DPRK (NORTH KOREA) CHRONOLOGY FOR 2017
Compiled by
Leon V. Sigal
Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project
Contact:
1/1/17:
North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, said that his country was making final preparations to conduct its first test of an intercontinental ballistic missile — a bold statement less than a month before the inauguration of President-elect Donald J. Trump. In his annual New Year’s Day speech, which was broadcast on the North’s state-run KCTV on Sunday, Mr. Kim spoke proudly of the strides he said his country has made in its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. He said that North Korea would continue to bolster its weapons programs as long as the United States remained hostile and continued its joint military exercises with South Korea. “We have reached the final stage in preparations to test-launch an intercontinental ballistic rocket,” he said. Analysts in the region have said that Kim might conduct another weapons test in coming months, taking advantage of leadership changes in the United States and South Korea. Kim’s speech indicated that North Korea may test-launch a long-range rocket several times this year to complete its ICBM program, said Cheong Seong-chang, a senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute of South Korea. “We need to take note of the fact that this is the first New Year’s speech where Kim Jong-un mentioned an intercontinental ballistic missile,” he said. Doubt still runs deep that North Korea has mastered all technology needed to build a reliable ICBM. But analysts in the region said that the North’s launchings of three-stage rockets to put satellites into orbit in recent years showed that the country had cleared some key technological hurdles. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Says It’s Close to Long-Range Missile Test,” New York Times, January 2, 2016,
New Year’s Day Address: “Dear Comrades, Having seen out 2016, in which we glorified each and every day with gigantic struggle, creating a new history of great prosperity unprecedented in the history of the Juche revolution, we are seeing in the new year 2017. …Last year, amid the soaring revolutionary enthusiasm of all the Party members, service personnel and other people and great interest of the world, the Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea was held in a meaningful and splendid way as a grand political festival. The congress proudly reviewed our Party’s glorious history of advancing the revolutionary cause of Juche along the victorious road under the wise leadership of the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and unfolded an ambitious blueprint for accomplishing the socialist cause under the banner of Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism. Through this historic congress, the iron will of our service personnel and people to continuously march along the road of Juche following the Party was fully demonstrated, and lasting groundwork for the Korean revolution was laid. It will be etched in the history of our country as a meeting of victors that demonstrated the invincible might of the great Kimilsungist-Kimjongilist party, as a glorious meeting that set up a new milestone in carrying out the revolutionary cause of Juche. Last year an epochal turn was brought about in consolidating the defense capability of Juche Korea, and our country achieved the status of a nuclear power, a military giant, in the East which no enemy, however formidable, would dare to provoke. We conducted the first H-bomb test, test-firing of various means of strike and nuclear warhead test successfully to cope with the imperialists’ nuclear war threats, which were growing more wicked day by day, briskly developed state-of-the-art military hardware, and entered the final stage of preparation for the test launch of intercontinental ballistic missile; we achieved other marvelous successes one after another for the consolidation of the defense capability. This provided a powerful military guarantee for defending the destiny of the country and nation and victoriously advancing the cause of building a powerful socialist country. Our valiant People’s Army reliably defended the security of the country and the gains of the revolution by resolutely frustrating the enemy’s reckless moves for aggression and war, and gave perfect touches to its political and ideological aspects and military and technical preparations, as befits an invincible army. The brilliant successes achieved in the sector of national defense instilled a great national dignity and courage in our people, drove the imperialists and other reactionary forces into an ignominious defeat, and remarkably raised the strategic position of our country. Last year we achieved proud successes in the 70-day campaign and 200-day campaign organized for glorifying the Seventh Congress of the Party. These campaigns were a do-or-die struggle in which all the people smashed to smithereens the enemy’s vicious schemes to isolate and suffocate our country and brought about a turning point on all fronts where a powerful socialist country is being built, a massive struggle of creation that gave birth to a new Mallima era. Thanks to the heroic struggle of the Kim Il Sung’s and Kim Jong Il’s working class and all other people, the ambitious goals the Party set for the 70-day campaign and 200-day campaign were attained with success and a fresh breakthrough was made in the development of the national economy. Our resourceful, talented scientists and technicians, following the successful launch of the earth observation satellite Kwangmyongsong 4, succeeded in the static firing test of new-type high-thrust motor of the launch vehicle for a geostationary satellite. By doing so, they have opened up a broad avenue to the exploration of outer space. Also, they established fully-automated, model production systems of our own style, bred high-yielding strains with a view to ramping up agricultural production and achieved other laudable scientific and technological breakthroughs one after another. All this will be of great significance in developing the country’s economy and improving the people’s livelihood. The electric-power, coal-mining, metallurgical, chemical and building-materials industries, rail transport and other major sectors of the national economy attained their respective production and transport goals, thereby demonstrating the potential of our self-supporting economy and giving a powerful impetus to the building of a socialist economic giant. Numerous industrial establishments and cooperative farms registered the proud success of surpassing the peak-year level. The People’s Army stood in the vanguard in adding lustre to the history of “gold seas” and in creating a legendary speed at important construction sites. The sectors of education, public health and sports, too, made admirable achievements. When some areas in North Hamgyong Province were devastated by a sudden natural calamity, the whole country turned out in the restoration effort in hearty response to the Party’s appeal and achieved a miraculous success in a short span of time. During the 70-day campaign and 200-day campaign we created a new spirit of the times for building a powerful socialist country, and our people’s trust in the Party and confidence in socialism grew firmer. Last year, in which the whole country kept on seething with vigor day and night, all the Party members and other working people, youth and service personnel gave full scope to the indomitable attacking spirit of braving ordeals and difficulties, the death-defying mettle of answering the Party’s call with devotion and practice in any adversity, and the collectivist might of helping one another and leading one another forward to advance by leaps and bounds. …We should wage a vigorous all-people, general offensive to hit the targets of the five-year strategy on the strength of self-reliance and self-development. The strength of self-reliance and self-development is that of science and technology, and the shortcut to implementing the five-year strategy is to give importance and precedence to science and technology. The sector of science and technology should concentrate efforts on solving scientific and technological problems arising in modernizing factories and enterprises and putting their production on a regular footing with the main emphasis on ensuring the domestic production of raw materials, fuel and equipment. Production units and scientific research institutes should intensify cooperation between themselves, and enterprises should build up their own technological development forces and conduct a proactive mass-based technological innovation drive, propelling economic development with valuable sci-tech achievements conducive to expanded production and the improvement of business operation and management. The electric-power, metallurgical and chemical industries should take the lead in the efforts to hit the targets of the economic strategy. The electric-power industry should carry out its production plan without fail by ensuring good maintenance of generating equipment and structures and stepping up its technical upgrading. It should run the nationwide integrated power control system effectively and organize alternated production scrupulously to ensure balance between power production and consumption; it should also develop the various sources of power to create a new generating capacity on a large scale. The metallurgical industry should introduce advanced technologies to lower the iron production cost and ensure normal operation of Juche-based production lines to turn out iron and steel in larger amounts. The state should take stringent measures to supply raw materials, fuel and power to the Kim Chaek and Hwanghae iron and steel complexes and other metallurgical factories. The chemical industry is a basis for all other industries and plays an important role in consolidating the independence of the economy and improving the people’s living standards. This sector should revitalize production at the February 8 Vinalon Complex, expand the capacity of other major chemical factories and transform their technical processes in our own way, thus increasing the output of various chemical goods. It should direct efforts to establishing a C1 chemical industry to carry out the tasks at every stage promptly and satisfactorily. The coal-mining industry and the rail transport sector should meet the demands for coal and its transport by power stations and metallurgical and chemical factories on a top priority basis. The machine-building industry should be rapidly developed. Machine factories should step up their modernization, perfect the processes for the serial production of new-type tractors, vehicles and multi-purpose farm machines, and produce and supply different kinds of high-performance and quality machinery and equipment. This year light industry, agriculture and fishing industry should be radically developed to make greater progress in improving the people’s living standards. Light industry should work out proper management strategies, regarding use of domestically available raw and other materials as their core, so as to revitalize production and bring about a turn in diversifying the range and types of consumer goods and improving their quality. It should normalize production in the mines and enterprises in the Tanchon area, so that they can prove effective in improving the people’s living standards. The agricultural front, the major thrust in building an economic giant, should raise a strong wind of scientific farming and push forward the movement for increasing crop yield. It should widely introduce seeds of superior strains and scientific farming methods, whose advantages have been proved in practice, expand the area of land under two-crop farming, and be proactive in inventing and introducing high-performance farm machines. By doing so, it can attain the production goal of grains. It should adopt measures to run the livestock farming base in the Sepho area on a normal basis and increase the production of fruits, mushrooms and vegetables, so that the people can enjoy benefits from them. The fishing sector should conduct a dynamic drive for catching fishes and push perseveringly ahead with aquatic farming. It should build modern fishing vessels in a greater number and lay out a comprehensive fishing equipment production base in the east coast area, so as to consolidate the material and technical foundations of the fishing industry. The construction sector should complete the construction of Ryomyong Street at the highest level and concentrate its forces on the major construction projects including the building of the Tanchon Power Station, modernization of the Kim Jong Thae Electric Locomotive Complex and the development of the Wonsan area. It should also build more educational and cultural facilities and houses in an excellent way. …Upholding the slogan of self-reliance and self-sufficiency, every field and every unit of the national economy should launch a dynamic struggle to increase production and practice economy to the maximum, and thus carry out the plan for this year on all indices. The whole country should turn out in land administration. We should further transform the appearance of the land of our country by building modern tree nurseries in provinces, perseveringly pressing on with the forest restoration campaign and conducting river management, road repair and environmental conservation on a planned basis. In order to bring about a turnabout in implementing the five-year strategy for national economic development, it is imperative to carry on economic guidance and business management with clear objectives and in an innovative way. The Cabinet and other economic guidance organs should work out tactics to ensure the sustainable economic development by putting the overall national economy definitely on an upward track, and implement them with an unflinching perseverance. …The political and military position of socialism should be further cemented so that it can be an impregnable fortress. Single-hearted unity is the precious revolutionary legacy the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il bequeathed to us, and herein lies the invincible might of our style of socialism. All the service personnel and people should establish the ties of kinship with the Party, their hearts pulsating to the same beat as it, and unite closely behind it in ideology, purpose and moral obligation, so as to struggle staunchly to achieve the prosperity of the country. We should thoroughly apply the people-first doctrine, the crystallization of the Juche-oriented view on the people, philosophy of the people, in Party work and all the spheres of state and social life, and wage an intensive struggle to root out abuses of power, bureaucratism and corruption that spoil the flower garden of single-hearted unity. We should resolutely thwart the enemy’s sinister and pernicious schemes to check the warm and pure-hearted aspiration of our people who follow the Party single-heartedly and to alienate the Party from them. In this year of the 85th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army, we should raise the fierce flames of increasing the military capability. The People’s Army should conduct the Party’s political work in a proactive manner, so as to ensure that it is pervaded with the ideology and intentions of the Party alone. It should designate this year as another year of training, another year of perfecting its combat preparedness, and ensure that all its units of different arms, services and corps raise a hot wind of perfecting their combat preparedness in order to train all its officers and men as a-match-for-a-hundred combatants, tigers of Mt Paektu, who are capable of annihilating any aggressor force at a stroke. Officers and men of the Korean People’s Internal Security Forces and members of the Worker-Peasant Red Guards and Young Red Guards should prepare themselves politically and militarily and maintain full combat readiness to firmly defend the socialist system and the people’s lives and property. Officials, scientists and workers in the defense industry, burning their hearts with the “Yongil bomb spirit” of the days of the anti-Japanese struggle and the revolutionary spirit of the workers of Kunja-ri of the days of the Fatherland Liberation War, should develop and produce larger quantities of powerful military hardware of our own style. By doing so, they can build up the arsenal of the Songun revolution. …The current stirring era demands that our officials, standard-bearers in carrying out the Party’s policies, improve their working style and attitude in a revolutionary way. Last year, in reflection of the national desire for reunification and the requirements of the times, we put forward the Juche-oriented line and policy of reunification at the Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea and made strenuous efforts to this end. However, the south Korean authorities turned a deaf ear to our patriotic appeal and ignored our sincere proposal. Instead, they clung to their sanctions-and-pressure schemes against the DPRK and persisted in clamoring for a war against it, thus driving inter-Korean relations towards the worst catastrophe. Last year, south Korea witnessed a massive anti-“government” struggle spreading far and wide to shake the reactionary ruling machinery to its foundations. This resistance involving all south Korean people, which left an indelible mark in the history of their struggle, was an outburst of pent-up grudge and indignation against the conservative regime that had been resorting to fascist dictatorship, anti-popular policy, sycophantic and traitorous acts and confrontation with their compatriots. This year we will mark the 45th anniversary of the historic July 4 Joint Statement and the 10th anniversary of the October 4 Declaration. This year we should open up a broad avenue to independent reunification through a concerted effort of the whole nation. Positive measures should be taken to improve inter-Korean relations, avoid acute military confrontation and remove the danger of war between north and south. The improvement of inter-Korean relations is the starting-point for peace and reunification, and it is a pressing demand of the whole nation. Any politician, if he or she remains a passive onlooker to the current deadlock between the two sides, can neither claim to be fully discharging his or her responsibility and role for the nation nor enjoy public support. Every manner of abuses and slanders aimed at offending the other party and inciting confrontation cannot be justified on any account, and an immediate stop should be put to the malicious smear campaign and other acts of hostility towards the DPRK, all designed for the overthrow of its system and any other “change.” We are consistent in our stand to safeguard the security of the compatriots and peace of the country without fighting with the fellow countrymen. The south Korean authorities should not aggravate the situation by finding fault with our exercise of the right to self-defense thoughtlessly, but respond positively to our sincere efforts to prevent military conflict between north and south and ease the tension. They should also discontinue arms buildup and war games. The whole nation should pool their will and efforts to usher in a heyday of the nationwide reunification movement. All the Korean people in the north, in the south and abroad should achieve solidarity, make concerted efforts and unite on the principle of subordinating everything to national reunification, the common cause of the nation, and revitalize the reunification movement on a nationwide scale. They should promote active contact and exchange with each other irrespective of differences in their ideologies and systems, regions and ideals, and classes and social strata, and hold a pan-national, grand meeting for reunification involving all the political parties and organizations including the authorities in the north and south, as well as the compatriots of all strata at home and abroad. We will readily join hands with anyone who prioritizes the fundamental interests of the nation and is desirous of improving inter-Korean relations. It is necessary to frustrate the challenges of the anti-reunification forces at home and abroad who go against the aspiration of the nation for reunification. We must put an end to the moves for aggression and intervention by the foreign forces including the United States that is occupying south Korea and tries to realize the strategy for achieving hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and wage a dynamic pan-national struggle to thwart the moves of the traitorous and sycophantic anti-reunification forces like Park Geun Hye who, failing to see clearly who is the real arch-enemy of the nation, is trying to find a way out in confrontation with the fellow countrymen. Well aware of the will of the Korean nation to reunify their country, the United States must no longer cling to the scheme of whipping up national estrangement by inciting the anti-reunification forces in south Korea to confrontation with the fellow countrymen and war. It must make a courageous decision to roll back its anachronistic policy hostile towards the DPRK. The international community that values independence and justice should oppose the moves of the United States and its vassal forces aimed at wrecking peace on the Korean peninsula and checking its reunification, and the neighboring countries should act in favor of our nation’s aspiration and efforts for reunification. All the fellow countrymen in the north, in the south and abroad should do something to make this year a meaningful year of a new phase in independent reunification by stepping up a nationwide grand march towards reunification through the concerted effort of the nation. Last year the imperialist reactionary forces’ moves for political and military pressure and sanctions against our country reached an extreme. But they failed to break the faith of our service personnel and people in victory, and could not check the vigorous revolutionary advance of Juche Korea. We will continue to build up our self-defense capability, the pivot of which is the nuclear forces, and the capability for preemptive strike as long as the United States and its vassal forces keep on nuclear threat and blackmail and as long as they do not stop their war games they stage at our doorstep disguising them as annual events. We will defend peace and security of our state at all costs and by our own efforts, and make a positive contribution to safeguarding global peace and stability. Our Party and the government of our Republic will remain committed to the ideals of our foreign policy of independence, peace and friendship, expand and develop the relations of good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation with those countries championing independence, and make concerted efforts with them to ensure genuine international justice. Comrades, As I am standing here to proclaim the beginning of another year, I feel a surge of anxiety about what I should do to hold our people in greater reverence, the best people in the world who have warmly supported me with a single mind out of their firm trust in me. My desires were burning all the time, but I spent the past year feeling anxious and remorseful for the lack of my ability. I am hardening my resolve to seek more tasks for the sake of the people this year and make redoubled, devoted efforts to this end. Previously, all the people used to sing the song We Are the Happiest in the World, feeling optimistic about the future with confidence in the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. I will work with devotion to ensure that the past era does not remain as a moment in history but is re-presented in the present era. On this first morning of the new year I swear to become a true servant loyal to our people who faithfully supports them with a pure conscience. And I will push the effort to set up across the Party a revolutionary climate of making selfless, devoted efforts for the good of the people. As long as the great Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism is illuminating the road ahead of us and we have the single-hearted unity of all the service personnel and people around the Party, we are sure to emerge victorious. Let us all march forward dynamically towards a bright future, holding up the splendid blueprint unfolded by the Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea to develop ours into a powerful socialist country.” (Kim Jong Un’s New Year Address, Rodong Sinmun, January 2, 2017)
President-elect Donald Trump has asked for an intelligence briefing on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, Reuters reported. “Trump’s first, and at that time only, request for a special classified intelligence briefing was for one on North Korea and its nuclear weapons program,” the news agency said citing a senior U.S. intelligence official. “North Korea and its nuclear program has also been of interest to retired Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, Trump’s choice for national security advisor.” (Cho Yi-jun, “Trump Asks for Briefing on N. Korean Nukes,” Chosun Ilbo, January 3, 2017)
1/2/17:
A day after North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, declared that the “final stage in preparations” was underway to test an intercontinental ballistic missile, President-elect Donald J. Trump took to Twitter to declare bluntly, “It won’t happen!” Kim offered no time frame. “North Korea just stated that it is in the final stages of developing a nuclear weapon capable of reaching parts of the U.S.,” Trump wrote, somewhat misstating. Kim’s warning. Pyongyang has already tested nuclear weapons underground; the latest threat concerned what Kim called a “test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile.” After his first Twitter message, “China has been taking out massive amounts of money & wealth from the U.S. in totally one-sided trade, but won’t help with North Korea. Nice!” That appeared to reflect briefings Mr. Trump has received about how Chinese leaders fear instability and collapse in the North more than the status quo. A spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected Trump’s criticisms and appeared to suggest that such comments could inflame tensions with North Korea. “We hope that all sides avoid using words and actions that lead to escalating tensions,” the spokesman, Geng Shuang, said at a regular news briefing in Beijing on January 3 when asked about Mr. Trump’s messages. Geng said that China was committed to using negotiations to defuse the standoff over North Korea’s nuclear weapons. China, he said, “has made tremendous efforts to promote a peaceful and effective solution to the North Korean nuclear issue.” In his New Year’s Day speech, Kim said he would continue his country’s efforts to build a nuclear-strike capability unless the United States abandoned its “hostile” policy toward the North. How Trump would respond to such a provocation is a matter of great concern for South Koreans. (Maggie Haberman and David E. Sanger, “‘Won’t Happen,’ Trump Says of North Korean Missile Test,” New York Times, January 3, 2017, p. A-13)
1/3/17:
The number of North Koreans escaping to South Korea rose 11 percent on-year in 2016, government data showed, as more elites and overseas workers fled the country amid tough international sanctions. A total of 1,414 North Koreans came to South Korea last year, compared to 1,275 tallied for 2015, according to a preliminary data provided by the Ministry of Unification.
The total number of North Korean defectors in South Korea reached 30,208 as of end-December.
The 2016 tally marked the first time that the pace of annual growth picked up since 2011 when the North’s leader Kim Jong-un took office. The number of defectors reaching the South peaked at 2,914 in 2009, but the pace of growth had fallen off since 2011 as Kim strengthened border control and surveillance over North Koreans. (Yonhap, “Number of N.K. Defectors Grows 11% On-Year 2016: Data,” Korea Herald, January 3, 2017)
DoS Spokesman John Kirby: “Q: And then what is the U.S. assessment? I know you say you don’t talk about intelligence, but what if he’s lying? I mean, what if this is just an empty – empty threat? What is your assessment? I mean, is he close to – is this the last stage, or he is just — KIRBY: I think the intel – my understanding is that – again, we don’t talk about intelligence issues, so that’s one. Number two, we do continue to believe that he continues to pursue both nuclear and ballistic missile technologies. I mean, that’s pretty apparent. We do not believe that he, at this point in time, has the capability to tip one of these with a nuclear warhead. That’s as far as I’m going to go in terms of assessing. But we do know that he continues to want to have those capabilities and he continues – the programs continue to march in that direction, which is why, quite frankly, that the whole international community is as galvanized as it is to try to deter and to stop that. … Q: Yeah. Following up on Six-Party Talks, you mentioned – you called for them to return to that process. Is that without preconditions? KIRBY: It has always been. I mean, we want them to return. And the – but the condition is that they have to commit to a verifiable denuclearization of the peninsula. That’s always been the case, if that’s what you mean by preconditions. Nothing’s changed in that regard. They’ve got to be able to commit to denuclearization of the peninsula, and they have proven, obviously, unwilling to do that and unwilling to return to the process. … Q: John, you mentioned that the U.S. doesn’t believe that North Korea has the capability to … put a nuclear warhead on one of its missiles. KIRBY: To tip one. Yeah. Q: Does that mean any kind of missile, a short-range missile, a mid-range? KIRBY: I think I’m just going to leave it at that. I’m going to leave my statement where it was.” (DoS Daily Briefing, January 3, 2017)
1/4/17:
South Korea will this year launch a special unit tasked with incapacitating North Korea’s wartime leadership, two years ahead of schedule, its defense chief said Wednesday, as it strives to better counter Pyongyang’s evolving military threats. During its New Year policy briefing to Acting President and Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn, Defense Minister Han Min-koo said the military is putting top priority on beefing up defense capabilities against North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which includes nukes and missiles. “We are planning to set up a special brigade with the goal of removing or (at least) paralyzing North Korea’s wartime command structure (in the face of escalating threats from the communist state),” Han told Hwang, who took over the country’s executive powers from President Park Geun-Hye after she was impeached by parliament last month. In a related move, Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff launched the Countering Nuclear and WMD Center on Jan. 1 to better handle North Korea’s growing nuclear threats by drawing up military operations and strategic countermeasures in a more detailed and organized manner. The Ministry of National Defense has recently updated the size of weapons-grade plutonium and highly-enriched uranium that the North may be holding, the minister said. The materials are critical in making nuclear weapons. Seoul estimates Pyongyang has some 40 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, which is sufficient to manufacture four to eight nuclear weapons. In other efforts to cope with WMDs, the military will speed up the planned deployment of advanced weapons by a couple of years from the original schedule of the mid-2020s to enhance the country’s defense capabilities, the ministry said. Under the “three-pillar” system, South Korea aims to detect the North’s incoming missiles and launch counterattacks against the communist state’s key facilities. The system includes a “kill chain” strike system, the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and the Korea Massive Punishment & Retaliation (KMPR) plan. The entire plan is based on the use of locally developed defense systems. The kill chain and the KAMD are designed to detect and destroy incoming missiles in the shortest possible time. The KMPR is aimed at launching attacks on the North’s military leadership if signs of the imminent use of nuclear weapons are detected. Han said the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) will be deployed in South Korea as planned. In November, U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Vincent Brooks said the THAAD missile defense system will be installed in eight to 10 months to counter growing nuclear and missile threats from the North. As for defense ties with Japan and China, the minister said South Korea will expand bilateral intelligence sharing with Japan under the the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) signed in November to counter North Korean threats. With China, he said Seoul will seek ways to explain the need for the THAAD system. China has explicitly expressed opposition against the planned THAAD deployment in South Korea on concerns that the move could hurt its strategic security interests. Looking ahead, the minister warned that the North could make a “strategic or tactical provocation” in the coming months while not giving up its nuclear and missile programs despite stricter international sanctions following its fourth nuclear test in January. The communist nation has a record of staging provocations around U.S. elections and transition periods. (Shin Hyon-hee, “Seoul Aims to Offset Leadership Vacuum, Up N.K. Pressure,” Korea Herald, January 4, 2017)
South Korea plans to faithfully implement a set of U.N. and unilateral sanctions against North Korea and seek ways to boost their effectiveness this year, Seoul’s unification ministry said. It also said that it will not respond to North Korea’s offer for talks which has no sincerity, but instead make efforts to seek inter-Korean dialogue that could contribute to North Korea’s denuclearization. “This year, North Korea is expected to seek recognition as a nuclear state and may continue to overturn South Korea’s inter-Korean policy and the international sanctions regime,” the ministry said in a statement. Seoul’s unification ministry presented its 2017 policy goals to Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn who serves as acting president following a parliamentary impeachment of President Park Geun-hye. The government said that North Korea’s willingness to give up its nuclear weapons should take precedence if the two Koreas are to hold meaningful dialogue. “North Korea does not seem to have an interest in denuclearization, as Kim’s New Year message showed. At the current stage, we are not considering proposing dialogue to the North,” Unification Minister Hong Yong-pyo told reporters. Kim Nam-jung, the head of the ministry’s unification policy office, said that resuming the complex would not be easy, given the U.N. sanctions imposed on North Korea last year. “There may be many limitations (in resuming the Kaesong Industrial Complex). It is hard to gauge the current situation at the factory zone, but it is believed that there are no signs that North Korea moves equipment out of the complex.” The ministry, meanwhile, said that it seeks to allow civic groups to provide humanitarian assistance to socially vulnerable people in North Korea, including infants, after taking into account various factors such as necessity and urgency. Seoul has suspended almost all civilian inter-Korean exchanges and South Koreans’ visits to North Korea since Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016. With virtually all cross-border exchanges at a standstill, the Unification Ministry will focus on laying the foundation for a unification at home such as by improving policy on defectors and human rights in North Korea. But the ministry said it would explore ways to revive dialogue if it contributes to the denuclearization of the peninsula. “It’s not that we won’t do talks. Our direction is to hold denuclearization talks first and then expand them to other areas if conditions are mature,” Unification Minister Hong Yong-pyo said at a news conference. “For the two Koreas to have meaningful dialogue, the North’s resolve for a denuclearization is vital. But at the moment, as the North’s firm resolve for nuclear development was confirmed in (Kim’s) New Year speech, we are not considering offering talks from our part first.” Since Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test and long-range missile firing early last year, Seoul refrained from providing humanitarian assistance or approving civic groups’ requests. Hong, however, acknowledged the need for sustained relief supplies, saying he would support aid for children, pregnant women and others in need and make a decision based on “necessity, urgency and transparency.” (Yonhap, “S. Korea Vows to Continue Employing Pressure, Sanctions on N.K. This Year,” January 4, 2017)
Rodong Sinmun: “The improvement of the north-south relations is a starting point for achieving the peace in the country and advancing the cause of national reunification. Improving the inter-Korean ties is a vital issue related to the destiny of the nation and the supreme task, a matter of utmost urgency. If the north and the south of Korea remain partitioned and stand against each other, it is absolutely impossible to pave the way for peace and reunification. To allow the north-south ties of confrontation and distrust to persist is just tantamount to committing an indelible crime against history and the generations to come. The north-south ties on which the destiny of the nation depends should be replaced by the ties of trust and reconciliation and only then is it possible to achieve lasting peace on the Korean peninsula and the independent reunification of the country by the concerted efforts of all Koreans. Whoever is concerned about the destiny of the nation should not be indifferent to the improvement of the ties but should boldly take the patriotic road of national reconciliation and unity, transcending differences in ideology, ism and social system. It is the steadfast will of all the fellow countrymen in the north and the south and abroad to meet the blatant challenges of the anti-reunification forces at home and abroad and open a new phase in the improvement of the north-south ties and the realization of the independent reunification.” (KCNA, “Improvement of North-South Relations Is Starting Point for Peace and Reunification: Rodong Sinmun, January 4, 2017)
Kim Jong Un rang in the New Year with an unsettling announcement: that North Korea was perfecting the design of an intercontinental ballistic missile, potentially posing a dire threat to the United States and its allies. President-elect Donald Trump was quick to respond with a pair of cryptic tweets that seemed to warn North Korea, or China, or both. His first: “North Korea just stated that it is in the final stages of developing a nuclear weapon capable of reaching parts of the US. It won’t happen!” Followed by: “China has been taking out massive amounts of money & wealth from the U.S. in totally one-sided trade, but won’t help with North Korea. Nice!” Sometime in the past year, the small tribe of North Korea-watchers has watched with alarm as Pyongyang has come closer of realizing its dream of a nuclear weapon that could hit U.S. shores. A swirl of tests this year showed the country making significant progress in its medium-range missile program and advancing toward larger goals. But just how scared should we be? And will Kim test President Trump with his first foreign policy crisis, as many national security experts expect? Not so fast, says Joshua Pollack, the editor of the Nonproliferation Review and senior research associate at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. It’s possible that North Korea’s enigmatic leader was, in fact, carefully moderating his language and signaling a willingness to go to deal with a new American administration. Of course, even if Kim is trying to cool it, an unpredictable Trump administration still worries Pollack for a number of reasons: rising U.S.-China tensions, a South Korea that wants nukes of its own and a region simmering with submerged tensions. “POLITICO: So after that tweet from Trump, a lot of people are predicting that North Korea will somehow provoke the first overseas crisis of Trump’s presidency. How do you think that might play out? Pollack: I don’t know that they’re intent on doing that. I got a very different message from reading Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s speech, and I thought he was actually intent on keeping his powder dry and waiting to see what moves the new administration makes and perhaps any new South Korean government that will come along. So, I’m not at all sure that there will be any such crisis. There was barely any movement on these issues during the Obama presidency. So, I could imagine something where the North Koreans could overplay their hand and, as a result, get nowhere. If they play it cool, then they might allow Trump an opening if he’s interested in pursuing one. POLITICO: An opening to do what? Pollack: To reach a new understanding. I think [Kim] said that in 2016 they completed the preparations for a test launch, or words to that effect. And he did not say, contrary to some headlines, that they’re planning one any time soon. So, you know, when you speak of preparations, that implies you will act, but he didn’t actually say that. He certainly did not promise it, and he could have. So, given that the speech overall was about big economic accomplishments this year, and was describing all of the military activities as accomplished or done, it made it sound like they checked a box. He also said that they would continue to strengthen their nuclear forces as long as the United States threatened them with nuclear weapons and with the joint exercises with the South Koreans that take place twice every year, and there he did not specifically say that they would undertake a nuclear test. He could have, but he was vague, and he sort of left it open. So, it seemed like he was putting down some markers about what might justify these activities and was perhaps putting them on the negotiating table. It’s difficult to make these inferences, but since his language was relatively muted and restrained compared to what it has been before and the overall focus of the speech was about basically overhauling the economy, I think it signaled that the door is open a crack. He did not refer openly to the new administration. The North Korean media has said very little about Trump, but simply because they are not eager to negotiate with Obama doesn’t mean that they wouldn’t be interested in negotiating with Trump, in my view. That’s why I see an opportunity there. There just wasn’t a whole lot of menace and saber-rattling. POLITICO: Do you think it reflects any kind of real change in their ambitions? Pollack: No. I mean, why would it? They have a longstanding approach which they’ve spelled out for us repeatedly, which is they want us to abandon what they call “the hostile policy.” They want us basically — they see themselves as being on a list of enemies, you know, an impression you might get from George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech, and they want off of it. They want us to treat them more like a peer, knowing that countries that have nuclear weapons tend not to mess with each other. So, they’re looking for ways to improve the situation to deter an attack that they always are afraid might be coming from the United States and South Korea.” (Katelyn Fossett, “Is Kim Jong Un Trying to Tell Donald Trump Something?” Politico, January 4, 2017)
1/5/17:
Trilateral Briefing: “Q: (Via interpreter) Thank you for the opportunity to ask a question. I am Hyun Won Sup from MBC. I have two questions. My first question goes to Deputy Secretary Blinken. You have mentioned about ways to address North Korea’s nuclear weapons. In his New Year’s speech, Kim Jong-un has mentioned that he is in the final stage of ICBM testing, and one North Korean defector diplomat has said that in the initial part of the Trump Administration North Korea will complete its nuclear weapons and, as a nuclear power, it will engage in negotiations with the United States. And as was mentioned before, there were several international sanctions; however, whether those sanctions were effective is something that we are thinking of these days. Some experts are saying that the United States has to consider some other military measures, including the preemptive attack, where they have to go ahead with negotiations with North Korea in order to address North Korea’s nuclear threats. What is – would be the most effective ways to address this issue? So we would be grateful for Deputy Secretary Blinken gives an answer to this question. …BLINKEN: Thank you. The effectiveness of sanctions and pressure requires two things. It requires determination and it requires patience: determination to build a sustained, comprehensive pressure campaign; and the patience to see that take hold and have effect. And it’s not like flipping a light switch. It takes time. But what we’ve done in the last year particularly is to put in place the building blocks of that sustained, comprehensive pressure campaign, as I described a few minutes ago, and it’s across the board. And I believe that as long as we sustain it and build on it, it will have an effect. And it will require the regime in North Korea to make a choice – a choice between continuing to pursue nuclear and missile programs that are unacceptable to the international community – not just the United States, not just Japan, not just Korea, the entire international community – or, if it doesn’t, it will face growing isolation and growing pressure in a way that will make it impossible for the regime to deliver on the basic needs of its people. Again, the purpose here is not to bring the regime to its knees. It’s to bring it to the table to negotiate authentic, credible steps toward denuclearization. And again, as I said a moment ago, it’s important to understand that it takes time to do this, and the Iran example is a very good one. We spent years building our own domestic sanctions against Iran and then, in this Administration, several years putting in place an international framework for sanctions and pressure. People said it’s not working, it’s not working, and then all of a sudden it worked. The pressure got to a point where Iran made the wise decision to come to the table to engage. We were able to get an interim agreement that froze the program in place, started to roll it back in certain respects, got inspectors in. That created time and space to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that has produced a very positive result for the security of the world. I would hope that the DPRK would be inspired by that example, and to add to its inspiration we are putting in place these comprehensive, sustained pressure and sanctions.” (DoS, Joint Press Availability with Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Sugiyama Shinsuke and Republic of Korea First Vice Foreign Minister Lim Sung-nam, Washington, January 5, 2017)
1/6/17:
Tokyo said it will recall its diplomats from South Korea and take other retaliatory measures against Seoul’s inaction concerning a “comfort women” statue in front of the Japanese consulate-general in Busan. “The installment of the statue will have a detrimental effect on Japan-South Korea relations,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide said at a news conference in Tokyo. Through diplomatic channels, Tokyo demanded the immediate removal of the statue, which was set up by a citizens group late last month. The South Korean government, however, has taken no action on the Japanese demands. In response to Seoul’s apparent tacit approval of the statue, Japan will instruct Nagamine Yasumasa, the Japanese ambassador to South Korea, and Morimoto Yasuhiro, consul general at the consulate-general in Busan, to return temporarily to Japan. Tokyo will also suspend talks on a new currency swap arrangement that will oblige the two countries to offer U.S. dollars or other currencies to each other during a financial crisis. In addition, Japan will shelve bilateral talks on economic cooperation involving vice ministers or their equivalents and call off participation by Japanese diplomats in events related to Busan. Suga said the government will “make a comprehensive assessment of the circumstances” before deciding on the time period for the measures. Japan and South Korea reached a bilateral agreement on the comfort women issue in December 2015, calling it a “final and irreversible resolution” to the longstanding source of friction between the two countries. Japan agreed to pay 1 billion yen ($8.62 million) to a foundation that Seoul helped to establish for assistance to the former comfort women who were forced to provide sex to Japanese troops before and during World War II. Tokyo acknowledged the Japanese military’s involvement and responsibility in the agreement. The Japanese government said the statue in Busan, which is similar to the one that remains in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, goes against the spirit of the agreement that pushes future-oriented relations. Seoul promised to “make efforts” in response to Japan’s request for the removal of the comfort women statue put up by a citizens group in front of the Japanese Embassy. “We strongly hope that a promise agreed upon by the two countries is implemented,” Suga said. The statue in Busan was originally removed by city officials on December 28 soon after it was installed. But anti-Japan sentiment resurged in South Korea, fueled by Defense Minister Inada Tomomi’s December 29 visit to Yasukuni Shrine, where Class-A war criminals are honored along with Japan’s war dead. The statue was set up again on December 30. Suga said Seoul is obliged to protect the dignity and other matters of Japanese diplomatic missions on its territory based on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. “(The statue) undermines the dignity of the consulate-general facility, and it is extremely regrettable in light of the provisions of the convention,” he said. (Asahi Shimbun, “Japan to Recall Ambassador over ‘Comfort Women’ Issue,” January 6, 2017)
Perry: “In 1994, when I was secretary of defense, we came perilously close to a second Korean War because of North Korea’s nuclear program. Today we are again approaching a crisis with North Korea, and again the cause is its nuclear program. A war in 1994 would have been terrible, but we were able to avoid it with diplomacy (the Agreed Framework, from which the United States and North Korea withdrew in 2002). Today a war would be no less than catastrophic, possibly destroying the societies of both Koreas as well as causing large casualties in the U.S. military. It is imperative that we employ creative diplomacy to avert such a catastrophe. The pressure boiled over this past week when Kim Jong Un announced plans to test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could deliver a nuclear warhead to the continental United States. In reply, President-elect Donald Trump tweeted, “It won’t happen,” seemingly suggesting he might take military action against North Korea’s missile program. The threat is real enough. North Korea has built more than a dozen nuclear bombs and conducted five nuclear tests, several at about the destructive power of the Hiroshima bomb. Pyongyang also has a robust ballistic missile program — it has fielded a large number of medium-range missiles and is testing long-range missiles. So the question is not whether but when Pyongyang will have a nuclear-armed ICBM. Its ICBM program is not yet operational, and it must take many difficult steps to make it so. But this is evidently a high-priority program moving at a fast pace. There is no reason to doubt that it will reach an operational capability, perhaps in the next few years. Certainly this is dangerous, but we should try to understand the nature of the danger. During my discussions and negotiations with members of the North Korean government, I have found that they are not irrational, nor do they have the objective of achieving martyrdom. Their goals, in order of priority, are: preserving the Kim dynasty, gaining international respect and improving their economy. The regime has demonstrated — over and over again — that it is willing to sacrifice its economy to assure that the dynasty is preserved. During negotiations in 1999 and 2000, we found a way to achieve all three of their goals without nuclear weapons. I believe that the North Korean government was ready to accept our proposal (it is easier for leaders to forgo weapons they do not yet have), but we can never be certain of that — nor that they would have, in fact, complied with an agreement — because the George W. Bush administration cut off the talks in 2001. I believe that the danger of a North Korean ICBM program is not that they would launch an unprovoked attack on the United States — they are not suicidal. But they have been playing a weak hand for decades, and they have demonstrated a willingness to take risks in playing it. The real danger of their ICBM program is that it might embolden them to take even greater risks — that is, overplay their hand in a way that could (inadvertently) lead to a military conflict with South Korea. The South Korean military, backed by U.S. air and naval power (and a small ground force), is more than a match for the large but poorly equipped North Korean military. So if North Korea were to begin losing a conventional conflict, they might in desperation turn to their nuclear weapons. What can we do to mitigate that danger? During the time I was defense secretary, I considered a preemptive conventional strike on their Yongbyon nuclear facility. We rejected that option in favor of diplomacy. Such a strike could still destroy the facilities at Yongbyon but probably would not destroy their nuclear weapons, likely not located there. In 2006, Ashton B. Carter, now secretary of defense, and I recommended that the United States consider a strike on North Korea’s ICBM launch facility. I would not recommend either of those strikes today because of the great risk for South Korea; at the very least, any such plan would have to be agreed to by South Korea’s leadership, since their country would bear the brunt of any retaliatory action. I believe it is time to try diplomacy that would actually have a chance to succeed. We lost the opportunity to negotiate with a non-nuclear North Korea when we cut off negotiations in 2001, before it had a nuclear arsenal. The most we can reasonably expect today is an agreement that lowers the dangers of that arsenal. The goals would be an agreement with Pyongyang to not export nuclear technology, to conduct no further nuclear testing and to conduct no further ICBM testing. These goals are worth achieving and, if we succeed, could be the basis for a later discussion of a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula. These objectives are far less than we would desire but are based on my belief that we should deal with North Korea as it is, not as we wish it to be. If this attempt at diplomacy fails, then we could consider much more punishing sanctions that would require China’s significant participation. That would be more likely if North Korea rejected a serious diplomatic approach. We could also pursue non-diplomatic approaches, such as disrupting their ICBM tests, not at their launch sites but over international waters. Indeed, our diplomacy would have a better chance of working if the North Korean government realized that we were serious about non-diplomatic alternatives. Time is of the essence. If we don’t find a way — and soon — to freeze North Korea’s quest for a nuclear ICBM, this crisis could all too easily spin out of control, leading to a second Korean War, far more devastating than the first. (William J. Perry, “To Confront North Korea, Talk First and Get Tough Later,” Washington Post, January 6, 2017)
1/8/17:
North Korea said it can test launch an intercontinental ballistic missile at any time from any location set by leader Kim Jong Un, saying the United States’ hostile policy was to blame for its arms development. “The ICBM will be launched anytime and anywhere determined by the supreme headquarters of the DPRK,” an unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesman was quoted as saying by KCNA. A U.S. State Department spokesman said last week that the United States does not believe that North Korea is capable of mounting a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile. “The U.S. is wholly to blame for pushing the DPRK to have developed ICBM as it has desperately resorted to anachronistic policy hostile toward the DPRK for decades to encroach upon its sovereignty and vital rights,” KCNA quoted the spokesman as saying. “Anyone who wants to deal with the DPRK would be well advised to secure a new way of thinking after having clear understanding of it,” the spokesman said. (Jack Kim, Tony Munroe and Ju-min Park, “North Korea Says Can Test ICBM at Any Time: KCNA,” Reuters, January 8, 2017)
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s “answer to the question raised by KCNA Sunday as regards the fact that the U.S. is pulling up the DPRK over its preparations for ICBM test-fire that have reached their final phase: The DPRK’s ICBM development is part of its efforts for bolstering its capability for self-defense to cope with the ever more undisguised nuclear war threat from the U.S. Nevertheless, the U.S. is crying out for tightening sanctions to pressurize the DPRK, terming the entirely just rocket launch preparations of the latter “provocation” and “threat.” This reminds one of a guilty party filing the suit first. A U.S. deputy secretary of State spouted rubbish on January 5 that threat from north Korea has reached an extreme pitch and sanctions aimed at pressurizing north Korea would as ever continue no matter what administration may appear in the U.S. Some pseudo-experts and conservative media are busy joining the Obama group in putting pressure on the DPRK. Explicitly speaking again, the U.S. is wholly to blame for pushing the DPRK to have developed ICBM as it has desperately resorted to anachronistic policy hostile toward the DPRK for decades to encroach upon its sovereignty and vital rights. Despite the unheard-of harsh sanctions and pressure, the DPRK developed H-bomb and had access to standardized nuclear warheads by bolstering up its nuclear weapons on a high level at an unimaginably high speed on the strength of self-development. The ICBM will be launched anytime and anywhere determined by the supreme headquarters of the DPRK. Respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un clarified that the DPRK will continue to build up our self-defense capability, the pivot of which is the nuclear forces, and the capability for preemptive strike as long as the United States and its vassal forces keep on nuclear threat and blackmail and as long as they do not stop their war games they stage at our doorstep disguising them as annual events. Anyone who wants to deal with the DPRK would be well advised to secure a new way of thinking after having clear understanding of it.” (KCNA, “DPRK’s ICBM Development Is to Cope with U.S. Nuclear War Threat: FM Spokesman,” January 8, 2017)
1/9/17:
William Perry: “In October of 2000, we had already come to a full verbal agreement on a detailed agreement on North Korea, by which they would agree to give up their nuclear program, and their long-range missile program. We were, I think, three to six months from having a signed, formal, agreement for doing that. Of course, it can, and should, be stated that, at that time, we could not be a hundred percent certain we would actually get that agreement, and even if we got the agreement, we could never be certain that North Korea was going to comply with that. So, I make that caveat. But, we will never know, because in 2000 the Bush administration in, it was about March of 2001, I believe, broke off all discussions with North Korea. It was a whole negotiating process which had gone on for more than a year before that that broke down. They said they had a different, and hopefully better, strategy of pursuing. Whatever that strategy was, the results of it are pretty clear. Namely, that North Korea actually, during that period, that administration, built and tested nuclear weapons. So, whatever you can say about the theory of this strategy, I have to say the results were bad. They were followed, in 2009, by the Obama administration, which actually articulated their strategy. It was called “strategic patience.” The results of “strategic patience” were more nukes and more missiles. So again, whatever you can say about the theory of this strategy, you have to conclude the results were bad. … The time for patience is over. Because time is really not on our side. I emphasize that as clearly as possible: time is not on our side; we have to do something. So, what? I consider those two questions separately, “How do we deal with the present dangers?” And my answer is very clear, simple and straightforward; we deal with it through deterrence. We already implicitly have that deterrence. I believe we should make that explicit, quite clear and quite specific, to North Korea. We do it with deterrence. The argument had been made that deterrence would not work with North Korea because they’re crazy. I simply do not believe that. Indeed, to deal with either of these problems, namely dealing with the present problem or reducing the dangers, we have to understand what North Korea’s goals are. Anybody that’s ever done any negotiations understands you cannot succeed unless you know where the other side of the table is coming from, what they’re trying to achieve. And I think a big failure of our negotiations in the so-called “Six Party Talks” is we have not done that and not understood where North Korea is coming from. I presume to tell you what I think they are. My knowledge is based on two things. Partly on having had numerous discussions with North Korean senior officials on this subject. But, I think more importantly, by observing what they do. What they do makes clear what they are thinking. So, let’s get to that for a moment. I believe – I believe without any, really, uncertainty – goal number one of North Korea is to
sustain the Kim dynasty. You could describe that as survival of the regime. But I put it more specifically: sustaining the Kim dynasty. The second goal is an important goal for them. It is achieving international recognition. A third goal is improving their economy. But I want to emphasize that third goal is subservient to the first two goals, and they have demonstrated that over, and over, again. They’re willing to sacrifice their economy if it’s necessary, to achieve those first two goals. So, sustaining the dynasty, achieving international recognition, and a poor third is improving their economy. The idea of a unified Korea that they talk about I think that’s way behind the other goals. They don’t see that as something that’s going to be operational for many, many – a long, long time. So, when I say, then, that dealing with the present problem is through deterrence, I have in mind that they have in mind sustaining the Kim dynasty is a critical goal, and they understand – they understand – that actions they take to provoke a war with South Korea and the United States would result in retaliation which would end their dynasty. So they are not suicidal, and we may not understand the logic but I think it’s clear that they are not suicidal and, most importantly, this is not ISIS. This is not al-Qaeda. They are not seeking martyrdom; they want to sustain their dynasty. So, deterrence will work. We should just be sure that we’re very clear and very explicit that they’re facing the challenge of a response from the United States, a devastating response to them. That will deal, I think, with the present threat, both for the United States and to our allies. But let’s make it more explicit. The second question is “How do we get them to lessen, take steps to lessen, the danger?” All of our negotiations in the past have been oriented around giving up their nuclear weapons. I just state flatly they are not going to do that; we’re wasting our time on those negotiations. We can achieve, I believe, if we try hard, achieve important goals in lessening the danger of their nuclear weapons. We can formulate that in many ways. Three things I would focus on are, number one, no more nuclear tests. Number two, no more ICBM tests. And number three, no selling or transport of nuclear technology. I think we might be able to achieve that kind of a deal. I think we can enforce that kind of a deal. And I think it would be something worth achieving, in and of itself. Beyond that, it’s quite possible, if we were to achieve that step, it would be a platform on which we could move to the more desirable goal of a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula. I do not think we can go directly to that goal, today. And we’ve had how many years of Six Party Talks to prove how futile that is. So, I am not at all in favor of restarting the Six Party Talks, based on the same goal we had in the past; it would just be an exercise in futility. I have no way of guaranteeing that even with setting those goals and even with good negotiating tactics, that we could succeed. I believe we can succeed. But I cannot assure that. So, we have to look at a plan B, “What if? What if we try, seriously and specifically, and still fail? What is our backup plan?” I think, first of all, any backup plan, at that stage, has to be based upon _____________, not coercion, and to turn to coercive tactics, and what kind, of course, of tactics? Number one on my list would be disrupting their ICBM tests. There are many ways we could do that. The one way I would not recommend today is bombing their launch sites. Some of you may remember that my colleague, Ash Carter, and I wrote an op-ed seven years ago saying that we should consider that. I do not recommend that today. I think it is too dangerous to South Korea. Any action, any military action, we take against North Korea, South Korea is the one that’s going to bear the brunt of the action. Even when we were considering that, which we were back in 1994, we understood we would never do it without consulting and getting the approval of the South Korean President. So, number one, backup action, if negotiation fails, is disrupting their ICBM tests, in my judgment short of bombing their launch sites. There are many things we – alternatives – for doing that. The second thing we can do is significantly increase sanctions. Our attempts at sanctions in the past have not been fully successful, because they have not had the full cooperation of China. So, what would be different? Why might China consider it this time? I think what might make a different to China is if we really had already gone through a really serious attempt at negotiation, offered a real alternative to North Korea. And, if they turn that offer down, then I think we’re in a much better position to go to China and say “We want to really tighten the screws on sanctions.” We can’t be sure of that outcome but it’s worth a try. The third is strengthen our anti-ballistic missile forces, both in South Korea and in Japan, to help defend those two countries. As many of you know, I am not a big ABM fan, both for technical reasons and for strategic reasons. But, in this case, I think they make sense. A very limited scale attack we’re considering, I think they have a reasonable prospect of, A, diminishing the effectiveness of the attack and, B, creating uncertainty in the minds of the attacker. So, in this case, I would recommend increasing the ABM capability both in South Korea and Japan. And the fourth recommendation I would make is increasing US military presence in South Korea, including a consideration of nuclear weapons. I have never been a fan of deploying nuclear weapons in South Korea, and I am not, today, a fan of that. I look at it only as a backup position if our negotiations completely break down. They are not necessary, to defend South Korea with. We can do it with the other nuclear weapons we have, both land-based and sea-based. What may be necessary, though, is to give the South Korean people the confidence that their nuclear deterrence is there. So therefore, in this case, if negotiations completely break down, I would consider that as a reasonable alternative. That concludes my opening remarks, and I will be happy to take questions. … Q: This is Nico Pandi from Jiji Press, Japan. If, in the negotiations to achieve those …four goals, if North Korea asks for signing a peace treaty, would you be willing to consider that, in exchange for achieving those goals of non-proliferation, halting ICBM tests, halting nuclear tests? PERRY: That’s a very good question and I neglected to answer it. I told you what our goals were. I neglected to say what would we have to offer North Korea, to get this. And my starting point on that would be looking at what we offered them in the year 2000, which in those days they were willing to accept. And we offered them three things. We offered them recognition, in various forms – there are several dimensions to the recognition – that was something primarily the United States could do. And we offered them economic incentives. Not “we.” In this case, it was South Korea and Japan. South Korea had one form of incentives, and Japan had another form of incentives. So, there were three different incentives on the table for them, at that time. They were interested in all three of those, and in those days they were willing to accept those three, in return for the non-nuclear and the no ICBM thing. Now, today, the situation is very different. They already have a nuclear arsenal, so they’re not going to agree to those same three incentives. But I say we look at those incentives as a starting point for what would be required to achieve these lesser goals. I think we could get by with lesser incentives, but I would start off with that package and sort of scale down from there, holding out the whole package for a later negotiation which might eventually get to a non-nuclear Peninsula. But, there’s no doubt in my mind that they are very much interested in the economic incentives of the kind South Korea had offered, which is helping build up some of their industry, for which those of you who are familiar with the Koreans know that the Kaesong factory, which is a joint South Korean-North Korean, is one good example. It could be based on that model. And from Japan we were considering great economic incentives, and the United States would sell them dimensions of recognition, one of which would have included the preliminary steps for setting up an embassy in Pyongyang, another which would include signing a formal peace agreement, which has never been signed after the Korean War. All of those things were very, very important to the North Koreans then. I think they are still important today. But, in and of themselves, they’re probably not enough, today, to make them give up what they were willing to give up in 2000. There’s a big difference negotiating with somebody not to develop nuclear weapons than getting them to give up nuclear weapons they already have. It’s a much steeper area to go. Q: David Brunnstrom from Reuters. Mr. Secretary, when you talked about the possibility of disrupting their ICBM tests, I’m just wondering how you would envisage going about that. PERRY: I can’t elaborate too much on that. Seemingly the most obvious way is simply shooting them down over international waters. But there are other ways of doing that as well, and so I would leave that up to the military, to decide how to do it. The goal would be disrupting their tests, disrupting them with the least – (pause) – the least political impact. I can think of three or four ways of doing it, but the one which is most obvious, the most straightforward, is simply shooting them down over international waters. They cannot really verify the effectiveness of an ICBM if it’s never gone through complete testing. And, to this date, their ICBMs have not gone through complete testing. Particularly, they’ve never tested the reentry aspect of it. Some of you know that technically speaking reentry of an ICBM is a pretty challenging technical problem, because of extreme heat generated on the reentry vehicle when it enters the atmosphere. So, that is a technical challenge which has to be – which I am willing to believe they probably have developed something they believe can do that, but it still has to be tested. So I think disrupting testing is a pretty effective way of stopping their ICBM program. To me, though, that is a far less attractive alternative than getting a diplomatic solution to the problem. WIT: Let me – I’m going to follow up on that a little bit, because this is a very unique opportunity to actually hear from someone who participated in planning for a preemptive attack, in 1994. And so I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about that experience, of planning for a preemptive attack, considering the consequences… PERRY: Yes, I would be happy to do that. In 1994 – I’ve already said that in ’94 I thought we were very close to a war. I was, in fact, in the Roosevelt Room – I mean, in the Cabinet Room – with the President and his national security staff, for the final meeting to get approval for deployment of many tens of thousands of troops to Korea, and other actions, which might very well have precipitated a North Korean attack. We were preparing for that to happen. And, I was actually in the room about the decision on how many we were going to deploy. Not “whether” to deploy, but how many to deploy. When the telephone call came in from Pyongyang in the middle of the meeting. I have never believed that was a coincidence, that that meeting – they knew the meeting was going on and they wanted to shortstop it. So…now let me get back to the question, the question, now, in particular – would you repeat the question in the question? WIT: I think you answered David’s question. PERRY: Well, okay. We did consider, and I had actually, on my desk, a plan for attacking Yongbyon, and taking the reactor out. We were satisfied we could do it with a few cruise missiles with conventional warheads, and we could do it without undesirable contamination to the people of North Korea. So, it was a plan that was easy to implement. What we did not know, of course, was what the repercussions would be from that plan, and the extent to which it would call upon military action against South Korea. So, we strongly favored diplomacy as an alternative to that, and diplomacy, in fact, was what finally won out. So, that plan could have been done. I never recommended it to the President. Had I recommended it, he would have, then – and had he agreed to do it – he would then have had to go to the President of South Korea and get his agreement also. Because, as I said, any action, military action, that we take against North Korea, the most likely consequence would be military action against South Korea. So, we cannot separate that out. The United States, in my judgment, does not have the right to take unilateral action, military action, against North Korea; it has to come in conjunction with our allies, in particular our ally in South Korea, which would face the brunt of any reprisals. So, that action, even aside from those issues, that actually makes no sense today, taking – namely, bombing Yongbyon – because they now have nuclear weapons and their nuclear weapons are undoubtedly not located at Yongbyon. So, taking out that facility would not take out their nuclear weapons. So, that’s an alternative, that’s an option, whose day has passed.
Q: Korea and Japan to acquire their own nuclear weapons, as a form of deterrence. What do you make of that, the efficacy of that? And also, his idea that it’s really China that should be taking the lead in persuading North Korea to negotiate? PERRY: Two good questions and two very different questions. To get China’s cooperation, I think our only prospect is to demonstrate by our action that we’re offering a serious diplomatic alternative to North Korea. That was basically what I proposed. I believe, if we made that offer and negotiated in good faith and North Korea walked away from negotiations, then I think there would be a much better opportunity to get cooperation from China, much more effective sanctions. On nuclear weapons, on a South Korean nuclear weapons program or Japan nuclear weapons program, let me be very clear on a few points. First, when either nation – if they were to decide to go to build a nuclear weapon – could have nuclear weapons in less than a year’s time. They both have the capability. They both have the ability to get the fissile material. They could move very quickly and very rapidly. They have voluntarily abstained from doing that, I think for good reasons, and I support them continuing to abstain from doing that. I am very much opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons from more nations, including even responsible nations like South Korea and Japan. So, I’m not in favor of that happening. If it gets to the point where either, in particular South Korea, were doubtful that our extended deterrence would apply to them, and therefore were considering building their own nuclear weapons, I think a preferred alternative to that would be the deployment of US nuclear weapons in South Korea, as an alternative to South Korea building their own nuclear weapons. It’s a better alternative, I think, than South Korea building their own nuclear weapons. That was the situation – and some of you may be old enough to remember the days of the Cold War, when Germany was “under the gun,” in this case from the Soviet Union, and we offered our extended deterrence to Germany from an attack by the Soviet Union. The Germans were a little hesitant, and they said, “Would you willing to sacrifice, if the Soviet Union attacked us, would you be willing to sacrifice New York to save Bonn or Berlin? We would feel much more confident about your offer of deterrence if you were deploying your nuclear weapons in Germany.” And so we did, during the Cold War. I think – thought then, and I think now – it was a bad decision, from a military point of view. But, from a political point of view, it was the right decision, because it gave the Germans the confidence that our deterrence really did apply to them. Again, to go one more step in detail, during the Cold War, when we deployed those nuclear weapons in Germany, we deployed them on a two finger on the button policy. In other words, they would be launched not only by the US President giving the authority but by the German Chancellor giving the recommendation. So, it seems to me that’s an analogy we can look to. I didn’t think it was a good idea then. I don’t think it’s a good idea now. But, a far better alternative – but it seems to me – and then it seemed to be a necessary alternative, because Germany was uneasy, uncertain, about our willingness to really follow through on extended deterrence. So, to the extent the South Korean people, for example, feel uncertain about our willingness to really extend our deterrence, and are thinking of building their own nuclear weapons, then I think a good alternative to that would be to deploy nuclear weapons there in the same spirit that we did in Germany during the Cold War.
Q: John Harris from Politico. If you had succeeded, in the closing hours of the Clinton administration, with getting a nuclear deal, that would have solved the security problem. To what extent do you think that would have led to solving the political problem of North Korea? Would it have led to a new North Korea, or did you see yourself as solving only the discrete military problem? PERRY: John, that’s a hell of a good question. And before I answer that one, I want to go back to the history of the Agreed Framework. We had that goal in the Agreed Framework, to not only solve the military problem, but to also solve the political problem. And the Agreed Framework, besides the specific provisions on nuclear weapons and providing nuclear reactors and so on, also had a provision for improving political agreements, steps each country could take. The United States followed through faithfully on all of our technical agreements, [but] did not follow through on the political provisions. I think it did not, not because the Clinton administration wasn’t willing to do it, but because it got a lot of opposition in Congress for doing that. Congress, as you may remember, was not even in favor of the Agreed Framework to begin with. So, there was a lot of resistance in Congress, for whatever reason. The consequence of that was that we did not really follow through on the political end of that agreement. So, that was one of the reasons, I think, the Agreed Framework did not achieve its full potential. The same situation applied to, would have applied, in 2001, if we had agreed – if we had come to the agreement we had reached with North Korea at that time. To get the political as well as the military benefits of it, there would have had to have been steps on both sides to try to reach accommodation, to try to bring North Korea back into the family of normal nations, so to speak. But that would require action on the United States’ [part] as well as on the part of North Korea. Finally, the other side of that picture is that North Korea might have signed such an agreement with the full intention of evading it, and I cannot disprove people who claim that would be the case. So that was always – even had we gotten the agreement – there was always the possibility that we would have arrived at the situation that we are today, only except five or 10 years later. … Q: Matt Pennington from AP. Secretary Perry, can you say – talk a little bit – about the difficulties in assessing North Korea’s capabilities with nuclear weapons and missiles? Currently, we hear different estimations of their capabilities, even within the US government, but you have people at the Department of Defense who will say – they sort of act on the basis that North Korea probably has the ability to put a nuclear warhead on an ICBM, and yet then we hear people at the State Department saying “We don’t believe North Korea has that capability yet.” Has it always been an issue, in the US government, that you get different assessments of North Korea’s capabilities? And how does that, sort of, influence how you make your policy decisions? PERRY: We have a shortage of hard, factual, data on which to base such a conclusion. That gives lots of room for a variety of views and a variety of opinion. My views on that are based primarily on my discussions with Sig Hecker, who I think knows more about this problem than any American. He was, as you may know, the Director of the Los Alamos Livermore Laboratories that developed our own nuclear weapons. He’s made several visits to Yongbyon, the nuclear facility. He has talked in detail with the head of their nuclear program. So, he probably knows more about that issue, based on factual data, than anybody that I know of. So, I look to him for that kind of information. Based on that, I think they have the ability, even now or in the near future, to build a nuclear weapon small enough to go on an ICBM. It’s probably a relatively low-yield weapon. But remember, it was a low-yield weapon that destroyed Hiroshima. So, that’s not a very comforting fact. I would just the biggest deterrence to an operational ICBM lies more in their ICBM than in their warhead. To the extent they have some deficiencies yet in their warhead, they’re probably things that could be tested out in another one or two tests. And, in addition, they may be conducting tests to get higher-yield warheads. So, there are many reasons for wanting to stop the nuclear testing. That’s why I put that number one on our objectives, things we can do to not eliminate the danger but to lessen the danger. So, if I leave anything else with you today, it is my strongly held view that we don’t have it in our power today to negotiate an end to the nuclear weapons program in North Korea, but we do have it in our power, probably, to lessen the danger, and the number one objective of that would be to stop ICBM testing, stop nuclear testing. That would go a long way, I think, towards lessening the danger. And, even if they can put a small enough nuclear warhead on an ICBM and neither of them have been tested, it’s a very dubious proposition. They then have to face three dubious propositions. One is whether their ICBMs will even work. Number two, whether their nuclear weapon will work. And three, whether our defense will work. All those combine together to give you a pretty low confidence that they can really do anything, and give a very high risk of trying.
Q: My name is Aikawa Haruyuki with Mainichi Newspaper. Could you please address your estimation about when the DPRK will get an ICBM with a nuclear warhead? And my second question is how to [intercept DPRK’s ICBMs] I understand that the United States has [different defense systems in Alaska – could the] US intercept North Korean ICBMs? PERRY: The answer to the first question of when they will be ready to deploy the ICBMs, is I don’t know. It depends not just on the factual data and test data we have, but it turns on what are their standards for deployment. Are they willing to deploy something which has not been fully tested? Are they willing to deploy something which they don’t have full confidence in? My guess is they would be, which means, I would say, in a year or two. But if they insist on the standards of testing that we insist on, then they are probably three, or four, or five years away from it. So, the reason I can’t give you a definite answer is that I do not know what standard they’re willing to impose before they could actually deploy something. If they want to deploy it for show, for effect, they could probably do it in a year or two. …Those of you who have heard me speak before, on the ABM subject, know that I’m not a big fan of the ABM, though my big negative on them has to do with their ability to defend against a mass attack, largescale attack. If we continue to work to improve our ABM capability, we probably have a reasonably good probability of stopping a small-scale attack, one, or two, or three. So, we would defend against it, first of all, by trying to catch it early in flight, which is relatively easy because of North Korea’s geography and the fact that we have ABM systems deployed on Aegis ships. We also have ABM systems deployed and designed to go for ICBMs specifically, and the reason I’m concerned about them is that they depend on midflight intercept and midflight intercept is highly susceptible to counter-measures and decoys and the like. But, with a relatively unsophisticated attack, from relatively few ICBMs, I think we’d have a pretty good shot. So, that’s a longwinded answer. To give you a short answer to your question, I think our ICBMs [ABMs] probably could be successful against a small-scale attack.
Q: Jae-soon Chang, Yonhap News Agency. Secretary Perry, you talked about disrupting North Korea’s ICBM tests as part of plan B that should be considered only after negotiations break down completely. …What if North Korea test fires one, even before negotiations begin, like, for example, last week? Do you think we should shoot it down? PERRY: I would not be opposed to some forms of disruption, even then. To make some point about coercive measures, I think it’s useful for North Korea to believe that we are willing to and capable of conducting coercive actions. I want to tell you one anecdote about that, based on the time when I was Secretary of Defense and we were, at the time, I said, we were very close to a war. The issue then was different. The issue was North Korea reprocessing spent fuel at Yongbyon, with the goal of making plutonium. And they had enough that they could – plutonium – they had enough to make about six nuclear bombs with what they had then. And we considered that a very undesirable outcome. And we were taking strong diplomatic measures to try to keep it from doing that. At the same time, as I told you, I had requested a study and had it on my desk of how to take out Yongbyon with cruise missiles. I didn’t advertise that, but I had it. But we did state, and I stated unequivocally, that we would not permit North Korea to make that plutonium. And, by the way, we meant it. This was not an empty threat. What happened, at that time, was a pure accident, as far as I was concerned. But my good friend, Brent Scowcroft, _____________________, wrote an op-ed, I think in the Washington Post, in which they recommended we do the very thing that I had a plan to do, said that’s what we should do. And, two days later, we got the offer from Yongbyon [Pyongyang] to negotiate. I have always believed – I can’t prove it – that that op-ed, which was certainly read by North Korea – that they believed that I had stimulated that op-ed. It was not true; I did not. But they believed it. And they believed that was a very serious threat. So, I think the ability to do coercive actions, and the other side believes that you’re willing to do coercive actions, is a great help in diplomacy sometimes.
Q: Mike Elleman with the IISS. On the ICBM, would you – well, first, if they don’t test it, the chances of it actually working, historically and from an engineering risk analysis, is about 30-40 percent, maybe less, which means they couldn’t possibly have much confidence in it. They may deploy it. But, if you combine that with missile defense and other measures, reliability of the warhead, it has to impact their calculus. If that is true, then would it be worthwhile to negotiate with them specifically on the ICBM issue, leaving the nuclear issue as a second negotiating tactic? Work the ICBM and incentive, allow them to do space launch activity under very controlled circumstances, with sufficient transparency. And what I mean by “controlled circumstances,” there is a limit to what types of engines and trajectories they can use. Would that be something that we should be considering and working towards? PERRY: Mike, understanding “the devil is in the details” in negotiation, my answer to that would be yes. Absolutely. They certainly could not have confidence, whether it’s 30 percent or – I don’t know what the number is – but it’s not fifty-fifty. They certainly cannot have that confidence. Add to that the question about whether our ABM system might work. All of that adds together to say that the deployment, if they made it, would be for show rather than because they think it’s going to work. But they might find value in deploying it, just for the show ________________. We could not write it off, but we should not take it too seriously. …WIT: I actually have a question now, before going back to – I’ll get to John at the end. I’ll save him, the best, for last. Since, of course, you have been Secretary of Defense, you are very well positioned to comment on one of the North Korean demands, which is the suspension of joint exercises, in return for some of the things that you would like to achieve. So, the question is, of course, first of all, do you think we can maybe not suspend joint exercises but modify them, change our exercises in a way that wouldn’t adversely affect our security but that the North Koreans might find attractive? Particularly, this whole idea of decapitating the North Korean regime. PERRY: I would not suspend them as a precondition. In fact, the exercises are a useful pressure for helping bring North Korea to the bargaining table. Once we got into a serious negotiation, would I put them on the table? And the answer is certainly I would. We can do all sorts of exercises; they don’t have to be called “Team Spirit.” They don’t have to be done in the way that was done. So, I think you could, in good faith, put them on the table without giving up the idea that exercises are a good thing. (William J. Perry, Transcript of a 38North Press Briefing, Washington, January 9, 2017)
The $36 billion system of ground-based interceptors can’t yet be counted on to shoot down a nuclear-armed missile aimed at the West Coast by the likes of North Korea or Iran, the Pentagon’s weapons testing office says. The network of radar and communications combined with missiles based in California and Alaska has demonstrated only a “limited capability to defend the U.S. homeland from small numbers of simple” intercontinental ballistic missiles, the testing office said in its latest annual report. The probability that the U.S. would succeed in intercepting an incoming missile can’t be quantified with any precision “due to a lack of ground tests” supported by verified “modeling and simulation,” according to an advance copy of the assessment provided late today to congressional defense committees and Pentagon officials. The testing office’s assessment is the same as its 2016 report because too few new results were generated to warrant a change, even as the threat from North Korea in particular has grown. The office said the “reliability and availability of the operational” interceptors are also low, as the Missile Defense Agency continues to discover new flaws and “failure modes” during testing. In response, Vice Admiral James Syring, director of the missile defense agency, said in an interview today he retains “high confidence” in the system. He said the next attempt to intercept a dummy missile is tentatively scheduled for the period of April to June. The next test will attempt to shoot down a target that replicates for the first time the speed, trajectory and closing velocity of an actual ICBM, Syring said. The U.S. will test avionics updates to the booster rocket built by Orbital ATK Inc. that carries an improved version of a hit-to-kill conventional warhead built by Raytheon Co. Interceptors are located at Fort Greely in Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The system is managed by Boeing Co. The next interception attempt will be the first since a successful test in June 2014. Before that, though, two tests that failed in 2010 prompted an extensive effort to fix flaws with the interceptor’s warhead that Syring said have now been fixed and verified. “I am very confident in the systems and procedures” the U.S. Northern Command, which operates the missile defense shield, “will employ to intercept a North Korean ICBM were they to shoot it toward our territory,” Syring said. Laura Grego, a missile defense analyst with the Union of Concerned Scientists, said last year that none of the interception tests since 2010 have used targets representative of actual threats or complex countermeasures. Since its inception, the system “has destroyed its target fewer than half the 17 times it has been tested, and its record is not improving over time,” she said. Since the 2004 deployment decision, “the system has a three-for-nine record,” said Grego, co-author of a July 2016 report titled “Shielded From Oversight: The Disastrous U.S. Approach to Strategic Missile Defense.” (Anthony Capaccio, “Stopping N. Korean Missile No Sure Thing, U.S. Tester Says,” Bloomberg News, January 10, 2017)
1/10/17:
The U.S. military might monitor a North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile test and gather intelligence rather than destroy it, as long as the launch did not pose a threat, Defense Secretary Ash Carter said. “If the missile is threatening, it will be intercepted. If it’s not threatening, we won’t necessarily do so,” Carter said in his final news briefing. “Because it may be more to our advantage to, first of all, save our interceptor inventory, and, second, to gather intelligence from the flight, rather than do that (intercept the ICBM) when it’s not threatening.” The top U.S. military officer, Marine General Joseph Dunford, who will stay in his role as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred with Carter at the event but did not enter into specifics. Carter’s language left open the possibility of U.S. military action in any scenario. (Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart, “U.S. Says Might Not Shoot down North Korean ICBM, Eying Intel,” Reuters, January 10, 2017)
The Defense Ministry warned that North Korea “seems to be capable” of launching an intercontinental ballistic missile from a mobile launcher. In a press briefing, ministry spokesman Moon Sang-kyun said, “We’re keeping close watch on the North’s big anniversaries this year as possible dates for an ICBM launch.” The Defense Ministry spokesman here said the KN-08 or the improved KN-14 could be launched from a 16-wheeled mobile launch vehicle without being immediately noticed by South Korea and the U.S. (Yu Yong-weon, “N. Korea ‘Could Fire Long-Range Missile from Mobile Launcher,’” Chosun Ilbo, January 10, 2017)
Secretary of State John Kerry said the U.S. may need “more forceful ways” of dealing with North Korea if it develops an intercontinental ballistic missile that threatens America. Speaking at the U.S. Naval Academy, Kerry said nuclear weapons in the hands of North Korea’s “reckless dictator” Kim Jong Un pose one of the most serious national security challenges to the United States. He said the aim should be resuming talks on denuclearization that could open the way to economic assistance for North Korea, sanctions relief and a formal peace on the divided Korean Peninsula. But Kerry said if the North persists in developing the long-range missile it “drags the United States into an immediate threat situation to which we may then have to find other ways, more forceful ways of having an impact on the choices that he is making.” Kerry didn’t elaborate. (Matthew Pennington, “Kerry ‘More Forceful Ways’ May Be needed with North,” Associated Press, January 10, 2017)
Tension between South Korea and China flared up after Beijing‘s fighter jets entered South Korea’s air defense zone without prior notice, amid protests from China over a US anti-missile system set to be installed here. According to the Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, some 10 Chinese military planes — including bombers — flew into the Korean air defense identification zone near the southern island of Jeju between 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. yesterday. The aircrafts also entered an equivalent air defense zone near the Tsushima Strait of Japan. In response, the South Korea military sent out 10 fighter jets, including F-15Ks and KF-16s. They sent a warning signal to the Chinese planes whoich, the Korean military said, were in and out of the KADIZ until they exit the area without conflict. It was not the first time that Chinese aircraft have entered the area since it was expanded in 2013. This latest action has, however, prompted fresh speculation over China’s motive in light of its clashes with Seoul over its decision to station the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-missile system here. “(China) gave us the answer that it was for training purposes,” said a JCS official. “We believe they have a different purpose at different times. It needs further analysis to find out what they were getting at.” Beijing has adopted a series of retaliatory measures against Seoul since it reached an agreement with the US to deploy the THAAD battery here last July. Not only did China impose punitive trade measures against Korean companies, it has even banned Korean actors and actresses from appearing on its shows. During a meeting on Jan. 4 with lawmakers of Korea’s main opposition Democratic Party of Korea, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi condemned Seoul’s decision to deploy THAAD, saying the process should be “delayed and frozen” if South Korea wants to expand cooperation with Beijing.
Since the ADIZs are not officially recognized airspace, military officials noted, states are not able to exercise sovereign rights to evict aircrafts flying over them. Instead, individual states can issue warnings to other nations who enter the area without prior notice. “Under the KADIZ, we are only allowed to detect and track unidentified aircrafts. We are not able to take forcible measures to evict those who intrude in the zone. It is different from what we can do in the airspace,” said the JCS official. According to the JCS, Chinese military planes intruded into the KADIZ on more than a dozen occasions last year. But the incident yesterday was “unusual,” they said, because it involved more than 10 aircrafts. In 2015, there were only few aircrafts flying into the area. Mounting tensions over the air defense areas has spurred the call for building a proper communication channel between Korea, China and Japan — such as to inform each other of their entry into the areas and to take preventive measures to prevent potential armed onflicts. Currently, the three countries are not obliged to notify each other of their entry into the ADIZs, the JCS said. South Korea often shares flight information with Japan when their aircrafts fly along the ADIZs under bilateral agreement. It has not yet to make such a pact with China. (Yeo Jun-suk, “THAAD Tension Brews after China Sends Planes to Korea’s Air Zone,” Korea Herald, January 10, 2017)
1/11/17:
Rex Tillerson, President-elect Donald Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State, denounced China’s “empty promises” on North Korea and said he would consider action to “compel” China to comply with the United Nations sanctions in case of violations. Tillerson pointed to North Korea as an adversary which posed “grave threats to the world because of their refusal to conform to international norms.” Speaking at a nine-hour confirmation hearing at the U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Tillerson attacked China’s attitude toward the DPRK and said the U.S. wouldn’t ignore “violation of international accords”. “We cannot continue to accept empty promises like the ones China has made to pressure North Korea to reform, only to shy away from enforcement,” Tillerson, former chairman and former chief executive officer (CEO) of Exxon Mobile, told committee members in an opening statement. “Looking the other way when trust is broken only encourages more bad behavior. And it must end.” The U.S. Secretary of State nominee said China “hasn’t been a reliable partner in using its full influence to curb North Korea.” When asked by Senator Cory Gardner whether he would be “willing to exert additional pressure on North Korea through China,” including enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions, Tillerson suggested China should enhance its role in North Korean issues. “I think we have to be clear-eyed as to how far China will go and not get overly optimistic,” Tillerson said. “That’s why ultimately it’s going to require a new approach to China in order for China to understand our expectations of them, going beyond certainly what they have in the past, which has fallen short.” With respect to imposing secondary sanctions, Tillerson also pointed out that “90 percent” of the North’s trade was with China and that it was “solely dependent on Chinese trade.” “To the extent there are specific violations of the sanctions, such as the purchase of coal, which is specifically mentioned in the UN sanctions most recently, if there are gaps of enforcement, they have to be enforced,” Tillerson said. “If China is not going to comply with those UN sanctions, then it’s appropriate for the United States to consider actions to compel them to comply.” The nominee reiterated that the U.S. should “hold China accountable to comporting with the sanctions.” “They really do have complete control over what sustains the government of North Korea. A big part of that is the sale of anthracite coal across the border and sanctions did speak to that sale,” he said. Tillerson called for “closing gaps” caused by insufficient enforcement of the UN sanctions as a way to lead multilateral efforts to peacefully disarm Pyongyang, describing it as “a long-term plan.” “…There are gaps in those sanctions today that are undermining their effectiveness. It is a question of closing those gaps where it’s appropriate to seek further steps against those who are not fully complying with those sanctions.” He said that the U.S. would “put additional pressure” on the North so as to prevent it from continuing to “advance not just their development but the delivery systems, which is where the greatest threat exists today.” (Dagyum Ji, “U.S. Can ‘Compel’ China to Comply with Sanctions on N. Korea: Tillerson,” NKNews, January 12, 2017)
North Korea has made significant progress on its nuclear capability with its plutonium stockpile reaching 50 kilograms, which is capable of making up to a dozen fission bombs, according to South Korea’s 2016 defense white paper released today, The report assessed that Pyongyang has secured some 50 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, up from the 40 kilograms estimated in the 2014 edition of its white paper. The volume is sufficient to manufacture around 10 nuclear weapons, as one bomb generally requires 4 to 6 kilograms of the material. “We have come up with this number based on when its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon began operation (and) how much plutonium it has obtained after using it for nuclear tests,” a Defense Ministry official said. The Defense Ministry’s biennial report said the communist state has scaled up its “Strategic Rocket Force” in charge of nuclear and missile warfare to 10,000 and cyber personnel to 6,800 as part of efforts to boost its asymmetric warfare capability. The 2016 report described in detail information about Pyeongyang’s various ICBMs, including the KN-08 and KN-14 with a range of up to 12,000 kilometers as well as the SLBM that the North test-fired last August. Pyeongyang has yet to test-fire the KN-08 and KN-14, which were revealed during a military parade in 2012. “We decided to classify the KN-08 and KN-14 as ICBMs because we want to track their development process,” the Defense Ministry official said. “It is part of our efforts to figure out the missiles’ capabilities and technological process.” The white paper also noted that Pyongyang has made “considerable” progress in producing highly enriched uranium, another type of fuel for nuclear bombs. But the report did not provide information about the specific amounts of weapon-grade HEU — a material produced by a centrifuge plant usually run in a secretive environment. Meanwhile, North Korea has increased its number of cyberwarfare troops to 6,800 from 6,000 in 2014, said the paper, reflecting mounting concerns over the growing threat of North Korea’s cyberattacks targeting South Korea’s defense system and socioeconomic infrastructure. “Recently, the North Korea military has reshuffled its organization,” said the paper, adding that Pyongyang’s General Staff Department, equivalent to Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, has created a new organization dealing with intelligence operation and increased military personnel for the mission. The paper noted that Pyongyang has increased the number of standing troops to 1.28 million in 2016 from 1.2 million two years earlier, highlighting the regime’s efforts to enhance conventional military power despite its decreasing population and shrinking economy. Specifically, the army boasted 1.1 million troops, 80,000 higher than two years earlier. Among them, 100,000 were assigned to “strategic forces” dedicated to nuclear and missile warfare. The air force shrank from 120,000 to 110,000. The navy remained unchanged at 60,000. North Korea’s army has increased the number of corps-level units to 17 from 15, and division-level units by one to 82, the paper said. The newly established units are dedicated to massive construction missions such as building highways and monuments idolizing Kim Jong-un, it added. “North Korea believes that it will need a more unified command and control system for construction missions glorifying Kim’s legacy,” said the official. “They think the military is more suitable for doing such missions than civilian organizations.” (Yeo Jun-suk, “Pyongyang’s Plutonium Stockpile Grows to 50 Kg: Seoul,” Korea Herald, January 11, 2017)
The Treasury Department targeted seven North Korean government officials and two government agencies, escalating the U.S. response to the Asian nation’s missile testing and threats. Americans are banned from financial transactions with the officials and agencies, sanctioned by the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The department will also freeze the U.S.-based assets of the sanctioned officials and parties. The sanctioned officials include government and party leaders in charge of national security, labor camps, propaganda, censorship and “maintaining ideological purity,” according to OFAC. Kim Won Hong, North Korean minister of state security, is among those sanctioned. OFAC said his ministry conducts torture at labor camps, including “beatings, forced starvation, sexual assault, forced abortions, and infanticide.” Other sanctioned officials include Kim Il-Nam, who runs a labor camp; Kim Yo Jong, who helps oversee propaganda and media censorship; Kang P’il-Hun, who manages “a network of police stations, interrogation and detention centers, and labor camps;” and Min Byong Chol, reportedly known as the “angel of death” for a record of political purges, according to OFAC. OFAC also sanctioned North Korea’s State Planning Commission and Ministry of Labor. (Sylvan Lane, “Treasury Sanctions Top North Korean Officials,” The Hill, January 11, 2017) The U.S. Department of Treasury has released a new list of designations against North Korean entities and individuals which include Kim Yo Jong, sister of the country’s leader, Kim Jong Un. Kim was identified as Vice Director of the Workers’ Party of Korea Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD), an entity previously designated by the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in March. In total seven individuals and two entities were listed “Treasury is taking this action in conjunction with the State Department’s Report on Serious Human Rights Abuses or Censorship in North Korea,” a Treasury press release read. “The North Korean regime not only engages in severe human rights abuses, but it also implements rigid censorship policies and conceals its inhumane and oppressive behavior,” John E. Smith, Acting OFAC Director, was quoted as saying. In a Department of State Report published in February the PAD was identified as controlling all media in the country, “which the government uses to control the public.” Kim Yo Jong now joins her brother Kim Jong Un on the list of designated individuals after he was listed in sanctions by OFAC in June, 2016 for his involvement in for what an accompanying press release called “North Korea’s notorious abuses of human rights.” Choe Hwi was also identified as a Vice Director of PAD and included in the sanctions list alongside Kim. Jo Yong Won and Min Byong Chol were designated for their roles in the country’s Organization and Guidance Department, a previously sanctioned agency. The press relase said that Min was also known as the Angel of Death “for his record of political inspections and purges.” Kang P’il Hun was designated for his role as a Director of the General Political Bureau of the Ministry of People’s Security, which is also an entity previously sanctioned for its role in human rights violations in North Korea. Kim Il Nam and Kim Won Hong were sanctioned for their roles in the Ministry of State Security, again a previously sanctioned agency. Kim Jong Un is head of both the Ministry of State Security and Ministry of People’s Security. North Korea’s Ministry of Labor and its State Planning Commission were the two entities subject to the new designations. “The Ministry of Labor forcibly allocates individuals to specific sectors, including the mining sector, in accordance with the State Planning Commission’s labor allocation plans,” the OFAC press release read. (Hamish Macdonald, “U.S. Sanctions Kim Jong Un’s Sister for Censorship Activities,” NKNews, January 11, 2017)
A high-tech sea-based U.S. military radar has left Hawaii to monitor for potential North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile test launches, a U.S. defense official said. The official said the radar, known as the Sea-based X-band radar (SBX), left two days ago and would reach its destination, about 2,000 miles (3,218 km) northwest of Hawaii, towards the end of January. The radar is able to track ICBMs and differentiate between hostile missiles and those that are not a threat. “The SBX’s current deployment is not based on any credible threat; however, we cannot discuss specifics for this particular mission while it is underway,” Commander Gary Ross, a Pentagon spokesman, said. (Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart, “U.S. Deploys High-Tech Radar amid Heightened North Korea Rhetoric: Official,” Reuters, January 11, 2017)
1/12/17:
Sigal: “Lost in the countryside, a city slicker stops to ask a farmer for directions. The farmer replies laconically, “Well, I wouldn’t start from here.” Starting from here is the sort of advice President Donald Trump is likely to get when he asks about North Korea. He will be urged to pick up where his predecessor left off: refuse to enter into negotiations unless the North first commits to denuclearizing completely and takes steps to demonstrate it is serious about that commitment. He also will be told to continue ratcheting up sanctions in a vain effort to force Pyongyang to the negotiating table on U.S. terms. That advice is tantamount to wishing away Washington’s current predicament in hopes of somehow going back to the future. Looming Threat President Barack Obama’s stance of “strategic patience”—pressure without negotiations—rested on the dubious premise that time was on Washington’s side. His successor does not have that luxury. North Korea’s fifth nuclear test may have yielded a nuclear device that can be mounted on a missile, although a few more tests still may be needed to prove its reliability. The North’s reactor at Yongbyon is fitfully generating more spent fuel, a refurbished reprocessing facility has just turned that spent fuel into plutonium, a new reactor is nearing completion, and its uranium-enrichment program, an alternative route to produce the explosive material for a nuclear bomb, has expanded. At its current pace, Pyongyang could have enough fissile material for more than 40 nuclear weapons by 2021. Pyongyang is also test-launching new missiles, its intermediate-range Musudan and a new submarine-launched ballistic missile that could circumvent the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system that is soon to be deployed in South Korea. A KN-08 ballistic missile is assessed to be capable of reaching the United States. Without testing, neither Washington nor Pyongyang can be sure of its range or reliability, but leader Kim Jong Un now said in his New Year address January 1 that his country is in the “final state of preparation”1 for the test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). “Won’t happen,” Trump responded in a January 2 tweet.2 So what will Trump do to head off that looming threat? Trump’s Impulses Trump’s campaign rhetoric was contradictory, yielding few cues about what his North Korea policy might be. He has disparaged Kim as a “total nut job” and a “madman playing around with the nukes.”3 Yet, he also expressed willingness to sit down and talk with him. “Who the hell cares? I’ll speak to anybody,” Trump said. “There’s a 10 percent or 20 percent chance I could talk him out of having his damn nukes, because who the hell wants him to have nukes?”4 Trump’s rhetoric was often impulsive, but it may be worth looking at the impulses he repeatedly revealed. Tougher sanctions. The favorite prescription of the foreign policy establishment is to tighten sanctions. To appear to do something while failing to tackle a difficult political problem is the classic stance of Washington insiders. Yet, sanctions may have less appeal to an anti-establishment outsider such as Trump and for good reason. Sanctions have enjoyed far less success against North Korea than against Iran. As the experience of negotiating with Iran suggests, moreover, relaxing sanctions may help stanch nuclear arming better than tightening them. Although UN sanctions have impeded weapons trade with North Korea, the evidence suggests that they have not done much to hamper North Korea’s economy, which has continued to grow at a modest pace over the past decade. Its foreign trade persists despite efforts of the U.S. Department of the Treasury to cut off its access to banks around the globe, suggesting that hawala, the informal networks of brokers and middlemen who move money for clients in countries with large Muslim populations in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, and similar middlemen in China have picked up some of the slack. Unlike oil-rich Iran, North Korea does not have many big-ticket items to buy or sell, making letters of credit from international banks less of a necessity. In a world where money flows more freely than water, trying to plug the many leaks seems doomed to fail. North Koreans may denounce financial sanctions as a sign of U.S. hostile intent, but they are crying all the way around the banks. Let China do it. Another favorite prescription in Washington is to outsource the North Korean problem to China. That misreads Pyongyang’s purpose: it has long sought to improve relations with the United States, South Korea, and Japan as a hedge against overdependence on China for its security and prosperity. Nothing threatens Pyongyang more than cooperation between Washington and Beijing. When Washington and Beijing applied concerted pressure on Pyongyang, the North responded with nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2016 in an effort to drive them apart. During his campaign, Trump repeatedly voiced support for letting China deal with Kim. “I would get China to make that guy disappear, in one form or another, very quickly,” Trump told CBS. “China has absolute control of North Korea. They won’t say it, but they do, and they should make that problem disappear.”5 As it has demonstrated over many years, China has no interest in making Kim or North Korea disappear, which limits how much pressure it is willing to apply on Pyongyang by imposing stringent sanctions. At the same time as he wants China’s help with North Korea, Trump has shown an impulse to pick a fight with China over trade and Taiwan. How will that help persuade China to step up pressure on Pyongyang, let alone “make that guy disappear”? “They don’t live and they don’t breathe without China,” he said of Pyongyang. “They wouldn’t get anything without China. China has the power, and we have to tell China to straighten out the situation,” Trump told Fox News. “We have power over China because of trade. Frankly, if we ever stopped it, believe me you would see a depression in China like you have never seen a depression before.”6 Yet, such a depression might also reduce U.S. growth and imperil South Korea and Japan, whose economies depend heavily on trade with China. And threatening to break the commitment to a one-China policy is likely to encourage Beijing to prop up Pyongyang. Regime change. South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s current passion for regime change has impeded U.S. efforts to open negotiations, but she is being forced out of office. Ironically, regime change seems to have come to Washington and Seoul sooner than to Pyongyang. Yet, if Trump follows Park’s lead and waits for North Korea’s collapse, he will likely face a North Korea with many more nuclear warheads able to be delivered by missiles, some possibly capable of reaching the U.S. heartland, before his first term ends. By then, if not before, Trump will hear siren calls to launch a preventive war to keep North Korea from fielding ICBMs armed with nuclear warheads, as if U.S. intelligence could pinpoint the locations of all the warheads in that tunnel-riven land. For a president who, as a candidate, repeatedly criticized U.S. military intervention abroad and was skeptical of alliances, that option might be particularly unpalatable.7 Negotiation. Trump’s strongest impulse is to approach international politics as transactional and to regard himself as a peerless deal-breaker and deal-maker. He first broached the idea of talking to Kim on January 6, the very day that North Korea conducted its fourth test of a nuclear device. “You have this madman over there who probably would use it, and nobody talks to him other than, of course, Dennis Rodman,” he told “Fox and Friends.” “But nobody is talking to him whatsoever, and nobody is discussing it with China.”8 In a May 17 interview with Reuters, he revealed a willingness to sit down personally with Kim, saying, “I would have no problem speaking to him.”9 In a campaign appearance in California on June 6, he was dismissive of experts’ “qualms about bargaining with North Korea.” To the practitioner of “The Art of the Deal,” that posed “no problems at all.” Not one to suffer critics gladly, Trump added, “They say ‘we would never, ever, talk.’ How foolish they are!”10 Nine days later, at a rally in Atlanta, he doubled down on the need for talks, saying he was prepared to host Kim, although he would forgo the usual diplomatic niceties. “If he came here, I’d accept him, but I wouldn’t give him a state dinner like we do for China and all these other people that rip us off when we give ‘em these big state dinners. We give them state dinners like you’ve never seen. We shouldn’t have dinners at all. We should be eating a hamburger on a conference table, and we should make better deals with China and others.”11 If he follows that instinct, he has to act sooner rather than later. The longer he waits, the greater the North’s bargaining leverage will be. Deferring negotiations until the North commits to complete denuclearization and takes unilateral steps to that end would be a waste of time. The urgent task is to induce Pyongyang to suspend arming now. Past Agreements Suspending the North Korean nuclear program has been the thrust of all three agreements that the United States has made with North Korea: the 1994 Agreed Framework; the September 19, 2005, six-party joint statement; and the 2012 Leap Day deal. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the first two accords had some success.12 The 1994 accord halted all fissile material production in the North for more than nine years until the George W. Bush administration seized on U.S. intelligence reports that Pyongyang was secretly acquiring the means to enrich uranium and used those reports to scrap the accord without bothering to probe the North’s offer to negotiate the issue. The 2005 accord was nearly stillborn when two days before the accord was finalized, the U.S. Treasury Department threatened sanctions on all banks that did business with North Korea, prompting authorities in Macao to seize North Korean funds at Banco Delta Asia. Shortly after North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006, Washington agreed to arrange for the return of the funds; and Pyongyang ceased all fissile material production at Yongbyon and nuclear tests and missile test-launches, only to have the deal fall apart in 2009 after South Korea failed to deliver promised energy aid. The Leap Day deal collapsed almost immediately when North Korea proceeded with a satellite launch attempt in 2013 despite a U.S. warning that such a move would be a deal-breaker. Given that history, trying for a suspension yet one more time would face formidable political opposition in Washington and Seoul. Opponents would demand that no deal be made unless Pyongyang first commits to denuclearization, which it insists it will not do. Delaying a possible suspension of the North’s programs while seeking an unlikely commitment to give up its weapons is to sacrifice the practical on the altar of the theoretical, and trying for a permanent dismantling of Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs would take much more substantial inducements and consume precious time. In short, without giving up the U.S. goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, negotiations have to start somewhere. Insisting on a more comprehensive deal while the North’s programs proceed apace does not make much strategic sense. Next Steps Washington understandably cannot keep negotiating while North Korea continues arming. Recent unofficial contacts indicate that Pyongyang seems open to talks about talks so long as it does not have to satisfy U.S. preconditions unilaterally. The subject of such talks would be a suspension of Pyongyang’s programs and the reciprocal steps that Washington would take to address its security concerns, along the lines of “action for action” as set forth in the September 19, 2005, joint statement. The North might be willing to suspend arming. That was also the implication of its January 9, 2015, offer of “temporarily suspending the nuclear test over which the U.S. is concerned” if the United States “temporarily suspend[s] joint military exercises in South Korea and its vicinity this year.”13 A one-year suspension would not work. What would happen when that year was up? Would exercises have to be suspended permanently to keep the North from testing? The North may be amenable to a reduction in the scale, scope, and operating tempo of the three largest U.S.-South Korean joint exercises instead. For instance, if it were forgoing nuclear tests, there would be less need to fly B-52s into South Korean airspace to reassure U.S. allies. Similarly, mock attacks on nuclear sites and leadership targets could be avoided as needlessly provocative. Both sides would have to agree to do more. Pyongyang might be willing to suspend not only nuclear testing, but also missile tests and possibly satellite launches and verifiably stop fissile material production. In return, Washington could suspend the application of all sanctions that predate the North’s nuclear program, reaffirm its commitments in the October 2000 U.S.-North Korean joint communiqué renouncing “hostile intent” and pledging to build “a new relationship free from past enmity,” commit to respect the North’s sovereignty and not interfere in its internal affairs, and, after consulting with Seoul, agree to commence a peace process on the Korean peninsula. Yet, the chances of persuading North Korea to go beyond another temporary freeze and dismantle its nuclear and missile programs are slim without firm commitments from Washington and Seoul to move toward political and economic normalization, engage in a peace process to end the Korean War, and negotiate regional security arrangements, among them a nuclear-weapon-free zone that would provide a multilateral legal framework for denuclearization. Trump’s willingness to hold out the prospect of a summit with Kim would also be a significant inducement. Doubts about his enduring commitment to the alliance, however, could intensify Seoul’s resistance to engaging in a peace process. Suspension would leave North Korea with a rudimentary deterrent, but it would forestall unbounded weapons programs with profoundly destabilizing effect on the balance of power in Northeast Asia. Outlook If all else fails and North Korea continues to arm, the fallback position of many in Washington is to bolster deterrence and contain it. For others, that is not enough. Yet, Trump’s indisposition to military intervention and skepticism about alliances14 seem to rule out some of the more forceful options being bruited about in Washington. Impulses are not policies, but they may provide clues to Trump’s inclinations. If he follows his impulse to talk, he could succeed where Presidents Obama and George W. Bush have failed. North Korea’s arming is now unbounded. Temporary suspension of its nuclear and missile programs, if possible, would have huge benefits for U.S. and allied security and could open the way to a gradual improvement in relations with North Korea that would ease its insecurity and facilitate more permanent dismantlement of its weapons programs. Perhaps Trump could get there if he starts from here. ENDNOTES 1. Kim Jong Un, “New Year Address,” http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/news/?22+3039. 2. Maggie Haberman and David E. Sanger, “‘It Won’t Happen,’ Trump Says of North Korean Missile Test,” The New York Times, January 2, 2017. 3. Donald Trump, On the Record, Fox News, January 7, 2016. 4. Maxwell Tani, “Donald Trump on North Korean Dictator Kim Jong Un: ‘If He Came Here, I’d Accept Him,” Business Insider, June 15, 2016; Steve Holland and Emily Flitter, “Trump Would Talk to North Korea’s Kim, Renegotiate Climate Treaty,” Reuters, May 17, 2016. 5. Donald Trump, This Morning, CBS, February 10, 2016. 6. Donald Trump, “On the Record,” Fox News, January 7, 2016. 7. Trump has said, “We’re basically protecting Japan, and we are, every time North Korea raises its head, you know, we get calls from Japan and we get calls from everybody else, and “Do something.” And there’ll be a point at which we’re just not going to be able to do it anymore. Now, does that mean nuclear? It could mean nuclear.… [A]t some point, we cannot be the policeman of the world. And unfortunately, we have a nuclear world now. And you have, Pakistan has them. You have, probably, North Korea has them. I mean, they don’t have delivery yet, but you know, probably, I mean to me, that’s a big problem. And, would I rather have North Korea have them with Japan sitting there having them also? You may very well be better off if that’s the case.” Maggie Haberman and David E. Sanger, “Transcript: Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views,” The New York Times, March 26, 2016. See “Transcript: Donald Trump on NATO, Turkey’s Coup Attempt and the World,” The New York Times, July 21, 2016. 8. David Sherfinski, “Donald Trump: About Time That China Gets Involved With the North Korea Problem,” Washington Times, January 6, 2016. 9. Holland and Flitter, “Trump Would Talk to North Korea’s Kim, Renegotiate Climate Treaty.” 10. Choi Sung-jin, “Trump Reaffirms Intention to Talk With Kim Jong Un,” Korea Times, June 6, 2016. 11. Eric DuVall, “Trump Would Host Kim Jong Un to Discuss Nuclear Program,” UPI, June 15, 2016. 12. For a history of the negotiations, see Leon V. Sigal, “What Have Twenty-Five Years of Nuclear Diplomacy Achieved?” in Pathways to a Peaceful Korean Peninsula: Denuclearization, Reconciliation and Cooperation, ed. Jeong-ho Roh (Seoul: Korean Institute of National Unification) (forthcoming). 13. Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), “KCNA Report,” January 10, 2015. 14. For instance, Haberman and Sanger, “Transcript: Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views.” (Leon V. Sigal, “One Impulse for Trump to Heed,” Arms Control Today, 47, 1 (January/February 2017), pp. 14-17)
John Schilling: “In his 2017 New Year’s Address, Kim Jong Un mentioned (among many other things) that North Korea had “entered the final stage of preparation for the test launch of intercontinental ballistic missile.” It should be noted that this was neither the focus of his speech—which, for the most part, was a list of last year’s accomplishments—nor was it an announcement that a test would occur any time soon. Quite possibly, it was a signal to the new dealmaker-in-chief of the United States that North Korea might be ready to make a deal: to not conduct the provocative test for the right price. Still, we should consider the possibility that a test may occur in the near future. In which case, how might this happen and what might it mean? First, any “test” that takes place so soon after such a high-level political announcement is probably no test at all, but a demonstration. A test is an experiment, an attempt to determine whether or not a new system will work, and if not, why. A demonstration is meant to prove to a skeptical audience that, yes, North Korea does have a workable ICBM. Even if a test ends in failure and the North loses credibility it would still gain valuable information about why it failed and how to fix it. People tend to call their demonstrations “tests” to minimize the impact if they do fail, but Kim’s announcement means North Korean credibility will unavoidably be at stake in any long-range missile launch. Which brings us to the next question: which ICBM might they test? North Korea has a family of road-mobile ICBMs under development, of which, the KN-08 and KN-14 might be ready for a real test of the sort that often leads to politically embarrassing failures. It also has a proven space launch vehicle, the Unha-3, which could be pressed into service as a crude ICBM. An ICBM variant of the Unha could be sufficiently similar to the space launch vehicle in that it would be very likely to succeed, making it a good candidate for a political demonstration even though the Unha would make for a poor missile. A demonstration launch of an Unha-based ICBM would, at first, look very much like a satellite launch. The rocket would be assembled, checked out, and fueled over a period of several days at the Sohae launch facility. The launch would follow a trajectory similar to a satellite launch, probably aligned to avoid overflying any of North Korea’s neighbors. The first technical indication that anything was different would be the low acceleration of the upper stage, carrying a reentry vehicle with enough ballast to simulate a nuclear warhead. Eventually, the simulated warhead would enter the atmosphere and impact some eight to ten thousand kilometers downrange. The reentry event would be the only part of this exercise that would qualify as a real test, as North Korea has never demonstrated an ICBM-class reentry vehicle before. If they are conservative in the design, there is little chance that it would fail outright, but the accuracy on the first launch is likely to be poor. North Korean engineers would certainly want to have a ship stationed near the impact point to gather data, and we would certainly hope the United States Navy is keeping a close eye on where the North is stationing its ships. Pyongyang might also test a new upper stage with a more powerful engine, better suited for carrying heavy warheads. They might test an accelerated launch procedure, with hours rather than days of preparation. Such changes would increase risk, however, and even then, they wouldn’t really demonstrate anything we haven’t already known for years. The Unha rocket works, it can be adapted to carry warheads instead of satellites, but it can only be launched from large, fixed sites that can be monitored for signs of an impending launch. If it were seen as a real threat, it could be preemptively destroyed. It is more useful as a space launch vehicle, and North Korea seems to genuinely want a space program as well as an arsenal of missiles. If the North Koreans really want to impress anyone, and particularly if they have any hope of their space program being seen as a peaceful endeavor that might escape the political and economic sanctions imposed on North Korea’s missile programs, they will want to demonstrate their ICBM capability using a KN-08 or KN-14 mobile missile. Moreover, it is more likely that they will test when they are ready to test rather than risk repeating the recent experience of demonstrating the Musudan intermediate-range missile which resulted in an embarrassing record of six or seven failures out of eight launch attempts. In any case, the first test of an entirely new multistage missile whose main engine has only recently been demonstrated on the ground will almost certainly end in failure. Nevertheless, even a failure might put the North on a path to success. This is literally rocket science, one of the archetypal hard problems, and success can only be achieved through perseverance. The first American ICBM, the SM-65 “Atlas,” failed 26 seconds into its maiden flight. Eight tests were conducted over the course of a year, with only two being fully successful. The first all-up test of the competing SM-68 “Titan” was even shorter, exploding on the launch pad. The Titan scored only one success in its first six launches. However, both missiles entered operational service within two years of their initial, disastrous flight tests, and proved adequately reliable in service. Russia’s early experience with ICBMs was similar, though some of the details are still hazy. We should expect North Korean ICBMs to follow a similar path—a series of early failures leading to an operational capability even with a spotty testing record. There might be a somewhat slower pace of testing with a North Korean ICBM since the high pace of testing in early US and Soviet ICBM programs was a sign of desperation, not wanting to be on the wrong side of a “missile gap” by showing up late to the ICBM party. Even under the best of circumstances, it usually takes an engineering team at least three months to verify that they understand why a long-range rocket exploded and develop a fix they can be confident in. If missiles are being tested every month and usually failing, this means someone is willing to destroy large, sophisticated rockets on little more than an educated guess at a solution to the last test’s problem. That’s a very expensive way to gain a few months’ edge in an arms race. North Korea has traditionally conducted large rocket tests at intervals of six months to a year, a slower but more efficient process that gives their engineers time to do their jobs properly. Recently, as with the Musudan, the North tested at the sort of pace we demonstrated in the early Cold War. We can guess at what might drive such desperation, but it seems unlikely that Pyongyang can afford to keep up that pace in a full-scale ICBM development program. Its aerospace industry hasn’t demonstrated the production capacity needed to test an ICBM every month. One test every three to six months would be more realistic, at least in the long run, so this is not a process that will be completed in 2017. If North Korea wants the tests to succeed, or at least to learn as much as possible from the failures, it will also conduct them at existing launch sites and on their usual trajectories. Even if they use a mobile launcher, as the KN-08 and KN-14 likely will in operation, the North will want to have the full support facilities and technical staff of an experimental test facility close at hand for the early flights. And, since at least one of the failed Musudan tests apparently destroyed an expensive mobile launcher, conducting the first few tests from a heavy steel gantry on a concrete pad would be preferable. It is likely that the North Koreans will launch on a trajectory that accurately represents a long-range missile flight, and with full coverage from tracking radar and telemetry antennas. They might choose a lofted trajectory, firing at a steep angle to reach a high altitude but a short range, as they have on some recent Musudan and KN-11 flights. The Unha’s upper stages don’t have the thrust for such a trajectory, but a KN-14 would and a KN-08 might. At ICBM velocities this would be technically challenging, particularly during the reentry phase, but is the only practical way to conduct such a test at reduced range while avoiding the need to send a tracking ship far out into the Pacific to monitor reentry. Several reports have suggested that the United States might respond to a North Korean ICBM test by simply shooting down the missile. The more responsible comments along these lines have limited the discussion to missiles whose trajectory directly threatens the US and its allies. However, North Korea is unlikely to “test” an ICBM by firing it at Los Angeles or Hawaii. In any case, currently the United States and its allies have a very limited ability to shoot down a test or demonstration flight of a North Korean ICBM. The US National Missile Defense system could probably do the job but it is based at fixed sites in Alaska and California and would be of no use in protecting US allies. The US, Japanese and South Korean navies all operate warships with the Aegis, meant for use against shorter-ranged missiles although under ideal conditions could be capable of shooting down an ICBM or even a satellite [6]. However, shooting down something capable of flying as high and as fast as an ICBM would require an Aegis warship to be located very close to the missile’s trajectory during the first or last few minutes of its flight. If the North Koreans limit themselves to using standard trajectories from fixed launch sites we could probably position Aegis warships to shoot the missile down shortly after launch, albeit close enough that North Korea could easily harass them with its air or naval forces. And that problem gets much worse if the North tests from a mobile launcher at a remote site, or on a lofted trajectory, or if they are willing to overfly other nations. To have any chance at an intercept, Aegis ships would have to be stationed even closer to North Korea, in waters Pyongyang regards as critical to its national security. Do we really want to find out what happens if a US warship fires a large surface-to-air missile while a North Korean MiG is conducting a mock attack run? The MiG pilot may not understand the missile isn’t aimed at him. And even then, the attempt to shoot down the ICBM would probably fail because Aegis was never designed to do that under combat conditions, has never been tested in such a role, and would be operating at the edge of its theoretical capabilities. In short, North Korea appears to have three options. First, it could conduct a near-term demonstration using a modified Unha space launch vehicle fitted with a reentry vehicle large enough for a nuclear warhead. Such a test would likely work, gathering information related to reentry technology while putting an end to any pretense or hope of a peaceful space program. Second, the North could launch a KN-08 or KN-14 ICBM prototype almost guaranteed to fail, and fail repeatedly if it keeps launching rockets faster than its engineers can understand what is going wrong. Or third, Pyongyang can conduct a serious test program characterized by launches at a reasonable pace, leading to deployments even before a full program is completed. Only in the very unlikely case that the North fires the test at the United States could the US reliably shoot it down.” (John Schilling, “How Might North Korea Test an ICBM?” 38North, January 12, 2017)
1/14/17:
KCNA: “A sign of acute China-U.S. confrontation is clearly seen in the run-up to Trump’s presidential inauguration. And there is awkward rumor afloat in the world that China would use “north Korea” as a playing card in its confrontation with the U.S. in the future. The Wall Street Journal and American Interest of the U.S. and the Financial Times of Britain and many other media of the world are carrying articles to the effect that there is increasing possibility for China to counter the Trump administration with “north Korea as a playing card.” This cannot be construed otherwise than a unilateral viewpoint of media ignorant of the universal principle concerning the sovereignty of countries and the true picture of the DPRK. Explicitly speaking, it is illogical to say that the DPRK can be used as a “playing card” of others as the country is demonstrating its might as a political and ideological power and a nuclear power. Firm is the DPRK’s position as a nuclear weapons state whether others recognize it or not. One has to face up to the reality of the DPRK clearly and squarely, if one wants to know about it. The hotspot in which the interests of big powers are intertwined and the issues of international nature have historically accumulated is the Northeast Asian region centered on the Korean peninsula. Historically, the tense situation on the Korean peninsula and the war atmosphere fanned up on it have been attributable to the U.S. and other hegemonic forces’ diplomatic and political purposes and the Korean nation has been the biggest victim of the tension on the peninsula. If the DPRK had not bolstered up and defended its sovereignty, it would have already faced the miserable fate of modern day slaves in the 21st century, not just ending in the “color revolution” and Mideast situation. Today the sovereignty of countries and nations is wantonly violated in different parts of the world due to the hegemonic forces’ high-handed and arbitrary practices and appeasement, and the U.S. and its vassal forces’ sanctions and blockade against the DPRK have reached the extremes. Even under such situation the DPRK towered as a nuclear power and a military power in the East no formidable enemies can dare to provoke. The DPRK is not an entity sandwiched between neighboring powers. For its treasured nuclear sword of justice it has emerged a powerful force that can spearhead the regional situation as a strategic stronghold in which the vital interests of big powers are intertwined. A new dynamic structure has been set up with the DPRK as an absolute parameter. Nothing can bring down the position of the DPRK that has ranked itself with dignity among the nuclear powers with a firm hold on the treasured nuclear sword of justice in order to defend the sovereignty of the nation and its rights to existence and development and safeguard the regional peace and stability. It remains strong regardless of someone’s recognition. Now is the time for the DPRK to steer the solution of the issue of peace and stability in Northeast Asia as it has undergone a fundamental change in its strategic position. The DPRK will as ever safeguard its peace and security by its own strength and make a positive contribution to defending the world peace and stability.” (KCNA, “KCNA Commentary Stresses Need to Have Proper Understanding of DPRK,” January 14, 2017)
1/18/17:
Bermudez: “Commercial satellite imagery indicates that North Korea may be preparing to resume operations at its 5 MWe reactor, which had been suspended since late-2015. Throughout the previous four months, there has been a continued presence of vehicles at and around the 5 MWe reactor suggesting either ongoing maintenance, refueling or preparations for renewed operations. Concurrently, while no steam exhaust was observed at the 5 MWe reactor or its support buildings in any imagery from October through January, the channel in the Taeryong River leading to and from the reactor’s cooling cisterns was cleared of ice and dredged between December 1 and 29. This channel remains clear as of January 16, although no water discharge is observed. Additionally, no snow was observed on the roofs of the 5 MWe reactor or its support buildings in imagery from December 29, but there was snow on the roofs of other buildings in this area. This indicates that the 5 MWe reactor and its support buildings are occupied and at least minimally heated. Taken as a whole, these activities suggest preparations to resume operation of the 5 MWe reactor.” (Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Yongbyon Facility: Possible Resumption of Operations at the 5MWe Plutonium Production Reactor,” 38North, January 18, 2017)
A group of F-35 fighter jets arrived at a U.S. Marine base in western Japan, marking the first deployment of the stealth aircraft outside the United States and reflecting the country’s policy of focusing on Asia. The move is expected to increase the importance of U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni as a key military post in the region at a time when Japan faces rising Chinese maritime assertiveness. Some F-35s will arrive later, raising the total number of the deployed aircraft to 16, according to the U.S. military. The Yamaguchi Prefecture base is also set to accept about 60 carrier-based aircraft now stationed at the U.S. Navy’s Atsugi Air Facility in Kanagawa Prefecture, with the relocation to start in the second half of this year in line with a realignment plan for U.S. forces in Japan. (Kyodo, “U.S. F-35 Fighter Jets Arrive in Japan, Mark 1st Overseas Deployment,” January 18, 2017)
1/19/17:
North Korea has probably built two missiles presumed to be intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) [?] and placed them on mobile launchers for test-firing in the near future, military officials said. The two missiles are estimated to not exceed 15 meters in length, making them shorter than the North’s existing ICBMs, the 19-20 meter-long KN-08 and the 17-18 meter-long KN-14, the officials familiar with the matter told Yonhap. The North appears to have intentionally leaked the new missiles to send a “strategic message” to the incoming government of Donald Trump who takes office tomorrow, they said. The officials didn’t provide the exact date for when the missiles were picked up by intelligence, although it is estimated that the U.S. detected them on January 16 when the U.S. Navy hurriedly moved its sea-based X-band radar system to the western part of the Pacific Ocean from seas off Hawaii. “There is no imminent sign of provocations, but we remain vigilant as the North could fire a missile at any time and place determined by its leadership,” an official from Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff told reporters. The ministry didn’t confirm whether the North has recently developed a new, upgraded prototype of their ICBM. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Has Likely Build 2 ICBMs, Placed Them on Mobile Launchers: Sources,” January 19, 2017) The United States has seen indications that North Korea may be preparing for a new missile test-launch in the coming days or weeks, U.S. officials said on Thursday, in what could be an early test of President-elect Donald Trump’s administration. South Korean media, citing intelligence agencies, said Pyongyang may be readying a test of a new, upgraded prototype of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) as early as tomorrow, the day Trump is inaugurated. U.S. officials, who spoke to Reuters on condition of anonymity, cautioned however that they did not have such precise information about the range or potential timing of Pyongyang’s missile test, should it happen. One official suggested Pyongyang could be largely seeking to provoke the Trump administration. “If they do something, it would more likely be a test of Trump than a test of a delivery system,” said a U.S. intelligence officer who monitors North Korean activities. “They probably want to see how he reacts to a provocation, even a minor one, and if they really want to poke him, they’ll do it right away.” (James Pearson and Phil Stewart, “North Korea May Be Readying MissileTest,TimingUnclear: U.S. Officials,” Reuters, January 19, 2017)
John Schilling: “On January 19, South Korea’s Yonhap news agency reported that North Korea had placed two missiles on mobile launchers in preparation for possible testing in the early days of the Trump administration. Details are still scarce, and it should be noted that North Korea has in the past prepared missiles for launch without conducting any test. As we recently noted, missile “tests” are often political demonstrations, and often what is being demonstrated includes an element of restraint. And, of course, if launch preparations indicate technical problems likely to lead to failure, the nature of the demonstration will likely be changed to accommodate the technical reality. Still, it is possible that North Korea could conduct a missile test in the next few days. We recently discussed what this might entail, but from the limited data available we can perhaps narrow down the speculation. The missiles are reportedly on mobile launchers, but are explicitly described as less than 15 meters long. This measurement rules out any of North Korea’s known ICBM prototypes, all of which are at least 16 meters long. North Korea probably has missiles under development that we don’t know about, but the likelihood of any such missile being ready for an imminent flight test without our first having seen signs of extensive ground testing is very low. One possibility is that we are not seeing a complete missile: a KN-14 mobile intercontinental ballistic (ICBM) without the reentry vehicle, or a KN-08 mobile ICBM without the third stage, would meet the description provided. It would be unusual to mount the missile on a mobile launcher in an incomplete configuration, but it might be done if the reentry vehicle is stored separately and the mobile launcher is the most expedient way to deliver the missile to the launch site. If this is the case, we might expect a demonstration launch in the next few days, allowing time to mate the reentry vehicle and conduct a final checkout of the integrated system. It has been suggested that North Korea might even launch a KN-08 with only the first two stages, if for example, the third stage is facing severe technical difficulties. This seems unlikely, however, as both the guidance system and the attachment fitting for the reentry vehicle are part of the third stage. One might launch a missile with a dummy third stage containing only the guidance and payload systems, with ballast in place of the engines and fuel. There is precedent for this in other countries’ large rocket testing, but the rocket would still be of normal length. A final possibility is that the missile is a plain old-fashioned Nodong missile, the workhorse of North Korea’s strategic arsenal and just about 15 meters long. Kim Jong Un’s engineers almost certainly understand that any test of a new ICBM rushed to meet a political deadline will likely result in failure, and if they have had the courage to tell their boss this then Kim might settle for posturing with shorter-range missiles that he can be confident will actually work. We are looking for high-resolution satellite imagery to help clear this up. For now, we see three realistic possibilities. First, this may turn out to be simply a bluff. Second, the North Koreans may posture with a demonstration launch of a Nodong missile or two, demonstrating no new capabilities but reminding the world that they are at least a regional threat, Finally, they may launch a KN-08 or KN-14 missile after adding a yet-unseen reentry vehicle (and in the case of a KN-08, the entire third stage). Such a test would probably fail and embarrass the regime, but it could fail in a way that provides Pyongyang’s engineers with critical data going forward. North Korea usually fails with their first test of a new missile, and usually figures out how to make it work in the end.” (John Schilling, “Is North Korea Preparing a Missile Test?” 38North, January 21, 2017) North Korea looks set to launch a Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) instead of a long-range one as it still has to master the related technologies, military officials said January 30. “There are no signs of an imminent test firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by North Korea. But we are closely monitoring any new military activities in the country as it could launch an IRBM at any time if leader Kim Jong-un gives the order,” an official at the defense ministry said. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Likely to Launch Mid-Range Missile,” January 30, 2017)
1/20/17:
White House: “The Trump Administration is committed to a foreign policy focused on American interests and American national security. Peace through strength will be at the center of that foreign policy. This principle will make possible a stable, more peaceful world with less conflict and more common ground. Defeating ISIS and other radical Islamic terror groups will be our highest priority. To defeat and destroy these groups, we will pursue aggressive joint and coalition military operations when necessary. In addition, the Trump Administration will work with international partners to cut off funding for terrorist groups, to expand intelligence sharing, and to engage in cyberwarfare to disrupt and disable propaganda and recruiting. Next, we will rebuild the American military. Our Navy has shrunk from more than 500 ships in 1991 to 275 in 2016. Our Air Force is roughly one third smaller than in 1991. President Trump is committed to reversing this trend, because he knows that our military dominance must be unquestioned. Finally, in pursuing a foreign policy based on American interests, we will embrace diplomacy. The world must know that we do not go abroad in search of enemies, that we are always happy when old enemies become friends, and when old friends become allies. The world will be more peaceful and more prosperous with a stronger and more respected America. …This strategy starts by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and making certain that any new trade deals are in the interests of American workers. …In addition to rejecting and reworking failed trade deals, the United States will crack down on those nations that violate trade agreements and harm American workers in the process. The President will direct the Commerce Secretary to identify all trade violations and to use every tool at the federal government’s disposal to end these abuses.” (White House, “America First Foreign Policy,” January 20, 2017)
In the first major policy change about North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction in nearly a decade, Seoul will focus more on blocking Pyongyang from actually using the weapons instead of trying to deter their development. The change was described by an official from the South Korean government Thursday who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue. “For almost 10 years, [the South] tried in vain to freeze North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program or scrap it entirely through the six-party talks and other efforts,” said the source. “But none led to any tangible results.” Seoul’s policy shift reflects the “reality” of circumstances and imminent threats from North Korea, the official continued. For the new strategy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established a so-called Weapons of Mass Destruction Response Center on Jan. 1 to better respond to North Korean provocations by predicting Pyongyang’s military capabilities five to 10 years from now and devising ways for the South to defend itself from them. The group is composed of three different departments, a drastic expansion from the past when only one department was allotted for the same task. In another tip-off from the South Korean military, a senior official said that North Korea appears to have recently developed a satellite that uses an optical camera it bought last year from abroad. The international community widely views North’s satellite development as a cover to test the ballistic missiles needed to put the satellites into orbit. (Jeong Yong-soo, Lee Sung-eun, and Lee Chul-jae, “Seoul to Give up North Denuclearization Policy,” JoongAng Ilbo, January 20, 2017)
Rodong Sinmun commentary: “The U.S. deputy secretary of State blustered that the DPRK’s threat has reached an alarming phase and sanctions and pressure upon it would go on no matter what administration may emerge in the U.S. as regards the DPRK’s entry into the final stage in preparation for the test launch of ICBM. …It is a righteous self-defensive measure for the DPRK to test-launch its ICBM as part of its measures for bolstering up the military capability to cope with the U.S. daily-increasing threat of nuclear war. Therefore, no one can find fault with this. The U.S. is wholly to blame for pushing the DPRK to developing ICBM as it has desperately pursued its anachronistic policy hostile toward the DPRK for decades to encroach upon its sovereignty and vital rights. The U.S. is not entitled to grumble about the DPRK’s test-fire of inter-continental ballistic racket, to say nothing of more powerful weapons, to react to its nuclear blackmail. The DPRK, a responsible nuclear weapons state, will never remain a passive onlooker to the daily-increasing nuclear war danger on the Korean peninsula. It will redouble its efforts to put an end to the source of nuclear threat and blackmail. Its test-launch of ICBM is part of a series of measures for bolstering up the self-defensive military capability to cope with the U.S. daily-increasing nuclear war threat. No matter what others may say, ICBM will be launched anytime and anywhere determined by the supreme leadership of the DPRK.” (KCNA, “No One Can Find Fault with DPRK’s Test-Fire of ICBM: Rodong Sinmun, January 20, 2017)
South Korea, the United States and Japan began a three-day naval exercise designed to counter North Korean missiles amid growing indications that Pyongyang is ready to test-fire an intercontinental ballistic missile in time for Donald Trump‘s inauguration. According to the South Korean Navy, the joint maritime exercise involves three Aegis-equipped destroyers capable of detecting, tracking and intercepting ICBM. Seoul deployed its first Aegis destroyer, the Sejong the Great, while Washington and Tokyo sent USS Curtis Wilbur and JDS Kirishima, respectively. “The military exercise takes place in the waters of the three countries,” a Navy official familiar with the matter said on the condition of anonymity. “The exercise is not an interception drill. Using hypothetical targets, we will track, detect and share information (about the missiles).” (Yeo Jun-suk, “S. Korea, U.S., Japan Kick off Maritime Drill to Counter N.K. Missiles,” Korea Herald, January 20, 2017)
The United States thought in the early 1990s that economic sanctions would not make North Korea give up its nuclear weapons program even if such a step would significantly hurt the North’s economy, a declassified report showed. The US analyzed the possible impacts of economic sanctions on North Korea and potential responses from the North, South Korea, China and others, according to the National Intelligence Council’s report from December 1991 and titled “North Korea: Likely Response to Economic Sanctions.” The report said that the intelligence community believes that sanctions per se would not cause North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, but they would significantly dent the North’s economy. “A trade embargo — if fully respected and enforced — would cause a significant falloff in production and impose severe hardships on the North Korean populace,” it said. “The reduction of crude oil would be particularly troublesome,” the report said, adding that the cutoff of oil deliveries would cause the North to speed up the shutdown of even key industries. It said North Korea could move towards hostile responses including a possible terrorist action against the US or South Korean facilities or people if sanctions were to be enforced militarily. “North Korea could raise tensions by staging military incidents along the Demilitarized Zone,” the report said. The report raised doubt that stronger economic sanctions could pose a threat to the North’s regime. “In the short run at least, the result could produce more support for the leadership rather than any backlash or pressure for change,” the report added. (Yonhap, “U.S. Did Not Think Sanctions Would Cause N.K. to Give up Nukes in 1991: Report,” January 20, 2017)
“President Trump will end the defense sequester and submit a new budget to Congress outlining a plan to rebuild our military,” the White House said on its website, referring to the automatic cuts in defense spending. “We will provide our military leaders with the means to plan for our future defense needs,” it said. “We will also develop a state-of-the-art missile defense system to protect against missile-based attacks from states like Iran and North Korea.” (Yonhap, “Trump’s White House Vows to Develop Missile Defense System to Defend against N. Korea,” January 21, 2017)
1/22/17:
Exports to China have fallen sharply for South Korean materials and components such as semiconductors, flat-panel displays, and automobile parts. Analysts said the phenomenon, which comes amid steps by China to hasten its own technology independence and strengthen bans on processing trade, shows an increasing collapse in the three-way division of labor with China and Japan that took shape after the rapid rise of the Japanese economy in the early ’00s. A report on 2016 exports and imports for materials and components released by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MTIE) on Jan. 16 showed a total of US$82.7 billion (around 97.8 trillion won) in South Korean material and component exports to China last year. The number was down by more than US$10 billion from the US$95.3 billion recorded for 2014 and the US$93.5 billion for 2015. By item, exports of electronic components such as mobile phone liquid crystal displays and wireless communication devices plummeted to US$38.7 billion last year from US$46.2 billion in 2014 and US$47.2 billion in 2015. Transport machinery exports, including mechanical equipment and car parts, were down to US$5.5 billion in 2016 from US$6.7 billion in 2014 and US$6.5 billion in 2015. “Exports have dropped off as China has improved its self-sufficiency in materials and components and strengthened restrictions on processing trade,” explained the MTIE. “There has also been a phenomenon of reverse exports back to South Korea because of businesses that have ventured in China and produced material and component intermediate goods there but have been unable to sell them locally,” it added. The number of items subject to Chinese processing trade bans rose from 341 in 2004 to 1,871 in 2014. As the Chinese economy began its period of rapid growth in the ’00s, material and component manufacturers in South Korea, Japan, and Japan formed a system with a three-way East Asia division of labor. Japan, which holds a technological comparative advantage in key materials, exported materials and parts to South Korea, which developed them into components and half-finished goods for export to China, which in turn assembled and processed them as finished products for export to the global market. Fears that the system might be breaking down have been voiced for several years. Now they appear to be coming true – with a resultant shock to South Korea‘s system. The amount of materials and parts imported by South Korea from Japan has been declining for the past several years, tumbling from US$37.4 billion in 2012 to US$30.5 billion in 2014 and US$27.2 billion last year – a decrease of around US$10 billion, or 27%, in the space of just four years. At first glance, the decrease in imports may be welcome news for the balance of trade with Japan, signaling an improvement in conditions that have persisted since the 1980s. But sentiment on the South Korean end has been mixed. As the collapse in the three-way division of labor intensifies, the result has been a situation of both declining exports to China for South Korean industries and businesses and sharply falling imports of key materials from Japan. South Korea remains dependent on Japanese imports for some of its key materials, including mechanical equipment, semiconductors, and automobile parts, which have international trade harmonized system (HS) codes beginning with the number “8.” It was around 2004 that China, the “world’s factory,” began seriously pushing to stop being a mere assembly base and promoting domestic production of materials and components – a phenomenon called “China inside.” In 2004, Beijing moved to curb imports of intermediate goods and boost the competitiveness of China‘s material and component industries by designating 341 items as subject to processing trade bans, including used machinery. In 2007, it extended that list to 1,140 items. “It was right after the financial crisis in 2008 that China’s self-sufficiency rate for materials and components began to suddenly rise,” explained Hyundai Research Institute researcher Chen Yong-chan. “Recent international technology assessment reports show South Korea is still at the stage of pursuing Japan in terms of key material technology, while China is rapidly gaining on South Korea in semiconductors and machinery,” Chen noted. It’s a situation where improved manufacturing business competitiveness and self-sufficiency for components amid rapid advancements in technological innovation and industry structure in China are spelling emergency for South Korean intermediate good exports. South Korea’s mainstay export items to China remain material and component intermediate goods such as petrochemicals, steel, semiconductors, and displays. (Cho Kye-wan, “Three-Way Division of Labor Breaking Down among S. Korea, China and Japan,” Hankyore, January 22, 2017)
1/23/17:
On his first full weekday in office, President Donald Trump signed an executive action to abandon a multilateral trade deal involving 12 countries, underlining his tough trade policy and raising concerns over a possible renegotiation of the South Korea-US Free Trade Agreement. Trump and his economic advisors have showed their strong opposition to free trade deals — which have been a global trend since the mid-2000s — citing a growing trade deficit with its trade partners. In addition to withdrawing from the TPP, the Trump administration also vowed to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement. As the US drops out from the deal — a fast execution of one of Trump’s campaign pledges — concerns are raising here over a possible renegotiation of the South Korea-US Free Trade Agreement. Peter Navarro, who will lead the new National Trade Council, last year called NAFTA, the World Trade Organization and the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement the three worst trade deals in history. “The entire scrapping of the trade deal seems unrealistic but it is possible that the US might ask for a renegotiation of the trade deal with bigger openness in service sectors such as finance, health and law,” said Oh Jun-beom, a senior researcher at Hyundai Research Institute. Some are adopting a cautious stance on the possibility. “Trump did mention the Korea-US FTA during the campaign, but he has not mentioned it since he was actually elected,” an official at the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy said Tuesday. Hyundai Research Institute’s Oh also agreed. “If renegotiated, it would be after the Trump administration handles NAFTA and TPP issues and China, which has a bigger trade surplus with the US than South Korea,” Oh said. South Korea‘s trade surplus with the US was $23.4 billion in 2016, according to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. China’s trade surplus with the US stood at $250.79 billion in 2016, according to China‘s customs data. Over in Washington, the reaction was mixed. Democratic Sen. Bernie Sanders welcomed the move while Republican Sen. John McCain lamented it. “Now is the time to develop a new trade policy that helps working families, not just multinational corporations,” Sanders said in a statement. “For the past 30 years, we have had a series of trade deals … which have cost us millions of decent-paying jobs and caused a ‘race to the bottom,’ which has lowered wages for American workers.” McCain said in a statement, “This move to withdraw from the TPP is a serious mistake that will have lasting consequences for America’s economy and our strategic position in the Asia-Pacific region.” The member countries of the TPP showed their willingness to continue the trade pact without the world’s biggest economy and open their doors to other nations. Australian Trade Minster Steven Ciobo said during a radio interview January 24 that there is scope for China to join the TPP. The remaining 11 member countries of TPP include Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Japan ratified the treaty January 20, becoming the first country to do so. Meanwhile, South Korean Trade Minister Joo Hyung-hwan said he will visit the US soon to seek ways to expand bilateral cooperation with the new US administration. Joo said the Seoul government remains open to every possibility and is preparing for every possible scenario, as the new US administration’s trade policies still remain uncertain. While the US ditches the TPP, stepping back from free trade deals, Asia will push ahead with regional economic cooperation. Last week at the World Economic Forum, Chinese President Xi Jinping likened protectionism to “locking oneself in a dark room” and signaled that China would push ahead regional trade deals. Joo urged to conclude the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, another major trade deal undertaking of nearly the scope of the TPP, in order to expand markets and regional integration. The RCEP under negotiation since 2012 involves 16 countries including China, Japan, India, Australia and South Korea. (Park Ga-young, “Trump’s TPP Abandonment Fans Trade Fears in Korea,” Korea Herald, January 24, 2017)
1/24/17:
The U.S. government has reportedly sent humanitarian aid earmarked for flood relief to North Korea’s North Hamgyong Province via the UN. “Shortly before President Obama left office, the Obama administration sent humanitarian aid to North Korea by way of the UN, and the Trump administration is planning to make this public before long,” an expert on the Korean Peninsula in Washington who is familiar with affairs in the US government told Hankyore. This expert said that American aid to North Korea was at a “symbolic level” and did not mention the exact size or the items provided. This is the first humanitarian aid the US government has given to North Korea since it gave US$900,000 through the independent relief organization Samaritan’s Purse in 2011. Even as the Obama administration toughened its independent sanctions against the North in response to North Korea’s fourth and fifth nuclear tests, it allowed humanitarian aid from the private sector but did not provide any governmental aid. Considering that the Obama administration maintained a harsh policy of ignoring North Korea known as “strategic patience,” the fact that it played the card of governmental humanitarian aid through the UN just before Obama left office can be seen as a significant message to North Korea. The move provides the Trump administration, which is succeeding Obama, with a way to make unofficial contact with the North Koreans early on to explore resetting US relations with the North while giving Trump cover for the political fallout of providing humanitarian aid. The fact that the Obama administration provided government-level humanitarian aid to North Korea through the UN just before Obama’s term ended looks very much like a “small present” to the incoming Trump administration. The Obama administration takes on the political burden of providing the humanitarian aid to the North, while the Trump administration only has to make the announcement. Considering that the Obama administration even this year avowed putting sanctions and pressure on the North during high-level deliberations with South Korea shortly before the handover of power on Jan. 20, this decision can also be seen as an unexpected twist. The Trump administration has basically been given effective leverage to explore the possibility of resetting US-North Korea relations at the beginning of the Trump presidency. When dealing with North Korea, humanitarian aid from the government is a way to send a friendly signal to the North without spending much domestic political capital. It’s a way to “prime the pump” and relax tensions that offers good “value for money.” While the administration of South Korean President Park Geun-hye completely severed inter-Korean relations and basically banned humanitarian aid from the private sector in response to North Korea’s two nuclear tests in 2016 (the fourth test on January 6 and the fifth test on September. 9), the Obama administration has not closed the final “window of opportunity” that humanitarian aid represents. The fact is that the Trump administration and the North Korean regime of Kim Jong-un are still testing the waters. Trump did not mention North Korea during his inaugural address, and the six major policy goals announced by the White House only mention Iran and North Korea in the context of developing a cutting-edge missile defense system. Trump has yet to announce the framework of his North Korean policy or the specific methods of implementing that policy. During his New Year’s address on January 1, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un indulged in a little saber-rattling by claiming that “the preparations for a test launch of an ICBM are in their final stage.” Nevertheless, he has maintained a wait-and-see attitude for President Trump and the new American government by refraining from mentioning them so far. That’s why the Korean Peninsula expert in Washington believes that the US government‘s humanitarian aid to North Korea, as “the first action to be taken,” could cause US-North Korea relations to move in a positive direction in the early days of the Trump administration. “In order for South Korea to avoid being trapped between the US and China, it needs to negotiate with the Trump administration so that Trump will suspend efforts to deploy THAAD for now and so that he will eventually not feel the need to deploy it at all. That will require North and South Korea to hold off-the-record meetings toward that end and for North Korea to continue refraining [from taking military action],” the expert advised. If the Obama administration’s “last little gift” is to be used as a stepping stone to transforming the political situation on the Korean Peninsula, there needs to be wise response not only from North Korea and the US but also from the South Korean government, the expert said. (Lee Je-hun, “U.S. Provides First Humanitarian Aid to North Korea in Five Years,” Hankyore, January 25, 2017)
1/25/17:
The United States has provided $1 million in humanitarian aid to impoverished North Korea, the . State Department said. Outgoing Secretary of State John Kerry awarded $1 million for North Korea to UNICEF, a U.N. agency, the day before President Donald Trump took office last week. It marks the first time that the U.S. provided humanitarian assistance to the North since 2011, when it provided relief items including medical supplies to North Korean flood victims. That aid, worth $900,000, was made through Samaritan’s Purse, a U.S.-based humanitarian aid organization. The current assistance comes in the aftermath of Typhoon Lionrock, which hit North Korea in August with heavy rain that resulted in flooding. At the time, the government reported hundreds were dead and missing, and said thousands had lost their homes. International aid organizations responded immediately. The State Department confirmed the assistance in an email to VOA and said the funding was destined only for humanitarian assistance. However, a spokesman added that U.S. officials are “currently reviewing last-minute spending approved by the previous administration.” News of U.S. assistance to North Korea came as a surprise to some officials in Washington and Seoul, since both countries have been increasing pressure on Pyongyang since the communist country conducted multiple nuclear tests last year. (Baik Sungwon, “U.S. Humanitarian Aid Goes to North Korea Despite Nuclear Tensions,” VOA, January 25, 2017)
The highest-ranking defector from North Korea in years said that the days of the country’s leadership were “numbered,” and that its attempts to control outside information were not working because of corruption and discontent. “I am sure that more defections of my colleagues will take place, since North Korea is already on a slippery slope,” the defector, Thae Yong-ho, said during a news conference in Seoul. “The traditional structures of the North Korean system are crumbling.” His diagnosis of Mr. Kim’s rule is hardly new. Defectors from the North, as well as some conservative analysts and policy makers in the South, widely share that view. Before his defection, he was a career diplomat, fluent in English, who had served in Britain, Denmark and Sweden, often delivering passionate speeches glorifying the Kim family that has ruled North Korea for seven decades. In the South, Thae, now affiliated with the Institute for National Security Strategy, a think tank arm of the National Intelligence Service, has vowed to spend the rest of his life trying to bring down the North Korean government. Thae said he had high expectations when Kim took power after the death of his father, Kim Jong-il, in 2011. Schooled for several years in Switzerland, Kim was expected to help modernize his impoverished country. Instead, he resorted to a “reign of terror” by executing scores of officials, including his uncle Jang Song-thaek, whom he thought posed a challenge to his power, Thae said. The former diplomat said he had come up with a detailed plan for his defection, first ensuring that his two sons joined him and his wife in London. (North Korean diplomats are required to leave a child in the North, a measure intended to prevent their defection.) The best way to force change in the isolated North, he continued, is to disseminate outside information there to help ordinary citizens eventually rebel. South Korean TV dramas and movies smuggled from China are already popular in the North, he said. Another sign of Kim’s weakening control, Thae said, is evident at the unofficial markets in North Korea where women trade goods, mostly smuggled from China. The vendors used to be called “grasshoppers” because they would pack and flee whenever they saw the police approaching. Now, they are called “ticks” because they refuse to budge, demanding a right to make a living, Thae said. Such resistance, even if small in scale, is unprecedented, he added. The spread of outside news and market activities could eventually doom Kim because his government “can be held in place and maintained only by idolizing Kim Jong-un like a god,” Thae said. “If he tries to introduce a market-oriented economy to North Korean society, then there will be no place for Kim Jong-un in North Korea, and he knows that.” But the leader’s efforts to clamp down on information and products from outside North Korea have been unsuccessful because the police accept bribes in exchange for freeing smugglers and people caught watching banned movies and dramas. “Kim Jong-un’s days are numbered,” Thae said. After months of debriefing by the authorities in South Korea, Thae used meetings with the country’s politicians and the news media to suggest that North Korea was determined to be recognized as a nuclear power, just as India and Pakistan are. Thae warned against compromising with the North, arguing that sanctions were effective. In recent interviews with local news outlets, he said that North Korea had lost annual income worth tens of millions dollars, after Britain froze accounts last year held by its state-run insurance company as part of sanctions recommended by the United Nations. Until then, the company had claimed large insurance payments through fabricated documents, he said. Kim wanted to negotiate a compromise, under which the United States and South Korea would cancel their annual joint military exercises and lift sanctions on the North in return for a moratorium on North Korean missile and nuclear tests, Thae said. But such a deal would validate Kim’s argument that he had been forced to develop nuclear weapons as a reaction to American hostility, he said. “That is really a trap Kim Jong-un wants,” Thae said. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korean Defector Says Leadership’s Control Is Crumbling,” New York Times, January 26, 2017,
China has released a new list of items banned for export to North Korea, ranging from wind tunnels to plutonium, following a new round of United Nations sanctions and complaints from U.S. President Donald Trump that Beijing was not doing enough to pressure its communist neighbor. The step was seen by one leading expert on North Korea as an attempt to show that China is fully meeting its commitments, and to pre-empt any moves by the U.S. to punish Chinese companies that deal with the North. However, the expert questioned whether the ban would have much effect in slowing a North Korean nuclear weapons program that is already well advanced and gathering momentum. A statement from the Chinese Commerce Ministry said the items included dual-use technologies that could aid the North’s programs to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as the missiles to deliver them. While largely comprising specialty chemicals and rare alloys, the list also includes computer software, machinery, high-speed cameras, aerospace engines and six-axle truck chassis. Grinding machines, molds and radio transmitting equipment also joined plutonium and wind tunnels among the banned items. The ban on “dual-use measures related to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery” takes effect immediately, the announcement said. There was no evidence that the extensive list of items was prompted by anything other than the U.N. Security Council resolution passed in November in response to the North’s missile test in September. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying on Thursday said sanctions should be “implemented in an all-round and balanced way” and China was merely meeting its obligations. However, the official Communist Party newspaper Global Times suggested the timing had to do with the upcoming weeklong Lunar New Year holiday, a period during which North Korea last year staged a missile test and in 2013 held its third underground nuclear test. The announcement “is also a warning for the North Korean side not to conduct another round of nuclear testing during China’s Spring Festival this year,” it quoted Yanbian University expert Jin Qiangyi as saying, using another term for the Lunar New Year. Trump’s nominee to be secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, has spoken in starker terms. He accused China of making “empty promises” on North Korea and warned of U.S. sanctions on Chinese companies found to be violating U.N. Security Council resolutions, recently beefed up to tighten restrictions on North Korean coal imports. “If China is not going to comply with those U.N. sanctions then it’s appropriate for the United States to consider actions to compel them to comply,” Tillerson told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee earlier this month. China feels like it has not received credit for its previous concessions over North Korea, said John Delury of Yonsei University in Seoul. Trump’s “antagonistic rhetoric” has only strengthened those feelings and China is now seeking to avoid U.S. secondary sanctions on its companies, Delury said. China also has its own security concerns over North Korea’s programs and would have banned the items in any case, he said. However, given that previous bans and other sanctions appear to have had little effect, the latest move “won’t be the game-changer that people are looking for,” Delury said. “North Korea is already pretty far along, they’ve got momentum,” he said. “In technical terms, they’re pretty self-reliant at this point and don’t need to buy things ‘over the table’ from China.” (Christopher Bodeen, “China Releases New List of Items Banned for Export to N. Korea,” Associated Press, January 26, 2017)
Robert Huish: “Based on a review of automatic identification system data tracking approximately 70 vessels that entered DPRK ports between April 2016 and October 2016, current sanctions on North Korea do not appear to be impeding marine traffic into the country. The majority of marine traffic into the DPRK during this period was from Chinese ports by vessels flagged by several countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the DPRK. The registration and flagging of vessels trading with North Korea occurs via offshore firms that are based outside sanctions enforcement zones in places such as Hong Kong, the British Virgin Islands, and the Seychelles. Sanctions against North Korea are thus largely symbolic gestures of disapproval that do not demonstrate any capability to change the political behavior of the Kim Jong-un regime. For sanctions to influence the regime’s behavior, it would be necessary to pursue restrictions on the capital flows that allow marine traffic to enter the country rather than sanctioning the regime itself. Despite the latest round of UN Security Council sanctions in March 2016 and U.S. sanctions in June 2016, marine traffic into the DPRK continued throughout 2016. Between April 2016 and October 2016, I used automatic identification system (AIS) software from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to analyze marine traffic into active DPRK ports and identified approximately 70 incoming vessels, mostly arriving from Chinese ports but also from other locations, including a vessel that traveled to Sinpo harbor from Vancouver, Canada. While the methods used in this article are insufficient to produce a conclusive account of all marine traffic into the DPRK, this study finds that, despite the existence of sanctions, marine traffic regularly enters DPRK ports owing to the reflagging of vessels under flags of convenience and ownership of vessels by offshore capital management firms. This suggests that the Kim Jong-un regime has the means to bypass many of the sanctions that are currently in place. These restrictions are meant to restrict the movement of any vessel owned, managed, or operated by the Kim regime. The United Nations listed 31 North Korean “blacklisted” vessels under Resolution 2270. This list is meant to include vessels that are flagged in the DPRK or owned by the Kim regime under the Pyongyang-based company Ocean Maritime Management, as well as those that are sailing under flags of convenience but that are ultimately operated by the regime. However, many vessels on this list have since been reflagged in third countries, and ownership data suggests that they are controlled by offshore shell companies, some of which are traceable through the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists’ Offshore Leaks Database, which contains information from the Panama Papers. Many vessels on this list continue to facilitate trade with Pyongyang while being insured by European, UK, and U.S. companies. On July 7, 2016, the U.S. Treasury Department enacted new sanctions specifically targeting Kim and ten other top officials in the DPRK. The recent seizure orders by the United States exhibit a political willingness to act in response to the human rights crisis in North Korea, in addition to addressing the nuclear proliferation threat from the Kim regime. The sanctions freeze any property that Kim or his colleagues have in U.S. jurisdictions. The Treasury Department bases the sanctions on “North Korea’s notorious abuses of human rights…and to further our efforts to expose those responsible for serious human rights abuses and censorship in North Korea.” Executive Orders 13722 and 13687 target individuals who “have engaged in, facilitated, or been responsible for an abuse or violation of human rights by the Government of North Korea or the Workers’ Party of Korea” and who could assist in the regime’s nuclear proliferation goals. This executive order aims to punish these officials by confiscating any assets that they may have in the United States and U.S. territories. The question remains as to whether any of those named in the executive orders actually have property or assets in the United States. Assets held in offshore accounts set up by third-party intermediaries often cannot be seized under such measures. In addition to the eleven individuals named in Executive Orders 13722 and 13687, five firms are also included. However, all these entities are DPRK government departments, with no mention of banks, transportation firms, merchants, or suppliers. Previous U.S. executive orders have targeted DPRK banks and firms for seizure based on nuclear security concerns. The financial measures that involve maritime vessels are aimed at reducing the importation of military goods and luxury items. The U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control passed Executive Order 13551 in June 2015 to target the maritime transport of goods to North Korea, with a specific focus on military material and resources. This executive order uses an assets seizure clause for anyone who has “imported, exported, or re-exported any arms or related material”; provided “training, advice, or other services” related to arms materials; or “imported, exported, or re-exported luxury goods into North Korea.” Executive Order 13466 “prohibits persons from registering vessels in North Korea, obtaining authorization for a vessel to fly the North Korean flag, and owning, leasing, operating, or insuring any vessel flagged by North Korea.” This 2015 legislation, while aimed at stopping arms trafficking into the country, has the ability to target individuals who are profiting from business with the Kim regime. It thus could disrupt trade with the DPRK if the stakeholder also has direct dealings with the United States. Other countries have imposed sanctions on marine vessel traffic into the DPRK. The European Union, Canada, and New Zealand all follow the UN sanctions to restrict trade and financial transactions with the Kim regime. The UK Treasury has a list of 66 North Korean individuals whose assets are subject to seizure. In addition, the British government names 42 DPRK entities, including banks, firms, and merchants. Effectively enforcing these sanctions remains a problem, however, given that the entities targeted likely have their assets outside UK jurisdiction. Although heralded as a worthwhile political move, such executive orders to freeze assets do not actually apply much pressure on their targets and thus have little value in curbing human rights abuses or deterring nuclear proliferation. A notable change in tone exists with the recent U.S. financial measures to focus on human rights as the impetus for the sanctions rather than previous efforts that solely aimed at quelling nuclear proliferation or tactical security concerns. These measures do not target third parties, whereas the 2015 legislation provides the capacity to take action on those trading and dealing with the regime via marine traffic. In both cases, the fundamental purpose of the sanctions is to bring about behavioral change; yet unless the financial networks on which the Kim regime depends are targeted, this is unlikely to occur. Between April 2016 and October 2016, I used IMO’s AIS software—a system that tracks the recorded position and destination of merchant marine vessels—to record approximately 70 vessels that entered DPRK ports. This figure may not include all traffic, but it certainly captures the majority of it. Of the seventeen ports in the DPRK, most marine traffic enters the port of Nampo, located down river from Pyongyang. Other active ports include Daeson, Chongjin, Wonsan, and Sinpo. The vessels’ IMO numbers and call signs were recorded, along with country flag, home port, past track, and itinerary history. The analysis also recorded the management companies, owners, and insurers of the vessels. Taken together, the data demonstrates that despite imposed sanctions, marine traffic continues to Nampo, which is a supply port for the capital, and Sinpo, which includes a submarine pen that is being expanded. This finding exposes four challenges to enforcement of the sanctions regime: the use of flags of convenience, false or misleading vessel identification and registry, offshore ownership, and the failure of maritime insurance companies to monitor compliance with sanctions requirements. The container ships entering DPRK ports are almost entirely arriving from either Chinese ports or the Russian port of Vladivostok. The exceptions are the vessels Cheyenne (IMO 9706504) and Ryong Rim (IMO 8018912) that left the Japanese ports of Kashima and Yokohama, respectively, in early May 2016. Dailan, Bayuquan, Tianjin, Jingtang, and Lianyungang are all Chinese ports from which vessels have departed for the DPRK. Yet despite the number of ships arriving from Chinese ports, no Chinese-flagged vessels were found to have entered DPRK ports during the period of time examined. Rather, nineteen ships were flagged under the DPRK, six were flagged under Panama colors, six were flying Tanzanian flags, four were flagged in Russia, and four carried Mongolian colors. Other arriving vessels were flagged in Jamaica, Liberia, India, Togo, Taiwan, the Bahamas, and Cambodia. No data on the cargo the ships carried is publicly available. While some vessels are linked to the regime or connected to offshore capital, some are not and instead rely on misleading travel plans, misidentification, or false registries. The Voge Challenger (IMO 9490454), a Liberian-flagged vessel owned by TSC Ship Management out of Hamburg, traveled from Bahia Blanca, Argentina, to Sinpo, North Korea, on April 16, 2016. On June 18, it left Vancouver, Canada, broadcasting its destination as Port Qasim in Pakistan. AIS tracking confirmed the ship’s anchorage 38 days later in Port Qasim for a twelve-hour period on August 3. However, the tracking information also shows that the vessel stopped in Sinpo between July 17 and July 26, which constitutes a sanctions violation under Canadian and European law. According to Canadian law, vessels cannot leave Canadian ports carrying goods destined for the DPRK, while the EU prohibits companies from insuring, owning, or managing vessels trading with the DPRK. Other ships entering North Korean waters may have violated regional regulations, including those imposed by China and South Korea. In March 2016, Japanese media reported that China banned DPRK-flagged vessels from entering six of its ports. The DPRK-flagged vessel Su Song, formerly the Sun Orion (IMO 9024889), entered the port of Weifang, one of the allegedly banned Chinese ports, on July 19, 2016. Chinese authorities later denied that the ports were given instructions to prohibit DPRK-flagged vessels. The vessel Chon Un 68 (IMO 9001021) is a Tanzanian-flagged cargo ship with a capacity of four thousand tons. AIS tracking shows that on July 10, 2016, the vessel docked at Nampo port, and on July 18 it was docked at Weifang. On July 29, 2016, the ship registered its destination as Barra, a small passenger ferry terminal in the western Hebrides of Scotland. This, however, was a false registry by the ship’s management meant for distraction. On October 10, 2016, the Chon Un 68was sailing for Nampo, once again with its registered destination as Barra. The companies that own and manage these vessels are mostly based in Hong Kong, Singapore, or Pyongyang and registered in offshore locations such as the British Virgin Islands, Samoa, Hong Kong, Seychelles, Panama, and the Bahamas. The companies that own the vessels—including Hunchun Sino Unity, Hua Heng Shipping, Korea Kumunsan Trading, Fortune Shipping International, Nanjing Ocean Shipping Co., World Merge Shipping, and Dorian—are all mentioned in the Offshore Leaks Database (also known as the Panama Papers). These firms are established in offshore locations with the assistance of third-party intermediaries, many of which are based in Hong Kong or Singapore. The Hong Kong company Orion House is cited as the intermediary for several of these shipping firms, including four North Korean vessels on the United Nation’s blacklist. Since these firms are registered in offshore locations, the United States, South Korea, and the EU are unable to pursue enforcement of sanctions. Offshore firms are incredibly opaque, especially with respect to identifying their stakeholders or boards of directors. Intermediaries play an essential role in establishing offshore holdings, and the system could not function in its current form without their assistance. There is little, however, that authorities can do to penalize or otherwise stop intermediaries. As long as they exist, marine traffic will continue to flow to the DPRK. Most of the vessel traffic into the DPRK relies on this murky network of offshore capital. However, companies that do not rely on third-party offshore firms own some vessels that enter DPRK ports. The vessel Badri Prasad (IMO 8903284) was owned by Essar Shipping, an Indian company that is affiliated with Essar Energy, a power-generation company in India. In April 2016, the Badri Prasad docked in Sinpo port, stopped in Yantai port in China, and then traveled to Pakistani waters. As of December 2016, the vessel appears to be decommissioned. The CEO of Essar Power, K.V.B. Reddy, was featured by the North Korean media in early 2016. Although Essar’s traffic between India and Pakistan may be a concern for Indian authorities, the Indian government’s Act East policy has encouraged more trade with the DPRK. Ri Su-young, the DPRK’s foreign minister, visited India in 2015, and since then relations seem to be warming. Another factor is that many of the marine protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance companies connected to vessel traffic into North Korea are able to operate in violation of sanctions because mechanisms of enforcement are not rigorously applied. Some of these insurance firms are questionable shell companies themselves with offshore holdings, but others are legitimate. Yet even when the management firms dealing with North Korea exist outside sanctions jurisdictions, the firms insuring the vessels are registered within enforceable territories. West of England P&I, for example, is headquartered in Luxembourg and has an office in London. It is the insurance provider for dozens of vessels traveling to North Korea, including the Mi Yang 8 (IMO 8863733), a DPRK-flagged vessel owned by Miyang Shipping in Pyongyang. Likewise, Raetsmarine Insurance, a Dutch company, insures the DPRK-flagged vessel Kum San Bong (IMO 8810384), and Britannia Steam Ship Insurance covers the Zhang Hong No. 1 (IMO 8307894), a Taiwan-owned and -flagged vessel that entered Nampo on July 30, 2016. The Norwegian firm Skuld P&I currently insures the Tian Zhu (IMO 9338981), a formerly DPRK-flagged vessel owned by Hunchun Sino Unity Shipping in Hong Kong. On July 19, 2016, Skuld posted a page on its website stating that U.S. and EU sanctions prevent firms from offering marine insurance to DPRK-flagged vessels. As of August 1, 2016, the IMO broadcast signal reported that the name of the Tian Zhu had changed to Chang Phyong and that the vessel is now sailing under the flag of Kiribati—a flag of convenience. The Chon Un 68, mentioned above, is owned by Hua Heng Shipping and K&H Shipping based in Hong Kong. However, the ship is insured by a South Korean firm, Korea P&I Club, based in Seoul, despite the fact that South Korean law prohibits the insurance of ships entering North Korea. Other insurers of vessels entering the DPRK include Steamship Mutual P&I, North of England P&I, and Standard Club in the United Kingdom. A noteworthy example of poor compliance with sanctions by maritime insurance companies involves the Sun Unity, now named the Sun Rizhao (IMO 8736382), which traveled from a Chinese anchorage to Nampo port on August 2, 2016. The vessel is owned by a Hong Kong–based firm and insured by Maritime Mutual Insurance Association, a New Zealand–based company. In 2005, the government of Japan complained to the government of New Zealand that Maritime Mutual had exploited a loophole in sanctions law in order to profit from insuring DPRK vessels entering Japanese waters. The company calls itself an insurance agent even though it is not registered as one in New Zealand. The directors of Maritime Mutual are thought to be based in Liechtenstein and on the island of Guernsey. The company has insured DPRK vessels with impunity for over ten years. New Zealand responded to Japan’s complaint against Maritime Mutual by maintaining that it could do nothing to prevent its corporations from insuring DPRK vessels. In sum, European, Asian, and other marine insurance firms are actively providing coverage for vessels entering the DPRK and possibly for vessels using flags of convenience, which flaunts sanctions restricting the insurance of vessels tied to the Kim regime. Shareholders and directors of offshore accounts or of intermediary firms could be targets for international pressure, but once again no real juridical authority exists within current sanctions law to pursue action. What is even more troubling is that it appears that insurance firms that fall within sanctions jurisdictions, including the New York–based insurance firm American Club P&I that insures the First Gleam (IMO 9110236) and Orion Star (IMO 9333589), continue business with impunity. Any firm with assets in the United States should be pursued under Washington’s executive orders, but there is no evidence of such actions being taken. The lack of political will to enforce sanctions against violating vessels and their associated entities becomes obvious when vessels like the Voge Challenger and the Cheyenne enter U.S. waters after docking at a DPRK port. The Cheyenne was reported in DPRK ports in May 2016 but returned to U.S. ports in August 2016. In sum, marine traffic continues to flow into North Korea, with most of the vessel owners flying flags of convenience and registering with offshore firms, some not accurately disclosing their port calls, and some being insured by marine P&I companies that are merely shells. In the latter case, the insurance companies are in violation of UN sanctions and domestic financial regulations. The Badri Prasad case discussed above demonstrates emerging relations between India and North Korea regardless of international sanctions. The activities of the Voge Challenger and the Chon Un 68 could also be challenged as violations of current sanctions inasmuch as these vessels are operating in jurisdictions with specific sanctions laws against the DPRK. However, many of the owners and managers of vessels entering the DPRK are connected to offshore capital, and additional financial regulations would be needed to target the flow and exchange of money between the regime and the vessel operators. This would involve targeting the offshore firms rather than the regime itself. The lack of action to strengthen enforcement demonstrates a phenomenal indifference to the issue or an embarrassing inability to enforce sanctions on vessels. In either case, the current state of active marine traffic into the DPRK exposes the weaknesses of the recent sanctions aimed at the Kim regime, as the deep involvement of offshore holding companies, combined with lax enforcement, outmaneuvers current sanctions.” (Robert Huish, “The Failure of Maritime Sanctions Enforcement against North Korea,” Asia Policy, 23 (January 2017) pp. 131-52)
1/26/17:
Trump tasks NSC Asia director Matthew Pottinger with preparing options paper on North Korea. (Bob Woodward, Rage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020), p. 39)
Rodong Sinmun: “It is an earnest requirement of the Koreans in the north and the south and abroad to improve the north-south relations and achieve national unity and reunification. …The reality of the situation in which the north-south ties are pushed into the lowest ebb, is presenting their improvement as a pressing issue. …There are extremely growing tensions between the north and the south at present. There is no dialogue or cooperation, exchange or contact between the north and the south but daily escalating political and military confrontation and tensions and the danger of nuclear war only. History and the reality show that the improvement of the inter-Korean ties is a starting point for achieving peace and reunification and that the deadlock between the north and the south leads to confrontation and war. Any politician, if he or she remains a passive onlooker to the current deadlock between the two sides, can neither claim to be fully discharging his or her responsibility and role for the nation nor enjoy public support. Whoever is heartily interested in the destiny of the nation should resolutely break with the outdated confrontation concept, irrespective of differences in ideology, political view, faction and position, and take the patriotic road to mend the north-south relations as desired by the fellow countrymen. If the Koreans are to improve the ties and achieve the national reconciliation and unity, they should resolutely put an end to the confrontation move of the puppet conservatives. The reckless anti-reunification action taken by the puppet ruling forces of south Korea with the extreme hostility to the ideology and system of the fellow countrymen in the north is a serious barrier to the improvement of the relations. All Koreans in the north and the south and abroad should turn out in the nation-wide struggle to thwart the anti-reunification scheme of the puppet regime aimed at inciting and escalating distrust and antagonism among the compatriots.” (KCNA, “Improvement of Inter-Korean Ties Is Pressing Requirement: Rodong Sinmun,” January 26, 2017)
1/27/17:
The White House has launched a review of its policy on North Korea, reflecting the growing nuclear threat from Pyongyang that Barack Obama told Donald Trump would represent his most pressing national security challenge. Two people familiar with the review, which the White House has not disclosed, said it was designed to determine what the Trump administration could do differently to address concerns that North Korea could strike the U.S. with a nuclear-armed missile. One person said Michael Flynn, national security adviser, ordered the review on January 27. Trump has personally had several detailed intelligence briefings in recent days, according to a third person familiar with the discussions. The move came just as James Mattis, defense secretary, was preparing to travel to South Korea then Japan to discuss ways the allies can tackle the mounting nuclear threat from Pyongyang. (Demetri Sevastopulo and Bryan Harris, “U.S. Launches Review of North Korea Policy,” Financial Times, February 2, 2017)
President Trump has been deferential to Jim Mattis, the retired Marine general sworn in today as defense secretary, who has quickly established himself as a top aide whose advice the president is willing to take. In a remarkable show of deference to his own subordinate, Trump said during an earlier news conference this morning with Theresa May, the British prime minister, that he would let Mattis decide about whether to use torture in interrogations. Mattis has said he does not believe torture is effective. “I don’t necessarily agree, but I will tell you that he will override because I’m giving him that power,” Trump said. “I’m going to rely on him. I happen to feel that it does work.” Before the refugee ban signing ceremony, Trump met with Mattis and his military chiefs for about an hour. The meeting in “the tank” included introductions for Trump to his military chiefs of staff. The meeting was attended by Michael Flynn, the national security adviser; Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the chiefs of the four services and the National Guard. The men discussed how to accelerate the fight against the Islamic State and North Korea and how to deal with a host of global challenges, said a defense official who was not authorized to talk publicly about the internal talks. The leaders also discussed how to improve military readiness. (Michael D. Shear and Helene Cooper, “Trump Targets Muslim Areas in Refugee Ban,” New York Times, January 28, 2017,
Liu and Bermudez: “New commercial satellite imagery indicates that operations at the 5 MWe plutonium production reactor located at North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center has likely resumed. Analysis from January 18 showed signs that Pyongyang was preparing to restart the reactor after spent fuel rods had previously been unloaded for a reprocessing campaign that produced additional plutonium for its nuclear weapons stockpile. Imagery from January 22 shows a water plume (most probably warm) originating from the cooling water outlet of the reactor, an indication that the reactor is very likely operating.” (Jack Liu and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Facility: Operations Resume at the 5MWe Plutonium Production Reactor,” 38North, January 27, 2017)
Elleman: “Drawing from an excellent description of how North Korea might test an ICBM by John Schilling, it is easy to see that the most politically and technically feasible flight-test option would be to use an Unha rocket—possibly one modified to include higher-thrust engines for the upper stages—to evaluate warhead re-entry technologies. The test would likely succeed because the Unha is a relatively proven system, though using the satellite-carrier rocket as a military missile would throw cold water on Pyongyang’s claims that its space program is a strictly civilian enterprise. Further, relying on Unha technology would do little to address the development challenges associated with the KN-08 or KN-14 missiles, which appear to be optimized for the delivery of a nuclear weapon. As such, if North Korea’s primary objective is to develop an operational ICBM, Pyongyang would want to begin by conducting flight trials of the KN-08, KN-14 or both notwithstanding the strong probability initial test flights would fail. How the missiles are tested will also take into account geographic, political and diplomatic constraints. To avoid the risk of a simulated warhead landing on the territory of another country, North Korea would likely fly the missile to the east; however, an easterly trajectory would necessarily overfly Japan. A test of the two-stage KN-14 offers the greatest likelihood that the impact of the first stage would fall well short of Japan. Use of the three-stage KN-08 would leave little room for error in missing Japanese territory. It therefore seems reasonable that if North Korea decides to launch an ICBM toward the Pacific Ocean, the KN-14 would be the preferred missile. The United States and Japan operate Aegis ships armed with SM-3 Block 1A and 1B interceptors in the East Sea. These ships are capable of intercepting short, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in the mid-course and terminal phases of flight. Tests to validate the performance of the SM-3 Block 1 interceptors are ongoing and to date have been largely successful. SM-3 interceptors have never been tested against an ICBM, nor have they been tested against any missile in the boost or ascent phase of flight. In other words, boost- or ascent phase intercepts using SM-3 interceptors are an unproven, hypothetical capability. An Aegis ship armed with SM-3 Block 1A or B interceptors could, in principle, intercept a North Korean KN-14 ICBM under a limited set of circumstances. If North Korea flies a KN-14 on a minimum-energy trajectory, and the Aegis ship is located 500 km from the launch site, intercepts are kinematically possible. If, however, Pyongyang launches the KN-14 on steeper trajectories, the possibilities are reduced. For lofted trajectories roughly 18 degrees steeper than minimum-energy ones, no intercept is possible. In other words, North Korea can defeat America’s current sea-based capabilities by flying the ICBM to higher altitudes and shorter distances, while still gaining the necessary engineering information to support missile development. Though it must be noted, as stated previously, the KN-14 (or KN-08) is more likely than not to fail on its own during initial flight tests. But even if the US was improbably fortunate, and North Korea launched a KN-14 directly over an Aegis ship, and the trajectory is not sufficiently lofted, it is doubtful that a successful intercept would occur. There are multiple operational reasons why an intercept is beyond current capabilities. First, it is doubtful that an Aegis ship would be close enough (500 km or less from the KN-14 launch location) at the right time. The US or Japan would be placing their Aegis boats at considerable risk if either attempted to move closer than 200 km off North Korea’s coast while waiting for a launch. At the very least, good fortune would be needed to have an Aegis ship in the right place, at the right time to support the narrow circumstances under which an intercept could occur. Second, it is unclear if the necessary tracking data can be acquired with enough precision when relying solely upon the Aegis’s on-board SPY-1D radar. Would other high-precision sensors be available to aid in developing a KN-14 track at the earliest possible moment? The answer today is likely to be no. Third, can a fire-control solution be developed in just the required 10 seconds after the SPY-1 radar detects the KN-14 missile? This is likely an overly optimistic assumption, as command, control and communication limitations would likely delay the transmission of critical data, the development of a fire-control solution by the Aegis SPY-1D radar and battle management system and finally the decision and command to fire the interceptor. If it turns out that 30 seconds are required, then an intercept using SM-3 Block 1 interceptors is not possible, even when only the kinematics are considered. Fourth, to reduce the chances of a successful intercept, North Korea could decide not to fly the missile to maximum range and to put it on a trajectory that is off-line from the Aegis ship. But even in the unlikely event that the KN-14 flies directly over an Aegis ship, the KN-14 would have already passed over and be moving away from it because a fire-control solution for the interceptor will likely require too much time. While it is still kinematically possible for intercepts to occur when the target is moving away from the SM-3’s launch position, such intercepts are not considered feasible because the interceptor is ‘chasing’ the target from behind. Therefore, the last possible intercept point is defined to occur when the target is directly over the Aegis ship. In sum, current capabilities to intercept a North Korean ICBM using sea-based assets are lacking. However, when the SM-3 Block 2A interceptor becomes operational, the calculus changes dramatically. The Block 2A interceptor is projected to have a burnout velocity of 4.5 km/second, which is 50 percent faster than the current Block 1 interceptors. The added speed facilitates much greater possibilities. With this in mind, the Pentagon should be developing concepts of operations, procuring enabling assets and planning to test the Block 2 interceptors against ICBMs in the boost and ascent phases. Preventing Kim Jong Un from developing an operational ICBM can be achieved if North Korea never tests prototypes of the missile. Without flight tests, Pyongyang will not know if the ICBM’s performance and reliability are adequate. However, sea-based missile defenses available today are not capable of reliably interrupting a North Korean ICBM test.” (Michael Elleman, “Can the U.S. Prevent North Korea from Testing an ICBM?” 38North, January 27, 2017)
1/30/17:
President Donald Trump spoke with Korea’s acting president, Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn, over the phone. “The two discussed the importance of the U.S.-Republic of Korea [ROK] alliance,” the White House said in a statement. “President Trump reiterated our ironclad commitment to defend the ROK, including through the provision of extended deterrence, using the full range of military capabilities.” The statement confirmed the two leaders agreed to “take steps to strengthen joint defense capabilities” to defend against possible threats and provocations from North Korea, and also discussed the upcoming visit of Secretary of Defense James Mattis to Korea. “The conversation took place at the request of the White House,” said an official of the Prime Minister’s Office. “It was the first time that Trump spoke with Hwang after his inauguration.” “The U.S.-Korea relations have developed into a comprehensive and strategic alliance in the past 60 years and must be strengthened further,” Hwang told Trump, according to the Prime Minister’s Office. “Should there be a North Korean provocation in the future, the United States and South Korea will have to respond strongly together.” The Prime Minister’s Office in a press release said that Trump responded by saying the United States will be with Korea “100 percent” of the time, and that the U.S.-Korea relations will be “better than ever before.” The two also reportedly discussed the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system to be installed in Korea to counter the military threats from the North. Hwang has been serving as acting president since, though some critics have questioned the extent and power of this role. Hwang has been criticized by some politicians as a possible dark horse in the upcoming presidential election using his new position to his advantage. “It is troubling to see Hwang, an acting president, taking the role for more than it actually is,” Rep. Chang Je-won of the Bareun Party said in a written statement. “[Though he is not the president,] he hosted the New Year press briefing and now is holding talks with leaders of other countries.” (Esther Chung and Jeong Yong-soo, “Trump Chats with Acting President for 30 Minutes,” JoongAng Ilbo, January 31, 2017)
2/1/17:
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman Gen. Lee Sun-jin asked Washington to strengthen its deterrence against North Korea, including deploying U.S. strategic assets in South Korea. During a 20-minute phone call with his U.S. counterpart, Gen. Joseph Dunford, Lee stressed the importance of implementing measures agreed to in December during the inaugural meeting of the allies’ Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) in Washington. At the time, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to regularly deploying strategic weapons, such as nuclear-capable bombers, to South Korea to better deter Pyongyang’s growing nuclear and missile threats. This is the first time that Seoul brought up the issue of the deployment of strategic weapons since the inauguration of President Donald Trump’s administration. The telephone conversation took place a day after talks between Defense Minister Han Min-koo and U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis, during which the latter vowed to offer extended deterrence, which refers to Washington’s stated commitment to defend its ally by mobilizing all military capabilities ― nuclear and conventional ― to deal with the North’s aggression. “During their phone conversation, the two generals also reaffirmed the allies’ commitment to forming a strong joint defensive posture against the North,” the JCS said, adding that the two agreed on the greater possibility of the isolated state pushing forward with strategic and tactical provocations to show off its advanced nuclear capability around major events in the isolated state. Lee cited North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s birthday on February 16, the allies’ Key Resolve exercise in March and the North’s late founder Kim Il-sung’s birthday on April 15 as possible days for such provocations, according to the JCS. Following the talks, expectations are growing that Han and Mattis will discuss whether Washington will deploy U.S. strategic assets to South Korea on a regular rotational basis during their upcoming meeting scheduled for Friday in Seoul. Mattis will arrive here today for a two-day visit on his first overseas trip after being appointed to head the Pentagon. He said he chose South Korea as his first destination as the Seoul-Washington alliance is significant amid growing North Korean threats. Gen. Dunford will accompany Mattis. During the annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October, Minister Han and former U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter agreed to conduct a review of whether to deploy strategic military assets to the South on a rotational basis. The U.S. armed forces temporarily dispatched strategic assets such as B-52 and B-1B bombers to Seoul last year in response to Pyongyang’s two nuclear tests and missile launches. Observers raised the likelihood that the bombers and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers could participate in the Key Resolve exercise. Meanwhile, the United States plans to deploy 12 F-16 fighter planes to South Korea this month, the U.S. Pacific Air Forces Command said. “Approximately 200 airmen and 12 F-16 Fighting Falcons with the 119th Fighter Squadron from Atlantic City Air National Guard Base, New Jersey, are set to deploy in February to Osan Air Base” in South Korea, the command said on its website. The U.S. Pacific Air Forces routinely deploys a unit to the region in a bid to counter North Korea’s growing threats and bolster the Seoul-Washington alliance since 2004. The move is part of its “theater security packages”, which aims to help “maintain a deterrent against threats to regional security and stability,” the command said. The planned action would mark the first deployment of military assets by the U.S. to South Korea since Trump took office last month. (Jun Ji-hye, “Korea, U.S. Military Chiefs Discuss Contingency Plans,” Korea Times, February 1, 2017)
Rodong Sinmun: “The DPRK set it as a primary task to steadily improve the inter-Korean relations in the whole course of the cause of national reunification and has spared no efforts to carry it out. …The DPRK remains unchanged in its stand to achieve the reunification of the country and prosperity of the nation through improvement of the north-south relations. …Its proactive measures for mending the north-south relations are prompted by the Juche-based stand to settle the issue of national reunification by the concerted efforts of the Koreans responsible for it, the patriotic standpoint of prioritizing the requirements and interests common to the nation. No one can replace the Korean nation in settling its issue. When the Koreans pool their will and intention, they will have nothing impossible to settle and can properly improve the north-south relations as desired by them. How to approach toward improved inter-Korean relations is the touchstone distinguishing reunification from division and peace from war. It is necessary to eliminate the anti-reunification forces to the last one in order to improve the inter-Korean relations as early as possible. The reality goes to prove that the Korean nation cannot achieve peace and the reunification of the country but may suffer irrevocable disasters of a nuclear war unless positive measures are taken to remove the obstacles to mending the north-south relations.” (KCNA, “DPRK Remains Unchanged in Its Stand to Mend Inter-Korean Relations: Rodong Sinmun, January 31, 2017)
Roberta Cohen: “North Korea’s accelerated nuclear weapons development and threats to test inter-continental ballistic missiles to target American cities have prompted calls to the Trump administration to initiate negotiations on denuclearization. But denuclearization talks alone will not be sufficient. The threat to the United States emanates not only from North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction but also from the nature of the regime. A nuclear empowered country with North Korea’s unparalleled human rights record is a danger to the rest of the world. If a denuclearization agreement is to inspire confidence and trust, it would have to be matched by efforts to mitigate serious human rights abuses at the foundation of the regime. During the Cold War, the United States did not limit its discussions with the USSR to one subject—arms reduction. Instead, it insisted upon an expanded information flow between the communist bloc and the West and a more open society; and advocated for core human rights concerns—Soviet Jewish emigration, the protection of Pentecostals and other Christians, the release of political dissidents, the unification of families and the formation of human rights organizations to monitor the Helsinki Final Act. It raised these concerns in bilateral discussions and in the multilateral Helsinki process. Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, a doctrine espoused by the Soviet Union to shield itself from criticism was not accepted by the US in its negotiations with Moscow. Neither should it be in the case of North Korea, as increasing numbers of policy experts now point out. A recent Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Task Force report suggests that nuclear negotiations could expand into broader talks and that a peace agreement and normalization of relations will have to depend on both “nuclear disarmament” and “progress on human rights.” Even more cautious strategists also acknowledge that human rights must be part of any future negotiation. But which human rights issues should be raised? The UN General Assembly’s annual resolution on North Korea’s human rights situation—adopted by consensus in 2016—lists a wide range of violations, many said to constitute crimes against humanity. The UN Commission of Inquiry (COI)’s 400-page report provides extensive backup information on the crimes committed. Beginning in 2016, the US sanctioned some 30 North Korean individuals and entities responsible for serious human rights abuses, from the head of state down. It follows that any human rights negotiations between the US and North Korea would have to address these serious issues of concern rather than limit talks to the lower standard that is sometimes proposed. For example, it has been argued that the US should raise at the outset of negotiations only those human rights issues the DPRK is ready to discuss, in particular, “low hanging fruit,” that is, the rights of women, children and the disabled to which North Korea agreed in a UN process known as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). Such initial talks would presumably also encompass the recommendations agreed to by North Korea concerning the rights to food, health care and education. These are matters worthy of discussion, in particular, non-discrimination in access to food and health care in light of North Korea’s discriminatory songbun (class) system; and the DPRK’s promised increase in governmental expenditures on health care and agriculture. But to limit negotiations, even initially, to issues selected by North Korea would be to set aside many of the serious human rights concerns that the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council have identified over the past decade in resolutions and reports as well as those raised publicly by the US and put forward in its own legislation. A permissive approach born out of fear that “a forceful human rights policy may backfire” and put “at risk” security objectives would abet the denial of rights as fundamental as the right to life, freedom of expression and movement, protection from torture and cruel and inhuman treatment, protection from arbitrary detention and imprisonment, protection from deliberate starvation and more. That is, the rights set forth in UN human rights treaties to which the DPRK has acceded, and from which it should not be given a pass. North Korea will not become less dangerous by being asked to promulgate another law on economic, social and cultural rights, ratify more human rights treaties or add more women to public office—per the UPR. Such issues can and should be taken up and advanced by UN treaty bodies, committees and humanitarian organizations on the ground. What must be given attention by the US is that North Korea at the UPR excluded from consideration or redress the many violations deemed by the COI to have crossed “the high threshold of crimes against humanity.” If negotiations are to be credible, they will have to address these issues. The US should begin with those specific to its own interests, namely: The release of all Americans imprisoned in North Korea. Currently, there are two, including a university student on charges that would not merit more than a fine in other countries. A negotiation must also include a warning against the detention of future Americans as hostages—over the past eight years, 10 Americans have been detained and then released for a political price. The reunion of Korean Americans with their families in the North separated since the Korean War. Of the 1.7 million Korean Americans in the US, some 100,000 are estimated to have families in the North, but just about none have been allowed to meet with their relatives. A resolution approved by Congress in 2016 calls upon North Korea to allow such reunions. Another important priority would be access to North Korea by human rights and humanitarian actors since access is an effective entry point for addressing human rights issues. It would enable North Koreans to engage with the world, bring needed information and knowhow into the country, and correct the human rights findings it says are fabrications. In particular, the US should insist on: Access for the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in the DPRK and for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, whose offices have requested entry for more than a decade. Since 2014, North Korea has indicated it might allow entry to these officials although it has also obstructed their proposed visits. At the UPR, North Korea agreed to cooperate with UN human rights mechanisms. At the UPR, the DPRK accepted “free and unimpeded access to all populations in need” so that humanitarian aid can reach “the most vulnerable.” The US should continue to support this principle together with the language adopted by General Assembly resolutions that the most vulnerable include children, pregnant and lactating women, the elderly, the disabled and “political prisoners,” those held in a cruel network of prison camps. Although in 2012, the US regarded prisoners in the prison labor camps as too sensitive to talk about, its statements and policy changed dramatically after satellite imagery, former prisoner and guard testimonies and the COI report offered evidence of the camps’ existence and the cruelty practiced there. In 2016, Congress required the State Department by law to compile and provide information about the prison camps; and US human rights sanctions came about in part because of the camps. The intention is clear: the US must support the access of humanitarian agencies not only to places North Korea allows, but to the most vulnerable in camps and detention facilities. And accordingly, the US must not shy away from raising the most difficult issue—the release of tens of thousands of men, women and children held in political prison camps, reeducation camps and other detention facilities deprived of adequate food and medical care and subject to inhumane treatment. The COI found North Korea’s camps to be reminiscent of those of World War II, and UN resolutions have made them of concern internationally. Although North Korea denies the existence of some of these camps and objects to their being spoken about, it knows that US officials and intelligence agencies have information about these facilities as do members of Congress, the UN, other governments and NGOs and that the US is likely to raise them in discussion. The first step should be to press for the release of the children and families incarcerated with the political prisoners as a result of North Korea’s practice of ‘guilt by association.’ Their liberation should not affect the security of the state. Thereafter, a negotiation should be proposed, led by the UN or an organization like the International Committee of the Red Cross, to support the release of all North Koreans held on political and religious grounds, as called for by UN resolutions. The US should also raise the issue of abduction of foreigners by North Korea, a practice affecting countries’ security outside North Korea’s borders, in particular Japan and South Korea. The lifting of US human rights sanctions depends, in fact, on steps toward resolution of this issue. Most recently, information surfaced about an American who might have been abducted by North Korea while in China in 2012. Clearly, there is need for: An accounting of the numbers and whereabouts of abducted foreigners and the voluntary repatriation of those held and their families. Although Japan has led negotiations regarding abductees from its country and has achieved the return of a small number, it has called for US and international support. A multilateral effort should be undertaken. Finally, the US should seek to expand information exchanges, internet usage, radio broadcasts, DVDs, USBs and other messaging that could bring into North Korea needed information about life in other countries and how to address problems North Koreans face, whether in business, private markets, agriculture or other fields. A more open society and freedom of information would also help assure the success of denuclearization agreements. The US goal should be a negotiation, not a dialogue with North Korea. DPRK dialogues with EU members in the past have been described as sterile legal conversations about provisions in UN human rights treaties. What must be conveyed to North Korea is that political acceptance by the international community, economic investment in its economy, and greater national security will require changes in its human rights practices. The negotiation should be focused on results. In fact, in the past, North Korea has, at times, released Americans, arranged for family meetings at least as concerns South Korea, released some abductees, provided information on others and offered visits to UN human rights officials. Needed now is for North Korea to genuinely carry out these steps and expand them to include access to the camps and release of prisoners. If either a peace treaty or normalization of relations is important to the North, then it should be ready to consider concessions on these issues. Other incentives the US will offer will vary. For some of the family reunification meetings between North and South Koreans, Pyongyang reportedly expected cash payments. In its discussions with Japan over abductions, North Korea asked for and received the easing of financial sanctions and other concessions in exchange for information. Food and fuel aid have been a major incentive in past nuclear negotiations with the DPRK. For the failed “Leap Day Agreement” of 2012, for instance, Pyongyang committed to a freeze on nuclear weapons in exchange for the US provision of food for some 900,000 North Koreans. Sometimes, the question is posed whether North Korea will try to barter away human rights concerns, in particular, accountability, in exchange for making nuclear concessions. But if the past is any guide, North Korea appears to prefer concrete and substantial material gains as a quid pro quo for denuclearization. In the case of human rights, it has confined its bargaining to objectives within that arena—offering the Special Rapporteur a visit in exchange for the removal of the accountability provisions from a General Assembly resolution. Certainly, were nuclear negotiations to take place, diplomacy and common sense would dictate that the US not use the occasion to publicly call for the accountability of people with whom the US is negotiating. But at the UN, over the past five years, the US, the EU, Japan, South Korea and more than 100 other states have stood firmly behind strong resolutions on North Korea’s human rights situation, including accountability. This multilateral effort is the only human rights measure that has ever unnerved North Korea, and could, over time, lead to results. It was the General Assembly’s reference to crimes against humanity and the ICC that prompted North Korea to offer visits to UN human rights officials. Its sensitivity even prompted Victor Cha and Robert Gallucci to comment that human rights could serve as “a source of leverage and pressure on North Korea for the nuclear issue.” Similarly, in the United States, the human rights provisions in the North Korea Sanctions Act, adopted by near unanimity in Congress cannot simply be bartered away. Specific human rights steps are required to suspend and then terminate sanctions. Choosing nuclear issues at the expense of human rights would be to ignore what the US and world now know about North Korea. It also would be out of step with a well-established part of US policy—expressing Americans’ “shared values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law,” which “are probably the most important thing that defines us.” If North Korea refuses the political and economic benefits that could accrue from overall negotiations, and continues to defy UN resolutions, it will undoubtedly face more potent steps to bring it to the table. In the nuclear area, experts speak of more coercive economic and military measures, while the Security Council in its latest resolution mentions the possible threat of suspension from the UN if North Korea fails to cooperate. In the human rights area, there are stronger measures to take as well. The CFR Task Force recommended mobilizing other states to adopt human rights sanctions like those the US has enacted and also to explore the withdrawal of North Korea’s credentials at the General Assembly. It proposes giving North Korea two years to take human rights steps to avert withdrawal. Some might object that withdrawal would only increase North Korea’s isolation, but allowing it to continue to defy the world body undermines the longstanding system established to uphold human rights monitoring and scrutiny and removes pressure on the regime to make improvements. Human rights talks may or may not succeed with North Korea, but the relationship between security and human rights makes it essential to try to encompass both goals in US policy, make clear to North Korea that America stands for both and that improved relations will require both to be taken into account.” (Roberta Cohen, “A Serious Human Rights Negotiation with North Korea,” 38North, February 1, 2017)
2/2/17:
North Korea fired its state security minister last month, presumably over corruption, abuse of power and torture committed by his agency, according to rival South Korea’s government on Friday. Jeong Joon Hee, spokesman for the Unification Ministry, said the sacking of Kim Won Hong, who had been seen as close to leader Kim Jong Un, might cause instability in the country’s leadership by causing more fear into the ruling elite. North Korea has not said anything about Kim Wong Hong, and Jeong did not say how the South’s government obtained the information. South Korea has a spotty record of tracking developments in North Korea as information about the secretive, authoritarian state is often impossible to confirm. It is not clear if Kim Won Hong’s alleged sacking means he has been permanently removed from North Korea’s leadership circle. (Associated Press, “Seoul Says North Korea Has Fired Its Security Chief,” February 2, 2017)
2/2-3/17:
On his first mission to reassure an important American ally, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis met on October 2 with top South Korean officials, who agreed to push ahead with the deployment of a new missile defense system. “THAAD is for defense of our allies’ people, of our troops who are committed to their defense,” Mattis told reporters. “Were it not for the provocative behavior of North Korea, we would have no need for THAAD out here,” Mattis added. “There is no other nation that needs to be concerned about THAAD.” Trump’s various messages — some spontaneous, some premeditated — have turned Mattis’s otherwise traditional statements of support for South Korea and Japan into messages with strategic importance. “It is a priority for President Trump’s administration to pay attention to the northwest Pacific,” Mattis said. “I am going to get current by listening to them, finding out where their issues are, and then we are going to work together and strengthen our alliance.” Mattis met with an array of officials in Seoul, including Hwang, who is the country’s prime minister as well as serving as acting president during the impeachment trial of President Park Geun-hye. “Mattis is going to meet with people who probably aren’t going to be in office in a few months,” said Joel S. Wit, a Korea expert at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. During Mattis’s meeting with Hwang, the allies confirmed that they would deploy the THAAD system as planned. “Secretary Mattis reaffirmed the United States’ firm defense commitment to South Korea, including the provision of extended deterrence, and said that the Trump administration will be treating the North Korean nuclear threat as a top-priority security issue,” the office of Kim Kwan-jin, South Korea’s director of national security, said in a statement. Mindful of the possible early election, crucial opposition leaders in Seoul are opposing the deployment of the THAAD system. They say it would do little to defend South Korea from the North’s plentiful short-range missiles but would anger China, which might retaliate economically. Moon Jae-in, an opposition leader who is considered the front-runner among potential presidential candidates, has argued that South Korea should use the THAAD program as diplomatic leverage with China, keeping open the possibility that it would not be deployed if China helped rein in North Korea. “Given our standoff with North Korea and its nuclear program, our security and the alliance with the United States are our top priority,” Moon told reporters recently. “But the best scenario for us is when the U.S. and China get along well. If there is friction between the two, it’s not going to be easy for us.” Hwang, in contrast, has said that the THAAD deployment is “inevitable” because of the North’s rapidly growing missile threat. “THAAD is a defense tool whose deployment should not be delayed any more,” he said at a recent news conference. “We are explaining our position in various ways to neighboring countries like China, who are concerned about the THAAD deployment.” (Michael R. Gordon, “Mattis, in South Korea, Tries to Reassure an Ally as Regional Tensions Rise,” New York Times, February 3, 2017,
2/3/17:
The White House has launched a review of its North Korea policy, reflecting the growing nuclear threat from Pyongyang that Barack Obama told Donald Trump would represent his most pressing national security challenge. Two people familiar with the review, which the White House has not disclosed, said it was designed to determine what the Trump administration could do differently to address concerns that North Korea could strike the U.S. with a nuclear-armed missile. One person said that Michael Flynn, national security adviser, ordered the review today. The U.S. president has personally has several detailed intelligence briefings in recent days, according to a third person familiar with the discussions. (Demetri Sevastopulo and Bryan Harris, “White House Shifts Focus to North Korea in Face of Nuclear Threat,” Financial Times, February 3, 2017)
China’s imports of hard coal from North Korea jumped in December despite U.N. sanctions, according to recent data. This suggests Beijing has continued to allow Pyongyang to bypass international sanctions designed to reduce the reclusive country’s coal sales, its biggest foreign exchange source. The latest data from China’s Commerce Department shows that Beijing imported 2 million tons of hard coal (anthracite) worth $168 million in December alone, bringing the 2016 annual figure to 22.5 million tons worth $1.2 billion. The December figure was twice the volume and three times the value approved by the latest United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions imposed late November. On November 30, the council, including China, adopted a set of sanctions over North Korea’s September nuclear test, imposing an export limit of 7.5 million tons for 2017 valued at $401 million. Separately, it put a cap on December exports of 1 million tons ($53 million). “I think China is protecting the Kim regime even though it doesn’t really want to,” William Brown, a non-resident research fellow at the Korea Economic Research Institute, said. He is also professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. “It senses more danger from radical change than from the status quo or from slow change,” he said. (Kim Jae-kyoung, “China Keeps on Pampering N. Korea,” Korea Times, February 3, 2017)
Elleman: “Little is known about the missile, though some have speculated that it relies on a liquid-fueled engine originally developed by the Isayev Design Bureau for the Soviet R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile. If so, this could make it a variant of the North Korean Musudan (KN-10), an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) that uses the same engine and that Pyongyang began flight testing in 2016. The ramifications of such a connection would be significant, not only because it would signify ongoing close Iranian-North Korean missile cooperation, but also because such an engine would be a foundation for Iran to develop a viable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). However, contrary to some assertions, the available evidence cannot verify speculation that the Iranian missile is similar to North Korea’s Musudan, or reports that Pyongyang exported R-27 engines to Iran. … Fox News asserted that Iran tested a BM-25 missile, built with R-27 engine technology imported from North Korea in July 2016. However, that report was not independently confirmed by other media sources. Moreover, during a briefing to journalists on February 1, 2017, a National Security Council official described the missile tested as a Shahab, a missile based on older North Korean technology. Given these uncertainties, there are four possibilities regarding Iran’s new ballistic missile, ordered from most likely to least likely. The first possibility is that Iran tested a Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) based on North Korea’s Nodong missile. Initially test fired by Tehran in 1998, this weapon has a range of 950 kilometers when carrying a 1,000-kg warhead. Iran has created variants of the Shahab-3 called the Ghadr, and most recently the Emad, which deliver a smaller 750-kg payload to roughly 1,600 kilometers. The Emad, the most recent design, is similar to the Ghadr, but in principle could become more accurate since fins on its base allow the warhead to alter its flight path as it re-enters the atmosphere. Perfecting the new re-entry vehicle design requires Iran to conduct a dozen or more flight tests, essentially creating a new missile. The second possibility is that the missile tested was a variant of the Shahab-2, based on the North’s Scud-C missile that was imported by Iran from North Korea in the late-1980s and early-1990s, called the Qiam. It has a maximum range of about 700 kilometers, which would seemingly eliminate it as well as any other Scud variants as the possible subject of the recent test flight. However, North Korea unveiled and tested a one-meter diameter Scud in the summer of 2016 capable of reaching a distance of about 1,000 kilometers. There is no evidence to suggest Pyongyang has transferred one-meter Scuds to Tehran, but it is within Iran’s technical and industrial capacity to develop a clone of the North Korean missile. Third, the recent Iranian test may have been a solid-fueled missile derived from Iran’s Sajjil program which has not been tested since 2011. A missile consisting of only the Sajjil’s first stage would have an approximate range of 1,000 kilometers and could be used to target Arab Gulf states and US forces in the region from less-vulnerable launch positions in Iran’s interior. The final and least likely possibility is that Iran tested a missile that is essentially the same as the North Korean Musudan. This is unlikely for three reasons. First, if the Iranian missile were modeled on the 3,000 kilometer-range Musudan, it would be an intermediate-range ballistic missile, contrary to the US description of the Khorramshahr as a medium-range ballistic missile. Second, while the July 2016 and January 2017 test flights conducted by Iran were largely successful, North Korea’s tests of the Musudan failed soon after launch in six of eight attempts, a wide discrepancy that is difficult to explain even if, as some might assert, Iran is more capable at missile development. Finally, flying a Musudan to only 1,000 kilometers is unnecessary for Iran, since it has a much larger flight corridor within which test flights can be performed and has done so. There is also no reason to believe that Iran could not test a BM-25 to maximum range—instead, if the Khorramshahr is based on the BM-25, it would have flown a very lofted trajectory. In fact, the flight paths associated with each of the possibilities vary considerably, with a possible BM-25 launch flying to the highest altitude, and the one-meter Scud taking the flattest trajectory. The countries monitoring Iranian air space would certainly be able to distinguish between a BM-25 missile test from one involving a Ghadr or Emad. A one-meter Scud missile test would differ from either a BM-25 or Ghadr/Emad test. If a single-stage missile based on Sajjil technology were tested, its flight path and acceleration profile during boost phase would be different from that of a one-meter Scud. Given these differences, it is difficult to imagine that the US government does not know the identity of the missiles tested last July and in January 2017.The strategic implications of Tehran’s recent missile test and the possibility of continued missile cooperation with Pyongyang vary depending on what was actually launched. If the Khorramshahr was a Shahab-3 variant based, in part, on old Nodong technology acquired from North Korea years ago, then Iran is keeping with a pattern it has pursued over the past half dozen years—prioritizing greater accuracy and enhanced military utility. However, it would not be evidence of ongoing missile cooperation with North Korea. If the test involved either a one-meter Scud or a single-stage version of the Sajjil, then Iran has refocused its missile acquisition efforts in an attempt to diversify its stockpile and increase operational flexibility. In this case, only the development of a one-meter Scud would indicate ongoing cooperation with Pyongyang. Finally, in the least likely scenario, if the Khorramshahr did employ an R-27 engine, which uses high-performance propellants, it would signify that not only does Iran continue to have close missile cooperation with North Korea, it could also develop a road-mobile, two-stage intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking the US mainland. However, such a development would not occur overnight, and would require four or five years of observable flight tests.” (Michael Elleman, “Iran’s Missile Test: Getting the Facts Straight on North Korea’s Cooperation,” 38North, February 3, 2017)
Abrahamian: “The leadership of the DPRK certainly realizes that over the next five years their international environment could develop in several different ways—and most of the scenarios would have a negative impact on economic growth and exports. Sanctions could increase, China’s economic slowdown could continue, or other consumers of North Korean goods could abandon traditional partnerships with the DPRK in response to South Korean and US diplomatic pressure. Although it is possible that a breakthrough on the nuclear issue could ease international pressure, Pyongyang cannot count on such a long shot coming to pass. As such, it makes sense for the country to keep its goals vague. It is probably unclear—even to the leaders themselves—to what extent they will incorporate the market economy into official plans for growth. Their policy steps after the Party Congress assumed a decidedly traditionalist tenor with the June commencement of a 200-day “speed battle,” a competitive, Stakhanovite, nationally mandated program of overtime and additional work. This battle followed directly on the heels of a 70-day speed battle that was started in February and lasted until just before the Party Congress. While this grueling work schedule may provide tangible boosts in some sectors, it does little to solve the bottlenecks or key shortages of capital investment that are major inhibitors of growth. If the international environment shapes how the leadership in Pyongyang makes economic promises and policies, what room is there for more reform in the current context? UN, US and ROK sanctions are challenging the DPRK’s economic growth streak of recent years. Facing external pressure, leaders in Pyongyang recognize it will be harder than ever to attract capital and investment from abroad. In theory, they could help alleviate this by improving protection of property rights and access to information and communication tools. However, they have found this hard to do. Some experimentation with greater information access happened between 2010 and 2013 and more companies and organizations appeared to get online, but they still faced serious restrictions. Moreover, property rights also remain politically sensitive; while there is a very active grey market, formal property ownership rights extend only to two apartment blocks in the Rason Special Economic Zone. In both of these areas, concerns over security and stability appeared to supersede any interest in reforms that could spur economic growth. Banking, then, is perhaps the only consequential economic sector poised for potential near-term change. Indeed, that change is underway. In a way, North Korea is taking it back to the 2000s, when they began trying to strengthen the lending functions of banks by encouraging them to attract depositors. In 2004, the DPRK Central Bank Law was passed, followed in 2006 by the DPRK Commercial Bank Law. The latter was supposed to codify rules for two-tier banking and allow “commercial banks to positively mobilize idle funds, for which they can take savings.” Unfortunately, a lack of expertise and commitment hindered progress. Kim Jong Il was primarily focused on the nuclear program and attendant diplomacy, and then suffered ill health in 2008. The 2009 currency revaluation then shattered any faith that North Koreans had in their banking system, prompting most to keep as much of their savings as possible in foreign cash. Recovering the trust of potential North Korean depositors has been an ongoing, years-long project, but the country has steadily trained them to believe in banking again. This has been no easy task. Re-establishing trust in non-cash financial products may have begun with cash cards, which are now available in competing versions and accepted widely in Pyongyang and elsewhere. Such cards are not linked to bank accounts, but they have helped citizens become used to reliable, non-cash transactions. Cash still remains king for most people, and many in Pyongyang and elsewhere have Narae or other cash cards but no bank accounts. Ultimately, though, banks will need to attract deposits for the commercial banking sector to function. To this end, North Korean financial institutions have competed for retail customers since at least 2012, when the DPRK’s Civilian Cooperation Bank reportedly offered interest rates ranging from 1 percent for general deposits to 9 percent for 10-year deposits. Chinmyong Joint Bank, which ran a booth at the 2016 Pyongyang Spring International Trade Fair, offered interest rates of 2 percent on three-month deposits, 3 percent on six-month deposits and 7 percent on one-year deposits. These are extremely high rates, arousing skepticism among foreign observers that such returns could possibly be paid out. Possibly in another bid to attract deposits, North Korean banks have improved their use of technology. Retail financial products now include a mobile app that allows payments and top-ups on the go. Corporations appear increasingly reliant on banking and companies have received access to an electronic fingerprint verification system for ensuring secure transfers between one another. Interest in the financial sector has generally grown under Kim Jong Un, as more students and delegations have been sent abroad to explore issues related to banking, and relevant domestic education has increased. Also in the last couple of years, North Korean media have made a rhetorical return to the mid-2000s by lamenting the wastefulness of “idle funds.” As The Kim Il Sung University Gazette noted in 2014: “Some of the funds that are being circulated in the market have strayed away from the normal production process and distribution passage and remain harbored in the hands of organizations, enterprises, and people … mobilization of idle funds shall meet the funding needs of the state and serve as a source of supplementary income to increase state revenue.” The last sentence implies a key risk: if banks in the DPRK take deposits to fund loans, those loans have to perform. If banks are forced to make loans to economically non-viable state projects, depositors could lose out, quickly undermining the process of banking-sector development. Despite this potential pitfall, greater regulation and formalization of the system of deposits and lending would be a positive step. Informal financing currently dominates the commercial loan market with little guidance from the state and interest rates can surpass 15 percent. By offering formal loans that are cheaper, North Korea’s banks could help drive growth. Much remains to be done. The central bank has limited experience managing a banking sector, and the experience of most North Korean bank employees is in many cases limited to being transaction service providers, catering to trading companies that conduct foreign transactions. Moving forward, it will be crucial for these bankers to properly set rates and ensure reliable and transparent practices in an economy known for exactly the opposite. Technocrats realize the high stakes in this sector, but if managed properly, North Korea’s banks could help improve the functioning of the economy. This may contribute to the sense that the country can put off other key reforms. Under Kim Jong Un, the economy has grown and North Korea’s quality of life has improved. His personal brand is very much connected to the economy, and Pyongyang is reluctant to experiment with rules that could disrupt social order or minimize asymmetric advantages it holds over its enemies by having most of its systems offline. Fortunately, though the pace of economic experimentation has slowed significantly since 2013, no significant rollback of prior changes has taken place. Facing a tougher external environment, Pyongyang is responding by trying to invigorate the domestic banking sector. It will be important for observers to pay attention to this sector, and it will be even more important for government officials to regulate and communicate with stakeholders. Such communication is necessary to ensure the development of effective management, as well as trust in banking institutions among North Korean citizens.” (Andray Abrahamian, “Banking on North Korea’s Banks?”38North, February 3, 2017)
2/3-4/17:
Visiting U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis clearly said during talks with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on October 3 that the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture are within the scope of Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which obliges the United States to defend Japan, according to a senior government official who attended the meeting. At the opening of the meeting, Abe said he hopes and is certain the two countries “can demonstrate in our country and abroad that the Japan-U.S. alliance is unshakable.” In response, Mattis said that he intended to make clear during the meeting that Article 5 of the security treaty will be important five years or 10 years from now, just as it was a year ago or five years ago. Mattis arrived in Tokyo on the day to hold talks with the prime minister, Defense Minister Inada Tomomi and other members of Abe’s Cabinet to exchange views on the security environment in East Asia and to address mutual security concerns. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Abe, Mattis Reaffirm U.S. Commitment on Senkakus,” February 3, 2017)
2/6/17:
North Korea still has a lot of work to do in developing an operational intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), so the test it threatened to do will almost certainly end in failure, according to military experts. They said the North seems to have made progress in some technologies related to the intermediate- and long-range missile, such as stage separation, clustering of engines and guidance and control systems, but its progress in reentry vehicle capability and engine performance remain dubious. Pyongyang has never flight-tested road-mobile KN-08 or KN-14 ICBMs. On January 19, the reclusive state reportedly has built two missiles, presumed to be the new ICBMs, and placed them on transport erector launchers (TELs) for the North’s first test-firing of ICBMs. However, Leon Sigal, director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) in New York, downplayed the young leader’s claim, saying “in the final stages of preparation” may mean the state is not quite ready yet. “There is no sign yet that it has perfected a reentry vehicle robust enough to resist the heat and pressure of penetrating the atmosphere,” he said. Securing missile reentry technology is the toughest challenge in developing operational middle- and long-range ballistic missiles. As missiles reenter the Earth’s atmosphere at Mach 24, the warhead needs to be capable of withstanding temperatures of around 7,000 to 8,000 degrees Celsius. In March last year, after its simulation test, the reclusive state claimed that it has secured the heat-resistant capability of the long-range missiles. But a South Korean military expert said, asking not to be named, the test environment was far different from that in real ICBM test-firing, given that the test temperature was only about 1,500 degrees Celsius.
