DPRK (NORTH KOREA) CHRONOLOGY FOR 2003
Compiled by
Lee Sigal
Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project
Contact:
1/1/03:
Pres-elect Roh Moo-hyun: “I am skeptical whether so-called ‘tailored containment’ reportedly being considered by the United States is an effective means to control or impose a surrender on North Korea,” he told reporters. “Success or failure of U.S. policy toward North Korea isn’t too big a deal to the American people but it is a life-or death matters for South Koreas. Therefore, any U.S. move should fully consider South Korea’s opinion.” (Peter S. Goodman, “North Korea Threatens to Abandon Treaty,” Washington Post, January 1, 2002, p. A-13) “If the United States makes and announces a unilateral decision, and South Korea follows it, it can’t be called real cooperation between the two countries.” (Hwang Jang-jin, “Roh Expressed Doubts about ‘Tailored Containment’ Policy,” Korea Herald, January 1, 2003) “The president[-elect] thought that he should put the brakes on the escalating tension between Washington and Pyongyang,” says Roh admin official. “He was desperate. He wanted to get a promise from the Bush admin that it would rule the possibility of force. That is why Mr. Roh made such a strong comment.” (JoongAng Ilbo, “The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The Untold Story,” p. 22)
“If the United States continues to put pressure on North Korea by refusing dialogue, Pyongyang will only resist and [pressure] will be ineffective,” an LDP official says. “We’re going to lose everything if North Korea opts to withdrawal from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or resume operations of its nuclear reprocessing facilities.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “N. Korea Policy Problematic,” January 1, 2003)
1/2/03:
Pres Bush in Crawford: “what I worry about with a leader like Kim Jong-il is somebody who starves his people. The United States of America is the largest — one of the largest, if not the largest donor of food to the North Korean people. And one of the reasons why the people are starving is because the leader of North Korea hasn’t seen to it that they’re economy is strong or that they be fed. We’ve got a great heart, but I have no heart for somebody who starves his folks.” Q You’re talking about a diplomatic solution and you believe that there is one. How do you think you can bring some of the other countries in the region that are reluctant right now — THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don’t think the countries are reluctant to — Q — reluctant to put pressure on. THE PRESIDENT: They may be putting pressure on and you just don’t know about it.” (Office of the Press Secretary, text of President’s Remarks to the Press Pool)
US official: “Even if we have to accept North Korea having a few more nuclear weapons, we will still keep them in their box and contribute to the dissolution of the regime.” Yoo Jay-kun, chief foreign affairs adviser to Roh: “Washington has to understand that we have no choice but to settle this matter peacefully.” (Wall Street Journal, “A Split with Seoul Complicates Crisis over North Korea,” January 2, 2003, p. 1)
Dep FM Lee Tae-shik in Beijing: “If China is given the right card by the U.S., maybe China will play a more active role.” (AFP, “North Korea Vows to Strengthen Military As Bush Calls for Diplomacy,” January 2, 2003) Lee refers to South Korean ideas for a Bush letter promising not to attack, resumption of HFO shipments, aid and security assurances from others in return for North’s promise to abandon its nuclear programs. Han Sung-joo: US will have to find “some kind of face-saving way” to hold talks. “That will happen once it becomes clear that there is no way out” (Peter S. Goodman, “S. Korea Readies Plan to End Standoff with North,” Washington Post, January 5, 2003, p. A-15; James Brooke, “North Korea Issues Warning, And Seoul Seeks Compromise,” New York Times, December 5, 2003, p. 12) Top MOFAT official: “We will play an active role as mediator between the United States and North Korea, urging representatives of both countries to seek a compromise.” (Shim Jae-yun, “S. Korea to Seek Compromise on Nuclear Issue,” Korea Times, January 3, 2003)
1/3/03:
State Dept spokesman Boucher: “We are not willing to bargain or negotiate over commitments that have made before. We are looking for North Korea to visibly and verifiably dismantle its nuclear programs and we have no intent to invade the North. Those things are quite clear in terms of our policy. … We have no intention to sit down and bargain again to pay for this horse again, as it has been put very bluntly by Jim Kelly and others.” (Transcript of Daily Briefing, Department of State, January 3, 2003)
DPRK Amb to China Choe Jin-su calls for talks: “The U.S. should respect the international community and respond to dialogue without any preconditions.” He adds, “If other countries are concerned about nuclear security on the Korean Peninsula, they should urge the United States to assure us of security, and if they can’t do that, they should be quiet,” he said. “The Bush administration has been saying the whole time it has no intention of invading our country. We can’t believe that. Who can believe these words?” (James Brooke and Elisabeth Rosenthal, “New Seoul Leader to Press U.S. and North to Yield a Bit,” New York Times, January 4, 2003, p. A-6)
IAEA draft resolution “deplores in the strongest terms the DPRK’s unilateral acts.”
Rodong Sinmun signed commentary: “For Japan to follow the U.S. anachronistic hostile policy toward the DPRK without a political principle leads to its self-destruction. … It is like poking one’s eyes with one’s own hands. (KCNA; Kyodo, “N. Korea Says Japan ‘Suicidal’ in Following U.S. Policy,” January 4, 2003)
“China fever” in South Korea. Two-way trade jumped about 20% in 2002, making China South Korea’s largest trading partner. In 2001, for the first time, more Chinese (444,113) than Americans visited ROK and South invested $830 million in China, for first time more than in US. (James Brooke, “China ‘Looming Large’ in South Korea As Biggest Player, Displacing the U.S.,” New York Times, January 3, 2003, p. A-12)
1/5/03:
“Thanks to improving air and naval power, the United States can help defend the South from bases in Japan or even Hawaii, making the concept of the American troops as a tripwire against a North Korean invasion an outdated one. But an even more contentious argument for withdrawing the troops is that they have become detrimental to American interests. The Pentagon might be unwilling to launch preemptive strikes against North Korea because Americans might be quickly overrun or taken hostage during a North Korean counterattack.” Kurt Campbell: “Any movement of American forces would almost certainly involve countries and individuals taking the wrong message. The main one would be this: receding American commitment, backing down in the face of irresponsible North Korean behavior. And frankly, the ultimate beneficiary of this would be China in the long term.” Morton Abramowitz, who as a senior Pentagon official helped block President Carter’s troop withdrawal plan: “The whole point is to preserve stability. You would take a great risk by pulling out troops.”(James Dao, “Why Keep U.S. Troops?” New York Times, January 5, 2003, p. IV-5)
John McCain (R-AZ): “We’re talking about a country that’s governed by a sociopath. And by the way, we could go after his estimated $4 billion that he has around the world. We could go after him directly. But we are facing a nation that is Orwellian, a most oppressive nation in the world, which we’ve been propping up indirectly by our hundreds of millions of dollars of oil and food support. By the way, that is in direct contradiction with what the United States is supposed to be all about. Now, if you allow the North Koreans to gain some sort of leverage or agreement that would be beneficial to them, that will be a lesson to all other nations: Do the same thing. … There are a variety of options. First, by the way, an economic embargo enforced by the Chinese, Japanese, South Koreans and the United States is the best option. There is a series of military options that we have, including selective surgical strikes, such as were advocated by people like Brent Scowcroft in 1994. And yes, I recognize the North Korean artillery on the DMZ. I recognize that they have this missile capability. But a few years from now, if they develop this arsenal, then they have a variety of options which they don’t have today. So it’s the absolute last, last option, but to remove it as an option, I think, would not do justice to the seriousness of the threat.” (CBS, “Face the Nation,” January 5, 2003)
1/6/03:
Bush press conference: “I went to Korea and clearly said that the United States has no intention of invading North Korea. I said that right there in South Korea. And in Kim Jong-il’s neighborhood, I spoke as clearly as I said, and said we won’t invade you. And I’ll repeat that: We have no intention of invading North Korea. We expect North Korea to adhere to her obligations. She’s in an agreement with the United States; she said that she would not develop nuclear weapons. And we expect people to keep their word. We will have dialogue; we’ve had dialogue with North Korea. The Secretary of State visited with the Deputy Foreign Minister — SECRETARY POWELL: The Foreign Minister. THE PRESIDENT: — the Foreign Minister — excuse me — and talking is one thing. But we expect people to honor obligations. And for Kim Jong-il to be a credible member of the world community, he’s got to understand that he’s got to do what he says he’s going to do. I believe this will be resolved peacefully, and I believe it can be resolved diplomatically.” (Office of the Press Secretary, “President Discusses Economy with the Cabinet,” transcript, January 6, 2003) “Part of the reason that we don’t want to get North Korea’s problems in front of the Security Council too quickly,” one senior official suggested today, “is that the other Security Council members will be overwhelmed by too many problems at once. And these problems are different enough that you don’t want one polluting the other.” (David E. Sanger, “Bush Welcomes Slower Approach on North Korea,” New York Times, January 7, 2003, p. A-1)
Koizumi press conference: “It is important to execute the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang declaration. … We will continue to persuade North Korea that forming friendly ties with the international community is beneficial.” (AFP, “Japan PM Urges North Korea to Adhere to Nuclear Policy Commitments, January 6, 2003)
Robert Novak: “The real problem is South Korea’s President-elect Roh Moo-hyun, who successfully campaigned on a clearly anti-American platform (following a string of election defeats through 2000 that led him to be called “Roh the idiot”). Roh, a former left-wing activist, has offered to mediate between the North and the U.S. …The impulse in Washington is to take Roh at his word and pull out U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula, letting the South and North deal with each other. What complicates this is the war that George W. Bush declared on terrorism after Sept. 11, 2001. Nearly a year ago, the president let rhetoric overpower policy when he accepted the formulation of his speechwriters and inveighed against the “axis of evil”: Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Some conservatives who cheered those words now regret them. While Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says publicly that the U.S. can fight at the same time in the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia, nobody in the military is ready for a disastrous second Korean War even without fighting in Iraq. Certainly, nobody in the Bush administration wants one. … The immediate problem for U.S. policymakers is the South and its new president. Today’s Koreans show little gratitude to Americans for shedding their blood in 1950-53 to prevent the Republic of Korea (ROK) from falling under communist control. Indeed, they hardly remember it. Roh Moo-hyun is a reflection of that mood rather than its creator. Departing President Kim Dae-jung, who in 1981 was saved by Ronald Reagan from execution by South Korea’s military dictatorship, proved the most anti-American president in the Republic’s history. …South Korea has tired of the Americans, and the Americans have grown impatient with South Korea. The second phase of the Bush administration’s decision not to negotiate with the Communist North is to make the South responsible for itself, at long last.” (Robert Novak, “South Korea’s Crisis,” Washington Post, January 6, 2003, p. A-)
Suspension of food aid by US and Japan and severe cutbacks by South Korea have meant that, for the first time in years, WFP will miss its goals in North Korea this winter “by a wide margin.” “We’re very concerned about it,” says WFP official. ‘We understand that there are political considerations. But this is a population that is suffering, with women and children the most vulnerable.” Admin off: “Our intention is to go forward, but we do need to solve these monitoring problems first.” He added that food could not be distributed until Congress approved the State Department budget for the program, in the next month or two. WFP official: “no hard evidence” of diversion. “We have relatively good confidence that the food is reaching the people who need it.” ”We’ve got to decide what KEDO does about further deliveries of equipment and construction materials,” said an administration official. The allies disagree, with South Korea fearing U.S. desire for a cutoff will only provoke North Korea further. (Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. in No Rush over North Korea’s Food Aid,” New York Times, January 6, 2003, p. A-11)
1/7/03:
Bush: “We have no aggressive intent, no argument with the North Korean people. We’re interested in peace on the Korean peninsula.” (White House Office of the Press, Secretary, “President Discusses Taking Actiuon to Strengthen America’s Economy, “ Economic Club of Chicago, Janaury 7, 2003)
Kelly meets separately with ROK, Japan, before TCOG. “There is no proposal,” a South Korean official said. “We discussed some ideas of how to solve this question, and we had a frank exchange of views on how we see the situation now.” (Glenn Kessler, “U.S. and Asian Allies Discuss North Korea,” Washington Post, January 7, 2003, p. A-8) Diplomats in Seoul had anticipated that [national security adviser] Yim [Sung-joon] would present the administration with a compromise plan aimed at persuading North Korea to reverse course in exchange for security assurances from the United States. But, before departing, Yim told reporters that the discussion would involve setting “a broad framework of methodology rather than looking for a specific solution.” (Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Backs Direct Talks with N. Korea,” Washington Post, January 8, 2003, p. A-1) US, Japan turned down ROK proposal for US to resume HFO shipments and give security assurances in exchange for abandoning plutonium program, defer action on HEU which will take time and it is uncertain it will work. (Kyodo, “U.S., Japan Nixed S. Korean Proposal on N. Korea, January 8, 2003)
“It’s like dealing with a 7-year-old having a tantrum,” said one admin off. “You can have your screaming fit but we are going to keep you in your box until you behave.” (Richard Wolffe, with Tamara Lipper and George Wehrfritz, “Who Is the Bigger Threat?” Newsweek, January 13, 2003)
CIA report to Congress: “North Korea has continued procurement of raw materials and components for its ballistic-missile programs from various foreign sources, especially through North Korean firms based in China.” The public report coincides with other classified intelligence reports obtained in recent weeks indicating that China is also helping North Korea’s nuclear program. (Bill Gertz, “North Korean Firms Using China As Base to Obtain Missile Supplies,” Washington Times, January 22, 2003)
1/6-7/03:
TCOG in Washington: Disagree over scrapping LWR project. Kelly, Lee Tae-shik, Yabunaka Mitoji issue Joint Statement: “The three delegations expressed their continued support for the South-North dialogue and the Japan-North Korea dialogue, based on the June 2000 South-North Declaration and the Pyongyang Declaration, respectively. … The US delegation explained that the United States is willing to talk to North Korea about how it will meet its obligations to the international community. However, the US delegation stressed that the United States will not provide quid pro quos to North Korea to live up to its existing obligations.”
1/8/03:
“Obviously, where we are waiting is to make diplomacy work,” a Western diplomat remarked recently in Seoul. “There are no carrots that Washington is prepared to offer. You have a North Korean regime that is using blackmail. … Nobody’s talking about bombing anything. … The focus of Washington is to avoid bilateralizing the issue. [For that reason] the focus is on the International Atomic Energy Agency and using all available channels, including the New York channel of North Korea’s mission to the United Nations.” (Don Kirk, “News Analysis: Offer of Talks Masks Firm U.S. Line,” International Herald Tribune, January 8, 2003)
1/7-10/03:
ROK informs US, Japan of Lim Dong-won mission to Pyongyang
1/9/03:
SecSt Powell in interview: US could provide formal assurances it has no plans to attack North Korea. “We have made it clear we have no aggressive intent,” Powell said. “Apparently, they want something more than a passing statement.” (Glenn Kessler, “Security Assurances Possible for N. Korea,” Washington Post, January 9, 2003, P. A-1)
“Reaffirming the joint communiqué issued in October 2000 would suffice,” a diplomatic source with close ties to Pyongyang told Reuters in Tokyo. “The North would agree to abandon its nuclear program if the United States agrees to go back to the joint communiqué and reaffirm it.” (Paul Eckert and Teruaki Ueno, “North Korea May Offer Way Out of Crisis: Diplomats,” Reuters, January 9, 2003)
Recent Gallup poll for Chosun Ilbo found more than 53% of South Koreans said they disliked the US, up from 15% in 1994, liked the US dropped from 64% to 37%. Dislike expressed by 26% over 50, but 70% in 20s. (Peter S. Goodman and Joohee Cho, “Anti-U.S. Sentiment Deepens in S. Korea,” Washington Post, January 9, 2003, p. A-1)
Dep Permrep Han Song-ryol has dinner with Governor Bill Richardson in Santa Fe. Richardson ‘was given to understand they have a message,” says senior official. (Glenn Kessler, “N. Koreans Meet with Richardson,” Washington Post, January 10, 2003, P. A-14) Three weeks ago Han had called Richardson on his cell phone. “Han, how did you get my cell phone number?” Richardson asked him. “I have friends.” “Well, what do you want?” “I want you to help us with the Bush administration.” These guys just don’t get it, Richardson thought. “Han, there was an election two years ago. I am a Democrat. My guys lost. I was just elected governor of New Mexico. What the hell can I do?” A few days later he went to a “how-to-be a governor” conference in Washington that included a meeting with chief of staff Andrew Card at the White House. “On a little White House On a little White House napkin, I scribbled that the North Koreans had contacted me to pass a message to the administration. I handed it to Card who stuffed it into a pocket without a glance,” Richardson writes. Two weeks passed, with the North Koreans calling nearly every day. Then he got a call from Steve Hadley, deputy national security adviser. “Governor, I have your napkin,” Hadley said. It cracked me up and he laughed, too. “We’d like you to follow up on that message.” “You’re sure?” “Yes,” he said. “Colin Powell will be calling you in a few minutes.” North Korea announced it was withdrawing from the NPT. “Han, this is not good,” he told the North Korean envoy. “No, no, these are just tactics,” said Han. “Tell [Colin] Powell they are just tactics to improve our negotiating position.” (Bill Richardson, with Michael Ruby, Between Worlds: The Making of an American Life (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2005), pp. 297-98) SecSt Powell in interview: “Over my last two years as secretary of state, Governor Richardson would keep me regularly informed of his conversations with North Korean officials. I found the information he gave to me useful, and he was always respectful of the guidance I gave him with respect to his actions.” (Steven R. Weisman, “A U.S. Democrat to Go to North Korea for Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, October 14, 2005, p. A-8) Midway through this morning’s talks, Richardson learned his two visitors had never tasted green chili, took Han and Mung Jong-chol to a downtown restaurant for a “bowl of green.” (T.R. Reid, “On the Menu, Local Fare and International Intrigue,” Washington Post, January 11, 2003, p. A-16) Talks end on the 11th. Richardson said he repeatedly reported back to Powell. “It is my hope we will see a direct dialogue soon,” Richardson tells reporters. (Karen DeYoung and T.R. Reid, “Bush Administration Shifts Blame for N. Korea Crisis,” Washington Post, January 12, 2003, p. A-22) Richardson on ABC “This Week”: The North Koreans were “being belligerent in preparation, I believe, for a negotiation.” He added, They always do that. They did say to me that they’re ready to negotiate the verification of some of their nuclear-reprocessing facilities. They did say they would talk to the administration about the uranium enrichment facilities. They did say they want to improve relations with the U.S.” (Steven R. Weisman, “North Korean Talks? U.S. Weighs the Possible Price,” New York Times, January 13, 2003, p. A-10) “They don’t negotiate like we do. … They believe in order to get something they have to lay out additional cards, step up the rhetoric, be more belligerent. … So what I think the administration needs to do, with all due respect, is just pick up the phone, start the preliminary talks at the U.N. in New York at a low level to set up broader talks that address these issues.” (Leigh Strope, “North Korea Ready to Negotiate with U.S.,” Associated Press, January 12, 2003) Op-ed says of “green chili diplomacy” in Santa Fe: “During our three days of discussions, North Korea withdrew from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and threatened to resume missile testing. For my part, I believed that Pyongyang’s statements were fairly typical of its approach taking an extreme position going into a negotiation in order to have more to give when it came to the table. … Clearly the current situation cannot be resolved until the sides meet directly, and the longer this current impasse continues, the further North Korea has to be brought along.” (Bill Richardson, “The Santa Fe Trail,” Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2003) As Pritchard recalls it, “The North Koreans were grasping for straws, looking for any friendly face. But they forgot to do the math. Richardson was a Democrat, a Clinton guy. No way would Bush have anything to do with him.” Einhorn agrees. In the Bush administration, as he delicately puts it, “The default mode was skepticism about anything involving Clinton.” (Fred Kaplan, “Rolling Blunder,” Atlantic Monthly, May 2004)
1/10/03:
Pyongyang announces withdrawal from NPT, effective tomorrow. DPRK PermRep Pak Gil-yon reads statement by “the Government of the DPRK” at UN press conf: “Though we pull out of the NPT, we have no intention to produce nuclear weapons and our nuclear activities at this stage will be confined only to peaceful purposes such as the production of electricity. If the United States drops its hostile policy to stifle the DPRK and stops its nuclear threat to the DPRK, the DPRK may prove through a separate verification between the DPRK and the US that it does not make any nuclear weapons.”
Senior foreign policy official: “You step out of a meeting on this and you realize that you’ve heard 12 ideas and no consensus.” Sen. John McCain (R-AZ): “After first responding appropriately to North Korean violations of the agreement and refusing even to discuss with North Korea its extortionist demands, the administration now appears to have embraced, and in some respects, exceeded the style and substance of Clinton’s diplomacy.” (David E. Sanger and Julia Preston, “U.S. Assails Move by North Koreans to Reject Treaty,” New York Times, January 11, 2003, p. A-1)
Senior South Korean official: “The North’s decision to withdraw from the NPT is an expression of displeasure with the U.S. position that it will not offer quid pro quos.” (Shin Yong-bae, “North Presses for Deal with U.S.,” Korea Herald, January 10, 2003)
Sen Richard Lugar (R-IN), SFRC chmn: North Korea needs to see “a light at the end of the tunnel.” “North Korea must have a glimpse of what their prospects must be” under a deal with the US. (Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Plays Down North Korean Move,” Washington Post, January 11, 2003, p. A-1)
1/11/03:
DPRK Amb Choe Jin-su press conference in Beijing: “Because all agreements have been nullified by the United States side, we believe we cannot go ahead with the self-imposed missile moratorium any longer.” (Joe McDonald, “North Korea Suggests It Might End Moratorium on Missile Tests,” Associated Press, January 11, 2003)
Asian diplomat in Washington: “I’d like to get a handle on what President Bush has in mind.” This administration “sends as many conflicting signals as the North Koreans.” One senior administration official who sat, almost fuming, as State Department, Pentagon and White House officials replayed old arguments: “We ended up with a policy that could best be described as ‘hostile neglect.’” In 1994, said Arnold Kanter, a military attack on the reprocessing plant “was a risk worth running.” Now, ‘the consequences of retaliation could be catastrophic.” “The question,” a senior official said, “is how willing is the president to tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea?’ He paused, and added, “I don’t know. I don’t know if anyone knows.” (David E. Sanger, “Nuclear Mediators Resort to Political Mind-Reading,” New York Times, January 12, 2003, p. 14.)
Chief cabinet secy Fukuda Yasuo: “Japan has its own position. I think we should press North Korea to proceed with the negotiation.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “N. Korea’s NPT Exit Likely to Stall Talks,” January 12, 2003)
1/12/03:
Hyundai head Chung Mong-hun in Pyongyang at invitation of Kim Yong-sun (Associated Press, “South Korean Entrepreneur Visits North Korea Amid Nuclear Tension, January 12, 2003)
1/13/03:
Asst SecState Kelly in Seoul has hour-long meeting with president-elect Roh, tells reporters: “Once we get beyond nuclear weapons, there may be opportunities with the U.S., with private investors, with other countries to help North Korea in the energy area.” One official complained that Kelly “went off the reservation” with his answer. “He should not have planted that seed,” said the official, who reflects the views of the hard-line camp. He said the administration’s “bold approach” to North Korea, unveiled last summer, would not have offered any type of energy assistance, making Kelly’s suggestion of energy aid implausible. Another official, who represents the views of the opposing camp, said the problem with those offering an uncompromising approach is “they increasingly don’t give a damn” about North Korea’s dangerous threats and actions. “They know [Kim Jong-il] is evil. They want him dead.” (Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Says No New Tack on N. Korea,” Washington Post, January 14, 2003, p. A-14) Kelly in Seoul urges early visit to Washington by pres-elect but Roh team cautious. “I think President Kim’s visit with President Bush gave us a lesson, and there is more homework to be done between the teams. We are not going to have a repetition of the visit between Mr. Kim and Mr. Bush.” White House spokesman, Ari Fleischer: North Korea’s weapons dismantling must be “verifiable” and “irreversible.” “North Korea wants to take the world through its blackmail playbook, and we won’t play,” he said. “It’s up to North Korea to come back into international compliance with their obligations.” (Howard W. French, “Aides Declare U.S. ‘Willing to Talk’ in Korea Dispute,” (New York Times, January 14, 2003, p. A-1) Pritchard, who accompanied Kelly, recalls, “The conversation in the streets of Seoul was, ‘Is there going to be a war? What will these crazy Americans do?’ Roh said to us, ‘I wake up in a sweat every morning, wondering if Bush has done something unilaterally to affect the peninsula.’” (Fred Kaplan, “Rolling Blunder,” Washington Monthly, (May 2004)
Rodong Sinmun editorial: “The claim that we admitted developing nuclear weapons is an invention fabricated by the U.S. with sinister intentions. … “If the United States evades its responsibility and challenges us, we’ll turn the citadel of imperialists into a sea of fire.” (Peter S. Goodman, “U.S. May Offer Aid to North Korea in Deal on Arms,” Washington Post, January 13, 2003, p. A-12) White House spokesman Ari Fleischer: “I don’t think you have anything new here.”
SecState Powell interview: AF “did succeed in capping production” of fissile material. “But [it] left intact the capacity for production. I think, therefore, that we need a new arrangement and just go back to the existing framework.” Adds that no decision yet on whether it would support reactor construction if North abandons all weapons activities: “Are reactors the best way to give them the kind of energy capacity they need? These are kind of open questions. … It might be reactors; it might be some other form of energy.” (Carla Anne Robbins and David S. Cloud, “Powell Urges Tougher North Korea Nuclear Pact, Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2003, p. A-3)
Rep. Park Jin, on GNP delegation just back from Washington: “The Bush administration has a view that North Korea would be able to extract plutonium to make five to six nuclear bombs in June or July this year if it speeds up reprocessing spent fuel rods …” (Ryu Jin, “NK Will Have Uranium-Enriched Nukes in 1-2 Yrs: GNP Lawmakers,” Korea Times, January 13, 2003)
PM Koizumi after talks with Konstantin Pulikovskii, Russia’s rep in Far East: “Japan and the United States believe that Pyongyang should first take measures to address the nuclear issue.” Pulikovskii disagrees: “North Korea’s energy problem is catastrophic. If the energy problem is resolved, the nuclear issue will be addressed.” (Mochizuki Koichi, “Koizumi: NPT Key to Energy Aid,” Yomiuri Shimbun, January 13, 2003
1/14/03:
President Bush press conf: “I want to remind the American people that prior to North Korea making the decision it made, that I had instructed our Secretary of State to approach North Korea about a bold initiative, an initiative which would talk about energy and food, because we care deeply about the suffering of the North Korean people. …I view this as an opportunity to bind together nations in the neighborhood and around the world to make it clear to the North Koreans that we expect this issue to be resolved peacefully, and we expect them to disarm. We expect them not to develop nuclear weapons. And if they so choose to do so — their choice — then I will reconsider whether or not we will start the bold initiative that I talked to Secretary Powell about. People say, well, are you willing to talk to North Korea? Of course we are. But what this nation won’t do is be blackmailed. And what this nation will do is use this as an opportunity to bring the Chinese and the Russians and South Koreans and the Japanese to the table to solve this problem peacefully.” (Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Bush and Polish President Kwasniewski in Photo Opportunity,” January 14, 2003)
Senior US official: In US proposal conveyed through several diplomatic routes including DPRK UN mission, two EU countries, and Australia, US would provide written security assurance in the form of a letter from President Bush. North Korea has yet to reply. (Kyodo, “U.S. Proposes Written Security Guarantee to N. Korea,” January 14, 2003) Armitage to Japanese reporters: “We have no hostile intentions toward North Korea, and we’re not going to invade North Korea. We believe there is some way to document this, whether it’s an exchange of letters or official statements or something like that.” (Doug Struck, “S. Korean Says U.S. Considered Attack on North,” Washington Post, January 19, 2003, p. A-18) Senior official [Armitage?] on security assurances: “We’re thinking of ways that involve a formal, signed statement from the United States, and maybe a parallel statement from the Security Council. But will it fly with the North Koreans? Beats me. It’s possible that they have just decided that the only way to deal with us is to build six or seven nuclear weapons, and then negotiate.” (David E. Sanger, “Bush Says Shift by North Korea Could Bring Aid,” New York Times, January 15, 2003, p. A-1)
With Asst SecState Kelly in Beijing to meet Li Zhaoxing, vice FM, China says it will host talks. Chinese FoMin spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue: “We hope the United States and North Korea can resume dialogue swiftly because we think that talks are the most effective channel for resolving the problem. If the parties concerned are willing to have dialogue in Beijing, then we will have no difficulty on our side.” (John Pomfret, “China Offers to Host U.S. Talks with N. Korea,” Washington Post, January 15, 2003, p. A-15)
PM Koizumi visits Yasukuni shrine. Asahi Shimbun editorial “This is the worst possible time to go to Yasukuni. … Of all the time, why now? This is beyond belief. Japan is in a diplomatic crisis involving North Korea’s nuclear development. This is precisely the time when Japan ought to be working most closely with the rest of the world to urge Pyongyang to scrap its nuclear program … Japan’s important partners are this point are China and South Korea. Surely Koizumi could not have been unaware of what damage his Yasukuni visit would do to Japan’s relations with these two neighbors.” (“Koizumi’s Nonsense Visit,” January 16, 2003)
Sen Kyl (R-AZ) introduces bill prohibiting nuclear cooperation, applying same refugees provision for Cubans to North Korea, authorizing increased funding to Radio Free Asia for broadcasts to North Korea and authorizing full economic sanctions: “None of the funds appropriated under any provision of law may be made available to carry out any sanctions regime against North Korea that is less restrictive than the sanctions regime in effect against North Korea immediately prior to the September 17, 1999, announcement by the President of an easing of sanctions against North Korea.”
1/14-18/03:
UN Sec-Gen Kofi Annan’s special envoy Maurice Strong in Pyongyang
1/15/03:
North and South set date for ministerial-level talks. U.S. military has seen increase in patrols by North in one sector of DMZ, “not alarming, just unusual,” says LtCol Matthew Margotta, battalion commander. (Hans Greimel, “U.S. Military Says North Korea Has Increased Patrols in DMZ; U.S. Envoy in Beijing,” Associated Press, January 15, 2003)
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Some high-ranking officials of the U.S. were reported to have said that the U.S. has willingness to have dialogue with the DPRK and discuss the matters of energy and food aid if the latter scraps its ‘nuclear weapon development program.’ In this regard, some of the world community have shown impromptu views that the U.S. made a switchover in its position from its stand of denying dialogue and compensation to that of expressing its willingness to do so. But, in essence, there is no change in the U.S. conditional stand that it would have dialogue with the DPRK only after it scraps its ‘nuclear program.’ It is clear that the U.S. talk about dialogue is nothing but a deceptive drama to mislead the world public opinion.
We prudently examined the matter of dialogue raised in the Jan. 7 joint statement of the U.S., Japan and South Korea for the first time, and made its utmost efforts to have dialogue with the U.S. side. Until the day before the DPRK government’s statement was published on January 10 we seriously dealt with the U.S. “willingness” for dialogue conveyed by a third country [PRC] and directly got in touch with the U.S. State Department through a New York channel for DPRK-U.S. contacts. However, what we heard from the U.S. side was simple words that the U.S. had nothing to say about the resumption of dialogue. …As seen above, the U.S. loudmouthed supply of energy and food aid are like a painted cake pie in the sky as they are possible only after the DPRK is totally disarmed.” (KCNA, January 15, 2003)
1/16/03:
Henry Sokolski, head of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center: “There was a sentiment when they came in that with enough missile defense and enough covert action and maybe holding onto nuclear weapons and brandishing them — that was the best you could do.” Reflecting the change in philosophy changed Nonproliferation Strategy and Export Controls to Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense at NSC. (Gerald F. Seib and Carla Anne Robbins, “Nuclear Arms Move to Center Stage for U.S. Policy,” Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2003, p. A-1)
Roh in interview: “North Korea wants to escape from its status as a rogue state and open up to the world. I believe once these things are guaranteed, North Korea will abandon its nuclear ambitions.” “It is our judgment that we cannot face or embrace war with North Korea. It is such a catastrophic result that I cannot even imagine. We have to handle the North-South relations in such a way that we do not have to face such a situation.” (Howard W. French, “South Korea’s President-Elect Rejects Use of Force Against North Korea,” New York Times, January 17, 2003, p. A-12)
1/17/03:
Charles Krauthammer: “The Bush position on North Korea is in total collapse. In less than a month we have gone from “tailored containment” to shoeless appeasement. It usually takes longer. It began when the Bush administration responded to North Korea’s brazen nuclear breakout by immediately — and explicitly — taking the military option off the table. This was a serious mistake.
… Instead, the Bush administration came up with a new policy of “tailored containment.” One has the image of a nicely trimmed, neatly hemmed, shoulder-padded straitjacket for the deranged Kim Jong-il. Economic sanctions and political isolation were not bad ideas. Yet when South Korea and China criticized them and North Korea threatened war if sanctions were imposed, the administration took a huge dive. Within days, the vaunted program of nonmilitarily squeezing North Korea into compliance went down the memory hole. You hear not a word about it today. Instead, we went into high appeasement mode.
… On Monday, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly announced that if North Korea plays nice it can count on assistance “in the energy area.” So much for no rewards. It gets worse. The day after Kelly’s cave-in, the president quadrupled the ante, offering a “bold initiative” of not only energy assistance but also economic aid, and eventually even diplomatic agreements and security guarantees. This goes far beyond carrots. This is cake with the cherry on top.” (“Korea Follies,” Washington Post, January 17, 2003, p. A-23)
It’s time for “quiet diplomacy,” says Russian Dep FM Alexander Losyukov in Beijing: “First of all, this situation needs to be resolved on a bilateral level between North Korea and the United States.” (Hans Greimel, “Global Pressure Mounts on United States to Enter Talks with North Korea,” Associated Press, January 17, 2003)
1/18/03:
Chyung Dai-chul Roh Moo-hyun’s special envoy, accompanied by Yoon Young-kwan, Moon Chung-in, Yoo Jay-kun, Choo Mi-ae, in Washington
1/19/03:
UN envoy Maurice Strong back from Pyongyang says 6-8 million people threatened by food shortage. “Humanitarian aid, as President Bush himself has confirmed, is tied to the politics of this crisis.” (Reuters, “U.N. Envoy Says North Korea Is Short of Fuel,” New York Times, January 19, 2003, p. 14)
First vice FM Kang Sok-ju tells Dep FM Alexander Losyukov Pyongyang and Washington alone have to resolve nuclear problem “knee to knee.” (Kim Young-sae, “’Knee to Knee’ Talks Demands by North,” JoongAng Ilbo, January 20, 2003)
U.S. delivered its last shipment of grain to North Korea on Dec. 10 and has imposed strict conditions for resuming food aid, leading analysts to conclude that Washington is using hunger as a weapon in its confrontation with North Korea over nuclear weapons. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher has said the aid will resume when a budget for the assistance is approved. But Natsios has promised Congress that North Korea would be required to permit more food monitors, give them more freedom, and allow them in parts of the country that North Korea has declared off-limits, all unpalatable requirements for Pyongyang. “There’s just not enough food to go around in this country,” Richard Corsino, head of the World Food Program in Pyongyang, said by telephone Friday. “Even though they had a fairly good crop this year, they are still over a million tons short.” The United States provided more than 250,000 tons of the 400,000 tons of food distributed last year in North Korea, he said. (Doug Struck, “U.S. Criticized for Halting N. Korea Aid,” Washington Post, January 19, 2003, p. A-18)
National security adviser Condoleezza Rice with Tim Russert: “I can tell that since the beginning of this situation American policy on this has been consistent. …The president said very early on that while he retains all of his option, he believes that a diplomatic course is the appropriate one here and that this can be resolved diplomatically.” Russert: “Seymour Hersh, in The New Yorker [1/27/03, p.47]which came out today, added this: “One American intelligence official who has attended recent national security meetings at the White House [says] ‘Bush and Cheney want that guy’s head’ — Kim Jong-il’s — on a platter. Don’t be distracted by all the talk about negotiations. There will be negotiations but they have a plan, and they are going to get this guy after Iraq. He’s their version of Hitler.’” Rice: “Well, again, I have to say, people who actually know what the president is thinking and what Vice President Cheney is thinking don’t generally talk in that way. I’ve been party to those meetings. I know that this policy has been consistent from the beginning.” (Transcript, NBC “Meet the Press,” January 19, 2003)
Hersh: Since 1997, the C.I.A. said, Pakistan had been sharing sophisticated technology, warhead-design information, and weapons-testing data with the Pyongyang regime. … A former senior Pakistani official told me that his government’s contacts with North Korea increased dramatically in 1997; the Pakistani economy had foundered, and there was “no more money” to pay for North Korean missile support, so the Pakistani government began paying for missile systems from North Korea in part by sharing its nuclear-weapons secrets. According to the report, Pakistan sent prototypes of high-speed centrifuge machines into North Korea. And sometime in 2001 North Korean scientists began to enrich uranium in significant [??] quantities. Pakistan also provided data on how to build and test a uranium-triggered nuclear weapon, the C.I.A. report said. …A former senior Pakistani official told me that his government’s contacts with North Korea increased dramatically in 1997; the Pakistani economy had foundered, and there was “no more money” to pay for North Korean missile support, so the Pakistani government began paying for missiles by providing “some of the know-how and the specifics.” Pakistan helped North Korea conduct a series of “cold tests,” simulated nuclear explosions, using natural uranium, which are necessary to determine whether a nuclear device will detonate properly. Pakistan also gave the North Korean intelligence service advice on “how to fly under the radar,” as the former official put it—that is, how to hide nuclear research from American satellites and U.S. and South Korean intelligence agents. …In the past decade, American intelligence tracked at least thirteen visits to North Korea made by A.Q. Khan (Seymour Hersh, “The Cold Test,” The New Yorker, January 27, 2003, pp. 42-47) A former State Department official said that a nuclear warhead built according to a design Libya obtained from the Khan network would be too large to fit in the re-entry vehicle Iran would have designed.” (Arms Control Today, “Corrections,” July-August 2008, p. 49) In 2004, Swiss investigators seized computer files and documents from the Swiss nationals Friedrich, Marco, and Urs Tinner. The computer files, containing over 1,000 megabytes of information, were encrypted and difficult to decipher. Nonetheless, Swiss investigators found the designs of smaller, more sophisticated nuclear weapons than the design found in Libya. Why did these smugglers associated with the notorious Pakistani nuclear engineer Abdul Qadeer Khan have these designs, unless they had sold or intended to sell them for Khan? Moreover, these computers were unlikely to be the only place where the Tinners stored the designs. A senior IAEA official doubted that the Tinners were the only ones who had the designs found on their computers. “A very scary possibility,” he said. Others were bound to have received the digitized designs, he added. (David Albright, “Swiss Smugglers Had Advanced Nuclear Weapons Designs,” ISIS Online, June 16, 2008)
1/?/03:
The United States had limited leverage, said Stephen Yates, OVP Asia director, but Cheney “was supportive of trying to grow those instruments.” He did not take regime change for granted. “What eveidence do we have that we know who would come in aftrer him?” he asked. “What evidence do we have that implementing a strangulation or inducement strategy would increase or decrease the risk of proliferation? If you take away all sources of income but weapons of mass destruction, does that lead him to sell the weapons of mass destruction?” Another Cheney aide, Aaron Friedberg said, if Cheney had his way, “we wouldn’t have the six-party talks. What you would have instead is pressure, with others, either to squeeze them or contain them. What you ended up with was negotiations and partial pressure.” (Gellman, Angler, pp. 239-40)
1/20/03:
Planner have not yet overcome “tyranny of proximity,” says John H. Tilelli, Jr., former USFK, even with technological improvements in precision-guided weapons to target 500 170mm Koksan artillery systems and 200 MLRS with range of Seoul. Victor Cha says in a recent war game participated in, events quickly “got out of control.” (Vernon Loeb and Peter Slevin, “Overcoming North Korea’s ‘Tyranny of Proximity,’” Washington Post, January 20, 2003, p. A-16)
US moves to have the UN Security Council take up the North Korean nuclear issue. SecSt Powell: “North Korea has chosen to ignore the resolution from the IAEA and I think the IAEA therefore has an obligation to refer the matter to the Security Council for the Security Council, to make its own judgment as to what it wishes to do. … As President Bush has said repeatedly, we have no intention of invading or attacking North Korea and we’re looking for a diplomatic solution and there have been some interesting elements that have come forward.” (“Remarks to the Press after the UNSC Ministerial Session on Terrorism,” January 20, 2003)
Under SecSt Bolton in Seoul asked if US could provide some sort of guarantee not to attack: “Certainly we can find ways to record that fact.” (Shim Jae-yun, “US Set to Bring NK Issue to UN,” Korea Times, January 21, 2003) In Beijing after meeting with vice FM Wang Guangya: “I don’t detect any opposition here, certainly, to moving the matter to the Security Council in an appropriate fashion.” (Stephanie Hoo, “U.S. Envoy: China Won’t Oppose U.N. Security Council Involvement in North Korea Issue,” Associated Press, January 21, 2003)
Rumsfeld contrasts Iraq, North Korea. “In both word and deed, Iraq has demonstrated that it is seeking the means to strike the U.S., our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction for a reason: so that it can acquire the territory of its neighbors,” Rumsfeld said. “North Korea, by contrast, is a country teetering on the verge of collapse. Its history has been one of using its weapons programs to blackmail the West into helping stave off an economic disaster. North Korea is a threat, to be sure. But it is a different kind of threat — one that needs to be handled differently.” (U.S. Department of State, Text of Rumsfeld’s Speech to the Reserve Officers Association, January 20, 2003)
High-ranking MOFA official after FM Kawaguchi Yoriko meets Asst SecState Kelly: “[Armitage’s] proposal appears to indicate a step forward on behalf of the United States because it referred specifically to an exchange of letters or official statement.” Japan particularly interested in his implied offer of thermal power plants: “The essence of the North Korean problem lies in the energy problem. The possibility of building thermal power plants in the North will perhaps be discussed by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “U.S. Stance on North Korea Please Govt.” January 20, 2003)
Dep FM Alexander Losyukov in Pyongyang 1/18-21 gives Kim Jong-il “package plan” reaffirming nuclear-free peninsula in return for US written security guarantee, economic aid promised in 1994. “The Korean side constructively and attentively considered these proposals.”(Doug Struck, “Russian Envoy, North Korean leader Meet in Effort to Resolve Crisis,” Washington Post, January 21, 2003, p. A-13)
Russian intelligence officers secretly placed nuclear sensors in North Korea in 1990s. US trained them in use of sensors and they shared findings. “Krypton is a very good technical indicator that is hard to hide,” said one person familiar with the intell efforts. “If you are able to situate the sniffers in the right places, then you could have confidence that you can find out whether plutonium reprocessing is going on.” (James Risen, “Russia Helped U.S. on Nuclear Spying Inside North Korea,” New York Times, January 20, 2003, p. A-1)
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard in Seoul television interview: “If they satisfy our concerns about the nuclear programs, we are prepared to consider a broad approach that would entail, in the final analysis, some economic cooperation, perhaps in the power field. We are prepared to go beyond food aid.” DPRK amb to China Choe Jin-su interview with Kyodo: “Genuine dialogue is a fair and equal discussion in which both parties concerns are simultaneously addressed. The United States is leading world opinion in a mistaken direction, as if it were interested in dialogue, but there is no change in its stance of ‘first abandon the nuclear program and then we’ll hold talks.’” Dep SecSt Richard Armitage in interview with Japanese journalists published today: “We are not going to invade North Korea. If we respect their sovereignty and their economic activity, then there is a basis to move forward.” (Howard W. French, “U.S. Expands Aid Offer, and North Korea Wants to Talk,” New York Times, January 20, 2003, p. A-14)
John McCain (R-AZ): “Beijing should see that a nuclear standoff in Asia threatens the stability on which China’s economic growth depends. Japan, understandably, will be under enormous pressure to deploy nuclear weapons absent North Korean disarmament, setting off a proliferation race in Asia with serious consequences for China’s ambitions. And the Chinese would surely want to avoid an American military occupation of North Korea in the event of war with Pyongyang, or the possibility that Taiwan might seek nuclear weapons in response to regional proliferation. The views of our South Korean ally are important. But South Korean policy today seems motivated more by fear than by logic. Policies that sustain Kim Jong-il’s regime do not serve the long-term interests of the Korean people. Instead, they immorally prolong the suffering of North Koreans. … After first responding appropriately to North Korean violations of the agreement and refusing even to discuss with North Korea its extortion demands, the administration now appears to have embraced, and in some respects exceeded, the style and substance of Clinton’s diplomacy. Both the president and secretary of state publicly ruled out the use of force, although force could eventually prove to be the only means to prevent North Korea from acquiring a nuclear arsenal–a dangerously shortsighted precedent that even the Clinton administration did not publicly suggest. The administration’s public rejection of North Korean demands for new negotiations gave way to public offers of direct talks, then one day later to a public offer to discuss formally assuring North Korea that the United States would never be the first to use force on the peninsula. This rapid deterioration of our resolve is as reckless as it is disingenuous.” (John McCain, “Rogue State Rollback,” The Weekly Standard, January 20, 2003)
LDP lawmakers specializing on national security at breakfast meeting with former SecDef William Cohen were greatly disturbed when he asked whether Japan could tolerate a North Korea in possession of several nuclear weapons. (Kawashima Kohei, “Japan Shouldn’t Tolerate Nuclear North Korea,” Yomiuri Shimbun, February 6, 2003)
1/20-21/03:
North-South Red Cross talks on family reunions reach last-minute agreement to start construction of permanent site for family reunions at the foot of Mount Kumgang and to hold sixth round of reunions February 20-25. (Joint Press Corps and Ryu Jin, “Reunion Center Construction to Start in April,” Korea Times, January 22, 2003)
1/21/03:
“For North Korea to arm a Rodong missile with a nuclear warhead, it must downsize the plutonium warhead to a weight of about 1.2 tons as well as manufacture detonators triggered by high explosives to be attached around the warhead. Many experts believe North Korea has yet to satisfy these requirements.” (Hidaka Tetsuo, “Analysis: North Korea N-Threat Not Immediate,” Yomiuri Shimbun, January 21, 2003)
Powell: “What everyone has to understand is that we cannot get to a solution where the United States is essentially bargaining with North Korea in a way that suggests that we will give them something to cause them to stop doing what they shouldn’t be doing in the first place, and what they shouldn’t have been doing. …My predecessors — Madeleine Albright and Warren Christopher, Bill Perry, President Carter, President Clinton — all did a good job, and I have never hesitated to give them credit for bottling up Yongbyon. But there were flaws in the Agreed Framework. One, the material was never removed. It’s still there, and that’s the problem we have now. And, two, they didn’t know at the time, and we didn’t know for the first year and a half of this administration, that they had immediately, almost immediately, begun to ignore the Agreed Framework and their other obligations by trying to achieve the capability to enrich uranium.” (Transcript, Interview with Regional Journalists, January 21, 2003)
1/21-23/03:
Inter-Korean railway talks; North wants Tonghae (east coast) and Kyongui (Seoul-Sinuiju) lines reconnected “simultaneously” while South says latter can be relinked next month. (Joint Press Corps and Ryu Jin, “Koreas Wrangle over Timetable to Reconnect Kyongui, Tonghae Lines,” Korea Times, January 24, 2003)
1/22/03:
DPRK’s Kim Sung-ryung in ministerial talks in Seoul: “Although we have withdrawn from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, we have no intention of producing nuclear weapons at this stage.” (AFP, “North Korea Says No Intention of Producing Nuclear Weapons,” January 22, 2003) He added, “Let’s hold our hands together and move forward.” (Howard French, “The Two Koreas Open Cabinet-Level Talks,” New York Times, January 22, 2003, p. A-9)
KCNA: “If the United States abandons its hostile policy and refrains from nuclear threat, the DPRK may substantiate through a special verification between the two countries that it does not manufacture nuclear weapons. The nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula should be settled peacefully through fair negotiations that call upon both the DPRK and the U.S. to clear each other of their concerns on an equal footing.” … “The U.S. had no will to implement the AF from the beginning and has systematically violated the AF, calculating that the DPRK would collapse. … The conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between the DPRK and the U.S. would provide the only realistic way of fundamentally solving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and peacefully settling the obtaining grave situation. If the U.S. signs the treaty and legally assures the DPRK of its non-aggression including the non-use of nukes, the DPRK can also clear the U.S. of its security concerns.” (KCNA Detailed Report on Circumstances of DPRK’s Withdrawal from NPT, January 22, 2003)
Head of Roh transition committee Lim Chae-jung: The North Korean nuclear “is not an issue that should be referred to the U.N. Security Council yet.” (Kim Kwang-tae, “Roh’s Aide Opposes Referral of Nuclear Issue to UNSC,” Korea Times, January 22, 2003)
Under SecSt Bolton news conf in Seoul: “The Security Council has a broad range of options it can consider — political, economic and other,” he said. “The issue of taking the matter to the Security Council and the question of sanctions are two entirely separate matters.”(Doug Struck, “U.S. Signals It Won’t Seek Sanctions Against North Korea,” Washington Post, January 23, 2003, p. A-17)
New Japan-DPRK back-channel opened after Yabunaka Mitoji, dir-gen of Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau, telephone top DPRK official, who insisted it had not abandoned Pyongyang communiqué. Other channels are Tanaka Hitoshi with DPRK military officer said to be close to KJI, and the embassies in Beijing. High-ranking MOFA official reaffirms Japan ready to provide quid pro quo: “If North Korea’s nuclear issues are resolved, it will ask Japan for economic assistance. But it will be difficult for Japan to advance talks if no progress is expected in the abduction issue.” (Asahi Shimbun, “Japan Digs Back Route to N. Korea,” January 24, 2003)
Nishimura Shingo, Diet hawk, says it is “totally irresponsible” for Koizumi not to press the North on nuclear issue to avoid complicating abduction issue, “He is treating it as though it is someone else’s problem.” Kim Jong-il “is saying he’ll make Tokyo a sea of fire, and the United States says Japan is the target of North Korean nuclear arms. But what is Japan doing?” He says “Japan should renounce its non-nuclear principles.” (Doug Struck and Sachiko Sakamaki, “In Flurry of Diplomacy to End Crisis, Japan Remains on Sideline,” Washington Post, January 23, 2003, p. A-17)
1/23/03:
N-S Ministerial talks communiqué: “The South and North will make joint efforts to guarantee peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and will actively cooperate to solve nuclear and all other issues through dialogue.” South rejected North wording, “national unity against outside forces.” (Seo Hyun-jin, “Korea Struggle on Joint Statement,” Korea Herald, January 23, 2003)
China conducts military drill by “mechanical division of the Shenyang military zone,” which is 120 miles northwest of North Korea. (Associated Press, “China Conducts Military Drills in region Near North Korea,” January 23, 2003)
Putin telephones Bush on Dep PM Losyukov’s visit to Pyongyang, sees “a good basis for productive dialogue with North Korea.” (Associated Press, “Putin Consults with Bush on North Korea, Says Good Chances Exist to Defuse Crisis,” January 23, 2003) Losyukov tried to placate the DPRK by avoiding the term “mediator” and instead saying his aim was to “promote dialogue between the United States and North Korea.” (Sergei Borosov, “Russia: Peacemaker on the Korean Peninsula?” Transitions Online, January 19, 2003)
Rumsfeld unhappy with olive branches offered, to push to revert to cabinet decision made in November to talk with North only if it takes verifiable steps to halt its nuclear programs. “He’ll draw a line in the sand, which means we’ll talk, but the conversation will consist of us screaming at them to dismantle,” says a U.S. official. Working-level officials drawing up plans for UN-backed sanctions calling for ban on arms sales and purchases, financial transfers, prevent travel by DPRK officials. (Far Eastern Economic Review, “Hawks Prepare Korea Sanctions,” January 30, 2003)
1/24/03:
Kim Young-mok op-ed: “Regardless of Pyongyang’s rhetoric, it is still probable that North Korea wants to make a deal before it reaches the point of no return.” (Kim Young-mok, “North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Time for an Agreement”)
In CNN interview with Mike Chinoy, his first since the election, Roh Moo-hyun says, “I think the best means of peaceful solution is dialogue, rather than unilaterally demanding North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions. … If the tactic to pressure North Korea leads to a triggering of war opr a collapse of North Korean regime, I don’t think South Korea is able to withstand the situation, so I don’t think it is a proper policy tool for the U.S.” He described the nuclear program as less a threat than “a political card to secure their political regime and to secure economic assistance for implementing reforms and opening up. I don’t think it is an accurate description or accurate presumption to consider North Korea’s nuclear ambitions as a possible, usable tool. Common sense tells us that North Korea will not confront U.S. with its nuclear weapons. And I think it is just trying to deter the possible attacks from United States by having a nuclear weapon and by guaranteeing its security.” (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 155)
Investigation focusing on 400-billion won ($341-million) loan from Korean Development Bank to Hyundai Merchant Marine, 224 billion ($190 million) of which has not been accounted for and may have surreptitiously been used to pay for 2000 N-S summit. Chung Mong-hun barred from leaving Korea. (Don Kirk, “Hyundai Query Focuses on a Possible Payoff to North Korea,” New York Times, January 25, 2003, p. A-6)
Japan Defense Agency Dir Gen Ishiba Shigeru: Japan is constitutionally allowed to “counterattack”: “if North Korea expresses the intention of turning Tokyo into a sea of fire and if it begins preparations [to attack], for instance by fueling a missile, we will consider [North Korea] is initiating [an attack]” and preempt. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Ishiba: Japan to ‘Counterattack’ If N. Korea Prepares to Attack,” January 26, 2003)
1/25/03:
ROK urges postponement of IAEA meeting on North Korea while its envoys in North. (Paul Shin, “South Korea Urges IAEA to Postpone Meeting on North Korea,” Associated Press, January 25, 2003)
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Of late the United States claimed that the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula should be debated at a ‘multi-party talks’ including the five permanent member nations of the un security council.
Lurking behind the claim is a U.S. sinister intention to flee from the responsibility for the nuclear issue and put international pressure upon the DPRK.
It is owing to the U.S. that the issue surfaced, got worse and has reached the extremes.
It is the United States that menaces the sovereignty of the DPRK and its right to existence. Only the U.S. is responsible for doing away with the threat and able to do so.
The U.S. should know that its efforts to flee from the responsibility under the signboard of the ‘multi-party talks,’ ignoring the stark fact unanimously recognized by the international community would not help solve the issue but make its settlement more complicated.
It had better soberly think over to which phase its attempt will push the DPRK.
The only way of solving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula peacefully and in a most fair way is for the DPRK and the U.S. to hold direct and equal negotiations.
This is the invariable principled stand of the DPRK.
The DPRK is strongly opposed to any attempt to internationalize the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and will never participate in any form of ‘multi-party talks’ related to the issue.
Any country that is interested in the nuclear issue should not seek any other purpose by poking its nose into it, but give disinterested help to the DPRK and the U.S., the parties concerned, so that they may site face to face to seek a negotiated settlement of the issue.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on ‘Multi-Party Talks,” January 25, 2003)
Choe Jin-su, DPRK amb to China, repeats first sentence on “never” verbatim. (Paul Shin, “North Korea Vows to Resist U.S. Pressure over Its Nuclear Dispute,” Associated Press, January 31, 2003)
KCNA: “Of course it is universally recognized norms of international law that countries exchange government statements or letters to put their rights and commitments stipulated between them into force and they should own national responsibilities for honoring them.
For example, the U.S. administration signed the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework in 1994 and the then President Clinton sent a letter of assurances to the DPRK. … The Bush administration has unilaterally backpedaled its international commitments, asserting that the preceding president committed a “mistake”. So, there is no guarantee that the next administration would not break the promise made by the present administration to the DPRK. Bush’s personal letter of assurances or a joint statement cannot be trusted as they may gather dust anytime without being ratified by congress. So, it is quite senseless to expect any peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and any improved relations with the U.S. depending on them.” (“KCNA Dismisses Proposed ‘Exchange of Statements or Letters’ As Untrustworthy,” January 25, 2003)
Powell en route to Davos: Talks will take place “eventually”: “We will work out what the proper manner and form is.” “There is a strong desire on the part of the North Koreans to talk directly to us. We believe that the problem that exists in North Korea is not a U.S.-D.P.R.K. problem. Other nations are involved.” (James Brooke, “North Koreans Still Demand Direct Talks With the U.S.” New York Times, January 26, 2003, p. 15)
1/?/03:
Powell authorizes Jack Pritchard to meet with DPRK PermRep Pak Gil-yon in New York and propose P5+5 dialogue on the nuclear issue (North and South Korea, Japan, Australia and the EU). The North rejects the proposal. (Chinoy, Meltdown, pp. 165-66)
1/26/03:
U-2 spy plane crashes after pilot ejects, injuring the pilot and 4 on ground near Seoul. (Don Kirk, “U.S. Spy Plane Crashes in South Korean Town, Injuring 5,” New York Times, January 27, 2003, p. A-3)
Koizumi and Bush confer by phone. Koizumi told him, “There is a need for a peaceful resolution of the issue. We highly praise your announcement to seek a resolution through diplomatic means and Japan will also make every effort in that area.” (Asahi Shimbun, “Koizumi, Bush Talk on North Korea, Iraq,” January 27, 2003)
CIA’s Special Operations Group “has swelled to several hundred officers. They are planted in Pakistan, Central Asia, North Africa and East Asia.” (Douglas Waller, “The CIA’s Secret Army,” Time, February 3, 2003)
Powell in Davos: “The United States has no intention of attacking North Korea. President Bush has said that repeatedly, and we are prepared to convey this in a way that makes it unmistakable to North Korea. At the same time, we keep all of our options on the table. Meanwhile, the United States has been the world’s biggest donor of humanitarian assistance to North Korea, and we will continue to contribute to their humanitarian requirements and needs.” (Transcript of speech to the World Economic Forum, Davos, January 26, 2003)
Adm. Thomas B. Fargo, CINCPAC, requests dispatch of several squadrons of warplanes to the theater. Rumsfeld inclined to approve dispatch of carrier Carl Vinson if Kitty Hawk sent to Gulf. “These are deterrent-type forces that would be put in place,” a Defense Department official said, while emphasizing the administration’s policy of pushing for a diplomatic solution. “These guys are clearly watching television and timing their moves when they think attention is on Saddam, said a senior official involved in discussing possible military responses if North Korea escalated the crisis by beginning to reprocess nuclear fuel. (Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, “Admiral Seeks Deterrent Force in Korea Crisis,” New York Times, February 1, 2003, p. A-1)
1/27/03:
Six months after reforms announced, runaway inflation in North. “Now the economic situation is more precarious than before the reforms. They can’t do this halfway,” said Cui Yingjui, a Chinese Korean economist and adviser to the North Korean government. “They risk social chaos and economic collapse.” Another issue is electricity. As farmers plant more crops they will want to use water in reservoirs for irrigation, not for power generation, said Cui. “There are a whole series of conundrums and Catch-22s.” (John Pomfret, “Reforms Turn Disastrous for North Koreans,” Washington Post, January 27, 2003, p. A-1)
Lim Dong-won on departure to Pyongyang: “We need to pay attention to the fact that even if all things go well, it would take many years to [fully] resolve this problem.” “Assistance and economic cooperation regarding North Korea will be realized in the course of dispelling fundamental security concerns such as the nuclear issue. But these issues will not be put up for bargaining, “Lee Jong-seok, on Roh’s transition team, said. “In other words, ‘We will not say, ‘If you get rid of the nukes, we will give you this.’ That won’t be the case. This is the philosophy the president-elect holds.” (Seo Soo-min, “Lim to Meet NK Leader,” Korea Times, January 27, 2003)
Mitchell Reiss, “Negotiating with North Korea: Lessons Learned (and Relearned)”: “North Korea exists to make every American administration look foolish. … It is possible to do business with North Korea. The KEDO experience bears that out. KEDO has signed over 50 protocols, agreements and MOUs with North Korea. Some have involved very sensitive matters such as Privileges & Immunities for ROK nationals in North Korea, and direct transportation and communication links. By and large, North Korea has honored them. … In 1992 the North Koreans signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and provided an initial declaration of facilities and activities. Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, the North agreed to allow ad hoc and routine inspections on all facilities and activities listed in the initial declaration. From day one, North Korea did not abide by this commitment. In particular, it did not allow IAEA inspectors access to the Isotope Production Laboratory at Yongbyon, where we know North Korea had separated plutonium. … If you do not have a policy towards North Korea, North Korea will determine your policy for you.”
