a “proliferator” of nuclear technology, chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. Recently, “F-35A” stealth fighters were brought into south Korea and the U.S. nuclear strategic submarine “Oklahoma City” came into port of Pusan. In the meantime, the U.S. is pushing forward the move to introduce even high-altitude reconnaissance drone “Global Hawk” into south Korea. All these put us on our guard. All the above facts prove that the U.S. and south Korean authorities do not have political will at all to implement the joint statements whereby they committed to improve the DPRK-U.S. relations and the inter-Korean relations, and that they remain unchanged in their position to continue to face us as an enemy. Since the hostile military moves of the U.S. and south Korean authorities have reached the danger line, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea makes clear the following principled position, strongly condemning and denouncing the above moves. First, the U.S. and south Korean authorities will, under no circumstances, evade from their responsibilities for compelling the DPRK to take countermeasures for eliminating the potential and direct threats to its state security. The U.S. and south Korean authorities know too well that the joint military exercise will cause a backlash from us. Then what is its ulterior motive to conduct it at any cost which only provokes and threatens us? We have already warned several times that the joint military exercises would block progress in the DPRK-U.S. relations and the inter-Korean relations and bring us into reconsideration of our earlier major steps. There is no such a law that one side might be allowed to walk away from its commitment and our side only should be bound by the commitment. As the U.S. and south Korean authorities take every possible occasion to claim that the joint military exercises are “defensive” in nature, an “essential element” for combat preparedness, etc, so we are compelled to develop, test and deploy the powerful physical means essential for national defense. The U.S. and south Korean authorities cannot counter this even though they have ten mouths. If south Korea finds itself so distressed by “security threat,” it would be much more expedient for it not to commit such an act that will only make a rod for itself. Second, we remain unchanged in our stand to resolve the issues through dialogue. But the dynamics of dialogue will be more invisible as long as the hostile military moves continue. The prevailing situation is dramatically dampening down our desire for implementing the DPRK-U.S. agreements and the inter-Korean agreements, which also affects the prospect of future dialogue. It is too axiomatic that a constructive dialogue cannot be expected at a time when a simulated war practice targeted at the dialogue partner is being conducted, and there is no need to have a fruitless and exhausting dialogue with those who do not have a sense of communication. The U.S. and south Korean authorities remain outwardly talkative about dialogue. But when they sit back, they sharpen a sword to do us harm. If this is what they call “creative approach” and “imaginative power beyond common sense”, we will be compelled to seek a new road as we have already indicated. If the U.S and south Korean authorities trust to luck, disregarding our repeated warnings, we will make them pay heavy price which will in turn make them very much difficult.” (DPRK, “Spokesperson for Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DPRK Issues Press Statement, August 6, 2019)
China warned it would “not stand idly by” if the United States deployed ground-based missiles to Asia, as a bruising trade war and strained relations fueled fears of an arms race between Beijing, Washington and Moscow. A Chinese arms control official, Fu Cong, delivered the warning three days after the American defense secretary, Mark Esper, said he favored deploying such missiles to the region “sooner rather than later.” Esper did not give an exact timeline or a possible base for the missiles, but suggested it would take months, potentially 18 or more, to field the weapons. “We call on the U.S. to exercise restraint,” Fu said in a Foreign Ministry statement today. “China will not stand idly by and will be forced to take countermeasures if the U.S. deploys intermediate-range ground-based missiles in this part of the world.” Fu did not specify what countermeasures China would take in response to a deployment. He did say, though, that China had “no interest” in arms control talks with the United States and Russia — a step toward President Trump’s ambition of a three-way nuclear accord. Fu said the American withdrawal from the treaty would have “a direct negative impact” on global stability and security, and called it a “pretext” for an American weapons buildup. Fu cited the disparity in weapons stockpiles, saying, “I do not think it is reasonable or even fair to expect China to participate in any nuclear reduction negotiations at this stage.” Fu said that China took part in multilateral discussions on arms, and that it would “not participate in any nuclear arms race.” American officials have repeatedly warned about Chinese and Russian buildups. Lt. Gen. Robert P. Ashley Jr., the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said in May that China was likely to diversify and “at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile” over the next decade. Russia’s nuclear stockpile was “likely to grow significantly,” he said. Fu said that the deployment of missiles to an American ally in the Pacific would be like “deploying missiles at the doorsteps of China.” Even on the American territory of Guam, he said, a deployment would be “a very provocative action” and could be “very dangerous.” He added a warning to American allies in the region, naming Japan, South Korea and Australia. China called on “our neighboring countries to exercise prudence and not to allow U.S. deployment on its territory,” he said, “because that will not serve the national security interests of these countries.” (Alan Yuhas, “China Warns U.S. on Plans to Deploy Some Missiles,” New York Times, August 7, 2019, p. A-8)
8/8/19:
DPRK Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country (CPRC) Reunification and Agitation Department open letter “revealing who is the arch criminal harassing peace and stability on the Korean peninsula as regards the fact that the south Korean authorities and the U.S. have conducted an aggressive joint military exercise since August 5. According to the open letter, the joint military exercises which have been conducted by the south Korean authorities with outsiders century after century are the root cause escalating tension on the Korean peninsula and blocking the development of the inter-Korean relations. The south Korean authorities continue to conduct joint military exercises against the fellow countrymen together with outsiders while asserting that “they should adopt perfect military posture” after shaking hands with us for “reconciliation and peace” at the venue of dialogue. They had conducted the “2018 Max Thunder”, the very adventurous allied air combat drill aimed at making a preemptive air strike at the DPRK and commanding the air with the U.S., in the whole area of south Korea since May 11, last year even before the ink of the historic April 27 Panmunjom Declaration which excited the whole Korean nation and international community got dry. This is the typical example. The south Korean authorities responded to the repeated warnings of the DPRK against the joint military drills with outsiders by launching at last the north-targeted war drills whose original codename Ulji Freedom Guardian was changed, but form and contents never differ from it at all. Citing a series of hidden hostile acts for invading the DPRK in south Korea, the open letter went on: The north and the south, in their agreement in the military field for implementing the Panmunjom declaration, agreed each other to completely halt all hostile acts of becoming the root cause of military tensions and conflicts on the ground and in the air and the sea and all other spaces. But the south Korean authorities are staging north-targeted attack drills in camera in league with outsiders, saying “there is a method not to make public the drills” and “joint drills will not be exceedingly publicized for the sake of strategic communication.” The war-like forces of the south Korean military mobilized marine corps and special operation units to secretly stage joint special operation drills against the DPRK together with the U.S. marines in March. They have been staging in camera flying drills of F-35A stealth fighters since April. They also staged a joint naval drill Pacific Vanguard together with the U.S. in the waters off Guam in May and secretly a joint infiltration exercise targeting the nuclear facilities of the DPRK together with south Korea-present U.S. forces at a U.S. military base in Uijongbu city, Kyonggi Province in June. They took part in the U.S.-led multinational naval intercepting drill targeting the DPRK on the pretext of “preventing WMD proliferation” in the waters off Pusan in July in the wake of last year’s, and waged a joint sub drill Silent Shark targeting the DPRK together with warships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the waters off Guam. The drill involved subs and sea patrol planes. Condemning the south Korean authorities for their frantic arms build-up against the fellow countrymen in the north, the open letter continued: At the seminar “national defense reform” on May 11 last year, less than two weeks after he signed the historic Panmunjom declaration, the south Korean chief executive said that powerful defense capabilities are necessary to cope with unspecified and diverse threats in the case of the improved inter-Korean ties and ordered his men to concentrate all efforts on the arms build-up. Accordingly, days later the south Korean bellicose military forces launched with due ceremony a large-sized transport ship for a landing operation in the area of the DPRK side in case of emergency, claiming that the military’s mission will never change though the security situation may change and that they will further tighten the military posture. The south Korean authorities have purchased F-35A stealth fighters one after another from the U.S. since March this year in a bid to mount a “preemptive attack” on the DPRK, according to the “defense ministry’s program for 2019” and the “2019-2023 mid-term defense program.” Under the pretext of coping with “the existing threat from the north,” they increased the military budget for 2019 by 8.2%, as compared to the one for 2018 which was at the record level. Not content with this, they submitted to the “National Assembly” the draft military budget for 2020, 8% up from the one for 2019. The open letter warned that the south Korean authorities, who have been disloyal to the fellow countrymen and abetted the U.S. in the moves for stifling the DPRK, can never escape from the responsibility of compelling the DPRK to take countermeasures for eliminating potential and direct threats to its security, and will pay dearly for it.” (KCNA, “CPRC Reunification and Agitation Department Blames South Korea-U.S. Joint Exercises,” August 8, 2019)
8/9/19:
Trump: “Well, I hope that South Korea and I hope that Japan start getting along with each other. You know, they’re supposed to be allies. And it puts us in a very difficult position. South Korea and Japan are fighting all the time. They’ve got to get along because it puts us in a very bad position. With that being said, I got a very beautiful letter from Kim Jong Un yesterday. It was delivered — hand-delivered from — Q: What did it say? THE PRESIDENT: It was a very positive letter. Q: What did it say? THE PRESIDENT: I’d love to give it to you. I really would. Maybe — maybe sometime I will. Q: Kim Jong Un mention of a next meeting and a summit talk? THE PRESIDENT: I think we’ll have another meeting. He really wrote a beautiful, three-page — I mean, right from top to bottom — a really beautiful letter. And maybe I’ll release the results of the letter, but it was a very positive letter.” (White House, Remarks by President Trump before Boarding Marine One, South Lawn, August 9, 2019)
8/10/19:
North Korea fired two projectiles off its east coast today, hours after President Trump said he had received a “very beautiful letter” from the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un. The projectiles were launched from Hamhung, a coastal town northeast of Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, the South Korean military said in a brief statement. The North’s missiles flew 248 miles, the South’s military said. It was the second weapons test by North Korea this week. North Korea has been carrying out the tests to express its anger at a joint military drill the United States and South Korea are scheduled to begin on Sunday and to gain leverage in bilateral talks that Washington hopes to start soon with the North, analysts said. The office of President Moon Jae-in of South Korea said the projectiles North Korea launched on Saturday appeared to have been short-range ballistic missiles. It urged North Korea to stop such tests because it said they could raise military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Yesterday, Trump said that he had received a letter from Kim a day earlier and added that he could have another meeting with him. “It was a very positive letter,” he told reporters at the White House. “I think we’ll have another meeting. He really wrote a beautiful, three-page — I mean, right from top to bottom — a really beautiful letter.” Trump has been playing down the significance of the North’s recent weapons tests, calling them “smaller ones” that did not involve a nuclear weapon or intercontinental ballistic missile. He has also stressed he was still getting along “very well” with Kim. Yesterday, Trump said that Kim had discussed his country’s missile tests in his letter and that Kim wrote that he was not happy about carrying them out. “But he wasn’t happy with the testing; he put that in the letter,” Trump said. “In the meantime, I say it again: There have been no nuclear tests. The missile tests have all been short-range. No ballistic missile tests. No long-range missiles.” Trump’s comments partly contradicted South Korea’s analysis of the missiles North Korea has launched in recent weeks. The South said that at least some of them were short-range ballistic missiles. Under a series of United Nations resolutions, North Korea is banned from testing ballistic missiles. According to Trump, the North Korean leader also indicated that he was not happy with the joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States. Trump said he didn’t like them either because South Korea didn’t pay enough for them. “I’ve never liked it. I’ve never been a fan,” he said. “You know why? I don’t like paying for it. We should be reimbursed for it, and I’ve told that to South Korea.” South Korea and the United States are about to begin a new round of talks on how to divide the cost of maintaining 28,500 United States troops in South Korea. South Korea paid about $925 million this year but Washington wants Seoul to increase its contribution. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on August 7 he was hopeful that staff-level talks would resume with North Korea in a couple of weeks. Yesterday, Trump also urged South Korea and Japan to “sit down and get along with each other,” indicating that a festering trade dispute between the American allies was undermining Washington’s ability to work closely with them to better cope with the challenges posed by China and North Korea. “South Korea and Japan are fighting all the time. They’ve got to get along because it puts us in a very bad position,” he said in his strongest criticism of the way Seoul and Tokyo have been handling their dispute. “I’m concerned that they’re not getting along with each other.” Analysts have accused Trump of being reluctant to help repair the rift between the American allies. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Fires Projectiles after Its Leader Writes Trump, “New York Times, August 10, 2019, p. A-7) North Korea again fired two more projectiles believed to be short-range ballistic missiles into the East Sea, South Korea’s military said, the latest in a series of saber-rattling moves against the joint exercise between Seoul and Washington. The projectiles were fired at 5:32 a.m. and 5:50 a.m. from its eastern coastal city of Hamhung in South Hamgyong Province into the East Sea, and both flew around 400 kilometers at a maximum altitude of 48 km and a top speed of around Mach 6.1, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). “We see high chances of additional launches, as North Korea is now carrying out summertime drills and the combined exercise between South Korea and the U.S. is underway,” the JCS said in a release. “Accordingly, we have been closely monitoring the situation, while maintaining staunch military readiness,” it added. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Fires 2 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles into East Sea: JCS,” August 10, 2019) North Korea said August 11 that the two projectiles it fired a day earlier were a new type of missile, making this the third new short-range ballistic missile or rocket system the North has successfully tested in less than a month as Washington struggles to resume talks on denuclearization. The two missiles were launched off North Korea’s east coast yesterday in its second weapons test in the past week. KCNA released photographs of Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, watching what it called the launching of “another new weapon system.” After scrutinizing the photos, outside analysts said the missiles, fired from a tracked mobile launcher with two missile tubes, were of a type unveiled for the first time. The test “looks like a new short-range ballistic missile,” likely with a purpose similar to that of the KN-23, said Michael Duitsman, a research associate at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey, Calif. “I am not sure why North Korea would need two different missiles for the same role.” But the unveiling and testing of a new missile leaves little doubt that despite President Trump’s insistence that his on-again, off-again diplomacy with Kim is making progress toward denuclearization, North Korea has continued to modernize and expand its missile capabilities. “North Korea had not one but two short range ballistic missile under development this year,” Melissa Hanham, a missile expert at One Earth Future Foundation, said on Twitter. “This is not denuclearizing, this is not even close.” The president’s attitude has essentially given North Korea a free hand in developing and testing its short-range weapons, analysts said. Yesterday, Trump said that Kim had sent him a letter with a “small apology” explaining that North Korea was conducting tests to counter an American military exercise with South Korea that Trump has himself criticized as too expensive. Today, North Korea invoked Trump’s comments to argue that the South had no business complaining about its recent weapons tests. “With regard to our test for developing the conventional weapons, even the U.S. president made a remark which in effect recognizes the self-defensive rights of a sovereign state, saying that it is a small missile test which a lot of countries do,” Kwon Jong-gun, a North Korean Foreign Ministry official, said in a statement carried today by KCNA. All three of the new missile and rocket systems tested by the North in recent weeks are significant advances for the North Korean military, analysts said. They all used solid fuel and were fired from mobile launchers. Such missiles and rockets are easier to transport and hide, especially in a mountainous country like North Korea, and take less time to prepare for launching than the North’s old missiles that used liquid fuel, they said. The weapons also appeared to be maneuvered during flight, making it more difficult for South Korean and United States missile defense systems to intercept them, the analysts said. The North’s recent weapons tests also highlight how quickly inter-Korean relations have deteriorated despite the three summit meetings last year between Kim and President Moon Jae-in of South Korea. All the missiles and rockets were launched early in the morning, breaking a promise Kim made to Moon during their first meeting in April last year. “I heard you had your early-morning sleep disturbed many times because you had to attend the National Security Council meetings because of us,” Kim told Moon. “Getting up early in the morning must have become a habit for you. I will make sure that your morning sleep won’t be disturbed.” Now it has become impossible for the South Korean authorities “to have a sound sleep at daybreak,” Kwon, the North Korean official, said today. By contrast, North Korea has seldom attacked Trump in the hopes of maintaining the goodwill of the American president, who has said that he and Kim fell “in love.” Trump said that in his letter, Kim wrote that he wanted to resume dialogue with Washington as soon as the joint military drill between the United States and South Korea ended later this month. North Korea has been less amenable to negotiating with South Korea, which it accused of failing to implement the ambitious inter-Korean economic projects that Kim and Moon agreed to pursue in meetings last year. Today, North Korea said it would not start inter-Korean talks unless South Korea halted joint military exercises with the United States or made “a plausible excuse or an explanation in a sincere manner for conducting” them. Until then, any dialogue will be “strictly between” the North and the United States, “not between the North and the South,” Kwon said. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Says It Tested New Missile,” New York Times, August 12, 2019, p. A-9)
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, guided the test-fire of a new weapon on August 10. The scientists in the field of national defense science and workers in the field of the munitions industry perfected another new weapon system the orientation of research and development of which was indicated by the Party recently, and made a proud report to the Party Central Committee. After receiving a report on the development of the new weapon, Supreme Leader of the Party, state and armed forces Kim Jong Un gave an instruction to test it immediately. The Supreme Leader looked round the new weapon at the launching site. He said that the new weapon which was developed to suit the terrain condition of our country and as required by the Juche-oriented war methods has advantageous tactical character different to the existing weapon systems, and explained the strategic and tactical attempt of the Party Central Committee which indicated the task to develop the weapon system to the field of national defense science. He mounted the observation post and guided the test-fire. When he gave the order of fire, powerful Juche projectiles spewed dazzling flashes as if they heralded their birth. The detailed analysis of the test-fire result proved that the new weapon system’s advantageous and powerful demand of the design was perfectly met. After seeing the test-fire result of the new weapon transmitted to the display at the observation post, the Supreme Leader expressed great satisfaction, being very pleased that another new weapon intended by the Party came into being. Noting that our scientists in the field of national defense science and workers in the field of munitions industry do everything when the Party gives an orientation only, he said that they correctly see through the strategic idea and intention of the Party Central Committee and carry out them before anyone. He added that they are very grateful comrades who always relieve him of heavy burden, difficulties and hardships. He appreciated that the heroic and patriotic feats of the scientists in the field of national defense science and workers in the field of munitions industry will be recorded forever along with the history of the struggle of our Party as they are steadily consolidating the defense capability of the country, true to the Party’s strategy for developing the defense industry, with boundless loyalty to the Party and the revolution and the noblest patriotism.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of New Weapon,” August 11, 2019)
Trump tweet: “In a letter to me sent by Kim Jong Un, he stated, very nicely, that he would like to meet and start negotiations as soon as the joint U.S./South Korea joint exercise are over. It was a long letter, much of it complaining about the ridiculous and expensive exercises.”
8/11/19:
KCNA: “Kwon Jong Gun, Director-General of the Department of American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, issued the following press statement on Sunday: “A fool becomes a greater fool with age.” This saying goes to the south Korean authorities. It is well-attested by the south Korean authorities which changed the name of the joint military exercise from its original “Alliance 19-2” to “south Korea-U.S. Combined Command Post Exercise in the second half” and announced that it starts its full-scale exercise from August 11. It is a miscalculation if they think that the very change of the name of the exercise can alter its aggressive nature or that we would make it pass off quietly. Shit, though hard and dry, still stinks even if it is wrapped in a flowered cloth. What cannot be overlooked is the fact that the Chongwadae made a flurry of activity, calling an “emergency meeting of concerned ministers” even at a time of no war over the DPRK’s regular measures for conventional weapons modernization. Last time, it became a global laughing stock when it lost its head because it had failed to calculate properly the range of the power demonstration firing of our army. Instead of drawing a lesson from it, it intruded where it is not wanted and flounders even missing a good sleep at dawn. It is really a sight to see. Such an attitude of the Chongwadae might be seen to the eyes of the south Korean “people” as it being a “master” of putting security in good order. But we see this as nothing more than a shy dog barking more wildly. With regard to our test for developing the conventional weapons, even the U.S. president made a remark which in effect recognizes the self-defensive rights of a sovereign state, saying that it is a small missile test which a lot of countries do. But the south Korean authorities call the building of our self-defensive armed forces as a military tension while urging to stop it. Then, how can the south Korean authorities have a cheek to say such a nonsense? There is neither rhyme nor reason about it. Moreover, we now stand in an extraordinary situation when the south Korean authorities defiantly staged an aggressive war exercise against us. In the vortex of this, they rather run wild on their part trying to tarnish the DPRK’s image. It is indeed a case of a thief calls “Stop thief!” It is only regrettable that our counterpart falls short of standard as it is now. If the south Korean authorities think they can tide over this crisis by simply changing the name of the military exercise, it is really a big mistake. Though we are to enter into a dialogue in future as the currents flow in favor of dialogue, they had better keep in mind that this dialogue would be held strictly between the DPRK and the U.S., not between the north and the south. Given that the military exercise clearly puts us as an enemy in its concept, they should think that an inter-Korean contact itself will be difficult to be made unless they put an end to such a military exercise or before they make a plausible excuse or an explanation in a sincere manner for conducting the military exercise. We will certainly settle this on all accounts and closely watch the act of the south Korean authorities. If the south Korean authorities let loose a blast to save face even a little by standing such a funny fellow like Jong Kyong Du again, it would be a foolish act of putting out the fire by oil. It already went wrong for Chongwadae to have a sound sleep at daybreak as it notoriously keeps security in good orders.” (KCNA, “Press Statement by Director-General of DPRK Foreign Ministry,” August 11, 2019)
8/14/19:
President Moon Jae-in reaffirmed his unflinching commitment to inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation despite resurgent skepticism over his peace drive amid Pyongyang’s saber-rattling and hardening rhetoric. In his Liberation Day speech, Moon stressed the “unshaken” momentum for dialogue with the North as a “significant result” of Seoul’s peace initiative, and hammered away at his “peace economy” mantra to move forward his cross-border cooperation agenda. “In spite of a series of worrying actions taken by North Korea recently, the momentum for dialogue remains unshaken, which is a significant result of my government’s peace process on the Korean Peninsula,” Moon said. “Even though numerous forces still exist at home and abroad that seek to stir up conflict, we have been able to come this far thanks to our people’s fervent desire for peace,” he said. Moon sticks to his dialogue-based approach for peace while warning against any move to dampen the mood for talks. “Even if there is a cause for dissatisfaction, making dialogue difficult by spoiling the mood or erecting barriers is by no means a desirable course of action,” the president said. Moon pointed out that the North and the U.S. are exploring the working-level talks ahead of their third summit, which he said may constitute the “most critical juncture in the entire process of achieving denuclearization and establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula.” “If there is dissatisfaction, it too should be raised and discussed at the negotiating table. I hope the people will also pull together to ensure that we can overcome the last hurdle in the dialogue process,” Moon said. “When we pass this hurdle, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will move closer and inter-Korean relations will also make significant strides,” he added. Moon also doubled down on his push for a “peace economy,” a scheme under which the two Koreas join forces to promote peace, create new growth engines and pursue co-prosperity on the peninsula and beyond. His detractors have used the North’s recent missile launches as useful fodder to cast the scheme as a far-fetched dream. “We will create new economic growth engines through the peace economy. We can no longer afford to let division consume our capacities,” he said. “We will open the door to a new Korean Peninsula by pouring all we have into the peace economy.” His Liberation Day speech went beyond the level of economic cooperation to include a broad vision for national unification by 2045, when the Koreas will mark the 100th anniversary of their liberation from Japan. “We aim to establish a peace economy, in which prosperity is achieved through peace and also complete our liberation through the unification of the peninsula,” he said. “By overcoming the division of the peninsula, we must transform the Korean people’s energy into a driving force for future prosperity.” (Song Sang-ho, “Moon Reaffirms Unswerving Commitment to Peace Drive,” Yonhap, August 15, 2019)
Moon: “ … we aim to establish a peace economy in which prosperity is achieved through peace and also complete our liberation through the unification of the Peninsula. By overcoming the division of the Peninsula, we must transform the Korean people’s energy into a driving force for future prosperity. The peace economy begins with the efforts to continue dialogue and cooperation so that North Korea can choose economic prosperity over nuclear program upon the foundation of complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The two Koreas and the United States have engaged in dialogue for the past 20 months. In spite of a series of worrying actions taken by North Korea recently, the momentum for dialogue remains unshaken- which is a significant result of my government’s peace process on the Korean Peninsula. Compared to the past when the whole Peninsula experienced turbulence whenever North Korea engaged in a provocation, the situation has definitely changed. Even though numerous forces still exist at home and abroad that seek to stir up conflict, we have been able to come this far thanks to our people’s fervent desire for peace. Following the meeting in June among the leaders of the two Koreas and the United States at Panmunjom, North Korea and the United States are exploring working-level negotiations ahead of the third summit. This will probably constitute the most critical juncture in the entire process of achieving denuclearization and establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula. Now is the time for both Koreas and the United States to focus on resuming working-level negotiations between Pyongyang and Washington at the earliest possible date. Even if there is a cause for dissatisfaction, making dialogue difficult by spoiling the mood or erecting barriers is by no means a desirable course of action. If there is dissatisfaction, it too should be raised and discussed at the negotiating table. I hope the people will also pull together to ensure that we can overcome the last hurdle in the dialogue process. When we pass this hurdle, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will move closer and inter-Korean relations will also make significant strides. When economic cooperation accelerates and the peace economy begins, unification will beckon as stark reality before us someday. According to IMF estimates, Korea will lead the Fourth Industrial Revolution and its GDP per capita will surpass 40,000 USD around year 2024. In addition, if we combine the capabilities of the two Koreas, even while maintaining their respective political systems, it will be possible to create a unified market of 80 million people. Once the Korean Peninsula is unified, it is expected to become one of the six largest economies in the world. There have been research findings both at home and abroad that concludes that an era of GDP per capita of 70,000 to 80,000 USD will be possible around 2050. It is clear that there will be enormous economic benefits from peace and unification. New markets and opportunities will open up for both South and North Korean businesses. Both Koreas will be able to reduce not only huge defense expenditures but also the invisible cost of the division, the so-called ‘Korea Discount’. We will also be able to find solutions to problems we currently face, such as low growth, low birth rate and an aging society. However, the hopes and passions that will stoke the hearts of the people just as they did on that day of liberation will be more important than anything else. There can be no greater driving force for economic growth than hope and passion. The East Sea Rim Economic Belt that starts in Busan and encompasses Ulsan, Pohang, Donghae, Gangneung, Sokcho, Wonsan, Najin and Seonbong will reach out to the continental economy through Vladivostok and to the maritime economy that connects the Northern Sea Route to Japan. The Yellow Sea Rim Economic Belt that begins with Yeosu and Mokpo and includes Gunsan and Incheon and heads toward Haeju, Nampo and Sinuiju will help complete the grand economic strategy that looks toward China, ASEAN and India by nurturing the Blue Economy in Jeollanam-do; the new renewable energy industry around Saemangeum; and the high-tech industrial parks of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, Nampo and Sinuiju. North Korea has also shifted its national policy toward concentrating all of its efforts on economic development and is in the process of adopting market economy. The international community has also promised to assist its economic growth if it abandons its nuclear program. Our intention is not to unilaterally assist North Korea. Rather, our intention is to promote mutual benefits for both Koreas and prosper together while guaranteeing the security of our respective regimes. The plan is for the two Koreas to contribute to the development of the global economy. We will create new economic growth engines through the peace economy. We can no longer afford to let division consume our capacities. We will open the door to a new Korean Peninsula by pouring all we have into the peace economy. This will be possible if South and North Korea join forces and commit themselves to deciding the fate of the Korean Peninsula. When we overcome division, our liberation will finally be completed and Korea will become a country that cannot be shaken. Some people express skepticism regarding the wisdom of talking up peace economy when North Korea is firing missiles. However, we possess defense capabilities that are even stronger. Although we are paying close attention and doing all we can to manage the situation to prevent the escalation of tension on the Korean Peninsula, the ultimate goal that these actions serve, is dialogue, not confrontation. I hope these skeptics face up to the reality: the United States is continuing dialogue with North Korea without derailing while Japan is also seeking talks with Pyongyang. I hope these skeptics won’t remain prisoners to ideology. The unified strength of the people is essential. I ask the people to pull together as one. Fellow Koreans, decorated independence fighters and their bereaved families, and Koreans overseas, As we commemorate the Liberation Day today, I pledge to solidify denuclearization and peace regime on the Korean Peninsula during my term in office. I will initiate the peace economy upon this foundation and move toward unification. We will advance dialogue and cooperation so that seeds sown together with North Korea in the spring of peace will grow into trees of prosperity. I pledge to solidify the foundation so that we can successfully host the joint 2032 Seoul-Pyeongyang Olympics and stand tall in the world as one Korea by achieving peace and unification by 2045, which will mark the 100th anniversary of liberation. It has been one hundred years since the Provisional Government declared the founding of a democratic republic named the Republic of Korea. We have reflected on ourselves and matured over the past 100 years. We now have the confidence that we can prevail over any crisis. The people’s ability to achieve peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula has grown stronger. We can create a country that cannot be shaken by anyone. I remind myself of the words of independence activist Lee Seung-hoon, pen named Namkang:”When seeds buried under the ground spring up and rise above the heavy soil, I have only seen them do this by themselves — never through the strength of others.” The path that allows us to prevail over division and move toward peace and unification will be the royal road to becoming a responsible economic power. This is the road to overtaking Japan and guiding it toward a cooperative order in East Asia. A new Korean Peninsula, one that will bring peace and prosperity to itself, East Asia and the world, awaits us. We can do it!” (Yonhap, “Full Text of President Moon’s Liberation Day Address, August 15, 2019)
8/16/19:
North Korea launched two projectiles yet again off its east coast today, as South Korean analysts said President Trump’s repeated downplaying of the North’s weapons tests had given it a free hand to conduct them. The two projectiles, launched from Tongchon in the southeast of North Korea, flew 143 miles, the South Korean military said in a statement. South Korean defense officials said they were analyzing data they acquired through radar and other intelligence-gathering equipment to determine what type of projectiles were launched. The launching was the sixth time North Korea has tested short-range ballistic missiles or other projectiles since late last month. It also came a day after President Moon Jae-in of South Korea urged North Korea and the United States to resume dialogue to try to narrow their differences on how to denuclearize the North so that the South Korean leader could push his ambitious plan to integrate the economies of the two Koreas. “Rather than denouncing these tests as violations of U.N. resolutions and as a threat to the American allies, President Trump has sounded as if he didn’t care, describing them as not a threat to the mainland United States,” said Kim Sung-han, a former vice foreign minister of South Korea who teaches at Korea University in Seoul. “His comments make the allies and American troops in the region more vulnerable to North Korean missile threats.” Trump’s attitude provided the North with a perfect opportunity to test new missiles that would make it harder the South Korean and United States militaries to intercept, said Lee Byong-chul, a North Korea expert at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul. It has also helped encourage North Korea to ignore the South as a dialogue partner, he said. “North Korea wants to advance its missile technology as much as possible before the talks with the United States resume so that it can enter them with more leverage,” Lee said. “It has become clear that North Korea wants to deal directly with the United States, seeing nothing to gain thorough talks with the South.” Despite widespread skepticism over inter-Korean relations, Mr. Moon said in his speech yesterday that despite “a series of worrying actions taken by North Korea recently,” the momentum for dialogue remains unshaken. He said South and North Korea could prosper together in an integrated “peace economy” if the North chooses “economic prosperity over its nuclear program.” “The international community has also promised to assist its economic growth if it abandons its nuclear program,” Moon said. “New markets and opportunities will open up for both South and North Korean businesses.” An unnamed Northern government spokesperson said in a statement carried by KCNA today that Moon’s remarks were so preposterous that they would “make the boiled head of a cow laugh.” The spokesperson said the joint military drill between the South and the United States was clearly an exercise to “annihilate” the North. The North also accused South Korea of continuing to build up its arms behind the mask of talking peace. Earlier this week, South Korea’s military unveiled multibillion-dollar plans to build new warships and develop precision guided weapons. Its midterm military spending plans were announced amid growing fears over North Korea’s expanding missile capabilities. Analysts say that the new missiles left little doubt that despite Trump’s insistence that his on-again, off-again diplomacy with Kim is making progress, the North has continued to modernize and expand its missile capabilities. All three of the new missile and rocket systems tested by the North marked significant advances for the country’s military, they said. (Choe Sang-hun, “More Launches by North Korea, 6th Time in Month,” New York Times, August 16, 2019, p. A-9)
South Korea and the United States’ intelligence agencies had reportedly detected the movement of North Korea’s transporter erector launcher (TEL) carrying short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) in Tongchon, Kangwon Province, yesterday morning, a day ahead of the North’s firing of two missiles. U.S. reconnaissance satellites perceived the movement of a TEL and troops in Tongchon area on Thursday morning, according to multiple government sources. Both Seoul and Washington’s intelligence agencies considered it to be a signal of an impending provocation, and mobilized their intelligence assets to track and monitor Pyongyang’s movements. (Sang-Ho Yun, “S. Korea, U.S., Aware of Reports of N. Korea’s Missile Launches,” JoongAng Ilbo, August 19, 2019)
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, guided the test-fire of new weapon again on Friday morning. Juche shells were fired in the presence of the Supreme Leader. The national defense scientists showed a perfect result in the test-fire, too, and helped cement bigger confidence in this weapon system. He said that our reliable scientists in the field of the national defense science developed in the shortest span of time the major military striking means the Party planned recently and showed the mysterious and amazing success rates, adding with great satisfaction that one can imagine the level of development of the national defense science and technology and it vividly proved that the material and technological foundations for the national defense industry are being perfected at a high level. Our party has strictly maintained the principles of self-reliance and Juche in national defense building, and recently set forth a strategic policy on the direction of the development of the Juche-oriented national defense building based on our own science, technology and strength to meet the needs of the developing situation, he said, stressing the need to keep channeling all-state efforts into, taking deep care of and rendering unreserved support to the sacred national defense building so as to reliably guarantee the sovereignty and security of the country and the happy future of the people. He said it is our Party’s goal of defense building to possess invincible military capabilities no one dare provoke and to keep bolstering them. He said that step-by-step objectives for implementing this goal have already been delivered as a policy task, calling on the fields of the national defense scientific research and the munitions industry to make all-out efforts to perfectly uphold the Party’s line on national defense building with loyalty under the slogan “leap higher and faster”. He said everyone should remember that it is the Party’s core plan and fixed will for defense building to possess such a powerful force strong enough to discourage any forces from daring to provoke us and to leave all others vulnerable to our Juche weapons of absolute power even though there comes the situation where physical strengths clash with each other. He appealed to the fields of national defense scientific research and the munitions industry to cherish unchanged loyalty for the Party and the revolution and make redoubled efforts for the sacred activities for increasing the national defense capabilities in every way. Accompanying him were the leading officials of the Party Central Committee and the field of national defense science to guide the test-fire.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of New Weapon Again,” August 17, 2019)
Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country’s statement: “There is a proverb that the mountains have brought forth a mouse. This is an appropriate comment on the “liberation day commemorative speech” by the south Korean chief executive. In the speech, he failed to put forward any proper measures against the insult by the Japanese islanders and any ways to overcome the worsening economic situation, but only played with words. So, his speech deserves the comments “foolish commemorative speech” and “citation of spiritual slogans.” What cannot but be pointed out is that he said the dialogue atmosphere was not marred despite some recent “worrisome acts” of north Korea and that things have changed from that in the past when the Korean Peninsula vibrated owing to a single “provocation” by north Korea — the reckless remarks which had nothing to do with the “liberation day.” He meant that south Korea is making efforts to maintain the prevailing dialogue climate, build a peace economy through the north-south cooperation and establish a peace-keeping mechanism in the Korean Peninsula — remarks that make the boiled head of a cow provoke a side-splitting laughter. Even at this moment, there go on in south Korea joint military exercises against the DPRK. Does he have any face to talk about dialogue atmosphere, peaceful economy and peace-keeping mechanism. The joint military exercises are now at their full swing and their keynotes are “annihilating” the main force of our army within 90 days, removing the weapons of mass destruction and “stabilizing the life of inhabitants”. And what’s more, there go on the counter-strike drills. His open talk about “dialogue” between the north and the south under such situation raises a question as to whether he has proper thinking faculty. He is, indeed, an impudent guy rare to be found. He often calls for peace. Then is he going to make an excuse that the drones and fighters being purchased from the U.S. are just for spreading agrochemicals and for circus flights? How can he explain the “mid-term defense plan” aiming at developing and securing the capabilities of precision guided weapon, electromagnetic impulse shell, multi-purpose large transport ship, etc. whose missions are to strike the entire region of the northern half of the Republic. What is clear is that all of them are aimed at destroying the DPRK. He may utter such to save his damaged face before the south Koreans. But how dare can he let out such remarks and how is going to give an account of it to us. A sure thing is that the south Korean chief executive is so funny man as he just reads what was written by his juniors. He used to get shocked into fright even at the sound of a sporting gun in the north. Yet, he, wearing a still look on his face, bluffs that he would help north Korea opt for economy and prosperity, not nukes. It is obvious that he is overcome with fright. The implementation of the historic Panmunjom declaration is now at a deadlock and the power for the north-south dialogue is divested. This is the natural outcome of the wayward acts of the south Korean chief executive. The south Korean authorities are snooping about to fish in troubled waters in the future DPRK-U.S. dialogue, dreaming that the phase of dialogue would naturally arrive after the joint military exercises just as the natural change of the time of the year. He had better drop that senseless lingering attachment. They can clearly see what we feel now, i.e. we have nothing to talk any more with the south Korean authorities nor have any idea to sit with them again.” (KCNA, “S. Korean Chief Blasted for His Anti-DPRK Remarks,” August 16, 2019)
High-level military officials from North Korea and China met in Beijing and agreed to develop their ties as denuclearization talks between Pyongyang and Washington are deadlocked. KCNA reported August 18 in an English report that the meeting included Gen. Kim Su-gil, director of the General Political Bureau of the North’s Korean People’s Army, and Miao Hua, director of the political affairs department of China’s Central Military Commission, on Friday afternoon. Kim led a military delegation to Beijing earlier that day. “Kim Su Gil expressed the will to develop the friendly and cooperative relations between the armies of the DPRK and China onto a higher level in conformity with the lofty intentions of the top leaders of the two countries,” the KCNA report read, referring to the North by the initials of its formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Hua was quoted as saying that ties between China and North Korea are “developing on a new level” thanks to the recent series of meetings between Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Neither KCNA nor China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency reported on a meeting between Xi and the North Korean military delegation as of press time. Park Byung-kwang, a researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy in Seoul, said that the military meeting was a sign that the two allies were resuming exchanges in an area where interaction has been nearly dormant since Kim Jong-un rose to power in late 2011 following his father’s death. “We’d have to wait and see if it’s a sign that China will ensure the North it will offer security guarantees in safeguarding its regime,” Park said. “If North Korea and China resume their combined military exercises or sharing of weapons, then relations between South Korea and China and the United States and China will likely worsen.” (Lee Sung-eun and Baek Min-jeong, “North, China Hold Military Talks,” JoongAng Ilbo, August 19, 2019)
8/20/19:
South Korea and the United States wrapped up their week’s long combined military exercises, raising hopes for a halt in a series of missile launches by North Korea and a possible resumption of nuclear talks between Washington and Pyongyang. The North has strongly bristled at the Combined Command Post Training and Crisis Management Staff Training, ratcheting up tensions with six rounds of missile or projectile launches and bellicose rhetoric over about three weeks. “We’ve wrapped up the training as scheduled, and all the training sessions proceeded without a hitch,” a military officer said. This year’s exercise, which replaced their summertime Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise, involved computer simulations without the actual mobilization of troops or military equipment, which is part of the allies’ reorganization of major exercises aimed at supporting peace efforts with North Korea. But the training was based upon similar scenarios to previous ones and was composed of two parts just as the allies have done before: defending the country against invasion by North Korea and launching a counterattack in response. “The focus of the exercise was to verify whether Seoul is on course to meet the conditions required for its retaking of operational control over its forces from Washington during wartime,” a defense ministry official said, adding that the results of the initial operational capability (IOC) test will be discussed later this year. For that test, the exercise was carried out under the envisioned platform of the future joint command, where a South Korean general commands the Combined Forces Command (CFC), with an American general taking the role of vice commander, according to the sources. “All officials of South Korea’s defense ministry also participated in the exercise to check and experience their future role after the OPCON transfer to Seoul,” the official added. Previously, the exercise mainly involved South Korean service personnel from the CFC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The two sides have agreed on a “conditions-based” OPCON transition. The conditions are the South’s capability to lead the allies’ combined defense mechanism, its capacity for initial responses to the North’s nuclear and missile threats and a stable security environment on the peninsula and in the region. No more major combine exercises are scheduled for this year between Seoul and Washington, except for small-scale ones between or among units, according to the military officer. (Oh Seok-min, “S. Korea, U.S. Wrap up Summertime Combined Exercise,” Yonhap, August 20, 2019)
8/21/19:
Pompeo: “Washington Examiner: North Korea. You just announced that you’re renewing the ban on use of U.S. passports to North Korea. Is that a sign of where negotiations are, or if they’re stalled? Pompeo: It’s just an extension of where we’ve been. We renew this, I think it’s annually. We do it in 12-month increments to measure. We concluded that we’ve not made enough progress to relieve that restriction, nor have we made enough progress to relieve the U.N. Security Council resolutions that have put economic restrictions on North Korea either. Look … I was the first senior leader to go. I went when I was CIA director to see Chairman Kim [Jong Un] back on Easter 2018. [Trump] said, “Mike, this is going to be a long road. It’s going to have steps forward and steps back. But what we need to do is build out a set of understandings that could ultimately permit Chairman Kim to make this decision to denuclearize. The whole world wants it. Let’s go see if we can convince Chairman Kim that he can be secure, that their country can prosper, that things can be better for North Korea, but they got to give up their nuclear weapons to do so and we have to do so in a way that is verifiable.” We’ve been at the table with them intermittently since then trying to deliver that. The president has come after Chairman Kim three times. Sometimes, I know these things are characterized as failures, but the truth is each time, I think the two leaders have developed deeper understandings of how it is we might achieve this. I still remain hopeful that Chairman Kim is committed to this and sees a path that allows him to execute on this. But in the event that he doesn’t, we’ll continue to keep on the sanctions that are the toughest in all of history and continue to work towards convincing Chairman Kim and the North Korean leaders that the right thing to do is for them to denuclearize. I think he sees it. I think we all need to continue to work at this so that he can find the path to actually execute the commitment that he made in Singapore in June.” (Salena Zito, “Mike Pompeo Says No to Senate Run in Wide-Ranging Exclusive Interview,” Washington Examiner, August 21, 2019)
8/22/19:
DPRK FoMin spokesperson’s statement: “Dangerous and unusual military moves are now on the horizon, which would trigger a new cold war on the Korean peninsula and in the region. One such move is the introduction yet again by the south Korean authorities of “F-35A” stealth fighters from the United States shortly after the end of joint military exercises, despite our repeated warnings. This act of continuously introducing the cutting-edge lethal equipment is a grave provocation that has openly denied the joint declarations and the military agreement between the north and the south of Korea, and as such, it only serves to graphically reveal again the hypocrisy and double-dealing conduct of the south Korean authorities who are noisily talking about making “efforts to do things more useful yet less harmful to dialogue.” Escalating hostile military moves by the United States and the south Korean authorities are reducing the dynamics of dialogue for building a lasting and durable peace on the Korean peninsula, and this compels us to weigh a realistic way of turning our attention more to strengthening the physical deterrence. Furthermore, the reality — that the United States has recently test-fired the intermediate-range cruise missile and plans to deploy a large quantity of offensive military equipment such as “F-35” stealth fighters and “F-16V” fighters in Japan and other surrounding areas of the Korean peninsula, thus adding to the regional arms race and confrontation — calls for our greatest vigilance. We have underlined time and again that the joint military exercises and the build-up of armed forces in south Korea are dangerous acts detrimental to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. We remain unchanged in our position to resolve all issues in a peaceful manner through dialogue and negotiation. However, dialogue accompanied by military threats is of no interest to us.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Denounces S. Korean Authorities,” August 22, 2019)
South Korea said it will pull out of a military intelligence-sharing pact with Japan that helps the neighboring countries counter threats such as North Korean missiles, amid an intensifying spat between them. The government said Japan’s actions on trade, namely its tightening of export controls on some materials crucial to South Korea’s technology industry, have changed the whole security situation, making it inappropriate to share sensitive information such as military intelligence. The termination of the General Security of Military Information Agreement, or GSOMIA, is the latest product of deepening enmity between South Korea and Japan over wartime history and trade issues. “We could not but reconsider the utility of the accord, given the fact that Japan has turned history issues of the past into security issues,” a government official said, emphasizing that the decision, made at a National Security Council meeting, stemmed from Japan’s recent measures. “If Japan takes back its unfair retaliatory moves and the two countries recover their friendliness, (the government) could possibly reconsider many measures including GSOMIA,” the official added. Signed in November 2016, the pact was facing a deadline on August 24 for either side to give written notification of their intent to pull out. South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung Wha, speaking to reporters at the airport upon returning from China, said the termination issue is separate from the alliance with the United States as it is an issue of trust between Seoul and Tokyo. During their talks, she and Japanese Foreign Minister Kono Taro failed to bridge the gap between them over a variety of issues, including a series of South Korean court decisions ordering compensation for forced labor during Japan’s colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945. Japan has railed against the rulings, saying the issue was settled by a 1965 bilateral accord under which it provided South Korea with a $500 million lump sum. On July 4, Japan began requiring case-by-case approval for exports of some materials that are crucial to the South Korean technology industry. Then on August 2, it decided to remove South Korea from a list of countries that enjoy minimum trade restrictions on goods that can be diverted for military use. South Korea has since taken Japan off of its own “white list” of trusted trade partners and announced tighter restrictions for importing coal ash and some waste recycling materials from Tokyo. Yesterday, South Korea announced it is placing tighter restrictions on Japanese food imports over concerns of radioactive contamination following the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. The tit-for-tat measures came amid a wave of outrage in South Korea over what is seen as Japan’s failure to own up to wartime atrocities. Boycotts of Japanese products have sprung up across the country and some airlines have suspended flights between the two countries due to a decrease in the number of passengers. (Kyodo, “S. Korea Decides to Terminate Intel-Sharing Pact with Japan,” August 22, 2019)
8/23/19:
DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho’s statement: “U.S. State Secretary Pompeo, when interviewed by a U.S. newspaper Wednesday [August 21], said if north Korea does not set out to denuclearize itself, the U.S. will maintain the strongest sanctions in history to make it confirm that the denuclearization is the right way. Just as a saying goes “A crow never becomes whiter for often washing”, he is the diehard toxin of the U.S. diplomacy. On April 24 he cited what he called a “lane change” in an interview with the U.S. media only to be snubbed. Nothing decent can be expected from Pompeo, a man subject to strong censure from many countries for adopting the most wicked methods of the Central Intelligence Agency as diplomatic means in every part of the world. But what arouses concerns is a string of senseless remarks made by the man heading the U.S. negotiation team at a time when the DPRK-U.S. dialogue is high on the agenda. There is a proverb saying “Sow the wind and reap the whirlwind”. Now that he made rhetoric about the DPRK without elementary obligation as a human being, losing his face as the diplomatic boss of a country, I cannot but respond to it in kind. Is he really the man who begged for denuclearization and pledged the establishment of new DPRK-U.S. relations when he was received by the chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK during his several visits to Pyongyang? He who has no shame has no conscience. He is truly impudent enough to utter such thoughtless words which only leave us disappointed and skeptical as to whether we can solve any problem with such a guy. The whole world knows that the U.S. is the chieftain which spawned the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula and which makes its solution difficult. Furthermore, what the U.S. has done since the adoption of the June 12 DPRK-U.S. joint statement was holding war exercises against the DPRK nonstop in and around the Korean peninsula and shipping strategic assets to it only to make the issue further complicated. Now he again resorts to the hackneyed sanctions rhetoric, misleading the truth. He must be a trouble-maker bereft of sensible cogitative power and rational judgment as he only casts dark shadow over the prospect of the DPRK-U.S. negotiations. All things to which Pompeo thrusts himself into go wrong and end up in failure though they showed signs of positive developments. He sure seems to be more interested in realizing his future “political ambition” rather than the current foreign policy of the U.S. We have already given ample explanation enough to be understood by the U.S. side and we have also given it enough time out of maximum patience. If the U.S. still dreams a pipe dream of gaining everything through sanctions, we are left with two options, either to leave it enjoying the dream to its heart’s content or to wake it up from the dream. We are ready for both dialogue and stand-off. The U.S. is sadly mistaken if it still thinks of standing in confrontation with the DPRK with sanctions, not dropping its confrontational stand. Then, we will remain as the biggest “threat” to the U.S. for long and long and will make it understand for sure what it has to do for the denuclearization.” (KCNA, “DPRK’s Foreign Minister Rebukes U.S. Secretary of State’s Anti-DPRK Malarky,” August 23, 2019)
8/24/19:
North Korea launched two short-range ballistic missiles today, two days after South Korea decided to pull out of a military intelligence-sharing agreement with Japan. The missiles were launched from Sondeok near the North’s eastern coast and flew 235 miles, the South Korean military said in a brief statement. It was the seventh time North Korea had tested short-range ballistic missiles or other projectiles since late last month. South Korean defense officials provided no further details on the latest launch, adding that they were analyzing data acquired through radar and other intelligence-gathering equipment. Japan requested South Korean intelligence on the North’s latest launch, and the South planned to comply because the information-sharing arrangement was still in effect, the South Korean military said. Japan said the missiles had landed well outside its territorial waters and posed no immediate threat to its security. Without the agreement, Tokyo and Seoul will have to exchange sensitive military intelligence through Washington, which has separate intelligence-sharing deals with both nations. But such an arrangement could slow down the information-sharing at critical moments, like immediately after a North Korean missile launch, analysts said. Speaking to reporters as he was leaving the White House for the Group of 7 meeting of industrialized nations, Trump said the tests did nothing to complicate his relationship with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, or his hopes for denuclearization talks. “He likes testing missiles,” Trump said. “But we never restricted short-range missiles. Many nations test those missiles.” The president said that the United States had recently “tested a very big one.” (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Launches 2 Missiles, South Says,” New York Times, August 24, 2019, p. A-10)
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, guided the test-fire of newly developed super-large multiple rocket launcher on Saturday. The Supreme Leader of the Party, state and armed forces learnt about the development of the super-large multiple rocket launcher system and issued an order to start the test-fire. The test-fire proved that all the tactical and technological specifications of the system correctly reached the preset indexes. He gave high appreciation, saying that it is, indeed, a great weapon, our young national defense scientists are so clever as to conceive out of their own heads and design and complete the weapon system at one go-off although they have never seen it, and they have performed a great work. What made him happy today is that a contingent of young and promising talents who will shoulder upon the rapid development of the Juche-oriented defense industry grow in the course of the development of the new weapon, he noted, saying with pride that they are precious treasure and wealth of the country which cannot be bartered for anything and the Juche-oriented defense industry will steadily be developed by the talented national defense scientists and technicians faithful to the Party. Each Juche weapon developed and completed by us reflects the greatness of the Workers’ Party of Korea which provided powerful war deterrent capable of firmly defending Korean-style socialism with the responsibility for the destiny and future of the country and the people and the noble loyalty of our national defense scientists who have unsparingly devoted their blood and sweats of patriotism true to the leadership of the Party, he said. Saying August 24 is, indeed, an unforgettable good day, and that three years ago today we succeeded even in the underwater test-fire of strategic submarine ballistic missile which only a few countries have in the world, he together with his dear comrades-in-arms recollected the unforgettable days of developing and completing strategic weapons while braving manifold trials. An important mission our defense industry takes up is to contribute to increasing national defense capabilities in every way so as to safeguard the Party, revolution, country and people, guarantee the final victory of the revolution and lead and promote the building of a powerful socialist nation, he said, underscoring the need to push ahead with an indomitable offensive campaign to put our strength onto the level desired by us to continue to step up the development of Korean-style strategic and tactical weapons for resolutely frustrating the ever-mounting military threats and pressure offensive of the hostile forces. He was accompanied by senior officials of the Party Central Committee and the field of national defense science including Ri Pyong Chol, Kim Jong Sik, Jang Chang Ha, Jon Il Ho and Jong Sung Il to guide the test-fire.” (KCNA, “Successful Test-Fire of Super-Large Multiple Rocket Launcher Held under Guidance of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un,” August 25, 2019)
Japan-based Choson Sinbo said today that the United States should be ready to discuss security issues at the working-level nuclear talks to resume their negotiations, blaming Washington for the delay of the promised resumption of talks. “The working-level negotiations agreed at Panmunjom can take place when the U.S. negotiations team is prepared with finding a constructive solution to meet each other’s interest by dealing with the North Korea and the U.S.’ mutual security issues,” it said. “The responsibility for the delay of the working-level negotiations between North Korea and the U.S., which President Trump has said would begin in two or three weeks, lies in the U.S.,” the article said, citing the allies’ combined drill that the North has long denounced as an invasion rehearsal. (Yonhap, “Pro-NK Newspaper Says Security Issues Should Be Discussed at Working-Level Talks,” August 24, 2019)
8/25/19:
President Donald Trump may not mind North Korea’s repeated tests of short-range missiles, including some believed capable of striking Japan, but his not-so-begrudging acceptance of the North’s actions is sending an unmistakable message to Washington’s Asian allies: America really does come first. The latest volley of tests came yesterday, making for a total of at least 11 apparent ballistic missile launches overseen by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un this year and eight in the last five weeks. The pace comes close to matching the frantic speed of testing in 2017, when Trump and Kim traded insults and threats. “I’m not happy about it, but then again he’s not in violation of an agreement,” Trump said Sunday, after the latest launches. He was apparently referring to a deal between the two leaders that ostensibly prohibits the firing of longer-range ballistic missiles. Strikingly, the comment was made while sitting beside the leader of possibly the United States’ closest ally in Asia, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, during a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Group of Seven summit in France. “I discussed long-range ballistic and that he cannot do and he hasn’t been doing it. … He has done short-range, much more standard missiles, a lot of people are testing those missiles, not just him,” the president said. “We are in the world of missiles folks, whether you like it or not,” he added. But contrary to two years ago, when Trump threatened to rain “fire and fury” on the North over its nuclear and missile tests, observers say the U.S. president’s de facto blessing of this year’s short-range tests is in effect telling Japan as well as South Korea, another top Asian ally, that they are expendable. It’s a message he’s sending to the tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers and expatriates there, too. So far, Trump administration and defense officials have remained mum despite growing concerns over the president’s stance. The Pentagon did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the issue and U.S. Forces Korea referred questions to the State Department. Asked August 27 when the president will say, “enough is enough,” and if he plans on “taking a stronger stance on North Korea,” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had little to say beyond the White House’s standard line. “The president’s taken the strongest stance in an awfully long time on North Korea,” Pompeo said in an interview. “We didn’t get to this situation in the 2½ years that President Trump’s been in office.” The message has reinforced existing security concerns in South Korea and Japan that Washington may not come to their defense at critical moments, especially if U.S. territory becomes vulnerable to a North Korean nuclear attack. “The recent development in North Korean missile technology certainly puts Japanese policymakers on notice, and Trump seeming to brush off the concern in his attempt to prioritize the resumption of denuclearization [talks] aggravates Tokyo’s anxiety,” said Tatsumi Yuki, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center think tank who previously worked at the Japanese Embassy in Washington. That anxiety was on full display when Abe expressed a view that deviated from Trump’s today, calling the latest test “extremely regrettable” and repeating Tokyo’s mantra that the launches are clear violations of U.N. rules. Trump, looking to placate his golf buddy, shook off the remarks. “I can understand how the prime minister of Japan feels. I mean, I can. It’s different. But, I mean, I can understand that fully,” he said. Abe has long pushed Trump to include in the denuclearization negotiations the shorter-range weapons that put Japan in the North’s crosshairs, and Trump has obliged, at least for now. But it remains uncertain if he will continue to do so as his focus shifts to what he considers the only real threat under America First: the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that can hit the United States. “This was the worst-case scenario for Tokyo — Trump deals with North Korea, only focusing on its nuclear program and ICBMs, leaving Japan still exposed to North Korea’s short- and medium-range missiles,” said Tatsumi. The North already has stockpiles of Rodong medium-range ballistic missiles, which have a range of 1,200 kilometer to 1,500 km, and Scud-ER (extended-range) weapons that can travel 800 km to 1,000 km. That puts large chunks of Japan in striking distance, a fact the regime has trumpeted and demonstrated on multiple occasions. While the distances paled in comparison with the North’s tests in 2017 — which included two intermediate-range ballistic missiles that overflew Japan and one ICBM that experts believe could hit all of the contiguous U.S. — Pyongyang has, in effect showcased ever-improving new capabilities for safeguarding its isolated regime. Perhaps the most fearsome of these has been the presumed Islander clone, known as a KN-23, which one test in July showed was able to fly as far as 690 km (430 miles) — putting South Korea and areas of Japan at risk. The missile is designed to be mobile, which makes it easier to hide, and fly at a height and speed that makes it hard for U.S. interceptor systems to shoot down, weapons experts have said. “In terms of the capabilities of this missile, it’s clearly got Iskander-like capability,” said Malcolm Davis, a senior defense analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute think tank in Canberra. “The main advantage of this system is that it is designed to circumvent missile-defense systems such as Patriot and THAAD.” A U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system is currently deployed to South Korea. By being able to travel around 700 km, “that would make U.S. bases in [the] ROK and southern Japan within range, and if U.S. and Japanese [ballistic missile defenses] can’t defeat it, that adds a new level of vulnerability … and a greater threat” from North Korea, Davis said, using the acronym for the South’s formal name, the Republic of Korea. Indeed, Japanese Defense Minister Iwaya Takeshi confirmed this view August 27, saying that Pyongyang appears to be developing warheads to penetrate the ballistic missile shield defending Japan — pointing in particular to the latest launches’ irregular trajectories. Japan and the United States have Aegis destroyers deployed in the Sea of Japan, armed with SM-3 interceptor missiles designed to destroy warheads in space. Tokyo also plans to build two land-based Aegis batteries, called Aegis Ashore, to bolster its ballistic missile shield. Those defense systems, however, are designed to counter projectiles on regular and therefore, predictable, trajectories, and any variation in flight path would make interception trickier. Japan also employs the ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile interceptor, which is said to be capable of intercepting an enemy missile within a radius of less than 20 km and is designed to strike incoming missiles in the lower atmosphere. Markus Schiller, a rocketry expert with the German company ST Analytics, said that while speed is “not that much of a problem” for the Patriot system, “if an intercept actually succeeds is another question.” “You never have 100 percent hit-and-kill probability,” Schiller said. “However, if you are crossing a site at an altitude of 25 km or above, this would be too high for the Patriot to reach the target. And it seems that SM-3 and THAAD would have a problem there, too, because that would be too low for both SM-3 and THAAD to kick in,” he said. (Jesse Johnson, “Trump’s De Facto Blessing of North Korea’s Missile Tests Sens Ominous Message to Japan,” Japan Times, August 28, 2019)
South Korea kicked off its biannual military exercises aimed at demonstrating control over a set of islets that are the source of a territorial dispute with Japan, a move that was likely to heighten tensions between Washington’s two key Asian allies. The two-day military exercise began three days after South Korea announced that it would terminate a military intelligence-sharing deal with Japan to retaliate against trade restrictions Tokyo had imposed earlier. The drill involved an unannounced number of navy and coast guard ships, air force planes and army and marine troops and took place around Dokdo, a set of largely uninhabitable volcanic outcroppings off the east coast of South Korea. The country has administered Dokdo, keeping a contingent of armed coast guard officials there since the 1950s. But the rocks are also claimed by Japan, which calls them Takeshima. Japan has criticized the biannual military exercises by South Korea for raising tensions and aggravating bilateral ties. “Our military conducts this exercise to further cement our determination to protect our national territories in the East Sea, including Dokdo,” the South Korean Navy said in a statement. South Korea has been conducting such exercises since the early 1990s. South Korea had delayed the first of two exercises planned for this year as it sparred with Japan over the trade dispute. Japan accuses South Korea of occupying the islets illegally and has stepped up its campaign to highlight its territorial claim in recent decades. To South Koreans, Japan’s territorial claim epitomizes its early 20th-century aggression and what they consider its refusal to atone for its colonial occupation of Korea. Russian and Chinese military planes flew together near the islets in an unprecedented joint training mission last month, forcing South Korean fighter jets to fire warning shots to drive away a Russian plane flying too closely to the islets. At the time, Japan protested the South Korean move. Like the death of the military intelligence-sharing deal, the failure by South Korea and Japan to work together to counter the Russian and Chinese planes at the time provided fresh evidence that their historical disputes were undermining Washington’s efforts to build a closer trilateral security partnership to counter North Korea, China and Russia. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Holds Exercises near Islets Japan Also Claims,” New York Times, August 26, 2019, p. A-7)
8/28/19:
Bermudez and Cha: “New Beyond Parallel imagery (August 26, 2019) of Sinpo South Shipyard suggests circumstantial evidence of the construction of a new ballistic missile submarine and preliminary evidence indicates possible preparations for a test. These images confirm North Korean media reports late last month, in the midst of multiple sets of short-range missile tests, of Kim Jong-un’s inspection of a “newly built submarine.” We believe this to be the long-expected follow-on ballistic missile submarine (SSB) to the Korean People’s Navy’s (KPN’s) existing SINPO-class experimental ballistic missile submarine (SSBA).The appearance of support vessels and a crane in the imagery suggest possible preparations, based on past practice, to tow the missile test stand barge out to sea for an SLBM test flight; but there is no conclusive evidence at the moment that this is a near-term. The construction and commissioning of a true SSB capability would represent a significant advancement of the North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear threat and complicate defense planning in the region, given the difficulties of tracking and/or pre-emptively targeting such capabilities. Despite North Korea press statements that “operational deployment is near at hand,” it is more accurate to describe the SLBM existential threat as emerging rather than imminent. Nevertheless, these images suggest North Korea is making real progress in developing a second leg of the nuclear triad, bringing them closer to a survivable nuclear force and lessening prospects for full denuclearization.” (Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha, “Sinpo South Shipyard: Construction of New Ballistic Missile Submarine?” Beyond Parallel, CSIS, August 28, 2019)
Van Diepen: “An August 28 analysis of recent commercial satellite imagery assessed that North Korea was building a new type of conventionally-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSB). The report termed this a “significant advancement of the North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear threat,” showing the DPRK is “closer to a survivable nuclear force” and “making real progress in developing a second leg of the nuclear triad.” American television reaction to the report verged on the hysterical, terming this “alarming new evidence” to be “a game changer” and a “very, very ominous development” regarding one of Kim Jong Un’s “most menacing weapons” that “can get pretty close” to the continental US, claiming that “he seems determined to deploy as soon as he can.” This article will analyze five key contentions of the US television coverage of the SSB: its advent is “new”; the DPRK is pursuing a “full steam ahead program” to deploy ballistic missile submarines; it will be survivable, unlike the North’s longstanding land-based missile systems; it presents a significant threat to the continental United States; and it represents an “ominous” and even novel addition to the DPRK missile threat to the US. In fact, indications of the new-type SSB have been recognized for years. We do not know how many SSBs the DPRK intends to produce, or how quickly. The new SSB is almost certainly significantly more vulnerable than the North’s land-based missiles. Its vulnerability and operational limitations render it a marginal threat to the continental US. Overall, the new SSB would provide only a small addition to the threat posed by the DPRK’s much larger, increasingly longer range, and much more survivable land-based ballistic missile force. The North’s construction of a new-type SSB is far from “new.” The possibility has been flagged since at least January 2015, when it was reported based on analysis of commercial imagery that North Korea began work in June 2014 on the infrastructure to build a new type of submarine—one that right away was noted as possibly being an SSB. By September 2016, indications of the movement of numerous components into the completed infrastructure suggested construction was under way. Press reports in October 2017 said US intelligence detected a new diesel-electric submarine under construction, and said the submarine is likely an SSB. The imagery underlying the August 28 report only shows a continuation of the apparent submarine construction activity noted since September 2016—a continuation itself noted elsewhere as recently as June 2019. In fact, the newest information in the report came not from satellites, but from the photos the North Koreans released on July 23 of a new type of submarine on the building ways inside a construction hall. That submarine almost certainly is the one whose construction has been indicated in open-source imagery since 2016; the photos were assessed within days to be of an SSB capable of carrying three submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)—in a design remarkably similar to the September 2016 prediction of a submarine analyst. The North has invested in significant infrastructure that would permit the construction of additional (and even larger) SSBs. It also has built between 2011 and 2014 two missile test stands used for SLBMs and a ground test facility for large solid-propellant rocket engines of the type used on the DPRK’s most recent KN-11 and larger future SLBMs. The construction of these SLBM-related facilities further presaged the advent of a new SSB to carry the related missile. At this point, however, we do not know whether the new SSB is a political signal or a dictator’s vanity project, or if North Korea will build an SSB force of at least several boats (which would be required for a true “second triad leg”). There currently are no open-source indications of how many SSBs the DPRK intends to build, or how quickly. Nor is there any basis, either on the submarine side (where the new-type SSB has taken some three years to build and still has not been rolled out of the construction hall) or on the SLBM side (where there have been no apparent flight tests since August 2016), to substantiate the US TV claim that Kim “seems determined to deploy it as soon as he can.” The American TV coverage has overstated the survivability of a North Korean SSB and understated the survivability of the DPRK’s longstanding force of land-based ballistic missiles, claiming land-based missiles can be taken out (even “easily” so), while taking out subs is “much more difficult.” The new SSB appears to be based on the 1950s-vintage Soviet ROMEO-class diesel-electric submarine, very noisy boats that are thus highly susceptible to acoustic detection while having only a limited ability to know that they are being tracked by Allied submarines. North Korean SSBs clearly would become priority targets for allied intelligence in peacetime and for allied anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces in crisis and wartime, and the US has over 65 years of experience in detecting, tracking and combating Soviet-style diesel-electric subs. This is not to say that North Korean SSBs would be easy prey for the US and of no concern, especially if they remain in the Sea of Japan (East Sea), but they would be operating under conditions of allied air and naval superiority, and would face a substantial risk of destruction prior to or during launch operations. North Korea’s road-mobile missiles, on the other hand, have a high probability of avoiding detection and attack once they have deployed from garrison (which they would almost certainly have done at the outset of a crisis and prior to war). Land-mobile missile survivability would further benefit from the DPRK’s long history of using camouflage, concealment and deception; its thousands of underground facilities; and the ability to plug-in to landline communications networks unavailable to sea-based systems. As stated in a previous piece, Iraq’s ability during 1990-1991 to preserve most (if not all) of its mobile Scud launchers in the face of coalition air superiority and a dedicated “Scud-hunting” effort—and in desert terrain, to boot—underscores the substantial survivability benefits competently-operated DPRK land-mobile ballistic missiles enjoy compared to North Korean SSBs. American TV commentators have said that North Korean SSB’s “can get pretty close” to the continental US, wondering if they “would put everybody in the United States at risk.” But, in fact, the SSB’s vulnerability and operational limitations render it a marginal threat. (For what it is worth, North Korea has stated that the submarine it revealed in July 2019 is intended to operate in the Sea of Japan.) It is possible for the new-type North Korean SSB to sail within missile range of the US West Coast. Assuming deployment with the DPRK’s most recently tested KN-11 SLBM (1,200 km range), an SSB would need to sail some 6,800 km to strike the West Coast; returning home would require another 6,800 km, not counting any loiter time off the US. The ROMEO-class submarine, the apparent basis for the new DPRK SSB, is assessed to have an endurance of about 7,000 km—making a one-way mission striking the West Coast with KN-11s feasible. (A similar attack against Hawaii would require a 5,700 km transit—still a one-way mission. Nor could Guam be targeted from within the Sea of Japan, which would require launching from the east side of the Japanese Islands.) Putting aside whether the DPRK would mount such a mission, which would be operationally ambitious for the Korean People’s Navy, whose submarines rarely put out to sea and only operate on short exercises, the already substantial vulnerability of the new SSB noted above would be magnified greatly by the lengthy transit through the deeper Western Pacific, which would erode the SSB’s operational advantages compared to deploying in the shallower Sea of Japan. The need to cover such a large area would impose many more opportunities for detection as the SSB proceeded east, all the while coming within the coverage of successive US ASW systems. The SSB would have to either transit the whole way using its noisy diesel engines, or use them every 480 km or so when its batteries ran out and had to be recharged, which would render them more vulnerable to detection. (Recharging might be even more frequent if, as one submarine analyst suggests, the new SSB used some of the ROMEO’s battery space to house SLBM launch tubes.) Any requirement for the SSB to communicate with home would add further detection opportunities. The SSB is, therefore, unlikely to represent “a surprise first strike weapon, inching quietly towards its target undetected and then launching a barrage of missiles.” The new SSB is not an “existential threat,” “a major advance in its [DPRK’s] arsenal,” “an ominous weapon,” “a significant escalation of the North Korean ballistic missile threat,” or any of the other overwrought labels noted above. It will not expand the target coverage of DPRK land-mobile missiles, or add meaningfully to the number of warheads the DPRK can deliver (which can be done more cost-effectively by adding more land-mobile missile launchers than by adding more SSBs). South Korea, Japan, and Okinawa already are covered by the DPRK’s existing Nodong land-based medium-range ballistic missiles with ranges up to 1,500 km. The North has conducted three apparently successful tests of the 4,500 km range Hwasong-12 land-based intermediate-range ballistic missile, which is able to reach Guam, and may have deployed the 4,000 km range Musudan land-based IRBM in the early 2000s. The DPRK has conducted two apparently successful flight tests of its 10,000+ km range Hwasong-14 and one its 8,500-13,000 km range Hwasong-15 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, which could cover at least half of the continental US from North Korea. Based on its historic practices, the North could have already begun deploying these systems or could do so at any time. The new-type SSB almost certainly is substantially less survivable than the DPRK’s land-mobile ballistic missile force, and would be even more vulnerable if it were to be forward-deployed against the US West Coast or Hawaii. (The DPRK’s flight testing of a road-mobile version of the KN-11, the KN-15 [Pukguksong-2], further underscores its understanding of the superior survivability and cost-effectiveness of its land-based missiles.) Although some have contended that the allies will have to add new ASW assets to combat DPRK SSBs, they have had to plan to devote substantial ASW resources since at least the mid-1970s against North Korea’s submarine fleet, currently one of the world’s largest, and may well instead just prioritize DPRK SSBs as targets for their existing ASW assets. (Even if new ASW assets are added, it is highly unlikely that “could provoke China and Russia into being more aggressive in the Pacific.”) The SSB deployed off South Korea does offer the potential to strike ROK targets from different directions than DPRK land-based missiles, further complicating the task of missile defenses. Doing so for Japan would require deploying to the east of that country, making the SSB more vulnerable than if in the Sea of Japan, and doing so for Guam or Hawaii would require much longer transits, meaning even greater vulnerability. But the SSB probably will only carry nuclear-armed SLBMs; these would not be used in the most probable, potentially lengthy, initial conventional stage of a conflict—in which the DPRK, heavily reliant on conventional ballistic missiles, would have an urgent need to suppress allied missile defenses well before the war went nuclear. Indeed, since May, the DPRK has been flight testing three or four new types of land-based, conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles with unpredictable flight trajectories that will substantially complicate missile defenses throughout the ROK. North Korea’s new-type SSB (even a future SSB force) would provide only a marginal addition to the threat posed to South Korea, Japan and the US (including Guam and Hawaii) by the North’s much larger, increasingly longer range and much more survivable land-based ballistic missile force. While adding SSBs to the mix could “give US and allied war planners a headache,” it is an ASW headache they have been working to mitigate for many years, and an SLBM headache that pales in comparison to the North Korean land-based missile threat.” (Vann Van Diepen, “Cutting through the Hype about the North Korean Ballistic Missile Submarine Threat,” 38 North, September 6, 2019)
8/29/19:
North Korea has amended its constitution to further solidify leader Kim Jong-un’s “legal” power and authority, its state media reported Thursday, summing up the results of a rubber-stamp parliamentary session. The 2nd Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) convened on the day made “some amendments and supplements to the Socialist Constitution” of the communist nation, according to the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). Kim was apparently absent from the meeting, attended by 687 deputies, and KCNA cited a report by Choe Ryong-hae, president of the SPA Presidium. Added to the constitution was a stipulation about the status of the chairman of the State Affairs Commission (SAC), a position held by Kim. The SAC chairman is “elected” at the SPA “in accordance with the unanimous will of all the Korean people” and “not elected as deputy to the SPA,” Choe was quoted as announcing. He added that it “constitutionally fixes the status of the SAC chairman as the supreme leader of the party, state and armed forces of the DPRK elected in accordance with the unanimous will and desire of all the Korean people, both in name and reality,” KCNA said in the English-language report. The DPRK is the acronym of the country’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The SAC chairman is also “authorized to promulgate SPA ordinances and major SAC decrees and decisions and to appoint or recall diplomatic envoys to foreign countries” under another new stipulation. Therefore, Choe stressed, the “legal status of the chairman of the SAC representing our state has been further consolidated to firmly ensure the monolithic guidance of the Supreme Leader over all the state affairs,” KCNA said. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Amends Constitution to Cement Kim’s Grip on Power,” August 29, 2019) North Korea convened this year’s second session of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) today and announced amendments to its constitution mostly aimed at strengthening the legal status and authority of chairman of the State Affairs Commission (SAC) currently held by Kim. The move came just four months after the rubber-stamp legislature met in April and Kim was reelected as chairman of the SAC and the constitution was revised to make him the official head of state. “The North’s move to revise its constitution again … can be seen as a demonstration of Chairman Kim Jong-un’s intention to take care more actively of state affairs from diplomacy to economy, national defense and education,” Jeong Seong-chang, a senior researcher at the Sejong Institute, said. Under the revised constitution, SAC chairman is authorized to promulgate ordinances, decrees and decisions and to appoint or recall diplomatic envoys to foreign countries. The amendments also stated that SAC chairman’s legal status will be “supreme leader of the party, state and armed forces” which is “elected in accordance with the unanimous will and desire of all the Korean people, both in name and reality.” Experts see the transfer of the power over diplomats to leader Kim as intended to promote the image of a normal state and ease its diplomatic isolation. “It appears to be in line with (Pyongyang’s) efforts to turn itself into a normal state and tackle its diplomatic isolation by beefing up the status and responsibility of its ambassadors,” the Institute for National Security Strategy, the state-run think tank associated with Seoul’s spy agency, said in a report issued on August 30. What also drew attention from the latest constitution revisions is that SAC chairman is not elected as deputy to the SPA, which experts see as efforts to differentiate his status from other ordinary deputies. In March, Kim was not mentioned among the newly elected SPA deputies in nationwide polls, the first time that has happened in North Korean history. The omission stirred speculation that the North might be pushing to change its constitution in a way to consolidate his grip on power. Some say that all the decision appears aimed at promoting the image of a “normal state.” “It appears that the North is trying to highlight the image of a normal state to the outside by specifying that SAC chairman does not serve as SPA deputy, which I think is aimed at showing that there is a separation between chief executive and legislature,” Kim Yong-hyun, a North Korean studies professor at Dongguk University, said. Today’s session was closely monitored for any external message by Kim amid expectations that the stalled nuclear talks between the North and the U.S. may resume soon, as joint military exercises between the U.S. and South Korea recently ended. But the SPA meeting did not send any message toward the U.S. Kim was also apparently absent from Thursday’s meeting, unlike in the April session when he delivered a rare policy speech and set the year-end deadline for talks with the U.S. Experts still say that Kim’s strengthened power could be seen as a positive signal on future denuclearization talks in that Kim will have more leeway in negotiations but also take more responsibility if things go awry. “As leader of a normal state, Kim can show off his strengthened power in his talks with President Trump,” Kim of Dongguk University said. “I don’t think this is bad for North Korea-U.S. talks. It seems to be positive in that Kim has more leeway to determine his own action,” he added. Hong Min, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said that increased power comes with more responsibility, which he said could have positive impact on future U.S.-North Korea negotiations. “Thursday’s announcement appears to be aimed at sending a message to Trump and the international community to some extent that Kim Jong-un is the official leader of the country,” Hong said. “It can be understood that Kim could take an approach to future talks not just with stronger power but also more sense of responsibility.” (Koh Byung-joon, “N.K.’s Constitutional Revisions Signal Kim’s More Active Involvement in Diplomacy, Domestic Affairs,” Yonhap, August 30, 2019)
8/31/19:
DPRK First Vice-Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui’s statement: “A series of awful remarks provoking us is recently heard from the upper echelons of the U.S. administration. U.S. State Secretary Pompeo again irritated us by spouting such unreasonable words on Aug. 27 that the U.S. “recognized North Korea’s rogue behavior could not be ignored.” What he uttered to seriously insult us by even using such phrase as “rogue behavior” is just improper language, for which the U.S. administration will surely regret. Pompeo has gone so far in his language and it made the opening of the expected DPRK-U.S. working-level negotiations more difficult. It, moreover, added to the Korean people’s bad blood toward Americans. Our expectations of dialogue with the U.S. are gradually disappearing and we are being pushed to reexamine all the measures we have taken so far. We are very curious about the background of the American top diplomat’s thoughtless remarks and we will watch what calculations he has. The U.S. had better not put any longer our patience to the test with such remarks irritating us if it doesn’t want to have bitter regrets afterwards.” (KCNA, “Press Statement by First Vice-Minister of DPRK,” August 31, 2019)
9/3/19:
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his North Korean counterpart Ri Yong-ho met in Pyongyang and discussed a wide range of issues, including regional security and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, according to the ministry. The meeting took place after Wang arrived in Pyongyang on Monday for a three-day trip. During the meeting, Wang was quoted as saying that China’s stance remains unchanged that it will move friendly relations between Beijing and Pyongyang forward and expressed hope for close cooperation and communication on various fields. Ri was quoted as saying that North Korea and China are opening a new era and reaffirming the North’s efforts to advance bilateral ties and cooperation between the allies. The two also discussed the anti-government protests in Hong Kong and China’s foreign ministry said that Ri expressed “strong support” for Beijing’s stance that there should be no outside intervention in its internal affairs, according to the ministry. (Yonhap, “Top Diplomats of N. Korea, China Agree to Strengthen Ties, Cooperate on Peninsula Issues,” September 3, 2019)
9/5/19:
POE Summary: “During the reporting period, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continued to enhance its nuclear and missile programmes, although it did not conduct a nuclear test or intercontinental ballistic missile launch. Missile launches in May and July of 2019 enhanced its overall ballistic missile capabilities. While there have been continued diplomatic efforts, including at the highest levels, to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, and generally lower levels of tension on the Peninsula, the investigations carried out by the Panel of Experts show continued violations of the resolutions. For example, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continued to violate sanctions through ongoing illicit ship-to-ship transfers and the procurement of weapons of mass destruction-related items and luxury goods. These and other sanctions violations are facilitated through the country’s access to the global financial system, through bank representatives and networks operating worldwide. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has also used cyberspace to launch increasingly sophisticated attacks to steal funds from financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges to generate income. Ongoing deficiencies in the implementation by Member States of financial sanctions, combined with the deceptive practices of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, enabled the country to continue to access the international financial system. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea financial institutions, including designated banks, maintain more than 30 overseas representatives controlling bank accounts and facilitating transactions, including for illicit transfers of coal and petroleum. The country’s bank representatives and designated entities make use of complicit foreign nationals to obfuscate their activities. The Panel also investigated the widespread and increasingly sophisticated use by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of cyber means to illegally force the transfer of funds from financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges, launder stolen proceeds and generate income in evasion of financial sanctions. In particular, large-scale attacks against cryptocurrency exchanges allow the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to generate income in ways that are harder to trace and subject to less government oversight and regulation than the traditional banking sector. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea cyber actors, many operating under the direction of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, raise money for the country’s weapons of mass destruction programmes, with total proceeds to date estimated at up to $2 billion. Representatives of designated entities, including the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, Saeng Pil and Namchongang, continued to operate overseas, including under diplomatic cover, attempting to transfer conventional weapons and expertise and to procure equipment and technology for the weapons of mass destruction programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Munitions Industry Department and other designated entities continued to raise funds for those programmes, including through the overseas dispatch of information technology workers. The Reconnaissance General Bureau and other designated entities such as the Mansudae Overseas Project Group also engaged in the import of luxury goods and the attempted sale of frozen assets overseas. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continued unabated its ship-to-ship transfers, in violation of the resolutions. The Panel identified new evasion techniques, including the use of class B Automatic Identification Systems by feeder vessels and multiple transfers using smaller vessels. The Panel received a report from the United States of America and 25 other Member States containing imagery, data, calculations and an assessment that the annual cap for 2019, as set by the Security Council, of the aggregate amount of 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum transferred to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, had been exceeded in the first four months of 2019. The Panel also received a response to this from the Russian Federation that, at the present stage, it would be premature for the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to make a conclusive determination and to cease refined petroleum imports. It also received a response from China that more evidence and information were needed to make a judgment on the issue. The Panel noted that sanctions measures were not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the country. While the average time for the processing of exemption requests has been reduced, there has been no restoration of a banking channel, hindering the ongoing operations of United Nations and humanitarian organizations. The Panel recommends a series of designations and practical measures in order to provide the Security Council, the 1718 Committee and Member States additional tools by which to address the current challenges and shortcomings in the implementation of the resolutions.” (U.N., Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), September 5, 2019
Van Diepen and DePetris: “After a hiatus of almost 18 months, in May 2019, North Korea resumed ballistic missile launches. Although abiding by its self-imposed moratorium on launching intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs and IRBMs), the DPRK has thus far conducted the initial launches of at least three new types of solid-propellant, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Despite the relatively short time since these launches began and the very limited information available on these systems so far, much of the coverage in the Western media has portrayed these new systems as having “significantly raised the country’s [DPRK’s] military capabilities,” as “a marked improvement” in the North Korean missile threat to South Korea and Japan (including to US forces there)—and even an “immense danger.” These fears are overblown. The launches of new SRBMs over past four months do not fundamentally change the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and are highly unlikely to embolden Kim Jong Un to act more aggressively against the US or its allies in Northeast Asia. The deterrence that has prevented armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula for decades is as much of a reality today as it was a week, a year or five years ago. Concerns about these missiles resulting in a possible decoupling of the US-ROK alliance are unfounded. The launch of new SRBMs over the past four months totaled: seven launches on May 4 (one launch) and 9 (two launches), July 25 (two launches), and August 6 (two launches) of the KN-23, which externally resembles the Russian Iskander SRBM; four launches on July 31 and August 2 (two launches each) of a “large-caliber multiple launch guided rocket system,”[2] actually a ballistic missile; and four launches on August 10 and 16 (two launches each) of a system that externally resembles an enlarged version of the US Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). Two more SRBMs were launched to a range of 380 km on August 24. North Korea termed these “super-large multiple rocket[s],” and provided photographs showing what may be yet a fourth new type of missile system. Western media coverage has mostly assessed the threat from the three new SRBM systems based on four broad military-technical attributes: (1) missile system survivability, as a function of mobility and of the much faster reaction time of solid-propellant compared to liquid-propellant systems; (2) ability to penetrate missile defenses; (3) accuracy; and (4) dual capability. Taking these attributes together, the media generally has stressed that the three systems pose a new, sophisticated and significant threat to South Korea, Japan and US forces there. Survivability The fact that all three new systems use solid propellants and are mounted on mobile launchers is depicted in the Western media as making them substantially more survivable than the liquid-propellant missiles that make up the bulk of North Korea’s current SRBM force. One report even claimed these systems were “designed to circumvent preemptive strikes” by the US and South Korea. However, neither mobile nor solid-propellant SRBMs are new in the DPRK. All of North Korea’s deployed SRBMs have always been deployed on mobile launchers, including the several variants of liquid-propellant Scuds the DPRK has been fielding since about 1986, as well as the solid-propellant 120-to-170 km range KN-02/Toksa SRBMs that North Korea has deployed since 2006-2008 (if not earlier). Much has been made in the media coverage of the fact that solid-propellant systems do not have to be fueled prior to launch, and have a faster reaction time than liquids. But although some media coverage suggests liquids must sit out in the open just prior to launch to be fueled, thus providing substantial time and opportunity for their destruction during crisis or wartime, North Korean Scud launchers would almost certainly have been dispersed from base carrying fueled missiles. The most important contribution of solid-propellant mobile missiles to survivability probably stems from their ability to operate in the field without needing propellant storage and handling vehicles, reducing their footprint and, thus, their detectability. Although solid-propellant SRBMs still can react more quickly than liquid-propellant SRBMs, the use of already-fueled liquid-propellant missiles in crisis or wartime cuts down much of the difference. Iraq showed in the 1990-1991 Gulf War that it could launch already-fueled Scuds within 30 minutes of arriving at a new launch site, and have the launchers immediately depart to alternate concealment sites (“shoot and scoot”). Iraq’s ability during 1990-1991 to preserve most (if not all) of its mobile Scud launchers using such tactics in the face of coalition air superiority and a dedicated “Scud-hunting” effort—and in desert terrain, to boot—underscores the substantial survivability benefits even liquid-propellant mobile SRBMs enjoy if competently operated by the DPRK. Ability to Penetrate Missile Defenses Western media coverage has rightly focused on features in all three new SRBMs that will further complicate the task of US and ROK missile defenses: the apparent trajectory-changing capability demonstrated in launches of the KN-23; the demonstration of 48 km apogees by the KN-23 and the ATACMS-like system, above the 40 km maximum engagement altitude of the Patriot and below the 50 km minimum engagement altitude of the THAAD and Aegis missile defense systems; and the potential for guidance throughout flight (and, therefore, an unpredictable flight path). One analyst even contends that the defense-avoidance features of the KN-23 represent “…an alarming evolution in North Korea’s strategic thinking…beyond rudimentary forces that could retaliate for an attack or attempt to prevent U.S. reinforcements from arriving on the peninsula in a major war,” toward “a first strike option to destroy stealth aircraft on the ground before they have a chance to take off, or potentially to destroy the command and control networks that coordinate military operations.” North Korea can, however, already operate its existing SRBM force in ways that would complicate allied missile defense efforts; for example, it can conduct saturation attacks to overwhelm the number of interceptors that can be launched and guided at one time, and defense-suppression attacks against the radars and other key nodes of the missile defense system. The existing “rudimentary” force would be quite capable of executing the kind of first strike option attributed uniquely to the KN-23. Moreover, North Korea flight tested three times in 2017 (twice apparently successfully) a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) payload for the Scud that also would have an unpredictable flight path. But the new SRBM systems, if deployed in sufficient numbers, will give the DPRK more options to evade and attack allied missile defenses, and probably will reduce the number of SRBMs North Korea would need to expend in defense suppression/saturation missions (making more available for other targets). Accuracy High accuracy allows ballistic missiles to have greater lethality with conventional warheads. Media coverage has depicted the three systems as more accurate than existing DPRK SRBMs. This is a reasonable assumption when comparing inertially-guided DPRK Scud SRBMs to the KN-23 (given the latter’s resemblance to the relatively accurate Russian Iskander) and the “multiple launch guided rocket system” (given its shorter range, and, thus, shorter opportunity for inertial guidance system drift, and the presence of nose-mounted canards, suggesting in-flight guidance). There is less of a basis for such an assumption in the case of the ATACMS-like system, which has no obvious visual indicator of terminal or satellite-aided guidance—although, of course, these cannot be ruled out, either. For all three new systems, it is important to point out that we do not yet know from open-source data how they are guided, how capable their guidance systems are or what accuracy they have actually demonstrated. Also, the current DPRK SRBM force does not just contain inertially-guided Scuds: the long-deployed KN-02/Toksa may use an optical correlation system to supplement its guidance, and as noted above, the DPRK may already have deployed a MaRV on some of its Scuds that might be as accurate as the new systems (although, this, too, is unknown). Dual Capability Some media reports have noted that the KN-23, and perhaps the ATACMS-like system, can carry either nuclear or conventional warheads. A few of these reports have claimed this will create a “new level of unpredictability,” because the US and ROK would not be able to tell if an incoming missile was nuclear and thus would have “a matter of seconds” to determine how to respond. This, in turn, reputedly would tempt both the Allies and the DPRK to launch their missiles before the other side could. This scenario, however, is much more reflective of the US and USSR during the Cold War than it is of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The North probably believes a war would be preceded by an identifiable and relatively lengthy period of tension. Both sides almost certainly expect a conflict to begin with the use of conventional weapons, and probably to continue conventionally for a substantial period. North Korea has long had the option to initiate a war (or initiate escalation during a conventional war) with nuclear-armed SRBMs, but the US and ROK appear to have relied on the threat of retaliation by America’s massive, survivable nuclear capabilities deployed off-shore to deter such a move rather than to hold forces on the peninsula on a hair trigger to launch before the DPRK can (which still might not prevent a DPRK nuclear strike). In sum, the true contribution of the three new SRBM systems to the DPRK missile threat will depend most heavily on how many launchers and missiles of each type are deployed, and how accurate the new systems turn out to be. Both of these factors currently are unknown. If the new systems are substantially more accurate than existing DPRK SRBMs and are deployed in significant numbers, rather than constituting an “immense danger,” they will add incrementally to the longstanding SRBM threat that ROK and US forces have faced for over 25 years. In particular, they would allow North Korea to subject more U.S. and ROK targets to SRBM attack (particularly more point targets), add to the intensity of attacks, increase the North’s opportunities to tailor particular attacks to particular missile systems and further complicate the task of U.S. and ROK missile defenses. Context Matters: Why Now? Just as US officials must scrutinize the technical aspects of the SRBM launches, they would also be wise to take the broader context of these missile tests into account…The Kim regime has made it abundantly clear over the past two months that it would respond to the joint US-ROK 19-2 Dong Maeng joint military exercises. In late June, over a month before the drills commenced, North Korean foreign ministry officials warned Washington and Seoul about proceeding. The Kim regime’s interpretation of the US-ROK exercises remained consistent throughout: Such behavior is a deliberate act of hostility inconsistent with the Panmunjom and Pyongyang communiqués signed in 2018, both of which emphasized a de-escalation of military hostilities between the two Koreas and the establishment of a comprehensive inter-Korean dialogue. As the drills began, the tone of the North’s rhetoric became more brazen and less compromising. Pyongyang threatened to rescind its moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests and linked a resumption of denuclearization negotiations to the Moon administration showing contrition for its participation in the military exercises. South Korea’s acquisition in July of the F-35 fighter provided the North with an additional reason to proceed with SRBM testing. The spate of missile launches by the North should not have been a surprise, therefore, to US and South Korean officials. An August 6 statement from the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs bluntly stated that Washington and Seoul’s military exercises compelled “the DPRK to take countermeasures for eliminating the potential and direct threats to its state security.” From North Korea’s perspective, a tit-for-tat response to the US-ROK drills with military drills of its own was not only an appropriate response to an undiplomatic act, but also a way to send a stern message that Pyongyang will not be intimidated. For the North, the May-August missile launches were as much about demonstrating resolve and toughness in the face of adversity as they were about enhancing the range, accuracy and survivability of its SRBM fleet. Taking the Long-View: Deterrence Is Still Alive and Well Although there is a lot of technical information we don’t yet know about the new SRBM systems, North Korea’s military posture vis-à-vis the combined strength of the US-ROK alliance remains relatively static. With or without the new SRBMs, the ROK was already under the shadow of thousands of North Korean missile, rocket, mortar and artillery systems, all of which have proven to be a sufficient deterrent against a theoretical US or South Korean military attack. The Kim regime’s Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6 (Scud-B/C) SRBMs have long possessed the range to reach the South Korean capital and the rest of the country with relative ease. The regime’s larger quantity of 150-170 mm self-propelled howitzers and 200-240 mm multiple rocket launchers just north of the Demilitarized Zone could already cause extreme damage to Seoul and tens of thousands of casualties in the event of a conflict, devastation that has dissuaded Washington and Seoul in the past from embracing a more aggressive strategy. The greater Seoul area—where approximately 50 percent of South Korea’s population lives—is effectively already held hostage to older North Korean conventional weaponry. The potential advent of the new SRBM systems does not add much to the overall threat picture, or add “a significant challenge to the deterrence posture of the U.S.-South Korean alliance.” Some analysts are increasingly concerned about the possible decoupling of the US-ROK alliance in light of the North’s improved SRBM capability. The theory is straightforward: the more durable and accurate North Korea’s SRBM inventory, the less likely the United States will defend the South (or Japan) in the event of a conflict. US President Trump’s nonchalant dismissal of the North’s SRBM tests as less significant than longer-range IRBM or ICBM launches has done nothing to assuage South Korean and Japanese worries about the United States’ commitment to come to their defense against a North Korean attack. Some analysts have suggested that Trump’s constant downplaying of North Korean SRBM launches has the potential to irreparably harm America’s reputation as a reliable ally over the long-term. Such alliance decoupling would presumably heighten Pyongyang’s willingness to embrace a more confrontational strategy toward both Seoul and Tokyo. However, this concern is vastly overstated and based more on emotion than cold-hearted analysis. First, the North Koreans cannot be sure how their SRBM capability will hold up during a prospective conflict. Testing and exercises are one thing, but real-life scenarios where US and ROK missile defense and counter-strike systems are fully prepared for operations is something else entirely; it is a safe assumption that a portion of these missiles are likely to be rendered ineffective by these allied capabilities. Kim is unlikely to stake the survival of his regime on such an SRBM program. Indeed, the very concept of alliance decoupling is at best dubious—with over 28,000 US military personnel stationed on South Korean soil and tens of thousands of additional American civilians residing in Seoul alone, a North Korean attack utilizing any weapon is bound to result in American casualties and, would thus almost certainly prompt a fierce US military response. Conclusion The multiple SRBM launches since May 2019 are cause for concern, but their impact on the general strategic environment should not be overstated. Despite claims of technological progress from the North, there are a lot of technical details related to these new missile types that are unknown, including deployment numbers, accuracy and actual effectiveness against US and ROK missile defenses. While it is reasonable to assess that these new systems will allow North Korea to increase the number of potential targets in South Korea subject to SRBM attack, South Korea and the US forces deployed there have lived under the North’s SRBM threat for decades. Kim Jong Un’s eagerness to take risks on the Korean Peninsula is unlikely to change, even if his missile program has improved incrementally. There is no evidence to suggest that the latest missile flight tests have persuaded him to adopt a more aggressive posture—particularly when such a course of action could put his own survival in severe jeopardy. Kim’s instinct for self-preservation and the US military response that would almost certainly occur in the event of a North Korean attack of any kind will continue to restrain him from taking reckless action.” (Vann H. Van Diepen and Daniel R. DePetris, “Putting North Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles into Perspective,” 38 North, September 5, 2019)
9/6/19:
Pompeo: “Q: Well, it’s great to have you back in the state. And I know you obviously have a lot on your plate around the world right now. It’s — there’s never a slow time for you, even though it might be slow for Congress right now. When you look at what is happening right now, Mr. Secretary, with North Korea and some of the missile tests that they are undergoing, it seems like there have been corners of the administration that don’t seem overly concerned about it at this point in time. How concerned are you about what is going on there with Kim Jong-un? POMPEO: Remember the President’s mission set. We came in when the North Koreans were engaged in behaviors that we needed to fix, and we set about building out a coalition. We were successful at doing that. We got the whole world to join in the toughest sanctions in history. And then President Trump agreed to meet with Chairman Kim. He’s now done so three times. It’s been important, because Chairman Kim has made commitments. He’s made commitments to denuclearize. We’ve made commitments to create a brighter future for the North Korean people. I’m very committed to working with the North Korean team to negotiate a set of outcomes that will be good for both the United States and the world in terms of reducing the nuclear threat that emanates from the Korean Peninsula, but also ensuring that security and peace and prosperity can come to North Korea as well. We always knew it would take time. We always knew there would be bumps in the road. But it is truly the case that we hope Chairman Kim and his team will deliver on the promises they made back in Singapore in the summer of last year. Q: Have you waivered? Or how committed do you think they are to those negotiations with you, based on some of those actions they’ve taken lately? POMPEO: We think they’re still committed. We think they’re still — intend to head down the diplomatic path, and we’re doing everything we can to encourage that, because we think it’s the right outcome for the world. The world doesn’t need conflict. We don’t need nuclear risk. Those nuclear weapon systems that North Korea has been driving towards for decades now don’t provide the security that the North Koreans believe they do. In fact, what will provide them security is coming to a set of understandings with the United States and with the world to denuclearize. And when they do so, we’ll provide the security assurances that are needed for them and for their people. Every nation has the sovereign right to defend itself. Then we can create economic opportunity and better lives for the people of North Korea as well. It’s our mission set. We’re incredibly focused on it.” (DoS, “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo with Pete Mundo of KCMO,” Kansas City, September 6, 2019)
Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun called on the North to halt its demonstrations of hostility and return to denuclearization talks in a speech at the University of Michigan. “At this moment, to achieve further progress, the most important step we can take is for the United States and North Korea to work together to overcome the policies and demonstrations of hostility that compromise the simple ability of our diplomats to talk, and to sustain the rhythm of negotiations,” Biegun said in the speech, which was broadcast online. “If we are to succeed, North Korea must set aside its search for obstacles to negotiations and instead seek opportunities for engagement while that opportunity lasts. We have made clear to North Korea: we are prepared to engage as soon as we hear from them. We are ready. But we cannot do this by ourselves,” he said. Biegun underscored the threat a nuclear-armed North Korea would pose to the region by forcing other countries, such as South Korea and Japan, to consider nuclear armament themselves. “At what point will voices in South Korea or Japan and elsewhere in Asia begin to ask if they need to be considering their own nuclear capabilities? And what will this mean for a region whose prosperity and growth has been so inextricably tied to long-term stability and peace?” he asked in his speech. If tensions can be lowered, U.S. military forces in South Korea will no longer need to stand perpetually ready to fight, he added. “They could instead serve and cooperate to build a foundation to support a lasting peace. And if we can forge sustainable peace, forge the modalities of cooperation, we will reap the mutual rewards that will spring from frank discussion,” Biegun said. “This is President Trump’s vision, and it is a vision he is confident Chairman Kim shares.” (Lee Haye-ah, “U.S. Envoy Calls on N. Korea to Halt Hostility, Return to Talks,” Yonhap, September 6, 2019) Biegun appeared to call for faster action and acknowledged North Korea’s ongoing efforts to improve its nuclear capabilities. “We are aware that this diplomatic opening is fragile. We fully understand the consequences if diplomacy fails, and we are clear-eyed about the dangerous reality of ongoing development by North Korea of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them across the region and the world,” he said. Biegun also outlined the Trump administration’s overall vision for the talks and indicated that the United States recognizes that progress is possible through reciprocal actions that help advance the goals set out by the two leaders in Singapore in 2018. “Through direct engagement, we must create space and momentum for diplomacy,” Biegun said. “Once we begin intensive negotiations, we can directly discuss actions that each side can take to create more and better choices for our leaders to consider. Neither the United States nor North Korea has to accept all the risk of moving forward.” (Daryl G. Kimball and Julia Masterson, “North Korea Opens Door to Nuclear Talks,” Arms Control Today, October 2019) Washington is increasingly worried that failure to reach a denuclearization deal with North Korea will encourage a nuclear arms race among U.S. allies in the region. Biegun quoted former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as warning that “we are working today to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, but if that fails, we will respond to the proliferation challenges in Asia.” “Our allies, such as South Korea and Japan, have quit their nuclear weapons programs partly because of the extended deterrence they have in their alliance with the United States,” he pointed out. But he added that at some point they will start considering their own nuclear weapons if the North Korean nuclear threat continues. “I’m afraid Dr. Kissinger is right that North Korea will not be the last nuclear power in Asia if the international community fails to hold talks with the U.S.,” he added. Biegun’s remarks can also be read as a warning to China to play a more active role in getting North Korea to return to the negotiating table unless it wants more nuclear-armed countries on its doorstep. Quoting a Trump administration official, the Washington Post reported that the State Department is considering a new approach during the UN General Assembly starting September 17 to put public pressure on North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. It said Washington “remains stymied in its efforts to coax Pyongyang back to the negotiating table, leading to mounting frustrations that time is running out while [North Korean leader Kim Jong-un] has strengthened his position.” It added, “During a private briefing on Capitol Hill last week, a senior Trump administration official told congressional staffers that U.S. officials were continuing to reach out to Pyongyang but had heard nothing back.” Meanwhile, when asked whether the U.S. is willing to pull troops out of South Korea if North Korea scraps its nuclear weapons, Biegun said Washington would weigh many “strategic reconsiderations” if progress is made on all issues. (Cho Yi-jun, “U.S. Fears Nuclear Arms Race in Northeast Asia,” Chosun Ilbo, September 9, 2019)
Pyongyang has named an army general with expertise in artillery as its new military commander, North Korean state media reported, in a move that an analyst said could signal plans for the development of new weapons. Pak Jong Chon was appointed the “chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army,” KCNA said late today, adding that the decision was announced during a meeting attended by leader Kim Jong Un. Pak succeeds Ri Yong Gil, an expert on military operations who has served in the position on two separate occasions since 2013. His promotion from head of the Korean People’s Army’s Artillery Command may suggest a new military focus on weapons development, said Ahn Chan-il, a North Korean defector and researcher in Seoul. The North was particularly threatened by the South’s acquisition of cutting-edge American F-35 stealth fighter jets — known for their ability to evade radar detection — earlier this year, Ahn told AFP. “It is also notable that Pak accompanied Kim during the North’s test-firing of its new weapons,” he added. “With him as the North’s top military officer, it’s more likely that Pyongyang will prioritize artillery along with its new weapons system.” Pak accompanied Kim when he supervised the test-fire of what North Korea said were “new-type tactical guided missiles” in August. Pak was also present when Kim oversaw the test of a “newly developed large-caliber multiple launch guided rocket system” in July, KCNA reported at the time. (AFP, JIJI, “North Korean Artillery Commander Becomes Military Chief,” September 7, 2019)
9/7/19:
The U.S. Navy has announced that the Ohio class ballistic missile submarine USS Nebraska test-fired four Trident II missiles over the course of three days this week. The service does regularly test its submarine-launched ballistic missiles, but typically just in ones or twos. This larger test event comes as the United States is supposed to be getting close to fielding a new version of the Trident II with controversial lower-yield W76-2 warheads and amid an emerging arms race with Russia. In this most recent series of Trident II test launches, Nebraska fired two missiles on September 4, 2019, and another two on September 6, 2019. The submarine fired all of the weapons from an unspecified location off the coast of Southern California. Based on U.S. government warning notices to aircraft and ships, it appeared that the missiles may have come down in the Pacific Ocean north of Hawaii and/or near Guam. To date, there have been 176 total test launches of the Trident II, also known as the Trident D5. “These test flights were part of a Commander Evaluation Test (CET) whose primary goal was to validate performance expectations of the life-extended Trident II (D5) strategic weapon system,” according to a U.S. Navy release. “CETs and other flight tests are conducted on a recurring, scheduled basis to evaluate and ensure the continued reliability and accuracy of the system.” (Joseph Trevithick, “U.S. Navy Fires an Impressive Four Trident Missiles in Just Three Days,” The Drive, September 7, 2019)
9/8/19:
Pompeo: “Q: Meantime, on North Korea, their nuclear program, the talks have stalled since the Hanoi summit, and North Korea continues to test missiles. U.S. intelligence has concluded that they continue to add to their stockpile of nuclear weapons fuel as well. Are you concerned at all that Kim Jong-un is stringing President Trump along? POMPEO: George, we took office with nuclear tests being conducted and long-range missile tests being conducted with all too great a frequency. President Trump and my team have been working to deliver on the promises that were made in Singapore back in June of the year before. We know Chairman Kim has continued to make the commitment to denuclearize. We are hopeful that in the coming days or perhaps weeks we’ll be back at the negotiating table with them. That’s the best outcome. It’s the best outcome for the North Korean people. President Trump has made a commitment to their security and economic prosperity. We know that we can turn around that economy. The mission set, however, is to make sure that nuclear weapons inside of North Korea that have existed there for an awfully long time — George, you served in an administration where that nuclear stockpile grew as well — we have to make sure that Chairman Kim honors the commitments that he made to President Trump. I think President Trump would be very disappointed if Chairman Kim doesn’t return to the negotiating table or conducts missile tests that are inconsistent with the agreements that they made when the two of them were together these three times. Q: You put your finger on the problem. The North Koreans have continued the nuclear program through President Clinton, through President Bush, through President Obama. They appear to be continuing it now as well. And these short-term ballistic missile tests are improving their program, aren’t they? And isn’t that a violation of UN Security Council resolutions? POMPEO: Chairman Kim’s commitment to President Trump was pretty clear. He has not yet violated that. It’s not that we don’t all wish — we’re disappointed that he is continuing to conduct these short-range tests. We wish that he would stop that. But our mission set at the State Department is very clear: to get back to the table, to present a mechanism by which we can deliver, George, what I know you share my objective of — a full, completely denuclearized and verified denuclearized North Korea. That’s the goal. It’s what we continue to work on.” (DoS, “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo with George Stephanopoulos of ABC’s This Week,” September 8, 2019)
9/9/19:
DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui’s statement: “I gave heed to the recent repeated remarks of high-ranking U.S. officials leading the negotiations with the DPRK that they are ready for the DPRK-U.S. working negotiation. Kim Jong Un, chairman of the State Affairs Commission, clarified his stand at the historic Policy Speech in April that it is essential for the U.S. to quit its current calculation method and approach us with new one and we will wait for a bold decision from the U.S. with patience till the end of this year. I think the U.S. has since had enough time to find the calculation method that it can share with us. We have willingness to sit with the U.S. side for comprehensive discussions of the issues we have so far taken up at the time and place to be agreed late in September. I believe that the U.S. side will come out with a proposal geared to the interests of the DPRK and the U.S. and based on the calculation method acceptable to us. If the U.S. side fingers again the worn-out scenario which has nothing to do with the new calculation method at the DPRK-U.S. working negotiation to be held with so much effort, the DPRK-U.S. dealings may come to an end.” (KCNA, “DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Issues Statement,” September 9, 2019)
9/10/19:
North Korea fired two short-range projectiles from a western region toward the East Sea, South Korea’s military said, just hours after the communist nation offered to resume nuclear talks with the United States. The projectiles were fired at 6:53 a.m. and 7:12 a.m. from areas in the city of Kaechon, South Pyongan Province, about 80 kilometers north of the capital, Pyongyang, in a northeastern direction, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said. Both flew around 330 km across the peninsula, reaching a maximum altitude of around 50 to 60 km, the JCS said, while declining to confirm if the two projectiles landed in the East Sea or how fast they flew. The JCS added that South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities are analyzing their exact type. In response to the latest launches, South Korea held an emergency National Security Council (NSC) meeting, presided over by Chung Eui-yong, chief of the presidential national security office, and reviewed the overall security conditions on the Korean Peninsula, according to Cheong Wa Dae. In Washington, a senior U.S. government official said it is aware of the latest missile launches and is closely monitoring the situation in cooperation with its allies. The firings came just hours after First Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui expressed a willingness to resume denuclearization talks with the U.S. in late September and demanded that Washington come up with a new proposal acceptable to Pyongyang. The launches could be designed to strengthen Pyongyang’s negotiating hand ahead of the resumption of the nuclear talks that have been stalled since February’s no-deal breakdown of a summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Today’s firings were the 10th such launches so far this year, during which the North tested new types of missiles or multiple rocket launchers in protest of joint military exercises between the U.S. and the South, among others. The North last conducted such launches on August 24 from the eastern town of Sondok in South Hamgyong Province into the East Sea, and said it tested a “new super-large” multiple rocket launch system. “What the North test-fired today could be the same one launched on August 24, taking into consideration its flight range and other features, but we are open to all possibilities, including that they might be another new type,” a military officer said. The projectiles fired on Aug. 24 flew around 380 km at a maximum altitude of 97 km and a top speed of around Mach 6.5, according to the JCS. (Oh Seok-min, “N. Korea Fires 2 Short-Range Projectiles toward East Sea: JCS,” Yonhap, September 10, 2019) Pyongyang said the test-firing fulfilled its purpose, specifying it had conducted two rounds of tests. But experts in South Korea have floated the possibility that one projectile failed to reach the sea and hit land instead, and that the regime may have attempted to launch a third projectile. “The recent test-firing was in full line with its purpose and served as an occasion to clearly decide the next-stage orientation to complete the weapon system,” KCNA said. “Two rounds of test-firing took place.” In pictures released by the state-run media, the four-tube launcher had three of its caps open, appearing as though it may have sought to test-fire three projectiles. When it fired two projectiles from the new multiple rocket launcher last time on August 24, only two caps were open in released pictures. “In the picture, you can see that three of four tubes of the launcher do not have the cover caps, which means that three projectiles were launched,” said Kim Dong-yub, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies. “It is also interesting that Pyongyang specifically reported that it conducted two rounds of tests, which is unusual.” Kim also said Seoul’s JCS may have found something strange about the launch and may deliberately have not revealed details about the projectiles. Other experts say North Korea sought to launch three projectiles, but one of them may not have worked. It has also been pointed out that one of the two projectiles that flew may have hit land, not the East Sea, the likely target. Regarding the speculations, the JCS confirmed two projectiles were launched, but that it is still conducting a thorough analysis of the launch. (Jo He-rim, “N.K.’s Test-Firing of New Rocket Launcher May Have Failed,” Korea Herald, September 11, 2019)
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, gave field guidance to the test-fire of super-large multiple rocket launcher again on Tuesday {September 10]. The Supreme Leader learned in detail about the indexes to be confirmed in the test-fire while measuring the time of combat deployment of super-large multiple rocket launcher. Two rounds of test-fire took place. The recent test-fire was in full line with its purpose and served as an occasion to clearly decide the next-stage orientation to complete the weapon system. The Supreme Leader said that the weapon system of super-large multiple rocket launcher has been finally verified in terms of combat operation, the characteristics of trajectory, accuracy and precise homing functions, adding that what remains to be done is running fire test which is most vivid character in terms of the power of multiple rocket launcher. He highly appreciated the ardent patriotism and loyalty to the Party of the leading officials, scientists and technicians in the field of national defense science research who are bringing record-breaking successes one after another in the development of our style super-large multiple rocket launcher and extended thanks to them. He indicated immediate tasks and ways for putting the production of our style tactical guided weapons including super-large multiple rocket launcher on the highest level and steadily attaining the goals of breaking through the cutting-edge in the field of national defense science. He was accompanied by Army General Pak Jong Chon, chief of the general staff of the Korean People’s Army, and Kim Yo Jong, Jo Yong Won, Ri Pyong Chol, Kim Jong Sik and other senior officials of the Party Central Committee and Jang Chang Ha, Jon Il Ho, Jong Sung Il and other leading officials in the field of national defense science to guide the test-fire.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of Super-Large Multiple Rocket Launcher Again,” September 11, 2019)
Japan has failed to track the trajectory of some of North Korea’s new types of short-range missiles in a recent series of launches, raising concerns over Tokyo’s defense capabilities, sources close to the matter have said. The missiles, including some capable of reaching Japan, apparently escaped detection due to their low altitudes and irregular trajectories, and Tokyo is said to believe that North Korea is attempting to break through Japan’s existing missile defense network. In missile launches from May to September, North Korea fired off projectiles with different shapes and capabilities from previous ones on 10 occasions, according to the sources. Many of them flew below an altitude of 60 kilometers, lower than the altitude at which missiles typically travel. Some of the missiles managed to escape detection by the Maritime Self-Defense Force’s Aegis-equipped destroyer in the Sea of Japan as well as radar deployed in Japan and operated by the Air Self-Defense Force, the sources said (Kyodo, “Japan Radar Stations and MDF Crews Failed to Track Recent North Korean Missile Launches,” Japan Times, September 23, 2019)
President Trump pushed out John R. Bolton, his third national security adviser, amid fundamental disputes over how to handle major foreign policy challenges like Iran, North Korea and most recently Afghanistan. The departure ended a 17-month partnership that had grown so tense that the two men even disagreed over how they parted ways, as Trump announced on Twitter that he had fired the adviser only to be rebutted by Bolton, who insisted he had resigned of his own accord. Their differences came to a climax in recent days as Bolton waged a last-minute campaign to stop the president from signing a peace agreement at Camp David with leaders of the radical Taliban group. He won the policy battle as Trump scrapped the deal but lost the larger war when the president grew angry about the way the matter played out. Trump and his aides privately blamed the national security adviser for news reports describing Bolton’s opposition to the deal. Vice President Mike Pence and his camp likewise grew angry at reports suggesting he had agreed with Bolton, seeing them as an effort to bolster the adviser’s position. “I informed John Bolton last night that his services are no longer needed at the White House,” the president tweeted. “I disagreed strongly with many of his suggestions, as did others in the Administration, and therefore I asked John for his resignation, which was given to me this morning. I thank John very much for his service.” Bolton disputed the president’s version of events in his own tweet 12 minutes later. “I offered to resign last night and President Trump said, ‘Let’s talk about it tomorrow,’” Bolton wrote, without elaborating. Responding to a question from The New York Times via text, Bolton said his resignation was his own initiative, not the president’s. “Offered last night without his asking,” he wrote. “Slept on it and gave it to him this morning.” In the meantime, the White House said Charles M. Kupperman, the deputy national security adviser, would serve in an acting capacity. No other president has had four national security advisers in his first three years in office. While it was clear for months that Bolton was on thin ice, the end came with a brutal suddenness typical of the Trump White House. This morning, Bolton led a meeting of the national security principals in the Situation Room, with no sign that anything was about to break. At 11 a.m., the White House even scheduled a 1:30 p.m. news briefing where Bolton would talk about terrorism alongside Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. But then came Trump’s tweet two minutes before noon, and Bolton left the White House. The briefing went forward without him, and Pompeo, who has feuded with Bolton for months, shed no tears about the president’s decision. “He should have people that he trusts and values, and whose efforts and judgments benefit him in delivering American foreign policy,” Pompeo told reporters. The secretary also made no effort to hide his rivalry with Bolton. “There were definitely places that Ambassador Bolton and I had different views about how we should proceed,” he said. Asked if he was blindsided by the decision, Pompeo said, “I’m never surprised,” as he and Mnuchin grinned broadly. Pompeo and Bolton generally shared a conservative policy outlook, but the secretary of state has proved more adept at managing the president and subordinating his views to Trump’s, while Bolton kept pushing his beliefs even after they were rejected. Pompeo did not see Bolton as a team player, but as someone who undermined the president’s policies. Bolton saw Pompeo as a politician more interested in currying Trump’s favor to have his support in a future run for Senate. Bolton’s adversaries inside the administration have been after him for weeks, spreading stories about how the national security adviser had been excluded from meetings and was on the outs with the president. When Bolton declined to appear on two Sunday talk shows during the Group of 7 summit last month, his internal critics said it was because he refused to defend the president’s policies on Russia. Bolton denied that, saying he did not go on the shows because he anticipated that the main topic would be the trade war with China, which is not his area of specialty. Bolton, the hard-liner, saw his job as keeping Trump from going soft in what he considered fuzzy-headed diplomacy. “While John Bolton was national security adviser for the last 17 months, there have been no bad deals,” a person close to Bolton said minutes after the president’s announcement, reflecting the ousted adviser’s view. To Bolton’s aggravation, the president has continued to court Kim Jong-un, the repressive leader of North Korea, despite Kim’s refusal to surrender his nuclear program and despite repeated short-range missile tests by the North that have rattled its neighbors. In recent days, Trump has also expressed a willingness to meet with President Hassan Rouhani of Iran under the right circumstances, and even to extend short-term financing to Tehran. Pompeo confirmed today that it was possible such a meeting could take place this month on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly session in New York. The tension between Trump and Bolton was aggravated in recent months by the president’s decisions to call off a planned airstrike on Iran in retaliation for the downing of an American surveillance drone and to meet with Kim at the Demilitarized Zone and cross over into North Korea. Bolton favored the strike on Iran and publicly criticized the recent North Korean missile tests that Trump brushed off. Trump disavowed regime change in Iran, a long-held goal of Bolton’s. After the president arranged the DMZ meeting with Kim via a last-minute tweet, Bolton did not accompany him and instead proceeded on a previously scheduled trip to Mongolia. The day after the DMZ meeting, Bolton pushed an internal policy debate into the open by disputing a Times story reporting that some administration officials were considering an agreement with North Korea for a nuclear freeze as an intermediate step toward full disarmament. Bolton, on Twitter, accused someone of trying to “box in the President” and said “there should be consequences.” It soon became clear those officials were Pompeo and his special envoy, Stephen E. Biegun, making Bolton’s tweet a veiled attack on them. The same day [July 1], Bolton’s aides obtained a copy of notes taken by State Department reporters during an off-the-record briefing with Biegun discussing the nuclear freeze. Bolton tried to use those notes as a cudgel in the internal policy battle, administration officials said. Details of Biegun’s meeting were leaked to the news outlet Axios. If Trump’s original national security team was seen as restraining a mercurial new commander in chief, the president found himself sometimes restraining Bolton. Behind the scenes, he joked about Bolton’s penchant for confrontation. “If it was up to John, we’d be in four wars now,” one senior official recalled the president saying. Trump also grew disenchanted with Bolton over the failed effort to push out President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela. Rather than the easy victory he was led to anticipate, Trump has found himself bogged down in a conflict over which he has less influence than he had assumed. Russia was another flash point for the two. While Trump seeks to woo President Vladimir V. Putin, Bolton considers Moscow a hostile player. After Trump last month suggested inviting Russia back into the Group of 7 despite its annexation of Crimea, Bolton traveled to Ukraine to reassure its leaders of American support against Russian aggression. (Peter Baker, “President Ousts Bolton amid Rifts on Foreign Policy,” New York Times, September 11, 2019, p. A-1)
9/11/19:
Trump: “Jeff. Q. A follow-up on your decision yesterday with regard to Mr. Bolton. What led you to decide to part ways? THE PRESIDENT: So, John is somebody that I actually got along with very well. He made some very big mistakes. When he talked about the Libyan model for Kim Jong Un, that was not a good statement to make. You just take a look at what happened with Qaddafi. That was not a good statement to make, and it set us back. And, frankly, he wanted to do things — not necessarily tougher than me. You know, John is known as a tough guy. He’s so tough, he got us into Iraq. That’s tough. And — but he’s somebody that I actually had a very good relationship with, but he wasn’t getting along with people in the administration that I consider very important. And I hope we — we’ve left in good stead, but maybe we have and maybe we haven’t. … Q Who are your top picks to replace Bolton? THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have five people that want it very much. I mean, a lot more than that would like to have it. But there are five people that I consider very highly qualified. Good people I’ve gotten to know over the last three years. And we’ll be announcing somebody next week, but we have some very highly qualified people. But we were set back very badly when John Bolton talked about the Libyan model. And he made a mistake. And as soon as he mentioned that, the “Libyan model,” what a disaster. Take a look at what happened to Qaddafi, with the Libyan model. And he’s using that to make a deal with North Korea? And I don’t blame Kim Jong Un for what he said after that. And he wanted nothing to do with John Bolton. And that’s not a question of being tough; that’s a question of being not smart, to say something like that. So I wish John the best. We actually got along very well. I’m sure he’ll, you know, do whatever he can do to, you know, spin it his way. John came to see me the night before. In fact, I think a lot of you people were out there waiting for me to get on the helicopter. I’m sure you have a shot somewhere along the line. And he sat right in that chair. And I told him, “John, you have too many people, and you’re not getting along with people. And a lot of us, including me, disagree with some of your tactics and some of your ideas. And I wish you well, but I’d like you to submit your resignation.” And he did that. And I really — I know he’s going to do well. I hope he’s going to do well. And I wish him well.” (White House, President Trump’s Remarks at Meeting on Vaping, September 11, 2019)
9/13/19:
The U.S. Department of Treasury issued new designations against three North Korean entities involved in hacking and cyber theft. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) targeted the Lazarus Group, Bluenoroff, Andariel for their wide-ranging cybercrimes and their relationship the previously sanctioned Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). “Treasury is taking action against North Korean hacking groups that have been perpetrating cyberattacks to support illicit weapon and missile programs,” Sigal Mandelker, Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence said in a press release. “We will continue to enforce existing U.S. and UN sanctions against North Korea and work with the international community to improve cybersecurity of financial networks.” According to OFAC, the Lazarus Group targets “government, military, financial, manufacturing, publishing, media, entertainment, and international shipping companies, as well as critical infrastructure.” Part of the RGB’s 3rd Bureau, 110th research center, OFAC claimed the group was behind 2017’s WannaCry attack which affected 300,000 computers in over 150 countries, including part of the UK’s National Health Service infrastructure. The other two designations targeted two Lazarus subgroups, who between them were responsible for several high profile cyber-attacks. “Bluenoroff conducted successful operations targeting more than 16 organizations across 11 countries, including the SWIFT messaging system, financial institutions, and cryptocurrency exchanges,” OFAC said. The North Korean hacking group worked with Lazarus to steal $80 million from the Central Bank of Bangladesh’s New York Federal Reserve account in 2016. OFAC said that the second subgroup called Andariel focuses on “conducting malicious cyber operations on foreign businesses, government agencies, financial services infrastructure, private corporations, and businesses, as well as the defense industry.” “One (of Andariel’s attacks) spotted in September 2016 was a cyber intrusion into the personal computer of the South Korean Defense Minister in office at that time and the Defense Ministry’s intranet in order to extract military operations intelligence.” The OFAC press release also highlighted that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) were working “in tandem” to disclose potential North Korean cyberattacks. “This, along with today’s OFAC action, is an example of a government-wide approach to defending and protecting against an increasing North Korean cyber threat and is one more step in the persistent engagement vision set forth by USCYBERCOM,” OFAC said. (Leo Byrne, “U.S. Designates 3 North Korean Hacking Groups,” NKNews, September 13, 2019)
9/15/19:
Efforts to resume working-level denuclearization talks between Pyongyang and Washington are speeding up with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un suggesting a third summit and U.S. President Donald Trump responding that it should happen within the year. The two sides are currently conducting behind-the-scenes discussions to decide on a location and the timing of the resumption of denuclearization talks, according to diplomatic sources. A foreign affairs source told the JoongAng Ilbo in Washington today that Biegun “conveyed multiple options for the date and location of working-level talks to Vice Minister Choe Son-hui and is awaiting a response.” This source added, “We will know the date and location, as well as whether the [North Korean head of working-level talks] will be Vice Minister Choe or former Ambassador Kim Myong-gil when there is a response.” This indicates that there have already been behind-the-scenes over the past week since Choe said on Sept. 9 that Pyongyang was willing to hold talks with Washington in late September, “at a time and place that the two sides can agree on.” (Jung Hyo-sik and Sarah Kim, “Washington, Pyongyang Speed up Negotiating Efforts,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 17, 2019)
9/16/19:
DPRK FoMin Director General of the Department of U.S. Affairs’ statement: “It is fortunate that the U.S. has repeatedly expressed its stand to tackle an issue through dialogue and negotiations. I hope that the working-level negotiations expected to be held in a few weeks will be a good meeting between the DPRK and the U.S. A proposal that the U.S. put forward at the negotiations may improve the relations and, on the contrary, may add to the hostility towards each other. In other words, the DPRK-U.S. dialogue suggests two options — crisis and chance. In this sense, the upcoming working-level negotiations will be an occasion decisive of the future road of the DPRK-U.S. dialogue. Clear and invariable is the DPRK’s stand. The discussion of denuclearization may be possible when threats and hurdles endangering our system security and obstructing our development are clearly removed beyond all doubt. Whether the DPRK-U.S. negotiations will be a window for chance or an occasion to precipitate crisis is entirely up to the U.S.” (KCNA, “Director General of the Department of U.S. Affairs of Foreign Ministry of DPRK Releases Statement,” September 16, 2019)
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un last month sent a previously undisclosed letter to President Donald Trump inviting him to a fourth one-on-one meeting, according to diplomatic sources on Sunday, possibly in Pyongyang. “In the third week of last month, which included [Korea’s] Liberation Day, Chairman Kim sent a personal missive to President Trump,” said one source, who requested anonymity. “The letter — an invitation of sorts — was entirely separate from another letter [from Kim] that Trump revealed on August 9.” South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha today officially confirmed that Trump had received such a letter, telling lawmakers in Seoul that she was informed about the missive in detail from the United States not long ago. She refrained, however, from providing those details, saying South Korea’s Foreign Ministry was “not in the place” to reveal the letter’s contents or its date of reception. (Jeong Yong-soo and Shim Kyu-seok, “Kim Proposed Summit to Trump in August,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 17, 2019)
Trump: “Q Did Chairman Kim invite you to North Korea in that (inaudible)? PRESIDENT TRUMP: I don’t want to comment on that. Q Okay. PRESIDENT TRUMP: The relationship is very good, but I don’t want to comment on it. Q Would you be willing to go there? PRESIDENT TRUMP: I just don’t think it’s appropriate for me to comment. Q Would you be willing to go to North Korea? PRESIDENT TRUMP: Probably not. I don’t think it’s ready. I don’t think we’re ready for that. I would do it sometime at — sometime at a later future. And depending on what happens, I’m sure he’ll love coming to the United States also. But, no, I don’t think it’s ready for that. I think we have a ways to go yet.” (White House, Remarks by President Trump and Crown Prince Salman of Bahrain, September 16, 2019)
Eight of the 10 rocket launches by North Korea this year involved the same short-range ballistic missiles disguised to instead look like a variety of different weapons, according to South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense. In a ministry document that Rep. Ha Tae-keung, a member of the National Assembly’s defense committee, disclosed today, defense officials in Seoul said all of Pyongyang’s tests from May 2 to August 24 involved a short-range ballistic missile dubbed KN-23 by South Korean and U.S. intelligence, save for one on August 2 and its most recent test on September 10, which involved a new type of rocket artillery piece. The report directly contradicts official claims on the tests from North Korea, which maintained that the regime had tested at least four varieties of weapons including the KN-23. The other three, according to state media reports, were a new “large-caliber multiple launch guided rocket system,” an even larger-caliber multiple rocket launcher and another ballistic missile system akin to the U.S. MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System, or Atacms. The KN-23 is believed to be a North Korean domestic variant of the Russian-made Iskander missile system that was apparently first displayed at a military parade in February last year. According to South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 26, a day after the North’s first weapons test in two months, the Iskander-like missiles do not follow the trajectory of ordinary ballistic missiles but are equipped to perform a pull-up maneuver in the dive phase in order to avoid interception by anti-missile systems. Subsequent launches throughout July, August and early September took place in a variety of locations in North Korea, from coast to coast, and showed off different ranges and altitudes for the weapons. State media trumpeted that the country was advancing its conventional weapons capacity by testing a host of new weapons, clearly distinguishing between the types in the terminology used and the photographs it released from the tests. Yet the South Korean military, which undertook forensic analyses for every one of these tests, claimed almost all of them were short-range ballistic missiles that were likely different variants of the KN-23. In particular, the tactical ballistic weapons similar to the Atacms from Aug. 10 and 16 were effectively the same kind of weapons as the KN-23, the report said.
“North Korea revealed photographs to accompany their launches but in reality the launches did not take place as shown [in the documentation],” said one South Korean military official, implying that the North may have manipulated the photographs to feign a new weapon. Experts in both South Korea and abroad have also questioned the veracity of the North’s claims based on the data from the launches. Chang Young-keun, an aeronautics professor at the Korean Aerospace University in South Korea, raised suspicion with the fact that North Korea did not broadcast video footage of the launches, adding that it was uncommon for a country to develop four different weapons with similar ranges. Most of the tests, save for two on May 9 and July 25, involved ranges of 450 kilometers (280 miles) or lower, with the minimum being 230 kilometers on Aug. 16. The South Korean military’s analysis that the supposed Atacms-like missiles from late August were in fact KN-23 missiles was backed up by earlier analysis by Markus Schiller, a German missile researcher at the U.S.-based RAND Corporation. He wrote on his Twitter that the cable raceway — the cable attached to the side of the missile — from the projectile from August 10 and 16 was a feature unique to the Iskander missile. With diagrams and photos of the North’s missiles to back up his claim, Schiller said there was no room for the North’s Atacms look-alike to have a guidance system attached to it and implied that the photos of the missile from state media may have been stretched to make the missile look like a different weapon from the KN-23. When the photographs’ proportions were corrected, the rockets from both May and Aug. 10 had nearly identical sizes, Schiller showed. “There’s a good chance that the whole event was staged again,” Schiller wrote on Sep. 4. “Why? Because it’s cheaper than developing a complete Atacms-equivalent missile system. And it seems that analysts tend to fall for their confirmation bias (myself included!), and it feeds the public narrative of miraculous NK missile development capabilities.” (Shim kyu-seok, Lee Chul-jae, and Lee Keun-pyung, “North’s Weapons Not as Diverse as It Claims They Are,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 17, 2019)
9/18/19:
Robert O’Brien, who previously served as the U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs but is not well-known in the foreign affairs and security circles, has been appointed as the National Security Advisor of the White House. Both the U.S. and South Korean experts are projecting that U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will have even more influence over leading North Korean issues. The newly appointed national security advisor is part of the “Pompeo team” and is deemed to be more cooperative when it comes to team play, unlike his predecessor, John Bolton, who was often in conflict with the secretary of state. O’Brien, a former lawyer, joined the 2005 United Nations General Assembly as a member of the U.S. representatives and served as a foreign affairs and security advisor for former Republican Party’s presidential nominee Mitt Romney in 2012, however hasn’t had much experience dealing with North Korea policies. The new national security advisor oversaw hostage affairs in the Trump administration, however his appointment as the Envoy for Hostage Affairs in May last year was announced after three U.S. citizens detained in North Korea were released. Therefore, his involvement in the matters seems unlikely. “O’Brien isn’t a well-known figure (in the foreign affairs and security circles),” said a South Korean government official. “It’s been known that he doesn’t have experience (fully dealing with the North Korea issues).” This leads to the analysis that the influence of the State Department led by Pompeo over North Korea policies will become even stronger. “Negotiations with North Korea have been already led by Secretary of State Pompeo and U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun,” said David Maxwell, a senior fellow at the hawkish think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “The two figures’ influence will become even bigger now.” In addition, if Biegun maintains his position as the chief representative of North Korean nuclear talks and is promoted to the Deputy Secretary of State, the power of the department over policies towards North Korea will grow even more. (Dong-A Ilbo, “Pompeo’s Position to Lead N. Korean Negotiations Becomes Stronger,” September 20, 2019)
North Korea may have stopped using its main atomic reactor in the Yongbyon nuclear complex long enough to allow refueling, according to a report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which stressed the country’s continuing nuclear activities remain a “serious concern.” The report, submitted to the IAEA’s Board of Governors ahead of the agency’s general conference this year, said there were no indications that the North’s 5-megawatt reactor — which is believed to have produced the majority of the plutonium used for the country’s weapons — had operated since last December. According to the IAEA’s observations, the reactor “been shut down for a sufficient length of time for it to have been de-fueled and subsequently re-fueled,” the report read. As the centerpiece of the regime’s nuclear plant in Yongbyon, North Pyongan Province, the 5-megawatt reactor is known to be capable of producing around seven kilograms (15.4 pounds) of plutonium annually, enough to make at least one bomb. The IAEA’s observations from a report published in August showed that regular operations at the 5-megawatt reactor had been reduced to “intermittent” activities from August 2018, shortly after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump met for their first summit in Singapore that June. Since December, no activities have been observed at the reactor, the report read. In spite of the failure in Hanoi, the IAEA’s observations showed Pyongyang has not departed from its scaling down of nuclear activities, though it also noted signs that “activities at some other facilities continued or developed further.” In particular, the fuel rod fabrication plant in Yongbyon showed indications of renovation and construction work, as well as “possible chemical processing taking place,” while building activities also appear to have resumed at parts of the light water reactor and areas around the nearby Kuryong River, the report said. A further note was made about ongoing mining, milling and concentration activities possibly taking place at the country’s Pyongsan uranium mine and the adjacent uranium concentration plant in North Hwanghae Province. (Shim Kyu-seok, “Yongbyon Reaction Seems to Be Idle, Says IAEA,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 19, 2019)
Trump: “Q He [Bolton] also said, on your North Korea policy, that negotiations with the North Koreans were doomed to failure, today. THE PRESIDENT: Well, it’s easy to say that. He may be — he may be right and he may be wrong. I mean, he — let’s see what happens. Only time will tell. In the meantime, for three years, there’s been no nuclear testing. We’ve gotten our hostages back. We’ve gotten our great soldiers back who were killed — many of them. And many more are coming back. We have many more coming back. And the families of those — we call them “our heroes.” And they were our heroes. And they’re coming back. And the relationship is good. So I think that’s better than somebody that goes around saying we want to use the Libyan model. He said the “Libyan model.” That set us back very badly when he said that. So I think John really should take a look at how badly they’ve done in the past and maybe a new method would be very good. Now, with all of that being said — may be a very powerful attack. We’ve never had a military as strong as our military right now because of what we’ve done. And when I first came into this position, our military was in very, very depleted, sad shape.” (White House, Remarks by President Trump during Visit to the Border Wall, San Diego, CA, September 18, 2019)
9/20/19:
DPRK FoMin Roving Ambassador Kim Myong Gil’s statement: “I have read with keen interest the report that U.S. President Trump pointed to the injustice of applying the mode of “Libyan-style abandonment of nukes” to the DPRK and proposed a “new method” for the improvement of the DPRK-U.S. relations. I, as the chief delegate of the DPRK side to the DPRK-U.S. working-level negotiations, would like to welcome the wise political decision of President Trump to approach the DPRK-U.S. relations from a more practical point of view now that a nasty trouble-maker who used to face everything out of his anachronistic way of thinking has disappeared from the U.S. administration. If the former shillyshallying U.S. administrations with a rigid way of thinking were still in power, an uncontrollable situation would doubtless be created on the Korean peninsula, and no one would deny that this would come to be a direct threat to the U.S. security. At the moment I am not quite sure what he implied in his suggestion of “new method” but to me it seems he wanted to imply that a step-by-step solution starting with the things feasible first while building trust in each other would be the best option. The depth of what he uttered is something to give a second thought later, but the political decision to turn to a new alternative, finding it utterly impossible to make it with the old method is the manifestation of the political perception and disposition peculiar to President Trump, which no preceding U.S. chief executives even wanted to think of nor were able to do. I would like to keep myself optimistic about the results of the upcoming DPRK-U.S. negotiations with the anticipation that the U.S. side would come out to the talks with a proper calculation method.” (KCNA, “Statement by Roving Ambassador of DPRK Foreign Minister,” September 20, 2019)
9/23/19:
President Donald Trump and his South Korean counterpart Moon Jae-in held a summit in New York to discuss plans to restart U.S.-North Korea talks, as Seoul’s spy agency said the negotiations could take place in two to three weeks. Trump and Moon discussed ways to achieve practical results in the U.S.-North Korea working-level talks, Moon’s office said, while Trump expressed his confidence that Kim will fulfil commitments made during the two summits, according to a White House statement. “There’s been no nuclear testing at all,” Trump told reporters as he met Moon on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly. “And the relationships have been very good. … We want to see if we can do something. If we can, that’ll be great. And if we can’t, that’s fine, we’ll see what happens.” Moon said he hopes working-level negotiations between the United States and North Korea will be held soon to prepare for another summit, but Trump said he would want to know what would result from a third summit with Kim before agreeing to hold it. “Right now, people would like to see that happen. I want to know what’s going to be coming out of it. We can know a lot before the summit takes place,” Trump said. (Steve Holland and Joyce Lee, “Trump Asks What a Third Summit Would Yield,” Reuters, September 23, 2019) In a meeting with President Trump at a hotel, President Moon Jae-in reconfirmed close coordination between the allies on the Korean peace process ahead of the resumption of Washington-Pyongyang nuclear negotiations, according to Cheong Wa Dae officials. The two sides have “reaffirmed their determination to change relations with North Korea; end the hostile relationship, which has lasted nearly 70 years; and establish a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,” Cheong Wa Dae spokesperson Ko Min-jung said in a statement. In consultations with South Korea on the summit results, the U.S. has used the word “transform,” instead of “change” or “improve,” according to an informed source. It may reflect the Trump administration’s resolve to fundamentally reset Washington’s ties with Pyongyang. the peace process had sputtered since Trump’s second summit with the North’s leader Kim Jong-un in Hanoi ended without a deal. The North even resumed the test-firing of short-range and other rocket systems apparently in protest at combined military drills between the U.S. and South Korea. Cheong Wa Dae’s view is that the Moon-Trump summit has ushered in the outright recovery of the summit-driven initiative for the denuclearization and establishment of lasting peace on the peninsula, as Pyongyang and Washington look set to resume working-level bargaining within the next few weeks. Trust and good relationships among the leaders of the two Koreas and the U.S. are said to be the driving force behind it. Above all, Moon and Trump made it clear that the allies would avoid military action against the North. In another message to Pyongyang, they agreed that the Singapore summit accord between Trump and the communist country’s leader Kim Jong-un, signed in June last year, holds true. Pyongyang has called on Washington to come up with a new way of “calculating” the value of its offer of verifiably dismantling the Yongbyon nuclear complex, a major sticking point in the Hanoi talks. With his second summit with Trump in less than three months, Moon listened to Trump’s updated strategy and presented his ideas, thus highlighting Seoul’s stake and role in the peace process. Moon delivered his hope that Trump will have a third summit with Kim in the near future. For Moon, the best scenario is that another meeting between Trump and Kim will bear fruit and pave the way for the North’s leader to participate in the South Korea-ASEAN special summit, scheduled to take place in Busan in late November, as an observer. It’s Kim’s turn to visit South Korea, as Moon traveled to Pyongyang last year. On the other hand, Moon’s ninth summit with Trump also showed that money talks more in the traditionally value-based alliance. Starting the meeting, Trump abruptly said, “We’ll be talking the purchase of equipment. South Korea is one of our largest purchasers of military equipment. And we’re working together very well.” Splitting the U.S. Forces Korea cost was raised as well in their meeting, which lasted 65 minutes, longer than the originally scheduled 45 minutes. “Separate from close coordination on the North Korea issue and a robust alliance, a tough round of negotiations appears unavoidable,” a Cheong Wa Dae official said. As he addressed the 74th session of the U.N. General Assembly the next day, Moon asked the United Nations to help turn the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which cuts across the middle of the Korean peninsula, into an international peace zone. “If the DMZ comes to house U.N. offices already stationed in the two Koreas and other international organizations related to peace, ecology and culture and emerges as a center for research on peace, peacekeeping, arms control and trust building, it can become an international peace zone in name as well as substance,” he said. (Lee Chi-dong, “In New York, Moon Underscores Seoul’s Stake in Peace Process, Response to Climate Change,” Yonhap, September 26, 2019)
Trump: “Q What’s it going to take to have a third summit with Chairman Kim, sir? PRESIDENT TRUMP: Well, we’ll see. Right now, people would like to see that happen. I want to know what’s going to be coming out of it. We can know a lot before the summit takes place. We had, really, two very successful summits. There’s been — as you know, there’s been no lessening of the sanctions. There’s only been an increasing of the sanctions. But very importantly, we have our hostages back. And that was a very big deal. And we got our hostages back. We have the remains of our great heroes from the past back — a lot of them. And they’re coming in, and they actually have a lot of them ready to start coming in again. So, a lot of things have happened. Plus, there’s been no nuclear testing at all for the last quite a long period of time, at least that we can detect. And the relationships have been very good. So, we’ll see what happens. But we’d like to see if we can do something. And if we can, that would be great. And if we can’t, that’s fine. We’ll see what happens. But there’s been no nuclear testing for a long time. A long time. … Q Are you considering sanctions — considering actions first before denuclearization as part of your new method for the — in the denuclearization talks? PRESIDENT TRUMP: Sanctions where? Q Sanctions first before denuclearization, as part of your new method in denuclearization talks. PRESIDENT TRUMP: I can’t — you’re going to have to speak up. Say it again. Sanctions. Go ahead. What was — Q Sanctions — considering action first before denuclearization? PRESIDENT TRUMP: Where? Q For North Korea and the denuclearization talks. PRESIDENT TRUMP: I’m not considering actions. We’re getting along very well with North Korea. I have a good relationship with Kim Jong Un. And we’re not considering actions at all. There’s no reason for actions. I will say this: If I weren’t President, you’d be at war with North Korea, in my opinion. If the same group was in that preceded me, you’d be in a war with North Korea. So we’re not looking at any actions. We have a good relationship with Kim Jong Un. We’ll see what happens. Maybe we’ll be able to make a deal. Maybe not. … Q Mr. President, do you plan on discussing the North Korean short-range missile tests with your counterpart? PRESIDENT TRUMP: Yeah. We’re going to discuss that. Q And, Mr. President, yourself: Do you have any comment — PRESIDENT TRUMP: I will be discussing that. Q — on the North Korean missile tests? PRESIDENT TRUMP: Yeah. I will be discussing. We didn’t have an agreement on short-range missiles. And a lot of people and a lot of countries test short-range missiles; there’s nothing spectacular about that. But we will be discussing that also. Okay? Q Can we hear from President Moon if he is troubled by the short-range missiles and if he’d like to see you maybe try to stop it from happening — talk to Chairman Kim? PRESIDENT TRUMP: Well, we’ll take a look at it. We’re going to talk about it. But I didn’t really discuss that with Kim Jong Un. That was never a part of our discussion. We did discuss nuclear testing and other things. And, frankly, he’s lived up to his word on those things that we discussed. And we actually signed an agreement in Singapore. We actually had two very good meetings. You would have been at war right now with North Korea if I weren’t President.” (White House, Remarks by President Trump and President Moon of South Korea before Their Meeting, InterContinental Hotel, New York, September 23, 2019)
9/24/19:
Kim Jong-un could meet again with President Trump and even visit South Korea in November if expected talks between Pyongyang and Washington make progress on eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, South Korean intelligence officials told lawmakers today. South Korean officials have been considering inviting Kim to a conference of Southeast Asian countries that is planned in Busan, a port city on the southeastern tip of South Korea, in November. Neither North Korea nor the United States has officially announced the resumption of dialogue. But after a months’ long hiatus, denuclearization talks between the two countries will most likely take place within “two or three weeks,” Kim Min-ki, a governing-party lawmaker, quoted intelligence officials as saying during a closed-door parliamentary hearing today in Seoul, the South’s capital. If such talks lead to a breakthrough and Kim visits South Korea, it would be the first such trip by a North Korean leader to the South beyond the Demilitarized Zone and could give the party of South Korea’s president, Moon Jae-in, a lift ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for April. When Kim and Moon met in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, last September, Kim promised to visit Seoul soon. But that promise was never fulfilled as subsequent talks between North Korea and the United States stalled over deep differences over how to denuclearize the North, damaging inter-Korean relations. North Korean officials have also recently indicated that talks with Washington could resume in coming weeks. If such working-level talks were successful, Trump and the North Korean leader could hold another summit this year, said Mr. Kim, the South Korean lawmaker. Lee Eun-jae, an opposition lawmaker who also attended the parliamentary session with intelligence officials, quoted them as saying that Kim Jong-un also “may come to Busan depending on the result of denuclearization talks” with Washington. (Choe Sang-hun, “Kim May Visit South Korea, Giving Talks a Needed Lift,” New York Times, September 25, 2019, p. A-4)
9/27/19:
DPRK FoMin advisor’s statement: “It draws my keen interest that it is highly topical these days in the U.S. to hold another DPRK-U.S. summit. The past DPRK-U.S. summit meetings and talks served as historic occasions for the top leaders of the DPRK and the U.S. to express their political will to put an end to the hostile relations between the two countries and have peace and stability settled on the Korean peninsula. But no practical follow-up was made to implement the issues agreed upon at the summit talks, casting shadow over the possibility of future summit talks. The DPRK has made sincere efforts to build trust and implement the DPRK-U.S. joint statement, as evidenced by the repatriation of American detainees, who committed hostile acts against the DPRK, and of GIs’ remains, etc. However, the U.S. has done nothing for implementing the joint statement. On the contrary, it resumed the joint military drills, which the U.S. president personally pledged to suspend, and has ratcheted up sanctions and pressure on the DPRK only to make the DPRK-U.S. relations degenerate. It is hard reality that politicians in Washington are obsessed with “nuclear disarmament-first” assertion-the DPRK can get access to a bright future only when it abandons its nukes first- and with twisted view regarding that sanctions led the DPRK to dialogue. This makes me doubt whether a new breakthrough could be brought about in the DPRK-U.S. relations though another DPRK-U.S. summit talks may open. But I came to know that President Trump is different from his predecessors in political sense and decision while watching his approach to the DPRK, so I would like to place my hope on President Trump’s wise option and bold decision. I and the DPRK Foreign Ministry will follow the future moves of the U.S.” (KCNA, “Statement by Advisor to Foreign Ministry of DPRK,” September 27, 2019)
9/30/19:
In his first big public appearance since his acrimonious split with President Trump three weeks ago, former national security adviser John R Bolton rebukes the Trump administration over one of its central foreign policy initiatives: the pursuit of a nuclear deal with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Appearing at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Bolton set the tone by noting early on that he was about to speak about North Korea in “unvarnished terms” and suggested that Kim was happy to see him outside the White House. Bolton then suggested that the negotiations between the two sides were very likely to be fruitless. “I don’t think the North Koreans will ever voluntarily give up enough” in negotiations, Bolton said, adding, “There is no basis to trust any promise that regime makes.” Bolton said the United States should stop focusing on summits with Kim and instead pursue a harder approach involving possible regime change and even military force to stop the North Korean nuclear program. He also suggested that the Trump administration, as it pursues a nuclear deal, is giving North Korea too much of a pass on its violations of U.N. Security Council sanctions. “North Korea today, as we speak, is violating” those sanctions, Bolton said. “When the U.S. led the fight to get those resolutions, and we say we really don’t care, other countries draw their own conclusion that they don’t really care about enforcing sanctions. When you ask for consistent behavior from others, you have to demonstrate it yourself.” Bolton at other times demurred when asked to directly comment on internal administration matters. He was asked whether he agrees with the idea of “bromance diplomacy” Bolton said, “I’m not going to comment on that,” as the audience laughed. “Nice try.” Bolton has been sending signals ever since his exit that he’s not particularly optimistic about what lies ahead in Trump’s foreign policy. Within hours of Bolton’s resignation announcement, an anonymous aide was telling reporters, “Since Ambassador Bolton has been national security adviser over the last 17 months, there have been no bad deals.” (The implication being that any deals that come now would not reflect upon Bolton.) Bolton said that the Libya model was “feasible” yet difficult. But he then contrasted it with the folly of seeking a middle-ground approach with North Korea. “It may be the Libya model is not possible,” Bolton said. “But what I regard as even worse, in a way, is pretending that you’re getting to a resolution of the nuclear issue when you simply allow North Korea still to have a nuclear capability but give it enough economic assistance … that gives the regime a lifeline it currently doesn’t have.” (Aaron Blake, “Bolton Has Finally Spoken, and He Put up a Big Warning Sign about Trump and North Korea,” Washington Post, September 30, 2019)
10/1/19:
DPRK First Vice FM Choe Son Hui’s statement: “The DPRK and the U.S. agreed to have preliminary contact on October 4 and hold working-level negotiations on October 5. The delegates of the DPRK side are ready to enter into the DPRK-U.S. working-level negotiations. It is my expectation that the working-level negotiations would accelerate the positive development of the DPRK-U.S. relations.” (KCNA, “Choe Son Hui, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, Issues Statement,” October 1, 2019)
With a number of signs pointing to an imminent renewal of working-level talks between Washington and Pyongyang, it has been confirmed that the U.S. military has announced its plan to conduct a launch drill of Minuteman III, a long-range, three stage intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on October 2 (local time). According to Aircraft Spots, a private aircraft monitoring company, a Minuteman III ICBM will be test-launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. It is reported that the missile will fly about 6750 kilometers at a velocity 20 times the speed of sound and land in the waters off Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. The renewal of test-launches comes five months after the U.S. Air Force fired two Minuteman III missiles with the same launching sites and flying route in early May. The only ICBM launched from the U.S. mainland, Minuteman III is capable of striking a target 13,000 kilometers away with multiple nuclear warheads fully loaded. The ICBM can reach Pyongyang from California just in 30 minutes. Each year, the U.S. Air Force has fired mock warheads-loaded Minuteman III missiles over four or five rounds of test-launching to verify the precision and credibility of its weapon system. Some experts say that this is a warning against Pyongyang, which is escalating its pressure and criticism against Washington in the run-up to the working-level talks with the U.S.