“I don’t assess that the North has secured reentry vehicle technology,” he said. Terence Roehrig, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, said it was difficult to know for sure how reliable Kim’s claim was, albeit it could be a reliable claim for a future test. But he noted that being willing and able to conduct a test does not mean the test will be successful. “The record would suggest that an ICBM test will likely have problems,” he said. “Though North Korea has improved its missile capabilities through its satellite launches, these have had difficulties.” Referring to last year’s tests of the Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), he said, “The tests had numerous failures before one that showed some degree of success and the likely ICBMs to be tested, the KN-08 or KN-14 have yet to be flight-tested so that the likelihood of failure in the short-term seems high.” According to military officials in Seoul, the North’s ICBM uses engines in the same series as those of the Musudan. They said the fact the only one of the eight tests was successful showed that the North has failed to correct faults in the missile’s engines. Engine performance is essential in boosting the missiles, they added. “Each time North Korea tests, they learn from the attempt and their program continues to move forward,” Professor Roehrig said. “But there remain some important question marks for making the entire system operational. North Korea still has a good deal of work to do in developing an ICBM capability, but they are making progress and they will continue trying.” Taking into consideration the North’s dubious ICBM capability, military authorities here see the greater possibility for Pyongyang to launch the Musudan instead of the ICBM if it does decide to conduct any provocations in the near future. “We are closely monitoring any new military activities in North Korea, as it could launch an IRBM at any time if leader Kim Jong-un gives the order,” a military official said, asking not to be named. The Ministry of National Defense interpreted Kim’s ICBM threat as part of the North’s efforts to send a message to the new administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. Referring to the two suspected new ICBMs reported a day before his inauguration, officials raised the possibility that the North intentionally revealed the existence of the new missiles to send a strategic message to the new U.S. administration, which has hinted at carrying out a hard-line policy against the North. U.S. experts agreed with this view. “Kim’s announcement could have been an effort to see how the Trump administration would respond,” Professor Roehrig said. According to Sigal, it is noteworthy that in the past, after each United Nations Security Council sanctions resolution was passed, the North responded with test-launches and nuclear tests, but it did not do so this time. “This could be a sign that it is waiting to see whether President Trump meant what he said during his campaign about wanting to negotiate with Pyongyang, as well as the regime change in Seoul,” he said. “The statements by Kim Jong-un and the foreign ministry are a reminder of what is at stake if there are no talks.” (Jun Ji-hye, “N. Korea Has Yet to Master ICBM Technologies,” Korea Times, February 6, 2017)
2/7/17:
U.S. Forces Korea Commander Vincent Brooks called for greater capability to target and destroy North Korean missile bases. Addressing the Association of the United States Army in a video call, Brooks said the proliferation of low-cost missiles that can be used to threaten the U.S. requires a “layered” approach to missile defense. Brooks joins a growing chorus of hawkish voices in the U.S. calling for preemptive strikes against North Korea if it continues its nuclear and missile programs. Brooks said existing defenses are “insufficient” in dealing with the North Korean missile threat. The U.S. general warned that even one stray North Korean missile could wreak havoc on South Korea because of the high population density here. He also stressed the need “to present a sufficient combination of capabilities that is known to an adversary in both defensive and offensive aspects so that deterrence actually occurs.” Brooks is not the only U.S. government official touting the need for preemptive strike capabilities. New U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson the next day vowed to come up with a “new approach” to dealing with North Korea that includes military measures, while Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker asked a hearing on North Korea last week whether the U.S. needs to prepare for a preemptive attack on the North’s putative intercontinental ballistic missiles. (Yu Yong-weon, “USFK Chief Hints at Preemptive Strikes against N. Korean Missiles,” Chosun Ilbo, February 10, 2017)
South Korea’s Acting President and Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn warned of North Korea’s possible strategic provocations ahead of the birthday of its late former leader next week, stressing the need for Seoul to maintain strong security cooperation with its ally Washington. During a Cabinet meeting, Hwang also noted that U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis’ visit to Seoul last week reaffirmed the robust bilateral alliance and sent a “strong” warning to an increasingly provocative Pyongyang. “North Korea’s threats of provocations — including its claim that it is in the closing phase of preparations to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile — are increasingly explicit,” Hwang said. “Especially this month, which includes the 75th birthday of (former North Korean leader) Kim Jong-il, the likelihood of strategic provocations is higher than before,” he added. The late Kim’s birthday falls October 16. “I urge (the military) to stay alert so that it can sternly and immediately respond to any kind of provocation,” Hwang said. (Yonhap, “Acting President Warns of N.K. ‘Strategic’ Provocations,” February 7, 2017)
Officials from South and North Korean civic groups met in Shenyang to discuss ways to promote exchanges between the two Koreas despite Seoul’s opposition to their unauthorized contact. The two Koreas’ committees for the joint implementation of the June 15 summit declaration kicked off a two-day conference, according to an official from South Korea. Topics for the meeting are known to include football matches for teams from the labor unions of the two countries and the formation of a joint cheering squad for the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics. Seoul’s unification ministry rejected a request by the South Korean civic group to meet with their North Korean counterparts, citing inter-Korean tensions. “(We) are facing a grave security situation as North Korea has continued to threaten and make provocative acts,” Jeong Joon-hee, a ministry spokesman, said at a regular press briefing yesterday. “The government does not see such inter-Korean civilian exchanges as proper against this backdrop.” The government has suspended almost all inter-Korean exchanges and South Korean visits to North Korea since the North’s fourth nuclear test in January last year. Any trip to the North requires the Seoul government’s approval. “The meeting is being held as we believe that inter-Korean exchanges should be maintained at least at the non-government level,” said Lee Seung-hwan, a spokesman for the South’s committee. A ministry official said that unauthorized contact with North Koreans will entail fines for violators under the law on inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. (Yonhap, “S. Koreans Make Unauthorized Contact with N. Koreans in China,” February 7, 2017)
The top diplomats of South Korea and the US reaffirmed their commitment to shoring up the alliance Tuesday, calling for a joint approach to tackle North Korea’s “imminent threats,” Seoul’s Foreign Ministry said. Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se had his first phone conversation with new US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. During the 25-minute talks, the ministers agreed to continue “coercive diplomacy” to thwart Pyongyang’s unabated nuclear ambitions, while strengthening the alliance to a comprehensive, multifaceted partnership to handle regional and global issues. “The sides also concurred they will deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system here as planned under the view that it is a defensive step to respond to North Korean threats and does not damage other nations’ interests,” the ministry said in a statement. Yun singled out North Korea’s nuclear program as the “most critical foreign policy and security issue that the Donald Trump administration will face,” calling for a mobilization of a round-the-clock consultative scheme.
Tillerson affirmed the US’ “steadfast” security commitment to its key Asian ally including the extended deterrence, saying the allies should develop a “joint approach” to the communist state’s “immediate threat. Ahead of the call, Tillerson also spoke with Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio by phone, during which he reaffirmed that the Senkaku or Diaoyu islands claimed by China are subject to the U.S.’ defense commitment. (Shin Hyon-hee, “Yun, Tillerson Reaffirm ‘Joint Approach’ to N.K. Threats,” Korea Herald, February 7, 2017) Concerning the planned deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in South Korea, the two top diplomats reiterated the agreement reached between Han and Mattis last week. “Yun and Tillerson were on the same page about the deployment of the THAAD battery by the U.S. military in South Korea. They agreed it should be solely a defensive measure aimed at countering North Korea’s military threats, and will not hurt national interests of other countries,” the foreign ministry said. The two vowed to make “a wide range” of efforts to encourage China to join in denuclearizing North Korea, citing that Beijing’s role is critical in thoroughly implementing the U.N. Security Council’s sanctions on Pyongyang and fulfilling other related goals. Tillerson said he supports South Korea’s efforts to improve its relations with Japan, and that it will be helpful in strengthening the trilateral security alliance with the U.S. Both Yun and Tillerson are scheduled to join the Meeting of G20 Foreign Ministers in Bonn, Germany on Feb. 16 and 17, plus the annual Munich Security Conference from Feb. 17 to 19. The foreign ministry said it is consulting with the U.S. on setting up face-to-face talks between Yun and Tillerson then. (Korea Times, “Seoul Backs Trump ‘Peace through Strength,’” February 7, 2017)
North Korea vowed to further launch what it claims to be satellites into space as it marked the first anniversary of firing off a long-range rocket in defiance of international condemnation. “We will launch more satellites at the time and in the place decided by the Workers’ Party of Korea,” Rodong Sinmunr said. South Korea’s Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn, who serves as acting president, warned today that North Korea could make strategic provocations ahead of the 75th birthday of late North Korean former leader Kim Jong-il slated for February 16. “The government believes that North Korea will (make provocations) if the North’s leader gives the order,” said an official at Seoul’s unification ministry. “But there is no clear sign of (military provocations) yet.” (Yonhap, “N.K. Vows to Launch More Long-Range Rockets,” Korea Herald, February 7, 2017)
South Korea is currently reviewing if China’s recent trade actions, taken after Seoul’s plans to deploy U.S. missile defense systems on its soil, can be referred to the World Trade Organization (WTO), a high-ranking official said. “As we may happen to need to take legal action in the future, a working-level examination is under way on (the illegality of) all measures taken by the Chinese central and regional governments as well as the private sector following the Seoul deployment decision,” the official told reporters. (Yonhap, “South Korea Mulls Referring China to WTO for THAAD Retaliation: Official,” February 7, 2017)
North Korea has threatened a pre-emptive strike against South Korea if provoked as it marked a key military anniversary, KCNA reported. Hwang Pyong-so, director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), made the remarks during an event in Pyongyang one day before the 69th anniversary of the foundation of the armed forces. “If the enemies dare violate the sovereignty and dignity of the country even a bit, the KPA will wipe out the strongholds of aggression through merciless pre-emptive strikes of (North) Korean style and accomplish the historic cause of national reunification without fail,” Hwang was quoted as saying. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Threatens Preemptive Strike against S. Korea ahead of Anniversary,” February 9, 2017)
While the Donald Trump administration is reportedly reviewing the current U.S. policy on North Korea, some U.S. lawmakers and experts are calling for increased sanctions on the isolated state. During a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on North Korea this week, U.S. Rep. Ed Royce, R-California, stressed the need for additional sanctions. “There are other steps that can be taken to crack down on the Kim regime,” the committee’s chair said in a prepared statement. Anthony Ruggiero, a North Korea expert in the use of targeted financial measures who spent more than 17 years in the U.S. government, told VOA the failure to thwart North Korea’s nuclear program can be attributed to existing sanctions that aim at the wrong targets. Ruggiero suggested the U.S. should reorient the focus of North Korea sanctions. “I think that North Korea is vulnerable to sanctions if they are done in the right way,” said Ruggiero, who is now a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington. According to Ruggiero, designations have doubled under the previous administration, with the designated parties mostly being “people located inside North Korea.” Instead, the U.S. should, he said, pursue North Korea’s offshore front companies, whether they be in China or elsewhere, that facilitate the Kim regime’s nuclear development. Ruggiero added that it is crucial to introduce additional sanctions, including restricting tourist travel to North Korea. “I think that’s a dangerous area that provides hard currency to the regime but also puts Americans at risk,” he said. The North is known to hold two U.S. nationals, and the U.S. State Department issues travel warnings about the communist country every 90 days. Joshua Stanton, a Washington, D.C.-based attorney who also maintains the influential One Free Korea blog, called on the Trump administration to impose secondary sanctions on third parties that take part in North Korean financial activities, namely Chinese companies and financial institutions. “We need to do a much better job of first, devoting sufficient resources to finding out where North Korea’s money laundering is going through, and second, we have to have the political will to sanction, to designate, to freeze the assets of companies and banks in third countries, including China, that are helping North Korea violate the sanctions,” the lawyer said in an interview. Stanton claims that getting the sanctions to work quickly might be the only alternative to military action. “We have lost too much [time] and if sanctions don’t work, I am afraid that the president will decide that to protect the American people, the only alternative is a preemptive strike,” he said. Some argue the full implementation of existing sanctions is more important than imposing additional sanctions. “The U.S. has substantial sanctions against North Korea as it is. I don’t think it’s really a question of the U.S. adding new measures,” Daniel Glaser, who served as assistant secretary for terrorist financing at the Treasury Department in the Obama administration, told VOA. Glaser, a 20-year veteran of the Treasury Department, added that new measures are not going to have a substantial impact on the North at this point, “unless the [sanctions] are vigorously enforced across the borders throughout the international financial system.” Joseph DeThomas, who has spent 32 years in the U.S. State Department serving in various positions that dealt with North Korea, told the VOA the first step forward is to get the U.N. sanctions fully and completely enforced throughout the world. “We have very little to sanction North Korea. But we have to influence other countries to behave first according to the existing U.N. sanctions, which are relatively tough now,” said DeThomas, who is now an international affairs professor at Penn State University. (Jenny Lee, “Sanctions against North Korea: Strong Should They Be?” VOA, February 9, 2017)
2/8/17:
The Air Force says an unarmed Minuteman 3 missile has been launched from California’s central coast in the latest test of the intercontinental system. The missile blasted off at 11:39 p.m. PDT today from Vandenberg Air Force Base. The Air Force says the missile carried test re-entry vehicles that headed for a target area 4,200 miles away to the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The Air Force routinely uses Vandenberg to test Minuteman missiles from bases around the country. This test involved personnel from Vandenberg’s 576th Flight Test Squadron and the 91st Missile Wing, Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota. (Associated Press, “California Missile Launch: Did You See the Bright Flash,” San Jose Mercury News, February 9, 2017)
North Korean and Libyan officials met in Tripoli to discuss increasing military cooperation between the two countries, according to the Information Office of the Libyan Ministry of Defense. The Office of Information for the Libyan Ministry of Defense published details of the meeting between Minister of Defense Al-Mahdi Al-Barghathi and newly appointed North Korean Ambassador Ju Jin Hyok on its Facebook page. The meeting “brought together the defense minister with the Ambassador of the Republic of North Korea (sic), to bilaterally discuss the relations between the two countries, particularly in the field of military cooperation,” the post read. The two “agreed to develop a joint action plan to promote bilateral cooperation between Tripoli and Pyongyang in various fields, particularly in the fields of technical cooperation, information technologies and communication in military fields,” it added. Current UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions prohibit the procurement of “all arms and related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of” that material from North Korea. Resolution 2270, which was passed unanimously in March 2016, sought to clarify this point, and prohibits “States from engaging in the hosting of trainers, advisors, or other officials for the purpose of military-, paramilitary- or police-related training.” “UN Resolution 2270 made unavoidably clear that any North Korean exports that enhance the capabilities of foreign armed forces are prohibited,” Andrea Berger, a Senior Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, told NK News on Friday. “Military communication and IT technologies are now clearly within the scope of UNSC restrictions.” If the cooperation were to involve the transfer of other military-related equipment it could also be in breach of the Libyan arms embargo originally set out in UNSC Resolution 1970. The intention to continue past military cooperation between North Korea and Libya was also discussed at the meeting. “The Ambassador of the Republic of North Korea (sic) expressed during the meeting the aspiration for Pyongyang to further strengthen… the presence of North Korea’s role in the upgrading of the military establishment with which it has close ties with the state of Libya,” the Office of Information wrote. This is intended to take place “via the acceleration in the pace of the implementation of projects programmed through the past years as well as through the programming of new projects for the upcoming years.” North Korea’s historical military relationship with Libya previously involved cooperation in nuclear and ballistic missile technology, as well as conventional weapons and training. However, due to pressure from the U.S. and the UK in 2004, Libya under Muammar Gaddafi pledged to sever all military-related trade with North Korea, Wikileaks cables revealed. With the overthrow of Gaddafi in 2011 and the ongoing civil war, which broke out in 2014, such pledges by the deposed regime are likely no longer in force, however UNSC Resolutions imposed on North Korea would still not permit military cooperation. “Continued political turmoil in Libya and complete disconnect between parts of the system mean that this could be a case either of ignorance or of a conscious breach on the part of the Libyan defense ministry,” Berger said. “Many officials in countries where North Korea has military relations fail to realize that sanctions apply to more than just off-the-shelf weapons purchases from North Korea. But ignorance is not a defense,” she added. The current internationally recognized government of the country, the so-called Government of National Accord (GNA) for which Al-Barghathi is the defense minister, is backed by the UN. The Libyan representative office at the UN did not respond inquiries on whether or not Al-Barghathi’s meeting with Hyok was previously approved of, or sanctioned by, the GNA. The Libyan Ministry of Defense had not replied to NK News’ requests for comment at the time of publication. (Hamish Macdonald, “North Korea and Libya Discuss Military Cooperation despite Sanctions,” NKNews, February 10, 2017)
2/9/17:
North Korea is capable of building as many as 60 nuclear warheads, according to South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities, based on an assessment that it has been secretly producing more highly enriched uranium than previously estimated. According to a secret report by intelligence and military authorities exclusively acquired by JoongAng Ilbo yesterday, Pyongyang has 758 kilograms (0.83 tons) of highly enriched uranium and 54 kilograms of plutonium, based on 2016 figures. Military experts in Seoul and Washington estimate that between four to six kilograms of plutonium and 16 to 20 kilograms of highly enriched uranium are needed to make one nuclear warhead. Taking into consideration the government’s analysis of the plutonium and weapons-grade uranium that North Korea is stockpiling, the regime should be able to build between 46 to 60 nuclear warheads. It is the first time that such specific intelligence on Pyongyang’s highly enriched uranium reserves has been revealed. The figure is much higher than average estimates by defense experts that North Korea possessed around 300 to 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and 40 to 50 kilograms of plutonium. Seoul and Washington through intelligence-sharing last year calculated how much nuclear material North Korea has using various data including U.S. information on a new North Korean uranium enrichment facility, as well its expanded existing facility in Yongbyon in North Pyongan Province. “South Korea and the United States have been continuously tracking the trend of North Korea’s facilities that produce nuclear materials,” a South Korean intelligence official said. “And they concluded that the amount of nuclear materials possessed by North Korea far exceeds the amount estimated by experts.” Government officials deduced that Pyongyang is likely to be operating another secret facility to produce highly enriched uranium, taking into consideration the sharp increase in its stockpile of nuclear materials. This second uranium enrichment facility is believed to be located near Panghyon air base in Kusong, a city also in North Pyongan Province. A large-scale facility is needed in order for plutonium production, but centrifuges producing highly enriched uranium only requires around 600 square meters, so Seoul’s intelligence officials believe Pyongyang is concealing more uranium enrichment facilities. In 2010, nuclear expert Siegfried S. Hecker, a professor of management science and engineering at Stanford University, visited the Yongbyon nuclear complex and its uranium enrichment facility with 2,000 centrifuges. He estimated that the site could have produced 40 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. Seoul and Washington concluded in following years that Pyongyang expanded the facility by a factor of two between 2013 and 2014 and that the Yongbyon complex alone produced around 80 kilograms of highly enriched uranium yearly since 2014. Military experts have estimated that North Korea produced some 300 to 400 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium since 2005. However, the Yongbyon facility alone would not be enough to produce 758 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, hence the possibility of a second or even third uranium enrichment facility, according to experts. “A second facility [for uranium enrichment] definitely exists, and we are sharing the information with the United States,” an intelligence official told the newspaper. North Korea’s uranium ore deposits are estimated to be 26 million tons. “Highly enriched uranium can be mass produced for relatively little cost, and 1,000 centrifuges can be operated in a relatively small amount of space of around 600 square meters, so it is easy to conceal,” said Lee Chun-geun, a research fellow with the Science and Technology Policy Institute. The South’s Ministry of National Defense last month claimed in its 2016 defense white paper that North Korea’s stockpile of plutonium was around 50 kilograms, an increase of 10 kilograms from 2014. It estimated that Pyongyang has enough plutonium to manufacture 10 such nuclear bombs. But this biennial white paper released on January 11 only said that North Korea possessed “a considerable level” of highly enriched uranium without specifying a number. The South Korean government said it was not able to confirm the details of the intelligence report on North Korea’s nuclear materials. “We are concerned about North Korea’s increasing nuclear capabilities and observing the situation closely,” an official of the Ministry of Unification said. “South Korea and the United States routinely evaluate [North Korea’s nuclear capabilities] and closely share information. We cannot speak on this information in detail.” Moon Sang-kyun, a Defense Ministry spokesman, said in a briefing the same day, “The content is related to security matters, so we cannot confirm the details.” (Jeong Yong-soo, Lee Chul-jae, and Sarah Kim, “North Korea Could Have 60 Nuclear Warheads,” JoongAng Ilbo, February 10, 2017)
A senior US official warned North Korea not to undertake any provocations, saying such actions would affect the strategy the administration of President Donald Trump is putting together to deal with Pyongyang, according to a news report. The unidentified official also told a conference call with reporters that it is premature to discuss Trump’s policy on how to deal with the North’s nuclear program, according to a Reuters report. The White House has reportedly launched a North Korea policy review to determine what the Trump administration could do differently to address concerns that North Korea could strike the US with a nuclear missile. North Korea carried out a string of provocations last year, including two nuclear tests and a number of ballistic missile launches. But the regime in Pyongyang has not carried out any such provocations since November’s US presidential election. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said in his New Year’s Day address that the country is close to test-firing an intercontinental ballistic missile apparently capable of striking the US and two ICBMs were later readied on mobile launchers, but they were ultimately put back into hiding. Many experts saw that as a sign that the regime might have opted to wait out until the Trump administration puts together its North Korea policy. Other experts say the North is exercising restraint to avoid galvanizing conservatives in South Korea ahead of a presidential election. (Yonhap, “U.S. Official Warns N.K. Provocations Could Affect Trump Strategy,” Korea Herald, February 10, 2017)
Any restart of denuclearization talks with Pyongyang will likely end up as a “great fraud” due to its firm resolve to master its nuclear program, massive political risks for South Korean and US leaders, and the lack of solid monitoring mechanisms, said Thae Yong-ho, who served as the No. 2 man at the communist state’s embassy in London before defecting to the South last summer, said that despite calls for dialogue, a new round of gathering would only buy time for leader Kim Jong-un to prop up the moribund economy as shown by the so-called Geneva agreement with the US in 1994. “In my view, the Geneva deal was a joint work of fraud by Kim Jong-il and Bill Clinton,” he said at an international conference hosted by the Institute for National Security Strategy, an affiliate of the National Security Service, referring to the then North Korean and U.S. leaders. At least within the North, including the Foreign Ministry, no one saw the agreement’s implementation as possible in the first place, he said, citing the utter absence of infrastructure required for a light water reactor to be built by Seoul and Washington. “Back then, what Kim Jong-il needed the most was time, the time to achieve his purpose — patching up the country after his father Kim Il-sung died, the Soviet Union collapsed and so many people died from hunger,” Thae said. “Clinton, for his part, had apparently assessed that the North was about to break down on its own and sought to buy time to manage the situation for the time being.” Thae, who now works at the Seoul-based think tank, underscored that the incumbent Kim will not give up his nuclear ambition even in return for $10 trillion won. The leaders of South Korea and the US, too, would not be able to bear massive risks to strike such a deal at a time when they lack any authority or mechanism to inspect the reclusive country. “It’s never about the quantity or quality of incentives. … Kim will never engage in any act that may pose threats to his long-term rule,” he said, referring to offers from Russia and China to build a gas pipeline and railroad running through the peninsula from there. (Shin Hyon-hee, “Ex-N.K. Diplomats Says New Nuke Talks Would Be ‘Great Fraud,’” Korea Herald, February 9, 2017)
North Korea is increasing the scale and refinement of the tactics it uses to evade international sanctions, particularly in the lucrative trade in military technology, according to a summary of a U.N. experts’ report obtained by Kyodo News. The country’s movement of illicit ammunition, weapons and natural resources continues to prop up the regime of Kim Jong Un. The report blames a lack of political will on the part of the international community in effectively enforcing the implementation of sanctions. “The DPRK is flouting sanctions through trade in prohibited goods with evasion techniques that are increasing in scale, scope and sophistication,” the report reads. DPRK stands for North Korea’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. “(The sanctions implementation) effort has not yet been matched by the requisite political will, prioritization and resource allocation to ensure effective implementation,” the summary warned. According to the report, the problem was laid bare when in August the largest shipment of ammunition in the sanctions period was discovered. Maritime databases, which track vessels, indicated that the Cambodian-flagged ship reached a port in Egypt. “An interdiction of the vessel Jie Shun was the largest seizure of ammunition in DPRK sanctions history,” according to the document. A source informed Kyodo that the Egyptian port was not the general cargo ship’s final destination, despite its strategic location near a number of regional conflict hot spots. However, the report said that seizures like it demonstrate “the country’s use of concealment techniques as well as an emerging nexus between DPRK entities trading in arms and minerals.” The trade in minerals is also a valuable source of funding for North Korea despite it being specifically prohibited from supplying or transferring by sea or air from its territory minerals, such as gold, copper, nickel, silver, zinc and rare earth minerals. Although bans on trade in minerals were adopted for the first time in 2016, the report points out there are various interpretations of the minerals that are listed, and countries utilize exemption clauses in different ways, effectively circumventing bans. The summary also points out that North Korean entities and banks continue to operate by using agents who are “highly experienced and well-trained” in moving money, people and goods, which include arms and related materials, across borders. They include agents who are foreigners working as facilitators for North Korea utilizing front companies. “Their ability to conceal financial activity by using foreign nationals and entities allows them to continue to transact through top global financial centers,” the document states. The annual report is produced by a panel of experts under the U.N. Security Council’s sanctions committee on North Korea. The panel also makes recommendations to improve implementation of the resolutions. Before the report is publicly released, it must be adopted by consensus at the next sanctions committee meeting, which is to be held next week. Once adopted it is then circulated to the Security Council and later made public. (Kyodo, “Pyongyang Using Refined Tactics to Duck Sanctions on Large Scale: U.N. Report,” Japan Times, February 9, 2017)
2/10/17:
KCNA: “The government of the United States of America decided to offer humanitarian aid to the DPRK in connection with the flood which hit the northern part of the country last year.” (KCNA, “U.S. Government Decides to Offer Aid to DPRK,” February 11, 2017)
The latest joint statement by Japanese and U.S. leaders mentions nuclear weapons as a U.S. option to defend Japan for the first time since 1975, reflecting growing concerns about North Korea. The statement released by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and President Donald Trump after their summit talks in Washington states: “The U.S. commitment to defend Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, is unwavering.” Tokyo and Washington agreed they had to reaffirm the “nuclear deterrence” due to the threat posed by North Korea’s repeated missile and nuclear tests, said Mori Takeo at a meeting of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party on February 14. Mori, director-general of the Foreign Ministry’s North American Affairs Bureau, said it was only the second time for Japanese and U.S. leaders to release a document that uses the word “nuclear” in terms of the U.S. defense of Japan. The previous one, in August 1975 by Prime Minister Takeo Miki and U.S. President Gerald Ford, stated: “(The) United States would continue to abide by its defense commitment to Japan under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in the event of armed attack against Japan, whether by nuclear or conventional forces.” (Geji Kayoko and Takeda Hajimu, “Statement of Nuclear Option to Defend Japan a First in 42 Years,” Asahi Shimbun, February 15, 2017)
The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances said at a press conference in Seoul that its search list for South Koreans believed to have been abducted by North Korea has been growing. As of last year, was reviewing 53 cases of South Koreans suspected of being taken by North Korea during and after the Korean War (1950-53). The expert group had formally asked the North Korean government to provide information on 41 of the total cases, but the communist country did not come up with an answer sufficient to verify the fates of those missing, according to the group’s report submitted to the U.N.’s Human Rights Council in July. Since the report last year, there has been an increase in the number of such missing South Korean cases whose fates are unknown, the five-member panel’s chairwoman Houria Es-Slami told reporters here. Es-Slami said she could not disclose exactly how many until the group’s annual report to be submitted later this year, but called the increase “alarmingly high.”The panel has also called on the U.N. Security Council to refer North Korea to the International Criminal Court for its “organized and large-scale” human rights violations regarding such enforced disappearances, although little progress has been made so far on the matter, she said. Ariel Dulitzky, one of the panel members, said the group even asked Pyongyang to allow them access to the country for an on-site visit last year, but the country remains unresponsive. “Sadly up to today, we could not verify any single case” because of North Korea’s lack of cooperation on the issue, he noted. The meeting with reporters followed the group’s five-day consultation held in Seoul this week where the experts reviewed petitions seeking to determine the fate or whereabouts of those who were reportedly abducted by the North and other countries. (Yonhap, “UN Search List for S. Koreans Abducted by N. Korea Growing: Expert Group,” February 10, 2017)
The reopening of the inter-Korean industrial park in Gaeseong, North Korea, is emerging as a presidential campaign issue. Moon Jae-in and Lee Jae-myung, presidential hopefuls from the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), have pledged to make efforts to reopen the Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC) if elected. They claim this will help restart stalled talks between the two Koreas and save South Korean firms that have plants there. The companies have been suffering snowballing losses following the shutdown a year ago. But other potential presidential contestants are cautious about joining Moon and Lee amid concerns the resumption of the GIC could be a breach of the U.N. Security Council’s (UNSC) nuclear sanctions on North Korea. The Park Geun-hye government closed the GIC on February 10, 2016, claiming that the Kim Jong-un regime was pocketing earnings from North Korean employees there and funneling funds to the UNSC-banned nuclear program. Against this backdrop, Ahn Cheol-soo, a former co-chairman of the minor opposition People’s Party, has an ambiguous approach, saying, “The shutdown of the GIC doesn’t do any good for peace on the Korean Peninsula but we must be prudent over whether to resume its operation.” Another DPK presidential hopeful, South Chungcheong Province Governor An Hee-jung, says Pyongyang’s sincerity in making changes, such as resuming inter-Korean dialogue and denuclearization efforts, should precede any GIC reopening. Two conservatives from the Bareun Party – Rep. Yoo Seong-min and Gyeonggi Province Governor Nam Kyung-pil – have echoed a similar view by proposing conditions for the GIC’s reopening. Yoo wants “progress in resolving North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs” while Nam is seeking to “create a peaceful atmosphere on the peninsula.” The accumulated loss of the 123 South Korean enterprises at the GIC is estimated to be at least 250 billion won ($218.1 million), according to an emergency committee aimed at helping the victims. The victims say they have had difficulty securing new factories and experienced other problems in reviving their businesses. The Ministry of Unification, citing its own data, downplayed the concerns. It said 114, or 92.7 percent, of the 123 companies are operating and their average sales last year were about 79 percent of those in 2015. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Thursday reopening the GIC “does not correspond with” the international cooperation to press North Korea.
Some analysts said Moon and Lee are not realistic in their pledge and that they are trying to court more left-wing voters. “The support groups of Moon and Lee tend to overlap and they need to ensure wooing more supporters ahead of the primary by making what can be seen as radical promises,” said Shin Yul, a political science professor at Myongji University. Shin said the situation is more urgent for Lee, a Seongnam mayor who has been trailing Moon in the polls. Moon, a former DPK chairman, has had a firm lead for weeks. “The issues over the GIC are not something that can be resolved on our own,” Shin said. “It is complicated and involves discussion with the United States and Russia, and others.” Political commentator Hwang Jae-soon agreed. “The GIC is the most noteworthy legacy of late President Kim Dae-jung and underscoring a need to resume its operation can be effective to bring the voters together for Moon and Lee only until a DPK presidential candidate is chosen,” he said. “It will be burdensome for a candidate to oppose the UNSC sanctions, the U.S. pressure and other international measures taken against North Korea in the presidential campaign.” Other experts disagreed, claiming Seoul’s suspicions over Pyongyang’s exploitation of the GIC to funnel funds to the nuclear program are not proven. “Moreover, the UNSC does not explicitly state anything about closing the GIC,” said Chang Yong-seok, a senior researcher at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University. Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies, said the issues over the GIC should be separated from national security and ideology. “It makes more sense to say that the GIC is more related to economic interest,” he said. “Moreover, the voters are fed up with ideological disputes surrounding North Korea.” (Yi Whan-woo, “Kaesong Park Becomes Campaign Issue,” Korea Times, February 10, 2017)
Asia Society: “The biggest immediate challenge confronting the Trump administration in Asia is the nuclear threat posed by the Kim Jong-un regime’s growing nuclear and missile capabilities, which are fast becoming a direct threat to the national security not only of the United States but also of South Korea, Japan, and other Asian countries. The threat of an actual nuclear attack by Pyongyang may not yet be great, but when the regime secures a so-called second-strike capability to respond to a nuclear attack on its soil, its leaders could easily miscalculate and be tempted to undertake other kinds of provocative actions against its neighbors. The North Korean regime has already displayed signs of just such miscalculation. In 2010, it sank the Cheonan, a South Korean naval ship, and launched an unprovoked attack on the South Korean island of Yeongpyeong. If the United States and its allies were to react forcibly to another such provocation, North Korea might then feel compelled to use its nuclear weapons. What is more, it is possible that North Korea will be moved to sell nuclear and missile technology to other actors, including terrorist groups or hostile states. The North Korean nuclear and missile programs present China with difficult choices that have profound ramifications for its own national security, as well as the future path of US-China relations. With as much as 85 percent of North Korea’s foreign trade going through China, the Kim regime is economically dependent on Beijing—a reality that makes China a crucial actor in any potential solution to the nuclear problem. Yet China’s leaders appear to fear that that if they cut off trade and investment with North Korea, then the regime would likely collapse, leaving China facing not only a unified Korea under the Seoul government (and with US armed forces on its border), but also a potential mass refugee crisis across the Yalu River. Still, Beijing appears to recognize that a nuclear-armed North Korea is a serious risk to itself. It is also concerned by the implications for its own security of the defensive security measures now being taken by the United States and its East Asian allies to defend against the North Korean nuclear threat. Moreover, there is evidence that the Chinese public has soured on the Kim Jong-un regime and is increasingly unsupportive of the China-North Korea alliance. Therefore it serves the interests of both the United States and China to reach an agreement on a strategy that brings a halt to North Korea’s nuclear and missile program. To do that, however, Chinese concerns about its own future security must also be addressed. Assessing Current Policy: The lack of progress in the Six Party Talks (comprising China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States) to freeze the North Korean nuclear program, that began in 2003 and have spanned several US administrations, was due to the final unwillingness of Pyongyang to negotiate its denuclearization. Instead, by adopting its so-called byung-jin policy of pursuing the dual goals of developing a nuclear deterrent and economic growth, the Kim regime has hardened its self-proclaimed status as a nuclear power. Indeed, Kim Jong-un has now even added his regime’s nuclear status into his country’s constitution and advanced the development of its nuclear and missile capabilities through an accelerated testing program. North Korean officials have hinted at the possibility of negotiating a freeze if the United States abandons its supposedly hostile policy, but the Kim regime failed to implement a prior agreement along these very lines (the so-called “leap day agreement” in 2012) and has now taken the end goal of denuclearization off the table. One objective of the long-stalled Six Party Talks was to lay a foundation for a permanent multilateral security institution in Northeast Asia. But the cessation of those talks since 2008 alongside China’s veto of proposals for a five-country dialogue process—with an empty chair left for North Korea to join if it ever recommits to denuclearization—stymied those efforts. The United States subsequently strengthened its security posture in the region and reinforced its alliances with Japan and South Korea by encouraging them to work directly together in response to North Korea’s pursuit of its nuclear and missile programs. The heightened threat from North Korea has, indeed, reduced historical animosities and tensions between Japan and South Korea, which long were a barrier to greater amity, intelligence sharing, and defense coordination. This new common threat perception is now permitting deeper defense cooperation, such as the recent progress toward an information-sharing arrangement called the General Security of Military Information Agreement on the threats posed by North Korea’s ballistic missiles. Policy Recommendations: The North Korean nuclear and missile threat should be the highest priority in Northeast Asia for the Trump administration. The most difficult challenge is finding a way to induce China to use its economic and political leverage with North Korean leadership to spur them to halt their nuclear and missile programs. Yet because the stakes for US national security, Northeast Asian security, and the US-China relationship are so high, the new administration must make this a priority in the bilateral relationship. If China and the United States were able to collaborate more closely in addressing this threat, then they would not only alleviate a dangerous common threat but also reinforce mutual confidence in each other’s long-term strategic goals and help lay the groundwork to promote cooperation in other pressing security and economic issues. There are valuable precedents for the two countries to follow such a scenario, namely the cooperative effort of China and the United States (along with other countries) to reduce the threat of the Iranian nuclear program by means of effective sanctions and diplomatic negotiations, as well as earlier US-China coordination during the course of the Six Party Talks from 2003 to 2008. Without the proper diplomatic groundwork, however, US pressure on China to lean harder on North Korea might backfire, not only failing to halt the North Korean nuclear program, but also further complicating US-China relations. For this reason, President Trump should communicate immediately and directly with President Xi Jinping to call for the establishment of a special high-level channel dedicated to jointly resolving this problem. The new president should explain that unless the United States and China can find a more effective way to work together to reduce the North Korean threat, then the United States, South Korea, and Japan will together take any and all measures necessary to deter North Korea and defend themselves against possible attack or provocation. President Trump should make it absolutely clear to President Xi that the United States would much prefer to work in concert with China to reduce the threat through tougher economic sanctions and the promise of new negotiations. To implement this new approach, the United States should explore close coordination with China on existing economic sanctions to restrict North Korean access to sources of foreign exchange and exports of its coal and iron ore. At the same time, the United States should seek China’s agreement to undertake vigorous law-enforcement methods to close down the North Korean front companies operating inside China that Pyongyang uses to finance and transact its foreign trade. (In a promising move, the Chinese government has already begun to do this, launching a criminal inquiry into one firm after the United States charged it with money laundering and evading sanctions.) To secure China’s support, the United States should reiterate its willingness to offer a comprehensive approach to resolving the current impasse. An essential part of gaining China’s cooperation will involve offering Pyongyang an omnibus package deal including negotiations—among the four (United States, China, North Korea, and South Korea) or six (including Japan and Russia) relevant parties—of a peace treaty to replace the Korean War armistice and steps toward establishing diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea. In return, however, North Korea would have to be willing to implement a verifiable freeze of its nuclear and missile programs, including no further nuclear tests or missile launches and to pledge (echoing the Joint Statement of 2005) to denuclearize the entire Korean peninsula. Steps toward the peace treaty and diplomatic normalization with the United States could begin simultaneously with the nuclear and missile freeze. Of course, if North Korea failed to take measures toward denuclearization, then these diplomatic steps would immediately be halted. If North Korea did begin to honor its pledges on moving toward denuclearization, however, then the United States and its partners would have to be prepared to offer sequential sanction relief. Here, the negotiations would draw the on experience of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed to by Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States—as well as Germany and the European Union. If China fails to respond to such an offer of cooperation and continues to frustrate full sanctions efforts, then the United States must be prepared to use its authority to impose secondary sanctions unilaterally on Chinese banks and firms still doing business with North Korea. In any event, since South Korea plays a valuable role as interlocutor with China on this problem, the United States should express a willingness to establish a trilateral US-South Korea-China dialogue to coordinate diplomatic efforts. North Korea has been very successful at sowing divisions between China, the United States, and South Korea—especially after the fifth nuclear test and the decision by the United States and South Korea to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, antimissile defense system. But the hopeful side of this difficult stand-off is that the three countries involved all actually now share a real common interest—the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. If they fail to diplomatically overcome their differences, only Pyongyang will be the winner. Should North Korea resist all such joint efforts to bring it back to the negotiating table, the United States should be in a better position to overcome China’s reluctance to establish a five-country Northeast Asia security dialogue among China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and the United States without the presence of North Korea. South Korea has already called for such a process, and other countries should not allow North Korea’s refusal to cooperate to veto of the kind of multilateral mechanism that could help stabilize relations among these important Northeast Asian powers.” (Asia Society Task Force, U.S. Policy toward China: Recommendations for a New Administration, Orville Schell and Susan Shirk, chairs, February 2017)
2/12/17:
KCNA: “A surface-to-surface medium long-range ballistic missile Pukguksong-2, Korean style new type strategic weapon system, was successfully test-fired on [February 12]. Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea and chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK, guided the test-fire of Pukguksong-2 [Polaris-2] on the spot. Respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un set forth the task of developing the weapon system into surface-to-surface ballistic missile with extended firing range on the basis of the success made in the SLBM underwater test-fire held in August last year. He received the report on the development of Pukguksong-2, set the date of the test-fire of the missile and personally guided the preparations for it on the spot. Before the test-fire that day he looked round the caterpillar self-propelled missile launching truck produced by workers in the munitions industry by their own efforts, technology and wisdom. At the observation post he learned in detail about the plan for the test-fire of Pukguksong-2 and gave the order to launch it. The test-fire proved the reliability and security of the surface launch system and starting feature of the high thrust solid fuel-powered engine and reconfirmed the guidance and control features of ballistic missile during its active flight and working feature of high thrust solid fuel- powered engines and those of separation at the stages. It also verified the position control and guidance in the middle section and section of re-entry after the separation of the improved warhead of the missile which can be tipped with a nuclear warhead, the feature of evading interception, etc. The test-fire helped test and round off the mobility and operation of the new type missile launching truck in the worst surface condition and finally confirm its technological specifications through ballistic missile launch. The test-fire was conducted by the high-angle launching method instead of firing range, taking the security of the neighboring countries into consideration. He said that the newly developed Pukguksong-2 is the Korean style advantageous weapon system providing convenience in operation and ensuring speed in striking and a Juche-missile, Juche-weapon in name and reality as the launching truck and ballistic missile were designed and manufactured and fired by the indigenous wisdom, efforts and technology 100 percent. He expressed great satisfaction over the possession of another powerful nuclear attack means which adds to the tremendous might of the country. Now our rocket industry has radically turned into high thrust solid fuel-powered engine from liquid fuel rocket engine and rapidly developed into a development- and creation-oriented industry, not just copying samples, he said, adding: Thanks to the development of the new strategic weapon system, our People’s Army is capable of performing its strategic duties most accurately and rapidly in any space: under waters or on the land. At the end of the test-fire he had a photo taken with scientists and technicians in the field of defense industry and service personnel who took part in the test-fire of Pukguksong-2.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong UN Guides Test-Fire of Surface-to-Surface Medium Long-Range Missile,” February 13, 2017)
North Korea launched a ballistic missile toward the sea off its eastern coast, in what South Korea called the North’s first attempt to test President Trump’s policy on the isolated country. A projectile believed to be a modified version of the North’s intermediate-range ballistic missile Musudan [solid-fueled KN-15] took off at 7:55 a.m. from Banghyon, a town near North Korea’s northwestern border with China, and flew 310 miles before falling in the sea, the South Korean military said. Earlier, the United States Strategic Command issued a statement identifying the missile as “a medium- or intermediate-range ballistic missile” that “did not pose a threat to North America.” South Korea condemned the missile launching, saying that the North had launched the missile to raise tensions over its weapons programs and to use it as leverage in dealing with the Trump administration. “We see this as part of an attempt by the North to grab attention by demonstrating its nuclear and missile capabilities and to counter the new United States administration’s strong policy line against North Korea,” the South Korean military said in its statement. The missile launch came as Trump is hosting Prime Minister Abe Shinzo on an official visit, but it was unclear if the test was intended as a political message. Trump and Abe hastily arranged a joint appearance in response. “North Korea’s most recent missile launch is absolutely intolerable,” Abe said, calling on the country to comply with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. Looking grim, Trump said nothing about the missile launch, but pledged to staunchly back Japan. “I just want everybody to understand and fully know that the United States of America stands behind Japan, its great ally, 100 percent,” he said. The two leaders are at Mar-a-Lago, Trump’s club in Palm Beach, Fla., where they are meeting over the weekend. South Korea’s Foreign Ministry said the test, the first by the North this year, demonstrated the “maniacal obsession” of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, with developing a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile. The test came less than two days after Trumpat a news conference with Abe said that defending against the nuclear and missile threats from North Korea was a “very, very high priority.” In their joint statement, the two leaders had urged North Korea “to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and not to take any further provocative actions.” North Korea has deployed and often tested short-range Scud and midrange Rodong ballistic missiles that can reach most of South Korea and Japan, but it has had a spotty record in test-launching the Musudan, its only missile with a range long enough to reach American military bases in the Pacific, including those on Guam. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Missile Test Is First of Trump Era,” New York Times, February 12, 2017,
Nationwide Emergency Measure Committee against DPRK-targeted Nuclear War Exercises spokesman’s statement “as regards the fact that the south Korean puppet forces are going busy to stage the largest-ever Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises together with the U.S. in upcoming March: The said drill which will involve huge aggression forces, including all nuclear strike means of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces, will take place under the plan for a preemptive strike at the DPRK, including 4D operation scenario envisaging the “detection” of its nuclear and missile bases, “defense” from them, “disturbance and destruction” of them and “beheading operation.” This is an open disclosure of the attempt to launch a nuclear war against the DPRK. The puppet forces’ racket for a war against the DPRK and the hostile policy of the U.S. which actively supports it are an intolerable challenge to the Korean nation’s desire and aspiration after peace and reunification. And they constitute an open violation of the dignity and sovereignty of the DPRK. Hostility, discord, distrust and confrontation have now gone beyond such tolerance limit that any slightest and accidental conflict may lead to an unpredicted incident on the Korean peninsula. This is the situation prevailing on the peninsula at present. The army and people of the DPRK will take appropriate countermeasures depending on the level of the nuclear war racket being planned and pressed for by the south Korean puppet forces with the U.S. involved. The aggressors and provocateurs had better stop their rash actions, pondering over what counter-actions will be entailed by their reckless and serious nuclear war racket against the DPRK.” (KCNA, “Planned S. Korea-U.S. Joint Military Drill Slammed,” February 13, 2017)
The Institute for Disarmament and Peace of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs memorial report: “On the occasion of the 75th birth anniversary of the great leader Comrade Kim Jong Il, the army and people of the DPRK recollect with deep emotion the immortal feats he had performed to ensure peace and security on the Korean peninsula and the world. The great leader staunchly safeguarded peace and security of the Korean peninsula and the world by taming the unprecedented thunders and storms of history with the Songun politics and nuclear deterrent. His immortal feats have been and will forever be the guarantee for peace and prosperity in the Korean peninsula and the world. 1. To Prevent War on the Korean Peninsula. Respected Supreme Leader Comrade Kim Jong Un, in his report to the Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on the work of the Central Committee, stated that at present various parts of the world were still being devastated by war but the gunfire of war had not been heard in the DPRK for several decades and our people were leading a peaceful and stable life, free from war. He appraised that it was thanks entirely to the Songun politics of the great leader and herein lay the greatest achievement of the Party. With the collapse of socialist systems in the former Soviet Union and other east European countries in 1990s, major changes followed in the world political structure and the balance of forces. Assuming itself as the world’s “only superpower,” the U.S. became high-handed and arbitrary in the international arena and pursued all the more vicious schemes of aggression and war infringing upon the sovereignty of other nations to realize its ambition of world supremacy. The U.S. concentrated its offensive spearhead on the DPRK which held high the banner of independence and socialism. While unprecedentedly intensifying military aggressive maneuvers to stifle the DPRK, the U.S. and its vassal forces continued to press and suffocate the DPRK in all fields including politics, the economy, ideology, culture and diplomacy. The Korean peninsula had already turned into the hottest spot clouded with increasing danger of nuclear war in the world due to continuous war maneuvers of the U.S. Thus preventing war and defending peace on the peninsula was the pressing issue in ensuring peace and security of the world. Endowed with noble sense of mission to safeguard the destiny of the nation and peace and security of the world, the great leader firmly maintained the Songun-based revolutionary line, an ever-victorious path of the Korean revolution, and administered the Songun politics in an all-round way. Thanks to the iron will of the great leader to enhance defense capabilities at any cost and his energetic guidance, the DPRK’s defense industry had developed into a powerful one for self-defense. The strong defense capability provided under the Songun politics was a guarantee that made it possible to firmly defend our national security and socialist fortress by crushing the aggressive maneuvers of the imperialists. It was the unswerving will of the great leader to crush the imperialists’ outrageous pressure and challenges through tougher countermeasures of wielding a sword when the enemy were drawing a knife and leveling a cannon when they were pointing a gun. The DPRK thoroughly crushed growing military pressure and aggressive maneuvers of the U.S. and its vassal forces with the powerful military might strengthened by the great leader. In 1993 the U.S. resumed “Team Spirit” joint military exercises involving more than 200 000 aggression troops, thus creating a highly touch-and-go situation of nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula. The great leader frustrated the U.S. aggressive ambition with decisive measures of declaring a semi-war state and withdrawal from the NPT. In April 1996 the Korean People’s Army (KPA) under the commandership of the great leader physically pacified the reckless maneuvers of the U.S. and south Korean military war maniacs who aggravated tension to the extreme by bringing in heavy weaponry into the DMZ in wanton violation of the Armistice Agreement. At the end of 1998 when the U.S. made public the details of “OPLAN 5027”, a plan for preemptive strike against the DPRK, the KPA made an announcement that no provokers in the planet would be pardoned from its strike and demonstrated practical military capability, thus crushing the enemies’ aggressive intention. Such being the case, in 1999, the U.S., engaged in war against Yugoslavia and bombing the embassy of a sovereign state, sent Perry, former defense secretary, as the U.S. presidential envoy to the DPRK and claimed an engagement policy. Afterwards, the DPRK and the U.S. maintained contacts and cooperation in several sectors to establish new relations free from past hostilities. However, the Bush administration that emerged later unilaterally scrapped the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework and designated the DPRK as an “axis of evil” at the Union Address on January 30, 2002. In March the same year, the U.S. announced a “nuclear posture review” that included the DPRK in the list of targets of its nuclear preemptive strike. The U.S. went on to gradually intensify nuclear war exercises against the DPRK. The DPRK and the Korean nation were exposed to the danger of grave nuclear catastrophe. The increasing nuclear threat from the U.S., the world biggest nuclear possessor and the only nuclear weapons user, kept pushing the DPRK to nuclear possession. To address the grave situation, the great leader made strategic decision to cope the nuke with the nuke. Accordingly, on January 10, 2003, the DPRK government took a decisive defense measure as to effectuate withdrawal from NPT that had been on hold for 10 years. 3 years later, in October 2006, the DPRK carried out its first nuclear test followed by a second one in May 2009. This ended the nuclear imbalance in Northeast Asia which was full of nuclear weapons and nuclear umbrella but the DPRK remained the only nuclear vacuum. Owing to the deterrent impact of the DPRK’s nuclear possession, the danger of war on the Korean peninsula had significantly decreased. The great leader reliably defended peace and security of the peninsula and the world by strengthening the defense capability with the nuclear deterrent as its pivot and crushing every war provocations of the U.S. If the DPRK had yielded to the U.S. nuclear threat and blackmail, the tragedies of Iraq and Libya would have taken place on the Korean Peninsula and the world’s current biggest nightmare of refugees would have happened in Northeast Asia as well. The undying feats the great leader performed to prevent war on the Korean peninsula and defend peace and security of the world with the might of the Songun politics and nuclear deterrent will forever shine with the history. 2 To Ensure Durable Peace System. There is no peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula which is at the center of very sensitive Northeast Asia where nuclear states are confronting each other. The great leader Comrade Kim Jong Il wisely led the DPRK government to advance reasonable and practical proposals for ensuring durable peace on the Korean peninsula and the region and make consistent efforts for their materialization. The DPRK government has made strenuous efforts to ensure solid peace mechanism in the Korean Peninsula. These efforts include the proposal to sign DPRK-U.S. peace treaty made in March 1974, the proposal to establish a new peace-keeping mechanism to prevent war and guarantee solid peace on the Korean peninsula made in April 1994, and the proposal to sign DPRK-U.S. interim agreement, a more concrete proposal, made in February 1996. In his historic August 4, 1997, work “Let Us Carry Out the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s Instructions for National Reunification”, the great leader Comrade Kim Jong Il clarified the principle stand to reunify the country in a peaceful way without use of armed forces. He stated that, to ensure peaceful reunification, the U.S. should abandon hostile policy towards the DPRK and a new peace mechanism should be established on the Korean peninsula through DPRK-U.S. peace treaty. During the visit to the U.S. by his special envoy in October 2000, a Joint Communiqué was adopted. In the Joint Communiqué the DPRK and the U.S. agreed that there are a variety of available means to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula and formally end the Korean War by replacing the Armistice Agreement with permanent peace arrangements. The DPRK government was actively engaged in multilateral talks including 4-party and 6-party talks and took sincere attitude toward the discussion of issues related with ensuring peace and security of the Korean peninsula. The great leader wisely led the efforts to promote national reunification by concerted efforts of the north and the south and ensure peace and security of the Korean peninsula. Thanks to his great ideas for national reunification and peace mechanism, the inter-Korean contact and cooperation in various fields were active which finally led to the adoption of June 15 Joint Declaration at the historic north-south summit meeting in 2000. The Declaration is a reunification program common to the Korean nation for ensuring peace and realizing reunification by the Koreans themselves. Thereafter, the north and the south adopted and implemented an agreement to prevent accidental collision on the West Sea and end propaganda and remove relevant means along the Military Demarcation Line, which resulted in the brisk inter-Korean cooperation in all fields including politics, the economy and culture. The October 4 Declaration adopted at the historic north-south summit meeting in 2007 proclaimed that the north and the south shared the need to end the existing armistice mechanism and build a durable peace mechanism and agreed to cooperate in arranging the summit meeting of three or four relevant parties in the Korean Peninsula to announce the end of the war. However, the DPRK-U.S. and inter-Korean relations turned towards catastrophe by the Obama administration and the south Korean anti-reunification forces and the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula kept increasing. The reality more clearly proves the validity and vitality of the DPRK’s proposals for peace mechanism and the historic inter-Korean agreements. 3. To Honor the Feats of the Great Leader. Today respected Supreme Leader Comrade Kim Jong Un adds light to the immortal feats of the great leader for peace and security of the Korean peninsula and the world. In 2011 when the Koreans suffered a great national loss with the untimely passing away of the great leader, the Obama administration viewed it as a golden opportunity to stifle the DPRK and intensified military pressure on the DPRK, while initiating Asia Pacific Pivot Policy. The U.S. designated the DPRK as its first attack target and moved massively the armed forces that had been deployed in the U.S. mainland, Europe and Middle East into around the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. is increasing the scale and frequency of the U.S.-south Korea joint military exercises by introducing more strategic assets, including strategic bombers, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, into the Korean Peninsula. The aggressive nature and content of the joint military exercises become more rampant with high-profile operations like “Pyongyang occupation,” “precision strike,” “decapitation operation,” etc. In addition, the U.S. has staged trilateral naval exercises annually that involve the U.S., Japan and south Korea since 2012 and decided to deploy THAAD in south Korea so as to contain Russia and China. These moves made, all the more acute, the strategic confrontation of nuclear states around the Korean Peninsula. It is none other than respected Supreme Leader Comrade Kim Jong Un who firmly defended the sovereignty of the DPRK and peace and security of the world from the rigorous whirlpool of the history. Based on scientific analysis of the situation in Asia Pacific, he prevented nuclear war by advancing a new strategic line of simultaneous development of the economy and the nuclear forces and by taking the toughest countermeasures of strengthening nuclear forces. In 2016 alone, he strengthened the nuclear forces at a high speed beyond imagination with successive achievements including the H-bomb test, test launches of various striking means and nuclear warhead explosion test. These measures aimed at defending peace and security in the Korean Peninsula and the region clearly manifested the iron will of the DPRK fully prepared to take counter measures if the enemies dared to provoke it. The U.S. dares not to provoke a war against the DPRK despite its bragging about strong military capability. This is because the U.S. is apprehensive of the strong nuclear deterrent of the DPRK which is fully capable to make preemptive nuclear strike with standardized warheads and diversified delivery means against the aggressive forces deployed in the U.S. mainland and Pacific operation theater. The respected Supreme Leader has wisely led the efforts to prevent war and ensure durable peace on the Korean peninsula. When a touch-and-go situation was created along the Military Demarcation Line in August 2015, he led the DPRK to put under control the crisis by initiating a proposal for north-south high-level urgent contact, thereby clearing the dark clouds of war that hung over the Korean nation and defending peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and the region. The peace restored under the situation that reached the brink of a war was by no means something achieved on the negotiating table but thanks to the tremendous military muscle based on the defensive nuclear deterrent, developed by the great leader and strengthened by the respected Supreme Leader, and to the invincible might of single-minded unity of the army and people around the Party. In his report to the Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on the work of the Central Committee, the respected Supreme Leader stated that the U.S. should squarely see the strategic position of the DPRK that has joined the front ranks of nuclear powers and the trend of the times and scrap its anachronistic policy of hostility towards the DPRK, replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty and withdraw its aggressive forces and war equipment from south Korea. In his New Year Address for this year, he stressed that positive measures should be taken to improve inter-Korean relations and remove the acute military confrontation and the danger of war between the north and the south. Now that the DPRK has consolidated its tremendous military muscle and the improvement of inter-Korean relations and national reunification have become a mature and pressing demand of the times, the U.S. and neighboring countries should respect the DPRK’s strategic status and will for independent reunification and change their policies accordingly. This would be the practical way for ensuring durable peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the region. As long as the immortal feats performed by the great leader Comrade Kim Jong Il shines forever and the DPRK is wisely guided by respected Supreme Leader Comrade Kim Jong Un, the DPRK will defend its own peace and security by its own strength and make positive contribution to preserving the global peace and stability.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Il’s Feats for Peace and Security of Korean Peninsula and the World,” February 12, 2017)
Despite his campaign vows to take a tougher line with North Korea, President Donald Trump’s restrained public reaction to Pyongyang’s first ballistic missile launch on his watch underscores that he has few good options to curb its missile and nuclear programs. Trump’s initial public comments on the test launch of what was believed to be an intermediate-range Musudan-class missile were unexpectedly measured – and brief – compared to earlier bluster about another U.S. adversary, Iran, since he took office on January 20. “I just want everybody to understand, and fully know, that the United States of America is behind Japan, our great ally, 100 percent,” Trump told reporters in Palm Beach, Florida, speaking in a solemn tone alongside visiting Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. The U.S. president did not mention North Korea or signal any retaliatory plans for what was widely seen as an early effort to test the new administration. White House adviser Stephen Miller insisted on ABC’s “This Week” that Trump’s one-sentence statement was an “important show of solidarity” with Japan. He told “Fox News Sunday” the administration was going to bolster its allies in the region against the “increasing hostility” of North Korea. Trump’s aides have said that they will take a more assertive approach than the Obama policy dubbed “strategic patience,” which involved gradually scaling up sanctions and diplomatic pressure and essentially waiting out the North Korean leadership. But the new administration has been vague about how it would do this. The responses under consideration – which range from additional sanctions to U.S. shows of force to beefed-up missile defense, according to one administration official – do not seem to differ significantly so far from the North Korea playbook followed by Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama. Even the idea of stepping up pressure on China to rein in a defiant North Korea has been tried – to little avail – by successive administrations. But Beijing is showing no signs of softening its resistance under a new U.S. president who has bashed them on trade, currency and the contested South China Sea. More dramatic responses to North Korea’s missile tests would be direct military action or negotiations. But neither appears to be on the table – the first because it would risk regional war, the latter because it would be seen as rewarding Pyongyang for bad behavior. And neither would offer certain success. “Trump’s options are limited,” said Bonnie Glaser, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank in Washington. (Matt Spetalnick, “Few Good Options in Trump’s Arsenal to Counter Defiant North Korea,” Reuters, February 12, 2017) After North Korea threatened on New Year’s Day to test an intercontinental ballistic missile, Donald J. Trump, then president-elect, reacted with characteristic swagger. He vowed to stop the North from developing a nuclear weapon capable of hitting the United States. “It won’t happen!” he wrote on Twitter. But six weeks later, after North Korea defiantly launched a missile into the sea, Trump, now president, reacted with surprising restraint. Appearing before cameras late at night on February 11 in Florida with his golfing guest, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan, Trump read a statement of just 23 words that pledged American support for Tokyo without even mentioning North Korea. The muted comment stood in sharp contrast to his response after Iran tested a ballistic missile, when he directed his national security adviser to publicly warn Tehran that he was “officially putting Iran on notice” and followed up with sanctions. If North Korea was testing the new president, as many analysts believe, then Trump seemed intent on showing that he would not be baited into a confrontation every time an American adversary tried to provoke him. At least not right away. In his short time in office, Trump has shown that he can respond to events in measured ways one moment and with hotheaded bluster the next. But even after waking up on Sunday morning, Mr. Trump chose to publicly feud with Mark Cuban, the owner of the Dallas Mavericks, rather than the maverick leader of North Korea. “I assume they don’t have a strategy yet, so Trump with Abe by his side was properly taciturn, surprisingly so,” said Jeffrey A. Bader, an Asia scholar at the Brookings Institution who served as President Barack Obama’s Asia adviser. “But that can’t hold. At some point you need to articulate a strategy.” The tempered response may also have reflected the fact that the missile launched on yesterday by North Korea was either a medium- or an intermediate-range missile, according to the American military, and not an intercontinental missile, or ICBM, capable of reaching the United States. The missile flew 310 miles before dropping harmlessly into the Sea of Japan, according to the South Korean military, which identified it as an intermediate-range Musudan. North Korea regularly tests missiles in violation of United Nations resolutions, including roughly two dozen last year, but has boasted that it could test an ICBM “anytime and anywhere.” The kind tested today poses a potential threat to American allies in Japan and South Korea and American forces in the Pacific, but could not strike the United States. “It’s yet unclear what missile was tested,” said Thomas Karako, a missile expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “What is certain is that North Korea has now begun 2017 by continuing the aggressive pace of missile testing they’ve shown in recent years.” North Korea challenged Obama early in his tenure, too, with an underground nuclear blast four months after he took office. The effect was to harden Obama’s attitude toward North Korea for the rest of his presidency, according to former aides. Rather than try to negotiate, as both Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush did, Obama focused on tightening international sanctions and bolstering alliances with Japan and South Korea. That North Korea’s latest test came while Trump was hosting Abe for a multiday set of meetings, meals and golfing, first at the White House and then at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate in Palm Beach, Fla., was seen as no accident. And it may be that Abe counseled Trump on his response. In his own comments while he stood beside Trump, Abe called the launch “absolutely intolerable.” Asia experts and members of Congress praised Trump for reaffirming American support for Japan but lamented that he did not mention South Korea at the same time. “I was glad he issued the statement with the prime minister of Japan, but he ought to do it quickly with South Korea,” Senator Chuck Schumer of New York, the Democratic minority leader, said on “Face the Nation” on CBS. “South Korea is probably more susceptible to North Korea’s virulence than any other country.” White House officials remained quiet about the test and their emerging strategy. Stephen Miller, the president’s senior adviser for policy, said Trump had sent a strong signal with his joint appearance with Abe. “But we’re going to be sending another signal very soon, and that signal is when we begin a great rebuilding of the armed forces of the United States,” he said, also on “Face the Nation.” “President Trump is going to go to Congress and ask them to invest in our military so once again we will have unquestioned military strength beyond anything anybody can imagine.” Most policy makers consider China crucial to any meaningful response to North Korea, given the nations’ extensive economic and political connections, but it remains uncertain that Trump would have any better chance of persuading Beijing to take tougher action. Trump had a fence-mending telephone call with President Xi Jinping of China last week and promised to stick by America’s longstanding “One China” policy, reportedly at Secretary of State Tillerson’s urging. But the president has been an unrelenting critic of China on trade and currency matters, and some of his top advisers, including Stephen K. Bannon, his chief strategist, view China as a long-term adversary. “We will learn an enormous amount about his policy and his administration by how he deals with North Korea,” said Evan S. Medeiros, a managing director at the Eurasia Group and a former Obama adviser. “It’s the land of really bad options, and the threat is only becoming more serious and the window is closing. It will probably become the defining security challenge for the next president in Asia, if not globally.” (Peter Baker, “Trump’s Uncharacteristic Response to Provocation from North Korea,” New York Times, February 13, 2017, p. A-16) John Schilling: “What this missile brings to the table is a much higher degree of mobility, survivability and responsiveness than the Nodong. The Pukguksong-2 was tested from a cold-launch canister system carried on a tracked transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicle, which would provide substantially greater cross-country mobility than the Nodong’s wheeled TEL. The solid-fuel missile is more robust, and as it does not need tanker trucks to carry propellant its logistical footprint is smaller. And as it does not need to be fueled prior to launch, it can launch on perhaps five minutes’ notice compared to the thirty to sixty minutes required for a Nodong. All of these factors would make it much harder to find and preemptively destroy the Pukguksong-2. (John Schilling, “The Pukguksong-2: A Higher Degree of Mobility, Survivability, and Responsiveness,” 38North, February 13, 2017) The test took place on Sunday (Saturday evening in the United States) and was dramatic enough that aides to President Trump and Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan interrupted their dinner at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida to bring them early reports of the launch. Initially there was concern that North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, had made good on his threat to test an intercontinental ballistic missile, which one day may be able to reach the United States. Before dinner was over, it was clear that was not the case. The Sunday test went only about 310 miles, falling harmlessly into the sea after following a high-arc trajectory that took it briefly into space. That is well short of the estimated real range of the missile, of 700 or 800 miles. But the importance of the launch was not the missile’s range — though it could reach much of Japan — but in how hard it would be for the United States, Japan or South Korea to have warning of a launch in a real conflict. The launch of older rockets provides warning time because the loading of liquid fuel takes hours, and can usually be spotted by satellites. Solid-fuel rockets like the new Pukguksong-2, if the North Korean description is accurate, could provide little advance warning time. They can be stored on mobile launchers, rolled out and prepared for launch in minutes. The North said the test was conducted from a self-propelled mobile launcher. “All of these factors would make it much harder to find and pre-emptively destroy the Pukguksong-2,” John Schilling, a missile expert, wrote on February 13 on 38 North, an online publication that specializes in North Korea. For Trump, the new weapon complicates the problem of countering North Korea’s missile and nuclear program. It would be far harder for Trump to threaten to strike North Korean launch sites if the country’s mountainous terrain is hiding scores of mobile missiles in tunnels. North Korea said the new missile was based on the solid-fuel, submarine-launched ballistic missile, or SLBM. After several failed attempts, the North said in August that it had successfully launched the SLBM, claiming that the continental United States, as well as American military bases in the Pacific, were now within the range of its missiles, an assertion that military experts questioned. North Korea said it launched its Pukguksong-2 at a sharp angle to keep it from landing too close to Japan, indicating that it could have flown further than 310 miles if it had launched it at a normal angle.Tom Karako, a proliferation expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a policy institute in Washington, said that President Barack Obama’s strategy of “strategic patience has failed” and that it was time for the new Trump administration to take a different approach. “This weekend’s launch is part of a larger pattern of aggressive testing that confirms the North’s intent to produce more capable, more lethal and more survivable systems,” he said. (Choe Sang-Hun and David E. Sanger, “As North Korea Tests Missile, Experts See New Dangers in Its Mobility and Stealth,” New York Times, February 14, 2017, p. A-16)
KCNA: “Analysts of some countries are misleading the public opinion to give impression that the U.S. is stepping up the deployment of THAAD in south Korea this year because of the impending DPRK’s ICBM test-fire, floating rumor that the test-fire is escalating discord among its neighboring countries and aggravating the regional situation. Commenting on this, Minju Joson Sunday says that what arouses big astonishment is the simple and unilateral view of ignoring the essence of the problem while echoing sophism made by the U.S. which is accustomed to justifying its aggression moves by faulting others. The commentary points out what is the root cause of the escalated tension prevailing in Northeast Asia.It stresses that it is a vital matter related with the destiny of the country and nation for the DPRK to bolster up its military capability, as it has stood against the U.S., the most aggressive and arbitrary state in the world, over the past several decades. It goes on: The opinion that the “missile threat” from the DPRK spawned the issue of deploying THAAD is a foolish way of thinking that blindly parrots the U.S. assertion. Why is the regional situation in Northeast Asia being steadily aggravated? The reason is the scramble for hegemony among powers. Antagonism between China and the U.S. is the main reason of the aggravated regional tension. The military antagonism between China and the U.S. is bringing arms race to the Northeast Asian region and driving the regional situation into the worst instability.
Another undeniable reason is the antagonism between China and Japan. To try to make the public convince that the DPRK’s self-defensive measures aggravate the situation while ignoring such a reality would be unhelpful to preventing the aggravation of the situation in Northeast Asia.” (KCNA, “Minju Joson Points out Root Causes of Escalated Tension in Northeast Asia,” February 12, 2017)
2/13/17:
UN Security Council: “The members of the Security Council strongly condemned the most recent ballistic missile launches conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 11 February 2017 and 19 October 2016. These launches are in grave violation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s international obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), and 2321 (2016). The members of the Security Council deplore all the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ballistic missile activities, including these launches, noting that such activities contribute to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension. The members of the Security Council further regretted that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is diverting resources to the pursuit of ballistic missiles while Democratic People’s Republic of Korea citizens have great unmet needs. The members of the Security Council expressed serious concern that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea conducted these ballistic missile launches after the 15 April, 23 April, 27 April, 28 April, 31 May, 21 June, 9 July, 18 July, 2 August, 23 August, 5 September, and 14 October launches, as well as the nuclear test of 9 September, in flagrant disregard of the repeated statements of the Security Council. The members of the Security Council reiterated that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall refrain from further actions, including nuclear tests, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, and comply fully with its obligations under these resolutions. The members of the Security Council called upon all Member States to redouble their efforts to implement fully the measures imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by the Security Council, particularly the comprehensive measures contained in resolutions 2321 (2016) and 2270 (2016). The members of the Security Council directed the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to intensify its work to strengthen enforcement of resolutions 2321 (2016) and 2270 (2016) and assist Member States to comply with their obligations under those resolutions and other relevant resolutions. The members of the Security Council also called on Member States to report as soon as possible on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of resolutions 2321 (2016) and 2270 (2016). The members of the Security Council reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia at large, expressed their commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomed efforts by Council members, as well as other States, to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue. The members of the Security Council stress the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond. The members of the Security Council agreed that the Security Council would continue to closely monitor the situation and take further significant measures, in line with the Council’s previously expressed determination. (UN Security Council Press Statement, “DPRK’s Ballistic Missile Launch,” New York, February 13, 2017) Han Tae Song, the new Ambassador of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the United Nations in Geneva, was addressing the Conference on Disarmament on February14,a day after taking up his post. “The various test fires conducted by DPRK for building up self-defense capabilities are, with no exception, self-defense measures to protect national sovereignty and the safety of the people against direct threats by hostile forces,” Han told the 61-member state forum. “The successful test launch of a medium-to-long range missile on February 12th is a part of self-defense measures,” he said. “In this respect, my delegation strongly rejects the latest statement of the U.N. Security Council and all U.N. resolutions against my country.” Han said the divided Korean peninsula “remains the world’s biggest hotspot with a constant danger of war”. He condemned joint military exercises carried out annually by South Korea and the United States, as well as what he called “nuclear threats” and blackmail towards his country. “It is the legitimate self-defense right of the sovereign state to possess strong deterrence to cope with such threat by hostile forces aimed at overthrowing the state and the socialist system,” he said. North Korea shared mankind’s common goal of global denuclearization, Han said. “The DPRK supports global efforts toward nuclear disarmament and complete obliteration of nuclear weapons and we play a responsible role to contribute to achieving global denuclearization,” he said. In New York, U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley said in a statement after the Security Council meeting that it was “time to hold North Korea accountable” with “actions. U.S., Japanese and South Korean military officials held a teleconference today in which they condemned the launch as “a clear violation” of multiple Security Council resolutions. The United States “reaffirmed its iron-clad security commitments” to South Korea and Japan, the Pentagon said. (Stephanie Nebehay, “North Korea Rejects UN Statement, Says Missile Tests Defensive,” Reuters, February 14, 2017) China is moving to blame South Korea for North Korea’s ballistic missile launch, arguing that one of the causes of the launch was inter-Korean differences. “China is opposed to the DPRK’s launch which violates the Security Council resolutions,” said Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang during the regular press conference. While calling on countries in the region to refrain from actions that could increase tensions, Geng noted that the UN Security Council would be dealing with this matter and said that “China will take part in the discussions in a responsible and constructive manner.” Geng also reconfirmed China’s official stance: “As a permanent member of the Security Council [ … ] China has always enforced the Council‘s resolutions in their entirety” and has “made unremitting efforts to facilitate the settlement of the issue of Korean Peninsula.” The most striking part of Geng’s remarks was his statement that “The root of the DPRK nuclear and missile issue lies in the differences between the DPRK and the US and between the DPRK and the ROK.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry has frequently rejected the argument that China should take responsibility for North Korea’s nuclear program by attributing the program to strife between North Korea and the US, but these remarks also mention missiles and inter-Korean conflict. When asked multiple times for confirmation, Geng repeated the same remarks and said, “This is a viewpoint that has been repeatedly emphasized.” After the briefing, Geng told reporters, “You see the way tensions are rising now. When one side does something, the other side does something. It never ends – it’s like a knot that never unravels.” From this perspective, North Korea’s ballistic missile launch is seen as part of an arms race linked to military actions by South Korea and the US. “Pyongyang‘s persistence in launching missiles will further provide an excuse to accelerate Washington and Seoul’s pace to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-missile system in South Korea, which damages China‘s strategic interests,” Global Times said in an op-ed. (Kim Oi-hyun, “China Says Inter-Korean Tensions at the Root of N. Korean Missile Launch,” Hankyore, February 14, 2017)
The chief of South Korea’s spy agency confirmed that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s half-brother was murdered with poison in Malaysia. National Intelligence Service (NIS) Director Lee Byong-ho told lawmakers that for the past five years Pyongyang has been attempting to assassinate Kim Jong-nam, who was under the protection of the Chinese government. During a meeting with the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee, Lee confirmed that Kim was killed with poison at the airport, although it still needs to find out whether a needle or chemical spray was used. The agency conceded it was notified of the incident about four hours after it occurred. Kim was at the airport to take an airplane heading to Macao when he asked the staff for help after interacting with two “Asian” women. Kim died on the way to a nearby hospital. The Malaysian authorities presume Kim was poisoned, although details will be revealed through an autopsy. The agency said the suspects are presumed to be still at large in Malaysia. “There was also an (assassination attempt) in 2012,” Lee was quoted as saying by Rep. Kim Byung-kee of the Democratic Party. Lee then said the North’s latest action is presumed to have been based on Kim Jong-un’s “delusional disorder,” rather than on any calculation that his half-brother is a threat to the regime. The NIS head also told lawmakers that Kim sent a letter to the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in 2012, asking his brother to spare his and the lives of his family. Kim Jong-nam’s wife is currently staying in Beijing with a son, while his second wife is living in Macao with a son and a daughter. All of them are currently under the protection of Chinese authorities. The son in Macao is Kim Han-sol, who came into the spotlight in 2012 after being interviewed by a Finnish television station. He said he hopes for the unification of the two divided Koreas and wants to improve the livelihoods of ordinary people living in the impoverished country now controlled by his young uncle. The agency said Kim has never asked South Korea for asylum, nor was there an effort within North Korea to place Kim Jong-nam as the leader. (Yonhap, “Spy Agency Confirms Assassination of N.K. Leader’s Half-Brother,” February 15, 2017) The Royal Malaysia Police announced late yesterday afternoon February 15 that they had arrested a woman that morning and that she had been carrying a Vietnamese passport in Terminal 2, where the attack occurred. They said she was “positively identified” from closed-circuit video, and was alone at the time of her arrest. She was identified as Doan Thin Hoang, 28, according to the inspector general of the police, Khalid Abu Bakar. On February 116, the Malaysian police said they had detained a second suspect, a woman with an Indonesian passport. A police official told the Bernama news agency that more arrests were expected. Ever since Kim Jong-un succeeded his father in 2011, “there has been a standing order” to assassinate his half-brother, Lee Byung-ho, the director of the South’s National Intelligence Service, said during a closed-door briefing at the National Assembly, according to lawmakers who attended it. “This is not a calculated action to remove Kim Jong-nam because he was a challenge to power per se, but rather reflected Kim Jong-un’s paranoia,” Lee was quoted as saying. Kim Jong-un wanted his half-brother killed, Lee said, and there was an assassination attempt against him in 2012. Kim was so afraid of assassins that he begged for his life in a letter to his half-brother in 2012. “Please withdraw the order to punish me and my family,” Kim was quoted as saying in the letter. “We have nowhere to hide. The only way to escape is to choose suicide.” Lee said that Kim Jong-nam had no power base inside North Korea, where Kim Jong-un had swiftly established his monolithic rule with what the South called a reign of terror. Kim Jong-nam arrived in Malaysia last week, Lee said. He was in line at the airport to check in for a flight to Macau this morning when he was attacked by the two women, Lee said, citing security camera footage from the airport. The women fled the airport in a taxi, Lee said. If North Korea’s involvement is proved, Washington could face intense pressure to put the country back on its list of nations that sponsor terrorism, said Cheong Seong-chang, an analyst at the Sejong Institute, a think tank in South Korea. North Korea was first put on the terrorism list after the South caught a woman from the North who confessed to planting a bomb on a South Korean airliner that exploded over the Indian Ocean, near Myanmar, in 1987. The North was taken off the list in 2008, after a deal aimed at ending its nuclear program. South Korea’s military plans to use loudspeakers along the shared Korean border to inform North Koreans of Kim’s killing and of their government’s brutality, a South Korean news agency, Yonhap reported February 15. The Defense Ministry declined to confirm the report. Outside analysts often saw him as a possible candidate to replace Kim Jong-un if the North Korean leadership imploded and China, traditionally an ally, sought a replacement in its client state. Chinese experts on North Korea said they doubted that Kim Jong-nam had special security protection from Beijing. “Chinese elites had no expectation this guy could play an important political role,” said Cheng Xiaohe, an associate professor of international relations at Renmin University. “If China wanted to use him as an alternative leader, China would have offered good protection, but this assassination shows he had no security protection.” Kim was a prince in exile with little chance of returning home, analysts and officials in South Korea said. His wife and a daughter and son are in Macau under Chinese protection, Lee said. The South Korean intelligence agency did not disclose how it had obtained the letter from Kim begging his half-brother to spare his life. But government sources said that emails Kim sent home through North Korean embassies had been obtained in a hacking operation. In one of the emails, they said, Kim bitterly complained that the North Korean government stopped sending him cash after his father died and Kim Jong-un took over. In 2012, a news report said Kim was thrown out of a luxury Macau hotel, unable to pay a $15,000 bill. Kim Jong-nam’s mother, Sung Hae-rim, a decorated “people’s actress,” was already married and the mother of a child when Kim Jong-il forced her to divorce her novelist husband to marry him. Kim Jong-il adored his first son, Kim Jong-nam. He once seated his young son at his desk and told him, “This is the place where you will one day give orders,” according to Lee Han-young, a relative who defected to the South in 1982. But Kim Jong-nam’s grandfather, the North’s founding president, Kim Il-sung, never approved of the marriage. “My father was keeping highly secret the fact that he was living with my mother, who was married, a famous movie actress, so I couldn’t get out of the house or make friends,” Kim was quoted as saying in a 2012 book by a Japanese journalist. “That solitude from childhood may have made me what I am now, preferring freedom.” Kim was born in secret, and when his mother fell out of favor with Kim Jong-il and was forced to live in Moscow, he was left in the care of her sister. He was later sent to Geneva, where he learned English and French. (His mother was alone in Moscow when she died in 2002.) Kim Jong-il would later begin a relationship with Ko Young-hee, a star of Pyongyang’s premier opera, who gave birth to Kim Jong-chol and then Kim Jong-un. According to a Japanese sushi chef who published a 2003 memoir about his experience working for the Kim family, Kim Jong-un was by that time the father’s favorite. Kim Jong-nam squandered what little chance he may have had to succeed his father when he embarrassed Pyongyang in 2001; he was caught on a fake passport from the Dominican Republic. He told Japanese investigators that he wanted to visit Tokyo Disneyland. But rumors of intrigue never left Kim, as analysts speculated that if the young, inexperienced Kim Jong-un failed to meet the expectations of hard-line generals, they might summon home the eldest brother. In a way, Kim helped fuel such rumors. In the 2012 book by the Japanese journalist, Kim called his younger brother “a figurehead.” (Choe Sang-Hun and Richard C. Paddock, “Dictator’s Estranged Heir Met Death in Exile from North Korea,” New York Times, February 16, 2017,
In a case with a thousand plot twists, there has been but one constant in the murder investigation of Kim Jong Nam: Nothing is ever what it seems. The victim himself — the playboy half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un — was traveling under false papers when he died and had to be identified using DNA. The two women accused of killing him turned out to be hired dupes, paid a few dollars to perform what they thought was a reality-TV stunt. Stranger still was the murder weapon, liquid VX, a toxin so powerful that a few drops rubbed onto the skin killed the victim in minutes, yet it failed to harm the two women who applied the poison with their bare hands. Even more mysterious: why North Korea would go to extravagant lengths to use a battlefield-grade chemical weapon on foreign soil, only to work equally hard to cover its tracks. For the prosecutors preparing for the first court hearings later this month, some of the mysteries behind Kim Jong Nam’s death inside a Malaysian airport terminal will likely never be resolved. But nearly five months after the killing, U.S. and Asian officials have a clearer view of the attack’s significance. In carrying out history’s first state-sponsored VX assassination in a country 3,000 miles from its borders, North Korea has demonstrated a new willingness to use its formidable arsenal of deadly toxins and poisons to kill or intimidate enemies on foreign soil, analysts say.. “The choice of weapons was not accidental,” said Sue Mi Terry, a former senior analyst on North Korea at the CIA and currently managing director for Korea at the Bower Group Asia. “Everything about this incident was intended to send a message.” U.S. and South Korean intelligence agencies have long believed that North Korea possesses significant stores of the nerve agents VX and sarin — and probably biological weapons as well — but in the past, such arsenals were assumed to be intended as a deterrent against foreign attacks. But in the attack on Kim Jong Nam, North Korea revealed a strategy for using chemicals that looks a lot like cyberwarfare: limited, highly secretive attacks that can damage an enemy without inviting massive retaliation. Whether Kim Jong Un would risk such an attack against a foreign government — even the United States — is unclear. But the February incident is a reminder that North Korea has options for striking targets abroad that do not hinge on the country’s ability to build an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the U.S. mainland, current and former U.S. officials say. “North Korea is bad enough when you’re talking about their nuclear and missiles program,” Rebecca Hersman, a former Defense Department deputy assistant secretary for countering weapons of mass destruction, said at a recent policy forum. “But I think we ignore their chemical and biological programs truly at our own peril.” Not one, but two teams of assassins had rehearsed for the moment. The only ones Kim Jong Nam would see were female: two attractive women in their 20s who had been recruited locally. One of them, identified by police as Indonesian native Siti Aisyah, worked in a Kuala Lumpur massage parlor; the other, Doan Thi Huong, had moved from Vietnam to Malaysia to work in what authorities described vaguely as the “entertainment” industry. Both would tell police that they were hired by a Korean man to perform “pranks,” such as smearing baby oil on strangers, for a hidden-camera video show. For their service, each was promised $90 in cash and a shot at future TV stardom. At least four men — later identified by Malaysian officials as North Korean agents — are seen watching the attack and shadowing the visibly agitated Kim Jong Nam as he seeks help from police and an airport first-aid station. Minutes later, as the dying Kim is wheeled into an ambulance, the men slip through the departures gate to board flights out of the country. The only ones who didn’t escape were the women and the victim himself. Aisyah and Huong mysteriously avoided serious injury — perhaps, weapons experts speculate, because each handled harmless precursor chemicals that became toxic only when mixed, or perhaps because both women quickly washed their hands after the attack. Both are seen quickly entering airport lavatories after the attack, behavior that prosecutors have cited in accusing the two women of being knowingly complicit in Kim Jong Nam’s murder. The two women face court appearances later this month on charges of first-degree murder, a capital crime in Malaysia. Kim Jong Nam, who quickly sought medical help after the attack, lost consciousness in the airport medical station and died in the ambulance, less than 20 minutes after the episode began. It would take two autopsies and nearly two weeks to determine the name of the rare toxin that took his life. Malaysian investigators would conclude that the VX was smuggled into the country by North Korea, most likely in a commercial jetliner. It’s unclear whether the toxin arrived ready to use or in a form that required mixing two harmless ingredients to create. In either case, the advantage for the assassins is that only a few drops are needed to kill, said a U.S. official with years of experience in chemical-weapons defense. “Was it assembled in Malaysia? Not necessarily,” said the official, who insisted on anonymity in discussing U.S. intelligence assessments of the North Korean threat. “A single three-ounce container that would fit in your carry-on luggage would hold far more than you’d ever need.” Until the February 13 attack, hard evidence of Pyongyang’s arsenal of toxins did not exist, at least in the public realm. But for at least two decades, U.S. intelligence assessments have concluded that North Korea possesses a sizable stockpile of chemical weapons, with VX being one of many varieties. A State Department report in 2001 found that North Korea was “already self-sufficient” in making all the necessary precursors for sarin and VX, as well as older weapons such as mustard gas. Drawing from an array of sources — from North Korean defectors and spies to satellite photos and electronic eavesdropping — U.S. agencies calculated the size of the country’s chemical stockpile at between 2,500 and 5,000 tons. That’s far larger than Syria’s arsenal at its peak, and larger than any known to exist in the world, except for those built by the Soviet and U.S. militaries during the Cold War. A parallel but reportedly much smaller program produces biological weapons, current and former U.S. intelligence officials think. Published Defense Intelligence Agency documents have described efforts underway to weaponize at least four pathogens: anthrax, plague, cholera and biological toxins, such as botulinum. Work on chemical and biological programs began years before Pyongyang tested its first nuclear bomb, and U.S. analysts suspect that both were intended at first as a deterrent against foreign attacks. But although North Korea regularly boasts of its achievements in atomic energy and missiles, its chemical and biological weapons have always been kept carefully hidden, according to a study released jointly last month by the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the U.S. Korea Institute. “North Korea has deliberately built its NBC [nuclear, biological, chemical] infrastructures in extreme secrecy; undertaken camouflage, concealment and deception operations . . . and dispersed NBC facilities around the country,” report author Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., a prominent expert on North Korean weapons systems, wrote in the report. “It is therefore probable that there are significant elements of the NBC programs and their infrastructures that are simply unknown outside the North Korean government.” U.S. and South Korean defense officials alike take the threat seriously, so much so that both governments inoculate their troops against exposure to anthrax bacteria and even the smallpox virus. Soldiers deployed along the border are issued gas masks and protective suits and put through occasional drills to prepare for the day when canisters of VX or sarin are fired across the border in North Korean rockets or artillery shells. Any such attack would certainly prompt a massive retaliation. But Kim Jong Nam’s assassination has forced U.S. officials to consider the possibility of a clandestine attack, one that might be more difficult to trace, or to defend against. “With biological weapons, especially, there’s an opportunity for covert attack with deniability, since attribution would be difficult,” said Andrew C. Weber, former assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons defense. Although U.S. officials are fixated on North Korea’s nuclear advances, a nuclear attack “is not the most likely, or possibly even the most consequential,” he said. As Kim Jong Nam’s assassination demonstrated, the delivery of such weapons can be easy — especially for deadly pathogens, but also for toxic chemicals, he said. And any military response would be delayed for days or weeks while investigators attempted to find evidence that firmly pointed to a perpetrator. “A chemical attack would be knowable, almost as soon as it happens,” Weber said. “But Kim Jong Un is a brutal guy, and he may have no qualms against doing it. Or he may just miscalculate.” Kim Jong Un’s plan to use VX to kill his half-brother included extensive measures to ensure secrecy — so many, in fact, that some experts think the North Koreans wanted to keep their enemies ignorant about its use of the toxin, or at least unsure. After Kim Jong Nam’s death, Pyongyang requested the immediate return of his body, without an autopsy being performed. Malaysia refused, and soon afterward, local news media reported an attempt by unknown individuals to break into the morgue where the body was kept. The attempt failed, but in the weeks since, North Korea has insisted that the leader’s half-brother died of a heart attack and that any reports of chemical toxins were lies spread by outsiders. Kim Jong Un has a history of extreme brutality toward relatives whom he suspects of plotting against him. He may have seen Kim Jong Nam — a free-spoken man of leisure who enjoyed protected status in China and was widely reported to have intelligence contacts with several foreign governments — as a possible future choice by Beijing to replace him. “It might have just been an expression of how much he hates traitors,” said Joshua Pollack, a former government consultant on North Korean weapons programs and now editor of the journal Nonproliferation Review. “There’s no doubt that VX was an unusual choice for an assassination. But I think it was probably chosen because they thought no one would look for it.” Other current and former U.S. officials say that North Korea would have calculated that the VX would be found eventually. According to these officials, Kim Jong Un’s plan was to showcase his ability to strike with terrifying weapons, while also concealing the evidence to reduce the chances of retaliation. “His message about VX was, ‘We have it,’ ” said Terry, the former CIA analyst. “He knew they would eventually find it.” Whatever the motivation, the tactic worked on nearly every level, North Korea experts say: A potential rival was eliminated. A capability to strike covertly, using one of the most fearsome chemical weapons ever designed, was amply demonstrated. And North Korea, while issuing denials that are widely seen as implausible, managed to get away with it, at least until now. “They carry out an attack and make people afraid, but then ensure that there’s no evidence that can lead to real accountability,” Pollack said. “For them, that’s the sweet spot.” (Joby Warrick, “The Message behind the Murder: North Korea’s Assassination Sheds Light on Chemical Weapons Arsenal,” Washington Post, July 6, 2017)
A senior South Korean lawmaker called for a revision to the missile defense system sought by the country by the mid-2020s as North Korean missiles will likely become harder to detect before launch. The upcoming “kill chain” strike system and the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system are both designed to detect and destroy incoming missiles in the shortest possible time. In a meeting with reporters after being briefed on North Korea’s latest missile launch and Seoul’s countermeasures by the National Intelligence Service, Lee Cheol-woo, chairman of the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee, raised questions about the effectiveness of the anti-missile systems in hitting the North’s newly developed solid-fuel missile fired from a mobile launcher on Sunday. “With the planned systems, it is impossible to pre-emptively strike solid propellant missiles (through prior detection). So the kill chain (and KAMD) systems themselves don’t make an effective missile defense system,” he told reporters. Solid-fuel missiles pose a greater threat as they require less preparation time than liquid-fueled rockets, and can be fired more easily and quickly from a mobile launcher. It takes about one to three hours for the North to fuel a liquid-fueled missile, so it can be detected by surveillance satellites operated by the U.S. and South Korea. In that case, a pre-emptive strike is possible, according to military officials. Most of North Korean ballistic missiles, such as the shorter-range Scud with a range of 500-700 kilometers, the medium-range Rodong with a 1,300-1,500 km range and the intermediate-range Musudan missile with a range of more than 3,000 km, use liquid fuel. But the surface-to-surface intermediate-range Pukguksong-2 missile launched by the North February 12 has been determined by the military as a solid fuel type. It is speculated to have a range of more than 2,000 km. As it was launched at a high angle, the missile reached a height of 550 km and flew about 500 km before splashing down into the East Sea. “It takes only five to 10 minutes to launch the solid-fuel Pukguksong-2,” Lee said. As for anti-missile capabilities, the PAC-2 and PAC-3 Patriot systems currently operated by the U.S. Forces Korea and the Korean military are up to the task of intercepting the Pukguksong-type missiles, the chairman said. The PAC-2 and PAC-3 are designed to intercept missiles for a “low altitude” of 20-40 km. “Given the Patriot missile defense systems are designed to strike incoming missiles travelling at speeds of Mach 8-9, they may not be effective in shooting down an incoming missile at speeds of Mach 9-10,” he said. The NIS confirmed the Pukguksong-2 reached a maximum speed of Mach 10. Missile experts say if a missile reaches a height of 550 km and falls, it can reach very high speeds. This means the kill chain and KAMD won’t work properly in the face of an incoming missile from the North, they said. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system, scheduled to be deployed in South Korea this year, may also be ineffective in dealing with high speed missiles. THAAD is known to be able to intercept a missile flying 40-150 km from the ground, can shoot down missiles that comes directly towards it even if they reach speeds of Mach 14, but are less effective for missiles heading for distant areas. Yoo Seung-min, a presidential candidate for the conservative Bareun Party, argued South Korea needs to “inject a defense budget to secure two to three THAAD batteries here and have control over missile defense operations.” (Yonhap, “South Korean Lawmaker Calls for Revision to Anti-Missile Defense Systems,” February 14, 2017) Before the half-brother of Kim Jong Un was killed in a brazen nerve agent attack at a Malaysian airport in 2017, he was known as a playboy and a hustler — not a secret CIA informant. Kim Jong Nam, the exiled firstborn son of the late North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il, lived among the gamblers and gangsters of the Chinese enclave of Macau. Because he was the only high-profile member of the Kim dynasty living outside the territory and employment of the regime, Japanese and South Korean reporters would flock to him on sight. He was a bon vivant who enjoyed expensive watches, wine and cigars. On Facebook, he posted photos of himself outside various casinos and resorts. “Living Las Vegas in Asia,” he captioned one. But behind the veneer of a high-rolling North Korean card shark was a man supplementing his income with a job as an informant to the CIA, said two people familiar with his activities. Kim Jong Nam provided information to the intelligence agency, often meeting his handlers in Singapore or Malaysia, the people said. The revelation, detailed in the new book “The Great Successor” by Washington Post reporter Anna Fifield, one of the authors of this article, prompted a reaction from President Trump, who when asked about the CIA’s relationship with Kim’s half-brother said he couldn’t confirm or deny the account. “I know this: that the relationship is such that that wouldn’t happen under my auspices, but I don’t know about that. Nobody knows,” he told reporters June 11, 2019. The CIA declined to comment. The secret relationship underscores the lengths to which the spy agency must go to uncover information about the world’s most-closed society, where even an estranged half-brother may be able to offer coveted information. “It’s very viable that he was a source,” Bruce Klingner, a former CIA deputy division chief for Korea, said in an interview Wednesday. “After Kim Jong Il died, the U.S. government had very little information on Kim Jong Un, so there would’ve been a scramble for information, and strong interest in talking to the half-brother.” Kim Jong Nam is believed to have met with an American intelligence agent on a Malaysian island a few days before he was killed in Kuala Lumpur’s airport, according to a Malaysian official interviewed after the killing. The backpack he was wearing in the airport held $120,000 in cash, raising immediate suspicions of shadowy dealings. “A wad of cash like that would seem reflective of an under-the-table relationship that is either of a criminal or intelligence nature,” said Klingner, who joked that a payment of that magnitude would show that the “CIA pays its assets better than its employees.” What exactly Kim provided to U.S. officials, or to the South Korean and Chinese intelligence officials with whom he is also believed to have had relations, is unknown. But he is likely to have sought an additional source of income after the killing of his uncle, Jang Song-thaek, a person familiar with his finances said. Jang, a senior North Korean official who was executed in 2013 as Kim Jong Un consolidated power, spoke frequently with Kim Jong Nam during his exile and heavily subsidized his life in the resort of Macau, the person said. It is possible that the young leader’s quest for power and the execution of his uncle thrust Kim Jong Nam into the arms of foreign intelligence services as he tried to maintain his lifestyle. Klingner said intelligence officials probably would have asked Kim Jong Nam to interpret events inside North Korea. “When we have assets with information on a hard target like North Korea, we’ll try to get a sense of how they interpret recent actions,” he said, noting his recent discussion with a North Korean defector about the North Korean leader’s decision to launch short-range missiles. Klingner noted that Kim Jong Nam did not seem to have a “political base in North Korea,” so it is unclear how much information he would have had, but any details about how the regime functions would have been valuable. “It’s useful to get a sense of how the regime gets information and how it interprets information,” he said. But Kim would have been sharing information at substantial risk to his own safety, given that he was already viewed as a succession threat by Kim Jong Un because of his status as Kim Jong Il’s firstborn son. In dealing with others, Kim Jong Nam sought to emphasize that he was contented living abroad, away from the temptations of power, where he had children with three women. “He was a bit concerned about what would happen to him” after his brother took over, said one of his business associates, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss Kim Jong Nam’s feelings. “He was happy living the life that he was living. He was happy that his children and wives and mistresses were not in North Korea.” In the years before he died, the estrangement between the regime and Kim Jong Nam became more apparent. Anthony Sahakian, who went to school with him in Switzerland and kept in touch, said it appeared that Kim Jong Nam was working for a living and was not being subsidized by the Kim regime. On his last trip to Geneva, he stayed at an Airbnb rather than an upscale hotel. In 2009, when Kim Jong Il became noticeably frailer, Kim Jong Nam dismissed the idea that he would succeed his father, telling a Japanese TV crew that was tailing him: “Would I be dressed like this if I was the successor?” He was wearing sweatpants at the time. His view of the totalitarian state also grew more negative as he lived abroad. After his father chose Kim Jong Un as his successor, the overlooked older brother said he was opposed in principle to third-generation leadership but wished his brother good luck. “I hope my brother does his best to make the lives of North Koreans better,” he said, adding that he was happy to offer his help from abroad. He grew even more critical of the regime in 2009, saying it was time for the country to “reform and open up” like China. His harshest condemnations came in 2012 after Kim Jong Un became leader. “I have my doubts about whether a person with only two years of grooming as a leader can govern,” Kim Jong Nam wrote to a Japanese reporter at the time. The life of this jet-setting international playboy ended in airport security footage of him looking overwhelmingly ordinary as a balding 45-year-old man, with no entourage and waiting to check himself in at the counter of Air Asia, a discount airline. As he stood there, two women approached him, wiped different chemicals on his face and mouth and ran off to wash their hands. The chemical agents combined to form the deadly nerve agent VX. Less than 15 minutes later he was dead. Investigators later found 12 vials of antidote for poisons, including VX, on him the day he was murdered. It remains unclear why he never took any. (John Hudson and Anna Fifield, “From Casino Playboy to Slain CIA Informant: The Life of Kim Jong Un’s Half-Brother,” Washington Post, June 12, 2019)
2/14-16/17:
An Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine assigned to Submarine Group 9 completed a Follow-on Commander’s Evaluation Test (FCET) February 16, resulting in four successful test flights of Trident II D5 missiles. Designated FCET-53, the operation spanned a three-day period. The primary objective of an FCET is to obtain, under operationally representative conditions, valid reliability, accuracy, and performance of the missile system for use by Commander, Strategic Command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The missiles were unarmed and all launches were conducted from the sea, flew over the sea, and landed in the sea. At no time did the missiles fly over land. Since its introduction to the fleet in 1989, the Trident II D5 missile has completed 165 successful test flights. (John M. Daniels, “FCET Success: SSBN Launches Fleet Ballistic Missiles,” Strategic Systems Program Public Affairs NNS 170216-21, February 16, 2017)
2/14/17:
A day after Facebook posts came to light showing deliberations over North Korea in the public dining hall of the Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida, President Trump is up in arms about loose national security controls. The real story here is why are there so many illegal leaks coming out of Washington? Will these leaks be happening as I deal on N.Korea etc? — Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) Feb. 14, 2017
For 16 years, the United States has publicly refused to engage in direct talks with North Korea, arguing that doing so would reward it for bad behavior. In the meantime, the North raced ahead with its nuclear weapons program. Yet with a new president in the White House and South Korea’s leader under the threat of impeachment, a break from the longstanding stalemate suddenly seems possible. China has urged the United States to enter talks with North Korea to end its weapons program, apparently sensing that President Trump’s desire to make deals could break the years-long deadlock on negotiations. Beijing did so even after North Korea made another stride in its weapons program on Sunday, testing an intermediate-range missile that went into the Sea of Japan. “The root of the North Korean nuclear and missile issue lies in the difference between North Korea and the United States and between North Korea and South Korea,” Geng Shuang, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry in Beijing, said today. “We believe that dialogue and consultation offers the way out.” China was not alone in seeking a new direction, as it appeared to capitalize on a re-evaluation by the Trump administration of how to handle the government of Kim Jong-un. In Tokyo, after returning from meeting Trump in the United States, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo told a parliamentary committee that Japan needed to join its allies in finding a different approach. Japan must “cooperate with the international community, including China,” he said. And in South Korea, where the government is paralyzed while waiting for a court’s decision on impeachment and where an election is likely, progressive opposition parties called for new talks, emphasizing that sanctions intended to topple the regime had failed. “Dialogue and diplomacy” are the only proven means to end the development of nuclear weapons, said Choo Mi-ae, leader of the main opposition Democratic Party. Such talks seemed politically impossible under President Barack Obama, who favored sanctions as the prime safeguard against the North’s nuclear ambitions. There is a growing sense in the region that Obama’s approach to the North failed. Chinese analysts said the White House should seize the chance for a new chapter in dealing with North Korea and abandon Obama’s policy of applying sanctions. “We all think that the Trump administration should talk directly with North Korea,” said Lu Chao, director of the Border Study Institute at the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences in Shenyang. “That would be the best approach to crack this problem.” But the unpredictable nature of dealing with North Korea was underscored by reports today that Kim’s half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, had been assassinated in Malaysia. Dealing directly with the North is anathema to most American officials — Republicans and Democrats alike — who say that would be viewed as compensation for the aggressive behavior of a government whose nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches have alarmed the world. On his first official visit to South Korea as defense secretary, Jim Mattis showed little inclination toward talks. Any use of nuclear weapons will be met with “an effective and overwhelming response,” he said. The United States will keep its “ironclad” commitment to allies in the region, he added. But during his presidential campaign, Trump said he would be prepared to sit down with Kim and share a hamburger with him. After Trump chose not to mention North Korea during his brief remarks after it launched a ballistic missile over the weekend, some analysts interpreted his uncharacteristic restraint as a sign of wanting to take a different tack. Earlier last week, Chinese officials participated in behind-the-scenes talks with senior members of Trump’s staff to arrange the first phone call between President Xi Jinping and Trump. That conversation dealt with Trump’s decision to back the “One China” policy, which recognizes a single Chinese government in Beijing, but the discussions leading to the call covered a range of issues, including North Korea, according to a person in Washington who was briefed on the talks by a Trump administration official. “China wants the Americans to talk directly with North Korea,” said Cheng Xiaohe, associate professor of international relations at Renmin University. “China believes the North Korean nuclear problem actually was caused by the Cold War and Pyongyang’s fear of American invasion. Therefore, the blame falls squarely on the U.S., and all the negotiations should be about the U.S. talking with North Korea.” At the outset, Professor Cheng said China would not be fussy about how the Trump administration approached any talks. “Generally speaking, China is basically saying, please talk — talk whatever you want, in whatever way you like, as long as you guys could reach some consensus,” he said. William J. Perry, a former United States defense secretary, said in Washington last month that the new administration at least had to give direct talks with North Korea a chance to gain China’s help in addressing the nuclear threat. “What might make a difference to China is if we really had already gone through a really serious attempt at negotiation, offered a real alternative to North Korea,” said Perry, who was involved in North Korea policy during the presidency of Bill Clinton and favored Clinton’s visiting the country. “And if they turn that offer down, then I think we’re in a much better position to go to China and say: ‘We want to really tighten the screws on sanctions.’” One American expert on North Korea suggested a clear path for how the Trump administration should proceed. “Trump should start by holding back-channel talks,” said John Delury, associate professor of Chinese studies at Yonsei University in Seoul. “If those make enough progress, he should then send an envoy to Pyongyang, who could negotiate a nuclear freeze.” Trump could then begin high-level talks that would culminate in a meeting with Kim, Professor Delury said in an article in Foreign Affairs this month. Although China is considered the North’s closest ally, Beijing has cool relations with its volatile neighbor. Some Chinese experts call the relationship a “fake alliance,” and Beijing has become increasingly frustrated with the North’s continuing nuclear tests. The Foreign Ministry condemned the latest launch. In a show of exasperation, China backed tougher United Nations sanctions against North Korea last year, but the United States has doubted Beijing’s willingness to exercise control over the North’s rudimentary economy. In a counterpoint to the possibility of talks, a former American ambassador to China, Winston Lord, in a report issued last week by the Asia Society on the future of relations between the United States and China, urged heightening economic pressure on North Korea. Attempts by Washington to gain China’s cooperation have consistently failed because Beijing was more interested in maintaining government stability than removing nuclear weapons, he wrote. Therefore, the United States should move toward “rapid, not incremental, ratcheting up of Iran-type sanctions,” he said. (Jane Perlez, Choe Sang-Hun, Motoko Rich, “Trump’s Muted Tone on North Korea Gives Hope for Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, February 15, 2017,
2/15/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesman answer to a question raised by KCNA “as regards the fact that the U.S. and its vassal forces faulted the DPRK’s surface-to-surface medium to long-range strategic ballistic missile test-fire: The UN Security Council issued a press release under the manipulation of the U.S. on Feb. 13 in which it faulted the DPRK’s test-fire as a “breach of resolution” and threatened it would take “additional crucial measures.” The recent missile test-fire conducted by the DPRK is part of normal course which it has to go through in implementing the line of simultaneous development of the two fronts, its state line. Respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un in his New Year Address for this year declared that the preparations for the inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire had reached the final phase, and in the subsequent period, the DPRK officially clarified more than once that the measure for further bolstering its nuclear force can be taken any moment the Supreme Leader makes his decision. The self-defensive measure is for firmly protecting the sovereignty of the country and the right to existence of the nation from the threat of nuclear war posed by the U.S. and its vassal forces and reliably guaranteeing the peace on the Korean peninsula and the security of the region. No one is entitled to fault this legitimate right of a sovereign state. The UNSC has long been disqualified to take issue with the DPRK’s legitimate step for self-defense as it has gone to the extremes in its application of double-standards by which it labels the tests carried out by the DPRK for self-defense “illegal” but keeps mum about the tests conducted by the U.S. and other countries. For UN member nations or the UN secretary general to blindly follow the UNSC resolution, failing to discern its absurd double-dealing attitude, means that they do not properly perform their duties. There is no paragraph in the UN Charter which specifies nuclear test and missile test-fire as illegal. Therefore, the DPRK will never acknowledge the UNSC “resolution” which termed the DPRK’s nuclear test and rocket test-fire “illegal”, and will never do in the future, either. We categorically reject the press release of the UNSC which took issue with the right of a sovereign state to self-defense under the high-handed pressure of the U.S. in utter disregard of the DPRK’s just demand.” (KCNA, “Foreign Ministry of DPRK Slams U.S. and Vassal Forces for Faulting Its Strategic Ballistic Missile Test-Fire,” February 15, 2017)
2/16/17:
President Trump: “Those are criminal leaks. They’re put out by people either in agencies — I think you’ll see it stopping because now we have our people in. You know, again, we don’t have our people in because we can’t get them approved by the Senate. We just had Jeff Sessions approved. Injustice, as an example (ph). So, we are looking into that very seriously. It’s a criminal act. You know what I say, when I — when I was called out on Mexico, I was shocked because all this equipment, all this incredible phone equipment — when I was called out on Mexico, I was — honestly, I was really, really surprised. But I said “you know, it doesn’t make sense. That won’t happen” but that wasn’t that important a call, it was fine, I could show it to the world and he could show it to the world, the president who’s a very fine man, by the way. Same thing with Australia. I said “that’s terrible that it was leaked” but it wasn’t that important. But then I said to myself “what happens when I’m dealing with the problem of North Korea?” What happens when I’m dealing with the problems in the Middle East? Are you folks going to be reporting all of that very, very confidential information, very important, very — you know, I mean at the highest level? Are you going to be reporting about that too? So, I don’t want classified information getting out to the public and in a way that was almost a test. So I’m dealing with Mexico, I’m dealing with Argentina, we were dealing on this case with Mike Flynn. All this information gets put into the “Washington Post” and gets put into the “New York Times” and I’m saying “what’s going to happen when I’m dealing on the Middle East? What’s going to happen when I’m dealing with really, really important subjects like North Korea? … I’m not going to tell you anything about what response I do. I don’t talk about military response. I don’t want to be one of these guys that say, “Yes, here’s what we’re going to do.” I don’t have to do that. I don’t have to tell you what I’m going to do in North Korea. … I don’t have to tell you what I’m going to do in North Korea. And I don’t have to tell you what I’m going to do with Iran. You know why? Because they shouldn’t know. And eventually, you guys are going to get tired of asking that question. (President Donald J. Trump Press Conference February 16, 2017 Transcript)
Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se has voiced South Korea’s reservations about any U.S. agreement with North Korea that would reward Pyongyang for a nuclear freeze, sources said Tuesday, referring to the policymaker’s recent talks with American Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. Instead, any deal with Pyongyang should aim to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons program in a “complete, verifiable and irreversible” manner, the sources quoted Yun as telling Tillerson during their talks in Bonn, Germany. It was Yun’s first meeting with the U.S. top diplomat under the Donald Trump administration, which came after North Korea’s launch of an intermediate ballistic missile on Feb. 12. The provocation highlighted North Korea’s nuclear issue as one of the most pressing security challenges facing the new U.S. administration. The sources said that the South Korean foreign minister stressed that a mere freeze on North Korea’s nuclear program would be meaningless mainly because the country is believed to be already in possession of dozens of nuclear weapons and a freeze of North Korea’s highly-enriched uranium program may be hardly verifiable. “The (South Korean) government regards it as meaningless to pursue a freeze deal when North Korea shows no intention to give up its nuclear weapons program although freezing its nuclear facilities would be part of the inevitable process before the complete, verifiable and irreversible (nuclear) dismantlement,” the sources told Yonhap. During the meeting, Yun also expressed Seoul’s skepticism about opening any dialogue over North Korea’s demand to sign a peace treaty, the sources said. Pursuing talks with North Korea simultaneously on denuclearization and a peace treaty would give the regime an excuse to delay its denuclearization, Yun was also quoted as telling Tillerson. The foreign minister then underlined the importance of maintaining the on-going pressure-oriented diplomacy toward North Korea, suggesting broader sanctions on North Korea and Chinese firms doing business with the North. He also called for continuing pressure on North Korea’s human rights violations as a desirable policy approach toward the reclusive country, according to the sources. Yun’s policy stances are likely to be put to discussion when the South Korean and U.S. representatives on the North Korean nuclear issue hold a meeting in Washington possibly before the end of this month. Foreign ministry spokesman Cho June-hyuck said later, “The South Korean and U.S. foreign ministers shared in specific details in their first talks what our side thinks with regard to the two countries’ joint response to North Korea’s nuclear (development). In follow-up to the ministerial talks, special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs Kim Hong-kyun will travel to the U.S. in the near future to put the puzzle together on the matters of joint response,” he noted. (Yonhap, “Foreign Minister Yun Dissuades Tillerson from Reward-for-Nuclear Freeze Deal with N. Korea: Sources,” February 21, 2017)
2/?/17:
Woodward: “In February, General Dunford [chairman of the joint chiefs of staff] stopped by the office of Senator Lindsay Graham, the South Carolina Republican, for a private talk. …Graham could see that the chairman was shaken Trump was asking for a new war plan for a preemptive military strike on North Korea, Dunford confided. The intelligence on North Korea was not good enough. ‘We need better intelligence before I give the president a plan.’ Graham sensed that Dunford was stalling Trump’s request given the risk.” (Woodward, Fear, p. 100)
2/17/17:
South Korea and the United States conducted a joint exercise February 14-17 to seize and destroy North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD), according to the U.S. military. More than 400 soldiers, including 200 Korean Army soldiers, took part in the Warrior Strike 5 exercise at a live fire complex in Pocheon, 46 kilometers north of Seoul, the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division’s Web page showed. During the exercise, the allied forces formed a hypothetical special operations unit, practiced an air assault on nuclear and missile facilities, and conducted mock operations to locate and seize WMDs. “Our companies refined their standard operating procedures for air assault operations, urban operations and combined operations with our ROK Army counterparts,” said Maj. Jared Nichols, the battalion’s executive officer. “The value of training like this is key to our mission to be ready to ‘Fight Tonight’ if called upon.” The exercise was designed to train soldiers from 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, currently on a nine-month rotational deployment, with an aim to identify and eliminate sites containing enemy weapons of mass destruction, the Web site said. The allies also plan to start a two-week computer-simulated command post exercise, called Key Resolve, on March 13. (Yonhap, “S. Korea, U.S. Hold Exercise to Counter N. Korea Weapons of Mass Destruction,” March 3, 2017)
2/18/17:
China said that it was suspending all imports of coal from North Korea as part of its effort to enact United Nations Security Council sanctions aimed at stopping the country’s nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile program. The ban takes effect tomorrow and will last until the end of the year, the Chinese Commerce Ministry said in a brief statement posted on its website today. Chinese trade and aid have long been a vital economic crutch for North Korea, and the decision strips North Korea of one of its most important sources of foreign currency. Coal has accounted for 34 percent to 40 percent of North Korean exports in the past several years, and almost all of it was shipped to China, according to South Korean government estimates. The ban comes six days after the North Korean test of a ballistic missile that the Security Council condemned as a violation of its resolutions that prohibited the country from developing and testing ballistic missile technology. In the resolution it adopted in November in response to the North’s fifth and most powerful nuclear test, the Security Council said that North Korea should not be allowed to export more than 7.5 million metric tons of coal a year or bring in more than $400 million in coal sales, whichever limit is met first. It was unclear whether that cap has already been reached for this year. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not comment on the suspension after it was announced today. Calls to the ministry’s press officer were not answered. Yesterday, the Chinese minister of foreign affairs, Wang Yi, said at a conference in Munich that the United Nations sanctions of North Korea “must continue to be strictly implemented.” But Wang also argued that only renewed negotiations would offer any hope of curtailing North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. China has hosted six-party talks — including itself, South Korea, North Korea, the United States, Japan and Russia — aimed at a negotiated settlement of the North Korean nuclear standoff. But those talks have stopped since 2009, and there seems little hope of them restarting anytime soon. “This situation cannot continue,” Wang said, “because the ultimate outcome may be intolerable to all sides.” Last year, China imported 22.5 million metric tons of coal from North Korea, an increase of 14.5 percent on the amount in 2015, according to Chinese customs statistics. In December, China imported about 2 million tons of North Korean coal. Mysteel, a Chinese industrial analysis firm, estimated that under the limits imposed by the sanctions, the coal quota would be used up by April or May. In 2015, China’s cumulative imports of North Korean coal reached 7.5 million metric tons by May. The coal suspension also followed the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, the estranged half-brother of the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, on February 13 at an airport in Malaysia. (Choe Sang-hun, “China Halts Coal Imports from North Korea,” New York Times, February 19, 2017,
2/19/17:
Preparations are underway to bring senior North Korean representatives to the United States for talks with former American officials, the first such meeting in more than five years and a sign that Pyongyang sees a potential opening with the Trump administration. Arranging the talks has become a lot more complicated over the past eight days, with North Korea testing a ballistic missile and the assassination of Kim Jong Un’s half-brother in Malaysia, an act that many suspect was ordered by the leader of North Korea. Malaysian police today named as suspects four North Koreans who left the country on the day of the attack. Analysts also say they are highly doubtful that Pyongyang, which has insisted on being recognized as a nuclear state, would be willing to moderate its position on its weapons program. But if the talks do take place, they could offer a glimmer of hope for an already-hostile relationship that has only deteriorated as the Kim government works aggressively to develop a nuclear-tipped missile capable of reaching the continental United States. The planning for the “Track 1.5” talks — with the U.S. side made up of the former officials who usually take part in Track 2 talks, but the North Korean side comprising government officials — is still in a preparatory stage, according to multiple people with knowledge of the arrangements. The State Department has not yet approved the North Koreans’ visas for the talks, which would take place in New York within the next few weeks. “The North Koreans have expressed an interest in engagement, but nothing’s been approved yet,” said one person familiar with the preparations, speaking on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss them. Others who have been in touch with North Koreans describe an intense interest in what President Trump might do. “If this happens, it would be an interesting signal to the new administration,” he said of the discussions. The talks would be the clearest indication yet that Kim wants to talk with the Trump administration. “If this happens, I would take it as a very positive sign from both sides,” said another person with knowledge of the arrangements. In recent years, there have been sporadic Track 1.5 talks that have taken place in Kuala Lumpur, Geneva, Berlin and Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. But these talks have not taken place in the United States since July 2011, before Kim succeeded his father in North Korea. The planned talks are being organized by Donald S. Zagoria of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, who served as a consultant on Asia during the Carter administration and has organized previous rounds of such talks. Zagoria declined to comment on the preparations. Choe Son Hui, the director of the U.S. affairs department in North Korea’s Foreign Ministry, is likely to lead the delegation from Pyongyang. She is well known to American officials, having participated in official meetings including the six-party talks on denuclearization, as well as in other Track 1.5 talks. Choe has a direct line to Kim, according to Thae Yong Ho, the North Korean deputy ambassador to London who defected to South Korea last year. Since Trump was elected, there has been a notable change in North Korea’s usually bombastic rhetoric. Pyongyang had been sharply critical of the Obama administration, saying its policy of “strategic patience” — waiting for North Korea to change its nuclear calculations — was “an aggressive and heinous ‘strategic suffocation’ policy” against North Korea. But in its announcement of its missile launch Feb. 12, the North’s state media did not include its usual bluster about needing a deterrent against the United States and its “hostile policies.” In his own statement after the launch, Trump notably did not condemn Pyongyang. The new president has, in fact, said very little about how he plans to deal with North Korea. “North Korea — we’ll take care of it folks, we’re going to take care of it all,” he said at his news conference last week, without elaborating. His administration is now conducting a review of North Korean policy. This provides space to broaden the options for dealing with Pyongyang and an opportunity to influence the new president, analysts say. While some expect him to take a hard-line approach, encouraged by hawkish advisers, others say that Trump, who prides himself on making deals, could be open to dialogue with the North Korean regime. “U.S. policy is hanging in the balance,” said Adam Cathcart, an expert on North Korea at the University of Leeds in Britain. “I think the North Koreans ought to be pretty happy, because the Americans have laid off criticizing them too much and have, in fact, been making things quite easy for them,” Cathcart said. “But at some point, they are going to have to decide whether to pick up the cudgel.” For those favoring an even tougher approach to North Korea, recent events have provided plenty of ammunition. A week ago, North Korea tested a ballistic missile for the first time since Trump was elected. The missile appeared to show significant technological advances, with upgraded power and range, and could mark another step in the push toward the capacity to hit Alaska or Washington state. Then the next day, Kim Jong Nam, the estranged half-brother of the North Korean leader, was attacked and apparently poisoned at Kuala Lumpur International Airport. He died shortly afterward. Although the investigation is ongoing, the South Korean government has blamed the assassination on Kim Jong Un, who has systematically eliminated potential rivals to his power over the past four years. Malaysian police have arrested one North Korean man in connection with the attack — he is said to have a background in chemistry — and today named four other North Koreans suspected of being involved. The four had been in Malaysia for several weeks, but all left February 13, the day of the attack, said Noor Rashid Ibrahim, Malaysia’s deputy national police chief, on Sunday at a news conference. Complicating the environment even further, the South Korean and U.S. militaries are due to start annual joint exercises next month, an event that always elicits an angry response from Pyongyang, which sees the drills as a pretext for an invasion. In the past year or two, the exercises have become more overtly offensive, with the two militaries practicing “decapitation strikes” on the North Korean leadership. (Anna Fifield, “North Korean Officials Are Preparing to Come to U.S. for Talks with Former U.S. Officials,” Washington Post, February 19, 2017)
2/20/17:
China has warned South Korean conglomerate Lotte over its involvement in a planned US missile shield on the peninsula — the first time Beijing has openly criticised the group after months of pressure via undeclared economic sanctions. “Lotte will hurt the Chinese people and the consequences could be severe. The Chinese people will not support a company complicit in damaging China’s interests,” according to aXinhua commentary. The development underscores China’s two-track approach to the Korean peninsula amid heightened tensions over North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic weapons programs. On one hand, it is increasing pressure on Pyongyang following a declaration that it would stop importing North Korean coal. On the other, it is squeezing Seoul on its plans to deploy the US missile shield that Beijing says is a “threat to regional security and stability.” Related article Beijing turns up the heat on corporate South Korea Hyundai hybrid rollout dented and $2.6bn Lotte theme park project halted over THAAD. North Korea has re-emerged as a potential conflict hotspot after last year testing two nuclear devices and more than 20 ballistic missiles. Earlier this month, Pyongyang launched an advanced mid-range missile off its east coast in what observers saw a test of the new Trump administration. “The proposed deployment of a US missile defense system in the Republic of Korea is a threat to regional security and stability, and Lotte Group is one decision away from becoming an accessory to the act,” said Xinhua. Lotte is in talks with the Seoul government to trade the land needed to host the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense platform. However, South Korea’s fifth-largest conglomerate has dragged its heels on negotiations in recent months as Beijing stepped up retaliatory measures against its operations in China. In December, it emerged the group’s premises across China had come under increased scrutiny and had been subject to an array of health and safety and tax investigations. Earlier this month, the company said it would close three retails stores in Beijing, partly as result of the deteriorating bilateral relationship over THAAD. “Lotte stands to lose Chinese customers and the Chinese market. That would be a very large slice out of their business pie,” said Xinhua. The commentary urged Lotte to defer or reject the Thaad deal. Related article Asian consumer stocks: bunkered by politics Unpredictable politics is making shares hard to value conventionally The ultimatum puts the company in a difficult position — caught between its business interests and the will of the South Korean government. The issue is also a sensitive one for policymakers in Seoul who recognise the importance of relations with their biggest trading partner but are increasingly anxious about North Korean belligerence. “Lotte has the position to resolve this issue from the broad point of view, in other words, for the sake of the national security and national interests,” said the South Korean defense ministry. The warning to Lotte came after China announced it would suspend coal imports from North Korea in a sign of Beijing’s displeasure with the reclusive regime. China is North Korea’s main trading partner, and coal is one of its biggest imports from the country. “This warning against Lotte is only the first step in pressuring the company as well as the government,” said Cai Jian, a professor at Fudan University in Shanghai. “If Lotte does not budge, the penalties will get worse in terms impact and severity.” (Bryan Harris, “Beijing Threatens Lotte over U.S. Missile Shield,” Financial Times, February 21, 2017, p. 4)
2/21/17:
China and the United States have agreed on the need to address the nuclear threat posed by North Korea after a phone call between Chinese State Councillor Yang Jiechi and US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. The call came after Tillerson met China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi for talks at the G20 ministerial meeting in Bonn, Germany, last week. A statement released by the US State Department said Tillerson and Yang affirmed the importance of a constructive relationship between the two nations. The two sides also “agreed on the need to address the threat that North Korea poses to regional stability”, the statement added. China this week suspended all coal imports from North Korea as part of efforts to enforce United Nations sanctions against Pyongyang. Tillerson and Wang also discussed economics and trade, potential cooperation on counterterrorism, law enforcement and international crime, the statement said. Yang was quoted by the state-run Xinhua news agency as saying that the two countries have reached consensus over safeguarding the “political foundation” of their relationship after a phone call between President Xi Jinping and President Trump earlier this month. Yang was quoted as saying during his conversation with Tillerson that he hoped both countries would work according to “the essence of the two leaders’ conversation” and would strengthen high-level exchanges and interactions at all levels between China and the US. There was no reference to South China Sea in both statements from the two countries. (South China Post, “China, U.S. Vow to Address North Korea Nuclear Threat,” February 22, 2017)
For years, the United States and others have pressed China’s leaders to suspend imports of coal from North Korea to push the reclusive state to abandon its nuclear weapons program. For years, the Chinese leadership resisted — until February 18, when it suddenly announced in a terse statement that it would do just that. But if Beijing was sending a message to North Korea, it was also directing one at President Trump, who has complained that China was not putting enough pressure on North Korea. Now President Xi Jinping of China has essentially said: We have done our part in enforcing sanctions. Over to you, Mr. Trump. The challenge comes at a tantalizing moment. For weeks now, plans have been afoot for a North Korean government delegation to meet in New York in early March with a group of former United States officials who have long been involved in North Korea policy. Will the Trump administration issue visas to the North Koreans, a move that would suggest the new president is interested at least in hearing from Pyongyang through informal channels? There have been indications that Trump was willing to take a quite different tack from President Barack Obama. During his campaign, Trump said he was interested in sharing a hamburger with the 33-year-old leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-un. He seemed to suggest he had a smidgen of respect for, or at least curiosity about, the maverick leader, the most recent incarnation of a longstanding dynasty. Trump’s response to the recent North Korean missile test was restrained, perhaps the result of Obama’s warning after the November election that North Korea would be the incoming president’s most dangerous foreign policy challenge. “If the visas are issued, it will be a clear message that the Trump administration is prepared to go the extra mile and engage North Korea,” said Evans J. R. Revere, a former principal deputy assistant secretary of state. There should be little expectation, he warned, of any policy shift by the North, which has shown every indication of wanting to continue building its nuclear program. The planned meeting, sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, headed by Donald S. Zagoria, falls far short of talks between the two governments and has been designed as an initial sounding board. “I have been organizing such meetings with the North Koreans since 2003, and our goal is to increase mutual understanding as well as to encourage the kind of frank dialogue that may not be possible in official talks,” Zagoria said. The gathering would be the first of its type in New York in five years because the Obama administration opposed holding even informal talks on American soil given North Korea’s expansion of its nuclear weapons program. That North Korea is holding two Americans hostage was another impediment. Meetings with North Korean officials arranged by Zagoria and other groups were held in world capitals during the Obama era, including Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and Berlin last year. The decision whether to allow the meeting to proceed in New York is now freighted with more than the usual complications. Over the last 10 days, North Korea has shown its full colors. First, the regime flaunted its expanding nuclear capabilities with the test of an intermediate-range ballistic missile that uses a solid-fuel technology that will make it easier for the country to hide its arsenal. Then, last week, Kim Jong-nam, the half-brother of the North Korean leader, was assassinated in Malaysia in a crowded passenger terminal at Kuala Lumpur International Airport. The South Korean government has publicly accused North Korea of the killing, and six North Koreans have been linked to the plot. Without these two incidents, the Trump administration could have won praise for breaking the logjam with North Korea by allowing the New York meeting to go ahead, said a former participant in such meetings who declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the topic. But the assassination of Kim Jong-nam would allow opponents of North Korean engagement to charge that granting visas only rewarded bad behavior, the person said. Soon after the killing, Republican and Democratic members of Congress called for the United States to return North Korea to its blacklist of states that sponsor terrorism, from which it was removed nine years ago. The Trump administration faces another, perhaps more profound, decision on how to handle North Korea. Annual joint military exercises, set for March between South Korea and the United States, are expected to involve an American aircraft carrier, advanced stealth fighters, B-52 and B-1B bombers and a nuclear submarine, according to South Korean news reports. This annual show of force, not far from the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea and off the Korean coast, has traditionally been viewed by North Korea as an American preparation for an attack against its forces. With the heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and Chinese-North Korean relations at a low point, the risk of a strong response by the North to the exercises — through the launch of missiles or a nuclear test — is higher than usual, said Peter Hayes, the executive director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability in Berkeley, Calif. Last year, for example, the North conducted its fifth nuclear test during joint American-South Korean military exercises. “We are likely entering a new and extremely dangerous phase of the Korean conflict,” Hayes said. He suggested ramping down the exercises to “avoid inadvertent clashes and escalation to nuclear war, and to probe North Korean intentions.” China would like the Trump administration to deal directly with North Korea. Beijing’s suspension of coal imports from North Korea was a signal that China was being tougher than usual, offering Trump a concession to bring Washington to the table with the North. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has stepped up his contacts with Chinese officials in recent days. On February 21 he spoke by telephone with Yang Jiechi, China’s top diplomat, and among the topics they discussed was how to handle North Korea. But how much impact a suspension of coal imports would have on the rudimentary and seemingly resilient North Korean economy was far from clear. The Foreign Ministry insisted that day that the suspension of coal imports was a bureaucratic procedure. In the first six weeks of 2017 China had already imported almost all its annual quota of coal allowed under the United Nations sanctions, the ministry said. Zhang Liangui, an expert on North Korea at the Central Party School of the Communist Party, said he was not optimistic that any talks with North Korea, formal or informal, would result in a diminishing of the North’s nuclear capabilities. “North Korea has said more than 50 times that it will not participate in any talks that have denuclearization on the agenda,” he said. “I don’t think President Trump could pull this off and talk the Koreans out of it.” (Jane Perlez, “China Sends a Subtle Signal to North Korea,” New York Times, February 22, 2017, p. A-15)
2/?/17:
Woodward recounts repeated episodes of anxiety inside the government over Trump’s handling of the North Korean nuclear threat. One month into his presidency, Trump asked Dunford for a plan for a preemptive military strike on North Korea, which rattled the combat veteran. In the fall of 2017, as Trump intensified a war of words with Kim Jong Un, nicknaming North Korea’s dictator “Little Rocket Man” in a speech at the United Nations, aides worried the president might be provoking Kim. But, Woodward writes, Trump told Porter that he saw the situation as a contest of wills: “This is all about leader versus leader. Man versus man. Me versus Kim.” (Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, “On the Edge in Trump’s West Wing,” Washington Post, September 5, 2018, p.A-1) Former U.S. President Barack Obama mulled a preemptive attack on North Korea after its fifth nuclear test in 2016, according to a book released September 11, 2018. Obama was deeply disturbed to learn that North Korea had conducted its biggest-yet nuclear detonation on September 9, 2016, with the North claiming the new nuclear bomb could be mounted on a ballistic missile, journalist Bob Woodward wrote in “Fear: Trump in the White House.” “Even with his intense desire to avoid a war, Obama decided the time had come to consider whether the North Korean nuclear threat could be eliminated in a surgical military strike,” the book claims. “The North Korean threat had not been diminished, and in September 2016 Obama posed a sensitive question to his National Security Council: Was it possible to launch a preemptive military strike, supported by cyberattacks, on North Korea to take out their nuclear and missile programs?” it continues.