1/?/03:
PRC FoMin spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue: “There’s a saying in Chinese, ‘a lock can only be opened by one key.’ I think as long as the relevant sides feel that the resumption of direct dialogue between the United States and North Korea is the crux of the matter, then I think all concerned parties should continue to make efforts to push them to resume talks.” (John Pomfret and Glenn Kessler, “China’s Reluctance Irks U.S.,” Washington Post, February 4, 2003, p. A-20)
1/27-28/03:
Lim Dong-won, with Senior Secretary for National Security YimSung-joon and Lee Jong-seok of the Roh transition team in delegation, meets KWP secretary Kim Yong-sun, hands him letter to KJI from KDJ. “Seoul said Pyongyang should scrap and verify the dismantlement of HEU program if the North had one. If the North did not have one, it should also agree to inspections to verify the fact,” says senior ROK official. “Seoul also said it should not miss the opportunity because South Korea was delaying the UN Security Council’s move to debate the issue. Seoul said the North’s demand for a nonaggression tray with the US was nearly impossible even if the Bush administration wanted to negotiate one, because it would have to be ratified by the US Congress dominated by the Republicans. Seoul a written nonaggression promise backed by a multilateral guarantee would be appropriate.” Kim gave Lim Kim Jong-il’s reply on the evening of the 28th: “I appreciate the advice” but will reply “after a serious review” and turned down Lim’s requested meeting. (JoongAng Ilbo, “The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The Untold Story,” p. 18) Lim first met with Kim Yong-soon on ythe 27th. Given the low likelihood of meeting the demand for a non-aggression pact, Lim suggested a three-stage proposal: first, a letter of assurance on non-aggression from the Bush administration; second, a multilateral assurance against aggression from the United States, Russia and China, and third, a legally binding treaty of nonaggression with the United States. Li also conveyed a U.S. message: “We want North Korea to heed our public statement that we harbor no hostile intent and no intent to attack North Korea. If the North first expressed its willingness to abandon its HEUP, the United States would engage North Korea in dialogue.” He added, “As far as the United States is concerned, it would prefer bilateral talks in the frame of multilateral talks.” The North said, “We have already announced our position regarding this issue yesterday through government statements.” The North added, “We have not developed nuclear weapons. We do not have the intent to develop them at present. We are willing to prove it throughverification. As the nuclear issue is subject to resolution through direct talks between the United Statesand North Korea, we want to resolve it through fair direct talks with the United States ion equal footing.” He also said, “The nuclear issue is a product of the U.S. hostile policy to stifle our country.” Next they spoke with President Kim Young-nam who said, “The nuclear issue is a product of hostile U.S. policy against our country. President Bush threatens us as the aixs of evil and a target for preemptive nuclear attack, fabricating nuclear suspicions in a big fuss, and finally unilaterally abolishing the Agreed Framework. The United States is mobilizing international pressure against us, while avoiding dialogue with us. They are trying to internationalize the issue.” He added, “We will reciprocate good will with good will and a hardline with a hardline.” He proposed, “The United States should suspend its unilateral nuclear commotion and accept bilateral talks to build mutual confidence and to resolve the issue, by respecting our sovereignty anfd assuring us of nonaggression.” Kim Jong-il, Lim was told, wasd “visiting a provincial area on an important matter that requires his on-the-spot guidance, and therefore is not able to see you.” He then read telephone message from Chairman Kim, “I acknowledge the recipt of Kim Dae-jung’s letter, and I appreciate President Kim’s warm advice and the dispatch of his special envoy. Concerning President Kim;’s advice, I will inform you of my position after a serious review of his suggestions.” (Lim, Peacemaker, pp. 351-53)
1/28/03:
KCNA authorized to release report: “The situation on the Korean Peninsula is deteriorating so rapidly that an armed clash may break out quite contrary to the desire of the DPRK for the peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue. … While clamoring for the “peaceful settlement” and “multilateral talks,” the United States is stepping up the DPRK-targeted war preparations in full swing. … On the basis of such war preparations, former and present high-ranking officials of the U.S. military are asserting that in case the DPRK reprocesses the spent fuel rods, the U.S. should consider it as zero hour for its preemptive attack. To this end, the ultra-large aircraft carrier “Kitty Hawk” and warships belong to the seventh fleet of the U.S. navy which were supposed to sail toward the Gulf waters versed their voyage to appear in the waters off the Korean Peninsula on Jan. 25.” (“Report of Korean Central News Agency,” January 28, 2003)
1/31/03:
U.S. spy satellites detect trucks moving fuel rods out of storage throughout January. In addition to the truck traffic, one defense official said, the United States has also detected activity “you’d associate with an active weapons facility.” “They’re making the motions to get restarted,” the official said. “We’re talking about late winter when the reprocessing plant could be in operation.” Rumsfeld has pressed his top military advisers not only on the options for using force preemptively against North Korea but also on how … if needed to wage a serious conflict on the Korean peninsula, officials said. (David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Satellites Said to See Activity at North Korean Nuclear Site,” New York Times, January 31, 2003) Although “we don’t know for sure what’s happening … you’ve got to be concerned that spent fuel rods are being brought out of the facility,” said one U.S. official” (Paul Richter and Greg Miller, “U.S. Warns North Korea over Satellite Images,” Los Angeles Times, February 1, 2003, p. A-1) Bush administration officials have been blunter in private congressional briefings, saying the intelligence shows the North Koreans are clearly committed to building a nuclear stockpile,” congressional sources said. (Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Believes N. Korea Rapidly Seeking Stockpile,” Washington Post, February 1, 2003, p. A-1)
Bush signed National Security Presidential Document 17 authorizing nuclear response to chemical or biological attack earlier this year. (Nicholas Kralev, “Bush Signs Paper Allowing Nuclear Response,” Washington Times, January 31, 2003, p. 1)
2/2/03:
24 B-52 and B-1 bombers have been placed on alert for deployment to Guam. (Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Bombers on Alert to Deploy As Warning to North Koreans,” New York Times, February 4, 2003, p. A-1; Wall Street Journal, “Pyongyang in Mind, U.S. Will Boost Forces in Asia,” February 3, 2003, p. A-12) USFK did not request additional ground forces for Korean peninsula. (Seo Soo-min, “USFK Says No Request Made for Additional Ground Forces,” Korea Times, February 4, 2003)
2/3/03:
Roh’s special envoy, Chyung Dai-chul asks Rumsfeld to pursue active dialogue, a source traveling with the envoy said. The source said Rumsfeld reiterated that the U.S. has no intention to make any bargain with North Korea. (Kyodo, “Roh’s Special Envoy Urges Active U.S. Dialogue with N. Korea,” February 3, 2003) “I asked Washington to open direct U.S.-North Korea talks soon without conditions,” Chung told Korean reporters according to his aide, Park Jin-hyung. (Robert Burns, “North Korea: A Real Danger,” Associated Press, February 10, 2003)
2/4/03:
Dep SecState Armitage at SFRC: “First of all, of course we’re going to have to have direct talks with the North Koreans, there’s no question about it. Before we do that, we want to make sure, as I tried to indicate on the 16th of January, that we have, one, a strong international platform from which to have these talks; and number two, we don’t want this to become simply a problem between the United States and the DPRK. …There’s no question — I talked to the secretary about it this morning — we’re absolutely going to have to talk with them bilaterally. … Our suggestion is not quite that we handle these talks multilaterally, but that we have a multilateral umbrella, of any sort, in a bilateral discussion. … The big change in going from two to eight weapons would be on the danger of proliferation, for the United States. … I don’t think, given the poverty of North Korea, that it would be too long after she had a good amount of fissile material to do whatever she wanted to do with it first, that she would be inclined to engage with somebody, a non-state actor or a rogue state. However, I believe there’s another difference between Iraq and North Korea. We know, we think, what Kim Jong-il wants — at least the experience of our predecessors in previous administrations indicates — he wants some economic benefits and things of that nature, in exchange for these programs.” (Hearing Transcript, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 4, 2003) Bush was “off-the-wall angry” with Armitage’s testimony, said a senior administration official whose account was corroborated by several White House officials. (David E. Sanger, “U.S. Sees Quick Start of North Korea Nuclear Site,” New York Times, March 1, 2003, p. A-1) Armitage: Some people in the administration were very angry. But members of Congress were very happy. All of our allies in Asia were delighted. And what I said eventually became our policy.” (The Oriental Economist, 74, No. 3 (March 2006), p. 14) Administration insiders say Bush not angry with Armitage. Rice told State that Armitage had “gone off message” by talking about bilateral rather than multilateral talks. Bush and Armitage remain on good terms. (Oriental Economist, “Bombing on North Korea,” March 2003, p. 2)
In meeting with Deputy NSA Stephen Hadley, special envoy, Chyung Dai-chul and delegation urege3s bilateral talks with the North. Hadley counterproposes P5+5 (North and South Korea, Japan, Australia, EU). When they said the North wouldn’t accept that, he responded, “If that is the case, let the other nine countries work together to put pressure on the North.” (Quoted in Moon Chung-in, “Diplomacy of Defiance and Facilitation: The Six-Party Talks and the Roo Moo-hyun Government,” Asian Perspective, 32, No, 4 (2008), p.p. 78-79)
Chang Young-dal, Roh delegation member: “At heart, the North would like to have their regime guaranteed. I think the actions they have taken lately have come because they fear for their survival, because of the weakness of their regime and the difficult economic conditions. A the same time the United States must be prepared for a comprehensive dialogue with North Korea so a package settlement on the nuclear issue and the Korean peninsula situation can be resolved in the near future.” (David R. Sands, “S. Korean Official Says ‘Fear’ Motivates North,” Washington Times, February 4, 2003, p. 1)
At private dinner, American participants say, mouths dropped when a senior ROK envoy said that if had to choose, the incoming government would prefer that North Korea had nuclear weapons to seeing it collapse. “I sense major trouble ahead in the relationship,” said one. “The impression I got is that Roh and his generation, the ultimate goal is to reunite their country and get us off the peninsula.” Victor Cha: “This is a test of alliances, and if they can’t figure out how to deal with a real threat together, there’s not much of an alliance left.” (Howard W. French, “Reversals in U.S.-South Korea Links, and Some Jagged Fault Lines,” New York Times, February 11, 2003, p. A-17)
For the first time, South Korean tourists went by land through the DMZ to Mount Kumgang. Boarded a bus from the southern Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) and went 23.4 kilometers to the northern CIQ. (Kim Ki-tae, “Overland Route to Mt. Kumgang Open, Korea Times, February 5, 2003)
2/5/03:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The DPRK is now putting the operation of its nuclear facilities for the production of electricity on a normal footing after their restart.” (KCNA, February 5, 2003)
PIPA Poll taken 1/21-26: 83% say US should talk with North Korea, 76% favor reassuring North Korea by signing formal agreement not to attack each other, 79% favor trying to get AF back on track, 43% say North would forego nukes if confident it would not be attacked and 46% say it won’t, 56% say US should not withhold food aid and 39% say it should, 45% say US would have right to bomb reactors if it thought North making nukes and 51% say it wouldn’t
2/6/03:
SecSt Powell SFRC testimony: “no military option’s been taken off the table, although we have no intention of attacking North Korea as a nation or invading North Korea” –implicitly making exception for its nuclear sites. (James Dao, “Bush Administration Defends Its Approach on North Korea,” New York Times, February 7, 2003, A-13) “North Korea is a more direct threat to South Korea and to China and to Russia than anyone else. Now, those nations are also encouraging us, Quick. Quick. Talk to the North Koreans.” But China says it opposes nuclear arming. “If that is the Chinese position — and it is — then they have something of a responsibility and obligation to play a role in finding a way forward and simply saying the United States has to solve this by talking directly. We will talk directly.” (Glenn Kessler, “Bush Prods China, Russia on N. Korea Crisis,” Washington Post, February 8, 2003, p. A-16) Chmn Lugar (R-IN) to Powell on multilateralism: “I hope we do not let form trump substance here.” On extending Nunn-Lugar: “There may come a time when, in working with North Korea, we suggest to them that we might be helpful in securing weapons of mass destruction or materials of mass destruction or helping the destruction of those.” (Hearing transcript, SFRC)
Deputy SecDef Wolfowitz press conf: “[W]e are dealing with a regime that is desperate to survive. And the key to that survival they have to recognize has got to come from solving the increasingly failed desperate economic situation that they face. And the president said that the North Korean regime will find respect in the world and revival for its people only when it turns away from its nuclear ambitions. I think that is the key formula that has to be put in front of the North Koreans. I think it’s the key formula for resolving this conflict without the kind of terrible war we all want to avoid.” (Department of State, transcript, February 6, 2003)
Ri Pyong-gap, deputy director of the DPRK FoMin, warns in BBC interview, “In the United States, they published the fact that after Iraq, North Korea will be their next target.” “A preemptive attack is not something only the United States can do. We can also do that when it is a matter of life and death.” He adds, “We are fully ready to have a conversation with the United States. At the same time, we are fully ready to have a war with the United States. (BBC News, Transcript: North Korea Interview, February 6, 2003)
Yoneda Kenzo, senior vice minister in Japan’s Cabinet Office on North Korean nuclear program: “It’s a matter of life and death for Japan. [Over this issue] the people’s distrust of the Japan-U.S. alliance will prevail.” (Kawashima Kohei, “Japan Shouldn’t Tolerate Nuclear North Korea,” Yomiuri Shimbun, February 6, 2003)
FoMin deputy director Ri Pyong-gap interview: “BBC: On the way to your office this morning I got caught up in what was apparently a full-scale air raid we heard from the streets of Pyongyang. Do you really believe that America would bomb the city now? Ri: The United States have taken the aircraft carrier and the ship on the east coast of our country. They said also that they would bring another carrier which is moving around this area. They brought 24 fighter planes. A B-52 was [flown] through South Korea — they’ve deployed them. The real meaning is, they’re going to invade our country by force. BBC: What would you do if this build-up continues? Ri: The responses for this are very clear. If the United States steps their boots over the borderline, we’ll take strong countermeasures. A pre-emptive attack is not something only the United States can do. We can also do that, when it is a matter of life or death. BBC: You would even consider launching a pre-emptive strike against American forces? Ri: “We are fully ready to have a conversation with the United States — at the same time, we are fully ready to have war with the United States. … BBC: Do you fear that US forces may turn their full attention to your country once their current confrontation with Iraq is over? Ri:I already know that. In the United States, they published the fact that after Iraq, North Korea will be their next target. After Iraq they will make war with North Korea.” (BBC Today, “Interview with Ri Pyong-gap, Feburary 6, 2002)
Rumsfeld ‘snowflake’: “We have to have an excellent memo on North Korea to the PC by tomorrow, or Sunday at the latest, so I can edit it when I get back (if you can’t fax it to me overseas). We have to get hold of this policy. It is not going well.” (SecDef Donald Rumsfeld, Memo to UnderSecDef Douglas Feith, February 6, 2003, Rumsfeld Papers)
2/7/03:
Pentagon officials confirm aircraft carrier Carl Vinson ordered to Japan, replacing the Kitty Hawk deployed to the Persian Gulf. (James Dao, “Bush Urges Chinese President To Press North Korea on Arms,” New York Times, February 8, 2003, p. A-10)
ROK officials: US has satellite images of steam coming from reactor, a sign it is operating. (JoongAng Ilbo, “North May Have Started Its Reactor, Officials Say,” February 7, 2003)
Bush telephones Jiang Zemin, says he “reminded him that we have a joint responsibility to uphold the goal that we talked about in Crawford.” China says U.S. needs direct dialogue. “They’re carrying Pyongyang’s water instead of ours,” complained one senior U.S. official. “The Chinese could cut them off, and in six months North Korea would be in dire circumstances.” (Glenn Kessler, “Bush Prods China, Russia on N. Korea Crisis,” Washington Post, February 8, 2003, p. A-16) “President Bush had been so frustrated that he raised the ante in a phone call with Chinese President Jiang Zemin. Before getting on the call, he asked me what more he could say to move Beijing. I suggested that he raise the specter, ever so gently, of a military option against North Korea. He liked the idea, and when Jiang began to revcite the timeworn mantra about the need for the Unitred States to show more flexibility with the North, the President stopped him. A bit more directly than I’d expected, he told Jiang that he was under a lot of pressure from hard-liners to use military force and added, on his own, that one also couldn’t rule out a nuclear Japan if the North remained unconstrained.” (Rice, No Higher Honor, p. 148)
2/9/03:
Sweden won’t suspend aid despite nuclear crisis. (Korea Times, “Sweden to Continue Aid to N.K. Despite Nuke Issue,” February 9, 2003)
2/10/03:
Richard Haass, dir policy plans, in Seoul
Rodong Sinmun signed article: “The Korean people are single-heartedly united around the great illustrious commander … This is a weapon of the revolution more powerful than a nuclear weapon …” (KCNA, “DPRK Boasts Single-Hearted Unity More Powerful Than Nuke,” February 10, 2003)
PM Kim Suk-soo to National Assembly: “North Korea is believed to have extracted enough plutonium to make one or two bombs before 1994. Since there has been no confirmation that it actually has produced nuclear weapons, we believe that they do not have any.” (Los Angeles Times, “South Korea Differs with U.S.,” February 11, 2003)
Chun Young-woo, ROK dir-gen of intl orgs: “Nobody is talking about sanctions now. Going to the Security Council doesn’t mean diplomatic efforts end.” (Don Kirk, “Seoul Sees Nuclear Crisis with North Headed for UN,” International Herald Tribune, February 11, 2003, p. 4)
2/11/03:
IAEA refers North Korea nuclear issue to UN Security Council. Senior US official says North sent signals via back-channel they won’t reprocess and are prepared to “wait and wait” for US to come to negotiating table. “I don’t discount it entirely.” (Glenn Kessler, “N. Korea Standoff Sent to UN Council,” Washington Post, February 13, 2003, p. A-1)
IAEA “decides to report … the DPRK’s noncompliance and the Agency inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material subject to safeguards … and in parallel stresses its desire for a peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue and its support for diplomatic means to that end.” (Text of IAEA resolution, February 12, 2003)
JoongAng Ilbo poll in January shows Koreans of all age groups shifting left, those in their 40s most of all, with 34% identifying as progressive, 35% centrist, 31% conservative. (JoongAng Ilbo, “Poll Shows Koreans Are Shifting to the Left,” February 11, 2003)
Tony Hall, US amb to UN food agencies says US delaying food pledges amid “credible” reports of diversion. “We are going to continue to be there because we don’t use food as a weapon,” he said. “But we are going to be darn sure that if we tell you where the food is supposed to be and you give it to someone else, then we’re going to wait, and we’re going to be darn sure that our food is getting through to the right people.” US gave most, $61 million, last year. So far this year, under $15 million pledged. (Nicole Winfield, “U.S. Delays North Korea Food Pledges,” Associated Press, February 11, 2003)
Rep Curt Weldon (R-PA): “There needs to be informal dialogue. That’s the biggest problem. No one is having discussions.” (James Dao, “U.S. to Ask Atom Agency to Chastise North Korea,” New York Times, February 12, 2003, p. A-19)
Indonesian presidential envoy Nana Sutresna, back from Feb 8-11 visit to Pyongyang says North wants direct talks. (Shun Yong-bae, “N.K. Insists on Direct U.S. Talks,” February 13, 2003)
SecDef Rumsfeld discloses plans to pull U.S. forces back from the DMZ, out of range of North Korean artillery and better position to counterattack the North. (Chosun Ilbo, “USFK Redeployment Mulled,” February 14, 2003)
North delegation in Seoul for four days of talks on economic cooperation. (Ho Ji-ho, “Pyongyang Mission Here for Economic Discussion,” Korea Herald, February 12, 2003)
Japan intell chief Ota Fumio to LDP defense cmte: “North Korea is pursuing weapons development,” not just raising stakes to bargain program away. (Doug Struck with Sakamaki Sachiko, “Japan Assents to U.S. View on N. Korea,” Washington Post, February 13, 2003, p. A-27)
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Rumsfeld slandered the DPRK, calling it ‘terrorist regime’ all of a sudden for no reason. … It is a stark fact that the DPRK has nothing to do with terrorism and has consistently maintained the stand of opposing any form of terrorism, which was admitted by the U.S. administration authorities in the past.” (KCNA, “U.S. Defense Secretary’s Anti-DPRK Remarks Refuted,” February 12, 2003)
2/?/03:
DoD studies military options. “What we did,” recalled Douglas Feith, undersecretary of defense, “was … look at the problem and try to inventory what are the sources and types of leverage that we have … what’s the full range of things we can do to induce or coerce a country like that to modify its behavior.” Said one senior U.S. military figure, “You would hope that they picked up the signals clearly and they revcognized we were dead serious about their nuclear capability.” (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 161)
2/12/03:
DCI Tenet worldwide threat briefing to Senate Armed Services Cmte: “Kim Jong-il’s attempts this past year to parlay the North’s nuclear weapons program into political leverage suggest he is trying to negotiate a fundamental different relationship with Washington — one that implicitly tolerates the North’s nuclear weapons program.” (Michael Gordon with Felicity Barringer, “North Korea Wants Arms, and More Aid from U.S., Chief of C.I.A. Suggests,” New York Times, February 13, 2003, p. A-17) Tenet says, North “probably” has “one or two plutonium-based devices” while CIA report says it “probably has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons.” (Paul Kerr, “Intelligence Chiefs Paint Grim Picture of Proliferation,” Arms Control Today, 33, No. 3 (March 2003), p. 23)
North Korea prepared to test-fire Taepodong 2 missile engine in January but did no test, U.S. sources say. The sources do not rule out the possibility trouble caused it not to test. (Kyodo, “N. Korea Prepared for Missile Engine Test in Jan.,” February 13, 2003) US and Japanese sources say they did test. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Pyongyang ‘Tested Rocket Booster in Jan.,” February 28, 2003)
2/13/03:
Chief cabinet secy Fukuda Yasuo: “We do not want [missile tests] to be conducted. That would further narrow the window of opportunity for talks.” (Kyodo, “Japan Urges N. Korea Not to Conduct Missile Testing, February 13, 2003
Roh to Federation of Korean Trade Unions and Korean Confederation of Trade Unions: “It is better to struggle than to suffer death in a war.” Sounding like he was still campaigning for office, he added, “Koreans should stand together, although things will get difficult when the United States bosses us around.” (Howard W. French, “U.S. Approach on North Korea Is Straining Alliances in Asia,” New York Times, February 24, 2003, p. A-9)
ROK MOFAT statement: “We hope the UN Security Council can prevent the situation from deteriorating and can handle the issue in a way that encourages a diplomatic solution.” PRC FoMin spokeswomen Zhang Qiyue: “Just because we agreed that the IAEA will report this to the Security Council does not mean we think the Security Council should be involved right now,” adding, “We hope the North Korea issue can still have a political settlement by means of the two sides talking. We hope the international community can be more patient.” Russia FoMin says IAEA decision a “premature and counterproductive move that doesn’t help to establish a constructive and trusting dialogue between the interested parties.” (Lee Soo-Jeong, “Russia, China, South Korea Urge U.N. Security Council to Pursue Diplomatic Solution to North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” Associated Press, February 13, 2003)
ROK postpones purchase of 48 Patriot missiles (JoongAng Ilbo, “Seoul Delays Buying 48 Patriot Missiles,” February 13, 2003)
Amb Pak Gil-yon text at NGO Committee on Disarmament: Bush, Powell and White House spokesman “said that North Korea would receive such benefits as ‘energy support’ and ‘food aid’ only if it dismantled its nuclear program. This only indicates that there is no change in the U.S. stand that the U.S. will have a dialogue with the DPRK only after it scraps its nuclear program. … If the UN Security Council … does not call the U.S. wrong Korea policy to task, the organization will turn out to be partial and the DPRK will, accordingly, not recognize it.” Sigal: “A face-saving way is needed to begin negotiations. Let me suggest one — using multilateral auspices to initiate direct bilateral U.S.-D.P.R.K. negotiations. If the United States says it is willing to enter into direct bilateral negotiations with the D.P.R.K. on issues of concern to the North and is prepared in principle, as part of a bilateral accord, to provide the security assurances it seeks, then the D.P.R.K. should agree to an opening meeting under the auspices of the P-5+5 and to halt its plutonium and uranium enrichment activities while bilateral negotiations proceed, as well as to indicate its willingness in principle, as part of a bilateral accord, to live up to all its obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Agreed Framework, including inspections of all its nuclear facilities. The P-5+5 could later endorse or act as a guarantor for any U.S.-D.P.R.K. agreement, upgrading its international status and providing some assurance against its breach by either party.” Pak, referred to January 25 statement and said “we will never have multilateral talks,” then asked for copy of talk.
2/14/03:
Kim Dae-jung in televised speech says he was aware of illegal payments to North Korea before 2000 summit, apologizes, “The government allowed it [Hyundai Merchant Marine’s transfer] out of the belief that it would help peace between the two Koreas and promote the national interest, despite the problems it had legally (Oh Young-jin, “Kim Apologizes for Summit Scandal,” Korea Times, February 14, 2003)
Bush administration developing plans for sanctions against the DPRK that would include halting its weapons shipments and cutting off money sent there by Koreans living in Japan if it continues developing nuclear weapons, senior administration officials say. The officials said late last week the administration had no plans to push for sanctions soon, since the Pacific allies still oppose the idea and the UN Security Council is likely to remain focused on Iraq for weeks. But the Pentagon and State Department are developing detailed plans for sanctions, and perhaps other actions, senior officials said. Many officials worry that if the US attacks Iraq, the DPRK will use opportunity to push forward with weapons production. “If they start to dismantle their weapons programs, then we can talk about incentives,” a senior administration official said. “But if they torque up the pressure, you’re looking at the other direction. That’s when sanctions become much more likely.” Pentagon planners are looking closely at using American military forces to stop, turn back or seize ships and aircraft from North Korea that are suspected of carrying missiles or nuclear weapons materials [PSI], officials said. At a Senate hearing last week, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld hinted at that strategy, “I see North Korea as a threat as a proliferator more than I see them as a nuclear threat on the peninsula,” Mr. Rumsfeld said. “Unless the world wakes up and says this is a dangerous thing and creates a set of regimes that will in fact get cooperation to stop those weapons, we’re going to be facing a very serious situation in the next five years.” The sanctions package would also probably include measures intended to cut off remittances to North Korea from Korean-owned gambling parlors in Japan and allow the interdiction of drug trafficking from North Korea. North Korean groups, some linked to the government, run a thriving trade in illegal methamphetamines in northern Asia, Western officials say [IAI]. “Direct talks are an indispensable ingredient of a solution here,” said Ashton B. Carter, a former Pentagon official who is now a professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. “The issue is only when and what to say. Once we figure that out, we can begin the experiment of seeing whether or not North Korea can be talked out of going nuclear.” (James Dao, “US Planning Sanctions Against North,” New York Times, February 17, 2003, p. A-1)
2/15/03:
Kim Jae-rok, DPRK energy director, in interview with BBC-4 in Pyongyang: North plans to build four more nuclear plants. (Mike Thomson (BBC-4 Today correspondent), “North Korea to Build Four More Nuclear Reactors,” Sunday Telegraph, February 16, 2003)
2/16/03:
Scowcroft/Poneman op-ed: “Within weeks, North Korea may start reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods containing enough plutonium for five to six nuclear weapons. … We should work with our allies in Seoul and Tokyo to make clear that separation of that plutonium from the spent fuel would constitute a “red line” that Pyongyang would cross only at its peril. While attacking the Yongbyon facility is an option of last resort, the best way to ensure that we do not need to consider it is to deter Pyongyang now by demonstrating strategic clarity on this point. Second, we should propose to North Korea that, in exchange for freezing all nuclear activities, we would be prepared to discuss the full range of security issues affecting the peninsula. While the president is right not to yield to blackmail, under this approach there is no need to “pay” Pyongyang to adhere to past commitments. Instead the United States should propose to go beyond the 1994 Agreed Framework to a comprehensive approach that, for example, expands the inspection rights of the International Atomic Energy Agency throughout North Korea and immediately secures the removal of the 8,000 spent fuel rods from the peninsula.” (Brent Scowcroft and Daniel Poneman, “Korea Can’t Wait,” February 16, 2003, Washington Post, p. B-7)
2/18/03:
DPRK FM Paek Nam-sun meets PRC Vice FM Wang Yi in Beijing. PRC FoMin spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue: “Both sides had a deep and broad discussion on the nuclear issue in North Korea, and exchanged views on the issue. Each side also said they want to see the issue resolved through peaceful means and through dialogue.” (Lisa Rose Weaver, “China, North Korea Meet over Nuclear Deadlock,” CNN, February 18, 2003)
“The Panmunjom mission of the Korean People’s Army is authorized to declare that the KPA side will be left with no option but to take a decisive step to abandon its commitment to implement the Armistice Agreement as a signatory to it and free itself from the binding force of all its provisions, regarding the possible sanctions to be taken by the U.S. side …” (KCNA, “Spokesman for Panmunjom Mission of KPA Issues Statement,” February 18, 2003)
“I believe the danger of war on the Korean Peninsula is slight — in fact, nonexistent,” Kim Dae-jung told his cabinet this morning. “I wouldn’t put too much weight on whether North Korea will actually initiate any real conflict,” said one ROK official. The problem is I Washington “you’ve got a lot of people who haven’t watched the North-South situation in the past. Suddenly you’ve got these amateurs with lots of ideas.” (Cho Joohee and Doug Struck, “Seoul Plays Down N. Korea’s Threat on Armistice,” Washington Post, February 19, 2003, p. A-17)
2/?/03:
Defense Minister Ishiba Shigeru threatens to preempt: “Our nation will use military force as a self-defense measure if they start to resort to arms against Japan.” (Howard W. French, “U.S. Approach on North Korea Is Straining Alliances in Asia,” New York Times, February 24, 2003, p. A-9)
2/?/03:
Oil flow from China to North Korea suspended for three days.
2/20/03:
North Korean fighter jet crosses NLL over Yellow Sea at 10:03 a.m., first such airborne intrusion in 20 years. (Barbara Demick, “N. Korean MIG Flies into South’s Airspace,” Los Angeles Times, February 20, 2003)
Ra Jong-yil, soon to be Roh’s national security adviser, meets unnamed North Korean in Beijing . US informed in advance and Powell told of meeting when he came to Seoul for inauguration. (Oh Young-hwan, “Roh Aide Met North Envoy in China,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 5, 2003) (Oh Young-jin, “Roh’s Aide Confirms Secret Meeting with N. Korean Official,” Korea Times, March 5, 2003)
A 1995 JDA study concludes it is unlikely the U.S. would allow North Korea to develop nuclear weapons. The study said, “As a Major threat to the credibility of the NPT, [North Korea’s nuclear program] is a problem the United States cannot ignore, and it is unlikely that the U.S. would tolerate North Korean nuclear weapons.” (Asahi Shimbun, “Japanese Nuclear Weapons Inconsistet with National Interest: Defense Agency Internal Report,” Feburary 20, 2003)
2/21/03:
Roh presidential transition cmte aims for a peace treaty with North (Ryu Jin, “Roh Seeks to Replace Armistice with Peace Treaty,” Korea Times, February 21, 2003)
2/20-21/03:
Wit, Albright Track II with Choe in Berlin on verification (Sakajiri Nobuyoshi, “U.S., North Korea Met in Berlin on Nuclear Issue,” Asahi Shimbun, March 6, 2003)
2/22/03:
SecSt Powell in Japan, then China, then Korea to attend Roh inauguration on 25th: “China has considerable influence.” A senior State Dept off: “They can do more.” (James Dao, “Powell Seeks China’s Help, and, at U.N., Its Abstention,” New York Times, February 24, 2003), p. A-9)
2/24/03:
Powell in Beijing. First discussion of trilateral talks. (Yoon interview, Oh Young-jin “’Bush Told Roh of Seoul’s Exclusion from Nuke Talks on April 4,’” Korea Times, April 18, 2003) Hu Jintao, about to be president of China, says US should hold “direct dialogues” with DPRK “as soon as possible.” Chinese diplomat: “We are not going to read the riot act to Kim Jong-il or engage in economic sanctions, because if the regime collapses all of Northeast Asia will face instability.” Chinese govt adviser: “We are not linking the issues [Taiwan and North Korea]. But what we are saying is this: The United States cannot expect us to continually give unless it gives us something, too. That’s how the real world works.” Wang Jisi: “We have gone out of our way to cooperate and coordinate, at least privately, with the United States on Iraq and North Korea. But what have we gotten in return? Right, now the American attitude is that we are doing all of this for our own benefit, that we’ve been a free rider, that we’re not active enough, that we should have done more. This is a disappointing attitude.” (John Pomfret, “Beijing Is Cool to Powell’s Pleas,” Washington Post, February 25, 2003, p. A-19) China tried to persuade him to hold bilateral talks. (David E. Sanger, “North Koreans and U.S. Plan Talks in Beijing,” New York Times, April 16, 2003, p.A-1) Powell press conf: “the United States and China share the goal of a diplomatic and peaceful resolution to this problem. It cannot simply be treated, hwoever, as a bilateral matter between the United States and North Korea.” (DOS, “Secretary Colin L. Powell’s Press Conbference,” Beijing, February 24, 2004) Powell later said he pressed China to “rise to its responsibilities in dealing with this regional problem.” In March Vice PM Qian Qichen flew to Pyongyang to say that “there would be no alternative to multilateral talks in which all countries of the region would be fully involved, China included.” (DOS, “Secretary of State Powell’s Remarks at Conference on China-U.S. Relations,” College Station, Texas, November 5, 2003) “I said, ‘Look … you really should want a discussion to take place,’” Powell recalls. “’You really have to be the spark plug in making all this happen.’” He knew “the last thing [Bush] wanted to do … because of the political world he lives in” was to look soft on Pyongyang. “We had to tell the Chinese that the only way I could get this thing going without hugew problems back [home] was [for them] to say, ‘No, no, there’s not going to be any bilateral meeting, this is trilateral.” (Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell (New York: Knopf, 2006), p. 474) BBC: Do you fear that US forces may turn their full attention to your country once their current confrontation with Iraq is over?
Kim Dae-jung, in final speech as ROK Pres, “More than anything, dialogue between North Korea and the United States is the key to a solution.” (Howard W. French, “U.S. Approach on North Korea Is Straining Alliances in Asia,” New York Times, February 24, 2003, p. A-9)
Australia FM Alexander Downer: “Whether one likes it or not — and I don’t particularly like it — this will have to be resolved bilaterally.” (Paul Eckert, “S. Korea’s Kim Urges U.S. Nuclear Talks with North,” Reuters, February 24, 2003)
Glenn D. Paige: “It is time for the U.S. to wake up. It must shift from its Cold War mindset of paternalism and enmity to become a constructive partner in helping all Koreans to achieve their historic task of independent peaceful reintegration.” (Glenn D. Paige, “The U.S. and Korea: Time to Wake Up,” Korea Times, February 24, 2003)
Roh interview: “I want to stress that North Korea was opening up and that it is already changing. If we give them what they desperately want — regime security, normal treatment, and economic assistance — they will be willing to give up their nuclear ambitions. We should not, therefore, treat them as criminals but as partners in negotiations.” (George Wehrfritz and B.J. Lee, “’A Life or Death Issue,’” Newsweek, February 23, 2003)
Powell in Tokyo, “You can’t eat plutonium. As long as you pursue those technologies, those who can help you grow the things that you can eat and develop an economy that will assist your people can’t help you.” (James Dao, “Powell Seeks China’s Help, and, at U.N., Its Abstention,” New York Times, February 24, 2003), p. A-9)
2/25/03:
Two hours before Roh’s inauguration, North Korea fires short-range antiship cruise missile into Sea of Japan. (Doug Struck, “N. Korea Fires Missile on Eve of Transition in the South,” Washington Post, February 25, 2003, p. A-1) U.S. intelligence official: “It appears to be a Silkworm variant that they modified to get a longer range.” (Bill Gertz, “North Korea Tested a Cruise Missile,” Washington Times, February 27, 2003, p. 4) DefMin Cho Young-kil at National Assembly Defense Cmte on March 6 calls it a failed attempt to test a new type of cruise missile, (Seo Soo-min and Ryu Jin, “NK’s Missile Test Failed,” Korea Times, March 7, 2003)
Powell: North has not started reactor or reprocessing facility. “I think that’s a wise choice if it’s a conscious decision.” (George Gedda, “Powell Says North Korea Has Not Restarted Plutonium Facility,” Associated Press, February 25, 2003)
US cuts food aid to 100,000 tons, 40,000 tons initially, says additional aid conditioned on “donors’ ability to access all vulnerable groups and monitor distribution. (Press Statement by Richard Boucher, Seoul, February 25, 2003)
PIPA poll taken February 12-18: If US diplomatic and economic efforts do not succeed in stopping North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, should the US move toward taking military action against North Korea? Yes 54% No 36% What if South Korea is strongly opposed toward the US moving toward taking military action? Would you still favor moving toward military action or not? Yes, still favor 68% No, would not 29%
2/26/03:
Spy satellites detect steam plume from Yongbyon reactor. (David E. Sanger, “U.S. Sees Quick Start of North Korean Nuclear Site,” New York Times, March 1, 2003, p. A-1) North Korea restarted reactor in past four or five days, say U.S. officials. (Walter Pincus and Glenn Kessler, “N. Korea Restarts Nuclear Facility,” Washington Post, February 27, 2003, p. A-23)
Dick Garwin: “Capability of centrifuge plant with machines giving 3 SWU/yr each: Once kg HEU contains 200 SWU. Some 60 kg of HEU have 12,000 SWU. This would be three years product of 1300 high-performance centrifuge machines.”
2/27/03:
China-Russia joint communiqué after talks between FMs Igor Ivanov and Tang Jiaxuan: “Equal and constructive dialogue between the US and the DPRK on the nuclear issue of the DPRK will be of great significance to the normalization of relations between the DPRK and the US. Both China and Russia are ready to actively push for a political resolution of the nuclear issue in both the bilateral and multilateral arena.” (AFP, “China, Russia Press US, As NK Accused of Firing Up Nuke Plant,” February 27, 2003)
2/28/03:
UN special envoy Maurice Strong in Seoul for inauguration: “The main parties are talking past each other at the moment, not to each other.” (Seo Soo-min, “Seoul May Pledge More Food Aid to NK Soon,” Korea Times, February 28, 2003)
Minju Chosun signed commentary: “These joint military exercises are to be staged after the U.S. imperialists have recently deployed scores of B-52, B-1 strategic bombers and several communication commanding and special reconnaissance planes close to the Korean Peninsula and put the 7th U.S. air force present in South Korea into a “semi-war state” under the pretext of coping with an “emergency.” This is increasing the possibility of their preemptive attack on the DPRK.” (KCNA, “U.S. Planned Saber-Rattling Under Fire,” February 28, 2003)
3/1/03:
Japan reconsidering LWR project. Senior official: “We will have to start thinking about suspending KEDO.” (Takahashi Junko, “Japan to Rethink KEDO Program,” Japan Times, March 1, 2003) US, ROK, Japan agree to suspend project. (Shim Jae-yun, “Allies Agree to Staff Construction of Two NK Reactors,” Korea Times, March 2, 2003)
Admin offs and intell offs expect reprocessing plant to resume operation in next few weeks. Spy satellites show activity “checking off the list, one by one,” says a senior official. “Once they start reprocessing, it’s a bomb a month from now on until summer.” Sharpens struggle over negotiating. In a safe in an office down the hall from the Oval Office, one senior official keeps a list of options for squeezing the North — everything from cutting off cash from Japan and trade with China, to ordering what officials call “maritime interdiction” of missile exports. But each turn of the screws requires the help of reluctant allies. “Without the agreement of the South Koreans, it is simply not going to happen,” a senior Japanese official said. “I can’t imagine we could engage in such an activity, which would be so close to military action.” Scowcroft said recently, “If you won’t talk to them, you won’t get a freeze.” “The problem with a red line,” one senior admin official said, “is that North Korea will walk right up to it.” (David E. Sanger, “U.S. Sees Quick Start of North Korea Nuclear Site,” New York Times, March 1, 2003, p. A-1)
Pro- and anti-US demonstrations in Seoul on anniversary of Japanese colonial rule.
3/2/03:
Four NK fighters, two MiG-29s and two MiG 23s, intercept USAF RC-135S in international airspace over Sea of Japan, say U.S. officials. “It’s a very serious incident,” a senior defense official said. “Our indications are that it wasn’t an accidental event.” (Bradley Graham and Glenn Kessler, “N. Korea Tails U.S. Spy Plane,” Washington Post, March 4, 2003, p. A-1) They “came within 50 feet,” says Lt-Cmdr Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman. (Paul Eckert and Charles Aldinger, “U.S. Angry over North Korea Near-Miss amid Crisis,” Reuters, March 4, 2003) One NK pilot “was waving at them to get out of there.” Whether they “locked on” with fire-control radar, as first thought, under study. (Eric Schmitt, “North Korea MiG’s Intercept U.S. Jet on Spying Mission,” New York Times, March 4, 2003), p. A-1) DoD official: “The North Korean MiG fighters carried heat-seeking missiles, which do not require radar targeting.” (Kim Hyung-jin, “N.K. Jets’ Radar Was not locked on U.S. Spy Plane,” Korea Herald, March 8, 2003) North Koreans were trying to force spy plane to land, a senior defense official says on March 7. No way of know for sure, say Pentagon officials. (Eric Schmitt, “North Korean Fliers Said to Have Sought Hostages,” New York Times, March 8, 2003, p. A-1) “I saw on the U.S. side a desire to reach out and touch the North Koreans in an interesting way by having our aircraft up there sniffing, so to speak,” said a U.S. official based in Seoul, “and that this was part of the overall demonstration effect of our military capabilities. But it was also a protective measure of putting aircraft there that could possibly detect nuclear-related activities.” (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 163) Reportedly, one of the pilots asked for permission to fire, but whether this was bravado or a serious step, permission was denied. After twenty minutes the U.S. aircraft turned back to its base on Okinawa. (Oberdorfer and Carlin, The Two Koreas, p. 393(
Aso Taro, LDP policy chief: “Economic sanctions should be effective in containing such [nuclear] activities.” (Kyodo, “Japan Should Consider Sanctions on N. Korea over Nuclear Issue,” March 2, 2003)
CIA reports, based on North Korean defector, suggest disaffection with Kim Jong-il, retracted within the past two weeks as not credible, but the reports may have influenced some. One official who did not put much stock in the reports: “There are people in this administration who will leap at anything” to justify their stance. (Glenn Kessler, Defector’s Data May Have Led to U.S. Hard Line on N. Korea,” Washington Post, March 2, 2003, p. A-10)
3/3/03:
Kim Jong-il quoted by KCNA: “Should a war break out on the Korean Peninsula due to the U.S. imperialists, it will escalate into a nuclear war.” (Keith Bradsher, “North Korea Says a U.S. Attack Could Lead to a Nuclear War,” New York Times, March 3, 2003, p. )
Bush admin expects reprocessing but initially “won’t do anything,” says administration official knowledgeable about Korea policy. “Some in the Bush administration think this [reprocessing] would not be a bad thing,” says a Senate staff member briefed on admin policy, but will alienate neighbors who have tried to conciliate it and help build untied front to confront North . (Barbara Slavin, “U.S. Will Wait Out N. Korea Situation,” USA Today, March 4, 2003, p. 1)
Piece of North Korean missile found in Alaska, report to National Assembly claims. (Ryu Jin, ‘NK Missile Warhead Found in Alaska,” Korea Times, March 4, 2003)
3/4/03:
Bush interview on diplomatic efforts: “If they don’t work diplomatically, they’ll have to work militarily. And military option is our last choice. Options are on the table, but I believe we can deal with this diplomatically. I really do.” Ted Kennedy (D-MA) on “Today”: “It’s amazing that we’re about to go to war with a country that doesn’t have nuclear weapons and we refuse to talk to a country that already has produced them.” (Associated Press, “Bush Says North Korea Must Be Convinced It Is Wrong to Be Threatening U.S. with Nuclear Program,” March 4, 2003) “One quarter of the South’s population was literally under North Korean guns. The classified ‘Net Assessment on Military Balance in Korea’ said there was a small chance that North Korea could actually win a conventional war. … The reaction of China … was also hard to predict. As vice president, Cheney was ‘mindful of just how hard it is to come up with military plans’ for North Korea, [Stephen] Yates [senior Asia policy adviser to the VP] said. Cheney sometimes said ‘targeted military strikes might be something we’d have to consider, but I never heard him as an adviocate. We never satisfied him with an adequate set options where we could reasonably put a lot of pressure on the North Koreans and the Chinese without having an unacceptable level of risk.’” (Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), p. 230)
Memo from NSA Rice to PC members: “U.S. Policy: Any resolution must remove the tools of blackmail (nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability) from North Korea’s hands. We seek the complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of North Korea’s weapons program. …A durable resolution will not be achieved quickly or easily, but we must not settle for an incomplete resolution that merely papers over this longstanding problem. The United States seeks a peaceful, diplomatic solution however[. The President has said that while] all options remain on the table[, the United States has no intention of invading North Korea]. …We have proposed multilateral talks to North Korea and we remain prepared to engage in such talks.[ In this multilateral format, we are prepared top discuss all issues, including DPRK interest in security assurances.] …Because this is an issue affecting the interests of many states, the United States will not engage in bilateral talks with North Korea regarding its nuclear weapons program. …Should North Korea verifiably eliminate its nuclear weapons program and take responsible steps toward greater engagement with the international community, it will find that the international community, including the United States, is prepared to respond. North Korea’s economy is shattered; it needs help from the outside world just to feed its people. The President has expressed his concern for the plight of the North Korean people and stated that we will continue to help feed them in spite of our differences with the North Korean Governmet. Donors’ ability to access all vulnerable groups and monitor distribution in North Korea is not satisfactory. The US calls on North Korea to enable the international community to feed its people by meeting international standards of monitoring and access. However, help and engagement — beyond humanitarian assistance — is made impossible by North Korea’s recent behavior.” (Memo from NSA Condoleezza Rice to PC, “North Korea Policy Points” based on State and Defense input seeking comments/concurrence, March 4, 2003, [bracketed ad italicized language is SecDef’s edits] Rumsfeld Papers)
RSOI/FE (Resourcing, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration/Foal Eagle) exercise starts with preparations to receive 5000 US troops.
Pentagon announces Rumsfeld ordered 12 B-1s and 12 B-52s to Guam this weekend before March 1 incident. “This incident also tells me they’re clearly calibrating the types of steps they’re taking toward the United States,” said one intell official. “They haven’t quite reached the point where they’ve gone across any red lines. But they’re bumping up pretty close.” (Bradley Graham and Doug Struck, “U.S. Officials Anticipate More Provocations by North Korea,” Washington Post, March 5, 2003) RS-135 flights “temporarily on hold,” says senior admin official, while military “is reviewing what happened and deciding what to continue” — to arm or escort them. (Barbara Slavin, “Pentagon Halts Flights After N. Korea Incident,” USA Today, March 5, 2003, p. 7)
Roh in first invw as president tells US not to overreact. “It was a very predictable chain of events.” Describing stepped up US surveillance: “A very strong threat against a counterpart can be a very effective means of negotiation. I am urging the US not to go too far.” On negotiation: “Ultimately, this problem has to be resolved by President Bush and Chairman Kim Jong-il, and they have to be moved to solve the problem,” he said. “In this regard I beli3eve Prime Minister Blair’s role is very important.” (Robert Thomson and Richard Lloyd Perry,” “’Don’t Go Too Far,’ South Korean Leader Tells Bush,” Times (London), March 5, 2003)
Cha Young-koo, assistant defense minister for policy, at briefing of parliamentary leaders: “At present there is no possibility that the United States will pull all its ground forces out of South Korea. But there is a possibility it will reduce them.” (Shim Young-bae, “U.S. May Reduce Troops: Seoul Official,” Korea Herald, March 5, 2003)
UnifMin Jeong Se-hyun in radio invw on military option: “That kind of scenario is nothing more than groundless imagination. How could the United States ignore South Korea’s position and go against it while pursuing its North Korea policy?” (AFP, “U.S. Won’t Strike North Korea’s Suspected Nuke Site: South Korea,” March 5, 2003)
US, Asian countries beginning to accept idea of nuclear-armed North Korea. Kono Taro, LDP Dietman: “We need to be debating how to live with North Korea, with or without nuclear weapons.” Rep. Mark S. Kirk (R-IL): “The total red line is sale of nuclear weapons material.” U.S. officials quietly dropped phrase “no hostile intent” from talking points, an official says. “It’s clear North Korea has hostile intent to us.” (Doug Struck and Glenn Kessler, “Foes Giving in to N. Korea’s Nuclear Aims,” Washington Post, March 5, 2003, p. A-1)
North Korea regards the steps it has taken to revive its nuclear program as the logical reaction to an American decision to break a deal in which it promised to give aid and pledged never to attack. … Just weeks after the AF was signed in late 1994, a huge Republican win in Congress undermine the Clinton admin’s ability to implement it. Stephen Bosworth: “There are reasons why the North Koreans might think we weren’t totally sincere” in implementing the agreement. Then came the October 12 communiqué. For Kim Jong-il’s government the document amounted to almost a first draft of a nonaggression pact between the two countries, say officials who have had extensive dealings with the North Koreans. If the Bush administration had endorsed the communiqué “things would have been very different right now,” asserts Bosworth. The siege mentality was palpable to Cui Yingjiu, one of China’s veteran Korea experts, when he visited Pyongyang last year: “The crux of the matter is that they believe what the Bush administration wants is regime change.” (David S. Cloud and Jay Solomon, with Charles Hutzler and Carla Anne Robbins, “How U.S., North Korea Turned Broken Deals into a Standoff,” Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2003, p. A-1)
Japan hopes to keep open dialogue channel with DPRK. Chief Cabinet Secy Fukuda Yasuo: “Would it be possible to generate adequate results if we were to go ahead with sanctions alone?” Rejecting U.S. idea that Japan go along with U.S. on sanctions, “If sanctions are implemented it would have to be done with international cooperation.” Younger LDP Diet members including Yamomoto Ichita of Upper House have drafted a bill authorizing the government to ban ships of certain countries entry into ports (Asahi Shimbun, “Japan Considers Sanctions As North’s Provocations Escalate,” March 7, 2003)
Funabashi column: Sunshine policy lacked transparency, verification, reciprocity — and human rights. (Funabashi Yoichi, “Kim Dae-jung, Like Icarus, Flew Too Close to the Sun,” Asahi Shimbun, March 4, 2003)
3/6/03:
Bush at press conf: “This is a regional issue. I say a regional issue because there’s a lot of countries that have got a direct stake into whether or not North Korea has nuclear weapons. We’ve got a stake as to whether North Korea has a nuclear weapon. China clearly has a stake as to whether or not North Korea has a nuclear weapon. South Korea, of course, has a stake. Japan has got a significant stake as to whether or not North Korea has a nuclear weapon. Russia has a stake. So, therefore, I think the best way to deal with this is in multilateral fashion, by convincing those nations they must stand up to their responsibility, along with the United States, to convince Kim Jong-il that the development of a nuclear arsenal is not in his nation’s interest; and that should he want help in easing the suffering of the North Korean people, the best way to achieve that help is to not proceed forward.