“The meaning behind the test-launch is that North Korea cannot compete with the U.S. for nuclear capabilities, and that Washington will not be swayed by the communist regime in future talks,” a South Korean military official said. (Sang-Ho Yun, “U.S. Air Force to Test-Launch ICBM before North Korea Talks,” Dong-A Ilbo, October 1, 2019)
10/2/19:
North Korea fired what was believed to be a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from waters off its east coast, South Korea’s military said, demonstrating its nuclear delivery capabilities just days before resuming denuclearization talks with the United States. The missile, believed to be a type of Pukguksong, a North Korean SLBM, was fired from off the east coast near Wonsan in an easterly direction at 7:11 a.m. and flew around 450 kilometers at a maximum altitude of about 910 km, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The high altitude means the missile was fired at a high angle, and if it had been fired at a normal angle, it would have flown a much longer distance. “Our military is monitoring the situation in case of additional launches and maintaining a readiness posture,” the JCS said, calling on the North to stop such acts that heighten tensions on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea’s presidential National Security Council (NSC) convened an emergency meeting and expressed strong concern over the launch. If confirmed, today’s launch will mark the North’s first SLBM test since August 2016, when it test-fired a Pukguksong-1 ballistic missile off the east coast, which flew about 500 km. So far this year, the North carried out missile and rocket launches 10 times, but all involved short-range projectiles. The communist country then tested Pukguksong-2 missiles in 2017 after remodeling the original version into a ground-based one. The maximum flight range of both types was known to be around 1,300 kilometers, according to the defense ministry. Oh Seok-min, “N. Korea Presumed to Have Fired 1 SLBM-Type Missile: JCS<” Yonhap, October 2, 2019) South Korea’s presidential Blue House said it “placed weight on the possibility” that the missile was launched from a submarine off North Korea’s east coast. But a U.S. official, who was not named, told CNN the missile was launched from an underwater platform, although it was designed to function as a submarine-launched ballistic missile. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said North Korea fired the ballistic missile from the sea northeast of the city of Wonsan, saying it flew 280 miles and reached an altitude of about 570 miles. David Wright, co-director of the global security program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, noted that the missile was fired with a lofted trajectory. “If flown on a standard trajectory with the same payload, that missile would have a maximum range of about 1,900 km (1,200 miles),” he wrote in a blog post. “This would classify the missile as medium range (1,000 to 3,500 km).” South Korea said it presumed the missile was a Pukkuksong type. Ankit Panda, a nuclear expert at the Federation of American Scientists, said it was likely to be the Pukkuksong-3, a new submarine-launched ballistic missile that has been under development for a while. In July, Kim Jong Un was seen inspecting a new submarine thought to be capable of firing ballistic missiles. “It shows Kim Jong Un is making progress on developing the sea leg of his nuclear forces,” said Panda. “It’s clear the sea leg isn’t just a vanity project or a prestige project, but they see it as something worth spending resources on, to improve their deterrence in a crisis.” The U.S. State Department called on North Korea to “refrain from provocations, and abide by its obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolutions.” It also encouraged Pyongyang to “remain engaged in substantive and sustained negotiations to do their part to ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and achieve denuclearization.” Japan’s government spokesman, Suga Yoshihide, initially said the country had detected two ballistic missiles. But he later said it may have been one missile that broke into two pieces, adding that one piece may have landed in the waters of Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). (Simon Denyer, “North Korea Fires Missile in Show Strength ahead of Talks,” Washington Post, October 2, 2019) The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff said Thursday that North Korea’s latest missile launch appeared to have come from a sea-based platform, not a submarine. The comments come after North Korea said it successfully tested a new submarine-launched ballistic missile off its east coast Wednesday. “We assess that it was a short- to medium-range ballistic missile,” JCS spokesman Air Force Col. Patrick Ryder told reporters, adding that it flew some 280 miles (450 kilometers) into the East Sea. “I would say that we have no indication that it was launched from a submarine but rather a sea-based platform,” he said. South Korea’s military said earlier that the North appeared to have fired an SLBM that flew around 450 km at a maximum altitude of about 910 km. It also said the launch appeared to have come from a sea-based platform. (Lee Haye-ah, “U.S. Says N.K. Missile Was Fired from Sea-Based Platform, Not Submarine,” Yonhap, October 3, 2019)
KCNA: “The Academy of Defense Science of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea succeeded in test-firing the new-type SLBM Pukguksong-3 in the waters off Wonsan Bay of the East Sea of Korea on Wednesday morning. The new-type ballistic missile was fired in vertical mode. The test-firing scientifically and technically confirmed the key tactical and technical indexes of the newly-designed ballistic missile and had no adverse impact on the security of neighboring countries. The leading officials of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and in the field of the national defense scientific research who guided the test-firing on the spot informed the WPK Central Committee of the result of the successful test-firing. Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un sent warm congratulations on behalf of the Central Committee of the WPK to the national defense scientific research units involved in the test-firing. The successful new-type SLBM test-firing comes to be of great significance as it ushered in a new phase in containing the outside forces’ threat to the DPRK and further bolstering its military muscle for self-defense.” (KCNA, “DPRK Academy of Defense Science Succeeds in Test-Firing of New Type SLBM,” October 3, 2019)
The Trump administration plans to propose a deal to move forward on dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program — and it’s less than the all-or-nothing approach Washington has taken so far. Here’s the offer, according to two sources familiar with the negotiations: The United Nations would suspend sanctions on Pyongyang’s textile and coal exports for 36 months in exchange for the verifiable closure of the Yongbyon nuclear facility and another measure, most likely the end of North Korea’s uranium enrichment. Yongbyon is the “heart” of the country’s nuclear program and tearing down its many facilities would greatly blunt Kim Jong Un’s arsenal. It’s a risky proposal, though, because North Korea could continue to improve its weaponry over the three-year period. Experts in the U.S. and South Korea also say it will take much more than three years to verifiably destroy all the nuclear facilities, documents, and other materials at Yongbyon — assum.i.ng international inspectors are granted the requisite access at all. That said, it’s possible U.S. negotiators will use the offer as a starting point and see how their counterparts respond, though of course American diplomats may alter the proposal between now and the weekend. It’s unlikely anything will be finalized, though, until Trump and Kim meet for yet another summit. Trump said two weeks ago that he could meet with the dictator again “soon.” But what will further complicate matters is that North Korea has visibly grown frustrated with the US handling of nuclear talks — and it’s made a bad situation even worse. North Korea launched what appears to be a submarine-launched missile today, which flew further than any other projectile in two years. It’s a sign that Pyongyang is angry with the lack of progress, and there may be a good reason why. According to two sources, Trump made two concrete promises to Kim during their June summit at the Panmunjom peace village at the inter-Korean border. First, Trump reiterated his vow to sign an end-of-war declaration that would formally say the U.S. and North Korea are no longer at war. That’s a fairly simple step to take, as it recognizes both countries haven’t fought since the 1950s and it would give Kim the ability to tell US-skeptics at home that he might not need as big a nuclear arsenal. But the second promise may have mattered much more: Trump told Kim that he’d cancel a joint military exercise with South Korea planned just weeks after third summit. Trump has long questioned the need for those drills, mainly because he thinks they’re too big and the U.S. spends a lot of money on them. But after multiple military aides told Trump that the Dong Maeng exercise was really a smaller-scale simulation, he relented and let it take place in July. Pyongyang had warned ahead of time that both nations shouldn’t proceed. “The U.S. is attempting to stage joint military drills ‘DongMaeng 19-2’ with South Korea, violating the commitment made at the top level,” a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson said on July 16. It’s very possible the “top level” refers to Trump. Which means that North Korea’s decision to conduct its most aggressive test in two years may in part have been a message to the president: do what you promised — or else. (Alex Ward, “Here’s the Nuclear Proposal the U.S. Plans to Offer North Korea This Weekend,” Vox, October 2, 2019)
10/5/19:
The first negotiations in eight months between the Trump administration and North Korea aimed at breaking the logjam over dismantling the North’s nuclear program broke down only hours after they began in Stockholm, the North Koreans said. “The negotiation did not live up to our expectations and broke down,” the chief North Korean negotiator, Kim Myong-gil, said, according to Yonhap, the South Korean news agency. Kim added that the United States had arrived “empty-handed” and had “not discarded its old stance and attitude.” The State Department, in a carefully worded statement, did not say the long-awaited session failed, and warned that the “early comments” from the North “do not reflect the content or the spirit of today’s 8 1/2 hour discussion.” The statement continued: “The U.S. brought creative ideas and had good discussions” with its North Korean counterparts, without specifying what they were. Eager not to be cast as the obstacle to progress, the State Department also said its delegation previewed new proposals not only on denuclearization, but on other elements of the talks, which include a commitment to finding a formal end to the Korean War. State Department officials did not say how the North Korean negotiating team reacted. Despite the rosy statement from the American side, it remained clear that discussions got nowhere. And although the American negotiators said they were willing to come back in two weeks, the North Koreans made no such statement. The talks were the first detailed discussion between the two countries since Trump and the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, walked away from a summit meeting in Hanoi in February. The outcome was hardly surprising. Despite Trump’s frequent optimistic statements about his relationship with Mr. Kim and what he has termed Kim’s “beautiful letters” to him, the North has accelerated its testing of missiles and added to its stockpile of nuclear fuel. In Washington, administration officials have struggled with how to lure the North back into a productive discussion without giving up so many sanctions that the Trump administration would lose negotiating leverage. One objective of the new talks, according to some administration officials, was to test new proposals that would amount to a temporary freeze of nuclear activity, so that the North’s capability did not increase while the talks drag on. Trump’s failure to negotiate a freeze when he first met Kim in Singapore in June 2018 — the first meeting between an American president and a North Korean leader — is considered by many experts to be a key flaw in his negotiating approach. A Vox report suggested the American negotiating team would call for a three-year suspension of United Nations sanctions on North Korean coal and textiles in return for shuttering a major nuclear site and halting some types of fuel production. It is not clear if the new talks even broached these or other proposals in any detail. The State Department’s chief negotiator, Stephen Biegun, has said little about the specifics of American proposals, other than making it clear they involved a more step-by-step approach to denuclearization than the all-or-nothing strategy Trump had used. In Singapore 15 months ago, Kim, sensing Trump’s desire for summit meetings that attract intense coverage, may be betting that Trump needs a breakthrough before next year’s American presidential election. As a result, he may be testing to see how little of his program he can give up in return for the Trump administration agreeing to lift the onerous sanctions that have squeezed North Korea’s export revenues for the past three years. It is possible talks will resume soon, after this initial testing of the waters. But in an essay posted on the Foreign Affairs website, Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang, two North Korea experts, note that “Pyongyang has set a very clear deadline — the end of this calendar year — for getting negotiations back on track and for the United States to moderate its position.” After that, they say, Kim could be back to intense testing, betting that Trump would not risk a conflict in the midst of a presidential campaign. (David E. Sanger, “Nuclear Talks Collapse Within Hours for U.S. and the North Koreans,” New York Times, October 6, 2019, p. A-8) Hours after North Korea’s top negotiator with the U.S. told reporters that working-level talks between the two nations had broken down, the State Department asserted that the diplomatic meetings in Stockholm had been “good.” The comments, from State Department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus, appeared to contradict — at least in tone — a far more negative view given earlier in the day by North Korea’s chief envoy in the talks. “The early comments from the DPRK delegation do not reflect the content or the spirit of today’s 8 1/2 hour discussion,” Ortagus said. “The U.S. brought creative ideas and had good discussions with its DPRK counterparts.” “In the course of the discussions, the U.S. delegation reviewed events since the Singapore summit, and discussed the importance of more intensive engagement to solve the many issues of concern for both sides,” she said. “The U.S. delegation previewed a number of new initiatives that would allow us to make progress in each of the four pillars of the Singapore joint statement,” she continued. Ortagus said that Washington would continue to pursue diplomacy with Pyongyang over its nuclear program. “The United States and the DPRK will not overcome a legacy of 70 years of war and hostility on the Korean Peninsula through the course of a single Saturday,” she said. “These are weighty issues, and they require a strong commitment by both countries. The United States has that commitment.” Ortagus also said that Sweden had invited the two sides to return for another round of meetings in two weeks, and that the U.S. had accepted. Earlier in the day, the DPRK’s lead negotiator in the working-level talks, Kim Myong Gil, said that the two nations’ latest attempt to strike a deal had failed — and that the blame lay with the Americans. “The breakdown of the negotiations without producing any results is entirely due to Washington’s failure to abandon its outdated stance and attitude,” Kim said after the day of meetings had finished in Stockholm. “The United States had raised our expectations by hinting at a flexible approach, new ways, and creative solutions, but has come up with nothing, and it has greatly disappointed us and discouraged us from negotiating,” he said. “The U.S. came out empty [handed] without any calculations we asked for,” he continued. “The negotiations failed to live up to our expectations and broke down.” (Jacob Fromer, “U.S. Rejects North Korean Claim That Talks Fell Apart,” NKNews, October 5, 2019) According to a diplomatic source familiar with the talks, the U.S. delegation led by Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun did not, in fact, offer any proposals that went beyond the original U.S. position in Hanoi — especially in terms of concessions it could offer Pyongyang in exchange for steps toward denuclearization. In particular, the source said, the U.S. nixed the possibility of granting sanctions relief in the early stages of the denuclearization process, even if the North dismantled its nuclear complex in Yongbyon, North Pyongan Province, as offered by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Hanoi. In a statement delivered outside the North Korean embassy at around 6:30 p.m., Kim said the U.S. delegation “greatly disappointed” the North Koreans by presenting “nothing” worthy of discussion. “One thing is for sure — the United States did not come [to the table] with any of the [new] calculations that we requested,” Kim said. “The calculus we have been asking for is that the United States prove with actions that it will take steps to remove all institutional barriers threatening our security and infringing on our development.” Adding that his delegation concluded the United States was “realistically not ready for negotiations,” Kim Myong-gil said the talks would temporarily stop “until the end of the year” so that Washington could reconsider its stance. In reply to a reporter’s question about whether the North would maintain its moratorium on nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests, the envoy laid out a warning characteristic to North Korean negotiating tactics, saying it was “up to the U.S. position” whether the tests would be kept under wraps or “revived.” Kim then related in detail the U.S. policies that were irking Pyongyang — what he termed “15 sanctions measures” imposed after the first U.S.-North Korea summit in Singapore; the U.S. combined military exercises with South Korea “that President [Donald Trump] personally promised to halt;” and the deployment of “cutting-edge warfare technology” in and around the Korean Peninsula that were “clearly threatening [the North’s] right to survival and development.” The North Korean delegation presented “realistic options” to break through the stalemate brought on by Washington’s “mistaken approach,” Kim said. (Shim Kyu-seok and Jung Hyo-sik, “Nuke Talks in Stockholm Go Nowhere,” JoongAng Ilbo, October 6, 2019)
DoS Statement: “The early comments from the DPRK delegation do not reflect the content or the spirit of today’s 8 1/2 hour discussion. The U.S. brought creative ideas and had good discussions with its DPRK counterparts. In the course of the discussions, the U.S. delegation reviewed events since the Singapore summit, and discussed the importance of more intensive engagement to solve the many issues of concern for both sides. The U.S. delegation previewed a number of new initiatives that would allow us to make progress in each of the four pillars of the Singapore joint statement. At the conclusion of our discussions, the United States proposed to accept the invitation of our Swedish hosts to return to Stockholm to meet again in two weeks’ time in order to continue discussions on all of the topics. The United States delegation has accepted this invitation. The United States and the DPRK will not overcome a legacy of 70 years of war and hostility on the Korean Peninsula through the course of a single Saturday. These are weighty issues, and they require a strong commitment by both countries. The United States has that commitment. The United States is deeply grateful to our hosts at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for having provided a venue and an opportunity for these discussions to occur.” (Department of State Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus, North Korea Talks, October 5, 2019)
DPRK FoMin spokesperson’s statement [DPRK translation]: “The DPRK and the U.S. held working-level negotiations in Stockholm, Sweden on October 5 after the preliminary contact on Oct. 4 under an agreement between the two sides. We approached the negotiations with expectations and optimism that the U.S. side would think and act in a proper way as it had persistently requested for the opening of the negotiations by sending repeated signals that it was ready for dialogue based on “a new method” and “creative solution.” However, the trite stance shown by the delegates of the U.S. side at the negotiations venue made us feel that our expectations were no better than an empty hope and rather increased a doubt as to whether the U.S. truly has a stand to solve the issue through dialogue. At the negotiations, the U.S. side maintained its former stand, seemingly showing that it has brought no new package, but repeated equivocal insistence that consecutive and intensive negotiations are necessary, yet not presenting any signs of calculation and guarantee. The U.S. has actually not made any preparations for the negotiations but sought to meet its political goal of abusing the DPRK-U.S. dialogue for its domestic political events on schedule. So, the delegate of the DPRK side to the negotiations opened a press conference and clarified our principled stand on the negotiations. However, the U.S. is misleading the public opinion, insisting that the press conference given by the delegation of the DPRK fell short of accurately reflecting the contents and the spirit of the negotiations and that they had wonderful discussion with the DPRK side. The greater the expectations, the greater the disappointment. The recent negotiations have left us skeptical about the U.S. political will to improve the DPRK-U.S. relations and made us think if it isn’t its real intention to abuse the bilateral relations for gratifying its party interests. The U.S. is spreading a completely ungrounded story that both sides are open to meet after two weeks but as it has conceived nothing even after the passage of 99 days since the Panmunjom summit, it is not likely at all that it can produce a proposal commensurate to the expectations of the DPRK and to the concerns of the world in just fortnight. We have no intention to hold such sickening negotiations as what happened this time before the U.S. takes a substantial step to make complete and irreversible withdrawal of the hostile policy toward the DPRK, a policy that threatens the security of the country and hampers the rights to existence and development of its people. We have already made it clear that if the U.S. again fingers at the old scenario which has nothing to do with new calculation method, the dealings between the DPRK and the U.S. may immediately come to an end. As we have clearly identified the way for solving problem, the fate of the future DPRK-U.S. dialogue depends on the U.S. attitude, and the end of this year is its deadline.” (KCNA, “Fate of DPRK-U.S. Dialogue Depends on U.S. Attitude: DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesperson,” October 6, 2019)
10/6/19:
North Korea’s top negotiator in just resumed nuclear talks with the United States warned today of “terrible events” unless the United States comes to the negotiating table well prepared. Kim Myong Gil made the remark at Beijing airport on his way back to North Korea from Sweden, where he had announced that the U.S.-North Korea working-level denuclearization talks that had restarted after months of stalemate “broke off” after just one day. “If the United States is not well prepared, we don’t know what terrible events will happen,” Kim told reporters at the airport. He said that whether the talks continue hinges on the United States. On the U.S. suggestion that the two countries meet in Sweden again in two weeks to continue discussions, Kim expressed skepticism, contending that the United States could not propose any alternative plan in the 100 days since the leaders of the two countries last met in late June. Meeting the press outside the North Korean Embassy, Kim urged the United States to consider what should be done concerning the negotiations by the end of the year. “It depends on the U.S. position” whether North Korea will continue to refrain from testing nuclear devices and intercontinental ballistic missiles, he said. (Kyodo, “North Korea’s Nuclear Negotiator Warns of ‘Terrible Events,’” October 7, 2019)
Kim Myung Gil: “This DPRK-U.S. working level talks was planned in conformity to the agreement in the Panmunjom DPRK-U.S. summit in last June. Since then, it was not easy to make it happen, as it had to overcome various difficulties. These talks were held at a crucial moment, when the situation on the Korean peninsula stands at the crossroads of dialogue or confrontation. Therefore, we have come to the negotiating table, with a responsibility that we should ensure a result to promote the development of the DPRK-U.S. relations, and also with an expectation that the U.S. will come up with a correct method of calculation and it will accelerate the positive improvement of DPRK-U.S. relations. However, the negotiations have not fulfilled our expectations and finally broke up. And I’m very unpleasant about it. The breakup of the negotiation without any outcome is totally due to the fact that the U.S. would not give up their own viewpoint and attitude. These days, the U.S. raised expectations by offering suggestions like “flexible approach,” “new method,” and “creative solutions.” But they have disappointed us greatly, and dampened our enthusiasm for negotiations by bringing nothing to the negotiation table. We have already clarified to the U.S. side what kind of calculation is necessary and gave plenty of time. But still the U.S. came to negotiation table empty-handed, which shows that they have no intention to solve the issue through dialogue. In this negotiation, we have proposed a realistic way to break the deadline of the DPRK-U.S. dialogue, caused by the U.S.’s wrong approach, and make a break-through in solving the problem. We made it clear that we can enter into a full discussion on denuclearization measures… when the U.S. responds in a sincere way to our preceding steps for denuclearization and confidence building, such as the discontinuation of nuclear and ICBM tests, dismantlement of the northern nuclear test ground, and repatriation of remains of U.S. soldiers. This is a realistic and appropriate proposal to recover confidence between the DPRK and the United States, which was unilaterally undermined by the U.S. and also to create an atmosphere that is helpful to the solution of the problem. The U.S. has openly threatened our rights to existence and development since the Singapore’s DPRK-U.S. summit meeting alone, they have imposed sanctions against the DPRK for 15 times, and resumed joint military exercises one after the other, which the U.S. President himself committed to suspend and introduced sophisticated war equipment into the Korean peninsula and its neighborhood. Our position is clear: the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is possible only when all the obstacles that threaten our safety and check the development are removed completely, without a shadow of a doubt. Claiming that our rights to existence can be ensured only when we first abandon nuclear deterrence, while the threats from the U.S. are still in place, that gave rise to the nuclear issue on the peninsula, and made its solution so difficult, is like putting the cart before the horse. We suspended the negotiations on our judgement that the U.S. is not practically prepared for the negotiations, and advised them to consider carefully a little longer until the end of this year. It is now totally up to the U.S. attitude, whether they kindle again the seed for resuming dialogue by boldly acknowledging the cause that broke down the current DPRK-U.S. working level negotiations, or close the door for dialogue for good. We will take only three questions from you. Reporter A (in Korean, translated by NK Pro): Are you saying the U.S. side did not express any positive thoughts or intentions regarding regime guarantees? Reporter B (in Korean, translated by NK Pro): My question is, will you maintain the moratorium on ICBM and nuclear testing until the end of the year? Reporter C (in Korean, translated by NK Pro): If the U.S. side comes up with another calculation, would you be willing to come to another [round of] negotiations within the year? Kim: I cannot publicize all the details what happened during the negotiations right now, but what’s clear is that the US side did not come to the negotiation with the new method of calculation which we have asked before. So what is clear is that complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is possible only when all the obstacles that threaten our safety and check the development are removed completely, without a shadow of a doubt. We’ve already made it clear that if the United States fingers the hackneyed and old-fashioned scenario, which has nothing to do with new ways of calculation, then the DPRK-US dialogue will come to an end. Whether our discontinuation of nuclear and ICBM test fire will resume or not totally depends on the US attitude. It is unchangeable in our stance to solve the Korean peninsula issue through the means of dialogue. However, if the United States admits the unilateral and hackneyed ways of thinking and action, then there’s no meaning in dialogue even though they sit with us 100 times, 1000 times. I wonder whether it might be necessary for the United States to waste time having a dialogue only for the purposes of having a dialogue. But for us, we don’t need that kind of dialogue. NK Pro translation: These DPRK-U.S. working-level negotiations were not an easy meeting: they were mapped out as per the agreement reached at the DPRK-U.S. summit meeting in Panmunjom last June, and various obstacles had to be overcome with difficulty to arrange [the meeting]. These negotiations proceeded at a critical time, when the situation of the Korean Peninsula has entered a crossroads between dialogue and confrontation. As such, we came to the negotiations with a sense of responsibility that we should derive a result to lend impetus to the development of DPRK-U.S. relations this time, and with the expectation that the U.S. would come out with a right calculation, which in turn would accelerate the positive development of DPRK-U.S. relations. The negotiations, however, did not meet our expectations and broke down. I am very displeased about this. That these negotiations did not generate any outcome and broke down is entirely due to the fact that the U.S. has not abandoned its hackneyed position and attitude. The U.S. has raised our expectations so much all this time, hinting at a flexible approach, new method, and a creative solution. However, it showed up with nothing, disappointing us greatly and dampening our desire for negotiations. That the U.S. came to the negotiations empty-handed, despite the fact that we had already clearly explained to the U.S. side what calculation is needed and gave it enough time, shows it ultimately has no intention of resolving the issue. During the negotiations, we presented a realistic method by which to break the stalemate in the DPRK-U.S. dialogue, brought about by the U.S.’s wrong approach, and by which to create a breakthrough in resolving the issue. We made our position clear that we can enter into a full-scale discussion on the next phase of measures for denuclearization if the U.S. responds sincerely to the denuclearization and trust-building measures we have preemptively taken, such as the suspension of nuclear testing and ICBM test launches, the dismantlement of the northern nuclear test site, and the return of US soldiers’ remains. This is a realistic and valid proposal for restoring relations of trust between the DPRK and the U.S., which the U.S. unilaterally abrogated, and for creating an atmosphere conducive to resolving the issue. Following the Singapore DPRK-U.S. summit meeting alone, the U.S. put into effect 15 rounds of sanctions measures targeting us; even resumed one by one the joint military exercises that the president himself pledged to suspend; and openly threatened our right of existence and development by drawing in state-of-the-art war equipment around the Korean Peninsula. Our position is clear. The complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is possible only when all obstacles threatening our security and undermining our development are removed wholly, and without room for doubt. The assertion that our right of existence and development will be guaranteed only when we first give up our nuclear deterrent, while there remains intact the U.S. threat that generated the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear issue and is making its resolution difficult, is the same as saying we should put the cart before the horse. We have concluded that the U.S. side is not actually prepared to negotiate with us. As such, we suspended the negotiations and advised [the U.S.] to think this over a bit more until the end of the year. It completely depends on the U.S. attitude whether it rekindles the fire of resuming dialogue by boldly admitting the causes of the failure of these DPRK-U.S. working-level negotiations and rectifying them, or whether it forever shuts the door to dialogue….[unidentified reporter A] Are you saying the U.S. side did not express any positive thoughts or intentions regarding regime guarantees? [unidentified reporter B] My question is, will you maintain the moratorium on ICBM and nuclear testing until the end of the year? [unidentified reporter C] If the U.S. side comes up with another calculation, would you be willing to come to another [round of] negotiations within the year? Kim: We cannot tell you everything in detail here what was mentioned during the negotiating process. However, one thing is clear: the U.S. did not bring one single calculation that we demanded. The calculation we are demanding is that only when the U.S. takes measures to perfectly remove all institutional mechanisms that threaten our security and undermine our development [can the Korean Peninsula’s denuclearization be achieved], and that it must prove so in practice. We have already made our position clear that if the U.S. toys with an old scenario that has no bearing on a new calculation that could end the dealings between the DPRK and the U.S. Whether we maintain the moratorium on nuclear testing and ICBM test launches or revive them completely depends on the U.S. position. Our position of trying to resolve the Korean Peninsula issue through dialogue and negotiations remains unchanged. That said, dialogue is meaningless, be it sitting down face to face for a hundred times or a thousand times, if the U.S. clings to its self-righteous, one-sided, and hackneyed position. So, while wasting precious time on negotiations for the sake of negotiations may be something the U.S. needs, we do not need it at all.” (NKNews, “’New Ways of Calculation’: Kim Myung Gil’s Stockholm Press Conference, in Full,” October 7, 2019)
10/8/19:
The United Nations has granted sanctions waivers for equipment to be brought into North Korea for next week’s inter-Korean World Cup qualifier in Pyongyang, a unification ministry official said today. “We know that the issue of U.N. sanctions exemptions necessary for the game and athletes’ trips (to North Korea) were resolved last week in accordance with customary procedures,” the official told reporters. The official, however, did not provide information on what and how many items have received U.N. sanctions exemptions. North Korea is to host the World Cup qualifier between the two Koreas in Pyongyang on October 15. Sports gear and equipment are among luxury goods subject to U.N. sanctions. The official also said that North Korea has not responded to Seoul’s offer for talks on the issue of sending a cheering squad for the upcoming football match. (Yonhap, “U.N. Grants Sanctions Waivers for Equipment Needed for World Cup Qualifier in Pyongyang,” October 8, 2019)
10/10/19:
DPRK FoMin spokesperson’s statement: “Despite our warning, six EU countries including Britain, France and Germany, at the instigation of the U.S., held a closed-door meeting of the UNSC Tuesday to release a statement “critical” of our self-defensive measure. The UNSC which champions fairness and equity picks fault with the just measure belonging to our right to self-defense, while keeping mum about the test-fire of Minuteman 3 intercontinental ballistic missile recently conducted by the U.S. This is a serious provocation against the DPRK. Worse still, the U.S. begged for the DPRK-U.S. working-level negotiations, but it came to the talks with empty hand, thus breaking them off. Yet, it claimed that the result of negotiations was positive and it encouraged its satellites to release a statement critical of the DPRK. We are now looking deep into what its intention was. As recognized by the international community, the United States conducted the recent intercontinental ballistic missile test-fire in a bid to pressure the DPRK. The DPRK can give tit for tat, but we are now exercising a restraint under the judgment that a counteraction is not necessary yet and it is still premature. But there is a limit to our patience and there is no guarantee that all our patience would continue indefinitely. Despite the strong warning from the DPRK, the UNSC, without a correct yardstick, put on the table for no justifiable reason the issue belonging to the DPRK’s right to self-defense just to meet someone’s interests. The reality urges the DPRK to reconsider the crucial measures it had taken on its own initiative for the confidence-building with the U.S.” (KCNA, “Spokesperson for DPRK Foreign Ministry Denounces U.S. Moves against DPRK,” October 10, 2019)
10/15/19:
North and South Korea drew 0-0 in a historic but surreal World Cup qualifier, played in front of an empty stadium and almost completely blocked off from the outside world. The showdown between the two sides — whose countries are still technically at war — took place at Pyongyang’s Kim Il Sung Stadium with no live broadcast, no supporters and no foreign media in attendance. Tottenham Hotspur star Son Heung-min captained South Korea in the first competitive men’s match to be played in Pyongyang but frustrated South Korean fans, who were not allowed to travel to the game, will have to wait days to see it on television — after officials bring back a recording on DVD. “North Korea promised to provide a DVD containing full footage of the match before our delegation departs,” the South’s unification ministry, which handles cross-border affairs, said in a statement. (AFP, “No Goals, No Fans, No TV: Koreas Draw 0-0 in Blacked-Out World Cup Qualifier,” October 15, 2019)
10/16/19:
The United States will address North Korea’s security interests if the regime gives up its nuclear weapons program, David Stilwell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, testified at a Senate hearing. “They’ve come out to talk. We need to encourage them to continue doing that,” Stilwell told the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia. “Special Representative (for North Korea Stephen) Biegun, I know, is working on engagement and trying to get these folks to the table to reassure them that their security interests — we’d take those into consideration as we work through this problem,” he added, referring to Washington’s chief negotiator. Security guarantees and sanctions relief are two of North Korea’s biggest demands from the U.S. in the on-again, off-again negotiations aimed at dismantling the regime’s nuclear weapons program. “There’s only one thing that North Korea thinks about,” Stilwell said in response to a lawmaker’s question about North Korea’s security interests. “A lot of these other things that they throw out there are distracters, leverage in some form.” The task at hand, he said, is to convince the North Koreans that they will be safer without nuclear weapons. “In this security dilemma that we face, it’s somehow convincing them that, you know, a massively overpowering US force truly will have their security interests, and they can successfully trade this nuclear program, which frankly makes them less secure, for US assurances,” Stilwell said. In a written statement submitted to the panel ahead of the hearing, the assistant secretary made clear that the US stands ready to resume “constructive discussions” with the North. “Our goal is to achieve the final, fully verified denuclearization of the DPRK,” he wrote, adding that the U.S. is also willing to discuss the other agreements reached between President Donald Trump and Kim at their first summit in Singapore in June 2018, including transforming the bilateral relationship and establishing a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. (Yonhap, “U.S. Seeks to Address N. Korea’s Security Interests: Official,” Korea Herald, October 17, 2019)
10/17/19:
Unification Minister Kim Yeon-chul said that North Korea may be seeking an epoch-making approach from the U.S. for a breakthrough in their deadlocked nuclear talks. “The US and North Korea have slightly different views [on their working-level talks in Stockholm]. The U.S. would like to continue to have a dialogue while North Korea wants to change (the approach) dramatically,” Kim said during a parliamentary audit. During the working-level talks, Kim said, the two countries discussed each of the four pillars of a joint statement they inked at their first summit in 2018 but seemed to have “not enough time to nail how to achieve a balance among the four points in detail.” The four-point statement includes promises to establish new US-North Korea relations, build a lasting peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, work toward the complete denuclearization of the peninsula and repatriate the remains of US soldiers who died during the Korean War. The Unification Ministry said it will support a “fundamental change” in relations between the U.S. and North Korea by continually seeking dialogue with the North. “Through continued dialogue, mutual security guarantees and close coordination with relevant countries, (the government) will provide support for bringing about a fundamental change in US-North Korea relations,” the ministry said. (Park Han-na, “’N. Korea Wants Innovative Approach from U.S. for Nuke Talks,’” Korea Herald, October 17, 2019)
10/19/19:
U.S. officials proposed a long-term plan to help North Korea construct a tourist area in return for denuclearization during recent working-level talks in Stockholm, Hankook Ilbo reported. U.S. negotiators prepared plans on the development of the Kalma tourist area, the paper said, citing an unidentified senior South Korean diplomat familiar with the talks in Stockholm. The paper didn’t say how North Korea reacted to the proposal. (Bloomberg, “U.S> Proposed to Help North Korea Build Tourist Area: Report,” October 19, 2019)
Four out of every 10 North Koreans urgently need food aid, the U.N. food agency has said, as crop production this year is expected to drop to its lowest level in five years due mainly to drought. Only 56.3 mm of rain fell throughout North Korea from January to March 2019, the lowest since 1917, the Food and Agriculture Organization said. South Hwanghae province — known as North Korea’s breadbasket — only received 50 percent of average rainfall from April to July 2019. The U.N. agency said dry conditions are likely to further compromise food security over the coming months. “An estimated 10.1 million people (40 percent of the population) are food insecure and urgently require food assistance,” the FAO said in a recent report on food security. (Kim Kwang-tae, “About 40 Pct. of N. Koreans Urgently Need Food Aid: FAO,” Yonhap, October 19, 2019)
10/21/19:
The United States and South Korea must produce new solutions for the current standoff on the Korean Peninsula, a senior North Korean military official said today, warning that hostile policies towards Pyongyang would lead to serious consequences. Kim Hyong Ryong, North Korea’s Vice Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, said at the Xiangshan Forum in Beijing that North Korea has worked to build lasting peace but that the situation has relapsed into a “dangerous, vicious cycle” of exacerbating tensions because of the actions of the U.S. and South Korean governments. “Though it has been more than one year since the DPRK-U.S. joint statement was adopted, there is no progress in improving bilateral relations between the two countries, completely because of the U.S.’ anachronistic, hostile policies against the DPRK,” Kim said. He also accused South Korea of a “double-dealing attitude” in continuing to carry out military drills with the U.S. and buying advanced military equipment. “Bearing in mind our firm will to safeguard peace in the region, the United States and the South Korean authorities must refrain from any actions disrupting the stability of the situation and come up with a new way for solving the problem,” Kim said. (Reuters, “North Korea Says U.S., South Korea Must Present New Solutions for Conflict,” October 21, 2019)
10/23/19:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, inspected Mt Kumgang tourist area. Supreme Leader of the Party, state and armed forces Kim Jong Un looked round Kosong Port, Haegumgang Hotel, House of Culture, Kumgangsan Hotel, Kumgangsan Okryu Restaurant, Kumgang Pension Town, Kuryong Village, Onchon Village, Family Hotel, Onjong Pavilion No. 2, Kosong Port Golf Course, Kosong Port Immigration Office, etc. which were built by the south side and Lagoon Samil and areas of Sea Kumgang and Kuryong Pool. Learning in detail about the service facilities in the tourist area, he said that the buildings are just a hotchpotch with no national character at all, and that they were built like makeshift tents in a disaster-stricken area or isolation wards. He added they are not only very backward in terms of architecture but look so shabby as they are not taken proper care of. He said that it was extremely wrong that a few blocks of such buildings reminiscent of temporary buildings at construction sites were set up for the tour of Mt Kumgang, the world-famous mountain. He added that in the past those concerned with construction built awkward-looking tourist service facilities only to damage the natural scenery. He said that due to the mistaken policy of the predecessors who tried to get benefits without any efforts after just offering the tourist area, the mountain has been left uncared for more than ten years to leave a flaw and the land is worthy of better cause. He made a sharp criticism of the very wrong, dependent policy of the predecessors who were going to rely on others when the country was not sufficient enough. He pointed out that structures on our land must be those of our style rich in national character and they must be created to meet our own sentiment and aesthetic taste. He called for removing all the unpleasant-looking facilities of the south side with an agreement with the relevant unit of the south side and building new modern service facilities our own way that go well with the natural scenery of Mt Kumgang. The present general view is that Mt Kumgang is a common property of the north and the south and it is the symbol and epitome of the north-south relations, and that the tour of Mt Kumgang would not be possible without the development of the north-south ties, he said, adding that this is certainly a mistaken idea and a misguided understanding. Mt Kumgang is our land won at the cost of blood and even a cliff and a tree there are associated with our sovereignty and dignity, he said, noting in a serious tone that the relevant department of the Party Central Committee responsible for policy guidance over the service for tour of Mt Kumgang thoughtlessly allotted the plot of the Mt Kumgang tourist area and paid no attention to the management of the cultural tourist area, thereby damaging the scenery. He continued that there are lots of distinguished scenic spots on our land but Mt Kumgang boasting of myriads of forms of natural scenery is the summa of scenic spots. He set forth detailed tasks for wonderfully developing modern cultural tourist resort in Mt Kumgang area so that the people can rest, fully enjoying the natural scenery of the country. He instructed to build Kosong Port coastal tourist area, Pirobong mountaineering tourist area, Haegumgang coastal park area and sports cultural area and to push for the construction in 3-4 stages on a yearly basis after mapping out and examining the master development plan of Mt Kumgang tourist area. He also said Mt Kumgang tourist area, the world-level scenic spot, should be taken good care of as the cultural tourist area that encompasses Mt Kumgang, Wonsan Kalma coastal tourist area and Masikryong Ski Resort, as befits the world’s scenic spot. He said that we will always welcome our compatriots from the south if they want to come to Mt Kumgang after it is wonderfully built as the world-level tourist destination but what is important is for our people to have the shared view that it is not desirable to let the south side undertake the tour of Mt Kumgang, our famous mountain. He was accompanied by officials of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea Jang Kum Chol, Kim Yo Jong, Jo Yong Won, Ri Jong Nam, Yu Jin, Hong Yong Song, Hyon Song Wol and Jang Song Ho, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Choe Son Hui and Director of a bureau of the State Affairs Commission Ma Won Chun.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Tours Mt. Kumgang Tourist Area,” October 23, 2019)
10/24/19:
Kim Kye Gwan, DPRK FoMin adviser’s statement: “I read with interest a news report that President Trump said again on a recent public occasion that the top leaders of the DPRK and the U.S. respect each other and maintain a good relationship. What I can ascertain is that the close relations between the chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK and President Trump are firm and the trust in each other is still maintained. When I met the chairman of the State Affairs Commission and reported to him the pending problems arising in external affairs including the issue of the relations between the DPRK and the U.S. a few days ago, he said that the relationship between him and President Trump is special. I sincerely hope that a motive force to overcome all the obstacles between the DPRK and the U.S. and to advance the bilateral relations in the better direction will be provided on the basis of the close relationship. The problem is that far from the political judgment and intention of President Trump, Washington political circle and DPRK policy makers of the U.S. administration are hostile to the DPRK for no reason, preoccupied with the Cold War mentality and ideological prejudice. There is a will, there is a way. We want to see how wisely the U.S. will pass the end of the year.” (KCNA, “Kim Gye Gwan, Adviser to DPRK Foreign Ministry, Issues Statement,” October 24, 2019)
10/25/19:
North Korea demanded that South Korea remove its facilities from the North’s Mount Kumgang resort on an agreed-upon date, saying the country will build a new tourist zone of its own at the scenic mountain, according to the unification ministry. In a notice delivered earlier in the day through the joint liaison office in the North’s border town of Kaesong, the North also said it wants to discuss details with the South in writing, rather than at face-to-face talks, according to the ministry. South Korea called for face-to-face talks to resolve the issue and said it will seek “creative solutions” to normalize the now-suspended tour program to the mountain, with the top priority to be placed on protecting the property rights of its people. “The North has asked the government and private companies to remove their facilities on an agreed-upon date,” ministry spokesperson Lee Sang-min told a press conference in Seoul. “It said that practical matters can be agreed upon through exchange of documents.” “I think we need government-to-government meetings,” he said. The spokesperson said that South Korea will take time to consider relevant “conditions and environment” to come up with countermeasures in light of the significance of the Mount Kumgang tour program. “By sufficiently reviewing the changed environment, our government will draw up creative solutions to the Mount Kumgang tour,” he said. (Koh Byung-joon and Choi Soo-hyang, “N. Korea Asks S. Korea to Removes Facilities at Mt. Kumgang on Agreed-Upon Date: Ministry,” Yonhap, October 25, 2019)
10/26/19:
Internal Egyptian government documents show officials in Cairo scrambling to do damage control after U.S. spy agencies uncovered an alleged scheme to smuggle North Korean military cargo into the country in defiance of international sanctions. The newly obtained records include what appears to be an explicit acknowledgment of the Egyptian military’s role in purchasing 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades that were discovered hidden on a North Korean cargo ship in 2016. The vessel was headed to an Egyptian port in the Suez Canal at the time of the bust, which a report by the United Nations described as “the largest seizure of ammunition in the history of sanctions” against the communist state. North Korean officials continued to demand payment for the estimated $23 million weapons shipment, prompting fears among the Egyptians that they might be subjected to blackmail, according to the Foreign Ministry documents obtained by the Washington Post. An Egyptian government spokesman declined to comment on the documents. The Post first reported on Egypt’s clandestine deal to purchase the North Korean grenades in October 2017. The North Korean-owned freighter Jie Shun was halted after U.S. intelligence agencies alerted Cairo to the possible presence of hidden contraband aboard the ship. Egyptian authorities uncovered the grenades and impounded the vessel. Only then did U.S. officials discover that the intended recipients were the Egyptians themselves. Egyptian officials never publicly acknowledged purchasing North Korean military equipment, a practice that is banned under U.S. and U.N. sanctions. Trump administration officials in 2017 ordered a freeze on the delivery of $300 million in military aid for Egypt, in part because of unspecified secret arms deals between Cairo and Pyongyang. But strained ties with Washington were only part of the fallout over the arms deal. The new documents appear to show deep concern among Egyptian officials over a host of problems stemming from the discovery of the arms shipment, including the possibility that North Korea would threaten to expose details of the business relationship. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry documents are dated from March to May 2017, before Cairo’s role in the arms transfer was publicly known. One of them, a memo from May 28, 2017, prepared for Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, discusses North Korea’s unhappiness over the seizure of the grenades and offers suggestions on how to keep the affair quiet. It refers to a letter sent by North Korea to the Arab Organization for Industrialization — the state-owned Egyptian defense industry conglomeration — demanding payment and issuing vague threats. “The letter once again included threats made by the North Korean side to disclose what they know about details of this shipment,” the memo states. The document says the Egyptian company “denies knowing about” the arms deal, but a few sentences later it urges a quick financial settlement to keep the North Koreans quiet. “We have made clear that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs favors to speed up the processing of this settlement at the earliest time,” and preferably before Egypt’s rotating membership in the U.N. Security Council ended in December of that year, the memo states. The first public disclosures of the weapons seizure occurred in a report by the U.N. Panel of Experts, a watchdog organization created by the council to investigate violations of U.N. sanctions against North Korea. The memo of May 28, 2017, outlines a strategy for resolving the payment dispute. Under the plan, Egypt’s military intelligence agency would handle the negotiations, working through North Korea’s military attaché in Cairo. The memo mentions a recent Egyptian loan to North Korea — the details are not spelled out in the documents — and suggests that Pyongyang might agree to a smaller payment for the grenades in return for more generous terms for repaying the loan. “Using this ‘loan card’ has [already] succeeded in pushing the Korean side to communicate with the Egyptian side,” it says. How the matter was ultimately resolved — including how much money, if any, was paid — is not clear from the documents. Because such sales are outlawed, North Korea often goes to great lengths to conceal the transactions. The grenades shipped to Egypt in 2016 were carried on a ship that sailed under a Cambodian flag, even though the vessel and cargo were North Korean-owned. The Jie Shun’s manifest listed its only cargo as limonite, a kind of iron ore. Customs officials who searched the ship in 2016 first saw only piles of yellow limonite stones in the ship’s cargo hold. But hidden beneath the stones were scores of wooden crates filled with grenades. A statement provided to The Post in 2017 by the Egyptian Embassy in Washington did not directly address the alleged sanctions violations, but cited Cairo’s cooperation with U.N. officials in finding and destroying the contraband. “Egypt will continue to abide by all Security Council resolutions and will always be in conformity with these resolutions as they restrain military purchases from North Korea,” the statement said. (Joby Warrick and Sudarsan Raghavan, “Egyptian Government Documents: Cairo Tried to Cover up Arms Deal with North Korea,” Washington Post, October 26, 2019)
10/27/19:
Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee, (KAPPC) Chairman Kim Yong Chol’s statement: “The U.S. is now more desperately resorting to the hostile policy towards the DPRK, misjudging the patience and tolerance of the DPRK. Faulting the DPRK on its measure for bolstering up its military capability for self-defense at the recent meeting of the First Committee of the 74th United Nations General Assembly, the U.S. delegate said the U.S. would not enter the U.S.-DPRK dialogue with its eyes shut and north Korea must come up with a new methodology for FFVD, which got on the nerves of the DPRK. The U.S. is persistently pressurizing other countries into implementing the UN “sanctions resolutions” and is leaving no stone unturned to get the anti-DPRK resolutions passed in the UN General Assembly, using its satellite countries. The U.S. strategic forces commander nominee, speaking at the Senate, called the DPRK “a rogue state” out of an evil intent, and the warlike forces of the U.S. military are reportedly planning nuclear strike exercises against the DPRK. The situation points to the U.S. intent to isolate and stifle the DPRK in a more crafty and vicious way than before, instead of complying with our call for a change in its calculation method. The DPRK-U.S. relations that could have been derailed and fallen apart several times due to such hostile acts and wrong habitual practices on the part of the U.S. are still maintained. It goes to the credit of the close personal relations between Chairman of the State Affairs Commission Kim Jong Un and President Trump. But there is a limit to everything. The close personal relations can never be kept aloof from the public mindset and they are never a guarantee for preventing the DPRK-U.S. relations from getting aggravated or for making up for. The U.S. trumpets the crucial measures taken by the DPRK for confidence-building as its own “diplomatic gains” but no substantial progress has been made in the DPRK-U.S. relations and belligerent relations still persists that there can be the exchange of fire any moment. The U.S. is seriously mistaken if it is of the idea of passing off in peace the end of this year, by exploiting the close personal relations between its president and the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK for the delaying tactics. My hope is that the diplomatic adage that there is neither permanent foe nor permanent friend does not change into the one that there is a permanent foe but no permanent friend.” (KCNA, “KAPPC Chairman’s Statement,” October 27, 2019)
10/29/19:
North Korea rejected South Korea’s offer for working-level talks about the fate of a long-suspended joint tour program to Mount Kumgang in the communist nation, insisting on discussing the matter in writing, the unification ministry said. South Korea made the dialogue offer yesterday in a counterproposal to North Korea’s demand that Seoul remove all of its long-abandoned facilities from the mountain resort in an apparent threat to end the joint business. “The North said that it is not necessary to hold separate working-level talks we proposed earlier and insisted on reaching an agreement (on the removal issue) through the exchange of documents,” the ministry said in a text message sent to reporters. “The government will draw up countermeasures on the Mount Kumgang matter in close consultation with relevant business operators with a principle that any inter-Korean issues should be resolved through dialogue and consultations,” it added. The North sent notices detailing its stance earlier in the day to the ministry and Hyundai Asan Corp., which operated the tour program to the mountain until the project was suspended in 2008. A ministry official said that the government will consider every possible measure, including sending a notice again to North Korea to propose holding working-level talks. (Koh Byung-joon and Choi Soo-hyang, “N.K. Rejects Dialogue Offer, Insists on Discussing Mount Kumgang Offer in Writing,” Yonhap, October 29, 2019)
10/31/19:
North Korea fired two short-range projectiles from a western region toward the East Sea, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said, amid a lack of progress in denuclearization talks with the United States and chilled inter-Korean ties. The projectiles were fired at 4:35 p.m. and 4:38 p.m. from areas in the city of Sunchon, South Pyongan Province, toward the East Sea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said. Both flew around 370 km across the peninsula, reaching a maximum altitude of around 90 km, the JCS said, adding that South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities are analyzing their exact type. “Our military is monitoring the situation in case of additional launches and maintaining a readiness posture,” the JCS said, calling on the North to “immediately stop such an act that does not help efforts to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea’s National Security Council (NSC) held an emergency meeting, presided over by Chung Eui-yong, chief of the presidential national security office, to analyze the intention behind the launch, and reviewed the overall security conditions on the Korean Peninsula, Cheong Wa Dae said, adding that the council expressed “strong concern.” It is the 12th time that North Korea has carried out such a weapons test so far this year, with the last test-firing taking place on October 2, when it tested a new type of submarine-launched ballistic missile, the Pukguksong-3, from waters off its east coast. Experts said that the launches could have involved North Korea’s newly developed multiple rocket launcher system. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Fires Two Short-Range Projectiles toward East Sea: JCS,” October 31, 2019)
KCNA: “The Academy of Defense Science of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea succeeded in another test-fire of super-large multiple rocket launchers on Thursday afternoon. The Academy of Defense Science organized the test-fire to verify the security of launchers’ continuous fire system. The successful test-fire result was directly reported to the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea on the spot. After receiving a report of the Academy of Defense Science on the military and technical appreciation of the test-fire, Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un expressed satisfaction over it and sent congratulations to the national defense scientists who are devotedly struggling for developing the self-defensive military muscle of the country and bolstering up its armed forces. The perfection of the continuous fire system was verified through the test-fire to totally destroy with super-power the group target of the enemy and designated target area by surprise strike of the weapon system of super-large multiple rocket launchers.” (KCNA, “Another Test-Fire of Super-Large Multiple Rocket Launchers Conducted in DPRK,” November 1, 2019)
President Donald Trump today nominated U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun, a widely respected foreign policy veteran, to become the next deputy secretary of state. A U.S. official said Biegun would retain his responsibilities for diplomacy with North Korea. Biegun would replace John Sullivan as the State Department’s No. 2 official. Sullivan has been nominated to be the next ambassador to Russia. Biegun’s nomination enjoys broad support and he is also regarded as a plausible acting secretary of state by senior current and former U.S. diplomats should Secretary of State Mike Pompeo choose to step down to run for a Senate seat neat year. News reports have said Pompeo, a former Republican congressman, is mulling a U.S. Senate run. He has declined to rule one out while saying he would serve in his post as long as Trump wanted him to. (David Brunnstrom and Arshad Mohammed, “U.S. North Korea Envoy Biegun Nominated for No. 2 Job at State Department,” October 31, 2019)