Obama eventually scrapped any plans for a preemptive strike, according to “Fear.” Not only was there no certainty that it would wipe out North Korea’s nuclear program, it could trigger a North Korean response. “The Pentagon reported that the only way ‘to locate and destroy — with complete certainty — all components of North Korea’s nuclear program’ was through a ground invasion,” Woodward writes. “A ground invasion would trigger a North Korean response, likely with a nuclear weapon.” Obama considered that “unthinkable.” “In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in 2009 he said, ‘War promises human tragedy,’ and ‘War at some level is an expression of human folly,'” the book says. “Frustrated and exasperated, he rejected a preemptive strike. It was folly.” After Trump took office, tensions escalated further as the new president engaged in a fiery war of words with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Trump not only threatened to “totally destroy” the regime but mocked its leader by calling him “Little Rocket Man.” Many of these messages were sent via Twitter, but there was one tweet Trump pulled back from, according to Woodward. “Within the White House but not publicly, Trump proposed sending a tweet declaring that he was ordering all U.S. military dependents — thousands of the family members of 28,500 troops — out of South Korea,” he wrote. “The act of removing the dependents would almost certainly be read in North Korea as a signal that the United States was seriously preparing for war.” In fact, in December 2017, Trump’s then national security adviser, H.R. McMaster, had received a warning attributed to Ri Su-yong, vice chairman of the Central Committee of North Korea’s ruling party, “that the North would take the evacuation of U.S. civilians as a sign of imminent attack.” Trump consulted with Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC), a member of the Armed Services Committee with hawkish views on the North. “You need to think long and hard before you make that decision,” Graham was quoted as telling Trump. “Because when you make that decision, it is hard to go back. The day you do that is the day you rock the South Korean stock market and the Japanese economy. That is a big frigging deal.” Trump asked, “You think I should wait?” Graham replied, “Mr. President, I don’t think you should ever start this process unless you’re ready to go to war.” (Yonhap, “Obama Mulled Preemptive Attack on North Korea: Book,” Korea Herald, September 12, 2018)
2/23/17:
President Donald Trump said he is “very angry” at North Korea’s ballistic missile test earlier this month, and that boosting a missile defense system for Japan and South Korea is among the options to counter provocative acts by Pyongyang. In an interview with Reuters, Trump said he wants to build up the U.S. nuclear arsenal to ensure it is at the “top of the pack,” reversing his predecessor Barack Obama’s goal of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. Trump said China could solve North Korea’s nuclear issue “very easily if they want to,” urging Beijing to exert more influence on Pyongyang to get it to rein in its missile and nuclear weapons programs, which violate U.N. Security Council resolutions. “There’s talks of a lot more than that,” Trump said, when asked about the missile defense system. “We’ll see what happens. But it’s a very dangerous situation, and China can end it very quickly in my opinion,” he said. China said over the weekend that it will suspend coal imports from Pyongyang until the end of the year as part of tightened sanctions against the country in accordance with a UNSC resolution. But China, the main economic and diplomatic benefactor of North Korea, has been reluctant to put too much pressure on the country, fearing it could destabilize Kim’s regime. Scholars say China has a strategic interest in ensuring the stability of North Korea because it serves as a buffer zone between it and South Korea, a U.S. ally. Trump did not completely rule out the possibility of meeting North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in the future under certain circumstances, but suggested it might be too late. “It’s very late. We’re very angry at what he’s done, and frankly this should have been taken care of during the Obama administration,” Trump said. Alluding to Obama’s call to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and eventually rid the world of them, as he pledged in his landmark speech in 2009 in Prague, Trump said the United States has “fallen behind on nuclear weapon capacity.” “It would be wonderful, a dream would be that no country would have nukes, but if countries are going to have nukes, we’re going to be at the top of the pack,” he said. “We’re never going to fall behind any country even if it’s a friendly country.” (Reuters, Kyodo, “Trump Backs Missile Shield against North Korea, Pushes Upgrade to Nuclear Arsenal,” Japan Times, February 24, 2017) ON CHINA HALTING COAL IMPORTS FROM NORTH KOREA “Well, we appreciate that. You know, I have a very, very good, I’ve had very good phone calls with the president, President Xi, and I’ve had very, very good talks with him, and the call is a start. But we have a very big problem and a very dangerous problem for the world with North Korea. … I think China has tremendous control over North Korea. Whether they say so or not is up to them, but they have tremendous control over North Korea. I think they could solve the problem very easily if they want to.” ON NORTH KOREA’S MISSILE PROGRAM “It’s very dangerous and something should have been done about it years ago. It’s very dangerous and very unacceptable. … And very unfair to Japan.” ON TALK OF ACCELERATING MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM FOR JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA “There’s talks of a lot more than that. We’ll see what happens. But it’s a very dangerous situation, and China can end it very quickly in my opinion. … It’s one of many things that can be done. Missile defense is one of many things that can be done.” ON WHETHER MEETING WITH KOREAN LEADER KIM JONG UN IS A POSSIBILITY “I guess … I would never say no. It may be very late. It’s very late in the picture right now. … We’re very angry at what he’s done, and frankly this should have been taken care of during the Obama administration.” (Reuters, “Highlights of Reuters Interview with Trump,” February 24, 2017) President Donald Trump said Thursday that he’s “not liking” the military dynamic in eastern Asia, citing the militarization of the South China Sea and the ongoing development of North Korea’s ballistic missile program as causes for global concern. “I know exactly what’s going on between China and North Korea and everybody else,” he told Reuters. “I’m not liking it.” The president, who frequently pledged to stand up to China during his presidential campaign, blamed his predecessor for the dynamic. “This didn’t take place under the Trump administration. This took place under the Obama administration,” Trump said. “Many things took place that should not have been allowed.” The president added: “You were in a much better negotiating position three years ago. I am not happy about it.” (Christiano Lima, “Trump ‘Not Liking’ Chinese and North Korean Military Moves,” Politico, February 24, 2017)
KCNA: “A touch-and-go situation is prevailing again in the hot spot waters of the West Sea of Korea. On February 22 the south Korean belligerent forces let civilian boats repeatedly infiltrate into the waters of the DPRK under the pretext of building “man-made reefs” aimed at checking illegal fishing operations of boats from a third country and protecting aquatic resources in the waters off the five islands in the West Sea. Such intrusion repeated 5 times and its depth reached 1.1 km that day alone. What merits a serious attention is that such intrusion is being perpetrated under the open patronage and zealous wire-pulling of the U.S. imperialists. U.S. imperialist aggressors appeared with a loudspeaker near the Military Demarcation Line at Panmunjom at dawn of Wednesday and staged a weird farce of “informing” the side of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) of an operation to build “man-made reefs” in the waters off Yeonphyong Island. Then they hurled a pack of hooligans into waters of the north side. They sent even ghost-like “UN Forces”-flagged warships to the waters under the pretext of “monitoring the operation and ensuring security.” Buoyed by their master’s encouragement, gangsters of the puppet military are blustering despite the warning served by the KPA that “it is an absurd accusation against their routine activities” and “it will be forced to pay dearly for threatening,” deliberately escalating the tension. The situation goes to prove that the intrusions are premeditated military provocations of the puppet forces to tide over the prevailing unprecedented crisis in south Korea by creating “security uneasiness and crisis.” The KPA has already warned that it would take a resolute counteraction against the aggressors engrossed in reckless military provocations in the waters of the West Sea where the DPRK’s sovereignty is exercised. If the U.S. and the south Korean puppet bellicose forces persist in foolhardy military provocations despite the repeated warnings served by the DPRK, they will be held wholly accountable for all catastrophic consequences to be entailed by them.” (KCNA, “S. Korean Military Warned of Strong Counteractions against Reckless Provocations in West Sea,” February 23, 2017)
2/24/17:
The poison used to kill Kim Jong-nam, the half-brother of the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, was VX nerve agent, which is listed as a chemical weapon, the Malaysian police announced. In a brief statement, Khalid Abu Bakar, the national police chief, said the substance was listed as a chemical weapon under the Chemical Weapons Conventions of 1997 and 2005, to which North Korea is not a party. . (Richard C. Paddock and Choe Sang-hun, “Nerve Agent Killed North Korean Leader’s Half Brother, Police Say,” New York Times, February 24, 2017, p. A-10)
Plans for back-channel talks in New York between North Korean government representatives and former U.S. officials were scuttled after the State Department withdrew the visa approvals for Pyongyang’s top envoy on U.S. relations, according to people familiar with the matter. The talks, which were scheduled to take place on March 1 and 2 at a hotel outside the United Nations headquarters in Manhattan, where North Korea has a mission, were contingent on the granting of a visa for Choe Son Hui, the director-general of the American affairs bureau in the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Jonathan Cheng, “Planned Back-Channel Talks between U.S., North Korea Scuttled,” Wall Street Journal, February 24, 2017) After approving plans on Friday for informal talks in New York between a North Korean delegation and former American officials, the Trump administration reversed course hours later, withdrawing approval for the North Koreans’ visas, two people who were to take part in the planned talks said. The schedule called for the two sides to meet in early March, and arrangements were underway for the six-member North Korean group, led by Choe Son-hui, who runs the American affairs bureau of the North’s Foreign Ministry, to travel to New York. The organizer of the talks, the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, led by Donald S. Zagoria, was told by the State Department the morning of February 24 that the visas would be granted. But the decision was reversed in the afternoon when “someone overruled State,” said one person who planned to participate in the talks. Both of the people on the participants’ list spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the delicacy of the matter. The reversal came as the Malaysian government announced that VX nerve agent, a chemical on a United Nations list of weapons of mass destruction, was used to kill the estranged half-brother of the leader of North Korea at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport on February 13. South Korea has accused North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, of ordering the killing of his half-brother, Kim Jong-nam. Just days before Mr. Kim’s death, North Korea launched a new type of nuclear-capable missile, apparently timed to coincide with the visit of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan to the United States. At first, the North Korea developments did not appear to deter the State Department’s plan to move ahead with the talks. The use of the VX nerve agent was already known when Zagoria got the green light about the visas on Friday morning. The missile test was on February 11. The State Department also knew about tough comments Trump made about the North Korean leader during an interview with Reuters on February 23. “It’s very late,” Trump said when asked whether he would meet with Kim. “We’re very angry at what he’s done, and frankly this should have been taken care of during the Obama administration.” The decision to reverse the initial approval for the visas came hours later the next afternoon, one of the people who planned to take part in the talks said. But it was clear, that person said, that a senior official in the State Department, the White House or elsewhere in the government had second thoughts about issuing visas to representatives of North Korea in light of recent events. “I suspect it was a combination of the VX attack and the president’s personal pique that caused the reversal,” the person said. “Someone obviously looked at the fact that the United States was going to issue visas to representatives of a country that had just violated international law, carried out a murder and intentionally violated the sovereignty of another country, and decided, ‘Maybe this isn’t such a good idea.’” While the talks were unofficial, they were seen as a test of the willingness of the Trump administration to begin serious negotiations at a later date, or to send a special American envoy to North Korea. Several prominent nuclear weapons experts have urged Trump to send an envoy, arguing that President Barack Obama’s refusal to engage with the North allowed it to make significant advances in its nuclear weapons program. “Every six to seven weeks North Korea may be able to add another nuclear weapon to its arsenal,” Siegfried S. Hecker, emeritus director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, said in a recent Op-Ed article. The leader of the North Korean delegation, Choe, planned to travel to New York in her “nongovernmental” role as president of North Korea’s Institute for American Studies. The American participants were mostly former officials who had dealt with North Korea over many years. Some of them have participated in similar gatherings with North Koreans organized outside the United States. But more weight was given to the New York gathering because it was taking place at the start of the new administration. During his election campaign, Trump said he was open to meeting with the North Korean leader over a hamburger. The Americans in the group represented a wide range of views on North Korea. Winston Lord, a former ambassador to China who was on the list of participants, recently wrote in a dissent to a report for the Asia Society that the United States should immediately step up sanctions on North Korea. Others in the American delegation were Robert L. Gallucci, a negotiator on North Korea during the Clinton presidency; Victor Cha, a senior adviser on North Korea to George W. Bush; and Evans J. R. Revere, a former principal deputy assistant secretary of state specializing in North Korea. Gallucci and Cha wrote a report for the George W. Bush Institute last year that emphasized the human rights abuses in North Korea. As well as holding discussions about the North’s rapidly expanding nuclear program, the American delegation was planning to talk with the North Koreans about two Americans now detained in North Korea. (Jane Perlez, U.S. Cancels Talks with North Korea, New York Times, February 26, 2017,
The United States denied visas for North Korean diplomats set to travel to New York for unofficial talks because the half-brother of North Korea’s leader was “assassinated presumably by or at the behest of North Korean authorities,” Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel said March 7. The remark is believed to mark the first time that a senior American official has publicly blamed the North for the February 13 killing in Malaysia of Kim Jong-nam. Russel said the killing led to the decision to deny visas for North Korean diplomats, including Choe Son-hui, director of the North Korean Foreign Ministry’s North American affairs bureau, who had planned to travel to New York for talks with former U.S. officials. “Kim Jong-nam was assassinated presumably by or at the behest of North Korean authorities by means of a chemical weapon that is banned by international convention, and under that circumstance, I think all of us got that the notion of some North Korean diplomats prancing into the United States was unseemly and untimely,” Russel said in his farewell briefing to reporters from Asian media. Russel said the planned unofficial talks with the North Koreans were “sideswiped” by the killing. “A North Korea that will commit murder by a WMD, that will threaten the use of nuclear weapons against the United States and its neighbors, and that will launch ballistic missiles repeatedly in the direction of Japan in contravention of its legal obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions, is not going to look like a country that is serious about negotiations,” Russel said. Still, he said the decision to deny visas doesn’t mean the U.S. isn’t interested in talks. (Chang Jae-soon, “U.S. Official: Kim Jong Nam Assassinated ‘Presumably by or at the Behest of North Korea,’”Yonhap, March 8, 2017)
2/25/17:
Rodong Sinmun: “Extremely provocative remarks are heard in the U.S. Brass hats of the U.S. military said that the largest-ever Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military drills would be kicked off in south Korea before long and they were examining the proposal to massively mobilize nuclear strategic assets including nuclear-powered carrier Carl Vinson, nuclear strategic bombers B-52 and B-1B and stealth fighter F-22. This goes to clearly prove that the U.S. policy toward the DPRK to bring down the latter by force of arms remains unchanged and the U.S. wants a war, not peace. The U.S. is groundlessly pulling up the DPRK over its measures for self-defense while talking about “provocations and “threat”. This is nothing but a cynical ploy to cover up its true colors as wrecker of peace and shift the blame on to the DPRK. It is the consistent stand of the DPRK to oppose the confrontation of force and preserve peace on the Korean peninsula through dialogue and negotiations. However, the DPRK cannot take only a fence-sitting attitude towards the U.S. working with bloodshot eyes to swallow up the former. Unless the U.S. makes a switchover in its policy toward the DPRK and stop the saber-rattling to invade the DPRK, the DPRK will steadily bolster up its capability for self-defense with the nuclear force as a pivot. The U.S. would be well advised to face up to the reality and stop going reckless and take a proper strategic option with deep thought. This would do the U.S. good, too. (Rodong Sinmun, “U.S. Should Take Proper Strategic Option,” February 25, 2017)
South Korea has decided to raise its voice against North Korea’s possession of biochemical weapons in international meetings following the Malaysian police’s announcement that a VX nerve agent was used to kill Kim Jong-nam, the half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, foreign ministry officials said. “The government will bring up the issue of North Korea’s biochemical weapons programs when top nuclear envoys from South Korea, the United States and Japan meet in Washington on Monday [February27], as well as during various multilateral talks based in Geneva and other locations,” one of the officials said. “The government plans to take a tough stance on the killing of Kim Jong-nam,” the other government official said. The third official said, “Things went out of control as the use of a chemical weapon was unveiled… The government is currently on the stage of trying to find the truth behind the case on the one hand and considering many different countermeasures on the other.” (Yonhap, “S. Korea to Raise Issue with N. Korea’s Biochemical Weapons Threat on Global Stage: Official,” February 25, 2017)
2/27/17:
The United States informed Japan and South Korea that it has started a review of whether to put North Korea back on a list of state sponsors of terrorism, Yonhap said. Quoting a senior South Korean official, Yonhap said the February 13 killing of Kim Jong Nam, the half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, in Malaysia. “I believe the U.S. [government] will take into account reactions from Congress,” the official was quoted as saying, referring to growing calls among U.S. lawmakers for relisting North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. Washington removed Pyongyang from the list in 2008. Yonhap said the United States told Japan and South Korea of its intention in a trilateral meeting in Washington of senior diplomats handling North Korean issues. Speaking to reporters after the meeting, Kanasugi Kenji, head of Asian and Oceanian affairs at the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, declined to say whether the three officials discussed such a review in the United States. He only said, “The United States had increasingly severer views on North Korea.” According to a joint statement issued after the talks, the officials explored new measures to further restrict North Korea’s funding for its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. In addition to existing sanctions under U.N. Security Council resolutions, the three allies “considered other possible measures under national authorities,” with a focus on Pyongyang’s illicit revenue streams, the statement said. The meeting between Kanasugi, Joseph Yun, U.S. special representative for North Korea policy, and Kim Hong-kyun, South Korea’s special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, was the first of its kind since Donald Trump was sworn in as the new U.S. president. Referring to the latest ballistic missile test-launch by North Korea, the statement said the country’s “flagrant disregard” for multiple Security Council resolutions prohibiting its ballistic missile and nuclear programs requires “strong international pressure on the regime.” Kanasugi said the three officials affirmed the need to ensure all countries strictly implement UNSC sanctions resolutions on North Korea. “It is important that China, which accounts for a nearly 90 percent share of North Korea’s trade, strictly implement Security Council resolutions,” he said. “We discussed China’s role following its recent announcement of a suspension of coal imports from North Korea.” Kanasugi also said the three officials exchanged information on the poison attack on Kim Jong Nam. “We discussed how the killing of Kim Jong Nam would affect the situation in North Korea going forward, and what kind of impact it may have on North Korea’s relations with China,” he said, without providing further details. Kim Jong Nam is said to have maintained close ties with China. Malaysian police have determined that the highly toxic VX nerve agent was used in the incident at Kuala Lumpur International Airport. VX is classified as a weapon of mass destruction by the United Nations and is banned under multiple international agreements. Kanasugi said his U.S. and South Korean counterparts reiterated support for an early resolution of North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s. (Kyodo, “U.S. Tells South Korea, Japan It May Return North Korea to List of State Sponsors of Terrorism,” February 28, 2017)
North Korean weapons barred by U.N. sanctions ended up in the hands of U.N. peacekeepers in Africa, a confidential annual report by a U.N. panel of experts on North Korea says. That incident and others in more than a half-dozen African nations show how North Korea, despite facing its toughest sanctions in decades, continues to avoid them on the world’s most impoverished continent with few repercussions. The report, obtained by the Associated Press, illustrates how Pyongyang evades sanctions imposed for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs to cooperate “on a large scale,” including military training and construction, in countries from Angola to Uganda. Among the findings was the “largest seizure of ammunition in the history of sanctions” against North Korea, with 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades found hidden under iron ore that was destined for Egypt in a cargo vessel heading toward the Suez Canal. The intended destination of the North Korean-made grenades, seized in August, was not clear. A month before that, the report says, a U.N. member state seized an air shipment destined for a company in Eritrea containing military radio communications items. It was the second time military-related items had been caught being exported from North Korea to Eritrea “and confirms ongoing arms-related cooperation between the two countries.” Eritrea is also under U.N. sanctions for supporting armed groups in the Horn of Africa. Discovering such evasions is challenging because Africa has the world’s lowest rate of reporting on monitoring U.N. sanctions on North Korea. Just 11 of its 54 countries turned in reports to the panel of experts last year, the U.N. report says. “African enforcement tends to be lax,” Marcus Noland, an expert on North Korea at the Petersen Institute for International Economics, wrote last month, adding that “North Korea may deliberately target African countries as a circumvention strategy.” He said North Korea’s long military involvement in Africa, and its growing interest in trade there to reduce its deep dependence on China, “bring the continent’s relationship with North Korea into increasing conflict with tightening U.N. sanctions.” North Korea continues to train and equip some African militaries, the new U.N. report says. In the most striking example, Congo’s government received automatic pistols and other small arms from North Korea that were issued to the Central African nation’s presidential guard and special units of the national police. Some of those national police units were deployed in the U.N. peacekeeping mission in neighboring Central African Republic, the report says. Neither the U.N. peacekeeping office nor Congo’s government responded to requests for comment on how the North Korean weapons, part of a series of shipments to Congo that included assault rifles and anti-tank mines, made their way into the peacekeeping mission. In neighboring Angola, officials in September confirmed to the visiting U.N. panel of experts that North Koreans continued to train members of the presidential guard in martial arts, respite a warning that it was a violation of sanctions. And in Uganda, seen as a regional security ally for the United States, North Korea’s military has been training Ugandan air force pilots and technicians under a contract set to expire in March 2018. Uganda has been warned that violates sanctions, the U.N. report says. A spokesman for Uganda’s military, Brig. Richard Karemire, neither denied nor confirmed that the North Korean training continues and would not comment. Last year, under the international pressure to enforce sanctions on Pyongyang, Uganda said it was not renewing separate contracts for North Korean training of its police. But a number of African leaders, such as longtime Ugandan President Museveni, have continued to praise Pyongyang in the fight against what they describe as Western imperialism. The North Koreans, Museveni has declared, are “friends who have helped Uganda for a long time.” (Edith M. Lederer and Rodney Muhumuza, “U.N. Report Shows North Korea Using Africa to Slip Sanctions,” Associated Press, March 6, 2017)
Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009): “Korea Kumsan Trading Corporation 18. The Panel’s investigation reveals that Korea Kumsan Trading Corporation (Kumsan) shares a phone and fax number and an e-mail address with the designated General Bureau of Atomic Energy and the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry. The Panel previously determined that the Ministry and the Bureau are the same entity. The Panel further notes that Kumsan’s address is identical to that of the sanctioned entities. … General Precious Metal 24. The Panel investigated the 2016 attempted online sale of lithium metal by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The enriched lithium-6 isotope, and products or devices containing it, are on the list of prohibited nuclear-related items adopted by the Security Council. According to IAEA, lithium-6 is used to produce tritium, an isotope found in boosted nuclear devices. This sales attempt suggests that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has access to remaining quantities of the material. Li-6 is advertised for sale by a company of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, General Precious Metal, which the European Union has identified as an alias of Green Pine Associated Corporation (Green Pine). Mr. Chol Yun was listed as the contact person of General Precious Metal for sale of the mineral and has an address and phone numbers in Beijing). The same name appeared as third secretary of the embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Beijing on an official diplomatic list dated 24 September 2012. The Panel notes a pattern whereby the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has accredited Green Pine overseas representatives as diplomats.”
David Albright, et al.: “For several years, North Korea has been concentrating on expanding and refurbishing its nuclear complex with the oft-stated goal of expanding the quantity and quality of its nuclear weapons. One aspect of that expansion has been its development of the capability to make thermonuclear materials. These materials when used in a fission-based nuclear weapon allow for much greater explosive yields and further miniaturization of nuclear weapons. A fundamental thermonuclear material for nuclear weapons is lithium 6, a soft, silver-white metal. When used as a target element in a reactor or a nuclear weapon, lithium 6 reacts with a neutron to produce tritium (T), the most important thermonuclear material for weapons. When tritium fuses with deuterium (D) it releases relatively large amounts of energy and neutrons, becoming a key reaction driving a thermonuclear explosion and leading to more efficient fissioning of the plutonium or weapon-grade uranium in a weapon. Based primarily on procurement data, North Korea appears to have built a lithium 6 production plant near the city of Hamhung on the east coast of North Korea. The existence of this plant adds credibility to North Korea’s claims that it has been working on thermonuclear weapons for several years. Armed with this plant, North Korea is in a far better position to deliver on its ability to improve the quality of its nuclear weapons by making crude types of thermonuclear or boosted fission weapons. One recent data point that supports that North Korea may have finished its lithium 6 production plant is the 2016 attempted online sale of lithium metal by North Korea. This attempted sale was discovered by Project Alpha at Kings College and, subsequently, investigated by the United Nations Panel on North Korea. It concluded: “This sales attempt suggests that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has access to remaining quantities of the material.” Lithium 6 is used in two main ways in thermonuclear weapons. It is irradiated in a reactor to make tritium, which is then separated and used directly in a nuclear weapon. In the case of North Korea, tritium is believed to be produced in either the 5 megawatt-electric (MWe) reactor or the IRT reactor at the Yongbyon site. Separation of the tritium from the lithium could occur at the Isotope Production Laboratory near the IRT reactor or in a new, larger facility being built in the Yongbyon fuel fabrication complex. Lithium 6 can also be combined with deuterium and sometimes also tritium into weapon components for thermonuclear weapons. When fashioned into components of nuclear weapons, the lithium 6 creates a method using neutrons from the nuclear explosion to greatly magnify the number of D-T reactions. In essence, using an abundant background of neutrons, lithium 6 produces a copious supply of tritium that then fuses with deuterium, adding greatly to the explosive yield through its own reaction and more efficient fissioning of the plutonium or weapon-grade uranium in the weapon. Lithium in combination with deuterium and/or tritium can be used in either one or two stage nuclear weapons; a two stage weapon is the traditional H bomb, and a single stage weapon can have multiple designs, which have been called an onion or a layer cake design. North Korea is likely unable to produce two-stage thermonuclear weapons, but it may be developing single stage weapons. This design is easier to achieve than a two-stage weapon but can achieve very high explosive yields. In the case of North Korea, a single-stage thermonuclear device could use a plutonium core with lithium 6-deuterium and/or lithium 6-deuterium-tritium solid components. The device would also be expected to have shells of weapon-grade uranium. A British one-stage thermonuclear device tested in mid-1950s with a plutonium core had 100 kg of weapon-grade uranium in multiple shells and achieved an explosive yield of several hundred kilotons. Lithium 6, deuterium, and tritium have been combined into a solid tablet which is placed at the center of a fission weapon and used to amplify or boost the explosive yield of the weapon. South Africa researched this design in the 1980s during its nuclear weapons program. It involved a fission weapon with a lithium, deuterium, tritium solid tablet placed at its center. With this method, the yield can be boosted many-fold. South Africa investigated boosting the yield of its weapons in this manner from about 10-15 kilotons to about 60-100 kilotons. Lithium 6 is a stable isotope that exists in nature. However, it has a relatively low natural abundance of 7.56 percent in natural lithium, for the bulk of lithium is lithium 7. For use in nuclear weapons or tritium production, the lithium 6 fraction must be typically increased to 40-95 percent of the lithium via a chemical enrichment process. If the lithium 6 is for tritium production in a reactor, the fraction of the lithium 6 in the targets placed in the reactor is limited to about 40 percent to prevent failure of the targets. For use in nuclear weapons, a 95 percent fraction of lithium 6 is desirable. Based on a 2012 procurement order, according to government sources, North Korea is assessed to have procured the wherewithal to build a lithium 6 enrichment plant based on mercury-based lithium exchange, shortened here to mercury exchange. This method of enrichment has been used by nuclear weapon states, including the United States. Almost all lithium 6 produced by the United States was enriched by the mercury-based column exchange process (COLEX) from 1954 to 1963. South Africa also built a pilot plant using this method to make lithium 6 for its nuclear weapons program in the 1970s. The mercury exchange process involves an amalgam of lithium and mercury which is made via electrolysis. Subsequently, the mercury lithium amalgam is mixed with an aqueous lithium hydroxide (LiOH) solution. Lithium 6 has a slightly higher affinity to mercury than lithium 7, so lithium 7 diffuses out of the amalgam more quickly than lithium 6, leaving the amalgam with increased, or enriched, concentration of lithium 6. The lithium 6 can be separated from the amalgam. The tailings fraction of Lithium 7 is electrolyzed from the aqueous solution of lithium hydroxide. Afterwards, the lithium hydroxide can be reused. What was procured? Most of the procurements were for industrial-scale equipment. Included in the order was metric tonne quantities of mercury and tens of kilograms of lithium hydroxide. Given the procurement of these two materials and the replacement of mercury with less harmful metals in many industrial processes, the purchase of mercury in combination with lithium hydroxide is a strong indicator that North Korea is using the chemicals in a mercury-dependent lithium 6 production process. The procurement evidence is reportedly contained in a 2012 North Korean contract to arrange the purchase of a wide range of industrial and lab-scale equipment and materials abroad in China. The purpose of the contract is not included but the list of goods, including the mercury and lithium hydroxide, implies they are for a lithium 6 enrichment plant using the mercury exchange method. The most likely site for the lithium 6 plant is the Hungnam Fertilizer Complex near the city of Hamhung in North Korea. The procurement contract had handwritten notes stating that the goods were needed urgently and the procurements involved the Hungnam complex. The Hungnam complex makes sense for a lithium 6 production plant. This site is involved in ammonia processing and fertilizer production, and has electrolysis facilities. We were unable to locate a lithium 6 production site at the Hungnam complex using commercial satellite imagery. Such a facility is not very distinctive in such a large complex (see figures 1 and 2). Moreover, equipment, which includes tanks and columns, would be brought into the building after the roof is installed. Nonetheless, by using historical Google Earth imagery, we could identify new construction in the period of 2009, 2012-2014, and 2016. …. However, it should be noted that the equipment may have been put into a refurbished building. We are unable to estimate lithium 6 output. But one would expect that North Korea would build a plant able to produce at least tens of kilograms of lithium 6 per year. This rate would allow both the use of lithium 6 in nuclear weapons and the production of many grams of tritium per year. North Korea’s choice of the mercury exchange method is further supported by examining its scientific and engineering literature. North Korea has devoted considerable effort to the research and development of lithium 6. Analysis of open source literature reveals that North Korea has conducted theoretical and experimental research on this and other lithium 6 production processes since the 1990s. The mercury-dependent process is based on immersing a lithium-mercury-amalgam in lithium-containing solution, such as aqueous lithium hydroxide. Both cost and efficiency of the separation process depend on several factors, and many of them have been studied by North Korea. Among them are kinetic studies, which determine the speed of the process and differences in experimental results and theoretical predictions. Except for the mercury and lithium components, the process includes many variables that North Korea can take advantage of to improve, re-scale, or disguise the enrichment. First, there are variables in the synthesis of the lithium-mercury amalgam, then there are variables during the isotope separation. One study shows that North Korea has used electrolysis of aqueous lithium hydroxide for the preparation of lithium-mercury amalgam at least on the laboratory scale. The following are a few variables from North Korea’s isotope separation studies: amalgam composition, solvents, column length and design, and stirring systems. Two of these studies show the common use of aqueous lithium hydroxide in the process. All this research comes on top of more general fluid mechanics studies. Studies on how these factors change when the individual process is repeated in an enrichment cascade have also been published. A 2004 journal article focused on the reasons why “concentrations of isotopes abnormally fluctuate with time in an […] enrichment cascade.” In this article, some references are made to unreported studies. The length of time North Korea researched the mercury exchange process, combined with procurement data and the ease of making necessary sensitive procurements in China, provide strong evidence that North Korea has built a lithium 6 production plant. There is little reason to doubt that such a plant is operational. The recent attempt by North Korea to sell lithium 6 metal in China supports that conclusion and suggests that North Korea is making more lithium 6 than it needs in its nuclear weapons program. These findings add credibility to North Korea’s claims that it has been developing thermonuclear or boosted fission weapons, albeit likely crude ones that may still not work. But with more nuclear testing and time, North Korea is likely to succeed.” (David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Mark Gorwitz, and Allison Lach, North Korea’s Lithium 6 Production for Thermonuclear Weapons, Institute for Science and International Security, March 17, 2017)
2/28/17:
An internal White House review of strategy on North Korea includes the possibility of military force or regime change to blunt the country’s nuclear-weapons threat, people familiar with the process said, a prospect that has some U.S. allies in the region on edge. While President Donald Trump has taken steps to reassure allies that he won’t abandon agreements that have underpinned decades of U.S. policy on Asia, his pledge that Pyongyang would be stopped from ever testing an intercontinental ballistic missile—coupled with the two-week-old strategy review—has some leaders bracing for a shift in American policy. U.S. officials have underscored the possible military dimensions of their emerging strategy in recent discussions with allies, according to people familiar with the talks. During Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s two-day summit in February with Trump, U.S. officials on several occasions stated that all options were under consideration to deal with North Korea, according to a person familiar with the discussions. It was clear to the Japanese side that those options encompassed a U.S. military strike on North Korea, possibly if Pyongyang appeared ready to test an ICBM, this person said. The Japanese side found that scenario “worrisome,” he said. U.S. allies in recent years have closely aligned with Washington in trying to increase diplomatic and economic pressure on Pyongyang in an effort to force it to drop its nuclear program. But the new U.S. policy review has generated anxiety in Japan and South Korea about a radical shift. After North Korea said earlier this year it was ready to test an ICBM, Trump wrote on Twitter, “It won’t happen!” About two weeks ago, Deputy National Security Adviser K.T. McFarland convened a meeting with national-security officials across the government and asked them for proposals on North Korea, including ideas that one official described as well outside the mainstream. The request was for all options, ranging from U.S. recognition of North Korea as a nuclear state to military action against Pyongyang. McFarland’s directive was for the administration to undergo a comprehensive rethink of America’s North Korea policy. The national-security officials reported back to McFarland with their ideas and suggestions today. Those options now will undergo a process under which they will be refined and shaped before they’re given to the president for consideration. The heightened prospect of U.S. military action in North Korea could encourage China, which fears the fallout of a military confrontation with its neighbor, to take steps Washington has long sought to choke off Pyongyang’s economic lifeline. In the wake of Trump’s election, leaders in Tokyo and Seoul have sought to intensify the existing U.S. strategy of exerting economic and diplomatic pressure against North Korea. “We will make sure that the North changes its erroneous calculations by further enhancing sanctions and pressure,” South Korea’s acting President Hwang Kyo-ahn said in a speech on March 1, as South Korea and the U.S. kicked off major annual military exercises. Japan is concerned it could get sucked into a regional conflict by a U.S. military strike on North Korea, said Kotani Tetsuo, a senior fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, a Tokyo think tank. Another fear for Japan is a scenario in which the U.S. instead holds talks with North Korea and reaches a deal that would lead to Washington disengaging from the region, he said. “Direct talks between Trump and Kim Jong Un would be a nightmare scenario for Japan,” Kotani said. Despite concerns about a military confrontation between the U.S. and North Korea, the acceleration of Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile program has emboldened calls by military hawks in Japan and South Korea for capabilities to pre-emptively hit North Korean military facilities if an attack appears imminent. Komura Masahiko, the vice president of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party, said recently that Japan should begin discussing whether to acquire such an ability. In parliament, Abe said there were no plans to do so. (Carol E. Lee and Alastair Gale, “White House Explores Options, Including Use of Military Force, to Counter North Korea Threat,” Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2017
President Donald Trump believes the “greatest immediate threat” to the U.S. is North Korea and its nuclear program, a senior administration official told reporters. Trump has already called on China to take action to rein in North Korea, over which China has considerable influence and leverage, the official said. “You gotta work on North Korea,” Trump told a Chinese official yesterday, the senior administration official said, apparently pointing to a brief meeting at the White House yesterday between Trump and Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi, the highest-ranking Chinese official Trump has met with since taking office. The senior official who spoke to reporters Tuesday on the condition of anonymity said President Barack Obama on his final day in office told Trump he believed North Korea is the biggest national security threat to the U.S. Trump previously referred to the conversation during an interview last month with Fox News, but declined to reveal what Obama relayed, other than to call it “a military problem with a certain place.” Trump’s concern over North Korea is in part fueled by his belief that North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un “may be crazy,” the official said. The question for Trump, though, has been, “Is he crazy or is he smart and strategic?” the official said, relaying Trump’s thinking. The senior administration official also pointed to North Korea’s alleged role in orchestrating the assassination of Kim’s half-brother as a sign of the country’s capabilities. Still, the senior administration official said Trump believes the US has a good relationship with China and expressed optimism about the prospects of enlisting China’s help in controlling Pyongyang. (Jake Tapper, Wolf Blitzer, and Jeremy Diamond, “Top Source: Trump Believes North Korea Is Greatest Threat,” CNN, February 28, 2017)
Trump State of the Union: “We expect our partners, whether in NATO, in the Middle East, or the Pacific –- to take a direct and meaningful role in both strategic and military operations, and pay their fair share of the cost. We will respect historic institutions, but we will also respect the sovereign rights of nations. Free nations are the best vehicle for expressing the will of the people –- and America respects the right of all nations to chart their own path. My job is not to represent the world. My job is to represent the United States of America. But we know that America is better off, when there is less conflict — not more. We must learn from the mistakes of the past –- we have seen the war and destruction that have raged across our world. The only long-term solution for these humanitarian disasters is to create the conditions where displaced persons can safely return home and begin the long process of rebuilding. America is willing to find new friends, and to forge new partnerships, where shared interests align. We want harmony and stability, not war and conflict. We want peace, wherever peace can be found. America is friends today with former enemies. Some of our closest allies, decades ago, fought on the opposite side of these World Wars. This history should give us all faith in the possibilities for a better world.” (Donald Trump, State of the Union Address, February 28, 2017)
Chinese state media have reacted with anger and boycott threats after the board of an affiliate of South Korea’s Lotte Group approved a land swap with the government that allows authorities to deploy a U.S. missile defense system on land that is part of a golf course owned by Lotte in the Seongju region, southeast of Seoul. The board of unlisted Lotte International Co Ltd approved the deal with the government on yesterday. Lotte should be shown the door in China, the influential state-run Chinese tabloid the Global Times said in an editorial today. “We also propose that Chinese society should coordinate voluntarily in expanding restrictions on South Korean cultural goods and entertainment exports to China, and block them when necessary,” it said in its English-language edition. The paper’s Chinese version said South Korean cars and cellphones should be targeted as well. “There are loads of substitutes for South Korean cars and cellphones,” it said. China has already twice issued “solemn representations” to South Korea about the most recent THAAD-related developments, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told a daily briefing in Beijing. But it welcomes foreign companies to operate in China, he said. “Whether or not a foreign company can operate successfully in China, in the end is a decision for the Chinese market and consumer,” he added. Late yesterday, the Communist Party’s official People’s Daily said cutting diplomatic ties should be considered. “If THAAD is really deployed in South Korea, then China-South Korea relations will face the possibility of getting ready to cut off diplomatic relations,” it said on the WeChat account of its overseas edition. Xinhua also said in a commentary late yesterday that China “did not welcome this kind of Lotte.” “Chinese consumers can absolutely say no to this kind of company and their goods based on considerations of ‘national security’,” it said. (Reuters, “China Reacts with Anger, Threats after South Korean Missile Defense Decision,” February 28, 2017)
South Korea called for “collective measures” against North Korea, including possible suspension of its United Nations membership, saying the use of chemical weapons to assassinate the half-brother of North Korea’s leader was a “wake-up call.” Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se was addressing the U.N.-backed Conference on Disarmament (CD) after Malaysia’s attorney general said two women will be charged with the murder of Kim Jong Nam. “Just a few grams of VX is sufficient for mass killing,” Yun told the Geneva forum. “North Korea is reported to have not just grams but thousands of tons of chemical weapons including VX all over the country …The recent assassination is a wake-up call to all of us to North Korea’s chemical weapons capability and its intent to actually use them,” Yun said. States could invoke the Chemical Weapons Convention, as the use of such agents is in violation of international law, he said. Malaysia is part of the 1993 pact prohibiting their production, transfer and use, but North Korea is not. States that have ratified the chemical weapons ban could invoke the treaty and “take collective measures,” Yun added. “Now is the time, I believe, for us to seriously consider taking extraordinary measures in all relevant regional and international fora including the U.N. as well as the CD.” “It could take the form of suspension of North Korea’s rights and privileges as a U.N. member,” he said, calling South Korea’s isolated neighbor a “serial rule-breaker.” Yun, in a speech yesterday to the U.N. Human Rights Council, urged major powers to criminally pursue Pyongyang’s leadership before its “ever-worsening” rights record, including mass executions and labor camps, threatened world peace. (Stephanie Nebehay, “South Korea Suggest Suspending North Korea’s U.N. Seat,” Reuters, February 28, 2017)
A senior North Korean diplomat arrived in Beijing for talks on “issues of mutual concern,” amid growing tensions over the North’s missile test and the death of the Pyongyang leader’s half-brother. China’s foreign ministry said that the North’s Vice Foreign Minister Ri Kil-song came to Beijing at its invitation and will have talks with senior officials including Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his stay. KCNA also confirmed Kyodo report earlier in the day about his visit. This marked the first time in about nine months that a high-ranking North Korean official has visited China for dialogue with his counterparts. In May, Ri Su-yong, a vice chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, visited Beijing. (Yonhap, “Senior N.K. Official Arrives in Beijing for Talks,” February 28, 2017)
3/1/17:
South Korean and U.S. troops began large-scale joint military exercise conducted annually to test their defense readiness against the threat from North Korea, which routinely characterizes the drills as preparation for war against it. The exercise, called Foal Eagle, comes amid heightened tension following the latest test launch of a ballistic missile by the North and in the past prompted threats by Pyongyang to launch military action in retaliation. South Korea’s Defense Ministry and the U.S. military based in the South confirmed the start of the drills on Wednesday that will continue until the end of April but did not immediately provide further details. The exercise last year involved about 17,000 American troops and more than 300,000 South Koreans. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis spoke with South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-Koo early today by telephone and said the United States remains steadfast in its commitment to the defense of its ally. Mattis welcomed a deal signed by South Korea with the Lotte Group conglomerate this week to secure the land to station the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in the South, the two countries said. Han said in the phone call with Mattis that this year’s joint drills will be conducted at a similar scale as last year’s, which the South’s Defense Ministry had called the “largest-ever” exercises by the allies. North Korea’s official KCNA news agency said earlier on Wednesday its leader Kim Jong Un inspected the headquarters of a major military unit and issued guidance on increasing combat readiness. (Jack Kim, Ju-min Park, and Phil Stewart, “S. Korea, U.S. Begin Large-Scale Annual Drills amid North Korea Tension,” Reuters, March 1, 2017)
KCNA: “It is half a month since Kim Chol, a citizen of the DPRK bearing a diplomatic passport, died in Malaysia on February 13. The cause of his death has not yet been clearly identified but the U.S. and the south Korean authorities are groundlessly blaming the DPRK, asserting that he was intoxicated by highly poisonous VX nerve substance. The absurdity of the U.S. and the south Korean authorities’ assertion and lack of its scientific accuracy and logical coherence are proven even by comments made by experts and media of other countries. It is view of chemists of many countries that even a drop of VX may claim deaths of tens or hundreds of people and it has strong permeability and stability as its properties. They asserted a claim that the woman suspect was safe because she washed her hands at a washroom does not correspond with the chemical property of VX. They added that even if the persons suspected of murder had been injected with atropine, basic antidote of VX, they might have fallen into shock and that even if they had worn gloves, this fatal substance would have been extremely dangerous. It is, therefore, the height of absurdity to claim that the person who applied VX, a substance fatal to the life even in case of inhalation of a tiny amount of it or its touch of skin, was left unaffected and the person to whom it was applied met a death, they asserted. World media query that if component of VX was allegedly detected from Kim Chol’s eyes and lips, the ambulance that carried him and police who guarded him must have all been intoxicated and if so, the airport should have been closed but it is still in operation.
Experts on international law and analysts said that under a regulation of the international organization on ban on chemical weapons, a final conclusion on the results of analysis of chemical weapons can be drawn only on the basis of the identical results of analysis made by at least two specialized laboratories, stressing that the recent case should have been reported to the organization and the relevant sample should have been analyzed at a lab designated by the organization. They further contended that if the use of VX were true, it would be necessary to probe where the substance was from, who made it and who handed it. Drawing any conclusion about VX without any concrete study would be unscientific and if some countries try to use it for other political purposes, the consequences will be beyond imagination, they warned. Some media suspect that in view of the fact that the women arrested as suspected murderers had visited south Korea several times in the past, it is highly possible that the south Korean authorities let them carry the said substance. This is by no means fortuitous. Almost all countries have scrapped chemical weapons under the convention on ban on chemical weapons but only the U.S. and some other countries still possess the said substance. What is all the more problematic is the fact that the U.S. is introducing into south Korea all kinds of chemical weapons. This being a hard fact, the U.S. and the south Korean authorities are kicking up an anti-DPRK smear campaign, groundlessly pulling it up. From the beginning the south Korean authorities spread rumor that the “death of Kim Chol was intoxication by two women secret agents sent by General Reconnaissance Bureau of north Korea” and “their dead bodies will appear”, causing confusion and driving a wedge between the DPRK and Malaysia. Lately they tried to use Kim Chol’s death for their stepped-up racket of “human rights” against the DPRK and floated the story about “use of chemical weapons” or “use of WMD” by someone in a bid to create atmosphere of “international criticism” of the DPRK. The reckless moves of the U.S. and the south Korean authorities are aimed to meet the dangerous political purpose to tarnish the image of the dignified DPRK and bring down the social system in it. This is clear to everyone. The danger and gravity of the problem lie in that the story about “use of chemical weapons” touted by the U.S. and the south Korean authorities has something in common with the story of “Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction” spread by the U.S. in the 1990s. It is the final aim sought by the U.S. to stir up international repugnancy towards the DPRK, lay an international siege for putting pressure on it and provoke a nuclear war against the DPRK at any cost. The U.S., however, is mistaken. Should the U.S. and the south Korean authorities keep resorting to political chicanery to bring down the social system in the DPRK, being lost to reasons, the DPRK will be compelled to take stronger measures for self-defense in order to protect the sovereignty and dignity of the country. The U.S. and its vassal forces should not run amuck, clearly understanding the strategic position of the DPRK as a nuclear power.” (KCNA, “U.S., S. Korea’s Absurd Sophism against DPRK over Its Citizen’s Death abroad Blasted,” March 1, 2017)
Two women were charged with murder in a Kuala Lumpur court in connection with the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, the estranged half-brother of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un. Siti Aisyah, 25, of Indonesia, and Doan Thi Huong, 28, of Vietnam, could receive the death penalty. The police said the two women rubbed a deadly nerve agent on Kim’s face as he prepared to check in for a flight at Kuala Lumpur International Airport on the morning of February 13. The women were charged as North Korea yesterday began a diplomatic effort to repair the damage from the killing, sending delegations to Beijing and Kuala Lumpur in a rare bit of outreach by the reclusive nation as it faced accusations that it had carried out the brazen assassination. The delegation to Beijing was led by Vice Foreign Minister Ri Gil-song, said KCNA, which did not provide further details. The Chinese Foreign Ministry confirmed that Ri was visiting at its invitation and would meet with China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi. Ri is the most senior North Korean official to visit Beijing since a delegation met with President Xi Jinping of China in May. His trip came five days after the North lashed out at China in unusually bitter language for tightening sanctions by suspending all coal imports from North Korea for the rest of the year, depriving North Korea of one of its most important sources of hard currency. The police have also arrested a North Korean man, Ri Jong-chol, and are seeking seven others. South Korean officials have accused the North Korean government of ordering the assassination. There was no word yet on whether Malaysian officials would charge Ri Jong-chol in the attack. With relations between Malaysia and North Korea fraying over the killing, a high-level North Korean delegation, including the former deputy ambassador to the United Nations, Ri Dong-il, arrived in the Malaysian capital to discuss taking Mr. Kim’s body to North Korea, Yonhap reported from Kuala Lumpur. Ri Dong-il, the envoy, said he also would demand the release of Ri Jong-chol, Yonhap reported. “We are here to discuss human rights issues and find an agreement,” Ri told reporters outside the North Korean Embassy. Ri also said he would discuss “strengthening friendly relations” with Malaysia. Whether Malaysia is prepared to discuss friendly relations remains to be seen. Officials at the Malaysian Foreign Ministry declined to comment on the standoff over the release of the body and the detention of the North Korean suspect. (Richard C. Paddock and Choe Sang-hun, “Two Women Are Charged with Murder in Kim’s Death,” New York Times, March 1, 2017, p. A-10)
The US Trade Representative (USTR) issued an official report stressing the need for serious reconsideration of the Free Trade Agreement with South Korea, citing it along with NAFTA and China joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) as factors in a rapid rise in its trade deficit. This marks the first time reconsideration of the KORUS FTA has been mentioned in an official government document since the Donald Trump administration’s inauguration. “[T]he largest trade deal implemented during the [Barack] Obama Administration – our free trade agreement with South Korea – has coincided with a dramatic increase in our trade deficit with that country,” the USTR said in its “2017 Trade Policy Agenda and 2016 Annual Report.” Specifically, the USTR noted that US exports to South Korea in 2016 were down US$1.2 billion (1.3 trillion won) from 2011, the year before the KORUS FTA took effect, while imports of South Korean items had increased by US$13 billion (around 14.8 trillion won). “As a result, our trade deficit in goods with South Korea more than doubled. Needless to say, this is not the outcome the American people expected from that agreement,” the report said. In addition to the KORUS FTA, the USTR also offered a diagnosis of trade with China and NAFTA. “Plainly, the time has come for a major review of how we approach trade agreements,” the report concluded. The statements offer a clear indication that the Trump administration has selected trade issues with three partners – China, Mexico, and South Korea – as areas for focused reconsideration. They also indicate a much stronger possibility of renegotiations on the KORUS FTA. While Trump has not specifically mentioned the KORUS FTA since taking office, he criticized it harshly during his election campaign, calling it a “disaster” and a “job-killing” deal. The message hints that the US may attempt harsh trade retaliation measures on partners in what the Trump administration deems “unfair” trade through anti-dumping and countervailing duties or executive orders. An early chapter on the President’s Trade Policy Agenda noted that “the largest trade deal implemented during the Obama Administration – our free trade agreement with South Korea – has coincided with a dramatic increase in our trade deficit with that country.” “As a result, our trade deficit in goods with South Korea more than doubled [after the agreement]. Needless to say, this is not the outcome the American people expected from that agreement,” it continued. “President Trump is just rehashing the same things he’s said in the past. There’s nothing new there, and he acknowledged some results from the KORUS FTA,” said Moon Jong-cheol, a senior analyst with the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics & Trade. At the same time, Moon said “things like the reference to ‘resisting’ the WTO suggest a commitment to seeing its policies through.” The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy said the report “made no direct mention of renegotiating the KORUS FTA, and the position is the same as what the US has expressed before.” The ministry added it would “continue working to develop response measures.” (Ko Na-mu, “U.S. Government Reports Stresses Need for Reconsideration of KORUS FTA,” Hankyore, March 3, 2017)
As ordinary North Koreans have found ways to get information the state denies them — soppy South Korean dramas and peppy pop songs, novels, news from the outside world — so too has the Kim regime has developed sophisticated new tools to check just what its citizens are up to, according to Compromising Connectivity, a new report from Intermedia, a Washington-based research group. The report underlines the challenges in getting information into the most tightly controlled country on the planet — and the challenges that North Korea watchers as diverse as the U.S. Congress and small defector-led groups face in trying to penetrate it. “In a lot of ways, the expansion of information is continuing,” said Nat Kretchun, the lead author of the report, which draws on interviews with 34 recent defectors from North Korea. “It’s just that we also see a lot of signs that the North Korean government is gearing up to combat it.” Thanks to dramas smuggled in on USB sticks and illicit shortwave radio broadcasts from the outside, an increasing number of North Koreans have realized that their brethren in the South enjoy unimaginable levels of wealth and freedom. Being caught with such banned media can result in harsh penalties, including imprisonment. At the same time, the introduction of cellphones — albeit for domestic calls only, and without Internet access — is allowing people around the country to share information much more freely internally. High-profile defectors such as Thae Yong-ho, who served as a North Korean diplomat in Europe for almost 20 years, have described the transformative effect of outside information and have urged governments and NGOs to flood North Korea with it. While imposing new sanctions on North Korea last year, Congress allocated $50 million over the next five years for radio programming and the promotion of freedom of information inside North Korea. But the real picture is more complicated, the Intermedia report says. “They’re clearly trying to innovate their way out of the breakdown of the security apparatus rather than going back to Kim Il Sung times,” Kretchun said, referring to the founding president of the totalitarian state. North Korea’s security apparatus began crumbling in the 1990s, after a devastating famine that gave the regime no choice but to tolerate markets — which then became a venue for sharing information. “They now have a vision of a more sophisticated but no less controlled media environment,” he said. Take cellphones. North Koreans are now allowed such devices — including a re-branded Chinese Android-based smartphone called Arirang. As recently as 2013, North Koreans could use these to share files — including songs and text — through Bluetooth or micro-storage SD cards. But a mandatory software update rolled out in 2013 included a program called “TraceViewer” that would collect browsing history and take periodic screenshots of activity — which the user could not delete. That means the security services can see exactly what the user has been up to, long after they have removed any SD card. The update also included a “signature system” that would prevent a device from opening any files that don’t bear a North Korean state signature — and, in fact, automatically deletes them. “Even with the network restrictions that were applied at the beginning, cellphones could have been a game-changing device in North Korea,” Kretchun said. But the system update stops that from happening. “North Korea has a unique advantage in that it can dictate what devices their people have,” he said. He added that the state has made it very difficult for citizens to undermine their technology. “They put a lot of work into making sure you have to be quite technologically sophisticated to do the equivalent of jailbreaking these phones.” Access to outside networks has also been curtailed. Residents on the border with China have been able to get signals on Chinese phones, but the regime appears to have cracked down on this, using jammers and signal detectors. “Once, I went into a house and made a call to China and inspectors came within 30 seconds,” said a 59-year-old man who used to work for a trading company near the Chinese city of Dandong. “There are inspectors going around with an eavesdropping device to control calls to China,” he told the report’s authors. But North Koreans are still able to watch movies and dramas at home relatively easily. Previously, they watched foreign movies and soap operas on DVDs smuggled into the country, but in recent years they have developed a preference for USB sticks and SD cards, which are easier to hide. They plug the USBs or SD cards into their DVD players — which are permitted, although only to watch North Korean propaganda — and make sure to have a DVD in the drive in case of a spot inspection. Small portable DVD players called “notels” also are used for watching foreign dramas. Using small storage devices not only allows North Koreans to hide them easily during raids but also enables them to share media with each other. All but one of the North Korean defectors Intermedia interviewed said they had shared content with others. Despite the challenges, Kretchun said there was reason to keep trying to penetrate the North Korean regime’s information blockade. “Right now, all the arrows continue to point up. People are still certainly watching foreign dramas and listening to the radio,” he said. (Anna Fifield, “North Korea Regime Is Finding New Ways to Stop Information Flows, Reports Says,” Washington Post, March 1, 2017)
One day THAAD could destroy North Korean missiles in mid-flight, a remarkable feat of military might and technical prowess. But so far, its main victims have been South Korean pop stars, cosmetics companies, and TV shows. As THAAD’s deployment date draws near, its denunciations have reached fever pitch, spurring retaliations online and in the streets. Chinese authorities have denied visas to South Korean pop stars who frequently perform on the mainland; rejected imports of South Korean cosmetics; and scrubbed at least five enormously popular South Korean TV shows — some with hundreds of millions of Chinese viewers — from Chinese video streaming sites. “We don’t have to make the country bleed, but we’d better make it hurt,” the Global Times, a Chinese state-run tabloid, said in an editorial on today. The measures have stirred anxiety in South Korea’s business community, upset Chinese TV fans and cast uncertainty over the future of the China-South Korea relationship, which has enjoyed relative stability since the 1990s, enabling huge amounts of transnational commerce and migration. Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, said that China — angered by North Korea’s recent missile tests — now faces strained relations with both Koreas for the first time in recent memory. “This is quite bad, in the long term, for the diplomatic security environment in Northeast Asia,” he said. Beijing has issued two “solemn representations” to Seoul over the impending deployment, and the People’s Daily, said in an editorial that Beijing could potentially sever diplomatic ties. But the measures have also played out in more minute and unexpected ways. Yesterday, after months of negotiations, South Korean retail giant Lotte Group reached a deal to swap land at its Lotte Skyhill Country Club — a lush, mountainous resort in on the southern side of Jeju Island — for a military-owned parcel on the outskirts of Seoul, making way for the missile shield to be placed on the country club site. That same day, Chinese authorities fined one of Lotte’s Beijing supermarkets $6,500 for displaying a “false advertisement” — a vanishingly rare charge in the city, according to the state-run Legal Daily. The fine, while negligible for Lotte — one of South Korea’s largest conglomerates — adds to a long list of challenges in the country. Lotte suspended construction of a planned $2.6-billion theme park project in the northeastern Chinese city of Shenyang last month after facing several fire, safety and tax investigations. Authorities have also targeted Lotte businesses in Beijing, Shanghai and the southwestern city of Chengdu. Today, Lotte’s Chinese website was inaccessible, showing only the message: “Lotte’s official webpage is undergoing maintenance. Please forgive any inconvenience.” Its South Korean page remained accessible. The cause of the outage is unclear. Starting last year, Chinese authorities have forbidden Korean stars from appearing on Chinese TV programs and soap operas; one Korean reality show participant, singer Hwang Chi Yeul, was abruptly replaced by an actor from Hong Kong. They have also banned imports from 19 Korean cosmetics brands. Since February 24, at least five Korean TV shows — including the extraordinarily popular variety show Running Man — have been inaccessible on Chinese video websites. South Korea’s economy is heavily dependent upon exports, about a quarter of which go to China, and experts say that the measures could take a bite. “Economic sanctions by China may have a substantial impact on the Korean economy as a whole, and especially on certain business sectors” such as its entertainment industry, said Sangin Park, an economics professor at Seoul National University. South Korean pop culture, exemplified by K-pop music and TV soap operas, is one of the country’s most important exports, and not just economically. Troy Stangarone, a senior director at the Korea Economic Institute of America, said China risks overplaying its hand by blocking popular South Korean content and could, over time, push its neighbor toward investing in other regional economies, such as Vietnam. “Banning or prohibiting the update of additional Korean dramas is a risky course by the Chinese due to the popularity of the products,” he said. “In the short term, it might have a negative impact on South Korea. There could also be a negative impact on China.” “It hurts China’s image as a business-friendly country,” he added. Last week, the South Korean government said it was aware that some local companies have expressed concerns about China’s new trade barriers. “Despite a tightened Korea-China relationship, we keep in touch with China,” said Woo Tae-hee, a deputy South Korean trade minister. He said South Korea would express its concerns to China under a communication framework that’s part of a year-old bilateral trade deal. South Korea plans to deploy the defensive missile system “before the end of the year,” said Moon Sang-gyun, a spokesman for the South Korean defense ministry. He said that authorities are still working on environmental impact studies, facility construction and final negotiations with American officials. Despite the tensions, the number of Chinese visitors to South Korea increased more than 8% from January 2016 to the same month this year. Zhu Quanjingzi, 24, a human resource professional in Beijing, said her feelings about THAAD were “a little complicated.” “I oppose THAAD — I think it poses a threat to China’s safety,” she said. She plans to stop traveling to South Korea as a tourist, and boycott Korean cosmetics. “But I cannot live without Korean TV shows,” she said. “I can watch them on YouTube.” (Jonathan Kaiman and Matt Stiles, “China, Upset over a Planned Missile-Defense System, Is Taking Aim at South Korea’s Pop Starts and TV Shows,” Los Angeles Times, March 1, 2017)
3/2/17:
KPA General Staff statement “as the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet warmongers kicked off joint military exercises for aggression against the DPRK on Wednesday [March 1]: The largest-ever war drills will reportedly be staged by unprecedentedly huge aggressor forces including the U.S. imperialist forces present in south Korea, reinforced U.S. forces from overseas, south Korean puppet troops and forces of various vassal states. To be involved in this muscle-flexing are various type strategic assets such as striking groups of U.S. nuclear carriers Ronald Reagan and Carl Vinson, nuclear submarines, nuclear strategic bombers, stealth fighters and Aegis destroyers. Lots of U.S. war operation groups and nuclear strike means deployed in south Korea and in its vicinity have already begun moving to the positions for invasion of the north. The enemies openly announced that Key Resolve and Foal Eagle this year would involve rehearsals for putting into a more concrete shape the 4D operation for preemptive attack on the DPRK and, at the same time, drills under the simulated conditions of deployment of THAAD. The above-said saber-rattling assumes ever-growing danger as it is under way after the U.S. imperialists secretly introduced at least 6 million tons of ammunition and war hardware into south Korea from the end of last year and took recently even the measure for urgent evacuation of families of U.S. forces in south Korea and those with U.S. citizenship staying there. In view of the prevailing grave situation the General Staff of the KPA clarifies the following principled stand of the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK: 1. Now that the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces again kicked off the dangerous nuclear war drills against the DPRK at its doorstep, our army will counter them with the toughest counteractions as it had already declared. This stand of ours clarified before the world is by no means an empty talk. 2. Should the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces fire even a single shell into the waters where the sovereignty of our Republic is exercised, the KPA will immediately launch its merciless military counter-actions. They should not forget that our revolutionary armed forces have everything in place and are always on alert. 3. The forces of vassal countries will be targets of our strikes as they are imprudently involved in the on-going saber-rattling, toeing the U.S. imperialists’ hostile policy towards the DPRK. They have to bear in mind that those lackeys have always met a miserable fate for recklessly running wild, backed by their master. The KPA will mercilessly foil the nuclear war racket of the aggressors with its treasured nuclear sword of justice.” (KCNA, “KPA General Staff Warns of Merciless Nuclear Counter-Action of Justice,” March 2, 2017)
Malaysia has canceled its visa waiver arrangement with North Korea amid a diplomatic spat over the assassination of the half-brother of the North’s leader, Malaysian news agency Bernama said. The cancellation will take effect on March 6, after which North Koreans entering Malaysia will be required to obtain a visa, Bernama quoted the country’s deputy prime minister, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, as saying. He cited national security as the reason. This marks Malaysia’s first tangible action taken against Pyongyang following the assassination of Kim Jong-nam at Kuala Lumpur International Airport on February 13. Malaysia has decided to release and deport Ri Jong-chol, a 47-year-old North Korean suspect, due to a lack of incriminating evidence, AP reported. Four North Korean suspects are believed to have fled Malaysia on the day of Kim Jong-nam’s death while three others, including Hyon Kwang-song, the second secretary at the North’s embassy in Malaysia, are wanted for questioning. South Korea’s spy agency told lawmakers February 27 that Pyongyang’s foreign ministry and spy agency were behind Kim’s killing. As North Korea continued to heap on accusations, the Malaysian deputy prime minister said last week that his country will re-examine its diplomatic relationship with Pyongyang, alluding to a possible severance of formal ties with the communist country. Malaysia formally established its diplomatic relationship with North Korean in 1973 and installed its embassy in Pyongyang in 2003. In 2009, they forged a visa waiver program through which about 1,000 North Korean workers are currently employed in Malaysia. On Tuesday, North Korea sent a high-level delegation led by former deputy ambassador to the United Nations Ri Tong-il to Malaysia, as it seeks to take custody of Kim Jong-nam’s body. Ri said he will also request that Malaysia release the one North Korean national detained over the incident and discuss ways to strengthen friendly ties with Malaysia. Malaysian authorities said that Kim’s next-of-kin should identify and claim his body. (Yonhap, “Malaysia Cancels Visa Waiver Program with North Korea: Report,” March 2, 2017)
A North Korean diplomat, Ri Tong-il, who is leading a delegation to Malaysia, suggested that Kim Jong-nam died of heart failure despite Malaysia’s finding that he was killed by a banned nerve agent. He said Kim had a history of heart disease and high blood pressure for which he needed medication. But while asserting the cause of Mr. Kim’s death, without providing any evidence, he stood by his country’s refusal to acknowledge that the victim was the half-brother of Kim Jong-un, instead calling him by the name Kim Chol, which South Korean officials have said is an alias. He also called on Malaysia to provide samples of the VX nerve agent that the police say they found on the body to the international organization charged with carrying out the global treaty that bans the use of chemical weapons. “If it is true that it was used,” he told reporters, “then the samples should be sent to the office” of the group, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, for examination. The Malaysian government said it has indeed reported the use of VX to the organization, which must now decide whether to bring the matter before the United Nations Security Council. “The ministry is in close contact with the O.P.C.W. regarding the recent incident and the latter has provided the Malaysian authority with some technical materials that have been requested to assist in its investigation,” the Foreign Ministry said in a statement on March 3. But the organization has declined to say whether Malaysia had provided it with samples for independent testing. Malaysian officials have also declined to comment on that question. The latest assertions came as Malaysia moved to punish North Korea for the airport assassination, saying that it would require visitors from that country to obtain visas, the government said. Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, the deputy prime minister, imposed the restrictions effective March 6, citing national security concerns. Until now, North Koreans have been able to enter Malaysia without a visa — one of the few places in the world that allowed such easy access for citizens of a country that is widely viewed as a pariah. About 1,000 North Koreans live and work in Malaysia, where they have been able to establish international companies and have access to the global banking system. It was unclear whether the visa order would affect North Koreans who are already in Malaysia. (Richard C. Paddock, “North Korea Offers an Alternate Cause in a Death,” New York Times, March 3, 2017,
The Chinese government is ratcheting up pressure on South Korea over its plans to deploy an American missile defense system, with the state-controlled news media urging the public to boycott South Korean retail products and threatening diplomatic and even military repercussions. Yesterday, South Korea and the United States began talks in Seoul to finalize details of the deployment of the so-called Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense System, or THAAD, according to the South’s Foreign Ministry. No date has been set for the system’s deployment, but the Pentagon said on March 1 that Defense Secretary Jim Mattis wanted it in place “as soon as feasible.” Military experts said the United States could use C-17 transport aircraft to quickly move the system’s truck-mounted launchers, interceptors, radar, fire control units and support equipment to South Korea. An outspoken Chinese general, Luo Yuan, now retired, recommended a tough series of responses in an article, going so far as to suggest a military strike against the missile system. “We could conduct a surgical hard-kill operation that would destroy the target, paralyzing it and making it unable to hit back,” General Luo wrote in the Global Times, a state-run newspaper that often features strident, nationalist views. “Since the United States, Japan and South Korea choose not to respect China’s major security concerns, China does not need to be a gentleman on everything,” the general wrote. “We must not undermine our own security interests while respecting the security interests of others.” People’s Daily, the party newspaper that is often considered the official voice of the leadership, said in its international edition this week that China should consider a “de facto” severance of diplomatic ties with South Korea. It said in a commentary that China should take “political and military measures” against South Korea and that it should consider coordinating with Russia in dealing with what it called the “U.S.-Japan-South Korea antimissile network.” China has said that THAAD would threaten its nuclear deterrent capacity. It said the system’s powerful radar would make it much easier for the United States to detect Chinese missiles and would give the American military much more time to intercept them. Trade experts said Beijing might be reluctant to take more extreme economic measures. China is South Korea’s largest trading partner by far, but South Korea is also China’s fourth-largest, and Beijing would probably be reluctant to damage those ties during the current economic slowdown. South Korean politicians have said that Washington wants THAAD deployed by mid-May, when many expect presidential elections to be held in the South. President Park Geun-hye awaits a ruling by the country’s Constitutional Court on whether she will be permanently removed from office. The court’s decision is expected in the coming weeks, and if it rules against her, a new president will be elected 60 days later. South Korea’s progressive opposition is seen as having a strong chance of winning the presidency should that election be held. Opposition politicians have expressed skepticism about the THAAD system, and some have charged that the United States wants to rush the deployment to ensure that it is completed before a new president takes office. Members of the largest opposition party, the Democratic Party, have visited China twice since August. In January, in an unusual development, a delegation from the party met with the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi. China had hoped it could persuade the South’s next president to refuse to agree to THAAD, said Cheng Xiaohe, an associate professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing. “Now China is afraid THAAD will be deployed before the new president of South Korea is in office,” he said. Even as China’s fury toward the South is on full display, it is also at odds with the North. A North Korean diplomat, Ri Kil-song, arrived in Beijing on February 28 for five days of talks, an apparent effort by Pyongyang to reach out to China, its economic and political benefactor. Ri and Wang made soothing public statements on March 1 about the “traditional friendship” between their two countries. Behind the scenes, though, things are unlikely to have been so smooth. “One thing after another is happening,” Cheng, the Renmin University professor, said of China’s simultaneous troubles with the Koreas. “Not good things — all bad things.” (Jane Perlez and Choe Sang-Hun, “Actions by North and South Korea Give China a Double Headache,” New York Times, March 3, 2017,
3/3/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s “answer to a question raised by KCNA as regards the fact that sophism calling for re-listing the DPRK as a “sponsor of terrorism” is heard in the U.S. Hard-line conservatives in the U.S., including some congressmen, have called for re-listing the DPRK as a “sponsor of terrorism” since the outset of the year. The DPRK government had already clarified its principled stand of opposing all forms of terrorism and any support for it before the international community and has consistently proved the stand in practice. Nevertheless, the U.S. is seeking to label the DPRK a “sponsor of terrorism” though it has nothing in common with it. This cannot be construed otherwise than an expression of inveterate repugnancy and hostile attitude towards it.
No matter how the U.S. again calls the DPRK as a “sponsor of terrorism” in line with its standard and interests, the latter will never be a “sponsor of terrorism.” Gone are the days never to return when the U.S. could stigmatize at random to oppress those countries incurring its displeasure, while having the world under its control. The U.S. will keenly realize how dearly it has to pay for its groundless accusations against the dignified DPRK.” (KCNA, “DPRK FM Spokesman Warns of Serious Consequences of Its Groundless Accusation,” March 3, 2017)
3/4/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s statement: “in denunciation of the ongoing U.S.-south Korea joint military drills against the DPRK. The spokesman branded the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises being staged by the U.S. in south Korea as the most undisguised nuclear war move to throw the Korean Peninsula and the rest of Northeast Asia into nuclear disaster. Nobody can vouch when the war drills kicked off after introducing a lot of nuclear strike means and huge forces into south Korea and the waters off it may go over to an actual war and, consequently, the situation on the Korean Peninsula is again inching close to the brink of a nuclear war. … The U.S. nuclear war drills assume more dangerous nature as they are staged at a time when it is resorting to the worst political and economic sanctions and pressure against the DPRK while finding fault with the latter’s measure for bolstering up its nuclear force. The U.S. seeks to convince the public that the joint military exercises are ascribable to the DPRK’s access to nuclear weapons, but this is sophism making profound confusing of right and wrong. The DPRK will never remain a passive onlooker to the new U.S. administration overtly revealing its intention to put military pressure on the DPRK and invade it while crying out for “peace by dint of strength.” The spokesman stressed that the army and people of the DPRK are unshakable in their will to further bolster up the deterrence for self-defense with the strategic nuclear force as a pivot in order to put a radical end to the danger of a nuclear war being imposed by the U.S. and deal a merciless retaliatory strike at any provocation by the invaders.” (KCNA, “DPRK Will Deal Merciless Retaliatory Strike at Provokers: Foreign Ministry Spokesman,” March 4, 2017)
The government of Malaysia declared North Korea’s ambassador “persona non grata” and gave him 48 hours to leave the country, a major break in diplomatic relations after the airport assassination of Kim Jong-nam. The decision to expel Ambassador Kang Chol came after he failed to appear at Malaysia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs as requested. Earlier, Kang had ignored a request to apologize for several inflammatory statements, including questioning the police finding that Kim was murdered with a banned nerve agent. “It should be made clear — Malaysia will react strongly against any insults made against it or any attempt to tarnish its reputation,” Foreign Minister Anifah Aman said in a statement announcing the expulsion order. (Richard C. Paddock, “Malaysia, in Major Diplomatic Break, Forces Out North Korean Ambassador,” New York Times, March 5, 2017,
3/5/17:
Three years ago, President Barack Obama ordered Pentagon officials to step up their cyber and electronic strikes against North Korea’s missile program in hopes of sabotaging test launches in their opening seconds. Soon a large number of the North’s military rockets began to explode, veer off course, disintegrate in midair and plunge into the sea. Advocates of such efforts say they believe that targeted attacks have given American antimissile defenses a new edge and delayed by several years the day when North Korea will be able to threaten American cities with nuclear weapons launched atop intercontinental ballistic missiles. But other experts have grown increasingly skeptical of the new approach, arguing that manufacturing errors, disgruntled insiders and sheer incompetence can also send missiles awry. Over the past eight months, they note, the North has managed to successfully launch three medium-range rockets. And Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, now claims his country is in “the final stage in preparations” for the inaugural test of his intercontinental missiles — perhaps a bluff, perhaps not. An examination of the Pentagon’s disruption effort, based on interviews with officials of the Obama and Trump administrations as well as a review of extensive but obscure public records, found that the United States still does not have the ability to effectively counter the North Korean nuclear and missile programs. Those threats are far more resilient than many experts thought, The New York Times’s reporting found, and pose such a danger that Obama, as he left office, warned President Trump they were likely to be the most urgent problem he would confront. Trump has signaled his preference to respond aggressively against the North Korean threat. In a Twitter post after Kim first issued his warning on New Year’s Day, the president wrote, “It won’t happen!” Yet like Obama before him, Trump is quickly discovering that he must choose from highly imperfect options. He could order the escalation of the Pentagon’s cyber and electronic warfare effort, but that carries no guarantees. He could open negotiations with the North to freeze its nuclear and missile programs, but that would leave a looming threat in place. He could prepare for direct missile strikes on the launch sites, which Obama also considered, but there is little chance of hitting every target. He could press the Chinese to cut off trade and support, but Beijing has always stopped short of steps that could lead to the regime’s collapse. In two meetings of Trump’s national security deputies in the Situation Room, the most recent on February 28, all those options were discussed, along with the possibility of reintroducing nuclear weapons to South Korea as a dramatic warning. Administration officials say those issues will soon go to Trump and his top national security aides. The decision to intensify the cyber and electronic strikes, in early 2014, came after Obama concluded that the $300 billion spent since the Eisenhower era on traditional antimissile systems, often compared to hitting “a bullet with a bullet,” had failed the core purpose of protecting the continental United States. Flight tests of interceptors based in Alaska and California had an overall failure rate of 56 percent, under near-perfect conditions. Privately, many experts warned the system would fare worse in real combat. So the Obama administration searched for a better way to destroy missiles. It reached for techniques the Pentagon had long been experimenting with under the rubric of “left of launch,” because the attacks begin before the missiles ever reach the launch pad, or just as they lift off. For years, the Pentagon’s most senior officers and officials have publicly advocated these kinds of sophisticated attacks in little-noticed testimony to Congress and at defense conferences. The Times inquiry began last spring as the number of the North’s missile failures soared. The investigation uncovered the military documents praising the new antimissile approach and found some pointing with photos and diagrams to North Korea as one of the most urgent targets. After discussions with the office of the director of national intelligence last year and in recent days with Trump’s national security team, the Times agreed to withhold details of those efforts to keep North Korea from learning how to defeat them. Last fall, Kim was widely reported to have ordered an investigation into whether the United States was sabotaging North Korea’s launches, and over the past week he has executed senior security officials. The approach taken in targeting the North Korean missiles has distinct echoes of the American- and Israeli-led sabotage of Iran’s nuclear program, the most sophisticated known use of a cyber weapon meant to cripple a nuclear threat. But even that use of the “Stuxnet” worm in Iran quickly ran into limits. It was effective for several years, until the Iranians figured it out and recovered. And Iran posed a relatively easy target: an underground nuclear enrichment plant that could be attacked repeatedly. In North Korea, the target is much more challenging. Missiles are fired from multiple launch sites around the country and moved about on mobile launchers in an elaborate shell game meant to deceive adversaries. To strike them, timing is critical. Advocates of the sophisticated effort to remotely manipulate data inside North Korea’s missile systems argue the United States has no real alternative because the effort to stop the North from learning the secrets of making nuclear weapons has already failed. The only hope now is stopping the country from developing an intercontinental missile, and demonstrating that destructive threat to the world. “Disrupting their tests,” William J. Perry, secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, said at a recent presentation in Washington, would be “a pretty effective way of stopping their ICBM program.” North Korea began seeking an intercontinental ballistic missile decades ago: It was the dream of Kim Il-sung, the country’s founder, who bitterly remembered the American threats to use nuclear weapons against the North during the Korean War. His break came after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when out-of-work Russian rocket scientists began seeking employment in North Korea. Soon, a new generation of North Korean missiles began to appear, all knockoffs of Soviet designs. Though flight tests were sparse, American experts marveled at how the North seemed to avoid the kinds of failures that typically strike new rocket programs, including those of the United States in the late 1950s. The success was so marked that Timothy McCarthy of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey wrote in a 2001 analysis that Pyongyang’s record “appears completely unique in the history of missile development and production.” In response, President George W. Bush in late 2002 announced the deployment of antimissile interceptors in Alaska and California. At the same time, Bush accelerated programs to get inside the long supply chain of parts for North Korean missiles, lacing them with defects and weaknesses, a technique also used for years against Iran. By the time Obama took office in January 2009, the North had deployed hundreds of short- and medium-range missiles that used Russian designs, and had made billions of dollars selling its Scud missiles to Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. But it aspired to a new generation of missiles that could fire warheads over much longer distances. In secret cables written in the first year of the Obama administration, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton laid out the emerging threat. Among the most alarming released by WikiLeaks, the cables described a new path the North was taking to reach its long-range goal, based on a missile designed by the Soviets decades ago for their submarines that carried thermonuclear warheads. It was called the R-27. Unlike the North’s lumbering, older rockets and missiles, these would be small enough to hide in caves and move into position by truck. The advantage was clear: This missile would be far harder for the United States to find and destroy. “North Korea’s next goal may be to develop a mobile ICBM that would be capable of threatening targets around the world,” said an October 2009 cable marked “Secret” and signed by Clinton. The next year, one of the new missiles showed up in a North Korean military parade, just as the intelligence reports had warned. By 2013, North Korean rockets thundered with new regularity. And that February, the North set off a nuclear test that woke up Washington: The monitoring data told of an explosion roughly the size of the bomb that had leveled Hiroshima. Days after the explosion, the Pentagon announced an expansion of its force of antimissile interceptors in California and Alaska. It also began to unveil its “left of launch” program to disable missiles before liftoff — hoping to bolster its chances of destroying them. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced the program, saying that “cyberwarfare, directed energy and electronic attack,” a reference to such things as malware, lasers and signal jamming, were all becoming important new adjuncts to the traditional ways of deflecting enemy strikes. He never mentioned North Korea. But a map accompanying General Dempsey’s policy paper on the subject showed one of the North’s missiles streaking toward the United States. Soon, in testimony before Congress and at public panels in Washington, current and former officials and a major contractor — Raytheon — began talking openly about “left of launch” technologies, in particular cyber and electronic strikes at the moment of launch. The North, meanwhile, was developing its own exotic arsenal. It tried repeatedly to disrupt American and South Korean military exercises by jamming electronic signals for guided weapons, including missiles. And it demonstrated its cyber power in the oddest of places — Hollywood. In 2014, it attacked Sony Pictures Entertainment with a strike that destroyed about 70 percent of the company’s computing systems, surprising experts with its technical savvy. Last month, a report on cyber vulnerabilities by the Defense Science Board, commissioned by the Pentagon during the Obama administration, warned that North Korea might acquire the ability to cripple the American power grid, and cautioned that it could never be allowed to “hold vital U.S. strike systems at risk.” Not long after General Dempsey made his public announcement, Obama and his defense secretary, Ashton B. Carter, began calling meetings focused on one question: Could a crash program slow the North’s march toward an intercontinental ballistic missile? There were many options, some drawn from General Dempsey’s list. Obama ultimately pressed the Pentagon and intelligence agencies to pull out all the stops, which officials took as encouragement to reach for untested technologies. The North’s missiles soon began to fail at a remarkable pace. Some were destroyed, no doubt, by accident as well as by design. The technology the North was pursuing, using new designs and new engines, involved multistage rockets, introducing all kinds of possibilities for catastrophic mistakes. But by most accounts, the United States program accentuated the failures. The evidence was in the numbers. Most flight tests of an intermediate-range missile called the Musudan, the weapon that the North Koreans showed off in public just after Clinton’s warning, ended in flames: Its overall failure rate is 88 percent. Nonetheless Kim Jong-un has pressed ahead on his main goal: an intercontinental ballistic missile. Last April, he was photographed standing next to a giant test-stand, celebrating after engineers successfully fired off a matched pair of the potent Russian-designed R-27 engines. The implication was clear: Strapping two of the engines together at the base of a missile was the secret to building an ICBM that could ultimately hurl warheads at the United States. In September, he celebrated the most successful test yet of a North Korean nuclear weapon — one that exploded with more than twice the destructive force of the Hiroshima bomb. His next goal, experts say, is to combine those two technologies, shrinking his nuclear warheads to a size that can fit on an intercontinental missile. Only then can he credibly claim that his isolated country has the know-how to hit an American city thousands of miles away. In the last year of his presidency, Obama often noted publicly that the North was learning from every nuclear and missile test — even the failures — and getting closer to its goal. In private, aides noticed he was increasingly disturbed by North Korea’s progress. With only a few months left in office, he pushed aides for new approaches. At one meeting, he declared that he would have targeted the North Korean leadership and weapons sites if he thought it would work. But it was, as Obama and his assembled aides knew, an empty threat: Getting timely intelligence on the location of North Korea’s leaders or their weapons at any moment would be almost impossible, and the risks of missing were tremendous, including renewed war on the Korean Peninsula. As a presidential candidate, Trump complained that “we’re so obsolete in cyber,” a line that grated on officials at the United States Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, where billions of dollars have been spent to provide the president with new options for intelligence gathering and cyberattacks. Now, one of the immediate questions he faces is whether to accelerate or scale back those efforts. A decision to go after an adversary’s launch ability can have unintended consequences, experts warn. Once the United States uses cyber weapons against nuclear launch systems — even in a threatening state like North Korea — Russia and China may feel free to do the same, targeting fields of American missiles. Some strategists argue that all nuclear systems should be off limits for cyberattack. Otherwise, if a nuclear power thought it could secretly disable an adversary’s atomic controls, it might be more tempted to take the risk of launching a pre-emptive attack. “I understand the urgent threat,” said Amy Zegart, a Stanford University intelligence and cybersecurity expert, who said she had no independent knowledge of the American effort. “But 30 years from now we may decide it was a very, very dangerous thing to do.” Trump’s aides say everything is on the table. China recently cut off coal imports from the North, but the United States is also looking at ways to freeze the Kim family’s assets, some of which are believed held in Chinese-controlled banks. The Chinese have already opposed the deployment of THAAD in South Korea; the Trump team may call for even more such systems. The White House is also looking at pre-emptive military strike options, a senior Trump administration official said, though the challenge is huge given the country’s mountainous terrain and deep tunnels and bunkers. Putting American tactical nuclear weapons back in South Korea — they were withdrawn a quarter-century ago — is also under consideration, even if that step could accelerate an arms race with the North. Trump’s “It won’t happen!” post on Twitter about the North’s ICBM threat suggests a larger confrontation could be looming. “Regardless of Trump’s actual intentions,” James M. Acton, a nuclear analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, recently noted, “the tweet could come to be seen as a ‘red line’ and hence set up a potential test of his credibility.” (David E. Sanger and William Broad, “President Inherits Cyberwar on North Korea,” New York Times, March 4, 2017, p. 1)
Schiller and Hayes: “On March 6, 2017, the New York Times published an article that stated that the United States deployed cyberattacks against North Korea’s missile tests. The article implied that these attacks may have succeeded in causing the failure of North Korean missile tests. The assertion that cyberattacks could cause a higher rate of failure than would otherwise have occurred is, to put it mildly, a stretch, given the intervening variables and other factors that are well known to cause high failure rates early in missile testing programs. It is useful, therefore, to examine the fundamentals of how a missile could be caused to fail by a cyber-attack. In principle, interference with a missile’s guidance system may cause it to veer it off course, or even destroy it in flight. But this is not as easily done as people would imagine, or as is suggested in the New York Times article. To mess with a guidance system by hacking into it, it has contain a computer system that uses software. This sounds very obvious, but it is very important to be reminded of this, because different rockets use very different guidance system. The Falcon 9 space launcher from SpaceX, for example, uses a guidance system with software that is based on Linux. It should be possible to hack this software, or plant some virus in it that does something weird during launch. To do this, the attacker must be able to meet two conditions. First, the attacker must know which software is used, and understand how the software is working to create compatible lines of code that actually do what you want them to do, and to plant this code into the existing software. Second, the attacker must have access to the software, either by direct access to the guidance system you want to sabotage, or by infecting the software before it is transferred into the missile’s computers. Also, the malware should not be detected once it is planted. Certainly the DPRK would have established a guidance laboratory early in its missile program to develop accelerometers, gyroscopes, computers, and inertial platforms in the quest for an indigenous inertial guidance system and developed the transformation techniques needed to convert inertial measurements into targeting information. However, the DPRK is not yet capable of developing and producing the required sensors and computers and has had to buy in many of these parts from the world market. The chances that the United States could identify and implant malware in such black-market imports are low. Moreover, it is not likely that that the DPRK would have failed to take cyber warfare defensive counter-measures to protect its guidance research and development program. Of course, all bureaucracies make mistakes, especially when operating in compartmentalized, vertical silos like those in the DPRK. But it is unlikely that the DPRK military did not mount cyber defenses given that it was forewarned by media reports in 2011 of the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s centrifuge program. It may also have been aware of the US National Security Agency attempts starting in 2010 to penetrate North Korea’s cyber systems. And it certainly has highly capable and world class cyber warriors to lend a hand. Even if the DPRK missile guidance system community let down its guard, U.S. knowledge of North Korea’s missile program is quite limited. It is doubtful that the United States has sufficient knowledge of the DPRK’s missile guidance software code, or even which software is used. It is also highly improbable that the DPRK’s missiles have a WiFi link, or Internet access, which could be used to infect the guidance software. But, even more basic: some missile guidance systems cannot be hacked, because they are not software-based. The Scud B guidance system, for example, is quite close to the guidance system that the German A4/V2 used during World War 2. This system is based on mechanical inputs. You cannot hack it, just as you cannot hack old Wurlitzer jukeboxes, or mechanical computers. There is no software, no line of code that could be modified. Scuds, of course, use a Scud-type guidance system, as does the Nodong. And judging by the technology that was found inside the Unha first stage, the Unha satellite launcher also uses some kind of this guidance type, perhaps just a modified Scud guidance system. There is simply no way to infect these systems with malware. The question today is whether the DPRK’s Musudan and the KN-15 missiles use a similar non-cyber guidance system; or if they use some type of modern strap-down guidance system that is based on sensors and a computer, and is running some software. And this question leads us straight to the old questions of where these missiles come from, what technology they are based on, and at what time they were actually developed. If the Musudan indeed is based on the R-27/SS-N-6, the chances are high that the original guidance system of this missile was also used for the Musudan, which means Soviet technology from the nineteen sixties, which would have been mechanical and therefore “hack-proof.” Even if the DPRK uses a modern guidance system on the Musudan, it is doubtful that the United States would have had access to the guidance software and be able to plant a code in there. And missiles do not have an USB port that you can use to infect their computer via USB stick, or just connect from a distance via Bluetooth. Such an insertion would have to be highly targeted, specific to the design and software used in the DPRK’s laboratory, and able to circumvent all the obvious countermeasures and barriers that would stand in the way of such an effort in the first place. Such a combination strains credulity. The New York Times article hearkens back to the movie “Independence Day”, where the world is saved from the Alien invasion by simply planting a computer virus into the mothership’s main computer by somehow just sending it over with a standard laptop. This might work in movies, but not in reality. Perhaps the more interesting story is who leaked to the New York Times the claims of the efficacy of cyberattacks on North Korea’s missiles and why now? We wonder if it is part of a policy battle in the course of the Trump Administration’s North Korea policy review, possibly designed to get President Trump’s attention. It might also be an intentional effort to conduct psychological warfare against the DPRK by creating paranoia and purges within the DPRK missile program. It might also be a way to impress allies and third parties that the United States has been doing more behind the scenes than patiently waiting for the DPRK threat to resolve itself and imposing ineffectual sanctions. We don’t know.” (Markus Schiller and Peter Hayes, “Could Cyberattacks Defeat North Korean Missile Tests?” NAPSnet, March 7, 2017)
KCNA: “The U.S. imperialists and south Korean puppet military warmongers staged the largest-ever joint military exercise for searching and destroying strategic facilities of the DPRK in Phochon, Kyonggi Province from February 14 to 17, according to the south Korean Yonhap News. They are mulling waging again such exercise during the Foal Eagle drill with ground, naval and air forces involved.” (KCNA, “U.S., S. Korean Warmongers Stage Exercise for Searching and Destroying Strategic Facilities of DPRK,” March 5, 2017)
South Korea’s Unification Ministry said that it would quadruple the cash reward it provides for North Korean defectors arriving with important information to 1 billion won, or $860,000 from $217,000, in an effort to encourage more elite members from the North to flee. Since famine hit the North in the mid-1990s, more than 30,000 North Koreans have defected to the South. The South Korean government helps them resettle by providing job training, rent and other subsidies. But it has also offered extra cash rewards for those who defected with information on the North Korean military or the inner workings of the secretive North Korean government, as well as for those who fled with military planes or other weapons. Defectors who flee with a warship or a military fighter jet will also get $860,000, instead of the current $130,000. Those who arrive with lesser weapons, like a tank or a machine gun, can expect rewards ranging from $43,000 to $260,000. The new cash awards will take effect in April, the ministry said. South Korea said the drastic increases reflected the effects of inflation over the 20 years since the rewards were last adjusted. They come at a time when South Korean officials say that more elite members from North Korea, deeply disappointed with their leader, Kim Jong-un, and fearful of his “reign of terror,” are trying to defect to the South. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Increases Rewards for Northern Defectors,” New York Times, March 6, 2017,
3/6/17:
North Korea fired four ballistic missiles into the waters off its east coast this morning, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said, the latest sign of Pyongyang’s determination to push ahead with its missile program despite increasing pressure against it. The Joint Chiefs said the projectiles were launched from Tongchang-ri in North Korea’s northwestern North Pyongan Province, at 7:36 a.m. Seoul time. North Korea has a launch site for longer-range rockets northwest of the capital Pyongyang. They said the projectiles flew about 620 miles and that the South Korean authorities were analyzing exactly what type of projectiles were fired. There were no immediate signs of any damage. A Japanese government spokesman said North Korea launched four missiles, and that three had landed inside Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone, an area extending about 230 miles out to sea from its coastline. South Korea’s acting president, Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn, convened a meeting of the Standing Committee of the National Security Council in response this morning. Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzo said he would hold a meeting of its National Security Council to discuss the missile launches. South Korea’s national-security adviser, Kim Kwan-jin, also spoke by phone with Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, a spokesman for the South Korean president’s office said. During the meeting, Hwang called the missile launch “an act of outright defiance to the international community, and a serious provocation.” The U.S. State Department condemned the launches on Sunday night, while reaffirming its commitment to defending allies including South Korea and Japan. “The [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea]’s provocations only serve to increase the international community’s resolve to counter the DPRK’s prohibited weapons of mass destruction programs,” said Mark Toner, acting State Department spokesman. A South Korean defense ministry official said the flight paths of four projectiles — including the flight distance and the maximum height of about 160 miles — indicate they weren’t ICBMs. “The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) determined the missile launch from North Korea did not pose a threat to North America,” said Cmdr. Gary Ross, a Pentagon spokesman. As with its launch in February, which came while Trump was meeting with Abe in West Palm Beach, Fla., analysts and experts struggled to identify details of the exact launch. In that case, analysts initially identified the missile as an intermediate-range missile it had previously fired. But the missile was actually a modified version of a submarine-launched missile that Pyongyang called the Polaris-2, boasting new capabilities some experts hadn’t yet expected North Korea to have developed. In this case, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs initially identified one missile launch from Tongchang-ri site, but then modified their assessment to include three more missiles, though it remains unclear whether those missiles were also fired from the same site. “This is an unusual launch because of its number and location. If it was this number in a different location or just one launch from this location, it would make sense,” said Scott LaFoy, a satellite-imagery and ballistic-missile analyst based in Washington. “North Korea is getting very good at switching up their tests. They keep changing the variables analysts watch for, so it is harder to quickly assess what any one event was.” The North’s missile launch took place as the U.S. and South Korea were conducting annual joint military exercises, strongly opposed by Pyongyang. Jeffrey Lewis, an arms-control expert at the California-based Middlebury Institute of International Studies, said it was normal for the North launch a salvo of missiles during big U.S. exercises, to signal that they can “practice nuking the forces we are practicing with to invade them.” He added that “they are conveying that their plan, early on, is to use nuclear-armed missiles at our forces in the region to repel an attack.” (Jonathan Cheng and Kwanwoo Jun, “North Korea Fires Missiles, Fanning Regional Concerns,” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2017, p. 1) Japan believes one of the ballistic missiles test-fired by North Korea earlier in the week may have come closer to its coast than any other missile launched by Pyongyang in the past, splashing down some 200 kilometers out to sea, a Japanese government source said March 9. The missile, one of four launched nearly simultaneously this morning from North Korea’s northwest, fell into the Sea of Japan around 200 km north-northwest of the Noto Peninsula in Ishikawa Prefecture, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide told a press conference. (Kyodo, “North Korean Missile May Have Come Closer to Japan than Any in the Past,” March 9, 2017) North Korea was practicing to strike United States military bases in Japan with its latest barrage of missiles, state media in Pyongyang reported March 7, and it appeared to be trying to outsmart a new American antimissile battery being deployed to South Korea by firing multiple rockets at once. Kim Jong Un presided over today’s launch of the four missiles, “feasting his eyes on the trails of ballistic rockets,” KCNA reported in a statement that analysts called a “brazen declaration” of the country’s intent to strike enemies with a nuclear weapon if it came under attack. “If the United States or South Korea fires even a single flame inside North Korean territory, we will demolish the origin of the invasion and provocation with a nuclear tipped missile,” the KCNA statement said. The four ballistic missiles fired this morning were launched by the elite Hwasong ballistic missile division “tasked to strike the bases of the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces in Japan,” KCNA said. The United States has numerous military bases and about 54,000 military personnel stationed in Japan, the legacy of its postwar security alliance with the country. Three of the four missiles flew about 600 miles over North Korea and landed in the sea, within Japan’s exclusive economic zone off the Oga Peninsula in Akita prefecture, home to a Japanese self-defense forces base. The fourth fell just outside the zone. North Korea did not say what kind of missiles it had fired, but after poring over photos released by state media, analysts at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in California said they were extended-range Scuds capable of flying more than 600 miles. North Korea’s extended-range Scud is halfway between a traditional short-range Scud and the medium-range missile known as the Rodong. But they can be produced much more cheaply than the Rodong, Lewis said, meaning that North Korea could fire them with more abandon. North Korea has tested these types of missiles before, so the point of today’s launches was not to see if the rockets would fly, but to test how quickly the unit could set them up and deploy them — classic training for a wartime situation, said Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute. “They want to know if they can get these missiles out into the field rapidly and deploy them all at once,” Lewis said. “They are practicing launching a nuclear-armed missile and hitting targets in Japan as if this was a real war.” KCNA reported that the four missiles were launched simultaneously and that Kim commented that they “are so accurate that they look like acrobatic flying corps in formation.” This appeared to be a further challenge to the United States and South Korea, which said March 7 that it had started deploying the advanced antimissile battery called Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, designed to protect the region against North Korea’s rockets. The first parts of the THAAD system arrived today at Osan Air Base south of Seoul, South Korea’s Defense Ministry said. But THAAD would have difficulty intercepting four missiles launched at the same time, analysts said. Furthermore, Osan Air Base is less than 300 miles from the missile launch site in North Korea — another apparent message to Pyongyang’s enemies. The launches coincided with joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises on the southern half of the Korean Peninsula, drills that take place every year and that North Korea views as preparation for an invasion. After the missiles were launched, the U.S. Strategic Command said it had determined that the missile launch “did not pose a threat to North America.” But KCNA reported that the 33-year-old Kim had ordered the strategic forces to be on high alert, “as required by the grim situation in which an actual war may break out anytime, and get fully ready to promptly move.” (Anna Fifield, “North Korea Said It Was Practicing to Hit U.S. Military Bases in Japan with Missiles,” Washington Post, March 7, 2017) A new open-source intelligence analysis of North Korean state-run media by missile experts has shown what appears to be the hypothetical target of the country’s test-launches earlier this week: U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture. Using images released by North Korean state media — including one showing a map detailing the range of the missiles — David Schmerler and Jeffrey Lewis of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in California, determined that the drill intended to simulate a nuclear attack on the base at Iwakuni. “This is the first time that the North Koreans have been specific about attacking U.S. Forces in Japan,” Lewis told Japan Times. “But last year, a North Korean missile unit launched a Nodong to simulate a nuclear attack on Busan, (South Korea).” Last July, the North said it held a similar drill that “was conducted by limiting the firing range under the simulated conditions of making pre-emptive strikes at ports and airfields in the operational theater in South Korea,” KCNA said in a dispatch at the time. An accompanying photo, similar to the one released Tuesday, showed a map that displayed the possible flight path of the missiles from Hwangju, North Korea, to areas near South Korea’s southern port cities of Ulsan and Busan. Because the flight path of the four missiles launched was about 1,000 km into the Sea of Japan off the coasts of Aomori and Akita prefectures, Schmerler said he initially believed the simulation might be targeting the U.S. air base in Misawa, Aomori. “But the range would be a push for the ER Scud to be reasonably used,” he said. Instead, Lewis suggested that U.S. bases in both Sasebo, Nagasaki Prefecture, and Iwakuni would be within range from ER Scuds deployed near the North’s Sohae Satellite Launch Station in Dongchang-ri, where the March 6 missiles were launched. After discovering the map photo from today’s launch, Schmerler compared it with the similar shot from the Busan drill in July, concluding that Iwakuni was the “hypothetical target for the (recent) drill,” he said. Besides American personnel, the U.S. base at Iwakuni is also home to Fleet Air Wing 31 of the Maritime Self-Defense Force, and other units of the MSDF. At present, the station has about 15,000 personnel, including Japanese national employees. The base is also now home to a squadron of F-35B stealth fighters, after the U.S. deployed them in January, marking the first operational overseas deployment for the high-tech aircraft. Lewis said the March 6 drill “demonstrates that North Korea’s war plan is to engage in the large-scale use of nuclear weapons against U.S. forces in the region to ‘repel’ an invasion.” Media reports have said the F-35B would participate in the exercises, known as Foal Eagle. “The addition of the F-35B is meant to deliver a strong message to the North that they could be used against the rogue state in case of a conflict breaking out on the Korean Peninsula,” Yonhap quoted an unidentified military official as saying last week. This, said both Lewis and Schmerler, was likely the North’s rationale for targeting Iwakuni. “North Korea sees Foal Eagle as a dress rehearsal for an invasion,” Lewis said. “So the missile launch is their rehearsal for using nuclear weapons to stop the invasion.” Asked about the analysis at a daily news conference on March 8, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide said he was not aware that Iwakuni may have been the simulation’s target, but noted the 1,000-km range would put it and other areas in Japan within the North’s sights. “The missiles flew for 1,000 km, so if you take that into account, western Japan, including Shikoku, could surely be a target,” Suga said, reiterating Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s comment that the government views the four missiles’ simultaneous launch as “a new level of threat.” A spokesman for U.S. Forces Japan also declined comment on the apparent threat to Iwakuni, but reiterated the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan and South Korea. “We remain prepared and will continue to take steps to increase our readiness to defend ourselves and our allies from attack, and are prepared to use the full range of capabilities at our disposal against this growing threat,” U.S. Air Force Maj. John Severns said in an email. According to Euan Graham, director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute in Australia, targeting Iwakuni could be a “way of letting us know they have the ability to hit U.S. bases in Japan that are likely to be used in a Korean contingency.” Graham also noted the threat to Japanese living nearby. “I wonder how the people of Hiroshima will feel at the prospect they may again be targeted by nuclear weapons in wartime, given the proximity of the marine base at Iwakuni,” he said. (Jesse Johnson, “North Korea Missile Drill Simulated Targeting Iwakuni Base, Analysis Shows,” Japan Times, March 8, 2017)
Fred Kaplan: “[T]he Joint Chiefs of Staff and the officers of the U.S. Pacific Command had devised a concrete plan for attacking North Korea. … The Trump-ordered plan assumed the United States would strike the first blow. It was a plan covering what officers call ‘the full array of military options’ different options for different scenarios – including, ultimately if necessary, a nuclear option. The scenarios began with North Korea preparing to launch a missile. If intelliegcen idnciated that the missile was armed with a nuclear warhead, one set of actions would be recommended; if the missile was headed to Japan, the plan would suggest a different set of actions; if it was headed toward the United States, a different set still. Under the plan, the first phase of the attack was to strike the launch pad with Army Tactical Missiles, known as ATACMs – ballistic missiles tipped with highly accurate conventional munitions, deployed on U.S. Army bases in South Korea, having sufficient range to hit targets throughout North Korea. Under this scenario, if the North Koreans hadn’t yet launched their missile, the ATACM would destroy it on the launch pad; if they had launched the missile, the ATACM would hit the launch pad anyway, demonstrating what the United States was willing to do – and ossibly killing some of the North Korean leaders, maybe even Kim himself, who often observed missile tests in person. … Some on the White House staff believed, or at least hoped out loud in private conversations, that the North Koreans would not retaliate; the strike would be too small, too clearly onfined to one target, for them to expand the confrontation; Kim and hs entourage would be so shcked by the strike – by the sheer, unprecedented act of an American attack – that they would have to step back. When vague details were leaked to the press, it became known as the ‘bloody nose’ plan – the idea being that a single punch would make Kim wobble and bring the fight to an end: a politico-military TKO. But military officers, including those who wrote the plan, were not so confident that Kim would simply reel. They thought it more likely that he would retaliate against South Korea or Japan, possibly against American military units in either or both of those countries – forcing the president to hit back, and so the conflict would spiral upward, eventually escalating to all-out war. The Joint Staff’s OPLAN … contained an option to launch nuclear weapons at eighty targets, mostly military and leadership sites, across North Korea. The OPLAN was not the starting point for the plan that Trump ordered; the new plan laid out a series of more limited strikes, with several stages of escalation, which, at some point, might make Kim alter his calculus and back down. But the officers had no illusions that they knew where Kim’s cracking pointwas; most of them figured he probably wouldn’t crack. The OPLAN was what would be put in motion if the Trump-ordered plan didn’t produce the desired effects. So the military commanders and the Joint Chiefs urged the president to take no action unless and until he was ready to go the full distance, H-bombs included. When a reporter asked [Defense Secretary] Mattis if there were military options the U.S. could take without putting South Korea at risk, he replied, ‘Yes, there are, but I will not go into details.’ The telling point was that he did not claim the options were realistic. At first, Mattis ignored the request from the White House to work up a new war plan. The request came early in the Trump term, after intelligence revealed that the North Koreans were about to test an intercontinental ballistic missile. Mattis wasn’t keen on preventive war; or was he confident that the first blow in such a war would be the final blow. … In short, Mattis didn’t think there were anygood military options in Korea and he didn’t want to foster the illusion that there were. Mattis’ resistance infuriated [National Security Advier] McMaster … The two officers did not get along. … In the end, McMaster got his – and Trump’s – way. Mattis could slow-roll his disobedience for only so long. Before the end of spring, a new war plan was in place. … Starting on Mrch 9 and continuing through November 29, every time the North Koreans launched a ballistic missile – fifteen launches in all, involving twenty-two mssiles – the National Military Command Center, inside the Pentagon, coordinated a ‘national event’ conference call with the relevant four-star generals, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of Strategic Command, Pacific Command, Northern Command, and U.S. Forces Korea. Early warning radars, installed in Korea, detected the launch – and usually preparations for the launch – in real time. The officers were plugged into the conference call within a few minutes of th alert. General John Hyten, the commander o StratCom, had stepped up the rehearsals of these conference calls since arriving at the Omaha headquarters the previous November, toard the end of Obama’s presidency. The conference calls had an air of urgency, not only because they weren’t drills, but also because, until a North Korean missile was launched, and sometimes not until it touched down, the American generals did not know whether the launch was a test or the onset of an attack. On at least five of those fifteen occasions, when a different type of missile was launched (for instance, a missile with three stages, suggesting it might be an ICBM) or whe it was headed toward Japan, the National Military Command Center brought cabinet secretaries into the conference call – Mattis, McMaster, Tillerson, and sometimes Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin. The crises never got to the point where Trump was called in; by the time when he might have been, the nature of the launch – the fact that it was a tet – had been established. But if these officers and officials had decided to take military action, Mattis possessed the legal authority to fire ATACMs at the North Korean launch site – to take the first step to what he and others thought would probably spiral into a major war. And starting with North Korea’s mssile launch in March, its second launch of the year, the ATACMs were moved into position and kept in a constant state of readiness. On two occasions, just after the North Koreans launched their missile, Mattis ordered the U.S. commander in South Korea to fire an ATACM – not at the launch pad or any other target in North Korea, but Rather into the Sea of Japan, along a path running parallel to the North-South Korean border. On those two occasions, South Korean officers, who were brought into the consultations, fired Hyunmoo-2 missiles – their version of ATACMs – at the same time, along a similar path. The South Koreans fired their missiles on three additional occasions when Mattis decided not to. Both of the ATACM firings took place between June and early August – before Trump’s bellicose remarks of August 8.” (Fred Kaplan, The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020) , pp. 265-69)
3/?/17:
President Trump meets with DCI Mike Pompeo and just retired CIA case officer Andy Kim, whom Pompeo tasked with setting up a North Korean mission center and planning for the covert overthrow of Kim Jong Un. (Woodward, Rage, pp.42-3) One of Kim’s first actions was to reach to a back-channel contact in the North Korean intelligence service he’d developed 20 years earlier. The White House sanctioned the meeting, which he arranged in a third country. His instructions were to find out what North Korea wanted. The contact could not give Kim authoritative information about the real goals. (p. 89)
3/7/17:
Alarmed over North Korea’s increasingly provocative behavior, the United States said that it had started to deploy THAAD in South Korea that China has angrily opposed as a threat to its security. The deployment came after North Korea launched four ballistic missiles yesterday, apparently in response to joint naval exercises by South Korea and the United States. Those launchings led South Korea to call for the accelerated deployment of THAAD. A spokeswoman for the United States forces in South Korea said that one of five major components of the missile system had arrived yesterday. Officials said it could take a couple of months for the system to become fully operational. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis had urged the South Koreans to move ahead with the deployment of the system during a visit to Seoul in February. In telephone calls yesterday to South Korean and Japanese leaders, President Trump said the United States would stand with its Asian allies and take steps to defend against North Korea’s growing ballistic missile threat. Trump emphasized that the United States was taking steps to “enhance our ability to deter and defend against North Korea’s ballistic missiles using the full range of United States military capabilities,” the White House said in a statement. China has been incensed over the deployment of the system, fearing it could give the United States military the ability to quickly detect and track missiles launched in China, according to analysts. A spokesman for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geng Shuang, said today that China would “take the necessary steps to safeguard our own security interests, and the consequences will be shouldered by the United States and South Korea.” Geng warned the two countries not to “go further and further down the wrong road.” Yang Xiyu, a former senior Chinese official who once oversaw talks with North Korea, said China was worried that the deployment of the system would open the door to a broader American network of antimissile systems in the region, possibly in places like Japan and the Philippines, to counter a growing Chinese military. “China can see benefits only for a U.S. regional plan, not for South Korea’s national security interest,” he said. The state media recently encouraged Chinese citizens to boycott South Korean products and companies over the THAAD issue. The Chinese authorities recently forced the closing of 23 stores owned by Lotte, a South Korean conglomerate that agreed to turn over land that it owned for use in the THAAD deployment. Hundreds of Chinese protested at Lotte stores over the weekend, some holding banners that read, “Get out of China.” Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., the head of the United States Pacific Command, announced the start of the deployment, saying that “continued provocative actions by North Korea, to include yesterday’s launch of multiple missiles, only confirm the prudence of our alliance decision last year to deploy THAAD to South Korea.” The developments come as South Korea is consumed by turmoil over the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, whose administration agreed to the deployment. But with the president facing possible removal from office over a corruption scandal, the fate of the system had been in doubt. Its accelerated deployment could make it harder, if not impossible, for her successor to head off its installation. Moon Jae-in, an opposition leader who is the front-runner in the race to replace President Park, acknowledged that it would be difficult to overturn South Korea’s agreement to deploy the system. But he has insisted that the next South Korean government should have the final say on the matter, saying that Park’s government never allowed a full debate on it. Under its deal with Washington, South Korea is providing the land for the missile system and will build the base, but the United States will pay for the system, to be built by Lockheed Martin, as well as its operational costs. The United States military statement said that “the first elements” of THAAD were deployed yesterday, the same day as the North’s missile launchings. A C-17 cargo plane landed at the United States military’s Osan Air Base, about 40 miles south of Seoul, last evening, carrying two trucks, each mounted with a THAAD launchpad. More equipment and personnel will start arriving in the coming weeks, South Korean military officials said. “South Korea and the United States are doing their best to make the THAAD system operational as soon as possible,” the South Korean Defense Ministry said in a statement today, adding that the system was necessary “to protect South Korea from the nuclear and missile threat from North Korea.” The ministry declined to specify when the system would be operational. But Yonhap reported that the deployment was likely to be completed in one or two months, with the system ready for use by April. The arrival of THAAD equipment was announced after South Korea’s acting president, Hwang Kyo-ahn, talked with Trump on the phone on this morning. The two leaders condemned the North’s missile tests as a violation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions and agreed to beef up the allies’ joint defense posture, strengthen sanctions and step up pressure against the North, Hwang’s office said. On the phone with Trump, Hwang called the North’s nuclear and missile threat a “present and direct danger” to its allies, his office said. The Japanese prime minister, Abe Shinzo, said he spoke for 25 minutes on Tuesday with Trump, who reiterated his pledge to stand by Japan “100 percent,” according to the public broadcaster NHK. “I appreciate that the United States is showing that all the options are on the table,” Abe said, adding that Japan was “ready to fulfill larger roles and responsibilities” to deter North Korea. Kawakami Takashi, a professor of international politics and security at Takushoku University in Tokyo, said the deployment of THAAD could put the United States in a stronger position to consider a pre-emptive strike on North Korea. If the United States took such action, he said, “North Korea is going to make a counterattack on the U.S. or Japan or another place, so in this case they will use THAAD.” With tensions increasing over the deployment of the system, some in China have advocated stern measures, including severing diplomatic relations with South Korea, or more. A retired general, Luo Yuan, even suggested that China destroy the system with a military strike. “We could conduct a surgical hard-kill operation that would destroy the target, paralyzing it and making it unable to hit back,” General Luo wrote in Global Times, a state-run newspaper. (Gerry Mullany and Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Deploys Antimissile System in South Korea after North’s Launches,” New York Times, March 7, 2017,
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), supervised a ballistic rocket launching drill of Hwasong artillery units of the Strategic Force of the KPA on the spot. Involved in the drill were Hwasong artillery units of the KPA Strategic Force tasked to strike the bases of the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces in Japan in contingency. Respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un learned in detail about the preparations for fire strike while going round the ballistic rocket launching grounds. At an observation post he was briefed on a launching plan and gave an order to start the drill. Feasting his eyes on the trails of ballistic rockets, he appreciated that Hwasong artillery units of the Strategic Force are very good at organizing and commanding fire strikes and strictly ensuring rapid and simultaneous fire strikes. The four ballistic rockets launched simultaneously are so accurate that they look like acrobatic flying corps in formation, he said. Praising once again the Hwasong artillerymen for successfully concluding the drill for launching ballistic rockets simultaneously, he added that it is a great pride of the Party and state, army and people to have such strongest one as the KPA Strategic Force equipped with Korean-style powerful ballistic rockets and Juche-based fire strike methods. He gave the officials accompanying him the tasks to be fulfilled to strictly establish a monolithic leadership system and commanding and managing system of the Supreme Commander over the strategic force, further round off the Juche-based rocket striking methods put on an actual, scientific and modern basis, continuously develop Korean-style ultra-precision and intellectually promoted rockets and bolster them in quality and quantity. He ordered the KPA Strategic Force to keep highly alert as required by the grim situation in which an actual war may break out anytime, and get fully ready to promptly move, take positions and strike so that it can open fire to annihilate the enemies once the Party Central Committee issues an order. Expressing expectation and belief that the Hwasong artillerymen of the KPA Strategic Force would successfully discharge their sacred mission and duty as creditable nuclear force of the Workers’ Party of Korea in the death-defying struggle against the enemies, he had a photo session with them. Accompanying him were Ri Pyong Chol, Kim Jong Sik and other leading officials of the WPK Central Committee and scientists and technicians in the nuclear weapon and rocket research fields. (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Supervises Ballistic Launching Rocket Drill of Hwasong Artillery Unites of KPA Strategic Force,” March 7, 2017)
The apparent success of four simultaneous missile launchings by North Korea yesterday raised new alarms about the threat to its neighbors and its progress toward developing an ability to overcome their ballistic missile defense systems, including those that have yet to be deployed. In Japan, analysts said the launches suggested that North Korea could pose a more serious threat than indicated by previous tests. Indeed, North Korea said that the tests were conducted by units “tasked to strike the bases of the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces in Japan in contingency.” “That would mean a lot in terms of the defense of Tokyo, because North Korea might have been conducting a simulation of a ‘saturation attack’ in which they launch a number of missiles simultaneously in order to saturate the missile defense that Japan has,” said Michishita Narushige, director of the Security and International Studies Program at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. “It would be difficult for Japan to shoot down four missiles all at the same time because of our limited missile defense.” KCNA said today that the launches were timed to counter a joint United States-South Korean military exercise. Japan’s Coast Guard sent out navigation warnings and stepped up air and sea patrols on yesterday after three of the missiles landed within the country’s so-called exclusive economic zone, where fishing and cargo ships are active. The fourth landed outside it, though nearby. During a parliamentary committee session yesterday morning, Abe said that the launches “clearly represent a new threat from North Korea.” The missiles took off from Tongchang-ri, in northwestern North Korea, and flew an average of 620 miles before falling into the sea between North Korea and Japan, said Noh Jae-chon, a South Korean military spokesman. Michishita, of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, said the missile launches could accelerate a discussion within the Japanese government about whether Japan should acquire more missile defense systems, including THAAD. In January, Japan’s defense minister, Inada Tomomi, visited a United States Air Force base on Guam for a briefing on THAAD. After North Korea’s missile test last month, Japan’s governing Liberal Democratic Party formed a committee to discuss the country’s ballistic missile defenses, and it plans to debate various options, including THAAD, early warning satellites and other defense systems that could intercept incoming missiles. North Korea’s provocations could also embolden Abe in his campaign to raise military spending. “This can be used by the government as a pretty credible reason why we have to spend more on defense at the expense of other budget items,” including social welfare programs, Michishita said. Mainichi Shimbun reported that residents in Akita Prefecture, which sits closest to where the missiles landed in the Sea of Japan, were concerned by the increasing frequency of the tests. Asai Kazuhiro, director of the Kitaura branch of the Fishermen’s Cooperative of Akita Prefecture, told Mainichi Shimbun that members of the group were frightened by the launches. (Mokoto Rich, “North Korean Missile Test Raises Stakes for Japan,” New York Times, March 7, 2017,
Woodward: “Trump invited [Senator Lindsay] Graham to lunch at the White House. …’What’s on your mind?’ Trump asked. ‘Short term, North Korea,’ Graham said. ‘There’ll come a day when somebody’s going to come in and say, ‘Mr. President, they’re on the verge of getting a missile. They’ve miniaturized a nuclear weapon to put on it. They can hit the homeland. What do you want us to do?’ …’What do you think I should do about it?’ he asked. ‘You can accept they’ve got a missile and tell them and China that if you ever use it, that’s the end of North Korea,’ Graham said. ‘And have a missile defense system that has a high percentage of knocking it down. That’s scenario one. Scenario two is that you tell China that we’re not going to let them get get such a missile to hit our homeland. And if you don’t take care of it, I will.’ ‘What would you do?’ the president asked. It had to be the second option, Graham said. You can’t let them have that capability. Number one is too risky. The president leaned toward [H.R.] McMaster. ‘What do you think?’ ’I think he’s right,’ the national security adviser said. ‘If it gets to be a mature threat,’ Graham said, don’t let us [Congress] just sit on the sidelines and bitch and moan. If you had the evidence, the day that they come in and tell you that, you call the congressional leadership up and say, I may have to use force here. Let me tell you why I want your backing to use force against North Korea. If we had a vote that was decisive and you had that authorization in your back pocket, it may prevent you from having to use it.’ ‘That’d be very provocative,’ Priebus said. ‘It’s menat to be provocative.’ Graham said. ‘You only do it as a last result.’ ‘That will get everyone worried and excited,’ Priebus said. ‘I don’t give a shit who I make nervous,’ Trump said.” (Woodward, Fear, pp. 100-02)
North Korea said that it was barring all Malaysians from leaving the country until there is a “fair settlement” of a dispute over the assassination in Kuala Lumpur of Kim Jong-nam. Malaysia responded in kind, with Prime Minister Najib Razak instructing the police to prevent all North Koreans from leaving Malaysia until he was assured of the safety of Malaysians in North Korea. The developments were a dramatic escalation in the diplomatic dispute over Kim’s killing, in which the Malaysian police have said that several North Koreans are suspects. Khalid Abu Bakar, Malaysia’s top police official, confirmed at a news conference that at least two suspects had taken refuge at the North Korean Embassy and that North Korea had refused a request to hand them over. “The North Korean authorities are not cooperating with us in this investigation,” he said. He said the police would wait as long as necessary to arrest Kim, the airline employee, and Ri, if he is there. “If it takes five years, we will wait outside,” he said. “Definitely somebody will come out.” North Korea’s statement on Tuesday described the exit ban as temporary. But Pyongyang has been accused of playing hostage politics before, partly to complicate negotiations over its nuclear arms and missile development. In 2014, North Korea said it would reopen an investigation into Japanese citizens it was accused of abducting during the Cold War, but it halted that inquiry last year in retaliation for sanctions imposed by Japan over a rocket launch. Duyeon Kim, a Seoul-based nonresident fellow at Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, said on Tuesday that North Korea was “playing dirty and not diplomatically, apparently hoping this might force Malaysia to reverse its findings” about Kim’s killing. Today’s developments follow the tit-for-tat expulsion of ambassadors between the two countries. Kang Chol, North Korea’s ambassador to Malaysia, was expelled on yesterday over what Malaysia considered to be insulting comments. North Korea responded by formally expelling Malaysia’s ambassador, Mohamad Nizan Mohamad, though he had already been recalled to Malaysia for consultations. (Richard C. Paddock, “North Korea, Citing Kim Jong-nam Dispute, Blocks Malaysians from Exiting,” New York Times, March 7, 2017)
As part of a settlement for breaking sanctions and selling electronics to Iran and North Korea, ZTE agreed to plead guilty and pay $1.19 billion in fines, the United States Department of Commerce said in an announcement. The penalty is the largest criminal fine in a United States sanctions case. The action is the latest in a series of skirmishes between the United States and China over technology policy. It also offered a chance for President Trump’s young administration to make a statement about the seriousness of United States sanctions. In addition to ZTE, the Commerce Department is also investigating the company’s larger Chinese rival, Huawei, for violating United States sanctions. “We are putting the world on notice: The games are over,” said Commerce Secretary Wilbur L. Ross. “Those who flout our economic sanctions and export control laws will not go unpunished — they will suffer the harshest of consequences.” ZTE was found to have breached United States sanctions against Iran by selling American-made goods to the country last March. At the time, the Commerce Department said it would force American companies to obtain a special license to sell to ZTE, which makes smartphones and telecommunications infrastructure equipment. The restrictions would have had the potential to cripple ZTE’s supply chain. The ban, however, was never put in place, and instead the Chinese company was given a series of reprieves. Still, ZTE, which is China’s second-largest maker of telecom equipment, has not fared well over the past year. Its revenue from the expansion of China’s 4G cellular networks has slowed and its smartphone business has faced major competition from new Chinese handset makers, as well as Huawei. Today, the Commerce Department said that along with selling prohibited American electronics to build Iran’s telecom networks, ZTE also made 283 shipments of microprocessors, servers and routers to North Korea, violating American embargoes in that country as well. “ZTE engaged in an elaborate scheme to acquire U.S.-origin items, send the items to Iran and mask its involvement in those exports,” said the acting assistant attorney general, Mary B. McCord. “The plea agreement alleges that the highest levels of management within the company approved the scheme.” She added that ZTE repeatedly lied to and misled federal investigators, its own lawyers and internal investigators. In a statement, ZTE said that it had strengthened its compliance policies and undergone a shake-up of top leaders; the company named a new chief executive last April. “ZTE acknowledges the mistakes it made, takes responsibility for them and remains committed to positive change in the company,” said Zhao Xianming, chairman and chief executive of ZTE. It is unclear whether the Commerce Department has completed its investigations into Chinese telecom equipment makers. In a rare step accompanying the announcement last March, the Commerce Department provided two internal ZTE documents. One, from 2011 and signed by several senior ZTE executives, detailed how the company had “ongoing projects in all five major embargoed countries — Iran, Sudan, North Korea, Syria and Cuba.” Another document laid out in a complex flow chart a method for circumventing United States export controls. Citing an unnamed company as a model for circumventing United States sanctions, that second document seemed to implicate ZTE’s more politically important rival, Huawei. The New York Times reported last year that the United States government was also investigating whether Huawei broke export controls. The Commerce Department subpoenaed Huawei, demanding it turn over all information regarding the export or re-export of American technology to Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. Huawei has said it is committed to complying with laws and regulations where it operates. Huawei and ZTE are private companies, but they have deep ties to the Chinese government, in part because they supply much of the equipment that makes the country’s telecom backbone function. (Paul Mozur and Cecilia Kang, “U.S. Fines Chinese Electronics Company ZTE for Breaching Sanctions,” New York Times, March 8, 2017, p. B-3)
3/8/17:
China, fearing a rapid escalation of tension on the Korean peninsula, called on North Korea on to top its nuclear and missile tests and for South Korea and the United States to stop joint military drills and seek talks instead. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the tests by the North and the joint drills across the border in South Korea were causing tension to increase like two “accelerating trains coming toward each other.” At his annual news conference on the sidelines of the meeting of China’s parliament in Beijing, Wang said, “China’s suggestion is, as a first step, for North Korea to suspend nuclear and missile activities, and for the U.S. and South Korea to also suspend large-scale military drills.” Such a “dual suspension” would allow all sides to return to the negotiating table, Wang said. “Holding nuclear weapons won’t bring security, using military force won’t be a way out,” Wang said. “There remains a chance of resuming talks, there is still hope for peace.” (Ben Blanchard, “China Asks North Korea to Stop Missile Tests, Tells U.S. and South to Seek Talks,” Reuters, March 8, 2017)
Wang Yi press conference: “Reuters: The situation on the Korean Peninsula at the moment is extremely tense. North Korea has again test missiles this week. Does China think there will be war on the Korean Peninsula? What is China’s strategy for preventing war from breaking out?
Wang Yi: Once again, tensions are rising on the Korean Peninsula. On the one hand, the DPRK has ignored international opposition and insisted on advancing its nuclear and missile programs in violation of Security Council resolutions. On the other hand, the US and the ROK are conducting military exercises of an enormous scale and putting more military pressure on the DPRK. The two sides are like two accelerating trains coming towards each other with neither side willing to give way. The question is, are the two sides really ready for a head-on collision? Given the situation, our priority now is to flash the red light and apply brakes on both trains. To defuse the looming crisis on the peninsula, China proposes that, as a first step, the DPRK suspend its missile and nuclear activities in exchange for a halt of the large-scale US-ROK exercises. This suspension-for-suspension can help us break out of the security dilemma and bring the parties back to the negotiating table. Then we can follow the dual-track approach of denuclearizing the peninsula on the one hand and establishing a peace mechanism on the other. Only by addressing the parties’ concerns in a synchronized and reciprocal manner, can we find a fundamental solution to lasting peace and stability on the peninsula. China’s proposal, fully in keeping with resolutions 2270 and 2321, tries to get to the crux of the matter. To resolve the nuclear issue, we have to walk on both legs, which means not just implementing sanctions, but also restarting talks, both of which are set out in the Security Council resolutions. The nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula is mainly between the DPRK and the United States. China is a next-door neighbor with a lips-and-teeth relationship with the peninsula, so we’re indispensable to the resolution of the nuclear issue. China has a strong commitment to denuclearizing the peninsula, to maintaining stability there and to resolving the issues peacefully. Indeed, China has done its level best to bring the DPRK and the US together and to chair the Six-Party Talks. We’ve also contributed to the adoption and implementation of Security Council resolutions. Going forward, to continue my earlier railway metaphor, China will continue to be a “switch-man”. We will try to switch the issue back to the track of seeking a negotiated settlement. And I wish to emphasize that nuclear weapons will not bring security, the use of force is no solution, talks deserve another chance and peace is still within our grasp.” (Embassy of China Press Office, Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press, Transcript, March 8, 2017)
China tried unsuccessfully to calm newly volatile tensions on the Korean Peninsula, proposing that North Korea freeze nuclear and missile programs in exchange for a halt to major military exercises by American and South Korean forces. The proposal was rejected hours later by the United States and South Korea. “We have to see some sort of positive action by North Korea before we can take them seriously,” Nikki R. Haley, the United States ambassador to the United Nations, told reporters after a Security Council meeting in New York on the escalating Korea crisis. Standing beside her, Cho Tae-yul, the South Korean ambassador, said, “This is not the time for us to talk about freezing or dialogue with North Korea.” “The two sides are like two accelerating trains coming toward each other, and neither side is willing to give way,” Wang said. “The question is: Are both sides really prepared for a head-on collision?” But in what appeared to be a hardening American position on North Korea, Haley said the United States was re-evaluating its approach to the country and its unpredictable young leader, Kim Jong-un, whom she described as “not rational.” “I can tell you we’re not ruling anything out, and we’re considering every option,” Haley said after the Security Council meeting, flanked by Cho and Japan’s ambassador to the United Nations, Bessho Koro. At the same time, Haley sought to reassure China publicly that the United States meant no harm by moving ahead with the deployment of a defensive missile shield system in South Korea, after North Korea’s missile launch on March 6. China has condemned the missile shield as a provocation by the Americans that risked a new arms race in the region. Doubts that Wang’s idea would gain traction were not surprising. North Korea made a similar offer in 2015 that went nowhere. Wang’s proposal was China’s latest attempt to regain the initiative on the nuclear issue, which has bedeviled Beijing’s efforts to stay friends with both North and South Korea and prove itself a mature regional power broker. “The current situation is a challenge for the Chinese government’s diplomacy,” said Cheng Xiaohe, an associate professor at Renmin University in Beijing who specializes in North Korea. “The situation in the East Asian region is increasingly complicated, and the possibility of a diplomatic solution to the nuclear missile issue is increasingly slim,” he said, referring to North Korea’s nuclear arms program. Reining in North Korea has also become a focus for the Trump administration’s dealings with China. Starting next week, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson is to visit Japan, South Korea and China for talks that will focus on “the advancing nuclear and missile threat” from North Korea, the State Department said. North Korea’s weapons advancements have reached a point where “we do need to look at other alternatives,” Mark C. Toner, a spokesman for the State Department, told reporters in Washington yesterday. “And that’s part of what this trip is about, that we’re going to talk to our allies and partners in the region to try to generate a new approach to North Korea.” But bringing the countries into agreement over initial steps toward peace will not be easy, especially while China is also in a deepening dispute with South Korea and the Trump administration. At the same news conference where he laid out his proposal, Wang stuck to China’s fierce opposition to the missile defense system the United States began assembling in South Korea this week, known as THAAD, or Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense. “It’s common knowledge that the monitoring and early warning radius of THAAD reaches far beyond the Korean Peninsula and compromises China’s strategic security,” Wang said at the news conference, which was part of a regular round of briefings during China’s annual legislative session. “It’s not the way that neighbors should treat each other, and it may very well make South Korea less secure.” American and South Korean officials say that that is untrue, and that China should instead focus on halting North Korea’s threats. Wang’s proposal for mutual suspensions was an attempt to give new life to China’s long-running efforts to tamp down confrontation between North and South Korea. China is the North’s only major economic and security partner, but it has also developed strong economic and political ties with South Korea that the missile defense system threatens to rupture. China’s rift with South Korea and the United States over the missile defense system is likely to embolden North Korea, making it more confident that Beijing would not turn on it, said Shen Dingli, a professor at Fudan University in Shanghai who specializes in nuclear proliferation issues. “The deployment of THAAD has led to a serious deterioration in Chinese-South Korean relations, so North Korea is delighted with that,” Dr. Shen said in an interview. North Korea appears to have passed the point where it would abandon its nuclear arms, he said. “There’s no solution to this, because North Korea won’t give up its nuclear weapons.” But Wang said negotiations were the only acceptable way to resolve the dispute. “To resolve the nuclear issue, we have to walk on both legs,” he said, “which means not just implementing sanctions, but also restarting talks.” North Korea’s ties to the global financial system are also under renewed pressure. Today, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, or Swift, issued a statement saying it had recently moved to ban North Korean banks from accessing its platform. Swift operates as part of the backbone of global bank payment processing by providing a communication platform used by central banks and financial institutions around the world. Several North Korean banks that were subject to sanctions by both the United Nations and the United States had continued as recently as last year to find ways to access the Swift network, according to a report by a United Nations expert panel that was published last week. Swift said it was responding to an enforcement action by the authorities in Belgium, where Swift is based, but it did not say when it moved to block the North Korean banks from its service. (Chris Buckley and Somini Sengupta, “China Is Rebuffed over Suggestion for Defusing Korean Tensions,” New York Times, March 9, 2017,
Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations on Wednesday rejected calls for opening negotiations with North Korea to defuse escalating tensions, saying North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is “not a rational person.” Amb. Nikki Haley also turned down China’s suggestion that the U.S. halt annual joint military exercises with South Korea in exchange for Pyongyang’s suspension of its nuclear and missile activities. She also said the U.S. is reviewing all options on the table. “I appreciate all of my counterparts wanting to talk about talks and negotiations. We are not dealing with a rational person. If this was any other country, we would be talking about that and it wouldn’t be an issue. This is not a rational person who has not had rational acts, who is not thinking clearly,” Haley told reporters after an emergency U.N. Security Council meeting on North Korea. But State Department spokesman Mark Toner said Haley’s point was that the North’s “behavior” has not been rational. He also said the U.S. remains open to dialogue with the North with the aim of returning to credible and authentic negotiations on denuclearization, and the North should take meaningful actions toward the goal. “Efforts up until today, whether it’s six party talks, whether it’s sanctions, all of the efforts that we have taken thus far to attempt to persuade North Korea to, again, engage in meaningful negotiations, have fallen short, to be honest. So we need to look at new ways to convince them, to persuade them that it’s in their interest,” he said. (Yonhap, “U.S. Envoy: N. Korea Leader ‘Not Rational Person’ to Talk to,” March 8, 2017)
DPRK FoMin spokesman gave the following answer to a question raised by KCNA “as regards the fact that the U.S. and its vassal forces are moving to take issue with the ballistic rocket launching drill staged by the Korean People’s Army (KPA): The ballistic rocket launching drill conducted by the Hwasong artillery units of the Strategic Force of the KPA this time is a routine one to resolutely frustrate the ever more undisguised nuclear war racket of the U.S. and other hostile forces and honorably defend the security of the country and nation. The U.S. and south Korean puppet forces kicked off the joint military maneuvers aimed at a preemptive nuclear strike against the DPRK only to push the situation to the brink of a nuclear war. It is a just self-defensive right of a sovereign state to keep highly alert as required by the grim situation in which an actual war may break out anytime and to consolidate powerful deterrence in every way to mercilessly wipe out the aggressors. Nevertheless, the U.S. and other hostile forces are openly conducting the drills for a real war aimed at a preemptive nuclear strike against the DPRK by mobilizing lots of strategic assets and armed forces. They let the UN Security Council release a press statement, labeling KPA’s routine drill as “threat”. It is a brigandish act like a thief crying “stop thief!” The DPRK categorically rejects the press statement of the UNSC as it wantonly violated sovereign state’s rights to self-defense. It is the unanimous view of the fair-minded international community that the largest-ever nuclear war drills launched by the U.S. in league with the south Korean puppet forces are the root cause of pushing the DPRK to take the toughest action. The DPRK has already clarified several times that the joint military drills are potentially dangerous as they will wreck peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and screw up regional tensions. So, it filed complaint with the UNSC against the war games this time, too. How to deal with the complaint and the ill-intended maneuvers of the U.S. and its vassal forces will be a marked occasion for the UNSC to show the international community whether the UNSC regarding it as its mission to preserve global peace and security fulfils its responsibility or not. As already clarified, the KPA will reduce the bases of aggression and provocation to ashes with its invincible Hwasong rockets tipped with nuclear warheads and reliably defend the security of the country and its people’s happiness in case the U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces fire even a single bullet at the territory of the DPRK. The DPRK will certainly preserve its peace and security with its own efforts and positively contribute to protecting global peace and security.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK FM Rejects Press Statement of UNSC,” March 8, 2017)
When the United States began deploying a missile defense system in South Korea this week, it was to protect an ally long threatened by North Korean provocations. But it was instantly met by angry Chinese warnings that the United States is setting off a new arms race in a region already on edge over the North’s drive to build a nuclear arsenal. China condemned the new antimissile system as a dangerous opening move in what it called America’s grand strategy to set up similar defenses across Asia, threatening to tilt the balance of power there against Beijing. The tensions are testing the new Trump administration and its uneasy allies South Korea and Japan, which have complained for years that China has simultaneously chastised and coddled the North, refusing to enact stiff enough measures to force it to abandon its nuclear and missile programs. But with the beginning of work to install the antimissile system, the delicate international cooperation against North Korea is splintering: Beijing is expressing more concern about American intentions in the region than about the dangers of the North’s latest surge in nuclear and missile testing. The dual approach seemed evident today when China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, said, “The two sides are like two accelerating trains coming toward each other, and neither side is willing to give way.” “Our priority now is to flash the red light and apply brakes,” Wang said at a news conference in Beijing. He said that North Korea should suspend its nuclear and missile activities and that in exchange, South Korea and the United States should suspend large-scale joint military exercises, laying the way to new negotiations with North Korea. President Trump got personally engaged in the problem on March 6, after North Korea launched four ballistic missiles, aimed toward Japan, that the North Koreans later described as practice for hitting American bases there. Japan’s prime minister, Abe Shinzo, said he spoke with Trump for 25 minutes, adding, “I appreciate that the United States is showing that all the options are on the table,” usually code words for raising the possibility of a military response. To conservatives in South Korea’s crisis-racked government, the antimissile system is exactly the kind of strong action needed to counter the North’s belligerence and demonstrate unity with Trump, who had suggested during the campaign that Asian nations needed to do far more to defend themselves. But South Korea remains deeply divided about the one response already underway: the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System, or THAAD. It is designed to intercept short- and medium-range missiles, but not the kind of intercontinental missiles that the North says it is developing to reach the United States. Many South Koreans oppose it and worry about China’s moves to block South Korean imports because of Beijing’s continued insistence that THAAD is aimed at containing Chinese power, not the missile capabilities of Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader. Japan is urging stronger American action, but remains uncertain about how much it wants to commit when a conflict with the North — deliberate or accidental — once again looks like a real possibility. The combination of military and diplomatic tensions suddenly unleashed in Asia comes before Trump’s full national security team is in place, and before it has a well-thought-out strategy. Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, who will travel to the region next week — stopping in Tokyo; Seoul, South Korea; and Beijing — has never dealt with a proliferation problem like this one. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has already been to Seoul on one visit, but was there mostly to reassure the country that, despite Trump’s statements last year, the United States remains committed to its defense. The new national security adviser, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, has focused more on counterinsurgency than dealing with the peculiar problem of a nuclear-armed failing state. In three meetings at the White House — more than on any other foreign policy problem — the National Security Council deputies have considered a range of options, and have already come to the predictable conclusion that a dramatic show of force, like attacks on the North’s missile and nuclear sites, would probably start a war. The New York Times reported this weekend that the Obama administration had created a cyber- and electronic-warfare program to slow the North’s missile tests, but that it was unclear how effective it had been, particularly in recent months. The North Koreans have made the most of this period of uncertainty and transition. Their sped-up testing seems intended to send a message that they can overwhelm antimissile defenses, deploying missiles faster than the United States and its allies can put countermeasures in place. And they hold an ace card: an ability to destroy Seoul with artillery buried in the mountains just north of the Demilitarized Zone, a remnant of the Korean War. In the North’s view, the American rush to put missile defenses around it only splits the global community, pushing China and Russia closer to Pyongyang, as American officials acknowledge. Tillerson is focused on ways to pressure China, while trying to set up a first meeting between President Xi Jinping and Trump. But the two nations’ leaders are conducting a balancing act. Xi’s is the hardest, trying to weigh his opposition to North Korea’s nuclear program against his conviction that a North Korean collapse would be far worse. The Trump administration is measuring how hard it can press Beijing. It is mulling negotiations to “freeze” the North’s nuclear arsenal, but that would also acknowledge it as a fact. “You may not want to acknowledge that North Korea has 12 or 20 weapons,” said Robert Litwak of the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, the author of the new study “Preventing North Korea’s Nuclear Breakout,” “but wouldn’t a freeze be better than looking at 100 weapons a few years from now?” That is exactly the debate taking place in the White House, as Trump’s aides try to figure out their alternatives, including changing the security landscape with a major military buildup or, if needed, an open conflict with North Korea. The current, slow-burning crisis arose not from one episode, but from Kim’s broader strategy over the past year: to accelerate the pace of nuclear and missile tests so his arsenal becomes a fait accompli, something the United States cannot hope to reverse. When North Korea launched four Scud-ER ballistic missiles on March 6, it tried to demonstrate an ability to simultaneously launch multiple missiles at American bases in Japan and at American aircraft carriers around the Korean Peninsula, South Korean military officials said yesterday. The ability to launch a barrage of missiles increases the chances of breaching an antimissile shield. But the types of midrange missiles North Korea has launched in recent months — including the Scud-ERs, with a 620-mile range — pose another problem for South Korea. Some of the missiles have been launched at a steep angle to achieve a higher altitude and return to earth at high speed, techniques that appear intended to complicate intercepting them. American military officials said the recent tests were a particular concern because they illustrated Pyongyang’s ability to carry out a salvo of launches and on very short notice. “What we saw this weekend was demonstration of a near-term simultaneous launch,” said Vice Adm. James D. Syring, the director of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency. “That is something beyond what we have seen in the past.” For Washington and Seoul, the rush to field THADD is as much about politics as missile interception. American officials have repeatedly warned China that its failure to rein in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs would force the United States to deploy missile defenses in the region. Seoul’s interim government wants to deploy the antimissile system before a progressive leader, skeptical of the deployment, can take power in a coming presidential election. But progressives have held deep reservations about the THAAD deployment, seeing it as part of the United States’ effort to wrap the South into an anti-China coalition and arms race. They have already mounted a case against it. Yesterday, Woo Sang-ho, the floor leader of the main opposition Democratic Party, warned, “Our business are dying; our people residing in China are being threatened.” Hong Ik-pyo, a senior policy maker in the opposition, said the THAAD deployment would do more harm than good for South Korea, whose economy depends on exports for growth and reaps a huge annual trade surplus with China. “They say this is only to defend us from North Korea, but everyone knows this is part of the American missile defense plan,” Hong said. “China sees the THAAD deployment in South Korea the way the Americans saw the Cuban missile crisis in the 1960s.” Chinese leaders have struggled to grapple with the unpredictable styles of Kim and Trump. Now there are fears that the North might take advantage of the political discord to move ahead with its nuclear weapons program. “They have seized this opportunity, knowing that U.S. and China are clashing,” said Cheng Xiaohe, an associate professor of international studies at Renmin University in Beijing. In recent weeks, China has shown signs of toughening its stance on North Korea, including banning imports of coal from the North. Criticism of the North has also sharpened. Yesterday, a state-run newspaper warned that North Korea should give up its weapons or “face long-lasting isolation and pressure.” Yet policy makers in Beijing failed to grasp how Washington and its allies regarded North Korea’s nuclear program as getting closer to a dangerous threshold of being able to place a warhead on an intercontinental ballistic missile, said Paul Haenle, the director of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center at Tsinghua University in Beijing. “That’s a game-changer,” he added. (David E. Sanger, Choe Sang-hun, Chris Buckley, and Michael R. Gordon, “Korea Tensions Present Trump with Early Test,” New York Times, March 8, 2017,
Rattled by North Korean military advances, influential Japanese lawmakers are pushing harder for Japan to develop the ability to strike preemptively at the missile facilities of its nuclear-armed neighbor. Japan has so far avoided taking the controversial and costly step of acquiring bombers or weapons such as cruise missiles with enough range to strike other countries, relying instead on its U.S. ally to take the fight to its enemies. “If bombers attacked us or warships bombarded us, we would fire back. Striking a country lobbing missiles at us is no different,” said Onodera Itsunori, a former defense minister who heads a ruling Liberal Democratic Party committee looking at how Japan can defend against the North Korean missile threat. “Technology has advanced and the nature of conflict has changed.” For decades, Japan has been stretching the limits of its postwar, pacifist Constitution. Successive governments have said Tokyo has the right to attack enemy bases overseas when the enemy’s intention to attack Japan is evident, the threat is imminent and there are no other defense options. But while previous administrations shied away from acquiring the hardware to do so, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s LDP has been urging him to consider the step. “It is time we acquired the capability,” said Imazu Hiroshi, chairman of the LDP’s policy council on security. “I don’t know whether that would be with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles or even the F-35 (fighter bomber), but without a deterrence North Korea will see us as weak.”The idea has faced stiff resistance in the past but the latest round of North Korean tests means Japan may move more swiftly to enact a tougher defense policy. “We have already done the groundwork on how we could acquire a strike capability,” said a source with knowledge of Japan’s military planning. Any weapon Japan acquired with the reach to hit North Korea would also put parts of China’s eastern seaboard within range of Japanese munitions for the first time. That would likely anger Beijing. “China has missiles that can hit Japan, so any complaints it may have are not likely to garner much sympathy in the international community,” said Onodera. Currently, more than three missiles at once would be too many for Japan’s already stretched ballistic missile defense to cope with, another source familiar with Japan’s capability said. One serious concern for Japan is North Korea’s development of solid fuel systems demonstrated last month that will allow it to conceal preparations for missile strikes because it no longer needs to fuel its missiles just prior to firing. That test also demonstrated a cold launch, with the rocket ejected from its launcher before engine ignition, minimizing damage to the mobile launch pads. Japanese officials also noted that the launch truck was equipped with tracks rather than wheels, allowing it to hide off road. Japan is already improving its ballistic missile defenses with longer-range, more accurate sea-based missiles on Aegis destroyers in the Sea of Japan and from next month will start a $1 billion (114 billion yen) upgrade of its ground-based PAC-3 Patriot batteries. Also under consideration is a land-based version of the Aegis system or the THAAD system. Those changes, however, will take years to complete and may not be enough to keep pace with rocket technology advances by Pyongyang, the sources said. A quicker option would be for Japan to deploy ground-to-ground missiles to defend against an attack on its Yonaguni island near Taiwan fired from bases on Japanese territory several hundred kilometers to the east. A missile with that range could also hit sites in North Korea. Japan could also buy precision air launched missiles such as Lockheed Martin Corp.’s extended-range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) or the shorter-range Joint Strike missile designed by Norway’s Kongsberg Defense Aerospace AS for the F-35 fighter jet. But with limited capability to track mobile launchers, some Japanese officials still fear any strike would leave North Korea with enough rockets to retaliate with a mass attack. “A strike could be justified as self-defense, but we have to consider the response that could provoke,” said another LDP lawmaker. (Reuters, “As Missile Threat Grows, Japanese Lawmakers Debate 1st Strike Options,” Asahi Shimbun, March 8, 2017)
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While the Trump administration is exploring strategies to thwart North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, former U.S. officials who dealt with the communist state extensively offer mixed views on how to achieve that goal. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed Wednesday to halt the military drills in exchange for North Korea freezing nuclear and missile programs, a proposition that has been rejected by the United States and South Korea. Speaking to reporters after attending a U.N. Security Council meeting over the launches, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, said the regime must take “positive action” before it can be taken seriously. She made her remarks a week before U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is scheduled to make his first trip to Asia, where North Korea is likely to top his agenda. Although former U.S. nuclear envoys who participated in direct talks with the North appear to agree that dialogue with North Korea may not be possible in the near future, they differ on whether the U.S. should pursue negotiations as part of its long-term policy. Christopher Hill, who served as the head of the U.S. delegation to the six-party talks, which stalled in 2008 during the George W. Bush administration, raised doubts about the regime’s willingness to discuss denuclearization. “I’m very pessimistic about talks, but I think we should leave the door open to talks,” Hill said during an interview with VOA Wednesday. “North Korea indicates no interest in doing away with its nuclear weapons. On the contrary, their interest is in enhancing their nuclear arsenals,” added the former envoy, now the dean of Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. Hill stressed that any future talks with North Korea must be based on what the country has already agreed to, referring to a nuclear deal in 2005 in which Pyongyang promised to give up its nuclear weapons programs. The envoy called for U.S. efforts to strengthen relations with regional allies and engage China to try to narrow differences on the North. James Kelly, a former assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs who also led the U.S. negotiation team in the Bush administration, called on the Trump administration to put all options on the table, describing the current standoff with the North as “very dangerous.” Kelly believes the Trump administration could consider talks as an option, but cautioned against direct engagement with the North, saying it could undermine the administration’s coordination with U.S. allies. Critics argue pressure alone would not resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Robert Gallucci, who was the top U.S. negotiator when the first North Korean nuclear crisis broke in the early 1990s, said the U.S. should seek an opportunity to engage North Korea without any precondition. “I think the smart thing would be at some point to agree to have talks without preconditions, and then talk about what both sides want to discuss,” said Gallucci in an interview with VOA. Sanctions would not change Pyongyang’s course on its nuclear weapons, Gallucci said. “I am opposed to the idea that we imagine that sanctions are going to be so effective that they are going to stop the North Korean behavior that we don’t like, or maybe even they are going to be so effective, they will cause the regime to collapse,” he said. Joseph DeTrani, who served as envoy for the nuclear talks from 2003 to 2005 during the Bush administration, told VOA the Trump administration should rein in the North’s provocative behavior, while seeking talks to try to slow the country’s nuclear development. “I think it’s important for North Korea to understand that there are consequences when they violate U.N. Security Council resolutions and launch missiles as they recently did,” said the envoy, who currently is the president of the Daniel Morgan Graduate School on National Security in Washington, DC. DeTrani suggested the Trump administration should try “exploratory talks” with Pyongyang to test if the country has any intention of freezing its nuclear weapons programs in exchange for easing sanctions or a security guarantee. Recently, The Wall Street Journal reported the Trump security team is considering military action against the North as part of a review of its policy toward Pyongyang. However, whether such a plan is viable remains unclear. Adm. Samuel Locklear, the former head of U.S. Pacific Command in the Obama administration, told VOA this week the U.S. should not rule out any possibility, including the use of military force, in its dealing with North Korea. Retired Adm. William Fallon, who also commanded U.S. forces in the Pacific in the Bush administration, however, showed skepticism about using force, telling VOA he “would not go down that road.” (Jenny Lee, “U.S. Policy toward North Korea: More Pressure or Dialogue?” VOA, March 10, 2017)
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A South Korean court removed the president, a first in the nation’s history, rattling the delicate balance of relationships across Asia at a particularly tense time. Eight justices of the Constitutional Court unanimously decided to unseat Park for committing “acts that violated the Constitution and laws” throughout her time in office, Acting Chief Justice Lee Jung-mi said in a ruling that was nationally broadcast. Park’s acts “betrayed the trust of the people and were of the kind that cannot be tolerated for the sake of protecting the Constitution.” Her removal capped months of turmoil, as hundreds of thousands of South Koreans took to the streets, week after week, to protest a sprawling corruption scandal that shook the top echelons of business and government. Park Geun-hye, the nation’s first female president and the daughter of the Cold War military dictator Park Chung-hee, had been an icon of the conservative establishment that joined Washington in pressing for a hard line against North Korea’s nuclear provocations. Now, her downfall is expected to shift South Korean politics to the opposition, whose leaders want more engagement with North Korea and are wary of a major confrontation in the region. They say they will re-examine the country’s joint strategy on North Korea with the United States and defuse tensions with China, which has sounded alarms about the growing American military footprint in Asia. As the verdict was announced, silence fell over thousands of Park supporters who rallied near the courthouse waving South Korean flags. Soon, they tried to march on the court and called for “destroying” it. When the police blocked them, some of the mostly elderly protesters attacked the officers with flagpoles, hurling water bottles and pieces of the sidewalk pavement. Two pro-Park demonstrators, ages 60 and 72, died during the unrest. Park did not comment on the ruling, and remained in the presidential palace after her removal from power. But In Myung-jin, leader of Park’s Liberty Korea Party, said he “humbly respected” the ruling. With the immunity conferred by her office now gone, Park, 65, faces prosecutors seeking to charge her with bribery, extortion and abuse of power in connection with allegations of conspiring with a confidante, her childhood friend Choi Soon-sil, to collect tens of millions of dollars in bribes from companies like Samsung.