“We’ve tried bilateral negotiations with North Korea. My predecessor, in a good-faith effort, entered into a framework agreement. The United States honored its side of the agreement; North Korea didn’t. While we felt the agreement was in force, North Korea was enriching uranium.” (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, transcript)
Powell at SFRC: “I don’t know of any basis to the report that we have decided to live with a nuclearized North Korea.” (Washington Post, In Brief: U.S. Not Resigned to Nuclear North Korea, Powell Contends,” March 7, 2003, p. A-5)
Japan MOFA spokesman Takashima Hatsuhisa: Japan has been hold talks with DPRK in Beijing: “They are responding to our calls.” Ra, too. (Paul Wiseman and Barbara Slavin, “Japan, South Korea Hold Low-Key Talks with North,” USA Today, March 6, 2003)
China FM Tang Jiaxuan: “The basic point is that we support denuclearization on the Korean peninsula for the sake of peace and stability in this part of the world. The most effective way to achieve this is for the DPRK and the US to talk directly to each other.” (Audra Ang, “Chinese Foreign Minister: North Korea, U.S. Must Talk Directly,” Associated Press, March 6, 2003)
SecDef Rumsfeld at Q&A session with Pentagon workers says U.S. troops might be redeployed back from DMZ. South Korea’s economy is 25 or 30 times bigger than North Korea’s and it “has all the capability in the world of providing the kind of up front deterrent that’s needed.” Former Under SecState Arnold Kanter testifies at SFRC: Bush admin must pay “urgent attention” to North Korea. “We must make a good faith effort to negotiate a reasonable deal.” It is “irrelevant and distracting” to debate how to hold talks. “We need to stop the momentum” of the buildup. (Barbara Slavin, “Rumsfeld May Pull Troops from Korean DMZ,” USA Today, March 7, 2003) “I suspect that what we’ll do is we’ll end up making some adjustments there,” Rumsfeld says. “Whether the forces would come home or whether they’d move farther south on the peninsula or whether they’d move to a neighboring area are the kinds of things that are being sorted out.” (James Brooke, “Musing on an Exodus of G.I.’s, South Korea Hails U.S. Presence,” New York Times, March 8, 2003, p. A-11) DefMin Cho Young-kil says U.S. “has never officially notified us of the movement of U.S. troops.” (Don Kirk, “Seoul Says U.S. Failed to Tell It of Troop Plans,” International Herald Tribune, March 8-9/03, p. 1)
Within hours of Rumsfeld’s comments, PM Goh Kun calls on Amb Thomas Hubbard to defer troop realignment: “As now is a sensitive period due to the North Korean nuclear issue, so it is not proper to put the matter on the official negotiating table.…As the USFK has been playing an important role in preventing war on the Korean peninsula, there should not be any decrease to its war deterrence here, should there be a rearrangement of positioning.” (Shim Jae-yun, “Relocation Should Wait Until Nukes Settled,” Korea Times, March 6, 2003)
Sigal: “There is a kind of tit-for-tat pattern that’s getting nasty here, but is still somewhat restrained.” He adds, “We’re at a point at which the propaganda in the North is pretty high-pitched, which means the armed forces are hyper-vigilant, hyper-attentive. On our side, I assume people are being hyper-careful. But things happen. Armed reconnaissance happens in the DMZ, Apache helicopters do stray, certain intelligence operations do possibly penetrate real air space.” (Christopher Torchia, “North Korea Likely to Further Raise Tension in Nuclear Dispute,” Associated Press, March 6, 2003)
3/?/03:
Hardliners such as the Pentagon’s Doug Feith and J.D Crouch, the State Department’s John Bolton, and the NSC nonproliferation specialist Bob Joseph were doubtful from the beginning that any dialogue with the North would prove fruitful. (Oriental Economist, “Bombing on North Korea,” March 2003, p. 2)
3/?/03:
North fires laser at Army helicopters patrolling DMZ. Col. Samuel Taylor, USFK spokesman: “Two USFK pilots were alerted by on-board laser-detecting equipment that laser systems may have illuminated their aircraft.” Possibly Chinese antipersonnel laser ZM-87. “These are blinding laser weapons,” said one official. (Bill Gertz, “Revealed: N. Korea Fired Laser at U.S. Troops,” Washington Times, May 13, 2003, p. 1)
3/7/03:
Powell meets Chinese FM Tang Jiaxuan in New York, discusses political difficulty of getting Bush to approve bilateral talks, appeals for China to host multilateral meeting. (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 166) At meeting at U.N. “we persuaded the Chinese” that Bush would never agree to bilateral talks. (David E. Sanger, “North Koreans and U.S. Plan Talks in Beijing,” New York Times, April 16, 2003, p.A-1)
“The only alternative policy is to temporize, to make a series of concessions to North Korea as a way to buy time. Just time. We will not be able to restore a semblance of deterrence to the Korean peninsula until the Iraq war is over. In the interim, North Korea will have to be propitiated. First with direct negotiations (which might help ascertain Kim’s intentions). Then with other blandishments, economic and diplomatic. This is appeasement, but it should be temporary appeasement. The blandishments should be immediately withdrawn as soon as Iraq is over and we can marshal enough strength in the northern Pacific to credibly threaten military action.” (Charles Krauthammer, “A Place for Temporary Appeasement,” Washington Post, March 7, 2003, p. A-33)
Air Force to deliver report to House and Senate Armed Services Cmtes stating military requirements for a “robust nuclear earth penetrator,” to dig into the ground before it explodes aimed at North Korea’s underground facilities. (Walter Pincus, “Pentagon Pursues Nuclear Earth Penetrator,” Washington Post, March 7, 2003, p. A-25)
3/8/03:
PRC Vice PM Qian Qichen in Pyongyang. Powell: Qian flew to Pyongyang to say that “there would be no alternative to multilateral talks in which all countries of the region would be fully involved, China included.” (DOS, “Secretary of State Powell’s Remarks at Conference on China-U.S. Relations,” College Station, Texas, November 5, 2003) David Lampton op-ed: “In March China sent its most senior diplomat, Qian Qichen, to Pyongyang to deliver the message that North Korea was to knock off its gratuitous provocations and start talking to Washington. Reinforcing the point, Beijing interrupted the flow of oil to dependent, hungry and cold North Korea. Shortly thereafter the North Koreans agreed to meet in Beijing with Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly.” (David Lampton, “China: Fed Up with North Korea?” Washington Post, June 4, 2003, p. A-27)
3/9/03:
NSA Condoleezza Rice on ABC “This Week” on talks: “We need to do so in a way that will bring maximum pressure on North Korea to actually this time not just freeze the weapons of mass destruction, but begin to dismantle them.” (Associated Press, “North Korea Hits Back at Top U.S. Security Official for ‘Reckless’ Talk,” March 13, 2003)
3/10/03:
Safire calls U.S. troops a “reverse deterrent”: “With so many Americans as the North’s human shields, Pyongyang’s blackmailers are emboldened — the opposite of deterred. … America’s strategic interests in this post-Security Council era is to let the strong South defend its territory while we make clear to weapons traders in the North that their illicit nuclear production is vulnerable to air attack from a nation soon to show its disarmament bona fides in Baghdad.” (William Safire, “The Asian Front,” New York Times, March 10, 2003, p A-19)
Australian FM Downer op-ed: “A diplomatic solution must be found. … Australia seeks a meeting of key regional countries to address the question of a possible multilateral security guarantee for North Korea. … Australia is now working through ideas for diplomatic options with fellow member countries the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.” (Alexander Downer, “Diplomacy Can Solve the Crisis,” International Herald Tribune, March 10, 2003, p. 14)
North Korea anti-ship cruise missile test in East Sea. “It was the same type of missile that the North test-fired on Feb. 24,” said a ranking ROK Defense Ministry official. (Kim Hyung-jin, “N.K. Tests Anti-Ship Missile,” Korea Herald, March 11, 2003, p. 1)
3/?/03:
Jon Van Dyke, Mark J. Valencia, Jenny Miller Garmendia, “The North/South Korea Boundary Dispute in the Yellow (West) Sea,” Marine Policy, 27, 2 (March 2003),143-58
3/11/03:
Representatives of two main umbrella unions in South visit Pyongyang. (Korea Times, “Union Delegates to Visit NK to Enhance Inter-Korean Ties,” March 11, 2003, p. 3)
Even as it rattles it nuclear sabers, North Korea is toying with a version of market reforms to patch its ravaged economy. But eight months after changes like price incentives began, the economy retains an unmistakable Alice in Wonderland quality. Nicholas Eberstadt of AEI: “The North Korean government tried to do a forced-march economic opening under the presumption they would get foreign aid and that no one would catch them on their nuclear program.” (James Brooke, “Trial Runs of a Free Market in North Korea,” New York Times, March 11, 2003, p. C-1)
Party wrangling over North Korea’s assertion that a GNP representative made a secret trip North to offer financial support before last year’s presidential election. (Ko Jung-ae, “Political Enmity Flares on North Report,” Joong-Ang Ilbo, March 12, 2003, p. 3)
3/?/03:
Ban Ki-moon, foreign affairs adviser to Roh, makes unannounced trip to New York, Hong Kong to reassure investors, convince Moody’s not to lower rating on Korea’s sovereign debt because of political risk. (Oh Young-jin, “Roh Trying to Mend Fences with U.S.,” Korea Times, March 13, 2003, p. 2)
3/12/03:
Asst SecState Kelly at SFRC: “The enriched uranium issue, some have assumed, is somewhere off in the fog of the distant future. It is not, Mr. Chairman. It is only probably a matter of months and not years behind the plutonium.” [?] “While we will not dole out ‘rewards’ to convince North Korea to live up to its existing obligations, we in the international community as a whole remain prepared to pursue a comprehensive dialogue about a fundamentally different relationship with that country once it eliminates its nuclear-weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner and comes into compliance with its international obligations.” … “Within multilateral talks there are all kinds of arrangements. But it is inevitable in such situations that there is a direct conversation and dialogue. So I think the direct talk language has probably been confusing, especially when used by some of our allies.” Chairman Richard Lugar (R-IN) calls it “vital that the United States be open to bilateral diplomatic opportunities that could be useful in reversing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.” (Transcript)
DPRK UN mission passed a message to Donald Gregg that in the face of a growing threat from the United States, if Washington failed to start a direct bilateral dialogue, the North would take a number of steps, including launch of a multistage missile and acceleration of reprocessing — which “had already started.” (Oberdorfer and Carlin, The Two Koreas, p. 394)
Powell meeting with FM Yoon Young-kwan. “When I visited the U.S. in March, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell asked about our view on the three-way dialogue and we accepted it in the light of the need to resolve the North Korean nuclear standoff peacefully at an early date.” (Shim Jae-yun, “U.S., China, N.K. to Meet Next Week,” Korea Times, April 16, 2003) Yoon, in first public expression of support for multilateral talks, says the North should not oppose such talks, which could “give it a lot that it wants.” (Kim Young-sae, “Seoul Nuances North Policy,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 13, 2003, p. 1)
Stealth F-117s en route to South Korea for military exercise. No comment for Air Force if to be used to escort spy planes. (Don Kirk, “U.S. Sends Stealth Jets to Korean War Games,” International Herald Tribune, March 13, 2003, p. 1)
Reconnaissance flights resume without interference. (Associated Press, “New Recon Flights Go Unmolested,” March 14, 2003)
North Korea is preparing a missile test that would break its moratorium, U.S. intelligence officials say. Recent satellite photos showed activity that could be flight-test preparations. “There aren’t indications of an imminent launch, but it is something they might well do,” one U.S. official said. A second official said there are concerns that the flight test could be a Taepodong 2. A third official at the Pentagon said, “Clearly the potential is there for a launch with little or no notice.” (Bill Gertz, “North Korea Prepares New Test of Missile,” Washington Times, March 12, 2003, p. 1)
North and South agree to resume work linking railways in late March. (Korea Herald, “Koreas Agree to Resume Railway Work,” March 13, 2003)
Japanese are starting to ask, can they defend themselves adequately? Their answer is no. “If North Korea fires a missile, Japan cannot do anything,” says Yamamoto Ichita, LDP member of the Upper House. (Sebastian Moffett, “Japan Begins to Doubt Its Defense Capabilities,” Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2003)
FM Kawaguchi Yoriko tells abductees’ kin, “At present we are not planning economic sanctions.” Although “common sense would say the abductions seem like an act of terrorism, there is no universal definition of terrorism.” (Karasaki Taro, “Kawaguchi Says ‘No’ to N. Korea Sanctions,” Asahi Shimbun, March 13, 2003)
North exports crabs, mushrooms, drugs, counterfeit yen to Japan. Nishihara Masashi, National Defense Academy president: “Wee need to consider sanctions, starting with non-military ones.” (Associated Press, “Japan Nursing N.K’s Wrecked Economy,” Korea Herald, March 12, 2003, p. 4)
3/13/03:
Bush-Roh 15-minute telephone conversation. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer: “The two agreed on the importance of working on the issue in a multilateral fashion.” (Oh Young-jin, “Roh, Bush Shows Signs of Reconciliation,” Korea Times, March 14, 2003) Bush thanked him for support on Iraq. (Kim Young-sae, “Multinational Talks Gain,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 14, 2003) Senior Roh admin off: “Mr. Bush said the US basic policy was to think about all the means to maintain peace, even though some people were concerned about the possibility of war on the peninsula. After that conversation, the US stopped using the phrase ‘all options are on the table.’” (JoongAng Ilbo, “The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The Untold Story,” p. 23)
FM Yoon Young-kwan in radio interview expresses willingness to support war in Iraq, calling the “duty” of an ally. (Oh Young-jin, “Roh Trying to Mend Fences with U.S.,” Korea Times, March 13, 2003, p. 2)
Bolton op-ed: “In contrast to the longstanding situation with Iraq, we have only begun to exercise our diplomatic options for dealing with North Korea. The United States believes that North Korea’s nuclear ambitions … should be addressed in a proper multilateral forum, which in this case is the UN Security Council. (John R. Bolton, “Why North Korea Is Different,” Far Eastern Economic Review, March 13, 2003)
South to give 430,000 tons of surplus rice from rising inventory to North (Korea Herald, “South to Provide North Surplus Rice for 3 Years, March 15, 2003)
JDA says it dispatched Aegis destroyer to monitor for missile test. (Yo Jae-suk, “U.S. Says North Korea Months Away from Enriched Uranium for Bombs,” March 13, 2003, Associated Press)
3/14/03:
PM Koizumi on missile launch: “We have varied information, but I should not talk about it.” Chief Cabinet Secy Fukuda Yasuo: “no information that validates [the reports].” Ito Yasunari: “We have not received any solid information confirming that North Korea is actually preparing a missile launch. We will continue usual surveillance activities.” (Takahashi Junko and Shimoyachi Nao, “Government Silent on Pyongyang Missile Reports,” Japan Times, March 14, 2003)
Japan is preparing to launch spy satellites, speeding up development of missile defenses, building up commando forces, and extending the range of its air force. A few right-wing politicians are also suggesting that Japan build nuclear weapons to counter North Korea, but the idea has almost no public support. (Paul Wiseman, “N. Korea Prods Japan into Buildup,” USA Today, March 17, p. 4 )
“We’re always ready to go,” Capt. Richard B. Wren told journalists touring USS Carl Vinson anchored off South Korea. (Y.J. Ahn, “U.S. Carrier Shows Off Might; North Korea Says Danger of War Increases,” Associated Press, March 15, 2003)
3/?/03:
North exports 10 SCUD-Bs to Pakistan, possibly in return for nuclear technology, Sankei Shinmun reports, citing U.S. security official. Pakistani ship, loaded in Nampo in mid-March and refueled in China, arrived in late March. (AFP, “N Korea Exported Scud Missiles to Pakistan in March: Japanese Report,” April 2, 2003)
3/16/03:
VP Dick Cheney on NBC “Meet the Press”: “The idea of a nuclear-armed North Korea with ballistic missiles to deliver them will, I think, probably set off an arms race in that part of the world, and others, perhaps Japan, for example, may be forced to consider whether or not they want to address the nuclear question.” (Kyodo, “N. Korea Nukes Could Prompt Japan No-Nuke Rethink,” March 16, 2003)
3/17/03:
Ra Jong-yil, Roh’s national security adviser, cites intell reports from Japan: “North Korea is not showing any movement to reactivate its nuclear reprocessing lab and test-fire a missile.” (Yoo Jae-suk, “North Korea Says Its Sovereignty at Stake,” Associated Press, March 17, 2003)
Updated CRS Issue Brief: CIA “issued a statement in December 2002 that North Korea likely could produce an atomic bomb through uranium enrichment in 2004” (p. 1) [???] “The main elements of Bush administration policy are: (1) terminating the AF; (2) no bilateral negotiations with North Korea until its satisfies U.S. concerns over its nuclear program; (3) assembling an international coalition to pressure North Korea; and (4) proposing multilateral talks … (5) warning and planning for future economic sanctions … and (6) warning North Korea not to reprocess [by] asserting that ‘all options are open,’ including military options.” (Congressional Research Service, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” Larry A. Niksch, updated March 17, 2003)
3/18/03:
President Hu Jintao telephone conversation told Bush, Xinhua reports: “The key to the issue now is to launch dialogues in certain forms as soon as possible, especially between the United States and the DPRK.” (Associated Press, “Report: China’s Hu, Talking to Bush, Urges Dialogue with North Korea on Nuclear Issue,” March 18, 2003)
Lee Jong-seok appointed vice chief of NSC. (Seo Soo-min, “Lee Jong-seok Named NSC Vice-Chief,” Korea Times, March 18, 2003)
Chief Cabinet Secy Fukuda Yasuo: “I want to make a decision on whether to abrogate the [Pyongyang] declaration after considering the general situation a bit more,” but warns, “It is really coming close to the absolute edge” of violating the declaration. (Kyodo, “Fukuda Warns N. Korea, Saying Pyongyang Pact Could Be Scrapped,” March 18, 2003)
U.S. experts on Korea challenge rejection of direct negotiations. “There was division on the task force about whether it was too late to try to negotiate with North Korea,” said Selig Harrison, director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy. But “there was complete agreement that the first steps have to be in direct, bilateral negotiations…” (Doug Struck, “Panel Urges U.S.-N. Korea Talks,” Washington Post, March 19, 2003, p. A-23)
Senior admin official: “China, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and the E.U. have all told North Korea that reprocessing is a red line. I think that has caused the North Koreans some pause, because the Chinese never went in this hard before, and neither have the Japanese. … as far as we know at this point, they have not crossed the Rubicon of reprocessing. … We’re talking to the Chinese now not about bilateral versus multilateral but about the modalities of making a multilateral approach work.” (Jonathan Rauch, “Yes, Bush Has a Policy on North Korea. It Might Even Work,” National Journal, D.C. Dispatch, March 18, 2003)
Koizumi in Diet debate: “The Pyongyang Declaration is a weighty political document. It is valid, and we will implement it with sincerity.” Ozawa Ichiro, head of Liberal Party: “North Korea has ignored the declaration so thoroughly there aren’t even scraps left.” (Audrey McAvoy, “Six Months Later, Koizumi Stands By Agreement with North Korea, Despite Tensions,” Associated Press, March 19, 2003)
North Korea turns down UN Command invitation for general officers’ meeting to brief them on military exercises now under way. (JoongAng Ilbo, “North Rejects Proposal to Discuss War Games,” March 20, 2003)
A senior DoD official believed to be Richard Lawless, DASD for Asian and Pacific Affairs, gave a pointed briefing to South Korean reporters in Washington, indicating that the U.S. intends to relocate the 2nd Infantry Division south of the Han River. He also said if South Koreans wanted U.S. forces out of their country, they could be out in a day. (Robin Lim, “U.S.-R.O.K. Alliance in Crisis,” Japan Times, March 29, 2003)
3/20/03:
Roh at emergency NSC meeting decides to dispatch a battalion of engineers (500-600 troops) and a battalion of about 150 medics to Iraq in 7-10 weeks. Vice President Dick Cheney calls Roh to say diplomatic efforts had failed and war with Iraq was imminent. (Kim Ji-soo, “Seoul Backs War, But Reluctantly,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 21, 2003) In nationally televised address Roh announces he will send aid and non-combat troops to Iraq after the fighting stops: “We decided it is in our best interest to support the United States.” (Paul Eckert, “S. Korea Backs War, Seeks to Avoid Impact on North,” Reuters, March 20, 2003) Kim Sang-woo, former member of National Assembly foreign affairs cmte: “I think Seoul has done a deal with Washington. We have promised to support war in Iraq on the condition that Bush pursues a diplomatic solution in North Korea.” (Andrew Ward and David Pilling, “Tokyo and Seoul Support War in Iraq with One Eye on North Korea,” Financial Times, March 21, 2003, p. 7)
In slip of the tongue, presidential spokeswoman Song Kyoung-hee says, ‘there was a report that we raised the Watchcon level by one notch.” When asked whether she meant Defcon or Watchcon, she said, “I am sorry. Please understand that I cannot give sufficient answers about the military and its operations.” But she said “yes” to a reporter who asked, “Is it correct that the military raised [any of the meters] by one level?” (Seo Hyun-jin, “Official’s Security Gaffe Stirs Controversy,” Korea Herald, March 24, 2003)
North Korea is having trouble restarting reprocessing plant. “They are working 24/7,” a senior administration official said. “But it is not going as fast as they wanted to.” Another senior admin official said, “They do not have cutting-edge technology.” Steam is coming out of the power plant next door. “They are definitely trying hard.” (Glenn Kessler and Walter Pincus, “N. Korea Stymied on Plutonium Work,” Washington Post, March 20, 2003, p. A-24)
DoD informs Japan it will strengthen monitoring capability using RC-135S Cobra Ball reconnaissance planes to monitor possible missile launch, RC-135U to intercept radio communications, and missile-tracking USS Invincible deployed in the Sea of Japan. (Shibata Gaku, “Japan, U.S. on High Alert over N. Korea,” Yomiuri Shimbun, March 21, 2003)
3/21/03:
President Roh to heads of foreign firms investing in Korea: “It is my firm determination that there should be no war under any circumstances.” (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Accuses U.S. of Stoking War Jitters on Korean Peninsula,” Associated Press, March 21, 2003)
Massive amphibious landing drill with 3,000 troops including 1,000 U.S. Marines backed by warships, planes, begins at Pohong, 220 miles south of Seoul. (AFP, “U.S., South Korea in Massive Landing Drill against North Korea,” March 21, 2003)
Rodong Sinmun on “Military-First Ideology”: “Today, the popular masses’ struggle for independence and socialism has entered a new stage. Aspects of the world have undergone a dramatic change and the circumstances and conditions for the revolutionary struggle have also changed in the new century. New theoretical and practical issues, which could never be foreseen in the past and which cannot be resolved with the revolutionary theory of the past, are being raised.The great Comrade Kim Jong-il’s military-first ideology is a guiding principle for our era’s revolution that illuminates the future path of the struggle for independence and socialism. … The great leader, Comrade Kim Jong-il, pointed out the following: ‘The military-first revolutionary line and military-first politics are the scientific revolutionary line and political method that most accurately reflect the demands of the era and the revolution.’ … The drastic changes that occurred in the world’s political arena during the 1990s of the 20th century and the international political situation developed ever since showed that the popular masses’ struggle for independence was being waged in the environments of a new era. The current era is one in which a life-or-death struggle is waged between socialism and imperialism and between the force of independence and the force of domination. Since its inception, the popular masses’ struggle for independence and socialism has continued to advance through severe confrontations with all sorts of reactionaries in history, particularly, with the imperialists. However, never before has the struggle been as acute as it is today. … In particular, since the balance of power has changed on a global scale since the Cold War, the US imperialists have come to leave no means untried in attempting to dominate the world. … Military might must be powerful if people are to achieve a victory for the cause of independence in countering the bloodthirsty imperialists who are falling upon them while wielding cannons and nuclear weapons. The militarized imperialists can only be conquered with military might. … Diverse social and political groups engage in the struggle waged for the popular masses’ independence on each historic stage, and the positions and roles these groups take and play also vary in each era. Which class or which social group plays a main role in the development of the social revolution in a certain era in history is determined which group is most powerful in revolutionary spirit and combat capability.In the past, the working class, as a revolutionary class that had come to realize its class situation and mission, played an important role in promoting the social and class liberation of the oppressed working popular masses and in steering the course of changes in the world. … In the revolution and construction of our era, the position and role the army takes and plays are being markedly enhanced. Due to its nature as an armed group that regards organizational spirit and discipline as its integrity and due to the fact that the army is in charge of the foremost line in the anti- imperialist, class struggle, which becomes even severer, the revolutionary army plays a special role in the revolutionary struggle — a role which no other class or group can substitute. … In building a state in our era, it is essential to beef up the main force of the nation and fortify the revolutionary base, and, in this regard, it is most important to build up powerful military might. In today’s world, without powerful military might, no country can defend its dignity and sovereignty nor can it achieve development and prosperity. … In short, military-first ideology is an ideology of giving priority to military issues that calls for giving priority to military issues over everything, and it is a line, strategy, and tactics of putting the Army before the working class in order to depend on the Army by putting it to the fore as a pillar and as a main force for the revolution. … The great leader, Comrade Kim Jong-il, pointed out the following: ‘That our party, as it implements military-first politics, puts the People’s Army, not the working class, to the fore as the main force of the revolution, is a start that is made with a new viewpoint and attitude toward the issue of the main force of the revolution and toward the issue of the role the revolutionary army plays in the revolution and construction’ … Our army is a unit of armed revolutionaries who are from the working people; thus, no other group is as firm as it is in ideology and faith, no other group is as merciless to the class enemies as it is, and no other group is as uncompromising as it is in defending the revolutionary principle. The revolutionary army is in charge of the most serious, fiercest anti- imperialism military front in the revolution. The final victory of the anti- imperialism class struggle hinges on the barrel of a gun, and it is the revolutionary army that leads this struggle. The combat capability of the army as an elite corps, which is in charge of the frontline of the bloody class struggle and which regards discipline as its integrity, is incomparably more powerful than that of other groups of the society. … In our socialist society, the Army is a pillar for the party and the state. If the party and the regime can be seen as a guide or as a political tool for consummating the socialist cause, the Army can be seen as the pillar of the revolution on which the party and the regime depend. … Our party’s military-first ideology explains the need to push ahead with the revolution and construction through the constant enhancement of the revolutionary army’s position and role. By comprehensively embodying the demands of military-first ideology, great Comrade Kim Chong-il is wisely leading the advance of the 21st century in order to achieve the victory of the independent cause. In the socialist construction, our party firmly maintains the position of putting its prime effort into beefing up the Army, which is the main force of the revolution. For the revolution, nothing is more urgent and important than beefing up the ranks of the armed forces. If we are to organize and beef up the revolutionary ranks, the armed ranks should be put to the fore as a core, and, if we are to awaken and organize the masses, the armed group, which is firm in ideology and faith and which is powerful in combat capability, should be put to the fore as a model. … Our party is putting its prime effort into national defense while regarding military issues as the most important issues among all the issues of the state. … Our party is putting its prime effort into national defense while regarding military issues as the most important issues among all the issues of the state. … The great leader, Comrade Kim Jong-il, pointed out the following: ‘The military-first revolutionary line is the basic strategic line our party maintains for the construction of a powerful state and for the consummation of the chuch’e revolutionary cause.’ … The imperialists loudly advertise ‘prosperity under the free market economy,’ but, this is nothing more than the sophistry aimed at justifying the law of the jungle and ‘the rich growing richer and the poor growing poorer.’ In the capitalist society, there is only ‘freedom’ with which the strong exploits the weak, and there is only ‘prosperity’ by which only the few live a rich and luxurious life, but the many suffer poverty. Prosperity in the true sense of the word, which is for one’s own country and people and which contributes to the people’s lofty and rewarding life, is possible only in a powerful socialist state. A powerful socialist state in the true sense of the terms is one where economy develops dynamically based on modern science and technology and based on the self-reliant foundations that never swing in any global economic fluctuations, and where the popular masses enjoy a material and cultural life to their heart’s content consistent with their independent aspirations and demand. … Consolidating the political system of the state consistent with the military- first demand means to thoroughly apply in the construction of the state and in its activities the principle of placing importance on the barrel of a gun and subordinating everything to the military work. The state structural system in the era of building a powerful state must be a system focused on the defense of the nation. … Tightly grasping the defense industry as a lifeline for the country and the nation in advancing is an important line that our party consistently maintains in building a powerful state. In a powerful state, the defense industry takes a leading and key position in the economy.” (Rodong Sinmun, “Military-First Ideology Is an Ever-Victorious Invincible Banner for Our Era’s Cause of Independence,” March 21, 2003)
“A spokesman for the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland released a statement today. South Korea is staging together with the United States large-scale joint military exercises targeted against the DPRK. Under this situation, the South Korean authorities called a “national security council” meeting to take “diverse measures” against the DPRK which has nothing to do with the Iraqi war. And they issued an order placing the whole of South Korea on high alert dubbed ‘defense readiness condition 2.’ It is the first time that DRC 2 was declared throughout South Korea. … This goes to prove that the U.S. scenario to provoke a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula has entered a reckless phase of implementation.” (KCNA, “CPRF Spokesman on S. Korean Authorities’ Anti-DPRK Confrontation Moves,” March 21, 2003)
Maurice Strong, UN special envoy back from Pyongyang: “Fear I do not believe is in their vocabulary. Concern, yes. Real determination to seek a peaceful settlement at the same time preparation for war if necessary.” (AFP, “UN Envoy Says U.S.-Korea War Possible, But Pyongyang Wants to Avoid It,” March 22, 2003)
3/22/03:
North Korea postpones North-South talks. KCNA criticizes joint exercises for “driving the situation in Korea to the brink of war.” (Reuters, “North Korea Delays Inter-Korean Talks, Citing Military Tensions,” New York Times, March 23, 2003, p. A-7)
3/23/03:
Iraq is the triumph of neocon’s doctrine of preemptive war. “This is just the beginning,” said an administration official. “I would not rule out the same sequence of events for Iran and North Korea as for Iraq, but circumstances do not compel you to end up in the same place.” (Steven R. Weisman, “Pre-Emption: Idea with a Lineage Whose Time Has Come, New York Times, March 23, 2003)
Deputy Cabinet Secy Abe Shinzo in television interview: U.S. military action “is impossible if there is no concerted policy among the three countries” — Japan, South Korea and the US. (AFP, “Japan Denies Any U.S. War Plans Against North Korea,” March 23, 2003)
3/24/03:
Ishihara Shintaro, governor of Tokyo: “Why doesn’t the Japanese government judge that abduction as terrorism? I think it is terrorism.” What should be done? “Revenge.” He backs the Iraq war because “depending on how the world deals with Iraq, North Korea’s behavior would change. They will realize that they’ll face the same fate.” (Doug Struck, “Nationalist Keeps Eye on Japan’s Top Job,” Washington Post, March 24, 2003, p. A-9)
Amb Howard Baker quoted by aide as telling LDP general secretary Yamasaki Taku, “there are some signs, but none that are certain. We will definitely inform Japan in advance if it becomes certain.” (Audrey McAvoy, “Envoy: U.S. Has Detected Signs North Korea May Be Preparing Missile Test,” Associated Press, March 24, 2003)
“With the public and the media falling in for the war effort, there is no place for anti-war or anti-Bush sentiments. Here we see that even a developed country like the United States can be swept up in mass hysteria. This excited atmosphere could be dangerous for Korea. If it persists until after the war in Iraq is over it could carry over into and affect decisions made to solve the nuclear crisis on the peninsula. We could see confusion arising from U.S. actions in Korea resulting from irrational impulses.
Naturally, Koreans observing recent developments cannot avoid being worried. We could be facing a dilemma, in which neither a U.S. advancement nor a U.S. retreat is desirable.
The United States that we see now is different from the United States that we have known. Americans tolerate domestic anti-war sentiment in the name of diversity, but seethe at allies who voice anti-war and anti-American sentiments. And it seems that the Americans will not budge an inch from their attitude of ‘American supremacy.’” (Kim Tae-chung (Washington correspondent), “The U.S. and Its War Face, Chosun Ilbo, March 24, 2003)
3/25/03:
National Assembly delays request to send 700 South Korean engineers and medics to Iraq. (Doug Struck, “Assembly Stalls South Korea’s Aid for U.S. War Effort,” Washington Post, March 25, 2003)
DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly convenes, allocates 15.4% of budget to defense, up from 14.9% last year. (AFP, “North Korea Boosts Military Spending As Nuclear Crisis Persists,” March 27, 2003)
3/26/03:
KPA withdraws from regular liaison meetings. Gen. Ri Chan-bok sent telephone message to UNC’s MajGen. James Soligan. (Seo Soo-min, “NK Suspends Regular UNC Contact,” Korea Times, March 26, 2003) KCNA: “And the message warned that if the US forces side continues pushing the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of war as now in gross breach of the armistice agreement, the KPA side will have no option but to take new important measures as regards the armistice agreement for its self-defense.” (AFP, “N. Korea Withdraws from Regular Contacts with U.S. Military, March 26, 2003)
Roh at commencement for 3rd Military Academy: “When Korea-U.S. relations are steadier, it will be possible to solve the nuclear problem and improve relations between the North and the United States. Because of practical reasons like these, the government decided to send troops to the Iraq war. …Peace on the peninsula was given top priority in the decision.” (Shin Jung-rok, “Roh Justifies Decision to Send Troops,” Chosun Ilbo, March 26, 2003)
Asst SecSt Kelly at SFRC on North’s insistence on bilateral talks: “We have detected indications [there is] possibly some softening of that.” (Reuters, “U.S. Says North Korea Might Be Softening Stance,” March 27. 2003)
EU seeks resolution from UN Human Rights Commission. HRW advocacy director Rory Mungoven asks the commission to voice its concern about the plight of North Korean refugees in China: “North Korea’s human rights record is as bad as it gets and yet they have been able to rely on political cover from their friends to avoid criticism by the commission.” (Claire Nullis, “Former Camp Inmates Appeal for U.N. Action on North Korea,” Associated Press, March 28, 2003)
Variation in U.S. estimates of North Korean nuclear capability (Jonathan Pollack, “The United States, North Korea and the Agreed Framework,” Naval War College Review, 56, No. 3 (Summer 2003), 11-49)
3/27/03:
On 26th, eve of Powell meeting with ROK FM Yoon, “Korean officials explained to the US officials its three-step proposal to end North Korea’s nuclear ambitions,” says a senior ROK official. “A freeze of the North’s nuclear activities, restoring the status quo ante and resolving the nuclear crisis comprehensively were the three steps.” When the South Koreans raised Qian’s visit to North, “The US officials said that … Washington, Beijing, and Pyongyang were discussing a plan to hold a three-nation dialogue.” Roh was then told. “He believed that it was more important to begin negotiations to end the crisis than persist in demanding South Korea’s participation at the talks.” Yoon gave Powell the go-ahead the next day. (JoongAng Ilbo, “The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The Untold Story,” p. 25-26) DAS Don Keyser in Seoul to consult about talks. Yoon told of trilateral talks on March 26. (Oh Young-jin, “’Bush Told Roh of Seoul’s Exclusion from Nuke Talks on April 4,’” Korea Times, April 18, 2003) FM Yoon says he gave approval for trilateral talks: “In March, the United States asked North Korea to accept multilateral talks, and the North Korean side insisted on bilateral talks. So [the situation] remained in a lull for a while. Then, China set forth what you could call a counterproposal to the US proposal, and it was a three-way dialogue framework. When North Korea was gauged on this dialogue framework, North Korea said it was all right with it and expressed the position that they were basically for it. When this thought was conveyed to the US Government, which sounded out our government, they said: We have not decided yet, and before we do so, we would like to consult with the South Korean Government first. So an official from the United States came to South Korea, and he explained [the situation] to our government with the US ambassador [to South Korea], and this is how we dealt with the situation. I happened to be in the United States at the time, and Secretary Powell and I held one-on-one talks on this issue in the United States. I was briefed on the situation at the talks. He explained the background of what had been taking place and told me that he would like to hear South Korea’s position on these [multilateral] talks. So I contacted headquarters [Ch’ongwadae] here, and after discussing a wide range of issues, we reached a decision. The decision was that, basically, in light of the seriousness of the situation at the time, it was important to start the dialogue first and thus lay the foundation for peacefully resolving this issue. …So the United States proposed to North Korea, through Chinese channels, its position that it, too, was all right [with holding multilateral talks]. (FBIS text, Yoon press conference, April 16, 2003)
DASD Richard Lawless in Seoul for talks with Asst DefMin for Policy Cha Young-koo on joint study of alliance including redeployment. (Hwang Jang-jin, “Korea, U.S. Start Talks on Alliance Future,” Korea Herald, February 27, 2003)
JDA chief Ishiba Shigeru: Boosting Japan’s capabilities to preempt “is worth considering” while still maintaining its defense-oriented policy. Also willing to introduce missile defense: “It is the only way to defend against ballistic missiles,” he said. “If it is exclusively defense-oriented, I think there is no reason to reject it.” (Kyodo, “Japan Should Consider Offensive Capabilities: Ishiba,” March 27, 2003)
3/28/03:
After Yoon-Powell meeting, ROK official says, “The South and the United States are in the process of reaching an agreement on ways to open a multilateral forum. We share the need for early resumption of dialogue for that matter.” (Seo-Hyun-jin, “U.S. Ready to Talk with North Korea,” Korea Herald, March 29, 2003) Yoon tells journalists, “We called on the United States to send a signal that it would have direct talks with North Korea once it comes to the multilateral dialogue format.” (Shim Jae-yun, “Seoul Urges U.S. to Talk Directly with NK,” Korea Times, March 31, 2003) Yoon tells National Assembly cmte he presented “road map” of “step-by-step” items: “Secretary Powell said he would study the proposal in detail, describing it as an interesting and useful idea.” (Shin Yong-bae, “Multilateral Talks Could Result in Aid,” Korea Herald, April 9, 2003)
Izume Hajime, currently in US, says divide between Washington and Seoul larger than he thought. In response to Yoon speech on March 28, one US government official joked to him, the United States and China joined hands because they had a common enemy, the Soviet Union. If the United States and North Korea join together, he said, their common enemy would be South Korea.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Iraq War Shakes Japan’s Asian Diplomacy,” (April 6, 2003)
Powell interview: Just because there is a war with Iraq, “that doesn’t mean we’re going on a war footing [with North Korea] as soon as Iraq is dealt with. The president has available to him lots of tools, and the tool you use is not always a hammer.” (Steven R. Weisman, “Powell Sees Major Role for U.N. in Postwar Iraq,” New York Times, March 29, 2003, p. B-10) Bush to war veterans: “We are sending a clear signal to the world that we will not submit to a future in which dictators and terrorists can arm and threaten the peace without consequence.” (David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Rumsfeld Cautions Iran and Syria on Aid to Iraq,” New York Times, March 29, 2003, p. B-10)
Japan launches two spy satellites. Knowledgeable sources differ on who was at fault — Japan or the United States — in the hours’ long delay before Tokyo found out that the Taepodong 1 had soared over Japan on August 31, 1998. Nakatani Gen who headed JDA until last September: “This is a first step for Japan to obtain means to get information on its own. Japan should move away from being totally reliant on the U.S.” (Doug Struck, “Japan to Launch Spy Satellites,” Washington Post, March 26, 2003, p. A-14) “Around 1993 and 1994, when I was chief of the Joint Staff Council, Japan could not obtain spy satellite information from the United States or any direct information concerning nuclear facilities in North Korea, said Nishimoto Tetsuya. “When the four information-gathering satellites are in orbit, it will become possible for the nation to survey North Korea several times a day, and information on the North’s graphite-moderated reactor will be available to us. It’s very important that we are able to obtain information about such incidents as the resumption of the North’s reactor operations and missile-launch preparations without relying on non-Japanese sources.” (Hidaka Tetsuo, “Spy Satellites to Watch N. Korea,” Yomiuri Shimbun, March 4, 2003)
Peter Ennis: 1)The Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces had ships in the Sea of Japan, floating right next to American ships, monitoring the Taepodong launch in August 1998. The US knew it was coming, and promptly informed Japanese military authorities. As usually happens between the two navies, they worked together, and jointly monitored the launch. 2) In turn, the JDA decided to keep the information to itself. Information within the Japanese government is notoriously compartmentalized, partly out of bureaucratic rivalries, and partly from the fact that Japan, until recently, did not have a secrecy law that would forbid release of classified information provided by the JDA to the Diet. (That has recently been rectified.) 3) Once the Taepodong launch took place, Mitsubishi Denki launched an intensive lobbying campaign in the Diet, pushing for the spy satellites to be developed and launched. Some Diet members were honestly upset that they did not know. But they blamed that failure on Washington rather than their compatriots, which in turn helped Mitsubishi Denki. 4) There are occasional — very occasional — restrictions on the flow of intelligence from the US to Japan. But it would astonish many people to know the extent of collaboration. There is a virtual real- time link between the US National Reconnaissance Office, the HQ of US Forces Japan at Yokota, and the JDA’s Defense Intelligence Headquarters. 5) US officials initially opposed Japan developing the intelligence satellite, for two reasons: a) during the Nye Initiative, the US side proposed the establishment of a joint intelligence center, in which US and Japanese intelligence analysts would work side-by-side on issues relating mostly to China and North Korea, including with ultra- secret satellite-based intelligence. The US was prepared to help train Japanese photo analysts (as it is now doing), and to work on joint estimates. At the time, JDA officials assured Nye that Japan would not develop its own satellite systems (the issue, pushed by Mitsubishi and others, had been around for several years). But Japan said “no” to the joint center idea, arguing it would violate the ban on “collective self-defense”. That upset the US. But also upsetting, in the wake of the Taepodong launch, was Japan’s decision to break an agreement with the US and go ahead to develop its own spy satellites. b) US authorities were also upset about the 1998 decision to go ahead with satellites because of the waste involved. US spy satellites are the crown jewel of the US intelligence community. It’s possible that more money has been spent on satellite reconnaissance over the last 50 years than on any other single “weapon” or “technology” system available to the US government. Japan’s satellites, soon to be launched, will be far inferior to US systems. It would have been far better for Japan to invest in hiring hundreds of photo analysts (the US has thousands, at work every day, pouring over shots of China, North Korea, Iraq, etc.). The US could supply the photos, and involved Japan in the analysis. Tokyo decided to go in another direction. Washington recognized it could not stop Japan, and it might be harmful to try. So Washington decided to help. But there is no doubt that there is a little bit of bad taste in the mouths of many US officials about the decision Tokyo made, and the way the decision was made.
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The DPRK has already warned Japan that the launch would be a hostile act against the DPRK and a serious threat to it. Nevertheless, Japan launched the satellite to spy on the DPRK, wantonly violating the DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration in which both sides committed themselves to refrain from doing any act threatening the other side. The satellite launch deprived Japan of any justification and qualification to talk about the DPRK’s satellite launch. Japan will be held wholly responsible for sparking a new arms race in Northeast Asia.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts Japan’s Launch of Spy Satellite,” March 28, 2003)
National Assembly again delays a vote to send troops. In a poll of 2,154 South Koreans conducted last month by Fn Research and Consulting, 68.4% favored withdrawal of U.S. troops. (James Brooke, “South Korea Delays Vote on Sending Troops to Iraq,” New York Times, March 29, 2003, p. B-12)
3/29/03:
Rodong Sinmun signed commentary: “The DPRK will not make any slightest concession and compromise with those who pressurize, threaten and blackmail it as it regards the revolutionary principle and faith as its life and soul.” It goes on: “It is too early to make a conclusion on the outcome of the Iraqi war. But it is clear that the destiny of Iraq is at stake due to its concession and compromise. The DPRK would have already met the same miserable fate as Iraq’s had it compromised its revolutionary principle and accepted the demand raised by the imperialists and its followers for “nuclear inspection” and disarmament. The Workers’ Party of Korea’s army-based policy and self-defensive capacity are no. 1 lifeline of the DPRK and serve as the most powerful weapon of justice and a master key to all its victories.” (KCNA, “DPRK Will Not Make Any Concession Or Compromise,” March 29, 2003)
3/31/03:
US-DPRK meeting in New York channel. (Reuters, “Report: U.S., North Korea Held Working Level Talks, April 5, 2003) North Koreans officials told Jack Pritchard and David Straub it had begun reprocessing. Pritchard recalled, “We’ve watched what you’re doing in Iraq,” the North Koreans told them. “The lessons we’re getting out of that is that Iraq does not have weapons of mass destruction and you invaded them. So, we’re going to reprocess the spent fuel rods, we’re going to take them and create a nuclear deterrent so you cannot invade us.” Said one senior official, “That was the turning point on the president’s and Rice’s willingness to let Powell and Armitage and Kelly have a relatively free hand.” (Chinoy, Meltdown, pp. 166-67) Kelly was immediately informed, but Powell and Armitage decided not to tell others in the government, infuriating others when they found out later. The delegation to three-party talks was under instruction to suspend them immediately if the North acknowledged reprocessing the fuel rods. (Glenn Kessler, The Confidante, p. 69) Some officials did not learn of this until April 18. “I think heads will roll over this,” one administration official said April 26. “That that information was not shared is very disturbing.” DoS spokesman Richard Boucher: “Information was shared appropriately with other agencies of the U.S. government at senior levels — not every agency and not every person, but appropriately.” (Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Officials Spar over N. Korea,” Washington Post, April 27, 2003, p. A-11) Powell news briefing on April 28: “What we were told on the 31st was shared within the administration. I’m not sure if everybody in the administration got it, but it isn’t relevant because it didn’t seem to be anything that was terribly new or different from what we had been told on a regular basis over the last several months.” [?]
ROK FM Yoon Young-kwan after meeting with PM Koizumi for 40 minutes says Japan calls South’s guidelines for inducements a “positive and desirable contribution.” He asked Japan resume talks with North Korea. (Seo Hyun-jin, “Tokyo Backs Seoul on North Korea,” Korea Herald, March 31, 2003; Choi Heup, “Yoon Asks Koizumi to Resume Talks with North,” Chosun Ilbo, March 31, 2003)
CINPAC Adm Thomas Fargo: “We have seen some MiG activity over water” but had not “seen anything that indicated [the MiGs] acted in a manner to effect another intercept” of reconnaissance planes. “But I couldn’t characterize it as being directed at our surveillance flights.” (Doug Struck, “N. Korean Jets Keep Their Distance during U.S. Missions,” Washington Post, April 1, 2003), p. A-16)
Dep SecState Armitage invw: North’s intention was “always to have nuclear weapons.” (Shibata Gaku, “Armitage: U.S. Seeks Postwar Resolution,” Yomiuri Shimbun, April 1, 2003)
US sanctions A.Q. Khan Research Institute. (David E. Sanger, “U.S. Rebukes Pakistanis for Lab’s Aid to Pyongyang,” New York Times, April 1, 2003, p. B-15)
National Security Adviser Ra Jong-yil tells Russia’s Deputy FM Alexander Losyukov if North shuts down its nuclear program, Seoul would support development of power generation there, proposes gas pipeline to connect Irkutsk with two Koreas. (Chung Byeong-seon, “Gas Pipeline for North Discussed,” Chosun Ilbo, March 31, 2003)
In poll 27% of Japanese support war in Iraq, down from 31% in March 20-21 poll and 53% oppose Koizumi’s announcement supporting war, 36% favor it. (Asahi Shimbun, “Japanese Anti-War Sentiment Up,” March 31, 2003)
Eric Johnston, deputy editor of Japan Times and author of “The North Korea Abduction Issue and Its Effect on Japanese Domestic Politics,” JPRI Working Paper No. 101 (June 2004: “Hirasawa Katsuei, the politician closest to the abductees’ kin is a right-wing nationalist. Nishimura Shingo, another backer of the kin, lost his post for suggesting Japan go nuclear. Not all the kin agree. “The Yokotas, whose daughter Megumi was taken, spurn the right. But Hasuike Toru, the brother of an abductee, will speak with groups that want textbooks to whitewash Japanese atrocities in Korea and China. (JoongAng Ilbo, “Japan’s Right Moves to Exploit North Korean Abductions Issue,” March 31, 2003)
PIPA poll March 22-25 finds 15% say situation with North Korea most important, 52% situation in Iraq, 20% al Qaeda, 22% says going to war with Iraq makes it a lot more likely North Korea will make nuclear weapons, 23% a little more likely, 38% no effect, 12% a little less likely, 2% a lot less likely, 26% say U.S. should take the lead in trying to stop North Korea from making nuclear weapons, 72% say U.N., 79% say U.S. should deal with North Korea primarily by trying to build better relations and 15% pressuring it with implied threats that U.S. may use military force against it.
3/?/03:
First academic conference in Pyongyang in which ROK academics were allowed to present position papers. “Their message was that they are ready to start a dialogue with the U.S., but not in the open, said Park Myung-lim, prof of Korean studies at Yonsei. “Our side was telling them it [a nonaggression pact] was just a piece of paper,” said Moon Chung-in. (Doug Struck, “With N. Koreans, a Quiet Diplomacy,” Washington Post, April 12, 2003, p. A-14)
4/1/03:
Pres Roh appeals to National Assembly to approve troop dispatch to Iraq: “I decided to dispatch troops, despite ongoing antiwar protests because of the fate of our country and people,” he says. In order to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully, it is important to maintain strong cooperation with the United States.” (Howard W. French, “South Korea Agrees to Send Troops to Iraq,” New York Times, April 5, 2003, p. B-13)
US wants to start relocating troops south of Seoul in FY2004. “We would like to execute this as quickly as possible.” Roh wants no change until nuclear crisis is resolved, but “that timetable is too slow for us.” Adm Thomas Fargo has been saying in effect, “I’d like to be out yesterday” says another source. “The train is running very quickly in the bureaucracy, but the speed is making Seoul uncomfortable.” (Barbara Demick, “A ‘Less Intrusive’ Presence for Troops in South Korea,” Los Angeles Times, April 2, 2003) MoD official: “Our position is that the 2nd Infantry Division issue can be dealt with only after this year. (Seo Soo-min, “Seoul Set to Block U.S. Troop Reduction,” Korea Times, April 6, 2003)
USFK Leon LaPorte invw: “Our desire is to relocate a significant portion of U.S. service members who currently serve in Seoul to the south. … No decisions have been made on relocation, but I think both governments agree that it would be in the best interests of both nations to reduce the U.S. military footprint and relocate.” (Jeffrey Miller, “Korea-U.S. Alliance Will Stay Strong, LaPorte Says,” Korea Times, April 3, 2003)
Military-first editorial in Rodong Sinmun a sign of change. “A month or two ago I thought I saw signs of a debate over economic reform versus military spending,” a longtime North Korea analyst said. “The Rodong Sinmun may be a signal that the debate is over and a decision has been made: To hell with profits, to hell with supply and demand, to hell with light industry and consumer goods, and to hell with dialogue.” (Howard W. French, “North Korea’s Reaction on Iraq Is Subdued So Far,” New York Times, April 2, 2003, p. A-6)
North launches third short-range surface to ship missile in five weeks, JDA spokesman says. It travels 37 miles from NW coast. (Doug Struck, “North Korea Fires Short-Range Missile,” Washington Post, April 1, 2003), p. A-12) ROK MoD denies report. (AFP, “No Sign of North Korean Missile Launch: South Korea,” April 1, 2003) Not a test, say ROK, US intelligence. (JoongAng Ilbo, “So It Wasn’t a Missile Test After All,” April 4, 2003)
DoS annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices cites DPRK for extrajudicial killings and disappearances and trafficking of women, forced abortions and infanticide in women’s prisons, abuse of detainees. (Chosun Ilbo, “Human Rights Report Cites North’s Abuses,” April 1, 2003) U.S. Amb Jeane Kirkpatrick calls North “hell on earth” in speech to U.N. Commission on Human Rights. “It is hard to imagine the possibility of a country whose citizens endure a worse or more pervasive abuse of every human right.” (Richard Waddington, “U.S. Calls North Korea ‘Hell on Earth’ on Rights,” Reuters, April 1, 2003)
North has given no response to South request to hold 10th inter-Korean ministerial on April 7. Talks may be suspended. (Seo Soo-min, “S-N Ministerial Talks Face Delay,” Korea Times, April 1, 2003)
Some F-117s and F-15Es will remain in Korea after exercise. (Daniel Cooney, AP, “U.S. Planes in S. Korea Will remain As Deterrent,” Washington Post, April 2, 2003, p. A-13)
Senior MOFAT official denies FT report attributed to Ra Jong-yil that Seoul proposed providing Siberia or Sakhalin natural gas to North as means of resolving nuclear standoff: “We have not considered that and made no such proposal to the U.S. and Japan,” adding “It may have been his [Ra’s] own idea.” (Shim Jae-yun, “Govt Denies Report on Gas Provision to NK,” Korea Times, April 1, 2003)
Ruediger Frank, “EU-North Korean Relations,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, 11, No. 2 (2002)
4/3/03:
UN special envoy Maurice Strong in London for talks with Clare Short, secy for intl aid and development, says war is “entirely possible.” UN sanctions if enacted at next week’s Security Council meeting would be seen in Pyongyang as an “act of war.” (AFP, “U.S.-North Korea War ‘Entirely Possible’: U.N. Envoy,” April 3, 2003)
North Korea will secretly import Russian-made tactical missile Iskander-E and MLRS Smerch from Syria without Russia’s knowledge, Sankei Shimbun says. (AFP, “Stalinist State to Buy Missiles from Russia,” Washington Times, April 4, 2003, p. 16)
China’s ambassador to Korea Li Bin: “We oppose any move toward economic sanctions against the North as it would only further complicate the issue. Sanctions can never be helpful in resolving the issue.” (Shim Jae-yun, “China Opposes Sanctions on N. Korea,” Korea Times, April 4, 2003)
Rodong Sinmun on “Military-First Ideology”: “The DPRK-US confrontation, which has been fiercely staged in recent years amid international society’s undivided attention, was not born from our nuclear issue; it was generated by the conflict between our resolute position of trying to preserve the nation’s sovereignty and the US imperialists’ dominationist ambition to rule all of Korea and turn our people into slaves. It is the US imperialists’ true intent and disgusting actual intention to try to isolate and crush our Republic, and moreover, attain global hegemony by spreading lies about our so-called nuclear development program. Our Republic, which cannot be viewed as a big country in terms of territory or population, stood face to face with the US imperialists, who style themselves as the sole superpower, and resolutely safeguarded the country and nation’s sovereignty and dignity. This is something that is beyond imagination for those with ordinary common sense. This miracle in history could be created by none other than the military-first road. … Our ultra-hardline response toward the United States is not just empty words. These words are a resolute response based on our powerful political and military might, firm resolution that means business when one says one will do something, and a conviction of certain victory that believes in winning every fight. If the US imperialists dare to set out in taking a rash challenge by misjudging our standpoint, will, and might, the enemies will only meet with a bitter, miserable defeat while we will achieve the complete reunification of Korea. … There was not one calm day on the Korea peninsula over the past 50-odd years after the fatherland’s liberation war ended, due to the US imperialists’ maneuvers to provoke a new war. In particular, the US imperialists’ maneuvers to provoke a war of aggression reached the extreme and a second Korean War became an established fact after the Cold War ended, which led to breakdown in the balance of power in the international arena. The fact that [we have] secured peace on the Korean peninsula, which is the most dangerous flash point area in the world, for a long period spanning half a century, itself, is clear proof of the might of our party’s military-first ideology. Our military-first politics is not used in threatening or attacking some one. It is a principled and righteous anti-imperialism, pro-independence politics as well as a politics for national protection that aims to smash the imperialists’ maneuvers of aggression with an invincible bayonet as well as safeguard the country’s peace and the nations’ destiny. … The US imperialists smashed many countries with force while ignoring officially recognized international laws and opinion of concerned nations, if it was in their national interests. Therefore, the reason that they were unable to sound the firearms of war on the Korean peninsula, where their strategic interests have intensively relied, was totally due to our powerful military power. The US imperialists dared not aim a clumsy blow, although they recently branded our Republic as [part of] an axis of evil and overtly revealed their attempt to deal a preemptive strike against us. This is because they, as world public opinion recognizes, are afraid of the disastrous results that could be brought about through confrontation with us. … Historically, the US imperialists have persistently plotted to isolate and crush our Republic. However, today, our Republic’s foreign relations are expanding day by day. Nowadays, the countries that kept a distance from us or disliked us and even the countries that followed the US imperialists’ isolating and crushing maneuvers are maintaining close relations with us. Amid such a trend of the time, the US imperialists’ anti-Republic isolating and crushing encircling net is falling to pieces. … The bitter history of begging the powers, making requests to big countries, and receiving the cold shoulder as a small and weak country has become the eternal past. Today’s stark reality is that any issue of the Korean peninsula cannot be resolved without attaching importance to us and respecting our position.” (Rodong Sinmun, “Military-First Politics Is a Precious Sword of Sure Victory for National Sovereignty,” April 3, 2003)
4/4/03:
In telephone call, a senior ROK official said April 17, “Bush asked Roh whether or not he could accept a trilateral meeting only involving the U.S., North Korea, and China … and Roh gave his consent.” (Oh Young-jin, “’Bush Told Roh of Seoul’s Exclusion from Nuke Talks on April 4,” Korea Times, April 18, 2003)
China playing more active role. China warned North Korea to stop provoking U.S., backing up the warning by closing an oil pipeline to North Korea for three days sometime after February 18, Chinese and Western sources said. “We have realized that we cannot let this situation alone,” a Chinese official involved in foreign policy said. “So we’ve decided to attempt to influence it, specifically by getting the two sides together.” China has transmitted more than 50 messages between Pyongyang and Washington. Hu Jintao underscored role in March 16 phone call to Bush shortly after vote by National People’s Congress making him president when he urged dialogue “as soon as possible.” (John Pomfret, “China Urges N. Korea Dialogue,” Washington Post, April 4, 2003, p. A-16)
Foreign direct investment to Korea in first quarter fell 48.4% from a year ago to $1.175 billion, lowest level since first quarter of 1998 in midst of financial crisis. (Chosun Ilbo, “Foreign Direct Investment Nosedives,” April 4, 2003)
Ha Soon-bong of GNP in National Assembly floor speech urges bipartisan special cmte on nuclear issue “as soon as possible” to “open parliamentary talks” with North. “With the U.S.-led war on Iraq showing signs of being protracted, our economy is falling further in the mire” and proposes parties both join government’s investor conference in New York. (Kim Hyung-jin, “GNP Offers S-N Talks on Nukes,” Korea Herald, April 4, 2003)
Three direct-current stabilizers seized as ship left Kobe for Thailand with North Korea as ultimate destination. (Joby Warrick, “N. Korea Shops Stealthily for Nuclear Arms Gear,” Washington Post, August 15, 2003, p. A-19)
4/6/03:
“Iraq is not just about Iraq,” a senior administration official who played a crucial role in putting the strategy together said in an interview last week. In Bush’s mind, the official added, “It is of a type.” Powell has been most vocal in insisting that Iraq is about Iraq and nothing more. “I think it is an overstatement to say that now this one’s pocketed on to the next place,” he said as the war began. “His view is that we’ve made enough enemies in the past five months, and we don’t need to go looking for another fight,” one of his senior advisers said. No one has seen Kim Jong-il in months and some experts say they believe he may be staying out of sight for fear of his own personal safety. So far the North has not resumed reprocessing. “He may have simply encountered technical troubles, said one North Korea expert in the administration. “But he may also be looking at CNN and considering the wisdom of his next move. The fact is, we don’t know.” (David E. Sanger, “Viewing the War As a Lesson to the World,” New York Times, April 6, 2003, p. B-1)
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The United States forced the UN Security Council to call a meeting on April 9 to discuss the DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT. As pointed out in the Jan. 10 statement of the DPRK government, its withdrawal from the NPT has already taken effect. The U.S. and some countries insist on a “legal argument” that the DPRK’s withdrawal takes effect after April 10 but a scrutiny into the minutes of the UNSC meeting held in June 1993 would tell that such assertions are meaningless. … The UNSC’s handling of the nuclear issue on the peninsula itself is precisely a prelude to war. The UNSC’s discussion of the Iraqi issue was misused by the U.S. as an excuse for war. The U.S. intends to force the DPRK to disarm itself. The Iraqi war shows that to allow disarming through inspection does not help avert a war but rather sparks it. Neither international public opinion nor the UN Charter could prevent the U.S. from mounting an attack on Iraq. This suggests that even the signing of a non-aggression treaty with the U.S. would not help avert a war. Only the physical deterrent force, tremendous military deterrent force powerful enough to decisively beat back an attack supported by any ultra-modern weapons, can avert a war and protect the security of the country and the nation. This is a lesson drawn from the Iraqi war. The U.S. is seriously mistaken if it thinks that the DPRK will accept the demand for disarming while watching one of the three countries the U.S. listed as part of an ‘axis of evil’ already subject to the barbarous military attack. The DPRK will not recognize any resolution to be adopted at the UNSC meeting to be called by the U.S., which launched the war defying the U.N. If the UNSC is abused for the U.S. hostile policy to stifle the DPRK, it will not bear any responsibilityu for the failure of all the efforts for dialogue and the extremely tense situation but will have no other option but to beef up the deterrent force for war by mobilizing all the potentials” (KCNA, “Statement of FM Spokesman Blasts UNSC’s Discussion of Korean Nuclear Issue,” April 6, 2003)
“There’s no question that signaled a willingness to compromise,” dropping its demand for a bilateral nonaggression pact, says an intermediary in Seoul who recently held private talks with North Korean officials [KAN]. Others are not so sure. “I’ve seen a multiple of back channels to North Korea. None of them produced anything of substance,” said a former State Department official [RC] in Washington, now out of government but still in touch with Korean issues. “The North Koreans are adroit at using them to build political support,” he said. “But when the direct channel, the official contact, starts, all of that warm fuzzy feeling evaporates very quickly.” (Doug Struck, “With N. Koreans, a Quiet Diplomacy,” Washington Post, April 12, 2003, p. A-14)
One longtime American analyst of North Korea: “This is an earthquake that registers 15 on the Richter scale. There is not a single policy that we have known in North Korea over the past 10 or 15 years that is left standing.” (Howard W. French, “North Korea Says Its Arms Will Deter U.S. Attack,” New York Times, April 7, 2003, p. B-13)
FM Yoon Young-kwan tell KBS: “Our government believes that the nuclear issue can be settled without relying on the official channel of the United Nations if diplomatic efforts can be successful outside the U.N. framework.” (Seo Hyun-jin, “Minister Yoon Says N.K. Issue Could Be Resolved outside U.N. Framework,” Korea Herald, April 4, 2003)
Nonaka Hiromu and Koga Makoto, former LDP secgens, have been forging ties with Chinese leaders while Koizumi is hampered by Yasukuni. PRC ambassador to Japan Wu Dawei asked them, “Why does Mr. Koizumi continue to worship at the Yasukuni Shrine, where Class-A criminals are enshrined?” Koizumi in Seoul in February urged Roh, “The engine of Japan’s development was, is, and will be its alliance with the United States. The alliance between United States and South Korea is also important.” When Roh announced support for the US in Iraq, Koizumi told his aides, “I changed Roh Moo-hyun’s way of thinking.” On March 27 Koga was told by PM Goh Chok Tong of Singapore, “Japan has become no more than a satellite of the United States. What happened to Japan?” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Iraq War Shakes Japan’s Asian Diplomacy,” (April 6, 2003)
4/7/03:
In National Assembly interpellation PM Goh Kun said a second summit already agreed on Roh administration believes the deal still holds. Shim Jae-kwon of MDP demanded that government refrain from sanctions or other hard-line policies while Park Jin of GNP said, “There will not be a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis without the vigorous application sticks as well as carrots. Only when the threats of pressure and sanctions are credible can Pyongyang be drawn into further negotiation.” (Ryu Jin, “Agreement on S-N Summit Still Valid,” Korea Times, April 8, 2003)
4/7-12/03:
Rep. Kim Won-wung, key ally of Roh, in Pyongyang. (Kim Hyung-jin, “Lawmaker’s Trip to N. Korea Fuels Speculation on Purpose,” Korea Herald, April 15, 2003)
4/8/03:
US-DPRK meeting in New York channel
4/9/03:
China blocks Security Council condemnation of North Korean nuclear program. “It is not appropriate for the UN Security Council to get involved in these issues,” Liu Jianchao, PRC FoMin spokesman said. “No related parties should take actions that would further complicate this matter.” (Associated Press, “North Korea’s Critics Blocked,” International Herald Tribune, April 9, 2003, p. 6)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Lawless, blindsided his South Korean counterpart, Lt. Gen. Cha Young Koo, Assistant Defense Minister for Policy, by summarily announcing plans to redeploy US forces and to move the US military command well southward. After talks Lawless says, “Both the ROK side and the United States have decided that this is an issue that can’t wait any longer for resolution. We have committed to one another that we would proceed … as fast as possible to solve what is admittedly a very complex and complicated issue.” (Associated Press, U.S. to Move Military Base Out of Seoul,” April 9, 2003) ROK to take over “selected missions” from U.S., counterbattery fire by MLRS, Apache helicopters. (Lee Chul-hee, “Seoul Accepts Bigger Defense Role, JoongAng Ilbo, April 10, 2003)
4/10/03:
US-DPRK meeting in New York channel. Senior MOFAT official: “There have been contacts between the two sides since North Korea expressed its willingness to join the multilateral talks, which the U.S. positively assessed.” (Shim Jae-yun, “U.S., N.K. Begin Contacts to Open Dialogue,” Korea Times, April 15, 2003)
Saddam Hussein’s statue is toppled from its pedestal in Baghdad.