India has confirmed its newest nuclear power plant was the victim of a cyberattack. The Kudankulam nuclear power plant in the south was hacked using malware known as DTrack, designed for data extraction designed by the Lazarus Group, cyber experts said. The group is known to have ties to two North Korean-backed groups. The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited confirmed that malware had been identified in the system but said it was “isolated from the critical internal network.” His assessment is disputed by cyber security experts who say critical information was compromised. News of the hack first surfaced when VirusTotal, a virus scanner site owned by Google parent Alphabet, flagged a data dump related to the Indian malware. Indian security officials have known about the hack since September, according to Pukhraj Singh, a private security consultant who used to work at the National Technical Research Organization, India’s equivalent to the National Security Agency. He said he alerted the government himself after receiving a tip about the virus. “The attackers gained a very privileged vantage point in the network,” said. Singh. Cybersecurity firm Kaspersky said DTrack had “similarities with the Dark-Seoul campaign” that targeted South Korean banks and media companies dating back to 2013 attributed to the Lazarus Group. (Stephanie Findlay and Edward White, “India Confirms Hack of Nuclear Plant,” Financial Times, November 1, 2019)
11/4/19:
Kim Jong Un has made up his mind about the timing of the next U.S.-North Korea summit, Suh Hoon, the head of South Korea’s national intelligence service, told the National Assembly’s information committee. The third official meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader could take place before the end of the year, News 1 and MoneyToday reported. In preparation for the third summit, working-level talks between Pyongyang and Washington could take place in November, or early December at the latest, the spy chief said, according to reports. Suh also said Kim could visit China ahead of a third U.S.-North Korea summit, to commemorate the 70th anniversary of bilateral ties. Last week, sources in China told a South Korean newspaper North Korea’s all-women’s Moranbong Band could tour Chinese cities in December, and that Chinese President Xi Jinping could attend a concert with Kim. The spy agency raised concerns regarding North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear complex. The plutonium reprocessing facility at the site has shown no signs of activity other than maintenance inspection, but the uranium enrichment facility is in operation and the experimental light-water nuclear reactor appears to be under renovation, according to Seoul. Suh said the Punggye-ri nuclear test site that North Korea detonated in May 2018 appears to be in a “state of neglect.” Recovery work is under way in the area following damage caused by typhoons to roads and bridges. (Elizabeth Shim, “Kim Jong Un Has ‘Decided’ on U.S.-N. Korea Summit, Seoul Says,” UPI, November 4, 2019)
11/5/19:
DPRK FoMin Spokespersons’ answer to a question put by KCNA “with regard to the fact that shortly ago, the U.S. Department of State found fault with the DPRK in the “country reports on terrorism for 2018”: The U.S. Department of State took issue with the DPRK again in the “country reports on terrorism for 2018” issued on November 1. This proves once again that the U.S. preoccupied with inveterate repugnancy toward the DPRK is invariably seeking its hostile policy towards the latter. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK condemns and fully rejects the reports as a grave politically-motivated provocation against the DPRK as they are full of all sorts of falsity and fabrication. It is the consistent stand of the DPRK to oppose all forms of terrorism and any support for it. It is unreasonable that the U.S., hotbed and ringleader of terrorism, is styling itself a “judge of terrorism”, which is just like a guilty party filing the suit first. The U.S. persistently tries to brand the DPRK as a “state sponsor of terrorism” at a sensitive time when the DPRK- U.S. dialogue is at a stalemate. This is an insult to and perfidy against the DPRK, dialogue partner. The channel of the dialogue between the DPRK and the U.S. is more and more narrowing due to such attitude and stand of the U.S.” (KCNA, “Spokesperson for DPRK Foreign Ministry Brands Country Reports on Terrorism as Gravely Politically-Motivated Provocation,” November 5, 2019)
Building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula is an integral part of U.S. President Donald Trump’s vision for North Korea, a U.S. official involved in denuclearization negotiations with the North said today. The remark by Deputy Special Representative for North Korea Alex Wong comes as negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang have stalled due to differences over how much the North should denuclearize in order to receive sanctions relief and security guarantees from the U.S. “We can have a more stable, a more prosperous, and a more peaceful future for all people on the peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region if we can do the job we need to do in the negotiations,” Wong said during an event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank. “That’s why a stable peace regime is a key pillar of the Singapore summit joint declaration that President Trump signed with Chairman Kim,” he said, referring to the first summit between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore in June 2018. Wong’s remarks appeared to signal the U.S.’s willingness to address North Korea’s concerns about its security and formally end the 1950-53 Korean War that ended in an armistice, not a peace treaty. “A peace regime is an integral part of President Trump’s vision for a bright future for the DPRK,” he said, referring to the North by its official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. “The concept holds the promise of the type of strategic shift on the peninsula that will advance the interests of all players, of all the stakeholders, and make even more clear than it is today that the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction programs, rather than being a source of security for the DPRK, are a key driver in the DPRK’s insecurity,” he said. (Lee Haye-ah, “U.S. Holds out Prospect of Peace Regime on Korean Peninsula,” Yonhap, November 5, 2019)
11/6/19:
DPRK FoMin Roving Ambassador Kwon Jong Gun’s statement: “Shortly ago, the U.S. Defense Department officially announced that it is pushing ahead with the procedure for resuming the combined aerial exercise with the south Korean army in December. The U.S. committed itself to stopping military exercises against the DPRK after Singapore DPRK-U.S. summit. The U.S. announcement of the combined aerial exercise plan after a month since the breakdown of the Stockholm DPRK-U.S. technical negotiations amounts to a declaration of confrontation with the DPRK. The U.S. intention to openly hold war exercise against the DPRK at a sensitive time when the whole world is concerned about the prospect of the DPRK-U.S. relations clearly proves again its nature as the chieftain harassing world peace and security and the hegemonic state regarding the recourse to military strength as a cure-for-all in settling issues. The U.S. reckless military frenzy is an extremely provocative and dangerous act of throwing a wet blanket over the spark of the DPRK-U.S. dialogue on the verge of extinction and stoking the atmosphere of confrontation on the Korean peninsula and the region. No one will believe that the changed war exercises will change their aggression nature. We have already emphasized more than once that the planned joint military exercise can block the DPRK-U.S. relations from advancing and compel us to reconsider the crucial measures we have already taken. Our patience is nearing the limitations and we will never remain an onlooker to the reckless military moves of the U.S.” (KCNA, “Roving Ambassador of Foreign Ministry of DPRK Blasts U.S. Plan to Resume Combined Aerial Exercise with S. Korea,” November 6, 2019)
South Korea will reduce its troops by nearly 80,000 by 2022 and expand the use of technologies, responding to an ageing society, according to the country’s fiscal chief. “We will reorganize the structure of our military forces, focusing on cutting-edge technologies,” said Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Hong Nam-ki in a ministerial meeting on economic revitalization, held at Export-Import Bank of Korea headquarters in Yeouido. The restructuring plan aims at reducing the country’s military establishment to 500,000 from the current 579,000 over the upcoming years. The corresponding figure as of last year was 599,000, the 2018 defense white paper showed in January. To make up for the capacity shortage, the government will expand the use of weaponized drones, reconnaissance satellites and unmanned aircraft, according to the minister. While phasing out converted military services such as conscripted police and maritime police, the government will take a more flexible approach to alternative services in military-designated companies. “The (pace and scale of) reduction for alternative (military) services will be decided in consideration of economic situations, such as the government subsidy for small and medium-sized enterprises,” Hong said. The minimum number of people required in the military has been on a steady decline — projected to fall to 225,000 in 2025 and further to 161,000 in 2038, from 360,000 in 2016. Also, embracing the active social participation of women and an increased number of naturalized foreigners, the government vowed to heighten the ratio of female military officers and possibly to mandate military service for naturalized nationals. The number of foreigners acquiring Korean nationality stood at 10,086 as of 2017, data showed. The military downsizing came in line with the country’s demographic changes. Statistics Korea forecast that the population here will contract to 39 million in 2067, dropping sharply from the estimated 51.7 million this year. The country’s birthrate hit a record low of 0.98 births in a woman’s lifetime, visibly lower than the 2.1 that is required to maintain the current population stable. The corresponding average of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is 1.65. (Bae Hyun-jung, “S. Korea to Reduce Troops Number to 500,000 by 2022,” Korea Herald, November 6, 2019)
North Korea is not believed to be capable yet of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) from transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicles, the chief of South Korea’s defense intelligence agency said today. The issue has been a source of controversy in Seoul, after Chung Eui-yong, chief of Cheong Wa Dae’s National Security Office, has said it is “technically difficult” for the North to fire ICBMs from mobile launchers. Conservative critics accused Chung of being naive. “The chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Kim Yong-hwan) said that he does not believe that North Korea has such capabilities,” Rep. Lee Hye-hoon, the chief of the intelligence panel, told reporters during a parliamentary audit into the agency. Kim was also quoted by Rep. Lee Eun-jae of the main opposition Liberty Korea Party as saying that North Korea tried to fire an ICBM from a TEL but failed to do so due to some unidentified problems. Today’s comment is contradictory to his earlier assessment. During an audit into the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) earlier this month, Kim said that North Korea’s ICBM technology “has been advanced to the degree where the missile can be fired from a TEL.” During three rounds of ICBM tests in 2017 — twice involving the Hwasong-14 and once with the Hwasong-15, North Korea used TELs to transport the long-range missiles to its test sites, and fired them from a launch pad fixed on the ground during three rounds of ICBM tests. (Oh Seok-min, “N. Korea Not Capable of Firing ICBMs from Mobile Launchers: Seoul Official,” Yonhap, November 6, 2019)
The stalled diplomatic process aimed at convincing North Korea to denuclearize could ultimately collapse next year, leading to Pyongyang even restarting nuclear tests, Joel Wit, a senior fellow at Washington-based think tank Stimson Center, said at a conference in Seoul, saying that the latest working-level talks between the two countries in Stockholm showed that a debate over whether to denuclearize might have intensified within North Korea. The U.S. and North Korea held a working-level meeting in the Swedish capital in early October after months of a stalemate, but the talks broke down again, with Pyongyang accusing Washington of failing to come up with a new proposal. “The U.S. delegation came prepared for detailed talks. The North Koreans didn’t. They were in listening mode almost the whole time,” Wit said according to a script for the forum. “I think the odds are we are approaching a breakdown in the diplomatic process that has been in place over since 2018 and a return, at best, to a standoff with North Korea.” Stressing the need to take drastic steps to bolster the diplomatic process, Wit said U.S. President Donald Trump should agree to visit Pyongyang for a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un once they reach a deal by their negotiators beforehand. Such a visit would be “politically and symbolically attractive enough” for the North to move the denuclearization process forward, he said. “The Kim-Trump relationship based on their face-to-face meetings, letters and other contacts may actually count for something,” the expert said. Yet he said preparations are necessary for the North’s possible resumption of long-range missile tests that can reach the U.S. “It might even resume nuclear tests although that would be risky since it might drive the Chinese away,” he said. (Yonhap, “U.S.-N. Korea Diplomacy Likely to Collapse Next Year: American Expert,” November 6, 2019)
11/7/19:
Despite strong complaints from North Korea, South Korea and the United States plan to stage a joint air exercise this month as scheduled, sources said today. The maneuvers will be smaller in scale than the massive Vigilant Ace exercise that the allies had conducted annually before suspending it last year as part of efforts to support diplomatic efforts to convince North Korea to denuclearize, the sources said. “The South and the U.S. plan to hold a combined air exercise with an adjusted scale around the middle of this month,” a source said on condition of anonymity. “Its size will be adjusted from the large-scale Vigilant Ace exercise.” During the 2017 exercise, the allies mobilized around 270 aircraft, including radar-evading fighter jets, such as F-22s, F-35As and F-35Bs, in a show of force against North Korea. Earlier this week, the defense ministry said the two countries plan to hold a joint exercise this winter as a replacement of the Vigilant Ace drills that used to take place in December. But further details were not available, including its timing. The U.S. Department of Defense also said the two sides will hold the Combined Flying Training Event. In response, North Korea yesterday issued a statement warning that its patience is “reaching its limits” and it “will just not sit idle while just watching the U.S.’ reckless military movements.” Following North Korea’s complaints about the combined exercise, Lt. Col. Dave Eastburn, a Pentagon spokesman, said yesterday, “We don’t scale or conduct our exercises based off North Korea’s anger.” South Korea’s Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo also stated earlier this week that Seoul and Washington “are planning to stage (the exercise) in an adjusted manner in consideration of all circumstances,” which aims to secure “actual capabilities.” “The militaries of the two countries have continuously done combined exercises to maintain a strong readiness posture, and the envisioned air exercise will be carried out in that sense,” another Seoul military source said, noting that the authorities have no plan to make an official announcement regarding the upcoming drill as a matter of policy. (Oh Seok-min, “S. Korea, U.S. to Stage Combined Air Exercise This Month,” Yonhap, November 7, 2019)
DPRK Ambassador Song Il Ho’s statement: “A fool remains as it is till his doom’s day and a rogue cannot be converted forever. Abe, prime minister of Japan, is an idiot and villain as he is making fuss as if a nuclear bomb was dropped on the land of Japan, taking issue with the DPRK’s test-fire of super-large multiple rocket launchers. Abe is reeling off a string of ill-intended remarks that the DPRK’s test-fire of super-large multiple rocket launchers was a ballistic missile launch and a threat to Japan. Moreover, he impudently said at the ASEAN summit that north Korea’s launch of missile is a wanton violation of the UN resolution and that the international community should turn out for the north’s denuclearization. It is very shameless for him, who had repeatedly said that the DPRK’s recent successive self-defensive measures “have no impact on security of Japan,” to talk such rubbish as ballistic missiles and violation of the UN resolution. Abe is a base politician as he lays bare his nature by following the trend of the times. Abe is also a rarely ignorant man who dreams of making Japan a military power, though he is not able to distinguish multiple rocket launchers from missiles, and he is an under-wit as he is only able to utter such crude words as “provocation,” “outrage,” “violation,” “abduction,” and “pressure.” He is, indeed, a deformed man. As such a base, rude and immoral man is the prime minister of Japan, it is censured as a “politically small nation,” “sinking island country” and “gloomy, desolate country” by the world. It is too natural that Abe is treated as a poor dog and dwarf that fails to enter the international political arena with the Korean Peninsula as a center. Anyone cannot help but laugh at Abe as he is knocking the door of Pyongyang with caution, while citing “no-strings-attached talks.” Abe would be well-advised never to dream of crossing the threshold of Pyongyang as he hurled a torrent of abuse at the just measures of the DPRK for self-defense. Not many years have elapsed since peace settled in the sky above Japan. If the dwarfs persist in provoking the DPRK, seemingly to get the uneasiness and horror with which they trembled when a projectile flew over Japan, the DPRK will do what it wishes to do, indifferent to the island nation. Japan had better know well that it will face a more serious disaster and ruin if it keeps on running reckless, failing to know where it stands.” (KCNA, “Japanese PM Condemned for Taking Issue with DPRK’s Test-Fire of Super-Large Multiple Rocket Launcher,” November 7, 2019)
11/8/19:
The U.S. special envoy for North Korea and a North Korean foreign ministry official handling American affairs spoke briefly to each other during a reception for participants in a nuclear non-proliferation conference in Moscow, a participant said. Special Envoy Mark Lambert had a five-minute talk with Jo Chol-su, director-general of the North American department at the North’s foreign ministry, in the reception Thursday for the 2019 Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, according to the participant. Lee Do-hoon, South Korea’s chief nuclear negotiator, was also present at the reception but did not exchange greetings with Jo, apparently reflecting the chilled relations between the two Koreas. Jo stayed at the reception for about 40 minutes. (Yonhap, “U.S., North Korea Envoys Meet Briefly at Nonproliferation Conference in Moscow,” Korea Times, November 8, 2019)
11/13/19:
DPRK State Affairs Council statement: “We explicitly defined the joint military drill being planned by the U.S. and south Korea as a main factor of screwing up tensions of the Korean peninsula and the region out of control, and have expressed deep concern over it and repeatedly warned them to stop it. Despite our repeated warnings, the U.S. and the south Korean side decided to push ahead with the military drill hostile to the DPRK at the most sensitive time. This has further enraged our people, making it hard for them to keep the patience they have so far exercised. The U.S. Defense Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff, asserting that they would adjust the scale of the projected U.S.-south joint air drill and not stage it in consideration of north Korea’s anger, openly said now is just the time to launch a joint drill of such type and it is aimed to gird itself for going into a war even tonight. The U.S. is not accepting with due consideration the year-end time limit that we set out of great patience and magnanimity. Such moves of the U.S. constitute an undisguised breach of the June 12 DPRK-U.S. joint statement adopted on the basis of mutual trust and an open denial of the Singapore agreement which evoked great sensation worldwide. We have so far tried hard to recognize the U.S. as our dialogue partner, halted different actions that the U.S. was concerned about, and have taken all possible confidence-building measures, true to its commitment to stop military actions irritating and antagonizing the dialogue partner during the goodwill dialogue between the DPRK and the U.S. By such efforts of us, successes termed by the U.S. president his exploits at every opportunity could be possible. We, without being given anything, gave things the U.S. president can brag about but the U.S. side has not yet taken any corresponding step. Now, betrayal is only what we feel from the U.S. side. The U.S. persists in the trite and unreasonable mode after overturning even the official stand of its president to handle the “nuclear issue of north Korea” out of a new calculation method, raising higher the obstacles to the improvement of the DPRK-U.S. relations and the end of the hostile relations. This year alone, it staged Key Resolve and Foal Eagle with changed codename Alliance 19 in March and Ulji Freedom Guardian with changed codename “drill for examining wartime operation control transfer” in August. Whenever it was given opportunities, it waged a series of dangerous hostile military acts in a disguised mode, namely special operation drills. Such acts of perfidy of reciprocating the good faith with evil have already put the DPRK-U.S. relations on the verge of a breakdown. Still it is mulling about combined aerial drills targeting the DPRK, the dialogue partner, under such situation only to further aggravate the situation. Our official stand is that we can no longer remain an onlooker to such a reckless act of the U.S. At present when one party backpedals on its commitments and unilaterally takes hostile steps, there is neither reason nor any excuse for the other party to keep itself bound to its commitments. What’s more, there is no sufficient time left. Now that the physical movement of threatening our sovereignty and the security environment is clearly seen, it is the exercise of the full-fledged self-defensive right of a sovereign state to take countermeasures to contain it. It is our intention and will to answer dialogue with dialogue and recourse to force in kind. To look back on the past hours which we let them pass with patience, we no longer feel the need to exercise any more patience. The U.S. has to ponder over what it can do during the short last hours left. The U.S. had better behave itself with prudence at a sensitive time when the situation on the Korean Peninsula could go back to the starting point due to the joint military drills between the U.S. and south Korea, the biggest factor of the repeating vicious circle of the DPRK-U.S. relations. The U.S. will have to meditate on what influence the “new way” we can be compelled to take will have on the “future of the U.S.” It will face greater threat and be forced to admit its failure, being put into trouble before long if it doesn’t do anything to change the trend of the present situation.” (KCNA, “Statement of Spokesman of DPRK State Affairs Council,” November 13, 2019)
North Korea has a message for President Trump and the United States: The clock is ticking, and a bomb is about to explode. There are seven weeks until North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un is scheduled to deliver a keynote New Year’s Day speech. That will come a day after his self-imposed year-end deadline expires for the United States to come up with new proposals to restart nuclear talks. Today — with Washington transfixed on the House impeachment inquiry — North Korea significantly raised the stakes, making an implicit threat to resume long-range missile or nuclear tests. In an official statement, the North said it felt “betrayed” by a U.S. decision to continue with joint air drills with South Korea, calling it an “undisguised breach” of an agreement made between Kim and President Trump in Singapore last year. As a result, North Korea said it no longer felt bound by previous commitments. That could signal plans to resume nuclear or long-range missile tests. “The U.S. is not accepting with due consideration the year-end time limit that we set out of great patience and magnanimity,” the statement from the country’s State Affairs Commission said. “We, without being given anything, gave things the U.S. president can brag about but the U.S. side has not yet taken any corresponding step,” it added. “Now, betrayal is only what we feel from the U.S. side.” South Korea says it is taking the threat seriously but insists there is still time to save the day. Unification Minister Kim Yeon-chul said he believed the United States and North Korea would return to the negotiating table before the end of the year. “If they miss this opportunity, the situation and the environment will get more difficult, and it will become more difficult for us to solve the issues,” he said in an interview. Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper said he took it seriously when any foreign country or leader says something but added that his department’s job was “to retain our readiness, deter conflict and if, for some reason, conflict happens, be prepared to fight and win.” “Talks about talks” are underway, Esper said Wednesday en route to South Korea, adding that the best path forward was through a “political arrangement.” Pessimism is rising among the North Korea-watching community of policy experts and analysts. They see the prospect of an escalation in tensions between Washington and Pyongyang. Robert Carlin, a visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, said he believed the polarized political atmosphere in Washington limited U.S. negotiators’ room to maneuver. “Do you know how hard it is to pull together a major diplomatic initiative in seven weeks? Do you know how hard it is when the president is moving into impeachment? In Washington, we’re seeing the most poisonous atmosphere, so that no matter what the president proposes, it will be torn to shreds,” he said in a lecture in Seoul yesterday. If the North Korean leader announces “extremely negative measures” in his New Year’s speech, “I cannot see us responding in anything other than a very stern, escalatory way,” he said. “My concern,” he added, “is the North Koreans are going to miscalculate.” Meanwhile, Kim Yeon-chul, South Korea’s unification minister, will travel to Washington and Los Angeles next week as Seoul tries to reprise its role as peacemaker. But he faces an uphill battle: North Korea has shut off dialogue with the South, and Washington sees Seoul as much less central to the process than it did a year ago. Kim says he will bring ideas to Washington. He wants the two sides to focus on confidence-building measures; for example, by easing travel restrictions on U.S. citizens of Korean origin who still have relatives in the North. He suggested they might consider an “Olympics armistice” next year, in which North Korea suspends its missile tests and the United States suspends joint military exercises with South Korea. Japan — which also had deep concerns over North Korea’s military and nuclear capabilities — is host of the 2020 Summer Games. His main message, though: Progress on North Korean denuclearization has to go hand-in-hand with progress in inter-Korean relations, and the three countries, North and South Korea and the United States, all need to work on improving relations. “So if all of these three relations could make some positive progress and create a virtuous cycle, then we can make successful progress with North Korean denuclearization,” he said. (Simon Denyer, “North Korea Threatens Escalation as Clock Ticks on Year-End Deadline,” Washington Post, November 14, 2019)
Makowsky and Town: “Recent commercial satellite imagery shows tens of military aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip along the taxiways and parking aprons at North Korea’s Wonsan-Kalma International Airport. While the purpose of the display is unclear, the North may be preparing for a site visit by Kim Jong Un and possible demonstration of its air force capabilities. Similarly, it may be reviving the suspended annual Korean People’s Army Air and Anti-Air Force Flight Drill Competition, which is usually observed by Kim Jong Un and demonstrates the air force’s ability to destroy enemy targets. Other explanations may be staging for possible air exercises, although the wingtip-to-wingtip formation makes this scenario less likely, or potentially an air show like what took place in September 2016, although without a grand audience seems unlikely as well. On imagery from November 11, there were four MiG-17 fighter aircraft, six MiG-15 fighter aircraft, fourteen Su-25 close support aircraft, six MiG-29 fighter aircraft and six Il-28 bomber aircraft observed on the tarmac north of the passenger terminal. On November 13, additional MiG-15 and MiG-17 were added to the display bringing their total to eleven MiG-15s and eight MiG-17s. Several small vehicles were parked on the tarmac near the MiG-23 and Il-28 aircraft. In addition, thirteen probable MiG-21 fighter aircraft were observed on the alert apron at the south end of the airfield, and six small, either Hughes 500 or Mi-2 Hoplite light helicopters, six medium, possibly Mi-8 or Mi-14, medium transport helicopters, and eight An-2 Colt light transport aircraft were parked along the auxiliary runway located on the southwest side of the airfield. Further to the south of the auxiliary runway at the rail transfer point, seven additional MiG-21 were parked on an adjacent apron. It could not be determined whether these aircraft are newly arrived, perhaps by rail, or whether they have been moved there for temporary storage.” (Peter Makowsky and Jenny Town, “Military Aircraft Lined up at the Wonson Airport,” 38 North, November 14, 2019)
11/14/19:
DPRK Foreign Ministry Roving Ambassador Kim Myong Gil’s statement: “Biegun, special representative of the U.S. Department of State for North Korea policy, sent us through a third country a message hoping that the DPRK and the U.S. would meet again within December for negotiations. I cannot understand why he spreads the so-called idea of DPRK-U.S. relations through the third party, not thinking of candidly making direct contact with me, his dialogue partner, if he has any suggestions or any idea over the DPRK-U.S. dialogue. His behavior only amplifies doubts about the U.S. If the negotiated solution of issues is possible, we are ready to meet with the U.S. at any place and any time. If the U.S. still seeks a sinister aim of appeasing us in a bid to pass the time limit — the end of this year — with ease as it did during the DPRK-U.S. working-level negotiations in Sweden early in October, we have no willingness to have such negotiations. Now that we have already informed the U.S. side of our requirements and priority matters, the ball is in the U.S. court. If the U.S., failing to put forth a basic solution for lifting the anti-DPRK hostile policy harmful to our rights to existence and development, thinks that it can lead us to negotiations with war-end declaration, which may reduce to a dead document any moment with change of situation, and with other matters of secondary importance like the establishment of a liaison office, there is no possibility of the settlement of the issues. If the U.S. side has found a solution to be presented to us, it can just explain it to us directly. But I intuitively feel that the U.S. is not ready to give a satisfactory answer to us and its proposal for dialogue with us is a trick to earn time through the orchestration of DPRK-U.S. meeting. Explicitly speaking once again, I am not interested in such a meeting.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Roving Ambassador Issues Statement,” November 14, 2019)
U.S. military exercises with South Korea could be scaled back to aid diplomacy with the nuclear-armed North, Defense Secretary Mark Esper said on his way to Seoul, as Pyongyang warned it was running out of patience. “We will adjust our exercise posture either more or less depending on what diplomacy may require,” Esper told reporters on board his plane to Seoul, where he starts an Asian tour Thursday. The possible downsizing of the joint drills should not be seen as a “concession” to Pyongyang, he said, “but as a means to keep the door open to diplomacy.” He added, “I’m all for diplomacy first.” His comments came after Pyongyang reiterated its demands for the combined exercise to be scrapped. “The US is not accepting with due consideration the year-end time limit that we set out of great patience and magnanimity,” a spokesman for the State Affairs Commission (SAC) said in a statement carried by KCNA. The tests would improve the North’s capabilities, Esper acknowledged. “Anytime you test, you learn something,” he said. “We take them very seriously and we watch them very closely, but we’re also not going to overreact and do something that, for example, could close the door to diplomacy.” (Sylvie Lanteaume, “U.S., South Korea Could Scale Back Joint Drills: Esper,” AFP, November 14, 2019)
Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee Chairman Kim Yong Chol’s statement: “I took note of the remark made by the U.S. secretary of Defense Mark Esper on Nov. 13 that he would adjust the U.S.-south Korea joint military drill for the progress of the DPRK-U.S. negotiations. As the remark of the U.S. secretary of Defense was made just after the announcement of the statement of the spokesperson for the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK, I would like to understand it as the U.S. intention to drop out of the joint military drill or completely stop it. I don’t think he made the decision after consulting with the south Korean authorities in advance. Because no one in the south Korean political circles can dare to make such a wise decision. I would like to believe that the remark of the U.S. secretary of Defense reflected the intention of President Trump, and appreciate it as part of positive efforts of the U.S. side to preserve the motive force of the DPRK-U.S. negotiations. However, if this ends up with our naive interpretation and the hostile provocation is committed eventually to incite us, we will be compelled to answer with shocking punishment that would be difficult for the U.S. to cope with.” (KCNA, “Chairman of Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee Issues Statement,” November 14, 2019)
11/15/19:
KCNA: “ … [T]he south side has behaved awkwardly from the beginning as regards our new project for the development of Mt Kumgang tourist area. On October 25, the relevant institution of our side, in reflection of the firm will of the Central Committee of our Party, sent to the Unification Ministry and the Hyundai Asan Co. Ltd of south Korea a message asking them to send us a plan for the withdrawal of the south side’s facilities in Mt Kumgang area and corresponding schedules, and to make an earlier agreement by way of exchanging documents. The south Korean authorities responded with senseless words like “initiative method” and “proposal of technical talks”. As it seemed that they did not understand clearly what we asked, we, on October 29 and November 6, again notified them of our fixed intention. We made clear our stand in mother tongue, but the south Korean authorities pretended ignorance, uttering “in-depth discussion” and “necessity of visit by a joint inspection team.” The south Korean authorities left the facilities for the tour of Mt Kumgang untouched for over a decade in fear of the U.S. Only after they are pressed with the withdrawal of those facilities, they are dismayed, begging us to let them stay even at a corner of the mountain and take part in the resumption of the tour. How can they be called, pitiful or shameful? Provided that the timetable is set, we cannot while away time, only exchanging messages. Therefore, on November 11 we sent an ultimatum, warning that if the south Korean authorities persist in their useless assertion, we will take it as an abandonment of the withdrawal, and take resolute measure for unilaterally pulling down the facilities. However, they have remained answerless until today. When we gave enough time and opportunities, enduring huge losses on our side, and when we showed the magnanimity out of compatriotic feelings of allowing the resumption of the tour of Mt Kumgang without any precondition and in return for nothing, they remained retracted while reading this face and that face. Now they are faced a bolt from the blue. It’s like raising an axe to bring it down on its own feet. Being steeped in the sense of flunkeyism to the marrow of their bones, they, not coming to their senses even at this crucial moment when the fate of their facilities is like a light before the wind, went to the U.S. to make an entreaty, letting loose senseless utterances that “the issue of tour of Mt Kumgang should be handled in the DPRK-U.S. negotiations” and “substantial discussion of the tour can be possible only when progress is made in the negotiations for the denuclearization”. But their master only remained cold. By origin, the issue of the development of Mt Kumgang tourist area is never an issue to be interfered in by the south Korean authorities and they have already disqualified from doing so. To make it clear again, Mt Kumgang is our land where our sovereignty is exercised and our noted mountain where even a tree and a cliff is associated with our sovereignty and dignity. The diamond mountain, the best in the world, which all the world people want to see saying “See Mt Kumgang and then die” is clearly neither the common property of the north and the south nor the place symbolic of north-south reconciliation and cooperation. We will develop Mt Kumgang to be the world renowned tourist resort with responsibility and in our own way as its owner for the sake of the nation and posterity. There is no room for south Korea to find its place there.” (KCNA, “Mt. Kumgang Is Not Common Property of North and South,” November 15, 2019)
South Korea adamantly rejected an American request to continue sharing military intelligence with Japan, as the two American allies remained locked in festering disputes over trade and history. Mark T. Esper, the United States secretary of defense, visited Seoul to attend an annual defense meeting and personally implore his South Korean counterpart to remain in the intelligence-sharing pact with Japan, known as the General Security of Military Information Agreement, or GSOMIA. “The only ones who benefit from the expiration of GSOMIA and continued friction between Seoul and Tokyo are Pyongyang and Beijing,” Esper said during a joint news conference with his counterpart, Jeong Kyeong-doo, today. “That reason alone should be powerful enough for all of us to sit down and make sure that we restore our alliance and partnership where it was,” Esper added. Jeong said South Korea would abandon the agreement in one week unless Japan removed the export restrictions it had earlier imposed against South Korea. That sentiment was echoed by the office of President Moon Jae-in. “Our decision to terminate GSOMIA was inevitable,” Ko Min-jung, a spokeswoman for Moon, said in a radio interview earlier today. “If we revoke our decision unilaterally without any change in Japan’s exports restrictions and in relations between South Korea and Japan, it would only prove that we made our original decision not prudently enough. That was not the case.” The agreement took effect in 2016 and had become a symbol of Washington’s successful efforts to persuade its two key East Asian allies to set aside their mutual enmity in order to counter China’s growing military influence and the nuclear and missile threat from North Korea. Simmering tensions between the two neighbors exploded after South Korea’s Supreme Court ruled late last year that Japanese companies should pay reparations to South Koreans for forced labor during the colonial era. Japan insists that all wartime claims were settled when it and South Korea established diplomatic ties in 1965. Japan later imposed a series of restrictions on security-related products exported to South Korea. In August, South Korea retaliated by announcing an end to GSOMIA. Although Mr. Moon and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan met briefly in Bangkok last week, their governments have yet to narrow their differences. During his trip to Seoul, Esper also discussed how to bring North Korea back to denuclearization talks and mounting friction between South Korea and the United States over how to share the cost of keeping 28,500 American troops in South Korea. The issue of cost has become particularly contentious under President Trump, who has insisted that South Korea and other allies shoulder the expense of maintaining American bases on their soil. In February, South Korea agreed to contribute about 1.04 trillion won, or $925 million, this year, an 8.2 percent increase from last year. Washington is now demanding that South Korea contribute as much as $4.7 billion next year, according to South Korean news media and lawmakers. Today, Esper would not name an exact figure but said South Korea is a “wealthy country” that “could and should” pay more. Jeong said the United States and South Korean negotiators were trying to work out a “fair and reasonable” deal. Mr. Trump has often questioned the cost of stationing American troops abroad. Today, both Esper and Jeong indicated that the allies were open to changing their plans for a joint air force drill to help maintain diplomatic momentum with North Korea. But they stopped short of canceling the drill. “We always have to remain flexible in terms of how we support our diplomats to ensure that we do not close any doors that may allow forward progress on the diplomatic front,” Esper said. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Rejects U.S. Request to Stay in Intelligence Pact with Japan,” New York Times, November 16, 2019, p. A-9)
11/17/19:
The United States and South Korea said they will postpone upcoming military drills in an effort to bolster a stalled peace push with North Korea, even as Washington denied the move amounted to another concession to Pyongyang. The drills, known as the Combined Flying Training Event, would have simulated air combat scenarios and involved an undisclosed number of warplanes from both the United States and South Korea. In deference to Pyongyang, the exercises had already been reduced in scale and scope from previous years, but North Korea still objected to them regardless. Defense Secretary Mark Esper said the U.S. and South Korean militaries would remain at a high state of readiness despite the move, and denied that the decision to postpone the drills was a concession to North Korea. “I don’t see this as a concession. I see this as a good faith effort … to enable peace,” Esper told reporters, as he announced the decision alongside South Korean counterpart Jeong Kyeong-doo in Bangkok, where Asian defense chiefs are gathered for talks. “I think creating some more space for our diplomats to strike an agreement on the denuclearization of the peninsula is very important.” The drills were meant to begin in the coming days. Earlier this month, a senior North Korean diplomat blamed the U.S. joint aerial drill for “throwing cold water” over talks with Washington. Pyongyang regularly opposes such U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises, viewing them as a rehearsal for invasion. Esper said he hoped North Korea would respond to the gesture. “We encourage the DPRK to demonstrate the same goodwill as it considers decisions on conducting training, exercises and testing,” he said “We also urge the DPRK to return to the negotiating table without precondition or hesitation.” North Korea said on Sunday it had tried to interpret the U.S. adjustments to joint drills positively, but the recent U.N. resolution on human rights showed Washington had no sincerity in upcoming talks. Pyongyang described the U.N. criticism of its human rights record as a product of U.S. “hostile policy” aimed at toppling its regime, and called the resolution a U.S. “political provocation. “Even if dialogue open, nuclear issues will never be discussed, before the issue of withdrawing U.S. hostile policy was put on the agenda to improve relations with us,” the North’s foreign ministry said in a statement carried by KCNA. At the start of a three-way meeting with Esper and South Korea’s Jeong in Bangkok, Japanese Defense Minister Kono Taro cautioned against optimism and called for the three nations to ensure military readiness. “No one could be optimistic about North Korea,” Kono said. “North Korea has repeatedly launched more than 20 missiles this year, including new types of ballistic missiles, as well as a submarine-launched ballistic missile.” The Combined Flying Training Event was not seen as a major drill by Seoul and Washington. The exercises had already been scaled back from 2017, when it was called Vigilant Ace. Vigilant Ace had more than 230 aircraft, including six F-22 Raptor stealth fighters, and around 12,000 U.S. service members. Asked when the United States and South Korea would hold the postponed drills, South Korea’s Jeong declined to offer any sense of timing, saying only that it would be decided through “close coordination” with Washington. (Phil Stewart, “U.S., South Korea Postpone Military Drills in Bid to Bolster North Korea Peace Effort,” Reuters, November 17, 2019)
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s statement: “On November 14, an anti-DPRK “human rights resolution” was railroaded at a meeting of the Third Committee of the 74th UN General Assembly. We bitterly denounce it as a politically-motivated reckless provocation made by the hostile forces to take clear aim at the DPRK and destroy its system by brigandish means. The adoption of the “resolution” under the signboard of the UN fully reveals that the UN was reduced into a marionette controlled by the U.S. As seen in history, it is the stereotyped method of the imperialists to cook up “human rights” issue for the regime change in the countries that disobey them and to use it as an excuse for aggression. What is more serious is that the “resolution” was railroaded at a time when trumpeting about “human rights” is being heard among political circles in Washington and human scum who abandoned even their native places and families frequent the White House. This clearly proves that the United States stands behind the anti-DPRK “human rights” racket. Now that some days ago the U.S. expressed its will to adjust the joint military exercise with south Korea, we, for our part, have made painful efforts to appreciate it as part of positive attempt to ease tensions and make the most of chance for dialogue in consideration of the DPRK, its dialogue partner. But, the railroaded “resolution” made us confirm once again that the U.S. stills dreams a foolish dream of collapsing our system. We approach with vigilance the fact that the U.S. has made another political provocation getting on our nerves at this crucial time when the DPRK-U.S. relations are put into delicate moment. The reality proves that the U.S., obsessed with the inveterate repugnancy towards our idea and system, is still wedded to the hostile policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK. In particular, the U.S. dreams of bringing down our system when the DPRK-U.S. dialogue is on a high agenda, which shows that the U.S. has no intention to sincerely work with us towards the settlement of issues. Therefore, we have no willingness to meet such dialogue partner. Worse still, it is not necessary to sit at the table with the U.S. which tries to bring the dignified DPRK to the so-called International Criminal Court. Explicitly speaking, even if the DPRK-U.S. dialogue is held in the future, the nuclear issue would never be put under discussion before the withdrawal of the U.S. hostile policy would be put on the agenda for the sake of improved relations with the DPRK.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denounces U.N. ‘Human Rights Resolution,’” November 17, 2019)
11/18/19:
DPRK FoMin adviser Kim Gae Gwan’s statement: “Reading an article posted by President Trump on Twitter on November 17, I interpreted it as a signification indicative of another DPRK-U.S. summit. Three rounds of DPRK-U.S. summit meetings and talks were held since June last year, but no particular improvement has been achieved in the DPRK-U.S. relations. And the U.S. only seeks to earn time, pretending it has made progress in settling the issue of the Korean peninsula. We are no longer interested in such talks that bring nothing to us. As we have got nothing in return, we will no longer gift the U.S. president with something he can boast of, but get compensation for the successes that President Trump is proud of as his administrative achievements. If the U.S. truly wants to keep on dialogue with the DPRK, it had better make a bold decision to drop its hostile policy towards the DPRK.” (KCNA, “Adviser to DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues Statement,” November 18, 2019)
11/19/19:
DPRK FoMin Roving Ambassador Kim Myong Gil’s “answers to the questions put by KCNA as regards the DPRK-U.S. dialogue: Question: Could you comment on U.S. media’s recent report that the DPRK-U.S. working negotiations are quite likely to open in December? Answer: As we have already reiterated several times, the DPRK-U.S. dialogue is impossible unless the U.S. makes a bold decision to drop the hostile policy towards the DPRK. Question: It is said that the special representative of the U.S. Department of State for north Korea policy suggested having a meeting again within December through a third country. Which country is it? Answer: It is Sweden. Question: The United States asked Sweden to deliver the suggestion, not having direct contact with the DPRK. What is the reason? Answer: In my opinion, the U.S. side traded on Sweden not to give impression that it fawns on the DPRK. The DPRK appreciates the Swedish side for offering the venue for the DPRK-U.S. working negotiations and convenience early in October. Now that the DPRK and the U.S. know each other’s stand so well, Sweden no longer needs to work for the DPRK-U.S. dialogue, I think. I am not sure that Sweden is either interested in the improvement of the DPRK-U.S. relations or beseeched by the U.S., but if the Swedish side behaves like a back-seat driver, it might be regarded as unreasonable. It is not for lack of communication channel or mediator that the DPRK-U.S. negotiations have not yet been held. The Swedish side would be well-advised to properly understand the situation and behave itself. The U.S. should no longer pretend it is interested in the DPRK-U.S. dialogue, having the third country stand for it.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Roving Ambassador Gives Answers to Questions Put by KCNA,” November 19, 2019)
Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee Chairman Kim Yong Chol’s statement: “The U.S. secretary of Defense said on November 17 that the U.S. decided to suspend the joint aerial drill with south Korea, adding that north Korea should make a “good response” to the U.S. “measure of good will” and come back to the negotiation without any condition. The U.S. tries to make a good impression as if it contributes to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, describing the suspension as “consideration for and concession” to someone. But, we demand that the U.S. quit the drill or stop it once and for all. The suspension of the drill does not mean ensuring peace and security on the Korean peninsula and is not helpful to the diplomatic efforts for the settlement of issues. If the U.S. is concerned about the DPRK-U.S. dialogue, the question is why it persistently depends on “human rights” racket, sanctions and pressure aiming at defaming and stifling the DPRK, its dialogue partner. From the viewpoint of the international community, such behavior of the U.S. may be seen vague as the one confused and contradictory, but the DPRK clearly see it. The U.S. is resorting to every crafty artifice, obsessed with hostility towards the DPRK, seeking to earn time to get out of the critical situation in the run-up to the year in and year out. The U.S. always calls for negotiation for denuclearization, but there is no room to say about the negotiation before the complete and irrevocable withdrawal of its hostile policy toward the DPRK, the root cause of the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula. We have nothing pressing and have no intention to sit on the table with the tricky U.S. From now on, the DPRK will get due compensation for every administrative achievement the U.S. president has talked too much about for over a year. It will be possible to consult the denuclearization only when confidence-building between the DPRK and the U.S. goes first and all the threats to the security and development of the DPRK are removed, rather than discuss the issues for the improvement of DPRK-U.S. relations and establishment of peace mechanism within the framework of negotiation for denuclearization. The U.S. should not dream of the negotiations for denuclearization before dropping its hostile policy toward the DPRK.” (KCNA, “U.S. Should Not Dream about Negotiations for Denuclearization Before Dropping Its Hostile Policy towards DPRK,” November 19, 2019)
Chinese officials have warned Japan and South Korea that their relations with Beijing will deteriorate if they allow the United States to base intermediate-range missiles on their soil, several sources said. One of the warnings came during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s separate meetings with his Japanese and South Korean counterparts in August, Japanese and U.S. government sources said. According to the Japanese and U.S. government sources, China relayed its concerns in bilateral meetings held on the sidelines of the foreign ministers conference between Japan, China and South Korea in Beijing in August. “If the United States deploys intermediate-range missiles in Japan, that would have a major effect on Japan-China relations,” Wang was quoted as telling then Foreign Minister Kono Taro. Wang made a similar comment during his meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha. According to the sources, Kono did not directly touch upon the possibility of such a U.S. missile deployment in Japan, but he did tell Wang, “Chinese missiles are capable of hitting Japan, so China must first work toward reducing its arsenal.” Kang told Wang that China should first end its retaliatory measures against South Korea for the deployment of the U.S. military’s Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system, the sources said. In October, China again expressed its concerns about the United States deploying intermediate-range missiles in Japan and South Korea. Randall Schriver, the U.S. assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, visited Beijing for meetings with his counterparts who brought up the possible missile deployment. Schriver subsequently landed in Tokyo where he explained China’s position to high-ranking officials of the Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry. He described the response from Beijing as interesting. The United States confirmed with officials in Japan and South Korea that issues between the allies regarding the INF did not have to be discussed with China and Russia. A Japanese specialist on China said, “After Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Japan next spring, a major issue that will likely arise between Japan and China will be whether Japan allows the United States to base new missiles here.” A Foreign Ministry source said the official ministry position was that no decision had been made about deploying U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Japan. The source added that it would likely take five years before U.S. missiles would be ready for an actual deployment. The source also said the government and ruling coalition have not decided on whether the issue of deploying intermediate-range missiles should be put on the Diet agenda for discussions. However, the United States could push for an early decision. High-ranking officials in charge of foreign affairs and defense from Japan and the United States are scheduled to hold a meeting in December to discuss extended deterrence issues. The United States plans to hold similar discussions with South Korean officials around the same time. “Officials will have to begin thinking about various possibilities since the INF issue will have to be dealt with in the short- and medium-term,” a source knowledgeable about Japan-U.S. ties said. (Makino Yoshihiro, “China Warns Japan, S. Korea over Deployment of U.S. Missiles,” Asahi Shimbun, November 19, 2019)
11/20/19:
U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun said a year-end deadline North Korea has set for Washington to show more flexibility in nuclear talks was an artificial one, but could mean a return to “provocative” steps that preceded the past two years of diplomacy. North Korea has been demanding the lifting of sanctions hobbling its economy and its leader Kim Jong Un set the deadline for Washington to show more flexibility in April, raising concerns he could resume nuclear and long-range missile testing suspended since 2017. U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly held up this suspension as a major achievement of his engagement with North Korea, but in his nomination hearing for the State Department’s No. 2 post, Biegun suggested this could come to an end. “I can imagine that we could see a possibility of going back to some of the more provocative steps that preceded the start of this diplomacy to begin with,” Biegun told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “I think that would be a huge mistake and a missed opportunity by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” (David Brunnstrom and Daphne Psaledakis, “Year End Could See North Korea Return to Provocations,” Reuters, November 20,2019) The U.S. sent a message on November 20 calling on North Korea to return to denuclearization talks while proposing that working-level talks take place at a higher echelon between U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui. The aim is to achieve substantive progress ahead of a summit between the two leaders by assigning more weight to talks between vice minister-level officials holding practical authority. Biegun shared his opinions during his Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmation hearing that day as deputy secretary of state. Remarking on his promotion, he said that it sent an important message to the US’ counterparts in Pyongyang by further elevating the priority of North Korea-related issues. Biegun plans to continue taking part in negotiations with North Korea as special representative if he is confirmed as deputy secretary of state. “The person who needs to negotiate with me in North Korea is the First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Choe Son-hui,” he said. Commenting that the North Korean dialogue partners he had met to date did not hold sufficient authority, he noted that Choe is trusted by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who keeps her close by his side. While Biegun’s current North Korean counterpart is Foreign Ministry Roving Ambassador Kim Myong-gil, his remarks read as openly suggesting that North Korea should choose Choe, a higher-level official with more weight and practical authority, if he is confirmed by the Senate as deputy secretary of state. As a reason for naming Choe as his preferred counterpart in negotiations, he pointed to the conclusion that the failure to make progress in working-level talks was the result of representatives appearing on North Korea’s behalf without practical authority on the denuclearization issue. In his remarks Biegun quoted President Donald Trump as saying there needed to be a deal or “near-deal” for a summit to yield results — stressing the importance of achieving substantive results at the working level before a third summit takes place. “We do not have any verifiable or meaningful evidence that they have yet made that choice [to denuclearize]. Our hypothesis is they can make that choice,” he said, indicating his strong commitment to dialogue. Repeatedly emphasizing that the “window is still open,” he called on North Korea to “seize the moment.” (Hwang Joon-bum, “Stephen Biegun Asks for Choe Son Hui as His N. Korean Counterpart in Negotiations, Hankyore, November 24, 2019)
KCNA: “The preparation for a special ASEAN summit slated to open in Pusan, south Korea on November 25 is reportedly pushed forward in its final stage. On November 5, south Korean President Moon Jae In politely sent to us a personal letter earnestly inviting the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission (SAC) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to be present in the special summit. There is no reason for us not to be grateful for it, if the personal letter contained the sincere trust in the SAC Chairman and invitation carrying earnest expectation. We already know that the south side is looking forward to the visit by the SAC Chairman, with full preparations of the highest level including escort and ceremonies regarding his visit to Pusan. We also fully understand the distress and agony of President Moon Jae In to hold on to the opportunity to make it a new occasion for unraveling the present north-south relations. This can be known from the fact that in the wake of the personal letter, there were several earnest requests for sending even a special envoy, if the SAC Chairman could not come. But the beclouded air of south Korea is so skeptical about the north-south relations and the south Korean authorities are still not away from the misguided stand of settling all the issues arising in relations between the north and the south in reliance on outsiders, not national cooperation. This is a stark reality today. Even at this moment, the minister of “Unification” is on his way to the U.S. over the issue of north-south relations. How can we sit face to face and solve things with such a partner entrusting everything to the outsider without any independence and self-standing attitude. It is said that earnest request can even be read by a blind man. Everything needs its suitable time and place. We cannot but think whether the present moment is a suitable time for the top leaders of the north and the south to meet. From the reports being aired in the world, we know well enough that the sentiment pervading the land of the south is not clean. The south Korean conservative forces have become zealous in their censure and attack on the DPRK, calling for “scrapping of the north-south agreement”, not content with slandering the present south Korean regime as “pro-north regime” and “left-wing regime.” Even such wild words as a “regime change in north” and “leading the north to collapse” which could not even be heard in the previous regimes are being heard. It is doubtable that the meeting between the north and the south will be meaningful at this time. The south Korean authorities fall short of taking any measures even though the warm breeze of reconciliation and cooperation that made a rare visit is being brought to naught. If they think they can easily turn around the present serious situation with just a piece of letter, they would be seriously mistaken. This is our thought. We cannot but ask the south side what sort of north-south relations it wants to show to foreigners after inviting them who have no interest in the destiny and future of the Korean nation at a moment when repeated visits with the feelings of repentance of its wrongdoings should be paid by it. We will never follow without reason the impure attempt of the south side to give impression that dialogue is going on between the top leaders of the north and the south although no settlement of the fundamental issues between the north and the south, issues pertaining to the nation, is being made, and to insert the north-south issue to the corner of the “neo-southern policy” masterminded by it. How can the hand-shaking and photo-taking in the complicated international meeting of no great interest to us be compared with the historic moment when the top leaders of the north and the south held their joined hands high up on Mt Paektu, the sacred mountain of the nation. As nothing was achieved in implementing the agreements made in Panmunjom, Pyongyang and Mt Paektu, the north-south summit for the mere form’s sake would be pointless. This is our stand. It is too late to lament over the present crisis facing the north-south relations after clearly understanding its reason. At this moment, not content with sustaining losses from dependence on the U.S., the south side made an offer for discussing the north-south relations in the theatre of multi-lateral cooperation. This makes us only dubious. If children mulled over piling up eggs on a horn, it can be ascribable to their innocence. But, now that those taking the helm of south Korea set themselves to meditating on how to draw a picture on water, far from pondering over their wrong deeds and failures, how can the north-south relations be improved and when will the flower of reconciliation and cooperation bloom again. Explicitly speaking again, it is important to choose the proper time and place, if everything is to be done well. Therefore, it can be said for sure that a good result cannot be produced though even a number of meetings are held with those of no knowledge of such reason. Under these circumstances, there would be no option for us but to see with patience when the independent decision would begin to develop and grow from such barren mentality. We are grateful for the trust and sincerity of the south side but we hope it would understand the reason that we failed to find out the proper reason for the SAC Chairman to visit Pusan. (KCNA, “Everything Needs Suitable Time and Place,” November 21, 2019)
11/22/19:
South Korea announced a decision to “conditionally” suspend the expiry of a military information-sharing accord with Japan. South Korea has also decided to temporarily halt a petition process at the World Trade Organization while negotiations with Japan on the two sides’ export control policies go on, Kim You-geun, deputy director of Cheong Wa Dae’s national security office, said at a press briefing. He added the two sides have agreed to resume working-level talks to discuss the export controls. It paves the way for the two sides to focus on substantive dialogue, at least for the time being, on pending bilateral issues such as compensation for wartime forced labor and the trade dispute. Depending on progress, President Moon Jae-in may hold one-on-one summit talks with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe next month. Seoul’s announcement was made six hours before the expiry of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), scheduled at the end of the day. A key condition is that South Korea can terminate GSOMIA at any time it wants and Japan has expressed “understanding” over it, Kim said. Speaking at the same Cheong Wa Dae press room three months earlier, Kim, who doubles as head of the secretariat of the National Security Council (NSC), read out a statement on Seoul’s plan not to extend the pact, signed in 2016. Cheong Wa Dae have stressed that Japan should retract the “unjust” trade steps and normalize its relations with South Korea for the extension of GSOMIA. More specifically, what has been suspended is the efficacy of a diplomatic document related to Seoul’s notification of its decision to terminate GSOMIA, a Cheong Wa Dae official told reporters on background. It means a “provisional” halt to the GSOMIA expiration, with the document’s efficacy able to be “reactivated” anytime, he added. (Lee Chi-dong, “S. Korea Decides to ‘Conditionally’ Suspend Termination of Seoul-Tokyo Military Pact,” November 22, 2019) Under intense pressure from the United States, South Korea reversed itself at the last minute today and extended an intelligence-sharing pact with Japan, a sign that the Seoul government wanted to halt fraying relations with the two countries. Trump administration officials pressed to preserve the pact, and have been angered over an impasse with South Korea in a separate dispute over the costs of maintaining American troops in the country as a deterrent to North Korea. South Korea’s decision also came as a bitter trade dispute with Japan showed signs of easing. Taken together, both developments suggested that President Moon Jae-in of South Korea was looking for ways to de-escalate underlying historical tensions, which have caused one of the most serious rifts between the two countries since they normalized relations 54 years ago. The moves came on the eve of a Group of 20 meeting of foreign ministers in Nagoya, Japan, appearing to set the tone for improvement in relations with the United States and Japan that have been increasingly strained. At the same time, Mr. Trump has been demanding that Mr. Moon contribute much more to the expense of keeping more than 28,000 American troops deployed in South Korea, which he has described as “$5 billion of protection.” It is unclear whether the American move directly contributed to Seoul’s reversal on the intelligence-sharing pact. But the extension of the pact will help Seoul improve relations with Washington and Tokyo. Moon administration officials emphasized that the decision on the pact, known as the General Security of Military Information Agreement or G.S.O.M.I.A., could change depending on negotiations with Japan. “We made our decision on the premise that we can terminate G.S.O.M.I.A. any time,” said Kim You-geun, deputy director of South Korea’s National Security Council. Just yesterday, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had made a renewed effort in Washington to persuade Tokyo and Seoul to work out a deal, as the deadline for leaving the agreement loomed. He spoke by telephone with Kang Kyung-wha, the foreign minister of South Korea, formally known as the Republic of Korea, and the two “pledged to maintain close coordination and reaffirmed the importance of the ROK-Japan relationship,” according to the State Department. Earlier this month, Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper visited Seoul and publicly exhorted his South Korean counterpart to stay in the pact. Esper has also pressed Seoul to increase its payments to maintain the troops. “South Korea is a wealthy country,” he said three days ago while on a trip to the Philippines, according to Reuters. “They can and should contribute more.” South Korea’s decision came as Japan announced that it would resume negotiations with South Korea over export controls. Tokyo had imposed trade restrictions on shipments of certain products to South Korea and had removed it from a list of favored trading partners as the tensions escalated. But Iide Yoichi, a Japanese trade official, insisted today that the trade and intelligence sharing developments were not linked. “We did not compromise,” he said. Current and former American officials familiar with the intelligence-sharing agreement said its implementation was still in the early stages. Once the infrastructure and protocols are in place to make the agreement work, the two nations, in theory, would be able to coordinate on intelligence on critical security matters in Asia. Without the agreement, both nations need the American military to act as a go-between for coordinating on intelligence, American officials say. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo described South Korea’s decision today as “strategic” in view of the need to cooperate “to take measures against North Korea.” Today’s decision by South Korea and Japan’s call to resume trade talks indicated that both sides wished to cool tensions. (Motoko Rich and Edward Wong, “Under U.S. Pressure, South Korea Stays in Intelligence Pact with Japan,” New York Times, November 23, 2019, p. A-7)
11/25/19:
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has inspected a front-line military unit on an island just north of the western sea border with South Korea and ordered firing drills, KCNA said today. South Korea expressed regret over the artillery fire from the border islet of Changrin, saying that it represents a violation of a military agreement between the two Koreas to avoid tension-heightening activity along their border. The islet lies just north of the Northern Limit Line (NLL), a de facto maritime border with South Korea, which was the site of bloody naval skirmishes between the two Koreas in the past. KCNA said that Kim ordered soldiers “to set up a well-knit system” to ensure “full readiness for carrying out a combat mission any moment.” He also “indicated the target for Gun 2 of the coastal artillery company on combat duty and gave an order to fire.” KCNA said the artillery company “fully showed their gun firing skills they cultivated in their day-to-day training to delight” the leader. However, it did not provide more details such as the type of the artillery and how many rounds were fired in which direction. South Korea protested the firing drills as a violation of a military agreement the two Koreas signed in September last year to avoid activities that increase tensions near the border. “The artillery firing drills that North Korea mentioned is in violation of the Sept. 19 military agreement that the military authorities of the two countries agreed and have fully implemented,” defense ministry spokesperson Choi Hyun-soo told a regular briefing. “We call on North Korea to immediately stop all military actions in border areas that are feared to heighten military tensions, and to fully comply with the pact,” she added. In a separate report, Pyongyang’s state media reported that leader Kim also visited a “women’s company under Unit 5492 of the Korean People’s Army” stationed “at the remote seaside on the southwestern front, “apparently referring to the Changrin islet. It is the first time that Kim has toured the islet since taking office in late 2011. KCNA said that Kim’s late father, former leader Kim Jong-il, visited there decades ago. The latest “field guidance” was his third reported visit to military installations this month. (Koh Byung-joon, “N.K. Leader Inspects Border Military Units, Orders Artillery Drills,” Yonhap, November 25, 2019)
11/26/19:
The Trump administration is implementing a reshuffling of officials handling North Korea affairs while North Korea is disregarding the U.S.’ calls to restart nuclear negotiations and increasing its threats against the U.S. and South Korea. With several State Department officials, who have extensive experience on North Korea issues, leaving their positions, there are growing concerns about the future of nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea. According to a diplomatic source on Monday (local time), U.S. Special Envoy for North Korea Mark Lambert will be taking charge of a new role from next month. Lambert took office as State Department director for Korea policy in 2015 and has been engaging in negotiations with North Korea since he was named acting deputy assistant secretary for North Korea. Once he leaves the position, Alex Wong, deputy assistant secretary for North Korea, will be managing all diplomatic policy on North Korea. Wong, who is in his mid-30s, is considered a young diplomat with a relatively short experience with North Korea affairs. Critics have pointed out that the White House is failing to concentrate on nuclear negotiations with North Korea since Matthew Pottinger, who handled Korea issues at the White House as Asia policy adviser, was promoted to Deputy National Security Advisor. Moreover, the White House is busy dealing with an impeachment vote by the House of Representatives slated for next month. It is hard to see President Trump mention North Korea during his campaign or on his Twitter account. (Dong-A Ilbo, “Trump Administration Reshuffles Officials Handling North Korean Affairs,” November 27, 2019)
11/27/19:
South Korea’s military fired warning shots toward a North Korean merchant boat with engine trouble that violated their sea border on Wednesday, South Korean officials said. The vessel was detected crossing the inter-Korean maritime frontier at around 6:40 a.m. (2140 GMT Tuesday) near a South Korean border island off the west coast, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said. The South Korean military issued a warning and fired shots into the water near the ship to drive it away. “So far, we confirmed that the ship drifted toward that area due to bad weather and engine trouble, and it’s currently on the way back to the North on its own,” the JCS said in a statement. It was the second time the South fired warning shots toward a North Korean vessel since President Moon Jae-in took office in May 2017, a military official said. (Hyonhee Shin, “South Korea Fires Warning Shots toward North Korean Merchant Vessel,” November 27, 2019) The military launched an operation to guide a North Korean merchant ship back across the Yellow Sea border after the vessel strayed into South Korean waters due to an engine problem, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said. The vessel was detected crossing the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the de facto inter-Korean maritime border in the Yellow Sea, onto the South Korean side from the northwestern part of the South Korean island of Baengnyeong at around 6:40 a.m., the JCS said in a release. After confirming that the boat was a North Korean merchant ship, the military fired warning shots after issuing broadcast warnings in accordance with protocol, the JCS said, adding the ship was slowly moving westward into deep waters on its own power. “We believe that the ship crossed the NLL due to bad weather conditions and an engine problem,” the JCS said. “We are taking related measures to drive it out of our waters. … The trespassing appears to be accidental, and no menacing actions by the North Korean side took place.” (Oh Seok-min, “S. Korea Guiding N.K. Merchant Ship Back across Yellow Sea Border: JCS,” Yonhap, November 27, 2019)
11/28/19:
North Korea fired two projectiles from what is presumed to be a super-large multiple rocket launcher, South Korea’s military said. The projectiles were fired from Yeonpo in the country’s eastern South Hamgyong Province into the waters off the east coast at around 4:59 p.m., the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said in a release. Both flew around 380 km, reaching a maximum altitude of around 97 km, and were fired within a 30-second interval, the JCS added. “South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities are analyzing additional features,” the JCS said. “Our military is monitoring the situation in case of additional launches and maintaining a readiness posture.” “Our military expresses strong regret over the acts and urge North Korea to immediately stop such moves,” Maj. Gen. Jeong Dong-jin of the JCS told reporters. It is the 13th time this year that North Korea has carried out such a weapons test, with the last test-firing taking place on October 31, when it fired two missiles from its super-large multiple rocket launcher towards the East Sea. In an apparent sign of ramped-up surveillance of the North, the United States flew three spy aircraft ― EP-3E, RC-135V and E-8C jets ― over the Korean Peninsula in succession for two days from yesterday. (Yonhap, “North Korea Fires Two Large Projectiles, Apparently from Super-Large Multiple Rocket Launcher: JCS,” November 28, 2019)
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, inspected the test-fire of the super-large multiple launch rocket system conducted by the Academy of Defense Science. Supreme Leader of the Party, state and armed forces Kim Jong Un was greeted at the launching ground by Ri Pyong Chol, first vice department director of the WPK Central Committee, Kim Jong Sik, vice department director of the WPK Central Committee, and Jang Chang Ha, Jon Il Ho and other leading officials in the field of scientific researches for national defense. Also inspecting the test-fire were Army General Pak Jong Chon, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army, and commanders of the large combined units of the KPA. The volley test-fire aimed to finally examine the combat application of the super-large multiple launch rocket system proved the military and technical superiority of the weapon system and its firm reliability. The Supreme Leader expressed great satisfaction over the results of the test-fire. The commanders of the large combined units of the KPA sincerely extended their congratulations and gratitude to the Supreme Leader who saw to it that lots of arms and equipment of powerful performance were developed and perfected this year for the military and technical strengthening of the KPA.” (KCNA: “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Inspects Test-Fire of Super-Large Multiple Launch Rocket System,” November 29, 2019)
The clock is ticking. Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s leader, has said that the United States has until the end of the year to make a new proposal to create a breakthrough in stalled negotiations on denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. The looming deadline — which North Korea has issued repeated warnings about — carries the implicit threat that the country could return to its alarming behavior of the past by ending its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear tests and launching long-range missiles capable of hitting American cities. Today, it launched two projectiles, its 13th rocket or missile test since May. “Today, we sit on top of a live volcano,” said Robert L. Carlin, a former nuclear negotiator at the State Department and longtime North Korea observer, describing a rapidly deteriorating situation on the peninsula during a lecture this month at Yonsei University in Seoul, the South Korean capital. “We don’t have a lot of time to back away.” In the past month, North Korea has warned that the Trump administration should not even “dream of” discussing denuclearization without first ending its “hostile” policies, including smothering economic sanctions. It swore “shocking punishment” if Washington were to ignore the year-end deadline. Senior American diplomats do not appear to share that urgency. To them, it’s just posturing. “I don’t remember a time limit being set. Is this the North Koreans?” David R. Stilwell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, told reporters in Tokyo last month, admitting to being unaware of the deadline. “But I would say that the North Koreans do one thing a lot, and that’s bluff.” When Washington has addressed the January deadline, it has called it an “artificial” time limit. And that leaves analysts fearing the outbreak of another crisis on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has not been explicit about what might happen after December 31, except that Kim has warned of finding a “new way” if Washington persists with sanctions and tries to force an unpalatable denuclearization deal. Some analysts say the deadline shows how badly Mr. Kim wants a deal so that he can finally deliver on a promise to his people to lift sanctions and rebuild the country’s ailing economy. North Korea’s increasingly urgent statements in recent weeks are designed to pressure Washington to return to the negotiating table with a more flexible proposal, they say. “The North Koreans are telling the United States: ‘We will have to do something very bad unless you do something for us by the end of the year, so please help us stop ourselves,’” Kim Hyung-ki, a former vice unification minister of South Korea, said during a forum in Seoul last month. Kim’s “new way” could mean resuming tests of nuclear devices and intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, analysts say. If North Korea launches another long-range missile, it will set off more United Nations sanctions. It would also invite harsh reaction from Washington, perhaps even a return to the type of “fire and fury” threats Mr. Trump once used as the United States and North Korea appeared to be hurtling to the brink of war. With its increasingly strident demands in recent weeks, North Korea is playing a delicate game in denying itself an escape hatch from Kim’s year-end deadline. And it comes as Washington is consumed by the impeachment hearings, which limits Trump’s room for diplomacy with the North. That combination makes the situation volatile, escalating the risk that either side could miscalculate, officials and analysts worry. “We could see a possibility of going back to some of the more provocative steps that preceded the start of this diplomacy,” Stephen E. Biegun, Washington’s special representative for North Korea, said last week during a confirmation hearing on his nomination as deputy secretary of state. “I think that would be a huge mistake and a missed opportunity by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” Other analysts say Kim would most likely first take actions that do not breach the moratorium on nuclear or long-range missile tests but would still deliver a strong message to Washington. That could include restarting plutonium-producing nuclear reactors in Yongbyon, about 60 miles north of Pyongyang, the capital, or launching short- or medium-range missiles. If Kim ends his diplomacy with Trump, he could, at least in the short term, “muddle through with the help of China,” said Lee Jung-chul, a North Korea expert at Soongsil University in Seoul. “It will be difficult for the North to attempt a provocation, given the importance of its relations with China.” North Korea has not specified what it seeks in demanding that Washington drop its “hostile policy.” It has long indicated that it wants international sanctions lifted and an end to joint military exercises between the United States and South Korea. In the past, it has also called for the United States to end its military presence in and around South Korea. But in recent statements, North Korea has only hardened its demands, further dimming the prospects for dialogue. It said it had already taken enough confidence-building steps, such as the test moratorium, the shutting down of its underground nuclear test site and its return of American remains from the Korean War. It said Trump should expect no more gifts “he can boast of” and that he should instead keep the promises he made in his Singapore summit meeting last year with Kim, like ending regular joint military exercises with South Korea that the North sees as war preparations. Analysts worry that with talks having stalled, North Korea will continue to produce more nuclear fuel and warheads. As its nuclear arsenal increases, the cost of denuclearization continues to rise. “You might argue, how can we reward a bad guy like North Korea?” said Jun Bong-geun, acting president of the government-run Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security in Seoul. “But sanctions and pressure alone have never worked on North Korea. You also have to offer incentives.” (Choe Sang-hun, “Fears of New Crisis as Kim’s Deadline for Talks Nears,” New York Times, November 29, 2019, p. A-4) The series of tests since the KN-25 was first unveiled in August show the North Koreans steadily improving their ability to quickly fire multiple rockets from their mobile launch vehicles. That capability makes it more likely that in case of a war, North Korean rocket crews could speedily deploy, fire and move before being targeted by South Korean or American forces, experts said. “The faster it fires, the quicker it can (get) out of dodge before counter-fire arrives,” Jeffrey Lewis, a missile researcher at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), said on Twitter. In the first two KN-25 tests in August and September missiles were fired 17 minutes and 19 minutes apart, respectively, the JCS said. By the end of October crews had narrowed that interval to three minutes, while on Thursday the gap between the two missiles was only about 30 seconds. The missiles travelled up to 380 km (236 miles) and reached an altitude of 97 km, according to the JCS, putting nearly all of South Korea within range. Photos released by KCNA showed missiles being fired from a transporter-erector-launcher equipped with four launcher tubes. “North Korea is trying to selectively modernize conventional forces in a low-cost, high-efficiency way to focus on the economy and reassure the military while nuclear talks are under way, and the rocket launcher is a product of that effort,” said Kim Dong-yub, a former South Korean Navy officer who teaches at Kyungnam University in Seoul. “The latest test indicated that the system was ready for mass production and deployment.” (Hyonhee Shin and Josh Smith, “North Korea’s Thanksgiving Day Test Shows Improving Speed for Missile Crews,” Reuters, November 28, 2019)
11/29/19:
KCNA: DPRK FoMin Department of Japanese Affairs Vice Director General’s statement: “He who is born a fool is never cured. The saying fits perfectly to Japanese Prime Minister Abe whose ignorance and stupidity were fully brought to light when he claimed the recent volley test-fire of the super-large multiple launch rocket system conducted by the DPRK is ballistic missile launch. Early in November Abe termed the test-fire of the super-large multiple launch rocket system conducted by the DPRK a ballistic missile launch at the ASEAN summit only to be denounced as an underwit who fails to distinguish a missile launch from multiple launch rocket system, and a rare-to-be-seen deformed child. He still makes an ass of himself. On November 28 when the volley test-fire of the super-large multiple launch rocket system of the DPRK was conducted successfully amid great satisfaction, Abe convened an emergency meeting of the National Security Council and claimed that it was a ballistic missile launch and grave challenge to the international community with no reason. Echoing Abe’s claim, the chief cabinet secretary, the minister of defense, the foreign minister and other subordinates and media of Japan term the test-fire a “ballistic missile launch.” This time the DPRK made a photo-illustrated report about the recent test-fire with a view to helping such fools as Abe see the projectiles with their eyes wide open. It can be said that Abe is the only one idiot in the world and the most stupid man ever known in history as he fails to distinguish a missile from multiple launch rocket system while seeing the photo-accompanied report which even civilians who have no knowledge of the “military affairs”, to say nothing of soldiers, can know with a single glance. The whole world is unanimous in saying that the DPRK’s recent test-fire is one of multiple launch rocket system, but Abe claims that multiple launch rocket system is missile launch to be ridiculed by the world people. The wretched sight of Abe makes us regard him as a dog seized with fear or a puppy fawning upon the master like the U.S. He seems to think that the U.S. will welcome his remarks about “threat from the north” at the juncture when the DPRK-U.S. negotiations are at a stalemate. The political dwarf’s thought is very poor. It is quite natural that Abe is ridiculed as a puppy affected by mange as he fails to tell one thing from another and has plenty of cheek to turn black into white, being excluded from international politics. The DPRK considers it best not to deal with Abe as dealing with the most stupid person ever known in history and political dwarf out of favor brings disgrace to it. This thought of ours is hardening day by day. Worse still, it is the height of absurdity that Japan closest to the DPRK with the East Sea of Korea in between claimed that the multiple launch rocket system distinguished across the ocean is ballistic missile launch. It is uglier that Japan is making a fuss about “a serious challenge to not only Japan but also the international community”, “threat from the north” and “protest” over the shell which did not drop in the waters off Japan. No one beat Abe, but evidently he is a thoughtless fool as he insists that he was beaten. There is a Korean saying that a fool makes a rod for himself. Abe may see what a real ballistic missile is in the not distant future and under his nose. Abe would be well-advised to distinguish multiple launch rocket from a ballistic missile. Abe is none other than a perfect imbecile and a political dwarf without parallel in the world. Pyongyang estimates such thing as Abe so much.” (KCNA, “Abe Ridiculed as Matchlessly Political Dwarf,” November 30, 2019)
A U.S. digital currency specialist living in Singapore has been arrested and criminally charged with helping North Korea use cryptocurrency and blockchain technology to evade American sanctions, the U.S. Department of Justice said. Federal prosecutors in Manhattan said Virgil Griffith, 36, traveled to North Korea via China in April to attend the Pyongyang Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Conference, despite being denied permission by the U.S. Department of State to go. Griffith, who has a doctorate from the California Institute of Technology, gave a presentation on topics preapproved by North Korean officials, provided valuable technical information, and engaged in talks about using cryptocurrency technology to circumvent sanctions and launder money, prosecutors said. A lawyer for Griffith did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Griffith was arrested on yesterday at Los Angeles International Airport and charged with conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which carries a maximum 20-year prison term. “The consequences of North Korea obtaining funding, technology and information to further its desire to build nuclear weapons put the world at risk,” FBI Assistant Director-in-Charge William Sweeney said in a statement. “It’s even more egregious that a U.S. citizen allegedly chose to aid our adversary,” he added. According to a criminal complaint, Griffith’s presentation titled “Blockchain and Peace” described how blockchain technology including a “smart contract” could help North Korea. Prosecutors said Griffith later started work on making it easier to move cryptocurrency between North Korea and South Korea and encouraged other U.S. citizens to travel to North Korea, including for the same cryptocurrency conference in 2020. The complaint said a search last month of Griffith’s cellphone with his consent uncovered an August 6, 2019, message to an unnamed individual, known as Individual-2, indicating a need to send some cryptocurrency between North Korea and South Korea. “Individual-2 asked, in sum and substance, ‘Isn’t that violating sanctions?’ Griffith replied, ‘it is,’” the complaint said. (Reuters, “U.S. Cryptocurrency Specialist Arresting for Helping N. Korea Evade Sanctions,” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 30, 2019) He was a former hacker from Alabama who styled himself a “disruptive technologist” and believed that he was using his data-mining expertise as a force for good. But then, in April, Though the United States government had denied Griffith permission to go to North Korea, he traveled there anyway in April and spoke at the Pyongyang Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Conference, according to a criminal complaint unsealed today. In a statement, Ethereum said Griffith acted on his own. “We can confirm that the foundation was not represented in any capacity at the events outlined in the Justice Department’s filing, and that the foundation neither approved nor supported any such travel, which was a personal matter,” the company said. Hacker magazine, 2600, where Mr. Griffith was a contributing writer, issued a statement on Twitter today saying that his arrest was “an attack on all of us.” The magazine’s editor, who uses the pen name Emmanuel Goldstein, said on Twitter that what Griffith had done — explaining the concept of cryptocurrency — was not a crime. In a phone interview on Friday, Goldstein said he had socialized with Griffith the night before he met with the F.B.I., and Griffith had insisted on telling federal authorities “the truth” without a lawyer. “I kept warning him it was a trap,” Goldstein wrote on Twitter. After the conference, Griffith encouraged other American technology experts to travel to North Korea and attend a similar conference next year, writing in a Facebook post that North Koreans “have reached out to me to for recommendations of new people to invite to their country.” According to the criminal complaint, Griffith told a federal investigator in Manhattan in May that the North Korean mission in New York City had given him a visa. He also said an official at the conference had urged him to talk about using digital currencies to launder money because “such topics were likely to resonate” with the audience, the complaint said. Later, Griffith told investigators that the information he shared with North Korean officials included basic concepts that could be found on the internet, the complaint said. Federal investigators obtained text messages that Mr. Griffith had sent to a colleague in which he said he needed to send cryptocurrency between North and South Korea, the complaint said. When the person asked if that was a violation of United States sanctions, Griffith said: “It is.” Griffith appeared to have a growing affinity for North Korea, according to posts on his Facebook page, where he wrote that “an uncommonly large proportion of news about it happens to be fake.” He also wrote in another post that North Korea “is peak woke,” adding, “Thank you Socialist Party USA.” He had announced his intention to renounce his American citizenship and has researched how to purchase citizenship in other countries, prosecutors said. (Jan Ransom, “He Gave a Cryptocurrency Talk in North Korea. The United States Arrested Him,” New York Times, December 2, 2019, p. A-22)
12/1/19:
North Korea’s trade with China has jumped more than fivefold since 2001, data showed, highlighting Beijing’s status as a key patron for the cash-strapped regime under biting international sanctions. China’s proportion of the North’s overall external trade rose to 91.8 percent last year, compared with 17.3 percent in 2001, according to the data from a report of the Korea International Trade Association (KITA). South Korea, once the North’s second-largest trade partner, virtually had no trade with the North in the 2017-2018 period due to the 2016 shutdown of their joint industrial complex in the North’s border town of Kaesong and a strengthening of global sanctions against the regime. “Trade between the North and China surged drastically as all dealings between the two Koreas, except for those in the Kaesong complex, came to a halt in 2010,” the report said. “After the shutdown of the Kaesong complex, trade between the North and China further increased, making China currently account for 90 percent of the North’s external trade.” According to the KITA report, Japan accounted for 30.1 percent of the North’s total trade in 2001, trailed by China with 17.3 percent and South Korea with 8.8 percent. Last year, China took first place, with India and Russia comprising 1.4 percent and 1.3 percent, respectively. From 2001-2018, China has the highest annual average trade with the North at 50.3 percent, followed by South Korea at 17.8 percent, India at 4.7 percent, Japan at 3.4 percent and Thailand at 2.7 percent. (Yonhap, “North Korea’s Trade Reliance on China Surges Fivefold since 2001: Data,” December 1, 2019)
12/3/19:
DPRK FoMin Vice Minister for U.S. Affairs Ri Thae Song’s statement: “Drawing nearer is the year-end time limit the DPRK set for the U.S. However, the U.S. is keen on earning time needed for it, talking about the “sustained and substantial dialogue”, far from acting in response to the measures taken by the DPRK first. The dialogue touted by the U.S. is, in essence, nothing but a foolish trick hatched to keep the DPRK bound to dialogue and use it in favor of the political situation and election in the U.S. The DPRK has heard more than enough dialogue rhetoric raised by the U.S. whenever it is driven into a tight corner. So, no one will lend an ear to the U.S. any longer. The DPRK has done everything transparently and openly so far. It feels no need to hide what it will do from now on and therefore, reminds the U.S. once again that the year-end time limit comes nearer. The DPRK has done its utmost with maximum perseverance not to backtrack from the important steps it has taken on its own initiative. What is left to be done now is the U.S. option and it is entirely up to the U.S. what Christmas gift it will select to get.” (KCNA, “DPRK Vice Minister for U.S. Affairs Issues Statement,” December 3, 2019)
KCNA: “The Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea decided to convene the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the WPK in the latter part of December in order to discuss and decide on crucial issues in line with the needs of the development of the Korean revolution and the changed situation at home and abroad. A relevant decision of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee was announced on Tuesday.” (KCNA, “Presidium of the Political Bureau of WPK Central Committee Decides to Convene Plenary Meeting,” December 4, 2019)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is back on his white horse, inspecting “revolutionary battle sites” in knee-high virgin snow on a sacred mountain, state media announced today, as Pyongyang foreshadowed a major policy decision later this month. The images of Kim on horseback, returning to Mount Paektu after a similar visit in October, were high on symbolism. But it was a second, more dryly worded announcement today that was at least as significant. The Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea decided to convene the fifth plenary meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in the latter part of December, the Korean Central News Agency said, “to discuss and decide on crucial issues in line with the needs of the development of the Korean revolution and the changed situation at home and abroad.” Put simply, after giving the United States until the end of the year to change its approach to denuclearization talks and warning that North Korea would follow a “new path,” Kim appears to have made his decision on what that path should be, experts said. Cheong Seong-Chang, a North Korea specialist at South Korea’s Sejong Institute, said the announcements taken together did not bode well for relations with Washington. “Kim Jong Un is displaying strong hostility and a strong will to resist the United States in order to gather support ahead of announcing the ‘new path,’” he said. “The party plenum is likely to see a strong criticism against the United States and South Korea. North Korea is highly likely to announce the discontinuation of nuclear talks and the establishment of North Korea’s status as a nuclear power.” Ankit Panda, a North Korea expert at the Federation of American Scientists, said a Workers’ Party plenum was more significant than Kim’s much anticipated New Year’s Day speech. The last plenum took place in April, when Kim called on the United States to make a “bold decision” while threatening to put his country on a “new path.” “Presumably, we’ll now learn what happens next,” he tweeted, suggesting important new policy guidance, with the possibility that may involve a return to the byungjin policy of simultaneous military and economic development. (Simon Denyer and Min Joo Kim, “Kim Jong Un Is Back on His White Horse as North Korea Flags a Big Decision,” Washington Post, December 4, 2019)
President Donald Trump said that the necessity of keeping U.S. troops in Korea “can be debated” as Washington continues to pressure Seoul to pay a much steeper contribution to their next bilateral defense cost-sharing pact. “I can go either way,” Trump said, when asked by a reporter ahead of a NATO summit in London today whether it was in U.S. national security interests to station U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula. “I can make arguments both ways […] I think if we’re going to do it […] they should burden share more fairly.” His remarks come as the Korean and U.S. negotiating teams in Washington kicked off their fourth round of talks for the 11th Special Measures Agreement (SMA) as the current cost-sharing pact expires at the end of this year. Washington has reportedly been pressuring Seoul to pay five times its current contribution, or some $5 billion. It appears that Trump raised the withdrawal of the U.S. forces in Korea as a negotiation tactic amid the ongoing talks to seal a new deal with Seoul. Trump told reporters in a press briefing alongside NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, “We’re spending a tremendous amount of money to protect South Korea, and we think that it’s fair that they pay substantially more.” He said, “Last year, I asked them to pay more and they agreed. And nobody knows this — I’ll say it now, I think, for the first time — but they agreed to pay approximately $500 million a year or more for protection.” He continued, “Now we only had a month or two before the budget ended, so they said, ‘No, no, no.’” Trump called Koreans “very good businesspeople” and said he met with them “six, seven months ago,” and “we agreed to $500 million more” which “got them up to close to a billion dollars.” He said he told Korea, “It’s not fair. We do a great job. We have 32,000 soldiers there. It cost us, you know, many times what you’re paying. And you have to pay up.” Trump made similar remarks in the past including in February, when he alluded to Korea agreeing to pay $500 million more in defense “with a couple of phone calls.” Seoul and Washington in February signed a one-year cost-sharing deal in which Korea was to pay 1.04 trillion won, or around $920 million at the time, up 8.2 percent from the previous year, for the stationing of 28,500 U.S. troops in Korea. Trump in August also referred to the stationing of “32,000 soldiers on South Korean soil.” Trump also said Tuesday, “It’s not fair for the United States to defend many countries” and added that the “same conversations” were happening with five other countries, including Japan. Jeong Eun-bo, Korea’s chief negotiator for the SMA, held two-day talks with his U.S. counterpart James DeHart. The negotiations for the 11th SMA started in September. DeHart walked out of the third round of talks last month in Seoul, cutting discussions short, and called on Korea to bring out “new proposals.” On Trump’s remarks on the possible withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea, Jeong told reporters today that this had not been “discussed at all” during the talks that day, and added, “I don’t think there has been a change in the situation.” U.S. lawmakers of the House of Representatives’ armed services and foreign affairs committees, sent a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defense Secretary Mark Esper today expressing concern over U.S. demands to “exponentially increase” its annual contribution to roughly $5 billion per year,” saying it could bring about a “wedge” in the alliance with Korea. Rep. Adam Smith, chair of the House Armed Services Committee, and Rep. Eliot Engel, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, noted that contrary to Trump’s claims about the United States protecting wealthy countries “for nothing,” the presence of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula “is not solely about protecting South Korea.” They wrote, “At a time when the United States, South Korea and Japan should be working jointly to counter regional security threats ranging from increased North Korean provocations to growing Chinese assertiveness across the region, U.S. demands for a massive increase in South Korean annual contributions serve as a needless wedge between us and our allies.” They said the demands contradict “key principles and undermine U.S. efforts to affirm an enduring commitment to the region,” stressing the importance of “the interoperability of U.S. and South Korean forces” to deter any provocations by “competitors and adversaries.” The lawmakers questioned, “What is the basis for the requested increase from $924 million per year to roughly $5 billion per year?” They also asked for an answer within two weeks on the total annual cost of maintaining U.S. military forces on the Korean Peninsula, the impact if no agreement is reached as well as mitigation measures. While supporting an agreement that is “fair and mutually beneficial,” they added negotiations should not be undertaken in a “manner that jeopardizes our alliance relationships or continuity of presence.” (Sarah Kim, “Trump Questions U.S/ Troops Commitment in Korea,” JoongAng Ilbo, December 5, 2019)
Press Briefing: “PRESIDENT TRUMP: Well, thank you very much. It’s a great honor to be with Secretary General Stoltenberg of NATO. This is our first meeting, meaning my first meeting of this trip. But we’ve met many times … . Q Mr. President, why has North Korea continued its nuclear program despite your various meetings? TRUMP: Well, we’ll see. I have confidence in him. I like him. He likes me. We have a good relationship. We’ll see. We’ll see what happens. He definitely likes sending rockets up, doesn’t he? That’s why I call him “Rocket Man.” Q Was that helpful do you think — calling him “Rocket Man”? TRUMP: But we have a very good — we have a very good relationship and we’ll see what happens. It may work out; it may not. But, in the meantime, it’s been a long time. President Obama said it’s the number-one problem. And it would’ve been war; you’d be in a war right now if it weren’t for me. If I weren’t President, you’d be in a war right now in Asia, and who knows where there that leads. But that brings in — Q Mr. President, you’ve met with — TRUMP: — that brings in a lot of other countries. Q Mr. President, you’ve met with Kim Jong Un three times now, and yet he continues to build his nuclear program and test his missiles. So what more will it take? TRUMP: Well, you don’t know that. Number one, you don’t know that. And number two, very importantly, I have met and, in the meantime, we still have peace. We have peace. And at least, speaking for myself, I have a very good personal relationship, and he has with me. I’m possibly the only one he has that kind of relationship with in the world. They call it the “Hermit Kingdom.” I know a lot about his “Hermit Kingdom,” but I have a very good relationship. If you would’ve listened to President Obama, we’d be in a World War Three right now. So we’ll see what happens. Hey, look — we are more powerful, militarily, than we ever have been. And I will tell you, when I took over the United States military, when I became Commander-in-Chief, our military was depleted, our military was in trouble. You know that better than anybody. We had old planes; we had old everything. We didn’t have ammunition. Now we have the most powerful military we’ve ever had and we’re by far the most powerful country in the world. And, hopefully, we don’t have to use it, but if we do, we’ll use it. If we have to, we’ll do it. But, you know, my relationship with Kim Jong Un is really good, but that doesn’t mean he won’t abide by the agreement we signed. You have to understand. You have to go and look at the first agreement that we signed. It said he will denuclearize. That’s what it said. I hope he lives up to the agreement, but we’re going to find out. Now, in the meantime, we’re working with South Korea because it’s burden sharing. And we’re spending a tremendous amount of money to protect South Korea, and we think that it’s fair that they pay substantially more. Last year, I asked them to pay more and they agreed. And nobody knows this — I’ll say it now, I think, for the first time — but they agreed to pay approximately $500 million a year or more for protection. That’s $500 million. Now we only had a month or two before the budget ended, so they said, “No, no, no.” And, you know, they’re very good businesspeople; you see how they do on trade. But they agreed to pay almost $500 million a year more. That got them up to a billion dollars — close to a billion dollars. That’s a lot of money. I did that with a number of phone calls and a meeting. Now, we’re negotiating for them to pay more, because the United States is paying a lot of money to protect South Korea and we think it’s fair that they pay up and pay more. We have a very good relationship, but we think it’s fair that they pay more. I’m not sure if anybody knows. Did you know about the $500 million that they agreed to pay more? Q No, sir. Can you tell us more about it? (Inaudible.) TRUMP: Yeah. I met with them six, seven months ago — maybe a little bit longer than that. And I said, “You’re not paying enough. It’s not fair.” They were paying $500 — they were paying less than $500 million a year and it costs us billions. And I said, “It’s not fair. We do a great job. We have 32,000 soldiers there. It cost us, you know, many times what you’re paying. And you have to pay up.” And they said — again, in a very good way, very fine negotiation. And they were very close to being at the end of their budget, and we agreed to $500 million more, almost — around $500 million. And that got them up to close to a billion dollars from $500 million — really less than $500 million, which has been that number for many, many years — decades. And I got $500 million more a year. So, it’s $500 million a year. That’s a lot of money. But it’s still substantially less than it costs. So now we’re in a negotiation for them to pay more. And they can do that because they’re a very rich country. Q And is it — TRUMP: Did — you didn’t know about that, did you? Q No. That’s interesting. Do you — T TRUMP: Good. I wonder if I’ll get a good story for that. I don’t think so. Q Do you believe it’s in America’s — TRUMP: I don’t get — I don’t get good stories. Q Is it in America’s national security interests to continue to have all of those troops in the Korean Peninsula in the region? TRUMP: It can be debated. I can go either way. I can make arguments both ways. But I think it’s — I do think this. I think if we’re going to do it, I think it’s — you know, they should burden share more fairly. It’s not fair for the United States to defend many countries — not only that country, but many countries where we — and they’re rich countries. I could tell you there’s five other countries that I’ve had the same conversations with. You know, Saudi Arabia — we moved more troops there. And they’re paying us billions of dollars. Okay? You never heard of that before. You’ve never heard of that in your whole life. We moved troops and we paid nothing. And people took advantage and the world took advantage of us. But we do — we have a good relationship with Saudi Arabia, but they needed help. They were attacked. And, as you saw, we just moved a contingent of troops, and they’re paying us billions of dollars and they’re happy to do so. The problem is nobody ever asked them to do it until I came along. Nobody ever asked. Obama didn’t ask. Bush didn’t ask. Clinton didn’t ask. Nobody asked. In fact, they said to me, “But nobody has ever asked us to do this.” I said, “I know, King, but I’m asking.” And they’re paying us — they’ve already sent us billions of dollars. It’s already in the bank. So — and that’s right. And they’re happy to do it. But we never had a President who would ask. And it’s not right. So — and we have many other countries that were doing the same thing — wealthy countries. Now, in some cases, you have countries that need help that don’t have money. They’re poor and there’s tremendous trauma. There’s tremendous problems and things going on that shouldn’t be going on. And that’s a different situation. But we have wealthy countries — I’ve asked Japan. I said to Prime Minister Abe — a friend of mine, Shinzo. I said, “You have to — you have to help us out here. We’re paying a lot of money. You’re a wealthy nation. And we’re, you know, paying for your military, essentially. You have to help us out.” And he’s doing — he’s going to do a lot. They’re all going to do a lot. But they were never asked. Now they’re being asked. Q Sir, do think you’ll be able to get a China trade deal by the end of the year? TRUMP: I think it’s a very important point. You understand. I mean, it’s a point nobody probably really knows about. I don’t talk about it, but this is the first time I’ve talked about it publicly. But, no, South Korea is paying us almost $500 million more. And now we’re starting a negotiation for millions of dollars … . Q Mr. President, on the China trade deal, sir? Do you think you’ll be able to get it by the end of the year? Is that your goal? RESIDENT TRUMP: Let me tell you, the China trade deal is dependent on one thing: Do I want to make it? Because we’re doing very well with China right now and we can do even better with the flick of a pen. And China is paying for it. And China has their worst year, by far, that they’ve had in 57 years. So, we’ll see what happens. But we’re doing very well, right now. And I gave the farmers, as you know, $28 billion and had a lot left over. Because the farmers were targeted by China. I gave them $28 billion over a two-year period, and that got them whole. That was everything that China took out. I gave them from the tariffs that China paid us, and I had billions left over — many billions left over. Q So you don’t really have a deadline? TRUMP: I have no deadline. No. Q Mr. President, are you concerned about the — TRUMP: In some ways, I think it’s better to wait until after the election, you want to know the truth. I think, in some ways, it’s better to wait until after the election with China. Q But why? Why is that, sir? TRUMP: But I — I’m not going to say that. I just think that. I’ll just tell you: In some ways, I like the idea of waiting until after the election for the China deal. But they want to make a deal now. And we’ll see whether or not the deal is going to be right. It’s got to be right. Look, China has been ripping off the United States for many, many years. Again, because of leadership, or lack of leadership, or it wasn’t their thing. It’s like I told you about the military and the kind of money we’re taking in. And, you know, every one of these countries — these are rich countries I’m talking to. They would always say, “But nobody has ever asked us to do that.” Like, “Therefore, why should we do it now?” I said, “Well, they haven’t because they were foolish, but I am.” And that’s where we are. And that’s why — with Saudi Arabia, with South Korea, with so many other countries — they’re paying a lot of money to the United States that they weren’t paying. And they will be paying a lot more. … ” (White House, Briefing with President Trump and NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg after 1:1 Meeting, Winfield House, London, December 3, 2019)
North Korea said today that its leader, Kim Jong-un, had opened a new mountain resort this week, calling it “an epitome of modern civilization,” as the isolated country tries to attract more foreign tourists to blunt the pain of international sanctions. Kim attended the ribbon-cutting ceremony of the Township of Samjiyon County, near the North’s central border with China, KCNA reported. Since he took over North Korea following the death of his father, Kim Jong-il, in late 2011, Kim has promised to rebuild his country’s moribund economy, allowing more market activities and launching a building boom in Pyongyang, the capital, and elsewhere. Tourism is excluded from the sanctions that the United Nations has imposed on the North, which prevent it from earning hard currency by exporting its coal, iron ore, fisheries and textiles. transforming Samjiyon from a decrepit holiday town into a modern resort complex complete with ski slopes, spas and hotels has been one of Kim’s pet projects. The town is on the slopes of Paektusan (also spelled Baekdusan), a mountain on the border with China that many Koreans regard as the birthplace of their country and North Korean propaganda declares the birthplace of Kim’s father, a claim historians refute. In his annual New Year’s Day address this year, Kim called on his country to turn Samjiyon into “an ideal socialist village.” He has visited the construction site several times in recent years. But the project has been plagued by a lack of electricity, construction materials and other resources aggravated by the United Nations sanctions. Kim mobilized troops and what were called “loyalty donations” from his people to press ahead with the project. Defectors from the region have reported that electricity and workers were diverted to Samjiyon from surrounding towns as the authorities struggled to meet Kim’s construction deadline. Tourism is likely to become even more important to the North’s economy in the coming months. Under the United Nations’ sanctions resolutions, countries like China and Russia must send home all North Korean workers, another key source of cash for Kim’s regime, by the end of this month. Visitors have been one way for Beijing, which does not want its Communist neighbor to collapse, to extend a lifeline. Last year, 1.2 million Chinese tourists visited North Korea, a 50 percent increase from 2017, providing badly needed cash for Pyongyang, according to the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency in Seoul, citing Chinese customs data. As his diplomatic efforts with Trump have faltered, Kim has increasingly emphasized a “self-reliant” economy, trying to boost domestic industries and mobilizing troops for building projects. He has been particularly focused on building resort towns, a taste some analysts suspect he had acquired when he studied in Switzerland in his teens. In Wonsan, an east coast town, he is building a large summer tourist complex that includes beachfront hotels, water parks and golf courses. In October alone, he visited Samjiyon, a resort town in Diamond Mountain and a hot-spring resort in Yangdok to encourage the resort-planners there. In Diamond Mountain, he ordered the demolition of South Korean hotels and other buildings there that the two Koreas once operated together. Kim began pressing South Korea to reopen the complex last year, when he first met with the South’s president, Moon Jae-in. But when the South balked, Kim said North Korea would rebuild the town on its own. North Korea has recently invited tourists from China and other countries to the mountain for hiking trips, according to news reports. Because he assumes there will be no immediate lifting or easing of sanctions, Kim has sought to weather them by promoting tourism, analysts said. At the same time, North Korea gave the United States by the end of this month to return to the negotiating table with a more flexible proposal on how to end its nuclear weapons program. The North has threatened to abandon diplomacy and perhaps resume missile and nuclear tests if that deadline is not met. “What is left to be done now is the U.S. option and it is entirely up to the U.S. what Christmas gift it will select to get,” Ri Thae-song, a vice foreign minister of North Korea who handled United States affairs, said today. (Choe Sang-Hun, “Wit Economic Options Left, North Korea Builds on Tourism,” New York Times, December 4, 2019, p. A-4)
12/4/19:
KPA Chief of the General Staff Pak Jong Chon statement: “I heard that the U.S. president made undesirable remarks about the DPRK on December 3 during the NATO summit in Britain. The Supreme Commander of our armed forces was also displeased to hear it. The DPRK and the U.S. are still technically at war and the state of truce can turn into an all-out armed conflict any moment even by any accidental case. Recently the armed forces of the U.S. have shown unusual military moves targeting the DPRK, and we are analyzing the effects those military actions can have on the security of the DPRK and are getting ourselves ready to cope with them. I think the only guarantee that deters physical conflict from flaring up in relations between the DPRK and the U.S. despite such a dangerous military stand-off is the close relations between the top leaders of the DPRK and the U.S. But recently the U.S. president said that he may use armed forces in clear reference to the DPRK, even though he attached preconditions. This greatly disappointed me. Such elated spirit and bluffing may greatly get on the nerve of the dialogue partner even at the slightest slip. One thing I would like to make clear is that the use of armed forces is not the privilege of the U.S. only. Anyone can guess with what action the DPRK will answer if the U.S. undertakes military actions against the DPRK. I clearly state here that if the U.S. uses any armed forces against the DPRK, we will also take prompt corresponding actions at any level. The use of armed forces against the DPRK will be a horrible thing for the U.S.” (KCNA, “Use of Armed Forces Is Not Privilege of U.S. Only: Chief of General Staff of Korean People’s Army,” December 4, 2019)
North Korea’s ambassador to the United Nations, Kim Song, said in a statement today, the U.S. pursuit of “sustained and substantial dialogue” was a “time-saving trick” to benefit a “domestic political agenda.” He added, “We do not need to have lengthy talks with the U.S. now and the denuclearization is already gone out of the negotiation table.” (Dakin Andone and Elizabeth Joseph, “North Korea’s UN Ambassador Says Denuclearization Is Off the Table in Talks with U.S.,” CNN, December 7, 2019)
Kim Jong-un this week took a second ride in less than two months on a white horse to the country’s sacred, snow-covered Mount Paektu. The images showing him “riding a steed through knee-high virgin snow” may look like typical propaganda. But analysts are holding their breath because of the timing of his visit. In the past, Mr. Kim had often gone to the mountain on the Chinese border and the nearby Samjiyon County — which are venerated as the birthplace of the North Korean regime — when he wanted to show his people and the outside world his resolve before a major policy shift. “Kim Jong-un wanted to signal at home and abroad that North Korea will go its own way, concluding that there is nothing it can expect from dealing with President Trump,” said Lee Byong-chul, a North Korea expert at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul. “We will see an escalation of tensions.” Kim traveled to Mount Paektu in 2013, just two weeks before he executed Jang Song-thaek, his uncle and the No. 2 in his regime. He visited there again in December 2017, shortly after his country successfully launched its Hawsong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile and declared itself a nuclear power. Weeks later, in his New Year’s Day speech, he started a flurry of diplomatic engagements that led to his summit meetings with President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and President Trump. Now, Kim is widely expected to make another policy shift in coming weeks, as his diplomacy with Trump has failed to bring about the benefits he had sought, especially the lifting or easing of sanctions over his weapons programs. In recent weeks, North Korea has repeatedly warned that Washington has until the end of December to make a new, more flexible proposal on how to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. The warning raised fears that Kim would abandon diplomacy and perhaps resume missile and nuclear tests. Washington has dismissed the deadline as “artificial,” and North Korea said today that it would convene the Central Committee of its ruling Workers’ Party this month to “discuss and decide on crucial issues,” given “the changed situation at home and abroad.” If visits to Mount Paektu are symbolic gestures, the Central Committee meeting is the traditional venue where Kim typically adopts major policy shifts. In one such meeting in 2013, Kim declared the byongjin — or “parallel” and simultaneous — pursuit of economic growth and a nuclear arsenal. In a meeting in April 2018, two months before his first meeting with Trump, he declared that since he had completed his nuclear force, he would adopt a “new strategic line” of focusing entirely on economic growth. But as Kim’s diplomacy with Trump faltered, North Korea warned this year that its leader would find “a new way,” signaling that there would be another major policy shift. The upcoming Central Committee meeting could see Kim “declaring an end to denuclearization talks and reaffirming his country’s status as a nuclear power,” said Cheong Seong-chang, a senior North Korea specialist at the Sejong Institute in South Korea. Cheong said it was noteworthy that Mr. Kim chose top military leaders to accompany him on the trip to Mount Paektu, a visit captured in dozens of photos released by the North’s state media. Although Kim has visited Mount Paektu or Samjiyon nine times since taking power, this trip was the first time he was accompanied mainly by top military field commanders, analysts said. “This signals that Kim Jong-un is likely to start paying more attention to the military and focus on strengthening its power,” Cheong said. North Korea has made the mountain the centerpiece of its propaganda. School textbooks and museum paintings there depict the plain around the mountain as the battleground where a small band of Korean guerrillas led by Kim Il-sung, Kim’s grandfather and the founder of North Korea, fought Japanese colonialists in extreme weather on foot or on horseback, eventually leading the Koreans to liberation. The North says that Kim’s father, Kim Jong-il, was born in one of the “secret guerrilla camps” there, a claim outside historians have refuted. According to North Korea, the Kim family’s revolution will not end until North and South Korea are reunified and freed forever from the “imperialist” influence of the United States. The 71 photos of Mr. Kim’s latest trip to the region were carefully choreographed to reinforce that propaganda: He led a group of military generals on horseback through paths cut through deep snow to visit the old guerrillas’ secret camp sites. Kim was accompanied by his wife, Ri Sol-ju, just as his grandfather Kim Il-sung used to be followed by his wife and a fellow guerrilla, Kim Jong-suk. Kim Jong-un and his generals huddled around a bonfire, re-enacting a scene from the “arduous march” the Koreans undertook in their struggle against foreign powers. “To outsiders, this may come across as crude and even comic propaganda,” Lee said. “But this is the North Korean way of showing resolve and comradeship in the face of a difficult challenge, evoking the memories of the Koreans’ struggle against the Japanese.” As his diplomacy with Trump has failed to ease sanctions, Kim has exhorted his people to build a “self-reliant” economy and brace for a protracted standoff with the Americans. Today, North Korean news media said Mr. Kim had visited Mount Paektu to inspire his people to resist “the unprecedented blockade and pressure imposed by the imperialists” and prepare themselves for “the harshness and protracted character of our revolution.” Trump, for his part, said he still had “a good relationship” and “confidence” in Mr. Kim. But he also revived the possibility of using force against North Korea. “We’re by far the most powerful country in the world,” he said as he met with NATO leaders in London on Tuesday. “And, hopefully, we don’t have to use it, but if we do, we’ll use it.” Today, North Korea vowed to retaliate if the United States used military force. “One thing I would like to make clear is that the use of armed forces is not the privilege of the U.S. only,” Pak Jong-chon, chief of the general staff of the Korean People’s Army, said in a statement. (Choe Sang-hun, “Kim Takes Ride toward Likely Shift in His Dealings with U.S.,” New York Times, December 5, 2019, p. A-8)
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that Seoul and Beijing should strengthen their cooperation to protect the international order that he said had been threatened by unilateralism, amid the neighbor’s ongoing trade war with the United States. During a meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha, Wang apparently asked Seoul to join Beijing in the fight against unilateralism and protectionism, a reference to President Donald Trump’s economic policy, and criticized such moves as challenging global stability and peace. “Along with all responsible countries, including South Korea, China will uphold the ideology of multilateralism, principles of fairness and justice,” Wang said. Wang stressed the strong bond between neighboring countries to enhance regional stability. “Regarding the current international situation replete with uncertainties, and against the backdrop of changes never seen in the past 100 years, the neighbors should strengthen their mutual visits much more, enhance cooperation and understand and support each other, and have to work together to safeguard our legitimate rights and play a constructive role for regional peace and stability,” he said. The Chinese minister arrived in Seoul on a two-day visit. Following a bilateral meeting with Kang, they were scheduled to have dinner. Tomorrow, he will pay a courtesy visit to President Moon Jae-in. This is Wang’s first official visit to Seoul since May 2014. There has been speculation that Wang may use the Seoul trip to warn against any move by South Korea to bolster the US’ influence in the region or strengthen its military foothold through such decisions as hosting intermediate-range US ballistic missiles. Kang said both countries have a shared understanding of the need to improve their cooperation. Following Seoul’s decision to deploy the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-missile system here in 2016, which Beijing sees as a security threat, the relationship between the two countries grew rocky. “Through today’s talks, I expect that we can have in-depth exchanges of views on ways to enhance practical cooperation in the economy, environment, culture and people-to-people exchanges, and ways to cooperate over the denuclearization of the peninsula and the establishment of peace,” she said.