By law, the country must elect a new president within 60 days. The acting president, Hwang Kyo-ahn, an ally of Park’s, will remain in office in the interim. After the ruling, Hwang called key ministers to put the nation on a heightened state of military readiness, saying the lack of a president represented a national “emergency.” He also warned North Korea against making “additional provocations.” The last time a South Korean leader was removed from office under popular pressure was in 1960, when the police fired on crowds calling for President Syngman Rhee to step down. (Rhee, a dictator, fled into exile in Hawaii and died there.) In a sign of how far South Korea’s young democracy has evolved, Park was removed without any violence, after large, peaceful protests in recent months demanding that she step down. In addition to the swell of popular anger, the legislature and the judiciary — two institutions that have been weaker than the presidency historically — were crucial to the outcome. “This is a miracle, a new milestone in the strengthening and institutionalizing of democracy in South Korea,” said Kang Won-taek, a political scientist at Seoul National University. When crowds took to the streets, they were not just seeking to remove a leader who had one year left in office. They were also rebelling against a political order that had held South Korea together for decades but is now fracturing under pressures both at home and abroad, analysts said. Park’s father ruled South Korea from 1961 to 1979. He founded its economic growth model, which transformed the nation into an export powerhouse and allowed the emergence of family-controlled conglomerates known as chaebol that benefited from tax cuts and anti-labor policies. Park was elected in 2012 with the support of older conservative South Koreans who revered her father for the country’s breakneck economic growth. But the nexus of industry and political power gave rise to collusive ties, highlighted by the scandal that led to Park’s fall. The scandal also swept up the de facto head of Samsung, Lee Jae-yong, who was indicted on charges of bribing Park and her confidante, Choi. Samsung, the nation’s largest conglomerate, has been tainted by corruption before. But the company has been considered too important to the economy for any of its top leaders to spend time behind bars — until now. The jailing of Lee, who is facing trial, is another potent sign that the old order is not holding. In the wake of the Park scandal, all political parties have vowed to curtail presidential power to pardon chaebol tycoons convicted of white-collar crimes. They also promised to stop chaebol chairmen from helping their children amass fortunes through dubious means, like forcing their companies to do exclusive business with the children’s businesses. With the conservatives discredited — and no leading conservative candidate to succeed Park — the left could take power for the first time in a decade. The dominant campaign issues will probably be North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and South Korea’s relations with the United States and China. If the opposition takes power, it may try to revive its old “sunshine policy” of building ties with North Korea through aid and exchanges, an approach favored by China. That would complicate Washington’s efforts to isolate the North at a time other Asian nations like the Philippines are gravitating toward Beijing. Moon Jae-in, the Democratic Party leader who is leading in opinion surveys, has said that a decade of applying sanctions on North Korea had failed to stop its nuclear weapons programs. He has said that sanctions are necessary, but that “their goal should be to draw North Korea back to the negotiating table.” He believes that Park’s decision to allow the deployment of the American missile defense system — known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD — has dragged the country into the dangerous and growing rivalry between Washington and Beijing; China has called the system a threat to its security and taken steps to punish South Korea economically for accepting it. Conservative South Koreans see the deployment of the antimissile system not only as a guard against the North but also as a symbolic reaffirmation of the all-important alliance with the United States. Moon’s party demands that the deployment, which began this week, be suspended immediately. If it takes power, it says it will review the deployment of the antimissile system to determine if it is in South Korea’s best interest. As South Korea has learned, it cannot always keep Washington and Beijing happy at the same time, as in the case of the country’s decision to accept the American missile defenses. Park’s impeachment was also a pushback against “Cold War conservatives” like her father, who seized on Communist threats from North Korea to hide their corruption and silence political opponents, said Kim Dong-choon, a sociologist at Sungkonghoe University in Seoul. Park’s father tortured and executed dissidents, framing them with spying charges. Now, his daughter faces charges that her government blacklisted thousands of unfriendly artists and writers. “Her removal means that the curtain is finally drawing on the authoritarian political and economic order that has dominated South Korea for decades,” said Ahn Byong-jin, rector of the Global Academy for Future Civilizations at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. Analysts cautioned that political and economic change will come slowly. As Moon put it recently: “We need a national cleanup. We need to liquidate the old system and build a new South Korea. Only then can we complete the revolution started by the people who rallied with candlelight.” (Choe Sang-hun, “Leader Is Ousted in South Korea,” New York Times, March 10, 2017,
Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers and the U.S. military’s Carrier Strike Group 1, comprising the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, destroyers, supply and other ships, have been conducting a joint exercise in the East China Sea since Tuesday, according to multiple government sources. It is unusual for the U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and the MSDF to conduct a joint exercise in that sea. The USS Carl Vinson has conducted patrols in the South China Sea since mid-February, putting strong pressure on China. The aircraft carrier was traveling in the East China Sea toward the sea around South Korea to join a U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Japan, U.S. Conduct Joint Military Exercise,” March 10, 2017)
KPA Strategic Force spokesman’s statement: “The U.S. and its vassal forces are running around like a chicken with its head cut off following the ballistic rocket launching drill conducted by Hwasong artillery units of the Strategic Force of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) on March 6. It is against this backdrop that the UN Security Council, at the instigation of the U.S., Japan and the south Korean puppet forces, made public a press release terming the KPA’s ballistic rocket launching drill as “threat” and “violation of resolution”, after discarding international justice and impartiality once again. … There is no country in the world whose army responsible for the defense of the state takes into account the approval by the UN or article of the international convention when staging exercises and it does not make sense to claim that the KPA’s rocket launching drill becomes a threat to world peace and security. …We have never acknowledged the illegal “resolution” cooked up by the U.S. and its vassal forces. The aggressors and provokers keen on holding the largest-ever nuclear war drills against the north after massively introducing nuclear strike means in and around the Korean peninsula are finding fault with the regular and just drill of the KPA for defending sovereignty. This is nothing but a strange act like a thief crying “stop thief.” No matter what rhetoric the aggressors and provokers may make, our Strategic Force will more perfectly arm itself with our-style rockets of super precision and intelligence and further round off the Juche-based rocket strike war methods. The U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces should clearly bear in mind that our warning that if a single bullet is fired into the areas where the sovereignty of the DPRK is exercised, it will blow up the bases of aggression and provocation with the matchless Hwasong artillery pieces mounted with nuclear warheads, is not hot air. (KCNA, “Ballistic Rocket Launching Drill Is Right for Self-Defense of Sovereign State: KPA Strategic Force Spokesman,” March 10, 2017)
A group of former U.S. officials plans to seek its latest round of informal talks with North Korean officials as tensions escalate in the region. Joseph DeTrani, a former U.S. intelligence specialist who helped broker a 2005 agreement on North Korea’s nuclear program, said unofficial talks between the two sides usually take place about every six months. He said his group plans to contact the North Korean mission to the United Nations in New York at the end of this month or the beginning of April to arrange the meetings. DeTrani said he is hopeful that informal talks will eventually lead to exploratory meetings between current U.S. officials and North Korean diplomats. That would allow North Korea to explain its insistence on having a nuclear deterrence, talk about a peace treaty and discuss objections to U.S.-South Korea military exercises, DeTrani said. “You have to give it a shot, re-engage, have some exploratory talks, and see if you can get some momentum on halting what they are doing, because it is beyond the pale right now,” DeTrani said in an interview. (David Tweed, “U.S. Group Seeks Informal Meeting with North Korea as Threat Grows,” Bloomberg, March 12, 2017)
Frank Pabian and David Coblentz: “Commercial satellite imagery of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site shows that substantial tunnel excavation is continuing at the “North” Portal (previously the “West” Portal), which provided support for the last four of the five declared underground nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The North Portal tunnels provide direct access under Mt. Mantap, where up to 800 meters of overlying rock is available for test containment. This locale provides the maximum overlying rock possible within the entire test site and is where the most recent and largest detected test occurred on September 9, 2016 (estimated at 15-20 kilotons yield). The continued tunneling under Mt. Mantap via the North Portal has the potential for allowing North Korea to support additional underground nuclear tests of significantly higher explosive yields, perhaps up to 282 kilotons (or just above a quarter of a megaton). In a recent article, we discussed the yield progression of the five acknowledged underground nuclear tests at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site and the general lack of associated observable surface disturbances until the most recent one. The tests have generally been increasing in explosive yield, from the first test on October 9, 2006, which had an estimated yield of less than one kiloton equivalent of chemical explosives, to the latest test on September 9, 2016, which had a yield of up to 20 kilotons. Several independent seismological teams (in China, South Korea and Norway) have very precisely geolocated the last four tests in the same region near Mt. Mantap, with the most recent test directly under Mt. Mantap. A study by another South Korean team, using Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar (InSAR) data, provided an empirical basis from which to corroborate those geolocations. It is most likely that a complex horizontal tunnel network, accessible via the “North” Portal (previously designated by outside observers as the “West” Portal), supported these four tests and is in the same general location where additional tunneling is now ongoing. The North Portal is also the only portal within the test site to have an encompassing security perimeter fence, further emphasizing its current role as the primary test portal. There are three other tunnel portals located within the test site: the “East,” “South” and the new “West.” (“new” because it is a bit west of the original “West” Portal that has been re-designated by those same observers as the “North” Portal). Prior to the first test in 2006, only two tunnel portals (entrances) were present within the Punggye-ri underground nuclear test site. Large piles of excavated rock spoil were already present outside and downslope from each of those two portals since at least February 14, 2005 (using Google Earth archive imagery). Following its employment in support of the first underground nuclear test in September 2006, the East Portal was abandoned (most likely due to the post-test radionuclide release). The next two tests (in May 2009 and February 2013) involved the use of the tunnel accessed by the North Portal. …New excavation activity for a third tunnel, located in a southern portion of the main nuclear test site, was observed on commercial satellite imagery on October 8, 2009. That new tunnel area has been since labeled by outside observers as the “South” Portal. Tunnel excavation at the South Portal continued for several years with one hiatus due to massive flooding that washed away most of the spoil pile in mid-July 2013. The excavation may have also involved a smaller adjacent ancillary tunnel. Since that time, there has been minimal new tunneling activity near the South Portal. Currently, the South Portal is likely to be fully operational and capable of supporting a future underground nuclear test. However, to date, it has not been used for a known nuclear test. Excavation for a fourth tunnel, the new “West” Portal, has been underway since mid-2015. It has also undergone some improvements including terracing above the tunnel entrance in early 2016 for earth stabilization. While clearly an operational site, it is not yet possible to determine the status of that tunnel regarding its readiness for future underground nuclear testing. Roughly six weeks after the third DPRK underground nuclear test (February 12, 2013) involving the North Portal, excavation was observed nearly coincident with a radionuclide detection associated with that test. At about the same time that the radionuclides were detected, additional activity in the form of new tunnel excavation and spoil dumping had already begun at the North Portal. It is also possible that the radionuclide release led to some form of site contamination, because in April 2014, two support buildings nearest the tunnel entrance were removed entirely. One building had previously served to conceal the tunnel entrance (it was not replaced) and the other was a support/compressor building, which was completely reconstructed. In any case, it seems that a second, entirely new, test support tunnel had begun to be excavated very close to the same starting point as the original entrance in the North Portal area, creating a new spoil pile. More spoil has been excavated from tunnel construction in the North Portal tunnel complex than from any other portal within the Punggye-ri nuclear test site.” Frank Pabian and David Coblentz, “North Korea’s Punggye-ri Test Site: Analysis Reveals Its Potential for Additional Testing with Significantly Higher Yields,” 38North, March 10, 2017)
3/11/17:
The foes of South Korea’s likely new leaders have called them blindly naïve, closet North Korea followers and anti-American — an unsettling accusation in a country where the alliance with Washington has been the military bedrock for seven decades. Now, after being out of power for almost 10 years, the South Korean liberal opposition is on the verge of retaking the presidency with the historic court ruling on Friday that ousted its conservative enemy, President Park Geun-hye, who had been impeached in a corruption scandal. The liberals’ presidential hopeful, Moon Jae-in, wants a profound change in the country’s tense relations with North Korea, pushing outreach and dialogue. He also is deeply skeptical of the hawkish stance embraced by the conservatives and South Korea’s most important defender, the United States. Moon and his liberal partners are especially worried about a new antimissile shield the Americans are installing in South Korea, citing China’s fury over it and warning of a standoff reminiscent of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The challenges for Moon and his liberal partners as they push to reclaim power in elections now scheduled for May will be how to engage with a far more dangerous North Korea, maintain close ties with the United States and repair relations with China, which increasingly mistrusts the American military’s intentions. Moon has called himself “America’s friend,” grateful that the United States protected South Korea from communism and supported its economic growth and democratization. The alliance with Washington is “a pillar of our diplomacy,” he said in an interview on the eve of Park’s court-ordered ouster. But he also said South Korea should learn to “say ‘No’ to the Americans.” Moon’s ascent could seriously complicate the American rush this past week to deploy the new advanced missile-defense system, known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or Thaad, in the South. He and his liberal associates have questioned the deployment, calling it an unnecessary escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The missile system would put sophisticated American weaponry on China’s doorstep, and has infuriated the Chinese so much they are boycotting South Korean brands and may now be less willing to use economic leverage to rein in the North. Moon vowed to review the deployment if elected. “I cannot understand why there should be such a hurry with this,” he said. “I suspect that they are trying to make it a fait accompli, make it a political issue to be used in the election.” Moon said he abhorred “the ruthless dictatorial regime of North Korea.” But he also said sanctions that the United States had enforced with the conservatives in South Korea for a decade had failed to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, so it was time to try something less confrontational. “We must embrace the North Korean people as part of the Korean nation, and to do that, whether we like it or not, we must recognize Kim Jong-un as their ruler and as our dialogue partner,” Moon said. That idea is not entirely new. The last time the liberals were in power, from 1998 to 2008, they pushed the so-called Sunshine Policy of promoting aid and exchanges with North Korea in the hopes of building trust and guiding it toward openness and nuclear disarmament. Moon said the strategy pursued by the conservatives was simply not working. “What have the conservative governments done, except badmouthing the North?” he said. “If necessary, we will have to strengthen sanctions even further, but the goal of sanctions must be to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table.” The possibility that Moon could become South Korea’s next president in a few months also comes as the Trump administration is formulating a new policy on North Korea. “I hope that Mr. Trump will come to the same conclusion as I did,” Moon said. As part of his outreach to the North, Moon said he would reopen the joint-venture factory complex the two Koreas had run in the North Korean town of Kaesong. Analysts of the conflict said it was premature to assess the outcome of Ms. Park’s removal. “A giant leap forward for South Korean democracy, a major step backward for taming Pyongyang,” said Lee Sung-yoon, a North Korea expert at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. For the past decade, South Korea has been governed by conservative leaders who regard anything less than unequivocal support for the alliance with Washington and the downfall of the Kim Jong-un government as ideologically suspect. Their liberal adversaries would bring in a new mentality. Moon grew up in a family that hated the Communist rule in the North but also had roots there. His parents were among tens of thousands of Korean War refugees on the run from Communists who were evacuated from the North Korean port of Hungnam by retreating American Navy vessels in the winter of 1950. But Moon also belonged to the generation of South Koreans who shaped their perspectives by fighting the anti-North Korean, pro-American military dictators, like Park Chung-hee, Ms. Park’s father, who ruled South Korea from 1961 to 1979. In college in the 1970s, Moon said he was profoundly influenced by Rhee Young-hee, a dissident journalist who wrote a book criticizing the Vietnam War. The military government, which sent its troops to fight for the Americans in Vietnam, banned the book and arrested the writer. “Until then, we were taught to think that whatever the United States did was justice, whatever the United States said was truth, and that whoever argued otherwise was an evil to repel,” Moon wrote in his 2011 memoir, “Fate.” “The book helped lift the veil of falsehood.” Some of the old student activists, like Moon, from the 1970s and ’80s form the mainstay of the political opposition of today. They do not want their country dragged into what they see as a hegemonic struggle among big powers, while conservatives have no qualms about siding with the United States in its rivalry with China. The Thaad antimissile deployment showcased those opposing perspectives. “The United States is pushing us to the West unnecessarily, and China is shoving us to the East unnecessarily,” said Kim Ki-jung, a political scientist at Yonsei University in Seoul and foreign policy adviser for Moon. “They should not push us too much; part of the Korean DNA is resistance against big powers.” (Choe Sang-hun, “Korean Ouster Could Herald a Shift in Ties,” New York Times, March 11, 2017,
3/12/17:
Henry A. Kissinger slipped into the State Department last week for a quiet lunch in his old office with Rex W. Tillerson, the former Exxon Mobil chief executive, who has all but covered himself in a cloak of invisibility in his first six weeks as secretary of state. He has been absent from the White House meetings with key world leaders, and when the State Department issued its annual report on human rights — usually a major moment for the United States to stand up against repression around the world — he skipped the announcement. On March 14, Tillerson will leave for his first truly fraught diplomatic mission: a trip to Japan, South Korea and China, at a moment when open conflict with North Korea is a growing possibility, and when the administration is planning Trump’s first meeting with President Xi Jinping of China. The trip is so vital that the “principals” committee of the National Security Council is set to convene tomorrow to discuss the North Korean threat and how to deal with China, so that Tillerson speaks from a consensus strategy. But do not expect to hear much about that strategy from the secretary before he arrives in Asia: The State Department has told reporters that they cannot ride on the plane. The decision appears to be unprecedented for a major diplomatic trip — even four decades ago, when Kissinger was conducting shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East and opening up China, he was delivering spin to reporters on the plane and offering up diplomatic tutorials. So why is the man many in the State Department call T. Rex so quiet? There are several theories. One is that his silence is highly strategic: He wants to cement key relationships in private, make sure he is aligned with a mercurial president and let the policy process at the National Security Council play out before making any grand pronouncements. The second is that he is waiting for the battles at the White House to burn out. In short, he wants to sidestep Stephen K. Bannon, the president’s top strategist, who believes that China’s rise can be halted and that Iran should be vigorously confronted, and work with Mattis, Kushner and McMaster. Senator Bob Corker (R-TN), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said that “he’s already reached an agreement with Mattis to come to agreement and present ideas together,” something that Condoleezza Rice and Hillary Clinton often did with their defense counterpart, Robert Gates. The third is that he sees the job as more akin to what he did at Exxon Mobil: Cut your deals, say as little as possible and take the heat. (David E. Sanger, “Tillerson Leads from Shadows of State Dept,” New York Times, March 12, 2017,
3/13/17:
KCNA: “The U.S. administration is floating a rumor that it is examining a way of mounting a preemptive attack on the DPRK. Various media including VOA, CNN and the Wall Street Journal carried articles to the effect that the White House is now examining strategies targeting the DPRK ranging from preemptive attack to regime change, anticipating a military conflict on the Korean peninsula within a month or two. It is against this backdrop that experts on the Korean issue are commenting in unison that the U.S. planned military attack on the DPRK is a crazy act of inviting irrevocable disasters. Harry J. Kazianis, room chief for defense studies of the Center for the National Interest and researcher for national security of the Potomac Foundation, warned that attack aimed at removing the regime in north Korea will invite an irrevocable disaster. He asserted that military invasion of north Korea is a crazy act, adding north Korea, which is well aware of foolishness of Saddam Hussein who allowed the deployment of the world’s most powerful war forces just at its doorstep, would not miss an opportunity but mount an attack by mobilizing all possible forces under its possession in case there is a sign of deployment of armed forces. He also said that if the U.S. is true in its decision to “overthrow” the regime in north Korea, there can be no reason for north Korea to tolerate, stressing that what should be taken into consideration is that north Korea has maintained its social system for over six decades to counter possible invasion by the U.S. Researcher of Defense Priorities Bonnie Kristian in a commentary titled “No, let’s not invade north Korea” said that the plan for a preemptive attack on north Korea will bring diverse disaster as it is a big blunder rather than a wise alternative. The commentary said that north Korea will decide on a powerful nuclear strike the moment it senses an imminent attack by the U.S., adding that it will be very stressful for the Trump administration to try to find out a solution to the issue of north Korea but military option will entail much greater danger let alone interests. The chairman of the U.S. Council of Foreign Relations when interviewed by media, warned that the Trump administration is at crossroads of crucial choice of whether to co-exist with north Korea possessed of capabilities of attacking the U.S. or disable nuclear and missile capabilities of north Korea by use of military force. This cannot but be wise advices to the Trump administration’s hard-line stand toward the DPRK. The present U.S. administration is repeating senseless policy of nuclear blackmail which would bring only defeat, from the outset of its office, far from drawing a lesson from the failed north Korea policy of the preceding regimes. It has gone foolish to plan a preemptive attack while pushing the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of a nuclear war by staging joint military drills with the south Korean puppet forces with the involvement of nuclear strategic assets like carrier task force, nuclear submarines, B-1B, B-52, B-2 strategic bomber triad. The U.S. had better stop the foolish act of pricking its eyes with its own fingers. Nothing can undermine the strategic position of the DPRK that has reached the highest level. Now that the U.S. started dangerous nuclear war drills again, the DPRK has no option but to counter it with the toughest measures for bolstering the nuclear force as it had already declared. If even a single shell is fired into the territory in which the sovereignty of the DPRK is exercised, the bases of aggression and provocation will be reduced to such debris that no living thing can be found. The U.S. should properly understand that its slightest misjudgment about the DPRK will lead it to final doom.” (KCNA: “U.S. Slightest Misjudgment of DPRK Will Lead to Its Final Doom: KCNA Commentary,” March 13, 2017)
3/14/17:
The US has declared it will permanently station missile-capable drones in South Korea in the latest round of military escalation in north-eastern Asia. The US military in South Korea took the unusual step of publicly announcing the deployment of a company of Grey Eagle drones, which it said would add “significant intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability” for American and South Korean forces. Grey Eagles are designed to carry Hellfire missiles and together with the deployment of Thaad anti-ballistic missile defenses in South Korea they represent a significant build-up of US military muscle in response to an accelerated program of missile and nuclear testing by the North Korean regime. Jeffrey Lewis, an expert on the North Korean nuclear weapons program, warned that unless the US military made it very clear that the new drones would not carry missiles in Korean skies, they could bring an already very dangerous situation closer to the brink of war. “If they are not going to arm them, they need to say that. They need to make them absolutely clear,” said Lewis, the director of the east Asia nonproliferation programme at Middlebury Institute of International Affairs at Monterey in California. “The thing the North Koreans are most afraid of is that we’re going to kill Kim Jong-un in a decapitating strike and … that will strengthen their incentives to make sure that low level commanders will have the ability to use nuclear weapons. It will make the North Koreans even more jumpy and have a way itchier trigger finger.” Lewis believes the North Korean strategy is to use a nuclear first strike to deter an attack aimed at regime change, a posture which makes for a particularly unstable balance of forces, with the adversaries motivated to act preemptively. “In a war they plan to use their weapons early,” Lewis said. “We plan to hit them before they do that, and the South Koreans plan to hit them before we have a chance to take too long to do that.” (Julian Borger, “U.S. to Deploy Missile Capable Drones across the Border from North Korea,” The Guardian, March 14, 2017)
3/15/17:
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson will warn China’s leaders that the United States is prepared to step up missile defenses and pressure on Chinese financial institutions if they fail to use their influence to restrain North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, according to several officials involved in planning his first mission to Asia. China has complained vociferously about the Trump administration’s recent decision to speed up the deployment of the Thaad antimissile system in South Korea, charging that it will undermine regional stability. But the Trump administration’s message is that the United States has run out of time to respond to North Korea’s military advances, and that the party the Chinese needs to complain to is in Pyongyang. One senior administration official involved in the planning called it “responsible” to increase the defenses of the United States and its allies against growing threats from North Korea. The official acknowledged that doing so would displease Beijing, but noted that China has the option of helping constrain and pressure the North. The tough message was shaped in a series of White House meetings before Tillerson’s departure for Japan today. It also followed more proposals at both ends of the spectrum — including opening up talks with North Korea and preparing for military action against its key missile and nuclear sites — that were set aside, at least for now. The result is that Tillerson is essentially adopting variants of the approaches that the Bush and Obama administrations took, though guided by Trump’s declarations that, unlike his predecessors, he will stop the North Korean program from developing a new intercontinental missile. This is not the first time that a secretary of state has sought to play the missile defense card. John Kerry told the Chinese that if China succeeded in constraining Pyongyang’s military ambitions, the United States could limit and perhaps even withdraw some of its antimissile systems in the region. “The president of the United States deployed some additional missile defense capacity precisely because of the threat of North Korea,” Kerry said after an April 2013 visit to Beijing. “And it is logical that if the threat of North Korea disappears because the peninsula denuclearizes, then obviously that threat no longer mandates that kind of posture.” During the presidential campaign, Trump said he was willing to sit down with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, and negotiate with him directly, perhaps over a hamburger. Since then, Trump has taken an increasingly hard line, and suggested that he would link China’s use of its influence over the North to other issues, including trade relations. Last week, the Chinese repeated a proposal they knew the United States would reject, calling for a freeze in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs in return for a cessation of American and South Korean annual military exercises, which are just now beginning. The Trump administration immediately rejected that call, saying that it would reward the North if it complied with United Nations resolutions it had long ignored, and would make the United States’ defense arrangements with South Korea a subject of bargaining. Reinforcing military ties, Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, conducted a 30-minute phone call on today with his South Korean counterpart, Gen. Lee Sun-jin. A Pentagon statement said the generals discussed the possibility that North Korea could carry out “provocative actions” during the joint American and South Korean exercises now underway, or in April when North Korean authorities commemorate the birthday of Kim Il-sung, the founder and first leader of the country.During the administration’s deliberations, there has also been discussion of putting more pressure on Chinese banks, perhaps through “secondary sanctions,” that would make it difficult for any bank that did business with North Korea to also deal in American dollars. The technique worked effectively against Iran before it reached a nuclear agreement in the summer of 2015. But Daniel L. Glaser, a former Treasury official who constructed many of the sanctions, and now a principal at the Financial Integrity Network, said in an interview that the largest Chinese banks often shun dealings with North Korea and that some of the smaller ones have little exposure to the American banking system. “It’s not easy to execute,” he said. “The North Koreans have hidden these relationships, and directed them, with care.” (David E. Sanger and Michael R. Gordon, “Pressure Builds on China to Hold back North Korea,” New York Times, March 16, 2017, p. A-15)
The US Navy SEAL team that killed Osama bin Laden is reportedly set to join military training drills against North Korea for the first time. Along with other elite US units including the Army Rangers, Delta Force and the Green Berets, SEAL Team Six will take part in annual training exercises alongside South Korean forces, according to Yonhap. “A bigger number of and more diverse US special operation forces will take part in this year’s Foal Eagle and Key Resolve exercises to practise missions to infiltrate into the North, remove the North’s war command and demolition of its key military facilities,” a South Korean official told Yonhap. SEAL Team Six would practice removing Kim Jong-un and destroying North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction, South Korea’s Defense Ministry told the Joong Ang Ilbo. A ministry official told the newspaper it would send a “strong message” to the communist state. But US Navy Commander Gary Ross denied the US military would practice taking out the North Korean leader. “Foal Eagle is designed to enhance the Republic of Korea-US alliance’s ability tio defend the RoK,” he said. F-35 fighter jets will also reportedly carry out strike simulations on key North Korean sites, while a joint amphibious landing drill involving the US and South Korea will begin next month. (Tom Embury-Dennis, “Navy SEAL Team That Killed Osama bin Laden ‘Taking Part in Military Drills against North Korea for First Time,’” The Independent, March 15, 2017)
3/16/17:
At a time of multiplying tensions in Asia, Rex W. Tillerson, the American secretary of state, began his first major foreign trip in Japan and said that the United States needed a “different approach” to North Korea’s escalating nuclear threat, though he declined to give specifics. Speaking to reporters in Tokyo after talks with Japan’s foreign minister, Kishida Fumio, Tillerson said that “the diplomatic and other efforts of the past 20 years to bring North Korea to a point of denuclearization have failed,” noting that during those 20 years, the United States had provided $1.35 billion in assistance to North Korea to encourage it to abandon its nuclear program. “Part of the purpose of my visit to the region is to exchange views on a new approach,” Tillerson added, saying he would highlight the issue in Seoul and Beijing, the next stops on his trip. Tillerson, who took questions only from reporters who had been preselected by one of his press advisers, did not answer when asked for details of a new approach. In his prepared remarks, Tillerson took a markedly different tone than the secretary of defense, Jim Mattis, who said on a visit to Seoul in February that the use of nuclear weapons by North Korea would be met with an “overwhelming” response. Tillerson said “North Korea and its people need not fear the United States or their neighbors in the region who seek only to live in peace with North Korea.” He added, “With this in mind the United States calls on North Korea to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile program and refrain from any further provocations.” Experts in the region said that while the United States had so far emphasized expanded missile defense with the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, or THAAD, they wanted to hear what Tillerson had to say about diplomatic options, as well as cooperation within the region. “It was very important to show the deterrence capability,” said Watanabe Tsuneo, a senior research fellow at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Tokyo. “But at the same time we need to create a carrot-and-stick type signal to North Korea.” Watanabe said that in addition to coordination among the United States, Japan and South Korea, “we also need coordination with China.” Still, given that President Trump suggested during the campaign that he might pull back from American security commitments to allies in Asia, both Japan and South Korea are likely to remain anxious about American resolve. “There’s that sense that they are assured for the moment,” said Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, “but Japan and South Korea are like skittish small dogs that need constant reassurance and are constantly nervous.” Some Diet members have suggested that Japan needs to consider obtaining the ability to make pre-emptive strikes against missile launches. Kishida said that “Japan will assume larger roles and responsibilities,” but when asked by Adriana Diaz, Asia correspondent for CBS News, about pre-emptive capabilities, he said he did not understand the question and declined to allow her to clarify. (Motoko Rich, “Tillerson Calls for ‘Different Approach’ to North Korea,” New York Times, March 16, 2017)
Tillerson: “As President Trump and Prime Minister Abe expressed in their February 10th statement, a priority of ours is expanding trilateral cooperation with the Republic of Korea. Trilateral cooperation allows our three nations to coordinate actions on major regional and global problems, and more effectively counter the threats posed by North Korea. We intend to continue our coordination in regard to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 2270 and 2231, which imposed robust and comprehensive sanctions on North Korea to inhibit its campaign to develop operational nuclear and missile capabilities. North Korea and its people need not fear the United States or their neighbors in the region who seek only to live in peace with North Korea. With this in mind, the United States calls on North Korea to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and refrain from any further provocations. The U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan and its other treaty allies through the full range of our military capabilities is unwavering. Q: (Via interpreter) My name is Takigawa from NHK. I have a question to both Minister Kishida and Secretary Tillerson. At the moment, the Trump administration is reviewing on the U.S. policy vis-a-vis North Korea. In your meeting, were you able to discuss that – the direction of the review? What was the position or the thinking as indicated from the U.S. side? And it is also said that the U.S. may re-designate the North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. So I would like to seek your thoughts on this. KISHIDA: (Via interpreter) So let me respond, first of all. As the United States is currently reviewing on the U.S. policy on North Korea, there seems to be a good progress. And today, I have conveyed Japan’s thoughts and position, and we were able to firmly align the policies of our two governments. It was very timely, I believe, and it was also very meaningful and relevant. But because of the nature of this issue, as to the specifics of what we have discussed, I would like to refrain from mentioning them. Now, as for the re-designation of North Korea as state sponsor of terrorism, you have asked this point as well. This is to do with how the legislations are interpreted and applied inside the United States, so ultimately, this is something to be decided by the U.S. Government. But between myself and Secretary Tillerson, we have agreed that we should keep in close contact. …TILLERSON: Well, I think it’s important to recognize that the diplomatic and other efforts of the past 20 years to bring North Korea to a point of denuclearization have failed. So we have 20 years of failed approach, and that includes a period in which the United States provided $1.35 billion in assistance to North Korea as an encouragement to take a different pathway. That encouragement has been met with further development of nuclear capabilities, more missile launches, including those of the recent February 11th and March the 5th. In the face of this ever-escalating threat, it is clear that a different approach is required. The purpose of – part of the purpose of my visit to the region is to exchange views on a new approach.” (DoS, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson Press Availability with Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio, Tokyo, March 16, 2017)
The Trump administration is moving toward increasing pressure on North Korea. The United States has started deploying the advanced Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antimissile system to U.S. forces stationed in South Korea earlier than previously planned, and is considering deploying unmanned attack aircraft. But the Trump administration has not ruled out the possibility of having direct talks with Pyongyang. Some Japanese government officials are therefore wary. “The United States may start bilateral talks with North Korea and make a compromise deal, with Japan being left out,” a Foreign Ministry source said. Due to this concern, both Abe and Kishida, in separate meetings with Tillerson, asked for “close coordination” over the policy toward North Korea between Japan and the United States. As Abe and Tillerson agreed on the importance of the two countries sharing a strategic goal on North Korea, the Japanese side is relieved for now. The strained relationship between Japan and South Korea over the issue of comfort women has cast a shadow in dealing with North Korea. Depending on the result of the South Korean presidential election, it is possible that the South Korean government will take a stronger anti-Japan stance. During the talks with Tillerson, Kishida emphasized the importance of implementing the Japan-South Korea deal on the comfort women issue as the foundation of cooperation between Japan and South Korea and between Japan, the United States and South Korea. He thus urged Tillerson, who was scheduled to visit South Korea on Friday, to discuss the issue in Seoul. (Miyai Toshimitsu and Oki Seima, “Japan, U.S. Agree to Closely Coordinate on North Korea,” Yomiuri Shimbun, March 17, 2017)
North Korea’s remaining links to global banking networks via SWIFT have been severed, according to the Brussels-based international system that supports most of the world’s financial transactions. (Don Weinland, “SWIFT Severs Remaining North Korean Links to Global Banking,” Financial Times, March 17, 2017) A further four North Korean banks were blocked from the world’s primary financial messaging service, as they were not in-line with the organization’s membership criteria. The SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) system allows banks and financial institutions to communicate about transactions and trades. But this month SWIFT has blocked seven DPRK banks from using its services. The Belgium-based group barred three banks designated by the UN on March 9, and another four that were not included on UN or EU blacklists. “The DPRK banks remaining on the network are no longer compliant with SWIFT’s membership criteria. As a result, these entities will no longer have access to the SWIFT financial messaging service,” a SWIFT spokesperson told NK News. “Given the increased ongoing international attention on the DPRK, SWIFT has informed the Belgian and EU authorities.” SWIFT did not reveal the names of the newly blocked banks to NK News, though an article from the Wall Street Journal in March listed four DPRK banks which were sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department which continued to use the service, the Foreign Trade Bank of the DPRK, Kumgang Bank; Koryo Credit Development Bank and North East Asia Bank. According to the U.S. Department of Treasury said the Foreign Trade Bank facilitates “transactions on behalf of actors linked to its proliferation network, which is under increasing pressure from recent international sanctions.” Reuters reported SWIFT’s actions were unusual given the banks were not sanctioned by the EU or UN, and the group had previously resisted pressure to cut off institutions from other countries in Washington’s crosshairs. “Removing them was long overdue. Taking steps to deny services to other DPRK banks is prudent because the jurisdiction is identified as a money laundering threat,” William Newcomb, a former member of the UN Panel of Experts told NK News. “There is no way for banks to be certain that funds originating or destined for DPRK are legitimate transfers, i.e. international banks are unable to take Financial Action Task Force-required countermeasures such as enhanced due diligence (EDD) in dealings with DPRK financial institutions.” Newcomb added the action would make it more difficult for North Korean banks to send money quickly and securely and might push the DPRK towards making greater use of cash couriers. (Leo Byrne, “SWIFT Blocks Four More North Korean Banks,” NKNews, March 17, 2017)
3/17/17:
President Trump decides on a policy of maximum pressure on North Korea, ratcheting up economic, rhetorical, military, and diplomatic preesure, and if necessary, covert action. (Woodward, Rage, p. 40)
Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson ruled out opening any negotiation with North Korea to freeze its nuclear and missile programs and said for the first time that the Trump administration might be forced to take pre-emptive action “if they elevate the threat of their weapons program” to an unacceptable level. Tillerson’s comments in Seoul, a day before he travels to Beijing to meet Chinese leaders, explicitly rejected any return to the bargaining table in an effort to buy time by halting North Korea’s accelerating testing program. “The policy of strategic patience has ended,” Tillerson said, a reference to the term used by the Obama administration to describe a policy of waiting out the North Koreans, while gradually ratcheting up sanctions and covert action. Negotiations “can only be achieved by denuclearizing, giving up their weapons of mass destruction,” he said — a step to which the North committed in 1992, and again in subsequent accords, but has always violated. “Only then will we be prepared to engage them in talks.” His inconsistency of tone may have been intended to signal a tougher line to the Chinese before he lands in Beijing tomorrow. It could also reflect an effort by Tillerson, the former chief executive of Exxon Mobil, to issue the right diplomatic signals in a region where American commitment is in doubt. This afternoon, after visiting the Demilitarized Zone and peering into North Korean territory in what has become a ritual for American officials making a first visit to the South, Tillerson explicitly rejected a Chinese proposal to get the North Koreans to freeze their testing in return for the United States and South Korea suspending all annual joint military exercises, which are now underway. Tillerson argued that a freeze would essentially enshrine “a comprehensive set of capabilities” North Korea possesses that already pose too great a threat to the United States and its allies, and he said there would be no negotiation until the North agreed to dismantle its programs. Tillerson ignored a question about whether the Trump administration would double down on the use of cyberweapons against the North’s missile development, a covert program that . Obama accelerated early in 2014 and that so far has yielded mixed results. Instead, he referred vaguely to a “number of steps” the United States could take — a phrase that seemed to embrace much more vigorous enforcement of sanctions, ramping up missile defenses, cutting off North Korea’s oil, intensifying the cyberwar program and striking the North’s known missile sites. At a meeting of the “principals committee” of the National Security Council today, any discussion of military action was kicked down the road. The rejection of negotiations on a freeze would be consistent with the approach taken by President Barack Obama, who declined Chinese offers to restart the so-called six-party talks that stalled several years ago — which included North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and the United States — unless the North agreed at the outset that the goal of the negotiations was the “complete, verifiable, irreversible” dismantling of its program. South Korea’s foreign minister, Yun Byung-se, repeated that formulation today; Tillerson did not. But classified assessments of the North that the Obama administration left for its successors included a grim assessment by the intelligence community: that North Korea’s leader Kim believes his nuclear weapons program is the only way to guarantee the survival of his regime and will never trade it away for economic or other benefits. The assessment said that the example of what happened to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, the longtime leader of Libya, had played a critical role in North Korean thinking. Colonel Qaddafi gave up the components of Libya’s nuclear program in late 2003 — most of them were still in crates from Pakistan — in hopes of economic integration with the West. Eight years later, when the Arab Spring broke out, the United States and its European allies joined forces to depose Colonel Qaddafi, who was eventually found hiding in a ditch and executed by Libyan rebels. Among many experts, the idea of a freeze has been favored as the least terrible of a series of bad options. Jon Wolfsthal, a nuclear expert who worked on Obama’s National Security Council, and Toby Dalton wrote recently in Politico, “A temporary freeze on missile and nuclear developments sounds better than an unconstrained and growing threat. It is also, possibly, the most logical and necessary first step toward an overall agreement between the U.S. and North Korea. But the risk that North Korea will cheat or hide facilities during a negotiated freeze is great.” William J. Perry, who was secretary of defense under President Bill Clinton, said in Beijing that the Trump administration would have to offer North Korea security assurances if it wanted to escape an increasingly dangerous spiral of confrontation. Previous administrations had mistakenly based their policies on the assumption that North Korea would collapse on their watch, Perry told a small group of reporters. “I see very little prospect of a collapse,” he said. “For eight years in the Obama administration and eight years in the Bush administration, they were expecting that to happen. As a consequence, their policies were not very effective. I would think that the United States and other countries as well should stop expecting a collapse in North Korea.” Perry said that American policy makers needed to grasp that North Korea’s leaders regarded their own survival in power, and especially the continuation of the Kim dynasty, as more important than improving the economy. He said that as long as the goal of the United States remained completely eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons, “I think we will continue to be unsuccessful.” He said, “It will take initiative, primarily by the United States, to be willing to talk with North Korea.” (David E. Sanger, “Secretary of State Rejects Talks With North Korea on Nuclear Program,” New York Times, March 18, 2017,
In a post on his Twitter account, President Trump said, “North Korea is behaving very badly. They have been ‘playing’ the United States for years. China has done little to help!” It comes after US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said military action against North Korea was an “option on the table.” (Andrew Buncombe, “Donald Trump Says North Is Behaving ‘Very Badly’ and China Is Not Helping,” The Independent, March 17, 2017)
Tillerson-Yun: “FOREIGN MINISTER YUN: (Via interpreter) … Today’s dialogue with the Secretary will be my third one in about a month’s time. North Korea’s latest provocations and additional threats will be analyzed, and our common actions forward will be forged upon this very important occasion. Especially the U.S. is still reviewing its North Korean policies. As such, Secretary Tillerson and I, in our phone conversations in early February, have discussed a joint approach on the response to North Korea’s nuclear programs, and concretizing our approach in this regard will be the main agenda of our discussions today. In pursuing such coordination, our unchanging goal is something that has already been declared by both countries, and spelled out in relevant UNSC resolutions. It is a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program CVID-based dismantlement. Under this unwavering shared goal for the denuclearization of North Korea, effective and comprehensive policy options will be discussed extensively. Furthermore, additional provocations of North Korea are anticipated (inaudible). The assassination of Kim Jong Nam with a chemical weapon has triggered an unprecedented turn of events. As such, in addition to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs, its use of chemical weapons and human rights violations will be addressed as we will have in-depth discussions on ways to guide international collaboration regarding these overall North Korea matters. Our two governments, in a bid to counter North Korea’s threat, which is of a different dimension from the past, have been pushing for the USFK’s THAAD deployment based on the alliance decision. This is attributed to the North nuclear missile threats, and does not target any specific third country. This has been our clear position. To safeguard national security and our people’s lives, the measure was taken as a self-defensive one against any bullying against us. Both our governments will respond bilaterally and on the global stage with clarity and resoluteness. The Korean Government welcomes the Trump Administration’s announcement of its robust Asia engagement policy and its steadfast commitment to the defense of the ROK. Most notably, the President himself stated that, in a new administration, the ROK-U.S. alliance would be made even stronger. I am very appreciative to bolster the ROK-U.S. alliance, the lynchpin of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. We are committed to maintaining our close coordination with the U.S. in the coming months and years. I have no doubt that this meeting today will mark another milestone in developing our comprehensive alliance that contributes to peace and stability, not only on the peninsula, but also the entire world. …TILLERSON: … The U.S. and our allies have repeatedly reassured North Korea’s leaders that we seek only peace, stability, and economic prosperity for Northeast Asia. As proof of our intent, America has provided $1.3 billion in assistance to North Korea since 1995. In return, North Korea has detonated nuclear weapons, and dramatically increased its launches of ballistic missiles to threaten America and our allies. The U.S. commitment to our allies is unwavering. In the face of North Korea’s grave and escalating global threat, it is important for me to consult with our friends, and chart a path that secures the peace. Let me be very clear: the policy of strategic patience has ended. We are exploring a new range of diplomatic, security, and economic measures. All options are on the table. North Korea must understand that the only path to a secure, economically-prosperous future is to abandon its development of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction. We call on other regional powers and all nations to join us in demanding the North Korean Government choose a better path and a different future for its people. The United States is committed to supporting the defense of our allies, and we will continue to develop a comprehensive set of capabilities to counter the growing North Korean ballistic missile threat. That is why the United States and the Republic of Korea decided to take the defensive measure of deploying THAAD Missile Defense System. While we acknowledge China’s opposition, its economic retaliation against South Korea is inappropriate and troubling. We ask China to refrain from such action. Instead, we urge China to address the threat that makes that necessary, that being the escalating threat from North Korea. The United States alliance with South Korea is built not only on security, but our commitment to our core principles that have enabled the success of our nations: a strong economic partnership, deep people-to-people ties, and democratic values. I am encouraged by our productive joint discussions, and pledge continued American support for the shared prosperity and security of our two nations. (Speaks in Korean.) Thank you. …Q: (Via interpreter) I would like to pose this question to the Secretary Tillerson. You are saying that we need a new approach to North Korea in order to resolve North Korea’s nuclear program problem. China probably needs to play a more active part. Have all of the tools in the tool kit probably have not been exhausted. What specific actions can we take, in your opinion? And the six-party talks were not fruitful, according to a press statement by the State Department. So I wonder — what will be the effective measures, going forward? And also, regarding a new approach, what will be the Korean Government’s position on this new approach? I pose this question to Foreign Minister Yun. TILLERSON: Well, as I indicated in my remarks, 20 years of talks with North Korea have brought us to where we are today. Both the ROK and the United States have been quite clear over these 20 years, that we seek nothing but a stable Korean Peninsula and an economically prosperous Korean Peninsula. North Korea has nothing to fear from the United States. But this 20 years of talking has brought us to the point we are today. So the track that we are now on is to use a number of steps with an ever greater number of actions ahead of us that involve sanctions, which the United Nations Security Council has already approved, including China, which voted for those sanctions. And then we are calling on all countries to now fully implement those sanctions. We are also calling upon China to fully implement those sanctions, as well, in compliance with the UN Security Council resolution that it voted for. We will be widening the circle of allies in response to North Korea’s threats and their provocative actions, and asking others to join in. It is important that the leadership of North Korea realize that their current pathway of nuclear weapons and escalating threats will not lead to their objective of security and economic development. That pathway can only be achieved by denuclearizing, giving up their weapons of mass destruction. And only then will we be prepared to engage with them in talks. YUN: (Via interpreter) Yes, regarding this new approach, Secretary Tillerson has given you a comprehensive response. As such, I don’t believe that there is much to add, myself. But, basically, our two ministers, as we stated in our opening remarks, the current North Korea nuclear and missile threats are of a different dimension from the past. It is an imminent and grave threat facing us. As such, this new approach that we are pursuing, this joint approach, will be against this imminent threat, and probably more than at any point in the past. We would be willing to utilize all of the means that are available to us. Diplomatic pressures will be one stream of such endeavors, but there could be other types of efforts. At the same time, as was mentioned by Secretary Tillerson, all of the stakeholders themselves, more than any point in time in the past, they should cooperate together to make sure that North Korea feels the pain for its wrongdoings, and pay the cost, pay the price. And for the aspects that were not up to our expectations, we should be collaborating further to ensure that there are tangible outcomes. In this process, one of the most important principles will be this: ROK and the U.S. will remain closely coordinating with each other for a shared response. And, through that effort, we can demonstrate our strong alliance. Q: Thank you. Mr. Secretary — down here — you mentioned a range of options, but I’m hoping you can drill down into a few specifics that we know are on the table. So one, for example, is the possibility of stepped-up interdiction by China against shipping into North Korea. Another is the cyber campaign against the North Korean nuclear or ballistic missile program. And the third is the possibility of negotiating a freeze, though I’m wondering whether the program is too far along for a negotiated freeze. So, could you address the pluses and the minuses of those specific programs, and the possibility for action on those? And then, for the Foreign Minister, just a very simple question. Can you guarantee that THAAD will go ahead, regardless of who wins the presidential election? Thank you. TILLERSON: Well, I think with regard to escalating sanctions, I don’t believe we have ever fully achieved the maximum level of action that can be taken under the UN Security Council resolution, with full participation of all countries. There also are other sources of revenue to North Korea that fall outside of the specific sanctions, and we know that other nations could take actions to alter their relationship with North Korea in support of our efforts to have them give up their nuclear weapons program. I think, in terms of talking about any kind of a freeze, I think it’s premature for that. But at this stage I’m not sure we would be willing to freeze, with the circumstances where they exist today, given that that would leave North Korea with significant capabilities that would represent a true threat, not just to the region, but to American forces, as well. YUN: (Via interpreter) Yes, regarding the question that was posed by the journalist from Bloomberg, basically, on the Korean Peninsula, this threat that we face from North Korea, these grave circumstances, will not change, even with a change of the governments in Korea. That is the reality that we face. As such, national security and the people’s lives should be safeguarded. And for that purpose, no matter which government comes into power in Korea in the future, such a gravity and urgency of the problem should be considered well for making a wise decision. In particular, the diplomatic policies and security policies should remain consistent. Responsible leaders of Korea would probably have the same view, similar view. MODERATOR: Thank you. Again, we would like to take a question from a Korean journalist from Arirang TV. Q: Welcome to South Korea, Mr. Secretary. I would like to ask you about the THAAD issue that you mentioned in your remarks. It seems like the THAAD deployment to South Korea is going to be completed before the new South Korean administration kicks in. And China has been imposing apparent retaliatory actions against South Korea for the deployment decision. When you meet Chinese President Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi in China, are you going to discuss the current difficulties that Seoul is facing? And is this issue going to be brought up during the U.S.-China Summit next month? TILLERSON: Well, I do believe that we will proceed with the installation of THAAD. And it’s my expectation that the new government in South Korea will continue to be supportive of the THAAD system, because it is directed solely at the defense of the ROK. As to conversations with the Government of China, we will be discussing with them the serious threat that North Korea poses to peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula, but even beyond. North Korea is now pursuing programs that would allow them to present a clear threat to the continental United States and to other parts of the world. So we will be discussing with China what we believe they should be doing to help mitigate this threat, as well. As to their punitive actions against South Korea because of the agreement to install the THAAD system, as I indicated in my remarks, we believe these actions are unnecessary, and we believe they are troubling. We also believe it is not the way for a regional power to help resolve what is a serious threat to everyone. And so we would hope that China would alter its position on punishing South Korea for the THAAD system. As I said, we have emphasized many times it’s purely defensive in nature, and we would hope that they would help us engage with North Korea to eliminate the reason a THAAD system is even required. MODERATOR: (Via interpreter) Yes, we are ready to take one more question from the members of the U.S. press. Yes, from CNN, please go ahead. Q: Mr. Secretary, is there a truly new or different approach that doesn’t include a military option? At what point does a military option become truly necessary, considering the obvious threat of retaliation to more than 20 million people in the Seoul Metropolitan Area? Also, it seems that the State Department has rejected the Chinese suggestion of a negotiation with North Korea that would involve dropping the joint military drills. Is that a viable option? Is it something that could be discussed between you on this trip? And, in turn, when you arrive in Beijing, will you push officials there to cut off the oil to North Korea? TILLERSON: As to — I will take the latter part of your question, first. As to the suggestion from the Chinese Government that we should stand down our joint military operations in exchange for engaging in talks, we do not believe the conditions are right to engage in any talks at this time. (Inaudible) and standing down our joint military operations. Those operations are an annual event. We’ve been carrying out these joint military operations for over 40 years. When those operations are to be undertaken, it is with clear transparency. We announce to the world that we are going to carry out these operations, so there is no surprise to anyone. And the purpose of those is made quite clear to the North Korean Government, as well. North Korea does not provide any of us the same type of transparency and forewarning when they choose to launch ballistic missiles. So, again, conditions must change before there is any scope for talks to resume, whether they be five-party or six-party. …All of the options are on the table. Certainly, we do not want to — for things to get to a military conflict. We are quite clear in that, in our communications. But obviously, if North Korea takes actions that threatens the South Korean forces or our own forces, then that would be met with an appropriate response. If they elevate the threat of their weapons program to a level that we believe requires action, that option is on the table. But we are hopeful that, by taking these steps — and we have many, many steps we can take before we get to that point — we hope that that will persuade North Korea to take a different course of action. That is our desire. Q: And the oil? TILLERSON: Well, I think, to the extent that China is supplying that oil — I think others are supplying oil, some of that oil comes from Russia, it comes from other sources — we will be calling on everyone to join in these actions. Certainly all of the regional players, but others who have commercial relationships with North Korea, we will be asking them to take steps, as well. (DoS, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Remarks with Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se Before Their Meeting, Seoul, March 17, 2017)
Japan launched a new spy satellite, the country’s space agency said, as the region grows increasingly uneasy over North Korea’s quickening missile and nuclear programs. (AFP-JIJI, “Japan Launches New Spy Satellite to Keep Eye on North Korea,” Japan Times, March 17, 2017)
3/18/17:
Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson signaled that the Trump administration was prepared to scrap nearly a decade of United States policy toward North Korea in favor of a more aggressive effort to eliminate the country’s nuclear weapons program. Whether that means pre-emptive action, which he warned was “on the table,” will depend a great deal on how China responds. Up to 40 percent of the North’s foreign currency — essential for buying goods abroad — comes from a network of about 600 Chinese companies, according to a recent study by Sayari Analytics, a Washington financial intelligence firm. Tillerson went to China today, a day after saying in Seoul that the United States would not negotiate with North Korea on freezing its nuclear and missile programs. In Beijing, Tillerson met with China’s top foreign policy official, Yang Jiechi, and the foreign minister, Wang Yi, today. He will see President Xi Jinping tomorrow. “We have committed ourselves to do everything we can to prevent a conflict from breaking out,” Tillerson said at a press conference after meeting Wang. The secretary said China and the United States “will work together” to see if they could make North Korea take “a course correction and move away from nuclear weapons.” Tillerson declined to specify the “number of steps” that would be taken to achieve that goal. His interactions with his hosts in Beijing, and whether he takes a hard line with China over its support for North Korea, will be closely watched — as will be China’s response. Last month, Beijing showed a new willingness to punish its longtime ally when it suspended imports of North Korean coal, saying it had reached the annual limit allowed under United Nations sanctions. Customs figures later showed that China had in fact imported only about 30 percent of the quota for 2017. Yang Xiyu, a veteran Chinese diplomat involved with North Korea, said Tillerson may be able to persuade Chinese leaders to do more when he meets with them in Beijing this weekend, particularly against Chinese companies that do business with the North. Yang cited as a potential model the case that United States officials built last year against a Chinese executive accused of selling North Korea a chemical that can be used in nuclear-enrichment centrifuges. While Beijing was not happy about the case, it eventually accepted it. “It wasn’t easy, but it was the right way to push the issue to a solution,” he said. When the United States filed criminal charges against the businesswoman, Ma Xiaohong, the owner of the Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Company, other Chinese companies conducting similar transactions were apparently left untouched. But Yang, who was a top negotiator for China during six-nation talks with North Korea from 2003 to 2009, suggested that those companies may now be vulnerable. If the United States continues to present evidence of illegal activities that contravene China’s responsibilities under United Nations sanctions, “there is a great deal of room for cooperation,” he said. He noted that China had published five executive orders, totaling more than 900 pages, listing items banned from export to North Korea. “Such activities violate China’s adherence to those orders,” he said. Yang added: “The United States should say, ‘Let’s extend our cooperation to implementation of the United Nations resolutions on sanctions.’ They should say, ‘Starting with the Hongxiang case, let’s move forward.’” Anthony Ruggiero, a former United States Treasury official involved in sanctions enforcement against Pyongyang, told a congressional panel last month, “It is not a foregone conclusion that China’s leaders will shelter North Korea.” Ruggiero said the United States would be likeliest to achieve Chinese cooperation from a position of strength. In 2013, he noted, when the Treasury blacklisted North Korea’s primary foreign exchange bank for contributing to the proliferation of nuclear materials, the Bank of China, one of China’s major commercial banks, immediately closed its account with the North Korean outfit. Now, no major Chinese banks deal with North Korea for fear of being penalized by the United States, though smaller ones do, along with front companies operating along the North Korean border with few links to the United States financial system, according to American sanctions experts. “This is a good example of China acting to cut off North Korea’s activities inside China when those actions threaten China’s economic interests,” Ruggierio said of the Bank of China’s severance of its North Korea connections. A more recent episode that could serve as a model came last week, when the United States Department of Commerce fined ZTE, one of China’s biggest technology companies, $1.19 billion for breaking sanctions and selling electronics to Iran and North Korea. “This is what the U.S. should be doing, but finding it out ain’t easy,” said Stephan Haggard, a visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, which is based in Washington. “I think that Commerce pretty much had a gun to ZTE’s head.” Officials in the Trump administration have discussed putting pressure on Chinese banks through “secondary sanctions,” which would make it hard for any bank that did business with the North to also deal in American dollars. That technique worked against Iran, helping to force it to the negotiating table over its own nuclear program. But such measures are likely to have much less impact in North Korea, which is already isolated, than they did in Iran, a major trading nation, sanctions experts said. “North Korea has one of the smallest international trade profiles on earth,” said Joseph M. DeThomas, a former American ambassador who served as a State Department adviser on Iran and North Korea sanctions. “North Korea often has to end-run the entire financial system to move money. They do things the old-fashioned way: sending guys on airplanes with suitcases full of money.” In an opinion article this week in the New York Times, a former United States deputy secretary of state, Antony J. Blinken, said the Obama administration had quietly pressed countries to eject North Korean workers whose remittances help fund the country’s military. He did not say how successful that effort had been. Tens of thousands of such workers are employed in China’s northeastern cities like Dandong and Hunchun, along the North Korean border. But Marcus Noland, of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, said he believed the organized export of labor earned the North Korean government less than has often been reported — hundreds of millions of dollars per year, probably less than half a billion, he said. “The next time you hear the claim of $2 billion annual earnings from the organized export of labor, remember not to believe everything you hear,” he said. Far more has been contributed in foreign currency by Chinese companies doing trade across the border, said Jessica Knight, director of analysis at Sayari Analytics. “Customs data indicates more than $8 billion in cross-border trade between China and North Korea since 2013, much of it in commodities like coal and steel,” she said. Whether any sanctions at all will deter the North from its nuclear pursuits is far from clear. The former United States defense secretary William J. Perry, who dealt with the North Korean problem during the Clinton administration, said on Friday in Beijing that he doubted they would. “We have sanctioned them a hundred times, and it didn’t stop developing nuclear weapons,” he said. “They seem to be prepared to suffer economic deprivation for the people so they can achieve the preservation of the regime, which they think that nuclear weapons is going to do for them.” (Jane Perlez, “As U.S. Shifts on Korea, China Holds Cards,” New York Times, March 18, 2017,
Wang spoke at a briefing in Beijing with U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. “The most important principle we have identified is that no matter what happens, we have to stay committed to diplomatic means as a way to seek a peaceful settlement,” Wang said on Saturday. “We hope all parties including our friends from the United States could size up the situation in a cool-headed and comprehensive fashion and arrive at a wise decision.” In his comments in Seoul, Tillerson laid out details of the U.S. approach, saying it would focus on getting China to better enforce United Nations sanctions against North Korea. His tone was more moderate when he spoke alongside Wang on Saturday, saying the countries had agreed to work together to confront North Korea. “I think we share a common view and a sense that tensions on the peninsula are quite high right now and things have reached a rather dangerous level,” Tillerson said. “We’ve committed ourselves to do everything we can to prevent any type of conflict from breaking out.” Wang said China has come up with proposals for all sides to study, though he didn’t detail them. While Tillerson has said a key component of his new effort involves pressing China to better enforce UN sanctions, Wang said the matter is primarily between the U.S. and Pyongyang. “The Korean peninsula nuclear issue in nature is an issue between the United States and the DPRK,” Wang said. “It is obliged upon all parties to implement the sanctions and restart the talks at the same time.” (Nick Wadhams, “China Pushes Back on U.S. Talk of ‘All Options’ over North Korea,” Bloomberg, March 18, 2017)
Tillerson-Wang: “TILLERSON: Nihao. Good afternoon. I’m pleased to be here this afternoon in Beijing to discuss the way forward in forging a constructive and results-oriented relationship between the United States and China. This is an important opportunity to follow up on the telephone conversation between President Trump and President Xi and to pave the way for continued productive high-level engagement. Since the historic opening of relations between our two countries more than 40 years ago, the U.S.-China relationship has been guided by an understanding of non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation. It is important that the leaders of our two countries engage in further dialogue to develop a common understanding that will guide our relationship for the next half-century. The United States and China are the world’s two largest economies, and we must both promote stability and growth. Our two countries should have a positive trading relationship that is fair and pays dividends both ways, and we will be working on that going forth. Foreign Minister Wang and I also spoke about the importance of safeguarding stability and security in Northeast Asia and the Asia Pacific region. We noted that efforts made over the last 20 years have so far not succeeded in curbing the threat posed by North Korea’s illegal weapons programs. Because China’s stated policy is denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, we renewed our determination to work together to convince the North Korean Government to choose a better path and a different future for its people. I discussed the importance of upholding a rules-based order in dealing with maritime disputes and freedom of navigation and overflight. And I made clear that the United States will continue to advocate for universal values such as human rights and religious freedom. I look forward on this visit to additional meetings today with State Counselor Yang and tomorrow with President Xi, and to continue to work together with my Chinese host to address shared challenges and opportunities. MODERATOR: Question goes to Bob Woodruff, ABC News. Q: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for talking today. (Inaudible) in terms of all these terms – in terms of all these issues, North Korea is certainly at the top, and you’ve spoken this week, couple days ago, there is this possibility of a preemptive strike and that it’s “on the table,” quote/unquote. Exactly where’s the red line on this? What would cause this to happen, do you think? You probably don’t have to detail it, but what does North Korea have to do in order to have that possibility? And also, did you talk to China about that today, and has that given some pressure, to use some influence on them to give you anything new in terms of sanctions, et cetera, or any changes in laws to enforce some rules about trading with North Korea? Secondly, it also was tweeted by the President, President Trump, yesterday, where he said very clearly that North Korea’s bad and China has done very, very little. Did you know about that tweet when that went out? Did you have a chance to talk to him, and what was his reaction to you? Has he made your job a lot harder? TILLERSON: As I indicated in my prepared statement, Foreign Minister Wang and I had a very extensive exchange on North Korea, and Foreign Minister Wang affirmed again China’s longstanding policy of a denuclearized Korean peninsula. We also exchanged views and I think we share a common view and a sense that tensions on the peninsula are quite high (inaudible) and that things have reached a rather dangerous level. And we’ve committed ourselves to do everything we can to prevent any type of conflict from breaking out, and we view there are a number of steps that we can take that are in front of us. And Foreign Minister Wang has agreed that we will work together to see if we cannot bring the government in Pyongyang to a place where they want to make a different course – make a course correction and move away from their development of their nuclear weapons. But it is with a certain sense of urgency that we both feel because of the current situation that we have on the peninsula. So I appreciated Foreign Minister Wang’s sincere expressions about how China sees the situation, and we had a very good exchange on that and we will continue to be talking with one another on what we can both do, along with working with others, to bring North Korea to a different place where we are hopeful we can then begin a dialogue. MODERATOR: (Via interpreter, in progress) — goes to the Chinese journalist from CCTV to Foreign Minister Wang. Q: (Via interpreter, in progress) — CCTV, and my question goes to Foreign Minister Wang. Recently, the situation on Korean peninsula is highly complex, and it is in a constant state of tension. And we have also noticed that some people are of the view that despite China has the biggest influence on Pyongyang, it has not done enough to address the issue of the peninsula. So how does China look at the cooperation between China and the United States on international and regional issues, especially the question of the Korean peninsula? WANG: (Via interpreter) Indeed, the Korean peninsula nuclear issue is of interest to everyone. And on this issue, I would like to say that China stays committed to the goal of denuclearization and upholds the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime. We are for the settlement of this issue through dialogue and negotiations and the maintenance of peace and stability on the peninsula and the overall region. The Korean peninsula nuclear issue in nature is an issue between the United States and the D.P.R.K. China, as a close neighbor of the peninsula and a responsible major country, has over the years devoted a lot of energy and efforts to seek a settlement to this issue. Upon the request of the U.S. side, China has worked to facilitate and secure the establishment of the Three-Party Talks, which was expanded to become the Six-Party Talks later on. In fact, all these efforts were geared to create the conditions and provide support to the engagement and the discussions between the D.P.R.K. and the United States. The tremendous, important efforts China has thus made is visible to all. And after the Six-Party Talks ground to a halt, China again worked together with the United States and the other members of the UN Security Council to pass a series of D.P.R.K.-related resolutions and played an important role in containing D.P.R.K.’s nuclear and missile programs and controlling tension on the peninsula. Hereby, I would like to bring to your special notice here is the fact that while all Security Council resolutions related to D.P.R.K. have mapped out a series of increasingly tougher sanctions against Pyongyang, they have also at the same time included clear provisions calling for efforts to resume the talks, to de-escalate the tension, and to safeguard stability of the peninsula. Therefore, it is obliged upon all parties to implement the sanctions and restart the talks at the same time. The entire course of trying to seek a solution to the Korean peninsula nuclear issue up to date has both had successes and failures and both successful experience and hard lessons. The most important progress made is the September the 19th joint statement we reached in 2005, when we drafted a comprehensive roadmap for the D.P.R.K. to give up its nuclear and missile programs and realize denuclearization on the peninsula. And the most important experience we have learned is that only when the legitimate concerns of all parties are addressed in a synchronized and reciprocal fashion could we secure genuine progress in the talks. And the most important principle we have identified is that no matter what happens, we have to stay committed to diplomatic means as a way to seek peaceful settlement. The situation we face today is precisely caused by the very fact that the Six-Party Talks has ground to a halt and there was no means for diplomatic and political dialogues. Right now, the situation on the peninsula has arrived at a new crossroads. We could either let the situation continue to escalate and aggravate, which will finally lead to confronting conflicts, or we could continue to strictly implement the Security Council resolutions, and while we do so, try to seek a breakthrough point to restart the dialogues and come back to the right track of a negotiated settlement. And we hope all parties, including our friends from the United States, could size up the situation in a cool-headed and comprehensive fashion and arrive at a wise decision. The Chinese side has in this respect come up with our proposals. We hope the parties will study the Chinese suggestions carefully. And meanwhile, we welcome all parties to come up with their own proposals, and we stand ready to continue to maintain close communication and the necessary coordination with the U.S. side on this issue. I spent a lot of time with Secretary Tillerson just now during our meeting on the Korean peninsula nuclear issue. Of course, one or two exchange of views like this will not arrive us at complete agreement, but the good thing is we have reached a fundamental consensus governing some of the overall general directions. As Mr. Tillerson has just said now – has said just now, both of us are firmly committed to the goal of a denuclearized Korean peninsula, and we are both ready to comprehensively and strictly implement the Security Council resolutions. And we both hope to find ways to restart the talks, and neither of us are ready to give up the hope for peace. And such discussions between China and the United States will keep going, and this is and will be an important aspect of China-U.S. cooperation.” (DoS, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Remarks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at a Press Availability,” Diaoyutai, Beijing, March 18, 2017)
Tillerson: “Q. First of all, let me just ask you since the South Korean newspaper reported that you cancelled dinner because of fatigue, and then they said you spent more time with the Japanese than the South Koreans. What happened? Tillerson: They never invited us for dinner, then at the last minute they realized that optically it wasn’t playing very well in public for them, so they put out a statement that we didn’t have dinner because I was tired. Q: So are you saying they lied about it? RT: No, it was just their explanation. … Q: Given the focus that they’re saying was on Japan, let me say broadly — it seems like there is an extraordinary focus on Japan from the administration, given the President’s two meetings with Abe, your visit, Mattis’ visit, and the vice president coming next month — Japan is getting more focus at a high level than any other country. It has to be more than just a reassurance mission. What do you want from the Japanese and what can you give the Japanese? RT: Well, let me correct a little bit just from the perspective on what you just said. There has been a high level visit with the Japanese because the Japanese prime minister is in place. South Korea’s government is not in place. So there’s been no opportunity for a high level meeting, so let’s keep things in perspective. When Secretary Mattis came, [he] came to Korea also. So no preference given there. Vice President Pence’s trip next month — he’s going to both countries also. So there is no … I don’t think anything should be made that there is some kind of imbalance in the relationship. I think it’s more of a reflection of the situation with the Korean government. The impeachment of the president — the Korean president — they have an interim government now. They’ll have a new government in place after elections in May. So in the meantime, the level of communication between our governments at the active ministerial level and active presence level has been very — it’s been frequent. Foreign minister Yun and I have met several times and have spoken on the phone several times, so I don’t think anything should be read into the amount of time with visits. I think people are making more of that than they should. …Q: You told Fox yesterday that ‘nothing is off the table’ with respect to the nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In your confirmation hearing, you kind of said that South Korea and Japan don’t need to have nuclear weapons. Has your view changed, given the urgency of the situation with North Korea, particularly because Japan could finalize development of a nuclear weapon rather quickly if they needed to? RT: No, it has not, nor has the policy of the United States changed. Our objective is a denuclearized Korean peninsula. A denuclearized Korean peninsula negates any thought or need for Japan to have nuclear weapons. We say all options are on the table, but we cannot predict the future. So we do think it’s important that everyone in the region has a clear understanding that circumstances could evolve to the point that for mutual deterrence reasons, we might have to consider that. But as I said yesterday, there are a lot of … there’s a lot of steps and a lot of distance between now and a time that we would have to make a decision like that. Our objective is to have the regime in North Korea come to a conclusion that the reasons that they have felt they have had to develop nuclear weapons, those reasons are not well-founded. We want to change that understanding. With that, we do believe that if North Korea [were to] stand down on this nuclear program, that is their quickest means to begin to develop their economy and to become a vibrant economy for the North Korean people. If they don’t do that, they will have a very difficult time developing their economy. Q: Over the last couple of days, you’ve laid out a couple of options that you can take, saying that all options are on the table. But what is option one? RT: Well, option one is to send very strong messages to North Korea by way of the sanctions — sanctions which have already been imposed by the UN Security Council resolutions — and to ask that everyone fully implement those sanctions. And there are additional steps that we can take to increase the pressure on the regime in hopes that they will understand the path they’re on is simply not sustainable. Q: And those steps — what’s step one and what’s step two? RT: Well, the first steps are the UN sanctions. There are broader sanctions that we can consider. I think that there are additional actions that the UN, that we can consider. There are broader participation by other countries in putting pressure on North Korea. So, this is a staged approach in which we want to give the North Korean government time to understand what’s happening, time to make decisions and adjust. We’re not … it’s not our objective to force them into some brash action. It’s our objective for them to understand things only continue to get more difficult if they don’t change their path. We want to give you time to change your path. Q: Now the liberal opposition is likely to take office in South Korea, and the Chinese are obviously opposed to that. My understanding, though, is that in addition to the North Koreans trying to send a message complaining about U.S. military exercises, part of the reason that they deployed four missiles at the same time was to practice … beating missile defense systems. So, how do you get ahead of the North Koreans, particularly when the Chinese and the next administration in South Korea want more engagement and less of a military posturing? RT: Well that’s the point. We’re not sure if we can get ahead of them. If they just continue, you know, we’re headed to a place no one wants to be. And that’s why the actions are tending to cause them to pause and rethink the pathway you’re on. ‘Cause if they continue with their testing and continue the development of both their weapons and their delivery systems, then we’re going to find ourselves in a place that’s even more dangerous than we are today. …And we don’t want anyone to arrive at that destination. Q: How dangerous is the place we’re in today? The State Department just announced that Joseph Yun is on the way here for six days. What’s his mission? What are the next steps? How urgent is it right now? RT: Well, in terms of the urgency right now is to ensure that the regime of Pyongyang has heard the message. That’s why we’ve tried to be very clear and succinct with the message, which is, first, we do not intend to be a threat to you. We do not want to have a conflict with you. We want you to change your direction. And we want others in the region to help us help them make a different decision. That’s the first step. And then obviously that has to be backed up with action, so that they understand we’re serious. And that means soliciting others to help us with that message and backing that message up to North Korea: that you need to change directions. Q: Which includes the Chinese. Now hours before we took off for Beijing, the President got onto Twitter and said “North Koreans are behaving badly and China has done little to help.” So let me ask, did you know that was coming? Was that an intentional … you’re shaking your head, no. So you don’t know if that was an intentional bargaining chip (RT: No) to set a table with the Chinese? Does it complicate your mission this weekend? RT: No, it’s consistent with the discussions I had with the president before I left on this trip. I had a very good conversation with the president on the approach that I felt was necessary with North Korea, including all of the parties that we think have to be a part of this. So, I did not know that he was going to tweet anything out, but the message that he sent out was very consistent with the message that I’ve been delivering so far in Tokyo and in Seoul. And I don’t think it will come as any surprise to the Chinese government that we do not view that they have ever fully used all of the influence available to them to cause the North Korean regime to rethink its pursuit of these weapons, and that’s some of what I’ll be talking with the Chinese government about as well is, you know, they need to understand: what are they willing to do? How far are they willing to go? Can this be an area of mutual cooperation between two great powers to bring peace and stability to the Korean peninsula? And let’s be great powers. Let’s denuclearize the peninsula. That has been China’s stated policy for more than two decades — is a denuclearized Korean peninsula. They need to help solve this. (Transcript of Secretary of State Tillerson’s Interview with Erin McPike, Independent Journal Review, March 18, 2017. This interview was provided to the traveling press.)
3/19/17:
North Korea heralded the successful development of a new “high-thrust engine” during a visit to the country’s rocket test site by leader Kim Jong Un, the reclusive nation’s state media said. Kim observed the test of the indigenously built high-powered engine at the North’s Sohae satellite facility in Dongchang-ri, according to KCNA. The facility is near the site where the isolated country launched four extended-range Scud missiles earlier this month as part of a practice exercise aimed at striking U.S. military bases in Japan. Kim said that the “development and completion of the engine would help consolidate the scientific and technological foundation to match the world-level satellite delivery capability,” the report said — an indication that the test was likely that of a long-range rocket engine. KCNA said the purpose of the test was to confirm the reliability of the engine’s features, including its thrust power in the combustion chamber and the movements of various valves. Rocket engines can be easily repurposed for use in missiles. In September, the North announced the successful ground test of a new type of “high-power engine,” ostensibly for launching satellites. State media said the engine could deliver 80 tons of thrust, making it likely the most powerful the country had ever seen. David Schmerler, a researcher at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, said today’s test was different from the engine tested last September. “This appears to be a single-nozzle engine with four vernier thrusters,” Schmerler said, referring to thrusters used to maneuver and stabilize a spacecraft. “We haven’t seen this configuration before in North Korea.” Schmerler said it could be a new second-stage engine for the North’s next satellite launch vehicle. “However, it may also have a dual use in their ballistic missile program,” he added. (Jesse Johnson, “North Korea Hails Test of Powerful New Rocket Engine,” Japan Times, March 19, 2017)
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army, watched the ground jet test of Korean-style high-thrust engine newly developed by the Academy of the National Defense Science. After being told about the production of the new-type high-thrust engine, he personally visited the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground at dawn to learn in detail about the technical specifications of the engine and preparations for the test and guided it. The test was conducted to confirm the overall technical indices of the engine such as features of thrust power in the combustion chamber, accurate movement of turbine pump, control system and various valves and their structural safety and reliability. He mounted an observation post and gave an order to start the test. The results of the test confirmed the stable maintenance of technical indices of all systems such as starting and stopping features of a new-type high-thrust engine of Korean style designed and manufactured by the defense scientists and technicians by their own efforts and with indigenous technology, the features of the thrust power in the combustion chamber, turbine pump, control systems in the whole course of engine operation after accurately reaching the expected values, and the perfect guarantee of their structural reliability. He noted that the success made in the current test marked a great event of historic significance as it declared a new birth of the Juche-based rocket industry which has radically turned into a development-and creation-oriented industry both in name and in reality by completely doing away with dogmatism, conservatism and formalism left in the field of rocket industry and the dependence on the technology of other countries. He emphasized that the whole world will soon witness what eventful significance the great victory won today carries. The development and completion of a new-type high-thrust engine would help consolidate the scientific and technological foundation to match the world-level satellite delivery capability in the field of outer space development, he noted, adding with pleasure that today when a great leaping forward has been made in the development of the rocket industry is the day to be always remembered, a historic day which can be called “March 18 revolution.” He said that the field of munitions industry made a series of unprecedented successes this year as it did last year, instilling dynamism into the grand revolutionary advance of all the service personnel and people. Then he had a significant photo session with the officials, scientists and technicians in the field of defense science who took part in the test. He was accompanied by Ri Pyong Chol, Kim Jong Sik and other leading officials of the C.C. the WPK and scientists and technicians in the field of rocket research.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Watches Ground Jet Test of Newly Developed High-Thrust Engine,” March 19, 2017)
John Schilling: “North Korea continues its new practice of releasing colorful audiovisual presentations of Kim Jong Un watching ground tests of rocket hardware, presumably as a way of signaling constant progress in the development of North Korean space and missile systems. This weekend’s test was of an integrated propulsion system for a large rocket or missile. Pyongyang claims that this “new-type high-thrust engine would help consolidate the scientific and technological foundation to match the world-level satellite delivery capability in the field of outer space development”—a bombastic way to say that this engine is meant for launching satellites, not missiles. Photographs released by KCNA shows a propulsion system consisting of one core engine surrounded by four verniers. We may have seen the core engine before; it is similar in size and appearance to an engine tested last September. That engine was assessed as producing approximately 160,000 pounds of thrust, using high-energy propellants, and being better suited for use in satellite launch vehicles than ballistic missiles. The engine tested in September included no visible steering mechanism, leading us to speculate that perhaps North Korea was planning to swivel the entire engine on gimbals. North Korea has traditionally used either jet vanes or separate vernier engines for steering—easier but less efficient practices—and it may be that they simply didn’t have the verniers ready last September. There are differences in the plume and the plumbing configuration between last September’s and this weekend’s engine tests. These may be due to the incorporation of the verniers, but we should not rule out the possibility that the core engine itself may be different. The new engine’s core may be slightly smaller than what was tested before. An upscaled derivative of North Korea’s old Nodong missile engine might fit what we are seeing, and while it would not be as efficient, it would probably be easier for North Korea to manufacture domestically. Whatever the underlying heritage of this engine, it appears that the combination of the core engine and verniers is too is too large to fit in any of North Korea’s known ICBM prototypes, or in any missile that could be carried on any of its mobile launchers. Unfortunately, we cannot be 100 percent certain of that assessment from the photographs available so far. With four steering engines around a single core, the engine is probably meant to be used alone rather than clustered. Of the North Korean rocket and missile projects that we are currently aware of, the best fit for this engine would be as the second stage of the new satellite launch vehicle provisionally known as the “Unha-9.” However, we cannot rule out other possibilities, such as a yet-unknown ICBM design sized for this engine. But North Korea has been moving towards lighter mobile systems and solid propellants for their strategic missiles. Meanwhile, they have been promising us an ambitious new space program, which will require a large new satellite launch vehicle. They have made extensive upgrades to the Sohae Satellite Launching Station to support such a vehicle. Now they have shown us an engine that would be a good fit for this vehicle, and they have told us what they plan to do with it. The North Korean regime has never been shy when it comes to bragging about their missiles. This time, it seems they are bragging about space program. Whenever they get around to showing us their new satellite launcher, we’ll know for sure. (John Schilling, “A New Engine for a New Satellite Launch Vehicle?” 38North, March 20, 2017)
Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson and President Xi Jinping of China cast aside their differences with a public display of cooperation, sidestepping areas of disagreement even as North Korea made another defiant statement by showing off a new missile engine. In the highest-level face-to-face meeting between the United States and China since President Trump took office, the two sides made no mention of other contentious issues, including possible punitive trade measures against China and Washington’s unhappiness with Beijing’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. At least in public, Tillerson adopted a far different tone than that of his boss, who said in a Twitter post on March 17 that China had “done little to help” on North Korea. Instead, Tillerson said the United States looked forward to stronger ties with China. Hours before the meeting, North Korea stuck its nose under the tent, announcing that it had tested a new high-thrust missile engine that analysts said could be used in an intercontinental missile. The missile engine created the “perfect test” of the red line drawn by Tillerson in Seoul, said Evans J. R. Revere, a former principal deputy assistant secretary of state specializing in North Korea. During his 24-hour stay in Beijing, Tillerson took the unusual step of repeating rosy Chinese language on the state of relations. The relationship is guided by “non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation,” Tillerson said at a news conference with Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The Chinese state news media quoted Tillerson’s echo of the Chinese phrasing, noting it approvingly. But behind the scenes, diplomats and analysts said there was little doubt that Tillerson had pressed China to enforce sanctions against North Korea and raised the possibility that the United States would bolster its missile defense in Asia if China did not rein in Kim. China strongly objects to the installation of a missile defense system in South Korea, and the polite public words from Tillerson were designed to give China “face,” said a diplomat in Beijing who spoke on the condition of anonymity per diplomatic custom. Tillerson was almost certainly sterner in private, according to the diplomat. “I believe Tillerson repeated in the meetings what he said publicly in South Korea and Japan, and backed up Trump in his tweet,” he said. That meant some public warmth was necessary, the diplomat said, because aside from talking about North Korea, Tillerson also had the task of setting a broad agenda for a summit meeting between Trump and Xi that is expected to take place in Florida in early April. At the summit meeting, China is expected to seek a reaffirmation of the “One China” policy, under which the United States recognizes a single Chinese government in Beijing and does not maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Chinese analysts said Tillerson had probably encountered resistance to his arguments that the THAAD missile defense system was of little danger to China, which firmly believes that the system erodes its nuclear deterrent. “Tillerson will repeat many times this is no threat to China, but Xi won’t believe it,” said Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University. The best chance for cooperation on North Korea might come if China decides to more dutifully enforce some economic sanctions, Shi said. That would be a relatively small price to pay the Americans for a smooth summit meeting in Florida, although it would further hurt China’s already strained ties with North Korea, he said. “Maybe Xi will broaden the punishment against North Korea somewhat, at the cost of further damaging relations with North Korea,” Shi said. “We have punished North Korea many times, and Kim Jong-un hates China more and more. Maybe China will take some small steps to shut down a few trading companies, but not all.” China keeps the rudimentary North Korean economy running by supplying almost all its oil, and there is little chance Xi would consider shutting down the pipeline, even though China abruptly halted imports of North Korea’s coal last month, ending a valuable source of foreign currency for Pyongyang. “China won’t turn the sanctions from targeting the North Korean nuclear program into a punishment for ordinary North Korean people,” Global Times said March 17. But on the eve of Tillerson’s visit to Beijing, the Institute for Science and International Security released a study that it said showed that China was not enforcing the sanctions aimed at the nuclear program. China has allowed large quantities of materials used to make a component of hydrogen bombs to pass through its borders to the North, according to the research group. A newly operating plant in North Korea that produces lithium 6, a key ingredient for hydrogen bombs is a glaring example of China’s ignoring sanctions, the group said. The North purchased mercury and lithium hydroxide in China, and the items were transported across the border, the president of the institute, David Albright, said. The two commodities are needed for production of lithium 6, he said. (Jane Perlez, “Tillerson and Xi Show off Cooperation in Meeting,” New York Times, March 20, 2017,
3/20/17:
The Trump administration is considering sweeping sanctions aimed at cutting North Korea off from the global financial system as part of a broad review of measures to counter Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile threat, a senior U.S. official said. The sanctions would be part of a multi-pronged approach of increased economic and diplomatic pressure – especially on Chinese banks and firms that do the most business with North Korea – plus beefed-up defenses by the United States and its South Korean and Japanese allies, according to the administration official familiar with the deliberations. While the long-standing option of pre-emptive military strikes against North Korea is not off the table – as reflected by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s warning to Pyongyang during his Asia tour last week – the new administration is giving priority for now to less-risky options. The policy recommendations being assembled by President Donald Trump’s national security adviser, H.R. McMaster, are expected to reach the president’s desk within weeks, possibly before a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in early April, the official said. North Korea is expected to top the agenda at that meeting. It is not clear how quickly Trump will decide on a course of action, which could be delayed by the slow pace at which the administration is filling key national security jobs. The White House declined comment. Trump met McMaster on March 18 to discuss North Korea and said afterward that the country’s leader, Kim Jong Un, was “acting very, very badly.” The president spoke hours after North Korea boasted of a successful rocket-engine test, which officials and experts think is part of a program aimed at building an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting the United States. The administration source said U.S. officials, including Tillerson, had privately warned China about broader “secondary sanctions” that would target banks and other companies that do business with North Korea, most of which are Chinese. The move under consideration would mark an escalation of Trump’s pressure on China to do more to contain North Korea. It was not clear how Chinese officials responded to those warnings but Beijing has made clear its strong opposition to such moves. In Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said the situation on the Korean peninsula was at a crossroads and there were two prospects. One, she said, was that the relevant parties could continue to “escalate toward conflict and potential war,” Hua told a daily news briefing on March 21. “The other choice is that all sides can cool down and jointly pull the Korean nuclear issue back to a path of political and diplomatic resolution,” China would strictly and comprehensively implement its duties under the U.N. Security Council resolutions, which meant implementing sanctions but also making efforts to get back to talks, she added. Analysts also have questioned whether such sanctions would be as effective on North Korea as they were on a major oil producer such as Iran, given the isolated nation’s limited links to the world financial system. North Korea has relied heavily on illicit trade done via small Chinese banks. So, to be applied successfully, the new measures would have to threaten to bar those banks from the international financial system. Also under consideration are expanded efforts to seize assets of Kim and his family outside North Korea, the official said. Washington is increasingly concerned, however, that the winner of South Korea’s May 9 presidential election might backtrack on the deployment and be less supportive of tougher sanctions. Another U.S. government source said Trump could also opt to escalate cyberattacks and other covert action aimed at undermining North Korea’s leadership. “These options are not done as stand-alones,” the first U.S. official said. “It’s going to be some form of ‘all of the above,’ probably excluding military action.” (Matt Spetalnick and David Brunnstrom, “Exclusive: Trump Administration Weighing Broad Sanctions on North Korea – U.S. Official,” Reuters, March 21, 2017)
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s “answer to a question raised by KCNA as regards the fact that the US administration tried to threaten the DPRK and impose pressure upon it, taking advantage of US Secretary of State Tillerson’s tour of Japan, south Korea and China: Tillerson admitted the failure of the US efforts to denuclearize the DPRK for 20 years and the end of Obama’s policy of “strategic patience” during his recent tour of those countries. He said that the US would militarily counteract to the DPRK’s threat to the US and its allies. Now Tillerson is repeating what Obama touted much about sanctions until he left the White House. What matters is that neither Obama nor Tillerson knows the reason why the DPRK had to have access to nuclear weapons and why it is dynamically bolstering up the nuclear force. The nuclear force of the DPRK is the treasured sword of justice and the most reliable war deterrence to defend the socialist motherland and the life of its people. The US should face up to the situation of the world with its eyes wide open. The DPRK has the will and capability to fully respond to any war the US would like to ignite. If the businessmen-turned US authorities thought that they would frighten the DPRK, they would soon know that their method would not work on the latter. The world will soon witness what eventful significance the great victory won by the DPRK in the recent ground jet test of Korean-style high-thrust engine will carry.” (Pyongyang News, “FM Spokesman Warns against U.S. Anti-DPRK Approach,” March 20, 2017)
3/21/17:
Washington’s special representative for North Korea policy, Joseph Yun, arrived in Seoul last night and kicked off his three-day schedule by separately meeting with some of South Korea’s leading presidential contenders. Yun, a career diplomat who was born and raised in Seoul until the age of 10, met South Chungcheong Governor An Hee-jung this morning for about an hour in a closed-door meeting and had lunch with Rep. Yoo Seong-min of the minor conservative Bareun Party, a breakaway from former President Park Geun-hye’s Liberty Korea Party. Tomorrow, Yun plans to meet with Moon Jae-in’s chief diplomacy advisers Cho Byung-jae, former ambassador to Malaysia, and also Seo Hun, a former first deputy director at the National Intelligence Service. Moon, former leader of the main opposition Democratic Party, who is currently leading in election polls with approval ratings above 30 percent, said he wasn’t planning to personally meet Yun because that it “wasn’t right on diplomatic protocol standards” for him to have discussions with the U.S. envoy before winning the primary, according to Lim Jong-seok, Moon’s senior secretary. Lim said Moon was contacted by the U.S. Embassy in Seoul for a possible meeting. Ahn Cheol-soo, former co-chair of the People’s Party, has no known plans of meeting Yun, which came as a surprise for local analysts because Ahn is another strong candidate in election polls, ranking third in the latest JoongAng Ilbo survey conducted over the past weekend. Moon ranked first with 34.7 percent, followed by South Chungcheong Governor An with 21 percent and Ahn with 13 percent.
Rep. Yoo Seong-min, who met Yun today, did not make it into the top 5 in the JoongAng Ilbo poll but ranked the highest for a candidate from the Bareun Party. Ahn’s close aides said they didn’t receive any calls from the U.S. Embassy about a meeting with Yun. Kim Heung-kyu, a political science and diplomacy professor at Ajou University, who serves as Governor An’s diplomacy adviser, said the candidate explained to the American envoy his views on foreign affairs and national security, and heard what stances the Trump administration was reviewing to take against North Korea. Kim, who said he accompanied An in the meeting this morning, furthered it was a “good opportunity to form a consensus” on related issues. Tomorrow, Yun also planned to meet with his South Korean counterpart Kim Hong-kyun as well as other government officials to discuss North Korean provocations. A spokesman from the Foreign Affairs Ministry said the South Korean government was not involved in planning out Yun’s schedule. Yun, who arrived from Beijing after spending three days there, will be leaving Seoul March 23. The U.S. State Department said in a statement March 17 that Yun will meet his Chinese and South Korean counterparts to “continue our close coordination on North Korea policy.” While Yun’s schedule in Beijing only mentioned a meeting with Wu Dawei, China’s special representative for Korean Peninsula affairs, the State Department said the American envoy was planned to meet with Kim Hong-kyun, South Korea’s special representative, and also “senior ROK [Republic of Korea] officials and members of civil society to discuss a range of regional and bilateral issues.” Hua Chunying, spokeswoman of China’s Foreign Ministry, said yesterday during a regular press briefing that Yun and his Chinese counterpart had “candid and in-depth exchange of views on easing tension on the Korean Peninsula, maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula and moving forward the denuclearization of the peninsula,” according to transcripts provided online by the ministry. No further detail was mentioned. (Lee Sung-eun and Yoo Sung-woon, “U.S. Envoy for North Korea Seeks ‘Consensus,’” JoongAng Ilbo, March 22, 2017) “I had a chance to discuss (with China) the shape of our review on North Korea, which is ongoing, as well as the strong points that the secretary delivered both here and in Beijing on THAAD,” Joseph Yun, the top U.S nuclear envoy, said at the start of talks with his South Korean counterpart Kim Hong-kyun on March 22. He came to Seoul from Beijing where he held talks with senior Chinese officials. “The secretary conveyed it very strongly to the Chinese side and the secretary also said in private meetings that really retaliating against a defensive system which China has done was something that was uncalled for and something of a growing concern for us. So I believe those points were well delivered by the secretary,” he added. In what appears to be the latest provocation, the North test-fired a missile from its east coast that appears to have failed, Seoul’s defense ministry said earlier in the day. After completing his talks with Kim, Yun said that he heard about the latest missile test, saying it hurts ongoing global efforts to tackle the nuclear stalemate. “It is not helpful at all. These are tests that have been banned by U.N. Security Council resolutions, so it’s not very helpful,” he said. Asked if Washington was considering a secondary boycott intended to penalize third-country firms doing business with the North in an effort to force Beijing to pressure Pyongyang, he said, “Those are all things we need to study.” Meanwhile, during the talks with Kim, Yun emphasized the strong alliance and close communication between South Korea and the U.S., citing Tillerson’s recent visit and the forthcoming trip to Seoul by Vice President Mike Pence. “I think that shows the highest level of engagement that we have done. I want to thank you on your part also making sure that the alliance relationship and our approach to North Korea is very closely coordinated,” he said. Kim noted that Tillerson made a “very clear and strong statement” in Seoul last week on the “ironclad” alliance with South Korea, the “maximum level” of sanctions against the North and China’s “inappropriate” economic retaliation over THAAD. In a press release after the talks followed by a meeting over lunch, the foreign ministry said that the two condemned in unison the North’s continued provocations, including the latest one on Wednesday, and agreed to step up the economic and diplomatic isolation of Pyongyang going forward. They also reconfirmed that it is not the right time to hold talks with the North given that it continues to carry out provocations, rather it is the time to apply more pressure on its regime until it changes its calculus. Yun delivered that position shared by Seoul and Washington during his trip to Beijing, the ministry said. A diplomatic source quoted Yun as saying during the talks in Seoul that he and his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei shared that it is premature to seek negotiations with the North. Yun added that Tillerson also made it clear in Beijing that Washington will not hesitate to punish any Chinese firms for illegal transactions with the North, according to the source. (Yonhap, “Tillerson Told China Its Retaliation on S. Korea over THAAD Is ‘Uncalled for: U.S. Official,’” March 22, 2017)
3/21/17:
A fast-attack nuclear-powered U.S. submarine has joined an annual combined military exercise in South Korea in the latest show of force against North Korea, a defense source here said. “The U.S. Navy’s USS Columbus (SSN-762) is participating in the Foal Eagle exercise,” the official said. It is the third high-profile strategic defense asset of the U.S. to be deployed here for the drill after aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and two B-IB bombers. (Lee Chi-dong, “U.S. Nuclear Submarine Joins Combined Exercise in S. Korea,” Yonhap, March 21, 2017)
3/22/17:
North Korea fired a missile off its east coast, but the test apparently failed. North Korea launched the missile from near an air base in Wonsan, a port city, the South Korean Defense Ministry said in a brief statement. “We believe the test was a failure,” the ministry added, providing no further details, such as the type of missile launched. Commander Dave Benham, a spokesman for the United States Pacific Command, said in a statement that the missile “appears to have exploded within seconds of launch.” Also on Wednesday, a nuclear-capable B-1B strategic bomber from the United States air base in Guam conducted a mock bombing exercise over the Korean Peninsula with South Korean warplanes, the South Korean military said. Before flying over to the peninsula, it also conducted a similar drill in Japan. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Launches Missile, but Test Appears to Fail,” March 22, 2017,
In what appears to be the latest provocation, the North test-fired a missile from its east coast that appears to have failed, Seoul’s defense ministry said earlier in the day. After completing his talks with Kim, Yun said that he heard about the latest missile test, saying it hurts ongoing global efforts to tackle the nuclear stalemate. “It is not helpful at all. These are tests that have been banned by U.N. Security Council resolutions, so it’s not very helpful,” he said. Asked if Washington was considering a secondary boycott intended to penalize third-country firms doing business with the North in an effort to force Beijing to pressure Pyongyang, he said, “Those are all things we need to study.” Meanwhile, during the talks with Kim, Yun emphasized the strong alliance and close communication between South Korea and the U.S., citing Tillerson’s recent visit and the forthcoming trip to Seoul by Vice President Mike Pence. “I think that shows the highest level of engagement that we have done. I want to thank you on your part also making sure that the alliance relationship and our approach to North Korea is very closely coordinated,” he said. Kim noted that Tillerson made a “very clear and strong statement” in Seoul last week on the “ironclad” alliance with South Korea, the “maximum level” of sanctions against the North and China’s “inappropriate” economic retaliation over THAAD. In a press release after the talks followed by a meeting over lunch, the foreign ministry said that the two condemned in unison the North’s continued provocations, including the latest one on Wednesday, and agreed to step up the economic and diplomatic isolation of Pyongyang going forward. They also reconfirmed that it is not the right time to hold talks with the North given that it continues to carry out provocations, rather it is the time to apply more pressure on its regime until it changes its calculus. Yun delivered that position shared by Seoul and Washington during his trip to Beijing, the ministry said. A diplomatic source quoted Yun as saying during the talks in Seoul that he and his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei shared that it is premature to seek negotiations with the North. Yun added that Tillerson also made it clear in Beijing that Washington will not hesitate to punish any Chinese firms for illegal transactions with the North, according to the source. (Yonhap, “Tillerson told China its retaliation on S. Korea over THAAD is ‘uncalled for’: U.S. official,” March 22, 2017)
Federal prosecutors are investigating North Korea’s possible role in the theft of $81 million from the central bank of Bangladesh that security officials fear could be a new front in cyberwarfare. The U.S. attorney’s office in Los Angeles has been examining the extent to which the North Korea government aided and abetted the bold heist in February 2016, according to a person briefed on the investigation who was not authorized to speak publicly. In the theft, the attackers, using a global payment messaging system known as Swift, were able to persuade the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to move money from the Bangladesh bank to accounts in the Philippines. The Swift system is used by some 11,000 banks and companies to transfer money from one country to another. In the months that followed the Bangladesh heist, it was disclosed that cyber thieves had also attacked banks in Vietnam and Ecuador using Swift. North Korea’s involvement in the attack on the Bangladesh bank had not been publicly known until the New York Times reported last May that security researchers had found evidence that pointed to the country. The researchers discovered that a rare piece of code used in the theft had also been used in the hacking attack on Sony Pictures in December 2014. Federal prosecutors in Los Angeles are also investigating the Sony breach, and what they uncovered in that inquiry led them to examine the bank theft. United States security officials have largely been quiet about whether North Korea was linked to the bank attacks, even as they have publicly attributed the Sony breach to Pyongyang. That reticence is now slipping, however. Yesterday, Richard Ledgett, a deputy director of the National Security Agency, noted the research that tied the two attacks “forensically” and said that if North Korea’s role in the bank robbery was confirmed, it would represent a troubling new front in cyberwarfare. “That is a big deal,” Ledgett said at an event sponsored by the Aspen Institute. John Carlin, the head of the Aspen Institute’s cybersecurity and technology program, who served as assistant attorney general for national security during the Obama administration, asked whether Ledgett believed that “nation states are now robbing banks.” Ledgett responded, “I do.” The renewed focus on North Korea’s cyber activities comes as the Trump administration seeks to take a tougher line on that country’s nuclear program. The breach of the Bangladesh central bank exposed how banks of all sizes are vulnerable to cyberattacks using the Swift network, once thought to be among the most secure messaging systems in the world. Investigators believe that the attackers gained access to the bank’s Swift credentials, possibly from someone who worked there. Using those credentials, the attackers then sent messages over Swift to the New York Fed, authorizing the release of the funds from the Bangladesh bank account there. The New York Fed released some of the $951 million to accounts in the Philippines, as requested by the attackers. But officials in New York halted the full transfer when they noticed that something seemed amiss. Swift has been urging the thousands of banks that belong to its network to take precautions. A Swift spokeswoman declined to comment today. Ledgett said yesterday that large companies and banks might be fundamentally outmatched by nation-state cyber attackers and suggested that the United States government needed to do more to help bolster their defenses. It is as if the “security guards at Home Depot and Target” are expected “to stand up to the North Korean Army,” said Ledgett, who plans to retire soon from the National Security Agency. “On the face of it, it doesn’t make sense.” News of the criminal investigation into North Korea’s role in the Bangladesh bank attack was reported earlier today by the Wall Street Journal. It was not clear whether any charges from the investigation were imminent. (Michael Corkery and Matthew Goldstein, “North Korea Is Said to Be Target of Inquiry over $81 Million Cyberheist,” New York Times, March 23, 2017, p. B-4) When hackers associated with North Korea tried to break into Polish banks late last year they left a trail of information about their apparent intentions to steal money from more than 100 organizations around the world, according to security researchers. A list of internet protocol addresses, which was supplied by the security researchers and analyzed by the New York Times, showed that the hacking targets were banks and other institutions spread across 31 countries and regions. including institutions like the World Bank, the European Central Bank and big American companies including Bank of America. While some of the Polish banks took the hackers’ bait, the scheme was detected fairly quickly, and there is no evidence that any money was stolen from the intended targets. Yet security researchers said the hit list, found embedded in the code of the attack on more than 20 Polish banks, were dozens of identifying IP addresses of intended targets, which underlines how sophisticated the capabilities of North Korean hackers have become. Their goals have now turned financial, along with efforts to spread propaganda and heist data and to disrupt government and news websites in countries considered enemies. The list of targets, which has not been previously reported, is part of a growing body of evidence showing how North Korea, a country that is cut off from much of the global economy, is increasingly trying to use its cyberattack abilities to bring in cash — and making progressively bolder attempts to do so. North Korea’s hacking network is immense, encompassing a group of 1,700 hackers aided by more than 5,000 trainers, supervisors and others in supporting roles, South Korean officials estimate. Because of the country’s poor infrastructure, the hackers typically work abroad, in places like China, Southeast Asia and Europe. Like other North Koreans allowed to work abroad, the hackers are constantly monitored by minders for possible breaches in allegiance to the government. The security firm Symantec said it believed that the hackers behind the Poland attack were also behind two other major breaches: the theft of $81 million from the central bank of Bangladesh and a 2014 attack on Sony Pictures, which rocked the film industry. “We found multiple links, which gave us reasonable confidence that it’s the same group behind Bangladesh as the Polish attacks,” said Eric Chien, a researcher at Symantec, which studied both attacks. The firm has not traced the attacks to a specific country’s government, but American officials have blamed North Korea for the Sony attack, partly based on intelligence that came from American breaches of North Korea’s computer systems. The list of targets uncovered in the Polish attack — including big American financial institutions like State Street Bank and Trust and the Bank of New York Mellon — is illuminating for its ambition, Chien added. “It’s one thing to go after Bangladesh,” he said, “but it’s a whole other thing to take on the U.S.” The Polish episode provides a case study of how North Korean cyberattack goals have escalated. The attack began around October when the hackers planted a virus on the website of the Polish financial regulator — then waited for banks to inadvertently download it when they visited the site. The perpetrators used what is called a watering-hole attack — named after the way predators ambush prey by lazing around a high-traffic spot — to go after the banks; in this case, the “watering hole” was the financial regulator’s website. When the visitors on the list landed on the page, they would be redirected to software that would attempt to download malware. The list of targets extended beyond Poland, investigators said, because the group intended to carry out similar attacks elsewhere. “This was a global list, but they hadn’t gotten around to making a watering hole for all these country banks,” Chien said, adding that the hackers appeared to have created watering-hole sites in Mexico and Uruguay, too. Symantec said it had blocked 14 attacks against computers in Mexico and 11 in Uruguay. The fact that the hackers were able to attack a specific site showed that their capabilities had improved, Chien said. The group also used its own modifications of code and exploits more broadly shared by cybercriminals, whereas before it had mostly built its own tools — another indication of evolution. While Polish banks were the most numerous targets, the second-largest number was in the United States, including the American arm of Deutsche Bank. CoBank, which lends to agriculture and rural projects, was targeted, too. The central banks of Russia, Venezuela, Mexico, Chile and the Czech Republic were on the list. The only target associated with China: branches of the Bank of China in Hong Kong and America. North Korea has been carefully cultivating its cyberattack capabilities since the early 1990s, according to South Korean officials. Generally, the country selects young computer prodigies and trains them as hackers, according to people who have attended the South Korean government’s discussions of the North’s hacking operations. South Korean cybersecurity officials began detecting attacks attributed to North Korean hackers around 2009. Working overseas is a huge incentive for young hackers, since many North Koreans have little chance to leave their impoverished, isolated country. As long as the hackers meet their government-set targets, they are allowed to live abroad and often get the added perk of running illegal gambling sites online, generating profits they can share with supervisors. While North Korea lags developed countries in hacking capabilities, it has occasionally startled observers in South Korea. In 2011, investigators found that a South Korean bank had been hit by malware when an infected computer used by a maintenance-company employee was briefly hooked into the bank’s server network. South Korean hackers who forensically analyzed the attack were impressed not so much by the malware, but by the fact that North Korean hackers had been so constantly on alert, apparently for hours or days on end, waiting for the short window during which the infected computer was connected to the bank’s servers so that they could activate the virus. While the Pentagon has recently warned that North Korea’s hacking abilities could be a cost-effective way of conducting military operations, the attacks on banks shows the country’s more prosaic goal of getting money. “In the past, North Korean hackers usually attacked government websites with the goal of destroying systems and triggering social confusion,” said Kim Seung-joo, a professor at the Graduate School of Information Security at Korea University in Seoul, who is an adviser for the South Korean government’s cybersecurity division. “Now they have shifted to making money, attacking banks and private companies, apparently because the North’s other means of raising foreign currency are increasingly blocked under United Nations sanctions,” Kim said. North Korean hackers have also begun using ransomware — viruses that encrypt all data in an infected computer or smartphone — to make money. The hackers demand a ransom, usually in Bitcoin, in return for providing victims with a decryption code. In July, the South Korean police said North Korea’s main intelligence agency had stolen the personal data of more than 10 million customers of Interpark, an online shopping mall in South Korea. Interpark did not learn about the breach until it received an anonymous message threatening to publicize the leak of personal data unless it paid the equivalent of $2.7 million in Bitcoin. South Korea attributed the attack to hackers belonging to North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau, its main spy agency. In the end, no Bitcoin changed hands. Instead of paying the ransom, Interpark reported the attack to the police. (Paul J. Mozur and Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea’s Ambition Seen in North Korea’s Rising Ambition Seen in Bid to Breach Global Banks,” New York Times, March 26, 2017,
Sigal: “During Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s first visit to Asia, David Sanger’s lede in The New York Times coming on March 17 was ominous: “Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson ruled out opening any negotiation with North Korea to freeze its nuclear and missile programs and said for the first time that the Trump administration might be forced to take preemptive action “if they elevate the threat of their weapons program” to an unacceptable level.” The news about no negotiations may have been music to the ears of Tillerson’s hosts in the lame-duck South Korean government, but the mere mention of preventive war, given President Trump’s reputation for recklessness, set off alarm bells elsewhere in the front-line capital. Other news outlets took their cue from Sanger. Soon the airwaves and blogosphere were filled with portentous speculation. After all, compared to dull diplomacy, preventive war is so much more thrilling to contemplate; like Iraq—only this time with real nuclear weapons to attack. Of course, who knows where in North Korea they might be hidden. Sanger was never one to underplay his stories, but had Tillerson “ruled out” talks and ruled in “preemption” in his so-called press availability in Seoul? On the subject of negotiations, Tillerson seemed to allude to the Obama administration’s insistence that North Korea commit up front to denuclearization before talks could begin: “[I]n terms of talking about any kind of a freeze, I think it’s premature for that. But at this stage I’m not sure we would be willing to freeze, with the circumstances where they exist today, given that that would leave North Korea with significant capabilities that would represent a true threat, not just to the region, but to American forces, as well.” “Premature” is not exactly a rejection of negotiating a freeze. And he did not rule that out: “So, again, conditions must change before there is any scope for talks to resume, whether they be five-party or six-party.” Standing beside him, Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se spoke of CVID (complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement) but Tillerson, noticeably, did not. What about “preemptive action” or, more precisely, preventive war? Well, Tillerson never actually uttered those words. Instead, he said: “All of the options are on the table. Certainly, we do not want to—for things to get to a military conflict. We are quite clear in that, in our communications. But obviously, if North Korea takes actions that threatens the South Korean forces or our own forces, then that would be met with an appropriate response. If they elevate the threat of their weapons program to a level that we believe requires action, that option is on the table. But we are hopeful that, by taking these steps—and we have many, many steps we can take before we get to that point—we hope that that will persuade North Korea to take a different course of action. That is our desire.” War, in short, lay way down a long road—if ever—and the policy review under way in Washington has reportedly already ruled out “preemptive action”—for now. The talk of war was also at odds with the reassuring words Tillerson had uttered in Tokyo the day before: “North Korea and its people need not fear the United States or their neighbors in the region who seek only to live in peace with North Korea.” Tillerson’s target audience for his remarks in Seoul seemed to be in Beijing, where he was heading next. Some reporters like Jane Perlez of the Times and Anne Gearan and Anna Fifield of The Washington Post grasped that essential point. President Trump’s policy, if there was any, resembled President Obama’s, if there was any—to push the Chinese to step up pressure on Pyongyang: “Diplomatic pressures will be one stream of such endeavors, but there could be other types of efforts.” That seemed in keeping with Trump’s tweet in the immediate aftermath of Tillerson’s remarks to the press: “North Korea is behaving very badly. They have been “playing” the United States for years. China has done little to help!” Tillerson acknowledged as much on March 18 in his only interview during the trip, which was made available to the press. When asked if Trump’s tweet complicated his diplomacy, he replied: “No, it’s consistent with the discussions I had with the president before I left on this trip. I had a very good conversation with the president on the approach that I felt was necessary with North Korea, including all of the parties that we think have to be a part of this. So, I did not know that he was going to tweet anything out, but the message that he sent out was very consistent with the message that I’ve been delivering so far in Tokyo and in Seoul. And I don’t think it will come as any surprise to the Chinese government that we do not view that they have ever fully used all of the influence available to them to cause the North Korean regime to rethink its pursuit of these weapons, and that’s some of what I’ll be talking with the Chinese government about as well is, you know, they need to understand: what are they willing to do? How far are they willing to go? Can this be an area of mutual cooperation between two great powers to bring peace and stability to the Korean peninsula? And let’s be great powers. Let’s denuclearize the peninsula. That has been China’s stated policy for more than two decades—is a denuclearized Korean peninsula. They need to help solve this.” Caught in the shoals between the President’s injunction and the need to keep a diplomatic option open, Tillerson had a tricky course to steer. The problem is, any delay in negotiations, a resort to tougher sanctions and the hint of war could provoke Pyongyang to conduct more missile and nuclear tests and could cause a breach with a soon-to-be elected government in Seoul. Cooperation with China also misconstrues North Korea’s purpose in seeking talks with the United States: to end US enmity and reduce dependence on Beijing. If Tillerson’s aim was to stampede the Chinese into tightening sanctions, there is no sign that he succeeded in Beijing. China was well aware that North Korea is open to talks—but not on US terms: that it first commit to denuclearization. In a joint “press availability” with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on March 18, Tillerson put the emphasis on China’s support for stepped-up pressure to compel the North to accept that goal: “Foreign Minister Wang has agreed that we will work together to see if we cannot bring the government in Pyongyang to a place where they want to make a different course—make a course correction and move away from their development of their nuclear weapons.” Wang’s reaction seemed to echo the longstanding Chinese stance that the Americans and the North Koreans had made the problem and it was up to them solve it: “I would like to bring to your special notice here is the fact that while all Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK have mapped out a series of increasingly tougher sanctions against Pyongyang, they have also at the same time included clear provisions calling for efforts to resume the talks, to de-escalate the tension, and to safeguard stability of the peninsula. Therefore, it is obliged upon all parties to implement the sanctions and restart the talks at the same time.” In Tillerson’s view, past negotiations had failed: “We noted that efforts made over the last 20 years have so far not succeeded in curbing the threat posed by North Korea’s illegal weapons programs.” Wang had a very different take, one closer to the negotiating record: “The entire course of trying to seek a solution to the Korean peninsula nuclear issue up to date has both had successes and failures and both successful experience and hard lessons. …The situation we face today is precisely caused by the very fact that the Six-Party Talks has ground to a halt and there was no means for diplomatic and political dialogues.” Wang implied that there had been a meeting of minds on implementing Security Council sanctions and entering into negotiations: “As Mr. Tillerson has said just now, both of us are firmly committed to the goal of a denuclearized Korean peninsula, and we are both ready to comprehensively and strictly implement the Security Council resolutions. And we both hope to find ways to restart the talks…” Tillerson said nothing about finding ways to restart talks. Was Sanger inspired to interpret Tillerson’s remarks by administration officials who whispered in his ear? In Sanger’s view, the fact that that did not happen was the problem. In an article the next day, he had the effrontery to lecture how the inexperienced Tillerson could benefit by taking reporters along, the next time he traveled abroad: “Rex W. Tillerson, the new secretary of state, offered the diplomatic understatement of the month on Saturday when he told the sole reporter he permitted on his airplane: ‘I’m not a big media press access person. I personally don’t need it.’ Perhaps, by breaking with a half-century of past practice and flying off without the regular State Department correspondents on board, Mr. Tillerson was hoping to continue to operate in a style that worked well for him as chief executive of Exxon Mobil. In that job, he could negotiate complex oil and gas deals behind closed doors and then inform his board of directors and shareholders afterward. Certainly, his predecessors at the State Department have all wished for more time, space and secrecy to work through some of the world’s knottiest problems. The North Korea crisis that dominated this trip is a prime example of one that, if mishandled, could easily veer into war. Yet long experience teaches that foreign policy is rarely made in the kind of media-free bubble that Mr. Tillerson wants. … The group that has covered the State Department is heavy with former foreign correspondents and war correspondents who have lived around the world, have sources in foreign capitals and write books about the global challenges the country faces. Their hotel-bar conversations have been known to run to wonkish topics like deterrence theory. So it might not be surprising that Mr. Tillerson doesn’t want them in the back of his airplane, talking to his staff and probing how the new administration’s approach to North Korea and China might differ from what predecessors tried.” Yet the novice secretary of state may have proved defter at delicate diplomacy than some seasoned reporters.” (Leon V. Sigal, “Misreading Tillerson,” 38North, March 22, 2017)
Mason Richey: “One overarching thread has remained true over the long period of North Korean nuclear weapons development and the various iterations of carrot-and-stick diplomacy that have accompanied it: for both the public at large and the leaderships of the United States, South Korea, and Japan, threat perceptions of a potentially nuclear-armed North Korea have been heightened by Pyongyang’s belligerent rhetoric. The regime’s Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) is infamous for English-language propaganda ranging from insulting to bellicose to ludicrous. A few examples include Kim Young-Sam, former South Korean president, referred to as a “thrice-cursed shabby US toady”; Japan’s government officials “are epileptic mentally deranged wretches”; George W. Bush, former US president, was a “cowboy buffoon”; South Korean President Park Geun-Hye “was a venomous swish of skirt”; North Korea will “turn Seoul into a sea of flame”; the North Korean military will “mercilessly annihilate the US”; and “Japan is planning nuclear attacks
on the DPRK.” Over the study period (1997–2006), North Korea uttered 790 insults against the United States, South Korea, and Japan; issued 302 threats against them; and made 130 claims of being under imminent attack by the alliance partners. The United States was the referent for 788 of these instances; South Korea, 550; Japan, 96. … An analysis of insulting, threatening, hyperbolic rhetoric in English-language news articles disseminated over the period 1997–2006 via the Korea Central News Agency and targeting the United States, South Korea, and Japan is instructive with respect to these hypotheses. During this period, belligerent rhetorical statements in the articles
trended downwards overall. Insults and threats diminished marginally, while statements claiming North Korea was imminently under attack by the United States, South Korea, or Japan, which compose a small number of total observations, clearly increased. The decline in rhetoric directed against South Korea roughly coincided with an increase against the United States and the initiation of the Sunshine Policy. Curiously, despite efforts at multilateral diplomacy, North Korean rhetoric claiming imminent attack by the United States, South Korea, and Japan increased by 170 percent after 2000. An ordinary least squares regression shows that the two major diplomatic efforts initiated by the international community—the Sunshine Policy and the Six-Party Talks—have a statistically significant, negative correlation with North Korea’s inflammatory rhetoric. In other words, diplomatic efforts are associated with a lower probability of inflammatory rhetoric by the Pyongyang regime. The reverse occurs—bellicose rhetoric increases—when Pyongyang’s leaders consider American and South Korean actions aggressive. Two classes of events are important: US overseas military operations, or expressions of hawkishness potentially leading to operations, that might indicate Washington’s appetite for strikes against rogue states like North Korea and US-led military exercises in the Asia-Pacific, particularly exercises involving the United States and South Korea. These two “US hawkishness” variables explain 20 percent of the variation in North Korea’s bellicose rhetoric. This is less than the independent variables indexing conciliation, but the coefficients are larger, which indicates greater effect intensity. North Korea’s belligerent rhetoric and independent variables Most people only notice North Korea during episodes in which Pyongyang executes some form of provocation, such as nuclear bomb or ballistic missile tests, artillery bombardments of South Korean islands, attacks on South Korean navy vessels, and violent incursions on the southern side of the military demarcation line. Media reports about and government reactions to such actions are overwhelmingly accompanied by references to North Korea’s inflammatory rhetoric, particularly the threats. But is the incendiary rhetoric meaningfully associated with provocations, or does Pyongyang’s intemperate rhetoric merely appear correlated because popular attention focuses on the Korean peninsula only during such incidents? The data… suggest the latter is the case, as indeed there is no statistically significant relationship between North Korea’s provocations and belligerent rhetoric. This perceived correlation, as opposed to actual correlation, is true of all types of belligerent rhetoric taken together as well as threats and claims of imminent attack against North Korea taken individually.” (Mason Richey, “Turning It up to Eleven: Belligerent Rhetoric in North Korea’s Propaganda,” Parameters 46(4) Winter 2016–17)
3/24/17:
North Korea has carried out another test of a rocket engine that U.S. officials believe could be part of its program to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile, officials told Reuters on March 27. The latest test follows one earlier this month, and is another sign of Pyongyang’s advancing weapons program. It comes amid mounting U.S. concerns about additional missile and nuclear tests, potentially in the near future. Several U.S. officials said the test took place on the night of March 24and the engine could possibly be used in an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). (Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart, “North Korea Tests Rocket Engine: U.S. Officials,” Reuters, March 27, 2017)
3/25/17:
It’s easy to write off Kim Jong Un as a madman. What with the colorful nuclear threats, the gruesome executions of family members, the fact that he’s a self-appointed marshal who’s never served in the military. Indeed, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) did it just this past week, calling Kim “this crazy, fat kid that’s running North Korea.” That came on the heels of a pronouncement from Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, that “we are not dealing with a rational person” in Kim. It’s a relatively common view. World leaders, military chiefs and Hollywood have all painted him as an unhinged maniac. But this is not just wrong, North Korea watchers and dictatorship experts say. It also risks dangerous miscalculation. “North Korea has consistently been treated like a joke, but now the joke has nuclear weapons,” said John Park, director of the Korea Working Group at the Harvard Kennedy School. “If you deem Kim Jong Un to be irrational, then you’re implicitly underestimating him.” Writing off Kim Jong Un as a lunatic could equally be playing into his hands. Want proof that he’s no senseless madman? Exhibit A: “He’s still in power,” said Benjamin Smith, an expert on regime change at the University of Florida. “He and his father and grandfather have stayed in power through a series of American presidents going back to Truman.” Indeed, the 33-year-old has defied predictions that he would not be able to keep a grip on the authoritarian state that has been in his family’s control since 1948. December marked his fifth anniversary in power — a milestone that the democratically elected president in the South did not reach. In person, Kim is confident and well spoken, said Michael Spavor, a Canadian who runs Paektu Cultural Exchange, which promotes business, sports and tourism with North Korea. Spavor is one of the very few outsiders to have met Kim. “He was acting very diplomatically and professionally,” said Spavor, who accompanied Dennis Rodman, the basketball player, on his trips to North Korea. “He felt old beyond his years. He could be serious at times and fun at times but by no means did he seem weird or odd.” Smith pointed out that saying Kim is rational isn’t the same as saying “he’s a perfect guy who makes perfect decisions.” Kim’s decisions to date have enabled him to achieve his primary goal — so far — of staying in power by staving off threats, real or anticipated, from the elite. “He has reasons to be afraid of conspiracies in the top levels of his government, especially in the military and secret police,” said Andrei Lankov, a Russian scholar of North Korea who once studied at Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang. “You can buy these people off, but they can still betray you. You have to terrify them, and that’s what he’s doing.” Kim has sent a message to the elites who keep him in power through a series of executions and purges that keep everyone fearful that they will be next. Kim has rid himself of 300-plus officials during his five years at the helm. He notably had his own uncle, Jang Song Thaek, executed for disobeying orders and building his own power base. Other high-level figures have been killed — a defense minister was reportedly dispatched with antiaircraft fire — or purged. The state security minister is said to be under house arrest. “What’s irrational about that? Irrational is going to the ICC and surrendering,” Lankov said. A United Nations commission of inquiry has recommended referring Kim to the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity. The assassination of Kim Jong Un’s half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, in Malaysia with a chemical weapon was a message to outside rivals that the young leader could hunt them down wherever they are, analysts say. To deal with threats from “hostile powers,” in North Korean parlance, having nuclear weapons makes sense for Kim, said Kongdan Oh of the Institute for Defense Analyses. “Steadily pursuing nuclear weapons is a very rational thing for him to be doing.” Kim has ordered three nuclear tests since he took power — claiming that one was a hydrogen bomb — and has overseen steady improvements in the missile program. North Korea has “entered the final stage of preparation” for the test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile, Kim has said, referring to a missile capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. North Korea was established in vehement opposition to the American “imperialist aggressors” and their “puppets” in South Korea. So maintaining a sense of threat from both provides a rationale for the state’s existence and a shared menace to unite the elite and the common people. Then there’s the economy. The fact that it’s growing is a sign that the leadership knows what it’s doing, said Park of Harvard. “There’s a puzzle here: The regime is getting wealthier amid the increasing implementation of sanctions,” he said. While the North Korean economy is far from booming, it has been steadily expanding in recent years, as evidenced by all the construction in Pyongyang despite increasingly tight restrictions imposed by the outside world. It has done this through state-run trading companies that form partnerships with entities in China, enabling them to circumvent sanctions. “Look at the web of elite North Korean state trading companies. You can’t be irrational or somehow crazy to consistently run this system to either make money off it or procure what you need for the nuclear weapons program,” Park said. “That objectively shows that there is a game plan, and a pretty consistently implemented game plan.” But being rational is not the same as being predictable, and many analysts say that the youngest Kim appears to be temperamental and hotheaded. That worries American military leaders. “Combining nuclear warheads with ballistic missile technology in the hands of a volatile leader like Kim Jong Un is a recipe for disaster,” Adm. Harry Harris, the head of Pacific Command, said in December. There is reason to be concerned about this factor, said Jerrold Post, a psychiatrist who founded the CIA’s personality analysis center and has studied Kim and his father. Kim’s capacity for brutality and his apparent spontaneity could be compounded by President Trump’s own impulsive acts, he said. “This is all about big boys and their big toys,” Post said. “Will he actively threaten the U.S.? I tend to think not, but I must say I’m concerned about words leading to actions between him and President Trump.” (Anna Fifield, “North Korea’s Leader Is a Lot of Things – But Irrational Is Not One of Them,” Washington Post, March 25, 2017)
3/26/17:
KCNA: “The U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces are busy staging madcap joint military drills for aggression with more than 300 000 troops, U.S. nuclear carrier Carl Vinson and B-1B and other nuclear strategic assets involved. The on-going saber-rattling under the simulated conditions of an actual war assumes more serious nature as its goal is to carry out the “special operation” aimed to eliminate in advance “the person” of the DPRK with “the right to issue an order” and destroy major strategic targets for the purpose of checking the rapid bolstering of nuclear deterrent of the army and people of the DPRK and depriving it of the right to use nukes. At least 3 000 U.S. troops or treble those involved last year are taking part in the “special operation” being conducted as part of the rehearsals. They include the Ranger Unit of the 75th Airborne Regiment of the U.S. Army, the Green Berets Special Units Nos. 1 and 19, the 353rd Special Warfare Corps of the Air Force, the 1st, 3rd 5th and 7th teams of the First Special Warfare Corps of the Navy, two battalions of the First Stryker Brigade of the 25th Division of the Army, one battalion of the 66th Armored Regiment and the 31st Naval Expedition Corps of the Marines. A particular mention should be made of the fact that Navy Seal and Delta Force belonging to the joint special warfare headquarters called “detached force of the White House” are hurled into the “operation” at the direct instruction of the U.S. president. The U.S. imperialists and the south Korean warmongers do not hide the fact that the scenario of the “special operation” being staged by the ill-famed units is mainly aimed at carrying out the “beheading operation” for “removing the headquarters of the north” and the “preemptive attack” operation for blowing up the nuclear and rocket bases. Through a spokesman’s warning statement, the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) on Sunday said that all moves assume more dangerous adventurous nature as they are nothing but last-ditch efforts and final gambling of the U.S. imperialists and the puppet military warmongers who are fated to meet destruction owing to the total bankruptcy of the hostile policy toward the DPRK and the policy of confrontation with the compatriots in the north. And it further said: The General Staff of the KPA warns the hideous provocateurs as follows with regard to the situation that has reached an extreme phase which should not be overlooked:
- The General Staff declares the KPA’s stand to mercilessly smash the enemy’s moves with its own style of special operation and preemptive attack, now that the sinister aim of the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean war maniacs’ “special operation” to hurt the dignity of the DPRK’s supreme leadership has become clear and they disclosed even the dangerous attempt at “preemptive attack.” They are sadly mistaken if their brigandish “special operation” and “preemptive strike” would work on this land guarded by the powerful revolutionary Paektusan army though they claim they proved successful in other countries and regions.
- They should be mindful that the KPA will deal deadly blows without prior warning any time as long as the operation means and troops of the U.S. and south Korean puppet forces involved in the “special operation” and “preemptive attack” targeting the DPRK remain deployed in and around south Korea. The KPA will not remain a passive onlooker to hordes of robbers trying to hurt our people with daggers.
- Once the enemy launches the said “operation and strike”, they will only bring about a historic event in which the U.S. imperialists will face a miserable doom and the south Korean puppet forces a final ruin. It is the centuries-old tragedy that the U.S. and the south Korean forces still don’t know how foolish and futile their attempts to hurt the supreme leadership of the DPRK and infringe upon its sovereignty are, though they have stood in standoff with the latter for decades. They should think twice about the catastrophic consequences to be entailed by their outrageous military actions. The KPA’s warning is not hot air.”
(KCNA, “KPA General Staff Warns U.S., S. Korean Forces on ‘Special Operations,’” March 26, 2017)
3/27/17:
As the threat from North Korea’s missiles grows, so the calls in Japan for a stronger military response are getting louder. An influential group of politicians is publicly arguing for technically pacifist Japan to acquire the ability to strike North Korea instead of having to rely on the United States for its defense. “Japan can’t just wait until it’s destroyed,” Imazu Hiroshi, the head of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s security committee and a proponent of the idea, said in an interview. “It’s legally possible for Japan to strike an enemy base that’s launching a missile at us, but we don’t have the equipment or the capability.” Nakatani Gen, defense minister until last year and a member of the committee, agrees. “I believe that we should consider having the capacity to strike,” he told the Washington Post. Their public pronouncements have not come out by accident, analysts say. Such senior members of the powerful ruling party would not raise the issue unless it was being promoted at the highest levels. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo publicly supports consideration of the idea. “I’d like to encourage the party to have this discussion and am keeping an eye on how it’s going,” he said in the Diet on Friday when asked whether he was in favor of acquiring the capability to strike. Under the American-written constitution imposed in the wake of its World War II defeat, Japan may defend itself if it comes under attack but is not allowed to go on the offensive. Imazu said that the current arrangement made Japan a “peculiar” country. “Our country is protected by other countries, but we can’t do anything to protect them. This is not acceptable in the international community anymore,” Imazu said. “We cooperate with the U.S. and other nations to protect our country and also to contribute to peace in East Asia. In this environment, it’s only proper that we should discuss how we could protect our country.” Abe has been trying to loosen the constitutional shackles on Japan’s military, notably with a 2015 law to allow Japan to come to the aid of the United States. He has signaled he would like to revise the constitution to allow Japan to have a normal military. North Korea is now giving Abe plenty of ammunition to bolster his case. It has been firing missiles at a steady clip into the Sea of Japan between the two countries, and three of the most recent salvo have landed inside Japan’s exclusive economic zone. The regime in Pyongyang said it was practicing to hit American military bases in Japan. Japan is now upgrading its PAC-3 Patriot missile batteries to double their range, and is considering other defensive measures. At a forum in Washington last year, defense minister Tomomi Inada said that Japan was considering acquiring the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense antimissile system recently deployed to South Korea — she even went to Guam to see it — and the Aegis Ashore, a land-based version of the SM-3 interceptors that Japan already has mounted on its Aegis destroyers. “We know that North Korea’s missile capability has improved considerably,” said Onodera Itsunori, another former defense minister in the Abe administration and the chairman of an LDP committee on responding to the North Korean missile threat. “Right now, we are discussing how we can make sure to prevent them,” he said, adding that the committee could make a proposal as soon as this week. Onodera was particularly concerned by North Korea’s recent launch of missiles simultaneously, a move apparently designed to outsmart interception systems. “In that case, we would come under attack one missile after another unless we strike the enemy base and stop them,” he said. “So the discussion is around the need to neutralize the missile launch base.” Acquiring strike capability might be legally permissible under international law, but it will be difficult to sell to the Japanese public, the majority of whom have been resistant to the small changes Abe has made so far. Analysts say that senior politicians could be floating a trial balloon to test public reaction to the idea. “This discussion is not random,” said Brad Glosserman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Pacific Forum, saying the likes of Onodera would not raise such an idea without the prime minister’s encouragement. “The bottom line is that a strike capability gives Japan more control over its destiny.” Discussion about acquiring a strike capability also arose during Abe’s first tenure as prime minister, in 2006-2007, a time that coincided with North Korea’s first nuclear test. “Now, the threat is more crystallized. Some in Japan are saying, ‘We want to have our own fingers on the trigger, we want to be able to defend ourselves,’ ” Glosserman said. But the Abe government has already taken one step that could take it halfway there — it decided to acquire 42 F-35 stealth fighter jets for air defense, which could be fitted with strike capability. “The question is whether to use the F-35 to its full extent,” said Michishita Narushige, a North Korea expert at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. Another option is to buy Tomahawk cruise missiles from the United States. The U.S. Marine Corps already has 10 F-35Bs deployed at its air station in Iwakuni, in western Japan. “Abe is politically astute and realistic in understanding what he can do,” Michishita said, describing how the prime minister is harnessing the momentum provided by North Korea’s threats. “F-35s might not be enough, but they’re a good place to start.” Any change would not happen without extensive consultation with the Americans, said Nakatani, Inada’s predecessor as defense minister. “Japan doesn’t have the capacity to launch an attack on North Korea by ourselves,” he said. “In order for Japan to do that, it would take a lot of discussion with the U.S.” (Anna Fifield, “As North Korea Fires Missiles, Some in Japan Want the Ability to Launch Strikes,” Washington Post, March 27, 2017)
Prosecutors said that they were seeking to arrest former President Park Geun-hye of South Korea on criminal charges including bribery and abuse of power. Whether they can arrest Park, who was removed from office in a historic court ruling this month, will depend on whether the Seoul District Court will issue an arrest warrant. If arrested, Park would be the first former South Korean leader put behind bars since two former military dictators were imprisoned on corruption and mutiny charges in the mid-1990s. Today, prosecutors formally asked the court for the warrant. It usually takes several days before the court studies evidence and decides whether an arrest warrant is justified. Prosecutors have been discussing whether they have enough evidence to apply for an arrest warrant since they questioned her for more than 20 hours last week. Prosecutors accused Park of conspiring with a longtime confidante, Choi Soon-sil, to collect tens of millions of dollars from big businesses, including more than $38 million in bribes from Samsung. Both Choi and Samsung’s top executive, Lee Jae-yong, have been arrested and indicted on a number of charges, including bribery. When they indicted Choi and Lee, prosecutors had already identified Ms. Park as a criminal accomplice. “The suspect abused her power by using her tremendous status and authority as president to help collect funds from businesses,” prosecutors said in a statement today explaining why they thought she needed to be arrested. “Although there have been a number of pieces of evidence collected, the suspect has denied most of them, and there is a danger of her destroying incriminating evidence if she is not arrested.” (Choe Sang-hun, “Prosecutors Seek to Arrest Ousted South Korean Leader,” New York Times, March 27, 2017,
3/28/17:
A ruling Liberal Democratic Party security policy panel urged the government to let Japan directly strike North Korean missile bases in the event Pyongyang stages a ballistic missile attack on the country. Specifically, the panel urged the government to procure long-range cruise missiles capable of striking North Korean sites. Panel members emphasized that Japan should only use such long-range missiles after the North fires a ballistic missile against Japan, given the war-renouncing Constitution that limits the use of force by Tokyo strictly to self-defense. Still, if the proposal is ever adopted by the government, it would mark a significant departure from Japan’s traditional defense posture, which has focused solely on the defense of its territory. Former Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori, a key member of the panel, said Pyongyang’s ballistic missile advancements and spate of recent test-firings into the Sea of Japan had prompted the body to make the “urgent proposal.” Japan currently has a two-layer missile-defense system, consisting of missile interceptors launched from Aegis destroyers and ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 systems. The two-layer system would first be used to destroy any incoming ballistic missiles from the North, Onodera said during a press briefing at the LDP’s head office in Tokyo on Wednesday. However, Japan needs to bolster its capabilities to destroy missile bases in the North in order to prevent a second or third wave of attacks, he argued. Over a number of years, hawkish LDP lawmakers have repeatedly called on the government to procure powerful weapons that can directly strike North Korean missile bases, including long-range fighter jets and Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from Aegis destroyers. So far, however, top government officials have remained cautious on these proposals. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo told a Diet session last month that currently Tokyo has no plans to procure such arms although he said he would not rule out studies on the option. Some experts have argued that knocking out the North’s ability to strike Japan with missiles is nearly impossible since Pyongyang is believed to have already deployed as many as 200 Nodong ballistic missiles and dozens of mobile launchers that can easily be moved and hidden. The Nodong, one of the North’s go-to missiles, can strike most of Japan. Still, possessing weapons that can directly strike the North would be a rational option for Japan because it would raise the bar for Pyongyang when considering an attack on Japan, said Michishita Narushige, professor of international relations at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. “North Korea is now trying to develop ballistic missiles that can reach the U.S.,” Michishita said. “If that goal is achieved, the United States would shift its priority to destroying missiles flying toward the U.S., and the defense of Japan would become a lower priority.” In that sense, he said, it would only be natural for Japan to boost its own defensive capabilities against the North, including one that would allow it to destroy the North’s missile sites. (Yoshida Reiji, “LDP Panel Urges Government to Let Japan Strike North Korean Missile Bases in Event of Attack,” Japan Times, March 29, 2017)
Bermudez and Liu: “New commercial satellite imagery of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site from March 28 shows a heightened level of activity over the past few days. Despite the recent snowfall, there has been continued pumping of water out of the North Portal, presumably to keep the tunnels dry for communications and monitoring equipment; the removal of material (probably rubble) and dumping on the tailings pile immediately to the east of the portal; and the probable removal of one or more vehicles or equipment trailers from in front of the portal. This activity is consistent with previous reports, while the rest of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site has been generally quiet. However, there is now one vehicle and a large contingent (70-100) of people standing in formation or watching in the courtyard of the Main Administrative Area. Such a gathering hasn’t been seen since January 4, 2013, which was followed by a nuclear test on February 12. The North Koreans know when commercial satellites are passing overhead and typically try to avoid activities during that time. The fact these formations can be seen suggests that Pyongyang is sending a political message that the sixth nuclear test will be conducted soon. Alternatively, it may be engaged in a well-planned game of brinkmanship.” (Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. and Jack Liu, “Heightened Activity at North Korea’s Pungye-ri Nuclear Test Site,” 38North, March 29, 2017)
3/29/17:
South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo instructed troops not to hesitate to take retaliatory actions in the event of a North Korea attack. Inspecting a coastline guard post of the Army’s 32nd Infantry Division, Han stressed the need for “perfect” combat posture both on the front lines and in the rear. “There shouldn’t be any disorder even by an inch in the military,” he said. “Any provocation from the North should not be tolerated.” (Yonhap, “Defense Chief Orders Immediate Retaliation to N.K. Provocations,” March 29, 2017)
KCNA: “The U.S. is playing a cheap trick in its relations with the DPRK. Recently a high-ranking official concerned of the U.S. State Department “officially” told that the U.S. decided to exclude the idea of preemptive attack on the DPRK from its planned policy toward the DPRK now under examination. As if to prove it, the paid media trumpeted in unison that “U.S. shows softened attitude to north Korea.” It is great irony to see the wolf whose nature is to bite off bleating. The U.S. rhetoric about “exclusion of preemptive attack” is nothing but a trick to calm down the DPRK taking the stand of the toughest counteraction and then attack it with surprise preemptive nuclear strike and thus put whole Korea under its control. Nothing surprising is the U.S. trite method by which it staged smear campaign to make its rival get relaxed and harbor illusion about the U.S. and then invade it through preemptive attack. On June 24, 1950, the U.S. trumpeted about weekend trips of the U.S. president and warmongers like the chief of the U.S. military advisory group in south Korea. On the other hand, it instigated the Syngman Rhee clique to release a false report that the two thirds of the south Korean puppet military had been on an outing and first-line officers and high-ranking officials of the ground army command had been indulged themselves in entertainment at an officers’ club. Then on June 25, it provoked the Korean War without declaration of it. On the eve of the Iraqi war in the new century, the U.S. conducted smear propaganda campaign against Iraq 17 hours a day at five different frequencies for the purpose of weakening the will of resistance among the army and people of Iraq and creating illusion about the U.S. military among them. After that it started a war through preemptive attack by cruise missiles. The deception of the rhetoric about “exclusion of preemptive attack” made by the U.S. is proven with added clarity through the contents of the military operations pursued by the empire of evil against the DPRK, and performance and deployment of strike means. Now the U.S. is carrying out Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises under the scenario of preemptive strike like OPLAN 5015 and OPLAN 4D targeting “precision strike” at key strategic strongholds including the supreme headquarters and nuclear and missile bases in the DPRK. They are openly describing the nuclear strategic assets involved in the exercises as “ideal preemptive strike means” and are unhesitatingly carrying out “special operation” drills targeting the headquarters of the Korean revolution by setting in motion heinous group of murderers. An assertion that preemptive attack has to be pushed forward in secrecy is heard from the U.S. policy-makers, a clear proof that the U.S. ambition to stifle the DPRK and its strategy for a preemptive attack remain unchanged and that the story now afloat is a prelude to an armed invasion. The U.S. is seriously mistaken if it thinks it can shake the will of retaliation of the army and people of the DPRK through such a trite trick and deceive the international community. The powerful revolutionary Paektusan army is closely following the every move of the hostile forces after putting the strongholds of aggression and provocation within the optical sight of its nuclear weapons. If the slightest sign of preemptive attack on the DPRK is detected, the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK will punish the enemies with powerful preemptive nuclear strikes. The U.S. should clearly understand the catastrophic consequences to be entailed by the reckless attempt at preemptive strike and behave with discretion.” (KCNA, “U.S. Trick Will Not Work on DPRK: KCNA Commentary,” March 29, 2017)
Russia is seeking to deepen ties with the government of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, seemingly unconcerned by raised eyebrows in the international community. In fact, Russia is now seen by many experts as closer to the North than Pyongyang’s traditional ally, China. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have two motives: He may be trying to use his ties with North Korea as a diplomatic card in his dealings with the U.S. He is also eager to bring in North Korean labor to help with the development of the Russian Far East. Moscow has recently begun talks with Pyongyang on allowing more North Koreans to work in the country. According to Russia’s Internal Affairs Ministry, the two countries held an intergovernmental meeting on migrant workers in Pyongyang on Wednesday. During the talks, the Russians laid out a medium- to long-term plan for accepting more North Korean workers. Representatives from state-owned Russian Railways also visited North Korea in late January to negotiate expansion of rail links between the two countries. The two sides reached a deal under which more North Korean railway engineers will receive training at a Russian university. According to Russian officials, Moscow did not halt oil exports to the North after the latter conducted test-launches of ballistic missiles in February. In February, KCNA named Russia at the top of the list of countries to which Kim had sent lunar New Year greeting cards. Maria Zakharova, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman criticized Washington, saying the deployment of the U.S. anti-missile system known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense had hurt regional stability. Experts believe Moscow hopes to use its increased influence with Pyongyang as a negotiating card as it deals with the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. Vasily Mikheev, a deputy director at Russia’s Institute of World Economy and International Relations, said he believes Moscow will maintain its pro-Pyongyang stance as a diplomatic leverage unless the U.S.-Russia relations improve. According to Russian government statistics, the number of North Koreans in Russia with work permits has doubled in the last five years to over 40,000. Many experts believe the actual number of migrant workers is far higher when illegal workers are included. A local official in Primorsky Krai, a territory in Russian Far East that shares a border with North Korea, said the country’s diligent, tireless workers are seen as essential to moving infrastructure projects along in the Russian Far East, including those in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. According to some analysts, Putin’s government is also seeking to strengthen economic ties with South Korea, again using its Pyongyang ties as a bargaining chip. Putin is hoping relations with Seoul improve after the country’s May presidential election. (Tanaka Takayuki, “Moscow Plays the North Korea Card,” Asian Nikkei Review, March 28, 2017)
Seoul has granted rival North Korea’s women’s ice hockey team permission to play in the South next week, the Unification Ministry said, a positive sign ahead of next year’s Winter Olympics. Seoul’s permission is required for all northern visits to the South, and for all trips by its citizens to the nuclear-armed North. “The visit to the South by the North Korean team was approved,” the unification ministry said in a statement. The 30-member North Korean delegation will include 20 athletes and 10 coaches and support staff. Pyongyang boycotted the 1988 Seoul Games, but Lee Hee-Beom, the chief organiser of next year’s event, has urged it to take part in a “peace” Olympics. (AFP, “Seoul Approves N. Korea Women’s Hockey Visit,” March 29, 2017)
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s statement “as regards the fact that the U.S. is driving the situation on the Korean peninsula to an ever more extreme phase through profound confusion of right and wrong: The statement recalled the fact that a spokesman for the U.S. State Department on Monday [March 27] malignantly pulled up the DPRK over the warning served by a spokesman for the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army with regard to the “special operation” staged by the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces, terming it “provocative act” and “inflammatory remarks.” The warning is an entirely just measure for self-defense against the heinous provocateurs given the prevailing situation that has reached a phase which can never be overlooked. …After kicking off joint military drills involving hundreds of thousands of troops and nuclear strategic assets, the U.S. is staging a “special operation” drill, the keynote of which are a “beheading operation” for “eliminating the headquarters” of a sovereign state and a “preemptive strike” operation designed to destroy its nuclear and rocket bases. Clear is its ulterior design. The U.S. has worked hard to justify the war rehearsals, talking about their transparency, but it is no more than a paradox. Its trumpeting about transparency is just outbursts of a gangster to commit robbery in broad daylight. As the strategic depth of the DPRK is not big, the only way to defend itself from the sudden preemptive attack from the U.S. modern strategic assets and special warfare units is just to mount a resolute preemptive attack. In case a war breaks out on the Korean peninsula, the U.S. will be held wholly accountable for it, no matter who will launch a preemptive attack, as it is causing trouble by bringing lots of nuclear strategic assets and special warfare means, not content with persisting in its hostile policy toward the DPRK.” (KCNA, “U.S. Will Be Held Accountable for Outbreak of War on the Korean Peninsula: Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry,” March 29, 2017)
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s answer to the question raised by KCNA “as regards the frantic financial sanctions racket being kicked up by the U.S.-led hostile forces against the DPRK: The U.S.-led hostile forces at a plenary meeting of the International Financial Supervisory Body held in Paris in February last again staged a farce of re-listing the DPRK as a target of “countermeasure” for blocking its financial transactions with other countries. Then, they pressurized the Society for World Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) headquartered in Belgium into terminating its financial communication service to the banks of the DPRK. The U.S. House of Representatives produced a “bill on escalating sanctions with respect to transactions with North Korea” after modifying and supplementing the “North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016.” It has gone the lengths of crying out for independent sanctions against banks and businesses of other countries dealing with the DPRK after inventing absurd pretexts. The recent racket kicked up by the U.S.-led hostile forces to tighten financial sanctions against the DPRK is no more than a stopgap measure of those being driven into a tight corner in the political and military standoff with the DPRK. A step was taken by SWIFT to ban its communication with the banks of the DPRK but the banks of the DPRK have not dealt with the SWIFT since a long time ago in actuality. As for the farce staged by the International Financial Supervisory Body to re-list the DPRK as a “target of countermeasure”, it is just an unfair one taken under pressure from the U.S., as repeatedly clarified by the DPRK. The DPRK is doing its best after establishing the system of anti-money laundering and combating financing of terrorism in accordance with international standard. The independent sanctions the U.S. claims slapping against other countries dealing with the DPRK are also being opposed worldwide as an impudent act of wantonly violating international law. All facts go to clearly prove that the frantic racket of the U.S. is aimed to tarnish the international image of the DPRK and stir up the international atmosphere of ratcheting up sanctions and pressure upon it. The whole gamut of base actions the U.S. and its vassal forces are running to deprive the DPRK of its nuclear weapons under the pretexts of UN sanctions and independent sanctions would only result in bringing into bolder relief the unreasonable and immoral nature of the sanctions. They can never check the advance of the DPRK accelerating the building of a socialist power under the unfurled banner of self-reliance and self-development, firmly holding the nuclear deterrent, a treasured sword of victory.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Slams U.S. Racket of Tightening Financial Sanctions,” March 29, 2017)
3/30/17:
Delegations from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Malaysia issued a joint statement on Thursday. The statement is as follows: “Delegations from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Malaysia recently held a meeting in Kuala Lumpur to resolve issues arising from the death of a DPRK national in Kuala Lumpur on 13 February, 2017. Both countries reaffirmed their desire to resolve the existing issues, based on the fundamental strength of their bilateral relations, which have been cultivated since the diplomatic relations were established in 1973. Both countries agreed on the importance of respecting the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and full implement the provisions contained therein. As the DPRK has produced all necessary documentations related to the body of the deceased from the family, Malaysia agreed to facilitate the transfer of the body to the family of the deceased in DPRK. Both countries agreed to lift the travel ban imposed on citizens of the other country and guarantee their safety and security within their respective territory. This would allow the nine Malaysians presently in Pyongyang to return to Malaysia and the DPRK citizens in Kuala Lumpur to depart Malaysia. The importance of bilateral relations was reaffirmed. In this connection, both countries agreed to positively discuss the re-introduction of the visa-free system and work towards bringing the relations to a higher level.” (KCNA, “Joint Statemnet of DPRK and Malaysia,” March 30, 2017)
3/31/17:
Former President Park Geun-hye was arrested, 21 days after she was removed from office by the Constitutional Court. Park became the nation’s third president to be put behind bars facing criminal charges, following Chung Do-hwan and Roh Tae-woo in the 1990s. The Seoul Central District Court issued the warrant at 3:03 a.m. following a hearing that lasted nearly nine hours.
“There are considerable reasons and need to arrest (Park) as key charges have been substantiated considerably and concerns over the destruction of evidence still prevail,” presiding Judge Kang Bu-young said, approving the prosecution’s request to arrest her. With Park in jail, the number of people who have been arrested because of the massive influence-peddling scandal involving her confidant Choi Soon-sil increased to 21. Park’s arrest warrant is valid until April 19, and the prosecution plans to question her further during this period. It is unclear yet as to whether prosecutors will summon Park or visit the Seoul Detention Center to question her. The questioning of Park is likely to take place early next week. Because official campaigning for the presidential election begins April 17, the prosecution is expected to indict Park before then, to minimize the case’s impact on the election. If Park is found guilty of the multiple charges laid against her, including bribery, she faces a minimum of 10 years in prison and possibly up to 45 years. She faces 13 charges in the scandal, including bribery, abuse of power, extortion and sharing state secrets with an unauthorized person, which is the largest number of charges faced by a former president. Park is suspected of having colluded with her long-time friend Choi to get Samsung Electronics Vice Chairman Lee Jae-yong to provide a total of 43.3 billion won in funds in exchange for Cheong Wa Dae assisting Lee in a smooth power transfer from his ailing father, Chairman Lee Kun-hee. She also faces allegations of collecting funds from over 50 other major conglomerates for the Choi-controlled K-Sports and Mir foundations. The prosecution’s investigation is also focusing on whether the funds were in exchange for business favors. Moreover, Park allegedly pressured conglomerates to sign projects with companies owned by Choi and her acquaintances. In addition, she is suspected of having a hand in the creation of a blacklist of artists critical of the government to cut them off from subsidies, forcing culture ministry officials to resign and pressuring former CJ Vice Chairwoman Lee Mi-kyung to step down, due to her disapproval of the group’s entertainment arm. Park also faces charges of giving classified documents to Choi, who did not hold a government post. Her accomplices in these charges – Choi, Lee and former aides Kim Ki-choon, An Chong-bum and Jeong Ho-seong, as well as former Culture Minister Cho Yoon-sun have been indicted and are currently on trial. At the hearing held for the arrest warrant, Park continued to deny all the charges against her. (Kim Bo-eun, “Ex-President Park Arrested,” Korea Times, March 31, 2017)
Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee’s statement “as regards the fact that the U.S. is running the whole gamut of intrigues to tighten its colonial domination over south Korea and persist in its hostile policy towards the DPRK as it feels uneasy about the increasing likelihood of the collapse of the pro-U.S. conservative “government” and the victory of the progressive and pro-reform forces in the coming “presidential” election. Shortly ago, the special representative for DPRK policy of the U.S. Department of State met figures of major opposition parties of south Korea to tap their attitude toward the deployment of THAAD and “nuclear issue of the north” and busied himself pressing them to accept its hostile policy toward the DPRK. Early in February the director general of the Atlantic Council of the U.S., one of the confidants of Trump, flew into south Korea in secret. When coming in touch with a “presidential” candidate from an opposition party, he tried to “verify” the former’s “view on the U.S. and north Korea.” The U.S. is openly wooing senior officials of the White House and the administration, congressmen and media into underscoring the need to prioritize the alliance with south Korea and strengthen it regardless of which regime appears there and steadily maintain the foundation of sanctions against the DPRK. It seeks to effect the deployment of THAAD before the “presidential” election so that the next regime may not reverse it. These moves are open high-handed practices for forcing the next regime to follow the policy of confrontation with the fellow countrymen pursued by the Park Geun Hye group of traitors in a bid to keep its system for domination, use south Korea as its permanent colony and outpost for carrying out its strategy for dominating Asia-Pacific. …The massive candlelight actions of south Korean people, which culminated in removing traitor Park Geun Hye from office, were an eruption of their bitter resentment against her “government’s” despicable submission and sycophancy towards outside forces and an expression of their strong desire to win back the usurped sovereignty. The gangster-like U.S. is the chieftain who has inflicted untold pain and misfortune upon the south Korean people and arch criminal disturbing national reconciliation, unity and reunification and threatening peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. The tragic reality of south Korea goes to clearly prove that sycophancy towards the U.S. and submission to it lead to national ruin and destruction but national independence is the way to survive and achieve reunification.” (KCNA, “KAPPC Spokesman Slams U.S. Scheme for Keeping Colonial Rule over Korea,” March 31, 2017)
4/1/17:
Donald Trump has warned that the U.S. will take unilateral action to eliminate the nuclear threat from North Korea unless China increases pressure on the regime in Pyongyang. High quality global journalism requires investment. In an exclusive interview with the Financial Times, the U.S. president said he would discuss the growing threat from Kim Jong Un’s nuclear program with Xi Jinping when he hosts the Chinese president at his Florida resort this week, in their first meeting. “China has great influence over North Korea. And China will either decide to help us with North Korea, or they won’t,” Trump said in the Oval Office. “If they do, that will be very good for China, and if they don’t, it won’t be good for anyone.” But he made clear that he would deal with North Korea with or without China’s help. Asked if he would consider a “grand bargain” — where China pressures Pyongyang in exchange for a guarantee that the US would later remove troops from the Korean peninsula — Trump said: “Well if China is not going to solve North Korea, we will. That is all I am telling you.” The White House views North Korea as the most imminent threat to the U.S. after Barack Obama warned his successor about the progress Pyongyang had made developing long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. The U.S. president says he has no regrets about his style and agenda but, as his 100-day anniversary approaches, governing is harder than he thought “There is a real possibility that North Korea will be able to hit the US with a nuclear-armed missile by the end of the first Trump term,” K.T. McFarland, the deputy White House national security adviser, told the FT in a separate interview. Ahead of the U.S.-China summit, Trump raised hopes that he would reach some kind of deal with Xi, despite heavy criticism about China’s trade surplus and exchange rate policy. “I have great respect for him. I have great respect for China. I would not be at all surprised if we did something that would be very dramatic and good for both countries and I hope so.” The National Security Council has completed a review of options on North Korea that Trump ordered after his inauguration, according to two people familiar with the review. One of those people said the review had been accelerated to have the options ready for the Trump-Xi summit. Barring a preemptive strike on North Korea, which the administration will not rule out since all options are on the table, many experts believe the U.S. needs Chinese help as Beijing has the most sway over Pyongyang. But Wahsington could consider alternatives, ranging from more effective sanctions to more controversial covert action. Barring a pre-emptive strike on North Korea — which the administration will not rule out since all options are on the table — many experts believe the U.S. needs Chinese help as Beijing has the most sway over Pyongyang. But Washington could consider alternatives, ranging from more effective sanctions to various kinds of more controversial covert action. “What President Trump is trying to do here is to press the Chinese hard by warning them what comes next if they don’t help or join with the US to deal with this problem,” said Dennis Wilder, a former CIA China analyst who later served as the top White House Asia aide to George W Bush. Related article Donald Trump in his own words “What he is signaling is that the next step is to begin secondary sanctions, which we have avoided. They are sanctions on Chinese companies and individuals who deal with North Korea,” he added. Wilder said Trump could also pressure China not to use North Korean labor, which is a source of revenue for Pyongyang. “Then you get to the other options, which are much more controversial, like taking covert action against North Korea, for example using cyber.” Trump told the FT that it was “totally” possible for the U.S. to tackle North Korea without China. Asked if that meant dealing with Pyongyang one on one, he said: “I don’t have to say any more. Totally.” (Lionel Barber, Demetri Sevastopolu, and Gillian Tett, “’If China Is Not Going to Solve North Korea, We Will,’” Financial Times, April 3, 2017)
4/2/17:
“We must deal with North Korea as it is, not as we wish it to be.” That was the key phrase in the preface of a report handed to the Japanese, South Korean and American leaders after then-U.S. defense chief William Perry’s unprecedented 1999 visit to Pyongyang. Nearly 18 years later, those words still ring true for Perry. The former defense secretary under President Bill Clinton has become one of the most visible faces of a growing movement urging Washington, as well as other key nations, to set realistic goals and again engage Pyongyang diplomatically over its burgeoning nuclear and weapons programs. According to Perry, recent U.S. policies and strategies toward the North, lacking a clear understanding of Pyongyang’s aims, have failed out of the gate. The result has been a ramped-up level of progress in its weapons programs unforeseen by U.S. analysts and government officials alike. “I believe our policies ought to be oriented around that assessment of what their goals are,” Perry told the Japan Times in an interview. “I think our negotiations ought to be oriented around what their goals are and our policies, our strategies, ought to be oriented around minimizing dangers. I don’t think our negotiations or our policies have been.” This could include moves such as moratoriums or deals on halting long-range missile programs and nuclear tests in exchange for certain carrots like economic aid and recognition. Not acknowledging the motivations behind North Korea’s provocations, Perry alluded, could end up seeing the U.S., South Korea — and in turn Japan — embroiled in another Korean conflict. In a January commentary for the website Politico, he wrote that it is probably too late to dismantle the North’s nuclear program. Instead, he said, the goal must be shifted to containing them. Citing Siegfried Hecker, the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory who has made four visits to the North’s Yongbyon reactor, Perry wrote that negotiations are “doomed to continue to fail” if they are based on the premise that it will give up its nuclear weapons. He said the U.S. could start off with more modest goals using Hecker’s “Three Nos” (1. No new weapons; 2. No better weapons; and 3. No transfer of nuclear technology or weapons), in addition to incentives previously offered to Pyongyang. Achieving these goals would not only be of great security value, but could also be a “stepping stone” for follow-up negotiations with an ultimate goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, Perry said. In 1999, he delivered to the North a proposal by Clinton that the 50-year-old economic embargo against the country be lifted gradually in exchange for a series of major concessions, including an agreement to end its long-range missile program. Perry’s legwork laid the foundation for a flurry of visits by top officials from both countries and a growing view at the time that a deal could be reached. But as the Clinton administration wound down at the end of 2000, and new President George W. Bush prepared to enter the White House, that momentum dwindled. The U.S. had been “tantalizingly close” to sealing a deal with North Korea to eliminate its medium- and long-range missiles and end its missile exports, Wendy Sherman, former special adviser to the president and secretary of state for North Korea policy, wrote in a New York Times editorial in March 2001. She urged Bush to seize the chance. Ten months later, the ground had shifted. “President Bush deliberately stopped the one negotiations — which were almost completed — which conceivably could have prevented this problem,” Perry said. “He did that with the belief that he had better a negotiation underway. That negotiation obviously did not succeed nor did the negotiations of the Obama administration. “Without assessing the theoretical value of what they were doing, the result is pretty straightforward,” Perry said, noting the current state of affairs. In his 2015 book “My Journey at the Nuclear Brink,” Perry summed up the results of U.S. policy toward the North since the Clinton administration as “perhaps the most unsuccessful exercise of diplomacy in our country’s history.” “My own assessment of why it did not succeed in the case of the Bush administration is that I think they were just distracted by the Iraq War,” Perry said. “They didn’t put enough time or attention into it. Who knows what would have happened if they had really made it a priority and worked at it. But they did not.” Still, Perry said, that while the Bush administration was preoccupied with the Middle East, his successor, President Barack Obama, actually had a policy — under which the North’s nuclear and missile progress continued. “It was called ‘strategic patience,’ ” he said. “Nearly as I can determine, what strategic patience means is that ‘if we wait long enough, North Korea will collapse.’ I think that’s a forlorn hope. I’d be happy to see them collapse, but there’s no reason at all to believe that is going to happen.” Instead, what Perry fears may occur amid the tense security environment on the Korean Peninsula is the eruption of smaller-level hostilities into a wider conflict that drags in the U.S. and Japan. “If that happens, that is if we have a ‘new Korean war,’ the North would surely lose … and at that point, seeing the end of the regime, they might unleash an Armageddon with their nuclear weapons,” Perry said. “So in a sense they could blunder into a war and if they blunder into it, they could use nuclear weapons in a last ditch effort.” For Perry, this scenario is the most likely one among the various theories of how the North could spark a conflict. He rules out any kind of surprise attack against South Korea, Japan or the United States, saying such a move would be “suicidal” and would violate Pyongyang’s No. 1 goal: survival of the regime. “They’re not seeking martyrdom. They’re not an al-Qaida or ISIL,” he said “However they use their weapons will be based on a calculation that the use is oriented around … first and foremost the survival of the regime, the sustaining of the Kim dynasty. That, I’m quite confident, is their primary goal in life.” And while North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his regime has often been labeled as “crazy,” including by former GOP presidential candidate Sen. John McCain last month, Perry believes this to be a false assumption. “People who say they are crazy, I think they’re wrong,” Perry said. “They’re a pariah state. They take outrageous actions, but those actions are all designed to strengthen their hold on power.” According to Perry, a grasp of this is necessary however U.S. policy toward the North proceeds. New U.S. President Donald Trump has vowed that his administration’s policy toward Pyongyang will differ from Obama’s, with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson declaring the end of strategic patience. Brinkmanship aside, Perry believes there is an opening for talks. “He might actually try to negotiate with them, which would be a good thing — if he negotiated from some real understanding of where they are coming from,” Perry said of Trump, cautioning that a good negotiator must strive to understand what drives the other side. “I think I do understand what drives the other side, which makes me a little pessimistic about a negotiation based on threats and bluster.” Beyond grasping what the North hopes to achieve, Perry believes there is another compound that is essential for the U.S. to make a serious run at negotiations with Pyongyang: China. “We need to do it in conjunction with China, which we have never done in the past,” Perry said. “Even though we both sat in the six-party talks together, we have never had a common understanding of the threat, we’ve never had a common strategy for how to proceed.” Now — amid the North’s frosty ties with Beijing, its erstwhile patron — may be an opportune time, he said. “I think what has happened in China over the last couple of years is they have gotten a better understanding of what the danger is of North Korean nukes,” he said. “I think they’re much more concerned about that than they were a few years ago.” Given that, Perry said, there is a distinct a possibility at least of coming to a common negotiating strategy. “If we could do that, it greatly improves our success in a negotiation,” he said. Some experts, including Perry, say that if the U.S. fails to set reasonable goals, it could inadvertently risk a disastrous situation in the region. One such result could see Japan and South Korea embarking on a quest to develop their own nuclear weapons capabilities — something Trump hinted at while campaigning — and further destabilizing the region. “I understand why the Japanese are distressed, but I also want to think about what their real alternatives are,” Perry said. “One alternative is for them to build nuclear weapons … so they could threaten a response themselves, an assured response. … That, I think is a very bad idea, but it could happen.” Another option, he said, would be to bolster Japanese confidence in the U.S. by asking Washington to make a stronger statement about its policy of extended deterrence. “The surest way of doing it would be to ask us to deploy some of our nuclear weapons in Japan,” Perry said, noting the example of Germany. U.S. atomic weapons were first deployed there during the Cold War as a way of displaying Washington’s commitment to protecting that country. “When you start talking tough, you have to start thinking about what are the realistic alternatives,” Perry said. “None of them is very attractive.” According to Perry, the U.S.-Japan strategy is moving toward reassurances of extended deterrence and providing some limited ballistic missile-defense systems — a policy not unlike that of Trump’s predecessor. For the former defense chief, this trajectory — a potential return to the status quo — has proved maddening. “It’s frustrating to think that you understand the issue and see it moving off in very different directions,” he said. “I could tell you what I think could work, but I have no reason to believe it’s going to be tried.” (Jesse Johnson, “Former U.S. Defense Secretary’s North Korea Strategy: Deal with It as It Is, Not as We Wish It to Be,” Japan Times, April 3, 2017)
The online ad reads like something only a metallurgist could love: an offer to sell 22 pounds of highly pure lithium 6 every month, set for delivery from the port of Dandong, China. But it caught the attention of intelligence agencies around the world for a simple reason: Lithium 6 offers a fast way to turn an ordinary atom bomb into a hydrogen bomb, magnifying its destructive power by up to 1,000 times. The seller listed in the ad — who even provided his cellphone number — was identified in a recent United Nations report as the third secretary in the North Korean Embassy in Beijing. Experts say the lithium ad — with its implication that the North is happy to sell an excess supply of the precious material — suggests that it is far too late to prevent the nation from becoming an advanced nuclear power. It is unclear exactly what Trump means by “solve North Korea,” though he seems to be borrowing from the playbook of the four presidents before him, who fruitlessly tried, with differing mixes of negotiations, sanctions, sabotage and threats of unilateral strikes, to force the North to give up its program. While experts doubt the declaration last year by Kim Jong-un, the North’s leader, that the country had tested a hydrogen bomb, intelligence estimates provided to Trump in recent weeks say that the mercurial young ruler is working on it. The acceleration of Kim’s atomic and missile programs — the North launched four ballistic missiles in a test last month — is meant to prove that the country is, and will remain, a nuclear power to be reckoned with. For Trump, that reckoning is coming even as his strategy to halt the North’s program remains incomplete and largely unexplained, and as some experts say the very idea of stopping Pyongyang’s efforts is doomed to failure. Trump’s budget is expected to include more money for antimissile defenses, and officials say he is continuing a cyber- and electronic-warfare effort to sabotage North Korea’s missile launches. The president’s insistence that he will solve the North Korea problem makes it hard to imagine a shift toward acceptance of its arsenal. But in private, even some of his closest aides have begun to question whether the goal of “complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament” — the policy of the Obama and Bush administrations — is feasible anymore. “We need to change the fundamental objective of our policy, because North Korea will never willingly give up its program,” Michael J. Morell, a former deputy director of the C.I.A., and James A. Winnefeld Jr., a retired admiral and a former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote last week on the website The Cipher Brief. “Washington’s belief that this was possible was a key mistake in our initial policy thinking,” added the two men, experienced hands at countering the North. The United States and China, they argue, should abandon the idea of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and turn to old-fashioned deterrence. Similarly, Robert Einhorn, a former senior State Department nonproliferation expert, writes in a new report for the Brookings Institution that a “dual-track strategy involving both pressure and negotiations” would be more likely to “bring China on board.” The technique is reminiscent of what was used to push Iran into nuclear negotiations. But Einhorn cautioned that “while the complete denuclearization of North Korea would be the ultimate goal of negotiations, there is virtually no prospect that it could be achieved in the near term.” The Chinese appear unlikely to make more than token efforts to squeeze North Korea, fearing the repercussions if the regime were to collapse, and Kim has made it clear that he is not about to negotiate away what he sees as his main protection against being overthrown by the United States and its allies. “China will either decide to help us with North Korea, or they won’t,” Trump said in the Financial Times interview. If the Chinese fail to act, he added, “It won’t be good for anyone.” It is unclear how close North Korea is to constructing a hydrogen bomb. But Siegfried S. Hecker, a Stanford University professor who once directed the Los Alamos weapons laboratory in New Mexico, and has visited the North’s main nuclear complex, said the ad for lithium 6, while surprising, was a reminder that North Korea, though a backward country, was still capable of major technical advances. “I can’t imagine they’re not working on true thermonuclear weapons,” Dr. Hecker said in an interview. As Trump and Xi meet on April 6-7, Kim, on the other side of the world, may have a plan of his own for the summit meeting: Satellite photographs suggest he is preparing for a sixth nuclear test. Workers have dug a deep tunnel, which can block radioactive leaks if carefully sealed, leaving intelligence experts struggling to estimate the North’s progress. American intelligence officials, and their South Korean and Japanese counterparts, are debating whether the next blasts will mark major steps down the road to a true thermonuclear weapon. The lithium 6 ad is evidence that Kim is following a road map that the United States drew up back in 1954. That is when it tested its first thermonuclear weapon fueled by the isotope. The blast, code-named Bravo, was the most powerful the United States ever detonated. In minutes, its mushroom cloud rose to a height of 25 miles. Though difficult to make, hydrogen bombs became the symbol of Cold War power — they are awesomely destructive and relatively cheap. The weapon relies on a small atom bomb, inside a thick metal casing, that works like a match to ignite the hydrogen fuel. For decades, bomb makers have used lithium 6 as a standard way of making hydrogen fuel for nuclear arms. Last month, two Los Alamos scientists argued that the rocky North Korean test site the United States monitors could confine explosions of up to 282 kilotons — roughly 20 times as strong as the Hiroshima blast. Although a hydrogen bomb can be that powerful, so can large atom bombs. Previously, the largest blasts at the site were in the Hiroshima range. “It’s possible that North Korea has already boosted,” said Gregory S. Jones, a scientist at the RAND Corporation who analyzes nuclear issues. Like other experts, he pointed to the nation’s two nuclear blasts last year as possible tests of small boosted arms. A next logical step would be for the North to turn the material it was advertising online, lithium 6, into a more complex kind of thermonuclear fuel arrangement for a much more powerful bomb. “It’s a big step,” Hecker, the Stanford professor, said of a true hydrogen bomb, adding that it was perhaps beyond the North’s skill. But overall, he said, the North had shown technical savvy in carefully pacing its nuclear tests, suggesting that it would eventually learn the main secrets of nuclear arms. “They’ve done five tests in 10 years,” he said. “You can learn a lot in that time.” As for the excess lithium 6, any interested buyers may have a hard time answering the ad. The street address given in the advertisement does not exist. The phone has been disconnected or no one answers. But if the operation really is being run out of the North Korean Embassy in Beijing, it should not be hard for Xi to find out: It is about two and a half miles down the road from the compound where he lives. (David E. Sanger and William Broad, “Ad from North Korea Yields Nuclear Clues,” New York Times, April 4, 2017,
4/3/17:
The U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed legislation calling for relisting North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and a resolution condemning North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile development. The swift passage of the bipartisan measures, which came just five days after they passed through the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was seen as a message to China in the run-up to the first summit talks between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. The North Korea State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation Act (H.R.479), which was introduced by Rep. Ted Poe (R-TX) in January, was approved in a 398-3 vote, while the resolution on the North’s missile development passed in a 394-1 vote. The terrorism bill requires the State Department to submit a report within 90 days after the bill’s enactment on whether Pyongyang meets the criteria for a terror sponsor. In the event the department determines the North doesn’t merit the designation, it should also offer a detailed justification for the decision.