Under Secretary of State John Bolton says, “We are hopeful that a number of regimes will draw the appropriate lesson from Iraq.” (Guy Dinmore, “Heed Lesson of Iraq, U.S. Tells Iran, Syria, and North Korea,” Financial Times, April 10, 2003, p. 4) “You heard this all the time, Michael Green recalled. “This was going to get Kim’s attention …” Green believed that immediately after the Iraq war there were signs that rth Korea was intimidated. Kim dropped out of sight for a couple of months. With the benefit of hindsight Green had a different view. “There were signs that Kim Jong-il intended to do this [nuclear test] all along,” he said. “And then we gave him the opportunity.” (Sanger, The Inheritance, pp. 312-13) “The Uniyted States was ten feet tall,”said Stephen Yates, OVP Asia director. “The Chinese were paying a lot more attention to what we might potentially do. That might have been an opportunity for a bold intiative on North Korea, with a bit of a swagger.” Yates found he “had no audience” for his plans. “I was having a hard time getting access to the vice president, or even Scooter or Eric Edelman.” Samantha Ravich, another OVP Asia specialist, told a colleague that the vice president “put North Korea on the back burner.” Said Yates, “In terms of his appetite for paper, we began exercising judicious editorial control on how much you could send the vice president that was not about Iraq.” (Gellman, Angler, pp. 252-53)
Howard Dean, pres candidate, backs “constructive engagement” with North Korea. “I think we can work hard and find a way both sides can get what they want accomplished.” “The idea that we might get into a war with North Korea, if anybody really is intimating that, I think is incredibly stupid.” (Glen Johnson, “A Foe of Iraq War Talks of Iran, N. Korea Threat,” Boston Globe, April 10, 2003, p. A-3)
Dep Permrep Han Song-ryol at Harvard conference: “We have to find a way acceptable to both sides” on modalities. No direct dialogue: “no heavy eye contact.” Direct dialogue not a reward. Not insisting on non-aggression pact but “nuclear threat must be stopped as soon as possible.” Our policy “so far” is “DPRK says it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons,” but “threat can make DPRK have a different policy — what would give us best deterrent against threat.”
Senior U.S. official says North Koreans have been spotted recently amassing the chemicals needed for separating plutonium at Yongbyon. (Barbara Slavin, “North Korea Pulls Out of Non-Nuclear Treaty,” USA Today, April 10, 2003, p. 10)
Roh invw with Donald Graham, Post reporters: “The United States has named North Korea as one of the axis of evil and has even mentioned the possibility of a nuclear attack against North Korea. So I think North Korea can’t help but to feel very nervous and afraid. Especially watching the recent Iraqi war I’m sure they are very much terrified … petrified by the Iraqi war. Kim Jong-il is developing nuclear weapons because he has “no other bargaining chips. Without this bargaining chip, Kim Jong-il does not have any other means of convincing his people that they are safe.” On human rights: “Ultimately, in order to secure the most protection for the most number of people in North Korea, the best method is to open up the Kim Jong-il regime and persuade. Rather than confronting or opposing them politically, it is better to have dialogue with the regime to fundamentally solve the problem. I think this will ultimately bring broader protection of human rights for North Korean people as a whole.” (Doug Struck, “S. Korean Stresses Alliance, Dismisses Differences with U.S.,” Washington Post, April 11, 2003, p. A-21)
4/11/03:
VP Cheney repeatedly tells Park Kwon-yong, speaker of National Assembly, Pyongyang must completely abandon its nuclear program before Washington will sit down again to talks. (Ju Yong-jung, “Cheney Conveys Very Hard Line,” Chosun Ilbo, April 11, 2003)
Dep FM Aleksandr Losyukov: Russia will oppose international sanctions only “as long as our North Korean colleagues maintain common sense,” warning, should North Korea begin producing weapons, “Russia will have to consider its position as the appearance of nuclear weapons in North Korea and the possibility of using them close to our borders goes categorically against Russia’s national interests.” (Michael Wines, “Warning to North Korea on Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, April 12, 2003, p. A-5)
PBS, Frontline: “Kim’s Nuclear Gamble,” April 11, 2003): William Perry: “I don’t know whether they have a bomb now. During the second or third year of the first Bush administration, we think they did some reprocessing of fuel without inspectors being present. Knowing the size of the reactor they had there, we believe that could have yielded enough plutonium for maybe one or two nuclear bombs. We don’t know that they’ve done that, but we know they could have done it. From that time, since about 1989 or 1990 to this point, which is 13 or 14 years, it’s possible that they have had enough plutonium for one or two nuclear bombs. I’m not unconcerned about that. But one or two nuclear bombs is a different nature of threat altogether from six or seven nuclear bombs, or from making five or 10 nuclear bombs a year, in terms of the threat to the United States. Because it gives them the option for testing, it gives them the option for selling, it gives them the option for still having nuclear weapons left over to threaten South Korea, Japan, the United States.” “I think it’s quite possible that the North Koreans have already decided that they’re going to become a declared nuclear state and that no amount of dialogue will stop them from that. I think that’s entirely possible. But I’m not sure that’s right. And therefore, I think the most urgent thing we have to do is put that to a test. And the way only way we can put it to a test is to undertake a dialogue with them to find out if they’re open to reasonable offers to stop to stop that nuclear program in a verifiable way.”
Q. On the economic and political side, was the Clinton administration able to hold to their side of the agreement? Perry: “Not really. There was in the Congress of the United States unhappiness with the Agreed Framework.” … “The most dramatic event, of course, was the summit meeting between the North and the South at that time. That was perhaps the high-water mark of this exploration that the North was doing. Another related high-water mark to me — at least symbolically, but I thought, quite interesting — was the North and South Korean athletes marching together in the Olympics. To me, those were all very, very positive developments. In that environment, then, the president invited Kim Jong-iI to come to Washington. The answer was he was interested in doing that, but couldn’t make the trip at this time, but would like to send his representative, Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok to Washington. The main point of Marshal Jo’s visit, besides just getting to know some of the Americans, was [to convey] a strong invitation to President Clinton, a personal invitation from Kim Jong-il to come visit him in Pyongyang. I think President Clinton was intrigued, and was willing to do that. I would like to have seen him do that, because I thought it was quite likely that what the North Koreans were saying then was right — which is they were prepared to close the deal at that stage, which was accept the proposal that I had made to them: Offer to give up their missiles, offer to give up their nuclear weapons, offer for reasonable verification of all of that in return for moving forward on this upward path. They would want to negotiate what some of the terms that would be, and they would hope that the visit of President Clinton would allow them to do that. But the purpose, what their proposal was for his visit was to close the deal. The president was intrigued, and probably would have done that, had the offer come sooner. But by that time, it was very late in the term, and he decided to temporize by sending secretary of state over, and sent Madeleine Albright — not as a rejection of the invitation, but as a precursor to it. He was only willing to go if he thought he had a if he had a deal at hand, and it was high probability. Secretary Albright went there to determine if that was the case, what the deal would be, and what the probability was of actually signing it. She came back with a report that she thought the deal was to be had. There were still one or two details — but important details — not yet worked out. But we’re pretty close to an agreement at that stage. The most important detail to be worked out had to do with how all this would be verified, which is a really sore point with the North Koreans, but a crucial point for us.”
Q. Did the Bush administration move the goal posts, effectively, from what were the goal posts established during the Clinton administration? Richard Perle: “Well, I would hope that we would move the goal posts because we didn’t like the playing field that was established during the Clinton administration. It was a playing field on which we were expected to pay the North Koreans not to do dangerous things, and that is not a sound basis for a policy. …It is the policy of the government of North Korea, in my judgment, to use its capacity to do harm to elicit support from those who might be harmed by actions they would agree not to take. That’s blackmail, and it’s going to continue. The shape of it, the timing of it, the form of it will change, but the basic structure of the relationship, implied in the Framework Agreement, is a relationship between a blackmailer and one who pays a blackmailer.”
Q. The criticism of the Bush administration would be that it, in all of this tough talk and rebuffing the Sunshine Policy, that they have failed to get to the negotiating table and that things have only gotten worse. Perle: “Well, I don’t agree with that, obviously. The Sunshine Policy, we now know, involves a lot less sunshine, a lot less light than heat — massive payments, as I understand it — in order to stage meetings that have political ramifications within South Korea, without any significant movement by the North Koreans in any direction that’s any way helpful. So the Sunshine Policy has simply not succeeded. It’s a failure.”
Q. But talking tough has resulted in them starting up the plant at Yongbyon again. Perle: No, I think that’s a kind of post hoc ergo propter hoc argument. It is true they have started up, or attempting to start up, the reactor at Yongbyon, but to attribute that to the statements and the policies of this administration, rather than a North Korean effort to apply blackmailer’s pressure, I think is quite wrong. I think this is another step in the continuing process of threatening to do menacing things in order to elicit payment.”
Q. But if we’re not talking to them, nothing’s happening and they’re building bombs, so what should we be doing? Perle: “Well, what I think we should be doing, and this, like I everything else I say to you, is my personal view, is I think we should be putting it to those countries who are in a position to bring great influence to bear on North Korea, the Chinese especially. Our proposition to the Chinese should be: We think the world will be a lot better off if the North Koreans choose not to proceed down this path, but we are determined not to allow them to proceed down this path, and we would like your help in resolving this peacefully. Because the alternative to resolving it peacefully is to resolve it as the Israelis dealt with a similar emerging threat in 1981, when they found it necessary to destroy the reactor that was going to produce the nuclear material that presented an existential threat to them.”
Q. But the situation is quite different here, in that a strike on Yongbyon is likely to produce another Korean War, with hundreds of thousands, if not over a million, people dead. Perle: “Well, we don’t know whether it would produce another Korean War.”
Q. But that’s a risk. Perle: “Of course, it’s a risk. There’s a risk in everything we do. There’s a risk in doing nothing. There’s a risk in continuing to pay blackmail to the North Koreans. I believe that we should be in a position to impress upon the Chinese their interest in a peaceful solution to this.”
Q. What’s the lesson that should be learned from what happened in 1994 for the folks that are trying to handle the crisis now? Robert Gallucci: “We did a deal with North Korea called the Agreed Framework, and it stopped the plutonium program. If we hadn’t done the deal, North Korea would have, without question, more than 100 nuclear weapons. Did they cheat on it? Absolutely. They cheated on it. And that’s a lesson, too. They will cheat. They cheated by having a secret uranium enrichment program because they’re still not confident their security will be guaranteed. Now, it may be that they’re unalterably committed to acquiring nuclear weapons, in which case, we gotta deal with that fact, if it is indeed a fact.”
Q. There are those now who have come forward from the Clinton administration saying that the deal was basically abandoned by the United States. That’s perhaps too strong, but that there was a lack of political will to enforce the Agreed Framework, that in fact, the complaints coming from North Korea that the United States dragged its feet and reneged have some validity. Gallucci: My own view here is — and there are disagreements about this — that in the Clinton administration there wasn’t the enthusiasm for everything the North Koreans wanted in terms of the political pay-off from the deal. So the North Koreans were somewhat disappointed. But let’s be clear about this. There are hard and soft portions to the deal. A hard portion was they needed to have their [plutonium] program frozen, and under inspection, and they needed to re-can the spent fuel so it wasn’t reprocessed. That was done.”
Q. Did they hold to their end of the agreement in that sense? Absolutely. Absolutely. And on our side, in terms of the hard part, so did we. We were obligated to create an entity called the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, an international entity — which was really South Korea, Japan and the United States and eventually the European Union — to build these 2,000-megawatt light-water reactors. That was a hard point in terms of the deal and we were doing that. We also had to deliver a quantity every year of something called heavy fuel oil to provide energy replacement for what they were giving up with not having their own nuclear facilities. And did we meet every delivery schedule on the day? No. Did we generally meet the schedule, and were we generally providing what we said we’d provide? Yes. So in terms of the hard performance under the framework, both sides were doing it.”
Q. But there was the political opening and the economic opening. The lifting of sanctions. The establishment of liaison offices. Sure. Liaison offices were not established, but not because we weren’t willing to. We were quite willing to. In fact, we had foreign service officers pulled out of rotation and prepared for that. It was the North Koreans that figured out: A) We were not going to have a huge operation up there that we would pay them for, instead, we were gonna use part of the old German Embassy, and B) They were gonna have to have a high bill to pay here in Washington. And they had other reasons why they were reluctant. So the liaison offices didn’t happen, but it wasn’t our fault. Second, with respect to the economic opening, lifting of sanctions, that’s the area in which they didn’t get the pay-off that they thought they’d get. But nothing that you could nail and say, this is what the framework says we didn’t perform. We were not as forthcoming as they might have liked.”
Q. In October of 2000, you go to Pyongyang. We know that you’re there to try to get them to put away their missile program, to stop making their long-range missiles. What is Kim Jong-il up to, in your opinion? Madeleine Albright: “Well, I think at that stage he wanted very much to have a relationship with the United States. The purpose, I think, generally, of his policy was to get some recognition from the United States that North Korea existed, that we should have diplomatic relations. So he was really quite open, in discussions that we had, in terms of limiting his missile program, and it was very evident that what he wanted to do was to be involved in a negotiation, which would lead to a meeting with President Clinton that would result in a better relationship.”… “I had, with my delegation, worked out a series of questions that we needed to have answered about what the propositions would be to work out some kind of an agreement to limit the production of missiles and their export. …But what was interesting was that, as I said to him, “I have a series of questions for you, maybe you’d like to ask your experts and get me the answers,” and he said, “No, just give me the piece of paper.” And what he did was systematically start answering the questions, without advising or asking advice from his advisers sitting next to him. So I think that he is informed on the subject, technically, and very much wanted to show that he was in charge.”
Stephen Bosworth: “From our point of view, this was an energy deal. Nuclear for nuclear, if you will. From the North Korean point of view, I always thought it was much more than that. It was a deal that they believed should have taken them to a normalized political relationship with the United States. And indeed, the agreement itself specified the easing of sanctions, the establishment of diplomatic liaison offices, various other things, which had they been implemented, I think would have taken us to a very different destination. Within 10 days after the framework was signed, it became a political orphan. The Democrats, President Clinton, lost control of both houses of Congress. And conservative Republicans, particularly in the House, who hated the Agreed Framework, believed that it was basically an example of the U.S. paying extortion, began to oppose it very fiercely. And in fact, there was very little follow through. We managed to scrape up enough money to continue to provide heavy fuel oil, as we were required to do, but beyond that, there was little appetite in the administration, no appetite in Congress, for the sort of political moves that would have been necessary to implement the broader Agreed Framework beyond the energy aspects.”
Q. You hold the administration equally responsible as the Congress in letting this agreement become a political orphan Bosworth: “In my judgment, the administration was not prepared to expend very much political capital on behalf of implementation of the Agreed Framework. No, they had other priorities. It would not have been easy — I don’t have any illusions about that. But basically, the Agreed Framework was an orphan. And to the extent that we had a policy toward North Korea from ’94 to ’98, the policy in effect consisted of waiting for North Korea to collapse.”
Q. The uranium enrichment program. Bosworth: I think there is good evidence that they started that some time in the second half of the ’90s. I don’t know when. I also, at this point, don’t know how vigorous a program that really was or is. I’ve always thought, from the beginning, that the North Koreans, in all likelihood, were hedging their bet. They did not have complete confidence that the Agreed Framework would do what they hoped it would do — provide a normal relationship with the U.S — so that they would retain something in reserve, to use in the event that the Agreed Framework broke down, or was not implemented in a satisfactory fashion. So, I’ve always considered that there would be a program of that sort, in all likelihood. And I think that the enriched uranium program was [that] program. So we’re left with a bad option, but the only one that’s feasible, and that is to try to engage with them, to try to figure out deals that will constrain them and prevent them from developing this nuclear option.”
Q. Who paid attention to this in the Clinton administration? Was [Secretary of State Warren] Christopher or the president or [National Security Adviser] Anthony Lake engaged in this? Or did it die at a lower level of the bureaucracy? Bosworth: “My sense is that after the signing of the Agreed Framework, which Bob Gallucci was instrumental in engineering, that basically the seventh floor of the State Department forgot about North Korea.”
Q. So, we recognize it as evil, we call it a member of the axis of evil, we call the leader names. Great, so what? But what’s the policy? Bosworth: “That’s not a policy. That’s the problem with it. It’s not a policy. And I think finally, well, middle of last year Secretary Powell met with the North Korea foreign minister at an ASEAN Conference in Asia. [Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] Jim Kelly geared up to go to North Korea. And at about that same time apparently the intelligence information regarding their enriched uranium program became so compelling that Kelly used that trip basically to explain what we thought we knew about what they were doing and to challenge them on. However, it seems to me [that] should have been done in the context of some analysis of how they were likely to react, what was it that they were likely to do in response to our confronting them about enriched uranium. And it seemed to me at the time and still seems to me now that for us the red line, both for them and for us, should have been to prevent at all costs their unfreezing the plutonium facilities at Yonbyon. Because enriched uranium could produce fissile material but not for a long time. Plutonium facilities can produce fissile material very quickly.”
Q. Do you think that the North Koreans kept their side of the deal? Lim Dong-won: “So far. So far under the Clinton administration both the U.S. and South Korea agreed that North Korea has honored that Agreed Framework.”
Q. But you don’t think they cheated? You don’t feel that they cheated [with the uranium enrichment program? Lim Dong-won: “Every country [tries] to have technology for research and development purposes, you know? But if they don’t have facilities and they don’t produce then it is not violating the intention of agreement.”
4/12/03:
DPRK tells China that Li Gun, deputy director for American affairs at the Foreign Ministry would lead its delegation to three-party talks. (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 18)
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The DPRK’s call for direct talks is aimed to confirm whether the U.S. has a political willingness to drop its hostile policy toward the DPRK or not. It is possible to solve the issue if the U.S. sincerely approaches the dialogue. … If the U.S. is ready to make a bold switchover in its Korea policy for a settlement of the nuclear issue, the DPRK will not stick to any particular dialogue format. (KCNA, Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Peaceful Solution to Nuclear Issue, April 12, 2003)
Based on German and French tips, French freighter Ville de Virgo intercepted at northern end of Suez Canal with 214 aluminum alloy 6061-T6 tubes bound for North Korea. German police arrest exporter and uncover scheme to ship 2,000 such tubes, enough for 3,500 gas centrifuges. “The intentions were clearly nuclear,” said a Western diplomat familiar with the investigation. “The result could have been several bombs’ worth of weapons-grade uranium in a year.” [?] (Joby Warrick, “N. Korea Shops Stealthily for Nuclear Arms Gear,” Washington Post, August 15, 2003, p. A-19) It spurred Bolton and Robert Joseph to try the Proliferation Security Initiative. (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 176)
Q Sir, given the success of American military forces, is this a message that people like Syrians and the North Koreans should take to heart? Do you think the North Koreans are taking it to heart? THE PRESIDENT: “I think that people have got to know that we are serious about stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction and that each situation requires a different response. But we are making good progress in North Korea. We have made it clear that we think that the best way to deal with their proliferation is through a multi-national forum. It looks like that might be coming to fruition. That’s very good news for the people in the Far East who are concerned about North Korea and their willingness to develop nuclear weapons. We’re making progress on all fronts.” (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President upon Arrival From Camp
4/13/03:
DoS spokeswoman Amanda Batt: “We note the report with interest. We expect to follow up through appropriate diplomatic channels.” (AFP, “U.S. Notes N. Korea Statement ‘With Interest,’” April 13, 2003) U.S. dropped demand that North promise to dismantle before any talks. “Everybody knows this is a sort of ‘appearance’” of multilateral talks, said a top Japanese official who helped pave the way for the talks. “We know that the key thing will be the direct discussion between the United States and North Korea.” Japan and South Korea expect to join talks later: “We explicitly agreed because if there’s a miscalculation, we suffer the consequences.” (Doug Struck, “U.S. Makes Concessions for N. Korea Negotiations,” Washington Post, April 16, 2003)
ROK MinFin Kim Jin-pyo in New York to woo investors; KOSPI down 16.4% in 1st quarter and won lost 5.5% against dollar, Moody’s downgrade because of political risk over North Korea. (James Brooke, “Unwanted Attention for Korea,” New York Times, April 15, 2003, p. W-1)
4/14/03:
Pres Bush approves talks hosted by China April 23-25. “What’s new here is that there is an active, bold participatory role for the Chinese,” said a senior U.S. official. No other parties. “This is what the traffic would bear,” but the U.S. “reserved the right” to bring others in. (David E. Sanger, “North Koreans and U.S. Plan Talks in Beijing,” New York Times, April 16, 2003, p.A-1)
Ranking ROK MOFAT official: “The North sees no reason for Japan and Russia to join the multilateral talks because it wants to discuss the abolition of the armistice pact and the signing of a nonaggression pact with the United States during the forum. Instead, the North wants the European Union to participate in the multilateral forum in an apparent hope that the EU may play a leading role in providing economic aid to Pyongyang.” (Shin Yong-bae, “N.K. Wants Japan, Russia Out of the Talks,” Korea Herald, April 15, 2003)
“It’s a favorable move,” Chief Cabinet Secy Fukuda Yasuo told a press conference. “It shows [North Korea] has become somewhat flexible toward solving the problem.” (Takahashi Junko, “Japan Lauds North Korean Olive Branch on Arms Talks,” Japan Times, April 15, 2003)
Ishihara Shintaro, reelected governor of Tokyo in landslide yesterday: “We are under threat ourselves from another terrorist state, North Korea, which has kidnapped 150 our citizens. 150 people! I don’t think any of them are alive. Pyongyang is also sending boatloads of drugs to Japan to harm our youngsters, and it has missiles ready to hit 15 Japanese cities. What other country would tolerate this? This should be called what it is — terror — and the Japanese government should recognize this and stand up to the North Koreas. We should say that we don’t want to leap into a war but if comes to it, we won’t avoid it either, together wit a policy of sanctions and seizure of the assets of North Korean organizations in Japan. Al Qaeda assets in the U.S. are confiscated. Why shouldn’t we? … Let’s say we attack another of their boats in our territory and put their spies in prison or execute them. That could spark another crisis. The expectation than from Japan’s side is that America would jump in to help us, but we really don’t know if they will, so that would probably mean war. And if it does, we’ll win, no question about it. At least the Japanese government should let Pyongyang know that they could expect sanctions and revenge.” (David McNeill, “Ishihara Shintaro on North Korea,” Japan Times, April 15, 2003)
4/?/03:
Rumsfeld memo drafted by Assistant SecDef Richard Lawless leaked by State: US should team up with China to oust North Korea’s leadership. At odds with State Department approach of convincing Kim Jong-il, in Powell’s words, “that we’re not trying to take him out.” (David E. Sanger, “Administration Divided over North Korea,” New York Times, April 21, 2003, p. A-15) Last week Rumsfeld proposed Under SecSt John Bolton to be U.S. negotiator at three-party talks. (Glenn Kessler, “State-Defense Policy Rivalry Intensifying,” Washington Post, April 22, 2003, p. A-1; Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 169)
4/?/03:
JCS chairman Richard Myers briefed President Bush on the a plan to attacks the North’s nuclear facilities. “It wasn’t an appealing option at all,” recalled Myers in April 2006. “We could handle the attack. It’s the response that was the nightmare.” (Sanger, The Inheritance, p. 311)
4/15/03:
Under SecState Bolton invw: “Well what we’ve said, going back months now, is that we expect the complete verifiable dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear weapons program before bilateral talks would proceed. That was the position in October, when [Assistant Secretary of State] Jim Kelly went and when the North Koreans admitted they had a nuclear weapons program, and that’s the position today, too.” (p. 28)
Q. When did the North start procuring parts for their uranium program? “What we’ve concluded, I think, is that this goes back — the North Korean uranium-enrichment effort is a serious attempt to get production scale capabilities — goes back to about 1998.” (p. 30) (“Undersecretary of State Bolton Speaks with ACT,” Arms Control Today, May 2003)
4/?/03:
DCI “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Related to WMD and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January-30 June 2002”: “We did not obtain clear evidence indicating that North Korea had begun constructing a centrifuge facility until recently. In 2001 North Korea began seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities. It also obtained equipment suitable for uranium feed and withdrawal systems. North Korea’s goal appears to be a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when full operational.” Report notes North Korea still procuring missile-related components and material from abroad but drops previous references to those supllies going thourgh North Korean firms in China. (Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation of WMD and Missiles, Congressional Research Service Report, November 15, 2006, pp. 19-20)
4/16/03:
Pres Bush instructs negotiators US will not settle for freeze, insist on dismantlement. Official says U.S. seeking ways “to assure the North Koreans that we are not looking to overthrow them, to take them out.” (David E. Sanger, “Bush Takes No-Budge Stand in Talks with North Korea,” New York Times, April 17, 2003, p. A-13) Powell received Bush’s final approval for his approach of offering assurances in meeting that Rumsfeld did not attend. “There’s a sense in the Pentagon that Powell got this arranged while everyone was distracted with Iraq,” said one intelligence official. “And now there is a race over who will control the next move.” (David E. Sanger, “Administration Divided over North Korea,” New York Times, April 21, 2003, p. A-15)
Bush in 20-minute telephone conversation with Koizumi promises to work to include Japan in talks, calls it “important” for Japan to be in. (Kyodo, “Bush Vows to Let Japan, S. Korea Join N. Korea Talks,” April 17, 2003)
FM Yoon says he gave approval for trilateral talks March 27: “So I contacted headquarters [Ch’ongwadae] here, and after discussing a wide range of issues, we reached a decision. The decision was that, basically, in light of the seriousness of the situation at the time, it was important to start the dialogue first and thus lay the foundation for peacefully resolving this issue. …So the United States proposed to North Korea, through Chinese channels, its position that it, too, was all right [with holding multilateral talks]. After waiting a long time, North Korea responded to the [US proposal] for talks last weekend through China, specifying when and where these talks would take place, and at what level the talks would be.” (FBIS text) “Although the talks will begin in a three-way forum, it will evolve into a four-tiered one, including South Korea, or a six-way format with the participation of Japan and Russia …” (Shim Jae-yun, “U.S., China, N.K. to Meet Next Week,” Korea Times, April 16, 2003) Yoon: “We won’t share the burden resulting from any talks that we do not participate in.” (Karen DeYoung and Doug Struck, “Beijing’s Help Led to Talks,” Washington Post, April 17, 2003, p. A-1)
Koizumi’s curt reply to criticism that Japan was snubbed: “I think it is good to have other countries press North Korea.” Senior MOFA official: “Above all, there must be a way to break the stalemate on discussing the nuclear issue.” He added, “Certainly the outstanding issues between Japan and North Korea are central to resolving the whole North Korea issue. We will insist Japan take part in the next round of talks, if there is a next round.” (Karasaki Taro, “Japan Glad Despite Snub in 3Way N. Korea Talks,” Asahi Shimbun, April 17, 2003)
South to send 200,000 tons on fertilizer ($55 million) if North requests it, UnifMin Jeong Se-hyun tells National Assembly. (JoongAng Ilbo, “Fertilizer Will Be Sent — If North Asks for It,” April 16, 2003) Jang Jae-on, head of DPRK Red Cross letter to ROK Red Cross passed through Panmunjom: “Based on the humanitarian spirit, we expect your side to provide us with rice and fertilizer.” (Seo Soo-min, “North Korea Asks for Fertilizer, Rice,” Korea Times, April 17, 2003)
Kan Naoto first Japanese pol to meet President Hu. DPJ leader said recently, he will not seek a “dichotomy of either following the United States or remaining anti-American, but a third way somewhere in between.” A CCP source: red-carpet welcome to “send a message to Koizumi that it would keep its distance.” (Kaneko Keiichi and Kurihara Kentaro, “Kan Makes Political Mileage in China,” Asahi Shimbun, April 18, 2003)
4/17/03:
UN Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution deploring abuses in DPRK; ROK abstains. “We decided not to participate in the voting rather than casting a blank ballot,” a senior MOFAT official said. “North Korea may overreact because they see this resolution as a Western attempt to press and kill the North Korean regime.” (JoongAng Ilbo, “Seoul Withholds Its Vote As UN Group Raps North,” April 17, 2003)
4/18/03:
DPRK FoMin spksmn: “As we have already declared, we are successfully reprocessing more than 8,000 spent fuel rods at the final phase as we sent interim information to the U.S. and other countries concerned early in March after resuming our nuclear activities from December last year.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Expected DPRK-U.S. Talks,” April 18, 2003) Revised April 21 to read: “we are successfully completing the final phase, to the point of the reprocessing operation, for some 8,000 …” Chun Young-woo, MOFAT director for arms control: “North Korea has repeatedly said they would start reprocessing. I’ve never heard that they actually did.” (Howard W. French, “North Korea’s Atomic Bravado Incites a Host of Skeptics,” New York Times, April 19, 2003, p. A-2) A U.S. official argues for delay: “We will look like fools if we get on a plane and go to those talks” after the DPRK statement. “This sends a signal to the rest of the world that North Korea is not interested in seriously negotiating.” (Glenn Kessler and Doug Struck, “N. Korean Statements Jeopardize New Talks,” Washington Post, April 19, 2003, p. A-1) “North Korea simultaneously played two cards of a nuclear threat and dialogue,” said a ROK official. “Both cards were intended to stop US military action.” (JoongAng Ilbo, “The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The Untold Story,” p. 27)
North proposes ministerial talks with South April 27-29. (Reuters, “North Korea Proposes Ministerial Talks with South,” April 18, 2003)
Chief cabinet secy Fukuda Yasuo reacting to Rumsfeld’s comment that U.S. won’t reward DPRK: “One doesn’t usually discuss conditions before negotiations.” (Kyodo, “Japan Questions Rumsfeld’s Remarks over N. Korea,” April 18, 2003)
Japan considering aid, says government source, if a nuclear deal: “no choice but to contribute even before normalizing ties.” Another source: “If we can stop nuclear development, which is a vital issue for Japan, we will consider food and other aid separately from the full assistance that would come after the normalization.” Hasuike Toru, brother of abductee Kaoru, says government is “weak-kneed”: “Do they think it’s a case of tens of thousands of people killed by nuclear weapons versus a few dozen people who have been abducted?” Yokota Sakie, abductee Megumi’s mother, says, “Prime Minister Koizumi promised us that he would not provide support [to North Korea] unless the abduction issue is resolved, so we want him to keep his word.” (Japan Times, “Japan May Aid Pyongyang Before Normalizing Ties,” April, 20, 2003)
4/20/03:
An adminintration official said Powell made his move to get talks started several days into the Iraq war when Rumsfeld was distracted and unable to oppose three-party talks as a fig leaf for bilateral talks. Rumsfeld “knew these would be perceived as bilateral talks, and it turns out he was right.” Frank Jannuzi wrote in February report for Woodrow Wilson International Center DPRK talking points for the first day of talks with Kelly suggest “an insecure North Korean regime seeking a way in from the cold. It was an invitation to dialogue, and a missed opportunity.” Japan worried about concerns being ignored. “If the North Korea-U.S. relationship starts to move, North Korea will not see Japan as a dialogue partner,” said Okonogi Masao at Keio University. “Unless Japan plays a role, there will be no return.” (Doug Struck and Glenn Kessler, “Clashing Agendas Threaten Start of North Korea Talks,” Washington Post, April 20, 2003, p. A-12) Robert Gallucci interview 7/?/04 by CFR: “The Chinese brought both Pyongyang and Washington to Beijing by telling the United States, ‘Essentially, these are multilateral talks because there are three of us there,’ and telling the North Koreans, ‘There are essentially bilateral talks because we are just hosting.’” “That was the Chinese playing both ends against the middle,” recalled Jack Pritchard, “telling the North Koreans, ‘Yes, you’re going to have a bilateral meeting with the U.S.’ and then turning around and telling the U.S., ‘Don’t worry, this is truly a three-party session.” (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 167)
Bush: “I believe that all four of us [US, Japan, ROK, China], working together, have a good chance of convincing North Korea to abandon her ambitions to develop a nuclear arsenal.” (AFP, “Bush Sees ‘Good Chance’ of North Korea Breakthrough,” April 20, 2003)
ROK national security adviser Ra Jong-yil on reprocessing claim: “We think North Korea is trying to gain leverage ahead of the talks.” (Yoo Jae-Suk, “North Korea Proposes Talks with South,” Associated Press, April 20, 2003)
Rodong Sinmun signed article: “All the Koreans in the north, the south and overseas should firmly unite as one to resolutely smash the U.S. moves for a war of aggression in order to protect the destiny of the nation and the future of a reunified country. The grim reality in which the nation stands at the crossroads of a war or peace and reunification or national extermination calls on all Koreans to launch a patriotic struggle for peace against the U.S. and war.” (KCNA, “Struggle against U.S. and War Called for,” Pyongyang, April 20, 2003)
After four-day chase, Royal Australian Navy seizes North Korean cargo ship, Pong Su, takes captain and crew of 29 into custody, for bringing $46 million of heroin into Lome. (Kyodo, “Suspected N. Korea Smuggling Ship Stormed off Australia,” April 20, 2003)
Explosion last November at Taepodong test site, USFK sources in Seoul say. (Kim Hyung-jin, “’Explosion Reported in NK Missile Site’” Korea Herald, April 22, 2003)
4/21/03:
First vice chmn Jo Myong-rok in China for three-day visit. (Kyodo, “Senior N. Korea Official to Visit China Next Week,” April 19, 2003)
Kyong Won-ha, said to be “father” of North’s nuclear program, among defectors moved in “Operation Weasel” through Nauru’s embassy in Beijing, which US helped pay for and set up in return for not imposing sanctions as “non-cooperative country.” (Doug Struck, “Korean Scientists Defect in China,” Washington Post, April 21, 2003, p. A-18) “He is not one who had core in formation about North Korea’s nuclear programs as the report described,” said a North Korean source in Beijing, which is why the North did not pay much attention to his movements in China. He reportedly worked at Los Alamos in the early 1970s and taught at McGill before moving to the North in 1974. Philip Gagner, lawyer in Washington working on Nauru, helped arrange defections. (Yoo Kwang-jong, “North Aide Says Defector Was Only Minor Scientist,” JoongAng Ilbo, April 22, 2003)
4/23/03:
Three-party talks open in Beijing. US position: “Certainly the item on the agenda for the United States is to achieve a verifiable and irreversible end to North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs … And as we have made clear, we are not prepared to offer any inducements to North Korea to try to achieve that.” (State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, Daily Briefing, April 21, 2003) Before he left for the talks Kelly tried to get permission to speak directly to the DPRK rep, prompting Rice to issue strict instructions he could not. Kelly then sent an email trying again and China’s ambassador made a personal appeal to Rice, to no avail. Even Powell thought Kelly’s request went too far. (Glenn Kessler, The Confidant, p. 69) Kelly was instructed to say we would not accept a freeze but insist on “verifiable and irreversible dismantlement.” (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 169) At dinner Li Gun pulled Kelly aside and said we have nukes. “We can’t dismantle them. It’s up to you whether we do a physical demonstration or transfer them.” Said one official, “If they only have two nuclear bombs,” and test, “they’ll rapidly run through their stock.” (Glenn Kessler, “N. Korea Says It Has Nuclear Arms,” Washington Post, April 25, 2003, p. A-1) Powell testimony, Senate Appropriations Committee, Foreign Operations Subcommittee, April 30, 2003: ‘The North Koreans, in very typical bellicose fashion, accused of everything imaginable, and then said, ‘We reprocessed all the fuel rods that were in storage.’ [He said the U.S. had been told previously, alerting others on the U.S. delegation who were unaware what had transpired on March 31 in the New York channel.] We can’t establish that as a matter of fact with our intelligence community, but they said they did it. That is their assertion. That is their position. And then they told Mr. Kelly that ‘By the way, we confirm that we have nuclear weapons, and we told you 10 years ago, in 1993, that we had nuclear weapons,’ although we can’t verify they told anybody that. And they said, ‘With these nuclear weapons, we can display them, we can make more, or we can transfer them.’ And then they said, ‘It’s up to you. It depends on the American reaction. Take your time. Think about it.’” [Version first put out by senior administration official was “Whether we test them, use them or export them depends on your next step.” The correct version in Korean had no direct object but spoke only of “display or transfer, a possible hint of the Syrian technology transfer.] (Carla Anne Robbins, “North Korea Talks Tough with U.S., Boycotts Meeting,” Wall Street Journal, April 25, 2003, p. A-3)] Powell press briefing on April 28: “They never used the word “test” and they said that it is the kind of capability that one can display in one way or another.” North also said it began reprocessing. U.S. delegation: Assistant Secretary of State Kelly, Director for Asian Affairs, Dr. Michael Green of the National Security Council; Brigadier General Gary L. North of Joints Chiefs of Staff; David Straub, Director of the Office of Korean Affairs, Department of State; Jodi Greene, Senior Country Director for North Korea, Office of the Secretary of Defense; an officer from the Department’s Korea desk; and an interpreter. Two officials, one American, one Asian, say Li’s words were vague. “No one talked about testing directly, or selling,” said one. “There was language about ‘taking physical actions.’” (David E. Sanger, “North Korea Says It Now Possesses Nuclear Arsenal,” New York Times, April 25, 2003, p. A-1) DPRK “bold proposal”: it would abandon nuclear program if U.S. would agree to normalize relations, provide assurances not to attack it, to respect its sovereignty and not to impede its economic development as it dismantles, Munhwa Ilbo reports. (Kyodo, “N. Korea’s ‘Bold Proposal’ Features 4 Points,” April 28, 2003) DPRK “bold proposal” says “normalization of diplomatic relations” with Japan a condition for scrapping its nukes. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Government Feels N. Korea Trying to Shelve Abduction Issue,” May 2, 2003) “When China agreed in April to act as a host of the talks, some State Department officials quietly hatched a plan to have Powell give instructions directly to the head of the U.S. delegation, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, that would allow him to speak to the North Koreans. When Kelly briefed members of the Rumsfeld/Cheney faction — which opposed the talks — they moved quickly to thwart him. Within four hours, State received instructions from Rice that specifically forbade Kelly from speaking directly to the North Koreans, officials said. The North Koreans, stunned that they would not get a one-on-one meeting, refused to attend the planned second and third day of the meetings, held in Beijing, and the talks were generally viewed as a failure. To win a new round of talks, the administration reversed itself and agreed to bilateral discussions during a six-nation conference held in August.” (Glenn Kessler and Peter Slevin, “Rice Fails to Repair Rifts, Officials Say,” Washington Post, October 12, 2003, p. A-1) Just days before the talks Rumsfeld sent a memo saying enough diplomacy had taken place and now it was time for regime change. In a second memo he warned the Chinese session was a trap to lure the U.S. into bilateral talks. When the talks were scheduled any way he sent a third memo saying Kelly should be replaced by Bolton or Joseph as delegation head. Kelly went but with a script that he read — literally. “These talks will not last the scheduled three days, Pritchard e-mailed his colleagues. “The North will walk out.” (Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Has a Shifting Script on N. Korea,” Washington Post, December 7, 2003, p. A-25) DoD rep Jodi Green threatened to report on back-channel that Li Gun said he’s already told the U.S. it was reprocessing if it was not included in the reprting channel. When Kelly asked to be able to hold a bilateral, others on the delegation sent back their own reports of Li Gun’s threat, which leaked to Andrea Koppel, among others. (Chinoy, Meltdown, pp. 172-73)
Deputy FoMin Aleksandr Losyukov: “It is possible that, as early as tomorrow, there will be a catastrophic development of events.” He adds, “If the danger is diffused, we would only welcome this.” (AFP, “’Catastrophic’ Events Imminent Regarding North Korea: Russia,” April 23, 2003)
Last June North Korean gunboat offloaded 198 bricks of heroin to Taiwanese fishing boat, say police and lawyers for the Taiwanese. Also trading in cocaine, bootlegged liquor, endangered species, counterfeit dollars. Defectors say collective farms ordered to grow opium. Raphael Perl, Congressional Research Service: “North Korea is essentially now a state-run criminal syndicate.” (Jay Solomon and Jason Dean, “Heroin Busts Point to Source of Funds for North Koreans,” Wall Street Journal, April 13, 2003, p. A-1)
4/24/03:
Bush invw on Air Force One, Tom Brokaw, NBC News, asked about reprocessing: “See, they’re back to the old blackmail game.” “North Korea is making my case, that we’ve got to come together” [on proliferation]. “I look forward to hearing what the Chinese say about being rebuffed by the North Koreans because they, too, believe that the peninsula ought to be nuclear weapons-free.” “It’s another reason, by the way, for us to also advance the missile defense system, because the missile defense system will make it less likely that a nuclear country could blackmail us or Japan or any one of our friends.”
DPRK boycotts second day of what was to be three days of talks after U.S. refused to meet bilaterally. (Carla Anne Robbins, “North Korea Talks Tough with U.S., Boycotts Meeting,” Wall Street Journal, April 25, 2003, p. A-3)
4/25/03:
Press briefing by Ari Fleischer: “During these talks, we made clear to the North Koreans our policy, which is the policy of our allies in the region, that North Korea must verifiably and irreversibly dismantle their nuclear weapon program. This is the goal of our allies. This is the stated policy of China, which played a very productive role in these talks and a very helpful role through the act of participation of the Chinese government. …The North Korean way of dialogue is often to engage in as bad a behavior as they could possibly engage in, with the expectation that the world will reward them for ceasing their bad behavior. That has been their previous actions. And the President has made clear that the United States will not reward bad behavior. So we’ll analyze what North Korea is doing, what North Korea is saying. And the President continues to believe that this can be a matter that will be solved through diplomacy. And I think it will also be very interesting to note what China’s reaction is to North Korea’s admission that it has nuclear weapons.” (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Transcript)
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “At the talks the DPRK set forth a new bold proposal to clear up bilateral concerns of the DPRK and the U.S., the parties concerned with the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, at the same time. The U.S., however, repeated its old assertion that the DPRK should ‘scrap its nuclear program before dialogue’ without advancing any new proposal at the talks. And it persistently avoided the discussion on the essential issues to be discussed between both sides.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on U.S. Attitude toward DPRK-U.S. Talks,” April 25, 2003)
“The Chinese presentation made it clear that the Chinese position is a denuclearized peninsula,” said a U.S. source familiar with the talks. “The Chinese position was interesting in that they took note directly and publicly in front of the delegations of the 1992 [denuclearization] agreement between North Korea and South Korea.” North Korea did threaten to “show” it had nuclear weapons but it is not clear it meant some sort of “test.” (AFP, “China Left North Korea in No Doubt on Nuke Position: US Sources,” April 25, 2003)
PM Koizumi: “We are aware of various reports [coming form the talks]. What is important is that the dialogue continues.” (Asahi Shimbun, “Japan Unfazed by Nuke Claim,” April 26, 2003)
4/27/03:
President Hu Jintao has 15-minute telephone conversation with Bush. (Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Officials Spar over N. Korea,” Washington Post, April 27, 2003, p. A-11)
Okamoto Yukio on NHK-TV: “I suspect that North Korea may be buying time until it possesses practical nuclear weapons. I do not think a good agreement will come from an extension of the framework of the talks.” (Japan Times, “Koizumi Aide Pessimistic on North Korea, April 28, 2003)
4/27-29/03:
10th N-S ministerial talks. Joint statement: “South and North Korea will thoroughly consult each other’s position on the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula and will continue cooperation to resolve the issue peacefully through dialogue.” MinUnif Jeong Se-hyun: North “did not object strongly” to South’s request to participate in multilateral talks. (Seo Soo-min, “Koreas Agree on Peaceful Resolution of Nuke Crisis,” Korea Times, April 30, 2003)
4/?/03:
South Korea detected smoke at reprocessing plant in late April. “Other signs needed to confirm that the North is reprocessing, such as traces of the chemical emitted during the process have not been detected yet,” a senior ROK official said May 7. (Seo Soo-min, “Seoul Confirms Detection of Smoke at NK Nuclear Plant,” Korea Times, May 8, 2003) US has given ROK satellite photo showing smoke coming from reprocessing plant. (Daniel Cooney, AP, “U.S. Satellite Photos Hint of Nuke Activity,” Washington Times, May 9, 2003), p. 15)
4/29/03:
PIPA poll taken April 18-22: 44% say North Korea more likely to make WMD now that US has toppled Iraq and 47% less likely. 11% say US should continue to be preeminent world leader, 72% say it should do its share to solve international problems together with others, 15% say it should withdraw from most efforts to solve intl problems. 67% say UN should take lead in stopping North Korea from making nuclear weapons, 31% say US.
4/30/03:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The DPRK government has long consistently called for the denuclearization of the peninsula from its peace-loving stand. In January 1992 it adopted the “joint declaration on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” with South Korea and has striven hard to implement it by the efforts of the whole nation. …
The U.S. however, has persistently pursued its strategic aim, going against the desire of the Korean nation. Finally it went to the lengths of torpedoing the process of denuclearization in Korea. The DPRK called for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to ensure peace and protect the sovereignty and the dignity of the nation, not to disarm itself under the U.S. pressure and fall victim to a war.
The reality requires the DPRK to deter the escalating U.S. moves to stifle the DPRK with a physical force, compels it to opt for possessing a necessary deterrent force and put it into practice.” (KCNA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Accuses U.S. of Derailing Denuclearization Process in Korea,” April 30, 2003)
US, ROK intell detect signs of reprocessing. ROK intell off: “US satellite photos showed some vapor from the cooling tower of the {radiological] laboratory. In the past, vapors had been detected at a boiler connected to the lab. But this was the first time that vapor was coming out of the cooling tower. But we did not make a final conclusion on whether the North was reprocessing the spent fuel rods or not because we could not detect other signs of reprocessing such as krypton-85 or high heat emissions.” (JoongAng Ilbo, “The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The Untold Story,” p. 27)
Powell testimony, Senate Appropriations Committee, Foreign Operations Subcommittee: “We thought we had bottled that up with the agreed framework, only to discover that they popped out somewhere else. There was another bottle with another genie in it that we discovered, with no cork. And so we confronted them. They first denied it; then they admitted it. And we’ve been telling them for a number of months, since last October, when this broke out, that the only way we can deal with this in the future is not to deal with it the way we dealt with it in the past, because that didn’t work. So we’re not going to get back into an agreed framework kind of arrangement where you make promises but we don’t get rid of the capability and it’s ready to pop out again, and meanwhile we’re giving you aid and light-water reactors and all kinds of other things. We also told them that ‘This time the solution has to involve your neighbors, not that we don’t have a role to play, and we know you are worried about us attacking you, but it’s your neighbors who are threatened by this capability. And their interests have to be served, and they have to be a party to the solution. Why shouldn’t they be?’”
Asst SecSt INR Carl Ford additional questions for the record for February 11 hearing: “China laid the groundwork for the initial US-DPRK-PRC talks on North Korea’s nuclear arms program. The confidential minutes of PRC-DPRK high-level consultations, coupled with Pyongyang’s continued belligerent anti-US rhetoric, prompted some to speculate earlier that China was not doing as much as it could to press North Korea to reverse course. …The prospect of DPRK miscalculations in reaction to the U.S. push into Iraq nonetheless imparted greater urgency to Beijing’s deliberations. The temporary oil supply cutoff earlier this year and the more recent PRC move to block a UN motion condemning the DPRK withdrawal from the NPT probably were among the ‘enticements,’ according to media reports, that Beijing employed to modify Pyongyang’s behavior.” “We believe Kim Jong-il is firmly in control and see no signs of revolt brewing beneath the surface.”
5/1/03:
Senior MOFA official response to “bold proposal”: “Japan’s stance is quite clear. The government won’t give economic assistance [to North Korea] as long as the diplomatic relations between the two countries are not normalized. To normalize bilateral relations, security issues and the issue of the abduction of Japanese nationals must be resolved.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Government Feels N. Korea Trying to Shelve Abduction Issue,” May 2, 2003)
FCO Bill Rammell holds first-ever ministerial-level talks with Choe Su-hon on opening of DPRK embassy in London
5/2/03:
Roh calls Hu Jintao and expressed wish for dialogue to continue. Senior ROK official: “President Roh was talking to Chinese President Hu, but he hoped that U.S. President George W. Bush would listen in, too.” Oh Young-jin, “Roh Frustrated at U.S. Will for Nuke Talks,” Korea Times, May 2, 2003)
5/3/03:
Bush discusses new approach with PM John Howard of Australia to prevent North from exporting plutonium [PSI]. “The president said the central worry is not what they’ve got, but where it goes,” said an official familiar with the talks. “He’s very pragmatic about it, and the reality is that we probably won’t know the extent of what they are producing. So the whole focus is to keep the plutonium from going further.” (David E. Sanger, “Bush Shifts Focus to Nuclear Sales by North Korea,” New York Times, May 5, 2003)
Baek Seong-gi, Korean Exchange Bank official who handled transfer of cash to a North Korean account in Macao in June 2000 said he saw nothing to suggest Hyundai Merchant Marine was the sender. National Intelligence Agency made the transfer. Lim Dong-won said spy agency was merely facilitating the transaction. (Kang Joo-an and Jeon Jin-bae, “North Funds Called a Spy Agency Deal,” JoongAng Ilbo, May 3, 2003)
5/4/03:
Senior admin official: “If we could have containment that’s tailored to the conditions of North Korea, and not continue to throw it lifelines like we have in the past, I think it goes away. It’s a bankrupt economy. I can’t imagine that the regime has any popular support. How long it takes, I don’t know. It could take two years.” And what is North Korea doing during this time? “I think it’ll crank out, you know, a dozen weapons a year or more. We lived with a Soviet Union that had tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, including thousands of them pointed at us. We just have to cope.” (Bill Keller, “The Thinkable,” New York Times Magazine, p. 101)
Ra Jong-yil saw Cheney, Powell, Rice, Wolfowitz in four-day trip. “National security Adviser Ra Jong-yil asked four key U.S. administration officials to resume talks as soon as possible during his recent trip to Washington,” says ROK official. “But they said they are still at the stage of interagency consultations and an outcome is not likely to be seen anytime soon.” (Oh Young-jin, “U.S. Tells Seoul to Stall Plans for Nuke Talks,” Korea Times, May 5, 2003)
“A second round is up to China,” says a senior US diplomat. “If the Chinese want to host it, we are ready. But we won’t attend unless it is larger and genuinely multilateral.” (Robert Marquand, “Korea Crisis Awaits Multistate Push,” Christian Science Monitor, May 5, 2003)
5/5/03:
Rumsfeld served on board of Zurich-based ABB which signed a contract in 2000 to provide design and key components for North Korean reactors under 1994 AF. Victoria Clarke, his spokeswoman, told Newsweek in February, “there was no vote on this” and her boss “does not recall it being brought before the board at any time.” (Richard Baker, “Rummy’s North Korea Connection,” Fortune, May 12, 2003)
Powell cites need to curb drug trafficking by North Korea. (Glenn Kessler, “Plan for N. Korea Will Mix Diplomacy and Pressure,” Washington Post, May 7, 2003, p. A-1)
5/7/03:
Principals meeting today to set policy: new talks combined with pressure by targeting illegal drugs and counterfeiting and possibly missile sales. State favored talks, Defense pressure. “We signed up for the hard side in order to get the soft side,” said one official who wants talks. “Some people want only the hard side.” (Glenn Kessler, “Plan for N. Korea Will Mix Diplomacy and Pressure,” Washington Post, May 7, 2003, p. A-1)
“Reports relating to North Korea’s procurement of enrichment-related equipment date as far back as the mid-1980s.” (p. 5) [pre-date 1992 Joint Declaration or AF] “In 1998 the United States sent a team to Kumchang-ni to look for undeclared nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment.” (p. 5) “By 1999, according to one former official, however, there were clear signs of active North Korean interest in uranium enrichment” (p. 5) “Khan reportedly has made 13 visits to North Korea, beginning the 1990s.” (p.6) “One media report cited Western officials that the aid included a complete design package for centrifuge rotor assembly; another report from Japan stated that Pakistan had exported actual centrifuge rotors (2000-3000) to North Korea.” (p. 6) (Sharon Squassoni, “WMD: Trade between North Korea and Pakistan,” Congressional Research Service)
5/8/03:
New assessment delivered in mid-April says North has reprocessed small amounts of plutonium, say senior admin and intell officials. “It means we don’t have forever to solve this problem, said senior US official. “Without the IAEA inspectors there, there is a much greater level of uncertainty about whether reprocessing is taking place, said Joel Wit. That’s the whole point of all of North Korea’s behavior,” he said. “You don’t know whether it’s a threat or whether it is the truth.” (David E. Sanger, “U.S. Suspects North Korea Moved Ahead on Weapons,” New York Times, May 18, 2003, p. A-18)
Chief cabinet Secy Fukuda Yasuo tells abductees Japan may consider economic sanctions “as an option to take following North Korea’s actions.” (Kyodo, “Japan May Study Economic Sanctions on N. Korea,” May 8, 2003) Japan-US summit March 23 my lead to sanctions, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secy Abe Shinzo suggests in March 10 speech. (Kyodo, “Japan, U.S. May Move Toward N. Korean Sanctions in Summit: Abe,” March 10, 2003) Japan intends to enforce laws on export control, drug-trafficking and other areas more strictly to exert diplomatic pressure on North, Koizumi will tell Bush. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Legal Blitz Planned against North Korea, March 10, 2003)
5/9/03:
Roh on preemption: “I would like to discuss with President Bush that the circumstances on the Korean Peninsula may not be appropriate for applying this principle from the very beginning,” he said in invw. “The mere thought of a military conflict with North Korea is a calamity for us.” NSA Rice on May 12: U.S. will keep “all options open.” (Joseph Curl, “U.S. Keeps Preemption Doctrine ‘Open,’” Washington Times, May 13, 2003, p. 1) Ra Jong-yil, national security adviser, on May 14: “What Ms. Rice said is the U.S.’s general view, repeated in the aftermath of the terror incident in Saudi Arabia, and doesn’t specifically target the North.” (Oh Young-jin, “Roh, Bush May Agree on New Round of Talks with N. Korea,” Korea Times, May 14, 2003)
Metropolitan Police Dept raids Meishin, trading company in Tokyo owned by pro-NK Korean suspected of attempting to export three direct-current control devices via a Thai communications device maker. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Firm Raided over ‘N-Part’ Export,” May 9, 2003)
Nonaka Hiromu, ex-secgen of LDP, said at lecture in November, “I even feel that my life is at stake” for trying to improve relations with DPRK. Journal Shukan Kinyobe, Social Democratic Part and DPJ targeted for harassment over abduction issue. (Asahi Shimbun, “For Speaking Out: Issues Involving Japan and North Korea Inevitably Draw a Sharp Reaction from Extremists,” May 9, 2003)
5/10/03:
Chinese Vice FM Wang Yi in Seoul seeking new talks, MOFAT official said. (Kim Young-sae, “Chinese Aide Reportedly Is Pushing New North Talks,” JoongAng Ilbo, May 12, 2003) Wang tells Japan FM Kawaguchi he wants multilateral talks to continue. (Kyodo, “China Expresses Intention to Continue Dialogue with N.Korea,” May 12, 2003)
5/11/03:
Bush advisers arguing over whether or negotiate or organize international blockade. “You’ve got two sets of challenges here,” said senior admin off. “One is the challenge of maintaining a common front” with South Korea and Japan “given that people list the priorities in the different order: deterring war on the peninsula, preventing nuclear transfer to terrorists and preventing missile development.” The second is “coming up with the right mixture of a willingness to negotiate with a willingness to confront.” Deploying more than 100 Nodongs “represents a fundamental miscalculation on the part of the North Koreans,” said a senior DoD official. “What they have done is almost single-handedly overturned a very deep-seated, third-generation pacifism.” (David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Aides Remain Divided As They Weigh Korea Risks,” New York Times, May 11, 2003, p. 1)
5/12/03:
U.S. intelligence officials have concluded Kim Jong-il went into seclusion for 50 days starting in mid-February because he feared he was targeted. DoD is examining lessons of leadership air strikes in Iraq for use against North with goal of assembling detailed intell on high-priority targets. “Truly, if I’m Kim Jong-il, I wake up tomorrow morning and I’m thinking, ‘Have the Americans arrayed themselves on the peninsula now, post-Iraq, the way they arrayed themselves in Iraq, rather than the way they were pre-Iraq?’” says senior DoD official. “And the idea is to make the North Koreans realize that we are arrayed, we are deployed, we are committed in Korea with the types of resources and types of capabilities that we brought to Iraq,” he added. “And we think that doing that will make our deterrence there much more credible and much stronger.” No changes in U.S. force deployments yet; process could take three years. North studies 1991 Gulf war and “we saw adjustments in the way they did things after that, especially in the areas of camouflage and concealment,” said one DoD official. “I suspect they are doing that again.” Kim’s seclusion “may be one of those adjustments.” [So why emerge now that Iraq over? Other hypothesis he was preparing military-first doctrine] (Thom Shanker, “Lessons from Iraq Include How to Scare Korean Leader,” New York Times, May 12, 2003, p. A-17)
KCNA detailed report blames U.S. for “reducing to a dead document the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization”:
“On February 3, 1958, the U.S. forces exhibited two 280-mm-calibre atomic guns and nuclear missiles Honest John each in the airfield of the U.S. first army corps in the vicinity of Uijongbu to show them to media persons. (Orient Press, Reuters and Hapdong News Agency).