According to a Foreign Ministry official, the two were not able to confirm a summit between President Moon Jae-in and Chinese leader Xi Jinping during the meeting. Seoul hopes the summit will take place on the occasion of Moon’s visit to China for a trilateral meeting involving Japan in Chengdu next month. Kang and Wang agreed to strengthen communication to help North Korea make progress in nuclear talks with the US, under the common understanding that the North’s possession of a nuclear program is unacceptable; peace in the Korean Peninsula should be maintained; and a war should not break out. The ministers discussed ways to fully restore their relations including easing Beijing’s ban on Korean TV programs and films, K-pop and package tours to South Korea, which was imposed to protest the deployment of THAAD. They agreed to hold deputy minister-level talks in the near future, to foster people-to-people exchanges and cooperative economic projects, according to a ministry official. Earlier in the day, Kang defended South Korea’s decision to deploy THAAD, saying Seoul’s role is to be a “force for cooperation rather than competition between the US and China.” “We have never knowingly taken steps to harm others unless it is for our defense or national interests,” she said. “The setback of 2017 has largely been overcome, though more needs to be done in the tourism and entertainment sectors.” (Park Han-na, “China Seeks Seoul’s Cooperation to Counter U.S. ‘Unilateralism,’” Korea Herald, December 4, 2019) “Both countries, China and South Korea, are close neighbors, friends and, not least, partners,” Wang said through an interpreter. “Regarding the current international situation replete with uncertainties, and against the backdrop of changes never seen in the past 100 years, the neighbors should strengthen their mutual visits much more, enhance cooperation, and understand and support each other, and have to work together to safeguard our legitimate rights and play a constructive role for regional peace and stability,” he said. He also criticized “unilateralism” and “hegemonic acts” as the biggest threat to world peace, though he did not name any specific country. “Along with all responsible countries, including South Korea, China will uphold the ideology of multilateralism, principles of fairness and justice,” he said. (Song Sang-ho, “Chinese FM Wang Calls for Joint Efforts for Regional Peace, Security,” Yonhap, December 4, 2019)
“I think that North Korea also understands that if they were foolish enough to act aggressively, that there would be a very strong response from the alliance as a whole,” Heino Klinck, deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia, warned on Wednesday (local time) regarding North Korea’s series of threatening statement against the U.S. He also mentioned the possibility that the entity in charge of policies toward North Korea, which is currently the State Department, may be replaced with the Pentagon or another department. Klinck said North Korea understands the current situation today at a conference hosted by the Korea-U.S. Alliance Foundation discussing a transfer of wartime operational control in Washington D.C. “The military option was never taken off the table,” Klinck answered in response to a question asking his thoughts on President Donald Trump’s comment on “using military power against North Korea, if necessary,” he added. “I mean, the military exists to serve as a deterrent. It serves as a stabilizing force.” “There may come a time where our response may be different, and where the lead for the State Department may switch to something else,” he warned. This implies that the Department of Defense may lead the polices toward North Korea with its military power at the center instead of the State Department with a focus on diplomacy in case of failed denuclearization negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea. (Dong-A Ibo, “’Military Option against N. Korea Was Never Taken off the Table,’ Says U.S. Official,” December 6, 2019)
12/5/19:
DPRK First Vice FoMin Choe Son Hui’s statement: “The phrase ‘use of military force’ against the DPRK which emerged during the NATO summit a few days ago has created a great splash worldwide, arousing concerns. What makes us feel worse is that the figurative style was dare used at random with no courtesy when referring to the dignified supreme leadership of the DPRK. This has prompted the waves of hatred of our people against the U.S. and the Americans and they are getting higher and higher. As reported, the Korean People’s Army immediately clarified its strong stand on it. We, Foreign Ministry, too, cannot repress displeasure over the utterances made by President Trump inappropriately at the most sensitive time. It would be fortunate if the utterances of the use of military force and the title of figurative style made by President Trump were a careless verbal lapse, but matter becomes different if they were a planned provocation that deliberately targeted us. If this is meant to make expressions, reminiscent of those days just two years ago when a war of words was fought across the ocean, surface again on purpose, it will be a very dangerous challenge. We will watch whether the phrase i.e. use of military force and figurative expression emerge again. If, if such phrases emerge once again and they are once again confirmed to be a calculated provocation of the U.S. against us, we will also start harsh words against the U.S. to counter it. If any words and expressions stoking the atmosphere of confrontation are used once again on purpose at this crucial moment, it must really be diagnosed as the relapse of the dotage of a dotard. The Chairman of our State Affairs Commission has not yet made any statement toward President Trump.” (KCNA, “First Vice-Minister of DPRK Foreign Affairs Choe Son Hui Makes Statement,” December 5, 2019)
12/6/19:
The International Criminal Court said today that it has no jurisdiction over North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un. In 2016, leaders of nongovernmental organizations NK Watch and Lawyers for Human Rights and Unification of Korea filed a complaint against Kim with the ICC, holding him responsible for human rights violations in the North. ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda said in its annual Report on Preliminary Examination Activities issued Thursday that the alleged crimes referred to the ICC were neither committed on the territory of an ICC member state nor by a national of a member state, nor has the United Nations Security Council referred the situation in question. The complainants had said that although North Korea is not an ICC member state, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over its leader, given that under South Korean domestic law, he may be considered a national of South Korea. Article 3 of the South Korean Constitution states that “the territory of Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands.” The Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, signed by South and North Korea in 1991, states that “inter-Korean relations are not relations between nations, but special relations established temporarily in the course of pursuing unification.” However, the ICC prosecutor’s office said the nationality granted by a state on the basis of its domestic laws is not automatically binding on international courts and tribunals. “Based on the (South Korean) Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ROK Constitution, the South Korean authorities have expressed that there is an ‘assumption’ that North Koreans can acquire South Korean citizenship … such recognition appears to correspond more to an entitlement to South Korean nationality,” the ICC prosecutor wrote in the report. ROK refers to the Republic of Korea, the South’s official name. For such entitlement to take effect, North Koreans must go through formal procedures to acquire ROK citizenship, and prior to the process, it appears that in practice, North Koreans are neither treated as South Korean nationals by the ROK government nor afforded the rights and protection enjoyed by South Korean nationals, the prosecutor said. Regarding another complaint filed in 2017 alleging that North Koreans are engaged in forced labor overseas that amounts to the crime against humanity of enslavement, the ICC prosecutor said that does not seem to be the case. Noting that the working and living conditions of North Korean workers abroad vary significantly among host countries, the ICC prosecutor said the detailed accounts of alleged serious abuse appear to be related to North Korean workers in non-ICC member states. While North Korean overseas workers dispatched to ICC member states are reportedly subject to exploitative working conditions, “it does not appear that their situation is, on the whole, comparable to conditions of slavery or amount to the crime of enslavement” under the Rome Statute of the ICC, the ICC prosecutor said. The Rome Statute, which was adopted in 1998 and went into effect in 2002, establishes the functions, jurisdiction and structure of the ICC, which prosecutes individuals for international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression. (Kim So-hyun, “International Criminal Court Says It Has No Jurisdiction over N.K. Leader,” Korea Herald, December 8, 2019)
Serbin and Puccioni: “ … Commercial satellite imagery from earlier this year, however, reveals a narrow but steady liquid effluent likely trailing from a pipeline stemming from the Turbine-Generator Building of the ELWR for at least three months. This new activity follows and builds upon notable developments at the ELWR since 2017, ostensibly aimed at preparing the reactor for start-up operation. They included the frequent movement of vehicles, cranes and equipment around the reactor’s entrance, the emplacement of a transmission tower and electrical transmission lines in 2017 and the construction of a dam and spillway by early 2018 to control water flow for the cooling system intake located upstream. This is not the first time that effluent has been observed being discharged in this area. Past instances, however, were likely associated with the Supply Facility’s wastewater pipeline, which shares an endpoint with the ELWR’s cooling system pipelines. Due to the increased volume and duration of effluent observed earlier this year, it is reasonable to conclude that does not emanate from the wastewater pipeline but is associated with the ELWR’s cooling system instead. If this is the case, at a minimum, this signifies ongoing testing or preparation of the ELWR’s cooling and/or service water systems for operation of the reactor. A start of ELWR operations could have significant implications for North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and would complicate any denuclearization process. Although the stated purpose for the ELWR is electricity generation, the reactor could be operated to produce weapons-grade plutonium or tritium for boosted fission or hydrogen bombs. The potential start-up of the reactor also raises questions about whether or not a civil nuclear energy program should be included in a denuclearization process. If so, the disposal of spent fuel and the decommissioning of the reactor would become complicating factors that do not exist today.” (Elliot Serbin and Allison Puccioni, “North Korea’s Experimental Light-Water Reactor: Possible Testing of Cooling System,” 38North, December 6, 2019)
12/7/19:
KCNA: “A very important test took place at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground on the afternoon of December 7, 2019. The Academy of the National Defense Science of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea made a report on the results of the successful test of great significance to the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. The results of the recent important test will have an important effect on changing the strategic position of the DPRK once again in the near future.” (KCNA, “Statement of Spokesman for the Academy of National Defense Science Issued,” December 8, 2019)
North Korea said it conducted a “very important test” at a rocket launch site, the same day a senior diplomat said denuclearization is off the negotiating table. The test paves the way for North Korea to launch a satellite or intercontinental ballistic missile around the end of this year, experts said, fulfilling a threat to give the United States an unwelcome “Christmas gift.” President Trump said he had convinced North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to close down the site when the pair met in Singapore in June 2018. When evidence emerged that North Korea was rebuilding the site, Trump said in March he would be “very, very disappointed” with Kim if that proved to be the case, but said he didn’t believe it would be. Kim Song, Pyongyang’s envoy to the United Nations, dismissed the Trump administration’s calls for dialogue Saturday as a “timesaving trick” solely for “its domestic political agenda.” “We do not need to have lengthy talks with the U.S. now and denuclearization is already gone out of the negotiating table,” he said. Later today, Trump stressed his good relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, saying Kim does not want to “interfere” with his reelection bid for 2020. “He knows I have an election coming up. I don’t think he wants to interfere with that, but we’ll have to see. … I think he’d like to see something happen. The relationship is very good, but you know, there is certain hostility,” Trump told reporters at the White House. Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, had predicted a test was imminent at Sohae earlier this week through analysis of satellite imagery. “The North Korean statement strongly implies that North Korea has tested a new or substantially improved rocket engine,” he said. “This suggests the ‘Christmas gift’ that North Korea has promised will be a new missile. Possibilities range from an improved Hwasong-15 to a solid-propellant ICBM.” (Min Joo Kim and Simon Denyer, “North Korea Claims to Have Carried out ‘Very Important Test’ at Rocket Launch Site,” Washington Post, December 8, 2019)
12/7/19:
Elleman: “ … Despite the lack of information, Twitter and media outlets are rife with speculation, with some analysts suggesting that North Korea ground tested a large, solid-fuel rocket motor designed for a notional intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM. Based on previous activity at the Sohae Vertical Engine Test Stand, it seems more likely that the test involved either an existing liquid-fuel engine, or a new, unknown engine. The Vertical Engine Test Stand at Sohae is the largest in North Korea. It has hosted numerous tests over the last half-decade, including static firings of the RD-250-type engine in September 2016 and again in March 2017. Variations of the RD-250 engine power the first stages of the Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and the Hwasong-14 and -15 ICBMs. No solid-fuel motor is known to have been tested at the Sohae site. The Vertical Engine Test Stand at Sohae—as captured in photographs of the RD-250 tests—appears to be designed only for liquid-fuel engines, which are much lighter than their solid-fuel counterparts. The single-chamber RD-250 engine, for example, weighs roughly 500 kg. When placed on the test stand, the engine, plus instrumentation, thermal protections and other elements weigh no more than 2,000 kg, likely considerably less. The liquid propellant used by the engine during the test is typically stored in large tanks near the test stand. Consequently, the test stand’s structural configuration appears to be designed to withstand the thrust generated by the engine during testing, but not necessarily to accommodate a much heavier test article, which induces loads in the opposite direction. A stage test of the Hwasong-15, which included the entire first stage of the missile, plus propellants, would require substantial modification of the stand’s superstructure to withstand its mass of more than 50,000 kg. Solid-rocket motors are configured very differently than liquid-fuel engines. Solid motors consist of a cylindrical casing that holds the propellant. An expansion nozzle is inserted into the aft end of the motor to provide an escape of the hot gases generated during the combustion process. Thus, when ground testing a solid motor, the test stand must hold in place the mass of the entire motor. First-stage, solid motors of an ICBM typically weigh between 20,000 and 30,000 kg. IRBM motors weigh between 15,000 and 20,000 kg. The massive weight of solid motors generally compels engineers to test them horizontally, rather than vertically. In the horizontal position, the motor can be placed on a wheeled cradle, where the thrust can be directed into a large restraining block. There are drawbacks to testing solid motors horizontally, mostly having to do with the management of molten alumina slag that accumulates near the bottom of the motor during the combustion process. Therefore, a motor tested vertically will better represent the thermal loads induced by the molten slag during flight. Specially designed and built vertical test stands are sometimes employed for this reason. In general, however, more than 95 percent of large, solid motors tests are conducted horizontally. North Korea tested a solid-motor in March 2016 using a horizontal stand situated near Hamhung. North Korea may have overhauled and substantially reinforced the Vertical Engine Test Stand at Sohae to accommodate large solid motors when it rebuilt the stand earlier this year. But this seems unlikely given the expense and the less-than-compelling need to test solid motors in a vertical position. Rather, it is more reasonable to expect Pyongyang to spend its limited resources on more worthwhile missile development efforts. Satellite imagery of the Sohae site from December 7 and 8 indicates ground disturbances consistent with either a large liquid engine or solid motor test. However, it is not possible to identify the type of propulsion system fired. For reasons described above, it is more reasonable to conclude that a liquid engine was tested by North Korea’s engineers. But did the test involve an engine based on RD-250, or 4D10 (i.e., Musudan) engines or something new? Again, we cannot answer that question without additional information or photographs from the site. North Korea has good reason to test the RD-250 derivative used on its IRBM and ICBMs, if these systems have entered serial production. Engines coming off a production line need to be tested to ensure quality and reliability. It is common, for example, to ground test every engine destined for use on a satellite launcher to validate its performance characteristics and dependability. Ground test costs are small relative to those of a failed rocket that destroys a very expensive satellite. IRBMs and ICBMs, which are manufactured in large numbers over a short time, may not ground test every engine that is mated to a missile, but a significant percentage of them are subjected to ground tests. If North Korea has begun serial production, it would very likely want to test at least some of the manufactured engines to ensure performance and reliability standards are maintained, particularly if the number of long-range missiles Pyongyang plans to deploy is less than a few dozen. North Korea’s claim that the test was special suggests that perhaps a new engine design was fired. What that engine might be is anybody’s guess. One leading possibility might be a cluster of four or six RD-250 combustion chambers for a notional satellite launch vehicle capable of lifting a heavy satellite to medium- or high-altitude orbits. Such possibilities are speculative, of course, but they would be consistent with some of North Korea’s previously stated ambitions to orbit large satellites. Regardless of what North Korea may have tested, it seems likely that we will soon find out when either a new ballistic missile or satellite launch vehicle is fired in the coming months. Perhaps patience has some virtue as we await the launch of a new system. Pressures for instant analysis are understandable but as we have found out in the past, it is often wrong.” (Michael Elleman, “North Korea’s Rocket Engine Test: What We Know and Don’t Know,” 38North, December 10, 2019)
12/8/19:
Trump tweet: “Kim Jong Un is far too smart and has far too much to lose, actually everything, if he acts in a hostile way. He signed a strong Denuclearization Agreement with me in Singapore. “He does not want to void his special relationship with the President of the United States or interfere with the U.S. Presidential Election in November.” Donald J. Trump@realDonaldTrump
12/9/19:
Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee Chairman Kim Yong Chol’s statement: “The U.S. president continues using inappropriate and highly risky words and expressions even after our December 5 warning. On December 5 we made clear our stand that we would keep watching the U.S. president whether he repeats irritating expressions stoking the atmosphere of confrontation or not, and that we would view the issue from a different angle in case he deliberately uses odd words and expressions against us again. As well known to the world, at a press interview and in an article he posted on December 7 and 8, Trump let out loads of words and expressions with implicit threat to someone without any calculation that he doesn’t think north Korea wants to interfere in the U.S. election but will keep watching it, he will be surprised if north Korea takes hostile action and it will lose everything if it does so. Such language is, indeed, disappointing. This naturally indicates that Trump is an old man bereft of patience. From those words and expressions we can read how irritated he is now. As he is such a heedless and erratic old man, the time when we cannot but call him a ‘dotard’ again may come. We make clear once again that the Chairman of our State Affairs Commission has not used any irritating expression towards the U.S. president as yet. Of course, it could be a sign of self-restraint but there has not been any yet. But if thing continues to go this way, our Chairman’s understanding of Trump may change, I think. If Trump’s acts and words were meant to be addressed toward us, he must understand that his own style bluffing and hypocrisy sound rather abnormal and unrealistic to us and that every word made by him is heard with derision. After receiving his erratic utterances, we have no intention to reconsider what we should do in the future, and will not feel worried about our future action. Trump has too many things that he does not know about the DPRK. We have nothing more to lose. Though the U.S. may take away anything more from us, it can never remove the strong sense of self-respect, might and resentment against the U.S. from us. Trump said that if we undertake an action, he would be surprised, and of course he will be astonished. Our action is for his surprise. So, if he does not get astonished, we will be irritated. This year is closing. If the U.S. has will and wisdom to stop the second-hand of clash, it would be a better option for it to spend time to calculate in anguish for it rather than choosing bluffing and threatening expressions as now. Stalling for time is not a ready-made solution. If the U.S. has no will and wisdom, it cannot but watch with anxiety the reality in which the threat to its security increases with the passage of time.” (KCNA, “Chairman of Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee Issues Statement,” December 9, 2019)
Ri Su Yong, vice-chairman of the KWP Central Committee Chairman Ri Su Yong’s statement: “It seems that Trump is very anxious to know what we are thinking of now. And he feels very fretful about what will be done by us. The recent words and expressions spouted one after another by Trump sound like a threat to someone at a glance but they are a corroboration that he feels fear inside. Trump might be in great jitters but he had better accept the status quo that as he sowed, so he should reap, and think twice if he does not want to see bigger catastrophic consequences. Our final judgment and decision which will soon be made at the end of this year are to be done by the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, and he has neither clarified any stand yet nor made any ironic and irritating expressions toward the other party as done by someone. Trump would be well advised to quit abusive language which may further offend the Chairman.” (KCNA, “Vice-Chairman of WKP Central Committee Issues Statement,” December 9, 2019)
The Trump administration has refused to support a move by members of the United Nations Security Council to hold a discussion tomorrow on North Korea’s rampant human rights abuses, effectively blocking the meeting for the second year in a row. The American action appeared aimed at muting international criticism of Pyongyang’s human rights record in the hope of preserving a tenuous diplomatic opening between President Trump and Kim Jong-un, the authoritarian leader of North Korea. United Nations diplomats, confirming a report in Foreign Policy, said the United States had declined to sign. Asked today about the administration’s blocking of the meeting, a State Department spokesman said any discussion of North Korea by the Security Council should cover recent developments on the Korean Peninsula, including missile launches by Pyongyang and a test at a satellite launch site. The council plans to discuss them in two days. (Edward Wong and Choe Sang-Hun, “Trump Officials Block U.N. Meeting on North Korea’s Human Rights Abuses,” New York Times, December 10, 2019, p. A-12)
12/10/19:
President Trump is facing mounting criticism that his administration is bowing to pressure tactics from North Korea in a desperate attempt to resuscitate moribund nuclear talks ahead of a year-end deadline from leader Kim Jong Un’s regime. John Bolton, the president’s former national security adviser, was among a number of prominent figures who today rebuked the Trump administration’s move to block a U.N. Security Council meeting on North Korea’s human rights violations, scuttling the gathering for a second consecutive year. “Kim’s repression of his people, terrorist activities, and pursuit of WMD’s all warrant the fullest scrutiny. We should take the lead, not obstruct other nations,” Bolton wrote in a tweet, marking the second time he has publicly criticized Trump’s North Korea strategy since he was forced out of the White House in September. The administration’s decision — which also drew condemnation from leading Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden and former U.N. ambassador Samantha Power — came after North Korea’s U.N. representative had warned that a human rights meeting would be viewed by Pyongyang as “another serious provocation,” the latest in a series of North Korean threats in recent weeks. “Trump again coddled a dictator — blocking a UN meeting on North Korea human rights, betraying our values,” Biden wrote on Twitter. “Trump continues to side with the brutal Kim Jong Un.” The State Department said the United States is seeking an alternative meeting at the United Nations this week that would offer a comprehensive update on North Korea’s recent missile launches and provocative behavior. “We feel that that’s the best use of the Security Council attention this week,” a senior Trump administration official said during a conference call to announce financial sanctions on individuals in other countries, including Myanmar, Pakistan and South Sudan, to mark International Human Rights Day. A White House official declined to comment. Analysts said Trump is in a difficult position after having invested so much personal attention in his unprecedented diplomatic gambit with the North, which has included three meetings with Kim Jong Un. “I think the chances of any meaningful dialogue are rapidly diminishing — if not over — so the big challenge is when to pivot back to sort of the traditional approach of dealing with North Korea, which is a combination of pressure and diplomacy,” said Joel Wit, a former State Department official who was involved in negotiations with the North during the Clinton administration. Wit, now a senior fellow at the Stimson Center and director of 38 North, a website focused on North Korea policy, said Trump and his team “still want to play this out to the end, and they have the idea that diplomacy still may be salvaged. Is it worth starting to pivot now because of an upcoming human rights meeting or picking another opportunity?” Most analysts have said the window for a diplomatic breakthrough appears closed. But Victor Cha, a top Asia policy official in the Bush administration, said he believes a small deal remains possible in which Trump agrees to lift some economic sanctions in exchange for initial steps to limit the North’s nuclear program. “Trump wants it really badly,” Cha said, citing the president’s desire to tout a win in his reelection campaign. “I just would not rule it out.” (David Nakamura, “Trump’s Moves to Salvage North Korea Nuclear Talks amid Threats from Pyongyang Draw Rebukes from Bolton and Biden,” Washington Post, December 11, 2019)
12/11/19:
U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun may visit the North Korean side of the Joint Security Area early next week, for a meeting with a high-level North Korean official, sources familiar with the issue told the Korea Times, today. “Biegun plans to visit South Korea later this week or early next week, after attending a meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in New York. Talks are underway for Biegun to possibly meet with a high-level North Korean diplomat on the North’s side of the border village of Panmunjom,” a senior lawmaker from the ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) said. Washington confirmed the upcoming UNSC meeting will focus on what North Korea claimed was “a very important test” at its rocket and missile, testing and launch facility in Dongchang-ri. The meeting had originally been intended to cover human rights issues in the North. “It’s uncertain whether or not Biegun will deliver a handwritten letter from U.S. President Donald Trump to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un if he meets with a senior North Korean official. But it is clear that Washington doesn’t want to see any backtracking in the denuclearization talks,” the lawmaker said. With the North Korea-set deadline for a possible end to denuclearization diplomacy fast approaching, the two countries are apparently trying to keep the dialogue going, according to sources at Cheong Wa Dae. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not specify a timeline for Biegun’s trip during a regular briefing, yesterday. Recent reports said Washington and Seoul are arranging for him to arrive around December 15. White House National Security adviser Robert O’Brien is also expected to come to Korea soon. Biegun’s visit is drawing attention as to whether it will be an opportunity for a dramatic turnaround in the deadlocked denuclearization negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea. His trip a year ago on December 20, 2018, did provide a shift in the two countries’ relations that were also strained at the time. Kim sent Trump a letter that resulted in the second U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi in February. Kyodo News in Japan has also reported that Biegun will meet a North Korean official at Panmunjom, possibly his North Korean counterpart First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Choe Son-hui. There is speculation on what role Seoul Korea can play to facilitate talks between Washington and North Korea. NSO chief Chung Eui-yong, who has been the President’s key messenger to the North, reportedly visited Panmunjom recently, according to sources. Cheong Wa Dae declined to confirm whether or not the visit took place when contacted by The Korea Times. Presidential spokeswoman Ko Min-jung also declined to reply to questions on Chung’s possible visit to Panmunjom and whether he has plans to talk with North Korean officials in the near future. President Moon has kept silent about the North’s latest “weapons” test and did not hold a National Security Council meeting following the news. “We recognize that the current situation in North Korea and the situation on the Korean Peninsula is serious,” a presidential aide said today. Moon has continued to be hopeful about a third U.S.-North Korea summit, which he believes will “surely result in an outcome.” (Do Je-hae and Kim Yoo-chul, “Biegun May Visit Panmunguk for ‘Undisclosed Meeting’ with N.K.” Korea Times, December 11, 2019)
The United States today flew a Global Hawk surveillance plane over the Korean Peninsula and a strategic B-52 bomber over the sea near Japan, an aviation tracker said, amid brewing tensions over Pyongyang’s threat of possible military provocations. A Stratofortress, supported by a KC-135R refueling aircraft, was spotted in skies above Japan’s east, Aircraft Spots said on its Twitter account without specifying the exact time of the operation. It said the aircraft took off from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam. (Yonhap, “U.S. Sends B-52 Bomber, Global Hawk amid Tensions with N. Korea: Aviation Tracker,” November 11, 2019)
The United States is prepared to take “simultaneous steps” with North Korea to achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula, the American ambassador to the United Nations said today, but she also warned the North Koreans against conducting further missile tests. The ambassador, Kelly Craft, made the remarks during a meeting of the United Nations Security Council, which was called at her request over worries that North Korea could soon resume testing of its long-range missiles or perhaps even nuclear weapons, which it halted in 2017. That moratorium was declared by North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un. Kim, angered over United Nations sanctions that have isolated North Korea for years, has been hinting of a change in policy unless diplomatic progress is made with the United States. Kim has given Trump a December 31 deadline for a concession that could restart the diplomacy toward a peace agreement. Other North Korean officials have warned that the United States might receive an unwelcome “Christmas gift” if that deadline is ignored. Responding to the North Korean warnings, Craft sought to portray the United States as willing to make concessions, although she did not specify what they might be. “We have said many times before that we remain ready to engage in this comprehensive process,” Craft told the council. “We remain ready to take actions in parallel, and to simultaneously take concrete steps toward this agreement.” But she also warned against further missile tests, asserting they are not only violations of longstanding Security Council resolutions but are “deeply counterproductive to the shared objectives” of Trump and Kim. There was no immediate response from North Korea, which did not send any representatives to the Security Council meeting. (Rick Gladstone, “U.S. Warns North Korea against Further Missile Tests,” New York Times, December 12, 2019, p. A-14)
The United States today returned four of its military bases in South Korea in a decision to end a years-long delay caused by differences on decontamination procedures and to allay worries over the adverse impact of the delay on regional development schemes. South Korea and the U.S. also initiated the long-awaited return process for the Yongsan Garrison in central Seoul, once home to the headquarters of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), to ensure that a mega project to establish a national park there proceeds as scheduled. The four returned bases are Camps Eagle and Long in Wonju, 130 kilometers east of Seoul; parcels of Camp Market in Bupyeong, just west of the capital; and the Shea Range parcel at Camp Hovey in Dongducheon, just north of Seoul. They were already closed between 2009 and 2011. The allies made the agreement at the 200th joint committee meeting of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) at Camp Humphreys, a sprawling U.S. military complex in Pyeongtaek, 70 kilometers south of Seoul. SOFA governs the legal status of 28,500 American troops here. Ko Yun-ju, director-general of the North American affairs bureau at Seoul’s foreign ministry, and USFK Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach, who also heads the 7th Air Force, presided over the SOFA meeting. The two sides agreed on the return of the bases on the condition that they continue consultations on responsibilities for base decontaminations, ways to strengthen the environmental management of installations currently under USFK control and other related issues, Seoul officials said. The agreement came after the presidential office Cheong Wa Dae displayed its desire in August to expedite the handover process of 26 U.S. military installations amid residents’ worries that a further delay could complicate decontamination efforts for already vacated bases and regional development prospects. The return is part of a broad relocation scheme to consolidate U.S. bases across the peninsula into two garrisons in Pyeongtaek and Daegu, with an aim to enhance defense readiness and operational efficiencies in the face of North Korean nuclear and missile threats. Seoul stressed that Wednesday’s agreement is meaningful as the allies have agreed to leave the door open for continued consultations over decontamination and environmental issues concerning base returns, as well as on related “institutional” improvements. “The government will make efforts to make the desired achievements through continued consultations with the U.S. side,” a press release read. After the return of the bases, South Korea will first carry out the decontamination process and then decide whether to sell off the sites, keep them as part of government assets or assign them for military purposes. The combined cost of the decontamination work, expected to take about two years, is estimated at 110 billion won (US$92 million). Seoul plans to discuss the cost issue with the U.S. later, but Washington could refuse to divvy it up based on the claim that no USFK personnel reported any specific health problems stemming from their stay at the bases. Some observers raised the need for Seoul to use its shouldering of the clean-up expenses to bolster its leverage in ongoing negotiations on the sharing of the cost for stationing the USFK. Since early this year, the allies had run a joint working group consisting of civilian environmental and legal experts on the decontamination issue but failed to bridge their differences. In a separate press release, the U.S. military said that it has 13 additional “completely vacated and closed” sites that are ready for return now, in addition to the four sites that were returned Wednesday. It also said that as a testament to the bilateral alliance, USFK remains committed to returning installations “as expeditiously as possible” to South Korean government control in line with its base relocation schemes and SOFA rules. The latest agreement at the SOFA committee meeting reflected hopes by many South Koreans that Yongsan, long dominated by foreign forces including the Japanese during Tokyo’s colonial rule of the peninsula, will be fully returned to them. USFK established its Yongsan headquarters in July 1957 after the end of the 1950-53 Korean War. A large group of U.S. troops first entered the peninsula in September 1945, less than a month after Korea was liberated from Japan’s 36-year-long colonial occupation. Their mission was to disarm Japanese troops south of the 38th parallel, a line drawn by the United States and the then-Soviet Union. (Song Sang-ho, “U.S. Returns 4 Bases; Yongsan Garrison Return Process Begins,” December 11, 2019)
12/12/19:
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s statement: “The year-end time limit set by us is nearing but the U.S. continues to raise the level of its provocation against us. State Secretary Pompeo cried out for thoroughly implementing the UN sanctions resolution on December 10. The next day the U.S. held an open meeting of the UN Security Council, where it committed a hostile provocation again by pulling up the DPRK over its measures for modernizing its weaponry for self-defense. It is a wanton violation of the principle of respect for sovereignty specified in the UN Charter that the UNSC with its principal mission to preserve global peace and security found fault with the measures taken by a sovereign state for self-defense. This serves as more supporting evidence that the UNSC is no more than a political tool being used for the sake of the U.S. We will never overlook such stance of the U.S. which played a leading role in an open UNSC meeting discussing the issue of the DPRK in a bid to incite the atmosphere of pressurizing it at this sensitive time. If bolstering of military capabilities for self-defense should be termed an act of destroying global peace and security, there comes the conclusion that all the steps taken by other countries for bolstering up their defense capabilities should be taken issue with. Such claim that they are entitled to launch ICBMs any time and we are not allowed to conduct the tests done by any other countries just sheds light on the nature of the bandit-like U.S. which seeks to disarm us completely. The U.S. talks about dialogue, whenever it opens its mouth, but it is very evident that the U.S. has nothing to present before us though dialogue may open. The U.S. talked about a “corresponding measure” in the meeting. However, as we already declared, we have nothing to lose more and we are ready to take a countermeasure corresponding to anything that the U.S. opts for. By holding the meeting, the U.S. did a foolish thing which will boomerang on it, and decisively helped us make a definite decision on what way to choose.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Issues Statement,” December 12, 2019)
12/13/19:
DPRK Academy of Defense Science spokesman’s statement: “Another crucial test was successfully conducted at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground from 22:41 to 22:48 on December 13, 2019. Our defense scientists were greatly honored to receive warm congratulations from the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea on the spot. The research successes being registered by us in defense science one after another recently will be applied to further bolstering up the reliable strategic nuclear deterrent of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for Academy of Defense Science of DPRK Issues Statement,” December 14, 2019)
KPA Chief of the General Staff Pak Jong Chon’s statement: “I am very glad that the Academy of Defense Science has recently registered great successes in bolstering up the defense capabilities while successfully conducting tests of great significance one after another. The priceless data, experience and new technologies gained in the recent tests of defense science research will be fully applied to the development of another strategic weapon of the DPRK for definitely and reliably restraining and overpowering the nuclear threat of the U.S. Genuine peace can be safeguarded and our development and future be guaranteed only when the balance of power is completely ensured. We have stored up tremendous power. We should be ready to cope with political and military provocations of the hostile forces and be familiar with both dialogue and confrontation. Our army is fully ready to thoroughly carry out any decision of the Supreme Leader with action. It is free to evaluate the entity of our power, but it will be necessary to see it clearly before judgment. In the situation of the acute confrontation, the U.S. and other hostile forces will spend the year-end in peace only when they hold off any words and deeds rattling us.” (KCNA, “Chief of KPA General Staff Issues Statement,” December 14, 2019)
12/16/19:
The United States has no deadline on nuclear negotiations with North Korea, U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun said today, emphatically offering to meet his counterparts from the North while he is in Seoul. Biegun also stressed that Washington will not give up, as Pyongyang has been threatening to take a “new way” if Washington does not make concessions before the North’s self-imposed year-end deadline. Biegun arrived in Seoul for a three-day visit yesterday amid heightened tensions due to the North’s apparent rocket engine tests that raised concerns that it could launch a long-range rocket if the deadline is not met. “It’s been a long year and we have not made nearly as much progress as we would have hoped. But we will not give up,” Biegun told reporters after meeting with his South Korean counterpart Lee Do-hoon. “Let me be absolutely clear. The U.S. does not have a deadline. We have a goal to fulfill the commitments the two leaders made during their historic summit meeting in Singapore,” he added. He was referring to the first-ever summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore in June last year. At the summit, the leaders agreed to seek to build new bilateral relations, make joint efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the peninsula and work toward the complete denuclearization of the peninsula. Biegun also pointed out his team’s readiness to resume negotiations with the North, saying the U.S. has offered to the North a number of creative ways to proceed with “feasible steps and flexibility” to reach “balanced” agreements. He did not elaborate on these steps, which appeared to have been put forward during his last negotiation with the North in Sweden in October. “I remain confident that all of this is possible. I believe we can do this, but the U.S. cannot do it alone,” he said. “It is time for us to do our jobs. Let’s get this done. We are here and you know how to reach us,” he said. In addition, the U.S. official warned against any provocations by the North. “We are fully aware of the strong potential for North Korea to conduct major provocations in the days ahead. To say the least, such an action will be most unhelpful in achieving the lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula,” he said. “But it does not have to be this way. It is not yet too late. We and the North Koreans have in our hands the ability to choose a better path,” he added. Referring to North Korean officials’ recent statements critical mostly of Seoul and Washington, Biegun called them “hostile, negative and unnecessary.” (Song Sang-ho and Kim Seung-yoon, “Biegun Says U.S. Has No Deadline on Nuke Talks, Offers to Hold Talks with N.K.,” Yonhap, December 16, 2019)
President Donald Trump said. “I’d be disappointed if something would be in the works, and if it is, we’ll take care of it,” Trump told reporters at a meeting with governors at the White House. “We’re watching it very closely.” Trump’s envoy for negotiations with North Korea, Stephen Biegun, has been in Seoul since yesterday and today he publicly offered to meet with the North Koreans during his stay. “It is time for us to do our jobs,” Biegun said while speaking to reporters. “Let’s get this done. We are here and you know how to reach us.” (Lee Haye-ah, “Trump Says U.S. Is Watching N. Korea Closely,” Yonhap, December 17, 2019)
Russia and China proposed partially lifting UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea today in an effort to reinstate a diplomatic process, according to Tass. Ahead of the draft resolution’s release, Russian Ambassador to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya said on December 11 that “sanctions will not substitute for diplomacy. It is impossible to reach an agreement without offering something in return.” Nebenzya’s comments closely echoed those of Lavrov’s at the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference on November 8, where he spoke on Moscow’s and Beijing’s preference for an “action-by-action, step-by-step” approach to North Korean denuclearization. North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui met with Russian officials twice in Moscow in November to discuss “international issues of mutual concern” and shared “views on the situation of the Korean peninsula,” according to statements issued by KCNA. Based on reporting by the South China Morning Post, initial conversations appear to have centered on gaining support for Pyongyang’s preference for reciprocal concessions, trading North Korean steps toward denuclearization for a gradual alleviation of U.S. and UN sanctions, as well as actions to address Pyongyang’s security concerns. According to a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement released after the October meeting, “it is time to start considering the adjustment of the UN Security Council’s sanctions regime” against North Korea. Today’s draft resolution reiterated this call and specifically recommended exempting from sanctions “certain industrial machinery and transportation vehicles which are used for infrastructure construction and cannot be diverted to…nuclear and ballistic missile programs,” among other things. It also urged “further practical steps to reduce military tension on the Korean Peninsula and probability of any military confrontation by all appropriate means, such as, but not limited to, conclusion of agreements between military officials, and adoption of formal declaration and/or a peace treaty for the end of the Korean war.” (Julia Masterson, “North Korea, China, Russia Converge Positions,” Arms Control Today, L, 1 (January/February 2020, p. 33)
12/?/19:
The U.S. Special Operations Command Korea conducted a joint drill with South Korea’s Special Warfare Command forces at Gunsan Air Base in November to practice infiltrating North Korea and capturing its leaders in an emergency. The drill was a regular training event, but Pentagon unprecedentedly released some images from it last week amid growing concerns about a possible North Korean provocation. The images show that they conducted a static line jump from a CH-47 Chinook helicopter and close-quarters battle training. Earlier the U.S. military posted a video clip showing a mock gunfight between combined South Korea-U.S. forces and imaginary North Korean troops, but it was later deleted. (Yang Seung-sik, “S. Korea, U.S. Special Forces Practice Capturing N. Korea Leaders,” Chosun Ilbo, December 23, 2019)
12/17/19:
China and Russia are pushing the U.N. Security Council to lift some sanctions on North Korea to ease the country’s humanitarian concerns and to “break the deadlock” in denuclearization talks between Washington and Pyongyang, China’s U.N. ambassador said today. Yesterday, China and Russia proposed the 15-member council lift a ban on North Korea exporting statues, seafood and textiles, and ease restrictions on infrastructure projects and North Koreans working overseas, according to a draft resolution seen by Reuters. “With regard to the sanctions, that’s also something DPRK has concerns (with) and their concerns are legitimate,” China’s U.N. ambassador, Zhang Jun, told reporters, referring to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. “If you want them to do something you need to accommodate their concerns. That’s the logic behind China and Russia’s initiative.” Asked when the draft resolution could be put to a vote, Zhang said: “Once we feel we have strong support then we will take further action.” Council diplomats met today to discuss the draft text (Michelle Nichols, “China Says Lifting Some UN Sanctions on N. Korea Could Help Break Deadlock,” Reuters, December 17, 2019)
South Korea held a ceremony to mark the operational deployment of F-35A stealth fighters, the Air Force said. The ceremony, which took place at the 17th Fighter Wing base in the central city of Cheongju, was closed to the press in an apparent effort to keep it a low-profile event to avoid angering Pyongyang, which has strongly bristled at the introduction of such state-of-the-art weapons as a sign of hostility. South Korea has so far brought in 13 F-35As, beginning with two in late March, under a plan to deploy 40 fifth-generation jets through 2021. Holding the fielding ceremony means that the military declared initial operating capability for the first batch of the fifth-generation fighters, as they are ready for limited combat deployment. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Won In-choul presided over the indoor ceremony that did not include any flying display by the new fighters. Critics have accused the government of handling the matter in a low-key manner as it minds North Korea too much. (Oh Seok-min, “S. Korea Officially Deploys F-35A Stealth Fighters,” Yonhap, December 17, 2019)
Pacific Air Forces Commander Gen. Charles Brown predicts North Korea will conduct a long-range ballistic missile test in the coming weeks — comments that come after North Korea has warned it would send a “Christmas gift” to the U.S. “What I would expect is some kind of long-range ballistic missile would be the gift,” Brown told reporters Tuesday during a Defense Writers Group breakfast in Washington, D.C. “It’s just a matter of does it come on Christmas Eve, does it come on Christmas Day, does it come after the New Year?” Brown added. (Diana Stancey Correll, “Here’s What PACAF Thinks N. Korea’s ‘Christmas Gift’ to U.S. Will Be,” Air Force Times, December 17, 2019)
12/18/19:
Senators from both parties are seeking to force President Trump’s hand on North Korea, with leading Democrats warning today that his diplomatic outreach is “on the brink of failure” and a bipartisan group pressing for stronger economic sanctions on Kim Jong Un’s regime. The moves illustrate growing alarm on Capitol Hill that the administration’s stalled nuclear talks with Pyongyang could lead to an increase in hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, with Kim promising an unwelcome “Christmas gift” by year’s end. The increasing pressure from lawmakers could put Trump in a difficult spot as his administration has struggled to persuade the North Koreans to reengage and has moved to defuse tensions in recent weeks by limiting joint military drills with South Korea and blocking a U.N. forum on human rights abuses. Despite those gestures, Trump’s top North Korea negotiator, Stephen Biegun, left Seoul empty-handed this week after calling on Pyongyang to resume talks. At a news conference today, a bipartisan group of senators said the time had come to enact stricter “secondary sanctions” approved by Congress that would punish international banks and other entities that do business with North Korea. They called the current international sanctions program “leaky” and said the Kim regime has been able to skirt some of the restrictions and buy time to develop its weapons program. The new sanctions measures are included in the sweeping National Defense Authorization Act being sent to the White House for Trump’s approval this week. “It seems to me the best chance we have in changing the path North Korea is on is with crippling sanctions. The current sanctions regime is not enough,” said Sen. Patrick J. Toomey (R-Pa.), a key architect of the provisions. He was flanked by legislative colleagues as well as Fred and Cindy Warmbier, the parents of Otto Warmbier, a college student who died in 2017, days after being released from 17 months of captivity in North Korea. In a separate action, eight Senate Democrats, including Minority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.), sent Trump a three-page letter today citing “grave and growing concern” at the prospects that the administration’s North Korea policy is headed toward failure. “We are disturbed that almost two years after the Singapore Summit your administration has yet to develop a workable diplomatic process to structure real, serious and sustainable negotiations with North Korea,” the Democrats wrote, referring to Trump’s first meeting with Kim in June 2018. The group supported continued diplomatic outreach to Pyongyang and cautioned against a return to Trump’s “fire and fury” rhetoric toward Pyongyang in 2017. The lawmakers instead called on Trump to pursue a “phased process to verifiably dismantle” key North Korean nuclear weapons production facilities. Pyongyang has called for the United States to lift some economic sanctions in return for a partial dismantlement, but the Trump administration has insisted that the North relinquish its entire program. White House officials declined to comment. The secondary-sanctions legislation calls on the administration to designate entities for sanctions within four to six months of the bill becoming law. The president can waive the sanctions only if he makes a case that they adversely affect U.S. national security, lawmakers said. (David Nakamura, “Senators Press Trump on North Korea Policy,” Washington Post, December 19, 2019, p. A-26)
South Korea and the United States failed to reach an agreement over Seoul’s contribution towards hosting some 28,500 U.S. troops, ending two days of talks that were the last before their existing deal expires on December 31. South Korean lawmakers have said Washington is seeking up to $5 billion (3.90 billion pounds) a year to support the troops — more than five times the amount Seoul agreed to pay this year. But the U.S.’s chief negotiator James DeHart told reporters after Wednesday’s meeting that “($5 billion) is not the number we are currently focusing on in the negotiation,” according to Yonhap News Agency. “We have been coordinating and compromising. But the figure we agree on will be very different from our initial proposal and will also be different from what we are currently hearing from the Korean side,” he added. (Josh Smith, “Seoul, Washington Fail to Agree on Cost of U.S. Troops; U.S. Denies $5 Billion Demand,” Reuters, December 18, 2019)
12/21/19:
DPRK FoMin spokesperson’s “answer to a question put by KCNA on December 21 with regard to the United States’ act of having taken issue over the DPRK’s ‘human rights’: At an interview with VOA on December 19, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor of the U.S. State Department made reckless remarks against the DPRK that the U.S. remains concerned over “human rights situation” in the DPRK and it should “engage to try to get a human rights violator like north Korea to change its behavior,” etc. It is a revelation of the inveterate repugnancy towards our system and a grave political provocation against our state that the U.S. does confront us head-on, taking up the issue of human rights, not satisfied in railroading an anti-DPRK “human rights resolution” at the 74th session of the United Nations General Assembly. Such malicious words which came at this time when the DPRK-U.S. relations are reaching a highly delicate point will only produce a result of further aggravating the already tense situation on the Korean peninsula, like pouring oil over burning fire. The U.S., a cesspit of all sorts of human rights violations including murder, rape, racial discrimination, maltreatment of immigrants, can neither be justified in poking its nose into other’s internal affairs, nor is entitled to do it. Our country is a people-centered socialist state where the entire people fully enjoy genuine freedom and rights, being the masters of the country. Human rights are the state rights and the sovereign rights of country and nation. If the U.S. dares to impair our system by taking issue over ‘human rights issue,’ it will be made to pay dearly for such an act. The Assistant Secretary of the U.S. State Department would be well advised to watch his mouth. A cat is never scared off by a squeaky mouse. We will further consolidate and develop the most superior socialist system of our own style which legally and practically guarantees the human rights of the people.” (KCNA, “Reckless Remarks of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State under Fire,” December 21, 2019)
American military and intelligence officials tracking North Korea’s actions by the hour say they are bracing for an imminent test of an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching American shores, but appear resigned to the fact that President Trump has no good options to stop it. If the North goes ahead with the test in the coming days — Pyongyang promised a “Christmas gift” if no progress had been made on lifting sanctions — it would be a glaring setback for Trump’s boldest foreign policy initiative, even as he faces an impeachment trial at home. Trump often cites the suspension of long-range missile and underground nuclear tests for the past two years as evidence that his leader-to-leader diplomacy with the North was working — and that such negotiating skills would persuade the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, to give up his arsenal. The administration’s argument has now changed. Should Kim resume tests, American officials say, it will be a sign that he truly feels jammed, and has concluded Washington will not lift crushing sanctions on his impoverished nation anytime soon. Left unaddressed, however, is the challenge that a new missile test would represent, and what that would mean for the sanctions strategy. Over the past week, Stephen E. Biegun, the North Korea envoy who was confirmed by the Senate on December 19 as the next deputy secretary of state, has traveled across East Asia to also try to stem new efforts by Russia and China to weaken those sanctions. Military officials say there are no plans to try to destroy a missile on the launchpad, or intercept it in the atmosphere — steps both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama considered, and rejected. It is unclear if the military’s Cyber Command is still trying to sabotage the launches from afar, as it did under the Obama administration, with mixed results. Instead, officials say, if the North resumes its missile tests, the Trump administration will turn to allies and again lobby the United Nations Security Council for tightened sanctions — a strategy that has been tried for two decades. New estimates from a leading authority suggest that Kim has expanded his arsenal substantially since Trump announced on Twitter after Singapore that “there is No Longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea.” Siegfried S. Hecker, the former head of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, says he believes the country has fuel for about 38 warheads — well beyond an earlier low-end estimate that he and other scientists and intelligence analysts had issued. In recent weeks, the North has conducted ground tests of what appear to be new missile engines that Pyongyang said would bolster its “nuclear deterrent,” suggesting that it has little intention of giving up its ability. “I think part of this may be bluff on their part,” John R. Bolton, the former national security adviser, said to NPR two days ago. “They think the president’s desperate for a deal, and if they put an artificial time constraint on it, they may think they’re going to get a better deal. We’ll just have to wait and see.” “But,” he noted, “this is all part of the North Korean playbook.” A new element of the playbook could be that Kim is calculating that impeachment has weakened Trump, making him more desperate for a policy victory. Senior foreign policy officials and military commanders are bracing for perhaps the most serious cycle of crisis yet. “What I would expect is some kind of long-range ballistic missile would be the ‘gift,’ ” Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., the commander of Pacific Air Forces, said December 17. “Does it come on Christmas Eve? Does it come on Christmas Day? Does it come after the new year? One of my responsibilities is to pay attention to that.” The expected North Korean escalation will leave Trump with an unpalatable choice. He could reprise his alarming threats of military action from late 2017, infusing the 2020 election year with a sense of crisis, which could cost him votes — and risk real conflict. Or he could endure the new provocation and double down, betting that greater sanctions could somehow force the North to abandon its decades-long course toward a nuclear-tipped missile capable of striking the continental United States. The recent threats from Kim come as he is preparing for two important political events — a year-end plenary session of the Workers’ Party of Korea and a New Year’s speech. Kim had declared at the start of 2019 that North Korea would not give up a single weapon until the United States lifts sanctions. He then gave Trump a year-end deadline. Now Kim finds himself empty-handed, unable to stride into the party plenum in triumph or deliver a pronouncement of victory on Jan. 1. Backed into a corner, he is trying once again to use his main leverage — the threat of weapons tests or military action — to coerce Trump into sanctions relief, analysts say. “Things have not worked out the way he has anticipated,” said Jean H. Lee, a Korea expert at the Wilson Center. “I suspect that he will keep provoking President Trump to compel him to get back to negotiations, but try to avoid overtly confronting him, because he wants to leave open an opportunity.” Kim could choose to launch a satellite rather than an intercontinental ballistic missile on the bet that might push Trump to loosen sanctions without inciting a violent reaction. Kim could also coax China and Russia into further easing sanctions at the United Nations. Both nations are eager to reassert a leadership role on the North Korea issue. On December 19, Luo Zhaohui, China’s vice minister of foreign affairs, said at a news conference in Beijing that easing sanctions, as China and Russia had proposed on Wednesday at the United Nations, was the “best solution” to “break the deadlock on the peninsula.” Analysts say China does not appear to be forcing all North Korean workers to leave its borders, as it is required by a United Nations resolution. China said it complies with the sanctions resolutions. American officials say Beijing also must stop ship-to-ship transfers carried out by North Korea of energy products. American efforts to maintain a common front against the North may be further complicated next week when President Xi Jinping of China hosts a summit with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan and President Moon Jae-in of South Korea. Trump’s efforts to get the South to cover the full cost of the American troops based there has strained relations between the allies. Trump contemplated attacking North Korea early in his administration, when officials floated the idea of a “bloody nose” strategy intended to signal that Washington would never allow the North to reach the point when it could hold American cities hostage with nuclear weapons. “Military solutions are now fully in place, locked and loaded, should North Korea act unwisely,” Trump in August 2017. More recently, Trump has shown a keen interest in winding down conflicts rather than starting new ones. Trump has also forced out hawkish senior advisers, including Bolton, who once argued for a pre-emptive strike on North Korea. Trump has essentially shrugged off the 13 short-range missile or rocket tests that North Korea has conducted since May. An intercontinental missile launch would be more difficult to ignore, though, and it is unclear how he might respond, especially if such a test intensifies criticism that Kim has manipulated him. Thus far, Trump is showing little appetite for a return to the “fire and fury” tensions of two years ago. “I have a very good relationship with Kim Jong-un,” Trump told reporters at the White House this month before adding, in what could prove to be wishful thinking, “I think we both want to keep it that way.” (David E. Sanger, Edward Wong and Michael Crowley, “New Missile Test Brews as Trump Failed to Kim,” New York Times, December 22, 2019, p. 1)