The resolution (H.Res.92) condemning the North’s ICBM development was introduced by Rep. Joe Wilson (R-SC) on February 17, just days after the North’s test-firing of a newly developed intermediate-range ballistic missile powered by solid fuel. The resolution was later updated to include an appeal to China to “immediately cease its diplomatic intimidation and economic coercion against South Korea” for Seoul’s decision to host the U.S. THAAD missile defense system. “The North Korean threat is urgent and real. Experts predict North Korea will be able to hit the U.S. with an ICBM in less than four years. Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un is taking aggressive steps to make North Korea a fully armed nuclear state,” Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said in a statement. “It is time for us to ramp up the pressure. That is why I am supporting these measures today, which urge the State Department to relist North Korea as a state sponsor of terror and condemn North Korea’s development of an ICBM. By passing these measures, we are taking important steps to push back against North Korea’s dangerous ambitions,” he said. (Yonhap, “U.S. Overwhelmingly Passes Resolution Calling for Relisting N. Korea as Terror Sponsor,” Korea Times, April 4, 2017)
4/4/17:
The White House declared that “the clock has run out and all options are on the table” on the North Korea nuclear issue ahead of a key summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Florida April 6-7. This assertion came as North Korea fired an intermediate-range ballistic missile toward the East Sea. “The clock has now run out and all options are on the table for us,” a senior White House official said in a news conference, which came just ahead of the missile launch. “We would have loved to see North Korea join the community of nations,” said the official. He said that hadn’t happened “over different dialogues and offers over the course of four administrations.” Claiming North Korea is a “matter of urgent interest” for President Trump and his administration, the official added that Trump “has been pretty clear in messaging how important it is for China to coordinate with the United States, and for China to begin exerting its considerable economic leverage to bring about a peaceful resolution to that problem.” (Sarah Kim, Cha Se-hyeon, and Yoo Jee-hye, “All Eye on Trump-Xi Summit,” JoongAng Ilbo, April 5, 2017)
With Japan’s Ambassador to South Korea Nagamine Yasumasa returning to his post in Seoul today, the government appeared to accept that his recall failed to dent South Korea’s resolve not to remove the “comfort women” statue outside Japan’s consulate in the city of Busan and an older one near its embassy in Seoul. Nagamine was ordered home nearly four months ago in protest over the new statue. The monuments commemorate women forced to provide sex for Japanese troops before and during World War II. “I want to exert every effort in dealing with the present challenges as the ambassador to South Korea,” Nagamine told reporters after meeting with Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. He declined to give details about instructions he received from the prime minister. Had Japan refused to back down on the statue issue, it risked souring relations from the outset with South Korea’s next president, who will be chosen in a May 9 election to replace disgraced former leader Park Geun-hye, government officials said. “We lowered the fist we had raised,” a government source said yesterday after Nagamine’s return was announced. The saga leaves a muddled impression of the way Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration conducts diplomacy. Bilateral relations had warmed under Park, with Japan and South Korea signing in December 2015 an accord aimed at “finally and irreversibly” resolving the issue. Under the deal, Japan deposited money into a fund that was to pay for care for the surviving women. Still, the statues have remained a sticking point. The Busan statue is of the same design as the one installed outside the embassy in Seoul in 2011 and in several locations abroad. Japan has repeatedly called on South Korea to “resolve” the issue of the statues following the 2015 agreement. Yesterday, Japanese officials reiterated that the next South Korean administration must “steadily implement” the deal. “The timeline and lineup of candidates for the South Korean presidential election have been set. This is the best time [for Nagamine to return],” a senior member of the Abe administration told reporters yesterday. At the time the official made the comment, it had become clear that the Democratic Party of Korea, South Korea’s largest opposition party, would choose Moon Jae-in as its presidential candidate. “Mr. Moon is the strongest candidate to become the next president,” a Foreign Ministry source said. “We will need to meet him quickly and communicate with him. Some have said we should have returned the ambassador earlier.” Nagamine will pursue a meeting with Moon, attempting to build up some sort of trust, before official campaigning in the election begins in the middle of this month. Upon returning to South Korea, Nagamine is set to meet acting President Hwang Kyo-ahn and urge the South Korean government to fully implement the deal. The decision to send Nagamine back ultimately came from Abe, who had put up a show of strength against South Korea for not pursuing the statue’s removal. After Park was arrested May 31 over the scandal that led to her impeachment and ousting, Abe summoned Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio to his office for an exchange of views. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide, the government’s top spokesman, said the decision was made yesterday on the basis of a range of information Kishida had provided. But some in the government had questioned the recall from the time of Nagamine’s return on January 9, wondering whether the standoff would work in Tokyo’s favor. It was far from guaranteed that Park’s embattled administration would be able to overcome South Korean public opinion and set about removing the Busan statue. Lawmakers had already voted to impeach Park at that point, awaiting the finalization of the motion by the country’s Constitutional Court. But the retaliation over the statue went ahead. “South Korea was supposed to work for a resolution of the statue issue, based on the agreement between Japan and South Korea on the matter of the comfort women, but it didn’t do so,” a government source said. “The prime minister, who had lost face, couldn’t pull out even if he’d wanted to.” When South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se told Kishida in a meeting in Germany in February that his country would make “maximum efforts” over the statue issue, Kishida replied that Seoul needed to accompany its words with actions. Kishida’s response served as a message that the ambassador would not return until Seoul had begun efforts to remove the statue. But that turned out to be an empty threat, with the Park administration having done nothing on the statue, even as the presidential election drew near. Moon is considered more of a hard-liner toward Japan than Park and must be acutely aware of South Korean voters’ sensitivities to bilateral issues between the two nations. He has called for a review of the 2015 agreement and was recently photographed touching the hands of the Busan statue, where he said there is “a meaning to (the statue) being in this place.” It remains to be seen whether Moon would respond positively to Japan even if it calls for an improvement in bilateral relations or further coordination in dealing with North Korea. Asked yesterday what the four-month recall of Nagamine accomplished for Japan, government officials were ambiguous in their responses. “In my opinion, it’s not over,” an official with close ties to the prime minister told reporters. Suga, never short of an excuse for the Abe administration’s actions, offered a shaky justification for the standoff. “I guess we let South Korea know about our strong will,” he said. In Seoul, a senior South Korean Foreign Ministry official yesterday expressed a wish that the return of the ambassador would promote bilateral communication. “We hope Ambassador Nagamine’s return to his post will better facilitate communication between the two countries,” the official said. (Kyodo, “Japan’s Statue Standoff with Korea Yields Only Loss of Face,” Japan Times, April 4, 2017)
Despite North Korea’s accelerating efforts, Admiral Scott Swift, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pyongyang is still “years away” from mastering the submarine-based ballistic missile technology, said, calling for the greater attention on the communist country‘s progress on land-based ballistic missiles and warhead miniaturization development. Smith also expressed skepticism toward additional deployment of U.S. strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula, although he did not rule out the possibility for such a measure should North Korea’s military threats evolves further. “To launch the missiles under the water is very, very complicated. I think it is still years away before that technology is developed,” Swift said during an interview with the Korea Herald and other news outlets at the U.S. Naval Forces Korea command in Seoul. “It’s more important to focus on the general ballistic missile capability that North Korea is developing,” said the admiral, referring to Pyongyang’s latest launch of medium-range ballistic missiles that used SLBM technology and solid fuel technology. The admiral was in Seoul as part of a three-day trip to South Korea. On Tuesday, he attended an international forum to discuss amphibious operation in the Asia-Pacific region and met with South Korea’s military leadership, including Gen. Lee Sun-jin, chairman of South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. Despite speculation the North has inched closer to completing SLBM technology, he stressed that Pyongyang has yet to secure key elements crucial for a successful launch: the missile technology and the miniaturization of nuclear weapons. “There are two broad elements to focus on. One is missile technology itself: both the physics of developing the missile and its reliability as well as accuracy of the missile. The other element is miniaturization of nuclear capability.” Confronted with North Korea’s evolving nuclear and missile threat, the commander has been expanding the role of the 3rd Fleet by forward deploying its strategic assets to the 7th fleet, whose area of operation mostly encompasses South Korea, Japan and China. Last month, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson was deployed to the Korean Peninsula after departing the home port of the 3rd Fleet in San Diego. After entering the 7th Fleet area of operation, the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier remains under the 3rd Fleet’s command and control. But the admiral said although the Navy will continue to expand its involvement in the Asian-Pacific region, there would be no additional “forward deployment” of aircraft carriers and other strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula. “One of the great advantages of naval power is its flexibility to deploy, but I don‘t see any additional carriers being forward deployed. … The challenge we have is the facility for maintaining and sustaining our ships.” “We will reach 60 percent of naval forces present in the Pacific by 2020. And all those decisions have been made and investments have been made. It‘s probably 57 or 58 percent. But it fluctuates from day to day.” When asked about whether the US Navy would dispatch its stealthy destroyer Zumwalt — an idea reportedly floated by Adm. Harry Harris, commander of the US Pacific Command, during a meeting with South Korean lawmakers, Adm. Swift expressed skepticism, but added, “Anything is possible. We can have the entire US Navy move somewhere. But it is very, very premature to discuss the probability of that. I would not recommend forward deploying it until we have fully have worked through challenges,” he said. (Yeo Jun-suk, “N.K. SLBM Is ‘Years Away’: U.S. Commander,” Korea Herald, April 4, 2017)
4/5/17:
The Pentagon now assesses North Korean missile launch was likely a failure. The missile did not go as far as intended, officials with knowledge of the latest intelligence reports said. It did not reach Japanese waters and may have “pinwheeled in flight,” according to one official. What’s more, the missile was an older SCUD — not the advanced land version of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (KN-15), as first assessed by the U.S. Pacific Command last night, a U.S. defense official confirmed. (Lucas Tomlinson, “North Korean Missile Launch Likely a Failure, U>S. Officials Say,” Fox News, April 5, 2017) North Korea fired a ballistic missile off its east coast on Wednesday, a day before President Trump was to host his Chinese counterpart, President Xi Jinping, at his Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida for their first summit meeting. The missile test is likely to intensify differences between Trump and Xi over how to deal with the recalcitrant government in North Korea. The timing is also a deep embarrassment for Xi as the leader of China, which for decades has been the North’s closest ally. China accounts for about 90 percent of the North’s trade and is a major supplier of oil for the country. But in the eyes of Washington, China has been reluctant to use its economic leverage forcibly enough to stop the North’s growing nuclear and missile threats. “The United States has spoken enough about North Korea,” Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson said in a statement. “We have no further comment.” In Seoul, the South Korean capital, acting President Hwang Kyo-ahn ordered a meeting of security cabinet ministers to assess the test and the North’s growing missile menace. The missile took off from Sinpo, a town on North Korea’s east coast, and flew 37 miles before splashing into the sea, the South Korean military said in a statement. Initial assessments indicated that the type of missile was a KN-15, [?] said Cmdr. David Benham of the Navy, a spokesman for the United States Pacific Command. KN-15 is the name the United States uses to refer to the Pukguksong-2, a new nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile North Korea launched for the first time in February. “The North American Aerospace Defense Command determined the missile launch from North Korea did not pose a threat to North America,” Benham said. Before the summit meeting, Trump increased pressure on China, saying that it was time for Beijing to rein in its Communist ally. In an interview with the Financial Times published on April 2, he said, “If China is not going to solve North Korea, we will.” But he did not say how. But China has insisted that the United States should re-engage the North in dialogue to work out a compromise. Trump and Xi will probably use another missile test by the North to stress the merits of their conflicting approaches on the North. North Korea rattled the region in February when it successfully launched the Pukguksong-2, which uses a solid-fuel technology that American experts say will make it easier for the country to hide its arsenal in its numerous tunnels and launch its missiles on very short notice. Then, on March 6, the North launched four ballistic missiles into the sea near Japan. By firing the four missiles simultaneously, North Korea tried to flaunt an ability to launch multiple missiles at American bases in Japan and at American aircraft carriers around the Korean Peninsula, South Korean defense officials said. The ability to launch a barrage of missiles increases the chances of breaching antimissile defenses. China, which had long considered the system a threat to its own security and strongly opposed it, warned that the deployment, in Seongju, South Korea, could set off a new arms race. China’s state-controlled news media, in angry editorials, urged boycotts of South Korean products, which led to protests against South Korean businesses in China and canceled tours to South Korea. The THAAD system has not won universal approval within South Korea. Moon Jae-in, a liberal candidate running to replace the ousted conservative president, Park Geun-hye, has expressed misgivings over the Thaad system, citing China’s fury. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Fires Ballistic Missile a Day before U.S.-China Summit Meeting,” New York Times, April 5, 2017,
Briefing by Pottinger, Thornton: “POTTINGER: And I was going to answer the question on North Korea, that in terms of an area of cooperation, of course we would like to see China working closely with the United States to address the menace emanating from North Korea – their weapons programs, the provocations that we’re seeing every week; missile launches, including one that we just had not too many hours ago. There is an opportunity for that to be an area of cooperation and to grow that. I think it’s in Beijing’s interest. I think that North Korea long ago ceased to be a strategic asset for China. It is now quite clearly a strategic liability, and it is one that is having an impact on the region. It is one that has the potential to destabilize not only the peninsula but really the region as a whole. … Q: Okay. Yeah, I’m Gyuseok Jang, from Christian Broadcasting System. I’m from Korea. …And my question is … what does that mean when you’re saying that the clock has running – the clock is running out? So yeah, if you – possible just to give us a little more explanation about that. …THORNTON: …I think you heard Secretary of State Tillerson. He was in Korea not long ago, made a trip to the Demilitarized Zone, had a press conference in Korea and spoke pretty clearly on the issue of where we stand on North Korea right now, that he said that the time for talking is now over – strategic patience has run out. This problem has really become very urgent, and it is, as Matt said, destabilizing to the entire region and actually further than the region now, reaches across the globe with the progress that North Korea is making in developing an intercontinental ballistic missile. So I think the feeling on our side is that this problem has really now become urgent and we are going to be not only talking to the Chinese this week, but I think you saw on Monday [April 3], Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley announced that we’re going to be convening a ministerial meeting at which the Secretary of State is going to preside up in New York later this month to talk and galvanize a lot more support from our other partners and allies around the world on this issue and chart a way forward in a very urgent way, because we feel that this problem has now crossed a certain line and we can no longer hope for some kind of reversion to negotiations. We need to do something proactive to change the situation and get some results, and we hope that the Chinese are going to be involved in that. We’ll certainly be talking to them about that in the next couple of days. Q: Thank you. Mariko de Freytas from Kyodo News. I wanted to ask about secondary sanctions. Would you be able to tell us whether the President or the Secretary of State will be discussing this issue at the summit? And if that’s the case, what do you expect the outcome to be? And how ready are you to implement secondary sanctions? POTTINGER: Sure. So, I’m not going to go into the specifics of our approach on North Korea, but I will say that this is going to be an early topic of conversation during the summit, and we will not, sort of, broadcast talking points of the President in advance. But of course, the question of sanctions generally is very much a live one. It’s an operative issue, because the situation’s really boiled down to one of having to apply more pressure, and economic pressure is something that China has the ability to bring to bear in a way that no other single country can.” (Foreign Press Center Briefing with Susan A. Thorton, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Matt Pottinger, Senior Director for Asia, NSC, April 5, 2017)
China carried out a naval training exercise in the Yellow Sea ahead of the first summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. The training exercise involved the deployment of the Liaoning, China’s only known aircraft carrier, the Global Times reported today. Quoting a Chinese navy announcement on Weibo, the Chinese social network, state news media said the Liaoning left its station in Qingdao on March 20 and conducted “annual naval drills” in the Yellow and Bohai Seas, off the coast of northeastern China. China also deployed the Shenyang J-15, also known as the “Flying Shark,” a carrier-based fighter jet most likely based on the Soviet-designed Sukhoi Su-33. The Navy carried out tasks including midair refueling, aerial combat and target strikes during aircraft deployment. A helicopter conducted night landing drills and search missions, according to the report. Although the exercises took place in March, they are being made public this week, a day ahead of the first summit between China and the United States. The drills took place near North Korea, a possible sign Beijing is getting its navy ready for any potential instability on the peninsula, South Korean news agency Yonhap reported. The deployment of the Liaoning to the area also coincides with the deployment of the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson to the peninsula during joint training exercises. The Chinese navy said the training was a regular occurrence and part of plans to connect the navy and the air force, and further advance “technical tactical and operational training.” (Elizabeth Shin, “Report: China Carried out Naval Drill near North Korea,” UPI, April 5, 2017)
Warning the U.S. could act alone, President Donald Trump has vowed to deliver an ultimatum to Chinese leader Xi Jinping to rein in North Korea when the two men come face-to-face for the first time this week. But Trump’s early retreat on Taiwan already has chipped away at his standing with Beijing, and another bluff could leave him looking the way he hates most: Weak. Trump warned this week, “If China is not going to solve North Korea, we will.” He didn’t elaborate, but his administration is looking at sanctions against Chinese banks and companies that provide North Korea access to the international financial system, a move strongly backed by Congress. And on a recent trip to Asia, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson reminded the region that the U.S. also retains the option of pre-emptive military force. Trump “is making it seem like we are prepared to go to war or use military action … and I don’t think that is going to be viable,” said Kurt Campbell, top U.S. diplomat for the region during former President Barack Obama’s first term. The devastation could be dramatic. South Korea’s capital, Seoul, lies within retaliatory range of North Korean artillery and missiles. “The key about using leverage in negotiation is that you have to be credible,” Campbell said. Of Trump’s ultimatum, he said, “I think the Chinese are likely to see through this.” In his two-and-a-half-months in office, Trump has backed off on one sensitive issue with China: Taiwan. As president-elect, Trump said he didn’t feel “bound” by existing U.S. policy toward the self-governing island that China considers part of its territory, demanding concessions from Beijing in trade and other areas. Within weeks, Trump reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to the 4-decade-old “one China” policy, smoothing the way for a February phone call with Xi. Asked if Taiwan was up for negotiation, Thornton said Wednesday: “We have basically moved on from there.” Winston Lord, the U.S. ambassador to China under former President Ronald Reagan and top diplomat to the region under former President Bill Clinton, said he assumes Trump isn’t bluffing this time. “Trump is right that China is a problem on North Korea and has got to do more. He’s right to stir their anxieties on what the U.S. might do unilaterally if they don’t act,” Lord said. But he said Trump’s back-pedaling on Taiwan made him look like a “paper tiger.” Dennis Wilder, a China specialist who served under former President George W. Bush and Obama, likened Trump’s approach to Obama’s before a Xi summit in 2015. Then, the U.S. was threatening sanctions unless China stopped commercial cyberthefts. A bilateral agreement ensued and has had some impact, though the problem persists. Wilder said past U.S. administrations preferred to be toughest with Beijing behind closed doors — something he said Bush did effectively. But he said Trump’s more forceful approach may now be necessary. “We have been trying the softly-softly approach on the Chinese for years on North Korea,” Wilder said. The Chinese have never gone far enough, as a result, to have “a meaningful impact on the situation,” he said. So can Trump succeed where his predecessors have failed? He faces some disadvantages. Beijing has highly skilled negotiators and their position on North Korea is deeply entrenched. Trump’s administration, by comparison, is thinly staffed and divided on China, Campbell said. Lord, who participated in historic U.S.-Chinese meetings in the 1970s, said an informal summit with Xi allows for strategy and red lines to be exchanged. But he worried about Trump’s knowledge of the issues and ability to negotiate solo. “I think he may end up being too soft,” Lord said. (Matthew Pennington, “Trump Presses China on North Korea; Another Bluff Could Hurt Him,” Associated Press, April 5, 2017) True to his inimitable style, Trump has been talking — and tweeting — tough on North Korea. He had hinted repeatedly that he would support military action to prevent North Korea from developing an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States. “Well if China is not going to solve North Korea, we will. That is all I am telling you,’’ Trump cryptically told the Financial Times in an interview published this week. Blustering aside, Trump presumably knows that unilateral military action against Pyongyang could start a war with devastating consequences. The calculus hasn’t changed much since 1994, when the Clinton administration considered striking the North Koreans’ main nuclear facility at Yongbyon. South Koreans produced a computer simulation projecting 1 million dead if a war broke out with North Korea. Although all the war games showed North Korea would be quickly defeated, the costs were deemed too high. Trump is also unlikely to follow through on an off-hand suggestion he made at a campaign rally in Atlanta to invite the rotund young leader, Kim Jong Un, out for a hamburger. So that leaves Trump stuck dealing with China. Beijing has been reluctant to enforce United Nations sanctions against North Korea or to shut down North Korean trading companies in China that handle money for the leadership and import weapons. At military parades in Pyongyang, the North Koreans have shamelessly displayed Chinese-made trucks converted into missile launchers. The Bank of China’s Singapore branch was implicated in a criminal case last year in the island city-state in which a shipping company was convicted of helping North Korea import weapons from Cuba. “North Korea has faced very few impediments to establishing front companies in China that do global business busting sanctions,” said William Newcomb, formerly the American representative on the U.N. panel that enforces North Korea’s sanctions. “I suspect the [Chinese] Ministry of State Security knows everything about North Korea’s activities, and the fact that they are allowed to continue is pretty disgraceful.” Going into the meeting Thursday, Trump has the advantage of dealing directly with the only person in China capable of deciding to crack down on the North Koreans. China’s North Korea policy is handled by the Communist Party Central Committee’s secretive International Liaison Department, often bypassing the Foreign Ministry. It is not dissimilar to the way that Trump has taken some foreign policy matters away from the State Department to be handled in the White House by his closest associates, including son-in-law Jared Kushner. “You have two alpha males who will be in the same room. Trump wants to come out of this meeting with something tangible that he has achieved,” said Jonathan Pollack, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington. And for all their differences, he said, “their grievances about North Korea are not wildly dissimilar.” However, the Chinese balk at any measures that could lead to the collapse of North Korea, an important buffer between its borders and U.S.-allied South Korea. And Trump will have more than met his match when negotiating with Xi, analysts say. “Xi obviously has not-insignificant amounts of experience dealing with American leaders. He is going to come in better briefed, more knowledgeable of the history and the record and more prepared to deflect critiques and beseeching by the United States,” said Pollack. Joshua Stanton, a lawyer specializing in North Korea sanctions, said the best leverage that the United States has in the negotiation is to implement so-called “secondary sanctions” against Chinese banks and businesses doing business with North Korea. “What I hope to see out of this meeting is not Trump and Xi coming out shaking hands and smiling. That probably means that Xi has made a promise he has no intention of fulfilling,” said Stanton. “We all know that [Trump’s book is] ‘The Art of the Deal,’ but the Chinese read that book too,” said Scott Snyder of the Council on Foreign Relations. “They are well-positioned to call Trump’s bluff.’’ However, Trump’s bluster and inexperience dealing with the erratic North Korean regime have unnerved Korea specialists who fear that a chain of misunderstandings could lead to another war on the Korean peninsula. “I don’t like bluffing unless I’m playing for small stakes,” said Robert Gallucci, a professor at Georgetown University who served in the State Department during the 1994 crisis. Gallucci said that any military response, such as trying to strike a missile on a launch pad, would likely be ineffective because North Korean weapons facilities are hidden underground and scattered around the country. “You couldn’t ever, ever assume that the North Koreans would just suck it up, and there are vulnerabilities in the South, which is where they would retaliate,” said Gallucci. “We would be involved in a military engagement, and people would die.” Gallucci believes that the United States must rely on the same strategies of deterrence used during the Cold War. “The Russians had 30,000 nuclear weapons. The North Koreans have 12,” he said. Military analysts disagree on how close North Korea is to being able to launch an ICBM capable of reaching the West Coast of the United States or to mount a nuclear warhead, but most agree it is making rapid progress. “The breakneck pace of North Korean nuclear ballistic missile and nuclear testing in the past few years means that a North Korean missile tipped with a nuclear warhead, capable of reaching our homeland, is no longer a distant hypothetical, but an imminent danger,” Gen. John E. Hyten, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, told a congressional panel on April 4. (Barbara Demick, “Trump’s Tough Talk on North Korea Will Be Put to the Test in His Meeting with Chinese Leader,” Los Angeles Times, April 6, 2017)
When Trump explored a presidential run back in 1999, he wrote an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal in which he suggested he would bomb North Korea if it didn’t end its nuclear weapons program.”I would let Pyongyang know in no uncertain terms that it can either get out of the nuclear arms race or expect a rebuke similar to the one Ronald Reagan delivered to Muammar Gadhafi in 1986,” he wrote, referring to the U.S. bombing of Libya under Reagan’s administration. Trump followed up those comments with a passage about North Korea in his 2000 book, “The America We Deserve.” In the book, Trump called US policy towards North Korea “weak-minded,” and explicitly said he would bomb the country’s nuclear facilities. “Am I ready to bomb this reactor? You’re damned right,” Trump wrote. “When the Israelis bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor they were condemned by the world community. But they did what they had to do to survive. The Korean nuclear capability is a direct threat to the United States. As an experienced negotiator, I can tell you that negotiation with these madmen will be fruitless once they have the ability to lob a nuclear missile into Chicago, Los Angeles, or New York. I don’t advocate a thermonuclear war, but if negotiations fail, I advocate a surgical strike against these outlaws before they pose a real threat.” In the book, Trump also dismissed concerns about nuclear fallout from the strike. “When I advocated the possibility of a surgical strike against the North Koreans on Meet the Press, moderator Tim Russert asked me about the possibility that nuclear fallout might pollute Asia as a consequence of our taking action. Russert quoted a former secretary of defense saying that a surgical strike was not an option for this reason. After all, Israel attacked a similar facility in Iraq with no fallout. (Within days of the Meet the Press broadcast I had two phone calls from officers very high up in our military who both assured me— off the record— that such a strike could be successful. Because both men are still on active duty, neither one wants to be identified.)” Throughout the 2000s, Trump would identify North Korea as an area of concern. In January 2003, Trump said on Fox News, “North Korea may be a bigger problem than Iraq.” Three years later, Trump told CNN that the US should get out of Iraq, especially with Iran and North Korea developing nuclear weapons. In a 2015 interview with “60 Minutes” Trump was asked about his prior calls for a strike on North Korea’s nuclear facilities. “You would drop a bomb on their nuclear reactor?” asked Scott Pelley. “I would do something,” Trump responded. “You have to do something about North Korea. Now, what I would do is I would make China respect us because China has extreme control over North Korea.” He added, “And if they don’t do that, they have to suffer economically because we have the engine that makes China work. You know, without the United States or without China sucking out all our money and our jobs, China would collapse in about two minutes.” (Andrew Kaczynski, “Trump Once Said He Would Bomb North Korea’s Nuclear Reactors,” CNN, April 5, 2017)
4/?/17:
Woodward: “During a spring meeting in the Oval Office, discussion turned to the controversy in South Korea about the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system, which had become an issue in the South Korea presidential race. …’Have they already paid for it?’ Trump asked. ‘They didn’t pay for it?’ Trump asked. ‘They didn’t pay for it,’ [National Security Adviser H.R.] McMaster said, ‘We paid for it.’ ’That can’t be right,’ Trump said. He wanted an explanation so McMaster set out to get some answers from the Pentagon. ‘It’s actually a very good deal for us,’ McMaster said when he returned in the afternoon. ‘They gave us the land in a 99-year lease for free. But we pay for the system, the installation and the operations.’ Trump went wild. ‘I want to see where it is going,’ he said. Finally some maps came in that showed the location. Some of the land included a former golf course. ‘This is a shit piece of land,’ said the former golf course and real estate developer. ‘This is a terrible deal. Who negotiated this deal? What genius? Take it out. I don’t want the land.’ The major missile defnse system might cost $10 billion over 10 years, and it wasn’t even physically in the United States, Trump said. ‘Fuck it, pull it back and put it in Portland!’ Trump was still outraged by the $18 billion trade deficit with South Korea and wanted to pull out of what he called the ‘horrible’ KORUS trade deal. Rising tensions around THAAD were bad enough. South Korea was a crucial ally and trade partner. Trump met with McMaster and [Defense Secretary Jim] Mattis. Both said that given the crisis with North Korea, it was not the time to bring uo the trade deal. ‘That’s exactly when you bring it up,’ Trump said. ‘If they want protection, this is when we renegotiate the deal. We have leverage.’ …On April 30, McMaster called the South Korean national security chief. He told Chris Wallace on Fox News. ‘What I told our South Korean counterpart is until any renegotiation, that the deal’s in place, we’ll adhere to our word.’ As a first step, the South Korean trade ministry later agreed to start to renegotiate the KORUS trade deal.’” (Woodward, Fear, pp. 105-07)
4/6/17:
DPRK FoMin memorandum: “The level of political, military and economic pressure and aggressive schemes of the U.S. against the DPRK is now beyond the danger limit. It is without any hesitancy that heinous acts are committed to insult our supreme dignity. “Special operations” aimed at “getting rid of the headquarters of the north” are in an open preparation in the real stage. The U.S. is now staging military exercises against the DPRK at our doorstep, mobilizing the largest-ever aggression forces and state-of-the art nuclear striking means. They even threw off the deceptive veil as they said the military exercises were of “defensive nature.” Not content with this, the U.S. is trying to disturb our socialist construction by imposing the toughest economic sanctions and blockades. Furthermore, it has revealed its open bid to cause economic suffocation against the DPRK. The situation on the Korean peninsula has come to the pass where it is no longer in control due to extreme provocative and aggressive war moves conducted by the U.S., which followed the path of getting worse. If the war sparks off on the Korean peninsula, there will come up with the issue of accounting for war provocation and postwar follow-up. It is against this background that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the DPRK releases this memorandum in order to lay open the gravity and illegality of the aggressive schemes of the U.S. which is now driving the Korean peninsula situation to the thermonuclear war as well as the justness and legality of the inevitable defensive choice of the DPRK to cope with the U.S. schemes.
- It is more often than not that the DPRK has already warned the grave aggressive acts would be considered as declaration of war whenever the U.S. and its vassal forces committed grave provocations. It also made it clear that the provokers should be held accountable for all the grave consequences arising from them. Following examples are telltale evidence of all of them.
– The Bush administration, after taking its office, declared as its state policy to negate our system by designating the DPRK as an “axis of evil”. It even declared openly nuclear war against the DPRK by putting it as a target of preemptive nuclear strike. (2003.1.10 statement of DPRK government)
– The U.S. is engrossed in mean tricks of smear campaign to tarnish the image of the DPRK system, groundlessly charging it with drug smuggling, counterfeiting of money, suppression of religious freedom, exodus of refugees, human traffic, training of computer hackers and arms sale, etc. At the same time, it is hampering the routine service of DPRK-flagged trading vessels under various pretexts. This hostile act is, in fact, little short of sea blockade against the DPRK. No matter how desperately the U.S. may try to cover up these moves, they are, in the final analysis, acts of scrapping the Armistice Agreement and a declaration of war. In the long run, it is an act of war. (2003.6.18 statement of the MFA spokesman)
– The Bush administration was undisguised in its attempt to seek a “regime change” in those countries including the DPRK which stood independent and are not obedient to what it had dictated upon them by means of preemptive strike while labeling them “outposts of tyranny”.
The “National Security Strategy Report” announced this time reveals, in a nutshell, the U.S. intention to start a war to prevent nuclear proliferation, “combat terrorism” and “spread democracy.” It is, therefore, nothing but a brigandish document declaring a war as it is an indication that the Bush regime will not rule out even a war to bring down those countries which refuse to follow its ideology and value by branding them as enemies without exception. (2006.3.21 statement of the MFA spokesman)
– The U.S. has become more frantic in its military exercises and arms build-up on the peninsula and in its vicinity for the purpose of launching the second Korean War since it made a de facto “declaration of war” against the DPRK through the recent brigandish adoption of a UNSC resolution. At the same time it is making desperate efforts to internationalize the sanctions and blockade against the DPRK by leaving no dastardly means and methods untried in a foolish attempt to isolate and stifle it economically and bring down the socialist system chosen by its people themselves. The Bush administration has gone the length of making ultimatum that it would punish the DPRK if it refuses to yield to the U.S. within the timetable set by it. (2006.10.3 statement of the MFA)
– The United States instigated the UN Security Council to pass another “resolution” calling for harsh international sanctions and blockade against the DPRK, unreasonably describing its nuclear test for self-defense as a “threat” to international peace and security. The UNSC “resolution,” needless to say, cannot be construed otherwise than a declaration of a war against the DPRK. (2006.10.17 statement of the MFA spokesman)
– The United Nations Security Council, at the instigation of the U.S., has finally adopted a “resolution on sanctions” against the DPRK over its second nuclear test. An attempted blockade of any kind by the U.S. and its followers will be regarded as an act of war and met with a decisive military response. (2009.6.13 statement of the MFA)
– Human rights precisely mean the right to independence and the national sovereignty of a relevant country. Therefore, the brigandish “resolution” against the DPRK’s genuine human rights means the most undisguised war declaration to infringe upon its sovereignty. (2014.11.23 statement of the DPRK National Defense Commission)
– The Obama administration, too, excluded the DPRK from the list of the “nuclear non-use” in April of 2010, fully revealing its scenario for mounting a preemptive attack on the DPRK. Through this, it has revealed its open bid to launch a nuclear preemptive strike against the DPRK. It continues even now to profess about it. U.S. has staged large-scale joint military drills every year and made practical preparations for a nuclear attack on the DPRK by mobilizing various types of nuclear hardware to be used in the war.
The aggressive nature and danger of this exercises lies in the fact that the U.S. threw off the deceptive mask of “annual” and “defensive” it has veiled so far and is examining the “decapitation raid” aiming our supreme headquarter and the tactics of “high-density strike at our strategic strike means in practice and openly committing reckless provocations like “precision strike drill” to destroy the office room of our supreme headquarters — herein lies the aggressive and dangerous character of the co-military exercise.
There is no country or government in the world which tolerate such challenge of maniacs running amuck to eliminate the headquarters of a sovereign state through special operations. (2016.3.31 statement of the MFA spokesman)
– What’s more serious is that various types of offensive operations, including the “decapitation raid” aiming at our supreme headquarters, the “operation for advancing into Pyongyang” and “precision strike drill” aimed to destroy the office of our supreme leadership, have been carried out in actual maneuvers in accordance with “OPLAN-5015.” The war rehearsals were the largest-ever maneuvers hostile to the DPRK as it was manifested in the drills that the U.S. scenario and moves to physically eliminate the DPRK reached an extremely dangerous phase. It is tantamount to an open declaration of war against the DPRK that the U.S., kicking off the drills, openly revealed its attempt to mount a preemptive attack on the DPRK after discarding even the spurious mask of “defensive”. (2016.4.30 statement of the MFA spokesman)
– The supreme leadership of the DPRK its servicepersons and civilians have safeguarded at the cost of their lives while following with all sincerity represents the dignity and sovereignty of the DPRK and the destiny of the Korean army and people. But the U.S. dared to challenge the dignity of the DPRK supreme leadership, an act reminiscent of a new–born puppy knowing no fear of a tiger. This is the worst hostility and an open declaration of war against the DPRK as it has gone far beyond the confrontation over the “human rights issue”.
Now that the U.S. has overstepped “red line” in the showdown with the DPRK by perpetrating such thrice-cursed crime, the DPRK came to have the legitimate rights to take all necessary countermeasures. (2016.7.7 statement of the MFA)
– The General Staff of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) warns the hideous provocateurs as follows with regard to the situation that has reached an extreme phase which should be no longer overlooked:
- The General Staff declares the KPA’s stand to mercilessly smash the enemy’s moves with its own style of special operation and preemptive attack, now that the sinister aim of the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean war maniacs’ “special operation” to hurt the dignity of the DPRK’s supreme leadership has become clear and they disclosed even the dangerous attempt at “preemptive attack.”
- They should be mindful that the KPA will deal deadly blows without prior warning any time as long as the operation means and troops of the U.S. and south Korean puppet forces involved in the “special operation” and “preemptive attack” targeting the DPRK remain deployed in and around south Korea.
- Once the enemy launches the said “operation and strike”, they will only bring about a historic event in which the U.S. imperialists will face a miserable doom and the south Korean puppet forces a final ruin. (2017.3.26 warning by spokesman for the KPA General Staff)
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Our serious warning goes not to each U.S. administration. It rather goes to U.S. itself.
Despite this, the U.S. gets more intensive in its act to run counter to our repeated warning in defiance of them. Provocative remarks viciously picking on our supreme dignity, which are as grave as declaration of the war, are pouring out from the U.S. without hesitation. The U.S. threw off its veil of “defensive nature” used at the time of the past joint military exercises and is now mobilizing the nuclear strategic assets like striking groups of nuclear carrier Carl Vinson and strategic bomber B-1B thus to cause the worst threat of nuclear preemptive strike against the DPRK. Worse still, it does not hide the fact that the scenario of “special operation” being staged by the ill-famed special warfare units is mainly aimed at carrying out the “beheading operation” for “removing the headquarters of the north” and “preemptive attack” operation for blowing up the nuclear and rocket bases.
While cooking up the illegal “sanctions resolutions” and forcing other countries to carry them out, the U.S. is now enforcing separate sanctions to stamp out the DPRK’s right to existence and development by all possible means. They are making frantic efforts to isolate and stifle the DPRK as evidenced by the adoption of three “sanctions resolutions” against the DPRK on March 29 alone.
Nuclear threat and blackmail, sanctions and blockade by the U.S. have never stooped even for a day. But it was never waged as of now in its frantic nature. Allthis means that its moves have gone over the hostile act into a full scale of war.
The present U.S. administration is committing itself to its anti-DPRK campaign in an unprecedented way. Because of this, the Korean peninsula is now in the war situation. It is from this that the DPRK was compelled to put into practice the repeated warning it had so far sent to the U.S. while displaying its maximum restraint.
- According to universally accepted international laws, the heinous acts of the U.S. and its vassal forces to stifle the DPRK are an apparent act and crime of war.
Code of offences against peace and security of mankind, adopted at the 6th session of the International Law Commission (June 3rd – July 28th, 1954) defined the preparation for use of arms by one state against another state as a crime against peace and security of mankind.
Paragraph 4 of the Article 2 of the UN Charter stated that “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” And Convention on the Rights and Duties of States stated in Article 9 that “Each state has an obligation of refraining itself from the use of war as a means of state policy, stand against territorial integrity and political independence of another state or threat or use of arms through other means inconsistent with international law and order.”
The London Treaty on Definition of Aggression as well as the resolution of the 29th session of the UN General Assembly “Definition of Aggression” defined the sanctions entailing blockade of a sovereign State in time of peace as an act of aggression and illegal.
The Article 2 (definition of aggression) of this Treaty stipulated that a State first committing acts, without a declaration of war, such as the attack by its land, naval and air forces on other’s territory, ship or airplane as well as the naval blockade of the other’s coast or port is regarded as an aggressor state in terms of international disputes according to the existing convention between disputing parties.
The 58th session of the UN General Assembly adopted resolution to condemn any act of armed aggression or threat or use of force against peoples, their elected Governments or their legitimate leaders.
Paragraph 15, Article II of the Korean Armistice Agreement (KAA) stipulated as follows; “This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the water contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.”
However, the U.S. has imposed an ever-intensive blockade on the DPRK — thus scraping off even the paragraph for banning naval blockade, the last one of KAA which had been valid merely for the form’s sake.
As seen above, the U.S. is now performing practical acts of aggression and war against the DPRK through extreme military threats and blackmails and blockade-style sanctions, blatantly violating universally accepted international laws.
- It is a legitimate right of the DPRK to make a resolute preemptive attack to thoroughly frustrate the moves for imminent and full-phased aggression and war made by the U.S. against the DPRK.
Article 51 “Right of Self-Defense” of the UN Charter and Article 12 of the Declaration on the Rights and Obligations of States clearly stipulated that every state is entitled to the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.
The Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, adopted on December 16, 1970, stipulated that “the States must fully respect the sovereignty of other States and the right of peoples to determine their own destinies, free of external intervention, coercion or constraint, especially involving the threat or use of force, overt or covert, and restrain from any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country.”
Article 40 of the Hague Convention on Laws and Customs of War on Land also provided that violation of the armistice by one of the parties gives the other party the right of denouncing it, and even, in cases of urgency, of recommencing hostilities immediately.
The option taken by the DPRK to defend itself from the moves of hostility and war of the U.S. would be a great war of justice to completely remove the bases of aggression and achieve national reunification, the long-cherished desire of the Korean nation.
The DPRK was founded by the general election involving both the north and south of Korea and by the general will of the entire Korean population. Since the south Korean authorities have flatly rejected the DPRK’s proposal to found a reunified federal state leaving the ideologies and systems existing in the north and the south intact, the DPRK’s great war of justice would be a fair and righteous exercise of the sovereign right of the state to reclaim the territory occupied by foreign forces, and it can never be condemned as “an act of aggression” on any account.
In case a war breaks out in the Korean peninsula, the U.S. will be held totally accountable for it, no matter who launched a preemptive attack, as it has constantly escalated its hostile policy toward the DPRK and drove the situation to the outbreak of war by deploying huge amount of nuclear strategic assets and special warfare means in the Korean peninsula.
The DPRK’s mode of attack, once launched, would be the precision strike to destroy only the military bases of the U.S. and its vassal forces targeting the DPRK and the DPRK will abide by the relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, as a signatory to it.
As already declared, the DPRK will also take all responsible measures for protecting the legal economic interests of other countries that they hold in south Korea. The international community should clearly understand the gravity of the situation created in the Korean peninsula by the US moves for aggression and war, and respect the option taken by the DPRK to defend itself.” [No mention of deterrent?] (KCNA, “Memorandum of DPRK Foreign Ministry,” April 6, 2017)
South Korea has recently succeeded in test-firing a homegrown ballistic missile, tentatively dubbed Hyunmu-2C, with a 800-km range, a military source said. It was test-fired at a test site of the Agency for Defense Development in Taean, South Chungcheong Province as Defense Minister Han Min-koo looked on, the source said. He added it “met standards in all categories” but was programmed to fly only a short distance. Hyunmu-class missiles include the Hyunmu-2A with a range of 300 km, the Hyunmu-2B with a range of 500 km, and the Hyunmu-3 cruise missile with a range of 1,000 km. Once the Hyunmu-2C is deployed, the military will be capable of hitting any target in North Korea from a safe distance in the south of the country t/hat lies outside the range of the North’s new 300-mm multiple rocket launchers and Scud-B missiles. It is designed to disable North Korean missile facilities in the early stages of a war. Four North Korean missile bases that pose a threat to South Korea lie within 300 km from central South Korea, six within 400 km, and nine within 550 km. The 2012 negotiations with Washington revising the missile guidelines, under which Seoul can now develop 800 km-range ballistic missiles with a maximum payload of 500 kg, but if it increases the weight it has to shorten the range. The military is also believed to have made progress on rocket re-entry technology while developing the Hyunmu-2C, which is needed because any missile with a range of more than 600 km briefly leaves the Earth’s atmosphere.
(Lee Yong-soo, “Seoul Tests Its Own 800km. Missile,” Chosun Ilbo, April 7, 2017)
4/7/17:
Tillerson-McMaster briefing: “Q: What is an overriding message here? Is it that it’s not clearly a declaration of war, but is it that for President Trump and his administration the credible threat of military force is back on the table? Was this articulated or explained in any way to President Xi prior to the President’s remarks? And do you see this as in any way sending a message more broadly on your policy towards North Korea that the President is willing to take decisive action? And both of you weigh in. TILLERSON: Well, I think as you just simply stated, this clearly indicates the President is willing to take decisive action when called for. And I think in this particular case, the use of prohibited chemical weapons, which violates a number of international norms and violates existing agreements, called for this type of a response, which is a kinetic military response. I would not in any way attempt to extrapolate that to a change in our policy or our posture relative to our military activities in Syria today. There’s been no change in that status. But I think it does demonstrate that President Trump is willing to act when governments and actors cross the line, cross the line on violating commitments they’ve made, and crossed the line in the most heinous of ways. I think it is clear that President Trump has made that statement to the world tonight.” (DoS, Secretary’s Remarks with National Security Advser McMaster, Palm Beach, April 7, 2017)
The missiles were being prepared even before the two men finished dinner, disrupting the carefully choreographed proceedings. The American attack on Syria unraveled China’s well laid plans for a summit meeting that would present President Xi Jinping as a global leader on par with President Trump, at once stealing the spotlight from Xi and putting him in a difficult position: choosing between condoning the kind of unilateral military action that China has long opposed, or rebuking his host. Xi’s dilemma was also acute because China has generally sided with Russia in defending Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, and because it worries that Trump might be prepared to order a similar strike on North Korea, Chinese and Western analysts said. “Xi can’t fail to be impressed by Trump’s resolve,” said Alan Dupont, an Australian military analyst who worked for that country’s Defense Department. “Xi will have to reassess what the Trump presidency means for Chinese interests in East Asia, particularly North Korea and the South China Sea.” The American strikes on Syria would quite likely make Xi be more amenable about the White House’s demand that China squeeze North Korea’s economy, analysts said. “I suspect Xi will treat Trump’s threat against North Korea as more serious than before this, provided the behind-the-scenes-body language does not counteract it,” said Douglas H. Paal, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Beijing has long been fairly confident that the United States would not risk an attack on North Korea, a much more dangerous target than Syria because of its nuclear arsenal and its capacity to hit Japan and South Korea, two American allies, Chinese analysts said. But China’s leaders are still trying to figure out Trump, and his quick decision to strike Syria may cause them to reconsider that assumption. The first evening between Xi and Trump looked warm and welcoming on Chinese state-run television, with lavish photographs of them chatting informally on an elegant sofa at Mar-a-Lago. The news shows also broadcast images of the two leaders sitting side by side at a vast dining table set with candelabra, and of Trump’s 5-year-old granddaughter, Arabella, singing in Chinese to Xi and his wife, Peng Liyuan, before dinner. The Chinese reports approvingly noted that the granddaughter did a three-part performance, singing a Chinese song, “Jasmine,” and reciting the “Three Character Classic” and some Tang poetry. Trump accepted Xi’s invitation to visit China at an “early date,” the state-run news agency Xinhua reported, a gesture that showed the two men had established the rapport that the Chinese leader was seeking to show his people at home. Then after dinner, with Xi safely back at his nearby hotel, Trump stepped to a podium to announce the strikes, making comments punctuated with emotional descriptions of the children killed by the Syrian government’s chemical weapons attack. Trump informed Xi of the attack during dinner, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson said in remarks to the news media on Friday afternoon. At the Foreign Ministry in Beijing, the spokeswoman, Hua Chunying, noted China’s opposition to the use of chemical weapons and added that it was necessary to seek a political solution in Syria. “It is imperative to prevent the further deterioration of the situation,” she said. China has maintained a longstanding policy opposing unilateral military action. But Trump’s decision to order the strikes at the very moment Xi was visiting inevitably put the focus on North Korea. Despite Trump’s action against Syria in the middle of Xi’s visit, there was not an exact parallel between Syria and North Korea, said Jin Qiangyi, director of the Center for North and South Korea Studies at Yanbian University in Jilin Province, which borders North Korea. Syria does not possess the capacity to hit back after the missile strikes, but North Korea, with its arsenal of weaponry and its nuclear program, does, Jin said. “The North’s nuclear capacity has reached such a level that any unilateral action from the U.S. would be extremely difficult,” he said. “The Americans have been saying a lot recently about attacking North Korea, but it is us who will be suffering from the consequences.” The northeast area of China where Jin teaches has become increasingly fearful of radiation leaks from North Korea’s nuclear operations. An attack by the United States would be “catastrophic for the region,” he said. Another consequence for China of the Syrian attack could be an increase in the disaffection for North Korea among the population, and among those in the government and think tanks that consider the North a strategic liability. Beijing believes that the leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-un, is insurance against a unified Korean Peninsula dominated by the American military. But a quiet debate has grown inside the Chinese government over the wisdom of hanging onto North Korea, an increasingly troublesome ally that functions because of China’s largess. China supplies North Korea with almost all of the oil needed to keep its bare-bones economy afloat, and 90 percent of North Korean trade passes through China. Some Chinese companies trade with North Korea in contravention of United Nations sanctions. The White House is trying to persuade China that its support for the North is counterproductive, an argument that Trump was prepared to make to Xi during their talks, a senior administration official told reporters before the meeting. The Syrian strike could serve to make that point, but it would not be definitive in changing China’s strategic thinking, said Andrei Lankov, a historian of North Korea who visits China. “Yes, North Korea is a liability for China,” he said. “But in the real world, the status quo is the least unpleasant option.” If the talks with Trump go badly, Xi will be able to use the Syrian airstrikes against the American president by telling the Chinese people that they were the action of a weak leader, some Chinese analysts said. “Trump is frustrated with his own critics,” said Shi Yinhong, professor of international relations at Renmin University. “This airstrike was a defensive measure to deal with criticism against him. The message from Xi to the Chinese public could be: ‘This is Trump, you know he is not so good for China.’” (Jane Perlez, “An Unexpected Change of Subject at an Elegant Diplomatic Dinner,” New York Times, April 8, 2017, p. A-16) Chinese President Xi Jinping asked President Donald Trump for a 100-day grace period to deal with North Korea’s military provocations during their talks in Florida in early April, according to several U.S. and Japanese sources. Trump asked Xi to strengthen economic sanctions against Pyongyang over its repeated ballistic missile and nuclear tests. The U.S. president said that if Beijing did not cooperate, Washington was prepared to implement new sanctions against Chinese companies that have business dealings with North Korea, including several financial institutions, according to the sources. Xi may have asked for the grace period to prevent such U.S. sanctions from making it difficult for the targeted Chinese companies to continue their business transactions with U.S. financial institutions and companies. Sources said Xi indicated to Trump that Beijing would take stronger action to persuade Pyongyang to halt its military provocations, such as restricting transfers of funds from companies in China to North Korea as well as limiting petroleum exports to North Korea. Both Trump and Xi agreed to implement independent sanctions in the event North Korea went ahead with a major provocation, the sources said. At the summit, Xi and Trump agreed to compile a plan over a 100-day period to correct the trade imbalance between the two nations. The same deadline was apparently used for the national security issue. Although there have been signs of a possible sixth nuclear test, North Korea has not gone ahead with that move. U.S. officials apparently feel that Chinese pressure was behind North Korea’s apparent reluctance to conduct a nuclear test, and some have suggested a shift in U.S. strategy to one emphasizing dialogue. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, for example, on May 19 expressed a cautious stance toward immediate military action against North Korea. The 100-day grace period asked for by Xi would end around the time the Group of 20 summit is held in Germany in July. (Asahi Shimbun, “Xi Asked Trump for ‘100 Days’ to Deal with North Korea,” May 23, 2017)
The National Security Council has presented President Donald Trump with options to respond to North Korea’s nuclear program — including putting American nukes in South Korea or killing dictator Kim Jong-un, multiple top-ranking intelligence and military officials told NBC News. Both scenarios are part of an accelerated review of North Korea policy prepared in advance of Trump’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping this week. The first and most controversial course of action under consideration is placing U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea. The U.S. withdrew all nuclear weapons from South Korea 25 years ago. Bringing back bombs — likely to Osan Air Base, less than 50 miles south of the capital of Seoul — would mark the first overseas nuclear deployment since the end of the Cold War, an unquestionably provocative move. “We have 20 years of diplomacy and sanctions under our belt that has failed to stop the North Korean program,” one senior intelligence official involved in the review told NBC News. “I’m not advocating pre-emptive war, nor do I think that the deployment of nuclear weapons buys more for us than it costs,” but he stressed that the U.S. was dealing with a “war today” situation. He doubted that Chinese and American interests coincided closely enough to find a diplomatic solution. “I don’t think that [deploying nuclear weapons] is a good idea. I think that it will only inflame the view from Pyongyang,” retired Adm. James Stavridis told NBC News. “I don’t see any upside to it because the idea that we would use a nuclear weapon even against North Korea is highly unlikely.” Two military sources told NBC News that Air Force leadership doesn’t necessarily support putting nuclear weapons in South Korea. As an alternative, it’s been practicing long-range strikes with strategic bombers — sending them to the region for exercises and deploying them in Guam and on the peninsula as a show of force. Mark Lippert, the former U.S, ambassador to South Korea, said nuclear deployment there is a concept that’s been embraced by a growing number of Koreans. “Some polls put it at well over 50 percent,” he said. “It’s something that’s being debated, and support for it over time, at least at this point, is climbing.” Still, he thinks it’s a bad idea, undermining the U.S. objective of a nuclear-free zone and “South Korea’s moral authority toward denuclearization of the peninsula.” Another option is to target and kill North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and other senior leaders in charge of the country’s missiles and nuclear weapons and decision-making. Acopting such an objective has huge downsides, said Lippert, who also served as an assistant defense secretary under President Barack Obama. “Discussions of regime change and decapitation…tend to cause the Chinese great pause of concern and tends to have them move in the opposite direction we would like them to move in terms of pressure,” he said. Stavridis, a former NATO commander, said that “decapitation is always a tempting strategy when you’re faced with a highly unpredictable and highly dangerous leader.” “The question you have to ask yourself,” he said, “is what happens the day after you decapitate? I think that in North Korea, it’s an enormous unknown.” A third option is covert action, infiltrating U.S. and South Korean special forces into North Korea to sabotage or take out key infrastructure — for instance, blowing up bridges to block the movement of mobile missiles. The CIA, which would oversee such operations, told NBC News it could offer “no guidance” on this option. But Stavridis said that he felt it was the “best strategy” should the U.S. be forced to take military action. He described such action as: “some combination of special forces with South Korea and cyber.” Last year, South Korea announced the creation of a special operations unit called Spartan 3000 to operate behind enemy frontlines inside North Korea. Trump has already indicated he’s open to unilateral action if China fails to rein in its ally, telling the Financial Times over the weekend, “If China is not going to solve North Korea, we will.” But on April 5, Gen. John Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that “any solution to the North Korea problem has to involve China.” He said that while his job was to present “military options” to the White House, he finds it “hard … to see a solution without China.” Last month, the Army announced that it would permanently station its version of the armed Predator — called Gray Eagle — on the Korean Peninsula. That follows an exercise last summer in which hunter-killer Reaper drones practiced the mock destruction of North Korean mobile missile launchers. Since North Korea’s first successful nuclear test in 2009, the United States has adopted a strategy to “slow, stop, and defeat” the North’s nuclear and ballistic missile pursuits. That ranges from interdiction of supplies to interception of a ballistic missile actually in the air. The Trump White House, through the National Security Council, asked for blue sky options in early February, a senior official told NBC on background. “Think big,” the official said that the agencies were instructed. Many proposals have already been abandoned, but on the military side, sources say, the three options with the highest impact still constitute the next steps. “It is absolutely appropriate,” Stavridis said, for all contingencies to be considered. “In fact, it’s mandatory for the Pentagon to present the widest possible array of options. That’s what enables presidents to make the right decisions, when they see all the options on the table in front of them.” (William M. Arkin, Cynthia McFadden, Kevin Monahan and Robert Windrem, “Trump’s Options for North Korea Include Putting Nukes in South Korea,” NBC News, April 7, 2017)
Trump-Xi summit: TILLERSON: “I would open by saying the President was very happy to host President Xi at Mar-a-Lago these last two days. As those of you that have been here know, it was obviously a perfect weather day today, and it was a great opportunity for both the Presidents and their wives to really get to know one another and enjoy, share meals together, and work on important issues. Each side did bring along senior delegations of officials — so, of course, we’re represented here — who also were able to build important relationships for a lot of work that’s still ahead of us. I think what I would really want you to get a grasp of is that both the atmosphere, the chemistry between the two leaders was positive. The posture between the two really set the tone for our subsequent meetings between our high-level delegations. And I would tell you the exchanges were very frank. They were candid, they were open, and they were very positive. So I think all of us are feeling very good about the results of this summit in terms of what it did for setting a very constructive tone going forward. The two leaders had positive, productive meetings. President Trump and President Xi agreed to work in concert to expand areas of cooperation while managing differences based on mutual respect. The two Presidents reviewed the current state of the bilateral relationship and noted the importance of working together to generate positive outcomes that would benefit the citizens of both of our countries. President Trump noted the challenges caused by Chinese government intervention in its economy and raised serious concerns about the impact of China’s industrial, agricultural, technology, and cyber policies on U.S. jobs and exports. The President underscored the need for China to take concrete steps to level the playing field for American workers, stressing repeatedly the need for reciprocal market access. The two sides noted the urgency of the threat of North Korea’s weapons program, reaffirmed their commitment to a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, and committed to fully implement U.N. Security Council resolutions. They agreed to increase cooperation and work with the international community to convince the DPRK to peacefully resolve the issue and abandon its illicit weapons programs. The two sides had candid discussions on regional and maritime security. President Trump noted the importance of adherence to international norms in the East and South China Seas and to previous statements on non-militarization. He also noted the importance of protecting human rights and other values deeply held by Americans. The two Presidents agreed to elevate existing bilateral talks to reflect the importance of making progress on issues. They established a new high-level framework for negotiations. The U.S.-China Comprehensive Dialogue will be overseen by the two Presidents, and it will have four pillars: the diplomatic and security dialogue; the comprehensive economic dialogue; the law enforcement and cybersecurity dialogue; and the social and cultures issues dialogue. The two sides agreed to undertake an ambitious agenda and schedule to show progress and achieve meaningful results. President Trump welcomed President Xi’s invitation to visit China for a state visit at a future date. They agreed to work together in the interim to ensure successful and results-focused visits. … Q. Secretary of State Tillerson, can I ask you about North Korea? Did the President say that he might use trade against China if they do not rein in North Korea? And did you get any specific commitments from China to do something about the North Korea problem? TILLERSON: The Presidents’ discussions — President Trump and President Xi — on North Korea were very wide-ranging, very comprehensive, and more focused entirely on both countries’ previous commitments to denuclearize the peninsula. There was no kind of a package arrangement discussed to resolve this. I think President Xi, from their part, shared the view that this has reached a very serious stage in terms of the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. They discussed the challenges that introduces for both countries, but there’s a real commitment that we work together to see if this cannot be resolved in a peaceful way. But in order for that to happen, North Korea’s posture has to change before there’s any basis for dialogue or discussions. President Trump indicated to President Xi that he welcomed any ideas that President Xi and China might have as to other actions we could take and that we would be happy to work with them, but we understand it creates unique problems for them and challenges and that we would, and are, prepared to chart our own course if this is something China is just unable to coordinate with us.” (White House, Office of the Spokesman, Briefing by Secretary Tillerson, Secretary Mnuchin, and Secretary Ross on President Trump’s Meetings with President Xi of China, Palm Beach, April 7, 2017)
Trump: “I have a very, very good meeting with President Xi of China. I really liked him. We had a great chemistry, I think. I mean at least I had a great chemistry – maybe he didn’t like me, but I think he liked me. We were going to have a 10 or a 15 minute sit-down. It lasted for three hours. Then the next day, it was another schedule, because everything is very orderly with the Chinese, frankly. And we had meetings scheduled. Well, the 15 minutes on the first day lasted for three hours. The 15 minutes on the second day lasted for two hours, just one-on-one, the two of us with interpreters. And I mean we understand each other. I think he’s, you know, a person that I got along with really well. We had a good chemistry, yes. BARTIROMO: Did he give you any suggestion that he would help…with North Korea? …TRUMP: The first thing I brought up was North Korea. I said you’ve got to help us with North Korea, because we can’t allow it. And it’s not good for you. And you have a tremendous power because of trade. Now, he then explains thousands of years of history with Korea. Not that easy. In other words, not as simple as people would think. They’ve had tremendous conflict with Korea over the years. Now, his father was in China four times. He was never in China. So I said, look, you have a tremendous power because of trading through the border. If they don’t get food, they don’t get, you know, they can’t sell their coal. In fact, I hear today two massive coal ships from North Korea were sent back to North Korea, heading to China. They were sent back, which is a very good sign. But I think China can help us. I hope China can help us. We talked about trade and I can tell you, China will do much better on trade if they help us with North Korea. BARTIROMO: And you think he knows that? TRUMP: I think he knows that. I told him that, yes. BARTIROMO: When you were with the president of China, you’re launching these military strikes. TRUMP: Yes. BARTIROMO: Was that planned? How did that come about that it’s happening right then, because right there, you’re saying a reminder, here’s who the superpower in the world is, right? TRUMP: You have no idea how many people want to hear the answer to this. I have had – I have watched speculation for three days now on what that was like (INAUDIBLE). … But I will tell you, only because you’ve treated me so good for so long, I have to (INAUDIBLE) right? I was sitting at the table. We had finished dinner. We’re now having dessert. And we had the most beautiful piece of chocolate cake that you’ve ever seen and President Xi was enjoying it. And I was given the message from the generals that the ships are locked and loaded, what do you do? And we made a determination to do it, so the missiles were on the way. And I said, Mr. President, let me explain something to you. This was during dessert. We’ve just fired 59 missiles, all of which hit, by the way, unbelievable, from, you know, hundreds of miles away, all of which hit, amazing. BARTIROMO: Unmanned? Brilliant. TRUMP: It’s so incredible. It’s brilliant. It’s genius. Our technology, our equipment, is better than anybody by a factor of five. I mean look, we have, in terms of technology, nobody can even come close to competing. Now we’re going to start getting it, because, you know, the military has been cut back and depleted so badly by the past administration and by the war in Iraq, which was another disaster. So what happens is I said we’ve just launched 59 missiles heading to Iraq and I wanted you to know this. And he was eating his cake. And he was silent. BARTIROMO: (INAUDIBLE) to Syria? TRUMP: Yes. Heading toward Syria. In other words, we’ve just launched 59 missiles heading toward Syria. And I want you to know that, because I didn’t want him to go home. We were almost finished. It was a full day in Palm Beach. We’re almost finished and I – what does he do, finish his dessert and go home and then they say, you know, the guy you just had dinner with just attacked a country? BARTIROMO: How did he react? TRUMP: So he paused for 10 seconds and then he asked the interpreter to please say it again. I didn’t think that was a good sign. And he said to me, anybody that uses gases – you could almost say or anything else – but anybody that was so brutal and uses gases to do that young children and babies, it’s OK. BARTIROMO: He agreed. TRUMP: He was OK with it. He was OK. I’ll tell you, we get along really well. I really like being with him. I’m going to be speaking to him tonight at 10:00, actually. I have a call tonight [April 12] at 10:00. It’s all set up with the president of China. But we got along – there was a great feeling, I think, between both of us. Now, we have two very different countries, two very different peoples. But I think he understood the message and I understood what he was saying to me.” (President Donald J. Trump, Interview with Maria Bartiromo, Fox Business News, April 12, 2017)
4/8/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The Trump administration on April 7 mounted a massive missile attack on an air-force base of the Syrian government army under the pretext that it killed civilians by using chemical weapons …an act of aggression on a sovereign state that can never be tolerated.
Through the recent U.S. military attack on Syria, the world clearly sees who is disturber and wrecker of peace. …The successive U.S. administrations have perpetrated strikes at those countries which do not have nukes only, styling themselves a superpower and the same is true of the Trump administration. Some forces are loud-mouthed that the recent U.S. military attack on Syria is an action of “warning” to the DPRK, but the latter is not frightened at such threat. What happened in Syria once again taught a bitter lesson that no one should have an illusion about the imperialists and one can defend oneself from the imperialist aggression only when one has one’s strength. Our tremendous military muscle with a nuclear force as its pivot serves as a treasured sword of justice for foiling the U.S. shameless high-handed and arbitrary practices and aggression moves and protecting the sovereignty of the country and the right of the nation to existence. The reality today goes to prove that any aggression should be countered with force only and that the DPRK’s choice is entirely just as it has bolstered up its nuclear force remarkably. The DPRK will increase in every way its military capability for self-defense to cope with the U.S. evermore reckless moves for a war and will defend itself with its own force.” (KCNA, “U.S. Missile Strike on Syria Unpardonable: DPRK FM Spokesman,” April 8, 2017)
4/9/17:
Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., the head of the military’s Pacific Command, diverted the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson and its wing of fighter jets from a planned series of exercises and port calls in Australia, the command said in a statement. The Vinson and three guided-missile destroyers and cruisers steamed out of Singapore on Saturday for their new mission in the Western Pacific. Asked why the Navy ships were being redirected toward the Korean Peninsula, the president’s national security adviser, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, said it was a “prudent” step to take. “North Korea has been engaged in a pattern of provocative behavior,” General McMaster said on “Fox News Sunday.” “This is a rogue regime that is now a nuclear-capable regime. The president has asked to be prepared to give him a full range of options to remove that threat to the American people and to our allies and partners in the region.” Military and intelligence officials said the timing of the ship movements was also intended to anticipate a milestone event coming up on the Korean Peninsula: the anniversary on Saturday of the birth of Kim Il-sung, North Korea’s founder and the grandfather of the country’s current leader, Kim Jong-un. North Korea has a history of testing missiles and generally taking provocative actions during such events. Administration officials said the strike by 59 cruise missiles on Syria might have strengthened Trump’s hand as he called on the Chinese to put more pressure on North Korea. Although officials noted that North Korea poses different, and in some ways more daunting, challenges than Syria, the parallel of a rogue government that possesses weapons of mass destruction was not lost on the Chinese. Xi told Trump during their meetings at Mar-a-Lago that he agreed that the threat posed by North Korea had reached a “very serious stage,” Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson said. Speaking on ABC’s “This Week,” Tillerson expanded on what the rest of the world should take away from the missile strikes in Syria: “The message that any nation can take is if you violate international norms, if you violate international agreements, if you fail to live up to commitments, if you become a threat to others, at some point, a response is likely to be undertaken.”Tillerson continued: “In terms of North Korea, we have been very clear that our objective is a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. We have no objective to change the regime in North Korea; that is not our objective.” Asked how close North Korea was to developing a weapon that could reach the United States, Tillerson said on ABC: “The assessments are, obviously, somewhat difficult, but clearly, he has made significant advancements in delivery systems. And that is what concerns us the most.” Tillerson added: “The sophistication around their rocket launch programs, their sophistication around the type of fueling that they use, and they’re working their way towards the test of an intercontinental ballistic missile. And these are the kinds of progress that give us the greatest concerns.” In the meetings between Xi and Trump, the Chinese made no new offers about how to deal with Kim’s government, according to an American official. (Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Reroutes Aircraft Carrier and Missile Ships toward North Korea,” New York Times, April 10, 2017, p. A-11)
National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster said that President Donald Trump has ordered him to prepare “a full range of options” to the nuclear and missile threats North Korea poses to the U.S. and its allies. McMaster also said on “Fox News Sunday” that it was a “prudent” decision to send the San Diego-based USS Carl Vinson strike group toward the Korean Peninsula, a move designed to warn Pyongyang against additional provocations. “North Korea has been engaged in a pattern of provocative behavior. This is a rogue regime that is now a nuclear capable regime, and (Chinese) President Xi (Jinping) and President Trump agreed that that is unacceptable, that what must happen is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” McMaster said. “And so, the president has asked us to be prepared to give him a full range of options to remove that threat to the American people and to our allies and partners in the region,” he said. During their first summit talks April 7, Trump and Xi noted the urgency of the threat of the North’s weapons program and agreed to increase cooperation to convince the North to abandon its illicit weapons programs, according to the White House. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson also said that the two sides are committed to working together to resolve the standoff in a peaceful manner, but “in order for that to happen, North Korea’s posture has to change before there’s any basis for dialogue or discussions.” The top American diplomat also said that the U.S. is prepared to chart “our own course if this is something China is just unable to coordinate with us,” echoing Trump’s repeated warning that the U.S. will take on the North on its own unless China helps rein in the North. (Yonhap, “McMaster: Trump Orders ‘Full Range of Options’ on N. Korea,” April 9, 2017) “I think even China is beginning to recognize that this presents a threat to even China’s interests,” Tillerson said during an interview on CBS’ “Face the Nation.” He was asked about how North Korea was discussed during last week’s summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. “President Xi clearly understands, and I think agrees, that the situation has intensified and has reached a certain level of threat that action has to be taken,” Tillerson said. Tillerson did not offer specifics on what those actions might be. Despite Tillerson’s assessment, China hasn’t signaled any change in its approach to Pyongyang in the wake of the landmark summit. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs didn’t mention North Korea in two statements it released after the two leaders met, and on April 10 ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying stuck to Beijing’s usual script. “China’s position on the Korean Peninsula issue has been consistent,” she said. “During the China-US presidential summit at Mar-a-Lago, both sides said they were committed to the goal of denuclearizing the peninsula, would continue to comprehensively carry out UN Security Council resolutions related to North Korea, and agreed to keep close communication and coordination on the issue.” Earlier this year, China called on both North Korea and the US to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula — Pyongyang by suspending its nuclear weapon and missile program and Washington by stopping military exercises with South Korea that antagonize Pyongyang. Hua reiterated this approach at her briefing. South Korea and China also agreed to take measures against North Korea if the country were to carry out another nuclear test or launch an intercontinental ballistic missile. “Both sides agreed that despite the international community’s warning if North Korea makes strategic provocations such as a nuclear test or an ICBM launch, there should be strong additional measures in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions,” said Kim Hong-kyun, South Korea’s special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs. (Brad Lendon and Steven Jiang, “U.S., China Agree on North Korea Nuclear Threat,” CNN, April 10, 2017) President Trump’s deployment of an aircraft carrier to the waters off the Korean Peninsula has raised tensions across East Asia. But the show of American force conceals a lack of better options for dealing with the provocations of the rogue government in North Korea. China’s president, Xi Jinping, did not make any public commitment to tighten the pressure on North Korea during his meeting in Palm Beach, Fla., last week with President Trump. Even privately, officials said, he was circumspect. And an attack on North Korea carries far greater risk than the missile strike that Trump ordered last week to punish President Bashar al-Assad of Syria for his deadly chemical weapons attack. That leaves the White House in a bind on a security issue that Trump has described as the most pressing of his presidency. Trump warned before the meeting with Xi that the United States would act alone against North Korea if China did not join his pressure campaign. A senior administration official expressed hope that the productive tone of the meeting would eventually lead to further Chinese actions. But Trump’s missile strike, which came while he and Xi were having dinner, could play both ways: Administration officials said it would convince the Chinese leader of Mr. Trump’s resolve, while some experts said it would reinforce fears in Beijing that he is erratic and unpredictable. Flexing America’s military muscle alone is not likely to deter North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong-un, from testing nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles. Former President Barack Obama ordered the aircraft carrier George Washington into the Yellow Sea twice to intimidate Kim’s father, Kim Jong-il, without persuading him to change his behavior. “This is déjà vu all over again,” said Jeffrey A. Bader, who advised Mr. Obama on China. “They’ve signaled a new approach, but they’re discovering that the new approaches are not particularly attractive.” The White House is likely to pursue so-called secondary sanctions, which target Chinese firms and banks that help North Korea earn foreign currency and finance its weapons programs. The question is whether the Chinese government will cooperate with the effort, and if it does not, whether Trump will impose the sanctions unilaterally, even at the risk of rupturing the relationship between Washington and Beijing. On April 9, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson said Xi agreed with Trump that “the situation has intensified and has reached a certain level of threat that action has to be taken.” There is also evidence of a tougher line toward North Korea among the Chinese elite, Bader said, though it has not yet filtered into the government’s policy. China has taken modest steps to increase the pressure. It agreed with South Korea on April 10 to impose tougher sanctions on North Korea if it carries out nuclear or intercontinental ballistic missile tests, a senior South Korean diplomat said. The announcement seemed intended to dissuade North Korea from conducting a test to mark a national holiday this week. Wu Dawei, the top Chinese envoy for international efforts to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, met with his South Korean counterpart, Kim Hong-kyun, in Seoul, the South’s capital, to discuss what to do about the North’s advancing nuclear and missile programs. Kim said he and Wu did not discuss a possible American military strike against North Korea. Analysts and officials in South Korea fear that a pre-emptive military attack against North Korea — even one limited to taking out nuclear and missile bases — could set off a catastrophic retaliation and a full-scale war. Seoul lies within range of North Korean artillery and rockets amassed along the border. Military planners in the Pentagon share those fears. “While the military is very focused on maintaining a strong deterrence posture on the peninsula, it is acutely aware of the dangers of escalation,” said Derek H. Chollet, a former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. The risk of escalation in Syria was lower, Chollet said, because Assad is weaker than Kim and there was less concern about Syria’s stockpile of weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands. “A nuclear-armed North Korea is a different story,” he said. In South Korea, the prospect of a pre-emptive strike has long been dismissed as unrealistic. But “under President Trump, we are afraid that that may not necessarily be so anymore,” said Cheong Seong-chang, an analyst at the Sejong Institute, a think tank in South Korea. Some American analysts argue that Mr. Trump’s unpredictability could give him leverage with the Chinese. Michael J. Green, an Asia adviser to President George W, Bush, recalled negotiating with China and North Korea when Mr. Bush began his invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Chinese noticeably shifted their tone, he said, and put more pressure on the North Koreans. “Everybody prices in North Korean unpredictability,” said Victor D. Cha, who also worked on Asia during the Bush administration. “Most of the other players price in U.S. predictability and reliability. The only time I’ve ever seen the Chinese worried is when they’re not sure what the U.S. is going to do.” American allies in the region offered general support for deterrence, but not necessarily pre-emptive action. In Japan, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo said he supported the “resolve” of the United States in stopping Syria from using chemical weapons. But he did not directly comment on the move of the aircraft carrier to the region. Moon Sang-gyun, a spokesman for the South Korean Defense Ministry, said the strike group was moving back to deter North Korean provocations in coming weeks. North Korea observes major anniversaries this month, including the April 15 birthday of its founder, Kim Il-sung, grandfather of Kim Jong-un, raising fears that it might carry out celebratory weapons tests. On April 11, North Korea lashed out at the United States over the deployment of the aircraft carrier. KCNA quoted a Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying: “We will hold the U.S. wholly accountable for the catastrophic consequences to be entailed by its outrageous actions.” (Mark Landler and Choe Sang-hun, “Deployment of U.S. Carrier Masks a Lack of Better Options on North Korea,” New York Times, April 11, 2017, p. A-21)
4/10/17:
China and South Korea agreed to slap tougher sanctions on North Korea if it carries out nuclear or long-range missile tests, a senior official in Seoul said, as a U.S. Navy strike group headed to the region in a show of force. However, South Korea’s chief nuclear envoy Kim Hong-kyun said there was no mention of any military option in his talks with China’s Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs, Wu Dawei. The two also did not discuss any possible strike against the North by the Trump administration, he said. “Both sides agreed that despite the international community’s warnings, if North Korea makes strategic provocations such as a nuclear test or an ICBM launch, there should be strong additional measures in accordance with U.N. Security Council resolutions,” Kim told reporters. Kim added the two sides agreed “an even stronger U.N. resolution” will have to be adopted in the event of additional weapons test by North Korea. Wu did not speak to reporters. In Tokyo, the feasibility of U.S. military action was downplayed, while South Korea said the focus remained on deterrence and readiness. “It probably is not realistic for the U.S. to attack North Korea,” a Japanese defense ministry source said. “If America says it is going to attack, both Japan and South Korea will probably put a stop to it,” said the source, who declined to be identified. A senior Japanese military source added: “If the U.S. military was to attack, there could be a request to Japan for rear-guard logistics support but there has been no talk of such preparations.” (Ju-Min Park and Nobuhiro Kubo, “China, South Korea Discuss More Sanctions on North Korea amid Talk of Trump Action,” Reuters, April 10, 2017)
4/11/17:
President Trump, frustrated by China’s inaction on North Korea, opened the door to concessions on his trade agenda with Beijing in exchange for greater Chinese support in pressuring Pyongyang. In doing so, he lashed together two sharply different issues in an already complex relationship. “I explained to the President of China that a trade deal with the U.S. will be far better for them if they solve the North Korean problem!” Trump declared in a morning Twitter post. Minutes later, he warned: “North Korea is looking for trouble. If China decides to help, that would be great. If not, we will solve the problem without them! U.S.A.” Trump’s threat rattled nerves in South Korea, where the government reassured the public that the United States would not launch an attack without first consulting Seoul. But the American president’s suggestion of a grand bargain with Beijing crystallized his quandary in dealing with North Korea. Only China, with its vast economic leverage over its reclusive neighbor, can realistically force a change in the behavior of North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong-un. Yet despite its own rising frustration with Kim, the Chinese government has so far been unwilling to tighten the vise on him. President Xi Jinping of China did not offer Trump any public commitments on North Korea or trade when they held their first meeting last week at Mar-a-Lago. Even in private conversations, officials said, the Chinese leader was noncommittal. Several former American officials said China was again unlikely to respond as Trump now wants. “He’s clearly groping for leverage over China,” said Evan S. Medeiros, a former top China adviser to President Barack Obama who is now head of Asia research at Eurasia Group. But Medeiros added: “Linking such distinct issues seldom works because each involves different actors and different interests in each system. Linkage can also be counterproductive by reinforcing China’s worst instincts.” Administration officials said they hoped Trump’s meeting with Xi would lead to further Chinese pressure on North Korea. Their meeting was punctuated by the missile strike on a Syrian airfield, which the officials said sent a message of resolve about Trump’s readiness to use force to defend American interests. “The last thing we want to see is a nuclear North Korea that threatens the coast of the United States, or, for that matter, any other country,” the White House press secretary, Sean Spicer, said Tuesday. “We need stability in that region, and I think he has put them on notice.” Trump ordered a Navy carrier strike group into the waters off the Korean Peninsula in a show of force that previous presidents have used, but which fanned regional fears that the United States would consider a pre-emptive military strike on North Korea. With anxiety and rumormongering rife among South Koreans, officials in Seoul said the United States would never attack the North without first consulting the South Korean government. “The United States makes it clear that it will not take a new policy or measure without consultations with us,” Cho June-hyuck, a spokesman of the South Korean Foreign Ministry, said. Moon Jae-in, a leader of the main opposition Democratic Party, issued his own warning against the possibility of an American pre-emptive strike carried out unilaterally. “The safety of South Korea is as important as that of the United States,” he said in a Facebook post. “There should never be a preemptive strike without South Korean consent.” Moon is vying with another opposition leader, Ahn Cheol-soo, for the May 9 election to choose the successor to former President Park Geun-hye. “Neighboring countries are taking advantage of the absence of a president in South Korea to try to exclude us and handle issues on the Korean Peninsula according to their own understanding,” Mr. Moon said, without blaming the Trump administration by name. Still, Trump’s explicit linkage of North Korea and trade suggested that the president was more likely to seek a deal with China than to proceed unilaterally. Under pressure from the United States on trade, China proposed a 100-day plan during the summit meeting that would overhaul the trade relationship between the countries. In his first concrete move on trade with China, Trump is preparing an executive order in coming weeks targeting countries that dump steel into the American market, a measure that would be aimed mainly at Beijing. But it is not yet clear which side has the initiative in the evolving debate over trade. During his meeting with Xi, administration officials said, Trump warned that China needed to address its yawning trade imbalance with the United States immediately. But the Chinese did not bring any trade-related gestures to the meeting, as many experts expected. Instead, they countered with the 100-day plan. While Trump embraced the idea, the commerce secretary, Wilbur L. Ross, noted that the plan would have “way stations” to measure progress, suggesting the White House was not willing to wait the full 100 days for results. Spicer said that deploying a carrier strike force to the region would act as a deterrent, as well as give the president more options. For Trump, however, an attack on North Korea would be a far riskier undertaking than the strike on Syria, given the North’s nuclear arsenal, fleet of missiles and proximity to huge population centers in South Korea. It is also clear that North Korea has no intention of forsaking nuclear arms. Top officials gathered in Pyongyang on Tuesday, the fifth anniversary of Kim’s election as leader of the ruling Workers’ Party, and vowed to uphold his policy of strengthening the North’s nuclear arsenal. Also, Ri Su-yong, a Politburo member, former foreign minister and adviser and childhood mentor to Mr. Kim, was given another powerful position in Parliament. Last year, Ri, 82, told Chinese officials that North Korea’s nuclear weapons expansion was “permanent.” (Mark Landler, “Trump Sees China in Arbiter’s Role,” New York Times, April 12, 2017,
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said the U.S. aircraft carrier Carl Vinson is traveling toward the Korean Peninsula “because that’s where we thought it was most prudent to have her at this time.” Mattis, however, said at a news conference that the Pentagon does not see “a specific demand signal or specific reason” for sending the carrier and several other warships toward the peninsula. (Kyodo, “Trump Says U.S. Ready to Solve N. Korea Issue without China,” April 11, 2017)
South Korea’s leading presidential candidate Moon Jae-in said that he doesn’t think the United States will preemptively strike North Korea, insisting Washington must first consult with Seoul before taking any such action. “The United States is talking about a preemptive strike as one of the available options, but I do not believe it will actually happen,” Moon said in a press conference in Ulsan, 410 kilometers southeast of Seoul. The presidential front-runner insisted the U.S. was only trying to bring Pyongyang back to the dialogue table. “However, it could lead to an undesirable and unfortunate outcome should such talk of conflict be repeated and the United States and China’s show of force continue,” he said. Moon’s remarks came after the U.S. sent a nuclear-powered air craft carrier, USS Carl Vinson, to waters near the Korean Peninsula in an apparent warning against North Korea over its possible nuclear test. “No matter what decision the United States makes, we own issues that are related to the Korean Peninsula, and we are the concerned party in the North Korean nuclear issue,” Moon told the press briefing. “No matter what decision the United States makes, it must first thoroughly discuss its move with South Korea in advance,” he added. (Yonhap, “Moon Says He Doesn’t Think U.S. Will Preemptively Strike N. Korea,” April 11, 2017)
Japan has asked the United States to consult with it prior to any military action U.S. forces might take against North Korea, and the U.S. government has indicated its intention to accept the request, a source in the Japanese government said April 12. A high-ranking Japanese government official said: “If [the United States] undertakes military action, we have asked them to offer prior consultation. The U.S. side understands this.” If the United States attacks North Korea, it is possible that Japan will be targeted by North Korea in retaliation. Thus the Japanese government judged it necessary to get the United States’ commitment that it will give consideration to Japan in its decision making. The Japanese government has repeatedly asked the U.S. government to coordinate their North Korea policies. As part of these efforts, Japan has asked the United States to offer prior consultation if Washington takes a step toward military action. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Japan Seeks U.S. Notice on N. Korea,” April 12, 2017)
The Russian foreign ministry, in a statement ahead of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s visit, said it was concerned about many aspects of U.S. foreign policy, including on Libya, Yemen and Syria, but said it was particularly concerned about North Korea. “We are really worried about what Washington has in mind for North Korea after it hinted at the possibility of a unilateral military scenario,” the statement said. “It’s important to understand how that would tally with collective obligations on de-nuclearizing the Korean peninsula, something that is underpinned in U.N. Security Council resolutions.” (Andrew Osborn, “Russia, Ahead of Tillerson’s Visit Says Worried U.S.A. May Attack North Korea,” April 11, 2017)
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North Korea appears to have a placed a device in a tunnel at its nuclear test site that could be detonated April 15 or even sooner, U.S. government and other sources said. “U.S. intelligence is always on alert for a possible North Korean weapons test,” a U.S. intelligence official told VOA. “Kim Jong Un wants his country to be validated as a nuclear power and a test would further that goal.” North Korea on Saturday will observe the “Day of the Sun,” marking the 105th birth anniversary of its founder, Kim Il Sung. The nuclear test facility is “primed and ready” for what would be North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, according to an analysis by Joseph Bermudez Jr. and Jack Liu at 38 North. South Korea has no indications a military provocation by the North is imminent, Joint Chiefs of Staff spokesman Roh Jae-chun told reporters in Seoul on Thursday morning. (Steve Herman, “N. Korea Nuclear Test Could Come Saturday or Sooner, Sources Say,” Voice of America, April 13, 2017)
Chinese President Xi Jinping urged President Trump to find a peaceful solution to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula during a telephone call between the two leaders early today, state media reported. The phone call comes just four days after the pair held face-to-face talks in Florida and hours after Trump tweeted that North Korea was “looking for trouble,” and the United States would “solve the problem” with or without China’s help. “Xi Jinping stressed that China insists on realizing the goal of denuclearization of the peninsula, insists on maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula, advocates resolving the problem through peaceful means and is willing to maintain communication and coordination with the U.S. side on the issue of the peninsula,” People’s Daily wrote. In a sign of its own growing discomfort at being caught in the middle, China’s Foreign Ministry also weighed in soon after. “It is irresponsible and even dangerous to take any actions that may escalate the tension,” spokesman Lu Kang told a regular news conference. “All relevant parties should exercise restraint and keep calm, ease the tension instead of provoking each other and adding fuel to the fire.” Lu said Xi had placed the telephone call, at Trump’s request. The Pentagon sent a Navy strike group led by the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier toward the Korean Peninsula over the weekend to “maintain readiness” amid concerns the regime in Pyongyang could be preparing for more missile launches and a possible sixth nuclear test. The Carl Vinson is accompanied by a carrier air wing, a guided-missile cruiser and two destroyers, which Trump described as “an armada, very powerful,” to Fox Business Network. “We have submarines. Very powerful. Far more powerful than the aircraft carrier. That I can tell you,” Trump said. According to Chinese state media, Xi said he and Trump had “enhanced mutual understanding,” and established a good working relationship. On Syria, Xi said “any uses of chemical weapons are unacceptable,” and also urged for a political settlement, as well as “solidarity” and unanimity at the United Nations Security Council. Foreign ministry spokesman Lu said Xi had made the phone call. But Lv Chao, a North Korean studies expert at Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences, said the situation on the Korean Peninsula appeared to top the agenda, warning that it had become a “very serious standoff” after the U.S. carrier had entered nearby waters. “The concerned parties should really signal red lights and hit the brake to defuse the situation,” Lu said. “Otherwise, it would be very easy for this to accidentally turn into a conflict. Though it’s very unlikely to have a full-scale war on the peninsula, it’s still very dangerous.” With typical bravado, Pyongyang has also raised the stakes by warning that it could “hit the U.S. first” with nuclear weapons. “Our military is keeping an eye on the movement of enemy forces while putting them in our nuclear sights,” declared Rodong Sinmun, adding North Korea will use its “mighty nuclear weapons” to “obliterate” the United States. While China continues to call for dialogue and a peaceful settlement to the crisis, there is no doubt it has become steadily more impatient with North Korea. Two days ago, a senior South Korean official said China had agreed to slap tougher sanctions on North Korea, through a stronger United Nations resolution, if it carries out nuclear or long-range missile tests. U.S. officials have stressed that stronger sanctions are likely to come first, but that military options are not off the table. But experts say a military strike by the United States remains unlikely, partly because it is not clear where to strike, and partly because North Korea would probably respond with a devastating attack on the South Korean capital Seoul. That won’t stop both sides from saber-rattling, though. In another show of force, Japan’s navy plans to dispatch several destroyers to conduct joint military drills with the USS Carl Vinson as it enters the East China Sea, Reuters reported, citing two sources. China says it has suspended coal imports from North Korea to comply with U.N. resolutions, but also urges a resumption of talks to find a peaceful settlement. It will not support any action that undermines or could topple the regime in Pyongyang. Nevertheless, its frustration with North Korea is increasingly evident. Yesterday, Global Times urged Pyongyang to stop its nuclear and missile program for its own security, arguing that a sixth nuclear test or inter-continental ballistic missile test would be seen as a “slap in the face” of the U.S. government and increase the chances of U.S. military action. “Not only is Washington brimming with confidence and arrogance following the missile attacks on Syria, but Trump is also willing to be regarded as a man who honors his promises,” the paper wrote. “The U.S. is making up its mind to stop the North from conducting further nuclear tests. It doesn’t plan to coexist with a nuclear-armed Pyongyang,” it said. “Pyongyang should avoid making mistakes at this time.” Global Times editorials do not represent official government policy, but they do often reflect a strain of thinking within the Communist Party. The paper also said China would seek stronger action by the Security Council if North Korea continued to conduct tests.
“If the North makes another provocative move this month, Chinese society will be willing to see the UNSC adopt severe restrictive measures that have never been seen before, such as restricting oil imports to the North,” the paper said, warning that the regime’s “gamble” could backfire. “Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program is intended for securing the regime, however, it is reaching a tipping point.” (Simon Denyer, “China’s Xi Calls Trump, Urges Peaceful Approach to North Korea,” Washington Post, April 12, 2017) China’s leader, Xi Jinping, and President Trump spoke by phone about the escalating tensions with North Korea as a prominent Chinese state-run newspaper warned the North that it faced a cutoff of vital oil supplies if it dared test a nuclear weapon. The phone call, reported by CCTV, came hours after Trump cautioned Beijing in a Twitter message and a television interview that it needed to help Washington rein in North Korea, a Chinese ally. During the call, which was initiated by Trump, Xi said that the matter should be solved through peaceful means, the state news agency Xinhua reported. In an unusually strong editorial, Global Times said Beijing would support stiffer United Nations sanctions, including “strictly limiting” oil exports to North Korea should it conduct a nuclear test. The editorial, indicating nervousness about what the North might do on April 15, said that the peninsula was the closest to “military clashes” since 2006. “China, too, can no longer stand the continuous escalation of the North Korean nuclear issue at its doorstep,” the editorial said. “Instead of accepting a situation that continues to worsen, putting an end to this is more in line with the wish of the Chinese public.” The newspaper called on Pyongyang to avoid a “head-on collision” with Trump by suspending its provocative activities. If the government made “a huge mistake, it may be difficult to have another chance to correct its strategy,” it said. Global Times also wrote, “Not only is Washington brimming with confidence and arrogance following the missile attacks on Syria, but Trump is also willing to be regarded as a man who honors his promises,” Global Times wrote. The CCTV account of the call did not mention new actions China might take against North Korea. But the two leaders most likely had a substantive conversation about addressing the situation, a Chinese expert on North Korea said. “We don’t know the real content of the conversation,” said Cheng Xiaohe, an associate professor of international relations at Renmin University. “China used to be in a passive mode. China’s policies towards North Korea are becoming increasingly proactive.” (Jane Perlez, “Xi and Trump Discuss Rising Korean Tensions,” New York Times, April 13, 2017,
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The U.S. is prepared to launch a preemptive strike with conventional weapons against North Korea should officials become convinced that North Korea is about to follow through with a nuclear weapons test, multiple senior U.S. intelligence officials told NBC News. North Korea has warned that a “big event” is near, and U.S. officials say signs point to a nuclear test that could come as early as this weekend. The intelligence officials told NBC News that the U.S. has positioned two destroyers capable of shooting Tomahawk cruise missiles in the region, one just 300 miles from the North Korean nuclear test site. American heavy bombers are also positioned in Guam to attack North Korea should it be necessary, and earlier this week, the Pentagon announced that the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier strike group was being diverted to the area. The U.S. strike could include missiles and bombs, cyber and special operations on the ground. The danger of such an attack by the U.S. is that it could provoke the volatile and unpredictable North Korean regime to launch its own blistering attack on its southern neighbor. Yesterday, North Korea said it would “hit the U.S. first” with a nuclear weapon should there be any signs of U.S. strikes. Today, North Korea warned of a “merciless retaliatory strike” should the U.S. take any action. “By relentlessly bringing in a number of strategic nuclear assets to the Korean peninsula, the U.S. is gravely threatening the peace and safety and driving the situation to the brink of a nuclear war,” said North Korea’s statement. North Korea is not believed to have a deliverable long-range nuclear weapon, according to U.S. experts, nor does it yet possess an intercontinental missile. South Korea’s top diplomat said today that the U.S. would consult with Seoul before taking any serious measures. “U.S. officials, mindful of such concerns here, repeatedly reaffirmed that (the U.S.) will closely discuss with South Korea its North Korea-related measures,” Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se told a special parliamentary meeting. “In fact, the U.S. is working to reassure us that it will not, just in case that we might hold such concerns.” “Two things are coming together this weekend,” said retired Adm. James Stavridis, former commander of NATO and an NBC analyst. “One is the distinct possibility of a sixth North Korean nuclear weapons detonation and the other is an American carrier strike group, a great deal of firepower headed right at the Korean Peninsula.” The U.S. is aware that simply preparing an attack, even if it will only be launched if there is an “imminent” North Korean action, increases the danger of provoking a large conflict, multiple sources told NBC News. “It’s high stakes,” a senior intelligence official directly involved in the planning told NBC News. “We are trying to communicate our level of concern and the existence of many military options to dissuade the North first.” The threat of a preemptive strike comes on the same day the U.S. announced the use of its MOAB — or Mother of All Bombs — in Afghanistan, attacking underground facilities, and on the heels of U.S. missile strikes on a Syrian airbase last week, a strike that took place while President Trump was meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago. Multiple government officials familiar with the situation say President Trump has talked to Chinese president Xi twice about North Korea since their Florida summit. China has since sent its top nuclear negotiators to Pyongyang to communicate the gravity of the situation to the North, officials say. Yesterday, President Xi called for a peaceful resolution to the escalating tensions. Moscow has weighed in as well: “We are gravely concerned about Washington’s plans regarding North Korea, considering hints about the unilateral use of a military scenario” the Putin government said in a press release issued on April 11.Implementation of the preemptive U.S. plans, according to multiple U.S. officials, depends centrally on consent of the South Korean government. The sources stress that Seoul has got to be persuaded that action is worth the risk, as there is universal concern that any military move might provoke a North Korean attack, even a conventional attack across the DMZ. Tensions have escalated on the Korean Peninsula, as April 15 marks the anniversary of the birth of the nation’s founder — Kim il-Sung, grandfather of the current leader, Kim Jong-un. At the highest levels in South Korea and the U.S., sources told NBC News, there are fears North Korea could mark the “Day of the Sun” by testing a nuclear device. “North Korea in the past has used these major national holidays to celebrate the strengths of the regime and to reinforce the national narrative of their independence,” says Victor Cha. According to multiple sources, the U.S. intelligence community has reported with “moderate confidence” that North Korea is preparing for its sixth underground nuclear test, though the U.S. is also in the dark regarding the specific timing. The Trump administration, emboldened by their punishing strike on Syria, and by a successful meeting with the Chinese leader, hopes that the Chinese will use their considerable leverage to dissuade Kim Jong Un and his government from moving ahead with their nuclear program. President Trump has said he thinks Xi “wants to help us with North Korea,” He credited China during today’s White House news conference with Xi with taking a “big step” by turning back boats of coal that North Korea sells to China. “I think that is what President Trump is getting trying to get the Chinese to do,” said Cha. “[It] would impose real pain and force real choices on North Korea — whether the costs are worth it for them to continue to pursue this program if they no longer have any sustenance.” In addition to the coal ships, the Chinese made an important gesture at the UN Thursday: A surprising abstention on a Security Council resolution condemning a Syrian chemical weapons attack. China didn’t stand with the Russians on Syria, as it has in the past. The president also made clear that if the Chinese were unable to defuse the situation, the U.S. would go to alone. On Thursday, he tweeted: “I have great confidence that China will properly deal with North Korea. If they are unable to do so, the U.S., and its allies will!” (William M. Arkin, Cynthia McFadden and Kenzi Abou-Sabe, “U.S. May Launch Strike If North Korea Reaches for Nuclear Trigger,” NBC News April 13, 2017)
China is not obliged to help defend North Korea from military attack if the reclusive state developed nuclear weapons, according to Chinese diplomatic and military observers. The assessment comes as senior officials in Washington warn of a strike against the Pyongyang regime. China and North Korea signed a mutual aid and cooperation treaty in 1961 as they sought to mount a united front against Western powers. It specifies that if one of the parties comes under armed attack, the other should render immediate assistance, including military support. But the treaty also says both nations should safeguard peace and security. For China, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons in violation of the United Nations treaty on non-proliferation could amount to a breach of their pact, leaving Beijing with no obligation to lend a hand, observers said. China could also have a get-out clause if any US military intervention was not deemed an armed attack. “It’s hard to say how China would assist North Korea militarily in case of war, since North Korea is developing nuclear weapons, an act that might have already breached the treaty between the two nations,” said Li Jie, a retired Chinese naval colonel. Shanghai-based military analyst Ni Lexiong said China would need to provide military assistance to North Korea if US land forces invaded, but Pyongyang’s violation of the UN non-proliferation treaty was a “strong reason” for Beijing to choose not to help. (Kristin Huang, “China’s Nuclear Get-Out Clause over Defense of North Korea,” South China Morning Post, April 13, 2017)
South Korea’s leading presidential candidates were united in opposing an armed clash on the Korean Peninsula as tensions escalated over a possible U.S. strike on North Korea. During their first TV debate, the five contenders explained what they would do if North Korea carries out a major provocation, such as a nuclear test, and the United States responds with a threat to strike the communist country. Moon Jae-in, the front-runner and nominee of the liberal Democratic Party, said he would first call U.S. President Donald Trump to make it clear he must not carry out a pre-emptive strike without South Korea’s consent. Then he said he would order a state of emergency and urge Pyongyang through various channels to stop all provocations that could trigger a pre-emptive strike by the U.S. Ahn Cheol-soo of the center-left People’s Party said his first step would be to make phone calls to the leaders of the U.S. and China. He said he would tell Trump that there can be no war and ask Chinese President Xi Jinping to put pressure on Pyongyang to halt its reckless behavior. After that, the former software mogul vowed to issue a statement urging the North to immediately stop its actions. Hong Joon-pyo of the conservative Liberty Korea Party also underscored the importance of first preventing a pre-emptive strike through talks with Washington and Beijing. If the U.S. goes ahead anyway, Hong said he would put the armed forces on emergency alert and prepare for battle. Yoo Seong-min of the splinter conservative Bareun Party stressed the importance of close coordination with the U.S. to ensure any strike on the North is carried out by consensus after thorough military preparations. He said a pre-emptive strike would be a preventive, self-defense measure in the event of an imminent threat of attack from the North. Meanwhile, Sim Sang-jeung of the minor progressive Justice Party said she would first give a special address as president and then hold talks by phone with the U.S. and Chinese leaders. And if necessary, she would dispatch a special envoy to make a case for the principle of keeping peace on the peninsula, she said. (Yonhap, “Presidential Candidates Voice Opposition to War with N. Korea,” April 13, 2017)
North Korea might already possess the ability to strike Japan using ballistic missiles armed with deadly chemical weapons like sarin, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo warned the security committee of the Upper House when asked about a proposal by his ruling Liberal Democratic Party to have Japan pursue the capability to directly attack North Korean military bases. Abe emphasized that Tokyo has no plan to acquire such powerful weapons and would never launch a pre-emptive strike against any country. But the government at the same time should conduct “various studies” for defense and strengthen the Japan-U.S. military alliance, Abe said. “It’s possible that North Korea has the ability to hit (Japan) with a ballistic missile carrying sarin in its warhead,” he said. He also noted that “nearly 100 innocent people, including children and babies, were victimized” by chemical weapons in Syria. “We need to squarely look at a reality like that, and firmly maintain the deterrence power to not let such things happen” to Japan, Abe said. The South Korean Defense Ministry has estimated that Pyongyang, which reportedly started producing chemical weapons in the 1980s, now owns 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons, including the lethal nerve agents sarin and VX. At a news conference later in the day, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide said Tokyo believes North Korea has “multiple numbers of plants” producing chemical weapons and possess “considerable amount” of them. (Yoshida Reiji, “North Korea May Have Sarin-Tipped Missiles, Abe says,” Japan Times, April 13, 2017)
Despite ongoing concerns that Washington may ultimately resort to military action, U.S. President Trump, the self-styled deal-maker, let on he will use trade as a bargaining chip with China as an incentive to put pressure on North Korea. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal yesterday, Trump said he pointed out the United States’ tremendous trade deficit with China, worth hundreds of billions of dollars, which he said can be overlooked if Beijing solves the problem in North Korea. “I said, you know, we’re not going to let that go ahead,” he said on the trade deficit. “But you want to make a great deal? Solve the problem in North Korea. That’s worth having deficits. And that’s worth having not as good a trade deal as I would normally be able to make.”
Washington “cannot allow” a country like North Korea to have nuclear weapons, he continued, warning of “mass destruction.” He said while North Korean leader Kim Jong-un doesn’t have the delivery systems yet, “you know he will.” Trump also told the newspaper that he and Chinese President Xi Jinping “have a very open dialogue on North Korea,” admitting, “We like each other.” He also said that the Chinese “are not currency manipulators,” walking away from a campaign promise to label Beijing as such early in his presidency.” President Xi “wants to do the right thing,” Trump said in a joint press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg yesterday, saying they bonded well in their summit. “I think we had a very good chemistry together. I think he wants to help us with North Korea.” He said he told Xi: “The way you’re going to make a good trade deal is to help us with North Korea. Otherwise, we’re just going to go it alone. That’d be all right, too. But going it alone means going it with lots of other nations.” Trump went on to laud China for sending back ships carrying North Korean coal exports this week, saying, “That’s a big step, and they have many other steps that I know about.” China banned all imports of coal from North Korea in mid-February after Pyongyang’s launch of an intermediate-range ballistic missile. The president said, “I really think that China’s going to try very hard and has already started.” But he acknowledged that such steps “may not be effective.” And in such a case, he said, “If it’s not effective, we will be effective, I can promise you that.” While Trump has repeatedly said that all options are on the table, which could include military action, he has indicated he will for now let China try to restrain the North while leaving room open for Washington, if this strategy fails, to take military action or even conduct a pre-emptive attack on the North. In additional to implementing stronger sanctions on Pyongyang in the case of further provocations such as a sixth nuclear test, the Trump administration may also implement secondary sanctions on Chinese entities involved in illegal dealings with North Korea. China, North Korea’s traditional ally and largest trading partner, said it will also support strong sanctions and pressure on North Korea if it conducts additional provocations, a message conveyed by top nuclear envoy Wu Dawei during his visit to Seoul this week. “China has never before shown such will to work toward resolving the North Korea issue because of pressure,” a government official in Seoul told the JoongAng Ilbo. “Stating all options are on the table and claiming that Washington definitely will attack North Korea are completely different issues.” In an attempt to assuage fears in Seoul that Washington may be considering a pre-emptive strike on Pyongyang, South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Yun Byung-se said that Washington will definitely consult with Seoul first before taking any important security measures related to Pyongyang. “The United States has recently revealed to us its position that it will definitely consult and mediate with the South Korean government on important security policy involving North Korea,” Yun told the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee. He said, “South Korea and the United States are cooperating closer than at any time in the past. There is no need to worry too much over ‘Korea passing,’” a slogan expressing the fear that Seoul may be left out crucial decisions. Yun said that the South Korean government through official meetings and unofficial channels communicated its position during the Trump administration’s review of it North Korea policy – which he said was “considerably reflected” in the U.S.-China summit one week ago. He added that Washington “has confirmed numerous times” with Seoul important decisions on Pyongyang and that when important actions are undertaken, the United States always first explains them before and after. “In the case of an upsurge of military tension on the Korean Peninsula and if there is an accidental clash, this becomes a problem for all Korean people,” Democratic Party Rep. Park Byeong-seug, a fifth-term lawmaker, told the committee. “We need to hammer into the United States and China that no matter what happens, there cannot be any decision on the fate of the Korean Peninsula without the involvement of the Republic of Korea.” On Xi and Trump’s phone conversation the previous day, Cho June-hyuck, spokesman for the South Korean Foreign Ministry, said in a briefing, “What was clearly revealed through such a phone call is that the United States and China at their highest level recognize the gravity and urgency of the North Korean nuclear problem, and confirmed domestically and internationally that the two countries leaders share the same understanding and volition to resolve this issue.” Cho added, “In addition, our government sees that [Washington] has showed strong intention to lead China, and through close cooperation between South Korea and the United States, we plan to continue efforts to enable China to play an even more active and constructive role [on North Korea].” (Sarah Kim, “Trump Attempts a Deal on North Korea,” JoongAng Ilbo, April 14, 2017)
Amid sharply rising tensions over North Korea’s nuclear arms program, China said that its trade with the country had expanded, even though it had complied with United Nations sanctions and stopped buying North Korean coal, a major source of hard currency for Pyongyang. The data released today showed that China’s trade with North Korea grew 37.4 percent in the first quarter of this year from the period in 2016. Chinese exports surged 54.5 percent, and imports increased 18.4 percent, the General Administration of Customs said at a news conference in Beijing. China buys iron ore, zinc and other minerals from North Korea, as well as growing amounts of seafood and garments manufactured in the North’s well-equipped textile factories. China reported that its imports of North Korean iron were up 270 percent in January and February compared with the period in 2016. But imports of coal dropped 51.6 percent in the first three months of 2017 compared with the first quarter of last year, said Huang Songping, a spokesman for the customs agency. Coal has been the biggest hard-currency earner among North Korea’s fairly limited menu of exports. China agreed to stiffer United Nations sanctions last November, after the United States said Beijing’s coal purchases were helping to pay for the North’s nuclear weapons program. The coal, used in China’s steel mills, earns the North about a billion dollars a year, according to economists. China had not imported any coal from North Korea since Beijing imposed a cutoff on February 19, Huang said. That ban has been interpreted as punishment for the February killing in Malaysia of Kim Jong-nam, the estranged half-brother of North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, which Pyongyang has been accused of orchestrating. There have been other indications that China was following through on its promise to stop buying the North’s coal. Shipping data from this month showed a dozen cargo ships returning to North Korea fully laden, after China ordered its trading companies to return coal, Reuters recently reported. Trump referred to that as an encouraging sign in one of his interviews on April 12, a detail that appeared to show that he was paying attention to China’s actions against North Korea. After the United Nations sanctions were announced, some economists said it was still possible for Chinese businesses to import coal on an off-the-books basis, using transactions that would not be recorded by customs officials. But since mid-February, Chinese coal traders have said that their business has virtually vanished. “It’s over,” said a coal trader who operates from Dandong, a city on China’s northeastern border that functions as the main center of business with North Korea. The trader spoke on the condition of anonymity because he feared reprisals from the city authorities. How much harder China would bear down on North Korea by its own volition remained an open question. “It’s hard to ban normal trade that is not prohibited by U.N. resolutions,” said Yang Xiyu, a former Chinese diplomat who led China’s delegation to the so-called six-party talks on the North’s nuclear arms development in the mid-2000s. The Chinese Foreign Ministry cautioned that Washington should not expect China to squeeze its neighbor, and ally, to the point that sanctions would provoke instability, and possibly the collapse of the North’s government. Nor would China be enthusiastic about more sanctions being placed by others on North Korea, the ministry said. Asked about the impact of secondary sanctions that could be applied by the United States on Chinese firms that do business with North Korea, the ministry’s spokesman said Beijing was opposed to such actions. “China has always opposed the frequent use of unilateral sanctions in international affairs, and we especially oppose those sanctions that undermine China’s interests,” the spokesman, Lu Kang, said at a briefing. “China always decides its own stance and policy based on the merit of the matter itself.” (Jane Perlez, “China’s Overall Trade with North Korea Rises, but Coal Imports Are Cut Off,” New York Times, April 14, 2017,
4/14/17:
The Trump administration has settled on its North Korea strategy after a two-month review: “Maximum pressure and engagement.” U.S. officials said the president’s advisers weighed a range of ideas for how to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, including military options and trying to overthrow the isolated communist dictatorship’s leadership. At the other end of the spectrum, they looked at the notion of accepting North Korea as a nuclear state. In the end, however, they settled on a policy that appears to represent continuity. The administration’s emphasis, the officials said, will be on increasing pressure on Pyongyang with the help of China, North Korea’s dominant trade and military partner. The officials weren’t authorized to speak publicly on the results of the policy review and requested anonymity. The U.S. officials emphasized that no engagement of North Korea is currently taking place, and that the focus now was on pressure. While China advocates for diplomatic outreach, the officials said the goal of engagement would have to be North Korea’s denuclearization. It cannot lead to an arms control agreement or reduction of the North’s atomic arsenal that would imply American acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power. The officials are hopeful China and Russia would agree to tighter U.N. sanctions on North Korea if it conducts another nuclear test. They pointed to a recent editorial in a state-run Chinese newspaper advocating tighter restrictions on selling oil to North Korea. Beijing’s decision earlier this year to cut off coal imports from North Korea also are being seen as a hopeful sign. Coal sales are an important source of revenue for Kim Jong Un’s government, and the U.S. says China has turned back some shipments in recent days. Russia and China are critical to any pressure campaign on North Korea because they both hold veto power on the U.N. Security Council. Trump, who last week acted unilaterally in ordering a cruise missile strike on Syria, has been using America’s military might to send a message to Kim. An aircraft carrier, the USS Carl Vinson, is heading to waters off Korea in a show of force. Trump has repeatedly issued ambiguous threats that if Beijing isn’t willing to do more to squeeze the North, the U.S. might take the matter into its own hands. But a U.S. military official, who requested anonymity to discuss planning, said the U.S. doesn’t intend to use military force against North Korea in response to either a nuclear test or a missile launch. The official said plans could change in the unlikely event a North Korean missile targets South Korea, Japan or U.S. territory. (Matthew Pennington, “Trump Strategy on N. Korea: ‘Maximum Pressure and Engagement,’” Associated Press, April 14, 2017) Tensions couldn’t be higher as the regime of Kim Jong Un signals that it may soon detonate its sixth nuclear bomb and North Korean officials say they are ready to “go to war” if provoked by the United States. The United States has moved significant military assets into the region, and officials are even signaling that the United States is capable of launching a preemptive strike. But behind the scenes, the Trump administration has completed a two-month comprehensive review of the North Korea policy that was approved by all of the top National Security Council officials this month, a senior White House official who has read the policy confirmed to me.
The policy calls for “maximum pressure” against the North Korean regime to try to halt its illicit missile and nuclear activity, through sanctions and other diplomatic means. The policy does not call for “regime change” but in facts calls for engagement with the North Korea regime, if and when it changes its behavior. “The administration’s priority is to end the threat of a North Korean regime armed with nuclear weapons. That is our goal,” the senior White House official said. “The national security interest of the United States in this case is the threat of the regime to us and our allies in the region and so our focus is on that. If and when regime change comes to the northern part of the peninsula, we’ll deal with that then, but for now we are focused on the shorter-term threat.” Top administration officials have begun briefing experts on the new policy review, including at a private dinner yesterday in Washington featuring a top administration North Korea policy official who talked about the new approach. The senior White House official confirmed to me that the goal of the policy is “denuclearization,” not simply a halt or freeze of some of North Korea’s tests or other illegal activities. The policy provides for the potential of secondary sanctions on Chinese companies and banks that aid the North Korean regime, but not upfront. First, China is offered the opportunity to voluntarily increase its own pressure on North Korea. President Trump tweeted this point Thursday, saying: “I have great confidence that China will properly deal with North Korea. If they are unable to do so, the U.S., with its allies, will! U.S.A.” Vice President Pence will discuss the North Korean situation with leaders in Seoul and Tokyo when he travels to both Asian capitals next week. Senior administration officials who briefed reporters about the trip on background said that they expected North Korea to come up in every discussion Pence has while in northeast Asia. The administration is prepared to respond to another North Korean nuclear test and has a range of options at its disposal, the officials said, adding that nothing is off the table but that the United States won’t telegraph its response in advance. “Do we anticipate it? Possibly. But are there options already developed? Absolutely,” one senior administration official said. “Unfortunately, it’s not a new surprise for us. He continues to develop this program. He continues to launch missiles into the Sea of Japan. So with that regime it’s not a matter of ‘if,’ it’s ‘when.’ … So we’re well prepared to counter that.” (Josh Rogin, “Trump’s North Korea Policy Is ‘Maximum Pressure’ But Not ‘Regime Change,’” Washington Post, April 14, 2017)
President Donald Trump’s tweets are adding fuel to a “vicious cycle” of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea’s vice foreign minister told Associated Press in an exclusive interview. The official added that if the U.S. shows any sign of “reckless” military aggression, Pyongyang is ready to launch a pre-emptive strike of its own. Vice Minister Han Song Ryol said Pyongyang has determined the Trump administration is “more vicious and more aggressive” than that of Barack Obama. He added that North Korea will keep building up its nuclear arsenal in “quality and quantity” and said Pyongyang is ready to go to war if that’s what Trump wants. This year’s joint war games between the U.S. and South Korean militaries are the biggest so far — the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier has been diverted back to the waters off Korea after heading for Australia, and U.S. satellite imagery suggests the North could conduct another underground nuclear test at any time. Pyongyang recently tested a ballistic missile and claims it is close to perfecting an intercontinental ballistic missile and nuclear warhead that could attack the U.S. mainland. Many experts believe that at its current pace of testing, North Korea could reach that potentially game-changing milestone within a few years — under Trump’s watch as president. Despite reports that Washington is considering military action if the North goes ahead with another nuclear test, Han did not rule out the possibility of a test in the near future. “That is something that our headquarters decides,” he said during the 40-minute interview in Pyongyang, which is now gearing up for a major holiday — and possibly a big military parade — on Saturday. “At a time and at a place where the headquarters deems necessary, it will take place.” The annual U.S.-South Korea military exercises have consistently infuriated the North, which views them as rehearsals for an invasion. Washington and Seoul deny that, but reports that exercises have included “decapitation strikes” aimed at the North’s leadership have fanned Pyongyang’s anger. Han said Trump’s tweets have also added fuel to the flames. Trump posted a tweet Tuesday in which he said the North is “looking for trouble” and reiterated his call for more pressure from Beijing, North Korea’s economic lifeline, to clamp down on trade and strengthen its enforcement of U.N. sanctions to persuade Pyongyang to denuclearize. “Trump is always making provocations with his aggressive words,” Han said. “It’s not the DPRK but the U.S. and Trump that makes trouble.” He added: “We will go to war if they choose.” Han said the sanctions approach is misguided and cited the opening ceremony of a sprawling new high-rise residential area in Pyongyang on Thursday as evidence that sanctions have failed to ruin the country’s economy. Leader Kim Jong Un presided over the ceremony before about 100,000 residents and a large contingent of foreign journalists who have been allowed in to cover the holiday. Han dismissed the suggestion Trump made last year during his presidential campaign that he was willing to meet Kim Jong Un, possibly over hamburgers. “I think that was nothing more than lip service during the campaign to make himself more popular,” Han said. “Now we are comparing Trump’s policy toward the DPRK with the former administration’s and we have concluded that it’s becoming more vicious and more aggressive.” Han said North Korea changed its military strategy two years ago, when the reports of “decapitation strike” training began to really get attention, to stress pre-emptive actions. “We’ve got a powerful nuclear deterrent already in our hands, and we certainly will not keep our arms crossed in the face of a U.S. pre-emptive strike,” he said. “Whatever comes from the U.S., we will cope with it. We are fully prepared to handle it.”
South Korea’s Foreign Ministry said Han’s remarks on the North’s readiness to conduct a nuclear test and even go to war reveal the “true colors of North Korea’s government that is bellicose and a breaker of regulations.” The ministry issued a statement saying North Korea will face strong punishment it will find hard to withstand if it makes a significant provocation, such as another nuclear test or an ICBM launch. (Eric Talmadge, “N. Korea Official: Ready for War If Trump Wants It,” Associated Press, April 14, 2017)
KPA General Staff statement “as regards the extremely dangerous situation prevailing on the Korean peninsula due to the Trump administration’s reckless military provocation: The Trump administration of the U.S. began to disclose its brigandish nature timed to coincide with Key Resolve and Foal Eagle nuclear war games now under way in across south Korea. …The DPRK policy shaped by the Trump administration is first to put high-intensity sanctions and pressure together with someone, second to constantly keep tactical nuclear weapons deployed in south Korea and third to launch an independent military action aimed at “beheading operation” against the leadership of the DPRK and “preemptive strike.” In actuality, the Trump administration, which made a surprise cruise guided missile strike at Syria on April 6, has entered the path of open threat and blackmail against the DPRK, describing it as “a strong warning message” to it. The U.S. State secretary, Defense secretary and other officials concerned with security of the U.S. are openly crying out more often than not for launching an independent military action against the DPRK.
Under the prevailing situation where the Trump administration’s serious military hysteria has reached a dangerous phase which can no longer be overlooked, the KPA General Staff re-clarifies its principled stand as follows upon authorization: 1. All the brigandish provocative moves of the U.S. in the political, economic and military fields pursuant to its hostile policy toward the DPRK will thoroughly be foiled through the toughest counteraction of the army and people of the DPRK. Our toughest counteraction against the U.S. and its vassal forces will be taken in such a merciless manner as not to allow the aggressors to survive. Under the prevailing grave situation, the U.S. has to come to its senses and make a proper option for the solution of the problem. The army and people of the DPRK will as ever courageously counter those who encroach upon the dignity and sovereignty of the DPRK and will always mercilessly foil all the provocative options of the U.S. with Korean-style toughest counteraction.” (KCNA, “U.S. Provocative Action Will Meet Toughest Counteraction of DPRK: KPA General Staff,” April 14, 2017)
China warned that tensions on the Korean Peninsula could spin out of control, as North Korea said it could test a nuclear weapon at any time and a United States naval group neared the peninsula — an American effort to sow doubt in Pyongyang over how President Trump might respond. “The United States and South Korea and North Korea are engaging in tit for tat, with swords drawn and bows bent, and there have been storm clouds gathering,” China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, said in Beijing, according to Xinhua. “If they let war break out on the peninsula, they must shoulder that historical culpability and pay the corresponding price for this,” Wang said. The comments were unusually blunt from China, which has been trying to steer between the Trump administration’s demands for it to do more to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its longstanding reluctance to risk a rupture with the North. The remarks also reflected, American experts said, an effort by the Chinese to throw responsibility for what happens back on Washington, after Trump declared, in several Twitter messages, that it was up to the Chinese to contain their neighbor and sometime partner. In a telephone conversation with Trump on April 12, China’s president, Xi Jinping, also called for restraint. But behind the scenes, officials said, Trump and Xi had reached some preliminary understandings, during their meeting at the president’s Mar-a-Lago resort a week ago, about what the Chinese might do to change the behavior of the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un. According to officials who have seen notes of the conversations, the Chinese have agreed to crack down on their second-tier banks that have helped finance the North’s trade. But it is unclear what that crackdown would look like: While much has been made by Trump about North Korean “boats” of coal that have been turned away by China, the most recent statistics show a significant increase in overall trade between the two countries. American officials contend that the two countries have also agreed to share some intelligence — a highly unusual step — about suspected North Korean shipments of arms and other illicit goods. That would improve the chances that those shipments can be intercepted, perhaps when they make port calls. The Bush administration began such a program, called the Proliferation Security Initiative, more than a decade ago, but attention to it has waxed and waned. The North Korean military issued a statement yesterday threatening to attack major American military bases in South Korea, as well as the presidential Blue House, warning that it could annihilate those targets “within minutes.” Administration officials flatly denied a report on NBC News that the United States was planning for a preemptive strike ahead of any nuclear test. It was unclear what American forces would strike, and the nuclear test site where the North has conducted its five previous tests would make a hard-to-hit target. Moreover, they noted, Vice President Mike Pence is scheduled to visit Seoul this weekend, and it is almost impossible to imagine a strike occurring while he was consulting with the South’s acting president about how to respond to the crisis. Even if a nuclear test occurs this weekend or in coming weeks, officials say, the response is likely to be diplomatic, with a ramping up of economic pressure and the deployment of more military assets. A carrier group, led by the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson, is headed to the waters off the peninsula. It includes Aegis cruisers with antimissile ability. That is notable because administration officials say they are more concerned about a test of an intercontinental ballistic missile that could reach the United States — a feat the North has never come close to accomplishing — than another nuclear test. According to one official, it’s the combination of a missile and a warhead that is most worrisome. The North, for its part, issued a statement that denounced what it called the Trump administration’s “maniacal military provocations,” including the deployment of the carrier group. “Nothing will be more foolish if the United States thinks it can deal with us the way it treated Iraq and Libya, miserable victims of its aggression, and Syria, which did not respond immediately even after it was attacked,” a spokesman for the general staff of the North’s People’s Army said in a statement carried by KCNA. North Korea’s vice foreign minister, Han Song-ryol, said on Friday that the United States was “becoming more vicious and aggressive” under Trump and that “we will go to war if they choose.” Han told The Associated Press that whether North Korea holds another nuclear test would be “something that our headquarters decides.” But he added an ominous coda: “At a time and at a place where the headquarters deems necessary, it will take place.” The speculation about an imminent underground detonation arises from satellite photographs that show the test site is fully prepared, and that holes into the site have been plugged, usually a last step to contain radiation. But at times the North, knowing it is under space surveillance, has readied the site but waited to conduct the test. Russia, another neighbor of North Korea, echoed China yesterday in urging all parties to exercise caution. A Kremlin spokesman, Dmitri S. Peskov, called on “all the countries to refrain from any actions that could amount to provocative steps,” Reuters reported. In a phone call on Friday between the Russian foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, and his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, both said they would try to revive talks over North Korea, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. In South Korea, whose people have lived through saber-rattling involving the North for decades, there were few signs of panic. Nonetheless, the South Korean Foreign Ministry warned yesterday that if the North conducted another nuclear test or launched an intercontinental ballistic missile, it would suffer an “unbearably strong punishment.” All the major candidates in the presidential election set for next month have called on the United States not to do anything that might initiate war on the peninsula without first seeking the consent of South Korea, its military ally. In his remarks in Beijing, Wang said there was still hope for renewed negotiations with North Korea on its weapons program. “There can also be flexibility about the form of renewed talks,” he said. The Chinese made much of their announcement two months ago that they were suspending coal imports from North Korea. But while those shipments seem to have dried up, Chinese overall trade rose 37.4 percent in the first quarter of 2017, compared with the same period in 2016. Chinese news outlets reported on Friday that Air China, the country’s main international airline, would suspend flights to Pyongyang starting April 17, leaving only Air Koryo of North Korea operating regular flights between Pyongyang and Beijing or other Chinese cities. The move appeared to have been in the works for some time; NK News reported last month that the suspension was likely, saying that Air China’s services were underused and that its flights were often canceled. Later, Air China issued a statement saying it had not entirely abandoned the route from Beijing to Pyongyang, and would arrange flights if there was enough demand. (Gerry Mullany, Chris Buckley, and David E. Sanger, “Korea Tensions Could Overheat, China Declares,” New York Times, April 15, 2017,
China warned that tensions on the Korean Peninsula could run out of control, after North Korea said it could test a nuclear weapon whenever its top leader, Kim Jong-un, decided, and as an American naval group neared the peninsula in a show of resolve. “The United States and South Korea and North Korea are engaging in tit for tat, with swords drawn and bows bent, and there have been storm clouds gathering,” China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, said in Beijing, according to Xinhua. “We urge all sides to no longer engage in mutual provocation and threats, whether through words or deeds, and don’t push the situation to the point where it can’t be turned around and gets out of hand,” Wang said after meeting with his visiting French counterpart, Jean-Marc Ayrault, according to Xinhua. “No matter who it is, if they let war break out on the peninsula, they must shoulder that historical culpability and pay the corresponding price for this,” Wang said. As Pyongyang’s weapons technology rapidly advances and the United States is led by an unpredictable new president, some of its neighbors were examining worst-case scenarios. The Japanese news media reported that the government’s National Security Council had been discussing the possible evacuation of an estimated 57,000 of its citizens in South Korea, should war break out. “We will take all necessary steps to protect our people’s lives and assets,” said Suga Yoshihide, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary. The Kyodo news agency said the council was concerned about the possibility of North Korean refugees arriving in boats on its shores. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo expressed concern yesterday that North Korea could have the capability to deliver missiles equipped with sarin, the nerve agent whose recent use against civilians in Syria prompted Mr. Trump to order a missile strike there. A Kremlin spokesman, Dmitri S. Peskov, called on “all the countries to refrain from any actions that could amount to provocative steps,” Reuters reported. In South Korea, whose people have lived through saber-rattling involving the North for decades, there were few signs of panic. Nonetheless, all major candidates in the presidential election next month called on the United States not to do anything that might initiate war on the peninsula without first seeking the consent of South Korea, its military ally. Further raising fears was a report by NBC News that the United States was prepared to take pre-emptive military action against North Korea if it became convinced that the North was preparing to test a nuclear weapon. The report, which cited unidentified intelligence officials, was vigorously denied by people in the Trump administration. The Defense Department said only that it would not “publicly speculate on possible scenarios.” Alluding to the Trump administration’s decision to send a naval flotilla to the region, North Korea accused the United States of introducing “nuclear strategic assets” to the peninsula and “pushing the situation there to the brink of war.” “This has created a dangerous situation in which a thermonuclear war may break out any moment on the peninsula,” said a statement attributed to the Foreign Ministry’s Institute for Disarmament and Peace. In his remarks in Beijing, Wang said there was still hope for renewed negotiations with North Korea on its weapons program. “There can also be flexibility about the form of renewed talks,” he said. “As long as there’s dialogue, formal or informal, first-track or second-track, bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral, China is willing to support this.” The United States has said it will not negotiate with the North unless it first shows that it is serious about ending its nuclear arms program and not merely playing for time. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said yesterday that the Trump administration should not expect China to risk instability in North Korea by going along with choking sanctions. “China and the North Korea are neighbors with traditional friendly ties, including normal trade activities,” a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Lu Kang, told reporters. “We strongly hope that all parties concerned will not pin all their hopes on sanctions only.” (Gerry Mullany and Chris Buckley, “China Warns of ‘Storm Clouds Gathering’ in U.S. North Korea Standoff,” New York Times, April 14, 2017)
The bomb that the United States dropped on an Islamic State cave complex in Afghanistan was big — at 22,000 pounds, the most powerful conventional weapon in the American arsenal. Arguably, even bigger were the messages it sent, whether by design or not. To potential adversaries like Syria and North Korea, the bombing could signal deterrence. For the American public, it underscored the Pentagon’s more aggressive stance under President Trump than under his predecessor, whose administration never even debated using the weapon. Dozens of militants were killed, Afghan officials said. American commanders said that the bomb was chosen because it fit the target, a series of tunnels with dug-in positions nearby used by militants in a remote part of eastern Afghanistan, and that it posed little or no risk to civilians. The bombing spared troops from fierce fighting in caves. It also illustrated how Trump is releasing commanders from Obama-era restrictions on the use of force and how the top United States commander in Afghanistan, Gen. John W. Nicholson Jr., was seeking to showcase Afghanistan’s myriad threats. General Nicholson, who has requested reinforcements to the 8,500 American troops stationed there, drew his bosses’ attention by dropping what the Pentagon has nicknamed the “mother of all bombs.” “Another promise kept,” Donald J. Trump Jr., the president’s son, said on Twitter, noting his father’s campaign promise to vigorously strike the Islamic State and using an emoji of a bomb with a lit fuse. Using the weapon, called the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast, or MOAB, presents special challenges. It can obliterate everything within a 1,000-yard radius. The ordnance contains almost 19,000 pounds of Composition H6, an explosive compound that is roughly one-third stronger than an equivalent weight of TNT. In Afghanistan, with its rural and agrarian economy, civilians who are engaged in food-gathering, woodcutting, farming or tending herds are often near or beside concentrations of militants. The blast radius of an explosion of this size could pose risks to people far from the center of the target. For that reason, President Barack Obama’s administration did not consider using the bomb, American officials said. Early in the Iraq war in April 2003, during the administration of President George W. Bush, American commanders weighed using the weapon to try to kill President Saddam Hussein, who was on the run from United States troops who had toppled his government. But commanders discarded the option when analysts estimated that the bomb’s blast would also kill thousands of civilians. “The collateral damage would have been massive,” said Marc Garlasco, who led a team in the military’s Joint Staff that was seeking to target Hussein. While some analysts said the bombing sent a stern symbolic message to Syria and North Korea, it has little real utility against those countries, or Iran or Russia, because it is pushed out of a lumbering cargo plane that can operate safely only over nations that have no effective air defenses or air forces. Some critics said the bombing could send an unintended message to North Korea that may unnecessarily rattle nerves in Pyongyang at a time of high tension for no clear strategic reason, while failing to advance a long-term strategy in Afghanistan. “Let’s not confuse this tactic for a strategy,” said Representative Seth Moulton, a Massachusetts Democrat and former Marine Corps captain who served four tours in Iraq. At the Pentagon, military officials said that they did not need to request authorization for the strike from Trump, although three officials also acknowledged that if Obama had still been in charge, the Defense Department would probably have sent the proposal to the White House before proceeding. But instead of the deliberative processes in place during the Obama administration that made for lengthy National Security Council staff meetings, Trump has approved allowing his commanders more authority, giving the Pentagon a rare freedom to assert its control over national security policy from a commander in chief who eschews quibbling over the details. (Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper, and C.J. Chivers, “A Giant Bomb Carries Even Bigger Messages,” New York Times, April 15, 2017,
4/15/17:
Worries about a potential military conflict continue to rise on the Korean Peninsula as Pyongyang declares it is ready to conduct another nuclear weapons test at any time and the USS Carl Vinson strike group steams toward waters off North Korea. U.S. officials continue to assert that “all options are on the table,” which presumably includes a preemptive strike. In response, in an interview yesterday, North Korean Vice Minister Han Song Ryol said “we will go to war if they choose.” In public, officials in Tokyo have welcomed Washington’s tough stance. But in private, reactions are mixed. Japanese officials affirm that attacking North Korea is easier said than done, and the senior officials do not appear to seriously believe Washington will soon launch a military strike against Pyongyang. At least for now. “The situation is not like that,” a senior Japanese government official said Friday when asked whether Tokyo needs to start preparing to evacuate Japanese residents from South Korea. As of today, Japan had not issued any warnings to nationals in or traveling to South Korea, although “numerous” Japanese had contacted the Foreign Ministry to ask how serious the security situation on the peninsula really is, they said. When asked if the report was “over-hyped,” the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, answered in the affirmative. “We know the situation is tense. But you need to calmly watch and analyze the situation at a time like this,” the official said. (Yoshida Reiji, “U.S.-Korea War Hype Rings Hollow as Verbal Jousting Continues,” Japan Times, April 15, 2017)
North Korea unveiled what appears to be launch tubes for a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) during a military parade in the capital of Pyongyang to celebrate the 105th birthday of the country’s late founder Kim Il Sung, South Korea’s military said. Local authorities said further analysis would be required to determine conclusively whether the missile in the tubes was an ICBM. If so, it would be the first time North Korea has publicly displayed the weapon. Officials in South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said the launch tubes displayed during the parade were longer than the North’s intermediate-range ballistic missiles, leading them to believe it might have intercontinental strike capability. The parade was aired live on KCNA’s YouTube channel. KCNA has yet to mention anything about an ICBM at the parade. Kim did not deliver a message at Kim Il Sung Square, but Choe Ryong-hae, vice chairman of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea, said in defiant speech that the North was “prepared to respond to an all-out war” and use its nuclear weapons. The reappearance of Kim Won-hong, the state security minister whom South Korean officials believed was purged earlier this year, also caught the attention of local authorities. The South Korean government believed Kim Won-hong had been sent to a “political re-education” prison camp for sending false reports to Kim Jong-un. On Saturday, the spy chief was seen standing just a few steps away from Kim Jong-un on video released by the KCNA. South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, which handles inter-Korea relations, said Kim Won-hong might have completed his term at the prison camp and been reinstated, though he was absent during a parliamentary meeting in Pyongyang on April 11. (Lee Sung-yun, “North Korea Parades What Appears to Be New ICBM,” JoongAng Ilbo, April 15, 2017) North Korea put on a jaw-dropping military display Saturday, when the regime celebrated its most important day of the year: “the Day of the Sun,” the anniversary of its founder, Kim Il Sung. So experts were anticipating a big show Saturday, but even they were stunned by the range of apparently new missiles on display, and the sheer number of them. As the finale for the parade, the North Korean military wheeled two sets of huge missile canisters through Kim Il Sung Square. These are the canisters that hold the missiles, not the missiles themselves, and it’s anyone’s guess what was inside the canisters. “But if it’s not an ICBM itself, it’s bridge to an ICBM,” Lewis said. One set of canisters appeared to be the right size for the KN-08, a three-stage missile that North Korea calls the Hwasong-13. With a theoretical range of about 7,500 miles, this missile could reach all of the United States from North Korea. “The natural reaction is: What the hell is that?” Lewis said of the canister. “Maybe there is a KN-08 inside it, maybe there’s some new missile inside it, or maybe it’s nothing. It’s a mystery.” The second set of “giant” canisters looked similar to those for the Topol-M, the Russian intercontinental ballistic missile, he said. “What’s inside those is a mystery too.” “My guess is that what it’s intended to convey is that there are more ICBMs coming, more solid-fuel missiles,” Lewis said. The North Korean military displayed six ballistic missiles that can be launched from a submarine, which the United States calls the KN-15 but which North Korea calls the Pukguksong-1 (or “Polaris-1.”) North Korea fired one of these missiles from a submarine near its east coast port of Sinpo in August, and it flew about 300 miles before falling into the sea inside Japan’s air-defense identification zone, the area in which Tokyo controls aircraft movement. Kim described it as “the greatest success” at the time and said North Korea has “joined the front rank of the military powers fully equipped with nuclear attack capability.” Analysts were surprised to see six of these missiles in the parade. “It looks like a real missile,” Lewis said. “They could go to all the trouble of manufacturing a perfect copy, but if you’re doing that, it’s just as easy to make the real missile.” North Korea also displayed — for the first time — its KN-15, the land-based version of its submarine-launched ballistic missile, which North Korea calls the Pukguksong-2 (or “Polaris-2.”) This is also powered by solid fuel. North Korea launched this missile for the first time earlier this month, firing it from a land base near Sinpo, home to a known North Korean submarine base. The missile did not appear to go very far, but still, analysts described the development as “scary” because of the solid-fuel component. This is what Lewis’s colleague Melissa Hanham said at the time: “Solid fuel is very significant because they can launch these missiles much faster and with a smaller entourage than with liquid-fueled missiles, making them much harder for the United States, South Korea and Japan to spot from satellites.” There were black-and-white missiles that looked like KN-08s, the intercontinental ballistic missile, but slightly smaller, Lewis said. And they were rolled out on missile vehicles usually used for the medium-range Musudan missile. Yonhap reported in January, citing military officials, that North Korea had probably built two ICBMs that were less than 50 feet long. That would make them shorter than the two known ICBMs, which are between 60 and 65 feet long. “I think this is that,” said Lewis. Lewis and his team were not sure about one type of missile that was on show, painted in camouflage and transported on a tank. It could be an extended-range Scud or a Rodong, capable of flying up to 800 miles. But what they were sure about was that the missile had fins on it, meaning that the reentry vehicle on the missile could be controlled on the way down – in other words, the warhead could be maneuvered to hit a target. If the extended range Scud was a “super Scud,” this is a “super-duper Scud,” said Lewis. Then there were the canisters on top of tracked vehicles that North Korea displayed at the very start of the parade. These appeared to be for anti-ship cruise missiles, a North Korean version of Russia’s Kh-35 missile. “In any other year, North Korea having a coastal defense cruise missile and showing it to us for the first time would have made us say ‘Wow’,” said Lewis. “But this year, with all this other stuff, nobody cares about something that can go only 100 or 200 km,” he said. (That’s 62 to 125 miles.) If this wasn’t enough, here’s one more observation. North Korea showed a large number of transporters during the parade, many of them an indigenous tank that North Korea can build at home, rather than having to import through China. This means that North Korea increasingly has the ability to move its missiles around and, with the road-mobile missile launchers they are now favoring over old-fashioned gantries, launch them from anywhere. As Lewis puts it: “They want us to know that their missile program is pretty far along.” (Anna Fifield, “Here Are the Missiles North Korea Showed off, One by One,” Washington Post, April 15, 2017)
4/16/17:
North Korea launched a ballistic missile this morning from near its submarine base in Sinpo on its east coast, but the launch failed, according to American and South Korean military officials. The timing was a deep embarrassment for the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, because the missile appeared to have been launched to show off his daring as a fleet of American warships approached his country to deter provocations. Cmdr. Dave Benham, a spokesman for the United States Pacific Command, said the military had “detected and tracked what we assess was a North Korean missile launch at 11:21 a.m. Hawaii time April 15.” The missile blew up almost immediately, and the type of missile involved is still being assessed, he said. Yesterday, what analysts said were three types of intercontinental ballistic missiles rolled through Pyongyang, the North’s capital, as the country tried to demonstrate that its military reach was expanding at a time of heightened tensions with the United States. During the parade in Pyongyang, Kim watched from a platform surrounded by elderly military officers as long columns of goose-stepping soldiers marched through a large plaza, accompanied by tanks, missiles and rocket tubes.It was the 105th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung. Making their parade debut on launcher trucks with huge wheels were very large missiles encased in tubes or canisters. Analysts said the tubes appeared to have been designed for two other kinds of long-range ballistic missiles. There were multiple examples of each tube; it was impossible to see what was in them, but analysts said it was likely that they contained missiles that were either completed or under development. Militaries use such canisters to “cold launch” missiles, ejecting them high into the air before their fuel ignites. If North Korea perfected that technology, it would help the nation better protect its mobile missiles from environmental damage while being driven around and from fiery exhaust during launch. The method can also make missiles harder to detect once fired. “They’re not just showing off missiles that are hard to build,” said Jeffrey Lewis, a North Korea specialist at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, in California. “They’re showing off all the associated technologies you need for credible deployments.” Kim Dong-yub, a missile expert at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University in Seoul, said one kind of tube appeared to be for the KN-14, a modified version of the KN-08 that was first displayed in a parade in 2015, during which the North claimed that its missiles were tipped with nuclear warheads. The other tube design was new to the analysts. “Given the size, it looks like it contains a new ballistic missile with a range of at least 6,000 kilometers,” or 3,700 miles, making it potentially an intercontinental threat, said Shin In-kyun, a military expert who runs the Korea Defense Network, a civic group specializing in military affairs. “Officials in the region will scramble to figure out whether this is a new solid-fuel, long-range ballistic missile the North was believed to be developing.” The Pukguksong-2, an intermediate-range ballistic missile that the North tested in February, uses solid-fuel technology. That missile was displayed in a parade for the first time on Saturday. So were the Pukguksong-1 — the North’s first submarine-launched ballistic missile, which was successfully tested in August — and the Scud-ER, a Scud with an extended range, designed to reach American military bases in South Korea and Japan. North Korea kept up its defiant rhetoric yesterday. “If they attempt a full-scale war, we will respond with a full-scale war,” Choe Ryong-hae, a senior official in the ruling Workers’ Party and a key aide to Kim, said in a speech before the parade. “If they start a nuclear war, we will respond with nuclear strikes.” (Choe Sang-Hun, David E. Sanger, and William J. Broad, “North Korea Flaunts Missiles in Military Parade amid Rising Tensions,” New York Times, April 16, 2017,
H.H. McMaster: “RADDATZ: And how close do you think North Korea is to having a nuclear weapon capable of reaching the United States? MCMASTER: Well, you know, estimates in these sorts of things vary widely. What is clear is, as long — as long as their behavior continues, as long as they continue missile development — even though this was a failed missile, they get better and they learn lessons. So what’s critical is for them to stop this destabilizing behavior, stop the development of these weapons, and denuclearize. And that is the best interests of everyone in the region, and ultimately it’s in the best interests of the North Korean people as well. RADDATZ: North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister said Friday that the Trump administration is more vicious and more aggressive than the Obama administration, saying that Trump’s aggressive tweets were making trouble. Does the aggressive language increase the likelihood of conflict? MCMASTER: I think it should make clear to the North Korean regime that it is in their best interest to stop the development of these weapons, to stop the development of these missiles, and to denuclearize the peninsula. And so I think while it’s unclear — and want to — do not want to telegraph in any way how we’ll respond to certain incidents, it’s clear that the president is determined not to allow this kind of capability to threaten the United States. And our president will take action that is in the best interest of the American people. RADDATZ: You know, one of the big concerns here, General McMaster, is how North Korea would respond to aggressive action or some sort of preemptive strike. How do you think they would respond? MCMASTER: Well, that’s what particularly difficult about — about dealing with this regime, is that it is unpredictable. This is someone who has demonstrated his brutality by murdering his own brother, by murdering others in his family, by imprisoning large numbers of people in horrible conditions for no reason, for political reasons. So this regime has given the world reason for concern. And that includes — that includes the Chinese people and the Chinese leadership as well. I mean, what Kim Jong-Un is doing is a threat to all people in the region and globally as well. I mean, this is someone who has said not only does he want to develop a nuclear weapon, but he wants to use it to coerce others. He’s said that he was willing to proliferate nuclear weapons once he develops them. And so this a grave threat to all people. RADDATZ: You know, you heard what President Trump said about China in that primary debate, but this week he said, after listening to President Xi, he realized it’s not so easy. Are you truly confident you can get China to pressure North Korea in a meaningful way? MCMASTER: Well, we’ll see what happens. What we do know is that, in the midst of responding to the mass murder of the Syrian regime, the president and the first lady hosted an extraordinarily successful conference, summit, with President Xi and his team. And not only did they establish a very warm relationship, but since that time they’ve worked together on other issues. On North Korea they worked together. But they worked together as well in connection with the response to the mass murder on the part of the Assad regime in connection with the U.N. vote. I think President Xi was courageous in distancing himself from the Russians, isolating really the Russians and the Bolivians. And this all occurred on the same day that President Trump hosted the Secretary-General of NATO, representing our wonderful NATO allies. And I think the world saw that, and they saw, well, what club do you want to be in? The Russian-Bolivian club? Or the — in the club with the United States, working together on our mutual interests and the interests of peace, security. And I think it was just a great week of the United States, in thanks mainly to our president’s (INAUDIBLE). RADDATZ: You know, you sound very confident. President Trump of course sounds very confident. But one final question on this: every president since Bill Clinton has said the U.S. will not tolerate a nuclear armed North Korea, and North Korea has only grown stronger in their capabilities. So why do you think President Trump will have a different outcome? MCMASTER: Well, as you mentioned, this is a problem that has been passed down from multiple administrations. But our president, I think, it’s really the consensus with the president, our key allies in the regions — Japan and South Korea in particular, but also the Chinese leadership — that this problem is coming to a head. And so it’s time for us to undertake all actions we can, short of a military option, to try to resolve this peacefully. And so we’re going to rely on our allies like we always do, but we’re also going to have to rely on Chinese leadership. I mean, North Korea is very vulnerable to pressure from the Chinese. Eighty percent of North Korea’s trade comes from China. All of their energy requirements are fulfilled by China. So in the coming weeks, months, I think there’s a great opportunity for all of us — all of us who are really the threat now of this unpredictable regime — to take action short of armed conflict, so we can avoid the worst.” (National Security Adviser H.H. McMaster, Interview with Martha Raddatz, “This Week,” ABC News, April 16, 2017)
When a North Korean missile test went awry on Sunday, blowing up seconds after liftoff, there were immediate suspicions that a United States program to sabotage the test flights had struck again. The odds seem highly likely: Eighty-eight percent of the launches of the North’s most threatening missiles have self-destructed since the covert American program was accelerated three years ago. But even inside the United States Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, where the operation is centered, it is nearly impossible to tell if any individual launch is the victim of a new, innovative approach to foil North Korean missiles with cyber and electronic strikes. Bad welding, bad parts, bad engineering and bad luck can all play a role in such failures — as it did in the United States’ own missile program, particularly in its early days. And it would require a near impossible degree of forensic investigation to figure out an exact cause, given that the failed North Korean missiles tend to explode, disintegrate in midair and plunge in fragments into faraway seas. But this much is clear, experts say: The existence of the American program, and whatever it has contributed to North Korea’s remarkable string of troubles, appears to have shaken Pyongyang and led to an internal spyhunt as well as innovative ways to defeat a wide array of enemy cyber strikes. By all accounts, the program that President Barack Obama stepped up in 2014 has been adopted with enthusiasm by the Trump administration. President Trump’s national security aides are eagerly hoping that the Chinese, among others, will get North Korea to freeze or reverse its program. Yet they have no compunctions about using this new class of weapon against missile tests that the United Nations has already prohibited. Speaking in Moscow last week, Rex W. Tillerson, the secretary of state, was put on the defensive by a Russian reporter who challenged American complaints of interference in the American election, despite Washington’s cyberattacks against Iran’s nuclear program and North Korea’s missile program. “Cybertools to disrupt weapons programs — that’s another use of the tools, and I make a distinction between those two,” Tillerson argued back, without specifically confirming their use against Pyongyang. Perhaps taken by surprise at the question, Tillerson never took the next step to voice the argument that some of his Trump administration colleagues make in private: that since the United Nations Security Council has banned North Korean missile tests, any effort to interfere with them would have some basis in international law. But the question for the United States’ intelligence agencies is whether this new tool is as effective as many have hoped. While billions of dollars have been poured into new offensive cyber weapons, touting a success in thwarting North Korea — whether it is real or imagined — can be turned into an argument for more. It is a particularly difficult question in light of today’s botched test, because it is still unclear exactly what missile was launched. By nature, missiles teeter on the brink of failure, and new designs are often accident prone. At their best, missiles are dense welters of pipes, engines, valves, pumps, volatile fuels, relays, explosive bolts, wires, sensors and circuit boards that suddenly emit blistering flames and roar skyward with such shattering violence that they often quickly hit the breaking point. Things can easily go wrong, and frequently do. But the sheer frequency of North Korean missile mishaps suggests that sabotage lies behind at least some of the recent failures. So does the timing. Typically, countries encounter high failure rates when they start their rocket programs. As the programs mature, and engineers gain experience, spectacular failures decline and success tends to become a habit. In North Korea, the situation has been the exact reverse. By and large, the North was a reliable maker of missiles in the 1980s, ’90s and into the 2000s. Then came the effort to launch the Musudan, an intermediate-range missile that Pyongyang first displayed in a military parade in late 2010. It was 5 feet wide and 40 feet long — remarkably small compared with the North’s big rockets. But it represented an enormous threat. Carried on a truck, it could be hauled on country roads through forested regions or kept in tunnels, making it easy to hide and, as a target, difficult to find and destroy. Last year, the North conducted eight flight tests. Only one succeeded, giving the missile an overall failure rate of 88 percent. It was after the last failure that the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, was reported to have ordered an investigation into whether the United States was sabotaging his country’s test flights, searching for spies in his system. Experts say that the best way to slow a program is to send a country scrambling for the causes of failures. “Disrupting their tests,” William J. Perry, defense secretary in the Clinton administration, said at a meeting this year in Washington, would be “a pretty effective way of stopping their ICBM program.” But more recently, the effectiveness of the United States’ sabotage has grown increasingly uncertain. Some new North Korean missile designs, using solid fuels, have had a higher success rate. Moreover, the North Koreans, as sophisticated cyber operators, have grown better at defense. John Schilling, a technical expert on North Korea’s missile program, expressed skepticism on Tuesday about the efficacy of the foreign cyberattacks against Pyongyang’s missiles. “We haven’t seen anything yet pointing to cyber specifically,” Schilling said on a conference call organized by 38 North. An easier target of sabotage, Schilling added, would be the parts and supplies that North Korea imports to feed its factories that make the missiles. Longtime North Korea watcher Martyn Williams, who runs a California-based blog called North Korea Tech, recently reported that the North’s scientists have developed a quantum encryption device that could completely secure communications systems from hackers, eavesdroppers and saboteurs. The effort, Williams wrote this month, has the potential to “hamper the ability of foreign intelligence agencies to monitor and affect North Korean systems in real time.” (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Hand of U.S. Leaves North Korea’s Missile Program Shaken,” New York Times, April 19, 2017, p. A-10)
4/17/17:
Vice President Mike Pence issued a fresh warning to North Korea not to test America’s resolve. But behind the threatening talk, the White House is taking a more calculated approach, giving the Chinese government time to show whether it is ready to use its influence to curb its erratic, nuclear-armed neighbor. The disparity between the Trump administration’s blunt public statements to Pyongyang and its growing reliance on Beijing has been put in sharp relief by Pence’s visit to South Korea, which included a stop at the demilitarized zone that divides the Korean Peninsula. North Korea should not test “the strength of the armed forces of the United States in this region,” Pence declared in Seoul. Yet in Washington, the White House said President Trump would not draw any red lines with North Korea. And officials expressed hope that China was finally playing a more active role in pressuring the North — a strategy that, if successful, could obviate the need for American military action. “There’s a lot of economic and political pressure points that I think China can utilize,” Sean Spicer, the White House press secretary, said at his daily briefing. “We’ve been very encouraged with the direction in which they’re going.” Spicer pointed to China’s cutback of coal imports from North Korea as evidence of its new resolve to curb the provocative behavior of its neighbor. But the Chinese government made the decision to stop purchasing North Korean coal before President Xi Jinping of China met with Trump this month at Mar-a-Lago. The administration has teed up additional sanctions on North Korea — from grounding its state airline to banning exports of its seafood — depending on its behavior, according to officials briefed on the policy. The White House is also considering targeting Chinese banks that do business with North Korea, these people said. But it is holding off on that step, which would antagonize Beijing, until it sees what China does. Few of the unilateral sanctions are likely to change North Korea’s behavior, and most would simply be recycled proposals from the Obama administration. So despite insisting it has mothballed the previous administration’s policy of “strategic patience” on North Korea, the Trump administration finds itself in the familiar position of waiting. Pence even held out the possibility of opening talks with the North Korean regime, noting that Washington was seeking security “through peaceable means, through negotiations.” The Trump administration’s mixture of resolve and ambiguity attested to its quandary with North Korea. Though the North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-un, refrained from detonating a nuclear device and suffered another failed missile test this weekend, the United States has not yet found a way around the limited options against the North that constrained his predecessors and put it on the path to becoming a nuclear power. Trump essentially has three choices: a military strike that could ignite a full-blown war; pressure on China to impose tougher sanctions to persuade the North to change course, an approach that failed for Barack Obama as president; or a deal that could require significant concessions, with no guarantee that North Korea would fulfill its promises. The question is whether his apparent willingness to consider both war and a deal may be enough carrot and stick to persuade China to change its approach and apply enough pressure to bring the North to the table. The State Department’s acting assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Susan Thornton, said that North Korea would need to make a definitive change in its nuclear or missile programs before the United States would consider renewed talks. The administration wants “a signal that they realize the current status quo is not sustainable,” Thornton said, although she refused to specify what signal would be acceptable. “Without a signal like that, I think the international community is going to resolve to just ratchet up the pressure.” The United States has a long history of failed attempts at negotiations with North Korea, reaching back to the Clinton administration and extending through the George W. Bush and Obama administrations. But Trump has made it clear that this problem can no longer be postponed. Kim already has enough fissile material for 20 to 25 nuclear weapons, and he may be able to produce sufficient fissile materials — plutonium and highly enriched uranium — for six to seven new weapons a year, according to Siegfried S. Hecker, a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Should the North conduct its sixth nuclear test, it would move closer to having a hydrogen bomb, or a two-stage thermonuclear weapon, Hecker said, with up to a thousand times more power than the Hiroshima-style weapons Kim has detonated so far. With that level of firepower, Hecker said he worried about a “nuclear catastrophe” on the peninsula resulting from either “escalation of military activities” or poor security around the North’s nuclear arsenal. Talks are needed immediately, he said, just to deal with the threat to Japan and South Korea, both American allies. The logic for diplomacy should be compelling to the Trump administration, Chinese experts say, even as Washington stakes out a policy of “maximum pressure” and has deployed a naval flotilla led by the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson to the coast of the Korean Peninsula, though it is still thousands of miles away. North Korea reacted to the latest warnings from the White House by accusing the Trump administration of applying “gangster-like logic” and promising “tough counteraction” to any military threats. Pyongyang’s deputy ambassador to the United Nations, Kim In-ryong, spoke from prepared remarks, four pages long and peppered with familiar statements condemning American “imperialism” and defending “sovereignty.” He referred to his remarks even when trying to answer half a dozen questions posed by reporters. The closest he came to answering a question was to say that another nuclear test would be carried out “at the time, at the place where our headquarters deemed necessary.”(Mark Landler and Jane Perlez, “Pence Talks Tough on North Korea, but U.S. Stops Short of Drawing Red Line,” New York Times, April 18, 2017,
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo emphasized that diplomatic efforts to defuse rising tensions over North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are necessary, despite the latest military muscle-flexing by Pyongyang. “Needless to say, it’s important to maintain peace through diplomatic efforts,” Abe told a Lower House session of the Diet. “At the same time, dialogue for the sake of dialogue would be meaningless. We need to put pressure on North Korea so that it will seriously respond to calls for dialogue,” Abe said. At the Diet session, Abe also said Tokyo has already conducted studies on how to deal with possible refugees in the event of a major armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. “We assume we would take a series of actions, including processes to admit landing, set up and manage accommodations, and screen (refugees) to decide whether we should protect them or not,” Abe said. Japanese officials have long feared a massive influx of refugees to Japan should ever a second Korean war break out on the peninsula. Since the 1990s, Tokyo has conducted studies and simulations on how to deal with refugees while also evacuating numerous Japanese nationals from South Korea. “The government is responsible for protecting and rescuing Japanese citizens if they face crises overseas,” Abe said. On April 27, the prime minister is scheduled to visit Russia to meet that country’s leader, Vladimir Putin. Abe said he will urge Moscow to “play a constructive role” in helping to defuse the ongoing crisis on the Korean Peninsula. (Yoshida Reiji, “Abe Urges Diplomatic Tack on North Korea, But Rules out ‘Dialogue for Dialogue’s Sake,” Japan Times, April 17, 2017)
South Korean prosecutors indicted jailed former President Park Geun-hye as they wrapped up a six-month probe into the corruption and influence-peddling scandal that brought her down last month. Park has been charged with bribery, abuse of power, coercion and leaking government secrets in 18 suspected crimes, mostly involving her long-time friend Choi Soon-sil and former key aides. Park became the country’s third former president to stand trial over corruption allegations, after Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo. In the indictment, the prosecutors accused Park of taking and soliciting bribes worth 59.2 billion won ($52 million) from three conglomerates — Samsung, Lotte and SK — for herself or her friend. If convicted, she could face a prison term ranging from 10 years to life. (Yonhap, “Ex-President Park Guen-hye Indicted in Corruption Probe,” April 17, 2017)
4/18/17:
When China’s best-known historian of the Korean War, Shen Zhihua, recently laid out his views on North Korea, astonishment rippled through the audience. China, he said with a bluntness that is rare here, had fundamentally botched its policy on the divided Korean Peninsula. China should abandon the stale myths of fraternity that have propped up its support for North Korea and turn to South Korea, Mr. Shen said at a university lecture last month in Dalian. “Judging by the current situation, North Korea is China’s latent enemy and South Korea could be China’s friend,” Shen said, according to a transcript he published online. “We must see clearly that China and North Korea are no longer brothers in arms, and in the short term there’s no possibility of an improvement in Chinese-North Korean relations.” Shen has gone much further than other scholars in calling for a reset. “The fundamental interests of China and North Korea are at odds,” he said in his lecture. “China’s fundamental interest lies in achieving a stability on its borders and developing outward. But since North Korea acquired nuclear weapons, that periphery has never been stable, so inevitably Chinese and North Korean interests are at odds.” He derided China’s opposition to the THAAD antimissile system as shrill and self-defeating, needlessly alienating South Korean opinion. “What we’ve done is exactly what the Americans and North Koreans would like to see,” he said. Shen’s views have incensed Chinese ultranationalists, who have accused him of selling out the country’s ally in Pyongyang. His views and the debate about them have not been reported in Chinese state news media. But Shen’s speech remains on the website of the Cold War history research center at East China Normal University in Shanghai, where he works. He has also restated his views at lectures in Shanghai and, last week, in Xi’an in northwest China, he said. In the past, articles in China critical of North Korea have been quickly censored. Shen said the tolerance — so far — for his views suggested that the government might be willing to tolerate greater criticism of North Korea and debate about the relationship. “Many people have asked me, ‘Teacher Shen, why hasn’t your speech been taken down?’” Shen said in a telephone interview from Shanghai. “At least it shows that there can be different views about the North Korea issue. It’s up to the center to set policy, but at least you can air different views in public, whereas before you couldn’t,” he said. The “center” refers to China’s central leadership. Shen acknowledged that shifting direction on North Korea would carry risks. If political cooperation between Beijing and Washington fails to constrain North Korea, he said, the two governments should cooperate in a military response. “If North Korea really does master nuclear weapons and their delivery, then the whole world will have to prostrate itself at the feet of North Korea,” he said in the interview. “The longer this drags out, the better it is for North Korea.” In South Korea yesterday, Vice President Pence held out the possibility of opening talks with the North Koreans, noting that Washington was seeking security “through peaceable means, through negotiations.” His office added that any talks would include Japan, South Korea, other allies in the region and China. (Chris Buckley, “Chinese Historian Bluntly Criticizes Beijing’s Policy on North Korea,” New York Times, April 19, 2017, p. A-11)
North Korea will continue to test missiles despite international condemnation and growing military tensions with the U.S. Vice-Foreign Minister Han Song-ryol told the BBC’s John Sudworth. “We’ll be conducting more missile tests on a weekly, monthly and yearly basis,” He said that an “all-out war” would result if the US took military action. Han told the BBC: “If the US is planning a military attack against us, we will react with a nuclear preemptive strike by our own style and method.” Han told the BBC that North Korea believed its nuclear weapons “protect” it from the threat of US military action. “If the US is reckless enough to use military means it would mean from that very day, an all-out war,” he said. (BBC, “North Korea ‘Will Test Missiles Weekly,’ Senior Official Tells BBC,” April 18, 2017) North Korea’s deputy UN representative Kim In-ryong held a press conference in New York, accusing Washington of turning the Korean Peninsula into “the world’s biggest hot spot” and “pushing the situation to the brink of war.”