“The meeting of the U.S. House of Representatives held on May 30, 1975 to examine the defense budget for 1976 officially disclosed that at least 1,000 nuclear weapons and 54 nuclear-capable aircraft were deployed in South Korea, according to Hapdong News from Washington D.C. in June 1975.
“Among the nuclear bombs shipped into South Korea were 80 nuclear warheads for missile Honest John, 192 tactical nuclear bombs for fighter-bombers, 152 nuclear shells for 155-mm-calibre howitzers and 56 nuclear shells for 8-inch howitzers, the January 1981 issue of magazine defense monitor published by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Center said.
“The U.S. deployed 56 neutron bombs in South Korea for an actual war the deployment of which was rejected by many countries in Europe and other areas, as well as a large number of field backpack nukes.
“The magnitude of the nuclear threat posed to the DPRK increased as the South Korean ‘Yusin government’ worked hard to develop nuclear arms.
“In early 1978 when the Kori Atomic Power Plant began operation South Korea had an annual capacity of extracting 139 to 167 kg of plutonium 239 with which to make 23 to 28 20-kilo ton-class nuclear bombs.
“On Jan. 10, 1984, the Central People’s Committee and the SPA Standing Committee held a joint meeting at which they adopted letters to the U.S. government and congress and the South Korean authorities. The letters proposed tripartite talks allowing the South Korean authorities to attend the DPRK-U.S. talks to discuss measures for removing the danger of nuclear war and providing preconditions for a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue.
“In order to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and fully ensure the sovereignty of the country, the DPRK government acceded to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in December 1985 and, after its accession to the treaty, advanced many more peace proposals on its own initiative and has made every possible effort for their materialization.
“In the June 23, 1986, statement it solemnly declared that it would not test, produce, store and introduce nuclear weapons nor allow the establishment of any foreign military bases, including a nuclear base, and passage of any other country’s nuclear weapons through its land, air and waters.
“The statement also clarified that if the U.S. government and the South Korean authorities request any negotiations as regards the DPRK’s proposal for turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone, the DPRK government would respond to it anytime regardless of their format.
“Since the ‘joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ was announced on Jan. 20, 1992, the DPRK has redoubled its sincere efforts to put it into practice.
“Its government paid primary attention to the efforts to ensure that the documents of historic significance in removing the very source of the danger of nuclear war from the Korean Peninsula have full legal validity. The joint meeting of the Central People’s Committee and the SPA Standing Committee on Feb. 5, 1992, examined and approved the joint declaration.
This was an epochal event that provided a landmark for turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone and reunifying the country.
“As a more practical step, the 16th meeting of the Standing Committee of the ninth SPA held on Feb. 18, 1992 and the third session of the ninth SPA held in April of the same year examined, discussed and approved the proposal for ratifying the safeguards accord between the DPRK and the IAEA. As a result, the accord took effect as from April 10, 1992.
“The DPRK government published a memorandum on Sept. 12, 1997, in which it disclosed the reckless nuclear arms buildup the U.S. and the South Korean authorities pushed forward behind the curtain of the talks and strongly demanded a prompt stop to it.
“In the memorandums of its Foreign Ministry, indictment of the Korean anti-nuke peace committee, and indictment of the DPRK Lawyers Committee released on March 15, 1993, April 20, 1994, January 7, 1999, and February 28, 2003, respectively the DPRK called attention to the fact that the danger of nuclear war was growing on the Korean Peninsula owing to the test nuclear war exercises of the U.S. and the South Korean authorities and the unreasonable behavior of some quarters of the IAEA secretariat, and put forth constructive and substantial proposals to solve this issue.
“A joint meeting of the government, political parties and organizations of the DPRK held on March 18, 2003 called upon all the Koreans at home and abroad to defend the sovereignty of the nation and peace of the Korean Peninsula from such growing danger of nuclear war through national cooperation.
“With a view to denuclearizing the peninsula, the DPRK government opened to the world community all the nuclear activities of the DPRK for a peaceful purpose, proving the validity and integrity of its nuclear policy.
“It allowed an IAEA delegation led by its general director to visit the DPRK from May 11 to 16, 1992, and inspect all its nuclear facilities they had wanted to do and any objects they had suspected.
“The DPRK submitted to the IAEA its initial inventory report on nuclear material and nuclear facility designing information on May 4, 1992, far ahead of the set date, which were to be presented according to articles 42 and 62 of the safeguards accord between the DPRK and the IAEA.
“The DPRK government rendered full cooperation to the IAEA’s ad-hoc inspection team in its six rounds of inspection in the DPRK from May 1992 to early February 1993.
“Thanks to the consistent and magnanimous efforts exerted by the DPRK government, the DPRK-U.S. joint statement was adopted between the two countries on June 11, 1993 and the DPRK-U.S. agreed framework was adopted on October 21, 1994, under which both sides committed themselves to fundamentally settle the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.
“Even when the U.S. moves to scrap the AF and reduce the north-south joint declaration on denuclearization to a dead document reached its zenith after the Bush administration took office the DPRK proposed DPRK-U.S. direct talks several times and strongly called for settling the nuclear issue by concluding a non-aggression treaty in the hope of preventing the process of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula from being derailed. …
“On March 20 this year the U.S. provoked a war of aggression against Iraq under the pretext of “finding out weapons of mass destruction” in a bid to topple the Saddam government.
“The Iraqi war taught the lesson that “nuclear suspicion,” “suspected development of weapons of mass destruction” and suspected “sponsorship of terrorism” touted by the U.S. were all aimed to find a pretext for war and one would fall victim to a war when one meekly responds to the IAEA’s inspection for disarmament.
“Neither strong international public opinion nor big countries’ opposition to war nor the UN Charter could prevent the U.S. from launching the Iraqi war.
“It is a serious lesson the world has drawn from the Iraqi war that a war can be averted and the sovereignty of the country and the security of the nation can be protected only when a country has a physical deterrent force, a strong military deterrent force capable of decisively repelling any attack to be made by any types of sophisticated weapons.
“The reality indicates that building up a physical deterrent force is urgently required for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula and ensuring peace and security of the world, now that the U.S. does not show any political intention and will to renounce its hostile policy toward the DPRK.
“The DPRK will increase its self-defensive capacity strong enough to destroy aggressors at a single stroke. Any U.S. aerial attack will be decisively countered with aerial attack and its land strategy will be coped with land strategy.” (KCNA, “U.S. to Blame for Derailing Process of Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula,” May 12, 2003)
Roh speech to Korea Society in New York: “The U.S. forces in Korea represent the core symbol of our alliance and hold importance both in political and security terms. If any changes take place without our consent it would put South Korea in a very difficult situation.” (Chosun Ilbo, “Roh Seeks to Dispel Doubts,” May 12, 2003) Invw: “I think coercive measures have to wait until we have exhausted all possible efforts at dialogue.” (Gordon Fairclough and Karen Elliott House, “South Korean President Roh Counsels Patience with North,” Wall Street Journal, May 13, 2003) Invw: “Many people are concerned that President Bush’s ‘peaceful resolution’ principle may change in the future despite his assurances otherwise.” Says he’s “very concerned” about administration hardliners. “The stronger party can afford to show some flexibility with the weaker party.” (David E. Sanger, “ South Korean Leader Wants U.S. Troops to Stay, for Now, “ New York Times, May 13, 2003), p. A-20)
U.S. military officer in ROK says North exported $580 million in missiles to Middle East in 2001, $500 million in narcotics and $15-20 million in counterfeit U.S. currency a year. (Asano Yoshiharu, “’N. Korea Missile Exports Earned 580 Mil. Dollars in ‘01’” (Yomiuri Shimbun, May 13, 2003)
SecState Powell testified recently that seizure of drugs in Australia shows North Korea “thrives on criminality.” Any conciliation, he told reporters last week, must include end to its nuclear program and “criminal activities.” (Doug Struck, “Heroin Trail Leads to North Korea,” Washington Post, May 12, 2003, p. A-1)
5/13/03:
Roh: I think coercive measures have to wait until we have exhausted all possible efforts at dialogue.” (Gordon Fairclough and Karen Elliott House, “South Korean President Roh Counsels Patience with North,” Wall Street Journal, May 13, 2003)
FM Kawaguchi press conf: “No countries, including Japan, are considering imposing economic sanctions, and the United Nations is also not discussing the issue.” (Kyodo, “Kawaguchi Rules Out Imminent Economic Sanctions on N. Korea,” May 13, 2003)
National security adviser Ra Jong-yil op-ed: “Even in the light of North Korea’s recent claim that it possesses a nuclear weapon, the present South Korean administration remains as convinced as ever that engagement through our “policy of peace and prosperity” — a continuation and expansion of the “sunshine policy” initiated by former President Kim Dae-jung — is the proper approach. The principle of the engagement policy is simple: to move unilaterally toward reconciliation with North Korea, gradually expanding the areas of common concern until enough trust has been built up to finally establish institutions leading to eventual unification.” (Ra Jong-yil, “Step by Step to One Korea,” International Herald-Tribune, May 13, 2003, p. 6)
5/?/03:
In mid-May 33 tons of sodium cyanide, chemical used to make tabun, which Singapore firm bought from German company with North as end user. (Joby Warrick, “N. Korea Shops Stealthily for Nuclear Arms Gear,” Washington Post, August 15, 2003, p. A-19)
5/14//03:
Bush-Roh summit. At joint press conf, Roh: “When I left Korea, I had both concerns and hopes in my mind. Now, after having talked to President Bush, I have gotten rid of all my concerns, and now I return to Korea only with hopes in my mind.” Bush: “I have found the President to be an easy man to talk to.” Joint statement: “President Bush reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to a robust forward presence on the peninsula and in the Asia- Pacific region. The two leaders pledged to work closely together to modernize the U.S.-ROK alliance, taking advantage of technology to transform both nations’ forces and enhance their capabilities to meet emerging threats. In the context of modernizing the alliance, the two leaders agreed to work out plans to consolidate U.S. forces around key hubs and to relocate the Yongsan garrison at an early date. President Bush pledged to consult closely with President Roh on the appropriate posture for USFK during the transition to a more capable and sustainable U.S. military presence on the peninsula. They shared the view that the relocation of U.S. bases north of the Han River should be pursued, taking careful account of the political, economic and security situation on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia. The two leaders also noted the opportunity provided by the Republic of Korea’s growing national strength to continue expanding the role of the ROK armed forces in defending the Korean Peninsula. … President Bush and President Roh reaffirmed that they will not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea. They noted with serious concern North Korea’s statements about reprocessing, possession of nuclear weapons, and its threat to demonstrate or transfer these weapons. They stressed that escalatory moves by North Korea will only lead to its greater isolation and a more desperate situation in the North. Both leaders reiterated their strong commitment to work for the complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program through peaceful means based on international cooperation. They welcomed the role played by China at the April 23-25 trilateral talks in Beijing. They agreed that the Republic of Korea and Japan are essential for a successful and comprehensive settlement and that Russia and other nations can also play a constructive role in multilateral diplomacy. While noting that increased threats to peace and stability on the peninsula would require consideration of further steps, they expressed confidence that a peaceful resolution can be achieved. Noting that the United States and the Republic of Korea are the two leading donors of humanitarian food assistance to North Korea, the two Presidents reaffirmed that humanitarian assistance is provided without linkage to political developments and noted the need to ensure that the assistance goes to those in need. President Bush [not Roh] stressed that North Korea’s nuclear programs stand in the way of the bold approach and the ability of the international community to consider comprehensive steps to assist the many needs of the North Korean people. President Roh outlined his Peace and Prosperity Policy and President Bush reiterated his support for the process of South-North reconciliation. President Bush noted that the Republic of Korea has used this dialogue channel to call upon the North to resolve the nuclear issue. President Roh stated that future inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation will be conducted in light of developments on the North Korean nuclear issue. The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining close coordination between the U.S. and ROK governments on this issue as well as in trilateral consultations with Japan. “At preparatory talks, the US wanted to put in the phrase ‘All options remain on the table,’ indicating a possibility of a military option. That was the expression the Mr. Roh strongly rejected,” says a Roh admin off. Lee Soo-hyuck refused and the US yielded. (JoongAng Ilbo, “The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The Untold Story,” p. 28) A senior admin off: “We are not going to freeze in place until the nuclear issue is solved, and the South Koreans know that and they agree.” (Dana Milbank and Karen DeYoung, “President Sees ‘Progress’ on North Korea,” Washington Post, May 15, 2003, p. A-2) “Our policy toward North Korea can really be summed up as follows: no one should be willing to give in to the kind of blackmail that North Koreans have been practicing for a number of years now, especially not the United States,” Condoleezza Rice told reporters. “We are not fearful of talks, and if we believe they are useful at some point in time, we would be more than willing to re-enter them.” Senior U.S. official asked if Roh got assurances force would not be used: “He didn’t ask for them.” A senior official suggested US and others could impose sanctions gradually: “There isn’t an on-off switch here.” (David E. Sanger, “Bush and New President of South Korea Are Vague on North Korea Strategy,” New York Times, May 15, 2003, p. A-24) Bush began the meeting by saying he heard the average height of North Koreans was six to eight inches shorter than South Koreans because of their poor diet. The South Koreans were struck by his emotion. In a meeting with Deputy SecState Armitage, FM Yoon Young-kwan asks, “What’s the point of having a multilateral conference if your side won’t meet and talk to the North Korean side?” Yoon used the word “bilateral” about ten times. (Chinoy, Meltdown, pp. 177-78)
US donated 278,000 metric tons of food in 2001, but this year had pledged only 40,000. WFP says it has pledges of 315,000 tons, 40% less than it needs. (Jay Solomon and Carla Anne Robbins, “Amid Nuclear Standoff, Food Aid Shrinks for Hungry North Korea,” Wall Street Journal, May 15, 2003, p. 1)
Berger-Gallucci op-ed: “The Bush administration’s position appears to be that we recognize the fact that the North may continue making plutonium; we will try to stop them from transferring it outside the country 9all you need to know is that plutonium for several nuclear weapons would fit in a breadbox); and we will increase pressure on the North by shutting down its heroin trade (presumably based on the success that a series of administrations have had in shutting down cocaine traffic from South America). This apparently is designed to collapse the North Korean regime, no mean feat for an economy that survives about two inches off the ground.
“What is the alternative? First, it involves a recognition that a nuclear weapons factory in North Korea, in a world of global terrorists, is not a situation we can tolerate. Second, it requires that we stop characterizing negotiations as succumbing to blackmail, decide what it is we most need (a verifiable end to its nuclear weapons and missile programs, involving intrusive international inspections nationwide) and then negotiate seriously. That, said a satisfactory agreement may not be achievable. The North already may have decided to pursue the nuclear-weapons track. But if we do not test this in good faith, we will not have any chance of support from South Korea, Japan or China for more coercive options. Third, we must make clear that further separation of plutonium by the North will result in serious consequences, with all options, including military, on the table. This is the hardest part because the possibility of war here is not Iraq redux; it could be the Korean War redux.
“President Bush’s goal at today’s summit should be to convince President Roh, first, that we are serious about negotiations and, second, that we must stand together if it is clear that the North is bent on the nuclear track. Only if we are prepared to say ‘yes’ to a good agreement — and are ready for the consequences of ‘no’ — do we have a chance of stopping the nuclear Wal-Mart before it opens.” (Samuel R. Berger and Robert Gallucci, “Shut Down North Korea’s Nuclear Wal-Mart,” Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2003)
KEDO still has 605 South Koreans, 353 Uzbeks, 99 North Koreans at site “continuing their work.” ROK has contributed $850 million to LWR project, Japan $323 million and EU $17 million, or about 28% of original budget. (Seo Soo-min, “Nation Pays $850 Mil. For KEDO,” Korea Times, May 14, 2003)
Rumsfeld testifies Senate Appropriations Cmte hearing: “It’s a serious matter that we do not have in the inventory the ability to deal with an underground, deeply buried target.” Admin gets Senate to lift 10-year-old ban on developing new nuclear weapon to devise bunker buster for use against North Korea. (Doug Struck, “U.S. Focuses on N. Korea’s Hidden Arms,” Washington Post, June 23, 2003, p. A-16)
5/15/03:
Diet lower house passes three war contingency bills authorizing use of private property, punishment for violation of emergency laws in event of “imminent threat.” “North Korea was definitely the biggest factor in the bills being passed now,” said Funakoshi Koichi, law professor at Nagasaki University. (Mark Magnier, “Japan Set to Clarify Defense Mandate,” Los Angeles Times, May 16, 2003)
Condoleezza Rice interview May 12: “looking at ways to deal with Pyongyang’s trade in illegal drugs, counterfeiting and missiles.” [IAI, PSI] Senior U.S. official: “We’ve got a decision and we’re going to do it.” (Carol Giacomo, “U.S. Seen Cracking Down on North Korea’s Exports,” Reuters, May 15, 2003)
Roh on plane to SF: “President Bush is not the type who likes sticking to details. He likes to deal with issues in broad strokes and lead the conversation. … He talked straight on big points, not liking to deal with complicated things. … He said that he hates the North Korean regime but feels sorry for the people suffering under the regime.” “Defense Secretary Rumsfeld is logical and very hard-headed. He talked mainly about changes in U.S. strategic needs. He left very little unexplained.” (Oh Young-jin, “Roh Says Bush, Rumsfeld Poles Apart,” Korea Times, May 16, 2003) Roh: “During my U.S. tour, North Korea declared the nullification of the inter-Korean denuclearization agreement. We need effective cards so that we can flexibly respond to [the North’s move]. …I made it clear that we will not play in the way the North intends.” (Hwang Jang-jin, “Roh Shifting N. Korea Strategy,” Korea Herald, May 17, 2003)
Roh on Lehrer NewsHour: “”When Korea, China, Japan, and the United States offers what North Korea wants, maybe North Korea’s attitude may change in the future. That is if North Korea receives security guarantees and an opportunity to reform and open up its economy, then there is a high likelihood that it will be willing to renounce its nuclear program.” [Rice] (AFP, “Roh Boats of ‘Chemistry’ with U.S. President,” May 16, 2003)
5/16/03:
Led by Michael Horwitz of Hudson Institute and conservative Christian churches, radical human rights activists urging admin to support policy of “implosion” by encouraging high-level defections, refugee outflows from North Korea. Activists met with officials in Vice President Cheney’s office. (Marian Wilkinson, “Defections Plan to Hit Pyongyang,” Sydney Morning Herald, May 16, 2003)
5/17/03:
Sixty activists picket Roh’s arrival at Incheon with signs decrying “humiliation.” Pickets from left-wing Hanchongryon protest his appearance at Gwangju. Democratic Labor Party issues statement, “Is Roh going to change jobs and become America’s bugler, discarding the urgent task of national coexistence?” MDP lawmaker Kim Sung-ho calls it anti-national for Roh to facilitate U.S. intervention in Korean internal affairs. People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy also critical. GNP defends Roh. (Shin Jong-rok, “Roh Faces Increasing Criticism,” Chosun Ilbo,, May 18, 2003) At a meeting later that week Roh complains, “Recently, the problems I’ve been facing are too difficult. The nation’s functions have become paralyzed, because everyone is trying to resolve things with their strength. A president cannot concede to everything. With all this strain, I am beginning to think I can no longer be the president.” (Howard W. French, “Criticism Takes Toll on South Korean Leader,” New York Times, May 30, 2003, p. A-10)
5/19/03:
Chief cabinet secretary Fukuda Yasuo: “Suspending remittances would be part of diplomatic efforts to achieve global peace via coordinated action by two or more countries, including Japan. We do not have to consider how North Korea [would interpret the move] as it is Japan’s prerogative to decide how to enforce its own foreign trade law.” MOFA official: “There was debate within the government on how many countries it takes to carry out ‘international efforts.’ We decided that two is enough.” (Takahara Kanako, “Japan Lowers Hurdle for North Korea Sanctions,” Japan Times, May 20, 2003)
Council on Foreign Relations Task Force report urges direct talks: “Although the Bush administration abandoned the Clinton administration’s engagement policy, it is not clear what has replaced it. …What the regional partners do agree on is that the United States should seriously negotiate with Pyongyang in the hope of reaching a peaceful resolution to the crisis or, at the very least, testing North Korean intentions.” It recommends “an interim proposal” to “test North Korea’s intentions”: “freeze its nuclear reactors and reprocessing facilities … readmit inspectors and account for and turn over all spent nuclear fuel rods, as well as any plutonium separated from the rods” [not enrichment]. “The United States, in exchange, would provide assurances that it would not attack North Korea and agree not to object to foreign assistance by other countries for as long as the interim agreement remains in effect” [no LWRs, US participation in aid or normalization]
5/20/03:
In keynote speech to N-S economic talks, Park Chang-ryun “dismissed the South side’s attitude taken as regards the ‘joint statement’ worked out with the U.S. as a perfidious act of running counter to the basic spirit of the joint declaration and an improper act of actively following its policy to stifle the DPRK militarily and economically. The south side should bear in mind that the inter-Korean relations will be put at the lowest ebb and the south side will sustain an unspeakable disaster if it turns to confrontation, talking about ‘nuclear issue’ and ‘additional measures,’” he said. (KCNA, Principled Matters To Be Abided by in Promoting Inter-Korean Economic cooperation, May 20, 2003) Talks held up three days, after South demands explanation and an apology for making statement public. The North says unofficially it was stated on a “theoretic level” or hypothetically: “If the further steps are military measures and the U.S. attacks first, then the South will experience unimaginable disasters as well,” a North Korean official said. (Kim Min-cheol, “Threat Mars North-South Meeting,” Chosun Ilbo, May 20, 2003)
Defector testifies to Senate subcommittee, collective farms ordered to cultivate poppies on 25 acres. “The only way to bring in large sums of foreign currency was to sell drugs to other countries.” William Bach, director of African, Asian and European affairs in DoS bureau for international narcotics says efforts to photograph poppy cultivation has not provided conclusive evidence about its extent. (James Dao, “North Korea Is Said to Export Drugs to Get Foreign Currency,” New York Times, May 21, 2003, p. A-21)
5/21/03:
Koizumi approval rating around 50% despite record. “The sentiment that the country has to unite to counter the North Korean threat is saving Koizumi,” says political analyst Miyake Hisayuki. “There are many criticisms of his economic policies. But he was saved by [his decision to support Bush in the Iraq] war. He was saved by diplomacy he’s not even good at.” [Iraq unpopular; rally round the flag against North] (Doug Struck, “U.S. Ties Help Japan’s Leader Weather Trouble,” Washington Post, May 21, 2003, p. A-16)
5/23/03:
Bush-Koizumi Crawford summit. Bush: “On the threat from North Korea’s nuclear program, the Prime Minister and I see the problem exactly the same way. We will not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea. We will not give into blackmail. We will not settle for anything less than the complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. …We are confident that our diplomatic approach will bring a peaceful solution. Yet we agreed that further escalation of the situation by North Korea will require tougher measures from the intelligence community.” Koizumi: “Ballistic missile defense is an important agenda in Japan’s defense policy, and Japan will further accelerate its consideration. …Japan will crack down more rigorously in illegal activities. And the North Koreans will have to understand that threats and intimations will have no meaning whatsoever. It is extremely important for Japan to comprehensively resolve the various issues, including nuclear weapons, missiles, and abduction, based on the Pyongyang Declaration. And without the resolution of these issues, normalization of relations will not occur.” (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, transcript, April 23, 2003) The term “peaceful solution,” as used by the Bush administration includes economic sanctions and military pressure, such as sea blockades. “The United States considers these measures acceptable as long as they don’t cause North Korea to ‘explode.’ It envisions the fall of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il from power by means of restricting North Korea’s source of foreign currency,” a MOFA official said. Tokyo may not tolerate regime change. “The collapse of Kim Jong-il’s regime poses the threat of North Korea taking extreme action,” an official of MOFA’s Asian and Oceanian Bureau said. “Through providing economic assistance, we should guide North Korea toward self-reformation and democratization under Kim’s rule.” The case is similar in Seoul. “South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun didn’t so much support ‘further measures,’ but only meant they were acceptable, “ an ROK source said. “He hasn’t turned to a hard-line approach.” The draft declaration changed the wording of the draft communiqué which originally said, “All options are on the table.” (Ito Toshiyuki and Ogawa Satoshi, “N. Korea Visions Seen Differing,” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 26, 2003) Some MOFA officials, FM Kawaguchi Yoriko, Vice Minister Takeuchi Yukio and Deputy Minister Tanaka Hitoshi, try to omit the word “pressure” from press briefing on two-pronged policy of “dialogue and pressure.” Tanaka argued “insufficient preparation had been made in case North Korea goes wild.” (Asahi Shimbun, “Tongue-Tied over North Korea Policy,” May 29, 2003) Two days later, in speech in Toyama, deputy chief cabinet secy Abe Shinzo: “Those who try to change our government’s policies by saying North Korea will go out of control are just speaking on behalf of Pyongyang.” (Kyodo, “Abe Criticizes ‘Dialogue-Oriented’ Officials over N. Korea,” May 31, 2003) Japan did join PSI. The Koizumi government introduced a bill to authorize economic sanctions without a UN mandate. Some Diet members pressed Koizumi to block remittances from North Korean sympathizers who resided in Japan—some four billion yen a year—but trying to stanch flows of funds will only redirect them via less transparent routes. Even with public opinion strongly in favor of sanctions, Koizumi remained reluctant to impose them. (Asahi Shimbun, “Tongue-Tied Over North Korea Policy,” May 29, 2003; Japan Times, “North Korea Not Facing Sanctions Soon: Koizumi,” May 26, 2003)
South agrees to send 400,000 tons of rice to North in four installments with increased monitoring, groundbreaking for Gaesong and completion of rail lines on 3rd anniversary of summit. (Joint Press Corps and Ryu Jin, “Seoul to Send 400,000 Tons of Rice to Pyongyang,” Korea Times, May 23, 2003) ViceMin of Finance and Economy Kim Kwang-lim, negotiator at economic cooperation talks, says ROK will slow rice aid if relations deteriorate. (Korea Times, “Seoul Hints at Tying Rice Aid with S-N Relations,” May 27, 2003)\
5/24/03:
DPRK FoMin spokesman accepts six-party talks: “Format of talks does not present itself as an essential issue if the U.S. is truly willing to settle the problem. The DPRK has already clarified its stand that it will not stick to any particular format of talks if the U.S. is truly ready to make a bold switchover in its Korea policy. … It is the DPRK’s stand that the DPRK-U.S. talks should be held first and they may be followed by the U.S.-proposed multilateral talks.” (KCNA, “U.S. Urged Not to Raise Format of Talks As a Precondition,” May 24, 2003)
5/26/03:
North’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland repeats threat. (AFP, “Isolated North Korea Turns on South with New ‘Disaster’ Threat,” May 26, 2003)
US has notified ROK of plan to send equipment but not troops for one heavy brigade to be stored aboard ship, deploying another 16 Patriot PAC-3s, add a landing strip at Osan. (Yoo Yong-won, “U.S. Bolstering Defenses on Peninsula,” Chosun Ilbo, May 27, 2003)
5/27/03:
Foreign nuclear scientist who worked on North’s nuclear program has provided intell on “location, degree of development in capabilities, where they are, how far along they are in developing multiple-weapons capability,” U.S. official said. (Timothy J. Burger and Perry Bacon, Jr., “A New Eye on North Korea” Time, June 2, 2003, p. 19)
U.S. military uses phrase “tyranny of proximity” when it talks about military options. Senior U.S. intell officer: any war would be far deadlier than Iraq. (Barbara Demick, “Seoul’s Vulnerability Is Key to War Scenarios,” Los Angeles Times, May 27, 2003)
Australian police find second load of heroin aboard North Korean freighter, Pong Su, bringing total to $145 million. (Anna Fifield and Andrew Ward, “Australia Seizes More N. Korean Heroin,” Financial Times, May 28, 2003, p. 6)
5/29/03:
Realignment for flexibility. UndSecDef Douglas Feith: “During the cold war, the general thought was the forces we had in Europe were going to be used in Europe, the forces we had in Korea were going to be used in Korea, and so on.” Now, “Everything is going to move everywhere.” Rumsfeld concluded “our history demonstrates that we have no idea where our forces might be used next, and we should not be devising basing arrangements and we should not be creating a force structure premised on the notion that the forces are going to be used where they are based.” (Esther Schrader, “U.S. to Realign Troops in Asia,” Los Angeles Times, May 29, 2003, p. 1) U.S. sending $11 billion in state-of-the-art military equipment to Korea, including 16 PAC-3 Patriot antimissile systems, two squadrons of Longbow AH-64D Apache helicopters, refitted smart bombs, and rotating in several hundred new tanks and armored fighter vehicles. (Robert Marquand, “In Korea, a Quiet U.S. Weapons Buildup,” Christian Science Monitor, July 1, 2003, p. 1) The next day Wolfowitz disavows Feith’s remarks at IISS conference on Asian security. (IISS, “American Forces in South Korea: The End of an Era?” Strategic Comments, 9, no. 5 (July 2003), p. 2)
Perry invw: On contingency plan for “eliminating the nuclear facility in Yongbyon”: “I never really proposed that to President Clinton and as a consequence he never proposed that to the president of South Korea because we believed, obviously we thought any military action will risk a full-scale war and we therefore wanted to avoid any kind of war.” …”I never presented the plan to President Clinton. He knew the plans existed, of course, and he also knew that if the situation got worse I might present it to him. But I never had to do that. We also looked, very seriously, at another contingency, which is what if the North would invade the South particularly as we put sanctions against the North and it had said it would consider sanctions an act of war.”
“We have not had meaningful discussions with the North. The discussions in Beijing, I understand, did not get into any depth at all. … Neither carrots nor sticks are relevant if you are not discussing. You cannot do this by public announcement. You have to actually meet with the North. What’s missing today is dialogue.” (Korea Times, “Perry Urges U.S. to Have Serious Talks with N.K,” June 8, 2003)
5/30/03:
A day after North Korean fishing boats intrude into ROK waters for third consecutive day, Navy beefs up surveillance. Roh tells senior secretaries they “should pay special attention to the incidents to prevent an accidental clash.” (Kim Hyung-jin, “N.K. Sea Incursion Raises Alarm,” Korea Herald, May 30, 2003)
5/31/03:
Pres Bush in Krakow announces Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Under SecSt Bolton tells Congress on June 4: “Our goal is to work with other concerned states to develop new means to disrupt the proliferation trade at sea, in the air and on land. …To jump-start this initiative, we have begun working with several close friends and allies to stop and seize suspected transfers. … In the last two months, interception of aluminum tubes likely bound for North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and a French and German combined effort to intercept sodium cyanide likely bound for North Korea’s chemical weapons program are examples of recent interdiction successes.” Britain, Spain, Australia, Japan and Poland publicly acknowledge discussing PSI with US. (Nicholas Kralev, “U.S. Asks Aid Barring Arms from Rogue States,” Washington Times, June 5, 2003, p. 15)
Dep SecDef Wolfowitz asked by delegate at Asian Security Conference in Japan for his solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis: “I do not really see a solution. Military action isn’t going to solve the short-term problem. Large-scale bribery isn’t going to solve the short-term problem. This is a case that requires long-term Asian patience.” [Make it a long-term problem?] (AFP, “No Short-Term Solution to North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Wolfowitz,” May 31, 2003)
Government to conduct Port State Control (PSC) inspection of North Korean ships to check for seaworthiness, narcotics. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Govt. to Up N. Korean Ship Checks,” June 1, 2003) Ferry Man Gyong Bong-92 that runs between Niigata and North Korea, is suspected of carrying drugs, missile components, illegal remittances and agents, also military sonar gear board supports suspicion it was used for espionage. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “N. Korean Ship Equipped with Military Sonar,” June 7, 2003) North cancels port call. Korean Committee for Aiding Overseas Compatriots accuses Japan of “vicious plot”: “If this means a beginning of ‘sanctions’ against the DPRK touted by the U.S. and its followers, it will push the situation to an unpredictable phase and bring about catastrophic consequences.” (Kyodo, “N. Korea Blames Japan for Cancellation of Ferry Visit,” June 8, 2003) But DPRK FoMin spokesman more low key: “The U.S. is seriously mistaken if it thinks it can lead the DPRK to collapse through international pressure and blockade. The DPRK wants a peaceful negotiated settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula to avert a war and preserve peace in this land. But there is a limit to its sincere efforts and magnanimity. In case it judges that the sovereignty has been violated, the DPRK will take an immediate physical retaliatory measure. The DPRK has built up the independent national economy and strong national defense capability, pursuant to the Songun policy. Therefore, neither sanctions nor pressure can work on the DPRK. The blockade against the DPRK will only bar the issue from being settled and aggravate the situation.” (KCNA, “U.S. Hit for Its Attempt at Intensified Blockade Against DPRK,” June 8, 2003)
5/30-6/1/03:
Curt Weldon (R-PA) in Pyongyang, along with Joe Wilson (R-SC), Jeff Miller (R-FL), Eliot Engel (D-NY), Silvestre Reyes (D-TX), and Solomon Ortiz (D-TX). FM Paek Nam-sun tells him North has nearly completed reprocessing all 8000 fuels rods. (JoongAng Ilbo, “The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The Untold Story,” p. 29) In his ten-point proposal, phase 1, U.S. would announce a one-year non-aggression pact and recognize the DPRK, the North would renounce its entire nuclear weapons program, permit full inspections and rejoin the NPT, the South would negotiate comprehensive economic and humanitarian aid. In phase 2, non-aggression pact would become permanent, CTR program to eliminate all nuclear weapons program within two years, North would curtail development and exports of ballistic missiles and technology (MTCR range), and begin to improve human rights, Congress would enact agriculture, energy and other aid. (Paul Chamberlain and Bill Taylor, “North Korea Wake-up Call,” Washington Times, July 22, 2003) DPRK FoMin spokesman: “This [the talks] helped both sides know better each other and they shared the view that the core of the DPRK-U.S. relations is to avert confrontation and war and peacefully co-exist on an equal basis. They were of the same view that it is necessary to seek a negotiated settlement of the nuclear issue and expressed their stand that it is necessary to continue seeking and discussing ways of settling it.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Korea Visit of Del. Of U.S. Congressmen,” June 2, 2003) Weldon at press conference in Seoul: “In our meeting with the Speaker of the Supreme People’s Assembly, he looked at us across the table and said, ‘Do I really look like I’m part of an axis of evil?’” Weldon then referred to a mural on the way from the airport showing a bayonet planted in the chest of an American and asked, “Would you really want to place a bayonet deep in my chest? … Is that the right signal you are sending to your people?” (AFP, “U.S. Lawmakers, N. Korean Leader Exchange Barbs over ‘Axis of Evil,’” June 2, 2003) “They admitted to having nuclear capability and weapons at this moment. They admitted to having just about completed the reprocessing of 8,000 rods.” (Cho Joohee, “Lawmakers Cite Nuclear Claims,” Washington Post, June 3, 2003, p. A-20) Weldon on abductees: “They said they knew they had to do something to satisfy the Japanese government and they were ready to do that.” (Sakajiri Nobuyoshi, “Lawmaker: North Hints at Move on Abductions,” June 5, 2003) North Koreans were “absolutely petrified” of a U.S. invasion, says Eliot Engel. “They are very much aware of what happened to the first part of the axis of evil.” They were eating atop the Koryo hotel when Kim Gye-gwan “looked me in the eye,” says Weldon. “He had had a couple of drinks; he said, ‘We have them.’” (David McGlinchey, “Lawmakers Say North Korea Ready to Talk,” National Journal, June 14, 2003, p. 1870) 6-point proposal June 26
6/1/03:
At G-8 meeting in Évian-Les-Bains, France, Hu Jintao tells Bush DPRK has softened demand for bilateral talks as price for resuming six-party talks. North had briefly dropped demand in April meetings with U.S, Japanese, Chinese diplomats. (Judy Keen, “N. Korea Easing Demand for U.S. Talks, China Says,” USA Today, June 2, 2003, p. 9) “The Chinese said that the North Koreans are saying that there has to be some sort of bilateral contact as the price for a multilateral meeting,” said a senior administration official. “The president said, ‘Look, in a multilateral format, sure, the North Koreans can look us in the eyes and say something.” (Kosukegawa Yoichi, “N. Korea Eyes Bilateral Contact with U.S. in Group Talks,” June 1, 2003; David E. Sanger, “Bush Presses Case on Iran and Korea at economic Talks,” New York Times, June 2, 2003, p. A-1)
Eight North Korean crab fishing boats cross NLL. ROK naval patrol boats fires warning shots. (Yoo Yong-won, “Warning Shots Fired at North’s Fishermen, June 1, 2003)
KCNA: US made 220 aerial espionage flights in May
6/2/03:
Roh at press conf: “The possibility of North Korea’s possession of nuclear arms has been stated on many occasions by U.S. intelligence authorities. But the South Korean intelligence organization has no compelling evidence to prove these claims.” (Shim Jae-yun, “Roh Not Sure of N.K.’s Nuke Possession,” Korea Times, June 2, 2003)
6/1-3/03:
IGCC meeting with North Korean officials in La Jolla
6/?/03:
Wolfsthal, McGoldrick, Cheon, “Verifying North Korean Nuclear Disarmament”
6/4/03:
Under SecSt Bolton testifies to House International Affairs Committee on PSI: “Our goal is to work with other concerned states to disrupt the proliferation trade at sea, in the air, and on land.” As part of campaign to get China to pressure the North, “a nuclear capable North Korea could well produce a decision in Japan to seek a nuclear weapons capability.”
USFK plans to redeploy 6,000 of its 7,000 troops in Seoul south to Pyeongtaek and Osan, Gen. Leon LaPorte tells forum at National Assembly, first public mention of the number. (Kim Hyung-jin, “U.S. to Move 6,000 Troops from Seoul,” Korea Herald, June 4, 2003)
ROK investigates whether 176 pounds of stimulant philipon seized on Chinese ship originated in North. (Reuters, “South Korea Investigates North Drug Link,” June 4, 2003)
6/6/03:
“We should not be bound by the shackles of the past forever,” Roh said in speech marking Memorial Day at the national cemetery before his departure for Tokyo summit. “Cooperation with Japan is very important for a peaceful solution to the North Korean nuclear issue and progress in inter-Korean relations.” (Kim Kyung-ho, “Roh Urges Koreans to Let Go of Past,” Korea Herald, June 7, 2003)
Diet upper house passes three war contingency measures.
Felice Gaer, chair of U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom testifies to East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcmte of SFRC: “North Korea is a humanitarian disaster of unimaginable proportions.” Calls for funding for human rights groups, government reporting. 1,140 fled to South Korea last year, 583 in 2001. (Yonhap, “”U.S. Agency Calls for Steps to Improve N.K. Human Rights, Korea Times, June 8, 2003)
6/7/03:
Roh-Koizumi summit. Two-day preparatory meeting two days before had deadlocked over further steps. “We should say that tougher measures should be taken if North Korea worsens the situation. That was agreed at the Japan-US summit on May 24,” said Yabunaka Mitoji. Lee Soo-hyuck objected that a reference to “further steps” after the May 15 ROK-US summit had been criticized “severely” in South Korea. “Including a stronger expression such as ‘tougher measures is unacceptable.” A senior ROK official: “We pointed out that President Roh Moo-hyun was visiting Japan on Korea’s Memorial Day, and that Japanese lawmakers were scheduled to vote on emergency legislation enabling Japan to actively respond to a war.” Yabunaka persisted. After he briefed FM Kawaguchi, Japan agreed to drop the phrase and word the joint statement, “To help solve the nuclear issue peacefully, the two leaders strongly urged the North not to take any more actions to aggravate the situation. In this connection, the two leaders reaffirmed the principles agreed to in the Korea-US summit and Japan-US summit held on May 14 and May 23 respectively and decided to strengthen Korea-Japan coordination.” Yet Koizumi used the phrase “tougher measures” in the post-summit press conference. (JoongAng Ilbo, “The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The Untold Story,” pp. 28-29) On eve of summit, LDP research Council chmn Aso Taro caused an uproar by saying that during Japan’s colonial rule many Koreans wanted to adopt Japanese surnames. (Asahi Shimbun, “Talks to Focus on N. Korea,” June 6, 2003) Joint press conference shows differences. “I pointed out that both dialogue and pressure are necessary for the diplomatic and peaceful solution, said Koizumi. “South Korea, the United States and Japan should cooperate closely and take a tougher measure if North Korea escalates the situation further.” Roh said, “dialogue and pressure are necessary in parallel. But I told [Koizumi] that the South Korean government hopes to put more emphasis on dialogue.” (AFP, “Roh, Koizumi Eye Dialogue and Pressure in North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” June 7, 2003) Koizumi adds, “We must deal strictly with North Korea’s illegal activities.” (Hwang Jang-jin, “Roh Stresses Dialogue with N.K.,” Korea Herald, June 9, 2003)
U.S., ROK joint announcement that U.S troops to be pulled back from DMZ. (Doug Struck, “U.S. Troops Will Leave Korean DMZ,” Washington Post, June 6, 2003, p. A-1) The relocation of 18,000 Army troops 75 miles south of the DMZ is designed to make them more mobile, freeing them up to respond to other emergencies in the region, says Andy Hoehn, DASD for strategy and the architect of realignment. Some of those troops might be brought home and redeploy to South Korea on six-month rotations. (Vernon Loeb, “New Bases Reflect Shift in Military,” Washington Post, June 9, 2003)
U.S. notified ROK of intention to pull out 12,000 of 37,000 troops stationed there, which was disclosed by a Blue House official in May 2004. (Shim Jae-yun, “US Seeks to Pull out 12,000 Troops,” Korea Times, May 28, 2004)
6/8/03:
GNP policy chief Lee Sang-bae: “I cannot but ask why Roh toasted with the Japanese emperor on Memorial Day while the Japanese Diet passed the war contingency bills.” Roh’s state visit to Japan “will be the symbol of an idiot’s diplomacy.” (Ryu Jin, “GNP Slams Roh’s Actions in Japan,” Korea Times, June 9, 2003)
6/9/03:
KCNA makes first DPRK reference to nuclear deterrent: “The Bush administration is escalating its moves to isolate and stifle the DPRK. …The DPRK has no intention to have a nuclear deterrent force without any reason, quite the contrary to Washington’s noisy propaganda. The DPRK is willing to clear up the U.S. concern as regards the nuclear issue if it drops its hostile policy toward Pyongyang and addresses its concerns. But if the U.S. keeps threatening the DPRK with nukes instead of abandoning its policy toward Pyongyang, the DPRK will have no option but to build up a nuclear deterrent force. The DPRK’s intention to build up a nuclear deterrent force is not aimed to threaten and blackmail others but reduce conventional weapons under a long-term plan and channel manpower ands funds into economic construction and the betterment of people’s living. (KCNA, “DPRK ‘Nuclear Deterrent Force’ to Be Built If U.S. Maintains ‘Hostile Policy,’” June 9, 2003)
Administration officials say U.S. and Asian allies start “selective interdiction” of North Korean ships. It “will be focused on those activities which require no additional laws, no new international treaties, no going to the United Nations Security Council,” a senior official said. “Look at the Japanese, who can’t stop transfers of money on North Korean ships, but suddenly discovered they can do ‘safety inspections.’” Powell: “This does not mean we are on our way to war. We are not.” (David E. Sanger, “North Korea Says It Seeks to Develop Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, June 10, 2003, P. A-10)
6/10/03:
KCNA signals reform: “Measures have been taken to improve the livelihood of the economy and the people in an epoch-making manner.” Goods can be bought and sold in so-called “farmers’ markets.” (Andrew Ward, “North Korea to Expand Private Sector,” Financial Times, June 11, 2003, p. 6) “Before, they were tolerating private business. Now they are encouraging it,” says Cho Myong Chol, North Korean defector. (Barbara Demick, “Communist State Pushes Free Enterprise,” Los Angeles Times, June 19, 2003)
Japan orders North Korean freighter Namsan 3 not to leave port in Maizuru saying inspection revealed illegal hole in bulkhead of bow. (Kyodo, “Japan Stops N. Korea Freighter Leaving Japan Port,” June 10, 2003)
Sayings by three 16th century warlords in Japan summarize approaches to North Korea. Nobunaga Oda: “If the nightingale will not sing, kill it.” Hideyoshi Toyotomi: “If the nightingale will not sing, try to make it sing.” Ieyasu Tokugawa: “If the nightingale will not sing, let’s wait until it does.” (Funabashi Yoichi, “’Dialogue and Pressure’ for Peace with North,” Asahi Shimbun, June 10, 2003)
6/?/03:
US detects krypton emissions. (David E. Sanger, “Intelligence Puzzle: North Korean Bombs,” New York Times, October 14, 2003, p. A-9)
6/12/03:
First meeting of PSI Core Group, hosted by Spain in Madrid. Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, UK and US attended. Bolton on coalition of the willing: “we had no road map for how to proceed. [Robert] Joseph and I agreed that we wanted a strong Madrid political statement that Core Group members were fully prepared to engage in WMD interdictions, and that5 if we found ourselves hamstrung by voices of timidity, we would be prepared to ice them out of future PSI activities. I already had a call from Javier Gil Caetana, the Spanish Foreign Ministry’s secretary general, who would be chairing the Madrid meeting, asking about EU participating. I said we were interested in countries with real operational capabilities — intelligence services and militaries — neither of which the EU had, not more diplomatic personnel. … I also rejected the idea of including a NATO representative, for reasons similar to those for not wanting the EU involved: NATO had a ponderous bureaucracy and carried enormous baggage.” (Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option, pp. 123-24) Senior admin official: “And so one of the things we need to do with the countries that are interested is to decide what authorities we need for actions inside territorial waters, inside national airspace, at ports, in the air, to get things done.” (Wade Boese, “U.S. Pushes Initiative to Block Shipments of WMD, Missiles,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2003, p. 26)
6/12-13/03:
TCOG in Hawaii: Kelly proposes scrapping LWR project, presents PSI and IAI. (Hakoda Tetsuya, “N. Korea Facing More Pressure over Nukes,” Asahi Shimbun, June 16, 2003) Discussion of three-way and five-way format for talks with DPRK. Japan will push U.S. to consider DPRK 8-point proposal in April trilateral in Beijing. (Asahi Shimbun, “Peace Process: Japan Push for U.S. to Heed North Korea’s 8-Point Plan, June 13, 2003) Kelly says US will return the issue to the U.N. Security Council if DPRK reprocesses or fails to rejoin multilateral talks. (Ogawa Satoshi, “U.S. Eyes UNSC Talks on N. Korea,” Yomiuri Shimbun, June 15, 2003) “How to read North Korea’s proposal?” mused a senior MOFA official. “It’s kind of like an initial bid. It’s never going to be satisfactory to the other party. But it shows some intent to keep bargaining.” (Doug Struck, “N. Korea Vows to Fight Any Blockade,” Washington Post, June 18, 2003, p. A-21) ROK gave ideas for comprehensive step-by-step resolution of crisis. So did Japan. (Oh Young-hwan, “South’s Plan Sees Phased Steps to Settle North Issues,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 17, 2003)
6/14/03:
North and South hold ceremonies to mark relinking of Gyeongui and Donghae railway lines. (Kim Kyung-ho, “South, North Link Railways,” Korea Herald, June 16, 2003)
6/15/03:
North and South activate naval hotline. (Ryu Jin, “Military to Be Probed for Coverup of NK Radio Message,” Korea Times, July 16, 2004)
North Korea still exports missiles to Iran, but has switched from sea to air shipment, ROK and US intelligence sources say. (Lee Chul-hee, “North’s Air Cargo: Missiles,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 16, 2003) Iranian nuclear experts made three secret visits to North Korea this year, Sankei reports. (AFP, “Iranian Nuclear Experts Visited North Korea,” June 10, 2003)
6/16/03:
Fearing pullback will free U.S. to bomb North’s nuclear sites, 133 National Assembly members begin petition drive opposing pullback. (James Brooke, “DMZ Twist: U.S Plans Unsettle North Korea, New York Times, June 16, 2003, p. A-8)
6/17/03:
In meeting with ROK, Japan at ARF, PRC FM Li Zhaoxing expressed support for their joining multilateral talks. (Sato Takeshi, “China Backs Japan, S. Korea Inclusion in Talks on North, Kyodo, June 17 2003) DPRK has told U.S. via PRC intermediary that “five-way talks including South Korea and Japan are possible,” said a diplomatic source in Washington” [Han Sung-joo]. (Ser Myo-ja, “North Said to Accept 5-Way Talks,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 18, 2003)
Rodong Sinmun signed commentary: “The DPRK will take an immediate physical retaliatory step against the U.S. once it judges that its sovereignty is infringed upon by Washington’s blockade operation. Explicitly speaking, the DPRK’s physical retaliatory step against the U.S. blockade operation include all possible means and ways a sovereign state can take and it is limitless. Nobody can vouch that this blockade operation will not lead to such a serious development as an all-out war. In case a war breaks out between the DPRK and the U.S. the frontline will not be confined to the Korean Peninsula only but every place where aggressors are stationed will be the target of the DPRK’s strike.” (KCNA, U.S. warned of catastrophic consequences of its blockade operation against DPRK,” June 17, 2003)
6/18/03:
Rodong Sinmun signed commentary: “Now that the U.S. is making preparations for a military attack on the DPRK under the signboard of ‘dialogue,’ the latter is left with no option but to implement all necessary measures it has already declared. The U.S. insistence on ‘multilateral talks’ is aimed to lay an international siege to the DPRK under the signboard of “dialogue” and stifle the DPRK by force. This is clearly evidenced by the fact that the U.S. asked countries around Korea to pressurize the DPRK and blustered that it would study the proposal for hard-line countermeasures and take the three-phase hard-line measure. The U.S. continued pressure on the DPRK to scrap its nuclear weapons program first is intended to contain it with ease after forcing it to disarm itself. The Iraqi war proved that disarmament leads to a war. Therefore, it is quite clear that the DPRK can never accept the U.S. demand that it scrap its nuclear weapons program first.