12/22/19:
KCNA: “The Third Enlarged Meeting of the Seventh Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) took place. The meeting was guided by Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the WPK. At the meeting Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un gave analysis and briefing on the complicated internal and external situation and said that the meeting would decide on important organizational and political measures and military steps to bolster up the overall armed forces of the country including the People’s Army militarily and politically as required by the fast-changing situation and crucial time of the developing Korean revolution and deal with an organizational matter. The meeting discussed and decided organizational and structural measures to more thoroughly realize and ensure the Party guidance over the overall armed forces of the country. Also discussed were important issues for decisive improvement of the overall national defense and core matters for the sustained and accelerated development of military capability for self-defense. The meeting gave a comprehensive analysis of work at units and fields at all levels of the People’s Army, referred to an issue of rectifying irrational structure and defects in machinery and some shortcomings in other military and political activities and reiterated and set forth from a new angle sectional tasks for beefing up the country’s defense capacity through strict implementation of the Party’s military line and policies. It decided on important military issues and measures for organizing or expanding and reorganizing new units in conformity with the Party’s military and strategic intention, changing the affiliation of some units and changing deployment of units. The enlarged meeting recalled and by-elected some members of the Party Central Military Commission. It dealt with the organizational matter such as disestablishing, transferring and appointing some commanding officers of the armed forces organ and corps commanders. Referring to merits and demerits in the recent work of the People’s Army and matters to be rapidly overcome, the Supreme Leader indicated in detail the direction and ways to be maintained as a main task in the future army-building and military and political activities. He expressed the expectation and conviction that all the commanding officers would fully discharge their sacred mission and duty for the times and the revolution. Attending the enlarged meeting were members of the WPK Central Military Commission, commanding officers of the services and corps of the Korean People’s Army, commanding officers of the General Political Bureau, the General Staff and the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces, commanding officers of the Ministry of People’s Security, the Ministry of State Security, the Escort Headquarters and other armed forces organs at all levels and vice directors of the Organizational Leadership Department of the WPK Central Committee.” (KCNA, “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Combined Meeting of WPK, CMC,” December 22, 2019)
12/23/19:
South Korea will provide some 2 billion won (US$1.72 million) to the Korean Red Cross to help North Korean villages still reeling from the aftermath of typhoons that lashed the impoverished nation last summer, the unification ministry said. The Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council approved the expenditure plan to provide the money to help North Korea repair typhoon-hit facilities in Pyongan and Hamgyong provinces and conduct drills to beef up North Koreans’ disaster preparedness, according to the ministry. Of the total, 807 million won will be spent on boosting the North’s disaster control ability, while another 544 million won will be spent on providing safe water to North Koreans and improving the overall sanitation status. The other 654 million won has been set aside for public health activities, it said. “The government will support the Korean Red Cross’ humanitarian activities in North Korea and continue to seek inter-Korean cooperation in disaster responses,” the ministry said in a release. Still, it is unclear whether the North will accept the aid amid chilled relations across the border. (Yonhap, “S. Korea to Contribute 2 Bln Won to Help N. Korea Restore Typhoon-Hit Regions,” December 23, 2019)
With the clock ticking on North Korea’s “end-of-the-year deadline,” and its threat to go down a “new path,” South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Chinese President Xi Jinping met for an in-depth discussion of how to work together to prevent a crisis on the Korean Peninsula and to maintain the impetus for dialogue. Particularly notable is South Korea’s first expression of support for the draft resolution that China and Russia recently submitted to the UN Security Council, calling for the relaxation of sanctions on North Korea. While noting that Moon and Xi had discussed the draft resolution, a senior official at the Blue House described the South Korean position as follows: “Various international efforts need to be made given the extreme gravity of the current security situation on the Korean Peninsula.” While the US expressed its opposition to the draft, describing it as “premature,” the South Korean government appears to have concluded that a partial relaxation of sanctions is necessary to contain the current danger and to preserve the momentum for dialogue. “This can be interpreted as the president expressing his belief that the sanctions on North Korea should be partially adjusted in order to preserve momentum for dialogue, given his belief that, if we miss this opportunity, we’ll face a crisis that would be difficult to reverse,” said Lee Hui-ok, director of the Sungkyun Institute of China Studies. Lee suggested that some sanctions could be reversed using a “snapback” condition, in which the sanctions would be reinstated if North Korea fails to move forward with denuclearization. The South Korean government apparently expressed this position to the U.S. and sought its understanding during Deputy Director of State Stephen Biegun’s recent visit to South Korea. “The South Korean government’s position has been that sanctions would need to be relaxed or adjusted at some point, if only to create an impetus for the North Korea-US negotiations. This position was adequately communicated during Biegun’s recent visit to South Korea, and the US understands our position,” a South Korean diplomat said. A substantial portion of the discussion between Moon and Xi ― which lasted for two hours and 15 minutes, including the summit and a work luncheon ― was devoted to Korean Peninsula affairs. “The recent circumstances, including the suspension of dialogue between North Korea and the US and the rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula, are not beneficial for North Korea, not to mention South Korea or China,” Moon said, while asking China to take action to ensure that North Korea doesn’t walk away from the negotiations. Blue House Spokesperson Ko Min-jung quoted Xi as saying that “Our two countries have had more in common in our positions on Korean Peninsula affairs since President Moon took office.” That was echoed by a report in China’s state-run Xinhua News, which quoted Xi as saying that “China and South Korea’s positions and interests in relation to Korean Peninsula issues coincide.” (Park Min-hee, “Moon, Xi Discusses Ways to Promote N. Korea-U.S. Dialogue,” Hankyore, December 24, 2019)
12/24/19:
President Donald Trump brushed off North Korea’s warning of a “Christmas gift,” saying “We’ll find out what the surprise is and we’ll deal with it very successfully.” Trump told reporters at his Mar-a-Lago resort, “We’ll see what happens.” “Maybe it’s a nice present,” he quipped. “Maybe it’s a present where he sends me a beautiful vase as opposed to a missile test.” China, North Korea’s most important backer, meanwhile, urged Washington to take “concrete steps” as soon as possible to implement agreements reached during last year’s summit between Trump and North Korea leader Kim Jong Un in Singapore. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in comments relayed on Twitter by the foreign ministry in Beijing, called on North Korea and the United States to work out “a feasible roadmap for establishing a permanent peace regime & realizing complete denuclearization on the (Korean) Peninsula.” (Alexandra Alper, “U.S. Ready to Deal with Any North Korean ‘Christmas Gift’ — Trump,” Reuters, December 24, 2019)
12/26/19:
A U.S. Army base in South Korea accidentally blasted an emergency siren tonight instead of the somber notes of taps, officials said, igniting brief panic on the base amid North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s threats of an unwelcome “Christmas gift.” Taps, the melancholy bugler’s song played at military funerals, was supposed to be sounded on Camp Casey’s announcement system at 10 p.m., as is custom at Army installations to mark the end of the day, said Army Lt. Col. Martyn Crighton, a spokesman for the 2nd Infantry Division. But Crighton said “human error” instead prompted the sounds of an emergency siren wafting through the freezing air throughout Camp Casey, the closest U.S. Army base to the North Korean border — and a likely prime target for missile strikes in the event of an attack. The mistake bewildered service members on base, who said in a Reddit thread posted soon after the incident that soldiers were “riled up,” and some ran through the halls in full uniform before the error was realized. A short time after that, U.S. Army WTF! moments, a popular digital hangout for soldiers, posted a video it said it received from a soldier at Camp Casey. Crighton said he couldn’t confirm the video was from today. The siren heard is commonly called an air raid siren. That is one function among others to generally warn soldiers to begin “alert procedures,” he said. Soldiers were “immediately” notified of the mistake, and control measures were put in place to ensure it is not repeated, Crighton said, though he did not say how much time passed between the false alarm and notification of the mistake. Although it is unclear how the incident occurred, it appears similar to a 2018 incident in Hawaii, when an operator at the emergency management agency accidentally alerted the state that a nuclear missile strike was imminent. Like that moment, the botched alert in South Korea came at precisely the wrong time. (Alex Horton, “A U.S. Base Near North Korea Accidentally Blared an Emergency Siren — Instead of Taps,” Washington Post, December 27, 2019)
12/27/19:
After receiving word in 2014 that two Japanese men who had disappeared in the late 1970s were alive and living in North Korea, the Japanese government decided not to release the information due to fears that the public would react negatively, sources with knowledge of the matter said Thursday. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo is said to have signed off on a decision by a senior official not to disclose that Tanaka Minoru, who the government officially lists as abducted by North Korean agents, and Kaneda Tatsumitsu, who is suspected of having also been taken, were found to have been living in Pyongyang. is said to have told Japan that both men were married and had fathered children since arriving in the country, and that they had no intention of returning. The senior official decided that the information was incompatible with Japan’s demand for North Korea to return all abductees, and that disclosing it would prompt a negative response from the public. Under an agreement signed in May 2014 in Stockholm, Pyongyang agreed to conduct a comprehensive survey of Japanese abductees in North Korea in return for Tokyo lifting some of its sanctions against the country. The probe, however, yielded few results, and bilateral relations soon soured as North Korea restarted its nuclear and missile tests. In 2016, North Korea disbanded a special committee tasked with looking into the whereabouts of the missing Japanese nationals. Tanaka disappeared after boarding a plane for Vienna at Narita Airport in June 1978. He was 28 at the time. In a report published in a monthly magazine in 1996, a man claiming to be a former North Korean agent said that the owner of the ramen shop where Tanaka had worked, who was also secretly an operative, lured him to the Austrian capital and had him taken away. In 2005, the Japanese government included Tanaka on the list of 17 people confirmed to have been abducted in the late 1970s and 1980s, five of whom were repatriated in 2002. Around November 1979, Kaneda, an ethnic Korean who was working at the same ramen shop, disappeared after telling people that he was heading to Tokyo to meet with Tanaka, according to his acquaintances. That summer, he had received a letter from someone claiming to be Tanaka encouraging him to come to Austria. There are no records of Kaneda, who was 26 at the time, leaving the country. The Japanese government has listed him as one of more than 800 people that are suspected to have been abducted by North Korea. (Kyodo, “Abe Approved Decision Not to Reveal Pair Were Alive in North Korea, Sources Say,” Japan Times, December 27, 2019)
South Korea’s Constitutional Court rejected a petition seeking the repeal of a 2015 deal with Japan settling a bitter dispute over Korean women enslaved for sex by the Japanese military during World War II. A decision to spike the largely stalled deal could have complicated efforts by the two countries to resolve separate thorny trade and history disputes, which recently plunged their ties to the lowest point in decades. Today’s ruling was in response to a petition by former sex slaves and their families who say the deal, which was made without their consent, undermined their dignity and infringed on their rights to participate in negotiations and seek fuller Japanese government compensation. In a unanimous decision, the nine-judge panel ruled that the deal was a non-binding political agreement that didn’t affect the victims’ legal rights, such as the ability to seek official Japanese compensation. It said the agreement did not receive parliamentary approval or Cabinet council deliberations in either country, necessary steps to make it a treaty. The court also said the deal was vague on the detailed steps required of each country and the consequences they would face if they failed to implement them. The ruling is final and cannot be appealed, court officials said. A total of 240 women in South Korea have come forward and registered themselves with the government as former sex slaves. But only 20 of them, aged about 91 on average, are still alive, according to their support group. Under the 2015 deal, Japan offered a new apology over the wartime slavery and pledged to finance a Seoul-based foundation to support former Korean sex slaves. In return, South Korea agreed to stop criticizing Japan on the issue on the world stage and to try to resolve Japanese grievances over a life-size statue of a girl representing a former sex slave that sits in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. (Hyung-Jin Kim, “S. Korea Court Rejects Attempt to Repeal Sex Slave Deal,” Associated Press, December 27, 2019)
12/28/19:
KCNA: “The 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea was convened here on Saturday, according to a decision of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the C.C., WPK. Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, guided the plenary meeting. Attending the meeting were members and alternate members of the C.C., WPK and members of the Central Auditing Commission of the WPK. Present as observers were officials of the WPK Central Committee, officials of ministries and national institutions, chairpersons of the provincial people’s committees, chairpersons of the provincial rural economy committees, chairpersons of the city and county party committees and officials of major fields and units and the armed forces organs. The WPK convened the plenary meeting in order to overcome the manifold and harsh trials and difficulties and further accelerate the development of the revolution with transparent anti-imperialist independent stand and firm will and to discuss important matters arising in the party building and activities and in the building of the state and national defense. Kim Jong Un appeared in the venue of the meeting to guide it. Kim Jong Un presided over the meeting upon the authorization of the Political Bureau of the C.C., WPK. The immediate orientation of the struggle of the WPK and the state and important policy issues for new victory in our revolution under the present situation were brought up as agendas of the plenary meeting. Kim Jong Un started to make a report on the work of the Central Committee of the WPK and the overall state affairs. The plenary meeting goes on.” (KCNA, “First Day Sessions of 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK Held,” December 29, 2019)
12/29/19:
KCNA: “The second-day session of the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea continued on Dec. 29. Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, continued his report on the work of the Party Central Committee and the overall state affairs. He comprehensively and anatomically analyzed the problems arising in the overall state building including the state management and economic construction in the present time. He put forward in detail the orientation of the struggle for bringing about a decisive turn in the development of the country’s economy and people’s standard of living as required by the Korean revolution and the building of a powerful socialist country and its practical ways. He stressed the need to reasonably straighten the country’s economic work system and order and establish a strong discipline and presented the tasks for urgently correcting the grave situation of the major industrial sectors of the national economy. He underscored the importance to take practical measures for further strengthening the independent economy of the country. Referring to the necessity to decisively increase the agricultural production, he put forward the important issues for bringing about a new turn in all sectors of agriculture. He indicated tasks and ways for improving science, education and public health including the issue of strengthening the political guidance over the scientific research and the issue of cementing the material and technical foundations in the sectors of education and public health. He called for dynamically waging the campaign for increased production and economization and better quality and taking thorough measures for protecting ecological environment and preventing natural disasters. Emphasizing the need to take positive and offensive measures for fully ensuring the sovereignty and security of the country as required by the present situation, he indicated the duties of the fields of foreign affairs, munitions industry and armed forces of the DPRK. He stressed again the issues of intensively struggling against anti-socialism and non-socialism, strengthening the work of the working people’s organizations and tightening the moral discipline throughout society. The plenary meeting goes on.” (KCNA, “Second Day Sessions of 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK Held,” December 30, 2019)
12/30/19:
KCNA: “The third-day session of the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea was held on December 30. Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, continued his report. In his report, Kim Jong Un raised the principled issues arising in strengthening the Party and enhancing the role of cadres. He referred to the tasks and ways in detail for further consolidating the Party organizationally and ideologically as required by the developing revolution, remarkably fostering its leadership ability as the General Staff of the revolution and developing the party into a militant party full of vitality and vigor. He stressed the need for officials to unconditionally and thoroughly carry out the idea of the Party’s guidance and make selfless, devoted efforts for the people. He made a comprehensive report on the work of the Central Committee of the WPK, state building, economic development and building of the armed forces for seven hours at the plenary meeting. He in his historic report comprehensively raised the issues arising in the overall Party and state works and clarified the orientation and ways to resolve them. They included the issue of straightening the economic work system and order, the task of major industrial sectors of the national economy and the issues of decisively increasing the agricultural production, promoting science, education and public health, dynamically conducting the campaign for increased production, economization and quality improvement, taking strict measures for protecting ecological environment and preventing natural disasters, preparing positive and offensive political, diplomatic and military countermeasures for firmly preserving the sovereignty and security of the country, intensifying the combat against anti-socialist and non-socialist acts, boosting the work of working people’s organizations, establishing moral discipline throughout the society, strengthening the Party and steadily raising its leadership ability and enhancing the role of cadres. Noting that the Workers’ Party of Korea has determined another arduous and protracted struggle for the final victory of the revolution and wellbeing of our great people, he concluded his report with calls for dynamically opening the road of victorious advance towards the materialization of the ambition and ideal to build a powerful socialist nation. The plenary meeting entered into the study of the draft resolution of relevant agenda as well as an important document to be discussed as next agenda. The plenary meeting continues.” (KCNA, “Third-Day Sessions of 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK Held,” December 31, 2019)
1/1/20:
KCNA: “The 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea was held at the headquarters building of the WPK Central Committee from December 28 to 31, Juche 108 (2019). Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, guided the plenary meeting. Attending the meeting were members and alternate members of the C.C., WPK and members of the Central Auditing Commission of the WPK. Present as observers were officials of the WPK Central Committee, officials of ministries and national institutions, chairpersons of the provincial people’s committees, chairpersons of the provincial rural economy committees, chairpersons of the city and county party committees and officials of major fields and units and the armed forces organs. Kim Jong Un presided over the meeting upon authorization of the Political Bureau of the C.C., WPK. The plenary meeting dealt with the following agenda items: On the orientation of our immediate struggle under the present internal and external situation On an organizational matter On modifying and supplementing the collection of the slogans set forth by the Party Central Committee On celebrating the 75th founding anniversary of the WPK with splendor. The first agenda was discussed. Kim Jong Un made a report on the first agenda. Saying that the period of the past eight months since the 4th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the WPK was a continuity of great intensified struggle and courageous advance, he referred to the fact that the WPK has always established and maintained correct internal and external political lines centered on the urgent demand, rights and interests of our people and the sovereignty and security of the state and has constantly struggled for them. He noted that the Party Central Committee convened the present plenary meeting for the purport of comprehensively and deeply analyzing and assessing the subjective and objective obstacles and difficulties faced in the course of the great and dynamic advance of our revolution and of taking a decisive measure for further promoting the socialist construction. Kim Jong Un advanced the revolutionary line on launching an offensive for frontal breakthrough as required by the present situation and the developing revolution. Noting that our Juche-based might with self-sufficiency and self-reliance as the motive power has been further strengthened in the tense struggle for carrying out the decision of the 4th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the WPK, he referred to the fact that our state and people greatly demonstrated the strong spirit and tremendous potentiality while proudly advancing and leaping in the difficult situation true to the appeal of the Party to open up a great period of surge in the socialist construction under the uplifted banner of self-reliance. He said that the challenges faced by us for the past several months were harsh and dangerous, which others would not withstand even a single day but give up, but no difficulties can ever stop or delay the rush of our people advancing as an integral whole, undaunted by whatever hardships. He added that great successes have ceaselessly been made in bolstering up the strength of the state and in increasing defense capabilities. He noted that the huge and complicated work of developing the ultra-modern weapon system possessed only by the countries with advanced defense science and technology presupposed our own innovative solution in terms of the scientific and technical aspect without anyone’s help, and all the research tasks were perfectly carried out by the driving force, i.e. our reliable scientists, designers and workers in the field of the munitions industry. This means a great victory, and our possession of promising strategic weapon system planned by the Party one by one serves as a great event in developing the armed forces of the Republic and defending and guaranteeing our sovereignty and right to existence, he noted. He stressed that such a leap in developing the ultra-modern national defense science would make our great military and technical power irreversible, greatly promote the increase of our great national power, raise the power of putting the political situation around us under control and give the enemies the blow of big uneasiness and horror. In the future, the more the U.S. stalls for time and hesitates in the settlement of the DPRK-U.S. relations, the more helpless it will find itself before the might of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea getting stronger beyond prediction and the deeper it will fall into an impasse, he noted. He referred to a series of successes achieved in the economic construction. Analyzing the trend of the prevailing present situation, he said the U.S. real intention is to seek its own political and diplomatic interests while wasting time away under the signboard of dialogue and negotiations and at the same time keep sanctions upon the latter so as to weaken the latter. He stressed that we further hardened our resolution never to barter the security and dignity of the state and the safety of its future for anything else. He said that the stalemate between the DPRK and the U.S. cannot but assume protracted nature as the U.S. is raising demands contrary to the fundamental interests of our state and is adopting brigandish attitude. He added that recently the U.S. is talking about continued dialogue while peddling the issue of the resumption of the dialogue here and there but this is just aimed to pass without trouble the year-end time-limit set by us and stall for the time for evading a lethal attack as it now finds itself in a tight corner, not out of the intention to withdraw the hostile policy toward the DPRK and solve issues through improved relations. On the other hand, the U.S. has openly revealed its provocative political, military and economic maneuvers to completely strangle and stifle the DPRK. This is the double-dealing behavior of the brigandish U.S., he added. He said that we will never allow the impudent U.S. to abuse the DPRK-U.S. dialogue for meeting its sordid aim but will shift to a shocking actual action to make it pay for the pains sustained by our people so far and for the development so far restrained. He continued: It is true that we urgently need external environment favorable for the economic construction but we can never sell our dignity which we have so far defended as valuable as our own life, in hope for brilliant transformation. The DPRK-U.S. stand-off which has lasted century after century has now been compressed to clear stand-off between self-reliance and sanctions. If there were not the nuclear issue, the U.S. would find fault with us under other issue, and the U.S. military and political threats would not end. The present situation warning of long confrontation with the U.S. urgently requires us to make it a fait accompli that we have to live under the sanctions by the hostile forces in the future, too, and to strengthen the internal power from all aspects. He said there are not a few problems that need to be set right in state management, economy and other fields from the viewpoint of strengthening our might. He analyzed the present situation including state management and economic performance which are insufficient for pulling and spurring the great cause of self-reliance and self-development and which fail to bring about a bold renovation but stay stagnant. The victory of the revolution is inevitable but it is not achieved without any difficulties and hardships, he said, and continues: If we do not put spur to the struggle for bolstering the power for self-development while waiting for the lift of sanctions, the enemies’ reactionary offensive will get fiercer to check our advance. The more we bolster our own strength and create valuable wealth on the strength of self-reliance and self-sufficiency, the deeper the enemies will be driven into greater agony and the earlier the day of the victory of socialism will come. All the Party organizations and officials have to shoulder upon themselves the important duties entrusted to them by the times and turn out in the offensive for frontal breakthrough to foil the enemies’ sanctions and blockade by dint of self-reliance. “Let Us Break through Head-on All the Barriers to Our Advance!” — this is the fighting slogan the entire Party and all the people should put up today. The key front in the offensive for frontal breakthrough today is economic front, he said, setting forth it as an immediate task for the economic field at present to rearrange the economic foundation of the country and fully tap all the possible production potential and to fully meet the demand needed for the economic development and people’s life. He advanced important tasks for putting in order the economic work system and order. He set forth the fundamental ways for strengthening the Cabinet responsibility system, Cabinet center system as the Cabinet is the nucleus of the state economic work system. He advanced crucial issues in finding out the correct way for improving the planning to meet the actual requirements, keeping the overall balance between production and supply and decisively raising the confidence of the national economic plan. Emphasizing that the Cabinet work is precisely the work of the Party Central Committee and the execution of the decision of the Party Central Committee is the Cabinet work, he made an anatomical analysis of the serious issues that need urgent solution in strengthening the state unified guidance and management of the economic work after the plenary meeting. After setting forth the innovative measures and detailed plans for adjusting the overall state machinery to spur the economic development and to enhance the role of officials, he specified realistic ways for pushing forward the improvement of economic management based on them. He specified the orientation of solving crucial issues for economic growth which should be pushed forward by the whole Party and state. He set forth tasks faced by the major industrial sectors of the national economy. He made the overall analysis of the evil practices and stagnation found in metal, chemical, power, coal, machine and building materials industrial fields, railway transport and light industrial field, and set forth one by one scientific and substantial measures to bring about a giant stride forward in the economic work. He said that we have to correctly set up index-wise plans of ten long-term goals through scientific calculation to develop the country’s economy on a stable and long-term basis and consolidate one by one the economic foundation of the country through the struggle to carry them out. He stressed the need to drastically increase the agricultural production. He called for improving science, education and public health. The inexhaustible strategic asset which we should rely on today is science and technology, he said, stressing that science and technology should become the light that brightens the way ahead and pioneer the development at a time like now when there are manifold hardships in the economic work. He set forth the tasks and ways for fundamentally improving the education of the country as required by the era of the revolution in education. Kim Jong Un set forth the important matters arising in the work for our socialist public health system, best in the world, provided by President Kim Il Sung and Chairman Kim Jong Il to preserve its original character and intensify the material and technological foundation of public health and train all the medical workers as loyal health workers of the WPK with great human love and high medical qualifications. He called for dynamically conducting the movement for increased production, ensuring economy and raising quality and protecting ecological environment and taking thorough-going measures for preventing natural disasters. He called for guaranteeing the offensive for frontal breakthrough politically, diplomatically and militarily. There have to be powerful political, diplomatic and military guarantee for sure victory in the offensive for frontal breakthrough to brave unprecedented harsh challenge and difficulties, he said, and advanced the policy for strengthening the diplomatic front under the prevailing situation. With comprehensive and deep analysis of the stern situation created on the Korean peninsula and complicated structure of the current international relations, he set forth important tasks of taking offensive measures to reliably ensure the sovereignty and security of our state. He said that the U.S. labeled our state as its enemy, “axis of evil” and “target of its preemptive nuclear strike” and applied the most brutal and inhuman sanctions against and posed the persistent nuclear threat to the latter over the past seven decades, and the current situation on the Korean peninsula is getting more dangerous and reaching serious phase, owing to the former’s hostile policy towards the latter. In the past two years alone when the DPRK took preemptive and crucial measures of halting its nuclear test and ICBM test-fire and shutting down the nuclear-test ground for building confidence between the DPRK and the U.S., the U.S., far from responding to the former with appropriate measures, conducted tens of big and small joint military drills which its president personally promised to stop and threatened the former militarily through the shipment of ultra-modern warfare equipment into south Korea, he said. The U.S. also took more than ten independent sanctions measures only to show before the world once again that it remained unchanged in its ambition to stifle the former, he said. He stressed that under such condition, there is no ground for us to get unilaterally bound to the commitment any longer, the commitment to which there is no opposite party, and this is chilling our efforts for worldwide nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Saying that the prevailing situation goes to prove that the road of defending ourselves by bolstering up our power sufficiently enough to keep the hostile forces at bay so that they would not dare provoke our sovereignty and security as already clarified by us is the one to be covered by us without any halt and hesitation, he clarified the policy of the WPK towards the U.S. Noting that it is the WPK’s firm goal of building national defense to possess the matchless military muscle and steadily bolster it, he stressed that it is the core design in building defense power and firm will of the WPK to make any force dare not to use its armed force against us. Saying that we should more actively push forward the project for developing strategic weapons, he confirmed that the world will witness a new strategic weapon to be possessed by the DPRK in the near future, declaring that we cannot give up the security of our future just for the visible economic results and happiness and comfort in reality now that hostile acts and nuclear threat against us are increasing and nothing has changed between the days when we maintained the line of simultaneously pushing forward the economic construction and the building of nuclear force and now when we struggle to direct our efforts to the economic construction owing to the U.S. gangster-like acts. He solemnly declared that there is no need to hesitate with any expectation of the U.S. lift of sanctions even now that we had close look into the real intention of the U.S., adding if the U.S. persists in its hostile policy towards the DPRK, there will never be the denuclearization on the Korean peninsula and the DPRK will steadily develop necessary and prerequisite strategic weapons for the security of the state until the U.S. rolls back its hostile policy towards the DPRK and lasting and durable peace-keeping mechanism is built. He said that we will reliably put on constant alert the powerful nuclear deterrent capable of containing the nuclear threats from the U.S. and guaranteeing our long-term security, noting that the scope and depth of bolstering our deterrent will be properly coordinated depending on the U.S. future attitude to the DPRK. He noted that our development of absolute weapons possessed by big powers is the great success but the big contingent of promising talents of science and technology in this course is more valuable result dear to the WPK. He said that the field of scientific researches for national defense and the field of munitions industry should implement the WPK’s line of building national defense with loyalty and perfectly under the uplifted slogan of Higher and Faster in order to attain the already-set stage goals while maintaining the principle of self-reliance and Juche from A to Z. He called on the officials and scientists in the field of munitions industry to strive hard for the sacred activities for bolstering up national defense capabilities in every way with invariable loyalty to the Party and revolution in the spirit and mettle with which they developed the nuclear war deterrent through three-year arduous struggle. He tabled the issues of conducting an intensive party-wide, nationwide and society-wide struggle against anti-socialist and non-socialist deeds and strengthening the work of the working people’s organizations and tightening the moral discipline throughout society. He mentioned about the need to strengthen the Party, the General Staff of the revolution, and markedly raise its leadership role. He proposed principled matters and practical measures for further strengthening the Party organizationally and ideologically and heightening the role of cadres as required by the era and the developing revolution. Saying that our revolution is dynamically advancing but the hostile forces’ challenge to it gets more persistent, and current difficulties are never easy to deal with, he stressed that the WPK decided to wage another arduous and prolonged struggle in order to win the final victory of the revolution and make our great people lead a good life. Saying that whether we will emerge victorious or not at the crossroads of the destiny of socialism only depends on the united might of the Party and its guiding role, he stressed that the WPK will firmly keep standing to steadily deal serious strikes at the U.S. and its followers and always share joy and sorrow with our people. Saying that our people learned a way of self-sustenance, way of defeating enemy and overcoming difficulties and way of defending their dignity and right in the prolonged and harsh environment unknown by history, he clarified that it is our firm revolutionary faith to defend the country’s dignity and defeat imperialism through self-prosperity even though we tighten our belts. Confirming that if we continue to make a dynamic struggle with the indomitable revolutionary faith, ardent patriotism and indefatigable struggle spirit, we will overcome every difficulty and greet the day of fresh victory when the song “We Are the Happiest in the World” becomes the real life of the whole people, he ardently appealed to all to break through head-on the grave difficulty faced in the revolution, and dynamically open a road of advance of victory to become a pioneer and standard-bearer in the current glorious struggle for realizing the aspiration and ideal of building a powerful socialist country. Then, written speeches on the first agenda were presented at the plenary meeting. The speakers fully supported and approved of the WPK Chairman’s outstanding idea and strategy of making frontal breakthrough and the program for their materialization that call for accomplishing earlier the great cause of self-prosperity despite all challenges and difficulties in the way of advance in the socialist construction. They made solemn pledges before the plenary meeting to uphold with proud practices the idea and intention of frontal breakthrough set forth by the Party Central Committee. The plenary meeting had an in-depth and positive study and discussion of a draft resolution on the first agenda and adopted it with unanimous approval. The resolution carries the following decisions: First, we will rearrange the economic foundation of the country and enlist all possible production potentiality to fully meet the demand for economic development and people’s living. Second, we will attach importance to science and technology and improve the education and healthcare representing the image of the socialist system. Third, we will protect the ecological environment and set up the national crisis control system against natural disasters. Fourth, we will guarantee the victory in the offensive for frontal breakthrough through powerful political, diplomatic and military offensive. Fifth, we will intensify the struggle against anti-socialist and non-socialist deeds and tighten moral discipline, and the working people’s organizations will scrupulously carry out the ideological education. Sixth, we will strengthen the Party, the General Staff of the revolution, and radically enhance its leadership role. Seventh, officials, leading members of the revolution, will make strenuous efforts to fulfill their responsibility and duty before the Party, the revolution and the people in the offensive for frontal breakthrough to overcome difficulties in the advance of the socialist construction. Eighth, Party organizations and political organs at all levels will meticulously conduct the organizational and political work to implement the resolution, and relevant organs like the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly and the Cabinet take practical measures for thoroughly carrying out the tasks set forth in the resolution. The plenary meeting discussed the organizational matter, the second agenda. Members and alternate members of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee were recalled or by-elected. Ri Il Hwan, Ri Pyong Chol and Kim Tok Hun were by-elected as members of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee. Kim Jong Gwan, Pak Jong Chon, Kim Hyong Jun, Ho Chol Man, Ri Ho Rim and Kim Il Chol were by-elected as alternate members of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee. Vice-chairmen of the Party Central Committee were dismissed or elected. Ri Il Hwan, Kim Hyong Jun, Ri Pyong Chol and Kim Tok Hun were elected as vice-chairmen of the Party Central Committee. Members and alternate members of the Party Central Committee were recalled or by-elected. Alternate members of the Party Central Committee Kim Hyong Jun, Han Kwang Sang, Kang Jong Gwan, Kim Kwang Chol, Kim Kyong Jun, Yang Sung Ho, Kwak Chang Sik, Pak Kwang Ju, Pak Myong Su, Ri Pong Chun and Song Sok Won were by-elected as members of the Party Central Committee and Ho Chol Man, Ri Ho Rim, O Il Jong, Kim Yong Hwan, Kim Il Chol, Kim Jong Ho, Son Yong Hun, Rim Kwang Il and Choe Sang Gon directly as members of the Party Central Committee. Jang Kwang Myong, Jon Hyon Chol, Sim Hong Bin, Ri Thae Il, Choe Kwang Il, Ri Wan Sik, Ri Yong Chol, Choe Chun Gil, Kim Hak Chol, Kim Chol, Pak Jong Gun, Jon Hak Chol, Jo Yong Dok, Sin Yong Chol, Kim Sung Jin, Mun Jong Ung, Ri Jong Gil, Choe Song Nam, Jon Hyong Gil, Kang Son, Kim Yong Bae, Kim Ki Ryong, Sin Hong Chol and Kim Yong Nam were by-elected as alternate members of the Party Central Committee. The chairman of the Inspection Commission of the Party Central Committee was elected and its members were recalled or by-elected. Ri Sang Won was elected as chairman of the Inspection Commission of the Party Central Committee. Directors of some departments of the Party Central Committee were dismissed or appointed. Ri Il Hwan, Kim Hyong Jun, Choe Hwi, Ri Pyong Chol, Kim Tok Hun, Choe Pu Il, Ho Chol Man, Ri Ho Rim, Han Kwang Sang and O Il Jong were appointed as department directors of the Party Central Committee. First vice-department directors of the Party Central Committee were appointed. Kim Tong Il, Ri Yong Gil, Kim Yo Jong and Ri Yong Sik were appointed as first vice-department directors of the Party Central Committee. Chairmen of the provincial Party committees were dismissed or appointed. Kim Yong Hwan was appointed as the chairman of the Ryanggang Provincial Party Committee. Cadres of state organs were dismissed or appointed. Kim Il Chol was appointed as vice premier of the Cabinet and concurrently chairman of the State Planning Commission, Jon Hak Chol as minister of Coal Industry, Jon Myong Sik as minister of Culture and Kim Sung Jin as president of the State Academy of Sciences. The plenary meeting discussed and decided the third agenda on the issue of modifying and supplementing the collection of slogans set forth by the Party Central Committee. The plenary meeting discussed the issue of splendidly celebrating the 75th founding anniversary of the WPK as the fourth agenda, and adopted a relevant decision. Concluding the plenary meeting, Kim Jong Un mentioned the significance and importance of the plenary meeting in making frontal breakthrough under the prevailing situation and bringing about a new surge in our revolution. He clarified that the basic idea, the basic spirit of the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the WPK is to conduct the offensive for frontal breakthrough, not to wait for the situation to turn better. In other words, we should never dream that the U.S. and the hostile forces would leave us alone to live in peace, but we should make frontal breakthrough with the might of self-reliance to tide over the difficulties lying in the way of advancing the socialist construction, he said. He said that we should not look for the way of getting ourselves adapted to the objective elements to be controlled by them in the current struggle, but should make a frontal breakthrough to put the objective elements under our control. He noted that it is necessary to hold effective party-wide discussion for the implementation of the tasks set forth in the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the WPK. He underlined the need to set up a concrete plan and adopt proper methodology for carrying out the Party policies and take substantial measures. He stressed that in order to carry on the revolution, revolutionaries must regard the worthy trust from our people as the whole of their lives, and earnestly called on them to become diligent and devoted servants working heart and soul for our excellent people. Kim Jong Un had a photo session with members of the Party central leadership organ at the significant place where the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the WPK was held.” (KCNA, “Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK,” January 1, 2020)
Kim conducted a major personnel change that replaced nearly all of his economic and foreign policy leadership. According to the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), one of South Korea’s leading government think tanks under the National Intelligence Service, Ri Su-yong, a former foreign minister and head of the Workers’ Party’s international division, appears to have been replaced by Kim Hyong-jun, who was the North’s ambassador to Russia until last year, since Ri did not appear in any of the group photographs of the plenary meeting. Also missing from the photographs was the North’s current Foreign Minister, Ri Yong-ho, one of the regime’s leading diplomats responsible for much of last year’s negotiations with Washington. With the ouster of the two Ris, whose foreign policy experience spanned several decades — which the INSS cautioned was far from certain — Kim may be signaling a major shift in his foreign policy. Kim Hyong-jun’s ties to Russia suggest the regime may be trying to shore up its support from traditional allies in Moscow and Beijing rather then resume talks with the United States for the time being. The plenary session also allegedly saw the removal of Jang Kum-chol, who heads the powerful United Front Department, a party organ responsible for diplomacy and spying on South Korea. While Kim Jong-un made no mention of Seoul in his lengthy address on Tuesday, Jang’s dismissal could herald a big change in Pyongyang’s inter-Korean policy. By contrast, prominent at the meeting was Ri Son-gwon, head of the North’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country, who was seldom seen at official events since April. Ri Son-gwon is regarded as a major player in the regime’s inter-Korean policy, having represented the North at high-level meetings. Top economic officials like O Su-yong and No Du-chol were apparently also given the boot. Pak Pong-ju, a leading economic reformist and former premier, was also speculated to have been fired, but he showed up at a later session of the plenary meeting in a wheelchair, indicating he was in an accident of some sorts. One of the few high-profile officials to survive the personnel change — the South’s Unification Ministry believes almost two-thirds of the party’s 16 so-called “professional departments” were cut — was First Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, the charismatic female diplomat responsible for many of the regime’s foreign statements. It is believed that Choe will continue to lead negotiations with Washington going forward in coordination with Kim Hyong-jun. (Shim Kyu-seok,”New Year Ushers in a Number of Changes in Pyongyang,” JoongAng Ilbo, January 2, 2020)
President Donald Trump said today he believes Kim Jong-un will uphold his commitment to denuclearize after the North Korean leader threatened to show off a “new strategic weapon.” “We’ll see. I have a very good relationship with Kim Jong-un,” Trump told reporters at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida as he arrived for a New Year’s Eve party. “I know he’s sending out certain messages about Christmas presents, and I hope his Christmas present is a beautiful vase,” the president continued, reprising his earlier joke in response to North Korea’s threat to send an unwanted Christmas gift. “That’s what I’d like, a vase, as opposed to something else.” “We have to do what we have to do,” he said. “But he did sign a contract. He did sign an agreement talking about denuclearization, and that was signed — number one sentence: denuclearization. That was done in Singapore. I think he’s a man of his word. So, we’re going to find out. But I think he’s a man of his word.” Trump was referring to an agreement he signed with Kim at their first summit in Singapore in June 2018. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo added to the hopes. “It remains the case that we hope that Chairman Kim will take a different course,” he told Fox News. “We’re hopeful that Chairman Kim will make the right decision, (that) he’ll choose peace and prosperity over conflict and war.” (Lee Haye-ah, “Trump Voices Confidence in N.K. Leader Despite New Threat,” Yonhap, January 1, 2020)
North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, said his country no longer felt bound by its self-imposed moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, its official media reported today, the strongest indication yet that the country could soon resume such tests. Kim also said the world would witness a new strategic weapon “in the near future,” according to KCNA, though no details were provided. North Korea has not conducted a long-range missile test or a nuclear test in more than two years. Kim had announced his moratorium at a time when he hoped negotiations with the United States — and his budding personal relationship with President Trump — would prompt the United States to begin lifting crippling sanctions. Trump has often cited the North’s restraint as a major diplomatic achievement. Speaking with reporters last night at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida, Trump said he still had a “very good relationship” with Kim. During the party meeting yesterday, Kim said his country “will shift to a shocking actual action” that will make the United States “pay for the pains sustained by our people.” It remained unclear if a test was imminent. It is possible that Kim’s announcement today is, by itself, the warning shot he wants to send to prod Trump, on the eve of a presidential election year, to begin lifting sanctions. All of the North’s state media gave prominent coverage to Kim’s remarks, indicating that they may have replaced an annual New Year’s Day speech that he had been expected to deliver. In its New Year’s Day edition, Rodong Sinmun filled its front page with Kim’s remarks, including an exhortation to his people to “foil the enemies’ sanctions.” Kim, who had hoped to shift his focus to finally reviving his country’s economy, has been growing frustrated in recent months as his negotiations on denuclearization with the Trump administration have stalled. He made the latest remarks about the moratorium yesterday, the last day of a four-day meeting of the Workers’ Party Central Committee, the North’s highest decision-making body. The remarks threatened a major shift in North Korean policy. He stressed that North Korea “should more actively push forward the project for developing strategic weapons” now that Washington’s “gangster-like acts” have stymied economic growth. Two months after Kim announced his moratorium — saying he had now completed his nuclear force — the two leaders met in Singapore in June 2018 in the first summit meeting between the two countries. The summit ended with a commitment to “work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” but the pledge was never understood the same way by the two sides. Subsequent negotiations have failed to close the gap. Trump, speaking in Florida last night, cited the Singapore pledge and said he considered Kim to be a “man of his word.” Kim’s words yesterday were much harsher. “If the U.S. persists in its hostile policy toward the D.P.R.K., there will never be denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula,” he said, using the initials for the North’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. “The scope and depth of bolstering our deterrent will be properly coordinated depending on the U.S. future attitude to the D.P.R.K.” That remark, and Mr. Kim’s reluctance to clarify when North Korea would officially resume testing, indicated that he might still be open to further negotiations with Washington. While the North has demonstrated that its fleet of missiles could likely reach parts of the United States, the country still has not shown it could design a nuclear warhead that would survive the heat and huge forces that come with re-entry of a warhead into the atmosphere. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said last night that the Trump administration continued to hope that Mr. Kim would “take a different course.” “President Trump came into office with the threat of war from North Korea real, and a true concern for the American people. He took a tack — we said we can deliver a better outcome for the people of North Korea,” Mr. Pompeo said in an interview with Fox News. “We’re hopeful that Chairman Kim will make the right decision, and he’ll choose peace and prosperity over conflict and war,” he added. Washington had dismissed the December 31 deadline imposed by the North as “artificial,” urging Pyongyang to maintain a dialogue and not revert to the provocations that had raised fears of war on the Korean Peninsula two years ago. As his diplomacy with Trump has failed to bring about the benefits he had sought, especially the lifting or easing of sanctions, Kim has sounded increasingly impatient. North Korea broke an 18-month hiatus in weapons tests in May, launching 27 mostly short-range ballistic missiles and rocket since then and warning of more provocative tests to come. In December, it conducted two ground tests at its missile-engine test site to bolster what it called its “nuclear deterrent.” At the same time, Kim has exhorted his people not to expect any immediate easing of sanctions and to brace for a prolonged struggle against the Americans by building a “self-reliant” economy. (Choe Sang-hun, “Leader of North Korea Hints at Resuming Tests,” New York Times, January 1, 2020, p. A-5)
While allies paid keen attention to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s warning about a “new strategic weapon,” officials in Seoul had one more concern — the absence of South Korea from Kim’s lengthy remarks on the communist state’s policy direction. In his 18,000-word address, reported by the North’s state-run Korea Central News Agency, he made no mention whatsoever of inter-Korean relations. The only time the words “South Korea” came up was when Kim condemned the U.S. for bringing “cutting-edge weapons into South Korea.” This was in contrast to last year, when Kim mentioned inter-Korean relations at least 10 times during his televised New Year’s address. “We need to see whether the North will additionally mention inter-Korean relations,” a Unification Ministry official told reporters on condition of anonymity. “There was no mention of South Korea during the meeting. We need to keep a close eye on the North’s actions against the South.” The situation adds to Seoul’s growing conundrum — finding a role in the stalled process toward peace on the Korean Peninsula, while the United States and the North are deadlocked in nuclear talks. Unification Minister Kim Yeon-chul, in his New Year’s address on January 2, stressed that the two Koreas need to recover trust and secure space first, in order to prepare for co-prosperity, with denuclearization negotiations and a lasting peace. Amid heightened fears of a potential North Korean military provocation, U.S. spy planes again flew around the peninsula Wednesday, according to aviation tracker Aircraft Spots. Seoul said it will continue to carry out military drills in an adjusted manner to support denuclearization efforts on the peninsula. “We’ve maintained our position that U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises shall be adjusted in close coordination between the two sides in order to support diplomatic efforts for denuclearization,” Defense Ministry spokesperson Choi Hyun-soo told a regular briefing January 2. The comment came after former U.S. national security adviser John Bolton, historically hawkish on North Korea, urged the US to resume full-scale military exercises with South Korea and hold hearings to determine US troops’ readiness — that is, the ability of the troops to fight a war in the region. “How to respond to Kim Jong Un’s threatening New Year’s remarks? The U.S. should fully resume all canceled or down-sized military exercises in South Korea,” Bolton wrote on Twitter. “Hold Congressional hearings on whether US troops are truly ready to ‘fight tonight,’” he added, referring to the motto of U.S. Forces Korea. (Ahn Sung-nu, “North’s Silence on North Korea Matters Puts Seoul on Edge,” Korea Herald, January 2, 2020)
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