“If the US dares opt for a military action, (North Korea) is ready to react to any mode of war desired by the US,” he said. “It has created a dangerous situation in which thermonuclear war may break out at any moment on the peninsula and poses a serious threat to world peace and security.” Kim said the Trump administration’s re-dispatch of the Carl Vinson nuclear carrier strike group toward the peninsula once again “proves the US’ reckless moves for invading the DPRK (North Korea) have reached a serious phase of its scenario.” “The prevailing grave situation proves once again that the DPRK was entirely just when it increased in every way its military capabilities for self-defense and pre-emptive attack with a nuclear force as a pivot.” In Pyongyang, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Han Song-ryol said despite the outside world’s censures, the country will continue to conduct more tests “on a weekly, monthly and yearly basis according to our own schedule.” “If the US goes on with their reckless option of using military means then that would mean from that very day, an all-out war,” he said in an interview with broadcaster BBC in Pyongyang. “If the US encroaches upon our sovereignty then it will provoke our immediate counter-reaction, and if it is planning a military attack against us, we will react with a nuclear pre-emptive strike by our own style and method.” The weapons are needed to protect the government and system, Han said, noting the country has learned the “lesson” from Libya and Syria where “people are suffering from great misfortune” due to US-led attempts at regime change. “If the balance of power is not there, then the outbreak of war is imminent and unavoidable,” he said. “If one side has nukes and the other side doesn’t, and they’re on bad terms, war will inevitably break out.” (Shin Hyon-hee, “After U.S. Warning, N.K. Responds with Threats,” Korea Herald, April 18, 2017)
Just over a week ago, the White House declared that ordering an American aircraft carrier into the Sea of Japan would send a powerful deterrent signal to North Korea and give President Trump more options in responding to the North’s provocative behavior. “We’re sending an armada,” Mr. Trump said to Fox News April 11. The problem was that the carrier, the Carl Vinson, and the three other warships in its strike force were that very moment sailing in the opposite direction, to take part in joint exercises with the Australian Navy in the Indian Ocean, 3,500 miles southwest of the Korean Peninsula. White House officials said Tuesday that they had been relying on guidance from the Defense Department. Officials there described a glitch-ridden sequence of events, from an ill-timed announcement of the deployment by the military’s Pacific Command to a partially erroneous explanation by the defense secretary, Jim Mattis — all of which perpetuated the false narrative that a flotilla was racing toward the waters off North Korea. By the time the White House was asked about the Carl Vinson, its imminent arrival had been emblazoned on front pages across East Asia, fanning fears that Trump was considering a pre-emptive military strike. It was portrayed as further evidence of the president’s muscular style days after he ordered a missile strike on Syria that came while he and President Xi Jinping of China chatted over dessert during a meeting in Florida. With Trump himself playing up the show of force, Pentagon officials said, rolling back the story became difficult. The story of the wayward carrier might never have come to light had the Navy not posted a photo online April 17 of the Carl Vinson sailing south through the Sunda Strait, which separates the Indonesian islands of Java and Sumatra. It was taken on Saturday, four days after the White House press secretary, Sean Spicer, described its mission in the Sea of Japan. Now, the Carl Vinson is finally on a course for the Korean Peninsula, expected to arrive in the region next week, according to Defense Department officials. White House officials declined to comment on the confusion, referring questions to the Pentagon. “Sean discussed it once when asked, and it was all about process,” a spokesman, Michael Short, said of Spicer. Privately, however, other officials expressed bewilderment that the Pentagon did not correct its timeline, particularly given the tensions in the region and the fact that Spicer, as well as the national security adviser, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, were publicly answering questions about it. “The ship is now moving north to the Western Pacific,” the Pentagon’s chief spokeswoman, Dana White, said Tuesday. “This should have been communicated more clearly at the time.” The miscues began on April 9 when the public affairs office of the Navy’s Third Fleet issued a news release saying that Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., the Pacific commander, had ordered the Carl Vinson, a Nimitz-class nuclear-powered carrier, and its strike force — two destroyers and one cruiser — to leave Singapore and sail to the Western Pacific. As is customary, the Navy did not say exactly where the carrier force was headed or its precise mission. Given the timing, it hardly needed to: Trump had just wrapped up a two-day summit meeting with Xi at his Palm Beach club, Mar-a-Lago, with a message that the United States had run out of patience with North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong-un, and its nuclear and missile programs. On April 16 General McMaster told Fox News that the deployment was a “prudent” move, designed to give the president “a full range of options to remove” the threat posed by Kim. What the Navy did not say was that the Carl Vinson had to carry out another mission before it set sail north: a long-scheduled joint exercise with the Australian Navy in the Indian Ocean. South Korean and Japanese news media, as well as the New York Times, reported Admiral Harris’s order as evidence that the crisis was intensifying. While an aircraft carrier is not the weapon of choice for a strike on North Korea — such an operation would more likely involve long-range bombers and cruise missiles — it sends a vivid message of military might. In July 2010, President Barack Obama ordered the aircraft carrier George Washington to the Sea of Japan to intimidate the North after it had torpedoed a South Korean Navy corvette, killing 46 sailors. When his defense secretary, Robert M. Gates, asked him to reroute the carrier to the Yellow Sea, to send an additional message to Beijing, Obama resisted. “I don’t call audibles with aircraft carriers,” he said, using a football metaphor to reject the midcourse correction. By all accounts, Trump is less worried than Obama about making such calls on the fly. His aides have praised this unpredictability as a virtue in dealing with rogue leaders in North Korea and Syria. In South Korea, though, fears of a full-blown war erupted. The government rushed to reassure the public that the Carl Vinson was coming only to deter North Korean provocations. April 15 is the birthday of Kim Il-sung, the nation’s founder and the grandfather of Kim Jong-un — an occasion the North typically uses to conduct celebratory weapons tests. On April 11, Trump stoked the fears of military action with an early-morning Twitter post: “North Korea is looking for trouble. If China decides to help, that would be great. If not, we will solve the problem without them! U.S.A.” Later that day, Mr. Spicer was asked by a reporter, who assumed the Carl Vinson was on its way north, why the United States had decided to dispatch the carrier group to the Sea of Japan. “A carrier group is several things,” Spicer replied. “The forward deployment is deterrence, presence.” He added, “I think when you see a carrier group steaming into an area like that, the forward presence of that is clearly, through almost every instance, a huge deterrence.” Spicer did not point out that the Carl Vinson was not, in fact, steaming into the area and would not be for 14 more days. A senior administration official said the press secretary was using talking points supplied by the Pentagon. He was discussing the rationale for sending a carrier, this official said, not confirming the ship’s schedule. An hour after Spicer left the podium, Mattis, the defense secretary, reinforced the perception of ships racing to the scene. Speaking at the Pentagon, he said the Navy disclosed the Carl Vinson’s itinerary in advance because the exercise with the Australians had been canceled. “We had to explain why she wasn’t in that exercise,” he said. Mattis, however, had conflated two things: Admiral Harris had canceled only a port call for the Carl Vinson in Fremantle, Australia, according to Pentagon officials, because he feared that images of sailors on shore leave would be unseemly at a time when North Korea was firing missiles. Navy officials said Harris never meant to suggest he was canceling the naval exercise. Organizing such exercises is a complicated effort that takes months. One official described it as a high-end exercise, raising the possibility that the two navies practiced scenarios to counter China, or tested new missile defenses or cyber operations. Some officials expressed irritation with Harris, saying he did not think through the consequences of announcing the deployment of an aircraft carrier during a period of high tension. Mattis sent mixed signals about the mission. He stressed the need for the Navy to operate freely in the Pacific but added, “There’s not a specific demand signal or specific reason why we’re sending her up there.” After a week of war drums, fueled by the reports of the oncoming armada, tensions subsided when the weekend passed with only a military parade in Pyongyang and a failed missile test. (Mark Landler and Eric Schmitt, “Aircraft Carrier Was Not Heading Where U.S. Said,” New York Times, April 19, 2017,
Analysts who examine satellite images of North Korea reported that they had spotted some unexpected activity at the country’s nuclear test site: active volleyball games in three separate areas. The surprising images were taken on April 16 as tensions between the United States and North Korea seemed to spike. The Korean Peninsula pulsed with news that the North was preparing for its sixth atomic detonation and that American warships had been ordered into the Sea of Japan as a deterrent, even though the ships turned out to have sailed in the opposite direction. The volleyball games, played in the middle of that international crisis, were probably intended to send a message, analysts said, as the North Koreans are aware that the nuclear test site is under intense scrutiny. But what meaning the North wanted the games to convey is unclear. “It suggests that the facility might be going into a standby mode,” Joseph Bermudez told reporters on a conference call organized by 38 North, a research institute at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. “It also suggests that these volleyball games are being conducted with the North Koreans knowing that we’ll be looking and reporting on it.” Bermudez, a veteran North Korean analyst, emphasized the ambiguity of North Korean intentions. “They’re either sending us a message that they’ve put the facility on standby, or they’re trying to deceive us,” he said. “We really don’t know.” (William J. Broad, “North Korea Sends Signal At Test Site: Men at Play,” New York Times, April 20, 2017,
4/19/17:
As tensions mounted on the Korean Peninsula this month, the U.S. military made a dramatic announcement: An aircraft carrier had been ordered to sail north from Singapore toward the Western Pacific, apparently closing in on North Korea and its growing nuclear arsenal. But the ship that some officials portrayed as a sign of a stepped-up U.S. response to threats was in fact, at the moment that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un mounted a defiant show of military force last weekend, thousands of miles away from the Korean Peninsula, operating in the Indian Ocean. Officials’ nebulous — if not seemingly misleading — statements about the whereabouts of the USS Carl Vinson come as the Trump administration attempts to deliver a dual message on one of its most thorny foreign problems: at once illustrating a willingness to employ force against a dangerous adversary while also steering clear of steps that could spiral out of control. A series of binary, sometimes conflicting comments delivered by top officials in the past week highlight the Trump administration’s hope that hardline rhetoric will have a deterrent effect and, more fundamentally, the lack of attractive options it faces on North Korea. While officials are eager to signal a break from previous U.S. policy, their strategy appears to be a continuation of the Obama administration’s attempt to use international economic and diplomatic pressure to force results in Pyongyang. “The Trump administration, having looked at the options, is speaking out of both sides of its mouth, which if done deliberately is good policy,” said Patrick Cronin, an Asia expert at the Center for a New American Security. “The idea is that we have the means of striking back, we’re certainly going to protect our allies . . . but we’re not going to make the mistake of starting a war,” he said. Standing at the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas this week, Vice President Pence issued his latest warning to North Korea. “The patience of the United States and our allies in this region has run out, and we want to see change,” he said. But even as they highlight Trump’s willingness to use force in new ways in Syria and elsewhere, Pence and other officials have also expressed a preference for a negotiated disarmament for North Korea. “Our hope is that we’ll be able . . . to achieve this objective through peaceable means,” the vice president said, adding that he hoped for a resumption of negotiations. The double-barreled comments from Pence, like those from national security adviser H.R. McMaster and other senior officials, also indicate the importance that China, which Trump hopes will play an instrumental role in persuading Kim to abandon his nuclear plans, holds in the administration’s strategy. Analysts said the White House is betting that its tough talk will convince Chinese President Xi Jinping that Trump is willing to use force to shatter the long standoff with Pyongyang, prompting Beijing to use the weight of its trade ties with North Korea to help avoid a huge conflict on its border. Trump himself has issued repeated warnings to North Korea on Twitter, calling on China for help but promising to act unilaterally if need be. “I have great confidence that China will properly deal with North Korea,” Trump tweeted on April 13. “If they are unable to do so, the U.S., with its allies, will!” Bruce Klingner, a scholar at the Heritage Foundation, said such statements appeared to be out of sync with the Trump administration’s preferred course. “It’s a message at a much higher volume and intensity than would seem warranted, if the focus is going to be on stronger sanctions” and a renewed diplomatic process, he said. The use of bellicose rhetoric, even when paired with messages of continuity, could bring unanticipated results. Already, North Korea has ratcheted up its rhetoric against the United States, threatening its own preemptive strike. Rodong Sinmun declared this week that North Korea would use nuclear arms to “obliterate” the United States if it made a move suggesting a first use of military action. Perhaps with that in mind, officials at the Pentagon and State Department have attempted to ratchet down speculation about potential conflict. Some of that was fueled last week ahead of a major North Korean anniversary by news of the carrier strike group’s deployment and media reports suggesting a preemptive U.S. attack might be in the works. While they have drawn up a range of actions that the United States might want to take in the event of a provocative move by North Korea — such as a nuclear test or strike on its southern neighbor — the officials indicate their hope is that diplomacy will prevail. Those options probably include stepped-up cyber and electronic activity, which would be more easily denied and less likely to trigger a North Korean response. “Diplomacy is only effective if it’s backed up by credible options,” said a defense official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss administration deliberations. Officials at the State Department have signaled that a resolution to the standoff could be well off in the future. “I think there’s not going to be an answer tomorrow or the day after that. It’s going to take more time,” Susan A. Thornton, acting assistant secretary for East Asia and Pacific affairs, told reporters this week. “Our preference is to put pressure on the North Korean regime so that they will undertake to cease this threatening behavior and roll back their illegal programs,” she said. It is not clear what effect the news that the Carl Vinson has been thousands of miles away in the Indian Ocean, rather than bearing down on the Korean Peninsula, will have in Pyongyang. While the belief that the Carl Vinson was heading toward Korea was reported as fact by media outlets around the world — Trump last week said he was “sending an armada, very powerful” — there were hints it was perhaps not steaming there as fast as many supposed. On April 11, U.S. Naval Institute News reported that although the carrier had canceled port calls in Australia, it had not scrubbed training events to move faster toward the Korean Peninsula and would still take more than a week to enter waters near Korea — a point that was lost amid heated talk of “war.”
Other photographs released by the Navy showed the Carl Vinson in the South China Sea from April 12 to 14. In any case, the carrier strike force appears to be finally steaming in that direction now. A spokesman for the U.S. military’s Pacific Command said the carrier strike group is “heading north to the Western Pacific as a prudent measure.” The spokesman did not provide a comment about why confusion about the ship’s location persisted, even as Trump and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis appeared to confirm last week it was heading in that direction. (Missy Ryan, Simon Denyer and Emily Rauhala, “U.S. Tough Talk Belies Its Focus on Diplomacy to Contain Kim,” Washington Post, April 19, 2017) In early April, officials at U.S. Pacific Command were developing plans to respond to a sharp rise in tensions with North Korea. Defense Secretary James Mattis ordered PACOM Commander Adm. Harry Harris to come up with “robust and sustainable” options for North Korea if President Trump ordered a strike on the rogue regime, according to four defense officials who spoke on background. Harris was traveling in Washington away from his Hawaii base of operations, something that he dislikes because, in his view, something always seems to happen when he’s not in his office. At one point that week, top PACOM officials called Harris to recommend that Vinson cancel its upcoming trip to Australia and make its way back to the waters near North Korea where the carrier had just been in March, thus serving as one of the responses to Mattis’s directive that they explore military options for the Trump administration. The plan was to truncate a secretive exercise with the Australians near Indonesia, to cancel Vinson’s visit to Perth and then head the direction of the Korean Peninsula — meaning Vinson would be off North Korea by the end of the month. Changing an aircraft carrier’s schedule is not a small muscle movement. Host nations expecting a visit from the mighty U.S. big decks have to do a fair amount of leg work to prepare for the visit. Furthermore, a good number of sailors had family flying out to Australia to meet their sailors. An Australia port visit is the holy grail for sailors on a Western Pacific deployment. The easiest thing to do, PACOM officials decided, would be send out a press release announcing the canceled port visit — making it easier for families to get their money back from airlines and letting all parties know why the Vinson wouldn’t be visiting the Land Down Under. And it would have another effect: it would put North Korea on notice by announcing the plans in a press release, which included language that not-so-subtly dropped that Harris had “directed the Carl Vinson Strike Group to sail north and report on station in the western Pacific Ocean after departing Singapore April, 8,” roughly the direction North Korea lies from Singapore. A press release, PACOM officials thought, was the perfect solution to wrap up all the loose ends from the carrier’s schedule change. Sending the release with the thinly veiled language would be a message to North Korea and nervous allies alike: The Navy’s big guns were on the way so behave accordingly. “A press release was really the only option,” one official said. This behind-the-scenes account is based on interviews with nearly a dozen defense officials in Washington, and in the Pacific, all of whom spoke to Navy Times on the condition of anonymity to relay in candid terms how the carrier’s movement blew up from a routine Navy operation to a full-on crisis. The war drums began beating on April 8, the day a press release came out from U.S. 3rd Fleet announcing the carrier’s move. U.S. 3rd Fleet has operational control of Vinson during its tour of the Pacific. But two hours before the 3rd Fleet’s press statement hit the streets, Reuters news agency published a story that said the Vinson Strike Group, which was visiting Singapore at the time, would proceed from there to the waters off North Korea to send a message to the rogue Korean regime, which is poised to detonate the country’s sixth nuclear bomb test. (David B. Larter, “Carried Away: The Inside Story of How the Carl Vinson’s Cancelled Port Visit Sparked a Global Crisis,” Defense News, April 23, 2017)
When Vice President Pence spoke at the Korean demilitarized zone on April 17, he said that the United States sought to solve the North Korean crisis “through peaceable means and negotiations,” after increasing pressure on the Pyongyang regime. But in an interview with me on Wednesday afternoon, he adopted a harder line: The Trump administration, he said, demands that North Korea abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs without any promise of direct negotiations with the United States. If the United States is unwilling to negotiate with North Korea, and the regime is unwilling to abandon its nuclear and missile programs based on pressure alone, the prospect of the United States using military action to prevent North Korea from developing the capability to strike the continental United States becomes more likely. Also, the Trump administration could open a gap with its key allies as well as China, who all anticipate an eventual return to something akin to the previous multilateral negotiations with Pyongyang. “I think the path of negotiations with North Korea has been a colossal failure now for more than 25 years,” Pence told me. “We believe that through discussions and negotiations among nations apart from North Korea that we may well be able to bring the kind of economic and diplomatic pressure that would result in North Korea finally abandoning its nuclear ambitions and its ballistic missile program.”
He pointed to North Korea’s violations of the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiated by the Clinton administration and the violations of the 2005 denuclearization agreement negotiated by the administration of George W. Bush. “All of those negotiations and discussions failed, miserably,” Pence said. “The time has come for us to take a fresh approach. And the approach President Trump has taken is not engagement with North Korea but renewed and more vigorous engagement with North Korea’s principle economic partner [China].” Pence acknowledged that if North Korea doesn’t abandon its programs on its own, and the United States is unwilling to negotiate with the regime, military action against the regime may be necessary. “When the president says all options are on the table, all options are on the table,” said Pence. “We’re trying to make it very clear to people in this part of the world that we are going to achieve the end of a denuclearization of the Korean peninsula — one way or the other.” (Josh Rogin, “Pence: The United States Is Not Seeking Negotiations with North Korea,” Washington Post, April 19, 2017)
4/20/17:
Trump told a news conference “some very unusual moves have been made over the last two or three hours”, and that he was confident Chinese President Xi Jinping would “try very hard” to pressure North Korea over its nuclear and missile programs. Trump gave no indication of what the moves might be. None of the U.S. officials who told Reuters about the heightened level of activity by Chinese bombers suggested alarm or signaled that they knew the precise reason for such activity. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang referred questions about the air force to the Defense Ministry, which has yet to publicly comment. Asked about Trump’s comment about Xi trying hard, Lu said Xi and Trump had had a full and deep discussion about North Korea when they met this month. “I can only say that via deep communications between China and the U.S. at various levels including at the highest levels, the U.S. now has an even fuller and more correct understanding of China’s policy and position and has a more rounded understanding of China’s efforts. We feel very gratified about this.” China Daily said there was optimism about persuading the North to end its pursuit of a nuclear program without the use of force, “now that even the once tough-talking Donald Trump is onboard for a peaceful solution.” “Beijing has demonstrated due enthusiasm for Washington’s newfound interest in a diplomatic solution and willingness to work more closely with it.” In Russia’s Ear East, some media have cited residents as saying they have seen military hardware being moved toward North Korea but Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said deployment of Russian troops inside Russia were not a public matter. (Ju-min Park and Ben Blanchard, “South Korea on High Alert as North Readies Army Celebration,” Reuters, April 21, 2017) President Trump said “some very unusual moves” have been made by China over the past several hours, adding that he was confident Chinese President Xi Jinping would try to pressure North Korea over its nuclear and missile program. “I can say that all of the pundits out there are saying they’ve never seen China work like they’re working right now,” Trump said in a joint press conference with Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni at the White House. He added, “Some very unusual moves have been made over the last two or three hours,” without elaborating. “And I really have confidence that the president will try very hard,” in reference to the Chinese leader. His remarks came after a report was released about China preparing military aircraft and bombers for potential contingencies in North Korea, amid heightened military tension on the Korean Peninsula. “I actually told him,” said Trump, “You’ll make a much better deal on trade, if you get rid of this menace, or do something about this menace of North Korea.” Trump also said, “As far as North Korea is concerned, we are in very good shape. We’re building our military rapidly.” The U.S. and South Korean militaries have been holding their large-scale annual Max Thunder exercises over the past two weeks, involving some 100 fighters and reconnaissance planes, including South Korea’s F-15K and KF-16 jets and U.S. F-16s and U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. The biannual aerial exercise from an air base in Gunsan, North Jeolla, involved a simulation-based precision strike drill, honing in readiness against enemies and coordination in case of emergency.
A South Korean intelligence source said Friday that there has not been any unusual movement by North Korea overnight. (Sarah Kim, “Trump Suggests China May Stand up to North,” JoongAng Ilbo, April 22, 2017)After U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said the United States was looking at ways to bring pressure to bear on North Korea over its nuclear program yesterday, Rodong Sinmun did not mince its words. “In the case of our super-mighty preemptive strike being launched, it will completely and immediately wipe out not only U.S. imperialists’ invasion forces in South Korea and its surrounding areas but the U.S. mainland and reduce them to ashes,” it said. Tillerson told reporters in Washington that the United States was “reviewing all the status of North Korea, both in terms of state sponsorship of terrorism as well as the other ways in which we can bring pressure on the regime in Pyongyang.” House of Representatives Speaker Paul Ryan said during a visit to London the military option must be part of the pressure brought to bear. “Allowing this dictator to have that kind of power is not something that civilized nations can allow to happen,” he said in reference to Kim. Ryan said he was encouraged by the results of efforts to work with China to reduce tension, but that it was unacceptable North Korea might be able to strike allies with nuclear weapons. South Korea’s acting president, Hwang Kyo-ahn, at a meeting with top officials repeatedly called for the military and security ministries to maintain vigilance. The defense ministry said U.S. and South Korean air forces were conducting an annual training exercise, codenamed Max Thunder, until April 28. North Korea routinely labels such exercises preparations for invasion. “We are conducting a practical and more intensive exercise than ever,” South Korean pilot Colonel Lee Bum-chul told reporters. “Through this exercise, I am sure we can deter war and remove our enemy’s intention to provoke us.” South Korean presidential candidates clashed on Wednesday night in a debate over the planned deployment in South Korea of a U.S.-supplied Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system, which has angered China. The United States and Russia clashed at the United Nations yesterday over a U.S.-drafted Security Council statement to condemn North Korea’s latest failed ballistic missile test. Diplomats said China had agreed to the statement. Such statements by the 15-member council have to be agreed by consensus. Previous statements denouncing missile launches “welcomed efforts by council members, as well as other states, to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue.” The latest draft statement dropped “through dialogue” and Russia requested it be included again. “When we requested to restore the agreed language that was of political importance and expressed commitment to continue to work on the draft … the U.S. delegation without providing any explanations cancelled the work on the draft,” the Russian U.N. mission said in a statement. The United States said it had cut the words because they “would overly narrow the means by which the international community could arrive at a peaceful and comprehensive solution to the North Korean nuclear problem,” the United States told council members, according to diplomats. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang said China believed in the Security Council maintaining unity. “Speaking with one voice is extremely important to the Security Council appropriately responding to the relevant issue on the peninsula,” he told reporters. (Ju-min Park, “North Korea Warns of ‘Super-Mighty Preemptive Strike’ As U.S. Plans Next Move,” Reuters, April 20, 2017)
China has put bombers on “high alert” in preparation for a potential contingency in neighboring North Korea, a US defense official was quoted as saying. CNN cited the unidentified official as saying that Chinese air force land-attack, cruise-missile-capable bombers were put “on high alert” yesterday. The official also said that the U.S. has seen an extraordinary number of Chinese military aircraft being brought up to full readiness through intensified maintenance as part of an effort to “reduce the time to react to a North Korea contingency.” (Yonhap, “China Puts Bombers on ‘High Alert’ to Prepare for N.K. Contingency: CNN,” Korea Herald, April 21, 2017)
When news broke less than two weeks ago that the Trump administration was sending the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson to the Korean Peninsula, many South Koreans feared a war with North Korea. Others cheered for Washington, calling the deployment a powerful symbol of its commitment to deterring the North. Yesterday, after it was revealed that the carrier strike group was actually thousands of miles away and had been heading in the opposite direction, toward the Indian Ocean, South Koreans felt bewildered, cheated and manipulated by the United States, their country’s most important ally. “Trump’s lie over the Carl Vinson,” read a headline on the website of JoongAng Ilbo. “Xi Jinping and Putin must have had a good jeer over this one.” “Like North Korea, which is often accused of displaying fake missiles during military parades, is the United States, too, now employing ‘bluffing’ as its North Korea policy?” the article asked. The episode raised questions about whether major allies of the United States, like South Korea and Japan, had been informed of the carrier’s whereabouts, and whether the misinformation undercut America’s strategy to contain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions by using empty threats. Compounding their anger over the Carl Vinson episode, many South Koreans were also riled at Trump for his assertion in a Wall Street Journal interview last week that the Korean Peninsula “used to be a part of China.” Although Korea was often invaded by China and forced to pay tributes to its giant neighbor, many Koreans say the notion that they were once Chinese subjects is egregiously insulting. “The 50 million South Koreans, as well as many common-sensical people around the world, cannot help but feel embarrassed and shocked,” said Youn Kwan-suk, spokesman of the main opposition Democratic Party, which is leading in voter surveys before the May 9 presidential election. Critics accused the ministry of fanning jitters among South Koreans before the May 9 election, in which North Korea’s behavior has been a central issue — as have Seoul’s close military ties to Washington. “There is no way for South Korea not to have known that the Carl Vinson would not be in Korean waters last Saturday,” said Kim Dong-yub, a former navy officer and defense analyst at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University in Seoul. “Still, they kept mum, doing nothing to ease the anxiety when security was a key election issue.” Kim added: “What they did was nothing short of trying to influence the election. The whole episode is a reminder of how fettered South Korea remains to its alliance with the United States.” Shin In-kyun, a military expert who runs the civic group Korea Defense Network, said that Trump appeared to have used the Carl Vinson as a feint aimed at preventing North Korea from conducting a nuclear test. “It would have been very awkward for the South Korean military to come out and clarify when they knew that Trump was bluffing,” Shin said. “The bluffing worked, in fact. North Korea didn’t do a nuclear test last Saturday.” Coupled with Trump’s order to strike a Syrian air base with dozens of missiles, and repeated warnings from his senior aides that “military options” were not off the table in dealing with North Korea, news that the Carl Vinson was rushing back to Korean waters stirred anxiety in South Korea. The fear was that if North Korea were to conduct a nuclear or long-range missile test on April 15 to commemorate the 105th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung, the North’s founding president and the grandfather of Kim Jong-un, the Carl Vinson would be in Korean waters by then to launch a pre-emptive strike. North Korea, never one to be outdone in tough talk, accused the United States of bringing war to Korea and vowed to respond with nuclear attacks on American military bases in South Korea and Japan. This week, it unveiled a video depicting its missiles engulfing an American city in flames, shown as a backdrop for the Kim Il-sung celebration. In South Korea, all major candidates for the presidential election issued statements warning that a preemptive American strike would set off a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula. They intensified their bickering over who was best suited to keep the peace on the peninsula. Kim Ky-baek, who runs the nationalist South Korean website Minjokcorea, expressed fear that the Carl Vinson episode would damage Mr. Trump’s credibility among South Koreans. “Trump may say this was part of his smoke-screen tactic,” he said. “But the impression we get is that the Trump administration still doesn’t know what it is really trying to do with North Korea, and has no clear and efficient line of communication.” “Whatever the case, whether it was deliberate misinformation or a miscommunication between the Pentagon and the White House, it’s quite serious,” said Michishita Narushige, a specialist in international security at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. “It undermines the credibility of U.S. leadership.” The Carl Vinson is now actually headed to the Korean Peninsula and is expected to arrive in the region next week, Pentagon officials say. April 25 is another major anniversary in North Korea, the birthday of the Korean People’s Army, and some analysts say the North might try to celebrate with a major provocation. In a Facebook post yesterday, Rear Adm. James W. Kilby, commander of the Carl Vinson carrier strike group, said its deployment “has been extended 30 days to provide a persistent presence in the waters off the Korean Peninsula.” (Choe Sang-hun, “South Koreans Perplexed by U.S. Strategy,” New York Times, April 20, 2017)
UN Security Council: “The members of the Security Council strongly condemned the most recent ballistic missile launch conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 15 April 2017. The members of the Security Council expressed their utmost concern over the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s highly destabilizing behavior and flagrant and provocative defiance of the Security Council by conducting this ballistic missile launch in violation of its international obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), and 2321 (2016). The members of the Security Council demanded that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall immediately cease further actions in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and comply fully with its obligations under these resolutions. The members of the Security Council agreed that the Security Council would continue to closely monitor the situation and take further significant measures including sanctions, in line with the Council’s previously expressed determination. The members of the Security Council stressed that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s illegal ballistic missile activities are contributing to its development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and are greatly increasing tension in the region and beyond. The members of the Security Council further regretted that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is diverting resources to the pursuit of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons while Democratic People’s Republic of Korea citizens have great unmet needs. The members of the Security Council emphasized the vital importance of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea immediately showing sincere commitment to denuclearization and stressed the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond. To that end, the Security Council demanded the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea conduct no further nuclear tests. The members of the Security Council strongly urged all Member States to significantly accelerate their efforts to implement fully the measures imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by the Security Council, particularly the comprehensive measures contained in resolutions 2321 (2016) and 2270 (2016). The members of the Security Council reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia at large, expressed their commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation, and welcomed efforts by Council members, as well as other States, to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue.” (U.N. Spokesperson, Security Council press statement on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Ballistic Missile Launch, April 20, 2017)
4/21/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s statement: “The situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the region has reached an extremely dangerous phase due to the mad-cap nuclear war provocations of the U.S. to violate the sovereignty and vital rights of the DPRK at any cost. Recently, the authorities of the Trump Administration are spouting a load of rubbish calling for browbeating the DPRK by force of arms every day. They are crying out for settling the issue with the help of someone, seeking to bring nuclear aircraft carrier strike groups one after another to the waters off the Korean Peninsula. Such intimidation and blackmail can never frighten the DPRK. The invincible revolutionary Paektusan army, closely following the maneuvers of the U.S., is waiting for an order only after rounding off its full preparedness to counter them immediately. It is an unshakable will of the DPRK to go to the end if the U.S. wants to remain unchanged in its confrontational stance. The army of the DPRK has already clarified that its heaviest counteractions include a sudden preemptive attack involving maneuvers on the ground, in seas, under waters and in the air and various other methods and the Korean-style tough counter-actions will be promptly taken to cope with the provocations of any forms and levels from the U.S. The world will clearly witness this time the fact that gone are the days never to return when the U.S. forced its will upon other countries. The DPRK, a peace-loving socialist state, is setting great store by peace. But it neither fears a war nor wants to avoid it. The DPRK is a nuclear power capable of countering any option and means of the U.S. and will not avoid any option made by it. As the DPRK had access to a powerful nuclear deterrent to protect itself from the U.S. nuclear threat, the DPRK will react to a total war with an all-out war, a nuclear war with nuclear strikes of its own style and surely win a victory in the death-defying struggle against the U.S. imperialists.” (KCNA, “U.S. Muscle-Flexing Can Never Browbeat DPRK: Foreign Ministry Spokesman,” April 21, 2017)
KCNA: “The following is the full text of “Are you good at dancing to the tune of others,” a commentary written by Jong Phil Friday [April 21]: Not a single word about the U.S. act of pushing the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of a war after introducing hugest-ever strategic assets into the waters off the Korean peninsula is made but such rhetoric as “necessary step” and “reaction at decisive level” is openly heard from a country around the DPRK to intimidate it over its measures for self-defense. Particularly, the country is talking rubbish that the DPRK has to reconsider the importance of relations with it and that it can help preserve security of the DPRK and offer necessary support and aid for its economic prosperity, claiming the latter will not be able to survive the strict “economic sanctions” by someone. Its official media claimed on April 18 that the DPRK’s pursuance of nuclear and missile program made the U.S., which had been its rival in the past, its supporter now. Then question is what the DPRK should call that country and how the DPRK should deal with it in the future. The DPRK’s nuclear deterrence for self-defense, its army and people built by tightening their belts to defend the sovereignty and right to existence of the nation, is by no means a bargaining chip for getting something. The DPRK has been so far exposed to economic sanctions but it has kept to the path of justice chosen by it with its own efforts. The present world ruled by the jungle law makes the DPRK realize once again the iron truth that there is nothing but its own strength to rely on and that self-reliance and self-development are the only way out. If the country keeps applying economic sanctions on the DPRK while dancing to the tune of someone after misjudging the will of the DPRK, it may be applauded by the enemies of the DPRK but it should get itself ready to face the catastrophic consequences in the relations with the DPRK. The DPRK will defend its dignity and build a paradise for the people with its own efforts, rallied close around the respected Supreme Leader.” (KCNA, “Are You Good at Dancing to Tune of Others?: Jong Pil,” April 21, 2017)
John Schilling: “Cyberwarfare is only effective against cybernetic targets; North Korea makes only limited and selective use of computers, and when they do, they use custom operating systems designed with a paranoid concern for security. The North maintains a cadre of extremely skilled cyber warriors, most of whom are likely playing defense. The exploits that enable skilled adversaries to readily subvert the relatively open networks of the Western democracies will be of little use north of the DMZ. Finding the narrow vulnerabilities that may exist in North Korea’s systems, developing the tools to exploit them, and infiltrating Northern networks while remaining concealed from Pyongyang’s security services, is going to be an exceedingly tedious process. Undoubtedly, the NSA, CIA and others have been working on this for many years, but it will take them longer to tap Kim Jong Un’s phone than it did for Angela Merkel’s, and some targets will remain forever beyond reach. Ballistic missiles may be among them. A ballistic missile is literally and figuratively air-gapped to an extreme degree—that is, thoroughly insulated from any attacker. The only connection to the outside world is a hardwired connection to a secure launch control center; however, once a launch is initiated, even that narrow path is severed. Even within the missile, and particularly the 1960s-style ballistic missiles favored by North Korea, there will be very little in the way of digital electronics with programmable software. Engines, warheads and the like will probably use hardwired, analog controllers. The guidance system might also be hardwired except for the details of the trajectory to be flown. One potential vulnerability, though, is North Korea’s known use of foreign commercial electronics components in the guidance control systems of their space launch vehicles, and presumably its more advanced missiles as well. Commercial generally means insecure when it comes to electronics, so it may be possible to find or create vulnerabilities in these components, effectively hacking the missile before it is even built. That is, if we can determine exactly which components are being used, and how, and find a path to them through North Korea’s sparse and secure networks. And that’s just too many “ifs” to be at all confident of success. A successful attack, then, will likely be aimed at something other than the missile itself. Note that the highly-publicized “Stuxnet” attack did not target Iran’s (probably nonexistent) nuclear weapons, but the uranium enrichment facility that would be used to manufacture them. North Korea positively brags about its computer-controlled milling machines; these can, in principle, be hacked to produce parts that aren’t exactly what the designer intended. Ovens used to temper and anneal alloys might also be computer-controlled, and subtle changes to the temperature profile can lead to parts that are visually perfect but will fail under load. There are numerous possibilities, and while most will not be practical to exploit, perhaps some will be vulnerable. North Korea’s factories might, perhaps, be “hacked” to produce defective missiles. Another possibility would be to attack the test program. Missile trajectories can be planned by pencil-and-paper calculation, but this is sufficiently tedious and imprecise that North Korea’s engineers are almost certainly allowed foreign-built computers for this purpose. Deciphering telemetry and analyzing the results of a test is also best done by a programmable computer. If every successful test is misinterpreted as a failure, if every test that results in excessive vibration or impacts twenty miles off course is falsely reported as a success, North Korea’s engineers may be induced to develop a missile precisely calibrated to deliver damaged warheads far from their targets. There is evidence that U.S. military and intelligence agencies are hard at work trying to exploit possibilities like these; possibly South Korea and Japan have similar programs. What we do not know is how much they have accomplished. Even if they have not yet succeeded, they may well do so in the future. What might that look like? An attack on the manufacturing process will most likely result in defective components that fail even in ground testing. We would likely never know about this, except to wonder why the ground test phase is taking so long. Interestingly, North Korea’s KN-08 ICBM was first seen in mock-up form in 2012, but there was not a single successful ground test until last year. That may not be the result of a cyberattack, but it is at least what a cyberattack would look like. It would be preferable if the failures occurred in flight, and ideally late in flight, leaving the defective hardware out of reach of North Korean investigators. But this cannot be accomplished reliably—defects subtle enough to survive ground testing would cause some missiles to fail but leave others to complete their mission successfully. And, with properly realistic testing, some failures will still occur on the ground, leaving the North Korean engineers to connect the failed parts with the machines that built them. Such an attack can delay North Korea’s acquisition of advanced ballistic missiles, but will not prevent it in the long run. Attacks on the test process might be more subtle. At the gross level, it might be possible to induce test launches to veer off course and maybe break up in flight. But the ideal outcome, as alluded to earlier, would be for North Korea to believe that its missiles have passed all tests when they instead harbor some defect that will prove crippling in operation. Such a deception cannot be maintained forever; the North will eventually reach the point of highly realistic operational tests. But, while it lasts, the results will necessarily appear to us as they are made to appear to Pyongyang, as a successful test series. What we would not expect to see, from any plausible cyberattack, would be missiles exploding on the launch pad. The parts of the missile with the potential to explode, are most likely not controlled by software. And if we could somehow tailor built-in defects in the hardware that precisely, we wouldn’t want to. If the missile explodes within sight of North Korean engineers and cameras, they’ll have too many clues as to what went wrong. Similarly, while there are plausible attacks that could result in a defective guidance system or an improperly-calculated trajectory, anyone delivering such an attack would prefer the error be small enough that the missile is well out of sight before it goes visibly off course. If we are seeing North Korean missiles fail very early in flight, as has been the case in two recent incidents, we should probably be looking for something other than a cyberattack. And we don’t have to look far. Consider the Vanguard rocket, intended to be America’s first satellite launch vehicle, which on its first flight ascended four feet, fell back to the launch pad and exploded—and then exploded six more times in seven launches over the course of a year. The first Atlas ICBM reached 10,000 feet before tumbling and exploding in mid-air. The next six flights suffered four more failures, though at least some of those flew far enough that the explosions weren’t visible to the crowds of spectators. The Titan ICBM, intended as a counter to Atlas’s unreliability, destroyed the launch pad on its first two tests, succeeded on the third, and then went on to a string of downrange failures. This is literally rocket science. It is the epitome of a hard problem. And it becomes even harder when political pressure demands more than the hardware can yet deliver, then tries to wash away the embarrassment of failure by demanding an immediate retest without allowing time to investigate the original failure. We didn’t need cyberattacks to cause North Korea’s Musudan missile to fail in seven out of eight tests last year, and we don’t need cyberattacks for two conspicuous failures this year. Kim Jong Un will happily deliver those failures for us, just like we did for ourselves with Vanguard and Atlas and Titan, by imagining successful rocket tests can be conjured out of political dictates rather than tedious engineering. The young Kim’s father was generally more patient about this sort of thing. But eventually, North Korean engineers probably will get this right no matter who is calling the shots. Cyberwarfare might slow that process down and it may already be slowing that process down, without our knowing about it. If so, we shouldn’t expect it to buy us more than a few years. And any cyber warriors responsible should expect to wait decades before receiving their deserved acclaim. That’s the price for playing the long game and playing to win.” (John Schilling, “How to Hack and Not Hack a Missile,” 38North, April 21, 2017)
4/22/17:
Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula can still be achieved peacefully because of Washington’s new engagement with China, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence said. “We truly believe that, as our allies in the region and China bring that pressure to bear, there is a chance that we can achieve a historic objective of a nuclear-free Korea peninsula by peaceful means,” Pence said. “We are encouraged by the steps that China has taken so far,” he said at a joint news conference with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull in Sydney. (Roberta Rampton and Colin Packham, “Peaceful Outcome for Korean Peninsula Still Possible: Pence,” Reuters, April 22, 2017)
Pence: “For more than a generation there has been a consensus in the world community for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. In the 1990s, it was a subject of negotiations and an agreed framework was arrived at. Six-Party Talks would follow sometime later. The last administration embraced a policy of strategic patience. All along the way the regime in North Korea answered the entreaties of the world community with broken promises and with continued pursuit — headlong pursuit of their nuclear and ballistic missile ambitions. And as President Trump has made clear, and I’ve made clear as I’ve traveled on this behalf throughout the region, the era of strategic patience is over. Under the President’s leadership and working closely with our allies, with Prime Minister Turnbull, in my meetings with Prime Minister Abe, and with acting President Hwang in South Korea, and others, the United States is determined to bring economic and diplomatic pressure to bear working with all of our allies — and China — to ensure that we achieve a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. Now all options are on the table, and the United States is prepared to do what’s necessary in conjunction with our allies to see to the security of this region and of our own people. But we are hopeful — in fact, in President Trump’s words, we have great confidence that China, with the encouragement of the United States, of our allies, and we’re grateful to say with the strong encouragement of the leadership here in Australia, that China will take advantage of the unique position and relationship that it has with North Korea to bring an end to their nuclear program and to their ballistic missile programs. We call on them to do that. The President observed recently that China in a very real sense is the economic lifeline for North Korea. They’ve already taken steps, which we greatly welcome — intervening in coal shipments and intervening in commercial travel. But we believe China can do more, and on behalf of the President, I’m just very grateful that even this week, Australia has taken steps to engage with China directly and encourage them to take even more steps to bring that economic and diplomatic pressure to bear. But make no mistake about it, the United States of America is committed to seeing this way forward and achieve what’s eluded the world community for a generation. And that is to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. …Q. Mr. Vice President, the administration is ramping up pressure on North Korea at the same time you seem to have ruled out talks. I’m wondering what you think the endgame is here. What makes you believe that the regime will give up the weapons systems and weapons that it has to ensure its — are perhaps guarantee of its own survival? …Pence: This is just a very serious time. And the President sent me to this region to engage with our allies to reaffirm the alliances that we enjoy, but also to make it very, very clear that the era of strategic partnership — strategic patience is over; that the United States of America is determined to work with our allies and especially with China to achieve the objective of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. We believe that that can occur peaceably, largely owing to the new engagement of China. In this regard, I think the world is seeing President Trump’s leadership in high relief. He is in a very real sense — like the Prime Minister of Australia — he is a bottom-line person that likes to get to the point. And in his meeting with President Xi, they had a very candid conversation about a broad range of issues. But on the issue of North Korea, the President made it very clear to President Xi that we were looking to China to step up and use that unique relationship that it has with North Korea to achieve an end to the nuclear ambitions and the ballistic missile ambitions of that regime. And as I said, we’re encouraged by the steps that China has taken thus far. That being said, we also wanted to make it clear that all options are on the table, and that the United States is prepared to work with our allies to ensure the security of our allies in the region, and ensure the security of the people of the United States of America. Nuclear weapons in the hands of the regime in Pyongyang with a ballistic missile program and with the potential for intercontinental ballistic missiles represents a threat to the stability and security of this region, and potentially a threat to the continental United States. And continuing on the path the world has been on with North Korea over the last 25 years is just unacceptable. But again, we continue to be hopeful and continue to have great confidence that we can finally after a generation achieve a peaceable solution. And I want to reiterate again the gratitude of the United States of America for the strong support that our ally here in Australia has provided to this effort; even this week, meeting with high-ranking officials from China urging them to do more to bring economic and diplomatic pressure to bear on China is welcome. We truly believe that as our allies in the region and China bring that pressure to bear that there is a chance that we can achieve a historic objective of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula by peaceable means.” (Office of the Vice President, Remarks by Vice President Mike Pence and Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, Sydney, April 22, 2017)
4/23/17:
North Korea has detained a U.S. citizen, officials said Sunday, bringing to three the number of Americans now being held there. Tony Kim, who also goes by his Korean name Kim Sang-duk, was detained on Saturday, according to Park Chan-mo, the chancellor of the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology. Park said Kim, who is in his 50s, taught accounting at the university for about a month. He said Kim was detained by officials as he was trying to leave the country from Pyongyang’s international airport. The Swedish Embassy in Pyongyang said it was aware of a Korean-American citizen being detained recently, but could not comment further. Park said Kim had taught at the Yanbian University of Science and Technology in China before coming to Pyongyang. He said he was informed that the detention had “nothing to do” with Kim’s work at the university but did not know further details. Though no details on why Kim was detained have been released, the detention comes at a time of unusually heightened tensions between the U.S. and North Korea. (Eric Talmadge, “N. Korea Detains U.S. Citizen, the 3rd American Being Held There,” Associated Press, April 23, 2017)
4/24/17:
China’s president, Xi Jinping, has urged President Trump in a phone conversation this morning in Beijing to show restraint toward North Korea despite signs that the North may be preparing a nuclear test In the latest call, the third between the two leaders, Xi indicated to Trump that China opposed any such test by North Korea, but he also nudged Trump to avoid a tit-for-tat response to the North’s fiery threats, according to a report on Chinese television. “China adamantly opposes any actions in contravention of the United Nations Security Council resolutions,” Xi said, according to the report, evidently referring to a series of decisions by the council to punish North Korea for its nuclear and missile programs. “At the same time, it is hoped that all sides exercise restraint and avoid doing things that exacerbate tensions on the peninsula,” Xi said, referring to the Korean Peninsula. “Only if all sides live up to their responsibilities and come together from different directions can the nuclear issue on the peninsula be resolved as quickly as possible.” The comments reflected growing Chinese fears that the tensions between North Korea and the United States and its Asian allies could spiral into outright military conflict. That widening rift is presenting China with confounding choices between its longstanding ties to North Korea and its hopes for steady relations with the United States. KCNA responded over the weekend in a comment that warned China of “catastrophic consequences” for their relationship if economic sanctions continued, reported Yonhap. But today, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry stuck to pleas for calm from all sides when asked repeatedly about North Korea, its threats to China and the possibility of another nuclear test. “The situation on the peninsula is complicated and sensitive,” the spokesman, Geng Shuang, said when asked about a possible North Korean nuclear test. “We strongly urge all sides to stay calm and restrained, and don’t take any actions that could escalate tensions.” The South Korean Defense Ministry said today that it was also considering holding joint drills with the Carl Vinson and accompanying ships, Reuters reported. Trump also spoke with Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan this morning in Tokyo, Abe told reporters. Abe told the president that he strongly endorsed Trump’s position that all options were “on the table.” “North Korea’s nuclear and missile program is an extremely serious threat to security not only in the international community but also for our country,” Abe said. “We will continue to closely cooperate and maintain the high level of warning and surveillance. We will respond resolutely.” In their latest call, Xi told Trump, “International circumstances are changing rapidly, and it’s extremely necessary for China and the United States to maintain close contacts and promptly exchange views on major issues.” (Chris Buckley, “Xi Asks Trump to Hold off on Responding to Threats,” New York Times, April 25, 2017, p. A-10)
President Donald Trump said the U.N. Security Council must be prepared to impose new sanctions on North Korea as concerns mount that it may test a sixth nuclear bomb as early as tomorrow. “The status quo in North Korea is also unacceptable,” Trump told a meeting with the 15 U.N. Security Council ambassadors, including China and Russia, at the White House. “The council must be prepared to impose additional and stronger sanctions on North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programs.” “This is a real threat to the world, whether we want to talk about it or not. North Korea is a big world problem and it’s a problem that we have to finally solve,” he said. “People put blindfolds on for decades and now it’s time to solve the problem.” U.S. officials have told Reuters tougher sanctions could include an oil embargo, banning North Korea’s airline, intercepting cargo ships and punishing Chinese banks and other foreign doing business with Pyongyang. The State Department said U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson would chair a special ministerial meeting of the Security Council on North Korea on April 28 to discuss ways to maximize the impact of existing sanctions and show “resolve to respond to further provocations with appropriate new measures.” Tillerson and U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats and General Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will also hold a rare briefing on North Korea at the White House on April 26 for the entire U.S. Senate, Senate aides said. Administration officials routinely travel to Congress to address lawmakers but it is unusual for the entire 100-member Senate to go to such an event at the White House, and for those four top officials to be involved. The White House said Trump and German Chancellor Angela Merkel discussed the “urgent security challenge” posed by North Korea in a phone call today. In an earlier phone conversation with Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for all sides to exercise restraint, as Japan conducted exercises with a U.S. aircraft carrier strike group headed for Korean waters. Angered by the approach of the USS Carl Vinson carrier group, a defiant North Korea, which has carried out nuclear and missile tests in defiance of successive rounds of U.N. sanctions, said the deployment was “an extremely dangerous act by those who plan a nuclear war to invade.” “The United States should not run amok and should consider carefully any catastrophic consequence from its foolish military provocative act,” Rodong Sinmun said in a commentary. Two Japanese destroyers have joined the U.S. carrier group for exercises and South Korea said it was in talks about holding joint naval drills. (Steve Holland and Ben Blanchard, “Trump Calls for New Security Council Sanctions against North Korea,” Reuters, April 24, 2017) Trump’s comments come as the USS Michigan, one of US’s most powerful submarines, arrived in South Korea in an apparent show of force and senators have also been summoned to the White House to be briefed tomorrow by top officials about the threat posed by North Korea. The US president later told a reception of conservative journalists that Kim wasn’t the strong leader he likes to portray himself as. “I’m not so sure he’s so strong like he says he is, I’m not so sure at all,” Trump told the reception in comments confirmed to CNN by the White House. The flurry of activity comes as North Korea marks the 85th anniversary of the founding of its army Tuesday — a significant date in the country’s calendar, which it used to conduct a “large-scale” live-fire military drill. Commentators said that Trump, with his strong rhetoric, was backing himself into a corner over North Korea, leaving him in a potentially dangerous position. “It’s been all about pressure and brinksmanship and military tools and tactics and chess something, and now to literally, directly taunt the leader of North Korea is like poking the hornet’s nest yet again,” said Paul Carroll, program director at the Ploughshares Fund, a group working to eliminate nuclear weapons. “If you do this kind of ratcheting (up) of rhetorical tensions but also sending military hardware into the region, if you do that absent of any kind of off ramp or door or window for the North Koreans to consider walking through and reengaging in any sort of discussions, bad things are going to happen,” he added. (Ben Westcott, “Is U.S. President Donald Trump Backing Himself into a Corner on North Korea,” CNN, April 25, 2017)
Behind the Trump administration’s sudden urgency in dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis lies a stark calculus: a growing body of expert studies and classified intelligence reports that conclude the country is capable of producing a nuclear bomb every six or seven weeks. That acceleration in pace — impossible to verify until experts get beyond the limited access to North Korean facilities that ended years ago — explains why President Trump and his aides fear they are running out of time. It is unclear how Trump would react to a test, but he told representatives of the United Nations Security Council at the White House that they should be prepared to pass far more restrictive sanctions, which American officials say should include cutting off energy supplies. The strategy emerging from Trump’s national security team comes down to this: Apply overwhelming pressure on the North, both military and economic, to freeze its testing and reduce its stockpile. Then use that opening to negotiate, with the ultimate goal of getting the North Koreans to give up all their weapons. Many experts, however, believe that is a fantasy, because Kim regards even a small arsenal as critical to his survival. The upside of the strategy, if it works, is that the “nuclear freeze” would delay for years the day the North can fit a small, reliable, well-tested weapon atop a large, reliable, well-tested missile. The downside is that it would leave the North Koreans with a small, potent arsenal — one the United States would be essentially acknowledging, if not accepting. (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “As North Korea Builds Bombs, Time Dwindles,” New York Times, April 25, 2017,
4/25/17:
Top envoys from Japan, the United States and South Korea held a trilateral dialogue aimed at discussing measures to “maximize” pressure on North Korea over its nuclear and missile programs. Kanasugi Kenji, director-general of the Foreign Ministry’s Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, told reporters that the three countries agreed to further cooperate in their effort to take “resolute” actions against nuclear provocations by the North. Kanasugi said the trio also shared the recognition that China — the largest trade partner with the North — has a “significant” role to play in reining in Pyongyang’s saber-rattling. He did not elaborate. South Korea’s envoy on North Korean nuclear issues, Kim Hong-kyun, warned that Pyongyang’s failure to discontinue its missile and atomic tests will be met with “unbearable” punitive sanctions, and that the three countries will seek to “maximize” pressure against the reclusive state. Kanasugi is scheduled to meet his visiting Chinese counterpart, Wu Dawei, special representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs, tomorrow. In meeting with Wu, Kanasugi said he will discuss the possibility of China cutting off its supply of oil to North Korea. Meanwhile, the three envoys agreed to “continue to work very closely with China” and “coordinate all actions — diplomatic, military, economic — regarding North Korea,” Joseph Yun, special representative for North Korea policy from the U.S., told reporters after the meeting. “We really do not believe North Korea is ready to engage us toward denuclearization,” Yun said. “We make clear among ourselves that denuclearization remains the goal and we very much want North Korea to take steps toward that.” (Osaki Tomohiro, “Japan, South Korea, U.S. Diplomats Discuss Ways to ‘Maximize’ Pressure on North Korea,” Japan Times, April 25, 2017)
DPRK FoMin spokesman answer to the question raised by KCNA Tuesday “as regards the fact that the U.S. is working hard to stoke the international atmosphere for pressurizing the DPRK: Recently, the U.S. is seeking to gain public support at home and abroad for a newly worked out policy called “maximum pressure and engagement” in a bid to isolate and stifle the DPRK. U.S. President Trump personally invited the delegates of the member states of the UN Security Council to the White House to discuss the issue of the DPRK. A closed-door briefing on the new policy toward the DPRK will be reportedly held in the White House for the senators in the presence of high-ranking officials including the State and Defense secretaries. Against this backdrop, the U.S. secretary of State is going to sponsor a ministerial meeting concerning the denuclearization of the DPRK at the UN Security Council. This is just a risky act little short of lighting the fuse of a total war under the present touch-and-go situation on the Korean peninsula as they openly cried out for ratcheting up pressure on the DPRK. The policy pursued by the U.S. to isolate and stifle the DPRK and the nuclear threat posed by the U.S. to the DPRK for more than half a century are the root cause of pushing the DPRK to have access to nukes. The Trump administration has gone so ridiculous and foolhardy to devise the policy characterized by the “maximum pressure and engagement” without any elementary sense about the reality, far from recognizing the changed strategic position of the DPRK and the thousand-fold retaliatory will of its service personnel and people. As the U.S. has unsheathed a dagger to stifle the DPRK at any cost, the DPRK will stand against it with a sword of justice and cut the windpipe of the U.S. imperialists by dint of the strong revolutionary forces with the nuclear force, an almighty treasured sword, as their pivot. The present reality helps the DPRK keenly realize once again that it was entirely just when it opted for bolstering the nuclear force both in quality and quantity under the uplifted banner of the great line of simultaneously developing the two fronts. There is a saying that those who are fond of playing with fire are destined to perish in the flames. The same can be said of the U.S.” (KCNA: “U.S.-Led Pressure Can Never Work on DPRK: Foreign Ministry Spokesman,” April 25, 2017)
The United States, Japan and other countries surrounding North Korea are on high alert over the nation’s provocative actions, including the possibility it would conduct its sixth nuclear test, as Tuesday marked the 85th anniversary of the foundation of its Korean People’s Army. According to Reuters and other media, the USS Michigan, an Ohio-class nuclear submarine, arrived in Busan, South Korea, on the day. The Michigan is one of the U.S. Navy’s largest submarines. According to South Korean government sources, North Korea conducted a large-scale drill with live ammunition today, using long-range artillery units, in an area around Wonsan in the east of the country. Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, inspected the drill, Yonhap News Agency said. The USS Michigan is known for its strong attack capabilities — it can launch up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles. It is also used for carrying U.S. Navy SEALs and serves as their base for conducting special operations. Fox News cited multiple U.S. military sources as saying the USS Michigan was scheduled to join the strike group of the USS Carl Vinson in the Sea of Japan after undergoing maintenance. The Michigan was to participate in a joint military exercise later. (Oka Seima, “Japan, U.S. on High Alert over N. Korea,” Yomiuri Shimbun, April 25, 2017)
South Korea said it has decided to purchase two advanced early warning radars on incoming ballistic missiles as North Korea’s threats have grown. The plan was approved at a regular meeting on arms procurement projects presided over by Defense Minister Han Min-koo, according to the Defense Acquisition Program Agency (DAPA). It plans to import the radars in the project starting within this year. The South Korean military has two Israel-made Green Pine land-based radars in operation. It is seeking to acquire radars with the maximum range of more than 800 kilometers to better detect ballistic missiles fired by the North. Initially, the defense authorities earmarked budget for the purchase of one more radar. But they have revised a mid-term defense plan to buy two more. The DAPA also said it will push for the production of special ships to support an operation by commandos to remove the enemy’s leadership, while continuing the development of indigenous ship self-defense guided missiles. (Yonhap, “S. Korean Military to Buy Two More Anti-Ballistic Missile Radars,” Korea Herald, April 25, 2017)
The United States military started installing a controversial anti-missile defense system in South Korea overnight, triggering protests and sparking criticism that it was rushing to get the battery in place before the likely election of a president who opposes it. The sudden and unannounced move came only six days after U.S. Forces Korea secured the land to deploy the system, known as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD. Moon Jae-in, a liberal candidate who has a strong lead in the polls ahead of the May 9 presidential election, has promised to review South Korea’s decision to host the anti-missile battery. A spokesman for Moon, the Democratic Party’s candidate for president, criticized the sudden moves overnight. “Moon Jae-in has been consistent in his position on the THAAD deployment: that it must be decided by the next administration after enough public discussion and by national consensus,” Park Kwang-on said in a statement. “Any deployment that completely ignores appropriate processes must be suspended now and the final decision should be made after consultation between South Korea and the U.S.,” he said. Moon has a solid 10-point lead over his closest rival in the most recent polls and political scientists expect him to be South Korea’s next president, barring any dramatic developments. “There’s a sense in Seoul that THAAD deployment has been rushed based on the timetable of South Korea’s presidential election, rather than North Korea’s threats,” said John Delury, a professor of international relations at Yonsei University in Seoul. “To some extent, the acceleration of THAAD deployment has ‘worked,’ limiting the next South Korean leader’s room for maneuver,” Delury said. “But there’s the danger of a backlash among the South Korean public feeling like a pawn in the game of ‘America First.’ ” South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense said that South Korea and the United States had been working “to secure the swift operational capability of the THAAD system against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat.” “South Korea’s military plans to secure full capability of the THAAD system operation within the year,” the ministry said in a statement. Each THAAD battery includes at least six truck-mounted launchers that carry up to eight missiles each. They are designed to shoot down enemy ballistic missiles like the ones that North Korea has been launching at a steady clip over the past year. Residents in the Seongju area, where the battery will be deployed, have also been protesting, worried that the system’s presence will make them a target for North Korea’s missiles. According to local reports, six trailers carrying the X-band radar, mobile launchers and other parts of the system were seen entering the site about midnight.
A group of residents protested against the move and tried to stop the equipment from being taken onto the site, clashing with police, the Yonhap news agency reported from Seongju, in the southeast of South Korea. They waved placards saying “No THAAD, No War” and “Hey, U.S.! Are you friends or occupying troops?” “Polce let THAAD equipment pass through [protesters] by repressing them,” Kang Hyun-wook, a religious leader who was leading the protest, told Yonhap. “The THAAD deployment is illegal and should be nullified.” (Anna Fifield, “U.S. Military starts to Deploy Controversial Anti-Missile Battery in South Korea,” Washington Post, April 25, 2017) The surprise delivery of two THAAD launchers in Seongju, North Gyeongsang Province, on the eve of the presidential election in late April was made at the request of the South Korean government rather than under US pressure, it was recently confirmed. The effort to set the THAAD deployment in stone after then-President Park Geun-hye was ousted from office was orchestrated by Kim Kwan-jin, then head of the National Security Council Standing Committee and the chief of the Blue House National Security Office. On October 10, Democratic Party lawmaker and National Assembly Defense Committee member Rhee Cheol-hee shared a document with the Hankyoreh titled “Reference Materials in Connection with the US Forces Korea THAAD System Deployment,” which was drafted by the Ministry of National Defense shortly after President Moon Jae-in took office in May. That document along with eyewitness accounts show that Kim pressured the ministry to twice move up the THAAD deployment schedule, citing the “deepening crisis on the Korean Peninsula.” Initially, South Korea and the US developed a plan for a temporary deployment in September 2017 and complete operational capabilities as of 2018, according to an agreement drafted in November 2016. But Kim subsequently began efforts to hasten the deployment after Park’s impeachment motion was approved by the National Assembly on December 9, 2016. Witnesses in the Ministry of National Defense and Blue House at the time said Kim gave orders after the impeachment for the ministry to consider moving the THAAD deployment date four months up to May 2017. During an NSC meeting attended in late December 2016, Kim was also reported to have sternly rebuked a senior ministry official who compared the respective pros and cons of the Sept. 2017 and May 2017 deployment plans and concluded there was “no advantage to moving up the date.” Around ten days later on January 8, Kim visited the US to discuss an “unhindered” THAAD deployment with then-White House National Security Adviser nominee Michael Flynn. After his return, Acting President Hwang Kyo-ahn hinted that the deployment could be sped up during a New Year’s press conference on January 23. “It would be good to do [the THAAD deployment] as soon as possible,” Hwang said at the time. With Seoul demanding the deployment be hurried along, the US military presented a revised plan in early February, which included a temporary deployment in May 2017 and full deployment as of 2018. But Kim, who had previously ordered examination of a May deployment, once again changed his position, telling then-Minister of Defense Han Min-koo the date should be moved up even further. In a March 1 telephone conversation, Han told US Secretary of Defense James Mattis that Seoul was “pursuing unhindered preparations for THAAD’s early operation.” On the evening of March 6, just ahead of the Constitutional Court’s Mar. 10 decision on the impeachment case, USFK airlifted part of the THAAD equipment into Osan Air Base. On March 15, Kim once again visited the US and held discussions with National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster on the THAAD system’s “unhindered deployment.” A second bilateral agreement reached in early March put the temporary deployment date in late April 2017 and the completion of full deployment within 2017. Early in the morning on April 26 came the surprise delivery of two THAAD launchers in Seongju. (Kim Tae-kyu, Choi Hye-jung, and Um Ji-won, “Ex-NSC Standing Committee Chief Kim Kwan-jin Found to Have Sped up THAAD Deployment,” Hankyore, October 11, 2017)
4/26/17:
Joint Statement by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats: “Past efforts have failed to halt North Korea’s unlawful weapons programs and nuclear and ballistic missile tests. With each provocation, North Korea jeopardizes stability in Northeast Asia and poses a growing threat to our Allies and the U.S. homeland. North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is an urgent national security threat and top foreign policy priority. Upon assuming office, President Trump ordered a thorough review of U.S. policy pertaining to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.). Today, along with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joe Dunford, we briefed Members of Congress on the review. The President’s approach aims to pressure North Korea into dismantling its nuclear, ballistic missile, and proliferation programs by tightening economic sanctions and pursuing diplomatic measures with our Allies and regional partners. We are engaging responsible members of the international community to increase pressure on the D.P.R.K. in order to convince the regime to de-escalate and return to the path of dialogue. We will maintain our close coordination and cooperation with our Allies, especially the Republic of Korea and Japan, as we work together to preserve stability and prosperity in the region. The United States seeks stability and the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. We remain open to negotiations towards that goal. However, we remain prepared to defend ourselves and our Allies.” (DoS, Office of the Spokesman, Media Note, April 26, 2017)
U.S. national security leaders emphasized economic sanctions and diplomacy to persuade North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, even as the Pentagon ramps up its military presence in the region with an aircraft carrier battle group and submarine. “North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is an urgent national security threat and top foreign policy priority,” according to a joint statement by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Defense Secretary James Mattis and Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats. “The United States seeks stability and the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. We remain open to negotiations towards that goal.” The statement followed warnings by the Pentagon’s top commander in the Pacific that Pyongyang is making steady progress toward developing ballistic missiles that can hit the U.S. Kim Jong Un’s regime is testing those missiles and nuclear devices with growing frequency and aggressiveness, Admiral Harry Harris said in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. “The words and actions of North Korea threaten the U.S. homeland and that of our allies in South Korea and Japan,” Harris said in his prepared testimony. The U.S. “must be prepared to fight” on short notice, he said. Harris also endorsed Trump administration statements that the U.S. goal wasn’t to topple Kim’s regime. “We want to bring Kim Jong Un to his senses, not to his knees,” he said. Pressed by lawmakers, Harris wouldn’t discuss publicly scenarios for a pre-emptive strike against North Korea, though he did address the risk that U.S. action could be met by a response that would kill many South Koreans, Japanese and U.S. troops in the region. “A lot more Koreans and Japanese and Americans die” if Kim’s regime reaches its nuclear arms goals, Harris said. “The military is obviously planning for a number of contingencies, a number of options, as well they should, running the full range from a more minimal military action to a far more significant military action,” Republican Senator Ted Cruz, of Texas, said after the White House briefing. “It is the hope of the administration, the hope of Congress, that military action does not prove necessary, that economic and diplomatic pressure will cause a change in behavior of the regime.” Democratic Senator Chris Coons, of Delaware, called the White House briefing “sobering,” adding that the North Korean threat “should be the top priority of the administration.” Senator Cory Gardner, a Colorado Republican, told reporters a military strike should be well down the administration’s list of alternatives. “There’re so many options that we need to be taking that are a long ways away from a strike,” he said, adding that diplomatic steps should include “secondary sanctions on Chinese individuals, entities and companies that are doing business with the North Korean regime.” House Foreign Affairs Chairman Ed Royce said that Congress would pursue legislation to crack down on financial institutions that have ties to the North Korean government. “There is additional legislation which we are going to move very quickly that will also choke off some of the hard currency that this regime uses for its nuclear program,” the California Republican said after attending a separate administration briefing on North Korea for House members. But Representative Brad Sherman, a Democrat from California who serves on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said the Trump administration wasn’t applying enough pressure on China to use its influence to rein in North Korea. “What was lost in the discussion is that they are unwilling to do anything that would put real pressure or China or use our ability to impose tariffs,” Sherman told reporters Wednesday. “Because these are things that Wall Street would reject.” (Nick Wadhams, Steven T. Dennis, and Terrence Dopp, “U.S. Pushes Sanctions, Diplomacy as North Korea Threat Grows,” Bloomberg News April 27, 2017)
An unarmed Minuteman 3 intercontinental ballistic missile was launched from California early in a test of the weapon system that is part of the U.S. nuclear force. The missile blasted off from a silo at 12:03 a.m. from Vandenberg Air Force Base and delivered a single re-entry vehicle to a target approximately 4,200 miles (6,759 kilometers) away at Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean, the Air Force Global Strike Command said. The launch command was issued via an air launch control system aboard a Navy E-6 Mercury jet. “Tonight’s launch was an important demonstration of our nation’s nuclear deterrent capability,” Col. John Moss, commander of Vandenberg’s 30th Space Wing, said in a statement. “Test launches like this one are vital to validating the effectiveness and readiness of our operational nuclear systems, so it is critical that they are successful.” Operational tests of Minuteman 3 missiles are conducted regularly but the timing of Wednesday’s launch amid U.S. tensions with North Korea over its nuclear and missile programs drew criticism from the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. “When it comes to missile testing, the U.S. is operating with a clear double standard: It views its own tests as justified and useful, while it views the tests of North Korea as threatening and destabilizing,” David Krieger, president of the organization, said in a statement on its website two days ago. (Associated Press, “U.S. Test Launches Unarmed Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,” April 26, 2017)
The Eighth U.S. Army started moving its headquarters out of the old garrison in Seoul to Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, further away from the tense inter-Korean border. The Eighth Army, which forms the core of the U.S. Forces Korea, held a symbolic ceremony at the Yongsan Garrison on Tuesday morning to take down a statue of Gen. Walton Walker (1899-1950) and ship it to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, the new USFK headquarters. A 300-strong force started relocating in May last year and completed the process this March. Other key units hope to complete their relocation by late June, and the entire process is going to be complete in November. Only Combined Forces Command headquarters, some support units and the Dragon Hill Lodge will remain at Yongsan until the end of this year. The 2nd U.S. Infantry Division scattered in Uijeongbu and Dongducheon, Gyeonggi Province will relocate to Pyeongtaek late next year. Once the relocation is complete, USFK troops, who have used outdated facilities in 91 locations nationwide, will be concentrated in Pyeongtaek and Osan in the central region and Daegu, Waegwan, and Gimcheon in the south. (Yu Yong-weon, “8th U.S. Army Starts Pulling out of Seoul,” Chosun Ilbo, April 26, 2017)
Sigal: “The drums of war are threatening to drown out the whispers of diplomacy with North Korea. Lost in the reverberations is the fact that Pyongyang is willing to negotiate — though not on US terms. Indeed, in early March the Trump administration opened the door to talks by extending visas to North Korean diplomats to come to New York — only to cancel them at the last minute. After the North revealed preparations for a nuclear test and launched missiles, administration officials claimed that a carrier battle group was dispatched to Korean waters, which has yet to arrive. North Korea responded with missile launches aimed at strengthening its deterrent. Amid much tough talk out of Washington and Pyongyang, a US Minuteman III was launched in the North’s general direction and a US submarine bristling with Tomahawk missiles arrived in the South. As Wednesday’s White House briefing suggests, the American show of force is just that — a show — which has two purposes. The first is to reassure allies made jittery by candidate Donald Trump’s questioning of US commitments. The net effect seemed more alarming than reassuring to Asian countries.
The second purpose is even more questionable: to press China to ratchet up pressure on Pyongyang to accept US terms by committing itself to denuclearization up front. The administration calls this strategy “maximum pressure and engagement.” It may succeed in getting China’s support for a UN vote to curb oil exports if North Korea conducts a nuclear test, but it will likely fail to curb Pyongyang. Indeed, if past is prologue, Chinese pressure will likely provoke more North Korean nuclear and missile tests. That’s because Washington’s preoccupation with Beijing’s influence misconstrues Pyongyang’s strategy. Throughout the Cold War, Kim Il Sung had played off China against the Soviet Union to maintain some freedom of action. In 1988, anticipating the breakup of the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union, Kim reached out to the United States, South Korea, and Japan in hopes of improving relations with all three and avoiding overdependence on China. The Kims have been doing that ever since. From Pyongyang’s vantage point, that was the basis of the 1994 Agreed Framework, which committed Washington to “move toward full normalization of political and economic relations” or, in plain English, end enmity. It was also the gist of the September 2005 six-party joint statement in which Washington and Pyongyang pledged to “respect each other’s sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies” as well as to “negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.” For Washington, suspension of Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs was the focus of these agreements, which, contrary to conventional wisdom, did enjoy some success. Both agreements collapsed, however, when Washington did little to implement its commitment to improve relations and Pyongyang, in turn, reneged on denuclearization. From that point on, whenever Washington and Beijing threatened concerted pressure in the UN Security Council, Pyongyang responded with nuclear tests — in 2006, 2009, 2013, and early 2016 — in an effort to drive them apart. Yet, after the Security Council imposed sanctions in November, defying South Korean warnings that he would soon conduct a nuclear test, Kim Jong Un held his fire — a sign that he was waiting to see if Trump was ready to negotiate. Despite visible preparations for a test in recent weeks, he still is — but not for long if US-China pressure intensifies with no talks. An improvement in US relations to reduce his dependence on China remains Kim’s strategy. As initial steps, he may be willing to suspend his missile and nuclear programs in return for a scaling down of US joint exercises with South Korea and other reciprocal measures to address their security concerns. The only way out of this predicament is for Washington to resume talks with Pyongyang. And meanwhile, muffle those war drums.” (Leon V. Sigal, “Misplaying the China Card with North Korea, Boston Globe, April 27, 2017)
4/27/17:
President Donald Trump said a major conflict with North Korea is possible in the standoff over its nuclear and missile programs, but he would prefer a diplomatic outcome to the dispute. “There is a chance that we could end up having a major, major conflict with North Korea. Absolutely,” Trump told Reuters in an Oval Office interview ahead of his 100th day in office on April 29. Nonetheless, Trump said he wanted to peacefully resolve a crisis that has bedeviled multiple U.S. presidents, a path that he and his administration are emphasizing by preparing a variety of new economic sanctions while not taking the military option off the table. “We’d love to solve things diplomatically but it’s very difficult,” he said. In other highlights of the 42-minute interview, Trump was cool to speaking again with Taiwan’s president after an earlier telephone call with her angered China. He also said he wants South Korea to pay the cost of the U.S. THAAD anti-missile defense system, which he estimated at $1 billion, and intends to renegotiate or terminate a U.S. free trade pact with South Korea because of a deep trade deficit with Seoul. Asked when he would announce his intention to renegotiate the pact, Trump said: “Very soon. I’m announcing it now.” Trump said North Korea was his biggest global challenge. He lavished praise on Chinese President Xi Jinping for Chinese assistance in trying to rein in Pyongyang. The two leaders met in Florida earlier this month. “I believe he is trying very hard. He certainly doesn’t want to see turmoil and death. He doesn’t want to see it. He is a good man. He is a very good man and I got to know him very well. With that being said, he loves China and he loves the people of China. I know he would like to be able to do something, perhaps it’s possible that he can’t,” Trump, asked if he considered North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to be rational, said he was operating from the assumption that he is rational. He noted that Kim had taken over his country at an early age. “He’s 27 years old. His father dies, took over a regime. So say what you want but that is not easy, especially at that age. I’m not giving him credit or not giving him credit, I’m just saying that’s a very hard thing to do. As to whether or not he’s rational, I have no opinion on it. I hope he’s rational,” he said. (Stephen J. Adler, Steve Holland and Jeff Mason, “Exclusive: Trump Says ‘Major, Major’ Conflict with North Korea Possible, But Seeks Diplomacy,” Reuters, April 28, 2017) President Donald Trump said he wants South Korea to pay for the US$1 billion deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery, a missile defense system the allies are currently fielding here, he said in an interview with Reuters reported. Trump also said he will “renegotiate or terminate” the U.S. free trade agreement with South Korea. “I informed South Korea it would be appropriate if they paid. It’s a billion-dollar system,” Reuters quoted Trump as saying. According to the interview, Trump questioned why the U.S. was paying for the THAAD system to defend against a potential missile attack from North Korea. South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense, however, said there is no change in the two countries’ official position that the U.S. funds the deployment while the South provides the land. A diplomatic official here also said the government has not been “informed” of the cost issue. “The official position remains unchanged that our government provides the land and other infrastructure while the U.S. covers the burden of cost of deploying and maintaining the THAAD system according to the regulations of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),” the ministry said in a brief press release shortly after the report. Ever since their first announcement of the deployment plan on February 7 last year, the ministry and U.S. Forces Korea have said the deployment will be carried out under the SOFA. The SOFA requires South Korea to supply plots of land and infrastructure for American forces stationed here and the U.S. to finance the operations of its forces and military assets. South Korea is currently sharing the cost of maintaining 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea by renewing the bilateral Special Measure Agreement (SMA) every five years. Under the latest SMA signed in early 2014, South Korea is contributing nearly 1 trillion won ($879 million) every year. The allies are expected to initiate their negotiations late this year or early next year to renew the agreement which will expire at the end of 2018. In the interview, Trump also called the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement “horrible.” “It is unacceptable, it is a horrible deal made by Hillary,” Trump said, putting the blame on his former presidential rival Hillary Clinton. “It’s a horrible deal, and we are going to renegotiate that deal or terminate it.” Asked when he would announce the renegotiation, he said, “Very soon. I’m announcing it now.” (Yonhap, “Trump Says He Wants S. Korea to PayUS$1 bln. THAAD Deployment: Report,” April 28, 2017)
Tillerson: “Steve Inskeep: I want to begin with North Korea. We heard when you said, “the era of strategic patience is over,” so we know what your policy is not. Is there a word or phrase you can give us to say what your approach to North Korea is? Secretary of State Rex Tillerson: Yes, our approach to North Korea is to have them change their posture towards any future talks. And I think when we say the era of strategic patience is over — in the past I think we have always negotiated our way to the negotiating table. Now when they act up, we would negotiate our way to get them to come to the table, and then decide what we’re going to give them to have them behave. We don’t have the running room left to do that now, given how far advanced their program has become. So this is an approach that is to put pressure on them through implementation of all the sanctions, as well as other diplomatic pressures, and calling on others to cause them to change their view of what will really allow them to achieve the security that they say they seek. Inskeep: Do you intend to direct talks with North Korea? Is that your goal? Tillerson: Obviously, that would be the way we would like to solve this. But North Korea has to decide they’re ready to talk to us about the right agenda — and the right agenda is not simply stopping where they are for a few more months or a few more years and then resuming things. That’s been the agenda for the last 20 years. Inskeep: Well help me understand what success is from your point of view. What does the goal have to be? Well our goal is the same as that of China, which is a denuclearized Korean peninsula. Inskeep: No nuclear weapons for North Korea? A denuclearized Korean Peninsula. Tillerson: It’s very clear: That’s China’s stated policy, it has been our stated policy, it’s been the stated policy of our allies in the region. And I would quickly add, you know, we did our part — we took our nuclear weapons out of the Korean Peninsula. It’s time for North Korea to take their weapons out as well. Inskeep: Is that a realistic goal? Tillerson: It is our goal. It is our only goal. Inskeep: And would you go so far as to say that is an absolute goal? I’m thinking of the way that President Obama during the nuclear negotiations with Iran said Iran will not have a nuclear weapon, period. Are you prepared to say: North Korea will not end this process with nuclear weapons, period? We must have a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. Tillerson: That is our goal, pure and simple. Inskeep: Nothing less? Nothing less. Inskeep: Regardless of the methods? Tillerson: I’m not sure what you mean when you say regardless of the methods… Inskeep: I guess I’m asking if that’s a red line for you — North Korea keeping any nuclear weapons at all. Tillerson: We don’t have any red lines. I think what you’re talking about perhaps is — how do we get there? And we say: We can’t begin the process of getting there until North Korea comes to the table with a willingness to talk about how we get there — and how they achieve their objective. Tillerson: You know, if you listen to the North Koreans and the regime of Pyongyang, their reason for having nuclear weapons is, they believe it is their only pathway to secure the ongoing existence of their regime. What we hope to convince them is: You do not need these weapons to secure the existence of your regime. Inskeep: Meaning you could assure the existence, or the continued existence of the regime? We have been very clear as to what our objectives are. And equally clear what our objectives are not. And we do not seek regime change, we do not seek a collapse of the regime, we do not seek an accelerated reunification of the peninsula. We seek a denuclearized Korean Peninsula — and again that is entirely consistent with the objectives of others in the region as well. Inskeep: Mr. Secretary, people will know that you’re trying to work through China on this and make sure that China is applying the appropriate pressure — one of many things you’re trying to deal with China on. I’d like to ask about the relationship between the president and the president of China, Xi Jinping. How important is that personal relationship between the two leaders? Tillerson: Well it’s extraordinarily important, first to just the broader relationship of where U.S.-China relations are going to find themselves over the next two to three to four decades. I think we are at a bit of an inflection point in the U.S.-China relationship. Now, North Korea is a threat that presents itself right up front to both of us, and in our conversations with the Chinese — and we have been very clear to them. I was on my initial trips to Beijing, and then in the visit of President Xi to Mar-a- Lago, the president and I were able to be very clear to them that things have to change in North Korea. And we need their help doing that. Now, we like for them to help, we want them to help. If they believe for their own reasons they cannot help, then if they’ll just let us know, we’ll take that into consideration as we go forward. I think to this point, what China is beginning to re-evaluate is whether North Korea is any kind of an asset to them, or whether North Korea themselves and the regime have become a liability to China’s own security. Because as I’ve said to my Chinese counterparts, those missiles go in all directions. And whether this regime is one that they feel is reliable for them to continue to work with.” (NPR, Transcript: NPR Interviews Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, April 28, 2017)
Gen. Brooks: “[T]he Alliance has taken a series of steps—B-52 and B-1 overflights of Osan Air Base and the Demilitarized Zone; naval operations in the waters off Korea’s east coast; the deployment of carrier strike groups led by the USS John C. Stennis and later the USS Carl Vinson to the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula at different times in the last year; a combined R.O.K.-U.S. visit to view U.S. strategic assets in Guam, including the ballistic missile submarine USS Pennsylvania; and the Alliance deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. Together, these actions send a persistent, deterrent message to the North while
assuring our allies of our committed presence and our extended deterrence beyond the forward presence.” (Vincent K. Brooks, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 27, 2017
The United States ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki R. Haley, has often been the first, most outspoken member of the Trump administration to weigh in on key foreign policy issues, on everything from military strikes on Syria to sanctions against Russia and how to approach human rights. Much of that has come as a surprise to the State Department, and the Secretary of State, Rex W. Tillerson, has often been far from the limelight. Now, in an apparent attempt to foster greater coherence in American foreign policy, State Department officials are urging her aides to ensure her public remarks are cleared by Washington first. An email drafted by State Department diplomats urged Haley’s office to rely on “building blocks” written by the department to prepare her remarks. Her comments should be “re-cleared with Washington if they are substantively different from the building blocks, or if they are on a high-profile issue such as Syria, Iran, Israel-Palestine, or the D.P.R.K.,” added the email, the text of which was seen by the Times. The White House is riven by feuds, with various cabinet members vying for prominence, and while Trump has a business-centric reverence for Tillerson, he is said to like Haley. There was a hint of that tension on April 24 during the White House lunch for the Security Council diplomats. “Now, does everybody like Nikki?” the president asked his lunch guests. “Because if you don’t, otherwise, she can easily be replaced.” The guests laughed a little. “No, we won’t do that, I promise,” the president said. “We won’t do that. She’s doing a fantastic job.” That evening came praise from the president’s daughter Ivanka. On Twitter, she posted a photograph of Haley surrounded by the Security Council diplomats and wrote: “The world is in good hands under her leadership.” Haley retweeted it. (Somini Sengupta and Gardiner Harris, “State Department Seeks to Review Haley’s Remarks,” New York Times, April 28, 2017, p. A-14)
Trump spoke with Reuters in his office just a day after key components of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery were installed in the early morning hours yesterday on a golf course in Seongju County, North Gyeongsang. “On the THAAD system, it’s about a billion dollars. I said, ‘Why are we paying? Why are we paying a billion dollars? We are protecting. Why are we paying a billion dollars?’” Trump said. “So I informed South Korea it would be appropriate if they paid.” The South Korean government said it was not informed of such intentions by the U.S. government before the interview and that nothing has changed in the terms of agreements in the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). “The Korean government stands by the agreements in the SOFA, in that the Korean government provides the land and basic infrastructure, while the U.S. government pays for expenditures incident to the maintenance of the U.S. armed forces here,” the Ministry of National Defense said in a statement April 28. “It is agreed that the United States will bear for the duration of this Agreement without cost to the Republic of Korea all expenditures incident to the maintenance of the United States armed forces in the Republic of Korea, except those to be borne by the Republic of Korea,” the agreement states, adding that South Korea should pay for use of facilities and areas for the U.S. forces here. Opposition lawmakers issued statements requesting explanations from the incumbent administration. “The Liberty Korea Party and Bareun Party [comprising lawmakers from the former ruling Saenuri Party] and the Ministry of National Defense has been saying that the Thaad’s deployment and management will be paid for by the United States,” said Democratic Party Rep. Youn Kwan-suk, also communications director of the presidential campaign of Moon Jae-in. “If media reports are true, then it seems that the decision to deploy the THAAD system has been flawed from the beginning. The Defense Ministry and former ruling party must explain what kind of agreements were in place concerning THAAD, and all procedures to deploy the battery must be put to a stop until the next administration.” Presidential front-runner Moon has been opposing the deployment of the U.S.-led antimissile defense system in Korea. “The deployment and management of the THAAD system must be paid for by the U.S. government, as agreed upon initially between the two governments,” said People’s Party Rep. Son Kum-ju, chief spokesman of the presidential campaign of Ahn Cheol-soo. “But if there were disagreements on the bilateral agreement to deploy the defense system, the agreement must be tabled for approval at the National Assembly.” The Park Geun-hye administration last July said the deployment requires no approval by the National Assembly, but liberal opposition parties that are against the placement said the matter should be deliberated and ratified by the lawmakers. “The People’s Party also opposes renegotiating the Korea-U.S. FTA. It is only right that two countries stick to agreements they have reached together,” Son added. Some lawmakers went so far as to request the cancellation of the agreement over Thaad. “We would rather the U.S. government take back the Thaad battery if it’s going to make the South Korean government pay for it,” said Rep. Sim Sang-jeung of the Justice Party, also a candidate for the presidential election, in a campaign speech on Friday at Hongik University Station in western Seoul. “The South Korean people have not asked for THAAD.” “[The 1.5 trillion won ($1.3 billion) for Thaad] will be paid by the U.S. forces,” Defense Minister Han Min-koo said in a meeting of the National Defense Committee on July 11, 2016. (Esther Chung, “Trump Wants Seoul to Pay $1 Billion for THAAD,” JoongAng Ilbo, April 28, 2017)
4/28/17:
Trump tweet: “North Korea disrespected the wishes of China & its highly respected President when it launched, though unsuccessfully, a missile today. Bad!”
Tillerson at UNSC: “According to UN Security Council Resolution 2321, a stated objective of this council is North Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. For the past 20 years, well-intentioned diplomatic efforts to halt these programs have failed. It is only by first dismantling them that there can be peace, stability, and economic prosperity for all of Northeast Asia. … For too long, the international community has been reactive in addressing North Korea. Those days must come to an end. Failing to act now on the most pressing security issue in the world may bring catastrophic consequences. We have said this before and it bears repeating: the policy of strategic patience is over. Additional patience will only mean acceptance of a nuclear North Korea. The more we bide our time, the sooner we will run out of it. In light of the growing threat, the time has come for all of us to put new pressure on North Korea to abandon its dangerous path. I urge this council to act before North Korea does. We must work together to adopt a new approach and impose increased diplomatic and economic pressures on the North Korean regime. …Our goal is not regime change. Nor do we desire to threaten the North Korean people or destabilize the Asia Pacific region. Over the years, we have withdrawn our own nuclear weapons from South Korea and offered aid to North Korea as proof of our intent to de-escalate the situation and normalize relations. Since 1995, the United States has provided over $1.3 billion dollars in aid to North Korea, and we look forward to resuming our contributions once the D.P.R.K. begins to dismantle its nuclear weapons and missile technology programs. The D.P.R.K., for its own sake, must dismantle its nuclear and missile programs if it wants to achieve the security, economic development, and international recognition that it seeks. North Korea must understand that respect will never follow recklessness. North Korea must take concrete steps to reduce the threat that its illegal weapons programs pose to the United States and our allies before we can even consider talks. I propose all nations take these three actions beginning today: First, we call on UN member-states to fully implement the commitments they have made regarding North Korea. This includes all measures required in Resolutions 2321 and 2270. Those nations which have not fully enforced these resolutions fully discredit this body. Second, we call on countries to suspend or downgrade diplomatic relations with North Korea. North Korea exploits its diplomatic privileges to fund its illicit nuclear and missile technology programs, and constraining its diplomatic activity will cut off a flow of needed resources. In light of North Korea’s recent actions, normal relations with the D.P.R.K. are simply not acceptable. Third, we must increase North Korea’s financial isolation. We must levy new sanctions on D.P.R.K. entities and individuals supporting its weapons and missile programs, and tighten those that are already in place. The United States also would much prefer countries and people in question to own up to their lapses and correct their behavior themselves, but we will not hesitate to sanction third-country entities and individuals supporting the D.P.R.K.’s illegal activities. We must bring maximum economic pressure by severing trade relationships that directly fund the D.P.R.K.’s nuclear and missile program. I call on the international community to suspend the flow of North Korean guest workers and to impose bans on North Korean imports, especially coal. We must all do our share, but China accounting for 90 percent of North Korean trade, China alone has economic leverage over Pyongyang that is unique, and its role is therefore particularly important. The U.S. and China have held very productive exchanges on this issue, and we look forward to further actions that build on what China has already done. Lastly, as we have said before, all options for responding to future provocation must remain on the table. Diplomatic and financial levers of power will be backed up by a willingness to counteract North Korean aggression with military action if necessary. We much prefer a negotiated solution to this problem. But we are committed to defending ourselves and our allies against North Korean aggression. …While the world sees the gleaming buildings of Pyongyang, the blight of oppression and starvation has swept this land for over 60 years. But even though the present condition of that country is bleak, the United States believes in a future for North Korea. These first steps toward a more hopeful future will happen most quickly if other stakeholders in this – in the region and the global security join us. For years, North Korea has been dictating the terms of its dangerous course of action. It is time for us to retake control of the situation. We ask the members of this council and all other partners to implement a new strategy to denuclearize North Korea.” (Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Remarks at the U.N. Security Council Ministerial Session on DPRK,” April 28, 2017)
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed that the two countries will send a joint public-private survey mission to northwestern Pacific islands at the center of the two countries’ territorial row as early as in May as part of efforts to materialize joint economic activities there. At their 17th summit, held about three hours and 10 minutes at the Kremlin in Moscow, Abe and Putin also confirmed that aircraft will be used for travel to the islands by former residents for visiting the graves of their ancestors. Aircraft has never been used for such travel. The use of aircraft is aimed at easing the burden of former islanders, many of whom are aging. The first travel by former residents using aircraft, to Etorofu and Kunashiri, will take place in June in a special grave visit program. At a joint press conference after the meeting, Abe said that fish and sea urchin farming and ecotourism capitalizing on the rich natural environment on the four islands, among other things, will be studied as areas to be covered by the planned joint economic activities. The program is expected to help improve the living standards and convenience of Russians residing on the islands and create a lot of new possibilities for Japanese people who are engaging in economic activities there, Abe said, adding that he wants to work with Putin to create a hopeful future. The planned dispatch of a joint survey mission will be the first step, Abe said, pointing out that the two countries will be able to conclude a peace treaty after continuing cooperation. Abe showed a strong desire to resolve the territorial issue while he is in office as prime minister, saying that he hopes to sign a peace treaty with Putin by boosting trust between the two countries’ citizens. Putin said it would be very good for the two countries’ mutual understanding and trust to deepen. (Sekiguchi Hiroto, “Abe, Putin Agree on Joint N. Isles Mission,” Yomiuri Shimbun, April 28, 2017
4/29/17:
A North Korean ballistic missile apparently failed shortly after launch, South Korea and the United States said, the third test-fire flop just this month but a clear message of defiance as a U.S. supercarrier conducts drills in nearby waters. The timing of the North’s test was striking: Only hours earlier the U.N. Security Council held a ministerial meeting on Pyongyang’s escalating weapons program. North Korean officials boycotted the meeting, which was chaired by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. President Donald Trump said on Twitter, “North Korea disrespected the wishes of China & its highly respected President when it launched, though unsuccessfully, a missile today. Bad!” He did not answer reporters’ questions about the missile launch upon returning to the White House from a day trip to Atlanta. North Korea didn’t immediately comment on the launch, though its state media yesterday reiterated the country’s goal of being able to strike the continental U.S. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a statement that the missile flew for several minutes and reached a maximum height of 71 kilometers (44 miles) before it apparently failed. It didn’t immediately provide an estimate on how far the missile flew, but a U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters, said it was likely a medium-range KN-17 ballistic missile. It broke up a few minutes after the launch.
Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide, speaking after a meeting of Japan’s National Security Council, said the missile is believed to have traveled about 50 kilometers (30 miles) and fallen on an inland part of North Korea. Analysts say the KN-17 is a new Scud-type missile developed by North Korea. The North fired the same type of missile April 16, just a day after a massive military parade where it showed off its expanding missile arsenal, but U.S. officials called that launch a failure. Some analysts say a missile the North test fired April 5, which U.S. officials identified as a Scud variant, also might have been a KN-17. U.S. officials said that missile spun out of control and crashed into the sea. Moon Seong Mook, a South Korean analyst and former military official, says that the North would gain valuable knowledge even from failed launches as it continues to improve its technologies for missiles. The South Korean and Japanese assessments about Saturday’s launch indicate that the North fired the missile from a higher-than-normal angle to prevent it from flying too far, he said. “They could be testing a variety of things, such as the thrust of the rocket engine or the separation of stages,” Moon said. “A failure is a failure, but that doesn’t mean the launch was meaningless.” The two earlier launches were conducted from an eastern coastal area, but Saturday’s missile was fired in the west, from an area near Pukchang, just north of the capital, Pyongyang. South Korea’s Foreign Ministry denounced the launch as an “obvious” violation of United Nations resolutions and the latest display of North Korea’s “belligerence and recklessness.” “We sternly warn that the North Korean government will continue to face a variety of strong punitive measures issued by the U.N. Security Council and others if it continues to reject denuclearization and play with fire in front of the world,” the ministry said. Yesterday, the United States and China offered starkly different strategies for addressing North Korea’s escalating nuclear threat as Tillerson demanded full enforcement of economic sanctions on Pyongyang and urged new penalties. Stepping back from suggestions of U.S. military action, he even offered aid to North Korea if it ends its nuclear weapons program. Tillerson said the U.S. does not seek regime change in North Korea, and he signaled American openness to holding direct negotiations with Pyongyang. The U.S. also could resume aid to North Korea once it “begins to dismantle its nuclear weapons and missile technology programs,” he said. Yet illustrating the international gulf over how best to tackle North Korea, several foreign ministers on the 15-member council expressed fears of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, which was divided between the American-backed South and communist North even before the 1950-53 Korean War. Foreign Minister Wang Yi said China would adhere to past U.N. resolutions and wants a denuclearized peninsula. But he spelled out no further punitive steps his government might consider, despite Tillerson’s assertions in an interview hours ahead of the council meeting that Beijing would impose sanctions of its own if North Korea conducts another nuclear test. Wang put forward a familiar Chinese idea to ease tensions: North Korea suspending its nuclear and missile activities if the U.S. and South Korea stop military exercises in the region. Tillerson said the North must take “concrete steps” to reduce its weapons threat before talks could occur. Six-nation nuclear negotiations with North Korea stalled in 2009. The Obama administration sought to resurrect them in 2012, but a deal to provide food aid in exchange for a nuclear freeze soon collapsed. “In a nutshell, (North Korea) has already declared not to attend any type of talks which would discuss its nuclear abandonment, nuclear disbandment,” Kim In Ryong, North Korea’s deputy U.N. ambassador, told The Associated Press. His government declined to attend yesterday’s council meeting. (Foster Klug and Kim Tong-Hyung, “North Korean Missile Test Fails Hours after UN Meeting on Nukes,” Associated Press, April 29, 2017) North Korea fired another ballistic missile early this morning, but it exploded within seconds of being launched, American and South Korean defense officials said. Today’s launch marked the 75th missile test since Kim Jong Un became leader of North Korea at the end of 2011, according to a Nuclear Threat Initiative database. American and South Korean defense officials said that the unidentified missile appears to have exploded soon after being launched at about 5 a.m. North Korea time. “The missile did not leave North Korean territory,” U.S. Pacific Command spokesman Dave Benham said in a statement. But analysts said not to be consoled. “This test may have failed, but Kim Jong Un’s overall missile test record is 58 successful flight tests and 17 failures,” said Shea Cotton of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation, who compiled the Nuclear Threat Initiative database. (Anna Fifield, “North Korea Fires Another Missile, 75th of Kim Jong Un’s Tenure,” Washington Post, April 28, 2017)
Schilling: “Details are still scarce on [today’s] missile test, but it appears to have been the missile provisionally named “KN-17” and described in sensational press reports as a “Carrier-Killer.” We have seen this missile before, certainly in the April 15 parade celebrating Kim Il Sung’s birthday, and possibly in two previous tests. All of these tests were reported by allied intelligence agencies as failures, and none were accompanied by the propaganda footage with which North Korea reports successful missile tests and demonstrations. Still, the North usually does manage to recover from test failures, and the consequences of an anti-ship ballistic missile in North Korean hands are worth considering. But we should also consider the possibility that the missile is intended for use against targets on land, which is a more plausible near-term threat. The KN-17 appears to be a Scud derivative with small fins on the reentry vehicle, presumably for steering during the last seconds of flight. Such Maneuvering Reentry Vehicles (MaRV) are not new; the American Pershing II missile deployed in from 1983 to 1991 used such a warhead. So does the Chinese DF-21D, an anti-ship ballistic missile that clearly is intended to threaten US aircraft carriers. But there are other reasons to deploy such a system. The Pershing II was never intended for use against naval targets, and used its MaRV for precision attacks on land targets such as airbases and command and logistics centers. MaRVs have also been proposed, and possibly deployed, as a means of evading enemy missile defenses. All three of these prospects would be of clear interest to North Korea. If Pyongyang does intend to use the KN-17 against naval targets, it would face a particularly difficult targeting problem. Allied military bases in South Korea and Japan can be reliably mapped in peacetime, and aren’t going to move. Aircraft carriers at sea are much more difficult to find. North Korean surveillance radar and coastal naval forces can probably track enemy warships within a few dozen miles of the North Korean coast, but while smaller allied warships may sometimes approach to such a distance, aircraft carriers will have little reason to do so. Long-range reconnaissance platforms like aircraft or submarines would need a great deal of luck to find a specific warship with the entire East Sea to hide in, particularly in wartime where the North’s planes and submarines would likely be destroyed long before they came close enough to spot an aircraft carrier. The ideal solution would be a constellation of satellites designed for maritime surveillance, but North Korean satellite technology isn’t up to that task yet. Pyongyang would also need an active radar guidance system capable of surviving a ballistic missile’s flight environment and providing precise guidance data during a steep, hypersonic terminal descent, which is also beyond their demonstrated capabilities. Another problem with attacking aircraft carriers with the KN-17 is that the missile doesn’t work, at least not yet. But if the recent tests were failures, they were curious failures. The April 5 test reached a height of 169 kilometers, while travelling only 60 kilometers downrange. The US Pacific Command (PACOM) claims that the missile “pinwheeled” during flight. The performance, however, is about what we would expect from a successful Scud launch on a lofted trajectory, and beyond what would be possible from any missile that tumbled during powered flight. One possibility is that PACOM, not yet being aware of the KN-17’s experimental MaRV, instead tracked the missile’s larger booster. Once the MaRV separated, the expended booster would likely tumble randomly through the sky. But if we credit PACOM with tracking the right target, they may have been able to track the MaRV itself tumbling out of control during the terminal guidance phase. In either case, a MaRV test would explain the unusual trajectory – North Korea doesn’t need to use a high-angle trajectory to keep a mere Scud from e.g. overflying Japan, but they would want the impact region for a MaRV test to be someplace they could observe very closely. The test on April 16 apparently exploded shortly after launch, and may not have been a KN-17 at all. We don’t yet have all the details on the April 28 test, but it may have been a repeat of the April 5 test. The maximum altitude of 71 kilometers was a bit lower than that of the earlier test, but still beyond anything a missile that failed during powered flight would be likely to reach. And the launch, from a west coast launch site, may have been an attempt to use a more traditional shallow-angle Scud trajectory by overflying the country with the warhead impacting just off the east coast. It isn’t surprising that a MaRV would experience failures in early testing. North Korea’s missiles usually fail in their first tests, and a MaRV is a trickier sort of rocketry than most. But North Korea usually does get their missiles working in the long run, and they appear to be taking the conservative approach of using a proven Scud missile as the basis for their first MaRV system. North Korea probably won’t be able to sink any American aircraft carriers with the KN-17, not because the missile will never work, but because they won’t be able to find the carriers in the first place. There’s also the small matter that American aircraft carriers are closely accompanied by a pair of Aegis cruisers or destroyers, possibly the most capable missile defense platforms in existence. But we shouldn’t overlook the threat an operational KN-17 would pose to targets on land in South Korea. A missile capable of hitting a maneuvering warship at sea would be even more accurate against fixed targets on land, and could possibly evade defending Patriot missiles during its terminal attack. We’ve long considered North Korea’s hundreds of conventional Scud missiles to be mostly a harassment weapon due to their inaccuracy, but if they can reliably deliver half a ton of high explosives directly onto a crowded barracks, an ammunition dump or USFK headquarters, we might have a real problem. It might be time to start testing the Patriot system against maneuvering reentry vehicles. (John Schilling, “North Korea’s ‘Carrier-Killer’ May Be No Such Thing,” 38North, May 1, 2017)
KCNA: “The U.S. is bluffing after firing dozens of missiles at Syria and dropping a GBU-43 bomb on Afghanistan. During his recent junket to Asia, U.S. Vice-President Pence, saying the world witnessed the “bold decision of the president” through the military actions in Syria and Afghanistan, behaved so arrogant as to urge the DPRK not to misjudge the will of the U.S. and test the decision of Trump and muscle of the U.S. forces. Dignitaries including the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations also noisily talk about “strong warning” to someone every day, asserting that the era of “strategic patience” has come to an end and all options including military action are on the table. This is just a bluff of the U.S. keen on flexing its muscle by striking non-nuclear countries and weak nations only. Such an act can never irritate the DPRK. The U.S. should not misjudge its rival. Since it won a victory in the past total war with the U.S. imperialists, the DPRK has cemented its national strength in every way for decades, resolved to stage a final sacred struggle against the U.S. imperialists. The last Korean War was just like the confrontation between rifle and A-bomb. But the DPRK inflicted a bitter defeat upon the aggressors by winning the war the U.S. imperialists ignited by mobilizing mercenaries from their 15 satellite countries, the south Korean puppet army and even the Japanese militarists. During the past decades when it remained a non-nuclear country, the DPRK foiled a series of war provocations made by the U.S. such as the spy ship Pueblo incident, the EC-121 large spy plane incident and Panmunjom incident through toughest countermeasures, not surrendering to the nuclear threat posed by the U.S. imperialists. The DPRK, keeping itself on high alert with all things required by a power, from H-bomb called absolute weaponry to ICBM, has all options of its own style to counter any aggression and is fully ready to react to any provocation from the U.S. The U.S. is getting evermore desperate in its bluffing, but it only reveals the vulnerability of those exasperated by the DPRK’s nukes of justice and invincible military muscle. The U.S. should pay attention to the world public comment that “north Korea is not like Syria and Afghanistan at all and Trump’s outbursts are no more than an senseless outcry to north Korea.” Bluffing can never work on those relying on their own strength, convinced of their victory. If the U.S. wants to dare test the will of the army and people of the DPRK to protect their socialist country, it will have to experience what a real war is like. This is the solemn warning of the DPRK.” (KCNA, “U.S. Muscle-Flexing Can Never Work on DPRK: KCNA Commentary,” April 29, 2017)
When President Trump called President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, White House officials saw it as part of a routine diplomatic outreach to Southeast Asian leaders. During their “very friendly conversation,” the administration said in a late-night statement on April 30, Trump invited Duterte, an authoritarian leader accused of ordering extrajudicial killings of drug suspects in the Philippines, to visit him at the White House. Administration officials said the call to Duterte was one of several to Southeast Asian leaders that the White House arranged after picking up signs that the leaders felt neglected because of Mr. Trump’s intense focus on China, Japan and tensions over North Korea. On April 30 Trump spoke to the prime ministers of Singapore and Thailand; both got White House invitations. (Mark Landler, “Trump Officials Brace for Anger at Duterte Call,” New York Times, May 1, 2017,
President Trump labeled North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un a “madman with nuclear weapons” during a private phone conversation with Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte last month, just days before stating publicly that he would be “honored” to meet with Kim. Most of Trump’s conversation with Duterte focused on how to deal with North Korea and whether China can exert more leverage on Kim’s regime, according to a transcript made by the Philippine government May 2 and obtained May 23 by the Washington Post from a person who asked not to be identified because the transcript, labeled by the Philippine government as “confidential,” is not intended for public release. Trump sought Duterte’s input on whether Kim is “stable or not stable” and expressed some satisfaction in North Korea’s recent failed missile tests, noting that “all his rockets are crashing. That’s the good news,” Duterte responded that Kim is “playing with his bombs, his toys” and offered that “his mind is not working well, and he just might go crazy one moment.” That prompted Trump to point out that the United States has “a lot of firepower over there,” including “two nuclear submarines” sent by the Pentagon to the region last month. Later in the call, Trump raised the stakes of the escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula when he observed: “We can’t let a madman with nuclear weapons let on the loose like that. We have a lot of firepower, more than he has, times 20 — but we don’t want to use it.” The focus between Trump and Duterte on North Korea comports with a brief public readout of the call from the White House on the day it took place. But the details of their conversation, first reported here, offer a deeper view of the urgency with which Trump is attempting to enlist foreign leaders to ramp up pressure on Pyongyang to halt its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. A senior Trump administration official acknowledged that the transcript is accurate but declined to speak on the record about “a leaked document from a foreign government.” Trump is “rallying as much support as he can on North Korea,” the administration official said. “Regional support is extremely meaningful. This is how he’s trying to proactively manage a very difficult situation.” Trump acknowledged after meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping in mid-April that “it’s not so easy” for Beijing to alter Pyongyang’s behavior. But when Trump asked Duterte whether China has “power over” Kim, the Philippine president responded: “Yes, at the end of the day, the last card, the ace, has to be with China. It’s only China.” Trump told Duterte he hopes “China solves the problem. … But if China doesn’t do it, we will do it.” Duterte then offered to call Xi and emphasize the importance of altering Pyongyang’s behavior. “You can tell him I am counting on him,” Trump replied. “I have a very good relationship with him. I had him in Florida for two days and got to know him well. He is a good guy.” (David Nakamura and Barton Gellman, “Transcript Shows Trump Called Kim Jong Un a ‘Madman’ in Call with Duterte,”Washington Post, May 24, 2017, p. A-10) The comments were part of a Philippine transcript that was circulated on May 23, under a “confidential” cover sheet, by the Americas division of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs. In Washington, a senior administration official confirmed that the transcript was an accurate representation of the call. Duterte wanted to discuss North Korea. He told Trump that “as long as those rockets and warheads are in the hands of Kim Jong-un we will never be safe as there’s not telling what will happen next.” That led Trump to inquire whether Kim is “someone who is stable or not stable.” Duterte offered up the opinion that Kim was unstable, noting that he is always seen laughing in pictures of missile and nuclear tests. Trump seemed to try to reassure Duterte. Kim, he said, “has got the powder, but he doesn’t have the delivery system — all his rockets are crashing.” The president said nothing of the American-led program to sabotage the launches, though in some tests both before and after the call, the North has conducted several successful launches. “We have a lot of firepower over there,” Trump noted. “We have two submarines — the best in the world. We have two nuclear submarines, not that we want to use them at all.” The two men talked about China’s potential influence and Duterte promised to call President Xi Jinping. Trump noted the two men had met at his Florida resort, and called Xi “a good guy.” (David E. Sanger and Maggie Haberman, “Trump Praises Philippine President in Call Transcript,” New York Times, May 24, 2017, p. A-12)
Trump-Duterte telephone call: “…POTUS: So how is everyone doing? How is the Philippine Islands doing? DUTERTE: We are doing fine Mr. President but in the ASEAN Summit every member state was really nervous about situation in Korean peninsula but we would like to tell you that we support you and keep on on the pressure because as long as those rockets and warheads are in the hands of Kim Jong Un we will never be safe as there’s not telling what will happen next. POTUS: What’s your opinion of him Rodrigo? Are we dealing with someone who stable or not stable? DUTERTE: He is not stable, Mr. President, as he keeps smiling when he explodes a rocket. He has even gone against China which is the last country he should rebuke. But it seems from his face that he’s laughing always and there’s a dangerous toy in his hands which could create so much agony and suffering for all mankind. POTUS: Well, he has got the powder, but he doesn’t have the delivery system. All his rockets are crashing. That’s good news. But eventually when he gets that delivery system … What do you think about China? Does China have power over him? DUTERTE: Yes, at the end of the day, the last card, the ace, has to be with China. He’s playing with his bombs, his toys and from the looks of it, his mind is not working well, and he just might go crazy one moment. China should make a last ditch effort to tell him to lay off. China will play a very important role there. POTUS: We have a lot of firepower over there. We have two submarines — the best in the world. We have two nuclear submarines, not that we want to use them at all. I’ve never seen anything like they are but we don’t have to use this but he could be crazy so we will see what happens. DUTERTE: Every generation has a mad man – in our generation is Kim Jong Un – you are dealing with a very delicate problem. POTUS: We can handle it. DUTERTE: But you can keep the pressure on him. POTUS: I hope China solves the problem. They really have the means because a great deal of their stuff comes through China. But if China doesn’t do it, we will do it.” DUTERTE: I will try to call President Xi Jinping and I will try to tell him that if we remain to be peaceful, China has the card. The other option is a nuclear blast which is not good for everybody. POTUS: “You can tell him I am counting on him. I have a very good relationship with him. I had him in Florida for two days and got to know him well. He is a good guy. DUTERTE: I will do that. I will call the ambassador here and will make an appointment to call him. It will be good if you can keep the pressure on Kim but actually we are all worried as we are all within striking distance of his rockets. We are all afraid. POTUS: We can’t let a madman with nuclear weapons let on the loose like that. We have a lot of firepower, more than he has, times 20, but we don’t want to use it. You will be in good shape. DUTERTE: We believe it. We know it all along. I will ty to make a call tmrw to China. POTUS: Pls call China and tell them we are all counting on China. Tell the President – we became friends for two days – he was great.” (Confidential Transcript of April 29 Phone Call of the President with the POTUS, Office of American Affairs, Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs, May 2, 2017)
4/30/17:
JOHN DICKERSON: Mr. President, you and the administration said to North Korea, “Don’t test a missile.” They have tested a missile. Is the pressure not working? PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: Well, I didn’t say, “Don’t test a missile.” He’s going to have to do what he has to do. But he understands we’re not going to be very happy. And I will tell you, a man that I’ve gotten to like and respect, the president of China, President Xi, I believe, has been putting pressure on him also. But so far, perhaps nothing’s happened and perhaps it has. This was a small missile. This was not a big missile. This was not a nuclear test, which he was expected to do three days ago. We’ll see what happens. DICKERSON: You say, “Not happy.” What does that mean? TRUMP: I would not be happy. If he does a nuclear test, I will not be happy. And I can tell you also, I don’t believe that the president of China, who is a very respected man, will be happy either. DICKERSON: Not happy mean military action? TRUMP: I don’t know. I mean, we’ll see. DICKERSON: The Chinese, our allies, have been allies with North Korea. How are you sure that they’re not using this as a way to test you? TRUMP: You can never be sure of anything, can you? But I developed a very good relationship. I don’t think they want to see a destabilized North Korea. I don’t think they want to see it. They certainly don’t want to see nuclear on — from their neighbor. They haven’t liked it for a long time. But we’ll have to see what happens. The relationship I have with China, it’s been already acclaimed as being something very special, something very different than we’ve ever had. But again, you know, we’ll find out whether or not President Xi is able to affect change. …I hope he is. DICKERSON: Why do these missiles keep blowing up? TRUMP: Well, I’d rather not discuss it. But perhaps they’re just not very good missiles. But eventually, he’ll have good missiles. DICKERSON: You don’t want to discuss it because maybe we have something to do with it? TRUMP: I just don’t want to discuss it. And I think you know me very well, where you’ve asked me many times over the last couple of years about military. I said, “We shouldn’t be announcing we’re going into Mosul.” I said, “We shouldn’t be announcing all our moves.” It is a chess game. I just don’t want people to know what my thinking is. So eventually, he will have a better delivery system. And if that happens, we can’t allow it to happen. DICKERSON: What do you make of the North Korean leader? TRUMP: I have — I really, you know, have no comment on him. People are saying, “Is he sane?” I have no idea. I can tell you this, and a lot of people don’t like when I say it, but he was a young man of 26 or 27 when he took over from his father, when his father died. He’s dealing with obviously very tough people, in particular the generals and others. And at a very young age, he was able to assume power. A lot of people, I’m sure, tried to take that power away, whether it was his uncle or anybody else. And he was able to do it. So obviously, he’s a pretty smart cookie. But we have a situation that we just cannot let — we cannot let what’s been going on for a long period of years continue. And frankly, this should’ve been done and taken care of by the Obama administration. Should’ve been taken care of by the Bush administration. Should’ve been taken care of by Clinton. … TRUMP: No, they were doing it before. I mean, there was no question. I mean, they were absolute currency manipulators before. But somebody said, “Oh, you didn’t call him a currency manipulator.” Now, you and I are just talking about how he’s working — I believe that President Xi is working to try and resolve a very big problem, for China also. And that’s North Korea. Can you imagine if I say, “Hey, by the way, how are you doing with North Korea? Also, we’re going to announce that you’re a currency manipulator tomorrow.” So the mainstream media never talks about that. They never say that. And that’s, you know, unfortunate. It’s just — it’s just one of many things, John. DICKERSON: You’re a negotiator. If you need something from somebody, you need China to help you with North Korea, doesn’t that send a message to China, “We’re not going to bug you about human rights, about intellectual property. In the South China Sea we’re not going to put too much heat on you”? Aren’t you breaking one of your own negotiating rules? TRUMP: No. I think that, frankly, North Korea is maybe more important than trade. Trade is very important. But massive warfare with millions, potentially millions of people being killed? That, as we would say, trumps trade. …Okay? You understand what I’m saying. And if I can use trade as a method to get China, because I happen to think that China does have reasonably good powers over North Korea. Now, maybe not, you know, ultimate, but pretty good powers. Now, if China can help us with North Korea and can solve that problem — that’s worth making not as good a trade deal for the United States, excuse me, right?” (CBS, Transcript: President Donald Trump’s Interview with ‘Face the Nation,’” April 30, 2017)
5/1/17:
President Donald Trump said he would meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un amid heightened tensions over his country’s nuclear weapons program if the circumstances were right. “If it would be appropriate for me to meet with him, I would absolutely, I would be honored to do it,” Trump said in an interview with Bloomberg News. “If it’s under the, again, under the right circumstances. But I would do that.” Kim has never met with a foreign leader since taking charge after his father’s death in 2011 and hasn’t left his isolated country. “Most political people would never say that,” Trump said of his willingness to meet with the reclusive Kim, “but I’m telling you under the right circumstances I would meet with him. We have breaking news.” (Margaret Talev and Jennifer Jacobs, “Trump Says He’d Meet with Kim under Right Circumstances,” Bloomberg News May 1, 2017)
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s statement: “[T]he touch-and-go situation, created on the Korean peninsula due to the U.S. DPRK-targeted joint military exercises for aggression and the military threat, has left a serious lesson. The confrontation between the DPRK and the U.S. has lasted for more than half a century but the U.S. aggression hysteria has never reached such a height and the situation on the Korean peninsula has never inched close to the brink of nuclear war as in the period of the recent drills. …The situation on the Korean peninsula proves once again that the U.S. is the chieftain of aggression and war, and harasser of peace who is escalating tension and that the DPRK was just and far-sighted when it opted for bolstering its powerful nuclear deterrence for self-defense under the uplifted banner of the simultaneous development of the two fronts. If the DPRK had not had access to the powerful nuclear force and had not gotten itself ready to counter the U.S. and its vassal forces’ provocation with merciless military counteraction, the U.S. would have committed without hesitation the same brigandish aggression act in Korea as what it committed against other countries. In order to check such high-handed and arbitrary practices and defend the sovereignty and the right to existence of the country and the nation, and to contribute to regional peace and security and genuine international justice, the DPRK has been bolstering its nuclear deterrence despite manifold difficulties. The recent confrontation with the U.S. reminds us once again of the iron truth that one has to build one’s own strength in order to defend oneself from the whirlwind of history in which it is neither aided nor sympathized by anyone. Now that the U.S. is kicking up the overall racket for sanctions and pressure against the DPRK, pursuant to its new DPRK policy called “maximum pressure and engagement,” the DPRK will speed up at the maximum pace the measure for bolstering its nuclear deterrence. The DPRK is fully ready to respond to any option taken by the U.S., and unless it withdraws its hideous hostile policy toward the DPRK and nuclear threat and blackmail, the DPRK will continue to bolster its military capabilities for self-defense and preemptive nuclear attack with the nuclear force as a pivot. The DPRK’s measures for bolstering the nuclear force to the maximum will be taken in a consecutive and successive way at any moment and any place decided by its supreme leadership.” (KCNA: “DPRK Will Boost Nuclear Deterrence at Maximum Speed: Foreign Ministry Spokesman,” May 1, 2017)
Despite decades of sanctions and international isolation, the economy in North Korea is showing surprising signs of life. Scores of marketplaces have opened in cities across the country since the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, took power five years ago. A growing class of merchants and entrepreneurs is thriving under the protection of ruling party officials. Pyongyang, the capital, has seen a construction boom, and there are now enough cars on its once-empty streets for some residents to make a living washing them. Reliable economic data is scarce. But recent defectors, regular visitors and economists who study the country say nascent market forces are beginning to reshape North Korea — a development that complicates efforts to curb Kim’s nuclear ambitions. Even as President Trump bets on tougher sanctions, especially by China, to stop the North from developing nuclear-tipped missiles capable of striking the United States, the country’s improving economic health has made it easier for it to withstand such pressure and to acquire funds for its nuclear program. While North Korea remains deeply impoverished, estimates of annual growth under Kim’s rule range from 1 percent to 5 percent, comparable to some fast-growing economies unencumbered by sanctions. But a limited embrace of market forces in what is supposed to be a classless society also is a gamble for Kim, who in 2013 made economic growth a top policy goal on par with the development of a nuclear arsenal. Kim, 33, has promised his long-suffering people that they will never have to “tighten their belts” again. But as he allows private enterprise to expand, he undermines the government’s central argument of socialist superiority over South Korea’s capitalist system. There are already signs that market forces are weakening the government’s grip on society. Information is seeping in along with foreign goods, eroding the cult of personality surrounding Kim and his family. And as people support themselves and get what they need outside the state economy, they are less beholden to the authorities. “Our attitude toward the government was this: If you can’t feed us, leave us alone so we can make a living through the market,” said Kim Jin-hee, who fled North Korea in 2014 and, like others interviewed for this article, uses a new name in the South to protect relatives she left behind. After the government tried to clamp down on markets in 2009, she recalled, “I lost what little loyalty I had for the regime.” Since 2010, the number of government-approved markets in North Korea has doubled to 440, and satellite images show them growing in size in most cities. In a country with a population of 25 million, about 1.1 million people are now employed as retailers or managers in these markets, according to a study by the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul. Unofficial market activity has flourished, too: people making and selling shoes, clothing, sweets and bread from their homes; traditional agricultural markets that appear in rural towns every 10 days; smugglers who peddle black-market goods like Hollywood movies, South Korean television dramas and smartphones that can be used near the Chinese border. At least 40 percent of the population in North Korea is now engaged in some form of private enterprise, a level comparable to that of Hungary and Poland shortly after the fall of the Soviet bloc, the director of South Korea’s intelligence service, Lee Byung-ho, told lawmakers in a closed-door briefing in February. Eighty percent of consumer goods sold in North Korean markets originate in China, according to an estimate by Kim Young-hee, director of the North Korean economy department at the Korea Development Bank in the South. But Kim Jong-un has exhorted the country to produce more goods locally in an effort to lessen its dependence on China, using the word jagang, or self-empowerment. His call has emboldened manufacturers to respond to market demand. Shoes, liquor, cigarettes, socks, sweets, cooking oil, cosmetics and noodles produced in North Korea have already squeezed out or taken market share from Chinese-made versions, defectors said. Regular visitors to Pyongyang, the showcase capital, say a real consumer economy is emerging. “Competition is everywhere, including between travel agencies, taxi companies and restaurants,” Rüdiger Frank, an economist at the University of Vienna who studies the North, wrote recently after visiting a shopping center there. A cellphone service launched in 2008 has more than three million subscribers. With the state still struggling to produce electricity, imported solar panels have become a middle-class status symbol. And on sale at some grocery stores and informal markets on the side streets of Pyongyang is a beverage that state propaganda used to condemn as “cesspool water of capitalism” — Coca-Cola. When Kim Jong-un stood on a balcony reviewing a parade in April, he was flanked by Hwang Pyong-so, the head of the military, and Pak Pong-ju, the premier in charge of the economy. The formation was symbolic of Kim’s byungjin policy, which calls for the parallel pursuit of two policy goals: developing the economy and building nuclear weapons. Only a nuclear arsenal, Kim argues, will make North Korea secure from American invasion and let it focus on growth. Kim has granted state factories more autonomy over what they produce, including authority to find their own suppliers and customers, as long as they hit revenue targets. And families in collective farms are now assigned to individual plots called pojeon. Once they meet a state quota, they can keep and sell any surplus on their own. The measures resemble those adopted by China in the early years of its turn to capitalism in the 1980s. But North Korea has refrained from describing them as market-oriented reforms, preferring the phrase “economic management in our own style.” In state-censored journals, though, economists are already publishing papers describing consumer-oriented markets, joint ventures and special economic zones. It is unclear how much of recent increases in grain production were due to Kim’s policies. Defectors say factories remain hobbled by electricity shortages and decrepit machinery while many farmers have struggled to meet state quotas because they lack fertilizer and modern equipment. More broadly, the economy remains constrained by limited foreign investment and the lack of legal protections for private enterprise or procedures for contract enforcement. Plans to set up special economic zones have remained only plans, as investors have balked at North Korea’s poor infrastructure and record of seizing assets from foreigners, not to mention the sanctions against it. But there is evidence that the state is growing increasingly dependent on the private sector. Cha Moon-seok, a researcher at the Institute for Unification Education of South Korea, estimates that the government collects as much as $222,000 per day in taxes from the marketplaces it manages. In March, the authorities reportedly ordered people selling goods from their homes to move into formal marketplaces in an effort to collect even more. “Officials need the markets as much as the people need them,” said Kim Jeong-ae, a journalist in Seoul who worked as a propagandist in North Korea before defecting. Donju is the word North Koreans use to describe the new class of traders and businessmen that has emerged. Called “red capitalists” by South Korean scholars, donju invest in construction projects, establish partnerships with resource-strapped state factories and bankroll imports from China to supply retailers in the marketplaces. They operate with “covers,” or party officials who protect their businesses. Some are relatives of party officials. Others are ethnic Chinese citizens, who are allowed regular visits to China and can facilitate cross-border financial transactions, and people with relatives who have fled to South Korea and send them cash remittances. Whenever the state begins a big project, like the new district of high-rise apartment buildings that Kim Jong-un unveiled before foreign journalists in April, donju are expected to make “loyalty donations.” Sometimes they pay in foreign currency. Sometimes they contribute building materials, fuel or food for construction workers. “Kim Jong-un is no fool,” said Kang Mi-jin, a defector who once ran her own wholesale business. “He knows where the money is.” Donju often receive medals and certificates in return for their donations, and use them to signal they are protected as they engage in business activities that are officially illegal. They import buses and trucks and run their own transportation services using license plates obtained from state companies. Some donju even rent farmland and mines, working them with their own employees and equipment, or open private pharmacies, defectors said. “Donju wear the socialist hide, operating as part of state-run companies,” Ms. Kang said. “But inside, they are thoroughly capitalist.” Before Kim Jong-un took power, the government made a last attempt to rein in donju and control market forces. It called on citizens to shop only in state stores, banned the use of foreign currency and adopted new bank notes while limiting the amount of old notes that individuals could exchange. The move wiped out much of the private wealth created and saved by both donju and ordinary people. Market activity ground to a near halt. Prices skyrocketed, and protests were reported in scattered cities. The government eventually retreated and is believed to have issued an apology when officials convened villagers for their weekly education sessions. It also executed the country’s top monetary official, Pak Nam-gi. The crisis is widely considered the moment when the government concluded it could no longer suppress the markets. A year later, Pak Pong-ju, a former prime minister who had been ousted for pushing market-oriented policies, was restored to power. He now manages the economy under Kim. As the markets develop, growing numbers of North Koreans will see the vastly superior products made overseas and perhaps question their nation’s backward status. “Thanks to the market, few North Koreans these days flee for food, as refugees in the 1990s did,” said the Rev. Kim Seung-eun, a pastor who has helped hundreds of defectors reach South Korea. “Instead, they now flee to South Korea to have a better life they learned through the markets.” Jung Gwang-il, who leads a defectors’ group in Seoul called No Chain, said that with more North Koreans getting what they needed from markets rather than the state, their view of Kim was changing. “North Koreans always called Kim Jong-un’s grandfather and father ‘the Great Leader’ or ‘the General,’” Mr. Jung said. “Now, when they talk among themselves, many just call Jong-un ‘the Kid.’ They fear him but have no respect for him.” “They say, ‘What has he done for us?’” Jung said. (Choe Sang-hun, “As Markets Spring up, Leader’s Grip on North Korea Slackens,” New York Times, May 1, 2017)
5/2/17:
Rodong Sinmun: “Catalina Devandas Aguilar, UN special rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and her party arrived here Tuesday.” (Rodong Sinmun, “U.N. Official Here,” May 3, 2017)
Heavyweight US Republican senators and former Democratic presidential nominee Hillery Clinton expressed concern after President Donald Trump said he would be “honored” to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. “I don’t understand it and I don’t think that the president appreciates the fact that when he says things like that it helps the credibility and the prestige of this really outrageous strongman,” John McCain, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said on MSNBC. “The largest gulag left on earth is in North Korea. And we all know about their human rights abuses and others.” Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) also said such a meeting could “empower” the North’s dictator. “I’d find it very hard for me to sit down across the table from a guy who makes Bashar Assad look like a choir boy,” Graham said on CNN. “If you understand what he (Kim) does to his own people, you’d be repugnant to be in the room with him.”
Graham also told reporters later that he would caution about such a meeting “because you empower anybody you meet.” “But if (President Trump) can find a way to stop North Korea from developing an ICBM with a nuclear weapon on top of it to hit America and that includes meeting him, count me in,” he said. Clinton said the US should be careful about negotiations with the North. “The North Koreans are always interested, not just Kim Jong-un but his father before him, were always interested in trying to get Americans to come to negotiate to elevate their status and their position. And we should be very careful about giving that away,” Clinton said at a Women for Women International event. “Negotiations are critical, but they have to be part of a broader strategy, not just thrown up on a tweet some morning that, ‘Hey let’s get together and, you know, see if we can get along and maybe we can come up with some sort of a deal.’ That doesn’t work,” she said. Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said that the “right circumstances” for Trump’s talks with the North’s leader should be for the regime to “stop its atomic weapons program and for North Korea to change its policies in terms of its treatment of its people.” “If Kim Jong-un changes his policies and allows political prisoners to be released and stopped his nuclear weapons program, I think we’re in concurrence that we would be able to have these discussions,” Royce told reporters after receiving a medal from South Korea’s government for his contributions to the Korea-US alliance. “Obviously, now is not the time. Now is not the time for those discussions because right now is the time to work with Beijing and the rest of the international community in order to put pressure on North Korea to stop its nuclear weapons program,” he said. (Yonhap, “Clinton expresses Concern about Trump’s Willingness to Meet with Kim Jong Un,” Korea Herald, May 3, 2017)
North Korea’s nuclear weapons development may be designed to take over archrival South Korea and coerce the United States into abandoning its close ally, a senior White House official said Tuesday, questioning the North’s stated purpose of warding off a U.S. invasion. Ruminating about Pyongyang’s possible motivations, Matt Pottinger, the Asia director on President Donald Trump’s National Security Council, said there may be some truth to claims that the North wants a nuclear deterrent to protect its communist dictatorship. But Pottinger said the country’s robust conventional military has worked as a deterrent for decades. Pottinger suggested other “disturbing” explanations for the North’s development of “an arsenal of the worst weapons in the world.” “They have made no secret in conversations they have had with former American officials, for example, and others that they want to use these weapons as an instrument of blackmail to achieve other goals, even including perhaps coercive reunification of the Korean Peninsula one day,” Pottinger told a a panel discussion organized by Sasakawa USA in Washington. The North, he added, also wants to coerce the United States “to leave the peninsula and abandon our alliances.” Echoing other Trump administration officials, Pottinger said the U.S. isn’t seeking regime change in North Korea. Rather, he said the U.S. wants an end to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. “We really have no choice but to increase pressure on North Korea to diplomatically isolate them, to bring a greater economic pain to bear until they are willing to make concrete steps to start reducing that threat,” he said. (Matthew Pennington, “U.S.: North Korea’s Nukes May Be a Tactic for Taking over South Korea,” Associated Press, May 2, 2017)
Moon Jae-in: “WP: Let’s start with THAAD. The U.S. has brought in the THAAD system very quickly and ahead of schedule. Do you view this as the Americans interfering with the election? MOON: I don’t believe the U.S. has the intention, but I do have reservations. It is not desirable for the South Korean government to deploy THAAD hastily at this politically sensitive time with the presidential election, without going through the democratic process, an environmental assessment or a public hearing. One of the biggest problems with this THAAD deployment decision was that it lacked democratic procedure, and it has resulted in a wide division of the nation and aggravated foreign relations. If the South Korean government were to push this issue further, it would only make matters worse, and it would be more difficult to find a solution to this problem. I hope the U.S. government will fully consider these issues. If the same were to happen in the U.S., would this have happened just by the administration’s unilateral decision without democratic procedure, ratification or agreement by Congress? If South Korea can have more time to process this matter democratically, the U.S. would gain a higher level of trust from South Koreans and therefore the alliance between the two nations would become even stronger. If this matter can be reviewed by the next administration, the new government would look for a reasonable solution based on the alliance between South Korea and the U.S. that can secure the national interest as well as a national consensus. South Korea and the U.S. share common interests with regard to the North Korean nuclear issue, so I promise that South Korea will fully consult with the U.S. on the deployment of THAAD. WP: In the policy document you released at the weekend, you said that nothing is more dangerous than letting another country decide for you. Is that an indication that you want to rebalance the alliance? Do you feel that the U.S. has too much say over what happens in South Korea? MOON: The answer is no. I believe the alliance between the two nations is the most important foundation for our diplomacy and national security. South Korea was able to build its national security thanks to the U.S., and the two nations will work together on the North Korean nuclear issue. However, I believe we need to be able to take the lead on matters in the Korean Peninsula as the country directly involved. I do not see it as desirable for South Korea to take the back seat and watch discussions between the U.S. and China and dialogues between North Korea and the U.S. I believe South Korea taking the initiative would eventually strengthen our bilateral alliance with the U.S. However, when I say ‘take the initiative,’ I do not mean that South Korea will approach or unilaterally open talks with North Korea without fully consulting the U.S. beforehand. WP: You said in an interview last December that you would go to Pyongyang before you would go to Washington as a sign of the importance of the North Korean issue. Do you still stand by that today? MOON: First of all, that news report is absolutely not true. I intended to say that, if it would help resolve the nuclear issue, I could go to North Korea after sufficient prior discussions with the U.S. and Japan. I do not know when I will be able to have talks with the North on scrapping its nuclear program, but if I become the president I believe I need to meet with President Trump first to discuss the issue in depth and reach an agreement with him on the measures to abolish North Korea’s nuclear program. With that agreement we can, on the one hand, put pressure on and attempt to persuade North Korea and on the other hand, seek cooperation from China, so we can try to resolve the nuclear issue with the U.S. In that process, I could sit down with Kim Jong Un, but I will not meet him for the sake of meeting him. I will meet Kim Jong Un when preconditions of resolving the nuclear issue are assured. I think I am on the same page as President Trump. President Trump judged the Obama administration’s policy of strategic patience as a failure with regard to North Korea, so he has stressed the need for a change in North Korean policy. WP: I didn’t come here today expecting you to agree with Trump! MOON: Trump talks about strenuous pressure, sanctions and even the possibility of a pre-emptive strike, but I believe his ultimate goal is to bring North Korea back to negotiations for the s nuclear program. In that respect, I share the same opinion as President Trump. Both the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations completely failed in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. I agree with President Trump’s method of applying sanctions and pressure to North Korea to bring them out to negotiate. If that happens, I would meet with Kim Jong Un to secure the nuclear program. I believe President Trump is more reasonable than he is generally perceived. President Trump uses strong rhetoric toward North Korea but, during the election campaign, he also said he could talk over a burger with Kim Jong Un. I am for that kind of pragmatic approach to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. We need to take a staged approach to resolve this problem. The first stage is for North Korea to not engage in any further nuclear provocations such as additional nuclear tests. The second stage is preventing the North from advancing its nuclear capability any further. Finally, the third stage is for North Korea to completely scrap its program. I think President Trump would agree with these measures. WP: What would you say in your first call or meeting with President Trump, especially regarding how to deal with North Korea? MOON: I suppose he’ll congratulate me for being elected to the presidency, so I would thank him for that. I would tell him that I would like to meet with him at the earliest possible opportunity to discuss measures for scrapping North Korea’s nuclear program so that North Korea completely gives up its nuclear ambitions.
WP: What do you say to the people in Washington, sitting there and thinking back to the Roh Moo-hyun era and looking at you as a liberal, soft-on-North-Korea politician. What is your message to them? MOON: When we reflect on the Roh Moo-hyun administration, South Korea decided to dispatch troops to Iraq and sealed the Korea-U. S., which broadened the bilateral alliance from a military alliance to an economic alliance. Also, the six-party talks reached an agreement for completely abolishing the North Korean nuclear program under the close cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. Although the agreement has not been properly implemented since the Lee Myung-bak administration, I would like to stress that our two nations reached an agreement on the North Korean nuclear issue during the Roh administration. Therefore, I would like to stress that the Roh administration brought South Korea and the U.S. closer in that era, contrary to the general perception in Washington.” (Anna Fifield and Yoonjung Seo, “Interview with Moon Jae-in, Set to Be South Korea’s Next President,” Washington Post, May 2, 2017)
When North Korean leader Kim Jong Un sent Lunar New Year greetings this year, the first card went to Russian President Vladimir Putin, ahead of leaders from China and other allies of the isolated country, according to KCNA. Some academics who study North Korea argue Kim could be looking for Russia to ease any pain if China, which accounts for about 90 percent of North Korea’s trade, steps up sanctions against the isolated country as part of moves to deter its nuclear and missile programs. There is no sign of any sustainable increase in trade between Russia and North Korea, but business and transport links between the two are getting busier. A new ferry service starting next week will move up to 200 passengers and 1,000 tonnes of cargo six times a month between North Korea and the Russian port of Vladivostok. Shipping data on Thomson Reuters Eikon shows there has been a recent steady flow of oil tanker traffic from Vladivostok into North Korean east coast ports. On April 27, five North Korean-flagged oil tankers had loaded up at Vladivostok-area ports and identified North Korean ports as their destination. It was not known what products they were carrying. Earlier this year, Russian government officials visited Pyongyang to discuss more cooperation in rail transport, according to media reports. A Russian-built railway link between the Russian eastern border town of Khasan and the North Korean port of Rajin has been used to carry some coal, metals and various oil products. “North Korea does not care about China’s pressure or sanctions because there is Russia next door,” said Leonid Petrov, a North Korea expert at Australia National University. “Pyongyang has been playing off Beijing and Moscow for half a century, letting them compete for the right to aid and influence North Korea.” Russia, especially Vladivostok, is also home to one of the largest overseas communities of North Koreans in the world, and they send home tens of thousands of dollars in much-needed hard currency each month. Trump and Putin spoke in a telephone call today and discussed North Korea, among other issues, both sides said. There was no word of any agreement. Samuel Ramani, a Russia expert at Oxford University, said support for the Pyongyang regime could bring economic benefits for Moscow. It would demonstrate Russia was “a loyal partner to anti-Western regimes facing international isolation and sanctions”, he said. “As Russia has close economic links with other countries at odds with the West, like Iran, Venezuela and Syria, this symbolic dimension of the Russia-North Korea relationship has strategic significance.” China exports about 500,000 tonnes of crude and 270,000 tonnes of products each year, oil industry sources in China say. Russia, the other major supplier of oil to North Korea, exported about 36,000 tonnes of oil products in 2015, the latest year for which figures are available, according to U.N. data. Russia has already taken over the supply of jet fuel to North Korea after China halted exports two years ago, according to the industry sources in China. Russia is also the source of foreign exchange for North Korea, mostly from Vladivostok. The city of 600,000 people, just about 100 km (60 miles) from the border with North Korea, is home to thousands of North Koreans who mainly work on construction or do home renovations. A city web site advertises “Korean Professional Contractors” and says they work “Cheaply and Fast.” One North Korean man, who works as a handyman, told Reuters he was obliged to hand over a portion of his income – $500 – to the North Korean state each month. Thin and in his 30s, he did not disclose his monthly income, but said he charged 4,000 roubles (about $70) for a day’s labor. The man said he had worked in Russia for 11 years, leaving his wife and daughter back home whom he only saw on rare visits. Like all North Koreans, he wore a badge on his lapel bearing the portrait of late North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung. “It’s better here than in North Korea,” said the man, who did not want to be named. “It’s a very difficult life there. Here you can make money.” But the most symbolic upturn in ties between Russia and North Korea is the start of regular trips of the Mangyongbong ferry from yesterday between Vladivostok and the North Korean town of Rajin. Vladimir Baranov, the head of Vladivostok-based Investstroitrest company, told Reuters his company had chartered the Mangyongbong and would be the general agent for the ferry route. The aging boat used to ferry tourists between Japan and North Korea, but Tokyo banned its visits in 2006 as part of sanctions against Pyongyang. Still, despite the differences with the United States and the existing links with North Korea, experts say Russia is unlikely to sharp increase trade with Pyongyang because of its low foreign exchange reserves and general unreliability. “All trade with North Korea has to be subsidized,” said Andrei Lankov, a Russian North Korea expert at Seoul’s Kookmin University. “I do not see the Russian government spending its dwindling currency reserves to support the regime they despise and see as incurably ungrateful, and also prone to risky adventurism.” (James Pearson and Alexei Chernyshev, “As U.S. and China Find Common Ground on North Korea, Is Russia the Wild Card?” Reuters, May 3, 2017)
5/3/17:
The Trump administration is just at the beginning stages of its campaign to pressure North Korea to give up developing nuclear weapons, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson told State Department employees in a wide-ranging discourse on applying “America first” principles to foreign policy. Tillerson said the administration is 20 percent to 25 percent of its way into a strategy that includes preparing more sanctions against government officials and individuals, convincing other countries to apply existing U.N. sanctions more rigorously and “leaning hard” on China to use its influence to get North Korea to change direction. “It’s a pressure campaign that has a knob on it,” he said to a packed auditorium of employees while thousands of others watched his remarks via live stream. “We’re at dial setting five or six now.” Tillerson said Washington would negotiate with Pyongyang “when conditions are right” but added a caveat: “We are not going to negotiate our way to the negotiating table. That is what Pyongyang has done for the last 20 years, is cause us to have to negotiate to get them to sit down. We’ll sit down when they’re ready to sit down under the right terms.” (Carol Morello and Anne Gearan, “Tillerson Says Putting Pressure on North Korea Is Just the Beginning,” Washington Post, May 3, 2017)
Tillerson: “…So I give you that as kind of an overarching view of how I think about the President’s approach of “America first.” We must secure the nation. We must protect our people. We must protect our borders. We must protect our ability to be that voice of our values now and forevermore. And we can only do that with economic prosperity. So it’s foreign policy projected with a strong ability to enforce the protection of our freedoms with a strong military. And all of you that have been at this a long time understand the value of speaking with a posture of strength – not a threatening posture, but a posture of strength. People know we can back it up. So with that in mind, let me just quickly walk around the world and give you my assessment of where we are in some of the early stages of policy that’s underway and some that’s yet to be developed. So as all of you clearly understand, when we came in to the State Department, the administration came in, was sworn in, immediately confronted with a serious situation in North Korea. Now, the prior administration, as all of you know, President Obama told President Trump this was going to be your greatest threat that you’re going to have to manage, and he was right. So it was – it’s right on the doorstep. And so it got immediate attention. It was the first policy area that we began to develop in terms of what is our overarching strategic approach and how do we want to execute against that. In evaluating that, what was important to us and to me to understand was, first, where are our allies? And so engaging with our allies and ensuring that our allies and we see the situation the same – our allies in South Korea, our allies in Japan. And then, secondly, it was to engage with the other regional powers as to how do they see it. And so it was useful and helpful to have the Chinese and now the Russians articulate clearly that their policy is unchanged; they – their policy is a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. And of course we did our part many years ago. We took all the nuclear weapons out of South Korea. So now we have a shared objective, and that’s very useful, from which you then build out your policy approaches and your strategies. So many people are saying, well, gee, this is just the same thing we’ve tried over and over – we’re going to put pressure on the regime in Pyongyang, they’re not going to do anything, and then in the end we’ll all cave. Well, the difference, I think, in our approach this time is we’re going to test this assumption, and when the – when folks came in to review the situation with me, the assumption was that China has limited influence on the regime in Pyongyang, or they have a limited willingness to assert their influence. And so I told the President we’ve got to test that, and we’re going to test it by leaning hard into them, and this is a good place to start our engagement with China. And so that’s what we’ve been doing, is leaning hard into China to test their willingness to use their influence, their engagement with the regime in North Korea. All of it backed up by very strong resolve on our part to have a denuclearized peninsula with a commitment to our security alliances on the peninsula and in the region to our important allies Japan and South Korea. So it’s a pressure campaign that has a knob on it. I’d say we’re at about dial setting 5 or 6 right now, with a strong call of countries all over the world to fully implement the UN Security Council resolutions regarding sanctions, because no one has ever fully implemented those. So we’re going to lean into people to fully implement them. We’ve told them we’re watching what you’re doing. When we see you not implementing, we see companies or we see individuals that are violating these sanctions, we’re going to contact you and we’re going to ask you to take care of it. If you can’t take care of it or you simply don’t want to take care of it for your own internal political reasons, we will. We’ll sanction them through third-country sanctions. So we are being very open and transparent about our intentions, and we’re asking our partners around the world to please take actions on your own. We want you to control how that happens. We’re not trying to control it for you, but we have an expectation of what you will do. So we’re putting that pressure on. We are preparing additional sanctions, if it turns out North Korea’s actions warrant additional sanctions. We’re hopeful that the regime in North Korea will think about this and come to a conclusion that there’s another way to the future. We know they have – they’re – they aspire to nuclear weapons because it’s the regime’s belief it’s the only way they can secure their future. We are clear – we’ve been clear to them this is not about regime change, this is not about regime collapse, this is not about an accelerated reunification of the peninsula, this is not about us looking for an excuse to come north of the 38th Parallel. So we’re trying to be very, very clear and resolute in our message to them that your future security and economic prosperity can only be achieved through your following your commitments to denuclearize. So this is where we are. We’re at – I would say we’re at about the 20 to 25 percent stage of this strategy. Thus far, our assessment is it is going like we had hoped for in terms of the response we’re getting from others, but we’ve got a lot of work left to do to keep that pressure on. And so that’s what the folks that are in the bureaus and out in the missions are doing to help us right now, is to continue this steady, resolute message and continue to talk out here to the North Koreans, but not here, yet, about what our intentions are and what we want. We are ready and prepared to engage in talks when conditions are right. But as you’ve heard me say, we are not going to negotiate our way to the negotiating table. That is what Pyongyang has done for the last 20 years, is cause us to have to negotiate to get them to sit down. We’ll sit down when they’re ready to sit down under the right terms. So that’s North Korea.” (Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Remarks to U.S. Department of State Employees, Washington, May 3, 2017)
KCNA: “Kim Chol released a commentary [today], urging Chinese newspapers to refrain from making reckless remarks undermining the DPRK-China relations. Noting that a string of absurd and reckless remarks are now heard from big neighboring countries, perhaps frightened at the U.S. blackmail and war racket, everyday only to render the acute situation of the Korean peninsula more strained, the commentary says: The People’s Daily and the Global Times, widely known as media speaking for the official stand of the Chinese party and government, have recently carried commentaries asserting that the DPRK’s access to nukes poses a threat to the national interests of China. They shifted the blame for the deteriorated relations between the DPRK and China onto the DPRK and raised lame excuses for the base acts of dancing to the tune of the U.S. Those commentaries claimed that the DPRK poses a threat to “the security in the northeastern region of China” by conducting nuclear tests less than 100 km away from its border with China. They even talked rubbish that the DPRK strains the situation in Northeast Asia and “offers the U.S. excuses for deploying more strategic assets” in the region. Not content with such paradox, the commentaries asserted that to remain averse to the DPRK’s access to nukes is to preserve interests common to the U.S. and China, calling for slapping harsher sanctions against the DPRK in order to avert a war which would bring danger to China. The newspapers, even claiming China holds the initiative in handling the DPRK-China relations, made no scruple of letting out a string of provocative remarks urging the DPRK to choose one among such options if it doesn’t want military confrontation with China — “whether to face protracted isolation or to preserve national security by making a U-turn” and whether to break Sino-DPRK friendship or to dismantle its nukes. This is just a wanton violation of the independent and legitimate rights, dignity and supreme interests of the DPRK and, furthermore, constitutes an undisguised threat to an honest-minded neighboring country which has a long history and tradition of friendship. China is hyping up “damage caused by the DPRK’s nuclear tests” in its three northeastern provinces. This only reveals the ulterior purpose sought by it, being displeased with the DPRK’s rapid development of nukes. As far as “violation of national interests” oft-repeated by politicians and media persons of China is concerned, it is just the issue that the DPRK should rather talk much about. It is just the DPRK whose strategic interests have been repeatedly violated due to insincerity and betrayal on the part of its partner, not China at all. Some theorists of China are spouting a load of nonsense that the DPRK’s access to nukes strains the situation in Northeast Asia and offers the U.S. an excuse for beefing up its strategic assets in the region. But the U.S. had activated its strategy for dominating Asia-Pacific long before the DPRK had access to nukes, and its primary target is just China. China should acknowledge in an honest manner that the DPRK has just contributed to protecting peace and security of China, foiling the U.S. scheme for aggression by waging a hard fight in the frontline of the showdown with the U.S. for more than seven decades, and thank the DPRK for it. Some ignorant politicians and media persons of China daringly assert that the traditional relations of the DPRK-China friendship were in line with the interests of each county in the past. They are advised to clearly understand the essence of history before opening their mouth.
Their call for not only slapping stricter sanctions but also not ruling out a military intervention if the DPRK refuses to abandon its nuclear program is no more than an extremely ego-driven theory based on big-power chauvinism that not only the strategic interests but also the dignity and vital rights of the DPRK should be sacrificed for the interests of China. One must clearly understand that the DPRK’s line of access to nukes for the existence and development of the country can neither be changed nor shaken and that the DPRK will never beg for the maintenance of friendship with China, risking its nuclear program which is as precious as its own life, no matter how valuable the friendship is. The DPRK, which has already become one of the most powerful nuclear weapons state, does not feel the need to think over how many options it has now. China should no longer try to test the limits of the DPRK’s patience but make proper strategic option, facing up to the situation. China had better ponder over the grave consequences to be entailed by its reckless act of chopping down the pillar of the DPRK-China relations.” (KCNA, “Commentary on China-DPRK Relations,” May 3, 2017)
KCNA: “A relevant institution of the DPRK intercepted American citizen Kim Sang Dok at Pyongyang International Airport at 8:00 on April 22 under a relevant law of the DPRK. Invited to Pyongyang University of Science and Technology to teach accounting as a professor, he was intercepted for committing criminal acts of hostility aimed to overturn the DPRK not only in the past but also during his last stay before interception. Kim is now under detention by a relevant law enforcement body which is conducting detailed investigation into his crimes.” (KCNA, “American Citizen Kim Sang Dok Detained in DPRK for Committing Hostile Acts,” May 3, 2017)
5/4/17:
Cracks in the alliance between North Korea and China widened Thursday as Pyongyang labeled its longtime communist ally a traitor, while Beijing expressed skepticism about renewing a 56-year old friendship and mutual assistance treaty. The North’s state-run Korean Central News Agency issued a commentary yesterday that included a rare and blunt attack on China. The commentary said China had violently crossed a “red line” in their relationship. “It is a “disloyal and betraying act,” it said. The North “will never beg for the maintenance of friendship with China, risking its nuclear program which is as precious as its own life, no matter how valuable the friendship is,” the commentary also said. In an attempt to avoid a formal diplomatic feud, the North issued the commentary in the name of a private citizen, Kim Chol, rather than having it come from a government official or entity. The statement was the North’s response to China’s intensifying pressure over its nuclear arms program. After a series of strategy meetings by top Chinese officials including Foreign Minister Wang Yu and Fu Ying, chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, Beijing reportedly decided to bolster its sanctions and pressure on the North while creating a mood for talks at the same time. A series of measures were taken since late April to implement the plan. At UN Security Council ministerial talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis, Wang presented the idea on April 28. Fu also published an essay on the Brookings Institution website earlier this week to send a message to both the North and the United States. “Powerful states may have greater influence over the international situation, but they should also bear the consequences of what they say or do. Smaller or weaker states may counter or respond to pressure from powerful states, but there is a price to pay for doing so,” she wrote. China’s pressure on the North includes implementation of new trade sanctions. All cargo to the North is being checked at the North Korea-China border, a change from random checks, Radio Free Asia reported. The searches were conducted without increasing the number of customs officials. The new inspection policy will create a serious bottleneck for North Korean trucks, which formerly arrived at Dandong, China, in the morning and returned home in the afternoon. Smuggling goods and cash into the North will also become much harder, the report said. After Pyongyang issued its direct criticism of Beijing, China also responded angrily. Global Times expressed skepticism today about the need to maintain the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty. In an editorial, the newspaper said the treaty was intended to promote bilateral cooperation and friendship as well as regional peace and security, and the North’s nuclear development goes against those principles. The newspaper said the treaty, signed in 1961, was automatically extended in 1981 and 2001. It will expire in 2021. “Since 2001, the conflicts between Pyongyang and Beijing over the North’s nuclear arms program grew, and voices grew inside and out of China to question the effectiveness of the treaty,” it said. “The North’s nuclear and missile provocations are in violation of the treaty by posing greater threats of a war.”