The DPRK has already declared that it would regard any sanctions to be applied against it as a declaration of a war. The hard-line measures are not a monopoly of the U.S. If the U.S. takes the three-phase hard-line measure, the DPRK will strongly react to it from its first phase. The DPRK has the right to build up a nuclear deterrent force for self-defense, contending that it would exercise all its rights to avert a war, protect the sovereignty and security of the country and the destiny and dignity of the nation.” (KCNA, “DPRK’s Determination to React Strongly to U.S. Hard-Line Measure Reiterated,” June 18, 2003)
Powell at ARF in Phnom Penh sees DPRK Vice FM Ho Jong. “Briefly, at the end of lunch, they bumped into each other, they shook hands and exchanged a few words,” says U.S. official. (Glenn Kessler, “N. Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions Are Urgent Issue, Powell Says,” Washington Post, June 19, 2003, p. A-23)
6/19/03:
U.S. circulates draft presidential statement at UN Security Council condemning North. (Colum Lynch, “U.S. Seeks Rebuke of N. Korea on Arms,” Washington Post, June 19, 2003, p. A-23) Text in Kono Hiroko and David Paul Kuhn, “UNSC Draft Takes Hard Line with N. Korea,” Yomiuri Shimbun, June 22, 2003)
6/?/03:
Yamamoto Eiji, minister at Japan UN mission, met with Dep PermRep Han Song-ryol, Mainichi reports. (Natalie Obiko Pearson, “Report: Japan, North Korea Hold Talks,” Associated Press, July 12, 2003)
6/20/03:
Koizumi tells reporters, “I doubt if now is suitable timing” for Security Council action. (Kyodo, “Koizumi Still Cautious about UNSC Handling N. Korea,” June 20, 2003)
6/21/03:
Dep State spokesman Philip Reeker: “The US also decided to use the card of referring the matter to the UN Security Council…to take steps to demonstrate the international community’s concern with the nuclear weapons program that is being pursued by North Korea. … One of the possible ways forward we have looked at is a [UNSC] presidential statement.” Japan against, says Vice FM Takeuchi Yukio on June 23: “We have been pushing for a diplomatic solution and have been calling for five-party talks.” (Kyodo, “Japan Wants U.S. to Be Cautious in Handling N. Korea at UNSC,” June 23, 2003)
Several U.S. officials warned Japan around March that North may have several nuclear warheads for missiles, senior Japanese official says. Chief cabinet secy Fukuda: “There is nothing we can say for sure at this point in time.” JDA chief Ishiba Shigeru says it would be “extremely difficult” for North to miniaturize. (Takahara Kanako, “U.S. Has Warned Japan over Pyongyang Warhead Threat,” June 21, 2003)
For now, Bush is pursuing a strategy of squeezing North Korea economically, finding reasons to intercept its exports and, if he can win the agreement of the North’s neighbors, cut off many of its imports. There is no talk of economic strangulation of Iran. “The approaches are pretty straightforward and based on the unique facts of each case,” says Condoleezza Rice. She described North Korea as a more imminent threat and called it “a particular case in which you have a long record of the same kind of behavior: They reach an agreement, break it, and then make an effort at blackmail.” (David E. Sanger, “2 Nuclear Weapons Challenges, 2 Different Strategies,” New York Times, June 21, 2003, p. A-3)
6/22/03:
Japan intends to deploy two missile interceptors on Aegis cruisers in FY2007, Standard Missile-3 Patriot Advanced Capability-3. US and Japan agreed at May summit to accelerate missile defense cooperation. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “New Missile Interceptors Slated for ‘07 Defenses Seen in Response to N. Korea Risk,” June 22, 2003)
Unification Ministry officials say North is pushing for joint projects to ease isolation. “Pyongyang seems resolved to end the current deadlock through smooth relations with Seoul in the face of international pressure,” says Lee Chul-ki of Dongguk University. (Kim Ki-tae, “N.K. Looks to Seoul to Escape Isolation,” Korea Times, June 22, 2003)
6/?/03:
US notifies ROK of troop reduction on Korean peninsula
6/23/03:
“It is desirable to continue the KEDO project notwithstanding the tension over the North Korean nuclear issue,” says a Blue House official. “If the U.S. does not provide key components for the reactors, the construction will inevitably come to a halt. However, we hope the work will go on without suspension.” (Kim Ki-tae, “Seoul Hopes KEDO Project Will Continue,” Korea Times, June 24, 2003)
6/25/03:
U.S. National Endowment for Democracy gave $250,000 to two activist groups in the South to raise awareness of human rights abuse in North. “We have received the funding since 1999,” Kim Yeong-ja, secgen of Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights said. Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights official said it got about $40,000 a year. “We use the funding for our monthly newsletter, Keys.” (Ser Myo-ja, “U.S. Is Funding 2 Korean Anti-North Groups,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 26, 2003)
6/26/03:
FM Paek Nam-sun letter to Sergey Lavrov, president of UNSC: “What we desire most with regard to the nuclear issue is to thoroughly eliminate the threats to the security of the DPRK, which have given rise to the nuclear issue. The real dire threats do not come from the countries surrounding us, but from the United States. This is the only reason why the DPRK attaches priority to the DPRK-USA bilateral talks. …Fifth, we consider that the Security Council should pay due attention, when considering the situation on the Korean peninsula, to the current status of the Korean Armistice Agreement with which the security council has a deep connection. …The United States has also decided to redeploy its troops in South Korea and tries to shift the U.S. army responsibility for the control of the demilitarized zone on to the South Korean army. This is a violation of paragraph 10, article one of the armistice agreement which stipulates that the demilitarized zone be controlled by the Korean People’s Army and the U.S. Army. The sea and air blockade pursued by the United States against the DPRK through “inspection of vessels and aircraft” is a violation of paragraph 15, article two of the armistice agreement, which calls on the contracting parties ‘not to engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.’” (KCNA, “DPRK FM Sends Letter to President of UNSC,” June 28, 2003)
6/26-29/03:
Kartman in Tokyo, Seoul. U.S. wants to cancel LWR project. Senior Bush administration official says, “There is no way that [the reactors] are ever going to be completed given that the North has said the Agreed Framework is dead … and has scrapped the North-South joint denuclearization agreement. … So the decision on whether to continue work, I think, has got to be made fairly soon. Otherwise, you’re just making a white elephant in North Korea.” “We have no faith that they would actually use the reactors for truly peaceful purposes.” A decision has to be made at some point MOFA official: “Stopping the light-water reactor construction is not something to be decided by the United States alone.” Another official says “it is difficult to continue the construction under the present circumstances and suspension is one option.” (Asahi Shimbun, “U.S. to Block North’s Reactors,” June 30, 2003) South Korea has urged the U.S. to continue the LWR project but Japan is increasingly inclined to temporarily suspend it unless the North signs a protocol obliging it to pay compensation for losses due to accidents and shows a willingness to resolve the nuclear crisis. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “KEDO May Halt N. Korea LWR Project,” June 23, 2003) On June 27 Japan called for caution before suspending project, Japanese officials said. “Efforts are currently being made to realize the next round of multilateral talks to peacefully resolve the nuclear problem, and we hope the future of KEDO will be discussed closely by Japan, the United States, and South Korea, as well as the KEDO secretariat,” Vice FM Takeuchi Yukio was quoted as telling Charles Kartman, KEDO executive director. (Japan Times, “Japan Wary of Suspending KEDO,” June 28, 2003)
6/27-7/2/03:
7th N-S family reunion
6/30/03:
DIA: “We have no indication that the Kim regime is under threat of a coup. … “Kim Jong-il’s hold on power appears secure. … We have low confidence in our assessment of prospects for instability due to the closed nature of the regime and the corresponding lack of access to key power centers.” (Written responses to Senate Select Cmte on Intelligence Worldwide Threat Hearing, June 30, 1993)
7/1/03:
U.S. assessment shared with Japan, ROK, others in recent weeks concludes North is developing technology to miniaturize warheads, cite existence of advanced nuclear testing site in Yongduk-dong. So far almost krypton gas detected. “What we are told is that it would take perhaps six months after that [reprocessing] to produce a miniaturized warhead and put it in to one of the missiles,” said a senior official familiar with the intell. “But after Iraq, who knows how good these estimates are?” Some officials warn estimate is “a best guess rather than a solid estimate.” Also speculation on reprocessing: “We don’t believe that the main reprocessing facility has been very active,” says senior admin official. “But could there be a second reprocessor? No one knows for sure.” (David E. Sanger, “C.I.A. Said to Find Nuclear Advances by North Koreans,” New York Times, July 1, 2003, p. A-1) “We think the North has yet even to develop a high-performance conventional detonator to trigger a nuclear explosion, based on our analysis of a satellite photo from the New York Times,” says Suh Kune-yul from Seoul National University’s Nuclear Engineering Department. “The U.S. seems to be exaggerating the North’s nuclear threat as a step to tighten the noose on the Pyongyang regime,” says another Seoul professor. (Kim Ki-tae, “Experts Discount NYT Report on NK,” Korea Times, July 2, 2003) FM Yoon Young-kwan tells closed-door meeting of National Assembly foreign affairs and trade committee the Times report was untrue, says MDP lawmaker Kim Yong-yap. High-explosives tests were already known because of gas leaks at Yongduk-dong test site, which is not new. (Kwon Dae-yeol, “Yoon Rejects NYT Report,” Chosun Ilbo, July 3, 2003) CIA report to Congress on August 8: “The unclassified version of the statements sent to the Senate make no reference to the size of nuclear weapons that the North can now produce, or whether they could be fitted onto its missiles, including those that can reach Japan or beyond.” (David E. Sanger, New York Times, November 1, 2003, p. A-4) Chang Young-dal, who chairs National Assembly Defense Cmte: “Although the North may have extracted weapons-grade plutonium, they do not have the capability of compressing a nuclear warhead to 500 kg or less so it can be loaded onto a missile.” He says assessment come from testimony of Defense Minister Cho Young-kil on July 23. (Lee Joo-hee, “’N.K. Has No Tech to Fire Nuclear Arms,’” Korea Herald, July 28, 2003)
Cabinet secretariat put in charge of abduction issue. Dep Chief Cab Secy Yachi Shotaro to coordinate info and options, with Deputy Chief Cab Secy Abe Shinzo and Cab Secretariat Adviser Nakayama Kyoko to do policy formulation. (Kyodo, “Gov’t Gives Cabinet Secretariat More Say on Abduction Issue,” July 1, 2003)
Military representative’s July 1 letter to U.N. Command at Panmunjom says sanctions would be “complete breach” of truce and KPA would “immediately take strong and merciless retaliatory measures.” (Felicity Barringer and David E. Sanger, “Delay by U.N. on Rebuking North Korea Is Urged,” New York Times, July 3, 2003, p. A-8) “It is, in fact, hardly possible to preserve the ceasefire in Korea by the unilateral efforts of the KPA side.” (Associated Press, “N. Korea Threatens to Abandon Armistice,” Baltimore Sun, July 2, 2003)
7/1-2/03:
TCOG in Washington. Japan proposes temporary suspension of LWR project. (Kyodo, “Japan Proposes Suspension of KEDO Reactor Construction,” July 3, 2003) Lee Soo-Hyuck, Yabunaka Mitoshi urge ROK, Japan participate in talks Japan says it will back UNSC statement if North fails to accept five-party talks. “It may be time for the UNSC to move forward with discussions on the issue. (Kyodo, “Japan to Tell Partners It May Join Effort to Denounce N. Korea,” June 30, 2003)
7/2/03:
Bush tells Putin by phone he’s not against Russia’s joining talks: “It’s helpful to be able to cooperate with Russia in dealing with matters of international security.” (Seo Soo-min, “6-Way Talks on NK Loom as Reality,” Korea Times, July 3, 2003)
China and Russia seek delay of U.N. action. “The Americans, British and French are all in favor of a statement” from the Security Council, says a Council diplomat. “The idea” is to be “firm about all the violations, at the same time supporting backing the diplomatic approach.” “The Chinese have been saying: ‘the time isn’t right’” the diplomat said. “The U.S., France and the U.K. are saying there is no contradiction between the two efforts; they can be complementary.” (Felicity Barringer and David E. Sanger, “Delay by U.N. on Rebuking North Korea Is Urged,” New York Times, July 3, 2003, p. A-8)
GNP chairman Choe Byung-yul says: “If the North gives up its nuclear ambitions, the international community should support it so Kim Jong-il can lead his country for a while.” He adds, “It is a misunderstanding that the Grand National Party is anti-reunification party. We do not think humanitarian aid to the North or inter-Korean economic projects are negative at all.” (Ryu Jin, “’GNP Doesn’t Want NK Regime Change,’” Korea Times, July 3, 2003)
Spokesman for the Panmunjom mission of the Korean People’s Army: “In the past the DPRK side excavated remains of many American soldiers and handed them over to the U.S. side with all sincerity from a noble humanitarian stand. But the U.S. administration has pursued an extremely hostile policy toward the DPRK. as a result, the anti-U.S. sentiment of the army and the people of the DPRK and their vigilance against it have reached their height and the DPRK-U.S. relations are at the lowest ebb due to the nuclear issue, in particular. Such situation makes it difficult for the DPRK side to make any smooth progress in the excavation of their remains as the same is the case with all other issues between the two countries. KCNA, DPRK side responds to U.S.-proposed talks on GI remains. But the DPRK side decided to respond to the U.S. side-proposed talks, taking into full consideration that this issue is a purely humanitarian one.” (KCNA, “DPRK Side responds to U.S.-Proposed Talks on G.I. remains, July 2, 2003)
Albright-Wit workshop on verified dismantlement in London.
7/3/03:
Dep SecDef Wolfowitz in Singapore: Northeast Asia countries must use their “economic leverage” to force North Korea to behave. (Jay Solomon, “North Korea Vows to Expand Its Atomic-Weapons Program,” Wall Street Journal, June 3, 2003) DoD says he said, “The…difference between North Korea and Iraq is that we had virtually no economic options with Iraq because the country floats on a sea of oil. In the case of North Korea, the country is teetering on the edge of economic collapse and that, I believe, is a major point of leverage, whereas the military picture with North Korea is very different from that with Iraq.” (Corrections and Clarifications,” The Guardian, June 6, 2003)
In poll taken June 28-29, 44% of Japanese favor establishing diplomatic relations with North, 46% opposed. In November it was 57-33% in favor. LDP members were opposed 46-36%. On abductions, 45% favored economic sanctions, 40% more dialogue, fewer than 10% military pressure by U.S.. (Asahi Shimbun, “Handling Pyongyang: Poll Shows Jump in Coolness to North Korea,” July 2, 2003)
7/?/03:
Roh writes Bush requesting review of troop drawdown and requests the withdrawal not be made public (JoongAng Ilbo, The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The Untold Story, p. 36)
7/6/03:
Koizumi may visit Pyongyang again in September Nihon Keizai reports. (AFP, “Japanese P.M. Koizumi May Visit North Korea Again in September,” July 6, 2003)
7/7/03:
Roh Moo-hyun Hu Jingtao summit. South Korea draft reference to “multilateral talks” dropped. (Seo Soo-min, “Roh, Hu Agree to Disagree on NK,” Korea Times, July 8, 2003)
Roh-Hu Jintao summit. “President Roh sent a message to Kim Jong-il by way of Mr. Hu,” says senior ROK off, asking the North to join multilateral talks. The joint statement reads, “China holds that the security concerns of North Korea should be taken into account.” Dep FM Lee Soo-hyuck and Vice FM Wang Yi were unable to agree in preparatory talks. “China insisted that the joint statement should say North Korea’s security concerns should be addressed and settled. But we could not put such wording in the statement in a format that said South Korea and China agreed on it,” says a ROK off. “China, however, was extremely persistent.” Lee raised China’s draft with Kelly at TCOG, who objected. Lee says, “We will try our best to avoid any wording in the joint statement that would say we had agreed with China’s position, but please understand our difficulty in this matter.” (JoongAng Ilbo, The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The Untold Story, pp. 30-31)
7/8/03:
In New York channel DPRK PermRep Park Gil-yon, Han Song-ryol meet Jack Pritchard, David Straub. Park tells Pritchard reprocessing of fuel rods completed. (Don Kirk, “North Is Said to Finish Reprocessing Spent Fuel,” International Herald Tribune, July 14, 2003) North Korean officials told the Bush administration on July 8 that they had finished producing quickly to turn the material into weapons, senior American officials said today. The North’s latest declaration came on Tuesday in New York, during an unannounced meeting between North Korean diplomats at the United Nations and Jack Pritchard, a State Department official who handles North Korea issues. “They went into new territory,” said one official familiar with the meeting. The North Korean diplomats read a statement from Pyongyang declaring that the reprocessing of the rods, a chemical process that the North perfected in the late 1980’s after receiving considerable foreign help, had been completed on June 30. The new declaration set off a scramble in American intelligence agencies — under fire for their assessment of Iraq’s nuclear capability — to determine if the North Korean government of Kim Jong Il was bluffing or had succeeded in producing the material undetected. Officials said today that the answer was unclear. A preliminary set of atmospheric tests for the presence of a gas given off as nuclear waste is reprocessed into plutonium is the best indicator the United States has from one of the world’s most closed nations. The most recent tests suggested that nuclear work has accelerated, but the results were inconclusive. More test results are expected at the end of this week. “It’s the mirror image of the Iraq problem,” one official said. “We spent years looking for evidence Iraq was lying when it said it didn’t have a nuclear program. Now North Korea says it’s about to go nuclear, and everyone is trying to figure out whether they’ve finally done it, or if it’s the big lie.” Other officials believe that Kim’s government has simply decided that it can make both Washington and its Asian neighbors accept North Korea as a new nuclear power.“There’s a body of thought that they are just getting everybody accustomed to the idea,” a senior administration official said. “So when they say one day, ‘We’ve gone nuclear,’ it’s no shock.” (David E. Sanger, “North Korea Says It Has Made Fuel for Atom Bombs,” New York Times, July 15, 2003, p. A-1) “At the time the US intelligence community believed that North Korea could not have physically completed the reprocessing,” says senior ROK intelligence official. “South Korea also believed that.” (JoongAng Ilbo, The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The Untold Story, pp. 30-31) Pritchard tells Park, U.S. ready to respond to its proposal, says Jang Sung-min, ex-MDP National Assemblyman. (Oh Young-jin, “U.S. to Respond to Pyongyang’s Proposal,” Korea Times, July 14, 2003) “They went into new territory,” says official familiar with the meeting, and read statement saying reprocessing completed June 30, then said weapons production beginning. “They didn’t say how long it would take, and they didn’t threaten to sell anything.” Revelation has set off scramble in intell community to determine if North is bluffing or not. Some see it as negotiating ploy; some don’t. “There’s a body of thought that they are just getting everybody accustomed to the idea, said senior admin official, so when they say one day, ‘We’ve gone nuclear,’ it’s no shock.” (David E. Sanger, “North Korea Says It Has Made Fuel for Atom Bombs,” New York Times, July 15, 2003) Pritchard was told, “If the United States continues its policy of pressure against us, we may be forced to take opposing measures, such as, for example, a nuclear test.” (Reuters, “Report: North Korea Prepared to Conduct Nuclear Test,” July 26, 2003)
Funabashi: “Japan began to apply pressure in the form of stronger controls on illegal remittances to North Korea. However, this pressure is being applied partly to prevent the United Nations from invoking economic sanctions. Japan is worried that if the United States applies too much ‘pressure,’ it could drive North Korea into a corner and cause it to react violently.” Whether or not LWR project is suspended, KEDO should be maintained. “KEDO is one of the few multilateral forums in which North Korea continues to stay politically involved.” (Funabashi Yoichi, “A Prop, Perhaps, But KEDO Works Magic,” Asahi Shimbun, July 8, 2003)
7/9/03:
NIS reports to National Assembly, “We believe that North Korea has reprocessed a small portion of the 8,000 spent rods.” (Christopher Torchia, “S. Korea: North Advancing Nuclear Program,” Associated Press, July 9, 2003) DefMin Cho Yung-kil told by CIA last month that reprocessing of 200-400 rods completed, at current pace North Korea will have 45 nukes by 2010. (Joo Yong-jung, “Nuclear Intel Came Directly from CIA,” Chosun Ilbo, July 10, 2003)
Kim Ryong-song, DPRK delegation head, tells N-S ministerial, “The situation on the Korean peninsula is nearing a dangerous stage on the verge of nuclear warfare. Even if this is not a negotiation between North Korea and the U.S., we can exchange opinions on the subject.” “We can respond to dialogue with dialogue and to war with war. But our basic position is to settle the issue through talks.” “Let’s join forces. An old saying has it that even heaven cannot stop us when we join our forces and hearts.” (Kim Ki-tae, “NK Ready to Talk Nukes with Seoul,” Korea Times, July 10, 2003)
Roh Moo-hyun speech at Tsinghua University: “The age of Northeast Asia is arriving. On center stage are China and Korea.” Appeal for China-Korea partnership gets cool reception from Hu Jingtao. Cooperation on economy, security, culture, turning 6-party into permanent consultative mechanism. Cheong Wa Dae official: “Agreements may be possible on a broad scheme but when it comes to details, Korea and China differ on many issues.” (Hwang Jang-jin, “China Cool to Roh’s Regional Vision,” Korea Herald, July 10, 2003)
7/9-10/03:
Australia, host of second Core Group meeting on PSI in Brisbane, backs away from quick interceptions. “We are not at this stage considering military contributions,” Prime Minister John Howard says. “We are considering ways and means of dealing with a very big problem.” Australia caught off guard by U.S. head of delegation asserting that coalition of the willing already had the legal authority to intercept North Korean ships on the high seas. Japan also raised concern that North Korea was too much the focus. (AFP, “Aggressive U.S. Plan on North Korea Arms Trade Hits Snag in Australia,” July 10, 2003) PSI communiqué: “Although interdiction efforts have been under way for some time, there is need to further develop and enhance capabilities of the PSI nations to conduct actual air, ground and maritime operations.” (John Kerin, “Net Tightens on North Korea,” News.com, July 11, 2003) “We’re ready to rock and roll right now” on PSI, says a State Department official who is familiar with the program. “All we need is actionable intelligence” on a suspect North Korean shipment.” Victor Cha: approach “the least worst option. Putting multilateral pressure on the regime has never been tried before.” (Barbara Slavin, “11 Nations Join Plan to Stop N. Korean Ships, USA Today, July 23, 2003, p. 6)
7/9-10/03:
Three experts groups met, including intelligence agencies. Military experts plan first operational exercises, piggy-backed on already planned naval exercise in the Coral Sea. (Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option, p. 124)
Kim Ryong-song, DPRK delegation head: Our basic position is that we want to resolve the [nuclear] issue peacefully. But if outside forces ignore our position and try to use force, we will face them boldly and show our strength.” (Yoo Jae-suk, “North Korea Says It Wants Nuclear Talks,” Associated Press, July 10, 2003)
KCNA correspondent: North proposes: “Firstly, the north and the south should take the measure of jointly confirming their will to avert the danger of a war on the Korean peninsula and protect the wellbeing of the nation and ensure peace on it. Secondly, the north and the south should refrain from getting involved in any act which may lead the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of a war, true to the spirit of the June 15 joint declaration, and counter such act through national cooperation. Thirdly, the north and the south should take the measure of simultaneously totally halting the TV broadcasting toward the north and the south, loudspeaker broadcasting in the forefront areas and all other broadcasting slandering the other side from august 15, 2003. Fourthly, the authorities of the north and the south should actively cooperate with each other in the efforts to make non-governmental organizations-sponsored functions to mark August 15 liberation day a grand festival demonstrating the nation’s will for peace and reunification against war. Fifthly, the north and the south should cooperate with each other in the efforts to let their red cross organizations arrange the 8th reunion of separated families and relatives at Mt. Kumgang resort and hold a ground-breaking ceremony of a reunion center on the occasion of upcoming Hangawi (harvest moon day), a folk holiday. The talks continue.” (KCNA, “Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks Open,” July 10, 2003)
Senate approves bill by Sam Brownback to ease resettlement by North Korean refugees in U.S. “There is an exodus of massive proportions taking place out of North Korea today,” said Brownback. (AFP, “Senate Votes to Ease Resettlement for North Korean Refugees in U.S.” July 10, 2003)
7/11/03:
Republican Policy Cmte recently brought Japan-based defector who advocates regime change to Washington for a week. National Endowment for Democracy will give Democracy Award to Yun Hyun of North Korean Human Rights Citizens Alliance, three defectors with John Kyl and Sam Brownback as speakers. (Chosun Ilbo, “More in U.S. Calling for Regime Change,” July 11, 2003)
Natl security adviser Ban Ki-moon invw: simultaneous steps by U.S., North: “We need to take a concurrent approach into account in finding a resolution to the nuclear issue.” (Shim Jae-yun, “Seoul Pushes for NK-US Compromise,” Korea Times, July 10, 2003)
GNP lawmaker Chung Hyung-keun says secret envoy Tony Namkung now in Seoul to discuss a second North-South summit. National security adviser denies the report. (Kwon Dae-yeol, “Summit-Seeking Envoy Said in Seoul,” Chosun Ilbo, July 11, 2003)
7/?/03:
Senior admin off at conf of intl businessmen in New York: “We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear state.” “All options are on the table.” Lists four “major mistakes” by KJI: establishment of Sinuiju SEZ without prior consultation with China, piecemeal economic reforms, admission of kidnapping, admission of HEU. Gregg: “He seemed to rule out any consideration of the possibility that these moves by the North Korean regime has in fact been efforts, however poorly implemented, to change the direction of its economic policies and the nature of its relations with Japan and the United States.” (Donald P. Gregg, “Regime Change: What Does It Mean for North Korea, Removal or Reform?” Korea Society Quarterly, 3, No. 4, p. 4)
7/12-18/03:
During Bush trip to Africa, Powell discusses allow U.S. officials to talk to the North Koreans, though not in a “separate” meeting. VP and OSD said any talks a reward for bad behavior. The lineup, Armitage says, was “OSD hard over, although the military was less so. VP’s office hard over. Bolton hard over at State and the rest of us wanting to talk to these guys to resolve the issue. Nobody else had equities in it.” (Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell (New York: Knopf, 2006), pp. 473, 475)
7/13/03:
Talks in Bangkok on MIAs between ColGen. Li Chan-bok and DASD Jerry Jennings conclude with agreement for U.S. to pay $2.1 million to conduct four searches. (Robert Burns, “U.S. to Pay North Korea for MIA Search,” Associated Press, July 15, 2003)
7/14/03:
Dai Bingguo, carrying letter from Hu Jintao meets with KJI who says he does not care about the format of the talks if the DPRK can have a meaningful negotiation with the US. Western diplomat briefed by the PRC Foreign Ministry on the proposal said it calls for a multilateral meeting in which bilateral talks take place on the sidelines. PRC FM spokesman Kong Quan: “Right now it is critical to continue the process of the talks.” “China has been very clear that it remains open and flexible on the participants and the formalities of the talks.”(Joseph Kahn, “As U.S. and North Korea Glower, China Pushes for Talks,” New York Times, July 16, 2003, p. A-3) In five days also had talks with Kang Sok-ju, Supreme People’s Assembly president Kim Yong-nam, FM Paek Nam-sun. (Kyodo, “China, N. Korea Have ‘In-Depth’ Talks on Nuclear Impasse,” July 15, 2003)
Article under pseudonym “Zong Hairen” credits Hu Jintao’s diplomatic efforts for talks, given China “a good international image, improved Sino-US relations, and won the trust of Kim Jong-il.” Despite China’s “dislike” of Kim Jong-il’s government and the financial burden of granting more economic aid to North Korea, Zong said that it was a price worth paying in order to repel the infiltration of US influence in Northeast Asia. … “Hu Jintao wrote a letter to North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-il in July, in which he explained the necessity of reopening talks with the United States, and sent a special envoy, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo, on a visit to North Korea for a vis-à-vis with Kim Jong-il that went on for nearly six hours. This move laid a foundation for the six-party talks in the end. … In March this year, China sent a special envoy to the DPRK, presenting to Kim Jong-il a proposal on “tripartite talks” in Beijing among the DPRK, the United States, and China. … At the talks, the DRPK side said: “It is necessary for the United States to promise not to invade our country. Under this precondition, we shall give up developing nuclear weapons.” … During his visit to Britain on April 30, DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su-hon reiterated the DPRK proposal tabled at the “tripartite talks” in Beijing on the one hand: If security assurances are obtained, the DPRK will not develop or produce nuclear weapons and will dismantle its nuclear arms facilities and allow international inspectors to inspect them. On the other hand, he refused to prove the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons. … The Bush administration kept urging China to exert more influence on the DPRK over the issue of nuclear crisis. To this end, the Bush administration held at least 10 consultations with the Chinese government through diplomatic channels. … Hu Jintao specially sent Dai Bingguo (to the DPRK) in the capacity of special envoy on July 12, Dai being the former head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and now executive vice-minister of foreign affairs who is on good terms with Kim Jong-il personally (as he has had the most meetings with Kim Jong-il and is the closest to Kim among all Chinese officials). Hu Jintao himself wrote a very sincerely worded letter to Kim Jong-il, in which he stated the pros and cons and candidly expounded the necessity of reopening talks with the United States. In his letter, Hu mainly made three promises: China is willing to help resolve this crisis, mediate, and facilitate negotiation with the greatest sincerity; China is willing to offer the DPRK greater economic aid than in previous years (without mentioning specific numbers); China will resolutely persuade the United States to make a promise of non-aggression against the DPRK, in exchange for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Dai Bingguo conversed with Kim Jong-il for nearly six hours. Kim Jong-il told Dai that he was willing to accept China’s viewpoint and could reopen talks with the United States. But he stressed in the same breath that one-on-one negotiation would be his bottom line and he did not like the idea of several parties getting involved in this, but he said in the end that this bottom line was not unchangeable. Kim also asked Dai to take a message to Hu, inviting Hu to visit the DPRK as early as possible. If a visit cannot be arranged this year, then next year is fine. Kim also specially had a private dinner with Dai. … On the morning of July 15, after the US side learned of the good news that Dai had returned from Pyongyang to Beijing, Powell telephoned (Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs) Li Zhaoxing and immediately invited Dai to visit the United States the next day. Vice-President Cheney, Powell, and others received Dai with great courtesy and had talks with him, proof that the United States was rather pleased with what Dai Bingguo had achieved on his DPRK visit. … Because of this, the Bush administration changed its approach of cautious support for Hu Jintao that it had adopted a few months before and made a strong show of support for Hu. Bush talked to Hu Jintao over the phone in person; Powell claimed that the Sino-US relations had entered the best period in decades; the White House made public its unequivocal attitude over the issue of “referendum” in Taiwan, more clear-cut than ever before, and issued several warnings in a row to (Taiwan President) Chen Shui-bian, telling him not to capitalize on the issue of a “referendum.” As a result, Sino-US relations reached a mini-climax, the first in recent years. However, as the US-DPRK talks deepen and some deep-seated conflicts come to the surface, China may have to pay a higher price than what it has promised to Kim Jong-il. … One can be certain that although both China and Russia dislike Kim Jong-il, they have to help his regime in order to repel the infiltration of US influence in Northeast Asia. The Chinese government has always maintained that the collapse of the Kim Jong-il regime or the outbreak of a Korean war would seriously jeopardize the national security of China. A more severe consequence would be that if the United States attacks and eventually occupies the DPRK, it will in effect complete the United States’ encirclement of China. Once the United States brings the Korean Peninsula under control, almost all the neighbors of China, from the east to the west, would come within the United States’ sphere of influence and this would complete the United States’ long-term strategy of containing China. This is the last thing that the Chinese government would like to see. Therefore, although the relevant ministries and commissions in the Chinese State Council object to the state freely offering the DPRK annual aid equivalent to the grant that the central government gives to a province in southwestern China (because of Hu’s promise, the aid that the DPRK will receive from China will be equivalent to the central grant to a province in the southern part of Central China), this expenditure is politically justified. … Hu Jintao once again took a proactive stance and decided to send another two delegations to Pyongyang on August 18 and 19, after the missions of Dai Bingguo and (Vice Foreign Minister) Wang Yi, headed respectively by Xu Caihou, member of the secretariat of the CCP Central Committee and director of the General Political Department (of the People’s Liberation Army), and Liu Hongcai, deputy head of the International Liaison Department of the CCP Central Committee. The main task of these two delegations was, again, to feel out the bottom line of the DPRK side regarding the upcoming six-party talks. On August 19, Xu Caihou first met with Jo Myong-rok, first vice-chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK and director-general of the General Political Bureau. During their meeting, Jo Myong-rok showed a very touchy attitude towards the United States in exactly the same tone as Kim Jong-il originally had, leaving no leeway for compromise whatsoever. After his meeting with Xu, Jo immediately reported to Kim Jong-il. Having heard Jo’s report, Kim Jong-il decided to meet Xu Caihou and his party himself and pose for a group photo with them, and asked the media to publish reports on this event. On August 20, Kim Jong-il had a high-profile meeting with Xu Caihou and his party. In Xu Caihou’s debriefing (he returned to Beijing on August 22), he said that Kim Jong-il was friendly to China and very polite to the delegation, but Kim was very unhappy with the attitude of the US side. He insisted on demanding a written pledge from the US side and did not make any direct comments on the proposal from countries like China and Russia that they would be willing to make a joint pledge to provide the DPRK with national security assurances. Kim Jong-il merely said that he was thankful for the brotherly sentiments from China and Russia. But Kim Jong-il also specially pointed out that the situation now is different from the 1950s (i.e., during China’s War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea) and that he does not subscribe to the idea that the DPRK needs national security assurances from China and Russia over the issues between the DPRK and the United States. He considered this the business of the United States alone. If the United States did it, the DPRK-US relations could immediately go back to where they were at the end of Clinton’s presidency. Kim Jong-il also said that the armed forces of the DPRK and China should conduct even closer military cooperation and exchanges. In order for Kim Jong-il to show more flexibility at the six-party talks, in order to make sure that Kim Jong-il can personally direct his delegation during the six-party talks via highly secure communication channels that are not bugged by countries like the United States and Japan, and, more importantly, in order to verify Kim Jong-il’s bottom line for the upcoming talks once again, Hu Jintao sent another official, even higher up than Xu Caihou, on a secret mission to Pyongyang to speak to Kim Jong-il in person.” (Zong Hairen (pseudonym), “Hu Jintao Writes to Kim Jong-il to Open Door to Six-Party Talks,” Hong Kong Economic Journal, August 28, 2003, FBIS, China, August 29, 2003)
On six occasions between April and early July, satellites spotted loading of Iranian cargo planes at Sunan Airport, north of Pyongyang. “It was cruise missiles,” says Bush admin off. “We know there is cooperation between North Korea and Iran in the nuclear field,” says Yossef Bodansky, director of U.S. Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, citing Middle East intelligence sources. The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), Paris-based dissident group, claims North Korean scientists have been helping Iran build a nuclear facility. John Bolton went to Middle East last month to persuade Arab nations to share intelligence. A U.S. official familiar with the trip says Middle Eastern diplomats are “concerned about North Korea exporting nuclear technology, know-how or fissile material to the region.” Citing sources in Iran, Michael Ledeen of AEI says a delegation of mullahs traveled to Pyongyang a few months ago to discuss swapping nuclear technology for cash. It isn’t know if the deal was concluded but after the trip top leaders if Iran’s Revolutionary Guards were told Iran would have its own nuclear weapons “soon,” says Ledeen. (John Larkin and Donald MacIntyre, “Arsenal of the Axis,” Time, 161, No. 27, (July 14, 2003). ROK intelligence sources said large Iranian cargo ship recently entered a Yellow Sea port, Haeju. Iranian cargo planes had made six trips to North since April, JoongAng Ilbo reported in mid-June. (Kang Chan-ho, “Iran Cargo Ship Visits Port in North Korea, Seoul Aide Says,” JoongAng Ilbo, July 9, 2003)
Division 39 has $5 billion cash hoard in Macao, Switzerland, Vienna for Kim Jong-il to buy political loyalty, say defectors. Cutoff of funds by shutting down illicit trade is key to regime change. Song Il-hyok, DPRK diplomat in Hong Kong acknowledges existence of Division 39. Samsung, LG bought gold from it. It has monopoly on minerals trade. Small trading company Zokwang caught passing counterfeit U.S. money. Song says, “North Koreans have no choice but to carry large amounts of cash, as the U.S. freezes us out of the global financial system.” (Jay Solomon and Hai Won Choi, “In North Korea, Secret Cash Hoard Props up Regime,” July 14, 2003, p. A-1)
Within past two months SecDef Rumsfeld ordered commanders to draw up OpPlan 5030. “Some of the things [Admiral Thomas Fargo, chief of Pacom] is being asked to do,” says senior U.S. official, “are, shall we say, provocative.” Large troop and carrier movements in prewar phase amounts to plan to topple regime by destabilizing its military forces. Tactical operations include flying RC-135s closer to force aircraft to scramble and waste fuel, military exercises that force North Koreans into bunkers depleting food supplies, disrupt financial networks, sow disinformation. (Bruce B. Auster and Kevin Whitelaw, “Upping the Ante for Kim Jong-il,” U.S. News &World Report, July 21, 2003)
U.S., Japan delay earmarking of annual funds to KEDO, halting LWR construction, says UnifMin official. (Kim Ki-tae, “Seoul Sees US Hang KEDO Out to Dry,” Korea Times, July 15, 2003)
Japan, ROK, U.S have agreed U.N. Security Council should adopt statement denouncing North if it does not conduct multilateral talks,” MOFA official says. (Takahara Kanako, “UNSC May Be Brought in on North Korea,” Japan Times, July 16, 2003)
7/16/03:
PRC FM Li Zhaoxing, SecState Powell “exchanged views on the nuclear issue of the DPRK during phone talks held Wednesday morning,” says PRC FoMin statement. (AFP, “China and U.S. in North Korea Phone Talks,” July 16, 2003) Powell told North ready to resume talks. (AFP, “N. Korea Appears Ready to Resume Talks on Nuclear Programs: U.S. Officials, July 17, 2003) Senior State Dept official [Bolton]: “We have been in close touch with the Chinese and [from] what we have heard so far it appears the North are willing to resume the Beijing talks.” “We will continue to press for five, but we will keep talks [and] keep in touch with the Chinese.” (Arshad Mohammed, “North Korea Said Ready for Three-Way Nuclear Talks,” Reuters, July 16, 2003)
SecState Powell plays down Washington Post report that U.S. was considering taking in refugees as a way to pressure North: “We are examining this matter but there are no proposals that are before the president or before me at this point.” (Arshad Mohammed, “North Korea Said Ready for Three-Way Nuclear Talks,” Reuters, July 16, 2003)
Han Song-ryol telephone invw with Hankyoreh, asked if negotiating card or making nukes for its defense, “Both are right.” “If the U.S. continues to isolate and gag us, we need the nuclear weapons for survival. But if the U.S. normalizes relations with us and guarantees non-aggression towards us, then it is also up for negotiation.” “In principle we do not oppose [multilateral talks].It’s a sort of game of chicken.” (Seo Soo-min, “N.K., U.S. on Final Stretch of ‘Game of Chicken,’” Korea Times, July 16, 2003)
7/17/03:
Lugar op-ed: “Up to 300,000 North Korean refugees are stuck in China. Many of them live in hiding in the border areas of northeastern China, fearful of being arrested by Chinese authorities and being sent back to North Korea. Many of the women are exploited by Chinese gangsters and forced into prostitution or abusive marriages. …The United States has repeatedly urged China to live up to its obligations under the United Nations Refugee Convention, which prohibits the forced return of refugees to places where they face possible persecution. China has refused, citing an agreement it has signed with North Korea to send such ’food migrants’ back across the border. The administration and Congress must continue to press China on this point. As an added humanitarian measure, the United States, along with the United Nations and other members of the international community, should demand that North Korea allow the WFP to provide food directly to the country’s vast, inhumane prison camps, where many of the repatriated refugees, as well as thousands of other political prisoners, are kept in unspeakable conditions. In the meantime, we should authorize the resettlement of some North Korean refugees in this country, and press our allies to do the same. If this sparks a greater flow of North Koreans from their gulag-like country, some would argue, that could help keep pressure on North Korea or even hasten the fall of the Pyongyang regime, much as the flight of East Germans in 1989 helped undermine the Communist system there. International steps to help North Korean refugees would also be an unmistakable signal to Pyongyang that the world community will not turn a blind eye to the regime’s systematic human rights violations and its unconscionable neglect of its people’s basic needs. Regardless, we should offer resettlement options to North Koreans because it’s the right thing to do.” (Richard Lugar, “A Korean Catastrophe,” Washington Post, July 17, 2003, p. A-21)
PRC FoMin spokesman Kong Quan: “The 1994 Agreed Framework is an agreement between the United States and North Korea and has had a role on how to resolve this.” “This agreement didn’t come easy and we hope it is continued.” (AFP, “China Urges N. Korea and U.S. to Revert to 1994 Agreed Framework,” July 17, 2003)
North and South exchange machine-gun fire from DMZ guard posts. (New York Times, “North and South Exchange Gunfire,” July 17, 2003, p. A-6)
British spoof: Rumsfeld decries “media feeding frenzy about a place that the British intelligence services do not even believe exists, for goodness sakes.” As evidence he cites a British report entitled “Our Friends the Orientals” authored by someone identified as “Arthur Darrowby, 4th Form, St. Botolph’s School for the Manual Arts.” Deadbrain.co.uk
7/18-22/03:
Dai Bingguo in Washington; bilateral phone calls among six-party leaders follow. Meets with Cheney and gives him letter from Hu Jintao to Bush, then meets with Rice at 2 p.m., then at 4 p.m. spends 2.5 hours with Powell. (People’s Daily, “Chinese Special Envoy Shuttles between U.S. & DPRK: Commentary,” July 21, 2003) Administration officials asked Dai to tell DPRK the U.S. would agree to meet with it and China provided the session was followed almost immediately by multilateral talks including South Korea, Japan and possibly Russia, U.S. officials said July 22. (Glenn Kessler, “Proposals to N. Korea Weighed,” Washington Post, July 22, 2003, p. A-1) “Powell acquiesced to the Chinese request for trilateral talks, but only on coniditon that Beijing persuade Pyongyang to expand the talks im mediately to include Tokyo and Seoul.” (Charles L. Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2007), 85)
7/18/03:
Chinese intelligence believes North has reprocessed enough plutonium for a bomb, prompting urgent Chinese diplomacy, according to diplomats in Beijing and a European official. “The Chinese are scared,” says a Western diplomat in Beijing. (Charles Hutzler, “China Says Pyongyang Has Material for Bomb,” Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2003)
7/19/03:
Minju Joson signed commentary: US redeploying troops into “positions favorable for mounting a preemptive attack. …Finding it hard to settle the nuclear issue as Washington intends and implement its policy to stifle the DPRK, the U.S. seeks to attain its criminal aim to stifle the DPRK at any cost by mounting a preemptive attack on it.” (AFP, “North Korea Accuses U.S. of Repositioning Troops in Preparations for Attack,” July 19, 2003)
North has built second reprocessing plant say US and Asian officials with access to latest intel. Discovery of new evidence that senior admin official said was “very worrisome but still not conclusive.” Sensors have begun to detect elevated levels of krypton-85 which do not come from Yongbyon. “How can you verify that they have stopped a program like this if you don’t know where everything is?” says Asian official who has been briefed. “If you follow their logic, if we find a second reprocessing plant, maybe there are more,” says American official. (Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, “North Korea Hides New Nuclear Site, Evidence Suggests,” New York Times, July 20, 2003), p. 1) Krypton-85 originated from Yongbyon and not a second reprocessing plant. U.S. intelligence has no knowledge of a second plant. (Bill Gertz, “2nd N. Korean Nuclear Site Not Likely,” Washington Times, July 22, 2003, p. 8) (Cf., 10/14/03)
7/20/03:
Iran unveils new missile based on North Korean design that could reach Israel. (Douglas Frantz, “Iran Closes in on Ability to Build a Nuclear Bomb,” Los Angeles Times, August 4, 2003)
7/21/03:
Bush shrugs off reprocessing: “The desire by the North Koreans to convince the world that they’re in the process of developing a nuclear arsenal is nothing new. We’ve known that for a while. And, therefore, we must continue to work with the neighborhood to convince Kim Jong-il that his decision is an unwise decision. And we will do just that.”
White House, Office of the Press Secretary , “Remarks by the President and Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi,” Crawford)
Japan will resume normalization talks if North enters multilateral talks. Senior MOFA official: “It is necessary for normalization negotiations to proceed simultaneously and in parallel with multilateral talks.” (Kyodo, “Japan to Resume Talks with N. Korea If 5-Way Talks Realized,” July 21, 2003)
Rodong Sinmun threatens to pull out of armistice agreement: “If the U.S. persists in its moves to start a war against the DPRK, it can no longer be bound to the defunct armistice agreement to leave the peace of the country and the destiny of the nation to the tender mercies of outside forces and stay idle.” (AFP, “North Korea Threatens Armistice,” July 21, 2003)
Reiss named director of policy planning.
7/22/03:
Boucher: U.S. offer of written assurances it won’t attack “still stands,” but after North begins to disarm: “The issue is not whether the U.S. provides a piece of paper. The issue is whether North Korea stops developing nuclear weapons.” (State Department Daily Briefing, transcript, July 22, 2003
Confusion over intelligence avoid untimely confrontation. Joel Wit: “There are people who want North Korea to collapse and people who want to stick with diplomacy. And they’re playing this game where they leak out the intelligence a little at a time, to reinforce this or that agenda.” (Christopher Cooper, “Confusion over North Korea Has Good Side,” Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2003, p. A-4)
Rowen: “The U.S. and China should work together toward a common goal: a leadership in Pyongyang committed to developing the North as a step towards the unification of the peninsula. This means the end of the Kim family dynasty, although not necessarily the immediate dissolution of the North Korean government. Keeping the Kim dynasty on life support keeps danger alive. Any deal would stand a better chance of avoiding future crises if it included specific actions by the North on opening the economy, human rights and the reduction of the threat to Seoul. Ultimately, we should try to work with China on a new leadership in Pyongyang.” (Henry S. Rowen, “China Must Help Us to End the ‘Kim Dynasty,’” Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2003, p. A-14)
7/23/03:
Under notes exchanged during Security Treaty revision of 1960, U.S. needed Japan’s prior consent for “the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan” but new documents show a secret deal excluded North Korean from that requirement, a former State Department official confirms, though attack on North Korea by U.S. forces subsequently made subject to prior consultation after 1969 Nixon-Sato summit. U.S. nearly held such a prior consultation in June 1994, according to Japanese and former U.S. officials. (Japan Times, “Japan, U.S. Anticipated North Korea Attack in ’94,” July 23, 2003)
7/23-24/03:
In Honolulu senior American and South Korean defense officials sought to thrash out redeployment of 2nd Infantry Division to Pyongtaek and Osan from northern Gyeonggi Province, approximately 25 km southeast of the DMZ. US officials seek an earlier redeployment than the South Koreans deem advisable. American planners envision a two-stage process, first to locations near Camp Casey and Camp Red Cloud, and ultimately to facilities near Osan Air Base and Camp Humphreys. Korean officials initially proposed a final target date of 2011 for these transfers, but US officials continue to press for a much earlier date. Relocation of the Yongsan garrison is expected to take place more rapidly. In the talks, the two sides agreed to work towards the target date of 2006. This is probably two years later than US defense planners would have liked, but their flexibility on this point may reflect a desire to reassure an anxious ally and buy time in which to reach agreement on sensitive issues. Detailed relocation and land acquisition strategies are to be worked out in 2003 and 2004. Total costs for these relocations are estimated at $3–5bn, with final agreement on cost sharing still pending. (IISS, “American Forces in South Korea: The End of an Era?” Strategic Comments, 9, no. 5 (July 2003), p. 2) “The U.S. expressed its hope that the construction of new camps will be finished by 2008,” said DefMin spokesman Hwang Young-soo. “It was an expression of their wishful thinking.” A Ministry official said, “The fact that the U.S. plans to complete construction by 2008 does not necessarily mean they will move the 2nd Infantry Division by that year.” (Kim Ki-tae, “Seoul, U.S. At Odds over Relocation Timing,” Korea Times, August 12, 2003)
7/?/03:
Diplomatic sources say North is ready to declare itself a member of the nuclear club by September 9 unless the nuclear crisis is resolved. (Reuters, “Report: North Korea Prepared to Conduct Nuclear Test,” July 26, 2003)
7/24/03:
Roh-Bush telephone conversation: “The two leaders exchanged opinions about multilateral talks …” (Shin Yong-bae, “Roh, Bush Optimistic on N.K. Nuclear Talks,” Korea Herald, July 26, 2003)
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The present U.S. administration announced an arms buildup plan to equip the U.S. forces in South Korea with weapons of the latest type. It is now working hard to put sea and air blockade against the DPRK into practice and loudly talking about provocative Operation Plan 5030. That is a blatant violation of the AA and a war action to invade the DPRK. …The aforesaid hostile acts of the U.S. compel the DPRK to build up a strong war deterrent force. We know well that the U.S., which is ditching one provision of the AA after another, intends to use any ultra-modern weapons on the peninsula. The DPRK will consider the ultra-modern weapons the new conservatives of the U.S. try to use as tactical nuclear weapons, which compels the DPRK to make as powerful weapons as them.” (KCNA, “U.S. Escalated Moves to Increase Tension Will Lead to Its Self-Destruction,” July 24, 2003)
7/25/03:
State Dept imposes sanctions on North Korean firm Changgwang Sinyong Corp, but not Yemen, for missile exports to Yemen. (AFP, “US Slaps Sanctions on North Korea over Yemen Missile Sale,” July 25, 2003)
7/27/03:
North Korea Freedom Coalition holds first meeting to draw up legislation to prohibit aid until practical agreement reached on human rights such as return of Japanese abductees, monitoring of concentration camps. “The main point of the bill is to link North Korea’s human rights problems with the U.S. policy on North Korea, says Michael Horowitz of Hudson Institute, who led the discussion. (Chosun Ilbo, “Horowitz Leads Group Pressing for Human Rights in North,” July 27, 2003)
7/29/03:
Self-styled nationalist member of Kenkoku Giyugun claims responsibility for firing shot at Chongryun headquarters in Niigata, planting incendiary device at Hana Credit Union, says “We will continue until North Koreans are expelled from Japan.” (Asahi Shimbun, “Nationalist Linked to Attacks on N. Korea Targets in Niigiata,” July 31, 2003)
7/30/03:
Bolton in Seoul for talks on PSI, UNSC action, sees both as “complementary” to talks. (Seo Soo-min, “US Wants to Discuss PSI with Korea, Envoy Says,” Korea Times, July 29, 2003) MOFAT spokesman Kim Sung-heung: “It is better for us to resolve the crisis outside the UN framework at this time.” (AFP, “US, S. Korea Hold Talks on Nuke Crisis As North Korea Reiterates Demands,” July 30, 2003)
7/31/03:
Bolton inflammatory speech in Seoul emphasizes multilateral, not peaceful or diplomatic solution. Just 15 mentions of North Korea, 43 uncomplimentary mentions of Kim Jong-il, “We are prepared to welcome a reformed North Korea into the world of civilized nations. This would mean, however, that Kim Jong-il makes the political decision to undergo sweeping reforms. A good start would be to respect the human rights of his people and not starve them or put them in death camps.” (Bolton, “A Dictatorship at the Crossroads,” Speech to the East Asian Institute, Seoul, July 31, 2003) FoMin spokesman reacts: “Such human scum and bloodsucker is not entitled to take part in the talks…” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry Slams U.S. Mandarin’s Invective,” August 2, 2003) FoMin spokesman calls Bolton a “fascist.” …” (KCNA, “KCNA Blasts Remarks of U.S. Undersecretary of State,” August 11, 2003) Bolton: “I knew we had struck home when the DPRK’s news agency denounced me as ‘human scum,’ probably the highest accolade I received during all my service in the Bush years. This speech, another successful effort by [Mark] Groombridge and others in my office to follow the bureaucracy’s process imperatives to the letter in the clearance process, while trumping them on substance, also gain notoriety during my 2005 confirmation battle. When Biden asked Powell about it at a closed SFRC hearing on September 9, 2003, Powell told me later that day he pointed to Jim Kelly, sitting with him, and said, Jim’s right here, and he can tell you that he cleared it.” (Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option, p. 118) Former U.S. ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard said that John R. Bolton, President Bush’s choice for U.N. ambassador, might have misled the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about a provocative and controversial 2003 speech on North Korea. Hubbard also described Bolton yelling and slamming down a telephone on him during a confrontation. It was the latest example of the allegedly confrontational behavior that had helped stall Bolton’s nomination. Hubbard has spoken with Foreign Relations Committee aides, who are expanding an investigation into Bolton’s background after senators this week postponed a confirmation vote until mid-May. In a sign of deepening White House concern about the fate of the nomination, Bush defended Bolton on Thursday while addressing a group of insurance agents about Social Security reform. A day earlier, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, traveling in Europe, staunchly endorsed Bolton.But in a potentially troublesome development for the administration, former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who has had sharp disagreements with Bolton, has been speaking to Republican senators about the nomination, Powell spokeswoman Peggy Cifrino said. Although Powell has not taken a public position on the Bolton nomination, his name was absent from a letter sent this month by a group of former Republican secretaries of State and other former officials urging Bolton’s approval as U.N. ambassador. The letter was signed by former chief diplomats James A. Baker III, Henry A. Kissinger and George P. Shultz, among others. In July 2003, Bolton attracted widespread attention with a speech in South Korea in which he leveled repeated personal attacks on North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. Some U.S. diplomats feared the speech would lead North Korea to pull out of international talks on its nuclear weapons program. In testimony last week, Bolton implied that Hubbard, former U.S. ambassador to South Korea, had approved of the speech in advance and that he had thanked Bolton for his comments afterward. But Hubbard, a career diplomat who was Bush’s ambassador to South Korea from 2001 to 2004, contradicted Bolton, saying in an interview that he had not expressed gratitude for the speech and that he had disapproved of it.”I didn’t approve personally of the tone of the speech, and had urged him to tone it down,” said Hubbard, now retired from the foreign service. Bolton testified that the night before the speech, Hubbard had “reviewed it one last time and made a few more changes.” After the speech, Bolton testified, Hubbard had praised him. (Paul Richter and Sonni Efron, “Testimony of U.N. Nominee Is Disputed,” Los Angeles Times, April 22, 2005) A State Department official provided copies on May 10 of emails between Bolton’s staff indicating that relevant officials had signed off on the speech. The first email, sent on the morning of July 23, to the NSC, DoD, and OVP, and top DoS officials including Richard Armitage, included a draft of the speech, then entitled “The Kim Jong-il Dictatorship: A Legacy of Tyranny and Squandered Opportunities,” and asked for comments ny noon the next day. Over the next two days a variety of relatively minor comments were received. The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affaiors cleared the speech without comment. (Glenn Kessler, “Bolton Talk on N. Korea Apparently Was Cleared,” Washington Post, May 11, 2005, p. A-6)
7/30-31/03:
N-S economic talks in Gaesong. Loudspeakers in DMZ silenced.
7/31/03:
Bolton speech in Seoul: after repeated references to Kim Jong-il by name—43 to be exact, nearly all derogatory—he warned of “timely action by the Security Council” as well as PSI. (John Bolton, “Dictatorship at the Crossroads,” July 31, 2003) Pyongyang denounces Bolton as “rude human scum.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for D.P.R.K. Foreign Ministry Slams U.S. Mandarin’s Invective,” August 2, 2003) David Straub, Korea desk director, highlighted problematic parts with yellow marker but Assistant SecState Kelly chose to avoid another fight with Bolton. (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 180) Thomas Hubbard, U.S. ambassador to Seoul, said he had argued it was “counterproductive to our interest in getting the North Koreans back to the table.” (Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Interview with Ambassador Thomas Hubbard with Regard to the Bolton Nomination, April 28, 2005) Soon after his return from Seoul, Bolton was summoned to Powell’s office. “Powell was pissed,” said an aide to Bolton, and the two got into “a screaming match.” Powell told him, “John, you can’t give any more speeches until I approve them.” (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 181)
DPRK tells other parties it will join the talks, but wants Russia included, Russia’s foreign ministry announces. (Steven R. Weisman, “North Korea Seen As Ready to Agree to Wider Meetings,” New York Times, August 1, 2003, p. A-1)
DPRK has told Japanese officials that release of the abductees’ family members would be in line with Kim Jong-il’s intentions, sources said today. (Asahi Shimbun, “Pyongyang Signals It Will Reunite Families,” August 1, 2003)
8/1/03:
Six-party talks announced. No prior round of three-party talks or even bilaterals. White House spokesman Scott McClellan: “Obviously they can always directly talk to us in the multilateral setting. If you’re sitting at a table, someone can talk across that table.” Lee Ki-tak, former national security adviser: “China’s fear is Japan’s nuclearization. China has abandoned cooperation with the Kim Jong-il regime.” (James Brooke, “U.S. and North Korea Announce Accord on Wider Atom Talks,” New York Times, August 2, 2003, p. A-2) President Bush makes no mention of negotiating: “In the past it was the lone voice of the United States speaking clearly about this. Now we’ll have other parties who have a vested interest in peace on the Korean peninsula. …And we’re upbeat about the fact that others are assuming responsibility for peace besides the United States of America. And we’ll see how the dialogue goes. We fully understand the past. We are hopeful, however, that Mr. Kim Jong-il, because he’s hearing other voices, will make the decision to completely dismantle his nuclear weapons program, that he will allow complete transparency and verifiability. And we’re optimistic that can happen.” (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, text of remarks by the President after meeting with his cabinet, August 1, 2003) “We have to have a large picture of the final settlement,” said one Asian diplomat who has worked closely with the administration. “Whether they call it negotiations or not is a matter of taste.” One approach under consideration would be a six-party assurance of non-aggression as the first stage in a larger discussion on future political and economic relations. Another circulating among NSC staffers would call on the North to take the first step of declaring what weapons programs it has and then offering to eliminate them. (Glenn Kessler, “N. Korea Arms Talks Appear Near,” Washington Post, August 1, 2003, p. A-1) State Dept. spokesman Boucher: “There are ways in that multilateral setting, whether it’s across the table or on the side or in some other way, probably a variety of ways, that any party can convey to another party what it wants to say.” [bilateral] (State Department Daily Briefing, transcript, August 1, 2003)
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The DPRK-U.S. contact took place in New York on July 31 as regards the nuclear issue between the two countries. … Some time ago the U.S. informed the DPRK through a third party that the DPRK-U.S. bilateral talks may be held within the framework of multilateral talks. At the recent DPRK-U.S. talks the DPRK put forward a new proposal to have six party talks without going through the three party talks and to have the DPRK-U.S. bilateral talks there.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Recent US-DPRK Contact, August 1, 2003)
Powell: “[O]nce we are at these meetings, many conversations can take place. A formal setting is six, but I have been in many diplomatic settings where different parties among those in attendance can talk to one another, one-on-one, two-on-two and three-on-three. …We’ve said we’re not doing non-aggression pacts. We don’t have any. I don’t know of a single non-aggression pact that I can think of. And we, as a practice, don’t do that. But there are ways to talk about security, and there are ways to talk about intent that don’t include a pact that would require some form of Senate confirmation or some form of legislative procedure. It’s also important to point out that the North Koreans were given various assurances by the previous administration on a number of occasions beginning with the agreed framework. The North Koreans entered into an assurance agreement with the South Koreans two years before the agreed framework. And in the last several years of President Clinton’s Administration, there were communiqués issued and other statements made that certainly demonstrated no hostile intent on the part of the United States. And in the face of that, the North Koreans went ahead and created a second track of enriched uranium capacity. …[re Wolfowitz on imminent collapse] My challenge is to work with not a collapse that may or may not happen, but the situation that’s there. Right now there is a government there. It’s been there for a lot of decades, and that’s what I have to deal with. So I can’t speculate on what the situation might or might not be. What the situation would be following a catastrophic collapse, I don’t really know. I don’t think it’s anything that any of North Korea’s neighbors at the moment wish to see.” (Secretary of State Colin Powell, Interview by Regional Syndicates, State Department transcript, August 1, 2003)
Donald Gregg: “We have an attitude, not a policy.” (Nicholas D. Kristof, “Grabbing the Nettle,” New York Times, August 1, 2003, p. A-21)
ICG report, “North Korea: A Phased Negotiating Strategy”: “North Korea has the materials and the capability to develop nuclear weapons — more than 200 of them by 2010.”
8/3/03:
Japan, U.S. considering forming a multilateral inspection team. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Members of 6-Way N. Korea Talks Plan N-Inspection Task Force,” August 3, 2003)
8/4/03:
Woolsey op-ed: “In the midst of the just announced six-party talks, one fact stands out: The only chance for a peaceful resolution of this crisis before North Korea moves clearly into the ranks of nuclear powers is for China to move decisively. Indeed we see no alternative but for China to use its substantial economic leverage, derived from North Korea’s dependence on it for fuel and food, to press hard and immediately, for a change in regime. Kim Jong-il’s regime has shown that agreements signed with it, by anyone, mean nothing. …Unfortunately, the reflexive rejection in the public debate of the use of force against North Korea has begun to undermine U.S. ability both to influence China and to take the preparatory steps necessary for effectiveness if force should be needed. The U.S. and South Korea must instead come together and begin to assess realistically what it would talk to conduct a successful military operation to change the North Korean regime.” (R. James Woolsey and [Air Force LtGen.] Thomas G. McInerney, “The Next Korean War,” Wall Street Journal, August 4, 2003, p. A-8)
Chung Mong-hun, son of founder, leaps to his death from Hyundai headquarters. Hyundai Asan secretly paid North before summit. (Associated Press, “Tycoon’s Death May Curtail Joint Korea Projects,” August 5, 2003, p. A-9) Kim Jong-il sent condolence note through Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee vice chair Song Ho-gyung, attending memorial service at Mount Kumgang. (AFP, “North Korean Leader Offers Condolences for Hyundai Executive’s Death,” August 11, 2003)
North Korean military scientists recently monitored entering Iranian nuclear facilities, says foreign intel official [Israel?]. They are assisting in the design of a nuclear warhead, say people inside Iran [MEK?] and foreign intel officials. So many North Koreans work on nuclear and missile projects in Iran that a resort on the Caspian is set aside for their exclusive use, according one of the sources and a UN official. (Douglas Frantz, “Iran Closes in on Ability to Build a Nuclear Bomb,” Los Angeles Times, August 4, 2003)
8/6/03:
Japan’s 2003 defense white paper says missile defense a “pressing” need.” Also, says “It’s time [for the ASDF] to graduate from the beginner stage” in peacekeeping. (Asahi Shimbun, “Missile Defense ‘Pressing’ Need,” August 6, 2003)
John Kerry op-ed: “If the coming talks are to be more than show, however, the Bush administration must commit itself to negotiate directly with the North Koreans — no matter who else is at the table — and have a viable negotiating strategy. The threat posed by North Korea is too dangerous to allow someone else, be it our allies or China, to negotiate our interests. Freezing North Korea’s reprocessing activities is our most urgent need. We cannot allow North Korea to continue to build its capacity to produce bombs while we are negotiating. …Administration officials have said precious little about an immediate freeze, preferring to focus on their oft-repeated demand that North Korea dismantle its nuclear weapons program in return for a U.N. promise not to attack. …Pyongyang is not going to freeze its nuclear program without some commitment from the United States that North Korea’s security will not be jeopardized. A U.S. commitment not to increase its offensive capabilities on the Korean peninsula while Pyongyang is freezing its nuclear activities is one obvious — and, I believe, viable — way to move forward and get both parties to the negotiating table. …the administration cannot resolve this crisis with a one-dimensional approach. Focusing solely on North Korea’s nuclear program not only fails to address the reasons why Kim Jong-il wants nuclear weapons but also enables him to engage in nuclear brinkmanship and blackmail. We must be prepared to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that addresses the full range of issues of concern to the United States and its allies — North Korea’s nuclear, chemical and missile programs, conventional force deployment, drug running and human rights — as well as North Korea’s concerns about security and economic development. And we must clearly signal our willingness to embark upon this path.” (John F. Kerry, “Next Step on Korea,” Washington Post, August 6, 2003, p. A-17)
8/7/03:
Chief cabinet secy Fukuda hints at bilateral on abductions on sideline of six-party talks. (Kyodo, “Fukuda Hints at Japan-N. Korea Talks on Abduction Issue,” August 7, 2003)
8/8/03:
Powell: “In trying to understand the concerns of the North Koreans, what we have said is there should be ways to capture assurances to the North Koreans from not only the United States, but we believe from other parties in the region, that there is no hostile intent among the parties that might be participating in such a discussion. I think what I have said … is, when one comes up with such a document, of such a written assurance, there are ways that Congress can take note of it without it being a treaty or some kind of pact. A resolution is something like that — taking note of something.” (Foreign Press Briefing, State Department transcript.)