China is expected to continue its efforts to pressure the North while promoting dialogue at the same time. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said yesterday that UN Security Council had an in-depth discussion last week on the North Korea issue and “most of the Security Council members put stress on both nuclear non-proliferation and peace talks.” (Shin Kyung-jin and Ser Myo-ja, “Relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing Sharply Deteriorates,” JoongAng Ilbo, May 4, 2017)
In a rare and surprisingly pointed criticism of China, North Korea’s state-run news agency warned in a commentary that the country would continue its nuclear weapons program even if it risked losing a friendly relationship with its longtime ally. The angry commentary, attributed to a writer named Kim Chol and carried by KCNA, came as President Trump was pressing China to increase the enforcement of sanctions against its neighbor to contain its nuclear and long-range missile programs. “One must clearly understand that the D.P.R.K.’s line of access to nukes for the existence and development of the country can neither be changed nor shaken,” the commentary said. “And that the D.P.R.K. will never beg for the maintenance of friendship with China, risking its nuclear program which is as precious as its own life, no matter how valuable the friendship is.” It is unusual for the state news media of North Korea to issue such a direct criticism of China, which accounts for 90 percent of its external trade and provides almost all of the country’s oil imports. A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Geng Shuang, sounded conciliatory when asked about the commentary at a regular news briefing today. “China’s position on denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula is consistent and clear, and so is our position on developing good-neighborly and friendly relations with the D.P.R.K.,” Geng said. The commentary was published as a rebuttal to a series of commentaries and editorials in the state-controlled Chinese news media, including Global Times, which had criticized the North’s nuclear weapons program and called for Beijing to cut off oil supplies if the North conducted another nuclear test. Today, Global Times responded to the KCNA piece, saying the North was “grappling with some form of irrational logic” over its weapons programs. In February, KCNA carried another commentary bitterly critical of China after Beijing announced that it was suspending all coal imports from North Korea for the rest of the year. But at the time, it did not mention China by name. The commentary on Wednesday did not directly attack the government or the Communist Party of China, instead criticizing “commentaries” and “some ignorant politicians and media persons” in China. But it pointedly noted that these opinions were carried in publications “widely known as media speaking for the official stand of the Chinese party and government” and accused China of “insincerity and betrayal.” In the North Korean state media, a commentary by an individual writer does not carry as much weight as an official government statement. But such bylined commentaries closely follow an official script, and the government in Pyongyang often uses them to voice its view indirectly. Kim Chol’s commentary is the latest sign that North Korea fears China will acquiesce to American pressure for more vigorous sanctions enforcement, especially after Trump’s summit meeting last month with the Chinese president, Xi Jinping. Last month, the Associated Press reported from Pyongyang that drivers were scrambling to fill their tanks as gas stations began limiting services, an apparent response to reports that Beijing might use its oil supplies as leverage to force North Korea to stop developing nuclear weapons. The KCNA commentary on Wednesday was the North’s most bitter and categorical criticism of China in recent memory, said Cheong Seong-chang, a longtime North Korea analyst at the Sejong Institute, a South Korean think tank. “It has been a long-established tradition between North Korea and China that even if they held grudges against each other, they didn’t voice them in public,” Cheong said. “This shows that the current North Korea-China relations are bad enough for both sides to break that tradition.” Cheong said that to avoid economic overdependence on China, North Korea would try to strengthen ties with Russia and South Korea, where a liberal candidate more supportive of dialogue and economic exchanges with the North was likely to win a presidential election May 9. It has been a long-running strategy of North Korea to drive a wedge between the powers surrounding it and find room for maneuvering in the rift. Vice Foreign Minister Han Song-ryol of North Korea met with the Russian ambassador in Pyongyang on April 30, and both sides “agreed to boost cooperation in various fields in line with the longstanding friendly relations,” KCNA reported. A North Korean delegation also visited the Russian Far East last month to discuss cooperation, according to KCNA. Analysts in South Korea have said that North Korea was trying to import more Russian oil to lessen its fuel dependence on China. The North is also believed to send workers to Russia to earn foreign currency. (Choe Sang-hun, “In Rebuke of China, North Korean Media Says Nuclear Program Will Go On,” New York Times, May 5, 2017,
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson urged Southeast Asian foreign ministers to do more to help cut funding streams for North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and to minimize diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. In his first ministerial meeting with all 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Tillerson also called on nations with competing claims in the South China Sea to cease all island building and militarization while talks aimed at creating a maritime code of conduct were under way. Patrick Murphy, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia, said Tillerson stressed Washington’s security and economic commitment to the region, amid doubts raised by President Donald Trump’s “America First” platform and withdrawal from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade pact. Tillerson called on ASEAN countries to fully implement U.N. sanctions on Pyongyang, which is working to develop a nuclear-tipped missile capable of reaching the United States, and to show a united front on the issue, Murphy said. “We think that more can be done, not just in Southeast Asia,” he told reporters. “We are encouraging continued and further steps across all of ASEAN.” Last week, Tillerson called on all countries to suspend or downgrade diplomatic ties with Pyongyang, saying that North Korea abuses diplomatic privileges to help fund its arms programs. Tillerson also warned that Washington would sanction foreign firms and people conducting business with North Korea if countries did not act themselves. All ASEAN members have diplomatic relations with North Korea and five have embassies there. Murphy said Washington was not encouraging ASEAN states to formally cut ties, but to examine the North Korean presence “where it clearly exceeds diplomatic needs.” He said some countries were already doing this and also looking at the presence of North Korean workers, another significant revenue earner for Pyongyang. Some officials of ASEAN members, speaking to reporters, acknowledged concerns about North Korea, but also cited concerns about trade relations with the United States. Philippine acting Foreign Affairs Secretary Enrique Manalo, whose country currently chairs ASEAN, said of the U.S. call to minimize relations with Pyongyang, “We haven’t really discussed that among the ASEAN countries, so that’s probably something we will look at. Our immediate concern is to try and ensure the tension on the peninsula doesn’t increase. … The last thing we would like to see is to have a conflict break out due to some miscalculation,” Manalo said. Singapore’s foreign minister, Vivian Balakrishnan, said sanctions would have to be fully implemented, but North Korea’s presence in his country is already minimal. Asked if that could be further reduced, he said: “I won’t say never, but at this point in time that’s not the issue – we will stick with the U.N. Security Council’s resolutions.” Balakrishnan, whose country signed the TPP, stressed the importance of U.S.-ASEAN business ties – annual trade of $100 billion supporting half a million U.S. jobs and $274 billion of U.S. investment. “Southeast Asia is replete with economic opportunities and it’s too big to miss out on,” he said. His remark highlighted growing concern in Asia that Trump has ditched former President Barack Obama’s economic “pivot” to the region by abandoning the TPP, something analysts say has led to more countries being pulled into China’s orbit. Diplomats say U.S. pressure has caused some irritation in ASEAN, including Malaysia, which has maintained relations with Pyongyang in spite of the assassination of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s estranged half-brother at Kuala Lumpur International airport in February. (David Brunnstrom, “Tillerson Urged ASEAN to Cut North Korea Funding, Minimize Ties,” Reuters, May 4, 2017)
Determined to exert greater economic pressure on North Korea, the Republican-led House voted 419-1 to impose new sanctions on Pyongyang targeting its shipping industry and use of slave labor. The legislation sponsored by Rep. Ed Royce of California, the Republican chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Rep. Eliot Engel of New York, the committee’s senior Democrat, is aimed at thwarting North Korea’s ambitions by cutting off access to the cash the regime needs to follow through with its plans. The bill bars ships owned by North Korea or by countries that refuse to comply with U.N. resolutions against it from operating in American waters or docking at U.S. ports. Goods produced by North Korea’s forced labor would be prohibited from entering the United States, according to the legislation. Anyone who uses the slave labor that North Korea exports to other countries would be subject to sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the bill states. At times when the nation is facing unusual or extraordinary threats, the president has wide authority under the law, including the power to block or prohibit transactions involving property located in the U.S. Goods produced by North Korean forced labor would be barred from entering the United States, under the bill. Royce said companies from Senegal to Qatar to Angola import North Korean workers, who send their salary back to Pyongyang, earning the regime billions of dollars in hard currency each year. “This is money that Kim Jong-un uses to advance his nuclear and missile program, and also pay his generals, buying their loyalty to his brutal regime,” he said. “That is what the high-level defectors that I meet with say. So let’s squeeze his purse.” The bill also requires the Trump administration to determine within 90 days whether North Korea is a state sponsor of terrorism. Such a designation would trigger more sanctions, including restriction on U.S. foreign assistance. (Richard Lardner, “House Overwhelmingly Passes New Sanctions on North Korea,” Associated Press, May 4, 2017)
5/5/17:
DPRK Ministry of State Security statement: “The last-ditch effort of the hostile forces, taken aback by the strong spirit of the DPRK dashing toward the final victory of the cause of Juche revolution, has gone beyond the limits after reaching the extreme phase. The recent hysteria about “beheading operation” and “preemptive attack”, openly staged by the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet military warmongers at the doorstep of the DPRK, is just the tip of the ice berg of those moves. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the U.S. and the Intelligence Service (IS) of south Korea, hotbed of evils in the world, hatched a vicious plot to hurt the supreme leadership of the DPRK and those acts have been put into the extremely serious phase of implementation after crossing the threshold of the DPRK. A hideous terrorists’ group, which the CIA and the IS infiltrated into the DPRK on the basis of covert and meticulous preparations to commit state-sponsored terrorism against the supreme leadership of the DPRK by use of bio-chemical substance, has been recently detected. The murderous demons of the IS who conspired with the CIA ideologically corrupted and bribed a DPRK citizen surnamed Kim, the then worker of the timber industrial branch in the Khabarovsk Territory of Russia in June 2014, and turned him into a terrorist full of repugnance and revenge against the supreme leadership of the DPRK. They hatched a plot of letting human scum Kim commit bomb terrorism targeting the supreme leadership during events at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun and at military parade and public procession after his return home. They told him that assassination by use of biochemical substances including radioactive substance and nano poisonous substance is the best method that does not require access to the target, their lethal results will appear after six or twelve months, bio-chemical substance can be added in cooperation with the CIA if one single correct information is obtained, the component of terrorism-purposed bio-chemical substance is the know-how of the CIA and it is only the CIA that can produce such substance, and that hardware, supplies and funds needed for committing terrorism against the supreme leadership will completely be borne by the IS. Then they handed him over 20,000 U.S. dollars on two occasions and a satellite transmitter-receiver and let him get versed in it. In the end, they gave him assurances of IS that they would keep his duty concerning terrorism against the supreme leadership as secret, and infiltrated him after appeasing and blackmailing him that his families would not be scot-free in case he fails to carry out the duty. In January, May, August and September of 2016 IS agents had satellite contacts with Kim who resided in Pyongyang. The IS agents gave instructions to choose and report the most effective and safe method with high probability of success while presenting him various terrorist methods using biochemical substances along with operational code of terrorism against the supreme leadership, the ways of bribing an object who would directly carry out the terrorist act and ways of entering the grounds of events. On August 12, 2016 they gave him an instruction to collect and send as much information as possible concerning the surrounding environment of event ground where celebrations are held frequently, guard situation there and orders observed at times of events, saying that once concrete and detailed data are given, they would study the most reasonable way in cooperation with the CIA. Urging him to set up an overseas liaison center for the safe introduction of equipment, aterials and fund for the terrorist acts, they financed him 100,000 U.S. dollars on two occasions for setting up the center and bribing terrorist accomplices. In March and April last an IS agent Jo Ki Chol and his secret agent Xu Guanghai, director general of the Qingdao NAZCA Trade Co. Ltd., met the terrorist accomplice in Dandong of China and handed him over new satellite transmitter-receiver and 50 000 U.S. dollars. They signed a “contract” on setting up the overseas liaison center and let the necessary equipment and materials be introduced as the first installment in early May. On April 7 a guy surnamed Han, chief of the IS team, taught Kim the way of bribing terrorist accomplices, saying that “even the U.S. CIA uses gradual engagement with due consideration given to the greed and mentality of persons depending on which class and strata they belong” and told him to use it as a reference in engaging terrorist accomplices to be infiltrated to the event ground. On November 4, 2016 and on April 13, 17 and 20 this year they let Kim know that they officially confirmed the types of bio-chemical substance and hardware to be used for committing terrorist act against the supreme leadership and requested it to the CIA, and instructed him to restudy the “creed” of the terrorist executor and reconfirm the state of “brainwashing” of him and report about them. They also repeatedly instructed him to take the best measure for the examination and preparations for the terrorist operation, as there can be such catastrophic incident as a war once the fact about terrorist means and funds provided by the IS is known. The chief of the south Korean puppet Intelligence Service Ri Pyong Ho praised the terrorist as a “very valuable existence for the nation and ‘IS'” and directly organized the terrorist operation and let the chief of the IS team Han and agent Jo Ki Chol take the lead in executing it. The puppet forces gave the terrorist more than 80 instructions for the execution of the operation. Recently the CIA and the IS actively spread the story about “emergency situation in the north” while trumpeting about advantages of terrorism by use of biochemical substances as such way can minimize the adverse effect on the executor and the back-stage manipulator and help evade retaliation against the assailant side and international denunciation. Lurking behind the story was the heinous plot that has been pushed forward in top secrecy. The DPRK Ministry of State Security clarifies as follows upon authorization since the hysteria of the U.S. and the south Korean puppet intelligence institution aimed to hurt the dignity of the DPRK supreme leadership has reached the dangerous phase which can no longer be overlooked: 1. We will ferret out and mercilessly destroy to the last one the terrorists of the U.S. CIA and the puppet IS of south Korea targeting the dignity of the DPRK supreme leadership. We do not view the recent hideous crime just as an act of encroachment on the security and sovereignty of the state that can be committed by dishonest hostile forces. The recent case was the most vicious challenge and the declaration of a war aimed to hurt the mental mainstay that all the Korean people absolutely trust and repose and to eclipse the eternal sun of the DPRK. It is the fixed will of the army and people of the DPRK that they can never tolerate even dreaming about such a crime. Criminals going hell-bent to realize such a pipe dream cannot survive on this land even a moment. This is a stern punishment made on behalf of the human conscience and in the name of all Koreans. The Ministry of State Security whose mission is to safeguard the leader, the social system and the people will ferret out to the last one the organizer, conspirator and followers of the recent hideous state-sponsored terrorism even by ransacking the whole earth, in reflection of the will of the army and people of the DPRK burning their hearts with hatred and wrath against the hideous murderous devils, no matter at which corner of the planet they may be. 2. Korean-style anti-terrorist attack will be commenced from this moment to sweep away the intelligence and plot-breeding organizations of the U.S. imperialists and the puppet clique, the most mean and brutal hideous terrorist group in the world. Even though we wipe out all those villains involved in the recent hideous state-sponsored terrorism, there is no vouch that the enemies would stop maneuvering as long as the chieftains and the plot-breeding bases remain. It is not a secret that the U.S. imperialists and the puppet group of traitors are getting all the more reckless with each passing day and their moves are spearheaded against the supreme headquarters of the Korean revolution. It is as clear as noonday that such heinous crime targeting the supreme headquarters of the Korean revolution would continue to be attempted, as long as the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet group of traitors remain unchanged in their hostile policy toward the DPRK and there are CIA and IS running amuck as a spearhead in executing the policy. Therefore, it is our determination to root up all the dens of plot and trick like CIA and IS, the source of all evils in the world, and a series of more powerful our-style anti-terrorism striking actions will begin immediately. 3. All the countries and peoples of the world that value justice and peace should resolutely turn out in the sacred struggle to terminate the heinous terrorist act committed by the U.S., kingpin of terrorism and chieftain of plot, and the south Korean puppet group of traitors. The present international situation proves that terrorism is a common enemy to humankind and the world would have no moment of peace unless terrorism is eradicated. The bloody terrorist acts of CIA and IS backed by the U.S., the empire of evil, in different parts of the world surpass terrorism which is said to be perpetrated by “Islamic State” forces. Nevertheless, the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet group of traitors have often brought charge of “terrorism” to anti-U.S. states and resorted to unprecedentedly hideous terrorism without hesitation under the pretexts of “anti-terrorism war”, “opposition to biochemical weapons”, “sponsor of terrorism”, etc. The heinous crime, which was recently uncovered and smashed in the DPRK, is a kind of terrorism against not only the DPRK but the justice and conscience of humankind and an act of mangling the future of humankind. The world free from fear of terrorism is no more than a daydream, as long as there exist in it such groups of bloodthirsty felons as CIA and IS, common enemies hoodwinking and trifling the humankind and outrageous destroyers of the earth. The honest peace-loving peoples of the world should wage a joint struggle to put an end to all sorts of inhumane plots, arbitrariness and evildoings that ruthlessly trample down their desire for peace and stability. The U.S. and the south Korean puppet group of traitors should clearly see their dirty looks as bloodstained homicidal maniac and make an apology to the DPRK for their atrocious state-terrorism and inhumane crime and immediately put the criminals to a death penalty. If they continue to make challenges in disregard of the DPRK’s warning and common desire of humankind, they are bound to meet nothing but the most miserable end in history.” (KCNA, “DPRK Warns U.S., S. Korean Intelligence Agencies of Merciless Punishment: Ministry of State Security,” May 5, 2017)
Institute for American Studies of DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman’s statement: “The U.S. carried out inter-continental ballistic missile test-fire on May 3 in the wake of the one on April 26 at a time when the situation on the Korean peninsula has reached the extremely dangerous phase due to the largest-ever joint military drills waged by the U.S. after introducing huge nuclear strategic assets, and the military provocation moves conducted by it. The U.S. claims the two ICBM test-fires conducted just in a little over one week were planned one year ago and they have nothing to do with the DPRK’s nuclear and long-range ballistic missile launch but many world media are concerned that the consecutive ICBM tests by the U.S. can push the acute situation on the Korean peninsula to graver phase. The U.S. maintains it may carry out missile launches but the DPRK cannot and that its launches are “contribution” to peace and security while the DPRK’s are “provocation” straining tension. This sophism is the height of double-dealing standards. The UN Security Council has kept mum about the U.S. test-fire of ICBM which flew more than 6 000 km across the ocean, even while crying out for “denunciation” and “sanctions” as for ballistic rocket test-fires the DPRK carried out in its own territorial land and waters. The UN Security Council which calls into question only the DPRK’s ballistic rocket test-fires while turning an unseeing eye to the U.S. ICBM test-fires under the pressure of Washington’s high-handed and arbitrary practices deserves the name of “double-dealing standards Security Council” or “U.S. Security Council.” In order to realize genuine international justice and build a fair and peaceful world, the U.S. double-dealing yardstick must be broken and the UN Security Council moving at the beck and call of the U.S. must be reformed. The DPRK will bolster the capabilities for Korean-style preemptive nuclear attack at remarkably higher pace as it has already clarified as long as the U.S. continues its hostile policy toward the DPRK and vicious nuclear threat and blackmail. If the UN Security Council does not call the U.S. to account for its aggressive and provocative large-scale joint military exercises and ICBM launches, the DPRK will not recognize any UNSC’s “resolution” taken over the DPRK’s ballistic rocket launches but continue to disclose the absurdity of the UN “sanction resolutions.” No one is entitled to find fault with the DPRK’s exercise of its just right to defend its sovereignty and right to existence.” (KCNA, “Institute for American Studies of DPRK Foreign Ministry Condemns U.S. ICBM Test-Fires,” May 5, 2017)
Disarmament and Peace Institute of DPRK Foreign Ministry study report “disclosing the danger of the heinous moves the U.S. has persisted while resorting to military adventure to push the situation on the Korean peninsula to the point of explosion of a thermonuclear war, and clarifying the validity of the principled stand of the DPRK to firmly defend the peace and stability on the peninsula and in the region. The U.S. military provocation moves have reached the height with Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 17 joint military drills as occasions. …The U.S. hurled 300 000-strong troops into the aggression war drills including troops from the U.S. military bases in areas around the Korean peninsula and even its mainland, to say nothing of those troops present in south Korea and the south Korean puppet forces. Through the joint military drill the U.S. posed an open military threat to the DPRK and, in actuality, planned to put preemptive attack and aggression war into practice. Under the active patronage and instigation of the U.S, the south Korean puppet forces conducted provocation in the hotspot waters in the West Sea of Korea in real earnest to ignite a war. Due to the U.S. extreme military provocation moves, the acute situation on the peninsula has lasted even after the joint military drills. Timed to coincide with the end of the drills, the U.S. introduced Carl Vinson carrier task force, Michigan nuclear submarine and other strategic assets into the Korean peninsula, ratcheting up military tension to the maximum. On May 1, just one day after joint military drills came to an end, B-1B nuclear strategic bomber formation was brought into the sky over south Korea to hold the drill of dropping nuclear bombs. From May 3 the U.S. staged joint military drills in areas around the Korean peninsula together with Japan, Britain and France, rendering tenser the situation on the peninsula, over which dark clouds of a nuclear war hang heavily. The evil cycle of escalation of tension has continued on the Korean peninsula due to the aggression war moves steadily conducted by the U.S. in conspiracy with its vassal forces. It is nothing but a despicable double-dealing tactics for the U.S. to talk about “dialogue” while hyping its political, economic and military pressure on the DPRK to an extreme pitch. And to clamor for denuclearization is a revelation of the gangster-like intention to deprive the DPRK of its nukes and open the way for a war of aggression. The report contended that it is the exercise of the full-fledged sovereignty which no one can fault with for the DPRK to continue to take measures for bolstering its nuclear force to the maximum with a firm hold on the nuclear treasured sword for independence and justice to stand against the U.S. unprecedented anti-DPRK moves.” (KCNA, “Disarmament and Peace Institute of Foreign Ministry on Validity of DPRK’s Stand to Defend Peace and Stability,” May 5, 2017)
North Korea’s coal exports sharply declined in March compared with the amounts tallied for the previous two months, a U.N. website showed. An unidentified country reported to the U.N. committee that it imported 6,300 tons of North Korean coal valued at some US$570,000 in March, according to the website. The unspecified nation is presumed to be China. For January and February, a country believed to be China reported that it imported 1.44 million tons and 1.23 million tons of coal from the North, respectively. The March data may reflect China’s calculation of some coal that was earlier imported but compiled later, experts said. A possibility of a third country importing North Korean coal cannot be ruled out, they added. (Yonhap, “N. Korea’s Coal Exports Fall Sharply in March; U.N. Website,” May 5, 2017)
KCNA: “Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea and chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK, inspected the defense detachment on Jangjae Islet and the Hero Defense Detachment on Mu Islet located in the southernmost part of the waters off the southwest front. He looked at Yonphyong Island at the observation post of the defense detachment on Jangjae Islet. After receiving a report from Pak Jong Chon, director of the Artillery Bureau, on the recent movements of the enemy of the Command for the Defense of Northwestern Islands of the south Korean puppet army and the situation of the reinforced unit on Yonphyong Island, he acquainted and examined the plan for fire strike of the newly organized forces at the objects of the enemy. He said that the KPA elite artillery group defending the southwest front should keep highly alert to break the backbone of the enemy once ordered. Going round the firing area and gun shelters, he acquainted himself with combat readiness. Looking round the newly-built room for turning seawater into fresh water, he acquainted himself with the production and supply of the fresh water. He also went round the barracks, mess hall and newly-built vegetable greenhouse and stables. He had a photo session with the service members and families of officers of the defense detachment on Jangjae Islet. Then he inspected the Hero Defense Detachment on Mu Islet. Going round the observation post, gun shelter and the position of gun no.1 honored with the title of DPRK Hero, he acquainted himself with the combat duty. He said that the Hero Defense Detachment on Mu Islet smashed the reckless and provocative shelling by the south Korean puppet warmongers with the merciless shower of shells to turn Yonphyong Island into a sea of fire, thus showing the spirit of the artillery of the KPA before the enemy. The Yonphyong Island shelling was the most delightful battle after the ceasefire and the feat of the service members of the Defense Detachment on Mu Islet is the brilliant military service to hand down through the generations along with the history of the Workers’ Party of Korea, he said, adding that the recruits should steadfastly carry on the baton of the praiseworthy feats and demonstrate the mettle of the hero defense detachment in the future battle once again. After receiving a report that the gun no. 1 of the defense detachment came first in the artillery firing contest held in March last, he encouraged the service members of the gun to take the lead in the whole army and then posed for a picture with them with the hero gun for a background. Dropping in at the newly-built room for turning seawater into fresh water at the defense detachment on Mu Islet, he personally drank water. Going round the barracks, education room, wash-cum-bath room, etc., he took warm care of the service members. He had a photo session with the servicemen and the families of officers of the Hero Defense Detachment on Mu Islet. He was greatly satisfied with the combat readiness and the soldiers’ living of the two defense detachments, he noted, adding that he confirmed that all the combat positions are fully ready for combat and to go into action. He was most pleased to see that the issue of drinking water for the soldiers on those islets has been completely solved. The duty of the two defense detachments are very important, he said, giving instructions for rounding off combat readiness at the defense detachments. Accompanying him were KPA Vice Marshal Hwang Pyong So, director of the General Political Bureau of the KPA, Army General So Hong Chan, first vice-minister of the People’s Armed Forces, Army Col. General Pak Jong Chon, director of the Artillery Bureau of the KPA, Army Col. General Ri Song Guk, commander of the 4th Corps of the KPA, Army Major General Ri Yong Chol, political commissar of the corps, and O Il Jong and Jo Yong Won who are senior officials of the Central Committee of the WPK.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Inspects Defense Detachment on Jangjae Islet and Hero Defense Detachment on Mu Islet,” May 5, 2017)
5/8/17:
President Donald Trump’s administration has told China he is open to welcoming North Korean leader Kim Jong Un for a meeting in the United States if Pyongyang abandons its nuclear and missile programs, according to diplomatic sources. The idea is among a set of proposals that the U.S. floated during recent discussions with Chinese officials on how best to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue. The U.S. administration has also said it would not resort to military action and would provide a security guarantee for Kim’s regime if the weapons programs are scrapped, the sources said today. U.S. officials have said all options, including a military strike, are on the table in trying to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. But they have said at the same time that the door for dialogue is open. The U.S. proposals center on four promises. In return for North Korea ceasing its development of nuclear and missile technologies, the United States would not seek regime change, regime collapse or an accelerated reunification of the Korean Peninsula, nor would it look for an excuse to advance north of the 38th parallel, the de facto inter-Korean border. China is believed to have already informed North Korea of the U.S. proposals. North Korea does not hide its willingness to return to the negotiating table with the United States. A senior North Korean diplomat in charge of U.S. affairs is scheduled to meet soon with former U.S. government officials in Norway, according to separate diplomatic sources. Choe Son Hui, head of the North Korean Foreign Ministry’s U.S. affairs bureau, is almost certain to discuss bilateral and nuclear issues with the former officials. However, it is highly unlikely for North Korea to stop its nuclear and missile programs any time soon and before the United States provides a security guarantee to the regime in concrete terms. For many years, North Korea has argued its pursuit of nuclear weapons is essential to deter U.S. military action. (Kyodo, “Trump Reportedly Open to Meeting Kim Jong Un in U.S. If North Korea Abandons Nuclear Weapons Program,” Japan Times, May 9, 2017) A South Korean foreign affairs official who spoke on the condition of anonymity said the ministry was “told by the U.S. State Department and the National Security Council that the report was groundless,” though which part of the story was wrong wasn’t specifically mentioned. “South Korea and the U.S. agree that now isn’t the right time for talks” with North Korea, the official said, highlighting Pyongyang’s ceaseless threats to carry out a nuclear attack. (Lee Sung-eun and Yoo Jee-hye, “Trump Offers Kim Jong Un Summit with Big Conditions: Japan Times, JoongAng Ilbo, May 9, 2017)
North Korean officials began informal talks with a group of American experts in Oslo, Norway, amid speculation that Washington may seek dialogue with Pyongyang, diplomatic sources said Tuesday. It’s their first Track II meeting in half a year. The previous session was held in Geneva. Dialogue between North Korean government officials and US civilian experts opened today in a suburb of Oslo and it will continue through Tuesday (local time), a source said. The North Korean delegation is reportedly led by Choe Son-hui, director-general of the North America bureau chief of the communist nation’s foreign ministry. Her counterpart is Suzanne DiMaggio, director and senior fellow at New America, a think tank based in Washington DC, according to another source. DiMaggio is known as an Iran specialist well versed in the Obama administration’s nuclear talks with the Middle Eastern nation. The US government will not attach any special meaning to the Track II dialogue. “Track-two meetings are routinely held on a variety of topics around the world and occur independent of US government involvement,” a State Department official said. But North Korea watchers took note of the timing of the meeting this time, saying it may provide the two sides with a chance for a type of “exploratory” talks. (Yonhap, “N. Korean Officials Meet U.S. Experts in Oslo,” Korea Herald, May 9, 2017)
5/9/17:
Moon Jae-in, Minjoo (Democratic Party), wins South Korean presidential election 13,423,800, 40.1% ; Hong Jun-pyo Liberty Korea Party, 7,852,849, 24.0%; Ahn Cheol-soo, People’s Party, 6,998,342, 21.4%; Yoo Seung-min, Bareun Party, 2,208,771, 6.8%; Sim Sang-jung, Justice Party, 2,017,458, 6.2%
5/10/17:
President Moon Jae-in inaugurated.
Moon’s inaugural address: “I will solve the security crisis promptly. I will go anywhere for the peace of the Korean Peninsula. If necessary, I will fly straight to Washington. I will go to Beijing and Tokyo and under the right circumstances go to Pyongyang as well. I will do whatever I can to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula. I will further strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance. Meanwhile, I will negotiate earnestly with the U.S. and China to solve the THAAD problem. Strong security depends on robust defense capabilities. I will try hard to strengthen our independent defense power. I will also lay the foundation for the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. I will provide a turning point to lower tensions on the peninsula by firmly establishing a Northeast Asia peace regime.” (Yonhap, “President Moon Jae-in’s Inaugural Address,” May 10, 2017)
In his first day in office, Moon rushed to build his government, appointing Lee Nak-yon, a provincial governor, as his prime minister. He also selected Suh Hoon, a former intelligence official, as director of the National Intelligence Service. Moon said he expected Suh to play a role in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. Suh said that another inter-Korean summit meeting was “necessary,” but that it would be premature to discuss it when military tensions remained high on the peninsula. “What we need the most is to find a breakthrough for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue,” Suh said. “When such conditions mature, I think we can go to Pyongyang.” (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korean Leader Aims to Build Trust with North,” New York Times, May 11, 2017,
President Donald Trump invited newly-elected Korean President Moon Jae-in to Washington at the earliest possible date in their first phone call today, and Seoul is working to arrange a bilateral summit as soon as next month. Trump and Moon held a 30-minute phone call at 10:30 p.m. in which they also agreed to freely call each other if a crisis arises before they meet. The White House said in a statement, “President Trump said he looks forward to working with President Moon and invited him to visit Washington at an early date,” adding Moon accepted the invitation.
While Moon and Trump will have an occasion to meet at the G-20 summit in Hamburg, Germany, on July 7 and 8, officials in Seoul think a summit shouldn’t wait. The Moon administration has yet to appoint foreign affairs and security teams, however diplomatic sources still believe that the first Korea-U.S. bilateral summit could happen as early as June. According to the Blue House in a statement, Moon said to Trump that the South Korea-U.S. alliance “is more important than at any other time given the growing uncertainties over the security situation of the Korean Peninsula.” Moon said, “The South Korea-U.S. alliance is the foundation of our diplomatic and security policy, and will continue to be so,” adding he appreciates that President Trump has prioritized deterring North Korea’s provocations on his security agenda. Moon said that he looked forward to working with Trump, whom he described as showing “strong leadership.” Moon said he will send a special envoy to the United States soon, and that he wishes to “visit Washington at the earliest date possible to meet with President Trump and exchange heart-to-heart opinions.” Trump replied that he would send a high-level advisory team to Seoul to discuss Moon’s visit to the United States. Moon said he would like to hold a phone conversation if a situation arises before their summit. Trump told Moon he looked forward to meeting in person and that he should feel free to call whenever necessary. Seoul is likely to send a special delegation to Washington to schedule a summit later this month. “A special envoy, often a politician, is usually sent during the transition period to key countries like the United States, China and Japan, but the situation is slightly different because there was no transition before the inauguration,” said a Foreign Ministry official in Seoul May 11. “The president said he will send a special envoy in the phone conversation, so we will be ready to carry out preparations as soon as he calls for it.” Cho June-hyuck, spokesman of the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said in a briefing May 11 that a U.S.-Korea bilateral summit will “be planned through close negotiations between the two countries.” Trump has also declared that he would be “honored” to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un “under the right circumstances.” The two leaders may not see eye-to-eye on what could comprise the right circumstances. Trump has also been calling for a renegotiation of the bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) and for Seoul to shoulder a larger cost of maintaining U.S. troops in Korea and pay for a $1 billion antimissile system. On the afternoon of the 11th, Moon held phone conversations with the leaders of Korea’s closest neighbors, China and Japan, discussing North Korea as well as points of bilateral contention. Chinese President Xi Jinping called Moon to congratulate him on his election at noon, and the two had a 40-minute conversation in which they agreed to improve bilateral relations at a time of tensions over the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery in Korea. This was the first time the Chinese leader has called a South Korean president to congratulate him or her on an election victory, said Yoon Young-chan, Moon’s press secretary, at a press briefing. The two leaders agreed that their common goal is denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. They also agreed that efforts are needed by all parties to ease tension on the Korean Peninsula and resolve the North Korea nuclear issue. Moon emphasized that resolving the North Korean nuclear problem has to happen in a “comprehensive, phase-by-phase manner, with pressure and sanctions applied at the same time as negotiations go on.” He added that the goal of the sanctions on North Korea is to lead Pyongyang to negotiations to ultimately scrap its nuclear program, and Xi was said to have expressed agreement. Moon acknowledged China’s concerns over the deployment of the THAAD system, but went on to request Xi to take a special interest in the concerns of Korean citizens and businesses in China that are suffering from a backlash over the THAAD deployment, asking for the restrictions and sanctions to be “resolved amicably.” Moon said he hopes the two sides could continue discussions on the THAAD issue. The two leaders also agreed to exchange special envoys as soon as possible. Moon said he plans to send separate delegations to discuss the THAAD issue and the North Korean nuclear problem to China. They also agreed to meet in person as soon as possible, while Xi officially invited Moon to Beijing. In his conversation with Japan’s leader, Moon noted “that most Korean people have difficulty accepting” the 2015 bilateral agreement to resolve the issue of the Japanese military’s sexual slavery of Korean women during World War II. Moon’s phone conversation with Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo started at 2:25 p.m. and lasted 25 minutes, said Yoon. The two countries’ foreign ministries struck a deal to resolve the so-called comfort women issue on Dec. 28, 2015, consisting of an apology by the Japanese prime minister and a 1 billion yen ($8.98 million) fund for the victims. Moon said he hoped the two countries could “work together to wisely overcome historical issues.” Abe repeated his position calling for the faithful implementation of the comfort women deal to build constructive, “future-oriented” bilateral relations. Moon did not mention renegotiating the deal in this initial conversation, according to his aides, though he called for that during his campaign. The two leaders agreed to meet as soon as possible. (Sarah Kim, “Moon, Trump Agree to Meet Very Soon,” JoongAng Ilbo, May 12, 2017) South Korea’s new president launched international efforts to defuse tension over North Korea’s weapons development, urging both dialogue and sanctions while also aiming to ease Chinese anger about a U.S. anti-missile system. Moon Jae-in first spoke to Chinese President Xi Jinping and later to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, with how to respond to North Korea’s rapidly developing nuclear and ballistic missile programs, in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, dominating talks. “The resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue must be comprehensive and sequential, with pressure and sanctions used in parallel with negotiations,” Moon’s spokesman, Yoon Young-chan, quoted Moon as telling Xi. “Sanctions against North Korea are also a means to bring the North to the negotiating table aimed at eliminating its nuclear weapons,” Yoon told a briefing, adding that Xi indicated his agreement. Moon has taken a more conciliatory line with North Korea than his conservative predecessors and advocates engagement. He has said he would be prepared to go to Pyongyang “if the conditions are right.” “Threats from North Korea’s nuclear and missile development have entered a new stage,” Japan’s Abe told Moon in their telephone call, according to Japanese Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Hagiuda Koichi. “How to respond to North Korea … is an urgent issue. I would like to closely cooperate with the president to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea,” Abe told Moon. But Abe also said “dialogue for dialogue’s sake would be meaningless” and he called on North Korea to demonstrate “sincere and concrete action,” Hagiuda said, adding that Moon shared Abe’s views. Japan has been concerned that Moon will take a tough line on feuds stemming from the bitter legacy of its 1910-1945 colonization of the Korean peninsula and could fray ties at a time when cooperation on North Korea is vital. Moon told Abe to “look straight at history” and not make the past “a barrier”, though he raised South Korea’s dissatisfaction with a 2015 agreement meant to put to rest a dispute over Japanese compensation for South Korean women forced to work in Japanese brothels before and during World War Two, Korea’s presidential office said. In the first direct contact between the South Korean and Chinese leaders, Xi explained China’s position, Yoon, the South Korean presidential spokesman said, without elaborating. “President Moon said he understands China’s interest in the THAAD deployment and its concerns, and said he hopes the two countries can swiftly get on with communication to further improve each other’s understanding,” Yoon told a briefing. Xi told Moon South Korea and China should respect each other’s concerns, set aside differences, seek common ground and handle disputes appropriately, China’s foreign ministry said in a statement. Moon explained the difficulties faced by South Korean companies that were doing business in China and asked for Xi’s “special attention” to ease those concerns, Yoon said. China has also denied it is doing anything to retaliate against South Korean businesses. (Ju-min Park and Christine Kim, “South Korea Urges ‘Parallel’ Talks and Sanctions to Rein in South Korea,” Reuters, May 11, 2017) “President Moon noted the reality was that most of his people could not accept the agreement over the sexual slavery issue,” Moon’s chief press secretary Yoon Young-chan said of the president’s telephone conversation with Japanese Prime Minister Abe. (Yonhap, “S. Korean President Hints at Scrapping Deal with Japan over Sexual Slavery,” May 11, 2017) Prime Minister Abe called on new South Korean President Moon Jae In May 11 to steadily implement the 2015 bilateral agreement on the issue of “comfort women.” According to Japanese officials with access to the leaders’ 25-minute telephone talks, Abe said it is important to carry out the agreement, which was praised by the international community, “in a responsible manner.” “I want to appropriately manage the Japan-South Korea relations, including the bilateral agreement,” Abe was quoted as saying. He also expressed hope for building forward-looking bilateral relations. In response, Moon said he would like to exercise wisdom to resolve various issues so the two East Asian neighbors can develop a good relationship. As some people in South Korea have cautious stances on the comfort women agreement, history issues need to be resolved in a wise manner for the development of both countries, Moon pointed out. On North Korean problems, Abe said he hopes to closely cooperate with Moon in denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Noting that “dialogue for the sake of dialogue is meaningless,” Abe underscored the importance of having Pyongyang show “serious intention and concrete action” toward scrapping its nuclear program. Moon said he thinks so, too. The Japanese and South Korean leaders agreed to meet with each other as soon as possible. Abe also told Moon that Tokyo wants to hold a Japan-China-South Korea summit at an early date. (Jiji, “Abe Urges Moon to Implement Accord,” Japan Times, May 11, 2017)
With South Korea hosting the 2018 Winter Olympics in PyeongChang, the Moon Jae-in government is seeking to use the event as a platform to kick-start dialogue with the North and set the tone for a nuclear moratorium in return for a restart of economic cooperation, a presidential adviser told the Korea Herald. But Choi Jong-kun, a professor in political science and international studies at Yonsei University in Seoul, emphasized that any thaw in relations with Pyongyang should be premised on its “explicit steps” toward denuclearization such as a halt in further nuclear and missile tests, as well as public consensus at home. “How to use the PyeongChang Olympics is extremely important for us. It’s held in Gangwon Province and (will be) the first major international event to be hosted by the new government, and there’s less burden because of its non-political nature and the Olympic spirit,” he said in an interview, referring to a region that shares a border with North Korea. “It could serve as a crucial platform for us to start talks with the North.” Given heightened tension and the absence of cross-border communication channels, the event could set the stage for Seoul to sound out Pyongyang’s willingness to engage in negotiations. The plan is to increase exchanges, such as through reunions of separated families, and then extract the moratorium in exchange for “corresponding” measures such as on the Kaesong and Kumkangsan projects, Choi said. Mindful of potential diplomatic and domestic backlash, the Moon administration will take the measures only after Pyongyang does its part and reverse them if it backpedals on its promises. The initiative would also require consultations with the US and other neighbors given controversy over whether the projects infringe upon the UN Security Council resolutions and independent sanctions adopted by past Seoul governments and Washington, he noted. “If we could manage to perk up the mood through the Olympics and then expand interactions, we will be able to send a meaningful signal about our intention,” Choi said. “And if the North takes explicit steps on denuclearization, we may take our own regarding Kaesong and Kumkangsan.” Yet the president will not be bent on rushing talks for the sake of talks, he said, adding there are “lots of procedures to undergo, and nationwide consensus should be built before we get there.” The professor has been working with Moon since long before he launched his second presidential bid. His name is currently being floated for top diplomatic jobs including foreign minister. The president, who served in ranking posts in the Roh Moo-hyun administration, is widely expected to carry on with the late liberal leader’s strategy of pursuing greater political and economic cooperation with the North. On the campaign trail, Moon had pledged to revive the Kaesong district and Kumkangsan tours. Choi said the Moon government would never defy UNSC resolutions for its own political interests nor create a crack in international coordination on the nuclear program, though it may give more weight to negotiations than its predecessors. “The new government will begin its own policy review after house cleaning and a buildup for a couple of months, but I assume it will no longer apply strict reciprocity as previous ones did,” he said. “Yes, the possibility and resolve for dialogue is higher than before, and the signal should be sent to the North. Our aim is to take the lead in one of the two prongs of international cooperation — negotiations and contact — while the UNSC continues to steer the other. Otherwise, there won’t be any breakthrough to foster peace and stability on the peninsula.” Despite skepticism over leader Kim Jong-un’s unruliness and will for denuclearization, dialogue is all the more necessary now than ever to comprehend the precise situation, he said. “North Korea under Kim Jong-il and North Korea under Kim Jong-un are quite different. Since we haven’t have any access to Pyongyang for the past decade, we don’t know who they are and they don’t know who we are, which is why there are sustained doubts,” Choi said. “What the Moon government wants to do is conduct empirical research, getting to know about their vision for denuclearization, how they want to resolve the situation, and how big and broad the gap is between ours and theirs. With that, we can only figure out whether we should talk or sanction or completely isolate them.” (Shin Hyon-hee and Yeo Jun-suk, “Seoul Seeks Inter-Korean Talks at PyeongChang Olympics,” Korea Herald, May 11, 2017)
The Central Intelligence Agency said it opened a mission center at an undisclosed location that’s sole task is to monitor North Korea. Many of the details about the center are not yet known. It is led by an unnamed CIA veteran, who was tapped as the new assistant director for Korea. The CIA offshoot will work closely with the intelligence and national security community, the agency said. “Creating the Korea Mission Center allows us to more purposefully integrate and direct CIA efforts against the serious threats to the United States and its allies emanating from North Korea,” CIA Director Mike Pompeo said in a statement. “It also reflects the dynamism and agility that CIA brings to evolving national security challenges.” (Ryan Gaydos, “CIA to Focus on North Korean Threat with New Mission Center,” Fox News, May 11, 2017)
5/12/17:
South Korea will dispatch a veteran politician with close ties with President Moon Jae-in to join a key Chinese government forum to be held in Beijing next week, the presidential office said, heralding a possible recovery of the bilateral relations marred by the deployment of an American-built defense system here. At the invitation of China, a delegation led by Rep. Park Byeong-seug of the Democratic Party will attend the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation that will kick off on April 14 for a two-day run, senior presidential secretary for press Yoon Young-chan said in a briefing. “The dispatch of the delegation is what (Chinese) President Xi Jinping asked when President Moon held a telephone conversation with him yesterday,” Yoon said, referring to the first telephone talks between the presidents yesterday. The delegation will also include two other ruling party lawmakers, Vice Foreign Minister Lim Sung-nam and a high-level official from the finance ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said. “Through the latest forum, the South Korean side plans to explore ways to cooperate bilaterally for regional co-prosperity, including its participation in the Chinese government-led the One Belt, One Road initiative, the ministry said. The delegation will leave for Beijing tomorrow to join the forum, another government official said earlier in the day. “An official invitation came from China recently,” he said on condition of anonymity. “We decided to send a delegation comprised of Rep. Park and other government officials.” Park, a five-term veteran lawmaker, served as co-chairman of Moon’s presidential campaign team. His delegation is expected to meet key Chinese government officials on the sidelines of the forum to discuss ways to repair their bilateral ties strained over the deployment of THAAD. in South Korea, the official said. An encounter with North Korean participants may not be ruled out as Pyongyang is also sending its delegation led by the external economy minister to the Chinese forum, according to the official. The forum is part of China’s so-called “One Belt, One Road” project that focuses on its economic connectivity and cooperation with the countries in Eurasia and as far as Europe and Africa. (Yonhap, “S. Korea to Dispatch Veteran Politician to China Forum for Possible Fence-Making,” May 13, 2017)
DPRK Permanent Mission to the United Nations press statement “to clarify the stand of the DPRK government over the fact that the anti-DPRK moves of the U.S. and the abuse of power by the UNSC Committee, established pursuant to resolution 1718(2006) on the DPRK, have gone to the extremes. Nowadays the U.S. resorts to the foolish scheme to encourage the increased environment for implementation of the “sanction resolutions” against the DPRK, staging such closed briefings by the Committee for each regional group countries at the UN Headquarters one after another, which are unprecedented ever in the UN history. …The U.S. raises its voice before the member states, claiming that many countries are not fully engaged in implementation of the “sanction resolutions” against the DPRK and even intimidating others into the implementation, openly threatening that member nations would be faced with “strong measures of sanction” if they do not implement or show less interest in fulfilling their obligation to implement the “sanction resolutions.” This only shows illegality and injustice of the “sanction resolutions” cooked up and imposed by the U.S. against the DPRK. It is self-evident truth that there is no need going to the trouble of begging or blackmailing others into the implementation of “resolutions”, if they were regarded reasonable, fully based on justice and clear with their legal ground that could be accepted by the international community. Besides, there is no other way but to interpret it as the behavior of arrogation that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718(2006) on the DPRK raised questions even on normal trading deals and operation of restaurants between countries as “illegal acts” by overturning interpretation of the UN “resolution”, which clearly stipulates that it is not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively those activities, including economic activities and cooperation. It will be only a laughing stock of the international community that with hysteria about sanctions, the U.S. has mistaken even ordinary restaurants run by the DPRK abroad for nuke or ballistic rocket manufacturers, so frightened at the tremendous military strength of the DPRK with nuclear force as a pivot, and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718(2006) on the DPRK has been reduced to the mere tool of executing U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK. If the UNSC considers that its “sanction resolutions” are legitimate, then there will be no reason for it not to meet the repeated demand of the DPRK for an international forum of legal experts to clarify the legal basis of the ‘resolutions.’ The UNSC, before it forces other countries to implement the “resolutions”, should reconsider why they are not being implemented and should try to clarify their legality in the proposed forum. The DPRK government determines such crazy hostile acts being committed by the U.S. and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718(2006) on the DPRK under the pretext of sanctions as a heinous crime against humanity aimed to trample down the sovereignty of the DPRK and its people’s right to existence and thus pull the country back into the life of dark age, disregarding the basics of the international law and common sense of legitimate trade deals among countries, and therefore totally rejects such kinds of ‘resolutions.’” (KCNA, “DPRK Permanent Mission to UN Issues Press Statement,” May 13, 2017)
5/13/17:
Choe Son-hui, director-general of the North America bureau chief of North Korea’s foreign ministry, told reporters at the Beijing Capital International Airport that her country “will hold dialogue under right conditions” with the U.S. administration. Choe led a North Korean delegation that met with a group of American experts, headed by Suzanne DiMaggio — director of the U.S. think tank New America — in Oslo, Norway, earlier this week, according to South Korean diplomatic sources. DiMaggio is known as an Iran specialist well-versed in the Obama administration’s nuclear talks with the Middle Eastern nation. Thomas Pickering, former U.S. envoy to the U.N., and Robert Einhorn, U.S. State Department’s former special adviser for nonproliferation and arms control, were also among the American experts’ group. The diplomat was in Beijing and was returning to Pyongyang. When asked what she discussed with Pickering, Choe answered, “I met with Pickering and I will discuss it when given the opportunity in the future.” When asked whether Pyongyang is preparing to hold dialogue with Seoul’s Moon administration, Choe replied, “We will observe the situation.” The U.S. government has stated that it will not attach any special meaning to the so-called “track two” dialogue in Oslo. “Track-two meetings are routinely held on a variety of topics around the world and occur independent of U.S. government involvement,” a State Department official said. (Yonhap, “Pyongyang Will Talk to Washington under Right Conditions: N.K. Diplomat,” May 13, 2017)
Despite seven rounds of United Nations sanctions over the past 11 years, including a ban on “bulk cash” transfers, large avenues of trade remain open to North Korea, allowing it to earn foreign currency to sustain its economy and finance its program to build a nuclear weapon that can strike the United States. Fraudulent labeling helps support its garment industry, which generated more than $500 million for the isolated nation last year, according to Chinese trade data. North Korea earned an additional $1.1 billion selling coal to China last year using a loophole in the ban on such exports, and researchers say tens of thousands of North Koreans who work overseas as laborers are forced to send back as much as $250 million annually. Diplomats estimate the country makes $70 million more selling rights to harvest seafood from its waters. China accounts for more than 80 percent of trade with North Korea, and the Trump administration is counting on Beijing to use that leverage to pressure it into giving up its nuclear arsenal. The Chinese government took a big step in February by announcing that it was suspending imports of coal from the country through the end of the year. But China has a long record of shielding North Korea from more painful sanctions, because it is afraid of a regime collapse that could send refugees streaming across the border and leave it with a more hostile neighbor. In addition, Beijing now has a sympathetic ear in South Korea, whose newly elected president, Moon Jae-in, echoes its view that sanctions alone will not be enough to persuade Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program. While North Korea remains impoverished and dependent on food aid, its economy appears to be growing, partly because of a limited embrace of market forces since its leader, Kim Jong-un, took power more than five years ago. Foreign trade, primarily with China, has surged, too, more than doubling since 2000, though it has slipped in the past three years. In theory, North Korea’s greater openness to trade makes it more vulnerable to sanctions, with new potential targets and pressure points. But it also highlights the limits of an approach to sanctions — defined largely by China at the United Nations — that aims to punish North Korea’s military and ruling elite while sparing its people. As trade expands, the lines have blurred. For decades, North Korea has been accused of sending workers abroad and confiscating most of their wages, an arrangement that activists liken to slave labor. Researchers say the practice has expanded since Kim took power, with more than 50,000 workers now toiling in up to 40 countries. In Dandong, the local government boasts that 10,000 North Koreans are employed in its apparel factories, working 12- to 14-hour shifts, with just two to four days off each month and a monthly wage of no more than $260. “They are well disciplined and easy to manage,” says the website of the Dandong commerce bureau, noting that the workers have been vetted before arrival. “There is no such thing as absenteeism or interfering with management, no using illness to shun work or procrastination and losing work time.” Paul Tjia, managing director of GPI Consultancy, a Dutch company that offers advice on doing business in North Korea, said that some European clients had ordered hundreds of thousands of garments and that “Made in China” labels could be justified by additional work put into the clothes inside China. China has kept North Korea’s garment sector off the list of industries targeted by United Nations sanctions, arguing that punishing it would hurt ordinary people and not military programs. It has protected North Korea’s seafood industry using the same argument. But it is difficult to say who benefits from this trade, in part because even private enterprise in North Korea is overseen by state officials who extract taxes and bribes. “Whether the proceeds from the textile industry support the nuclear program is an open question,” said Joseph M. DeThomas, a professor at Pennsylvania State University and a former American ambassador involved in sanctions policy. “Money is fungible.” At least one North Korean enterprise controlled by the atomic energy bureau, the Korea Kumsan Trading Corporation, ran a garment factory that added embroidery and beading to clothing, according to a North Korean government trade website. And South Korean officials say the millions paid by Chinese companies to fish in North Korean waters go primarily to firms controlled by the North’s military. Sanctions also do not cover the organized export of labor. The United States has urged countries to eject North Korean workers, saying their remittances benefit the military, not their families. But China, Russia and other nations continue to hire them. American sanctions against North Korea began with a near-total economic embargo adopted in 1950, at the start of the Korean War. Over the years, some sanctions were eased and others added, including after the cyberattack on Sony Pictures in 2014 that Washington attributed to the North. The United Nations Security Council did not impose sanctions until July 2006, when, after a series of missile tests, it banned countries from selling material for missiles or weapons of mass destruction to North Korea. The North detonated its first nuclear device months later, followed by additional tests in 2009 and 2013, and two in 2016. The Security Council tightened sanctions after each test, as well as after a satellite launch in 2013. It targeted military supplies and luxury goods, shut Pyongyang out of the international financial system and, most recently, banned a range of mineral exports. But loopholes abound. Resolutions called for searches of vessels carrying cargo to North Korea but have failed to stop its use of ships sailing under foreign flags. And when the Security Council banned its top export, coal, China insisted on an exception for transactions judged to be for “livelihood purposes.” New measures seek to limit North Korea’s ability to make money through its embassies. In Berlin, for example, the authorities are closing a hostel run out of former diplomatic quarters. But the North has responded to such crackdowns by shifting business to countries with weaker enforcement. “How much cooperation will the international community get from Cuba, Russia, Iran or even Pakistan, Bangladesh or Laos?” asked Stephan Haggard, an expert on the North Korean economy at the University of California, San Diego. The United States has also urged a boycott of Air Koryo, the North Korean airline, but it still flies to China and Russia. Chinese tourism to North Korea is booming, said Cha Yong Hyok, whose company, Indprk, takes groups by train to Pyongyang and will soon use new flights from Dandong. The North often circumvents banking sanctions using front companies and agents overseas, and North Koreans routinely send and receive payments using Chinese intermediaries who take a commission, despite the ban on “bulk cash” transfers. “We can and should go after these targets, but turning this into a game of financial cat-and-mouse will never achieve the level of pressure needed,” said Daniel L. Glaser, a former Treasury Department official involved in sanctions enforcement. Ultimately, he argued, that pressure will come only if China makes a strategic decision to truly squeeze the North. “Though China has taken helpful steps at times,” he said, “it has never been willing to go all in.” Many of China’s best-known companies have done business with North Korea even as they have sought customers and investors in the United States or relied on American-made parts and materials. ZTE, the mobile phone and electronics manufacturer, for example, shipped about $15 million of goods to the North in 2015, according to Chinese customs records viewed via the global trade database company Panjiva. The company agreed to pay $1.19 billion in March for violating American sanctions against Iran and North Korea, in part by sending 283 shipments of electronics with American-made components to the North. ZTE has pledged to improve oversight. But many Chinese companies sell products to North Korea without such problems. The electric car and battery maker BYD, in which Warren E. Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway owns a 10 percent stake, has shipped $14 million in goods to North Korea since 2012, including rubber products in January and vehicles in December, customs records show. BYD and Berkshire Hathaway didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment. Just about every big Chinese appliance maker does business with North Korea, too, shipping refrigerators, air-conditioners, televisions and other electronics. The major Chinese automakers sell vehicles to the North as well. Even Tsingtao Brewery shows up in customs records, delivering $20,000 worth of beer in the summer of 2014. United Nations sanctions prohibit the sale of luxury goods to North Korea, but countries are generally left to define what that means. The resolutions list jewelry, luxury automobiles, sports equipment and snowmobiles but make no mention of televisions, consumer electronics or home appliances. In some cases, Chinese companies with access to advanced technology are doing business with North Korea. Subsidiaries of the defense manufacturer Norinco made seven shipments, mostly of electronic and optical goods, worth a total of $1.5 million, in the second half of last year, records say. Norinco did not respond to a request for comment. Matthew Brazil, a security consultant and former diplomat for the United States who investigated Chinese trade controls in the 1990s, said it was often impossible to get China to follow up on leads suggesting Chinese firms were violating restrictions. “Three months later, if you’re lucky, the visit is scheduled, and many times, visits weren’t scheduled at all,” he said. Brazil said the problem had persisted, and “any level of control of American electronics has completely collapsed because this technology can be so easily shipped from China to North Korea.” On AliExpress, an e-commerce platform run by the Chinese internet giant Alibaba, six of the nine shipping services list North Korea as a potential destination. Alibaba declined to comment. The manager of a shipping firm in Dandong who asked to be identified only by her surname, Li, because of the nature of her work said shipping a package of electronics to North Korea was straightforward “as long as it doesn’t have obvious labels” and meets weight requirements. In fact, a delivery is more likely to run into problems on the North Korean side of the border than with customs inspectors in China. “The key,” she said, “is to make sure everything is fine with the people on the other side.” (Jane Perlez, Yufan Huang, and Paul Mozur, “The Art of Living under Sanctions,” New York Times, May 13, 2017,
5/14/17:
North Korea launched a ballistic missile this morning that fell into the Sea of Japan in defiance of international warnings, in what a Japanese official branded as possibly a new type of missile. The latest launch, which may have a range exceeding 4,000 kilometers that would put the Pacific island of Guam within range, came hours before the start of an international forum in Beijing promoting Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “One Belt, One Road” plan to expand regional trade routes. While the U.S. Pacific Command said the missile’s flight was not consistent with that of an intercontinental ballistic missile, Sunday’s launch may be a step forward to an ICBM test Pyongyang is believed to be preparing for. In Tokyo, Japanese Defense Minister Inada Tomomi told reporters that the missile “may be of a new type” and is estimated to have reached an altitude of over 2,000 km during its flight, apparently the first to fly that high. This raises the possibility it was launched at a steep “lofted” trajectory. Deliberately firing the missile at such an angle could allow North Korea to test its capabilities without it landing closer to Japan. The Japanese government’s top spokesman, Suga Yoshihide, told a press conference the missile flew for around 30 minutes, traveling some 800 km before landing in the Sea of Japan about 400 km off North Korea’s eastern coast. But it did not reach the exclusive economic zone ringing Japan’s territorial waters, the chief Cabinet secretary said. According to a Japanese government source, today’s missile is seen to have a capability exceeding that of the intermediate-range Musudan ballistic missile., which has a potential range of between 2,500 and 4,000 km and could reach U.S. bases on Guam. In Washington, the White House said in a statement the missile fell “so close to Russian soil — in fact, closer to Russia than to Japan” that President Donald Trump “cannot imagine that Russia is pleased.” Describing North Korea as a “flagrant menace,” the White House called for the international community to implement “far stronger sanctions” against the country. North Korea’s move was immediately condemned by neighbors Japan and South Korea and could also be seen as a loss of face for China, Pyongyang’s longtime political and economic benefactor. The North has sent a delegation to the forum, which China has carefully arranged as the year’s most important diplomatic event. Xi did not mention Pyongyang’s latest missile launch in his speech at the event. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said the missile was launched at around 5:27 a.m. near Kusong, North Pyongan Province, in North Korea’s northwest. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also condemned the launch, telling reporters North Korea’s repeated missile tests are “a grave threat to our country and are in clear violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions.” (Kyodo, “N. Korea Fires Ballistic Missile into Sea of Japan, Possibly New Type,” May 14, 2017) The missile took off from the northwestern city of Kusong and flew more than 430 miles before landing in the sea between North Korea and Japan, the South Korean military said in a statement. Data on the launch was still being analyzed by the South to determine the type of missile. Saying that North Korea had been “a flagrant menace for far too long,” the White House said in a statement late Saturday in Washington that the test served “as a call for all nations to implement far stronger sanctions” against Pyongyang. “The United States maintains our ironclad commitment to stand with our allies in the face of the serious threat posed by North Korea,” the statement said. The missile reached an altitude of more than 1,245 miles during its 30-minute flight time, the Japanese government said. That data, combined with the announcement by South Korea that the projectile covered a distance of 430 miles, showed that it was an intermediate-range ballistic missile that could target key United States military bases in the Pacific, including those in Guam, missile experts said. The North’s launch took place as its biggest supporter, China, was hosting delegations from around the world at its “One Belt One Road” forum in Beijing. President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir V. Putin, who was at the forum, had a “fairly detailed talk” about the situation of the Korean Peninsula, including the North’s missile test, said . Putin’s spokesman, Dmitri S. Peskov, according to the Russian news agency Interfax. “Mutual concern was expressed about how this situation is developing, and about growing tensions,”. Peskov said. Hours after President Trump’s comment, Russia’s Defense Ministry said the North Korean missile posed “no danger” to Russia because it flew at a “significant distance” from the coast, Interfax said, citing a ministry statement. Russia’s ballistic missile early-warning system tracked the North Korean missile for 23 minutes before it fell into the sea, about 310 miles off the Russian coast, while its air-defense systems were “on combat duty as usual,” the statement said. In South Korea, President Moon Jae-in ordered an urgent meeting of top security officials during which he condemned the missile launch as “a clear violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions” and ordered his military to be prepared for provocations by the North. Moon said the move was “deeply regrettable” only days after he took office calling for dialogue with the North. “We keep our door open for dialogue with North Korea, but we must act decisively against North Korean provocations so that it will not miscalculate,” Moon was quoted as saying by his office. “We must show that dialogue is possible when the North changes its attitude.” (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Launches a Ballistic Missile,” New York Times, May 14, 2017, p. A-14) South Korean President Moon Jae-in strongly condemned North Korea for its latest missile launch, describing it as a grave threat to regional security and a clear violation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions. He also called on Pyongyang to reverse its course of provocations for the resumption of dialogue while warning that his administration would deal resolutely with its provocations in order to ensure it would not “miscalculate” the situation. “Even if dialogue is possible, (we) should show (to North Korea) that it’s possible only in case of North Korea changing its attitude,” Moon said during a session of the National Security Council at the presidential compound Cheong Wa Dae. He called it a “grave challenge” to the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and the international community, presidential spokesman Yoon Young-chan told reporters. In particular, Moon took issue with the timing of the North’s missile firing, which is the second in two weeks and came just four days after the launch of the new South Korean government. Moon expressed “deep regret over North Korea’s reckless provocation” and ordered his troops to bolster deterrence against its military threats on the basis of the robust alliance with the United States. He especially instructed the military to speed up the establishment of South Korea’s own missile defense system, called the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD). The South’s foreign ministry issued a statement denouncing the North’s behavior. “The government strongly warns North Korea not to test the will of our government and the international community, including the U.S. and China, for enduring peace and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” the ministry said. It demanded that Pyongyang stop provocative acts and return to the path of negotiations for denuclearization. The JCS also issued a strong warning message, urging the North to immediately stop its nuclear and missile development programs. The JCS warned that the North would face “strong retaliations” from the allies if it continues to ignore their warning messages and sticks to provocations. South Korea’s National Security Office Chief Kim Kwan-jin and his U.S. counterpart H.R. McMaster had a 25-minute phone conversation, jointly condemning Pyongyang’s latest provocation. Kim and McMaster also agreed to bolster efforts to seek the denuclearization of North Korea. The two also vowed to maintain a thorough military readiness against Pyongyang based on the strong Seoul-Washington alliance. The foreign ministry said Seoul’s chief negotiator on the North Korean nuclear issue also had phone talks with his U.S. and Japanese counterparts, Joseph Yun and Kenji Kanasugi, to share assessments on the latest missile firing and discuss how to respond to it. “The top nuclear envoys agreed to closely consult with each other about future responses including measures to be taken by the United Nations Security Council,” a ministry official said. China also expressed its opposition to the North’s provocation and called on all sides to refrain from heightening regional tensions. “China opposes the DPRK’s violation of the Security Council’s resolutions. All relevant parties should exercise restraint and refrain from further aggravating tensions in the region,” the foreign ministry said in a statement. The missile launch was widely viewed as a test of Moon’s resolve. It also tried out the Moon government’s handling of the North’s provocation, with many conservatives in the South questioning its capability on the national security front. Forty-one minutes after the missile firing, Moon received a related report in person from his chief of staff Im Jong-seok. He was quick in giving instructions to his security aides and issuing a direct warning message for the North, presiding over the NSC meeting joined by defense, foreign and unification ministers, and the national intelligence chief appointed by his predecessor Park Geun-hye, Im told reporters. It is rare for Cheong Wa Dae to swiftly make public such a specific timeline on the president’s activities related to national security. (Yonhap, “Moon Condemns N.K. Missile Test, Urges It to Halt Provocations for Dialogue,” May 14, 2017) On May 14, a rocket launched by North Korea soared to an altitude five times higher than the International Space Station, and an analysis of publicly available data by Reuters shows how that may have brought leader Kim Jong Un closer to his goal of producing a missile capable of hitting the United States. The principle, experts say, is that the higher a rocket can travel, the further it can reach. “To avoid firing long-range missiles into or over Japan, the North Koreans have been launching them nearly straight up instead,” said Joshua Pollack, editor of the Washington-based Nonproliferation Review. “They fly much higher into space that way, but come back down relatively close to their launch points.” North Korea is not unusual in sending rockets to high altitudes — or “lofting” them — to test their range, but does so more than other countries because it is surrounded by other states, he said. Kim watched the May 14 launch of the Hwasong-12 rocket early on a Sunday morning on North Korea’s east coast. The missile splashed down just 787 km from the launch site, but reached an altitude of 2,111.5 km, according to North Korean state media. The South Korean and Japanese governments measured similar distances at the time. Had the Hwasong-12 been fired at a shallower angle, it would have flown more than 4,800 km, according to David Wright, co-director of the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, which works to reduce the risk of nuclear use. That would fall short of the mainland United States, but Wright’s calculations put parts of Alaska within range. North Korea has test-fired missiles at lofted trajectories in the past, but none as high as the Hwasong-12. It has used larger and more powerful rockets for space launches, but the Hwasong-12 is smaller, more mobile — and harder to detect. The rocket has a powerful engine. Photos of the launch show the missile had four additional steering engines as well as its main engine, giving slightly more power and accuracy, according to Ralph Savelsberg, writing on the 38 North website. After the May 14 launch, North Korean state media said the missile had been launched at such a high angle “in consideration of the security of neighboring countries.” As Jong Un has accelerated his missile program and developed more mobile rockets with longer ranges, he has launched them ever higher. This has other benefits, according to Pollack: It puts more stress on the nose cone as it re-enters the atmosphere, providing a more rigorous test than an ordinary trajectory. For a missile to become a threat, its nose cone has to be able to carry a nuclear warhead, and that warhead has to withstand the incredible stresses of re-entering the Earth’s atmosphere from space. Missiles that land closer to home also make it easier for North Korea to collect and analyze data to improve the missile program, according to Pollack. As threatening as these developments sound for the United States, it took North Korea 20 years to finish developing the rocket which eventually put a satellite in space in 2012, said German aerospace engineer Markus Schiller, who has closely followed the North’s missile development program. “It will be even longer until they have a real weapon deployed — if ever,” he said. A “real weapon” means an intercontinental ballistic missile that can be reliably launched under any circumstances, he added. But if North Korea were to win support from outside enabling it to buy in rocket parts, he said, “they could have an ICBM next month.” (James Pearson, “North Korea Uses ‘Lofting’ Technique to Bring It Ever Close to Long-Range Missile Goal,” Reuters, July 2, 2017)
KCNA: “A test-fire of new ground-to-ground medium long-range strategic ballistic rocket Hwasong-12 was successfully carried out on Sunday by scientists and technicians in the field of rocket research, who are bravely advancing toward a new goal to be proud of in the world, true to the far-sighted idea of Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army, for building a nuclear power. Kim Jong Un guided the test-fire on the spot. Looking at Hwasong-12, he expressed his satisfaction over the possession of another “Juche weapon”, a perfect weapon system congruous with the military strategic and tactical idea of the WPK and the demand of the present times. The test-fire was conducted at the highest angle in consideration of the security of neighboring countries. The test-fire aimed at verifying the tactical and technological specifications of the newly-developed ballistic rocket capable of carrying a large-size heavy nuclear warhead. According to the order of Kim Jong Un, the new rocket Hwasong-12 was launched at 04:58 on Sunday. The rocket accurately hit the targeted open waters 787km away after flying to the maximum altitude of 2 111.5km along its planned flight orbit. The test-fire proved to the full all the technical specifications of the rocket, which was newly designed in a Korean-style by defense scientists and technicians, like guidance and stabilization systems, structural system and pressurization, inspection and launching systems and reconfirmed the reliability of new rocket engine under the practical flight circumstances. It also verified the homing feature of the warhead under the worst re-entry situation and accurate performance of detonation system. Kim Jong Un hugged officials in the field of rocket research, saying that they worked hard to achieve a great thing. And he had a picture taken with officials, scientists and technicians who took part in the test-fire. Highly appreciating again their devotion for manufacturing the Korean-style medium long-range strategic ballistic rocket, he gave a special thanks to them on behalf of himself. He said with confidence that the successful test-fire of Hwasong-12, a demonstration of high-level defense science and technology of the DPRK, is of great and special significance for securing peace and stability in the Korean peninsula and the region and is the greatest victory of the Korean people. He declared that the DPRK is a nuclear power worthy of the name whether someone recognizes it or not. He stressed the DPRK will keep strict control over those engaging themselves in nuclear blackmail with its nuclear deterrence which has been unimaginably and rapidly developed. The U.S. massively brought nuclear strategic assets to the vicinity of the Korean peninsula to threaten and blackmail the DPRK, but the coward American-style fanfaronade militarily browbeating only weak countries and nations which have no nukes can never work on the DPRK and is highly ridiculous, he said, stressing that if the U.S. dares opt for a military provocation against the DPRK, we are ready to counter it. The most perfect weapon systems in the world will never become the eternal exclusive property of the U.S., he said, expressing the belief that the day when the DPRK uses the similar retaliatory means will come. He continued that on this occasion, the U.S. had better see clearly whether the ballistic rockets of the DPRK pose actual threat to it or not. If the U.S. awkwardly attempts to provoke the DPRK, it will not escape from the biggest disaster in the history, he said, strongly warning the U.S. not to disregard or misjudge the reality that its mainland and Pacific operation region are in the DPRK’s sighting range for strike and that it has all powerful means for retaliatory strike. He gave the scientists and technicians in the field of rocket research the order to continuously develop more precise and diversified nukes and nuclear striking means, not content with the successes, and make preparations for more tests till the U.S. and its vassal forces make a proper choice with reason.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of New Rocket,” May 15, 2017)
It looks as if Kim Jong-un, the North’s 33-year-old leader, has a different plan — one intended to improve his ability to strike the United States without setting off an American military response. Instead of going for distance, he has stepped up the testing of missiles that fly high into space, one reached a height of more than 1,300 miles — and then plunge down through the atmosphere, mimicking the kind of fiery re-entries a nuclear warhead would undergo if fired over a much longer distance. Instead, the payload lands in waters a few hundred miles or so from North Korea’s coast. “They can simulate an ICBM warhead on this kind of trajectory,” David C. Wright, a senior scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, a private group in Cambridge, Mass., said in an interview. “It’s a kind of steppingstone.” The best guess of nongovernmental experts puts an ICBM debut at roughly 2020. But military and intelligence officials regularly say the lack of a proven capability is different from the absence of a long-range threat to the continental United States, and they say commanders have to assume the worst given the North’s progress to date. “We think they’ve had enough time to mate a nuclear weapon to a missile,” Michael Morell, a Central Intelligence Agency deputy director in the Obama administration, recently told “CBS This Morning.” “So the threat is now.” Analysts said Sunday’s test flight, if conducted on a normal rather than a high trajectory, would have traveled about 3,000 miles, enough to reach as far as the Aleutian Islands off Alaska. That is well beyond the sprawling American base at Guam, some 2,200 miles away. More important, it would make the flight distance the longest to date for one of the North’s military missiles. Charles P. Vick, an expert on the North’s missiles at GlobalSecurity.org, a private research group in Alexandria, Va., said the United States had a history of using high missile trajectories as a way to intensify the returning warhead’s trial by fire. “Going really high,” he said, “gives you a very fast and very brutal re-entry.” Still, he and Dr. Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists cautioned that the method raised subtle questions that only a longer-range test could answer. For instance, the fiery heating, while as intense as that for an ICBM warhead, was of shorter duration. “You learn something but not everything,” Dr. Wright said. He added that in three or four of the North’s recent successful tests, missiles have flown to unusually high altitudes. Dr. Schilling suggested that the successful missile, which the North Koreans call the Hwasong-12, appeared to be a smaller version of the KN-08, a code name for Korea North Type 8. Identified by analysts as an intercontinental ballistic missile, the KN-08 made its debut in a military parade in 2012 and appears to have never undergone a successful flight test. Schilling said the smaller version appeared in a military parade last month, adding that it had been expected to have roughly the same performance as the test flight. “It clearly shares a common heritage” with the larger missile, he wrote. Schilling called the most interesting feature of the new vehicle its potential for “demonstrating technologies and systems to be used in future ICBMs,” including the KN-08 and a related long-range missile known as the KN-14. Repeated flights of the new missile, he wrote, “would allow North Korea to conduct at least some of the testing necessary to develop an operational ICBM, without actually launching ICBMs, particularly if it includes the same rocket engines.” Wright agreed that the successful test flight represented a major step forward. “If they’ve got a system with a new engine and can scale that up,” he said, “they’ve got a pretty believable path to an ICBM.” In political signaling, he added, what the North’s test is telling the West is: “Hey, we’re on our way. If you want to talk, now’s the time to do it.” (William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “North Korea Missile Test Tiptoes over U.S. Tripwire,” New York Times, May 16, 2017,
Schilling: “North Korea’s latest successful missile test represents a level of performance never before seen from a North Korean missile. The missile would have flown a distant of some 4,500 kilometers if launched on a maximum trajectory. It appears to have not only demonstrated an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) that might enable them to reliably strike the US base at Guam, but more importantly, may represent a substantial advance to developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Given speculation over the past months about the possibility of military action by the Trump administration to prevent Pyongyang from acquiring such a weapons, the possible testing of ICBM subsystems in this low-key manner may be a North Korean hedge against the possibility of such action. We are still awaiting more details on this test, and if the North Koreans follow their usual practice we can expect photographs soon. But unless Pyongyang is hiding something completely new, there’s only one real candidate for this missile. During last month’s parade, one genuinely new missile was revealed – one that looks very much like a small, two-stage version of their three-stage KN-08 ICBM prototype, on displayed on a mobile launcher previously used for the “Musudan” intermediate-range ballistic missile. We don’t have a name for this missile yet; the “KN-17” designation has been used for both this system and for a Scud-derived short-range ballistic missile with a maneuvering reentry vehicle displayed in the same parade. But whatever the name, it would be expected to have about the same performance as the missile just launched. While the April 15 parade may be the first time this missile was seen, and yesterday’s test may be its first successful flight, there have been earlier indications that such a missile was under development. In January this year, intelligence sources reported that North Korea had deployed two prototype ICBMs at a test site, just under 15 meters long. All of North Korea’s ICBM prototypes and mock-ups are well over that size, which left us puzzled. But this new missile comes in at just under 15 meters, and while its performance doesn’t quite reach ICBM standards it clearly shares a common heritage with the KN-08 ICBM. Quite likely this was the missile that was reported in January. It may have been tested on other occasions. Two failed missile tests from Kusong in October were presumed to be Musudans, but there was no solid evidence to confirm that – and the Musudan had recently been tested successfully, so it would be somewhat surprising for it to fail twice in a row. It wouldn’t be at all surprising for a new missile to fail twice, and if the missile were launched from a Musudan TEL, it might well be mistaken for a Musudan. Another failed test, on April 16, was initially ascribed to a new maneuvering reentry vehicle system, but may have been this missile instead – both were initially displayed in the parade the previous day, and a successful test of either one would neatly highlight the propaganda event. While this missile appears to share a common heritage with the KN-08 ICBM, it isn’t simply a KN-08 with the third stage removed. The first two stages also appear to be reduced in scale. Unfortunately, we have little detail about the missile’s design. We do not, for example, know if it uses the same twin-engine propulsion system as the first stage of the KN-08. But the more important question is, what is the new missile for? One possibility is that it is meant to replace the Musudan IRBM which represents an attempt to stretch a Cold War vintage Russian missile to reach the US base at Guam, some 3500 km from North Korean launch sites. But the Musudan has proven unreliable in testing, with only one success in at least six attempts, and its performance is marginal for reaching Guam. The Musudan may have been the best North Korea could manage ten years ago, but that level of performance really calls for a two-stage missile. Now, it appears that they have one. But existing North Korean missiles are already capable of reaching targets anywhere in South Korea or Japan, and extending that reach to perhaps 4500 kilometers won’t greatly change the strategic balance – aside from Guam, there aren’t really any interesting targets in that range. What would change the strategic balance is an ICBM capable of reaching the US mainland. This is not that missile but it might be a testbed, demonstrating technologies and systems to be used in future ICBMs like the KN-08 and KN-14. A full three-stage KN-08 would be very unlikely to work the first time it was tested, and the failure would be both expensive and very provocative. This missile would allow North Korea to conduct at least some of the testing necessary to develop an operational ICBM, without actually launching ICBMs, particularly if it includes the same rocket engines. If North Korea has already conducted a successful test using the engines and other components of the first two stages of the KN-08, it may be closer to an operational ICBM than had been previously estimated. US cities will not be at risk tomorrow, or any time this year since some tests have to be done with the full-scale system. With only one test of this reduced-scale system Pyongyang is probably some time from even beginning that process. But given this test and the possible North Korean path forward, a closer look will be needed to see how much progress has been made, and what technologies the North may have demonstrated, as will a reassessment of their ICBM program in that new light.” (John Schilling, “North Korea’s Latest Test: Advancing toward an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) While Avoiding U.S. Military Action,” 38North, May 14, 2017) By now, we have at least learned the name of the new missile North Korea tested on May 14: the Hwasong-12. We also have photos of the launch, as we have come to expect from the North following a successful high-profile missile test. Those photos provide us with some information about this new missile but still leave us uncertain about key technical issues and particularly whether or not this test advanced North Korea’s worrying intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program. Could the Hwasong-12 engine be used in advancing development of an ICBM? One obvious feature of this new missile is the engine: a single nozzle with four verniers. This is not an ex-Soviet R-27 engine as is used on the Musudan, but neither is it the dual R-27 system they developed for the KN-08 missile and tested last year. While it is difficult to tell from the photos released, the Hwasong-12 engine looks very much like a new engine North Korea tested in March, which we assessed at that time as a probable space launch vehicle engine, in large part because there didn’t seem to be a missile appropriate for it. They may still use it in their next space launch vehicle, for which it would be quite appropriate, but it seems they are using at least a variant of it in this missile. The engine used on the HS-12 might not have quite enough thrust for an ICBM, but it was likely designed to demonstrate key technologies and components for a new ICBM engine. It won’t take long to modify this design for ICBM use, if that is North Korea’s goal. What propellant powered the rocket? The propellant combination isn’t entirely clear either, as the North Koreans have been tinkering with the color balance on some of their photos for aesthetic effect. It is certainly a liquid propellant engine, and the most likely propellant candidates seem to be inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA) and unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH). This is slightly less efficient than the Musudan’s nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) and UDMH, but easier to store in the field. But we can’t rule out that the new engine uses the more efficient NTO/IRFNA, or even the old IRFNA/kerosene combination of the Nodong missile. Until we know exactly what propellant was used, we can’t make a more precise estimate of the engine’s performance. Was this a single stage or two stage rocket? Less obvious but more curious is something we can’t see. There is no sign of a stage separation joint or mechanism on the Hwasong-12. This has led to suspicion that we are seeing a single-stage missile. However, the lack of a visible separation joint is not proof. North Korea’s traditional stage separation techniques would have been clearly visible even at the coarse resolution of the launch imagery, but there are more advanced designs where the system is largely internal and invisible. We had better imagery from the parade last month, which on examination also doesn’t show a visible joint, but parade missiles are almost always mock-ups and may not have all the detailed features of a real missile. If this is a one-stage missile, it would be remarkable. The demonstrated performance, equivalent to a range of more than 4,500 km, may be unprecedented for a one-stage system. The only historic single-stage missile that might have matched the Hwasong-12’s performance is the old Soviet R-14 (aka SS-5), which with its lightest warhead could reach about 4,500 km—but that was an 80-ton behemoth, whereas the Hwasong-12 weighs perhaps only 20 tons. In order to deliver such performance from a package the size of a Hwasong-12, North Korea would have to couple an engine more efficient than any they have built before, with a structure far lighter than they have ever built before. Even with these enhancements, the Hwasong-12 almost certainly could not have reached the reported 2,100 km apogee with anything more than an empty fairing where the reentry vehicle and warhead should be. Essentially, this would make the entire exercise a pointless stunt—they don’t have a missile until they test the reentry vehicle, and they won’t be fooling the allied intelligence agencies that have detailed radar tracking of the acceleration profile. More likely this was a two-stage missile with a heavy payload and a new stage separation mechanism. Does this test advance North Korea’s ICBM program? A new engine, a new structural design and maybe a new stage separation mechanism is a lot of work for a missile that can target nothing farther than Guam. Make no mistake, Guam is an important target, but it’s not “design-a-new-missile-from-scratch” important. North Korea is likely going to use the technologies demonstrated here in its ongoing ICBM development program. The new engine would be helpful. The dual R-27 engine system offered adequate performance for an ICBM, but barely so, and it was always going to have reliability problems in service. The new engine may offer better performance, and will almost certainly offer greater reliability. It also seems to be an engine North Korea can manufacture for itself, where they may have been drawing from a limited stockpile of surplus Soviet hardware for the R-27. A new stage separation mechanism will make little difference unless it came as part of an improved structural technology, which could improve the performance of North Korea’s KN-08 and KN-14 ICBMs. Alternately, it could be used to make the missiles more rugged and readily transportable while keeping performance constant. These advantages may mean two steps forward and one step backward for the ICBM program. They come with a cost: the missile will have to be substantially redesigned to use the new technologies. That means throwing out years of effort already put into the old design. And it means waiting until the Hwasong-12 has finished testing, before going forward with the final design of the ICBMs. We may have to concern ourselves with a more robust and capable ICBM system, but we shouldn’t be too concerned about it entering service next year. While the success of the Hwasong-12 may advance the North Korean ICBM program by perhaps a year, deployment of an operational ICBM prior to 2020 is still unlikely. (John Schilling, “North Korea’s New Hwasong—12 Missile,” 38North, May 24, 2017)
David Wright: “As North Korea continues its missile development, a key question is what it may have learned from its recent missile test that is relevant to building a reentry vehicle (RV) for a long-range missile. The RV is a crucial part of a ballistic missile. A long-range missile accelerates its warhead to very high speed—16,000 mph—and sends it arcing through space high above the atmosphere. To reach the ground it must reenter the atmosphere. Atmospheric drag slows the RV and most of the kinetic energy it loses goes into heating the air around the RV, which then leads to intense heating of the surface of the RV. The RV absorbs some of the heat, which is conducted inside to where the warhead is sitting. So the RV needs to be built to (1) withstand the intense heating at its outer surface, and (2) insulate the warhead from the absorbed heat that is conducted through the interior of the RV. The first of these depends on the maximum heating rate at the surface and the length of time that significant heating takes place. Number (2) depends on the total amount of heat absorbed by the RV and the amount of time the heat has to travel from the surface of the RV to the warhead, which is roughly the time between when intense heating begins and when the warhead detonates. I calculated these quantities for the two cases of interest here: the highly lofted trajectory that the recent North Korean missile followed and a 10,000 km missile on a normal (MET) trajectory. …The maximum heating rate (q) is only about 10% higher for the 10,000 km range missile than the lofted missile. However, the total heat absorbed (Q) is nearly twice as large for the long-range missile and the duration of heating (τ) is more than two and a half times as long. This shows that North Korea could get significant data from the recent test—assuming the RV was carrying appropriate sensors and sent that information back during flight, and/or that North Korea was able to recover the RV from the sea. But it also shows that this test does not give all the data you would like to have to understand how effective the heatshield might be before putting a nuclear warhead inside the RV and launching it on a long-range missile. The rate of heat transfer per area (q) is roughly proportional to ρV3, where ρ is the atmospheric density and V is the velocity of the RV. Since longer range missiles reenter at higher speeds, the heating rate increases rapidly with missile range. The total heat absorbed (Q) is the integral of q over time during reentry. This calculation assumes the ballistic coefficient (β) of the RV is 48 kN/m2 (1,000 lb/ft2). The heating values in the table roughly scale with β. A large value of β means less atmospheric drag so the RV travels through the atmosphere at higher speed. That increases the accuracy of the missile but also increases the heating. The United States worked for many years to develop RVs with special coatings that allowed them to have high β and therefore high accuracy, but could also withstand the heating under these conditions. The results in the table can be understood by looking at how RVs on these two trajectories slow down as they reenter. Figs. 1 and 2 plot the speed of the RV versus time; the x and y axes of the two figures have the same scale. The maximum deceleration (slope of the curve) is roughly the same in the two cases, leading to roughly the same value of q. But the 10,000 km range missile loses more total energy—leading to a larger value of Q—and does so over a longer time than the lofted trajectory.” (David Wright, All Things Nuclear, Union of Concerned Scientist Blog, May 17, 2017)
Ralph Savelsberg: “On May 14, North Korea flight-tested a new ballistic missile, the Hwasong-12. This missile was first revealed during the April 15 military parade commemorating Kim Il Sung’s 105th birthday, and has since been the subject of much scrutiny as North Korea watchers try to assess its dimensions and capabilities, as well as what it contributes to the North’s overall ballistic missile program. At a first glance, the successful flight-test of the Hwasong-12 appeared to have implications for North Korea’s efforts to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), but to what extent is still unclear given the limited information available. In this article, I have run computer simulations to help assess the missile’s range and performance. The missile’s parameters were estimated based on close examination of the available photographs and missile trajectory, with a large focus on engine performance. Based on the results of the simulations, it would seem that the Hwasong-12 is simply a larger variant of the existing Hwasong-10 or Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a similar engine and a lighter construction, offering only slight gains in range but with limitations on mobility. While the new missile may serve as a testbed for some of the technology intended for an ICBM, theflight-test did not provide evidence of a major step forward in North Korea’s ICBM program. North Korea has displayed supposedly road-mobile ICBMs, known as the KN-08 and KN-14, during past military parades, and while Kim Jong Un announced in his 2017 New Year’s Address that the country was close to being ready to flight-test an ICBM, no test has taken place to date. The most powerful rocket that North Korea has flight-tested is its Unha-3, which was used to successfully launch small satellites into orbit in 2012 and 2016. In 2006, an attempted launch of an ICBM based on this rocket, known as the Taepodong-2, ended in failure; the Taepodong-2 is also too large for mobile use. The Unha-3 uses four Nodong engines for its first stage; a smaller missile with an intercontinental range will require more advanced rocket engines. So far, the most powerful liquid-fuelled engine that North Korea is known to have flight-tested is the engine used in the Hwasong-10 or Musudan IRBM. This engine is closely related to the one used in the Soviet R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). By itself, it does not have sufficient thrust to lift the mass of an ICBM, so using this type of engine for an ICBM would require combining at least two of them. However, because the R-27 engine was uniquely tailored for use in a very compact SLBM, building a rocket stage that incorporates two is an immensely complicated task. Photographs of ground tests of what appear to be two R-27 engines mounted very close together were published in 2016, but this combination does not appear to have been test-flown. Some experts speculate that the engine used in this test was the new engine North Korea tested in March, but it is difficult to confirm this based on the photographs alone. Additionally, North Korea has yet to demonstrate a working re-entry vehicle (RV) with a heat shield suitable for an ICBM. An ICBM’s RV enters the atmosphere at a much higher velocity than North-Korea’s known IRBMs and is therefore subject to much higher temperatures and stresses that cannot be fully replicated in ground tests. Flight-testing an RV design on the trajectory flown by the Hwasong-12 could provide more realistic conditions, but a truly convincing demonstration would have to involve even higher velocities. During the test-launch of the Hwasong-12, the missile reportedly flew on a lofted trajectory, covering a range of in roughly 30 minutes and reaching apogee at an altitude of 2,000 km. This performance has led to speculation that the missile is closely related to North Korea’s efforts to build a road-mobile ICBM, and it may have indeed used the engines intended for this. Based on photographs of the test released by North Korean state media, the Hwasong-12 appears to be a single-stage missile powered by a single large engine coupled to four vernier engines (see Figure 1). A single uninterrupted cable raceway is clearly visible on the outside of the missile, running from just below the re-entry vehicle towards the engine compartment at the bottom. This routes wires connecting the guidance system to the vernier engines along the outside of the propellant tanks. If the missile had multiple stages, one would expect the raceway to be interrupted near the location where the stages separate. Other photographs show that the missile was transported on a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) similar to the vehicle used to launch the Musudan. Video footage of the launch shows that the missile was not launched from the vehicle, but from a detachable launch table. To assess the Hwasong-12’s performance, I have run computer simulations of its trajectory. Parameters were estimated based on available photographs and baseline parameters of the Musudan. The diameter of the missile is similar to that of the Musudan at roughly 1.5 m, but it is longer and slightly flared at the base. Including the warhead, its approximate length is 15.7 m. The booster length is approximately 12.4 m. I assume that the single main engine is essentially an R-27 engine, as flown in the Musudan, but with the addition of two more verniers. This leads to a small increase in the mass flow and thrust. For the propellant, I assume dinitrogen tetroxide (N2O4) as the oxidizer and unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH) as the fuel, with corresponding values for the specific impulse—a measure of the fuel’s effectiveness. This is the same propellant combination as used in the R-27. The length of the missile allows estimating the propellant volume and propellant mass …Simulations of the lofted flight of the Musudan, in June 2016, showed that this was most likely flown with an empty re-entry vehicle, with a mass of 150 kg for just the empty heat shield. I assume that this was the case for the Hwasong-12 as well. The model for calculating the trajectory is the same as that used for the earlier analysis of the Musudan. With these parameters, a lofted trajectory over a distance of 700 km was simulated, with a launch originating from Kusong. The initial heading was 70 degrees. The simulation includes the effects of Earth rotation. The maximum altitude reached during the flight is 2,000 km and the total flight time is close to 30 minutes, both similar to the reported values. …In order to obtain this performance, the structural mass of the booster had to be reduced to 7 percent of the total booster mass. The lengthening of propellant tanks tends to decrease this number, but its low value means that the construction of the propellant tanks is unusually light. The equivalent number for the R-27, for instance, is closer to 10 percent. The use of a TEL to transport the Hwasong-12 suggests that it is meant to be a mobile weapon, but given these parameters, one can expect the missile airframe to be quite fragile and unsuitable for transport and erection with propellant inside. This means that the missile would have to be fueled after being positioned vertically on its launch table, which dramatically increases launch preparation time. The presumed N2O4 oxidizer also has a very limited temperature range in which it can be safely stored and used, further limiting the missile’s usefulness as a mobile system. Inhibited fuming red nitric acid (IFRNA) could serve as an alternative oxidizer since it is easier to handle safely, but this would result in a lower specific impulse. Therefore, if the Hwasong-12 had used IFRNA, it would not have had sufficient thrust for the trajectory it flew during the flight test. The lofted trajectory of the test flight is atypical for a ballistic missile. However, the Musudan, during its single successful flight in 2016, flew a similarly lofted trajectory over a distance of 400 km, reaching an altitude of more than 1,000 km. The Hwasong-12 flew both farther and higher. Consequently, if it were to be flown on a minimum-energy trajectory, which maximizes the range, it can cover a longer distance than the Musudan. With a payload of 650 kg (equivalent to the payload of the R-27, including the heat shield, but likely lighter than a North Korean nuclear warhead), its simulated maximum range is more than 3,700 km (on a 70 degree heading, including Earth rotation). Provided that North Korea has a sufficiently accurate guidance technology, this would theoretically allow the Hwasong-12 to reach Guam, at a distance of roughly 3,400 km—a target that cannot be reached by the Musudan. In the simulation of the lofted trajectory, the velocity during the re-entry peaks at 5.4 km/s. This is only marginally higher than the maximum of 5.2 km/s reached in the simulation of the minimum-energy trajectory. Therefore, testing a new heat shield for the re-entry vehicle is not a likely explanation for the choice of a lofted trajectory. The more likely reason for this choice is that the missile cannot be flown on minimum-energy trajectories without violating the airspace of other countries in the region, such as Japan. The velocity is a lot higher than the peak velocity reached by the Musudan, however, and is closer to ICBM velocities. Based on photographs and computer simulations, the Hwasong-12 appears to be a longer, lighter version of the Musudan. However, the main engine is not significantly more powerful than engines North Korea has already test-flown. The missile does have a higher performance than the Musudan, being able to deliver a payload as far as Guam, but its light construction and fuel/oxidizer mix mean that it is ill-suited for mobile use. Additionally, despite its light construction, it is still heavy compared to the thrust of this engine, which means that there is little room for further growth. While the new missile may serve as a testbed for some of the technology intended for an ICBM—for instance the heat shield—the May 14 flight test of the Hwasong-12 did not provide evidence of a major step forward in North-Korea’s ICBM program.” (Ralph Savelsberg, “A Quick Technical Analysis of the Hwasong-12,” 38North, May 19, 2017)
South Korea’s delegation to an international economic forum in Beijing said it held a brief meeting with its North Korean counterpart and expressed concern over Pyongyang’s latest missile provocation. Rep. Park Byeong-seug of the ruling Democratic Party, who leads the delegation, said he had a short conversation with Kim Yong-jae, Pyongyang’s minister of external economic relations, at the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation that runs in Beijing through tomorrow. Earlier in the day, North Korea launched a ballistic missile from a site about 100 kilometers north of Pyongyang. “We strongly condemned North Korea’s launch of the missile,” Park said. The lawmaker said he had a conversation on various issues with his North Korean counterpart. He added that he got the impression that Pyongyang is looking forward to having a summit with Seoul, while not providing details. (Yonhap, “Two Koreas’ Delegations Meet during Beijing Forum,” May 14, 2017)
5/15/17:
Russian President Vladimir Putin is urging foreign leaders to keep a cool head on North Korea. Speaking in China, Putin condemned North Korea’s latest missile launch as “dangerous.” But he also cautioned against “intimidating” the country, comments almost certainly directed at Washington. “I would like to confirm that we are categorically against the expansion of the club of nuclear states, including through the Korean Peninsula,” Putin told reporters. “We are against it and consider it counterproductive, damaging, dangerous.” In 2014, Moscow wrote off 90 percent of Pyongyang’s $11 billion Soviet-era debt. More recently, Russia and North Korea have considered a slew of economic deals, including an expansion of railway links between the two countries, a new ferry service that will cart people and cargo, and advanced training opportunities for North Korean engineers at Russian universities. Despite international sanctions, Siberian oil companies have sold fuel to North Korea. According to a report by the private intelligence firm Stratfor, “When China recently threatened to cut off fuel exports to North Korea if it conducted its sixth nuclear weapons test, Russia hinted it could replace at least some of that supply.” Pyongyang has returned the favor. In a February Lunar New Year greeting card, leader Kim Jong Un listed Russia as the country most friendly toward North Korea. North Koreans frequently travel (or are shipped off) to Siberia to help with construction projects. “The idea that Russia is once again superseding China as North Korea’s major international patron bodes well when viewed through the prism of North Korea’s Cold War-era tactics of playing China and the USSR off of each other,” Russia-Korea analyst Anthony Rinna wrote in a note at the Institute of Asia and Pacific Studies at the University of Nottingham. Russia hopes to use its cozier ties with North Korea to exert influence on the world stage. “If Russia can be instrumental in resolving a key international dispute like North Korea, they will want to parry that into something else, to use it as a bargaining chip,” said the chief of CNN’s Moscow bureau, Matthew Chance. (Amanda Erickson, “Russia Warns against ‘Intimidating’ North Korea after Latest Missile Launch,” Washington Post, May 15, 2017)
Intelligence officials and private security experts say that new digital clues point to North Korean-linked hackers as likely suspects in the sweeping ransomware attacks that have crippled computer systems around the world. The indicators are far from conclusive, the researchers warned, and it could be weeks, if not months, before investigators are confident enough in their findings to officially point the finger at Pyongyang’s increasingly bold corps of digital hackers. The attackers based their weapon on vulnerabilities that were stolen from the National Security Agency and published last month. Security experts at Symantec, which in the past has accurately identified attacks mounted by the United States, Israel and North Korea, found early versions of the ransomware called WannaCry that used tools that were also deployed against Sony Pictures Entertainment, the Bangladesh central bank last year and Polish banks in February. American officials said that they had seen the same similarities. All of those attacks were ultimately linked to North Korea. The computer code used in the ransomware bore some striking similarities to the code used in those three attacks. That code has not been widely used, and has been seen only in attacks by North Korean-linked hackers. Researchers at Google and Kaspersky, a Moscow-based cybersecurity firm, confirmed the coding similarities. Those clues alone are not definitive, however. Hackers often borrow and retrofit one another’s attack methods, and government agencies are known to plant “false flags” in their code to throw off forensic investigators. “At this time, all we have is a temporal link,” said Eric Chien, an investigator at Symantec who was among the first to identify the Stuxnet worm, the American- and Israeli-led attacks on Iran’s nuclear program, and North Korea’s effort to steal millions from the Bangladeshi bank. “We want to see more coding similarities,’’ he said, “to give us more confidence.” In a blog post on Microsoft’s website over the weekend, Brad Smith, the company’s president, asked what would happen if the United States military lost control of “some of its Tomahawk missiles” and discovered that a criminal group was using them to threaten a damaging strike. It was a potent analogy, and an unusually public airing of the newest split in the Silicon Valley-Washington divide. Over the past few months, it has become clear that the intelligence community’s version of Tomahawks — the “vulnerabilities” the N.S.A. and C.I.A. have spent billions of dollars to develop to break into foreign computers and foil Iranian nuclear programs or North Korean missiles — are being turned against everyday computer users around the world. “We have seen vulnerabilities stored by the C.I.A. show up on WikiLeaks,” Smith wrote, “and now this vulnerability stolen from the N.S.A. has affected customers around the world.” The N.S.A.’s tools were published last month by a hacking group calling itself the Shadow Brokers, which enabled hackers to bake them into their ransomware, which then spread rapidly through unpatched Microsoft computers, locking up everything in its wake. There is no evidence that the North Koreans were involved in the actual theft of the N.S.A. hacking tools. But hackers quickly seized on the published vulnerabilities to wreak havoc on computer systems that were not “patched” in recent months, after the N.S.A. quietly told Microsoft about the flaw in their systems. At a news conference at the White House today, Thomas Bossert, President Trump’s Homeland Security adviser, told reporters, “This was not an exploit developed by the N.S.A. to hold organizations ransom,” he said. “This was a vulnerability exploit that was part of a much larger tool put together by the culpable parties.” The weapons used in the attacks that started May 12, government officials insist, were cobbled together from many sources. And the fault, they argue, lies with whoever turned them into weapons — or maybe with Microsoft itself, for not having a system in place to make sure that when they issue a patch that neutralizes such attacks, everyone around the world takes the time to fix their systems. Or with the victims, who failed to run their security updates made available two months ago, or who continue to use so-called “legacy” software that Microsoft no longer supports. When asked about the source of the attack, Bossert said, “We don’t know.” He told reporters at the White House. “Attribution can be difficult. I don’t want to say we have no clues. But I stand assured that the best and brightest are working on this hack.” As Bossert was speaking, yet another N.S.A. hacking tool, very similar to the one used in the weekend’s ransomware attacks, was being retrofitted by cybercriminals and put up for sale on the underground dark web. In private hacking forums, cybercriminals were discussing how to develop more than a dozen other N.S.A. hacking tools for criminal use. (Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger, “In Computer Attacks, Clues Point to Frequent Culprit: North Korea,” New York Times, May 16, 2017,
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities, Catalina Devandas-Aguilar, welcomed a number of positive steps on disability issues taken by the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, but noted that “there is still a long way to go to realize the rights of persons with disabilities in the DPRK.” “The Government has shown openness to disability issues in particular through the ratification of the Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities and some progress in other areas, including the recognition of the Korean sign language as an official language of the DPRK,” said the expert, who undertook the first visit ever to DPRK by an independent expert designated by the Human Rights Council, from 3 to 8 May. “However, there is a range of challenges in realizing these rights for all persons with disabilities; not only for the blind and the deaf, or those with physical impairments,” the expert said. “For instance, the medical model of disability -which attempts to ‘cure’ and ‘rehabilitate’ persons with disabilities- remains prevalent and influences the way in which they are perceived and treated by society.” Devandas-Aguilar encouraged the Government to take measures to raise awareness about the dignity and capabilities of persons with disabilities, and to progressively implement an inclusive quality education system for all learners with disabilities.
She also called on the authorities to improve physical accessibility of public infrastructure, and increase the participation of persons with disabilities in society, including women with disabilities.
Among her recommendations, the UN Special Rapporteur stressed the need to revisit legislation that currently does not recognize the full legal capacity of all persons with disabilities. Devandas-Aguilar visited the cities of Pyongyang and Pongchon in the South Hwanghae Province, where she met with Government officials, the Korean Federation for the Protection of the Disabled, associations of persons with disabilities, the UN Country Team, international cooperation actors and the diplomatic community. (UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, “UN Disability Expert Welcomes Opportunity for Constructive Dialogue on Human Rights in north Korea,” May 15, 2017)
5/16/17:
South Korea and the United States agreed to work toward the “complete” denuclearization of North Korea, also vowing to seek new and practical ways to rid the communist North of its nuclear weapons, Seoul officials said. The agreement came at a meeting between South Korean officials and U.S. National Security Council (NSC) officials. “The United States reaffirmed its strong commitment to the security and defense of South Korea,” Yoon Young-chan, the top press secretary of South Korean President Moon Jae-in, told reporters. The sides agreed to exert joint efforts for a “complete” disposal of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, he added. “First, they agreed that their ultimate goal was the complete disposal of North Korean nuclear weapons. Second, they agreed to mobilize all available means, including sanctions and dialogue,” the South Korean official said. Tuesday’s meeting involved NSC’s senior director for East Asia Matt Pottinger and NSC director for Korea Allison Hooker. Chung Eui-yong, Seoul’s former ambassador to Geneva, headed the South Korean side. Chung currently heads a special advisory group for President Moon Jae-in on security and diplomatic issues. The sides said dialogue with the communist North was possible under the right conditions, Yoon said. However, Pottinger, speaking to reporters later, said now may be not be the right time for dialogue. “Right now, we certainly do not see the right conditions in light of the provocations,” he said. North Korea launched what is believed to be an intermediate-range missile on Sunday, prompting fresh condemnation from both Seoul and Washington, as well as the U.N. Security Council. “We would want to see concrete movement to reduce the threat. Right now the threat is gathering,” Pottinger said. Apparently to finally put an end to the decades old dispute over North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, the officials from Seoul and Washington also agreed to look for new “bold and practical” means to rid North Korea of its nuclear weapons, Yoon said. Tuesday’s meeting also sought to arrange schedules for a summit between Moon and his U.S. counterpart Donald Trump. Yoon said the sides have agreed to hold the summit in Washington in late June. During a courtesy call by the U.S. delegation, the new South Korean president said his upcoming meeting with the U.S. president will show the strong alliance between their countries, according to Yoon. “The summit will be a chance to once again display, not only to the people of our two countries but to the entire world, the strength of the Korea-U.S. alliance,” Moon was quoted as telling the visiting U.S. officials. “Also, I wish the countries will continue to work closely to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue,” he added, according to Yoon. Seoul’s presidential office earlier said Moon has named a special envoy to the United States to arrange and set agendas for his proposed summit with Trump. Hong Seok-hyun, a former ambassador to the U.S. and also a former chief of a prominent local media group, was set to head to Washington tomorrow, according to diplomatic sources. (Yonhap, “S. Korea, U.S. Agree to Seek New ‘Bold’ Ways to Denuclearize North Korea,” May 16, 2017)
The American ambassador to the United Nations called for stiffening sanctions against North Korea and perhaps even punishing those who continue to help it, even as she acknowledged that there was no consensus yet with the North’s powerful backers in China. “We have to turn around and tell the entire international community: You either support North Korea or you support us,” the ambassador, Nikki R. Haley, told reporters. “The United States is not past looking at third-country entities who are helping North Korea and putting sanctions against them. If you’re supporting North Korea, you’re against the rest of the international community.” Haley’s comments came as the United Nations Security Council met to discuss how to respond to North Korea’s latest ballistic missile test over the weekend. Asked if China had agreed to new sanctions, Haley said: “We don’t have it done yet. We are working with Beijing along with South Korea as well as Japan.” She also pointedly reminded Russia that the North’s latest missile test had reached close to Russia’s border. “You either support North Korea or you don’t,” she said. “But you have to choose; you have to pick a side.” She added, “Not one country is immune to the threat from North Korea.” (Somini Sengupta and Choe Sang-hun, “U.S. Envoy Calls for Tougher Action on North Korea,” New York Times, May 17, 2017, p. A-10)
Who made North Korea a nuclear power: Dr A Q Khan or Pakistan? On 4 February 2004, Khan appeared on the television and confessed to have supplied nuclear technology and components to North Korea, Iran and Libya. During the telecast, Khan accepted his crimes in English and not in Urdu, which is the language understood by most Pakistanis. That telecast was actually for the international audience, specially the United States and European intelligence agencies. Khan explicitly mentioned that this proliferation network was entirely of his own and the Pakistani government or authorities were never involved. But was it true? Pakistan had left the plutonium route long ago in 1975 when Khan brought stolen centrifuge technology from Europe where he was working for URENCO as a technical translator. Apart from China, Pakistan was the only major country in the world that not only maintained diplomatic relations with North Korea but received weaponry from them as well. But the cooperation in Nuclear and missile field started in late 1980s. Investigative journalists Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark did a commendable job while investigating Pakistan’s quest to acquire nuclear weapons and their proliferation. Their book Deception explains it all. In 2006, they interviewed Benazir Bhutto in Dubai. She revealed some interesting facts. This idea of proliferation for monetary gains was the brain child of the Pakistani Army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg. Towards the end of 1989, Benazir was the Prime Minister and in a meeting (attended by Gen Jahagir Karamat, DG-MI and Gen Hamid Gul, DG-ISI) Gen Beg briefed her about the Kashmir situation and suggested ways to fuel the insurgency by setting up more training camps, providing weaponry and logistic support, infiltrating 100,000 battle hardened Afghan Mujahedeen. Benazir was already under pressure due to poor economic state of the country and from the United State. She did not agree to escalate the situation; however she agreed to let Pakistan Army continue the low level insurgency. Beg’s second proposal was far more dangerous. To run the low level insurgency, Pakistan needed money independent of IMF funding, US aid etc. This was the first time when he suggested selling off the nuclear technology and assistance to likely customers. Bhutto was stunned and could not believe her ears. But the only customer she could thought of were Iraq, Iran and may be Libya. She then told the General that IMF gave around $200 million a year to Pakistan and how many `customers` he thought would give Pakistan that big amount. And for how many years? What would happen when those customers have got what all they needed? What will happen when international community learns about this proliferation? Bhutto rejected the idea and a disappointed General left her office. Bhutto claimed she had no clue about when happened later as military would keep her away from the KRL (Khan Research Laboratory) and the nuclear program. But the General did not stop. In a 2006 interview, Robert Oakley, Ambassador of the United States in Pakistan from 1988 to 1991, informed the authors of the book that soon after the meeting with Bhutto, Gen Beg went to Iran to get their support in Pakistan’s proxy war in Kashmir and in return offered Iranians support in their nuclear program. Oakley had informed US administration about this development but considering the Afghan Jihad, the US administration kept quiet. Benazir also revealed that Pakistani Army and AQ Khan did not lose hope. In December 1993, she was to visit Beijing and AQ Khan approached her again. He met Benazir and requested her to visit Pyongyong with a special request. Khan wanted Benazir to ask North Korean dictator for NoDong missiles. He argued that Pakistan was developing short range missiles which were not good enough to hit deep inside India. He said that “we have the bomb but we can’t deliver it.” Benazir was again shocked, but agreed for a short trip to North Korea on her way back. She discussed Khan’s proposal to her then Counsel – Hussain Haqqani. He advised her not to fall in the trap of security establishment but Bhutto did not want to cross Army’s way again. She tried earlier during her first term as the PM and she was accused of being a threat to the national security and her government was dismissed. Bhutto did not want that to happen again. She claimed that she believed that missile deal would be against cash and had no clue about Army and Khan’s plan to exchange nuclear technology instead. Bhutto flew to Pyongyong on 29 Dec 1993 and during the dinner, a nervous Benazir leaned over North Korean dictator and said “Give my country Nodong missile’s blue prints, we need those missiles”. Kim stared at her while she repeated the request. After a few moments’ silence, he agreed. Bhutto came back with a bag full of technical papers and disks. Soon the Army and Khan got what they wanted – Nodong missiles. They repainted the missile hurriedly and test fired it. Dr. Shafiq, son of Brig Sajawal who was in-charge of facilities administration of KRL, revealed to Adrian Levy and Catherine that `there was so much excitement that no one cared to notice that paint on the missile was still wet`. Leading newspaper The Guardian had reported the same while quoting David Wright, the co-director of the global security programme at the Union of Concerned Scientists “The first result was the Ghauri, a missile with a range of 1,500kms (930 miles). Basically, it was a repainted North Korean missile.” An evil deal had started where Pakistan’s Uranium Enrichment technology was being exchanged for North Korean missile technology and some “cash”. In 1995, former US ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley (mentioned above) held a conference in Washington where he invited three persons from Pakistan – former vice-chief Gen (R) Arif, Agha Murtaza Poya – editor-in-chief of the newspaper `The Muslim` and famous Pakistani journalist and editor of The Friday Times, Najam Sethi. During the conference, Oakley surprised all of them by showing photos of Pakistani Air Force’s C-130 planes unloading centrifuges and loading Nodong missile components. But Pakistan again denied conducting any such exchange. Soon there was plenty of other proof. Khan and PAF C-130s started making frequent trips to North Korea. CIA and other agencies tightened their grip over Pakistan’s network. The U.S. administration could no longer resist pressure from State Department and intelligence agencies, who were giving irrefutable proof of Pakistan security establishment’s (Army leadership and Khan) one stop shop that was supplying everything to North Korea, Iran and Libya – from the blue print to the actual centrifuges, technical support, bomb design and trigger mechanism. Everything was on offer for dollars – most of the amount went to Pakistan/Pakistani Army treasury and some of it went to personal pockets. In 2011, Washington Post reported that Khan had released a copy of a letter from a North Korean official, dated 1998. The letter had details of the transfer of $3 million to former Pakistani army chief Jehangir Karamat and $500,000 plus some jewellery to another military official, Lt-Gen. Zulfiqar Khan. Finally in 2002, the US officially announced that they had proof that Pakistan/AQ Khan’s network had exported the centrifugal technology to North Korea. But Pakistani President Musharraf did not hand over Khan for any investigation. When pressure kept mounting, the Pakistani Security Establishment persuaded Khan to take the sole responsibility in country’s “national interests”. Khan was assured that there would be no trial, no one would be allowed to question him and at most, he would be under house arrest. The rest is history. But the Pakistan-North Korea cooperation never stopped. As per Sunday Guardian report, some sources suspect that North Korea is conducting nuclear tests for Pakistan to provide vital data to Pakistan. This crucial data is needed to perfect the tactical nuclear weapon designs and their mating with the North Korean missiles. Interestingly China, the mentor and major supporter of both these countries, came out as the main beneficiary of this game. In early 1990s, China had refused to provide M-11 missiles to Pakistan as it was normalizing its relations with the United States and was hoping to sign trade agreements to transfer manufacturing from the US to China. But China had earlier provided nuclear bomb design to Pakistan and never stopped North Korea or Pakistan to fulfil each other’s needs. Now both his main allies are threatening his arch enemies – the United States and India. (Sumit Walia. “Who Made North Korea a Nuclear Power: Dr. A.Q. Khan or Pakistan?” SIFY, May 16, 2016)
5/17/17:
President Donald Trump told a special envoy of South Korean President Moon Jae-in that he looks forward to working closely with Moon to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and is willing to make peace through engagement with Pyongyang if conditions are right, the envoy said. Trump, however, stressed during a 15-minute meeting with special envoy Hong Seok-hyun that he won’t hold talks with the North for the sake of talks, the envoy said. Also in attendance at the meeting were Vice President Mike Pence, National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster and Trump’s son-in-law and senior adviser, Jared Kushner. It was the first time Trump has met with a South Korean official since taking office. “(President Trump) talked about sanctions on North Korea and cooperative relations with China. And he said he looks forward to cooperating closely with President Moon in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue so as to produce an outcome,” Hong said. “Though we’re now at the stage of pressure and sanctions, he said he has a willingness to make peace through the so-called engagement if certain conditions are right. He said, however, that what he’s willing to do is not talk for talk’s sake but for talks that produce an outcome,” the envoy said. Hong said he handed Moon’s letter to Trump and expressed thanks for supporting South Korea’s security and inviting Moon to visit Washington. Trump was quoted as saying that he very much looks forward to next month’s summit. “President Trump talked mainly about big pictures, and emphasized that we can achieve an outcome through the strong unity of the alliance and international cooperation,” Hong said. Hong also said he held a separate meeting with McMaster and talked briefly about the THAAD deployment. “I said there is a controversy about procedural problems in the course of the deployment, and I talked about the need for this issue to be discussed at the National Assembly,” Hong said. In response, McMaster said the U.S. is aware of and understands various talks about such procedural problems, Hong said, adding that the meeting was mostly about the North Korean nuclear issue. The issue of THAAD’s cost didn’t come up during the meeting, he said. (Chang Jae-soon, “Trump Willing to Make Peace with N. Korea though Engagement: S. Korea Envoy,” Yonhap, May 17, 2017) President Donald Trump expressed his support for engagement with North Korea to make peace – under the right conditions – to President Moon Jae-in’s special envoy to Washington. “Though we are now at the stage of pressure and sanctions, [President Trump] said he has a willingness to make peace through so-called ‘engagement’ if certain conditions are right,” said Hong Seok-hyun, the special envoy to the Unites States, to reporters after his meeting with Trump at the White House. “He said, however, that rather than holding talks simply for the sake of talks, he is willing to hold talks that produce some outcome.” This marks the first time Trump has publicly proposed “to make peace” with Pyongyang in reference to the North Korea issue. The Trump administration is also indicating a shift in the possibility of dialogue with Pyongyang, leaving room for cooperation with the Moon administration on engagement of North Korea in the future. Hong, chairman of the Korean Peninsula Forum and a former U.S. ambassador, led the Korean delegation to Washington, the first meeting of an envoy of the new Moon administration with Trump. Hong delivered a letter from Moon, who took office last week, to Trump. The special envoy added he conveyed Moon’s gratitude for the United States’ continuous consideration of South Korea’s security as well as thanks for President Trump’s invitation to an early bilateral summit to be held next month. Trump was said to have remarked upon receiving Moon’s letter, “It’s beautiful.” Trump expressed “great expectations for the summit with President Moon in June.” The U.S. president went onto say that he “looks forward the outcome of working in close cooperation with President Moon to resolve the North Korea issue in the future,” according to Hong. “President Trump generally talked about the bigger picture, emphasizing that we can achieve an outcome through unity in our sturdy alliance and international cooperation.” In his 40-minute talks with McMaster, Hong underscored that Korean conservatives and liberals stand in unity on security issues. “The new administration has the willingness to solve the North Korean nuclear issue based on a solid security and the [South Korea-U.S.] alliance,” Hong told McMaster. Hong went onto convey Seoul’s understanding of the Trump administration’s strategy of maximum pressure and engagement toward North Korea. He emphasized Seoul agreed with Washington on the importance of sanctions and pressure on North Korea, adding that when conditions are matured, dialogue also has to be appropriately used. McMaster also was said to have agreed to this principle, adding South Korea and the United States will have to cooperate and hold further discussions on the conditions necessary for dialogue with the North. He called for bilateral working-level talks on this. Hong also lauded Trump’s efforts to pressure China to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue. He added, “We are well aware how much effort President Trump has put into leading China” to more actively rein in North Korea, emphasizing the importance of the South Korea-U.S. alliance in that process. Hong, a longtime advocate of Korean Peninsula issues, arrived in Washington for a four-day visit and is expected to hold meetings with U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Defense Secretary James Mattis and other senior U.S. government officials, as well as opinion leaders. “President Trump remarking that he will not hold talks for the sake of talk, and only under the right conditions, shows again the shared understanding between the two countries,” said Cho June-hyuck, spokesman of the South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs May 18. He added that this is in line with Moon’s statement at a Sunday meeting of the South Korean National Security Council that dialogue is possible only if and when there is a change in North Korea’s behavior. “There will be close cooperation between us … for a resolute and pragmatic plan for our joint goal toward the complete scrapping of North Korea’s nuclear program,” said Cho. (Sarah Kim, “Trump Discusses North with Moon Envoy,” JoongAng Ilbo, May 18, 2017)
A special envoy of new South Korean President Moon Jae In agreed with Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio to pursue “future-oriented” ties but noted that a bilateral accord on the “comfort women” issue was widely viewed as unacceptable. “We discussed that our leaders should meet frequently in a future-oriented manner and make efforts toward that end,” envoy Moon Hee Sang said after the talks at the Foreign Ministry. Moon, who arrived in Tokyo earlier in the day, will meet with Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. The envoy said he did not ask for a renegotiation of the 2015 bilateral agreement, under which the countries confirmed they had “finally and irreversibly” settled the protracted row over Korean women who were forced to work in wartime Japanese military brothels. But he said that he told Kishida that “most of the South Korean people are emotionally unable to accept” the agreement. (Kyodo, “South Korea Envoy Tells Japan Majority Opposed to ‘Comfort Women’ Deal,” May 17, 2017)
President Moon Jae-in said he would not tolerate further provocations by North Korea or its nuclear weapons programs during his first visit to the Ministry of National Defense as commander in chief. “The firing of a ballistic missile is a serious provocation that violates United Nations Security Council resolutions and poses a serious challenge to peace on the Korean Peninsula as well as to the international community,” said Moon during his meeting with military commanders at the Defense Ministry in Seoul. “I will not tolerate the North’s provocations and nuclear threats.” The newly elected leader also stressed that South Korea’s military was capable of “stern retaliation against an enemy’s provocation” in any form. “Our military is maintaining an utmost readiness posture against any form of enemy provocation,” added the president in a surprise choice of words to describe the North Korean military – “enemy” – given his refusal to do so during the campaign. On the third presidential debate in April, Moon refused to define the North as the “primary enemy state” of the South, saying such a characterization was inappropriate for a presidential aspirant. Moon also noted the North’s military and nuclear program had “advanced dramatically” and become “real threats.” To deter it from further provocative acts, Seoul will actively work in cooperation with the international community, he said. (Kang Jin-kyu, “Moon Talks Tough about ‘Enemy,’” JoongAng Ilbo, May 17, 2017)
South Korea’s unification ministry expressed a need to reopen an inter-Korean communication hotline, which was severed early last year following North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests. In February 2016, North Korea cut off two inter-Korean communication channels as it expelled remaining South Koreans from a joint industrial park in response to South Korea’s closure of the Kaesong complex. One of them is a hotline at a liaison office located at the truce village of Panmunjom, which was set up in 1971. It had been periodically disconnected when inter-Korean ties seriously worsened. Technically speaking, the communication lines are not physically cut, but the dialogue channel is not operating as North Korea has not responded to South Korean officials’ daily contact over the phone. “The government has kept the stance that the inter-Korean dialogue channel should be reopened. The ministry has been reviewing ways to restore it,” Lee Duk-haeng, ministry spokesman, told a regular press briefing. “But there are no specific steps in the offing.” Lee also called on North Korea to heed the international community’s call for ending provocations as Pyongyang claimed that its latest missile test is to help ensure safety and security on the divided peninsula. “North Korea should pay attention to its call and have clear understanding about what the problem is,” the spokesman said. (Yonhap, “S. Korea Calls for Reopening Inter-Korean Communication Channel,” May 17, 2017)
5/18/17:
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said Washington has no intention for a regime change or invasion of North Korea, urging it to abandon its nuclear program in return for regime security and an end to hostility, according to Seoul’s special envoys. Tillerson made the remarks during his meeting with Hong Seok-hyun, a former chairman of JoongAng Media Network who is visiting Washington as President Moon Jae-in’s special envoy. During the 40-minute talks, Tillerson expressed the country’s willingness to return to dialogue with Pyongyang if it shows sincerity through actions such as a halt in nuclear and missile tests, an official at Hong’s delegation said. “The secretary said (the Donald Trump administration’s) policy goal is not to pursue a regime change or aggression but to ensure regime security,” the official told reporters after the talks, calling the Kim Jong-un regime to “trust us, instead of using back channels.” “But he said Washington will only openly send messages, rather than hold closed-door talks, emphasizing the North should take action to cease nuclear and missile tests.” Tillerson’s comments echo Trump’s remarks a day ago that he is willing to engage the communist state, but not for the sake of talks without the “right conditions.” The secretary also said during a press interview last month that the administration has “no objective to change the regime” but seeks a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. But the official said Tillerson’s remarks did not appear to mean any easing of preconditions for dialogue, with the ultimate goal of eliminating the North’s nuclear program remaining unchanged. “The US’ first-stage objective is that Pyongyang does not carry out additional nuclear and missile tests,” he said. “I think the level of preconditions is quite high, and North Korea is supposed to take substantial activity first by refraining from the tests for a while before the atmosphere for talks starts to form.” Hong also quoted Tillerson as saying there are a multitude of US businesses willing to invest in the North which would help rebuild the crumbling economy if it makes the right choice. “I was most impressed to see the US’ resolve for engagement that it pursues sanctions and pressure not to harass North Korea but to foster an opportunity for its development by opening its doors and abolishing its nuclear program in the long term,” Hong said. Tillerson noted Beijing is moving to relax its sanctions on Lotte Group, which provided land for the THAAD, another delegation member said. “China knows that THAAD poses absolutely no threat to its own security,” Tillerson was quoted as saying. “The issue regarding the range of X-Band radar is not a problem China should be worried about.” On his second day in Washington, Hong held a series of meetings with congressional leaders including Ed Royce, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Ted Yoho and Sens. Cory Gardner and Ben Cardin. Yesterday, Hong also met with National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster ahead of his visit to Trump. He is also scheduled for talks with John McCain and Mac Thornberry, who respectively head the Armed Services Committees at the Senate and House, think tank seminars and other events tomorrow. (Shin Hyon-hee, “Tillerson Promises N.K. Regime Security, Appeals for Trust: Envoy,” Korea Herald, May 18, 2017)
CIA Director Mike Pompeo discussed the potential for fomenting an insurrection against the Kim Jong Un regime in North Korea with Thae Yong Ho, one of the highest-ranking North Korean officials to defect to South Korea, according to U.S. intelligence officials. The meeting between Pompeo and took place during the CIA director’s visit to South Korea from April 29 to May 2. Disclosure of the meeting between the CIA chief and the defector comes as tensions remain high on the peninsula. A CIA spokeswoman declined to comment on Pompeo’s meeting with Thae, citing a policy of not discussing the director’s overseas travel. During the session with Thae, Pompeo discussed whether conditions inside North Korea were ripe for an uprising against Kim by the military, security, or political officials, according to intelligence officials familiar with the meeting. Thae responded that he believed conditions within North Korea were conducive to such an insurrection. The CIA director, according to the officials, is taking steps to strengthen the CIA’s espionage and covert action branch and increase its foreign operations capabilities. The Directorate of Operations was weakened under Pompeo’s predecessor, Obama administration appointee John Brennan, the officials said. Under Brennan, CIA clandestine and covert operations capabilities were limited severely, mainly by agency lawyers who limited overseas activities to less risky endeavors. Pompeo is said to be taking steps to strengthen the directorate of operations with increased resources, training, and personnel. (Bill Gertz,”CIA Director Met with High-Level North Korean Defector,” Washington Free Beacon, May 18, 2017)
Arms Control Wonk: “The assassination in February of Kim Jong Un’s half-brother Kim Jong Nam at Kuala Lumpur airport has turned international attention to North Korea’s other shady activities in Malaysia. A Reuters investigation has already revealed that a North Korean company has been marketing military radios from offices in Kuala Lumpur. It turns out that military radios may be the tip of the iceberg in terms of DPRK sales shenanigans in Malaysia. Open source investigations reveal that North Korea has also been involved – albeit to an unclear degree – with a Malaysian company apparently marketing North Korean designed military vessels including miniature submarines. Evidence, including a recent US sanctions listing in 2016 and a flashy Youtube video, suggest that the company – Kay Marine Sdn Bhd – has collaborated with North Korean partners and may have marketed North Korean designed military vessels since the UN arms embargo first entered force in 2006. In 2016, the US State Department designated several companies under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act including Kay Marine Sdn Bhd, whose designation slipped attention at the time. Kay Marine is a shipbuilding company that has supplied vessels to customers including the Malaysian and Australian governments. The US has not provided a reason for Kay Marine’s designation – although it must be due to evidence of the company trading with Iran, Syria or North Korea. A search of Kay Marine’s details under the Malaysian corporate registry shows no evidence of North Korean ownership. However, other evidence suggests that Kay Marine may have been collaborated with North Korea, and has possibly marketed North Korean designed products. Hints of Kay Marine’s involvement with the DPRK have previously appeared in the Malaysian press. A November 2006 interview with Kay Marine’s managing director suggested that the company had supplied North Korea in the past – the MD even stated that “the company was awaiting word from North Korea on a contract that would use technology from that country”. He also noted that “North Korea needs small patrol boats to guard against infiltration”. The previous month the UN had passed Security Council Resolution 1718, which prohibited the export of various arms to North Korea, including “war ships.” In 2007, another Malaysian news article reported that Kay Marine’s Chairman had stated that “the company was also forging cooperation with North Korean experts to manufacture assault boats.” YouTube, of all places, is where Kay Marine’s apparent relationship with North Korea gets really interesting. In 2011, a video was posted on a YouTube account apparently belonging to Kay Marine which raises further questions regarding Kay Marine’s activities. Against a soundtrack of non-descript 1980s rock music featuring intolerably long guitar solos (the video’s backing music is apparently provided by Grammy nominated guitarist Joe Satriani) the video features a selection of marine hardware. The first half of the video features a selection of civilian boats, including rigid inflatable boats, speed boats, a ferry-style “landing craft”, a self-righting “search and rescue boat” and an aluminum coast guard patrol boat. The video lists Kay Marine’s alleged customers including the Malaysian armed forces, Royal Malaysian Police and a variety of companies. So far, it’s all pretty mundane and consistent with the company’s broader digital footprint. However, halfway through the film, the screen fades to black and a second video begins, again starting with the company’s logo. This time the title page states “Advanced Military Boats from Kay Marine.” The video proceeds to feature around six military craft showing off their paces – from a “small patrol boat,” to a large military hovercraft, and a miniature “small submarine.” The video ends with a periscope-like electronic sensor object (all vessels are provided with names/designations in the video). Analysis of the video and comparison of these vessels with existing designs provides interesting results. Except for one generic-appearing patrol boat, these vessels all bear uncanny similarities to products designed in North Korea and used by DPRK clients including Iran. The first vessel bears a striking resemblance to the Iranian Peykaap patrol boat which the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) suggests was based on a North Korean design. Some images of Iran’s Peykaap craft from state media have been assembled here. The video suggests the boat carries an “armament” of “2Rounds x 324mm Torpedo.” The second vessel – with its distinctive three strutted spoiler – bears a strong resemblance to the Taedong-C torpedo boat (Iranian designation Gahjae class). The US ONI has suggested that two DPRK-designed semi-/submersible vessels were transferred to Iran by North Korea in the early 2000s. There’s an image and schematic of the Taedong-C here. The third vessel bears a strong resemblance to the Kajami submersible torpedo boat currently in service in Iran. This may be the second semi-/submersible boat that Iran received from North Korea in the early 2000s, according to ONI. There is a nice image and schematic of a Kajami here. The fourth vessel is difficult to identify. What appears to be three different types of hovercraft are displayed in the fifth segment of the video, including one that bears a strong resemblance to those displayed in a 2013 exercise (the footage of which was apparently also digitally manipulated). The final vessel displayed – the most exciting – looks to be a Yono type miniature submarine. The sub’s dimensions in the video (2.75m beam and 29m length) are consistent with dimensions listed online. A nice image of a Yono class can be found here. The sub is clearly the “piece de resistance.” Sat in a yard on a cradle on rails, the sub is filmed from different angles with the anchor seductively raised and lowered, and a small external propeller (likely for small scale maneuvers) rotated. The boat bears a strong resemblance to the Yono class submarine, a type that South Korean reports suggested was a strong candidate for having sunk the South Korean ROKS Cheonan corvette in 2010, killing 46 sailors. Interestingly, the products shown in the video are consistent with the product line of notorious North Korean arms trading firm, Green Pine Associated. Green Pine was listed under UN sanctions in 2012, with the summary concluding: “Green Pine has been identified for sanctions for exporting arms or related material from North Korea. Green Pine specializes in the production of maritime military craft and armaments, such as submarines, military boats and missile systems, and has exported torpedoes and technical assistance to Iranian defense-related firms.” Finding evidence which supports any hypothesis that any of these vessels are actually being manufactured in Malaysia – as opposed to simply being marketed from there – has been difficult. The midget Yono class submarine is certainly the most distinctive piece of equipment shown in the video. That this submarine in the video (despite its rather dodgy looking welds) may have been manufactured in Malaysia by Kay Marine is a far-fetched idea to say the least. Kay Marine’s online profile suggests that the company employs around 120 people and has six sites – mostly offices, one warehouse or industrial unit (away from the water) and one shipyard. The shipyard has a slipway around 50m long and was fairly simple for us to geo-locate using open source techniques. This shipyard, which is definitely not the one hosting the submarine in Kay Marine’s YouTube video, features in a second video hosted on Kay Marine’s YouTube account. This second video documents the launch of a research ship, the RV Discovery, that Kay Marine company built for a local university (the ship was marred by a corruption scandal, but that’s another story…). A news article detailing defects with the RV Discovery perhaps provides some insights into Kay Marine’s capability (or willingness to cut costs): “Among the defects were: the installation of an electronic cable beneath a generator (making it a fire hazard); failure to encase the high pressure oil hose with an anti-splashing tape; the lamps in the steering gear compartment not working; and the life rackets [sic] exceeding their life expectancy. This was on top of broken air conditioners, closed-circuit television (CCTV) and general shipping equipment.” This RV Discovery video featuring Kay’s shipyard, along with another filmed by students as part of a college project, suggests that the capability possessed by Kay Marine at this site and within a warehouse at an unclear location is pretty basic. In fact there is no evidence to suggest that the company has the capability to manufacture even the most simple patrol boats of North Korean design featured in the video. The final item advertised in the Kay Marine YouTube sales video is an outlier – a piece of equipment, rather than a maritime vessel. This “PASSIVE INFRARED DETECTOR” appears to be a periscope used on submarines similar to the Yono. While virtually no close-up images are available online of North Korean submarines, a comparative examination can be made of images of Iranian Ghadir submarines, with Iran being an export partner of North Korea for Yono type submarines since the early 2000s. Indeed, Iran’s former president Ahmadinejad inspected a Ghadir submarine at an Iranian naval base in 2008, and was pictured emerging from a hatch right next to a very similar looking detector. The sensor is featured in the video sat behind a table next to a box (likely holding electronics), a basic looking computer screen and a joystick. The sensor is apparently demonstrated, with a screenshot of its interface showing a ship in regular optical mode, and then white, apparently in a heat-signature mode. The screen also shows the sensor pointed at a moving vehicle and some people wearing glasses. Following the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan, South Korean media quoted intelligence sources as noting that the Yono included advanced sensors: the Yono “is similar to the shark-class submarine and was built recently for export, equipped with night-vision equipment and other high-tech gadgets, as well as a unique structure to enhance its stealth capabilities.” Is it possible that the DPRK is exporting submarines to customers abroad, as the Kay Marine YouTube video suggests? Historical evidence suggests that it is. In 1996, a strapped for cash North Korea exported two Yugo class (predecessor of the Yono class) midget submarines to Vietnam. Two further incidents (covered in Andrea Berger’s Target Markets) suggest North Korea’s interest in – or openness to – submarine export. According to a leaked State Department cable, the North Korean deputy Defense Minister visited Nigeria offering to sell “anything in its inventory” in 2004 including “missiles and submarines” because Pyongyang needed hard currency. In the 2000s, North Korea exported the Yono class to Iran, with US government sources suggesting Iran had seven by 2007. The issue of submarine parts trafficking has been raised more recently following the 2011 interdiction of a shipment of submarine parts in Taiwan, which was noted by the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts in their 2013 report. The Panel’s 2015 report noted these parts were brokered by Green Pine Associated Corporation and allegedly procured in the US. The 2016 report provides further detail, noting that: “The consignments were shipped from Vienna by an Austrian national, Josef Schwartz, through his company, Schwartz Motorbootservice & Handel GmbH. He had traded with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on multiple occasions in the past, including violations and attempted violations of the luxury goods ban. The Panel confirmed that he had assisted Green Pine in evading the arms embargo.” There is also evidence that Green Pine has exported services relating to marine craft and patrol vessels, having assisted Angola with revamping some of its Mandune class naval patrol vessels according to the Panel’s 2017 report. Further evidence also presented by the Panel suggests that the company explored Sri Lankan interest in ships. Growing evidence of Green Pine’s role in conventional and broader proliferation activities resulted in the UN Security Council’s designation of Green Pine in 2012. Green Pine’s ongoing activities also led the Panel to warn that states should enhance vigilance for possible trafficking of “Maritime electronics (radars, sonars, compasses and the like) that can be used for naval vessels” in 2016. Considering North Korea’s submarine-launched ballistic missile program, the Panel suggested in 2017 that “Member States should be vigilant regarding the export of dual-use commercial items that could contribute to the submarine programme.” South Korea also produced a “Tailored watch list for submarine parts” in late 2016. In sum, two questions remain: what is the true nature Kay Marine Sdn Bhd’s relationship with North Korea (indeed if any has endured)? And what is this strange YouTube video with midget submarines and squealy guitar solos? The alleged comments by the managing director and chairman of Kay Marine in the mid-2000s suggest that there were prospects for a relationship or contract with North Korea working on assault vessels after UN sanctions were put in place in 2006. It is unclear whether this contract came to fruition. Other comments by Kay Marine officials suggest that Kay Marine exported vessels to North Korea, although this was likely before UN sanctions came into place in 2006. However, the 2016 sanctioning of Kay Marine by the US suggests that the company was still in some way involved with its North Korean partners. The 2011 YouTube video raises red flags in this respect. A marketing film of unclear origin, branded with the Kay Marine’s logo, and including at least five weapons systems which appear to be of North Korean design. The origins of the footage are unclear, although certainly prior to 2011 when it was posted online. It is possible that separate segments of the film featuring different vessels may have originated in different time periods. The resemblance of the submarine and stated dimensions (29m, 2.75m) suggest that it is a Yono (not a Yugo) class. With North Korean efforts to export to Iran beginning in the early 2000s, this segment could date to this period or earlier. The design of the vessels, and the lack of similar images in the public domain, suggests that the footage originated in North Korea. All the available evidence suggests that Kay Marine has marketed arms on behalf of North Korea, possibly for the benefit of Green Pine Associated, a company which has a track record of exports and international collaboration in marine markets. North Korea is known to have marketed arms before using “hard-copy” marketing material (See Target Markets). The Reuter’s investigation also revealed a 2017 marketing video (complete with a dodgy techno soundtrack) which has been posted by James Pearson on Twitter. However, this video is both significant because of its age and its contents. It appears to be custom made for or by Kay Marine because its logo is attached (alongside footage of seemingly legitimate products in the first half). While the full story of Kay Marine’s involvement is unclear, at the very least it would be prudent to suggest that the UN Panel of Experts investigate the issue further in their 2018 report.” (Daniel Salisbury, “A Malaysian Shipyard with North Korean Connections?” Arms Control Wonk, May 18, 2017)
5/19/17:
North Korea will rapidly strengthen its nuclear strike capability as long as the United States maintains its “hostile policy” toward the country, the country’s deputy U.N. ambassador said. Kim In Ryong told a news conference that if the Trump administration wants peace on the Korean Peninsula, it should replace the Armistice Agreement that ended the 1950-53 Korean War with a peace accord and halt its anti-North Korea policy, “the root cause of all problems.” Kim also dismissed allegations that the DPRK was behind the recent wave of global cyberattacks as “ridiculous.” “Whenever something strange happens it is the stereotype way of the United States and the hostile forces that kick off noisy anti-DPRK campaign deliberately linking with DPRK,” he said. Kim singled out as “more serious” the push by the U.S. for a new sanctions resolution and the Trump administration’s demand for all countries “to decide whether they support for DPRK or U.S.” He reiterated that “the current situation on the Korean Peninsula is often engulfed in a touch and go state to the brink of war.” North Korea will never abandon its “nuclear deterrence for self-defense and pre-emptive strike capability” even if the U.S. ratchets up sanctions and pressure “to the utmost,” Kim said. “The U.S. should mind that the DPRK nuclear striking capability will be strengthened and developed at a rapidly high speed as long as the U.S. insists its anti-DPRK policy, nasty nuclear threats and blackmails, sanction and pressure,” he said. (Edith M. Lederer, “North Korea Links Nuclear Advances to ‘Hostile’ U.S. Policy,” Associated Press, May 19, 2017) North Korea’s deputy U.N. envoy said the United States needed to roll back its “hostile policy” toward the country before there could be talks as Washington raised concern that Pyongyang could be producing a chemical used in a nerve agent. “As everybody knows, the Americans have gestured (toward) dialogue,” North Korea’s deputy U.N. ambassador, Kim In Ryong, told reporters on Friday. “But what is important is not words, but actions.” “The rolling back of the hostile policy towards DPRK is the prerequisite for solving all the problems in the Korean Peninsula,” he said. “Therefore, the urgent issue to be settled on Korean Peninsula is to put a definite end to the U.S. hostile policy towards DPRK, the root cause of all problems.” U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley raised concern on Friday about an application by North Korea to patent a process to produce sodium cyanide, which can be used to make the nerve agent Tabun and is also used in the extraction of gold. “The thought of placing cyanide in the hands of the North Koreans, considering their record on human rights, political prisoners, and assassinations is not only dangerous but defies common sense,” Haley said in a statement. North Korea submitted the patent application to a U.N. agency, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), for processing. The agency does not grant patents. U.N. sanctions monitors said they are investigating the case for any violations. Under U.N. sanctions, states are banned from supplying North Korea with sodium cyanide and Pyongyang has to abandon all chemical and biological weapons and programs. WIPO said in a statement that it has strict procedures to ensure full compliance with U.N. sanctions regimes. It noted that “patent applications are not covered by the provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolutions.” Haley said: “We urge all U.N. agencies to be transparent and apply the utmost scrutiny when dealing with these types of requests from North Korea and other rogue nations.” (Michelle Nichols, “North Korea Says U.S. Has to Roll Back ‘Hostile Policy’ before Talks Can Begin,” Reuters, May 19, 2017)
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said that any military solution to the North Korea crisis would be “tragic on an unbelievable scale” and Washington was working internationally to find a diplomatic solution. “We are going to continue to work the issue,” Mattis told a Pentagon news conference. “If this goes to a military solution, it’s going to be tragic on an unbelievable scale. So our effort is to work with the U.N., work with China, work with Japan, work with South Korea to try to find a way out of this situation.” Mattis appeared to defend China’s most recent efforts, even as he acknowledged Pyongyang’s march forward. “They (North Korea) clearly aren’t listening but there appears to be some impact by the Chinese working here. It’s not obviously perfect when they launch a missile,” Mattis said, when asked about the May 14 launch. Mattis acknowledged that Pyongyang had likely learned a great deal from the latest test of what U.S. officials say was a KN-17 missile, which was believed to have survived re-entry to some degree. “They went to a very high apogee and when it came down obviously from that altitude they probably learned a lot from it. But I’m not willing to characterize it beyond that right now,” Mattis said. (Phil Stewart and David Brunnstrom, “U.S.: Military Solution Would ‘Tragic on an Unbelievable Scale,’” Reuters, May 19, 2017)
North Korea sent a critical message via its official media to the newly launched liberal South Korean government over its policy that pursues the North’s denuclearization and seeks dialogue at the same time, claiming that dialogue can never be compatible with confrontation. “Confrontation in parallel with dialogue is an incompatible sophistry,” KCNA said in a commentary contributed by an individual named Kim Myong-chol. The late former South Korean President Park Chung-hee’s biggest crime was to have abandoned basic inter-Korean unification agreements and clung to vicious plots to instigate inter-Korean confrontation, while talking big over “confrontation in parallel with dialogue,” said the commentary, titled “(Moon) should learn a lesson from its dictator’s (Park) sin against inter-Korean unification.” It said, “It’s obvious that (the two Koreas) can never achieve national reconciliation and improve inter-Korean relations while instigating fratricidal animosity and confrontation.” National independence and peaceful unification also cannot be materialized as long as the South follows foreign forces that plot to divide the Korean Peninsula permanently and invade the North, the commentary said. “(The Moon government) should make a resolute departure from an outdated era of mistrust and hostility if it really wants to better inter-Korean ties and realize reunification,” it said. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Criticizes Moon’s Dual-Track Policy toward It,” May 19, 2017)
The U.S. Navy confirmed that two of its aircraft carriers are operating in the Western Pacific region amid unrelenting tensions on the Korean Peninsula over the North’s provocation. “USS Carl Vinson and USS Ronald Reagan are in the Western Pacific, but they are not in close proximity to each other,” the Pacific Fleet said in a statement. It’s not routine for the U.S. to deploy two aircraft carriers simultaneously in a single theater abroad. Earlier in the day, a government source here said the two may hold joint drills with South Korea’s Navy in the East Sea early next month. The USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) and its Carrier Air Wing Five, featuring fighter jets and early warning aircraft, began its spring patrol earlier this week, according to the Pacific Fleet. They are currently focused on “flight deck and carrier qualifications,” as the flattop, which has its homeport in Japan, resumed its mission after months of regular maintenance, it added. Another U.S. naval strike group, led by the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70), has been also operating in waters near Korea since late last month. The Vinson of the 3rd Fleet, headquartered in San Diego, reportedly had its regional mission extended through the end of June following the North’s ballistic missile test last weekend. (Yonhap, “Two U.S. Carriers Set for Drills in East Sea: Sources,” May 19, 2017)
State airline Air Koryo’s twice-weekly shuttle service between Pyongyang Sunan International Airport and China’s Dandong International Airport has been suspended, an official told NK News on Friday. Dandong International Airport confirmed the development in a call with NK News, stating that Air Koryo would no longer be operating out of the airport and there would be no more flights on the route. But while the airports’ spokesperson wouldn’t confirm the reason for the suspension, other sources suggested it was either linked to government or the result of financial issues. “China is stopping it: it’s a Chinese government decision,” one informed travel source explained, who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of speaking to media. “This would relate back to the sanctions the Chinese are enforcing a lot on Air Koryo, where they’re restricting the amount of times (the airline) fly between the same route in one day.” (Chad O’Carroll, “Air Koryo Dandong to Pyongyang Service Suspended, Airport Confirms,” NKNews, May 19, 2017)
South Korea and Japan have agreed to resolve a row over a 2015 deal on Japan’s wartime sexual enslavement of Korean women in a future-oriented manner, President Moon Jae-in’s special envoy said Saturday. Moon Hee-sang relayed that Japan said that it understood South Koreans’ negative sentiment toward the controversial deal reached by the former South Korean government and Japan. His remarks came after returning from his four-day trip to Japan where he delivered Moon’s letter to Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo on May 18. “We did not mention scrapping the agreement, but made it clear that most South Koreans cannot accept the deal,” Moon told reporters, upon arrival in Seoul. “I’ve heard some comments from Japan that can be viewed as Tokyo’s understanding of South Koreans’ (sentiment).” (Yonhap, “S. Korea, Japan Agree to Wisely Resolve Row over Sex Slave Deal: Korean Envoy,” May 20, 2017)
5/20/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s statement: “The U.S. is trying hard to create international atmosphere for sanctions against the DPRK over the test-fire of its ground-to-ground medium-to-long range strategic ballistic rocket Hwasong-12. What is ridiculous is that the U.S. and its vassal forces advertise that more than 20 countries and international bodies denounced the launch of rocket Hwasong-12, claiming that their anti-DPRK moves were enjoying international support. A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK in a statement on Friday branded such behavior as a cynical ploy of making profound confusing of right and wrong. …Now several times more countries than stated by the hostile forces oppose the U.S. hostile policy and its frantic joint military drills, nuclear threats and military adventurous moves which have aggravated the situation in the Korean peninsula and the region and compelled the DPRK to bolster up its nuclear force. At a recent UN Security Council emergency meeting, the U.S. representative complained that some countries mislead the public opinion, contending that the U.S. threatens north Korea. This shows the position of the U.S. floundering in a dilemma. No matter how hard the U.S. may try, it can never cover up its criminal nature as aggressor and provocateur disturbing peace and security in the region and the rest of the world. When lies and fabrications did not work on the international community desirous of independence and justice, some maniacs of the Trump administration forced other countries to make decision for supporting north Korea or the U.S. They have behaved rudely, reigning over the UN, threatening that the U.S. would impose strict sanctions upon any country, organization or individual and take issue with any international body, when they support north Korea. If such high-handed and arbitrary practices are allowed in the international arena, neither independent development of sovereign countries nor genuine international justice can be ensured and the world would become a barren land where the robber-like U.S. rules the supreme. The tightened pressure upon the DPRK by the U.S. misleading the world public would only compel the DPRK to bolster up its nuclear deterrent for justice.” (KCNA, “FM Spokesman Hits Behavior of U.S. and Its Vassal Forces,” May 20, 2017)
5/21/17:
President Moon Jae-in announced his picks for the new finance and foreign ministers, chief of the National Security Office and two special envoys on security and diplomatic issues. Kang Kyung-hwa, special advisor on policy to the U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, has been named to head the foreign ministry. Moon expressed hope that she would wisely handle sensitive pending diplomatic issues based on her expertise and network that she has built on the global diplomatic stage since she began working for the United Nations in 2006. The appointment of the diplomatic expert as foreign minister is also meaningful in achieving gender equality in the Cabinet, the president said. Chung Eui-yong, a former lawmaker and former ambassador to Geneva, has been appointed to head the National Security Office. Chung has been leading a special security advisory group for Moon since the president came into office on May 10. He also worked as head of the International Labor Organization (ILO). Moon said he picked Chung to the post in recognition of his “strong sense of security and diplomatic ability.” Moon Chung-in, emeritus professor at Seoul’s Yonsei University, and Hong Seok-hyun, former head of a local newspaper and former ambassador to the United States, have been named special advisors for diplomatic and security issues, Moon said. The finance and foreign minister nominees are subject to parliamentary confirmation hearings, but parliamentary approval is not required for their appointments. The new presidential officials and advisors, on the other hand, do not have to go through confirmation hearings. Their appointments, including those of the special advisors, were effective immediately following the announcement. (Yonhap, “President Names New Foreign, Finance Ministers, Chief Security Officials,” May 21, 2017) Cheong Wa Dae, in a rare move, revealed “minor flaws” in Kang’s ethic credentials that her elder daughter had chosen US citizenship over her Korean nationality and that she once registered a false residence in order to be accepted into a preferred school. “Kang was nominated despite these problems as she was deemed the best diplomatic chief in current circumstances,” said Cho, the personnel affairs secretary. The nomine entered the Foreign Ministry in 1999 as a specialist for international relations, without passing the state exam for career diplomats. She went on to serve as an aide to former Foreign Minister Hong Soon-young and also worked as an interpreter for the late former President Kim Dae-jung. Since then, she assumed key positions in the Foreign Ministry. In 2005, she was named as director-general of international organization, becoming the second female diplomat to serve as a director-level official. Her foray into the UN began in 2006 when she was appointed as the UN deputy high commissioner for human rights. In 2013, she went on to become assistant secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and deputy emergency relief coordinator in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Prior to joining the Foreign Ministry, Kang assisted the speaker of the National Assembly in parliamentary diplomacy. Earlier in her career, she worked for the Korean Broadcasting System’s news bureau and international radio bureau, and lectured English literature at Sejong University in Seoul. A graduate from Yonsei University with a Bachelor of Arts in political science and diplomacy, she earned her Masters of Arts in mass communication and her Ph.D. in intercultural communication from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, in the US. (Yeo Jun-suk, “Kang Kyung-wha: Seoul’s First Ever Female FM Nominee,” Korea Herald, May 21, 2017)
North Korea fired a [KN-15] midrange ballistic missile, U.S. and South Korean officials said. The rocket was fired from an area near Pukchang, in South Phyongan Province, and flew eastward about 500 kilometers (310 miles), said South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. It did not immediately provide more details. The White House said it was aware that North Korea had launched a midrange ballistic missile. White House officials traveling in Saudi Arabia with President Donald Trump said the system, which was last tested in February, has a shorter range than the missiles launched in North Korea’s most recent tests. (Kim Tong, “North Korea Fires Ballistic Missile, South Korean Officials Say,” Associated Press, May 21, 2017) The United States Pacific Command said it had “detected and tracked” a medium-range ballistic missile that was launched by the North around 9:59 a.m. Hawaii time and landed in the Sea of Japan. It said that “the missile launch from North Korea did not pose a threat to North America.” In a statement, the White House said: “We are aware that North Korea launched an MRBM. This system, last tested in February, has a shorter range than the missiles launched in North Korea’s three most recent tests.” The Japanese military said it was analyzing the height and trajectory of the missile. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo said that by conducting another test just a week after the last one, the North was “trampling on the international community’s efforts aimed at a peaceful settlement.” North Korea said the missile was a Pukguksong-2 [Polaris-2], a ground-to-ground, medium- range missile. The state-run Korean Central News Agency said Kim had watched the test, which it called successful, and had ordered rapid mass production of the missile system for deployment. The North last test-launched a Pukguksong-2 on February 12.North Korea has said a Pukguksong-2 could carry a nuclear payload. The missile was also fired from a mobile-launch vehicle and used a solid-fuel technology that experts say will make it easier to hide and launch on short notice. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Launches 2nd Missile in a Week,” New York Times, May 22, 2017,
5/22/17:
South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s top security advisor voiced a need to resume talks with North Korea, though he said the dialogue must not get in the way of ongoing international sanctions against the communist state. “We will have to try and gradually resume dialogue, starting with working-level talks,” Chung Eui-yong, the head of the National Security Office, told reporters. “I believe we must review the possibility as I believe we could resume exchanges in various areas, such as personnel, social, cultural and sports, as long as they do not undermine the international framework of sanctions against North Korea,” he added. Chung’s remarks came after his visits with political parties earlier, one day after his appointment. Chung reaffirmed Seoul will not reward the North for its provocations, but again stressed the need for dialogue. “We will sternly deal with any provocation. It is also important to enhance our defense capability to deter and prevent North Korea’s additional provocations,” he said. Still, he insisted “we must restore dialogue (with North Korea) at an early date for a fundamental reduction of tension.” (Yonhap, “Moon’s Top Security Adviser Points to Need for Dialogue with N. Korea,” May 22, 2017)
During a news briefing, a spokesman for the South Korean military, Col. Roh Jae-cheon, said that the Pukguksong-2 was believed to be a medium-range missile. Medium-range missiles are classified as having a maximum range of about 620 to 1,900 miles. “Based upon the analysis of related authorities, the missile cannot reach” Guam, he said. Guam lies about 2,000 miles from North Korea. The test of the ground-to-ground Pukguksong-2 missile appeared to have provided North Korea with meaningful data that it could use to advance its missile programs, they said. It was fired from a mobile launch vehicle. And unlike most North Korean missiles, it used solid fuel, rather than liquid. But it remained unclear how far the missile could fly. North Korea calls it a “mid-to-long-range” ballistic missile. But during the test, the missile flew 310 miles while reaching an altitude of 348 miles, according to South Korean officials. Flown on a standard trajectory, the same missile carrying a similar payload would have a range of about 780 miles, according to David Wright, co-director of the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists. “If this test were conducted with a very light payload, as North Korea is believed to have done in past tests, the actual range with a warhead could be significantly shorter,” Wright wrote in a blog post. On May 22, Rodong Sinmun released pictures that it said were sent from a camera attached to the warhead of the Pukguksong-2. The images showed the Earth lying a great distance below. North Korea said that such photographs helped missile scientists check the warhead’s positioning and steering functions after it separated from the missile. The Pukguksong-2 could be a key steppingstone toward building an ICBM, said Kim Dong-yub, a defense analyst at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University in Seoul. By combining two or more engines of the type used on the Pukguksong-2, the North could create an engine powerful enough to carry an ICBM, he said. But most analysts say that North Korea is still years away from building a reliable ICBM. One of the challenges is to master “re-entry” technologies that can protect a nuclear warhead from intense heat and vibrations as it crashes through the Earth’s atmosphere. An ICBM warhead must endure far greater heat than a shorter-range ballistic missile like the Pukguksong-2. “South Korean and United States intelligence authorities believe that through yesterday’s test, North Korea has collected data meaningful in improving the reliability of its missile technologies,” Colonel Roh said. “But we need more analysis to determine whether the warhead had a stable atmospheric re-entry.” (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Missile Test Was Short but Informative, South Says,” New York Times, May 23, 2017,
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), chairman of the DPRK State Affairs Commission and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army, supervised a test-fire of ground-to-ground medium-to-long range strategic ballistic missile Pukguksong-2. The test-fire of Pukguksong-2 was aimed to finally verify all the technical indexes of the weapon system and thoroughly examine its adaptability under various battle conditions, before its deployment at military units for action. The Supreme Leader issued an order to launch the missile at the observation post. Together with officials, he analyzed the results of the test-launch and expressed his great satisfaction over them, saying it is perfect. Saying with pride that the missile’s hitting accuracy is very high and Pukguksong-2 is a successful strategic weapon, he approved the deployment of this weapon system for action. Now that its tactical and technical data met the requirements of the Party, this type of missile should be rapidly mass-produced in a serial way to arm the KPA Strategic Force, he said. He set forth the strategic tasks for bolstering up the country’s nuclear force. He expressed belief that the national defense scientists and workers at the munitions factories intensely loyal to the WPK would produce better and more Juche weapons, nuclear offensive means of Korean style. He had a photo taken with all the national defense scientists, technicians, workers and officials who carried out the successful test-launch. Accompanying him were Ri Pyong Chol, Kim Jong Sik, Jong Sung Il, Yu Jin, Jo Yong Won and other senior officials of the C.C., WPK and General Kim Rak Gyom, commander of the KPA Strategic Force.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Supervises Test-Fire of Ballistic Missile,” May 22, 2017)
UNSC: “The members of the Security Council strongly condemned the most recent ballistic missile launch conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 21 May 2017. The members of the Security Council expressed their utmost concern over the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s highly destabilizing behavior and flagrant and provocative defiance of the Security Council by conducting this ballistic missile launch in violation of its international obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), and 2321 (2016). The members of the Security Council agreed that the Security Council would continue to closely monitor the situation and take further significant measures including sanctions, in line with the Council’s previously expressed determination. The members of the Security Council vowed to fully and comprehensively implement all measures imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by the Security Council and strongly urge all other member states to do so in an expeditious and serious manner, particularly the comprehensive measures contained in resolutions 2321 (2016) and 2270 (2016), in response to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s flagrant act of defying the will of the Security Council to denuclearize the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea emphasized on April 28 at the Ministerial Security Council meeting. The members of the Security Council called on the 1718 Committee to redouble its efforts to improve global implementation of all measures, including by implementing the relevant feasible recommendations of the Panel of Experts as soon as possible. The members of the Security Council stressed that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s illegal ballistic missile activities are significantly contributing to its development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and are greatly increasing tension in the region and beyond. The members of the Security Council further regretted that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is diverting resources to the pursuit of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons while Democratic People’s Republic of Korea citizens have great unmet needs. The members of the Security Council emphasized the vital importance of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea immediately showing sincere commitment to denuclearization through concrete action and stressed the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond. To that end, the Security Council demanded the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea conduct no further nuclear and ballistic missile tests. The members of the Security Council reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia at large, expressed their commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation, and welcomed efforts by Council members, as well as other States, to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue.” (UN Spokesperson, Security Council Press Statement on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Ballistic Missile Launch, May 22, 2017)
“We mean to carry out a flexible review of private-sector exchange and other key issues dealing with inter-Korean relations in a way that does not damage the international community’s framework of sanctions against North Korea,” said Unification Ministry spokesperson Lee Duk-haeng. Lee’s remarks are noteworthy considering that they come amid a series of applications for contact with North Korea that organizations providing humanitarian aid to North Korea have submitted around the time of Moon Jae-in’s inauguration. “We believe the current rupture in inter-Korean relations is not desirable for the stability of the Korean Peninsula,” Lee said. Amid growing hopes that inter-Korean relations will improve under the new administration, a series of groups organizing social and cultural exchange and groups providing aid to North Korea have filed applications for contact, starting with the Korean Sharing Movement. In addition, the Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (chairman Lee Je-hoon), a coalition of groups providing aid to North Korea, filed an “indirect contact request” on May 10. They want permission to contact the North Korean office of the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation to discuss various aspects of humanitarian aid to the North. “While we cannot resume full-fledged dialogue at the present time because of a number of circumstances, I do think we should quickly reopen the communication network and the hotline at Panmunjom,” said Blue House National Security Advisor Chung Eui-yong when asked about inter-Korean dialogue. Chung made the comments while speaking to reporters following a meeting with the floor leaders of opposition parties at the National Assembly today. “We will gradually need to make an attempt to initiate dialogue, starting at the working level. And since it is our view that we can move forward with people-to-people exchange and social, cultural and sports exchange while respecting the system of sanctions against North Korea, we‘ll have to start carefully reviewing those options now.” Moon has made clear on several occasions, both before and after his election, that he intends to use improved inter-Korean relations to work with neighboring countries to tackle the North Korean nuclear and missile issues. A report titled “The Governing Conditions and Orientation of the New Government” that was jointly completed on May 17 by the Minjoo Party’s election committee and the Democratic Institute called for expanding exchange: “Depending on the improvement of inter-Korean relations, it will be necessary to adopt a liberal stance toward private-sector cooperation and exchange with North Korea.” “Given the current rupture in inter-Korean relations, the new government just needs to provide the minimum amount of aid to North Korea permitted by international norms,” suggested Kim Yeon-cheol, a professor at Inje University. “The international agreements on sanctions against North Korea are outlined in the sanctions by the UN Security Council. To begin with, we should slowly and progressively permit what is permissible, taking the Security Council sanctions as guidelines.” Chung Eui-yong also told reporters that “we‘re currently reviewing the idea of setting up a task force in the National Security Office to look into National Defense reform, the THAAD issue and how to strengthen the South Korea-US alliance.” (Jung In-hwan, “Moon Administration Considers Reopening Private Sector Inter-Korean Exchange,’ May 23, 2017)
5/23/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s answer to a question raised by KCNA “over the fact that the U.S. and its followers are faulting the DPRK’s test-launch of strategic ballistic missile Pukguksong-2: The officials in the field of national defense science and technology and the workers in the munitions field of the DPRK successfully carried out the test-launch of ground-to-ground medium-to-long range strategic ballistic missile Pukguksong-2 amid continued measures for bolstering the nuclear force of the country. As reported, the recent launch was aimed to finally confirm the technical specifications of the overall weaponry system of Pukguksong-2 series and fully examine their adaptability to various combat conditions before their deployment for action. This is part of the normal process for bolstering the military capabilities for self-defense and a process that has to be gone through for deployment. But the U.S. and its followers again published a UN Security Council press statement peppered with such rhetoric as “sanctions” and “denunciation.” We flatly reject the press statement taking the advantages of the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK. Nothing favorable can be expected from the U.S. and its followers obsessed by inveterate repugnancy and hostility toward the DPRK. But it is absolutely ridiculous to see them finding fault with the DPRK’s every measure for self-defense. The DPRK substantially displayed the capabilities for mounting a nuclear attack at Hawaii housing the U.S. pacific forces command and the Pacific operational theatre including Alaska, and has built full capabilities for attacking the U.S. mainland, the stronghold of aggression. The U.S. and its followers’ despicable act of taking issue with the DPRK’s measures for bolstering nuclear force will only result in increasing our hostility to them and furthering the efforts to diversify and modernize our own nuclear force.” (KCNA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Refutes U.S. Act of Criticizing Test Launch of Strategic Missile,” May 23, 2017)
China’s imports of North Korean goods in April fell below $100 million to the lowest in nearly three years, data showed, after China stopped buying coal from the isolated country and as calls mount for further economic sanctions. The world’s second-largest economy bought goods worth $99.3 million in April from North Korea, the lowest monthly tally since at least June 2014, according to Chinese customs data. That compares with $114.6 million in March and $167.7 million a year earlier. A fifth of the April total was iron ore imports, which hit 285,000 tonnes, their highest since August 2014. That was up 10 percent from a month earlier and 2-1/2 times higher than a year earlier. The value of imports from North Korea has fallen month-on-month since December, the data showed. China’s exports to North Korea eased to $288.2 million in April, down 12 percent from March. Exports for the first four months of the year were up 32 percent at $1 billion. Diesel shipments to North Korea in April more than halved from March to 2,606 tonnes and gasoline sales dropped 6 percent to 13,496 tonnes. (Josephine Mason, “China’s Imports from North Korea Sink as Coal Ban Bites,” Reuters, May 23, 2017) Is China really punishing North Korea for its repeated missile tests and its threats to the outside world? President Trump says yes, but economists poring over the data suggest the picture is far from definitive. “It’s not completely clear that China has quit North Korea cold turkey,” said Kent Boydston of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Almost all of North Korea’s exports go to China, and coal makes up 40 percent of the total. But recent visitors to the Chinese-North Korean border report seeing coal trucks and trains crossing into China, and experts are not seeing signs that a major financial lifeline has suddenly severed. The exchange rate for North Korea’s won has been “remarkably stable,” Boydston said, as have rice prices. Both are considered key barometers in the extremely secretive country. “It doesn’t seem like there is any sort of distress in North Korea,” he said. According to China’s customs service, overall North Korean exports to China fell to $99.3 million last month, the lowest in almost three years. However, for the first four months of the year, exports from North Korea were roughly the same as last year, at almost $600 million. This included almost two full months of coal trade at relatively high prices. Coal exports to China in March and April were apparently zero, although Boydston suggested taking Chinese statistics with a “rock of salt.” Experts say Beijing can finagle its trade figures or categorize trade as something else to suit its political purposes. Exports of another key commodity, iron ore, skyrocketed. They were up 10 percent from March and 159 percent from the previous year, according to the data. North Korea’s imports have not significantly contracted. They were down between March and April but were up a whopping 32 percent to $1 billion in the first four months of this year, compared with the same period in 2016. “North Korea is running a bigger-than-ever deficit with China,” said William Brown, a North Korean analyst who teaches at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. How is North Korea supporting such an apparently large trade deficit? Economists are scratching their heads. It is not like Pyongyang has access to the international financial system. But in the meantime, proponents of tougher sanctions are waiting to see whether China will agree to sanctions through the United Nations Security Council to prohibit oil being supplied North Korea. “China has been hurting them on the earnings side and threatening to hurt them on the oil side,” Brown said. “The key thing is not the oil itself but the free oil that China provides as aid.” China provides almost all of North Korea’s oil, sending it through pipelines, and considers cutting it off an extreme measure. But as the missiles keep flying, Beijing has threatened that oil could be next. “If the North makes another provocative move this month, the Chinese society will be willing to see the UNSC adopt severe restrictive measures that have never been seen before, such as restricting oil imports to the North,” Global Times wrote in an editorial last month — three missile launches ago. (Anna Fifield, “China Says It Hasn’t Imported Any Coal for Two Months,” Washington Post, May 23, 2017)
Worried over what they described as President Trump’s erratic response to North Korea’s behavior, 64 Democratic legislators urged him to talk directly to the North Koreans — and warned that he would need congressional approval for any pre-emptive military strike. “Few decisions are more needing of debate than a move to launch attacks, or declare war, on a nuclear-armed state such as North Korea,” read a letter signed by the lawmakers, led by Representative John Conyers Jr. of Michigan, the last Democrat in Congress to have served in the 1950-53 Korean War. “In such a volatile region, an inconsistent or unpredictable policy runs the risk of unimaginable conflict.” The letter was sent against the backdrop of divergent signals from the Trump administration in recent weeks regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests and its increasingly strident threats to use the “nuclear sword of justice” against the United States.The letter from congressional Democrats said Tillerson’s approach was the “preferred solution” and strongly urged Trump to adhere to it. “We respectfully request more information about the steps your administration is taking to advance the prospects or direct negotiations that could lower the potential for catastrophic war and ultimately lead to the denuclearization of the peninsula,” the letter said. It also asked Trump to specify steps he would take toward the reunification of Korean families long separated by the armistice that halted the Korean War, and the retrieval of the uncollected remains of American soldiers who had died in the conflict. Aides to Conyers said the 64 signatures on the letter symbolized the 64 years since the armistice was signed. They also pointed to an Economist/YouGov poll conducted from April 29 to May 2 that found that 60 percent of Americans, regardless of political affiliation, supported direct negotiations between the United States and North Korea. (Rick Gladstone, “Democrats Warn Trump against Preemptive Strike on North Korea,” New York Times, May 23, 2017)
5/24/17:
President Moon Jae-in named two senior officials at the National Security Office (NSO), the presidential office said. Lee Sang-chul, a professor at Seoul’s Sungshin University and former defense ministry official, has been appointed the first vice chief of the NSO. Kim Ki-jung, a political science professor from Yonsei University, has been named the second vice chief, Cheong Wa Dae said. (Yonhap, “President Names Two Senior Officials at National Security Office,” May 24, 2017)
Hazel Smith: “The focus on Kim Jong Un as supreme leader is misplaced and dangerous. It obscures and prevents discussion of where real power lies in North Korea. State power today lies with a number of key individuals who are engaged in savage intra-elite political competition and who exercise power via control of North Korea’s security institutions. In turn, those institutions are used by powerful individuals to fight for political and physical survival. These zero-sum political competitions are also struggles for who controls the nation’s new foreign trading companies – the North Korean ‘chaebols’ – and the access to personal wealth and enhanced power offered by such economic leverage. The conventional prism of leadership omnipotence – the same prism that the North Korean leadership propaganda tries very hard to sell at home and abroad – is not very helpful. It precludes investigating who holds substantive power and why, and how power can shift. We must rethink intra-elite conflict in North Korea and the consequences of these conflicts for security planners dealing with North Korea. Our character sketches of Kim Jong Un are entirely speculative – and have virtually zero evidential foundation. Equally without authoritative foundation is the assumption that Kim’s holding of specific offices equates to the holding of actual, untrammelled power. Anyone who has ever had any contact with North Korea – diplomats, humanitarian officials, businesses – knows that the person in charge is rarely the formal office-holder. In Kim’s case, the jury is still out. In some ways, it is understandable why global analysts have focused entirely on Kim Jong Un in trying to analyze North Korean decision-making. They assume that, even if there were differences of opinion within North Korea’s power elite, then both the common interests of the elite and the concentration of power in the leader would make these differences inconsequential in terms of political decision-making in North Korea. Yet today both these assumptions are moot. There is a mass of evidence to show intra-elite divisions on a scale that has not been seen since the 1950s and there is, equally, not much evidence to suggest that Kim Jong Un has direct control over important levers of state power. There are few indications that any single individual has unchallenged domination of state institutions, although we see the continuing dominance of Hwang Pyong-so within key state, party and, most importantly, military security institutions. Hwang is one of the three vice-chairmen of the State Affairs Commission, whose chair is Kim Jong Un, and which replaced the National Defense Commission in 2016 as the senior executive body in the DPRK. Hwang also controls the surveillance and security mechanism of the military as director of the General Political Bureau [GPB] of the Korean People’s Army [KPA]. Hwang’s power appears to have been institutionally enhanced in 2016 when the Military Security Office (formerly Military Security Command) – responsible for rooting out anti-regime activity in the military and civilian sectors, which formerly reported directly to the National Defense Commission (the predecessor of the State Affairs Commission) – was subordinated to the General Political Bureau under Hwang’s authority.