North Korea tells some participants it agreed to hold talks August 27-29 in Beijing. (Kyodo, “N. Korea Agrees to 6-Way Talks Aug. 27-29 in Beijing,” August 12, 2003)
Powell names Shamil Baseyev, mastermind of Moscow theater seizure, an international terrorist. Action came soon after Russian mediation for six-party talks, suggesting a deal. Around the time of secret U.S.-Russia talks, newspaper said Russian Far East could be endangered by nuclear pollution from North Korea and raised possibility of preemptive strike by Moscow and television began saying the changing course of Tumangang River on border with North could erode Russian territory. (Fuse Hiroyuki, “U.S. Russia Deal Behind North Korean Talks,” Yomiuri Shimbun, August 20, 2003)
Acting on US intelligence, Taiwan detains North Korean vessel en route from Thailand, seizes chemicals used to make rocket fuel. (Robert Marquand, “Ship’s Seizure Sends Warning to N. Korea,” Christian Science Monitor, August 12, 2003)
ROK navy fires warning shots turning back three North Korean fishing boats south of NLL. (Reuters, “South Korea Repels North Boats with Warning Shots,” August 8, 2003)
8/13/03:
Economic benefits would only come after dismantling. “There’s no such thing as you-do-this and suddenly Ed McMahon shows up with a check for $10 billion.” Hard-liners at the Pentagon oppose step-by-step concessions favored by State Department officials. “The question is what actions do you take if they freeze their program, versus dismantling it,” said admin official. “There is not now a fully coordinated U.S. position on that. There are some principles, but we have to decide the whole issue of sequencing.” One point under discussion is exactly what concessions might be offered if North Korea were to disclose the exact number of its nuclear weapons and details of its plutonium program. “There are a lot of concerns being addressed,” said an Asian diplomat. “The question is how they will be packaged, and in what sequence. The United States clearly wants its concerns addressed at an early stage, while the North Koreans want their concerns addressed at an early stage.” (Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Weighs Reward If North Korea Scraps Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, August 13, 2003, p. A-3) David Straub tried to insert reference to the bold approach in the intial draft but a Bolton aide said, it tried to fold in all the other issues — in terms of sequencing, who moved first, whether or not Korea had a right to a civil nuclear program, you know, the whole panoply of issues. And we just laughed.” Robert Joseph drafted his own instructions for Kelly. “I think that there were a number of people [who] really thought that they could conduct bilateral negotiations … and I thought that was a mistake. So it was my view that it was better that I wrote the talking points than EAP staffers.” Kelly was forbidden to meet with the North Koreans. Stephen Yates of OSD recalled, “There was always in the instructions that he was to avoid any bilateral meetings.” Kelly’s instructions were so strict, says an aide to Bolton, “You could have had a trained chimpanzee who spoke English do it.” (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 182)
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The U.S. is making an unreasonable unilateral assertion that the DPRK must dismantle its nuclear deterrent force before dialogue if it wants to get more aid from the international community, talking about the “written security assurances”, the idea set out by Congress, or “collective security assurances” to be given by the U.S. together with countries around Korea, instead of responding to the proposal to conclude a non-aggression treaty with the DPRK.
There is also a rumor that Washington intends to form an inspection team involving five countries expected to attend the six-party talks and carry out an “earlier inspection” of the DPRK so as to verify Pyongyang’s will to scrap its nuclear program before dialogue.
If this is the true U.S. approach towards the talks, one may come to the conclusion that at the coming talks the U.S. will seek a sinister aim of forcing the DPRK to scrap its “nuclear program” in a bid to completely disarm it in return for giving it “security assurances” with a paper without any binding force. This approach suggests that it would be hard to expect any substantial results from the talks.
Clear is the stand of the DPRK on the talks.
Firstly, it wants to confirm the U.S. willingness to make a switchover in its Korea policy. …It will be considered that the U.S. has practically given up its hostile policy toward the DPRK when a non-aggression treaty with legal binding is concluded and diplomatic relations are established between the DPRK and the U.S. and it is made clear that the U.S. does not obstruct economic cooperation between the DPRK and other countries. … Secondly, the DPRK does not demand of the U.S. a “guarantee for security or for system” as a present, but wants to conclude a non-aggression treaty that would strictly and legally guarantee that neither of the two sides attacks the other. The DPRK does not ask anyone to provide a guarantee for the security of its system. Its system is the socialist system of Korean style chosen by its people. It is not a matter that needs a guarantee by a third party. It is an insult to the DPRK to talk about “security” of its system guaranteed by a third party. Its system is guaranteed and safeguarded by its people themselves. …A solution of the problem can be sincerely discussed only by the method of “give-and-take” talks.
Thirdly, an “earlier inspection” is impossible and unthinkable before the U.S. abandons its hostile policy against the DPRK. The call for an “earlier inspection” of the nuclear facilities of the DPRK is an outrageous interference in the DPRK’s internal affairs and infringement upon its sovereignty.
By abusing the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.S. has so far used verification by inspection as a lever for stifling our system and is still trying to completely disarm the DPRK under the pretext of verification.” (KCNA, “DPRK’s Stand on Six-Party Talks Clarified,” August 13, 2003)
8/?/03:
PRC-owned newspaper in Hong Kong, Wen Wei Po, questions whether the alliance under the DPRK-China 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance still serves China’s interests. (Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation of WMD and Missiles, Congressional Research Service Report, November 15, 2006, p. 22)
8/14/03:
TCOG in Washington: Kelly, Lee Soo-hyuck, Yabunaka Mitoshi attempt to coordinate strategy in advance of six-party talks. (James L. Schoff, Tools for Trilateralism (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), p. A10) U.S. officials tell others they will make “contact” with DPRK reps but not hold a bilateral meeting. (Asahi Shimbun, “U.S. Open to N. Korea One-on-One,” August 16, 2003)
Seizure of missile technology on North Korean freighter Kuwolsan bound for Libya. “In the past we had seen missiles or engine parts, but here was an entire assembly line for missiles offered for sale,” said an Indian official — nose cone tips, sheet metal for rocket frames, machine tools, guidance systems, reams of engineers’ blueprints labeled SCUD B and SCUD C, calibrating equipment, instrumentation for testing. “The C.I.A. went to town on those blueprints,” says Greg Thielmann, ex-director of INR office on strategic, proliferation and military issues. “They used them to make full mock-ups of missiles, complete with decals.” (Joby Warrick, “On North Korean Freighter, a Hidden Missile Factory,” Washington Post, August 14, 2003, p. A-1)
8/15/03:
FM Yoon on ROK three-step plan: first, a nuclear and missile freeze; second, revive Agreed Framework on plutonium program; third, scrap nuclear programs, including enrichment. “If North Korea agrees to freeze the situation, the U.S. could declare it has no intention of attacking North Korea and will not push for a regime change.” (Seo Soo-min, “Seoul Upbeat about N.K. Nuke Talks,” Korea Times, August 15, 2003)
Roh speech on self-reliance: “[I]t is not right to leave our national security to the U.S. troops in Korea for an indefinite time. Since the Korean War, the military has steadily grown and has substantial power to defend the country. Nevertheless, the military is still not completely equipped with its own independent capability and authority to implement combat operations. Meanwhile, the U.S. security strategy has been undergoing changes. It is unbecoming for us to allow our defense policy to unravel and national opinion to go into a tailspin every time the strategy of the United States changes. Things will not work out simply by crying out against the withdrawal of the American troops. Now it is time for us to accept the changes in reality. During my remaining term in office, I intend to help lay a firm foundation for our armed forces to be fully equipped with self-reliant national defense capabilities within the next 10 years. To this end, the armed forces will solidify the capacity for intelligence and operation planning as well as readjust armaments and the whole national defense system. We will have to accommodate the rearrangement of the U.S. Forces in Korea on the premise that their substantive combat capabilities will not be weakened. Relocation of the U.S. Yongsan base will be made at the earliest possible date. The proposed redeployment of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division and readjustment of overall matters should be made in light of the North Korean nuclear program and other security situations surrounding the Korean Peninsula. I will closely consult with President George W. Bush about the appropriate timing of any action.”
“The North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved as early as possible. It has to be settled peacefully at all costs. …When the North gives up its nuclear program, the Republic is willing to take the lead in helping develop its economy. We will collaborate with our neighbors in an endeavor to induce the cooperation of international organizations as well as international capital for the North. By doing so, we will see the age of Northeast Asia open in earnest, and the North will be able to progress rapidly and share the benefit of peace and prosperity.” (Address by Roh Moo-hyun on the 58th Anniversary of National Liberation, August 15, 2003, text in Chosun Ilbo, “Roh Speech Stresses Self-Reliance”)
8/?/03:
In unclassified response to written question, CIA tells Senate Select Cmte on Intelligence North Korea validated its nuclear weapons design without a nuclear test and has Taepodong 2s ready to test. (John J. Lumpkin, Associated Press, “N. Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Described,” Washington Post, November 9, 2003, p. A-10) On July 1 Times reported U.S. satellites had been eyeing test site in Yongdoktong and CIA had told allies the North was working on compact warhead design. (David E. Sanger, “North Korea’s Bomb: Untested but Ready, C.I.A. Concludes,” New York Times, November 10, 2003, p. 4)
8/17/03:
DPRK to send observers at Russian maritime exercise involving ROK (Lee Young-jong, “North to Send Observers to a Multinational Military Drill,” August 8, 2003) North Korea denounces exercise. (Reuters, “North Korea Denounces Russian Naval Exercises,” August 20, 2003)
8/18/03:
Admin officials say naval exercise in Coral Sea in September intended as sharp signal to North Korea. U.S. and Australia to participate in first PSI action, “nonpermissive boarding,” but Japan will send ship if formally characterized as “police exercise,” not military exercise. The exercise “has not surfaced as much of a factor” in negotiations, an admin off said. “If laws are broken or our national security is threatened, then everybody should recognize that we need to take that seriously. We are taking those steps to protect our own societies.” A separate program, the DPRK Illicit Activities Initiative, is a quiet crackdown by many nations against counterfeiting, narcotics trade, money laundering, for example, Australian seizure of heroin shipment in April off Brisbane. (Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. to Send Signal to North Koreans in Naval Exercise,” New York Times, August 18, 2003, p. A-1)
North lashes out at PSI, says it “cannot dismantle its nuclear deterrent force at the talks” unless “it becomes clear that the U.S. does not hinder the economic cooperation” between it and other countries. (James Brooke, “North Korea Lashes Out at Neighbors, U.S.,” New York Times, August 19, 2003, p. A-10)
North cancels participation in international student athletic event in Daegu, citing the burning of its flag at anti-Kim Jong-il rallies in South last week. Roh apologizes for incident. (Jeong Yong-soo, “North Boycotts Daegu Games, Blames Seoul for Burning of Its Flag at Rally,” JoongAng Ilbo, August 19, 2003) North sends 500 athletes and cheerleaders to games. (James Brooke, “North Korea’s New Offensive Charms South,” New York Times, August 24, 2003, p. 14)
CIA: “We assess that the North expelled IAEA inspectors and withdrew from the NPT in order to seize the diplomatic initiative, in part by escalating tensions, and the October 2002 confrontation over its uranium enrichment program to Pyongyang’s advantage.”
“We assess that North Korea has produced one or two simple fission-type nuclear weapons and has validated the designs without conducting yield-producing nuclear tests.” (Stanley Moscowitz, Director of Congressional Affairs, to Roberts, chmn of Senate Select Cmte on Intel, CIA responses to questions for the record of February 11, 2003) A CIA statement of August 18, 2003 estimated that “North Korea has produced one or two simple fission-type nuclear weapons and has validated the designs without conducting yield-producing nuclear tests.” (Larry Niksch, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, CRS Issue Brief, January 17, 2006, p. 11)
?/?/03:
Zarate: “Investigators scrutinized Golden Star Bank in Vienna, Austria, and determined that it had been not only the primary financial center for North Korean business in Europe but the front for a variety of covert and fraudulent businesses that generated foreign fuinds for the regime. In 2003, the Austrian authoritiesd quietly shut the bank and disallowed its opoerations.” (Juan Zarate, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2013) p. 233)
8/19/03:
Navy plans to test new method of hunting hostile subs off Japan’s coast to include search for North Korean subs. (Emma Schwartz and Tom Squitieri, “Sub Hunt Risks Stirring Up China, North Korea,” USA Today, August 19, 2003, p. 4)
Sources close to the independent counsel say North asked South to pay $500 million for its acceptance of summit. South agreed to pay $100 million and North asked Hyundai to guarantee the payment. Park Jie-won initiated cover-up asked Kim Bo-hyun deputy dir of NIS in late April to remain silent about summit deal. Lim Dong-won and Lee Ki-ho former senior presidential economic aide then also agreed. (Kim Kyung-ho, “’Suspects Conspired to Conceal N.K. Payoff,” Korea Herald, August 18. 2003)
8/21-9/2/03:
Jannuzi-Luse in North Korea reports, “DPRK officials told the staff delegation that they believe the true aim of the United States is ‘regime change,’ and that de-nuclearization is just the first step toward that objective. Under pressure from China, the DPRK probably will come to another round of multilateral talks. However, China’s encouragement for DPRK’s participation will be contingent on the United States outlining specific steps it will take once the DPRK pledges to dismantle/eliminate its nuclear program. … DPRK officials were critical of the fact that they had only 40 minutes of ‘direct’ dialogue with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly over the course of three days of talks in Beijing, and said they had been misled into believing the multilateral talks would provide a venue for substantive one-one-one discussions with the U.S. envoy. In one particularly blunt exchange, DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan told the staff delegation that the Beijing talks had ‘confirmed’ the North’s assessment that the United States has no intention of changing its ‘hostile policy.’ Kim said the DPRK ‘had no choice but to maintain and reinforce its nuclear deterrent.’ … After extensive discussion with the delegation, Vice Minister Kim Gye-gwan advised the DPRK would allow NGO access to some prison camps on a ‘case by case’ basis. … The staff delegation met with the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC) director Jong Yun-hyong, who oversees agricultural reconstruction as well as foreign food aid programs. … Yun specifically cited the recent U.N. nutritional survey, and reported that “security officials” had initially objected to the survey, but that FDRC officials had prevailed in an inter-agency battle in order to permit the survey to be conducted. Yun argued that recent significant reductions in WFP food aid — just 300,000 metric tons in 2002, down from 811,000 tons in 2001–had made it more difficult for him to push for greater numbers of monitors and greater access for international observers. Nonetheless, Yun promised progress on monitoring in the future, and invited the international community to shift its humanitarian aid strategy away from food donations and toward ‘sustainable development,’ including agricultural reforms, new seek varieties and planting techniques, and ‘food for work.’… WFP has sustained its access to 162 of 206 total counties in North Korea. WFP does not deliver food aid to those counties that remain off limits, most of which are concentrated along the sparsely populated mountainous “spine” of the country and along the DMZ. … Staff Conclusions: So as to reduce what we believe is a significant risk of conflict arising out of miscalculation or mis-communication, the United States should greatly expand dialogue with North Korea, both within the framework of multi-party talks, as well as through informal or ‘Track II’ bilateral negotiations. The United States should appoint a senior official to represent the United States solely on issues related to the Korean Peninsula. Alternatively, the Administration should endow the current negotiator, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, with greater authority to direct and coordinate the President’s North Korea policy and gain access to more senior North Korean officials. The United States should acknowledge recent improvements in WFP operations and continue food aid to the DPRK under UN auspices. The United States should also consider funneling a portion of future U.S. food aid through non-governmental organizations, some of which have been able to achieve strong monitoring capability for their humanitarian relief.” (Congressional Record, October 31, 2003, pp. S-13716-18)
8/22/03:
Pritchard resigns
PSI, says Liu Jieyi, director of FoMin’s arms control and disarmament department, “could make a bad situation worse.” “In China, we have a saying: You should not shoot a mosquito with a cannon. The collateral damage could be worse and you may miss the mosquito.” (John Pomfret, “China Wary of Weapons Searches,” Washington Post, August 23, 2003, p. A-19)
8/23/03:
Yabunaka Mitoji, dir-gen of MOFA Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, asks Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly “to make sure the United States does not again [as in 1994] promise not use its nuclear weapons against North Korea if Pyongyang agrees to dismantle its nuclear development program.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Govt. Wants U.S. to Keep North Korea N.-Deterrent,” August 23, 2009, quoted in Takubo Masa, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons: Japan, the U.S. and ‘Sole Purpose,’” Arms Control Today, November 2009, p.16)
8/24/03:
U.S. proposal: Any economic and diplomatic opening must be preceded by a verifiable commitment to dismantle and far more stringent verification, says senior State Dept off. Actions to relinquish its nuclear weapons program, “could open the door to a new relationship.” (Peter Slevin, “U.S. to Urge N. Korea Nuclear Disarmament Commitment,” Washington Post, August 24, 2003, p. A-24)
8/25/03:
Japan will inspect North Korean ship as part of U.S.-initiated blocking of illicit activities. Niigata is on high alert for fear of right-wing demonstrations. “I’m afraid we could give North Korea an unnecessary excuse [to create a scene] during the talks,” an official close to Koizumi said. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Govt to Insist on Right to Check N. Korean Ships,” August 25, 2003) Mangyongbong-92 left Niigata after nine-hour delay for safety inspection. (Asahi Shimbun, “Mangyongbong-92 Departs,” August 27, 2003)
Senate Republican Policy Cmte: “The US should carry forward this resolute stance and forcefully call on its allies and the international community to collectively reiterate to Pyongyang that its pursuit of nuclear weapons will no longer be tolerated. It should note that all options remain on the table and that the use of force against Iraq is evidence of this administration’s steadfastness in dealing with threats to its security. To give additional substance to this statement, the Bush administration should declare that if North Korea does not agree to rejoin the NPT and comply with its obligations — including allowing IAEA inspectors to return to North Korea with unfettered access to all known suspected nuclear sites — the United States and its allies will impose enhanced multilateral economic sanctions against Pyongyang and require full; transparency in any humanitarian aid.”
8/26/03:
Japan will offer energy assistance in two stages, first, heavy fuel oil contingent on positive steps to resolve the nuclear and abduction issues, and second, full-scale energy aid (thermal plants) only after resolution of abductions and normalization. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Govt to Tie Aid to N. Korean Stance on Issues,” August 26, 2003)
Russia conducting exercises in Far East to prepare for any refugee crisis if North Korea collapses and intercepting shipment of nuclear material by North. (Peter Baker, “Russia Turns from Old Allies to U.S.,” Washington Post, August 27, 2003, p. A-19)
8/27-29/03:
First round of six-party talks. DPRK’s Kim Yong-il says “The denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is the ultimate goal of the DPRK. It is not our goal to have nuclear weapons.” Adds, “We can dismantle our nuclear program if the U.S. makes a switchover in its hostile policy towards us and does not pose any threat to us.” Says, “For a package solution, the U.S. should conclude a non-aggression treaty with the DPRK, establish diplomatic relations with it and guarantee the economic cooperation between the DPRK and Japan and between the north and the south of Korea. And it should also compensate for the loss of electricity caused by the delayed provision of light water reactors and complete their construction. For this, the DPRK should not make nuclear weapons and allow the nuclear inspection, finally dismantle its nuclear facility, put on ice the missile test fire and stop its export.” Offers four-step proposal: “According to the order of simultaneous actions, the U.S. should resume the supply of heavy fuel oil, sharply increase the humanitarian food aid while the DPRK should declare its will to scrap its nuclear program. According to this order, we will allow the refreeze of our nuclear facility and nuclear substance and monitoring and inspection of them from the time the U.S. has concluded a non-aggression treaty with the DPRK and compensated for the loss of electricity. We will settle the missile issue when diplomatic relations are opened between the DPRK and the U.S. and between the DPRK and Japan. And we will dismantle our nuclear facility from the time the LWRs are completed.” Wang Yi: North’s security concerns must be resolved as North denuclearizes. Yabunaka Mitoji: “Along with the issue of nuclear development, it is important that the issues of North Korea’s missile development and abductions of Japanese also be resolved.” Adds, “If North Korea takes specific steps to scrap its nuclear program, we can start discussing about extending assistance in the energy field at an appropriate time,” meaning resumption of heavy fuel oil. (Karasaki Taro, “Japan States Its Case on N. Korea Nukes,” Asahi Shimbun, August 28, 2003) “The North Korea-U.S. contact came about naturally, lasting for thirty minutes, and was held within our sight as we were all in the same room for the talks,” Wi Sung-lac tells press. “We proposed a set of parallel, step-by-step reciprocal measures to defuse the crisis leading to normalization of ties.” (Seo Soo-min, “US Insists Pyongyang Drop Nuclear Program,” Korea Times, August 27, 2003) Kelly floated idea of issuing a joint statement with vague reassurances that the North would not be attacked, but Washington balked at the language suggested by China. Wang Yi, China’s representative, put the best face on the lack of a joint communiqué, telling an August 29 press conference that the talks “helped make a very important step forward toward a final peaceful settlement of the issue.” Participants, he added, now “share a consensus” on six points: the goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, “peaceful settlement” of the nuclear issue through diplomatic dialogue, continuation of six-party talks, proceeding by “synchronous or parallel implementation,” the need to take North Korea’s “reasonable concern” about security into consideration, and the need to avoid actions that would escalate the tension. (Takeshi Sato, “Six Nations to Continue Dialogue Amid North’s Threats,” Kyodo, August 29, 2003. “Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo favored the term ‘parallel,’ but Pyongyang, Beijing, and Moscow insisted on ‘synchronized,’” according to FM Yoon Young-kwan of South Korea. Seo Hyun-jin, “North Unlikely to Boycott Talks,” Korea Herald, September 1, 2003. ) Kim denied U.S. allegations that the North had admitted developing nuclear weapons based on enriched uranium. (AFP, “North Korea Rejects U.S. Charges on Enriched Uranium,” August 28, 2003) Assistant Secretary Kelly repeated the mantra CVID — “completely verifiably and irreversibly dismantle” — and only hinted at U.S. flexibility without spelling out what it would do. According to one U.S. official, no longer would the North Koreans “have to do everything before they would hear anything.” The hint was so cryptic that the North Koreans did not catch it at first, nor did others. Kelly refused to elaborate in a half-hour conversation with his North Korean counterpart just after the plenary session. “Read my statement carefully,” he said abruptly. “Have Kim Jong-il read my statement.” Kim responded testily, warning that if the United States was unwilling to negotiate, North Korea would have “no choice but to declare its possession of nuclear weapons” and “demonstrate” its deterrent. The exchange was first disclosed by hard-line officials in Washington with access to the reporting cable. (Peter Slevin and John Pomfret, “N. Korea Threatens Nuclear Arms Test,” Washington Post, August 29, 2003, p. A-1) In that chat, Pritchard recalls, Kelly was under instruction to begin by saying, “This is not a negotiating session. This is not an official meeting.” (Fred Kaplan, “Rolling Blunder,” Washington Monthly, (May 2004), p. 9) One official said there would “still be no benefits till after” dismantlement but another said the “suggestion was that the movement could be parallel.”(Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Moderates Position on Incentives for North Korea,” Washington Post, September 5, 2003, p. A-18) Lee Soo-hyuck, South Korea’s representative, tried to be diplomatic about the encounter: the issue “wasn’t dealt with in a sensitive manner.” (Seo Soo-min, “U.S., N.K. Agree to Avoid Confrontation,” Korea Times, August 29, 2003) In two 20-minute bilaterals on the margin of the talks, Japan’s Yabunaka urged Kim Yong-il to have the family members sent to Japan soon while Kim says Japan broke its promise by not returning the five abductees. (Kyodo, “Japan, N. Korea Discuss Abductions; No Progress Made,” August 28, 2003) Japan’s representative Yabunaka Mitoji characterized the round as “very substantial and beneficial for finding ways to resolve the nuclear standoff.” He found North Korea’s acceptance of bilateral talks on the abduction issue especially soothing, “Tonight I intend to sleep well.” Izumi Hajime, director of the Center for Kean Studies at University of Shizuoka said, “Pyongyang is genuinely interested in making progress on the abductee issue.” (Karasaki Taro, “It Wasn’t Easy, But Talks on Abductions Are Alive Again,” Asahi Shimbun, August 30, 2003) South Korea’s deputy chief representative Wi Sung-lac positive on outcome. “From what the North Koreans said during the meeting, we could read that North Korea is willing to resolve the issue through dialogue.” (Seo Soo-min, “U.S., N.K. Agree to Avoid Confrontation,” Korea Times, August 29, 2003) China’s Wang Yi was blunt: “America’s policy toward the D.P.R.K.—this is the main obstacle we are facing.” (Joseph Kahn, “Chinese Aide Says U.S. Is Obstacle in Korean Talks,” New York Times, September 2, 2003, p. A-3) In a Foreign Ministry briefing, China’s spokesman Kong Quan elaborated, “How the U.S. is threatening the D.P.R.K.—this needs to be discussed in the next round of talks.” (Joseph Kahn, “U.S. Stand Could Stall Korea Talks, Chinese Say,” New York Times, September 3, 2003, p. A-8) Vice FM Wang Yi pushed hard for a joint statement. That was under consideration at a working-level meeting when Li Gun came in with instructions from Pyiongyang. According to a Japanese diplomat who was in the room, “Li Gun shook his head and said, ‘We can’t agree to anything.’” (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 187)
8/28/03:
North-South agreed to have direct trade. North agrees to construction on two rail lines, to begin constructing Kaesong industrial complex. (Sim Sung-tae, “Two Koreas Agree to Foster Direct Trade,” Korea Herald, August 29, 2003)
8/29/03:
Defense Ministry asks Diet for $1 billion a year through 2007 for missile defense, $1.2 billion next year nearly ten times what it spent over last five. (James Brooke, “Japan Seeks Shield for North Korean Missiles,” New York Times, August 30, 2003, A-3)
8/30/03:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “At the bilateral contact made between the DPRK and the U.S. on the sidelines of the six-way talks the U.S. flatly denied a package solution and the order of simultaneous actions proposed by the DPRK to attain its goal of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, but made such assertions that a full range of other issues of concerns including missiles, conventional weapons and human rights should be discussed for the normalization of relationship between the DPRK and the U.S. only after its “nuclear program” is scrapped. This means the U.S. asking the DPRK drop its gun first, saying it would not open fire, when both sides are leveling guns at each other. How can the DPRK trust the U.S. and drop its gun?” Adds, “This made it impossible for the DPRK to have any interest or expectation for the talks as they are not beneficial to it. The talks only reinforced our confidence that there is no other option for us but to further increase the nuclear deterrent force as a self-defensive measure to protect our sovereignty.”
9/1/03:
Japan may resume normalization talks if North allows five abductees’ kin to come to Japan, says Yabunaka Mitoji. (Mizumoto Natsumi and Sato Takeshi, “Japan to Mull Normalization Talks If North Allows Reunions,” Kyodo, September 1, 2003)
The DPRK is poised to begin production of UF6 at Yongbyon for a gas centrifuge enrichment project, Western officials said last week. Since last fall, when the U.S. government announced that the DPRK had secretly launched a program to enrich uranium with centrifuges, U.S. officials have warned that the DPRK may be able to produce weapons-grade high-enriched uranium (HEU) as early as mid-decade (NF, 24 Oct.’02, 1). Recently, however, experts qualified that the DPRK would have to overcome serious obstacles before it could do that. Based on Western government intelligence information, officials said, it is believed that the DPRK aims to produce several thousand G-2 type centrifuges using maraging steel, not aluminum, for rotor tubes. Obtaining and processing the rotor tube material, and manufacturing other critical centrifuge components, are by far the biggest challenges faced by North Korea in trying to enrich uranium. Another hurdle North Korea must overcome is production of large amounts of UF6 feedstock. But the DPRK could soon begin production of UF6 on a sufficient scale, experts and officials said. ”North Korea could probably start making hex fairly quickly,” said Gary Samore, director of studies at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London. Customs intelligence data would suggest that the DPRK aims to build a centrifuge plant with a capacity of about 17,500 SWU/yr. That would require a feedstock of about 13 metric tons per year of uranium as UF6. (Mark Hibbs, DPRK Poised to Embark upon UF6 Production at Yongbyon,Nuclear Fuel Vol. 28, No. 18 (September 1, 2003), p. 3)
Philip Gourevich, “Armies of the North,” New Yorker, cannibalism, brutality, etc.
David Albright paper on cooperative dismantlement
9/3-4/03:
Third meeting of PSI Core Group in Paris agrees on “Statement of Interdiction Principles,” but Germany and France wanted to consult with Russia and China before making it public. “We had already been doing that, as had the Brits, but one reason Russia and China were not in the Core Group to begin with was that we wanted to get something going that was not wishy-washy or watered down, and then bring others on board. We wanted ‘an activity, not an organization,’ as one off the Brits properly characterized PSI, meaning that gaining adherence to our statement was less important as a first step than a strong statement, which we had now achieved.” (Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option, pp. 125-26)
9/4/03:
ROK FM Yoon sees Bush, Powell. At briefing for reporters later, “I told Secretary Powell that it would be helpful if the United States comes out with more clear, detailed proposals,” Yoon said. Both sides shared the view that we should move in that direction.” (Shin Yong-bae, “’U.S. to Present Detailed Offer at Next Talks,’” Korea Herald, September 6, 2003) “I was instructed to talk tough,” Yoon recalled. Unless the U.S. took a more flexible attitude on North Korea, Yoon told Powell, the dispatch of ROK troops to Iraq would be indoubt. That angered Powell, “That is not how allies deal with each other.” (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 190)
Chinese official close to the six-party talks: “It depends on if the United States can have a more unified position and more specific proposals to induce North Korea back to the negotiating table.” US will have to modify CVID, he says. Rejecting the view that the North wants to possess nuclear weapons, he says North’s primary objective was to normalize relations with US. He said China has asked US to postpone or scale back naval exercises off Australia. (John Pomfret and Anthony Faiola, “U.S. Flexibility Sought on N. Korea,” Washington Post, September 4, 2003, p. A-16.) Chinese FoMin spokesman Kong Qian on PSI: “Many countries still question the efficiency and legitimacy of adopting this kind of measure.” (James Kyune and Andrew Ward, “Beijing Frustrated with US Policy on North Koreas, Financial Times, September 5, 2003)
U.S. officials say it softened position. One official said there would “still be no benefits till after” dismantlement but another said the “suggestion was that the movement could be parallel.” “The time has come for the United States to start laying down its cards,” said an Asian official who attended the talks. “You need to play the game.” (Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Moderates Position on Incentives for North Korea,” Washington Post, September 5, 2003, p. A-18) U.S. ready to phase in inducements only as North starts to dismantle, says senior State Department official. “We made clear we are not seeking to strangle North Korea” and the negotiators said “we are willing to discuss a sequence of denuclearization measures with corresponding measures on the part of both sides.” [They go first?] Rice, in telephone interview, disputes that Bush made significant change. “We’re going to give these talks a real chance,” she said. “This is the best opportunity for getting a resolution for a long time.” New negotiating strategy was presented to Bush at his ranch last month and approved the specific after a meeting with his senior national security aides in late August. Involvement of Rumsfeld’s aides was limited. “It helped that a lot of them were on vacation, or thinking about Iraq,” said one of the architects of the new approach. The North stuck to their script. “Sometimes their script seemed to be couched in assumptions about what we were going to say,” an American official said, “not what we did say.” (David E. Sanger, “U.S. Said to Shift Approach in Talks with North Korea,” New York Times, September 5, 2003, p. A-1)
UnifMin Jeong Se-hyun on threat to build up deterrent: “The conflicting message is a sort of pressure tactic outside the negotiating table ahead of further talks.” (AFP, “N Korea Nuclear Build-Up Threat a Tactic,” September 4, 2003)
Economic team in DPRK cabinet reshuffled, replacing prime minister with Pak Pong-ju, light industry specialist, two of three vice premiers, five ministers on state planning commission sacked.
Administration now says step-by-step process could yield interim benefits. “Everybody is realistic enough to know that you can’t have a negotiation where one side does everything before the other side does anything,” a senior official said. “I’ve never seen a negotiation like that.” (Steven R. Weisman, “Bush Foreign Policy and Harsh Reality,” New York Times, September 5, 2003, p. A-1)
9/5/03:
Jimmy Carter meets with Koizumi, goes to Beijing. “Unfortunately both sides have violated some of those agreements.” (James Brooke, “North Korea Standoff Poses ‘Greatest Threat,’ Carter Says,” New York Times, September 6, 2003, p. A-4)
Editorial: “It is sheer folly to go on refusing to enter into true negotiations.” (Boston Globe, “Reckoning with Pyongyang,” September 5, 2003)
9/6/03:
DepUndSecDef Richard Lawless asks ROK for more combat troops for Iraq (Seo Soo-min, “U.S. Wants Korea to Command Multinational Division in Iraq,” Korea Times, September 18, 2003)
9/7/03:
Yoon after visit to Washington tells press, “During my meeting with President George W. Bush, the U.S. side said it will be actively prepared to address Pyongyang’s security concerns, and I came to believe that it will bring a plan concerning the matter to the second-round nuclear talks.” (Seo Hyun-jin, ‘U.S. to Offer Security Plan to N.K.,” Korea Herald, September 9, 2003) SecSt Powell on “This Week with George Stephanopoulos” on ABC-TV: “We will have to make a judgment with our allies, over the next few weeks, before the next meeting, as to what kind of security assurance would be satisfactory to all of us to provide to the North Koreans so that they can feel comfortable in taking this step.” [abandoning nuclear programs]
9/8/03:
Jack Pritchard press briefing at Brookings: “The change that has to occur is putting in the component of a true bilateral engagement between the United States and North Korea. …Rather than the drive-by meetings that occur, where we roll down the window and we kind of wave to the North Koreans and then move on, we’ve got to have a full-time negotiator who can do the coordination with North Korea, do the coordination of our policies with our allies Japan and South Korea on a continuous basis, and touch base with the Chinese and the Russians …”
“What do we want?” chant North Korean cheerleaders at Universiade games, “Unification!” South Korean television is portraying North Korea in an increasingly positive light. (Anthony Faiola, “What Do They Want in South Korea? Unification!” Washington Post, September 8, 2003, p. A-1)
9/9/03:
“The DPRK will continue to increase its nuclear deterrent force as a means for just self-defense in order to defend the sovereignty of the country as the United States has not yet shown its will to drop its hostile policy toward the DPRK despite the DPRK’s good faith and magnanimity. Kim Yong Chun, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army, declared this in his speech at the parade and mammoth demonstration held here today to celebrate the 55th anniversary of the DPRK.” (KCNA, “DPRK to Steadily Increase Its Nuclear Deterrent Force,” September 9, 2003)
North Korea may display new Taepo-dong X during military parades on 55th anniversary of DPRK’s founding. Missile would have range to strike “most of the West coast,” says a U.S. official. (Bill Gertz, “North Korea to Display New Missiles,” Washington Times, Septmber 9, 2003) Another administration official estimated its range at 9,400 miles, which would enable it to strike almost all the U.S. (George Gedda, “Official Says North Korean Missile Could Target the U.S.,” Associated Press, September 11, 2003)
9/10/03:
One official in favor of negotiating said he did not believe the president knew what aides were doing in his name. When Bush states his views and they turn it into “guidance” for subordinates to implement, “it doesn’t come out anywhere near what a reasonable person would say is what the president meant.” A senior State Department official on bilateral only in six-party context: “The secretary got his marching orders from the president on this one.” Pritchard “says we have to have a bilateral or nothing ever happens. The secretary and the president say North Korea doesn’t make the rules.” (Sonni Efron, “Ex-Envoy Faults U.S. on N. Korea,” Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2003)
North Korea halts reprocessing? “Various sensors and imagery and other things we have don’t show any activity,” a U.S. official said. “There’s not much indication that anything is going on there at the moment.” They may have reprocessed or “of their own volition or through Chinese pressure, they’re signaling that they’re not pursuing the program as fast as they could to reassure the United States that they want to deal.” The CIA never concluded the facility was operating. “We never said it was operating.” No change in intentions: “I wouldn’t read too much into it,” he said. “They can start and stop fairly easily.” A Congressional source: “If the administration came up and told me now that Yongbyon is shut down, I wouldn’t necessarily believe it. The administration has a huge ulterior motive to try to say they’re making progress in North Korea.” (Paul Richter and Greg Miller, “Halt in Work Seen at N. Korea Nuclear Site,” Los Angeles Times, September 11, 2003)
9/11/03:
Explosive device found at home of Dep FM with envelope addressed to “Tanaka Hitoshi traitor.” Tokyo Gov Ishihara Shintaro speech in Nagoya: “A bomb was planted there. I think it was deserved.” Criticizing secretive way in which summit was arranged, Tanaka “is at North Korea’s beck and call.” (Japan Times, “Official Receives Bomb Threat,” September 11, 2003)
North developing new missile based on sub-launched SS-N-6, which suggests cooperation from Russian scientists, officials said, but others say it could be indigenous design. (John J. Lumpkin, “Official: N. Korea Developing New Missile,” Associated Press, September 12, 2003)
9/?/03:
Mitchell Reiss, dir of policy planning in DoS, and “circle of trust” — Michael Green of NSC, James Kelly, David Asher and David Straub, Evan Feigenbaum on policy planning, and Joseph DeTrani devise new policy “two plus two and a kicker”: shut down plutonium production at Yongbyon and pledge to halt nuclear activites in return for no-attack pledge with goal of nonnucleatr North Korea and normal relations and in the interim, opening a liaison office in Pyongyang. Powell did not accept the whole proposal but he did get Bush to offer a no-attack pledge. (Chinoy, Meltdown, pp. 191-92)
9/12/03:
Suzanne Scholte of Defense Forum Foundation has taken an organization once devoted to preserving U.S. military strength to exclusive promotion of regime change in North Korea. She does not argue that human rights in North Korea is a moral imperative but that a democratic North Korea is not a nuclear North Korea: “People think I’m crazy for calling for free elections in North Korea. Why should we not? What are our options? Do we want to keep living like we are now, with this threat?” (David Paul Kuhn, “Human Rights Said Key North Korea Issue,” Yomiuri Shimbun, September 12, 2003)
9/13-14/03:
First PSI exercise “a sharp signal to NK” says Ralph Cossa (KT 10/23/03)
9/14/03:
U.S. asks South Korea to send combat brigade to Iraq. ROK senior official: “Rather than expect an immediate return, we should pay attention to how the dispatch itself would contribute to our national interests, our profile in the international society as well as security and peace on the Korean peninsula.” (Seo Soo-min, “US Asks ROK to Send Light Infantry Division to Iraq,” Korea Times, September 15, 2003)
Presidential Determination 2003-37: “I hereby determine that it is vital to the national security interests of the United States to waive the restriction in that section and provide up to $3.72 million in funds made available … to KEDO for administrative expenses only.” (September 14, 2003)
UnifMin official: “The government will officially ask the [National] Assembly to sanction the financial support for the tour program, given the amicable environment surrounding North Korea’s nuclear issue.” (Korea Herald, “Seoul Seeks to Subsidize N.K. Tour,” September 15, 2003)
Japan govt sources say if North conducts nuclear test it will adopt step-by-step punitive measures: restrict exchanges of people and deny North crews landing permission at ports, work with U.S. to ban all remittances through Japanese financial institutions, take the lead in UN Security Council to get economic sanctions. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Step-by-Step Sanctions Eyed for N. Korea,” September 15, 2003)
9/?/03:
“In September 2003 the United States first told South Korea through defense channels that a significant troop withdrawal was iunevitable as part of the Global Defense Posture Review,” a Blue House official says. (Choi Hoon and Choi Jie-ho, “At U.S. Request, Troop Cut Plan Was Kept Secret,” Joong-Ang Ilbo, May 19, 2004)
9/?/03:
“The consensus among those who have studied the North Koreans closely is that they would never completely give up their nuclear weapons program. …The advocates of negotiation are essentially saying that they are willing to live with the possibility of a residual North Korean nuclear weapons capability, even though the government of every one of these countries has insisted that North Korean nuclear weapons can never be tolerated.” (Kongdon Oh Hassig, “Confronting North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions: US Policy Options and Regional Implications,” Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2003)
9/15/03:
China deploys troops along NK, take over border patrol duties. (Philip Pan, “China Deploys Troops on N. Korea Border,” Washington Post, September 16, 2003, p. A-13) It is seen as a warning by Chinafor North Korea not to raise tensions. (Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation of WMD and Missiles, Congressional Research Service Report, November 15, 2006, p. 22)
US undecided on 60,000 metric tonne food shipment after delivering 40,000. DOS spokesman Adam Ereli: “We remain concerned that North Korea has not allowed the World Food Program access to all vulnerable North Koreans, and that it has restricted the WFP’s ability to monitor the distribution of food aid.” (AFP, “US Warns on Food Shipment to North Korea,” September 15, 2003)
Presidential Determination 2003-38: “We are deeply concerned about heroin and methamphetamine linked to North Korea being trafficked to East Asian countries, and are increasingly convinced that state agencies and enterprises in the DPRK are involved in the narcotics trade. While we suspect opium poppy is cultivated in the DPRK, reliable information confirming the extent of opium production is currently lacking. … The April 2003 seizure of 125 kilograms of heroin smuggled to Australia aboard the North Korean-owned vessel ‘Pong Su’ is the latest and largest seizure of heroin pointing to North Korean complicity in the drug trade.” (Raphael Perl, “Drug Trafficking and North Korea: Issues for U.S. Policy,” CRS Report, p. 4)
9/?/03:
DPRK is believed to have cancelled visit by Wu Bangguo, number two in China, with KJI last month. Wu Bangguo, number two in China, to see KJI last month. (UnifMin, “Allies Discuss Step-by-Step Proposal to NK,” October 1, 2003)
9/16/03:
Choe Byung-yul, GNP chmn urges pressure by cutting food and fuel. (Sharon Behn, “S. Korean Calls for Cutting Food to North,” Washington Times, September 17, 2003)
9/17/03:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The bilateral relations finally greeted a turning phase of their improvement with the publication of the declaration as a momentum. But, regretfully, the review of the past one year indicates that the present bilateral relations are much worse than those before the declaration was published. Under the supervision of the government authorities steps are being taken in Japan to internationalize the nuclear issue and the issue of abduction and substantial sanctions are applied against the DPRK to strangle it economically. Rackets aimed to suppress the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, a dignified overseas compatriots organization of the DPRK, are becoming more undisguised. The Japanese authorities have taken one measure after another to increase their military capacity in a bid to launch overseas aggression under the pretext of the DPRK.” (KCNA, “Spokesman of DPRK FM on Implementation of DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration,” September 17, 2003)
Chief Cabinet Secy Fukuda insists kin of abductees to come to Japan: “Talks cannot be held between Japan and North Korea unless rightful actions are taken.” Kin hope Deputy Chief Cabinet Secy Abe will continue to oversee issue. (Takahara Kanako, “Pyongyang Given Ultimatum on Anniversary of Summit,” Japan Times, September 18, 2003)
9/19/03:
US deploys Shadow-200 unmanned surveillance planes. (AFP, “New US Unmanned Spy Planes Deployed Against North Korea,” September 23, 2003)
IAEA general conference unanimous resolution calls on North to “completely dismantle” its nuclear arms program and “accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards.” (George Jahn, “IAEA Urges North Korea to Abandon Nukes,” Associated Press, September 19, 2003)
9/21/03:
In surprise, Abe Shinzo made secgen of LDP to prepare for elections; Nukaga Fukushiro of Hashimoto faction policy affairs research council chmn. (Yoshida Reiji, “Koizumi Shakes up LDP Leadership,” September 21, 2003)
9/23/03:
Bush at UN calls for Security Council to “criminalize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,” enact strict export controls and secure sensitive material. (White House text)
9/24/03:
Senior MOFA official says North considering visit by abductees’ kin. (UPI, “North Korea Considers Japanese Proposals,” September 24, 2003)
9/25/03:
FMs of five in six-party talks meet at UN.
Pres Roh links troop dispatch to progress in talks: “Isn’t it difficult for the country to accept the dispatch of our troops abroad in such an uncertain situation as we don’t know how the six-party talks will go?” (Martin Nesirsky and Rhee So-eui, “S. Korea’s Roh Links Iraq Request to N. Korea Talks,” September 25, 2003)
9/?/03:
Paula DeSutter, who had worked for Sen. John Kyl (R-AZ) on the Senate Intelligence Committee and was now assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance under John Bolton, met with like-minded people in the intelligence community, OVP and NSC under Robert Joseph and produced a verification regime with the U.S., not the IAEA in charge “They had this concept of 10,000 inspectors linking hands along the DMZ and walking north,” says one official involved in the process. “It was completely unrealistic.” John Wolf, assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation under Bolton, said, “there was no way you could have had the kind of intrusive, no-notice verification in North Korea. The only way you could do it was through regime change.” “No sovereign government in the world has ever accepted this kind of intrusiveness,” said David Straub, DoS Korea desk director. “They were using this as a way to completely destroy any chance at negotiation.” (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 195)
9/26/03:
FM Yoon meets SecState Powell in New York. “Mr. Yoon practically told him that Seoul would link the nuclear issue with the troop dispatch,” says a senior ROK official. “We wanted to say that we would send more troops to Iraq, but that there should also be some progress in the nuclear talks. But the two matters were seen as firmly linked at the Yoon-Powell talks,” says a Blue House official. Other officials say that Yoon had faithfully followed the Blue House’s orders. “After listening to Mr. Yoon’s explanation, Mr. Powell became extremely angry. After Mr. Yoon left, he called in Mr. Kelly with an angry face.” Powell told Yoon, “That is not how allies deal with each other.” (JoongAng Ilbo, The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The Untold Story, pp. 34-36)
9/27/03:
FM Yoon in New York says US preparing proposal: “I think Washington is changing.” (Kim Ki-tae, “Foreign Minister Says US Preparing New Plan on NK Nuclear,” Korea Times, September 28, 2003)
Pres Putin after Camp David meeting with Bush: “Russia believes that ensuring nuclear nonproliferation regime should be accompanied by extending to North Korea guarantees in this sphere of security.” (Dana Milbank, “Putin Agrees in Spirit But Little Else,” Washington Post, September 28, 2003, p. A-1)
9/29/03:
Li Gun track 2 with NCAFP. Saiki Akitaka, dep dir-gen of MOFA Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau and Li Gun “met briefly but did not go into detailed discussions.” (Kyodo, “Ministry Admits Bilateral Contact Between Japan, N. Korea,” October 1, 2003) Li Gun talked with DAS State Donald Keyser during break on 2nd day. (Sakajiri Nobuyoshi, “Senior U.S., North Korean Officials Meet,” Asahi Shimbun, October 2, 2003)
FM Yoon press conf: “If presented with a comprehensive and satisfactory solution, North Korea will give up its nuclear ambitions and open itself up to economic aid.” (Samuel Len, “Seoul Works to Soften U.S. Stance on North,” International Herald Tribune, September 29, 2003)
9/28-29/03:
TCOG in Washington. Discuss first round, upcoming round of six-party, nonaggression pledge. (James L. Schoff, Tools for Trilateralism (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), p A10)Tense as US proposes ending KEDO. “The US cornered us,” says ROK official familiar with the talks. (JoongAng Ilbo, “The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The Untold Story,” p. 36) The United States is sincerely looking in top the issue of a security guarantee, Lee Soo-hyuck told reporters after the meeting. (UnifMin, “Allies Discuss Step-by-Step Proposal to NK,” October 1, 2003)
9/30/03:
DPRK FoMin: “We have lost any interest in or expectations for talks when it has been proved that the US has no will [for] peaceful coexistence but tries to use six-party talks to completely disarm us.” (Andrew Ward, “N. Korea Casts Doubt on prospect of Future Talks,” Financial Times, September 30, 2003)
10/1/03:
Roh on Armed Forces Day: “The most important factor in reviewing the issue of troop dispatch [to Iraq] will be whether we will have positive prospects and firm conviction on the peace and stability on the peninsula through the formation of a stable atmosphere for dialogue.” (UnifMin, “NK Talks Big Factor in Troops Dispatch: Roh,” October 2, 2003)
Amb Han Sung-joo says South should send troops to Iraq without “give-and-take” linkage. “Considering the positive impact the nation’s dispatch of army medics and engineers had last time on Korea-U.S. relations and the nation’s diplomatic standing, as well as its economic effects, an additional dispatch of troops this time will bring about several times as much [impact as then].” (Yonhap, “Han Calls for Troops Dispatch with No Strings Attached,” Korea Times, October 1, 2003)
10/2/03:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “As we have already declared, the DPRK resumed nuclear activities for a peaceful purpose, i.e., it fired up the 5 MW nuclear reactor in Yongbyon and is now stepping up the preparations for the construction of a graphite-moderated reactor. As part of it, the DPRK successfully finished the reprocessing of some 8,000 spent fuel rods. In the subsequent period, in order to cope with the situation created by the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK, it made a switchover in the use of plutonium churned out by reprocessing spent fuel rods in the direction increasing its nuclear deterrent force, while putting the operation of the nuclear facility on a normal track.” (KCNA, “DPRK to Continue Increasing Its Nuclear Deterrent Force,” October 2, 2003)
Vice FM Choe Su-hon at UN Mission says, “One thing we can tell you is that we are in possession of nuclear deterrence and we’re continuing to strengthen that deterrence.” (James Brooke, “North Korea Says It Is Using Plutonium to Make A-Bombs,” New York Times, October 2, 2003, p. A-10) “We have no intention of transferring any means of that nuclear deterrence to other countries.” SecState Powell: “I would say that this is the third time they have told us they just finished reprocessing rods. We have no evidence to confirm that.” (Anthony Faiola, “N. Korea Claims Nuclear Advance,” Washington Post, October 3, 2003, p. A-1) ROK official: “Technological advancements make it possible to produce one nuclear warhead with only some 5 kilograms instead of the 7 kilograms of plutonium previously needed.” (Seo Soo-min, “North Korea Ready to Extract More Plutonium,” Korea Times, October 3, 2003)
UnifMin Jeong Se-hyun in Washington: “The harder the U.S. pushes ahead with the Proliferation Security Initiative, the stronger the backlash it will face from the North.” (Kim Ki-tae, “Jeong Calls on US to Soften Stance on NK,” Korea Times, October 2, 2003)
Vice FM Choi Su-hon: North has “processed 8,000 fuel rods” and had “changed the purpose of these fuel rods,” New China News Agency reports. “We have no intention of transferring any means of that nuclear deterrence to other countries.” (Reuters, “North Korea Says Nuclear Fuel Rods Reprocessed,” New York Times, October 2, 2003, p. A-10)
North Korea tried to sell missile technology to Myanmar this year, says U.S. official. (Kyodo, “N. Korea Tried to Export Missiles Parts, Tech to Myanmar, October 2, 2003)
North retains Iraq’s $10 million down payment for missiles it never delivered. (John J. Lumpkin, “North Korea Holds onto $10M Payment, Associated Press, October 3, 2003)
10/6/03:
At China-Japan-South Korea summit at ASEAN+3 in Bali first-ever joint statement: “the three nations agreed to mobilize all possible political, diplomatic and administrative [not military] measures to prevent the spread of such weapons and their transportation tools.” (Shim Jae-yun, “3 Leaders Seek to End Nuke Crisis,” Korea Times, October 7, 2003)
DPRK FoMin spokesman “urged the Japanese government to face up to the trend of history and the times, halt at once its dastardly acts against the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon), apologize for all the damage done to all its institutions and Koreans and take a step to restore them to their original state. … The Japanese government’s suppression of Chongryon and Koreans in Japan is intolerable as it is a grave anti-DPRK hostile act, part of the political, military and economic sanctions and blockade imposed by Japan upon the DPRK in a bid to actively carry out the U.S. strategy for putting pressure on the DPRK.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK FM Demands Japan Halt Its Anti-Chongryon Campaign,” October 6, 2003)
10/7/03:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The DPRK would not allow Japan to participate in any form of negotiations for the settlement of the nuclear issue in the future. Referring to the fact that the Japanese authorities are persistently attempting to use the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. for their selfish purpose, he said: … The Japanese authorities’ much publicized ‘issue of abduction’ was already settled with the adoption of the DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration. There is neither ground nor base for them to link it to the nuclear issue.” (KCNA, “Japan Urged Not to Meddle in Any Negotiations to Solve Nuclear Issue,” October 7, 2003)
10/9-10/03:
Fourth plenary meeting of PSI participants (Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, UK, US) fail to complete work on model agreement on legal boarding of ships. (Wade Boese, “Interdiction Initiative Participants Agree on End, Differ on Means,” Arms Control Today, November 2003, p. 38)
10/10/03:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The Japanese authorities unilaterally broke the promise they made to the DPRK to return Japanese who went to Japan for home-visit and settle the issue of the repatriation of their families. … As if it were not enough with this, the Japanese authorities solicited for help, peddling the “abduction issue” here and there. Recently they referred it to the UN to kick up a row over it and are now talking about a “package solution”, deliberately linking it to the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. … The Japanese authorities have so far asserted that the solution to the “abduction issue” is a top priority related to the lives and security of the Japanese. There is no reason for them to refuse to accept the DPRK’s demand if this is true.” (KCNA, DPRK Foreign Ministry Blasts Japan’s Anti-DPRK Campaign,” October 10, 2003)
Roh bombshell: he’ll seek vote of confidence over allegations aide accepted billion won from SK Group after election. (Shim Jae-yun, “Roh Puts Public Support to Test,” Korea Times, October 10, 2003)
Powell looks into written security assurance. “My folks have come up with models that span 80 years.” North Korea fears U.S.: “They think we are still an enemy and we’re after them, and we won’t be satisfied until the regime is gone.” (George Gedda, “Powell Weighs Agreement with N. Korea,” Associated Press, October 10, 2003) “It would be something that would be public, something that would be written, something that I hope would be multilateral.” (AFP, “US Seeks Partners for Multilateral Security Pact with North Korea: Powell,” October 10, 2003)
Pritchard op-ed: “I am struck by what Kim Jong-il, North Korea’s leader, said to Madeleine Albright, former U.S. secretary of state, in October 2000. He told her that in the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader, was able to conclude that China faced no external security threat and could accordingly refocus its resources on economic development. With appropriate security assurances, Mr. Kim said, he would be able to convince his military that the United States was no longer a threat and then be in a similar position to refocus his countries resources.” (Charles Pritchard, “A Guarantee to Bring Kim into Line,” Financial Times, October 10, 2003)
10/?/03:
Mitchell Reiss, DoS director of policy planning, sends note to SecState Powell calling Bureau of Verification and Compliance approach a “nationwide proctological exam.” Powell authorizes him to come up with an alternative that emphasizes dismantling as an alternative to inspections. (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 196)
10/11/03:
Roh rejects resignation of cabinet, aides. (Reuters, “South Korean Government Quits Over Scandal, But Soon Returns,” New York Times, October 11, 2003, p. A-6)
10/12/03:
National security adviser Ra Jong-yil delivers letter to Bush from Roh, says an ROK official. “The letter said that Seoul, despite its difficult internal circumstances, was considering the US request for more troops for Iraq seriously. It also said the North’s nuclear issues must be resolved peacefully.” (JoongAng Ilbo, “The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The Untold Story,” p. 35)
Last week the White House announced NSA Rice given the responsibility of managing the effort to rebuild Iraq, or in the words of one official, Rice would “crack the whip, frankly.” A senior State Department official said, “If you want a one-word description of the NSC since January 21, 2001: dysfunctional.” [Instead of bring issues to the president for resolution and making sure they are implemented, she defines job as keeping hard choices and reclamas from the president.] (Glenn Kessler and Peter Slevin, “Rice Fails to Repair Rifts, Officials Say,” Washington Post, October 12, 2003, p. A-1)
10/14/03:
South decides to send North 100,000 tons of fertilizer worth $26.6 million. (Korea Times, “Seoul to Send NK More Fertilizer,” October 14, 2003)
Some Bush advisers say North may be telling the truth about reprocessing enough plutonium for 5-6 bombs. INR says North may be bluffing. The IAEA has told Asian governments that NK has probably produced enough plutonium for two bombs, say officials who took notes on the briefings. “When you add up the evidence, we have every reason to believe they’ve made two new weapons,” a senior Asian official said. In June evidence collected by US satellites and krypton sensors offered hints of additional reprocessing sites. But intelligence officials were unable to reproduce those findings, leaving what one senior official called “a lot of suspicions, but zippo evidence.” The facilities are thought to be in the mountains near China, perhaps in tunnels. “It’s the hardest intelligence target we have, said one senior American official, “much harder than Iraq.” “There are lots of ways for the North Koreans to scrub their facilities and reduce the amount of krypton that gets out,” said a former intelligence official with long experience with the technology. “So measuring the gas output is a crummy way of figuring out how much plutonium they have produced.” “Our knowledge of North Korea is so limited that you have to sympathize with the poor intelligence analysts who have to make sense of all this,” said Joel S. Wit. “The ramifications of a screw-up are pretty big: that you’ve missed a second facility, or that they have reprocessed and we haven’t picked it up. Either one of those is a pretty terrifying thought.” (David E. Sanger, “Intelligence Puzzle: North Korean Bombs,” New York Times, October 14, 2003, p. A-9)
10/15/03:
Chief cabinet secy Fukuda tells reporters, “We can impose economic sanctions right now if we want to, but how effective would they be if only Japan were to do so? We have to look at the whole picture.” “For the time being, we have the stance of going for dialogue,” he said. “At present, we are not thinking of economic sanctions.” (Kyodo, “Fukuda Rules Out Economic Sanctions on N. Korea for Now,” October 15, 2003)
10/16/03:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The Bush administration is now spreading the rumor that it is preparing a sort of ‘concession proposal’ to seek a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue. But its actual move is quite contrary to the discussion on any ‘concession’ or ‘peaceful solution.’ … If the U.S. delays a solution to the nuclear issue to attain something before the presidential election, there will be nothing bad for us. During that time the DPRK will have enough time to perfect and strengthen necessary means which has already been opened to the public. …What matters is that the Bush administration is persistently pursuing an aim to use talks for disarming the DPRK without any will to make a policy switchover. …It is entirely due to the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK that the nuclear issue surfaced between the DPRK and the U.S. and it has reached such worst phase. The United States, however, is working hard to create impression that the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is a matter related to the relations between the DPRK and its surrounding countries in a bid to sidestep it and gradually shirk its responsibility for it. …Recently some people of the international community argued whether the DPRK possesses a nuclear deterrent force or not in an attempt to sound out its inmost thought. The DPRK, however, does not care about this. When an appropriate time comes, the DPRK will take a measure to open [demonstrate] its nuclear deterrent to the public as a physical force and then there will be no need to have any more argument.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Recent U.S. Rumor over Nuclear Issue,” October 16, 2003) Roh Moo-hyun: “I think North Korea is blustering to earn a more favorable position in the negotiations. I do not think North Korea actually wants to possess nuclear weapons but rather it wants to secure guarantees for its regime and it wants to earn economic assistance from outside.” (Chaitanya Kalbag and Martin Nesirky, “S. Korea’s Roh Says North Threat Is Bluster,” Reuters, October 15, 2003)
10/14-17/03:
12th round of N-S ministerial talks in Pyongyang held. The two Koreas weren’t on the right “rhythm” at this point, said UnifMin Jeong Se-hyun. “There was no visible progress at the talks.” (Seo Soo-min, “S-N Talks End without Accord on Nukes,” Korea Times, October 17, 2003) “We have already revealed our principled position on the nuclear question to the world,” DPRK senior cabinet councilor Kim Ryong-song was quoted as telling the South. “I have nothing more to say on this, because the nuclear issue depends entirely on the U.S. attitude.” (Paul Eckert, “N. Korea Rebuffs South on Nuclear Row, Blames U.S.,” Reuters, October 15, 2003)
10/17/03:
Bush-Koizumi summit.
Japan maritime authorities prosecute captain of North Korean ferry over safety violation. (Japan Times, “North Korean Ferry in Hot Water,” September 17, 2003)
10/18/03:
ROK pledges more troops, $200 million to Iraq. (Anthony Faiola and Joohee Cho, “South Korea Pledges More Troops for Iraq,” Washington Post, October 18, 2003, p. A-19) Roh says he will dispatch 3,000 to Iraq. US requested more. (Sim Sung-tae, “Roh Limits Iraq Troops to 3,000,” Korea Herald, November 14, 2003) Defense, Foreign Ministry wanted to send 5,000 mostly combat troops, but NSC dep dir Lee Jong-seok wanted 3,000 mostly engineering and medic units. (Shim Jae-yun, “Progressives Prevail in Roh’s Administration,” Korea Times, November 14, 2003) Funds total $260 million from 2003 to 2007, according to November 15 SCM communiqué.
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The U.S. has increased its nuclear pressure upon the DPRK, escalating its row over its fiction of “enriched uranium program.” On November 14, 2002 it decided to stop even the supply of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK, thus nullifying the only article of the AF, which had been implemented. The DPRK declares that it has the legitimate right to receive from the U.S. compensation for the loss according to the internationally recognized laws and practice and, more importantly, in line with the provision which calls for taking measures in the event of noncompliance with the DPRK-U.S. agreement and Article 16 of the Agreement on the provision of LWRs and will take measures in this regard. Now it is as clear as noonday that the U.S. is set to seize the DPRK by force, through high-handed actions and by military means. It would be the biggest mistake for the U.S. to calculate that the DPRK would sit idle and disarm itself, taken in by Washington’s trick. When an appropriate time comes, the DPRK’s increased nuclear deterrent force will be proved in practice.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Its Nuclear Deterrent Force,” October 18, 2003)
US recently told Japan North has two more nuclear weapons, Sankei reports. (Korea Times, “NK Produces 2 More A-Bombs,” October 19, 2003)
10/19/03:
Bush offer of multilateral security assurances in writing, but not non-aggression pact after seeing Hu Jintao at APEC summit in Bangkok: “We will not have a treaty, if that’s what you’re asking. That’s off the table.” But short of a treaty, “Perhaps there are other ways we can look at, to say exactly what I’ve said publicly, on paper, with our partners’ consent.” Powell on “Fox News Sunday”: “We are willing to enter into some sort of agreement with them that will give them the assurances they’re looking for.” (Tom Raum, “Bush Rules Out Treaty with North Korea,” Associated Press, October 19, 2003) Bush still insists no bilateral assurances. “We’ve seen this movie,” one of his top advisers tells reporters. “There are a lot of people in the administration who think that the North is bound and determined to plow ahead with nukes, no matter what,” said a senior official in Washington who joined the Pentagon and the vice president’s office in opposing virtually any meaningful negotiation. But the official saw merit in proposing it if it failed: “We could demonstrate to the world that it’s time to take more decisive action, from cutting off their oil, to seizing their ships, to having unpleasant things happen to their suspected sites.” (David E. Sanger, “Bush Proposes North Korea Security Plan to China,” New York Times, October 20, 2003, p, A-1) A senior official noted, “Any moves on our part would be conditioned on verifiable progress on their part.” (Reuters, “Bush Says He’s Open to Security Assurances for North Korea,” October 19, 2003)
Lee Sung-ki, father of North’s nuclear program, got degree in chemical engineering in Kyoto Imperial University during Japanese occupation. Japan left uranium mining and milling equipment. Other scientists left Seoul when purged under Syngman Rhee. A.Q. Khan took 13 trips to North. (George Wehrfritz and Richard Wolffe, “How North Korea Got the Bomb,” Newsweek International, October 27, 2003)
North tests anti-ship missile in East Sea. (JoongAng Ilbo, “North Tests a missile, defense Ministry Says,” October 20, 2003)
10/20/03:
Bush, Roh summit statement: “President Bush explained how security assurances might be provided within the multilateral context, conditioned on North Korea’s progress in nuclear dismantlement.” (Korea Herald, “U.S., Korea Issue Security Statement after Talks, October 21, 2003)
“We are not going to go in, all guns blazing, say take it or leave it, this is it,” said NSA Rice. “This is going to take some time.” The North is not interested in multilateral assurances already have pacts with Russia and China. “Basically, they don’t give a damn about other people,” the U.S. official said. “What they want I s agreement with us.” (Mike Allen and Glenn Kessler, “Questions Linger on Plan for N. Korea,” Washington Post, October 21, 2003, p. A-19)
10/21/03:
KCNA: “Under the AF the U.S. was obliged to build two LWRs with a total capacity of two million kw by 2003 and supply 500, 000 tons of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK every year until their construction is completed. … The U.S. has not sincerely implemented its legal commitment to deliver heavy fuel oil in compensation for the loss of energy caused by the DPRK’s freeze of its graphite-moderated reactor and their related facilities according to Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the AF, the indictment notes, and goes on:
The U.S. has not properly financed the supply of heavy fuel oil. After suspending this supply for a long period, painting the supply as a sort of “benefit,” it sent a huge quantity of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK at a time, creating great confusion in its economy.
Finally, the United States decided to stop the supply of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK on November 14, 2002 and formally halted its supply through the KEDO from December of the year. The U.S. thus unilaterally abrogated the only article of the AF that had been implemented. … On December 19, 2000 Bush, when discussing the issue of taking over the presidential office from Clinton, insisted on scrapping the AF, asserting that it was better not to have any negotiated settlement with north Korea and the Geneva agreement failed to stop north Korea from developing nukes.
It is the U.S. commitment under the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework to lift economic sanctions against the DPRK. But the Bush administration regards them as a main leverage to isolate and stifle the DPRK.
In April this year Bush set out a security plan for preventing the proliferation of weapons, asserting that the international community is entitled to intercept vessels and aircraft suspected of proliferating weapons through the open sea and along international air routes. On this basis the U.S. proposed a security system for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction at the G-8 summit in June and this was elaborated at Madrid and Brisbane meetings in June and July.
There happened abnormal situation under which the approvals of regular aid projects for the DPRK have been delayed or shelved by some UN organizations under the manipulation of the U.S.
The present reality goes to prove that the U.S. threw away like a pair of old shoes the AF which called for the termination of the hostile relations between the DPRK and the U.S., the normalization of bilateral political and economic relations and their peaceful co-existence. … The U.S. has systematically increased the nuclear threat to the DPRK, among other things, by shipping into south Korea all types of nuclear weapons capable of striking the DPRK. … In a “report on nuclear weapons” in January 2002, the U.S. clarified that it would use nukes against north Korea. In a “report on national security strategy” issued in September of the same year Bush reiterated the U.S. intention to use nukes when mounting a preemptive military attack on the DPRK. The Bush regime defined the DPRK as part of an “axis of evil” and listed it as “a target of preemptive nuclear attack”. This is an open challenge to its duty under the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework and a wanton violation of it.
The U.S. declared the preemptive nuclear strike at the DPRK as its policy, reducing the joint declaration for denuclearization adopted between the north and the south of Korea to a dead document and wantonly trampling down the basic spirit of the NPT. … The DPRK will further increase its nuclear deterrent as a self-defensive measure as long as the U.S. refuses to make a switchover in its hostile policy toward the former and persistently pursues a nuclear stand-off. When an appropriate time comes, the DPRK’s increased nuclear deterrent force will be demonstrated in practice.” (KCNA, U.S. Indicted for Ditching DPRK-US Agreed Framework,” October 21, 2003)
10/22/03:
“I didn’t exactly see what official said it. But I — what I hope my answer conveyed to you in public there was that this requires a degree of patience, because Kim Jong-il is used to being able to deal bilaterally with the United States. But the change of policy now is, is that he must deal with other nations, most notably China. And I was pleased with my discussions with Hu Jintao, about his — reaffirming his mutual desire — or his desire, which is our mutual goal, that Kim Jong-il disarm. He realizes that it’s a problem. We discussed the security guarantees, what form they may come in. I made it very clear, obviously — I said this during the pool spray there — that a treaty is not going to happen, but there are other ways to affect, on paper, what I have said publicly — we have no intention of invading. Obviously, any guarantee would be conditional on Kim Jong-il doing what he hopefully will say he’ll do, which is to get rid of his nuclear weapons programs.” (“Roundtable Interview of the President by the Press Pool,” October 22, 2003)
U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea publishes report by David Hawk “The Human Gulag.” (James Brooke, “Rights Group Exposes Conditions in North Korean Prison Camps,” New York Times, October 22, 2003, p. A-9)
Anne Applebaum, op-ed: “Pictures and testimony will also help to chip away at whatever support, feigned or genuine, remains for Kim Jong-il’s government.” (Anne Applebaum, “See No Evil, Stop No Evil,” Washington Post, October 22, 2003, p. A-29)
Hoagland: Kim Jong-il is buying time “through the methodical export of strategic insecurity,” says Nicholas Eberstadt, in a bid to escape change and outside influence. “The Clinton administration’s 1994 Framework agreement ostensibly froze North Korea’s nuclear weapons program in return for free oil and two atomic reactors to produce electricity. The bet then was that the regime would either soon implode or be forced to open up. Instead, Kim launched a new secret nuclear program to expand his arsenal. He now poses an even greater threat and presumably expects a larger payoff.” (Jim Hoagland, “Playing Games with Pyongyang,” Washington Post, October 23, 2003, p. A-31)
10/23/03:
DPRK dismisses Bush comments as “laughable.” Jeong Se-hyun quotes DPRK official as telling him last week, “Recently, the U.S. has been refusing New York contacts. We have no choice but to demand dialogue in our own way.” (Paul Eckert and Teruaki Ueno, “N. Korea Signals Possible Movement on Nuclear Crisis,” Reuters, October 23, 2003)
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “What we want is for both sides to drop guns and establish normal state relationship to co-exist peacefully. … We are ready to consider Bush’s remarks on the ‘written assurances of non-aggression’ if they are based on the intention to co-exist with the DPRK and aimed to play a positive role in realizing the proposal for a package solution on the principle of simultaneous actions. … We have already informed the U.S. side of it through the channel of New York contact and are now in the process of ascertaining the real intention of the U.S.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK FM on U.S.-Proposed Written Assurances of Non-Aggression,” October 25, 2003)
10/24/03:
Han Song-ryol, David Straub meet in New York channel, says North would declare it will abandon its nuclear program in return for security assurance in a “president’s letter.” (Sakajiri Nobuyoshi, “North Korea Will Settle for a Bush Letter,” Asahi Shimbun, October 30, 2003)
10/25/03:
At Bush summit with Jiang Zemin in Crawford. Joint communiqué says, “On the nuclear issue of the DPRK, Jiang pointed out that China has consistently supported the non-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and wishes to see peace and stability on the peninsula. The two leaders agreed that the two sides maintain consultation with each other on the issue and make joint efforts to ensure that the issue is resolved peacefully.” Rice recalled, “Jiang Zemin basically says, Yeah, that North Korean nuclear program, that’s really a problem for you.’ And the president says, ‘No, I sit in the United States of America heavily armed. … This isn’t a problem for us. This is a problem for you, because it’s your region that’s going to have to react to a North Korean nuclear weapon,’” implying that Japan would go nuclear next. “That got Jiang Zemin’s attention.” (Sanger, The Inheritance, p. 309)
10/26/03:
Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA): “At the 11th hour, the White House withdrew its support for our bipartisan visit to North Korea.” (Lara Jakes Jordan, “Lawmaker: White House Nixed N. Korea Trip,” October 27, 2003) “We wonder if the administration is not getting nervous about the possibility of the state of our nuclear activity being confirmed by the delegation.” (KCNA, “KCNA Report on U.S. Cancellation of Plan to Send Congress Delegation to DPRK,” October 26, 2003)
Kim Yong-sun dies from injuries sustained in car accident four months ago. (Chosun Ilbo, “Key NK Official Dies form Traffic Accident,” October 27, 2003)
10/27/03:
Hwang Jang-yop Anti-North activists hope his testimony will galvanize support for regime change. (Gordon Fairclough, “Defector Advocates Regime Change for North Korea,” Wall Street Journal, October 28, 2003, p. A-14)
10/29/03:
Pres adviser Ban Ki-moon in invw: “We need to develop the six-party talks as a regional security forum ultimately to discuss steps to ensure peace and stability in the Northeast Asian region.” (Shim Jae-yun and Seo Soo-min, “Seoul to Seek to Turn Six-Way Talks into Security Forum,” Korea Times, October 29, 2003)
10/30/03:
Wu Bangguo, head of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Assembly, tells Kim Yong-nam, “Adherence to dialogue should be the correct direction in resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula,” Xinhua reports. (AFP, “China’s Top Envoy Steering North Korea Back to the Negotiating Table,” October 30, 2003) Wu announces $50 million in aid, not tied to talks according to China. (Reuters, “China Says Offered N. Korea Aid, But Not for Talks,” January 13, 2004) Wu reinterpreted four principles on China-DPRK relations — inheriting traditions, facing future, good neighborliness and friendship, and strengthening cooperation, saying, “Good neighborliness and friendship demanded understanding and mutual support from the two countries, attaching importance to issues of concern to both of them, which were demanded to be tackled carefully.” From this, writes Liu Ming of the Shanghai Aacademy of Social Sciences, “we can infer some implied messages: first, the two countries haven’t gotten along well in preservation of tradition, such as consultation and coordination between them on important issues. Second, in the Chinese view…North Korea policy didn’t adapt to the current international situation. Both of them should pursue a common policy that integrated themselves into the international community and globalization based on peaceful diplomacy and cooperation. …Third, North Korea should not always adopt some unilateral policy that endangers Chinese and other other countries’ security and interests, and DPRK should understand Chinese concern, dismantling nuclear program. Fourth, their economic cooperation should not always be limited on the manner of Chinese official economic assistance; both sides needed to develop new ways to rejuvenate North Korea’s economy and reform its system, such as … introducing reform and market economy transition experiences by China, diverting official assistance to the commercial cooperation between enterprises in thhe light of market practice, collaborating to utilize international funding and technology for certain industrial restructuring and infrastructure.” (Li Ming, “China;’s Role in the Course of North Korea Transition.”
KCNA: “Both sides agreed in principle to pursue the course of the six-way talks. The DPRK side expressed its willingness to take part in the future talks if they provide a process of putting into practice the proposal for a package solution based on the principle of simultaneous actions.” (KCNA, “DPRK and China Discuss Nuclear Issue,” October 30, 2003) State Dept spokesman Richard Boucher: “I would just point out ‘simultaneity’ is not a word that we have used.” (DOS Briefing)
Hwang Jang-yop in Japan TV invw, “I heard North Korea possessed nuclear weapons directly from National Defense Committee chairman Kim Jong-il.” “I became aware of this after Chairman Kim said, ‘We also succeeded in developing nuclear weapons,’ and asked me about how to commend the officials who succeeded in developing nuclear weapons.” (Korea Times, “Hwang Says NK Possesses Nuclear Bombs,” October 30, 2003)
ROK naval ship fires four rounds of 76 mm. shells at North patrol boat that crossed NLL. (Yonhap, “Navy Fires Shots at North Korean Patrol Boat,” October 30, 2003)
New Jersey man arrested for sending blueprints for values used to regulate pressure inside nuclear vessel to Mitsubishi with North Korea as end-user. (New York Times, “Suspect Accused of Trying to Aid North Korea,” New York Times, November 1, 2003, p. A-4)
11/1/03:
Moon Duk-ho, “The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program: Verification Priorities and New Challenges”
Hwang Jang-yop press conf: “Providing a security guarantee for the Kim Jong-il dictatorship in North Korea, in return for the North’s halting of its nuclear program, is deception of the peoples of the world and is weak in terms of upholding principles.” (Kim Chong-hyuk, “Hwang Blasts Softer U.S. Stance on North,” JoongAng Ilbo, November 1, 2003, p. 3)
11/4/03:
US gets KEDO to suspend reactor project. FM Yoon Young-kwan: “The position was based on the premise that the project could resume a year later. It is no more or less than that.” Gallucci: “There is no reason to project a posture of no interest in regenerating the deal. We need every carrot we have with the North Koreans — and saying that it is dead is gratuitous, an appeal to a domestic audience.” (David E. Sanger, “U.S. Persuades Allies to Halt North Korean Atom Project,” New York Times, November 5, 2003, p. A-12) U.S. official close to the talks says that as far as Washington is concerned “the light-water reactor project is dead.” (David Kuhn, “KEDO Moves to Suspend N-Project,” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 6, 2003)
11/5/03:
A U.S. intelligence official says CIA is “not certain there even is” a uranium-enrichment plant yet. (Barbara Slavin, “N. Korean Nuclear efforts Looking Less Threatening,” USA Today, October 5, 2003, p. 18A)
State Department spokesman Adam Ereli on KEDO: “Our position, as we said yesterday, is that there is no future for the reactor project.” DOS daily Briefing, November 5, 2003)
11/6/03:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “If this is true, it would mean that the U.S. would stop the construction of LWRs in the wake of its suspension of the supply of heavy fuel oil and thus unilaterally and finally scrap the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework. This is nothing surprising to the DPRK as it had already expected it.
What matters is why Washington is so getting on the nerves of the DPRK at a time when the resumption of the six-party talks is high on the agenda. This compels the DPRK to doubt whether the U.S. would come out to make a switchover in its policy toward the DPRK in case the six-way talks are resumed in the future. … The DPRK has so far suffered huge political and economic losses due to the U.S. noncompliance with the agreement on the provision of the LWRs. Tremendous is the adverse impact it had on the development of the DPRK’s national economy as a whole.
The U.S. and KEDO are obliged to make full compensations to the DPRK under relevant articles of the LWR agreement as Washington has caused such huge losses to the DPRK by refusing to fulfill its commitments under the AF. The DPRK will hold them accountable for this to the last. It will never allow them to take out all the equipment, facilities, materials and technical documents now in Kumho area for the LWR construction till this issue is settled.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK FM on U.S. Intention to Stop LWR Construction,” November 6, 2003)
11/?/03:
In a letter to the president sent to 130 House members, Curt Weldon (R-PA) accused NSA Rice of being an “obstacle” to implementing the president’s objectives in North Korea. “To my knowledge, never before has support been withdrawn for a CODEL after a plane has been designated and had State Department cooperation,” he wrote. “The treatment of the delegation by your national security team has been offensive and arrogant.” (Hans Nichols, “Weldon Lashes Out at Rice over Canceled Trip to North Korea,” The Hill, November 12, 2003)
11/7/03:
US may offer two written assurances, one while six-party talks continue and a second longer-term assurance once the North abandons its weapons programs. “Ito Toshiyuki, “U.S. Eyeing 2-Phase Assurance for N. Korea,” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 7, 2003)
Chinese Vice FM Wang Yi in Washington says “this is a good opportunity to resume the six-party talks.” US avoids the word negotiation. Kelly: “We are happy to work with the other partners towards resolution of this serious issue.” Powell: Wu Bangguo “brought back reaffirmation that the North Koreans were interested, in principle, in moving forward once again to six-party talks, where [we] can exchange views, present new ideas.” (AFP, “China Envoy in Washington for North Korea Talks,” November 7, 2003)
Japan FM Kawaguchi to South Korean reporters, “We are requesting bilateral talks between Japan and North Korea to tackle the abduction issue.” Japan will raise it in six-party talks: “Six-party talks will mainly deal with the nuclear issue, but I think all the issues should be discussed comprehensively. The talks should go into a direction that enables us to gain domestic consent.” (Seo Hyun-jin, “Japan Pressing N.K. on Abductions,” Korea Herald, November 7, 2003)
11/8/03:
N-S economic talks agree to joint development of Kaesong industrial park. (UnifMin, “Koreas Agree to Set up Joint Office in Kaesong,” November 10, 2003)
11/9/03:
North Korea’s only bank in Europe, Golden State Bank in Vienna, audited by Austrian authorities in July and August on suspicion of money laundering and weapons trade to Syria and Iran in anticipation of economic sanctions. (Yonhap, “Pyongyang’s Bank in Europe Probed,” Chosun Ilbo, November 9, 2003)
11/11/03:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The DPRK government proposed Japan to hold inter-governmental talks as early as possible to discuss the issue of compensation to the Korean victims of human rights abuses” referring to … a recently disclosed “list of at least 420,000 victims of forced drafting during the Japanese imperialists’ military occupation of Korea.” (KCNA, “DPRK-Japan Inter-Governmental Talks Proposed,” November 11, 2003)
11/14/03:
Kim Yong-ho, DPRK envoy, says, “If Mr. Bush’s proposal on written guarantees of security is based on the principle of simultaneous action which was proposed by the DPRK, we can consider [it] positively.” Why simultaneity? “Between the U.S. and the DPRK there is no confidence or mutual trust, so we cannot do first, and the U.S. cannot do first, so we do simultaneously.” What does the DPRK want? “First, guarantee the security, and second do not hinder the economic development of my country.” (John Zaracostas, “N. Korea Offers to Give Up Nukes,” Washington Times, November 14, 2003)
BP-led consortium announces plan to route gas pipeline around North Korea in Yellow Sea. South Korea wanted it to go through North. John Chambers, managing director for sovereign ratings at S&P: “In our view, it’s only a question of time when North Korea collapses because its current economic model is not sustainable.” (James Brooke, “Quietly, North Korea Opens Markets,” New York Times, November 19, 2003, p. W-7)
11/14-17/03:
KEDO executive director Charles Kartman in Pyongyang “to explain … a possible suspension of the LWR project.” (AFP, “N. Korea Informed of Energy Project Suspension: KEDO Chief,” November 18, 2003)
11/15/03:
35th US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting agrees to relocate Yongsan garrison “at earliest possible date” and to transfer ten missions from US to ROK. (Korea Times, “U.S. to Transfer Ten Important Missions to South Korea,” November 17, 2003) Rumsfeld’s visit “should be seen for what it really was, an early step in a long, gradual disengagement of U.S. land forces from South Korea and greater reliance on sea power to maintain an American security posture in Asia.” Discussing North and South Korea, a U.S. officer said, only half-jokingly, “I sometimes wonder which one is really our adversary.” (Richard Halloran, “U.S. Takes First Step Away from S. Korea,” Japan Times, November 23, 2003) U.S. will reassign troops from South Korea to Iraq and Afghanistan and shift most of the 7,000 people in its headquarters out of Seoul within a year, military officials say. (Richard Halloran, “Troops to Shift from S. Korea,” Washington Times, November 24, 2003)
11/16/03:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “Only recently, we clarified the constructive stand that we are willing to take into consideration “written assurances of non-aggression” to which President Bush referred instead of the non-aggression treaty which the U.S. finds it hard to accept and we can modify even the phraseology of the principle of simultaneous actions, taking U.S. concerns into account. As the DPRK declared more than once, it is ready to abandon in practice its nuclear program which the U.S. is concerned about at the phase where its hostile policy is fundamentally dropped and its threat to us removed in practice.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Next Round of Six-Way Talks,” November 16, 2003)
11/17/03:
Hwang Jang-yop in Monthly Chosun: “All external affairs related to the development of nuclear weapons were under the responsibility of three people, including myself, when I was the international secretary of the party, and the director for foreign affairs and the secretary for South Korean affairs. Before the conclusion of the Geneva Agreement in October 1994, Kim Jong-il called two meetings on the issue,” Hwang says. “At one meeting, Jeon Byeong-ho, then secretary of munitions, reported to Kim Jong-il that all preparations for underground nuclear testing were set, but there was no need to hurry the testing because nuclear bombs don’t go bad.” (Kim Yeon-kwang, “NK Prepared Nukes before Ink Dried on Agreement: Report,” Chosun Ilbo, November 17, 2003)
Yabunaka Mitoshi, dir-gen for Asian and Oceanian affairs, sought U.S. backing from James Kelly for addressing the abduction issue in six-party talks. “There was intensive discussion between the two. But no conclusions were drawn,” said a FoMin official who attended. (Karasaki Taro, “Kelly Told Not to Forget Abduction Issue,” Asahi Shimbun, November 18, 2003)
11/18/03:
Myanmar has been negotiating purchase of missiles from North Korea, U.S. and Asian officials believe. Yangon-based diplomats also say intelligence operatives have spotted technicians unloading crates and heavy construction equipment from trains at Myothit, near Natmauk, where Myanmar plans to build a nuclear research reactor. (Berttil Lintner and Shawn W. Crispin, “For U.S., a New North Korea Problem,” Wall Street Journal, November 18, 2003, p. A-19)
China proposes creating secretariat for six-party talks. (Kyodo, “China Proposes Institutionalizing 6-Way Talks on N. Korea,” November 18, 2003)
U.S. rejects Chinese proposal to sign written security guarantee with other four parties as witnesses. (Kyodo, “U.S. rejects China-Proposed Signing Format for 6-Way Accord, November 18, 2003)
SecDef Rumsfeld at Osan AFB: “The people in the North, repressed to be sure, watch their children waste away, eat bark, as that evil regime spends huge sums on weapons.” (AFP, “Rumsfeld, Brands N. Korea ‘Evil’ for Starving Its People,” November 18, 2003) At Elmendorf AFB: “We know repression works. We know you can put so much fear in people you can maintain your regime for decades with fear, and that it is possible to subjugate people semi-permanently. We know also that nothing is forever in life, and that at a certain point things can happen. We’ve seen dramatic shifts in countries where they’ve gone from here to there.” (AFP, “North Korea Could See Dramatic Change Despite Years of Repression: Rumsfeld,” November 18, 2003)
Joseph DeTrani replaces Jack Pritchard. (Dong-A Ilbo, “Former CIA Agent to Be Appointed Envoy to Korea,” November 18, 2003)
11/?/03:
In meeting on verification approach with John Bolton, his aide Mark Groombridge, James Kelly, and Powell’s chief of staff Lawrence Wilkerson present, Mitchell Reiss and Paula DeSutter of the Bureau of Verification and Compliance get into “a knock-down drag-out fight, a screaming match” when Reiss asserted his authority to take the lead on verification, as Powell had decided. “Paula lost it,” said a participant. “How dare you think of doing this?” Bolton, raising his voice, backed her. The result was a “split memo” sent to Powell, who supported Reiss’ approach. (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 196)
11/19/03:
In talks last week, US and North Korea agree to conduct five MIA searches. (JoongAng Ilbo, “U.S., North in Accord on New MIA Searches,” November 19, 2003)
China, DPRK sign treaty on law enforcement that could aim at crackdown on migration. (Korea Herald, “N.K.-China Treaty May Affect Escapees,” November 22, 2003; KCNA, “Treaty Signed between DPRK and China,” November 20, 2003)
11/20/03:
Macao-based organized criminal syndicate, not North Korea, behind $116 million heroin trafficking on freighter Pong Su, reports The Age, citing Australian Federal Police sources. (Kyodo, “Macao-Based Organized Crime Said Behind N. Korea Heroin Trade,” November 20, 2003)
Middle-aged woman, sister-in-law of a DPRK security official, boards China Air 180 from Nagoya to Beijing with inverter that controls spinning of a washing machine or a centrifuge. Gary Samore says the case suggests “North Korea might still have a long way to go in their highly enriched uranium program.” An Asian diplomat: “We think the U.S. claims are a little exaggerated, not as much as with Iraq, but still we have to be careful of what the U.S. says.” “I don’t see the smoking gun,” says David Albright. “It has been known for years that they have a research and development program with centrifuges and that was somewhat tolerated. But the really important thing is whether they have made the jump from RR&D to a plant that could make a bomb or more a yeas, and there really isn’t as much evidence as one would think to support that.” (Barbara Demick, “N. Korea May Have Nuclear Backup Plan,” Los Angeles Times, February 24, 2004)
11/21/03:
KEDO makes suspension of LWR project official.
North Korea more open. “it manifests itself in many small ways,” says WFP’s Richard Corsino. “You see it in the sort of questions you’re able to ask and the information you get on hunger and unemployment.” (Mark Magnier, “N. Korea Is More Open, U.N. Says,” Los Angeles Times, November 21, 2003)
11/23/03:
China, Germany, and France recently blocked North Korean efforts to import materials and devices to make nuclear arms, a senior U.S. official says. (Kyodo, “China, Others Block N. Korean Bids to Buy Nuke Materials,” November 24, 2003)
11/24/03:
PM Koizumi tells Diet Budget Cmte, “At this point, we are not thinking about economic sanctions, but if [North Korea] were to further aggravate the situation, I think we must think about it.” (Kyodo, “Koizumi Eyes Sanctions on N. Korea over Abductions,” November 25, 2003)
11/29/03:
FoMin official says Japan might accept resolution of nuclear dispute before other issues: “It may be difficult to resolve the abduction issue if the topic of nuclear development cannot be resolved.” (Japan Times, “Japan May Put Abductions on Back Burner: Official,” November 29, 2003)
11/?/03:
(Hiramatsu Kenji, “Leadup to the Signing of the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration,” Gaiko Forum, (Winter 2003), 20-30)
11/?/03:
Lee Jong-seok, who served as NSC chief and Minister of Unification during the Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003-2008), in his recently published book “Peace on a Knife’s Edge,” reveals the content of a personal letter from Roh delivered by actor and politician Moon Sung-keun when he visited North Korea in late 2003 as a special envoy. “The crux of the issue is how quickly the nuclear issue can be resolved,” Roh wrote in the letter. “Rather than splitting the issue down into parts and going back-and-forth as we resolve the nuclear situation and improve inter-Korean relations, we should resolve things fundamentally, generously, and comprehensively,” he recommended. Following Moon’s visit, Pyongyang began holding more proactive discussions with Seoul on the nuclear issue, using its National Intelligence Service line to provide notice on the status and North Korean position regarding dialogue with Washington (on December 9) and the results of discussions with Beijing (on December 29). This marked a change from its previous refusal to discuss the nuclear issue under the framework of inter-Korean relations. (Lee Yong-in, “New Book Reveals U.S. Abandoned Military Plans,” Hankyore, May 15, 2014)
11/30/03:
In 2001 Iraq negotiated with North Korea in Syria for missile production line delivered through Syria, makes $10 million down payment but with Iraq under U.S. scrutiny, North demurs. A month before the U.S. invasion Iraq asks for $1.9 million refund for failing to meet deadline for delivery of first shipment. “This $10 million was a down payment, and not just a straight purchase for Nodong missiles, but for Nodong technology,” said one U.S. official who read documentation on the deal. “Saddam’s intent was to get the expertise from the North Koreans and, potentially, open his own production line.” US had information downloaded from Iraqi hard drives, at least one obtained before the invasion, which was used to interrogate captured Iraqis. Bashir Assad: “This is the first time I have heard this story.” (David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “For the Iraqis, a Missile Deal That Went Sour; Files Tell of Talks with North Korea,” New York Times, December 1, 2003, p. A-11)
12/2/03:
Next round may be delayed. “We checked to see if the U.S. was willing to put down its guns at the same time as us, according to the simultaneous action principle we proposed,” says a DPRK diplomat in New York. “Through various channels, we have been able to confirm that the U.S. has not changed its position that we disarm first.” (Seo Soo-min, “6-Party Talks Likely to Be Delayed Until Next Year,” Korea Times, December 3, 2003)
Bolton at Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Conference: “To date PSI participants have agreed on a series of ten sea, air, and ground interdiction training exercises. Four have already taken place, and the remaining exercises will occur in the coming months. Australia conducted the first exercise in October in the Coral Sea, involving both military and law enforcement assets. The United Kingdom then hosted the first PSI air interception training session, a table-top exercise to explore operational issues arising from intercepting proliferation traffic in the air. In mid-October, Spain hosted the second maritime exercise, this one in the western Mediterranean Sea. Finally, France recently hosted a third maritime exercise in the Mediterranean Sea. …Later this month, the United States will host the fifth PSI operational experts meeting, which will bring together military and law enforcement experts from the original eleven participating countries, as well as Norway, Denmark, Singapore, and Canada. …Our PSI interdiction efforts rest on existing domestic and international authorities. The national legal authorities of each participant will allow us to act together in a flexible manner, ensuring actions are taken by participants with the most robust authorities in any given case. By coordinating our efforts with other countries, we draw upon an enhanced set of authorities for interdiction. At the December operational meeting, legal experts will analyze their authorities against real world scenarios and examine any gaps in authorities that can be filled either through national legislation or policy or international action.”
12/3/03:
“There’s a confluence of people who support do-nothing talks,” says one official, but North Korea still is making plutonium. “Every day we waste, we’ve got one foot in the grave.” A hard-liner disagrees: “Nothing can convince Kim Jong-il to give up his weapons. … It’s too late now. North Korea has internalized that they have nukes.” The hard-liners, says one administration official, “are going to give [Powell] enough rope to hang himself.” “The engagers see this as the first step to sending Powell to Pyongyang,” says one official. “Engagers think multilateral is a way to break through to bilateral.” Hard-liners won’t let that happen. “The negotiators will have limited latitude in their talks,” says one. “In terms of direct bilateral talks with North Korea in a pull-aside, absolutely no.” The instructions that Kelly received for talks earlier this year, says one top former official, “were extremely restrictive.” One official says, “For political people, a success is keeping [Korea] off the front pages of the papers. …. They want to put it in a box until after the election.” An administration official says, “One big mistake the Clintons made and that we could make is assuming time is on our side.” North Korea may already be using reprocessed spent fuel to make bombs. And Pyongyang is ‘burrowing away at building a [longer-range missile].” (Joshua Kurlantzick, “Look Away: A Do-Nothing Korea Policy,” New Republic, December 15, 2003)
Koizumi to Asian journalists: “I believe Kim Jong-il invited me to Pyongyang last year because basically he did want to normalize relations with Japan.” (Lee Kyong-hee, “Koizumi: N.K. Wants Improved Ties with Japan,” Korea Herald, December 3, 2003)
China issues white paper on non-proliferation policy and measures.
12/3-4/03:
TCOG in Washington. U.S., Japan, and ROK reject China’s first draft of joint statement as too favorable to DPRK. (Kyodo, “Japan, U.S., S. Korea Reject Proposed 6-Way Statement,” December 3, 2003) Emerging from TCOG, Kelly tells reporters, “As one of my colleagues said today, when we have six countries pursuing the details of these things, it’s little bit like herding cats.” (AFP, “North Korean Talks Diplomacy Like ‘Herding Cats’: Kelly, December 4, 2003) On December 4, TCOG agreed that joint statement make six points, including declaration of willingness to resolve the dispute peacefully and denuclearize the peninsula, to open talks on normalization provided it abandons its nuclear programs. (Kyodo, “U.S. Asks China Again to Revise Statement of 6-Way Talks,” December 13, 2003)
12/4/03:
In a new gambit North Korea is seeking written U.S. assurances to resume heavy fuel oil shipments in return for a pledge to abandon its nuclear program as part of joint statement. (Sakajiri Nobuyoshi, “North Korea Angling for Fuel as Reward on Nuclear Issue,” Asahi Shimbun, December 4, 2003) North Korea has called for normalization and removal from U.S. list of terrorist sponsors. (Kyodo, “N. Korea Calls for Normalization of Ties with U.S.,” December 7, 2003)
President Roh at Warsaw University: “Some raise the possibility of regime breakdown in North Korea, but this is an improbable scenario. Neither China nor South Korea wishes to see the North Korean regime fall apart.” (Quoted in Moon Chung-in, “Diplomacy of Defiance and Facilitation: The Six-Party Talks and the Roo Moo-hyun Government,” Asian Perspective, 32, No, 4 (2008), p.p. 78-79)
12/5/03:
Powell telephone conversation with FM Li Zhaoxing, trying to draft joint statement to pre-cook results of next round of six-party talks. (Reuters, “Powell Says Still No Date for North Korea Talks, December 5, 2003) State Department spokesman Adam Ereli: “It’s not that we’re standing in the way. We’re ready to talk.” Senior US official says Pyongyang trying to get US concessions in writing: “I’m not saying that there won’t be something before the talks, but you can’t negotiate the round before the round,” the official said. “You have to leave some things for the talks.” (AFP, “U.S. denies Blocking Six-Nation North Korea Crisis Talks,” December 5, 2003)
Raphael Perl, “Drug Trafficking and North Korea,” CRS Report: North Korean criminal activity generated about $85 million in 1997: $71 million from drugs and $15 million from counterfeiting. (p. 9) “The case of the ‘Pong Su’ arguably is demonstrative of such joint venture activity — reportedly Southeast Asian non-DPRK origin heroin carried by a North Korean crew on a North Korean vessel.” (p. 12)
Mark Manyin, “Japan-North Korea Relations: Selected Issues,” CRS Report: Japan may provide $5-10 billion in aid, “Raises fears that it will help sustain the Kim Jong-il regime without inducing any behavioral changes” and “could directly or indirectly finance military modernization.” (Kyodo, “Japan’s Aid May Help North Korea Regime Survive,” Japan Times, December 7, 2003)
Two Koreas agree final phase of construction of inter-Korean rail lines will begin in April. (Seo Soo-min, “Koreas Agree to Put Finishing Touches on Railroads in April Korea Times, December 5, 2003)
12/7/03:
DPRK will develop ties with FAO. (KCNA, “DPRK Delegate on Cooperation with International Organization,” December 7, 2003)
U.S., Japan, South Korea draft sent to China. South proposed “simultaneous actions” by U.S., says senior South Korean official. “Our concept was staged or step-by-step. We now call it coordinated steps.” He added, “The problem is when the DPRK uses ‘simultaneous,’ they mean their own four stages of simultaneous actions. That’s not going to be acceptable to us.” Chosun Ilbo reports that the approach requires the North to first declare that it will abandon its nuclear program. (Paul Eckert, “’Coordinated Steps’ Proposed to Disarm North Korea,” Reuters, December 8, 2003) In draft statement [in response to China’s] U.S., Japan, and South Korea agree to open talks to normalize ties provided North abandons nuclear programs. (Kyodo, “Draft to Say U.S. Willing to Open N. Korea Normalization Talks,” December 8, 2003) omits any reference to return to NPT, said to satisfy hawks who favor U.S., Asian inspectors to I.A.E.A. “I suspect that’s a deal breaker for the North Koreans,” one of the administration’s more hawkish officials said last week. “But we’ll see.” Asian officials involved said draft also omitted unilateral reassurance by administration not confront the North economically or militarily, which Chinese said North would insist on, because American officials feared it would lead North to demand an end to PSI. Many in Pentagon “still don’t want any talks at all, a senior White House official said. (David E. Sanger, “U.S. and 2 Allies Agree on a Plan for North Korea,” New York Times, December 8, 2003, p. A-1) Career EAP officials wanted to offer a security guarantee as soon as Pyongyang would “commit” to scrapping its nuclear program. EAP’s position was rejected in interagency process. Now EAP position is to offer guarantee when North “credibly commits” to scrapping. (Joel Mowbray, “North Korea’s Nukes,” Washington Times, December 11, 2003)
12/9/03:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “As the U.S. feels uncomfortable with the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between the DPRK and the U.S., we clarified that we are ready to accept the proposal for giving “written security assurances” made by President Bush if it presupposes the U.S. co-existence with the DPRK in peace and acceptance of our proposal for a simultaneous package solution to the nuclear issue. And we expressed a magnanimous view that if the U.S. is concerned over the phraseology of simultaneous actions, we can accept an expression favored by the U.S. as long as there is no change in its content. Through a New York contact channel on Nov. 1 we directly conveyed to the U.S. side our stand to resume the second round of the six-way talks early in December. … The U.S. seems to work hard to completely eliminate our nuclear deterrent force by giving just a piece of paper called “written security assurances.” In fact, it is no more than a commitment. It is unthinkable for us to allow ourselves to be disarmed believing in the lukewarm commitment of the U.S. … We, however, proposed a package solution based on the principle of simultaneous actions as the basic way of settling the nuclear issue, prompted by the fair and aboveboard intention to build confidence through the simultaneous practical actions on the part of the two sides. Our stand is not confined to this. Our stand is to agree upon the first-phase action by making “words for words” commitment at the next round of the six-way talks at least if the U.S. is not in a position to accept our proposal for a package solution at one time.
To this end, measures such as the U.S. delisting the DPRK as a “terrorism sponsor”, lift of the political, economic and military sanctions and blockade and energy aid including the supply of heavy fuel oil and electricity by the U.S. and neighboring countries should be taken in exchange for the DPRK’s freeze of nuclear activities. This would lay a foundation for furthering the six-way talks. What is clear is that in no case the DPRK would freeze its nuclear activities unless it is rewarded.” (KCNA, “Spokesman of DPRK Foreign Ministry on Issue of Resumption of Six-Party Talks,” December 9, 2003)
Japan announces troop dispatch to Iraq. Senior Blue House official on South Korean troop dispatch: “In the last five years, anti-American sentiment accumulated in South Korea. As a result, Americans are becoming increasingly critical of South Korea. Considering such circumstances, we have no choice but to send military personnel to Iraq.” (Funabashi Yoichi, “Japan, S. Korea in Agony over Troop Dispatch,” Asahi Shimbun, December 9, 2003)
Interviews with current and former intel officials and diplomats doubt North’s nuclear capabilities. U.S. has not found plant that administration says will soon begin enriching HEU, reprocessing has run into technical problems, China rushed troops to the border after U.S. warned of smuggling “grapefruit-size” quantity of plutonium only to find nothing. “We don’t know what they’re doing,” says Jack Pritchard. “We assess that North Korea has produced one or two simple fission-type nuclear weapons and has val.idated the designs without conducting yield-producing nuclear tests, the CIA said in August. “’We assess’ means they concluded based upon a judgment of North Korean intent and capabilities,” said Robert Gallucci. “Those are political judgments.” A former Bush administration official called it “a case of pleasing the bosses by telling them what they want to hear or analysts covering their backsides.” (Douglas Frantz, “N. Korea’s Nuclear Success Is Doubted,” Los Angeles Times, December 9, 2003)
U.S. satellite detects fumes rising from coal fired boiler at Yongbyon December 2, 3, 4, and 7, Dong-A Ilbo reports. UnifMin Jeong Se-hyun: “We are trying to confirm the activities, but at this stage I have no definitive information to report.” (Paul Eckert, “North Korea Atomic Moves Reported,” Reuters, December 10, 2003)
12/10/03:
Bush news conference after meeting with PM Wen Jiabao: “The goal of the United States is not for a freeze of the nuclear program. The goal is to dismantle a nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible way.” (AFP, “Blow to Nuclear Crisis Talks As Bush Rejects North Korea Offer,” December 10, 2003)
DPRK establishes diplomatic relations with Ireland. France is lone EU exception of 15.
12/11/03:
China sends revised draft of joint statement to other parties. (Kyodo, “Revised Statement Conveyed to N. Korea, Japan, U.S., S. Korea,” December 12, 2003)
U.S. is still withholding 60,000 metric tons of food aid after committing 40,000. World Food Program plans to distribute only 300,000 tons, 62% of what it sought. (James Brooke, “As Donations Fall, U.N. Plans to Reduce North Korea’s Food Aid,” New York Times, December 11, 2003, p. A-5)
12/10-11/03:
North Korea-KEDO talks at Kumho. North unveiled a plan to assert jurisdiction for its domestic laws over the site and demands compensation for suspension of the project. (Seo Hyun-jin, “N.K. Insists on KEDO Site Jurisdiction,” Korea Herald, December 20, 2003)
12/12/03:
Cheney chairs interagency meeting that rejects third draft of joint statement. (Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Won’t Offer Incentives at N. Korea Talks,” Washington Post, December 19, 2003, p. A-45) Reflecting North Korea’s demands, the draft called for rewarding the North at each step, including political measures as well as energy and other forms of economic assistance. Vice President Cheney urged rejection of the draft. “I have been charged by the president with making sure that none of the tyrannies in the world are negotiated with. We don’t negotiate with evil. We defeat it,” a senior administration official quoted him as saying. He insisted on calling for irreversible dismantling. (Warren Strobel, “Cheney at Center of Struggle to Manage N. Korea Talks,” Knight-Ridder News Service, December 20, 2003) China was pressing for another six-party meeting that they hoped would demonstrate progress. Chinese officials drafted a statement to be released at the end of the meeting, saying quick approval would ensure that the North Koreans would attend a round of talks in December. When Bush’s top foreign policy aides met on to discuss the Chinese initiative, Cheney — who had not attended a North Korea meeting for months — unexpectedly showed up. The text, as drafted by the Chinese, did not call for “irreversible” dismantling of North Korea’s programs or mention “verification,” two key phrases in previous U.S. statements. The vice president weighed in strongly at the meeting, saying those phrases needed to be in the statement. At one point, Cheney invoked the president and said he had made it clear that the United States doesn’t negotiate with tyranny, according to two officials who attended the meeting. “We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it,” Cheney declared. That ended the discussion: The Chinese draft was rejected. Kevin Kellems, Cheney’s spokesman, expressed doubt that Cheney put it that bluntly: “I don’t think he said it. I have never heard him say anything like it.” (Glenn Kessler, “Impact from the Shadows,” Washington Post, October 5, 2004, p. A-1) “He came in at the very last minute on a number of occasions to prevent other people from giving away the farm by softening our position,” said Aaron Friedburg, his deputy national security adviser. “Cheney’s view of the problem was that the regime was the root cause of the problem. …The only lasting solution to the problem is, therefore, a change in the character of the regime.” (Chinoy, Meltdown, pp. 194, 197) Two years ago, Cheney stepped into the Oval Office early one evening and raised an alarm. The negotiators were trying to entice North Korea to sign a document outlining the steps for resolving the standoff, but it lacked the tough language on disarmament that North Korea had rejected and Cheney knew Bush wanted. With Powell and Armitage at a black-tie dinner where they could not be easily reached on a secure line, Cheney “declared this thing a loser,” said a former senior official involved in the discussion that night. Bush sent new instructions through the NSC rather than State that essentially killed the deal. “Powell and Armitage were not happy,” one official said. “But it was too late.” (David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Cheney’s Power No longer Goes Unquestioned,” New York Times, September 10, 2006, p. 1)
Park Jie-won, Kim Dae-jung’s chief of staff, sentenced to 12 years in prison for accepted 15 billion won in bribes from Hyundai Group, but not for orchestrating $500 million transfer to North, which court said, “had to do with the duties of his office.” (Byun Duk-kun, “Park Jie-won Sentenced to 12 Years,” Korea Times, December 12, 2003)
12/9-12/03:
EU-DPRK talks in Pyongyang. Foreign Ministry officials said “for national security reasons, they cannot possibly dismantle their nuclear program until they have all the assurances they need for their security,” said Percy Westerlund, director of external relations for the European Commission. (Seo Soo-min, “No Signs of North Korea Wavering,” Korea Times, December 12, 2003)
12/12/03:
China was pressing for another six-party meeting that they hoped would demonstrate progress. Chinese officials drafted a statement to be released at the end of the meeting, saying quick approval would ensure that the North Koreans would attend a round of talks in December. When Bush’s top foreign policy aides met on to discuss the Chinese initiative, Cheney — who had not attended a North Korea meeting for months — unexpectedly showed up. The text, as drafted by the Chinese, did not call for “irreversible” dismantling of North Korea’s programs or mention “verification,” two key phrases in previous U.S. statements. The vice president weighed in strongly at the meeting, saying those phrases needed to be in the statement. At one point, Cheney invoked the president and said he had made it clear that the United States doesn’t negotiate with tyranny, according to two officials who attended the meeting. “We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it,” Cheney declared. That ended the discussion: The Chinese draft was rejected. Kevin Kellems, Cheney’s spokesman, expressed doubt that Cheney put it that bluntly: “I don’t think he said it. I have never heard him say anything like it.” (Glenn Kessler, “Impact from the Shadows,” Washington Post, October 5, 2004, p. A-1)
12/13/03:
U.S. asks China for another revision, saying draft did not call for international verification of abandonment of nuclear program. (Kyodo, “U.S. Asks China Again to Revise Statement of 6-Way Talks,” December 13, 2003)
Saddam captured.
12/14/03:
Roh, four parties agree to send 3,000 troops to Iraq, says spokesman Yoon Tai-young. (Shim Jae-yun, “Party Leaders Agree to Troop Plan,” December 14, 2003)
In telephone conversation with SecState Powell, China FM Li Zhaoxing urges U.S. “to take a more flexible and practical attitude.” (AFP, “China Tells US: Be More Flexible and Practical on North Korea,” December 15, 2003)
Presidential candidate Howard Dean favors bilateral talks, offer of “nonaggression pact” for dismantlement under “intrusive inspection regime.” “Down the line,” North Korea “ought to be able to enter the community of nations. We have much better control over the rogue behavior of errant states if they are in the tent than not.” (Glenn Kessler, “Dean Working to Be Seen as Foreign Policy Centrist,” Washington Post, December 14, 2003, p. A-1)
12/15/03:
At inaugural summit of East Asia Forum (ASEAN Plus Three), Kim Dae-jung calls for U.S. guarantee of North’s security, advancement into the international community. (Seo Soo-min, “DJ Urges Pyongyang, Washington to Negotiate,” Korea Times, December 15, 2003)
Rodong Sinmun signed commentary: “As for the DPRK-proposed first-phase measures for a simultaneous package solution, it is not just a simple ‘words-for-words’ commitment but an indication of its will to take direct actions to realize the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula as desired by all parties concerned. …
The U.S. is categorically refusing to take any measure in return for the DPRK’s freeze of its nuclear activities, describing it as sort of ‘reward.’ As the U.S. urges the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear weapons completely, verifiably and irreversibly, the latter has the same right to demand the U.S., the dialogue partner, give it complete, verifiable and irreversible security assurances.
If the U.S. fully accepts the DPRK-proposed simultaneous package solution, though belatedly, the DPRK is ready to respond to it with the elimination of all its nuclear weapons. But the U.S. in its proposal sent through a channel did not mention the DPRK-proposed simultaneous package solution at all but only asserted that the DPRK should ‘scrap nuclear weapons program first.’ …Its delaying tactics would only result in compelling the DPRK to steadily increase its nuclear deterrent force.” (KCNA, “U.S. Urged to Accept DPRK-Proposed Simultaneous Package Solution,” December 15, 2003)
Oil pipeline connects Daching oil field, China’s largest, to Ahnju in DPRK, Yomiuri Shimbun reports. (Dong-A Ilbo, “Oil Pipe between China and North Korea Verified,” December 14, 2003)
Presidential candidate John Edwards’s speech in Des Moines: “This administration does not have a coherent strategy for North Korea. All they are trying to do is persuade China to put pressure on North Korea. This is not a serious strategy to protect America. As president I will work with our allies to develop a serious plan for ending their destabilizing weapons programs and exports — a plan that includes carrots and sticks. We will verify that the North is complying and there will be real consequences if they are not. And I will work with them to develop a long-term strategy for the political and economic transformation of North Korea toward democracy and freedom.”
12/16/03:
Poll finds 57.6% disapproval for Roh’s job performance, compared to 65.1% in October. More than half of those who said they voted for Roh would not do so now. (Yoon Won-sup, “6 in 10 Disapprove Roh’s Performance,” Korea Times, December 18, 2003)
12/17/03:
Ruling parties (LDP, New Komeito) decides to submit bill in January revising Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Controls to allow economic sanctions against North Korea. (Kyodo, “Coalition Agrees to Send N. Korea Sanctions Bill to Diet,” December 17, 2003)
FM Yoon Young-kwan interview: “We will be implementing a Hong Kong-Shenzen model to the North Korean situation. Because Kaesong is so close to Seoul, if we can succeed in this project, the positive economic and political impact will be great. … The key of our North Korea policy is helping North Korea to adopt market mechanisms. That will help them rebuild their own economy, which will in turn bring about some positive domestic political impact in terms of North Korea’s international behavior. .. We South Koreans do not want abrupt change. We are not ready to digest sudden change in the political situation in North Korea.” (Norimitsu Onishi, “Seoul Has Big Plans for North Korea (Nightmares, Too),” New York Times, December 17, 2003, p. A-4)
12/19/03:
Daschle, Levin, Rockefeller letter to Bush: “To date, our negotiators have been lacking the clear guidance and flexibility necessary for successful negotiations. The result has been a serious loss of time and conflicting signals to our allies and the North Koreans.” Seek a briefing. (Text in Nelson report, 12/18/03)
Senior administration official: “Libya admitted elements of the history of its cooperation with North to develop extra long-range Scud missiles.” (Kyodo, “Libya Admits Working with N. Korea on Scud Missiles: U.S. Official,” December 19, 2003)
Japan will introduce missile defense based on recognition, says Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda, that the “system has reached technological maturity.” (Shimoyachi Nao, “Japan Approves Plan for Missile Defense,” Japan Times, December 20, 2003)
Joseph DeTrani in Beijing meets with Vice FM Wang Yi and Asian Affairs Department director Fu Ying. China names Ning Fukui special ambassador to coordinate six-party talks. (AFP, “US Envoy Discusses New North Korea Talks with Chinese Host,” December 19, 2003)
12/17-20/03:
N-S working-level economic talks. No agreement on safe passage. (Joint Press Corps, “Two Koreas Fail to Agree on Safe Passage,” Korea Times, December 21, 2003)
12/20/03:
Administration official: “We have no objection to a freeze as a step along the way. But the freeze cannot be cited as a goal by North Korea. This has to be a thorough process. We need something more than their earlier assertion that sometime in the future, the hope for a Korean peninsula without nuclear weapons.” (Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Won’t Lift Sanctions Until Libya Keeps Its Word,” New York Times, December 21, 2003, p. 30)
12/21/03:
U.S. deploying Stryker armored vehicles, AH-64D Apache Longbows, Shadow 200 UAVs to Korea, part of Rumsfeld’s June decision for $11 billion to compensate for redeploying 2nd Division. (Barbara Demick, “U.S. Puts Its Latest Arms in S. Korea,” Los Angeles Times, December 21, 2003)
12/20-21/03:
In meetings with Japanese lawmakers in Beijing, North says it will allow abductees’ kin to go to Japan if abductees fly to Pyongyang airport to meet them, admits details inaccurate. Japanese reject offer. (Kyodo, “N. Korea Advances New Proposal on Abduction Issue, December 25, 2003; Kyodo, “North Korea Willing to Resolve Abduction Issue, Admits Mistakes in Info, December 26, 2003; Takahashi Junko, “Pyongyang Offers to Free Abductees’ Kin — But There’s a Catch,” Japan Times, December 26, 2003 ) “We are prepared to return them. It’s troublesome for us to have the children stay in Pyongyang,” Jong Thae-hwa was quoted by the Japanese as saying. (Asahi Shimbun, “Insight: N. Korea Looking for a Way to ‘Save Face,’” January 12, 2004) PM Koizumi on December 25: “I think North Korea wants to try to break the current impasse.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Govt to Assess N. Korea Pitch,” December 27, 2003) DPRK set up Korea-Japan Exchange Association last fall under Vice FM Kim Yong-il, chief representative at six-party talks to give FoMin the lead over the party in dealing with Japan. Song Il-ho is Association’s vice president. Four out of five North Koreans who took part in meetings with Japanese lawmakers have ties to it. Jong Thae-hwa, chief delegate to normalization talks in October 2002, met with Japanese parliamentary group in December under the title of standing adviser to the association. (Kyodo, “Pyongyang Sets Up New Organization to Deal with Japan,” January 7, 2004)
12/25/03:
U.S. will donate another 60,000 tons of food. (Joo Yong-jung, “U.S. Donates More Food for North Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, December 25, 2003)
12/26/03:
In two days of meetings with Kang Sok-ju and Kim Gae-gwan, Vice FM Wang Yi says North to resume six-party talks early next year. (Kyodo, “N. Korea Agrees to Hold 6-Way Talks Early This Year,” December 26, 2003)
12/?/03:
Li Gun paper: “During the Clinton administration, as the result of DPRK-US negotiations to resolve the nuclear question, U.S. policy toward North Korea showed signs of moving away from pure hostility to partial engagement. For a time there was even a glimmer of hope fo the eventual solution to the nuclear question … But with the Bush administration putting an end to bilateral political dialogue, its ‘axis of evil’ pronouncement, and defining North Korea as a target of preemptive nuclear strike, the nuclear question has come back to the starting point.” (Charles L. Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy (Washington: Brookings, 2007), p. 2)