Hwang’s ascent to power came via brutal intra-elite warfare that involved principals and their families. Hwang’s wife is reported to have died, in either 2010 or 2012, as a result of an interrogation ordered by Kim Won Hong, who was himself deposed as minister of State Security in 2017. It is also reported that in 2014 and 2015, Hwang had the Military Security Office arrest Kim Won Hong’s son, Kim Cheol, who, again reportedly, suffered a stroke during his interrogation. South Korean intelligence officials have recently stated that an ally of Kim Won Hong, Kim Yeong Cheol, former head of the powerful Reconnaissance General Bureau, one of a number of powerful military intelligence organizations, was forced to undertake ‘re-education’ in 2016. Intra-elite North Korean conflict is not founded on ideological differences. The largely unquestioned ideology is not communism but a lowest common denominator nationalism, not dissimilar in objective and articulation from the nationalism espoused in South Korea. The aim is unification and the underpinning ideology is that all Koreans share a nearly 5,000-year history that can be traced back to the national founder, Tangun, and are distinctive in blood line and culturally homogeneous. Today, as in South Korea, North Koreans live in a capitalist economy (although not a liberal one). Neither is intra-elite competition about state goals, the most important of which is to prevent regime change. The common understanding is that the nuclear ‘deterrent’ does just that – it deters military intervention from abroad. Another shared goal is that of economic development and an awareness that foreign investment is necessary to achieve this goal. It is this economic goal that may propel North Korea to respond positively to overtures from South Korean President Moon Jae-in to reopen negotiations on denuclearization – with the hope of a substantial package deal involving eradicating sanctions, gaining public capital inflows, and encouraging private international investment. Nor are regime rivalries fundamentally conflicts of bureaucratic interest of the different state institutions – e.g., the army, the Party, the security apparatus – although these institutions are mobilized in intra-elite conflict. In the war between the different centers of power in North Korea, control over the military security apparatus is paramount. The military is the only organization of the state that has maintained continuous funding and organizational capacity since the economic collapse of the 1990s (and even this is relative, as there are indications of some degradation of command and control systems). KPA security officials, because of their subordination to military discipline, have fewer opportunities than their civilian counterparts to participate in individual market activities, which effectively involve local security officials flouting the law to sustain their own living standards. The motor force of the new capitalist economy in which all of North Korea – government, institutions, and individuals – is embedded is provided by the North Korean foreign trading companies that grew fairly spontaneously from the ashes of the command economy that was destroyed by the famine and economic collapse of the 1990s. Similarly to the chaebol in South Korea or the zaibatsu in Japan, the most important of these enterprises established themselves (and defeated competition from other incipient capitalist businesses) as a result of their ability to secure backing from influential political individuals. In North Korea trading companies are legalized by the ‘waku’ or licensing system. Foreign trading companies must receive a ‘waku’ from an official entity – of the Party, military or the state, or a part of those entities, for example the different security apparatuses. The official in charge of these agencies acts as ‘patron’ of the individual trading company and, to a greater or lesser extent, the fortunes of those companies and the individuals who provide the license become interchangeable. There are many important trading companies, many of which are, in the context of analyzing intra-elite struggles, matter because they add another dimension to complexity in the power plays in Pyongyang. Capitalism breeds competition for profits and markets that in turn fuels political rivalries between key players among North Korea’s political elite. Lines of control of the big trading companies in North Korea are, predictably, somewhat murky but it is thought that Kim Won Hong’s son, Kim Yeong Chol, controlled the important Cheongbong Trading Group and his father controlled the Shinheung Trading Group. Hwang’s political attacks on father and son therefore constituted an attack on family economic security. Illustrative of the nexus of power/wealth and family struggles is the fate of the Seungri Trading Group, which was formerly controlled by Kim Jong Un’s uncle, Jang Song Thaek. After Jang’s execution in 2013, Seungri Trading was incorporated into the Korea Songsan Economic and Trading Group, today controlled by Hwang Pyong-so and de facto managed by his foster daughter, Ri Yeong-ran.The focus on Kim Jong Un misses a trick – perhaps the trick. The febrile, fragmented, and brutal competition between power-holders in North Korea looks by no means to be over and explains much more about North Korea’s decision-making than any assumption of omniscient leadership. This is well-illustrated by the recent arrests of US citizens in Pyongyang – perhaps best explained by one set of security institutions demonstrating muscle, not to the outside world but to rival security institutions. The killing of Jang Song Thaek in 2013 and Kim Jong Nam in 2017 may be signs of a ruthless young leader eager to demonstrate his hardline credentials. An equally plausible explanation is that these were power plays by experienced political players designed to show to the inexperienced Kim Jong Un that the Kim family is no longer exempt from the fray. Given the intensity and ferocity of today’s intra-elite rivalries, rational actor behavior, in the sense of state-directed means-ends behavior in which the central state holds together all state institutions in the pursuit of a nationally determined strategy, is extraordinarily difficult. Internecine rivalry has also likely degraded command and control systems to the extent that coherent and consistent state security decision-making and implementation cannot be guaranteed. Elite priorities remain that of survival and that has come to mean physical survival in the face of internal enemies, which must seem much more imminently threatening than the long-anticipated intervention from abroad. “ (Hazel Smith, “North Korea: Intra-Elite Conflict and the Relevance for Global Security,” Pacific Forum CSIS, May 25, 2017)
5/25/17:
Washington has recently finalized a four-point policy plan on North Korea that calls for applying “all available sanctions and pressure” to incite the country to change its course and ultimately resolve the nuclear standoff through dialogue, South Korean lawmakers said. Joseph Yun, special representative for North Korea policy at the US State Department, introduced the plan to a group of visiting lawmakers led by Rep. Kim Kwan-young of the minor opposition People’s Party. The department established four principles on North Korea: it will not recognize the communist country as a nuclear weapons state; impose all available sanctions and pressure; pursue no regime change; and resolve the problem through dialogue. President Donald Trump approved a comprehensive report detailing the strategy about two weeks ago, Kim quoted Yun as saying.
While leaving open the possibility for talks, Yun stressed the current focus should stay on sanctions and pressure and that there would be no dialogue before Pyongyang shifts its attitude toward denuclearization. “The department officials questioned the possibility that the North would agree to talks, saying we should continue the sanctions campaign given no change in the North’s position,” the lawmaker told reporters in Washington. This may indicate possible future discord between Seoul and Washington, with President Moon Jae-in looking to a restart of inter-Korean dialogue and economic and humanitarian exchanges including the Kaesong industrial park and tours to Mount Kumgang. The lawmakers also expressed concerns about the confusion in South Korea over the ongoing deployment here of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system. Moon has pledged to seek parliamentary approval for the program but his ruling Democratic Party of Korea remains opposed to it. “It seemed if the THAAD dispute escalates to the extent where the deployment decision may be reversed, the US officials would take it very seriously,” Kim said, noting that if put up for a vote, the plan will likely pass. “The US officials apparently didn’t understand why we debate about a defensive weapon,” said Rep. Jun Hee-kyung of the main opposition Liberty Korea Party. Democratic Party Rep. So Byung-hoon conveyed skepticism among U.S. academics toward a resumption of the Kaesong and Mount Kumgang initiatives in the face of North Korea’s provocations and nuclear development. “Some of those at think tanks were very negative about their restart, asking what economic benefits South Korea would gain from that,” So said. (Shin Hyon-hee, “Trump’s N.K. Policy Calls for Utmost Pressure until Talks: Lawmakers,” Korea Herald, May 26, 2017)
5/26/17:
The U.S. wants to “pre-negotiate” with China a tough new United Nations sanctions regime against North Korea before Pyongyang conducts another missile or nuclear weapons test, a senior U.S. state department official said. “We’re discussing with them a new UN Security Council resolution that would be pre-negotiated so we wouldn’t have to undergo this very lengthy delay between the time that something happens and the time we can actually draw up a [resolution],” Susan Thornton, acting assistant secretary for east Asian and Pacific affairs, told reporters in Beijing. She added that Washington had spoken with Beijing about targeting “specific companies” that were the “biggest money earners for the [North Korean] regime”. U.S. negotiations are likely to focus on China as the toughest of the five permanent members of the Security Council, which would impose any new sanctions. In a departure from the practice of previous administrations, in April Trump appeared to link progress on Sino-US security matters, such as resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis, to trade and economic issues. “I explained to [Xi] that a trade deal with the U.S. will be far better for them if they solve the North Korean problem!” the president said at the time in a tweet. Thornton said there was no “clear-cut” linkage between Sino-US security and economic issues but also admitted that the two spheres could not be completely separated from each other. “If China is not working with us on this major regional security threat of North Korea, where they hold a lot of cards and leverage, then there are going to be problems in other parts of our relationship,” she said. “It’s not a clear-cut linkage but . . . either you’re helping on this major problem that we have and if you’re not then why would we be holding back [punitive measures] on anything else?” Despite the escalation in the North Korean nuclear crisis over recent months, Chinese officials have maintained their official position that Pyongyang and Washington are both to blame for the tensions, and urged the two sides to hold negotiations. Beijing fears the potential consequences, including a refugee crisis along its border with North Korea, if Kim Jong Un’s regime were to suddenly collapse. “Chinese tolerance for potential instability [in North Korea] is low,” Thornton said. “They don’t want to cut off the livelihoods of the North Korean people.” Sino-US relations have been strained over the past week by the Trump administration’s first protest to the Chinese military over an aerial encounter between the two countries’ air forces. That was followed yesterday, by the U.S. Navy’s first “freedom of navigation operation” challenging Beijing’s maritime claims in the South China Sea since Trump took office. Thornton said Washington’s South China Sea policy had not changed under Trump’s administration. In another sign of Washington’s willingness to dial up the rhetoric, the assistant secretary spoke on the record. Embassy officials had previously indicated it would be an off-the-record briefing. (Charles Clover and Tom Mitchell, “U.S. Seeks to ‘Pre-Negotiate’ North Korea Sanctions, Financial Times, May 26, 2017) On North Korea, the U.S. has seen a “shift in emphasis” in China’s approach to its fellow communist neighbor, Thornton said. “They’ve said that they have stepped up border inspections, beefed up sort of the policing function on the border, stepped up customs inspections,” she said. Beijing has also done “a number of other things on companies” that have dealings with North Korea, Thornton said, without giving details. The U.S. has been talking to Beijing about taking action against specific firms and is waiting to see what sort of action China will take, she said. China has signed on to U.N. sanctions and suspended coal imports from North Korea through the rest of the year, but has been generally reticent about what other steps it may be taking to use its leverage as Pyongyang’s most important trading and diplomatic partner. Asked about Thornton’s remarks, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said China remained committed to “strictly implementing” U.N. sanctions but offered no details or what other measures it might be taking. Lu also reiterated China’s call for a renewal of six-nation denuclearization talks that have been on ice since 2009, saying the parties should “be flexible, meet each other halfway, and return to the negotiating table as soon as possible.” Thornton said the U.S., China and others were also in talks on a future U.N. resolution on North Korea in order to cut the time needed to take action following another nuclear or missile test. “So we’re looking at trying to get going on the next set of major measures that would be taken in the wake of another provocation,” Thornton said. Such measures could include ratcheting up economic pressure on the North by targeting trade in consumer goods, possibly including textiles, she said. Despite Lu’s comments later in the day, Thornton said Beijing officials now realize more pressure is needed before dialogue can be restored. “And so they know now that they don’t have, I think, as much time to try to bring the North Koreans to the table, get their calculus changed and get them to the negotiating table as they may have previously thought,” she said. Adding to that, Beijing also seems to have recognized that North Korea’s actions were “undermining China’s own security in pretty major ways,” Thornton said. “They do recognize that it’s going to be pretty hard to have a dialogue while the North Koreans are shooting off missiles,” she said. (Christopher Bodeen, “U.S. Diplomat: China Tightened Border Controls with N. Korea,” Associated Press, May 26, 2017)
The Ministry of Unification approved private person-to-person contact with North Koreans by approving the nongovernmental organization Korean Sharing Movement’s humanitarian program, the first such contact approved in the Moon Jae-in administration and the first since the fourth nuclear test by the North last year. “The government will respond firmly to provocations from the North but will also maintain a flexible stance in reviewing possible humanitarian support and exchanges at the private-level, within the boundaries set up by the international sanctions on North Korea,” said Lee Yoo-jin, deputy spokesperson of the Unification Ministry. “The ministry has approved Korean Sharing Movement’s malaria prevention program at the border areas.” Some 10 private organizations have requested and are awaiting the ministry’s approval for humanitarian programs into the North. “The preventive measures against malaria need to be executed from the end of May for them to be effective,” said Kang Young-sik, secretary-general of the Korean Sharing Movement. “We will try to contact the North via fax messages and try our best to deliver the goods as soon as possible.” The Unification Ministry will have to dole out additional approval for the delivery of goods to the North, which in the case of malaria prevention, includes insecticide and basic medical kits. “The preventive measures on the border areas is needed for the people of both the South and the North,” said a ministry official. “There will likely be a positive review for goods to be delivered onto the North for the program.” The Ministry of Unification in its report to the Moon administration’s advisory committee for state affairs planning on Friday mentioned possible policies to improve the bilateral relations between the North and the South. “[The committee and the ministry] agreed that the ministry needs to play a more engaged role in leading a new type of bilateral relations for peace on the Korean peninsula,” said the Democratic Party Rep. Park Kwang-on, spokesman of the advisory committee for state affairs planning. “We will be systematically reviewing the policies of the new administration together.” The ministry is also looking to establish a type of bilateral bill of rights with the North, which was one of the campaign pledges of President Moon to organize the existing agreements between the North and the South, including the July 4, 1972, South-North Joint Communique and the 1991 inter-Korean Basic Agreement, to create a renewed and re-established agreement. (Jeong Yong-soo and Kim Rok-hwan, “Inter-Korean Contact Improved,” JoongAng Ilbo, May 26, 2017) Foreign Minister nominee Kang Kyung-wha, who served in various human rights-related posts at the UN, also said Thursday that humanitarian aid should be provided apart from political consideration, calling it a “universal value of mankind.” Last year, the government gave the green light only to Eugene Bell Foundation Korea, an international organization that specializes in providing tuberculosis medication to the impoverished country. The KSM said it will discuss the shipment of malaria prevention goods with its North Korean counterparts via fax and email. Together with Gyeonggi Province, the group has since 2008 been undertaking joint prevention projects with North Korean authorities, dishing out fumigator trucks, diagnostic kits, mosquito nets, drugs and other supplies. If the work proceeds smoothly, it plans to dispatch officials in mid-June to the North, including Rep. Won Hye-young of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea who co-heads the group, according to its Secretary-General Kang Young-sik. “Malaria prevention is a project that’s necessary for both Koreas, because disease and insect pests come and go across the border, so the work should be done in the North to ensure no one contracts malaria in the border areas in the South,” Kang told the Korea Herald. According to Gyeonggi Province, the number of malaria patients in border regions here sharply dropped from 1,616 in 2007 to 339 in 2013. Kang says the joint efforts played a “decisive role.” Since the program’s halt in 2013, the figures have surged again, reaching 458 in 2014, 545 in 2015 and 492 in 2016. “We’ve been unable to carry out the activity for the past four years, and if this vacuum continues for a few more years, the figures would skyrocket again in both the North and South,” Kang said, adding the goods should be shipped no later than May or June, given higher risks of malaria in summer. (Shin Hyon-hee, “South Korea Oks First Aid to North Korea since Moon Took Office,” Korea Herald, May 26, 2017)
“President Moon is highly interested in” inter-Korean economic cooperation, Lee Su-hoon, professor at Kyungnam University who heads the security affairs section at the State Affairs Planning Advisory Committee, said ahead of the Ministry of Unification’s policy report to the committee. “The Korean Peninsula new economy map is a very important key” in solving the job shortage issue as well as rejuvenating the economy,” Lee said, referring to Moon’s policy vision released while he headed the then opposition New Politics Alliance for Democracy party in 2015. The policy vision centers on forming a joint economic community between the two Koreas as a means to revive economic growth and bring peace to the peninsula. Lee said now is the time to openly search for ways to unify the two Koreas in collaboration with the public, hinting at the Moon administration’s focus on expanding engagement with the North. “The (option of) forging an agreement between the South and the North, which is tantamount to a treaty, should also be considered.” Lee also mounted criticism on the Unification Ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs for remaining inactive during the two conservative administrations which preferred sanctions on North Korea. “The Ministry of Unification became worse off during the past nine to 10 years. The inter-Korean relationship is also the worst ever,” he told the ministry officials. “The biggest task is how we could create momentum to improve the South-North relationship in order to meet the public’s aspirations.” Briefing on the results of the ministry’s report later in the day, spokesman Park Kwang-on said the committee, the de facto transition team for the administration, has shared the understanding with the ministry that “the Unification Ministry needs to play a more active role in order to take the lead in building peace on the Korean Peninsula and new inter-Korean relations.” (Yonhap, “Advisory Panel Stresses Moon’s Focus on Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation,” May 26, 2017)
5/?/17:
Woodward: “Near the end of May 2017, I learned … North Korea was accelerating both its missile and nuclear weapons programs at an astonishing rate, and would ‘well within a year’ have a ballistic missile with a nuclear weapon that perhaps could reach the United States mainland. Previously the intelligence showed North Korea would not have that capability for at least two years if not longer. …In response, a preliminary Top Secret Pentagon war plan called for the United States to send escalation signals to put the country on a war footing: reinforce the Korean Peninsula with two or three aircraft carriers; keep U.S. Navy attack submarines in the region (capable of firing barrages of Tomahawk cruise missiles); add another squadron of F-22s and more B-2 stealth bombers. Perhaps even withdraw U.S. dependents, family members of the 28,000 U.S. military in South Korea. Add more ground forces, thicken the theater missile defense systems, disperse troops to make them less vulnerable, harden infrastructure to help withstand artillery attacks. I began checking around about whether North Korea was ‘well within a year’ of a new ICBM nuclear weapon capability. At the top levels of the Pentagon, I was told, ”There is nothing like that,’ providing an absolute knockdown of my information. At the top of the intelligence community, I was told ‘there is nothing new’ and ‘no significant change’ in the two year-plus assessment. There was nothing to be alarmed about. I talked with a person with the broadest, most authoritative access to such current intelligence. The absolute denials were repeated emphatically, categorically. Then something happened that had never occurred in 46 years of reporting. ‘If I am wrong I will apologize to you.’…Just over a month later, on July 3, North Korea tested its first ICBM, a Hwasong-14. …I later learned that the person I had spoken to in May believed the information to be so sensitive, it had been decided that it was better to lie.” (Woodward, Fear, pp. 177-9, 181)
5/29/17:
North Korea launched a new short-range ballistic missile, similar to a Scud, which flew about 280 miles to land inside Japan’s exclusive economic zone. This launch is North Korea’s third in three weeks and its 12th this year. “The firing of the ballistic missile of this time is extremely problematic in terms of safety of aircraft and ships,” Suga Yoshihide, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, told reporters in an emergency news conference. “It also clearly violates resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council.” The missile was launched shortly after 5 a.m. local time from an airfield near Wonsan, on North Korea’s east coast, according to the U.S. Pacific Command and South Korea’s joint chiefs of staff. “The missile was tracked for six minutes until it landed in the Sea of Japan,” Pacific Command said in a statement, adding that it was working to assess the missile. “We continue to monitor North Korea’s actions closely.” Moon Jae-in, South Korea’s new president, ordered an emergency national security council meeting to discuss the latest launch, and his joint chiefs said that the South Korean military was “maintaining full preparedness.” Before the latest launch, U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said that war with North Korea would “probably be the worst kind of fighting in most people’s lifetimes.” “The bottom line is it would be a catastrophic war if this turns into a combat if we’re not able to resolve this situation through diplomatic means,” Mattis told CBS News’s “Face the Nation” yesterday. (Anna Fifield, “North Korea’s Latest Ballistic Missile Launch Lands in Japan’s Economic Zone,” Washington Post, May 29, 2017)
KCNA: “Respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un guided a test-fire of ballistic rocket equipped with precision guidance system. At a launching site, he looked round a caterpillar self-propelled launching pad vehicle and a ballistic rocket based on precision guidance system. He learned in detail about the tactical and technical specifications of the rocket and expressed satisfaction over the fact that its preparatory process before launching was further automated than the preceding Hwasong serial rockets to complete the system for markedly reducing the launching time so as to rapidly contain the enemies’ armed provocations. After being reported about its test-fire program at the command post, he ordered the launch of ballistic rocket. The test was conducted in the way of medium range firing for minute remote observation to the last-stage guidance of warhead. It is aimed to verify the technical indices of new-type precision guided ballistic rocket capable of making ultra-precision strike on the enemies’ objects at any area and examine the reliability of caterpillar self-propelled launching pad vehicle, newly designed to operate under various battle conditions. The ballistic rocket flew toward the east sky where the day was breaking and correctly hit a designated target point with deviation of seven meters after flying at the medium range. The test-fire verified the flight stability of ballistic rocket loaded with fin-controlled warhead in the active flying section and reconfirmed the accuracy of velocity correction and attitude stabilization system by a small heat jet engine in middle flying section. It also verified the accuracy of ultra-precision guidance in the re-entry section by more precise late-stage guidance system and fully confirmed the running features in different geographical conditions of newly-developed caterpillar self-propelled launching pad vehicle and features of its automated launching preparation process. Seeing the successful test-fire of ballistic rocket, he said that the rocket, which appeared for the first time at the square of military parade marking the Day of the Sun, seems to be sharp shooter’s arms of precision hitting a target and such accurate hit would dig up eyes of the enemies. Our Party highly appreciates this success, he said, adding: The national defense science research field making steady victorious advance under the deep care and direct guidance of our Party is now ready to apply world-level ultra-modern military science and technologies in the Korean way as it wishes. Whenever news of our recent valuable victory is broadcast, the Yankees would be very much worried and the gangsters of the south Korean puppet army would get dispirited more and more, he said. He stressed the need to continue developing more powerful strategic weapons on the basis of the present success. The national defense research field should clearly show the might of our self-reliant defense industry in a multi-phased and successive way under the timetable and road map worked out by the Party, he said, expressing belief that it would make greater leaping progress in the present stamina so as to send bigger “package of gifts” to the Yankees. Accompanying him were Ri Pyong Chol, Kim Rak Gyom, Kim Jong Sik, Jang Chang Ha, Jong Sung Il and Jon Il Ho.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of Ballistic Rocket Based on Precision Guidance System,” May 30, 2017)
The North has recently test-fired a series of missiles based on a technology that would give the United States little warning of an attack. The new generation of missiles uses solid fuels, enabling them to be rolled out from mountain hideaways and launched in minutes. That makes the job of intercepting them — already daunting — far harder, given that the American antimissile system works best with early alerts from satellites that a launch is imminent. The American response so far to the North’s nuclear and missile programs has included a secret campaign of cyber- and electronic-warfare strikes that President Barack Obama accelerated three years ago, after concluding that traditional missile defenses were insufficient. The covert program is known as “left of launch,” since the cyberattacks begin before missiles reach the launching pad, or as they blast off. The test scheduled for tomorrow is of the more classic antimissile defenses that the United States has struggled to make work since the Eisenhower administration. Yet it is the first since Trump took office vowing to “solve” the North Korea problem, and since he began talking about ratcheting up economic sanctions and raising military pressure on the North. But Trump is discovering what Obama learned before him: Intercepting intercontinental missiles over the Pacific is exquisitely hard, even when the tests, like the one scheduled for this week, are designed to give the interceptor its best shot. Incoming warheads move extraordinarily fast — more than four miles a second. In war, the interceptors in Alaska and California would race skyward and release speeding projectiles meant to obliterate incoming warheads by force of impact — what experts call hitting a bullet with a bullet. Critics warn that the system would do worse in war, since the flight tests are highly scripted. They note that no mock weapon has moved nearly as fast as a true enemy warhead. Portraying this week’s test as more realistic, Vice Adm. James D. Syring, the director of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency, has called it “the first intercept of an ICBM-range target.” That means it is meant to approach the warhead speed of a true intercontinental ballistic missile. While mock enemy missiles are always launched from Kwajalein, an atoll in the Pacific, North Korea uses large trucks to move around the intercontinental missiles it is developing, adding elements of surprise. Paul Bracken, a Yale military expert who is working on a book about mobile missiles, said foreign states saw movable arms as inherently safer from American strikes. In the past, the North’s reliance on liquid-fueled missiles eased the targeting job for antimissile interceptors. American military surveillance planes and satellites could track missile transporters and convoys of fuel trucks. The process of fueling a missile takes several hours, making it vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike, and giving the antimissile systems on the West Coast time to lock in on expected trajectories. With the new generation of weapons, the solid fuels are packed into the missile body in the factory, eliminating the need for fueling in the field. So the preparation time for an attack can drop from hours to minutes. “It’s concerning,” Dr. Coyle said. “It can give you less warning time.” Missile experts say the North’s shift to solids came as a surprise. Jeffrey Lewis, an expert in North Korean rocketry at the Middlebury Institute, noted last year that Washington had given two kinds of submarine missiles — one fueled by liquids, and a newer one by solids — the same identifier code. The lack of a distinction, he said, suggested that the North had “caught the U.S. unaware.” The C.I.A. disputes that, saying it has been tracking solid-fuel developments closely. Nonetheless, when the new C.I.A. director, Mike Pompeo, took office, his first organizational step was to create a unit to unify all analysis and covert operations against North Korea’s nuclear and missile systems, recognition, officials say, that the efforts had been fractured. In all, the North has now successfully tested solid-fueled missiles four times — twice last year and twice this year. After a test on May 21 — carried out in defiance of what Trump called an “armada” of warships and submarines off the Korean coast — the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, declared the new medium-range missile, known as the Pukguksong-2, ready to be mass produced and then deployed. Young-Keun Chang, an aerospace engineer and the director of the Global Surveillance Research Center at the Korean Aerospace University, in Seoul, said the North’s recent solid-fuel advances had moved the impoverished state closer to the “technological breakthrough” it needed to build a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. “North Korea may,” he said, “replace all its liquid-propellant ballistic missiles with solid-propellant missiles.” He called it a “fundamental paradigm shift” that could eventually pose “a serious potential threat to the United States.” (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “North Korean Tests Add Urgency for U.S. to Fix Flaws in Defense,” New York Times, May 29, 2017,
5/30/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s answer to a question raised by KCNA: “At the summit held in Sicily of Italy on May 26-27, the U.S. and its followers made public a joint statement slandering the DPRK. It is those seven nations which carried out most of the nuclear and missile tests that have been and who render regional situation extremely tense through competitive sales of war means like attack missiles to south Korea. Yet, they are urging the DPRK to scrap its nuclear deterrence meant for self-defense of the country. This is like a guilty party filing the suit first. The G-7 summit is a place where those nuclear- and missile-haves put their heads together to discuss how to pressure weak countries and those incurring their displeasure. The U.S. and its followers are seriously mistaken if they think they can deprive the DPRK of its nuclear deterrence, the nation’s life and dignity, through sanctions and pressure. The increased sanctions and pressure will compel the DPRK to further step up its moves for diversifying and modernizing its nuclear force.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Refutes G-7 Summit Joint Statement,” May 30, 2017)
South Korean President Moon Jae-in and his Japanese counterpart Abe Shinzo Abe agreed on the need for more sanctions and pressure on North Korea, saying now is not the time for dialogue during a 20-minute phone conversation one day after the North’s new ballistic missile test, Moon’s spokesman Park Soo-hyun said. “I agree with the prime minister’s words that now is not time for dialogue with North Korea, but a time to heighten sanctions and pressure,” Park quoted Moon as saying. The president added, however, that the ultimate goal of sanctions and pressure is to bring Pyongyang back to negotiations on its complete denuclearization, the spokesman said. “That is why the international community must on the one hand respond firmly and on the other hand continue to send the message that dialogue is possible if North Korea gives up its nuclear development,” Moon said, according to Park. (Yonhap, “Moon, Abe Agree on Need for More Sanctions on N. Korea,” May 30, 2017)
KCNA: “The gangster-like U.S. imperialists are making all the more desperate in their moves to ignite a nuclear war despite the repeated warnings of the DPRK. On May 29, the U.S. imperialists committed a grave military provocation by letting a formation of infamous B-1B nuclear [?] strategic bombers fly over south Korea once again to stage a nuclear bomb dropping drill. The formation of B-1B took off Guam at the dawn of the day and flew over the 80kms of the east of Kangrung on the East Sea of Korea near the Military Demarcation Line. It frantically staged a joint drill making a precision strike against the DPRK’s major objects together with pursuit and assault planes on nuclear aircraft carrier Carl Vinson which is conducting a joint naval drill with the puppet navy on the East Sea of Korea. And air pirates of the U.S. imperialists waged a drill for getting familiar with order of joint action when flying over the Korean peninsula with fighters of the puppet air force. Such military provocation of the U.S. imperialists is a dangerous reckless racket for bringing the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of a war. What should not be overlooked is that they staged the nuclear bomb dropping drill with nuclear strategic bombers involved once again, timed to coincide with the war drill against the DPRK with the Carl Vinson and Ronald Reagan nuclear aircraft carrier strike groups deployed on the East Sea of Korea. The U.S. imperialists’ ever-more reckless military provocation clearly proves that their talk about “dialogue” is nothing but hypocrisy to disarm the DPRK and their wild ambition to eliminate the DPRK with nukes remains unchanged even a bit. Their nuclear war provocation redoubles the will of our army to revenge the warmongers hell-bent on a war against the DPRK. The U.S. imperialist warmongers should not forget even a moment that their increasing danger of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula would precipitate a disaster whereby the U.S. mainland turns into a scorched-earth.” (KCNA, “U.S. Imperialists’ Reckless Military Provocation under Fire,” May 30, 2017)
A re-engineered American interceptor rocket collided with a mock intercontinental ballistic missile this afternoon in the skies over the Pacific Ocean, the Pentagon said, in the first successful test of whether it could shoot down a warhead from North Korea racing toward the continental United States at speeds approaching true battle conditions. At a time when tensions with North Korea are running high, a successful test enabled the Pentagon to argue that it is making strides in protecting the United States from a North Korean nuclear warhead. But even advocates of the program stop short of arguing that it can now provide a defensive shield; with today’s test, only five of the last 10 tests have been declared fully or partly successful in the 13 years since the system became operational. The test “demonstrates that we have a capable, credible deterrent against a very real threat,” said Vice Adm. James D. Syring, the director of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency, calling the test a “critical milestone for this program.” But Defense Department officials provided no details, saying only that initial indications showed the test had met its primary objective by hitting the target and that the missile agency would evaluate other data to determine how the system performed over all. The test was the first of a new “kill vehicle” that uses thrusters to aim directly at an incoming warhead. That is intended to solve a persistent technical problem blamed for many past misses. So far, North Korea has not tested a missile that could reach the United States. But experts expect that moment in the next five years or so. It would have to learn how to shrink a nuclear warhead to fit atop an intercontinental missile and survive the stresses of re-entering the atmosphere. Efforts to test the country’s multibillion-dollar efforts at missile defense have had mixed results. A Pentagon report in January criticized the long-range system, saying that it “demonstrates a limited capability to defend the U.S. homeland from small numbers” of medium- and long-range missiles “launched from North Korea or Iran.” In nine of the 17 tests of the system since 1999, the target missile was not destroyed, officials said. Critics of the system say the test record has not improved over time, as would be expected for a system that is maturing. And “the tests have still not been done under realistic conditions,” Laura Grego, a physicist with the Union of Concerned Scientists, wrote in a blog post yesterday. Grego and other scientists argue that only when the system is tested in a range of situations — such as at night, or when an adversary is using countermeasures — would the Defense Department be able to say that it works. Today’s test was launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Because the location was known and the approximate time of the launch was planned, the interceptor was ready — which might not be the case under real conditions. Yesterday, Pyongyang launched what South Korean officials called a Scud-type missile that flew 280 miles before falling into waters near Japan. Hours after the missile test, two American supersonic B-1B Lancer bombers conducted a drill over South Korea. (Helene Cooper and David E. Sanger, “Test of Missile Defense System Is a Success, U.S. Says,” New York Times, May 31, 2017,
The Blue House said the Ministry of National Defense intentionally failed to mention four additional launchers for the U.S.-antimissile system known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (Thaad) system at a briefing May 27. “After our investigation, we have confirmed that the Defense Ministry intentionally omitted the delivery of the launchers in its report [to the National Security Office],” said Yoon Young-chan, senior presidential secretary for public relations, in the Blue House press room. The Blue House’s claim is a direct contradiction of the Defense Ministry. Yesterday, it claimed it informed Chung Eui-yong, chief of the security office and de-facto security adviser for President Moon Jae-in, of the four launchers in the briefing. Yoon said that all Defense Ministry officials questioned by the Blue House acknowledged the omission, and that the four additional launchers were, in fact, mentioned in a draft of a report for the briefing. “Our probe proved that an initial draft report contained information saying six launchers were stored in a military camp. But after reviews [by senior defense officials], we learned those lines were taken out,” Yoon continued. “Instead, it vaguely stated [the equipment] had been brought in [to the country].” Asked how vague the briefing was, a Blue House official said a person who read the final report would not know the four launchers had been delivered. The Blue House official said Lee Sang-chul, first deputy chief of the National Security Office, grew suspicious about the final report and asked a defense ministry official for more details following the briefing. He learned that the four launchers had been brought into Korea. Lee reported it to Chung the next day. After being tipped off about the four additional launchers, Chung asked Defense Minister Han Min-koo during a luncheon Sunday whether they had indeed been delivered to Korea in addition to the two launchers already deployed to Seongju in North Gyeongsang in April. “I heard that four launchers were transferred here,” Chung was quoted as saying to Han by Yoon. The military chief didn’t acknowledge it, but instead asked Chung, “Have they really?” according to the Blue House. The conversation between Han and Chung fueled suspicion that the military was trying to keep President Moon and his office in the dark over the THAAD deployment, knowing that the Moon government is not in favor of it. If Han lied to the top security adviser to the president on May 28, it could raise serious questions about breach of trust as the top military official. The Blue House official did not rule out the possibility that the minister had lied, saying reporters should ask Han about it. Yesterday, the Blue House revealed that the Defense Ministry had not reported the transfer of the four launchers to the Presidential Advisory Commission on State Affairs Planning during a briefing on May 25, and that Moon belatedly confirmed delivery of the four launchers on May 29 in a telephone conversation with minister Han. Moon was quoted as saying it was “extremely shocking” that the four launchers were brought in clandestinely. In response to the Blue House’s statement, Defense Minister Han said today he did not order descriptions of the delivery of the launchers to be omitted from the briefing. “I did not make such an order (to omit the delivery part),” the minister told reporters at the Defense Ministry. Han said lower level officials might have taken the information out, thinking that the transfer of the four launchers was implied in the final report. On his luncheon with security adviser Chung, Han signaled that his chat with Chung might have been taken out of context, saying, there could have been subtle “differences in nuance and perspective.” The Blue House acknowledged today that some details about the deployment should be hidden from the public for national security’s sake. But it stressed that misleading the presidential office was a far graver issue. The Blue House’s aggressive moves in dealing with the THAAD controversy suggest that President Moon will order an extensive reshuffle of the military leadership, with Minister Han likely to be the first head to roll. Moon could also use the very public controversy over the four launchers as a negotiating card during his summit meeting with President Donald Trump, expected to be held later this month in Washington. Trump has said Seoul should pay $1 billion for the THAAD, although other members of his administration have rejected that claim. He also said he wants the United States to give his administration some more time to conduct an environmental impact assessment and discuss the matter at the National Assembly. “Even if it takes time, it is an expense that we have to pay as a democracy,” Moon was quoted as saying. The U.S. Forces Korea began installing key components of the THAAD battery on a former golf course in Seongju County, North Gyeongsang on April 26 – less than two weeks before the May 9 presidential election. Despite protests by Beijing and Moscow, Seoul and Washington agreed on the deployment in July last year, during the presidency of Park Geun-hye. The rushed deployment of the antimissile system took place while the country was under the leadership of an acting president after Park was impeached and removed from office in March. A THAAD battery typically consists of six truck-mounted launchers, 48 interceptors (eight per launcher), a fire control and communications unit, and powerful AN/TPY-2, or X-band, radar. The deployment in April included the radar system and two missile launchers and interceptors used with them. During the campaign, Moon made clear his objection to the rushed deployment. He maintained on the campaign trail the Thaad deployment should be reviewed by the National Assembly and an incoming government before a conclusion was reached on the contentious issue. Park Soo-hyun, presidential spokesman, said Moon met with Senator Richard Durbin, the Democratic whip, who paid a visit to the Blue House as part of a trip to Korea. Asked by Durbin about the latest series of news reports concerning the THAAD deployment, Moon said he does not treat lightly the agreement between Seoul and Washington to deploy the battery, although it was made by his predecessor. “My order for the probe was a measure entirely for domestic affairs, and I want to make clear that it was not intended to reverse the existing agreement or to send a message to the United States,” Moon was quoted as saying. (Kang Jin-kyu, “Ministry Tried to Keep Moon in the Dark: Blue House,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 1, 2017)
5/31/17:
South Korea decided to permit a civic group to contact North Koreans to prepare for a joint event to mark an inter-Korean summit 17th anniversary slated for next month. It may lead to the first joint commemoration of the 2000 summit in nine years despite heightened tensions over the North’s nuclear and missile programs. Yesterday, the non-government organization made the request for government approval for a plan to meet its North Korean counterpart to discuss the anniversary of the first meeting of the two Korean leaders held on June 15, 2000. The two sides agreed during a meeting in China in February to hold the event in Pyongyang or Kaesong in North Korea. The NGO officials contacted the North Koreans without government approval. (Yonhap, “S. Korea OKs NGO’s Contact with N. Korea on Summit Anniversary,” May 31, 2017)
6/1/17:
A U.S.-drafted resolution circulated to the U.N. Security Council would add 15 North Korean individuals and four entities linked to the country’s nuclear and missile programs to a U.N. sanctions blacklist. The resolution would not impose any new sanctions over North Korea’s missile tests, something that China has opposed. The final draft, obtained today by the Associated Press, is expected to be put to a vote tomorrow afternoon, diplomats said, speaking on condition of anonymity ahead of an announcement. The proposed resolution would impose a global travel ban and asset freeze on a range of North Koreans from the man believed to head overseas espionage operations and foreign intelligence collection to officials who control the media and key government and military appointments. The Vietnam representative of a bank and the heads of two companies would also face sanctions. The draft would also freeze the assets of two trading companies, a bank and the Strategic Rocket Force of the Korean People’s Army, which is in charge of all ballistic missile programs. The Security Council has already imposed six rounds of sanctions on North Korea, and the United States has been pushing for new and tougher measures. But China’s U.N. ambassador, Liu Jieyi, made clear last week that Beijing’s top priority is to restart talks with North Korea following its multiple tests to try to reduce tensions, rather than impose new sanctions. The draft resolution doesn’t call for any new sanctions, but it would add significantly to the U.N. blacklist of individuals and entities with links to North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs. That list currently names 39 individuals and 42 entities and groups subject to sanctions. One diplomat said all five permanent veto-wielding members — the U.S., China, Russia, Britain and France — had agreed to the proposed additions. The first individual on the proposed new blacklist is Cho Il U, believed to be the overseas espionage and intelligence chief who is identified as the director of the Fifth Bureau of the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Another key figure on the list is Kim Chol Nam, president of Korea Kumsan Trading Co., which procures supplies for North Korea’s atomic energy department and serves as “a cash route” to North Korea. The company would also be added to the sanctions list.Others facing possible sanctions include: Kim Tong-Ho, Vietnam representative for Tanchon Commercial Bank, which is North Korea’s main “financial entity for weapons and missile-related sales;” Pak Han Se, vice chairman of the government committee that oversees ballistic missile production and directs activities of Korea Mining Development Corp., the country’s “premier arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons;” Ri Yong Mu, vice chairman of the State Affairs Commission, which directs and guide all military, defense and security-related affairs in the country, “including acquisitions and procurement.”
The draft resolution expresses “serious concern” that North Korea continues to violate U.N. resolutions with repeated launches and attempted launches of ballistic missiles, noting that these tests contribute to development of its nuclear weapons delivery systems. It expresses “gravest concern” that the North’s nuclear and missile activities are generating “increased tension in the region and beyond” and continue to threaten international peace and security. The proposed resolution would condemn North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic activities “in the strongest terms” and reaffirm the Security Council’s demand that Pyongyang abandon all nuclear weapons and programs and halt all nuclear and missile tests. It would also reiterate the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in northeast Asia, express the council’s commitment “to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation,” and welcome efforts “to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive situation through dialogue.” (Edith M. Lederer, “Draft U.N. Resolution Would Add 15 North Koreans to Blacklist,” Associoated Press, June 1, 2017)
The U.S. Department of the Treasury has unveiled several new North Korea sanctions designations on both Russian and North Korean individuals and entities, a press release published on Thursday reveals. The new designations from the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) pertain to Executive Orders (EO) 13382, 13687 and 13722. The EO’s and Thursday’s sanctions target WMD proliferators, the Government of North Korea, the Worker’s Party of Korea and their supporters, as well as the country’s revenue earned from its commodity, energy and financial service industries. “The United States will continue to target individuals and entities responsible for financing and supporting North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, and will continue to increase pressure on this hostile regime,” said John E. Smith, Director of OFAC, according to the press release. The designations target a Russian individual and entities, including the Independent Petroleum Company (IPC), a company worth USD$4 billion, according to Bloomberg News. “IPC is a Russian company that has signed a contract to provide oil to North Korea and reportedly has shipped over $1 million worth of petroleum products to North Korea,” the OFAC statement read. “IPC also may have been involved in circumventing North Korean sanctions. OFAC also designated one of IPC’s subsidiaries, AO NNK-Primornefteproduct.” NK News previously identified Primornefteproduct as a possible North Korea oil supplier in 2015. A Russian national – Igor Aleksandrovich Michurin – and a Moscow-based company called Ardis-Bearings LLC, for which Michurin is listed as director, was also added to the list. According to OFAC, Ardis-Bearings LLC supported the Korea Tangun Trading Corporation, sanctioned by the UN in 2009 for “being engaged in or providing support for, including through other illicit means, DPRK’s nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile-related programs.” The Korean People’s Army (KPA), Ministry of People’s Armed Forces (MPAF) and the State Affairs Commission (SAC) were included in the latest round of sanctions for being controlled entities of the North Korean Government and for their involvement in military, nuclear and WMD programs. OFAC also targeted the Korea Computer Center (KCC), North Korea’s primary software developer. “The KCC generates money for the North Korean regime through software development and programming … The KCC is reported to have overseas locations in Germany, China, Syria, India, and the Middle East,” OFAC said. “As of 2014, KCC allegedly earned foreign currency for the UN- and U.S.-designated Munitions Industry Department, which is responsible for overseeing North Korea’s ballistic missiles,” it added. Two North Korean individuals identified as Su Kwang Kim and Song Hyok Ri, were also added to the designation list. Kim, OFAC says, is an official of the North Korean intelligence organization – the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). Kim was previously identified by a UN Panel of Experts (PoE) in 2015 as an RGB operative who had infiltrated the World Food Program (WFP) in Rome. Ri was designated for activities pertaining to North Korea’s financial services, and according to OFAC, was a Beijing-based official for the already designated Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank. Ri “has reportedly established several front companies in order to procure items and conduct financial transactions on behalf of North Korea,” OFAC said. North Korea’s Songi Trading Company and the Korea Zinc Industrial Group were also designated for being involved in exporting coal and zinc separately from the DPRK. UN Security Council Resolution 2321, adopted in November 2016, also prohibits the export of coal and zinc from North Korea. (Hamish Macdonald, “U.S. Designates Russian Individuals, Entities in New N. Korea Sanctions,” NKNews, June 1, 2017)
6/1/17:
Richard Haass: “Every new U.S. administration takes several months to staff itself properly, master new and often unfamiliar responsibilities, and develop a comprehensive strategy for American foreign policy. The Trump administration’s start has been especially rocky. But the administration has already executed a noticeable course shift on foreign policy and international affairs, exchanging some of its early outsider rhetoric and personnel for more conventional choices. If it can continue to elaborate and professionalize its new approach, it could achieve a number of successes. But for that to happen, the administration will have to act with considerably greater discipline and work to frame its policies toward regional and global issues as part of a coherent, strategic approach to international relations that benefits the United States, its allies and partners, and the world at large. President Donald Trump has properly concluded that the greatest threat to U.S. national security is North Korea’s accelerating nuclear and missile programs, which may give Pyongyang the ability to launch nuclear-tipped missiles at the continental United States in a matter of months or at most years. The president also seems to have concluded, correctly, that several decades of U.S. policy, mostly consisting of sanctions and on-again, off-again negotiations aimed at ridding North Korea of nuclear weapons, have failed. The challenge now is to choose among the three plausible alternative options for moving forward: acceptance, military intervention, or more creative diplomacy. A fourth possibility, that of regime change, does not qualify as a serious option, since it is impossible to assess its chances or consequences. In theory, the United States and other powers could accept a North Korean nuclear capability and rely on deterrence to lower the risk of an attack and missile defenses to reduce the damage should one occur. The problem is that deterrence and defenses might not work perfectly—so the acceptance option means living with a perpetual risk of catastrophe. Moreover, even if Pyongyang were deterred from using the weapons it developed, it would still be able to transfer them to other actors for the right price. And even if its nuclear capability were never used or transferred, acquiescence to North Korea’s continued possession of nuclear weapons would further dilute the nonproliferation regime and conceivably lead Japan and South Korea to rethink their nonnuclear postures. Military intervention could be either preventive (moving deliberately to destroy a gathering threat) or preemptive (moving quickly to head off an immediate one). The problem here is that any such strike would be a huge leap into the unknown with possibly devastating consequences. Officials could not know in advance just what a military operation would accomplish and how the North Koreans would react. Given Pyongyang’s ability to destroy large parts of Seoul using conventional, nonnuclear forces, the South Korean government is understandably leery of the intervention option, and so any moves along these lines would need to be planned and coordinated with extreme care. The unattractiveness of both acceptance and intervention is what keeps bringing policymakers back to the third option, trying to cap and reverse the North Korean nuclear threat through negotiations. But as decades of failed efforts have proved, diplomacy is no panacea. So the challenge on this front is not just getting back to the table but also figuring out how to make rapid progress once there. This could be done by breaking the issue’s resolution into two stages, with an interim deal that would freeze Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs, followed by longer-term efforts to reduce and eliminate the programs entirely. The interim deal could best be executed as a bilateral agreement between the United States and North Korea, with other governments kept involved and informed through consultations. The negotiations should have a deadline for reaching agreement, to ensure that Pyongyang doesn’t use the talks simply to buy time for further progress on its weapons programs. The North would have to agree to pause its testing of warheads and missiles while the negotiations continued, and the United States and South Korea would have to agree not to strike North Korea during the same period. In exchange for accepting a comprehensive, open-ended freeze on its nuclear and missile programs, intrusive inspections designed to ensure that the freeze was being honored, and a ban on any transfers of nuclear materials or missile technology to third parties, North Korea would get some sanctions relief and an agreement formally ending the Korean War, a form of de facto recognition. Follow-on talks would deal with denuclearization and other concerns (such as human rights) in exchange for an end to the sanctions and the normalization of ties. An interim agreement would not solve the North Korean nuclear problem, but it would keep it from getting any worse and lower the risks of war and instability—as positive a result as one could imagine in the current circumstances. Since Chinese pressure on North Korea would be essential to achieve such a deal, this option would build logically on the administration’s early investment in good relations with its counterpart in Beijing. And even if diplomacy failed again, at least the United States would have demonstrated that it tried negotiations before turning to one of the other, more controversial options. Over time, “America First” will lead others to put themselves first. As for the U.S. relationship with China itself, the administration’s primary goal should be to emphasize cooperation over North Korea, the most urgent item on the national security agenda. The two countries’ economic integration gives both Washington and Beijing a stake in keeping relations on course. China’s leaders are likely to focus for the foreseeable future on domestic concerns more than foreign policy ones, and the United States should let them do so. That means leaving in place long-standing U.S. policies on bilateral issues such as Taiwan, trade, arms sales, and the South China Sea; the Trump administration should avoid adopting positions on these issues that could either trigger a distracting crisis or compromise U.S. interests. The result would be a “North Korea first,” but not a “North Korea only,” U.S. policy toward China. Regarding the Asia-Pacific more generally, the administration should reassure U.S. allies about the United States’ continued commitment to the region—something that has been called into question by Trump’s abrupt withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and by various statements from the president and other administration officials. It would have made more sense for Washington to work with the other signatories to amend the TPP (as it appears to be doing in regard to the North American Free Trade Agreement) and join the modified pact. This remains an option, although it may be difficult to achieve. Failing that, the administration could attempt to work out an understanding with Congress that would allow the United States to join the TPP but commit the country to certain courses of punitive action in specific circumstances (currency manipulation, intellectual property theft, large government subsidies, and so on), similar to what was done when it came to U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements. The understanding would be codified and voted on at the same time as the trade agreement itself, as a binding package, to reassure the agreement’s critics. …Trump clearly prefers an informal decision-making process, with various voices included and many points of entry, and presidents get their way. But such an approach has downsides as well as upsides, and if the administration wants to avoid the dangers that come with excessive improvisation, it needs to ensure that the formal National Security Council policy process dominates the informal one—and that significant informal deliberations are ultimately integrated into the formal process rather than carried on separately. The president also clearly prefers to be unpredictable. This can make sense as a tactic, but not as a strategy. Keeping foes off balance can be useful, but keeping friends and allies off balance is less so—especially friends and allies that have put their security in American hands for generations. The less steady they judge those hands to be, the more they may decide to look out for themselves, ignoring Washington’s requests and considering side deals to protect their interests. Frequent policy reversals, even those that are welcome, come at a substantial cost to the United States’ credibility and to its reputation for reliability. Down that route lies the unraveling of the postwar order that the United States has worked so hard to create and maintain. It is important not to forget that the United States has been remarkably well served by this order. Where things have gone the most wrong—in Korea, when U.S. forces marched north of the 38th parallel in what would become a costly and unsuccessful effort to reunify the peninsula by force, in Vietnam, in Iraq—it was because of overreach by U.S. policymakers rather than a requirement to act on behalf of the order. But that order is now in decline. Many of its components need to be modernized or supplemented, and new rules and arrangements are needed to deal with the various challenges of globalization. But the international project should be a renovation, not a teardown. New challenges may have arisen, but the old challenges have not gone away, so the old solutions to them are still necessary even if they are no longer sufficient. The strategic focus for U.S. foreign policy should be preservation and adaptation, not disruption, so that the United States and those willing to work with it can better contend with the regional and, even more, the global challenges that increasingly define this era. The EU is imperfect in many ways, but it remains a source of peace and prosperity on the continent. In that regard, the president’s campaign slogan of “America First” was and is unfortunate, because it appears to signal a narrower U.S. foreign policy, one lacking in a larger purpose or vision. It has been interpreted abroad as suggesting that friends and allies now come second, at best. Over time, “America First” will lead others to put themselves first, which in turn will make them less likely to take into account (much less give priority to) American interests and preferences. The slogan also unfortunately reinforces the mistaken notion that there is a sharp tradeoff between money and effort spent on international affairs and those spent on domestic concerns. In a global world, Americans will inevitably be affected by what happens beyond their country’s borders. The United States needs both guns and butter, and national security is determined by how well a country meets its external and internal challenges alike. The good news is that the United States, which now spends only half the percentage of its wealth on defense that it did during the Cold War, can afford both. If the administration does decide to retain the phrase, it should at least recognize its shortcomings and counteract them. This means finding ways to make clear that although the United States does follow its own interests, it does not do so at its friends’ and partners’ expense. American patriotism can be defined and operationalized in ways compatible with responsible global leadership. And figuring out how to do that from here on in is the Trump administration’s central challenge.” (Richard Haass, “Where to Go from Here,” Foreign Affairs July/August 2017, pp. 2-9)
6/2/17:
U.S. officials said that naval maneuvers this week off the Korean Peninsula were the first in two decades to involve two American aircraft carriers in those waters and were intended as a “message of reassurance” to the region. The new details about the exercises, which also involved Japanese warships, were disclosed as Defense Secretary Jim Mattis arrived in Singapore for a security conference organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “This is about readiness,” said David F. Helvey, a senior adviser on Asian security issues to Mattis. “This demonstrates that the United States has military capabilities across the western Pacific, including in the Sea of Japan.” He added: “It sends a message of reassurance, and it does send a message of resolve. But this is part of our routine actions and our presence.” Mattis declined to discuss security issues on the record with reporters who traveled on his plane from Washington. But he read a short statement outlining themes he planned to address in a speech on Saturday, including the importance of “strengthening alliances,” “upholding international law” and “maintaining stability.” The carriers involved in the exercise are the Carl Vinson, which has been operating in the region for the past several weeks and whose home port is San Diego, and the Ronald Reagan, which is based in Japan. Each carrier leads a strike group of destroyers, cruisers and submarines, which are also participating in the drill. The Japanese have joined the exercise with two ships, including a helicopter carrier. The naval exercise, which is expected to last several days, is intended to reassure worried allies and demonstrate the reach of American forces. “I don’t expect this to change North Korea’s behavior,” said Helvey, who noted that the Trump administration was relying primarily on diplomatic and economic pressure to try to persuade North Korea to curtail its nuclear and missile programs. Operations involving two carrier strike groups have taken place in the western Pacific before. Last year, the John C. Stennis and the Reagan carried out drills together in the Philippine Sea. But the current exercise is the first time it has happened in the waters between Japan and the Korean Peninsula since the late 1990s, Helvey said. One issue that may come up in discussions with South Korea is the THAAD antimissile system. The new president of South Korea, Moon Jae-in, has complained that he was not told when the four remaining antimissile launchers were brought into his country. American officials have generally portrayed the debate as a matter of internal South Korean politics, and Helvey insisted that the United States had been forthright with South Korea. The plan had always been to deploy all six launchers, he said. “I can’t get into the specifics of what was communicated by whom and when,” he said. “We have been consulting with the R.O.K. government throughout this entire process to get the entire Thaad battery to the Korean Peninsula, which includes six launchers,” he added, using the acronym for the Republic of Korea. “We have been very transparent.” (Michael Gordon, “U.S. Naval Exercise off Korea Intended as a ‘Message of Reassurance,’” New York Times, June 2, 2017)
KPA Strategic Rocket Force spokesman’s answer to the question raised by KCNA “over a recent mock ICBM shoot-down test of the U.S. imperialists. The U.S. imperialists conducted a test Tuesday simulating the interception of an ICBM from the DPRK at the Vandenberg Air Force Base in California State. …This is just a serious military provocation that brings to light the U.S. imperialists’ wild ambition for igniting a nuclear war. Such risky act is a sign that their preparations for unleashing a nuclear war against the DPRK have reached the final phase. Their foolhardy moves go to clearly prove that the DPRK’s step for bolstering the nuclear force for self-defense is entirely just. They are now bluffing, bragging about the “success” in the test and the efficiency of the missile interception system. But the DPRK considers it just as a foolish act of those driven to despair. They are sadly mistaken if they think such missile interception system can prevent the shower of nuclear strike by the Strategic Force of the KPA. The last-ditch gambling of the Trump administration for a nuclear war will only bring earlier the day when the U.S. mainland will turn into ashes.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for Strategic Force of KPA on U.S. Mock ICBM Interception Test,” June 2, 2017)
In a month filled with missile tests that are certain to have a profound impact on the strategic balance of the Korean peninsula, Kim Jong Un attended what is claimed to be the final testing of an advanced new air defense system that is now ready to enter full-scale production and service with the Korean People’s Army Air and Anti-Air Defense Forces. The new design, which is heavily based on the infamous Russian S-300PMU Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) system, appears to have been produced almost entirely indigenously, despite the hard to master technologies it utilizes. First showcased during the 65th anniversary of the Workers’ Party in 2010, the system, designated Pongae-5 in North Korea and given the U.S. DoD designation of KN-06, introduces capabilities to the KPA that will severely complicate the aerial operations of its opponents during a potential conflict. First tested in June 2011 to a range of 150 kilometers, it is believed to be comparable to the S-300PMU, offering a very large engagement range as well as a high kill probability. Still, the Pongae-5 appears to have been developed in part by North Korea itself (possibly with Russian assistance), and comparison with footage from a previous test in April 2016 shows that several incremental improvements have been implemented to increase the system’s reliability and capabilities. For one, the cold launch, which is employed to eject the sizeable missile from its canister, is much more powerful than on Russian S-300 variants, mirroring the cold launch used by Chinese S-300 copies. Also notable is the fact that the cap of the canister is now jettisoned before launch instead of broken up, another indication of an innovation introduced after last year’s tests. KCNA, North Korea’s state media outlet, also confirmed these improvements, citing remarks made by Kim Jong Un: “He told KPA commanding officers and officials of the academy that the weapon system’s efficiency to detect and track targets has remarkably improved and its hitting accuracy has also increased, compared with those of last year. Some defects in the weapon system, discovered last year, were perfectly overcome to stand the test, he said...” Due to these differences, the characteristics of the North Korean design are likely to diverge from the system from which it was derived, possibly complicating attempts to counter it in wartime. Perhaps even more significant than the introduction of the system itself, however, is the radar suite it employs to detect and track its targets. These radars, one of which is the powerful 30ND “Flap Lid” (based on a North Korean-Russian Taebaeksan-96 truck), are a great improvement over most other types in use by the KPA, and will surely enhance North Korea’s aerospace awareness. More alarming still was the presence of a new type of large phased array radar that appears to have been developed by the DPRK itself, referenced in Kim Jong Un’s remark about the weapon’s increased efficiency in detecting and tracking targets. The production of such systems is notoriously difficult (requiring an advanced electronics industry) and if it gains traction it could bring powerful new capabilities to the table for the KPA. The coverage of the new test also referenced a visit made by the late Kim Jong Il to a facility that stored the Pongae-5 prototypes, likely before the 2010 parade. In Kim Jong Un’s description of this visit, images of which show the Pongae-5’s Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) before it even received a paint job, the importance that was attached to this project is clearly referenced: “Seeing such a perfect new-type anti-aircraft guided weapon system, I miss the General more a lot. That weapon system is a posthumous one the development of which had been guided by him with much effort since the start. The General would have been very glad to see this perfect weapon system as he had put his heart and soul into the work to bolster up the state anti-aircraft capability until the last moments of his life.” It is likely that Kim Jong Il did indeed invest substantial effort in securing the technology behind the system, which has been the subject of much controversy abroad – for instance in the case of Iran’s acquisition efforts. In this context, the S-300 is often touted as a potent deterrent aimed at preventing enemy air forces from operating successfully, due to its long range and perceived effectiveness. The first indication that North Korea was indeed looking to buy the coveted SAM came in 2001, with reports covering a visit by Kim Jong Il to Russia indicating that the leader was looking to purchase a range of new weapons systems, including “assistance and permission to produce S‐300 SAMs.” It appears that this process has now finally been completed, with the production of the Pongae-5 likely to ramp up as a result. (Joost Oliemans and Stijn Mitzer, “North Korea’s Pongae-5 Anti-Air Missile: What Do We Know?” NKNews, June 2, 2017)
South Korea’s government approved an additional eight requests by local aid providers and religious groups to have contact with North Koreans over inter-Korean exchanges. The Ministry of Unification said that it gave the green light to plans by two humanitarian aid providers and six religious groups to come in contact with North Korea as the government decided to revive civilian exchanges with the North. “The approval came as the government will flexibly review civilian exchanges between the two Koreas to an extent that the move would not hamper the international sanctions regime,” Lee Eugene, vice spokesperson at the ministry, told a regular press briefing. The groups receiving approval included agencies that seek to provide nutrition support and medication to North Korean children, the ministry added. (Yonhap, “S. Korea OKs Additional Civilian Exchanges with N. Korea,” Korea Herald, June 2, 2017)
6/1-2/17:
North Korean diplomats who attended an informal meeting with former U.S., South Korean and Japanese officials and academics may have expressed interest in denuclearization. Izumi Hajime, an international relations professor at Tokyo International University, told Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun that officials from Pyongyang had not abandoned the aim of denuclearizing the peninsula espoused by former leader Kim Jong Il. Izumi met with North Koreans during the forum held at Sweden’s Institute for Security and Development Policy on June 1-2, according to the report. North Korea stressed the development of nuclear weapons was for the sake of “self-defense” during the dialogue, while demanding the United States not to deploy nuclear weapons to the peninsula, the analyst said. The report did not identify the North Korean officials who attended the informal Track 1.5 talks. Ahead of the meeting, Hankyore reported the officials were from the North Korean foreign ministry’s disarmament and peace institute. From the United States, former CIA analysts Sue Mi Terry and Bruce Klingner were in attendance, and Shin Bong-kil, a visiting professor at South Korea’s Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies, went on behalf of Seoul. Asahi also reported North Korean officials said at an international conference held in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, on June 14-16, that the Armistice Agreement that brought truce to the peninsula after the 1950-53 Korean War should be replaced with a peace treaty. (Elizabeth Shim, “Japanese Analyst: North Korean Diplomats Open to ‘Denuclearization,’” UPI, June 21, 2017) Klinger and Terry: “…This month, we were part of a group of delegates from the United States, Japan, China and South Korea who met in Sweden with representatives of North Korea to explore possible grounds for resuming the six-party talks that collapsed in 2009. After many hours with the North Korean delegation at these “1.5 track” talks, we left more pessimistic than when we arrived. North Korean officials made unambiguously clear that Pyongyang will not be deterred from augmenting its nuclear arsenal or test-launching an intercontinental ballistic missile that could eventually threaten the U.S. homeland. There were no signals of flexibility or willingness to negotiate on these programs. Throughout, the North Korean message was that denuclearization is off the table. Pyongyang’s representatives declared: “The most perfect weapons system will never become the exclusive property of the United States.” We tried repeatedly to ascertain whether any combination of economic and diplomatic benefits or security reassurances could induce Pyongyang to comply with its previously negotiated commitments and with U.N. resolutions. The answer was an emphatic, unwavering no. Citing the fates of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Moammar Gaddafi, the North Koreans repeatedly said that their nuclear program is the ultimate life preserver for the regime. Our North Korean interlocutors presented a stark choice: “First accept us as a nuclear state, then we are prepared to talk about a peace treaty or fight. We are ready for either.” The North Koreans weren’t saying that they would initiate hostilities but that they would fight if provoked. A peace treaty ending the Korean War and legitimizing the North Korean state is a long- standing goal for Pyongyang, which sees it as a catalyst for the removal of all U.S. forces from the peninsula. Strikingly different from similar meetings in the past was the self-confidence, even cockiness, of the North Koreans, clearly a result of the recent successes of their nuclear and missile programs. The North Koreans also made clear that their nuclear program is a response to the general “U.S. hostile policy.” As such, nothing Seoul could offer would alter Pyongyang’s commitment to its nuclear arsenal. The North Koreans won’t even deign to negotiate with the South Koreans, whom they described repeatedly as “puppets” of the United States. Thus, the new South Korean president, Moon Jae-in, is in for a major disappointment if he tries to resurrect the “sunshine policy” of unconditional engagement pursued by previous progressive presidents from 1998 to 2008. President Trump has placed his hopes on Chinese promises to more fully implement U.N. sanctions. But as even he now seems to acknowledge, this hasn’t happened. He tweeted on Tuesday: “While I greatly appreciate the efforts of President Xi [Jinping] & China to help with North Korea, it has not worked out. At least I know China tried!” Although Trump has criticized President Barack Obama’s “strategic patience” policy as weak and ineffectual, he has yet to distinguish his North Korea policy from his predecessor’s. Trump’s policy of “maximum pressure” is anything but, and he continues to pull his punches against North Korean and Chinese violators of U.S. law. The Trump administration has also sent conflicting signals about whether it would negotiate with North Korea or potentially conduct a military attack to prevent the regime from mastering an intercontinental ballistic missile. Initiating a preemptive strike would be a bad idea against a state that already has nuclear weapons, as well as 10,000 artillery tubes aimed at Seoul. In our talks, the North Korean officials emphasized that they did not struggle to acquire nuclear weapons only to perish without using them. The implied threat was clear: If the United States were to use military force against North Korea, Pyongyang would retaliate, potentially leading to hundreds of thousands or millions of casualties. Instead of trying to preempt the North Korean nuclear weapons program, the Trump administration would be better advised to ramp up sanctions — including secondary sanctions, despite predictable Chinese protests. This would impose a penalty on North Korea, without risking a war — and could conceivably hasten the day the Kim regime finally collapses. Bolstering sanctions might not be exciting, but it would be a more pragmatic step than yet another attempt at negotiations.” (Bruce Kilinger and Sue Mi Terry, “We Participated in Talks with North Korean Representatives. This Is What We Learned,” Washington Post, June 22, 2017)
6/4/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s statement “as regards the fact that the hostile forces are getting hell-bent on the sinister moves for sanctions and pressure on the DPRK: Hostile forces are now in a flurry, being disconcerted over the gunfire of victory set off by the DPRK’s self-defensive industry in numbers and in succession. Pressing this panic button, they are desperate in their vicious attempts to put sanctions and pressure to bear upon against the DPRK. On June 3, the United Nations Security Council again framed up “sanctions resolution” taking an issue of the DPRK’s launch of ballistic rocket which is aimed to bolster up its nuclear forces. This “resolution”, which is said to have been drafted after a long “consultation” between the U.S. and China, places entities and individuals related with the DPRK’s nuclear and rocket program as a target of “additional sanctions.” Earlier, the U.S. took its own way of announcing “unilateral sanctions” against the DPRK and included in it “secondary boycott” with a target of businesses and individuals of even Russia and other third countries which are alleged to have links with the DPRK. The DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs gives a strong condemnation and rejection to the UNSC’s another campaign of sanctions as it is a crafty hostile act with the purpose of putting a curb on the DPRK’s buildup of nuclear forces, disarming it and causing economic suffocation to it. The U.S. steps up its military buildup including the modernization of nuclear weapons just in order to obtain the exclusive and permanent possession of the most sophisticated weapon system in the world. But, other country can’t be allowed to test or launch any object which goes with the words of nuclear or “ballistic.” This is really the height of shameless arrogance, self-righteousness and double standards. Two countries railroaded “sanctions resolution” at the UNSC after having drafted it in the backroom at their own pleasure and are enforcing it upon others just paving it as “the general will of the international society”. It is a bare expression of high-handed and arbitrary act in pursuit of their own interests trampling upon the international justice. The buildup of nuclear forces by the DPRK is all too natural an exercise of its sovereignty to thwart what the U.S. imposed nuclear threat against the DPRK in an unprecedented way. It is also to achieve genuine international justice let alone the fact that it is to ensure peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the region. It is a fatal miscalculation if the countries, which have had a hand in the frame-up of the “sanctions resolution”, would even think that they can delay or hold in check the eye-opening development of the DPRK’s nuclear forces even for a moment. They would squarely see that their mean and indiscreet act would go in just opposite direction to what they want for. They kept saying about “dialogue” this time. But, it does not make any sense to profess about dialogue with unjust preconditions attached and by applying “maximum pressure.” No matter what others say, whatever sanctions and pressure may follow, we will not flinch from the road to build up nuclear forces which was chosen to defend the sovereignty of the country and the rights to national existence and will move forward towards the final victory. The “Juche Rocket”, ultra precision and diversified, will continue to thunder and skyrocket in full blast in numbers and in succession until the moment when the U.S. and its followers are brought to reason about the root cause and a solution to the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula and take their right choices.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Slashes at Another UN ‘Sanctions Resolution,’” June 4, 2017)
6/5/17:
The Korean Sharing Movement said that it will delay shipments to North Korea of pesticide and medical supplies to fight malaria and its visit to North Korea as Pyongyang took issue with U.N. sanctions against the North. Kang Young-sik, the secretary-general of the group, said that Pyongyang took issue with the South Korean government’s attitude toward the latest adoption of U.N. sanctions against the North. “We’ve decided to put off our plans to deliver the supplies’ shipments and to visit North Korea for cooperation,” Kang said. (Yonhap, “N.K. Rejects S. Korean Aid Provider’s Inter-Korean Exchanges, Citing Sanctions,” June 5, 2017)
South Korea’s Ministry of Unification said it has approved an additional four requests for contacts with North Koreans as it has decided to flexibly resume civilian inter-Korean exchanges. The move raised the total number of the government’s such approvals to 15 since liberal President Moon Jae-in took office in May, it added. “The ministry approved them based on the stance that it will flexibly review the resumption of civilian inter-Korean exchanges to an extent that the move does not hamper the international sanctions regime,” Lee Duk-haeng, ministry spokesman, told a regular press briefing. NGO Green One Korea plans to discuss insect controls and forest cooperation with North Korea, and an association of the two Koreas’ historians will contact their North Korean counterparts for ways to preserve cultural heritages, the ministry said. Two others applying for the ministry’s approval for international conferences were the World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) and the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation, a pro-unification group of civilians and politicians. (Yonhap, “S. Korea OKs Four More N.K. Contacts over Inter-Korean Exchanges,” June 5, 2017)
Japan will strengthen inspections of cargo to and from North Korea to ensure the nation does not receive any help in developing its nuclear and missile programs, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida said. The measures, a new phase of an existing United Nations sanction, will start by the end of June at the earliest. “To put pressure on North Korea, we must stop the transfer of items and technologies related to nuclear and missile developments there, and cut their foreign currency acquisitions,” Kishida said in a speech in Kanazawa on June 4. He told reporters that he has instructed related agencies to complete procedures to introduce the new policy. Based on sanctions outlined in a U.N. Security Council resolution, the Japan Coast Guard and other agencies have been inspecting cargo to and from North Korea according to a list of items related to nuclear and missile development. Under the new policy, authorities would be able to search for items that are not included on the list, and inspections would be carried out more strictly. As for its own next-level sanction, the Japanese government has started discussions on widening its asset-freeze measure against organizations and individuals related to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs. (Asahi Shimbun, “Japan to Tighten Inspections of North Korea Cargo,” June 5, 2017)
Deputy Minister for Defense Policy Wee Seung-ho will be excluded from duty for his part in withholding THAAD-related information from the presidential office, Cheong Wa Dae announced. According to Cheong Wa Dae, Wee ordered the fact that four THAAD launchers were in store at a US military base in South Korea to be removed from the Ministry of National Defense’s report to the presidential transition team on May 25. “In the process of reviewing the report, Deputy Minister for Defense Policy Wee Seung-ho ordered phrases (that clarified the number of THAAD launchers) to be deleted,” Yoon Young-chan, chief presidential press secretary, said, saying that the initial draft clearly stated that six THAAD launchers were in South Korea, four of which were stored at a US military base. The draft was first compiled before the presidential election, Yoon said, adding that the motives for withholding information is still unclear. Yoon added that the phrases were replaced with ambiguous wording designed to prevent those being briefed from fully understanding the situation in the final version. According to Cheong Wa Dae, Wee claimed that the details were removed due to an agreement with the US military to maintain secrecy, and that he had planned to give an oral report elaborating on the details. “(The nondisclosure agreement with the US military) is an issue separate from the commander in chief. It has been confirmed that the introduction of additional launchers were reported to the previous administration, and the acting president was aware of the issue.” (Choi He-suk, “Deputy Defense Chief to Be Excluded from Duty over THAAD Report,” Korea Herald, June 5, 2017)
Kim Ki-jung, second vice chief of President Moon Jae-in’s national security team, submitted his resignation, twelve days after he was appointed, following ongoing rumors about his unethical behavior at Yonsei University, where he teaches political science and diplomacy. Yoon Young-chan, senior presidential secretary for public relations, said in a statement that Kim felt a “moral responsibility” to step down and that “his health steeply deteriorated due to the heavy workload.” Kim reportedly was hospitalized. Yoon did not mention whether Kim’s resignation was accepted or whether the Blue House was planning to approve it. Hankyore, which broke the news, reported that the presidential office decided to sack him and informed him of its decision last night. “The civil affairs office at the Blue House had been thoroughly looking into the rumors,” Hankyoreh quoted a senior official of the Democratic Party as saying. “President Moon has critical issues to deal with, like the upcoming bilateral summit, but he came to the conclusion that it wasn’t right to keep [Kim] on the team.” Kim did not report for work today. Sources from the ruling Democratic Party told the JoongAng Ilbo that Kim was practically fired for “inappropriate behavior” at Yonsei University, without elaborating. One official said there were “numerous reports from people” at the school, including “a lot of backlash from local women’s groups.” Moon has been struggling to redeem himself as his nominees for top government posts face tough hurdles to confirmation. When it was revealed that Prime Minister Lee Nak-yon’s wife used a fake address in 1989 to be assigned to a more favorable teaching position, Moon admitted his investigation procedures were botched last week and implored “understanding” from opposition lawmakers and the public. The Yonsei professor was known as an advocate of inter-Korea reconciliation and a more balanced alliance with the United States and assisted Moon during his campaign. In February, Kim visited Washington as Moon’s envoy when the candidate soared in the polls. Kim conveyed Moon’s foreign and security visions to the U.S. government, Congress and think tanks. (Kang Tae-wha, “Senior Security Adviser Resigns amid Rumors,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 6, 2017)
6/6/17:
President Moon Jae-in named Lim Sung-nam as vice foreign minister and Suh Choo-suk as vice defense minister to fill the vacuum in his administration as his national security team is reeling from a crisis ahead of his trip to Washington later this month for a summit with U.S. President Donald Trump. Lim, an elite diplomat who served in various key posts of the Foreign Ministry, will keep his post as the first vice minister. He is known as a veteran strategist who served in the Roh Blue House as a staffer from June 2006 to January 2007. Suh is a researcher who served as the senior national security secretary and strategy planning director of the National Security Council of the Roh Blue House. Park said Suh will be tasked to oversee defense reform.
During his service in the Blue House, Suh was labeled a member of a faction that promoted independent national defense while lessening the country’s heavy reliance on the United States. (Ser Myo-ja, “Vice Ministers Named to Fill up Cabinet Vacuum,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 7, 2017)
6/8/17:
President Donald Trump expressed fury over South Korea’s decision to delay the full deployment of the US THAAD missile defense system pending an environmental assessment, a senior official said on June 11. Trump’s reaction came when he discussed the matter with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis at the White House on June 8, the official told Yonhap. The revelations, if true, raise concern that the issue could affect the first summit meetings between President Moon Jae-in and Trump set for June 29-30 at the White House, though it is not clear if it would be on the agenda. (Yonhap, “Trump Expresses Fury over Korea’s Decision to Delay THAAD: Official,” Korea Herald, June 19, 2017)
North Korea fired a salvo of surface-to-ship cruise missiles into the East Sea this morning. They flew about 200 km each. The South Korean military believes the missiles were carried by a four-tube launch vehicle that made its debut during a parade in Pyongyang on May 15 marking the 105th anniversary of regime founder Kim Il-sung’s birthday. They flew at a relatively low altitude of 2 km, a military spokesman here said, apparently to avoid enemy radar, and are thought to be an improved version of the KN-01 missile adapted from the Russian-made Kh-35 Uran. The Kh-35 was developed in the mid-1990s and has been sold to Burma, India and Vietnam. It has a range of about 130 km and can withstand some electronic disturbance. But their range seems to have been extended by about 70 km. “The latest launch seems to be a show of force to display the North’s precision-strike capability against ships in response to South Korea-U.S. joint maritime exercises with a U.S. Navy strike group,” a Joint Chiefs of Staff spokesman here said. (Yu Yong-weon, “N. Korea Lobs Missiles into East Sea,” Korea Times, June 9, 2017)
North Korea has yet to invite a South Korean civic group for an inter-Korean summit anniversary event in Pyongyang slated for next week, officials said, raising the possibility of the joint event falling through. The two Koreas’ civic groups have been seeking to hold a joint celebration to mark the first summit on June 15, 2000, after new liberal President Moon Jae-in’s government said it would flexibly consider resuming civilian inter-Korean exchanges. The South’s group last week accepted the North’s offer to hold it in Pyongyang, instead of the North Korean border city of Kaesong. “We sent a fax on June 5 stating our acceptance of North Korea’s proposal, but the North has yet to send an invitation to us,” said an official at the preparatory group. North Korea has recently turned down South Korean civic and religious groups’ move to revive inter-Korean exchanges. Instead, it called on Seoul to implement two inter-Korean summit declarations on reconciliation in 2000 and 2007 before it seeks to resume exchanges. South Korea’s unification ministry cast a prudent stance over its possible approval of civilians’ visit to North Korea for the event. The government said it will take into account the event’s purpose, inter-Korean ties and the international environment in reviewing its approval. The group is known to want to send a 100-member delegation via a flight route over waters off the country’s west coast. A ministry official said that it would be impossible to reopen the route, given that strained inter-Korean ties cut off communication channels. “Given the tight schedule, it may be hard to hold a joint event next week,” said the official at the South’s group. “It is also uncertain whether the government will approve our officials’ visit to Pyongyang.” (Yonhap, “Inter-Korean Summit Celebration Event Likely to Fall through,” June 8, 2017)
6/9/17:
Amid Washington’s escalating frustration toward the stalled deployment of a U.S. antimissile system in Korea by President Moon Jae-in’s order for an environmental study, Chung Eui-yong, head of the National Security Office of the Moon Blue House, told a press briefing that the administration has no intention to defy the arrangement reached in line with the Korea-U.S. alliance. The remarks were made as U.S. President Donald Trump held a meeting at the White House with his top officials to address the issue. “First of all, the Moon administration has no intention to fundamentally reverse the agreement reached in line with the Korea-U.S. alliance,” Chung said, adding that the government will not treat it lightly just because the decision was made by the predecessor. Since he took office in May, Moon made a series of moves that will effectively delay the deployment schedule. Challenging the previous administration’s assessment that the deployment was urgent enough to skip a proper environmental study, Moon ordered a full survey, which may take up to two years. He also said the THAAD deployment issue should be taken to the National Assembly for discussion. The move is seen as a strategy to use the THAAD deployment as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Washington and Beijing. Chung defended Moon’s order by saying that the administration wants to take necessary domestic steps to ensure the deployment’s democratic and procedural legitimacy and transparency. “The environmental impact study, in particular, must be transparently carried out through reasonable and lawful means,” he said. “We will also consider Korea’s national interest and security needs above everything.” Chung also said he met with top officials in Washington earlier this month to arrange a presidential summit, but refused to make clear if the Thaad issue is an agenda. Moon will meet with U.S. President Donald Trump at the end of this month in Washington. “The two leaders are expected to exchange opinions on issues concerning the Korea-U.S. alliance, measures to resolve the North’s nuclear crisis and joint efforts to establish peace on the peninsula,” Chung said. Moon will also attend the G20 summit in Germany in July and have bilateral meetings with leaders of the United States, China, Japan, Russia and other major countries, he said. Yesterday, a senior presidential aide also said it is unlikely that Moon and Trump will have a specific discussion on the THAAD issue at the summit. Trump had a discussion about the THAAD issue with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis. The two secretaries also had a working breakfast before joining Trump at the Oval Office to discuss “the ongoing situation on the Korean peninsula and in the Gulf,” said Heather Nauert, spokeswoman of the State Department. “Thaad is something that’s important not only to protect U.S. forces, to protect our alliance, but also to protect – help to further strengthen the region,” Nauert said. “This is a conversation that’s taken place at the highest level,” she said. “We are committed to our South Korean ally. That commitment remains ironclad. We are aware, certainly, of the situation and the suspension of additional launchers, but – and we would continue to say that Thaad was an alliance decision at the time – we continue to work closely with the ROK throughout the process.” A senior diplomatic source also told JoongAng Ilbo that the THAAD issue is destined to be addressed at the upcoming summit. Another source also said the Trump administration’s decision to make public the White House meeting on Thaad should be interpreted as a protest to the Moon administration. Other senior politicians in Washington have also expressed concern. Among them is a top Democratic senator who met with Moon in Seoul last week and discussed the issue. “It’s my fear that he thinks – I hope I’m wrong – that [Moon] thinks that South Korea has a better chance working with China to contain North Korea than working with the United States,” Senator Dick Durbin, the Democratic whip, was quoted as saying by Washington Examiner on Wednesday. “I said to him [last week] if I were living in South Korea I would want missile defense in South Korea and I don’t understand why you don’t,” Durbin said. He added, “What he told me is they wanted to go through due process, he thought their assembly would approve it. I can’t understand the delay, why they even need to vote on it, but I said, ‘proceed with this, but it’s $900 million-plus from the United States we’re spending to put this in place and then to maintain it. So, I mean, from where I’m sitting, it’s a pretty good deal for the South Koreans.” (Ser Myo-ja, “Seoul Reassures THAAD Deployment Is Certain,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 10, 2017)
6/12/17:
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis declared North Korea the “most urgent and dangerous threat to peace and security,” before the House Armed Services Committee, moving Kim Jong Un’s regime past Russia as the No. 1 threat that the United States faces. The statement was included in the defense secretary’s prepared opening statement, five months after Mattis identified Russia as first among threats facing the United States. “North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them has increased in pace and scope,” Mattis said. “The regime’s nuclear weapons program is a clear and present danger to all, and the regime’s provocative actions, manifestly illegal under international law, have not abated despite United Nations’ censure and sanctions.”
Last week, Navy Vice Adm. James Syring, the director of the Missile Defense Agency, declined to say before the House subcommittee on strategic forces that the United States is “comfortably ahead” of the threat North Korea poses with an intercontinental ballistic missile. “It is incumbent upon us to assume that North Korea today can range the United States with an ICBM carrying a nuclear warhead,” he said. “Everything that we are doing plans for that contingency … in addition to looking ahead to what might be developed or what is possible over the next five to 10 years.” Mattis, asked today about the threat posed by ballistic missiles, said that the threat is growing but that existing missile-defense systems stationed at Fort Greely in Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California pose an adequate amount of protection as the Pentagon examines long-term options. Among them is adding a missile-defense site somewhere on the East Coast, he added. “Every time they fire one of these, they’re learning something more, so it’s a worsening situation,” Mattis said. “But we can buy the time right now.” Dunford, asked about the threat, said the United States balances its missile-defense systems with other ways to counter North Korea, including cyberwarfare, Navy weapons and intelligence collection. (Dan Lamothe, “Pentagon Chief Declares North Korea the New Top Threat to U.S. Security,” Washington Post, June 12, 2017)
6/13/17:
Former Defense Secretary William Perry, 89, said that the THAAD missile defense system would be little use for defending against North Korean missile attacks and that THAAD should be removed if the administration of President Moon Jae-in doesn‘t want it. Perry made the remarks during a Q&A session following his keynote address in a seminar about how to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula that was held in Washington under the joint auspices of the Institute for Korean Studies at George Washington University and the Korea Peace Network. The Korea Peace Network was established on Oct. 3, 2015, by groups such as the American Friends Service Committee, Women Cross DMZ and the National Association of Korean Americans (NAKA) that have worked for private-sector exchange with North Korea and for peace on the Korean Peninsula. Perry began by expressing his doubts about the utility of the missile defense system, mentioning that “there are very wrong views about the missile defense system as a whole.” “Worst of all, there are doubts about the only major reason for providing THAAD to South Korea,” he said. THAAD is being deployed in South Korea, Perry said, because the previous administration under former president Park Geun-hye (2013-16) had accepted it. “It’s very unclear whether the current administration [under President Moon Jae-in] wants it [THAAD] or not. If they don‘t want THAAD, the US ought to be gracious and remove it,” he said. Perry also made a few remarks about THAAD’s usefulness. “The US probably gave South Koreans a positive impression about THAAD’s defensive capabilities. But objectively speaking, THAAD probably wouldn’t be that good at defending against a North Korean missile attack,” he said. The former defense minister explained why: “THAAD is known to have had some problems even in interception tests. In particular, it‘s completely defenseless against North Korean decoys.” “We don’t know whether North Korea has developed decoys, but it’s really easy to make them,” Perry went on to say. “So if the South Korean government or public were to ask if THAAD could defend against an attack by a North Korean missile, I would say no.” American missile experts such as MIT professor Theodore Postol have argued that THAAD and other American missile defense systems are fundamentally limited in their ability to distinguish an incoming missile’s actual warhead from its decoys. If powerful explosives placed in the missile were used to break it into multiple fragments at a high altitude, interceptor missiles that had already been launched and were approaching the missile would be completely unable to distinguish between the real warhead and the harmless missile fragments, these experts say. “The North Korean regime may be reckless, but it‘s not crazy. North Korea’s first goal is the preservation of the Kim dynasty; its second goal is earning the respect of the international community; and its third goal is economic recovery. But North Korea can sacrifice its economy for the survival of the regime. Pyongyang has said it‘s developing an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] that can reach the continental US. That [the development of an ICBM] is no longer a matter of if, but when,” he said, stressing the urgency of finding a solution. “If we manage to combine a stick with a diplomatic approach through cooperation with China, we can successfully freeze North Korea’s nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs. The diplomatic approach means listening and listening some more. We first need to hear what North Korea’s primary interest is,” Perry said. “We need to create meaningful dialogue [with North Korea] and ultimately normalize relations with them.” In related news, the Wall Street Journal reiterated its hardline stance on North Korea in a June 13 editorial titled “South Korea’s Defense Blunder.” “Mr. Moon wants to play a balancing role between the regional powers and convince North Korea to negotiate an entente. This naivete puts South Korea’s security in peril,” the editorial said. It also stated, “Mr. Moon still has time to fix his mistake before he meets President Trump in Washington later this month. Environmental assessments can and should be waived when national security is at stake.” (Yi Yong-in, “Former U.S. Defense Secretary Says THAAD Should Be Removed If Moon Doesn’t Want It,” Hankyore, June 15, 2017)
Cho Myoung-gyon, a veteran North Korea policymaker who accompanied the late President Roh Moo-hyun during his one-on-one talk with the late North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in 2007, was nominated today to head the Ministry of Unification. Cho passed the public servant exam in 1979 and started his career at the National Tax Service. He joined the Ministry of Unification in 1984 and devoted most of his career to North Korea policy. He served various key posts of the ministry and joined the Roh Blue House in 2006 as the unification, foreign and security policy secretary. Cho has participated in both of the inter-Korean summits. In 2000, he participated in the historic summit as a supporting staff member. He also accompanied Roh to Pyongyang in October 2007, when Roh had only a few months left in his presidency, for the second summit between the two Koreas. At the time, he attended Roh’s exclusive talk with Kim as a record keeper. Moon was the presidential chief of staff at the time and also head of the inter-Korean summit arrangement team. Cho left the public service after the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration was launched in 2008. During the presidential election in 2012, in which Moon competed against Park Geun-hye, the summit became the subject of a fierce controversy. The Park campaign claimed Roh had disavowed the Northern Limit Line, the de facto border in the Yellow Sea, in his conversation with Kim, and the allegation dealt a critical blow to Moon’s campaign. An investigation by the prosecution also took place in 2013 after it was revealed that the original transcript of the summit has mysteriously vanished from the National Archives. Prosecutors concluded that Roh ordered Blue House aides to delete it and indicted Cho and Baek Jong-chun, former chief presidential secretary for unification, foreign and security policies. Moon was also investigated but prosecutors found no evidence that he was involved. The case is still ongoing. Cho was acquitted in the initial trial and the first appeal and is currently waiting for the Supreme Court’s ruling. “He is an expert of inter-Korean talks and North Korea strategy,” Park said. “He has an in-depth understanding in the new government’s policy toward the North and the pending inter-Korean issues.” Cho will likely advance denuclearization of the peninsula and the creation of a new economic map, Park said. Moon has largely recruited officials who worked in the Roh administration to arrange the 2007 summit. Suh Hoon, the new head of the National Intelligence Service, was involved in planning and arranging the 2000 and 2007 summits. Moon also named Chun Hae-sung, a veteran negotiator, as the vice minister of unification. These appointments indicate Moon’s intention to engage North Korea. Inter-Korean relations rapidly deteriorated during the conservative presidencies in the South. “We didn’t artificially plan it,” a presidential aide said. “But if their experiences are well harmonized and bring about improvement in the inter-Korean relations, we can expect a good outcome.” (Ser Myo-ja, “Roh’s Aide Returns to Unification,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 14, 2017)
Targeting just a few pivotal Chinese companies could severely disrupt North Korea’s ability to circumvent international sanctions and buy illicit goods — and could even cause its entire overseas network to collapse, according to a report out today. The new report, by Washington-based research group C4ADS, lays out multiple ways for Beijing to cut off North Korea’s trading routes to the outside world, if it wanted to. It also found a Chinese citizen who was conducting large amounts of trade with North Korea while serving as president of a company in the United States — a status that would allow him to open bank accounts and send or receive shipments. “By being centralized, limited and ultimately vulnerable North Korean overseas networks are, by their nature, ripe for disruption,” C4ADS researchers wrote in the report, titled “Risky Business.” Since taking office, Trump has urged China to deal with its neighbor using whatever means necessary, and Beijing says it has cut off imports from North Korea of coal, one of the regime’s biggest exports. There is still plenty more to be done, C4ADS writes. “Although to date economic coercion has been ineffective in persuading North Korea to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons, this does not mean it cannot work,” the researchers say. On the contrary, targeting key companies could cripple multiple networks across multiple countries simultaneously, they write, because so many of these firms are intertwined. “While on the surface we may see shrubs, below are roots that are remarkably deep and interconnected with other root systems,” said John Park, a sanctions expert at Harvard’s Kennedy School who advised C4ADS for its report. To take one example: A Chinese trading company based on the border with North Korea, Dandong Dongyuan Industrial, exported $790,000 worth of radio navigational aid equipment to North Korea in June 2016, according to Chinese customs records. This category of equipment includes navigation systems used in vehicles — the category into which guidance devices for ballistic missiles would also fit. It is not known exactly what was in that shipment, but North Korea often uses licit trading avenues to move illicit goods. That means the real potential is in the network. Dandong Dongyuan shipped $28.5 million worth of material to North Korea between 2013 and 2016, C4ADS reported. Chinese business registry filings show that the majority shareholder of Dandong Dongyuan, with a 97 percent stake, is a Chinese citizen named Sun Sidong. A complicated ownership trail of a freighter called the Jie Shun suggests further intertwining of Chinese business people carrying out deals with North Korea. In 2014, the ship was owned by a company of which Sun was a principal owner. Two years later, it was owned by a company controlled by a Chinese national named Sun Sihong, who listed her residential address as an apartment in the same complex as Sun Sidong, C4ADS reported, noting that it could not ascertain the relationship between them. On Aug. 11, 2016, the Jie Shun was intercepted near the Suez Canal by Egyptian authorities and found to be hiding 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades and sub-components — 132 tons of weapons in all — under a cargo of 2,300 tons of iron ore. The ship had left the North Korean port of Nampo and made no port calls before being intercepted, according to shipping data analyzed by C4ADS. The United Nations’ panel of experts on North Korea reported this year that, although there was no indication of where the cargo was heading, North Korean RPGs had previously been identified in Syria and Lebanon. Sun Sidong is also listed as the president of a company based in the United States, according to the report, allowing him to conduct business with firms around the world with no obvious ties to a Chinese company focused on North Korea. “In principle, it would also provide him the ability to register for business services within the United States, including sending or receiving shipments, establishing bank accounts, or applying for employment visas,” the report stated. Business registration records show that the American entity is called Dongyuan Enterprise USA and is based in Flushing, N.Y. Still, the paper trail continues. Chinese business registry filings show that Dandong Dongyuan shared an email address with another company based on the Chinese side of the North Korean border, Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material. Dandong Zhicheng alone accounted for 9.2 percent of North Korea’s total exports to China last year, according to documentation that C4ADS reviewed. Almost all — 97 percent — of this was North Korean coal, totaling about $250 million annually. The shared email address does not necessarily prove collusion or the existence of illicit activity, the report said. “However, it demonstrates again what has been consistently apparent: that the limited North Korean trading system is much more inter-connected than it at first appears, and that, because of links to illicit actors, it may be vulnerable to systemic disruption in the face of targeted enforcement action,” it said.
The companies did not respond to emails seeking comment. C4ADS researchers said focusing on these kinds of logistical “chokepoints” could cut off North Korea’s centralized, global system of illicit finance. For example, the Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co., which was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department last year — sending a sudden chill through the border city that acts as North Korea’s main commercial gateway to the outside world — is one of 18 companies that make up the Liaoning Hongxiang Group. This suggests the potential for an indirect effect if one company is stopped from helping North Korea, perhaps disrupting numerous other linked companies. “Based on what we’re seeing in the data in terms of the reach and scope of these networks and the limited nature of the system that they live in, and the contamination with illicit activity, there is inherent value to enforcement actions,” said David Thompson, a senior analyst at C4ADS. (Anna Fifield, “North Korea’s Trading Partners Are Linked, and That Could Make Them Vulnerable,” Washington Post, June 12, 2017)
C4ADS: “In the face of continued pressure and growing political will, the international community has struggled to understand how the Kim regime has remained steadfast in its development of WMD’s. The answer lies in large part with North Korea’s overseas networks, that have grown into a complex overseas financing and procurement system over the past decade, earning hard currency through reported schemes as diversified as sales of military equipment, cybercrime, printing of counterfeit currency, rhino horn smuggling, and narcotics trafficking. These networks have shown a deep understanding of how the systems of international trade, finance, and transportation work and, thus, how to nest their illicit activities within them. They have increasingly evolved into large-scale operations. C4ADS’ previous report, In China’s Shadow, profiled the Liaoning Hongxiang Group and identified how its parent company, Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co. Ltd. had transacted over $500 million in trade with North Korea. Yet, the regime’s global reach is closely intertwined with the work of its intelligence services, North Korean agents in Malaysia recently murdered the half-brother of Kim Jong Un using chemical weapons, where a large-scale military equipment network, violating sanctions to raise hard currency for the regime, was discovered weeks earlier. These networks even extend as far as the United States. In 2015, a North Korean agent was convicted for attempting to buy night vision goggles from a federal agent in Hawaii. The man in question, Kim Song Il, had businesses in Hong Kong, China, and Russia, with at least two different Cambodian passports. His network was also reportedly instrumental in the shipment of military equipment from North Korea, through China, to the Angolan Navy—a potential violation of international sanctions. …The continuing misperceptions of North Korea as the “Hermit Kingdom” or “the most sanctioned country in the world,” are fueling the narrative behind the narrowing of non-military options on the Korean peninsula. In truth, the North Korean regime, far from being isolated, is globally active through its overseas networks. The impact of these misperceptions is considerable, most notably in the false belief that sanctions cannot succeed on a “closed” country like North Korea. Many companies have been unwittingly exposed to North Korean proliferation activity because of the broad misunderstanding of North Korean infiltration of the licit commercial system of trade, allowing regime agents to thrive in an environment of obfuscation and uncertainty. A concerted effort by the international community to target specific sanctions violating entities is needed to curb the North Korean WMD program. We intend to spearhead this effort. Using open source research and data, this report aims to provide system-level analysis to map how these networks operate today. In an increasingly constrained environment, North Korea’s options are limited, and although the system of North Korean sanctions evasion is adaptive, it is not necessarily flexible enough to overcome certain principles in the system’s design. Using public information, our study finds that the North Korean overseas regime financing and procurement system is centralized, limited, and vulnerable, and thus ripe for disruption. North Korean overseas networks are centralized around key commercial facilitators who act as control nodes across multiple networks. As their role in illicit activity is ncovered, they often create new webs of shell and front companies to continue operations. North Korean overseas networks have helped the regime circumvent sanctions for the past decade. However, they are comprised of a limited number of commercial facilitators and regime agents, who freely conduct business within the licit global commercial system. Because of the layers of shell and front companies they employ to hide their actual purpose, everything from procuring proliferation material, to selling sanctioned conventional weapons, to purchasing Hennessey, enough obscurity exists for them to operate mostly unaffected by international sanctions. This creates a situation where a centralized group of regime linked individuals can repeatedly conduct illicit behavior abroad on behalf of North Korea. This can be seen in no better example than that of the seizure of the ship the Jie Shun. Intercepted on August 11, 2016 on route to the Suez Canal, the Jie Shun was seized with 30,000 PG-7 rocket propelled grenades and subcomponents hidden under a cargo of 2,300 tons of iron ore. According to Egyptian authorities, the cargo, 132 tons of weapons in total, was entirely manufactured in North Korea. Ship tracking software available to C4ADS shows the ship leaving the North Korean port of Nampo on June 16, 2016 and making no additional port calls before being intercepted. According to the UN Panel of Experts, there was no indication of the ultimate destination of the cargo, however, North Korean rocket propelled grenades have been identified in Syria and Lebanon. What is perhaps more striking than the shipment itself are the members of the network that sent it. The 2017 United Nations Panel of Experts report states that the holder of the document of compliance for the Jie Shun was a Chinese national named Fan Mintian. Mr. Fan, a veteran North Korean commercial facilitator, has played a role in multiple overseas networks, gaining his first mention in a United Nations Panel of Experts report in 2014 as an owner of Dalian Sea Glory Shipping. In 2011, the company in question reportedly operated the ship MV Light, which was interdicted by the United States Navy, suspected of carrying missile components to Myanmar. Another of Mr. Fan’s companies, V-Star Ships Ltd., was later referenced in the April 2016 court case of Chinpo Shipping in Singapore. Chinpo Shipping provided financial assistance to the ship Chong Chon Gang, which was seized while transiting the Panama Canal transporting weapons from Cuba to North Korea. The company was charged with transferring “financial assets or resources that may reasonably be used to contribute to the [North Korean] nuclear related programs,” as well as carrying out unlicensed remittances. Court transcripts included emails sent by employees of Chinpo Shipping regarding an attempted payment to V-Star Ships Ltd. of US$41,560, cancelled for “compliance considerations” by Wells Fargo on July 9, 2013, six days before the Chong Chon Gang was seized. Emails sent on July 11, 2013 in response to the cancellation state, “Please do not send us any instructions for outward and inward remittances to and from V-Star Ships Limited and Cuba so as to avoid being blacklisted.” Fan Mintian was active in networks surrounding some of the largest weapons seizures in North Korean sanctions history, including the Jie Shun and Chong Chon Gang, as well as the interdiction of the MV Light. Mr. Fan is not an anomaly. The repeated use of the same commercial facilitator across multiple major weapons shipments is indicative of the limited nature of North Korean overseas networks and thus their potential vulnerability to large-scale disruption through the removal of specific tactical nodes within these networks. Unfortunately, to date, the ability of individuals involved in multiple instances of illicit North Korean weapons proliferation to openly move from network to network, even after repeated seizures, is telling of the lack of effective implementation and rigorous enforcement of UN Security Council sanctions measures. The case of the _Jie Shun_ should be especially reprehensible given its implications. Repeated sales of weapons by North Korean overseas agents, potentially headed into some of the most conflict-ridden areas in the world, whose proceeds could be used to fund the development of the North Korean nuclear weapons, should be unacceptable to the international community. While complex webs of shell and front companies can be used to obscure North Korean assets, the purchases they conduct on behalf of the regime require a centralized financing system. This financing must work outside the traditional North Korean banking system, which is now under significant scrutiny and pressure. To achieve this, North Korea has begun to increasingly rely on a small number of “gateway firms” based in foreign countries. Positioned overseas to avoid the restrictions of sanctions, these firms are vital to allowing North Korea to both monitor the funds being deployed for procurement, as well as to access the international financial system. The clearest example to date is that of the Liaoning Hongxiang Group and its parent company, Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co. Ltd (DHID). DHID, now sanctioned by the US Treasury for acting on behalf of a sanctioned North Korean financial entity, had conducted over US$500 million in North Korea trade over the past five years and had nearly four dozen companies under the control of its Chairwoman, Ma Xiaohong. These included companies specializing in trading and logistics, information technology, restaurants, hotels, shares in financial institutions, and Chinese-North Korean joint ventures. It is important to first understand the unique role that Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development, and the Liaoning Hongxiang Group, played in the broader system of China-North Korea trade. According to documents released by the Department of Justice in light of the action taken against the network, DHID described itself as, “an enterprise that conducts Sino-North Korea import and export,” that “accounted for more than 20% of market share.” It was able to satisfy procurement orders for North Korean government organizations and purchase hundreds of millions of dollars of North Korean commodities that it moved through domestic Chinese distribution channels. In addition to its position as a large-scale trade firm on the border of North Korea, DHID played an additional, and likely much more valuable role for North Korea, as a means for the sanctioned North Korean financial institution Korea Kwangson Banking Corp. (KKBC) to access the global financial system. Designated since 2009 for its role in allegedly facilitating transactions for some of North Korea’s most notorious weapons proliferators, as part of North Korean banking’s foreign exchange infrastructure, KKBC needed to maintain access to the international financial system, especially the US dollar, to pay its various counterparties around the world. Department of Justice documents state, “DHID Entities served as financial intermediaries for US dollar transactions between North Korea based entities who were financed by KKBC and suppliers in other countries to evade the restrictions on US dollar transactions.” The documents further state “that over two separate time periods…a total of US$11,127,580.60 was remitted to DHID through this KKBC account. Of which approximately $8,324,067.00 were cash withdrawals for DHID, and $2,803,513.60 were designated as wire transfers to DHID.” To maintain records of KKBC in the broader set of DHID’s own financial documents, Department of Justice documents allege that DHID employed a “ledger system” to record transactions. This system, a parallel set of matching financial records held at DHID and KKBC, would likely allow for KKBC to settle the accounts of its various customers within North Korea without having to actually transfer money out of DHID host accounts. Court documents from the Chinpo Shipping court case in Singapore state that Chinpo was running a similar scheme, acting as a means by which North Korean entities could make payments to other parties. The documents reference a separate excel spreadsheet among the company’s financial documents in which Chinpo “kept track of [North Korean] deposits and payments.” In its ledger, Chinpo held sums varying from $3.6 million to almost $6.8 million between 2008 and 2012 on behalf of North Korean entities. To complicate the trail leading back to KKBC, DHID maintained a number of front companies in countries around the world. All in all, the network consisted of 43 total business entities and was present in six business jurisdictions on four continents. Department of Justice documents state that DHID used at least 22 companies to engage in US dollar transactions, moving nearly US$75 million through the United States financial system. Far from being isolated, the scope of the network allowed sanctioned North Korean entities to conduct financial transactions that would appear to US and European correspondent banks as coming from companies based in the British Virgin Islands, Seychelles, England, Wales, or Hong Kong. In spite of the steps taken to obfuscate transactions made on behalf of KKBC and the various levels of front companies employed, the system relied on DHID as its cornerstone. Its licit trading activities allowed for large transfers of value, via commodity sales, to come from North Korea, likely replenishing its DHID host accounts, and gave the regime a fleet of foreign flagged ships with which to send goods back. Since 2013, DHID imported over US$250 million in North Korean coal alone, and in that same time period sent nearly US$210 million of goods to the Kim regime. In addition, the ledger system allowed the Kim regime to monitor and control flows of money in and out of its accounts, maintaining its ability for centralized management of these funds. Targeted international action against entities like DHID strike at where the North Korean overseas financing system is most vulnerable, at key “chokepoints,” where licit and illicit activities converge. Firms playing a similar role to DHID should not be characterized as Chinese companies acting on behalf of the Kim regime, but rather as what they really are, North Korean regime assets assisting in the violation of international sanctions. Using loopholes and countermeasures, North Korea has been able to insert itself into border trade firms that act as proxies and enter the commercial system undisturbed. By targeting action against these host companies, as the US and China did in the case of DHID in September, 2016, the international community is doing more than simply freezing the assets of a single host. They are preventing the regime from accessing to the global financial system. China, the largest market exploited by North Korean overseas networks, represents about 85% of total North Korean trade. Yet, this entire trading system has consisted of only 5,233 companies from 2013 to 2016. Top firms by revenue in this dataset not only play a disproportionately large role, they also have begun to consolidate among themselves. North Korean overseas networks have been extremely adaptive to the combined pressures of international sanctions, in large part due to their ability to nest and disguise their illicit business within the licit trade. Like the cover material of iron ore over the RPG’s aboard the Jie Shun, or the dual role played by Dandong Hongxiang, the problem is particularly acute in the North Korean context where the state controls major aspects of the international trading economy. As early as 2006, former Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey noted that, “the line between North Korea’s licit and illicit money is nearly invisible.” As North Korea has become ever more isolated internationally, it has had to confine nearly all of its trade to China. Data from 2016 shows that around 85% of total North Korean trade was conducted with China. According to Harvard-based North Korea specialist John Park, “what we are seeing now is the operation of sophisticated North Korean-run networks based in China.” In this relationship, North Korea has repeatedly taken advantage of the system of trade to conduct illicit activity nested within the licit system. North Korea has repeatedly exploited the Chinese market to disguise its illicit activity. In the past, North Korean networks in China have reportedly shipped missile components to North Korea, used Chinese dual-use technologies in UAV’s, used Chinese vehicles for mobile missile launchers, and counterfeited Chinese currency. Using a variety of large-scale commodity exports, the regime found a receptive market in the growing Chinese economy, particularly the trade in anthracite coal, which made up over 46% of total exports in 2016 alone. While the ban on North Korean coal imports levied by China on February 18, 2017 has ostensibly halted Chinese imports of coal from North Korea, the regime’s nested trading infrastructure remains largely in place. “There are lucrative recurring business opportunities with elite North Korean state trading companies,” according to Park, “But the catalyst for the further development of sophisticated North Korean-directed networks is the private Chinese company.” These relationships are partly responsible for the development of black markets within North Korea, giving North Korean traders access to an expanding portfolio of foreign goods. Leveraging their unique position, many China-based, commercial facilitators branch heavily into other illicit networks. It should be noted that DHID-linked front companies were transacting heavily with the businesses of a formerly sanctioned Burmese regime crony, who was known to be a weapons facilitator for the junta. Although the regime has seen a boom in the sale of natural resources in recent years, the increased sale of fewer and fewer commodities to a single country has left its system of trade progressively more vulnerable. Analysis reveals that the scope of licit trade, in which North Korea nests its illicit networks, is surprisingly small. According to trade records, from 2013 to 2016, there were only 5,233 companies within China that either imported goods from or exported goods to North Korea. To put that number in perspective, as of 2016, 67,163 Chinese companies exported to South Korea. Additionally, these 5,233 businesses are not all unique actors: many of them have subsidiary relationships with companies within the dataset. For example, the network surrounding the DHID, the Liaoning Hongxiang Group, was made up of 18 companies in China alone, many of which appear within the dataset as unique entities. Companies within this discreet dataset that are seeking to conduct illicit activities are likely to be subject to similar market forces as the Liaoning Hongxiang Group, and are likely to manifest those forces in similar network structures. By analyzing trade flows to isolate these networks, it may be possible to significantly increase the tempo of investigations and enforcement actions. While the number of firms doing business with North Korea is limited, a disproportionate share of that trade is centralized among an even smaller number of large-scale trading firms. This centralization is best seen in the trade data. According to trade records, the top ten importers of North Korean goods in China in 2016 controlled just shy of 30% of the market. Many of these companies have retained their market position for years. In 2016, five of the top ten Chinese exporters had been in the top ten for at least three of four years since 2013. For its part, Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co. Ltd. appears on both the list of top importers and top exporters from 2013 to 2016, a position only shared by one other company, Dandong Qiancang Trading Co. Ltd. The limited number of companies dealing with North Korea on this scale annually suggests that these central companies have created a system in which dealing with the Kim regime carries high barriers of entry. This is an idea that has been explored in more detail by John Park: “The primary driver for the development of North Korean-run networks is the monetization of political relationships. The head of the private Chinese company, acting as the node of a network, has become adept at clearing a pathway of potential obstacles by buying the services of local law enforcement officers and politically connected officials. In a short period of time, these actors have become full-fledged partners in the network.” In 2016, a single company, Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co. Ltd, reportedly accounted for 9.19% of total North Korean exports to China. Established in July 2005, just as North Korean coal exports began to increase as a percentage of total exports, Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co. Ltd. is a commodity company based in Dandong, China. The company’s archived website states that, as of April 6, 2016, it was recording annual sales of US$250 million, mainly of North Korean coal. This fact is recorded in trade data: 97% of the company’s imports were of North Korean coal. The company’s rapid growth and subsequent market position today is best described by a 2013 statement by one of the company’s traders, “The golden time for high profit has ended. It is now difficult to expand the market share further, and small players are out of the game.” Since 2014, Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co. Ltd. has reportedly been the top overall importer from North Korea in China. While Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co. Ltd. is the clearest example of centralization of China-North Korea trade, it is hardly the only one. Even discounting the fact that many of the firms contained within the dataset are subsidiaries of larger firms, top firms hold a unique position—regardless of the presence of illicit activity, international business at this volume with North Korea is unlikely to occur without interacting with the regime. Court transcripts from the Chinpo Shipping case repeatedly state as much, “there are no private companies in DPRK. All companies are state-owned.” While statistical analysis of the dataset shows the influence of top firms on China-North Korea trade, the internal structure of their business networks reveals how truly limited these networks are. Once charted, not only do links between top firms become more apparent, but it becomes much more apparent that a very small number of key executives control a disproportionate share of the trade. Many of the top importers and exporters have relationships with other top firms via joint ventures, shared directors, shareholders, or common identifiers (office addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, etc.). For example, the company Dandong Hongri Diandang Co. Ltd. was formed via a joint venture between DHID and Dandong Kehua Economic Trade Co. Ltd. Both companies were additionally part of the “Northeast Asia Economic Trade Development Summit,” an event including five leading China- North Korea trade companies. These relationships, both formal and informal, are marks of an increasingly consolidating China-North Korea trade. The extent of inter-connectedness among these firms is perhaps best seen in the network surrounding executives linked to Dandong Tianfu Trade Co. Ltd. Together they link seven firms that appear on top ten importer or exporter revenue lists between 2013 to 2016, including the previously mentioned Dandong Qiancang Trading Co., into a loose network via shared directors, shareholders, and business identifiers. The combined exports of these seven companies to North Korea from 2013 to 2016 was US$737,302,913, or 5.6% of total Chinese exports to North Korea over that period. Centered around the CEO of Dandong Tianfu Trade Co. Ltd., Zhang Ling, a Chinese Communist Party member, the group holds a commanding position. Much like DHID, the network encompasses a full suite of commodity, logistics, trade, and hospitality companies. As John Park observed, “While on the surface we may see shrubs, below are roots that are remarkably deep and interconnected with other root systems.” Centralized illicit networks nested within a limited number of firms means that targeting specific key nodes can have a disproportionate impact. Moreover, due to these nodes requiring the licit systems of trade, transportation, and finance to conduct core business operations, they are also visible and vulnerable to law enforcement action. The main objective of the North Korean sanctions program is to deny the proliferation of WMD and dual- use materials that could benefit the regime’s nuclear and missile programs. Although sanctions have greatly restricted avenues for North Korea-related trade, it is clear from repeated weapons testing that proliferation materials are circumventing these measures. This is, in large part, likely because of the ability of North Korean overseas networks to disguise these transactions within their much larger trade flows. By monitoring the specific trade flows that these companies conduct, in addition to analyzing the network structures of firms playing a central role in China-North Korea trade, it may be possible to identify signals of illicit activity. It should be noted that analysis of DHID flagged a potential shipment of aluminum oxide, a component used in uranium enrichment, among the company’s exports to North Korea as recently as September 2015. The following Harmonized System (HS) codes, used to classify and define internationally traded goods, were provided by Catherine Dill, Senior Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, as goods that had a high potential for dual-use application in ballistic missile programs. While the list is not exhaustive, it does identify key dual-use components North Korea could use within its missile program. Further investigation is required to confirm the presence of any illicit activity.
- 9306.90 – Bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, missiles and similar munitions of war and parts thereof
- 9014.20 – Instruments and appliances for aeronautical or space navigation (other than compasses)
- 8802.60 – Spacecraft (including satellites) and suborbital and spacecraft launch vehicles
- 8803.90 – Parts for 8802.60
- 8526.10 – Radar
- 8412.10 – Reaction engines other than turbo-jets
- 8411.11 – Turbo-jets: Of a thrust not exceeding 25 kN
- 8526.91 – Radio navigational aid apparatus
- 8463.90 – Other machine-tools for working metal or cermet’s, without removing material
- 6815.10 – Non-electrical articles of graphite or other carbon
- 2825.10 – Hydrazine and hydroxylamine and their inorganic salts
- 3801.10 – Artificial graphite
- 3801.90 – Preparations based on graphite or other carbon in the form of blocks, plates or other semi- manufactures
Searches for these HS codes within trade data of Chinese firms exporting to North Korea produced a range of interesting results:
- In April 2014, Dandong Qiancang Trading Co. Ltd. was responsible for a shipment worth US$17,600 of HS code 8463.90. According to the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, items might include machine-tools for working metal or cermet, without removing material. These machines might be used in the production of specialized, precise components for military hardware, including items utilized in nuclear and ballistic missile development.
- Similarly, in July 2015, DHID was responsible for a shipment worth US $2,529 of HS code 8463.90.
- In April 2014, Dandong Stokers Trading was responsible for a shipment worth US $10,500 of HS code 8526.91. According to the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, types of items within this code might include navigation systems used in vehicles. It is possible that this category might contain guidance devices for ballistic missiles.
Chinese trade data suggests that there are additional types of goods, including potential dual-use weapons components, being exported to North Korea. By isolating firms that have sent potential dual-use weapons technology to the regime, it may be possible to identify sanctions violators and the North Korean overseas networks that surround them. The largest exporter of potential dual-use equipment in our sample, Dandong Dongyuan Industrial Co. Ltd., sent North Korea a shipment of US$790,000 of radio navigational aid apparatus (8526.91) in June 2016. Experts at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies state that this type of equipment, “might include navigation systems used in vehicles. It is possible that this category might contain guidance devices for ballistic missiles.” While the shipment itself may warrant deeper investigation and scrutiny from law enforcement, it is again the network around the company in question that is of greatest interest for the purposes of this investigation. Chinese business records for the company state that Dandong Dongyuan Industrial Co. Ltd. is a general- purpose trading firm whose business scope includes the sale of automobiles, machinery, natural resources, and general household products. Its customs records indicate that it has exported to three countries: North Korea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the United States. From 2013 to 2016, the company sent US$28,543,792 worth of material to North Korea. According to Chinese business registry filings, the majority shareholder, controlling a 97% stake, is a Chinese national named Sun Sidong. According to the Hong Kong business registry, Mr. Sun is also the owner of Jieshun Shipping Limited, a company that, according to Equasis shipping records, was the sole owner of the previously mentioned Jie Shun from April 14, 2012 to August 10, 2014. On August 11, 2016, when the Jie Shun was seized carrying RPGs, the ship was owned by a Hong Kong-based company named Vast Win Trading Limited. Hong Kong business registry documents reveal that Vast Win Trading Limited is owned by a Chinese national named Sun Sihong, a business partner of Mr. Sun’s. Sun Sihong additionally lists a residential address on her Hong Kong annual return of an apartment in the same complex as Mr. Sun. Further investigation is required to confirm familial ties between Sun Sidong and Sun Sihong. Exploitation of trading networks based out of Northeast China, as previously discussed, is common practice for North Korean overseas networks. What is more illustrative of the success of the North Korean regime’s sanctions countermeasures is their ability to penetrate other less familiar business jurisdictions around the world. In addition to companies in China and Hong Kong, Mr. Sun is also listed as the president of of a company based within the United States. This entity would allow Mr. Sun to transact with businesses around the world without any obvious ties to his China-based North Korea centric businesses. In principle, it would also provide him the ability to register for business services within the United States, including sending or receiving shipments, establishing bank accounts, or applying for employment visa’s. Further investigation into the companies associated with Mr. Sun yielded much more than just a network of front and shell companies—it provided linkages via shared identifiers between his network and the largest Chinese importer of North Korean coal over the past three years, Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co. Ltd. Included within the company’s business registry annual return information was an email address, sk5899@163.com. This email address is linked to only four companies within the Chinese business registry, two owned by Mr. Sun and two, including Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co. Ltd., owned by Chinese national Chi Yupeng. The fact that Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co. Ltd. and Dandong Dongyuan Industrial Ltd., a company with linkages to the Jie Shun seizure, share common identifiers on their business registry information does not necessarily prove collusion or the existence of illicit activity. However, it demonstrates again what has been consistently apparent; that the limited North Korean trading system is much more inter-connected than it at first appears, and that, because of links to illicit actors, it may be vulnerable to systemic disruption in the face of targeted enforcement action. International pressure and sanctions enforcement levied against North Korea have stumbled because of two key misconceptions. First, the system of North Korean financing and procurement is practically invisible, making it nearly impossible to expose. And second, the information needed to pressure the regime is unobtainable from the open source; therefore, unavailable to key stakeholders, such as banks, transportation companies, and much of law enforcement. Our study finds the opposite to be true. By being centralized, limited and ultimately vulnerable North Korean overseas networks are, by their nature, ripe for disruption. The cases studies in this paper, while not comprehensive, were intended to highlight key trends and patterns which can help to guide decision-makers in understanding the operational capabilities of these networks and to hopefully design more effective global enforcement strategies. Cases such as Fan Mintian’s role in weapons trafficking highlight the extent to which the system is centralized around key entities and individuals, while the activities of entities such as Dandong Hongxiang reveal the extent to which the entire system relies on key logistical ‘chokepoints’ for its global centralized system of illicit finance. Moreover, as can be seen in its trading relationships with the Tianfu Group and Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co. Ltd., the system is closely interconnected, and through connections to companies such as Dandong Dongyuan Co. Ltd., potentially exposed to, and facilitating, illicit activity. However, the entire system remains extremely vulnerable. The fact that a vast majority of North Korea’s trade activity, both licit and illicit, may be concentrated within just 5,233 companies makes the investigative work to map and expose these networks manageable. Additionally, these networks’ reliance on the licit systems of finance, trade, and transportation means they leave behind a digital trail within public records, and other data sources, and are acutely vulnerable to targeted sanctions. Although to date economic coercion has been ineffective in persuading North Korea to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons, this does not mean it cannot work. On the contrary, targeted enforcement actions against key nodes within the system can have the effect of impacting multiple networks across multiple countries simultaneously, removing key functions, such as individuals or entities specialized in illicit finance and procurement, who cannot be easily replaced. Each action can individually increase the cost and complexity of sanctions evasion for North Korea, but if applied against a number of these key nodes simultaneously, they could, in theory, cause the entire overseas system to collapse. The 2016 indictment and forfeiture action against Dandong Hongxiang in September 2016 is an ideal example of such action. The action not only disrupted a major source of revenue for the North Korean government, but also an important gateway through which the broader regime banking sector was accessing the international financial system. For the U.S. government, it closed down a network moving known dual-use materials that could be used in North Korea’s uranium enrichment program, but for the Chinese government, it had the additional benefit of closing down an entity that was exposing the Chinese banking sector to significant reputational and material risk. Dismantling North Korea’s overseas illicit financing and procurement system is the most compelling means to coerce the regime to the negotiating table. The time for action is now.” (David Thompson, Risky Business: A System-Level Analysis of the North Korean Proliferation Financing System, C4ADS, June 12, 2017)
6/13/17:
A drone found June 13 in South Korea was confirmed to have been sent by the North Korean military, possibly its intelligence agency, to spy on a US advanced missile defense system deployed in the South, Seoul’s military said. According to its investigation, the drone was flown on May 2 from Kumgang County, a small village located about seven kilometers north of the two Koreas’ border, and traveled about 490 kilometers until it crashed on a mountain near Injae, Gangwon Province of South Korea, where the device was found. Designed for a reconnaissance mission, the device may have been employed by either the North’s corps-level units or Reconnaissance General Bureau, the communist state‘s intelligence agency that manages clandestine operations, the defense ministry said. “We strongly condemn North Korea’s drone infiltration and urge them to stop such provocations,” said Army. Brig. Gen. Jeon Dong-jin, deputy director of operation at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, describing the North’s action as “a grave violation” of the two Korea’s armistice agreement. Equipped with an advanced engine and enhanced batteries, the drone traveled about twice as far as a previous model found on Baengnyeongdo in 2014, according to the military. The engine displacement was expanded to 50cc from 35cc, with the fuel tank capacity more than doubled at 7.47 liters, it added. The military also revealed that the drone was outfitted with components coming from six countries. Propelled by an engine made by Czech Republic, the drone used a South Korean servo motor, Canadian autopilot circuit board, American GPS system and Japanese A7R camera made by Sony. The drone flew at a maximum altitude of 2.4 kilometers at an average speed of 90 kilometers per hour in a “straight-line pattern,” until it reached the site for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery in Seongju, North Gyeongsang Province, the military added. The military confirmed that the drone carried about 551 photos of South Korean territory, including about 10 pictures of a THAAD battery. The images, however, were not transmitted to North Korea in realtime, the military analyzed. “We believe that North Korea has yet to secure technology to send the images back home in real time,” an anonymous official from Agency for Defense Development, a state agency for research and development of defense technology. Although the found drone was mainly designed to acquire information on ground targets, the North could use smaller-size devices for biological attacks involving toxic materials such as Antrax, the military asserted. “We believe North Korea has the capability to mount chemical weapons and explosives, instead of a camera. They can fly such drones into the South’s rear area,” a senior official at JCS said under the condition of anonymity. Analysts, calling such a drone attack an “imminent threat,” criticized the South Korean military for having done little about it, while acknowledging the challenges in detecting and intercepting small drones with current surveillance. After a North Korean drone was found to have flown over the presidential palace of Cheong Wa Dae and taken pictures of it in 2014, the South Korean military decided to ramp up efforts to purchase and develop low-altitude radars targeting drones. But the radars have yet to be fully deployed, particular at the border area.
“The military is in the process of developing a new system to detect and neutralize small-sized drones. We are doing our utmost to field extensive radar and other air-defense assets,” said defense ministry’s spokesman Moon Sang-kyun. (Yeo Jun-suk, “Drone That Spied on THAAD Was from North Korea: Military,” Korea Herald, June 21, 2017)
6/14/17:
The Trump administration has asked China to act against several Chinese entities suspected of doing illicit business with North Korea, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said during testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. But Tillerson was explicit that Washington also believes that Chinese businesses and individuals are helping North Korea evade a yoke of international sanctions. “Our expectations have been very clear with the Chinese. Their cooperation, I would say, has been notable, but it has been uneven,” Tillerson said. “We continue that dialogue with the Chinese, specifically around their actions that support revenue streams to North Korea, but also taking action against entities inside of China that may be supporting revenue streams as well,” Tillerson said. The Wall Street Journal reported this week that the Trump administration has given China a list of about 10 such suspect entities and has demanded action. Tillerson appeared to confirm that report and added that Chinese compliance would be a central topic during meetings he will have with Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and their Chinese counterparts next week in Washington. “We have made it clear to them, and we have provided them a list of entities that we believe they need to take action against,” Tillerson said. “We have asked that they take the action, but President Trump has also been very clear with President Xi that if they either don’t want to take the action or they do not take the action, we will act on our own.” Later, in testimony to a panel of the House Appropriations Committee, Tillerson said the United States assesses that China’s complicated relationship with North Korea is changing and that China increasingly sees Pyongyang as a liability. The combination of North Korean advances in nuclear weapons and long-range missiles means that “there’s no runway left,” for lengthy or ineffective diplomacy, Tillerson said. “We have to reverse what North Korea is doing,” and China understands the imperative, he said.
“They have affirmed their policy is a denuclearized Korean Peninsula,” Tillerson said. Chinese diplomats recently worked alongside the United States to approve additional new United Nations Security Council sanctions. Although mild, those penalties served as a warning that Chinese patience is thinning. “There is a critical window of opportunity for the nuclear issue of the [Korean] Peninsula to come back to the right track of seeking a settlement through dialogue and negotiations,” China’s U.N. ambassador, Liu Jieyi, told the Security Council, according to Reuters. “It is incumbent on all parties concerned to exercise restraint and to do more to help ease the tension and build mutual trust.” (Anne Gearan, “Tillerson Says U.S. Pressed China to Act on Entities Doing Illicit Business with North Korea,” Washington Post, June 14, 2017)
CPRC: “The Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Country (CPRC) of the DPRK Wednesday [June 14] released the following statement “A new era of development of the north-south relations and the independent reunification should be opened in the noble idea of By Our Nation Itself”: …Out of the firm will to create a new chapter of the development of the north-south relations and national reunification, as unanimously expected and desired by all Koreans in the north and the south and abroad, the Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Country of the DPRK clarifies the following principled stand on the occasion of the 17th anniversary of the June 15 joint declaration: 1. Whoever was born on this land should hold higher the banner of independence, the banner of By Our Nation Itself and adopt the transparent stand to dedicate to the improvement of the north-south relations and the sacred cause of national reunification. National independence is a fundament guarantee and a basic principle for the solution of the reunification issue. As the situation around the Korean peninsula gets more complicated and acuter, we should hold higher the banner of independence in dealing with the issue of the nation, the issue of national reunification, and as outsiders get more undisguised in their intervention and arbitrary practices, we, Koreans, should hold our hands more tightly. This is an absolute truth proven by the practical efforts made for the national reunification. For the past nine years when south Korea was ruled by the conservative group, the north-south relations plunged into the worst stalemate. It was because the group put the outsiders above the nation and valued cooperation with outsiders more than the nation’s interests and openly pursued the policy of submitting to the U.S. No outsiders ever want the Korean nation getting reunified and growing stronger. This is a serious lesson taught by the long history of the national division. Following the U.S., the ferocious unwelcome guest and principal enemy standing in the way of settling the reunification issue of the Korean peninsula, being backed by it, would not help achieve the great cause of national reunification. This is proven by the developments of the north-south relations that have undergone turns and twists. But the new authorities in south Korea, oblivious of this bitter lesson, are making insincere words and acts from the first day of their office, seriously tarnishing the prospect for the north-south relations. They get themselves busy, talking about “envoy diplomacy” and “telephone diplomacy” while kowtowing to big countries for no good reason. Calling for “strengthened south Korea-U.S. alliance” almost every day, they have buckled down to making preparations for flattering visit to the White House. Even at this moment, riff-raffs of all descriptions from the U.S. political circle, Congress and military fly into south Korea to tame Chongwadae but the south Korean authorities are only keen on showing hospitality and currying favor with them without saying even a proper word for fear of courting displeasure of their master. Was any difference made today from the days of Park Geun Hye when she only acted as a woman of pleasure while begging this or that country to help her prop up her regime. National reunification requires no one’s approval nor can it be achieved with the help of others. If the present south Korean chief executive truly speaks for the candlelight demonstrators and if he has the blood and soul of the nation, he should make a bold decision to part with the disgusting and servile act which would be of no help to maintaining national independence. Time has changed today and the initiative of settling the reunification issue is in the hands of the Korean nation itself, not any outsiders. The south Korean authorities should clearly understand this. If one is not able to move even a step at one’s own will, being shackled by the chain of sycophancy toward the U.S. despite their lip-service for “new era” and “new politics”, one can never be able to solve the north-south relations let alone the reunification issue. One who takes to flunkeyism would be fool and the nation which follows flunkeyism would ruin. This is a bitter lesson taught by history. The south Korean authorities should make a crucial decision at a crossroads of independence or submission to outsiders and By our nation itself or “south Korea-U.S. alliance”, and should never forget that herein lies the prospect for the improvement of the north-south relations and the settlement of the reunification issue. 2. The south Korean authorities should bear in mind that the road to reunification and rosy future of the nation will be opened when they accept promoting national unity as immutable truth, away from confrontation idea hostile toward the compatriots. National reunification is the great cause of rejoining the severed blood ties of the nation and achieving national unity. The great national unity leads to reunification and reunified powerful country. It is our consistent will to unite irrespective of ideology, social system, ism and political view for the great intention for national reunification. The north-south confrontation will be aggravated and the nation cannot dodge conflicts and war if they do not allow the ideas and social systems existing in the north and the south but force upon other side their own regarding them as absolute. When we go united, we will prosper, but divided, we will lose everything. Koreans should give up hostility to compatriots and open the new chapter of reconciliation and unity in order to radically improve the north-south relations as desired by the entire nation. However, the present south Korean authorities fail to pass the “red line” of confrontation drawn during the conservative regime. They claim “the government and army of the north are enemy”, expressing the will to continue sanctions and pressure on the north. Even they unhesitatingly reveal the sinister intention to use wicked means and methods for “collapse of social system in the north” sought by the conservative group. It is something new in its appearance but is the replica of the confrontation policy pursued by the past regime in its main substance. Far from welcoming the north’s measures for bolstering its capability for self-defense recognized by other countries, the south Korean authorities openly seek sanctions and pressure against the north in collusion with the U.S., branding them as “threats and provocations”. This is an expression of the will of the present south Korean regime to pursue confrontation policy against the compatriots in the north. Confrontation with the compatriots is the treacherous behavior following the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK and sanctions and pressure are a vivid expression of hostility to the latter. That’s why calling for improved relations pursuing the “strategy for carrying out sanctions and dialogue, pressure and contacts side by side” is a foolish act and self-deception. We call for recognizing the opposite side as companion of reunification and joining hands to open the new horizon of national reconciliation and unity, not for visits between few non-governmental organizations shirking the settlement of the fundamental problems. Such trick is nothing helpful but brings bigger disasters. If the south Korean authorities have no will to recognize and respect the north and give up confrontation and hostility to the compatriots, we have no idea to force them. The confrontation between social systems will finally lead to physical conflict, and then we are compelled to choose reunification by non-peaceful way. Bearing this in mind, the south Korean authorities should take the responsible option. 3. We make it clear once again that it is our invariable stand that measures to remove the acute military tensions on the Korean peninsula should be urgently taken before anything else. Peace and security on the peninsula is a vital issue related to the destiny of our nation and this serves as indispensable premise for national reunification. Despite our devoted and persevering efforts to ensure the peace on this land, unheard-of acute military tensions in history prevail on the peninsula and no one can guess when and where a nuclear war will break out. Moreover, the U.S., taken aback by the fact that the pro-American conservative regime fell in south Korea and the entire Korean nation’s interest in improved north-south relations and reunification is mounting, is busy staging the largest-ever war maneuvers everyday by introducing huge nuclear war forces into the peninsula and its vicinity to push the military tension to the extremes. What matters is that the present south Korean authorities, who vociferate about an “epochal turn” for peace on the peninsula during their term of office, are pro-actively joining in the robber-like aggression war moves of the U.S., persistently faulting the fellow countrymen’s measures for bolstering their nuclear force. After its emergence, the new regime of south Korea has caused such dangerous situation unprecedented in history as simultaneous introduction of two nuclear-powered carrier strike groups of the U.S. to the waters off the peninsula. And it has been staging more frantic aggression war exercises against the fellow countrymen, frequently introducing formations of nuclear strategic bombers such as B-1B, nuclear-powered submarine and other nuclear strike means into south Korea. When viewing the present situation, people at home and abroad unanimously express anxiety that it is hard to escape a disaster of nuclear war, far from expecting “lasting peace and prosperity” touted by the chief executive of south Korea. Under such grave situation, peace can be ensured only by strength for self-defense enough to beat any formidable enemy at one blow, not concession and submission to the aggressor. We could no longer allow the U.S. persistent nuclear threat, blackmail and aggression war moves that have continued for centuries, and so we have provided the world’s strongest military capability for self-defense with nuclear force as a pivot. We desire peace more than anybody else and do not want the war disaster to be suffered by our nation again. However, if the U.S. and its vassal forces finally make reckless attack, we are fully ready to blow up the aggressors and their bulwark with treasured nuclear sword of justice. Our nuclear strike means are so precise that they can destroy not only nearby nuclear strike assets of the U.S. but also gouge out even the aggressors entrenched in its mainland across the ocean. If the south Korean authorities truly want peace, they should not pull up the DPRK’s nuclear forces for self-defense, the most dependable and realistic guarantee for peace of the Korean peninsula, but take steps to put a halt to the U.S. aggressive and war-like deeds. In particular, they should no longer cling to the reckless military provocation aimed to defend the illegal and bogus “northern limit line” in the hotspot waters of the West Sea. And they should go into action to remove the danger of armed conflicts in land, sea and sky including the areas of the Military Demarcation Line and defuse the military tensions. Now the south Korean authorities should be mindful that they stand at the crossroads of life whether they will leave a proud mark in the nation’s history by improving the north-south relations together with us or follow the miserable suit of predecessors, staggering at while reading outsiders’ faces. Now that the DPRK emerged a dignified nuclear and rocket power, steadfast is its stand to open up a broad avenue to independent reunification by bringing about a great turn and change in the north-south relations. We take this opportunity to ardently call upon all compatriots in the north and the south and abroad to more valiantly turn out in the nationwide struggle for ushering in a new history of improved north-south relations and independent reunification through strict embodiment of the spirit of the June 15 joint declaration.” (KCNA, “CPRC Statement on Anniversary of June 15 Joint Declaration,” June 14, 2017)
The National Security Agency has linked the North Korean government to the creation of the WannaCry computer worm that affected more than 300,000 people in some 150 countries last month, according to U.S. intelligence officials. The assessment, which was issued internally last week and has not been made public, is based on an analysis of tactics, techniques and targets that point with “moderate confidence” to North Korea’s spy agency, the Reconnaissance General Bureau, according to an individual familiar with the report. The assessment states that “cyber actors” suspected to be “sponsored by” the RGB were behind two versions of WannaCry, a worm that was built around an NSA hacking tool that had been obtained and posted online last year by an anonymous group calling itself the Shadow Brokers. It was the first computer worm to be paired with ransomware, which encrypts data on victims’ computers and demands a ransom to restore access. WannaCry was apparently an attempt to raise revenue for the regime, but analysts said the effort was flawed. Though the hackers raised $140,000 in bitcoin, a form of digital currency, so far they have not cashed it in, the analysts said. That is likely because an operational error has made the transactions easy to track, including by law enforcement. As a result, no online currency exchange will touch it, said Jake Williams, founder of Rendition Infosec, a cybersecurity firm. “This is like knowingly taking tainted bills from a bank robbery,” he said. Though the assessment is not conclusive, the preponderance of the evidence points to Pyongyang. It includes the range of computer Internet protocol addresses in China historically used by the RGB, and the assessment is consistent with intelligence gathered recently by other Western spy agencies. It states that the hackers behind WannaCry are also called “the Lazarus Group,” a name used by private-sector researchers. One of the agencies reported that a prototype of WannaCry ransomware was found this spring in a non-Western bank. That data point was a “building block” for the North Korea assessment, the individual said. “What it really confirms is that . . . you don’t have to be the best in the business to cause a lot of disruption,” said Michael Sulmeyer, director of the cybersecurity project at Harvard’s Kennedy School. “And that’s what they showed they were willing and able to do.” The NSA declined to comment. . Federal prosecutors have been probing North Korea’s role in the Bangladesh bank theft, and indictments could be issued. The Justice Department in recent years has used indictments as a tool to try to hold accountable hackers from other nation states, including China and Iran. The fact of a nation-state using cyber tools to rob banks, then-NSA Deputy Director Richard Ledgett said in March, represented “a troubling new front in cyberwarfare.” He did not name North Korea, but the allusion was clear. “This is a big deal,” he said. The NSA cyber tool at the base of WannaCry was an exploit dubbed EternalBlue by the agency. It took advantage of a software flaw in some Microsoft Windows operating systems and enabled an attacker to gain access to those computers. Although Microsoft, after being notified by the NSA, issued a patch for the software flaw in March, many companies around the world and some in the United States failed to update their machines and fell victim to the virus. Michael Daniel, president of the Cyber Threat Alliance, a nonprofit group devoted to improving cyberdefenses through data sharing, said there were a “reasonable number” of victims in the United States. Microsoft declined to comment for this report. Williams, who has closely studied the code, said he is convinced that the ransomware accidentally got loose in a testing phase. That would explain some of its shortcomings, such as an inability for the attacker to tell who has paid the ransom or not, he said.
Nonetheless, he said, “this is a case where you’ve got a weaponized, government-sponsored exploit [or hacking tool] being used to deliver ransomware. If North Korea goes unchecked with this, I would expect other developing nations to follow suit. I think that would change the cyberthreat landscape quite a bit.” Daniel, who was Obama’s cybersecurity coordinator, said there needs to be “a broad-based approach to deterring North Korea across the board” in the physical world and in cyberspaceRep. Adam B. Schiff (Calif.), the top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, which is investigating Russian interference in the 2016 election, has said that the Obama administration’s response to North Korea after the Sony attack was not bold enough. “I . . . think the Russians were watching and decided that, well, we didn’t respond to that. They could get away with a cyberattack,” he said at a recent public discussion with Washington Post columnist David Ignatius. When the South Koreans want to respond to North Korea, Schiff said, they use a form of information warfare. “They do it with loudspeakers,” he said. “They do it by telling people in the North what a terrible regime they live under that’s starving their own people.” (Ellen Nakashima, “The NSA Has Linked the WannaCry to North Korea,” Washington Post, June 14, 2017)
6/15/17:
President Moon Jae-in said he was willing to “sit knee-to-knee, head-on-head” with North Korea to discuss ways to implement the joint inter-Korean declarations promoting peace and cooperation between the two countries, adding that on the key agenda could be normalizing ties between Washington and Pyongyang and the establishment of a “peace regime” on the peninsula. The statement was laid out in Yeouido, western Seoul, during his congratulatory remarks in a ceremony that marked the 17th anniversary of the June 15th North-South Joint Declaration. It was the first time in 12 years that a sitting president attended the event. Moon’s remarks were a step beyond his previous stance, whereby he mostly stopped short of saying he would talk with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un if the regime refrained from conducting any additional nuclear and missile tests. On Thursday, the agenda was specified. The North Korean leader’s most important diplomatic goal is to sign a permanent peace treaty with the United States to replace a 64-year-old armistice and formally end the Korean War. Washington has rebuffed the idea in the past unless Pyongyang fully scraps its nuclear and missile programs, which Kim has insisted will never happen. Moon called for the legalization of the joint inter-Korean agreements, saying Seoul’s North Korea policy would not have “gone back and forth” had the legislature ratified them. Moon mentioned four joint declarations in 1972, 1991, 2000 and 2007 to be made law, most of which stress that Seoul and Pyongyang agree to seek reunification independently, apart from any influence from third countries or outer forces. Other agreements include economic cooperation and building mutual confidence by boosting exchanges in all fields. In the midst of the conciliatory gesture, however, Moon spared no time in pressing the North to denuclearize. “North Korea must give up on developing nuclear weapons and find a way to cooperate with the international society,” he said. The annual ceremony, organized by the Seoul-based All Korean Committee for Implementation of the June 15 Joint Declaration in South Korea, was held six days after the group rescinded their decision to hold the event jointly with its North Korean counterpart in Pyongyang. The committee said it had considered “physical and political situations at hand” for their final call to host the celebration separately, but blamed the South Korean government for not officially endorsing the joint project. It lambasted Seoul’s stance that any humanitarian support to the North and exchanges at the private level would be reviewed within the bounds of international sanctions against the regime, saying, “Private human-to-human dialogue and exchanges must be independent” from any political issues between the two countries. North Korea ran several articles in its state-run media today that urged the South Korean government to part ways with the United States and draw back its sanctions. “National independence is a fundament guarantee and a basic principle for the solution of the reunification issue,” the Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Country of the DPRK, the North’s equivalent to South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, said in a statement, which was issued Wednesday and published in Rodong Sinmun today. Inter-Korean relations soured and reached a “total catastrophe due to the U.S. persistently seeking to hinder the Korean nation’s reunification,” the statement continued. Pyongyang threatened that the South-North confrontation will eventually lead to “physical conflict,” and that by then, both countries would be “compelled to choose reunification [the] non-peaceful way.” For Seoul to seek peace with Pyongyang, it should not fight for North Korea’s denuclearization because the weapons are the “most dependable and realistic guarantee for peace” of the Korean Peninsula, said the North. Trashing Moon’s “kowtowing to big countries for no good reason,” Pyongyang demanded that Seoul stop siding with Washington by applying sanctions and pressure against the regime. (Lee Sung-eun, “President Willing to Discuss Ways to Carry out Joint Declarations,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 16, 2017) A decision by North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons would be a sign that it is willing to implement its agreements with South Korea. If the North halts further provocations with its nuclear weapons and missiles, we’re willing to engage in unconditional dialogue with the North,” President Moon Jae-in said today. “The agreements reached by previous governments, including the July 4 Inter-Korean Joint Statement, the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, the June 15 Joint Statement and the Oct. 4 Summit Statement, are important assets that must be respected even when the administration changes. The government will handle the inter-Korean agreements of previous administrations under the principle that North and South Korea ought to return to them together.” “Inter-Korean relations must be reestablished and developed, if only to resolve the crisis we are facing,” Moon said during a congratulatory address in an event marking the 17th anniversary of the June 15 Inter-Korean Joint Statement, which took place in the 63 Building in Yeouido, Seoul, on June 15. It was the first time since 2006 (since former president Roh Moo-hyun, in office 2003-08) for a sitting president to attend this event, which commemorates the inter-Korean summit meeting attended by former president Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) on June 15, 2000. “Just as Kim Dae-jung managed to develop inter-Korean relations while holding to the principle of not tolerating North Korea’s nuclear weapons and provocations, we must also once again work toward a solution with determination and a daring plan,” Moon said. “I’m willing to sit down for a face-to-face discussion of how we will go about implementing the current inter-Korean agreements. It will be possible to discuss the complete range of issues, including the complete abolition of North Korea’s nuclear program, the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and even the normalization of North Korea’s relations with the US,” he continued, while calling for North Korea to stop committing nuclear and missile provocations. Since his presidential campaign, Moon has said he means to reach a new agreement while respecting previous inter-Korean agreements. “Considering that North Korea is under sanctions and pressure, we can’t make a new proposal to North Korea [that goes beyond our current stance]. He was emphasizing that we can work with the international community to help North Korea if the North abandons its nuclear weapon development and takes part in dialogue,” a Blue House official said when asked about Moon’s comments. “We’re in a situation where both the US and North Korea seem willing to engage in dialogue under the right conditions. Taking the initiative to create the conditions for dialogue will be the crux of the new administration’s foreign policy and security,” said an expert on inter-Korean relations whowas part of Moon’s presidential campaign. A large number of figures attended the commemorative event, including Kim Dae-jung’s widow Lee Hee-ho, Minjoo Party leader Choo Mi-ae, Minjoo Party floor leader Woo Won-shik, People’s Party interim leader Park Joo-sun and People’s Party floor leader Kim Dong-cheol. In a post on his Facebook page, Park Joo-sun even proposed to Moon Jae-in that “The dates of the June 15 Inter-Korean Joint Statement and the Oct. 14 Inter-Korean Summit Statement be designated as national anniversaries.” A resolution has currently been submitted to the National Assembly calling for this designation. “These anniversaries could be designated immediately with the approval of the cabinet,” Park said. (Lee Jung-ae and Jung In-hwan, “Pres. Moon Says Unconditional Dialogue If North Korea Halts Nuke Development and Provocations,” Hankyore, June 16, 2017)
The United States is exhausting all possible diplomatic efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue without using force because war with the North would result in massive human suffering unseen since the Korean War, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said. “We will win. It will be a war more serious in terms of human suffering than anything we’ve seen since 1953. It will involve the massive shelling of an ally’s capital, which is one of the most densely packed cities on earth,” Mattis said during a House Appropriations Committee hearing. That’s why President Donald Trump has directed one of the highest priority efforts to resolve the issue diplomatically, Mattis said. When Trump hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping in April, only two issues came up, and North Korea is one of them, he said. “We are working through China to ensure that China understands that North Korea is today a strategic burden for them, is not a strategic asset and China’s actually responded in some ways positively,” Mattis said. “We’re exhausting all possible diplomatic efforts in this regard,” he said. Mattis said he and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson will hold high-level talks in Washington with their Chinese counterparts and the issue of North Korea will “loom large.” “So it would be a serious, it would be a catastrophic war, especially for innocent people in some of our allied countries, to include Japan most likely. But it’s also one were doing everything possible not to have happen and resolve this through diplomatic means,” he said. (Yonhap, “U.S. Exhausting All Diplomatic Efforts to Resolve N.K. Nuclear Issue without Using Force: Mattis,” Korea Herald, June 16, 2017)
Otto Warmbier, who was medically evacuated from a 17-month detention in North Korea and arrived home June 13, has extensive loss of brain tissue and is in a state of unresponsive wakefulness, University of Cincinnati doctors said this afternoon. Doctors said they don’t know what caused the brain damage. When asked whether it could be the result of beating or other violence while in prison, they said that Warmbier did not show any obvious indications of trauma, nor evidence of either acute or healing fractures. Rather, Daniel Kanter, medical director of the neuroscience intensive care unit at University of Cincinnati Medical Center said, the pattern of brain injury they see on magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) results appeared consistent with a cardiopulmonary arrest, with damage to brain tissue caused by lack of blood flow to the brain. The doctors said they are not aware of anything from his medical history prior to his time in North Korea that might cause cardiopulmonary arrest. One of the more common causes of cardiopulmonary arrest is respiratory arrest, said Jordan Bonomo, neurointensivist and emergency medicine physician at UC Health. That cessation of breathing could be triggered by several things, including intoxication or a traumatic injury. It is possible to have respiratory arrest caused by an overdose of medication, intentional or otherwise, he said. Otto Warmbier’s condition, its possible causes and his treatment while he was detained in North Korea are of intense interest in a case that threatens to worsen already fraught relations between the United States and North Korea. President Trump called Warmbier’s parents last night to tell them his administration had worked hard to secure their son’s release, and to ask how he was doing. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson also expressed relief that Warmbier has been returned to the United States. However, asked at news conference in Miami about how the United States might respond given Warmbier’s brain damage during captivity, Tillerson said he would not comment on his health, saying it was a private matter for the Warmbiers. “We are glad that he is home, rejoined with his family,” he said.Warmbier has undergone a battery of tests since his arrival at the UC Medical Center on the night of June 13. The doctors said he has spontaneous eye-opening and blinking but shows no signs of understanding language or awareness of his surroundings. He has not spoken or engaged in any purposeful movement, Kanter said. “We don’t feel he has any conscious awareness,” Brandon Foreman, neurointensive care specialist at UC Gardner Neuroscience Institute, said. They have had no direct contact with North Korean medical authorities, Kanter said, but Warmbier arrived with two brain scans dated April and July 2016. They don’t have any way to verify those dates, but the damage to the brain is consistent with the deterioration they see from those previous scans, he said. After the tissue is damaged initially by insufficient blood flow — which they think probably happened before that initial scan — the body tries to remove the damaged tissue. “That’s what we’re seeing is this removal.” It has been almost a year and a half since Warmbier was detained in North Korea, which he had visited on a five-day tourist trip on his way to a study-abroad trip to Hong Kong with the University of Virginia. On his last night there, he apparently tried to remove a large propaganda sign. He was charged with “hostile acts against the state” and, after a sham trial, sentenced to 15 years of hard labor. It has been about 15 months since all contact was severed. He was allowed no consular visits. About a week ago, his parents suddenly got news: Their 22-year-old son was in a coma and had been for more than a year. They were told — but did not believe — that shortly after the trial Otto Warmbier contracted botulism and was given a sleeping pill, and that he had never recovered. There was no evidence indicating botulism, Foreman said today. Joseph Yun, the State Department’s special representative for North Korea, rushed to help secure Warmbier’s medical evacuation. Late on the night of June 13, the Gulfstream jet touched down in Cincinnati, and his family finally got to see him, before medical personnel carried him off the plane into a waiting ambulance. At a news conference earlier today, Fred Warmbier said they are left with many questions and no answers. One many people had was how an athletic young man had become so desperately ill. “There is no excuse for any civilized nation” to have kept his condition a secret and denied him medical care for so long, Fred Warmbier said. Today, North Korea’s state-run news agency said that a court had allowed Warmbier to return home “on humanitarian grounds.” (Susan Svrluga, “Otto Warmbier Has Extensive Loss of Brain Tissue, No Sign of Trauma,” Washington Post, June 15, 2017) One American who was held captive in North Korea said he was interrogated up to 15 hours a day by officials who wanted him to confess to plotting to overthrow their government. Another said she was held in a 5-by-6-foot windowless cell. Yet another former American inmate shivered on the concrete floor of a room “no bigger than a dog’s house.” But despite a history of such treatment of prisoners dating to the 1950-53 Korean War, North Korea has generally refrained from physically abusing the Americans it has held in recent decades. That makes the case of Otto Warmbier, a 22-year-old American college student who had been serving a 15-year sentence in North Korea, even more striking. North Korea is known to have detained 16 American citizens since 1996, including three who are still in custody. They have been subjected to varying degrees of mental abuse but less often physical torture. Despite its longstanding enmity toward the United States and its allies, North Korea remains deeply sensitive to outside criticism of its human rights record, billing itself as a righteous nation that respects international norms. And while its propagandists have presented American prisoners as proof that the United States has been sending subversive agents into the country, it has also used them as bargaining chips in dealing with Washington, analysts said. The prospect that the Americans might eventually be released as part of negotiations seems to have influenced their treatment. “There seems to be a general attitude of not using physical violence against Americans, although they don’t appear unwilling to use psychological tactics and that sort thing,” said Robert R. King, a former State Department special envoy for North Korea human rights issues who handled Warmbier’s case until he retired in January. “This situation with Warmbier is likely something that happened that they did not intend.” The worst known case of abuse before Warmbier was that of Robert Park, a Christian missionary who said he was severely beaten by North Korean soldiers after he was caught in 2009 while walking across the border from China waving a Bible. After he was transferred to Pyongyang, North Korea, he said, he was subjected to torture so horrific he begged for death. “Several North Korean women surrounded me and did the worst thing to me to try to make me commit suicide,” Park said in an interview with Yonhap. He said the women beat his genitals with a club. Park has said he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and has attempted suicide since his release. One former American detainee, Evan C. Hunziker, took his own life less than a month after he was released from North Korea in 1996, although it was unclear whether this was related to his experiences in the North. In a 2015 interview, the former detainee Aijalon Gomes recalled “a cement cell, which was beyond freezing.” He was later taken to a house where he was instructed to make bricks all day. Asked whether he was tortured, he said, “There were moments of violence and of humanity.” Laura Ling, who was held in North Korea in 2009 together with a fellow American journalist, Euna Lee, said she was held in a dark 5-by-6-foot cell. “Once I heard those words, ‘12 years,’ come from the judge, I could barely stand up straight,” Ling said on the “Oprah Winfrey Show,” recalling the day she and Ms. Lee were sentenced to 12 years of hard labor for illegal entry into the country. She spiraled into a deep depression. But she was not sent to a labor camp but was instead moved to a regular room while she was treated for ulcers. She was also allowed to place a few calls and send letters to her sister, husband and parents in the United States. She even taught curious guards a few yoga poses. The two women were released later in 2009 after former President Bill Clinton visited Pyongyang. It was a similar pattern for Kenneth Bae, a Korean-American missionary who was sentenced to 15 years of hard labor on charges of trying to establish a secret proselytizing network in the North. In his book “Not Forgotten,” Bae said his North Korean captors interrogated him up to 15 hours a day for the first four weeks. His treatment improved only after he wrote a confession in which he described himself as a terrorist who plotted to overthrow the government. Bae toiled on a soybean farm and lost more than 30 pounds. But he was allowed to read emails from his family and friends in the United States. He was hospitalized three times for problems including diabetes, an enlarged heart and back pain. And he was permitted to read his Bible. While his treatment was harsh, Bae said he also sensed an undercurrent of respect toward foreigners by the North Korean authorities, who were concerned about their image abroad. He was never beaten, said Mr. Bae, who was freed in 2014 after the American government sent the director of national intelligence at the time, James R. Clapper Jr., to Pyongyang. Some of the American detainees even said they were treated rather decently. Matthew Todd Miller said he was surprised that he was allowed to keep his iPhone and iPad for “at least a month” after his arrival in North Korea, enabling him to listen to music and access other stored information, although he could not use them to send or receive messages. “I was prepared for the torture. But instead of that, I was killed with kindness,” he said in an interview with NK News. Another former detainee, Jeffrey E. Fowle, also said he was never harmed physically during nearly six months in detention. Arturo Pierre Martinez said he was treated “well,” and was even allowed out to take photos like a tourist. King said North Korea appeared to be very concerned about the health of the Americans it held. “They don’t want anyone to die on their watch,” he said. “This is why the Otto Warmbier case is unusual.” In his book “The Last P.O.W.,” the journalist Mike Chinoy said that a North Korean doctor and nurse appeared to check the blood pressure, pulse and heartbeat of Merrill E. Newman, then an 85-year-old American detainee, four times a day. Newman was released after 42 days in 2013. “The North Koreans have traditionally not wanted to keep Americans if there’s a possibility of having a health issue,” King said. King said that Warmbier was treated much like other Americans until his trial in March last year, when he was sentenced to 15 years of hard labor for trying to steal a political banner from his hotel in Pyongyang. What happened afterward is unclear. His family in Cincinnati reportedly was told that after his trial he contracted botulism and took a sleeping pill, and then fell into a coma. King suspected that North Korea may have been less willing to provide information about Warmbier’s health during rising tension over recent American sanctions against the country. The news about Warmbier deepened the anxiety among families of South Koreans and Japanese citizens held in the North. North Korea is accused of kidnapping more than 450 South Koreans, mostly fishermen, and 12 Japanese citizens in the decades after the Korean War. “This sounded like a warning to us, signaling what might happen to our family members if we spoke out against human rights abuses in the North,” said Hwang In-cheol, whose father was on a South Korean airliner hijacked to the North in 1969. The families of the Japanese citizens who the government says were abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and early ’80s know the pain of waiting for loved ones to return. North Korea has told the Japanese government that eight of the 12 are now dead but many families refuse to give up. Iizuka Shigeo, 79, refuses to believe that his sister, Yaeko Taguchi, who was abducted in 1978, died in a traffic accident in North Korea. “All we want is that all the abductees, including Yaeko, return as soon as possible,” he said. He said he was shocked to hear of Warmbier’s release in a coma. “It’s like a warning to the U.S.,’’ he said. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea’s Brutality to American Captive Is Seen as Rarity,” New York Times, June 15, 2017,
The U.S. government has issued a global alert against a group of North Korean hackers known as “Hidden Cobra,” citing major global hacking incidents that have occurred since 2009. The Computer Emergency Readiness Team of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the FBI in a joint statement warned of additional cyberattacks by the group of hackers targeting international media, and the financial, air transport and aerospace industries. Hidden Cobra has also been known as Lazarus or Guardians of Peace. Lazarus is thought to be responsible for the WannaCry ransomware attack that hijacked computers in vital businesses and services around the world last month, as well as 18 major hacking attempts including on the central bank of Bangladesh and the Federal Reserve Board in New York. As Guardians of Peace they hacked Sony Pictures in the U.S. in 2014, resulting in the leak of the private information of 47,000 individuals. Hidden Cobra was identified as the U.S. government was investigating the source of the “Delta Charlie” malware. The hackers have targeted computers using outdated Windows programs and apparently funneled the money from ransomware attacks into the North’s weapons programs. (Chosun Ilbo, “U.S. Announces Global Alert against N. Korean Hackers,” June 15, 2017)
6/16/17:
Moon Chung-in, professor emeritus at Yonsei University and President Moon Jae-in’s special advisor on unification, foreign affairs and national security, said that the South Korea-US joint military exercises (which include the deployment of US strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula), could be scaled down if North Korea suspends its nuclear and missile activities. Moon Chung-in made the remarks during a seminar on the topic of “New Administrations and the U.S.-R.O.K. Alliance: Challenges and Way Forward,” which was hosted in Washington by the East Asia Foundation and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and during a press conference with South Korean correspondents that followed. With Moon Jae-in’s summit with President Donald Trump scheduled for June 29 and 30, Moon Chung-in’s remarks appear to be a preliminary attempt to direct US government and public opinion toward dialogue. “The president has made two proposals. The first is that we and the US can discuss reducing the South Korea-US joint military exercises if North Korea suspends its nuclear weapons and missile activities,” Moon said on the topic of North Korea’s nuclear program. “The president was thinking that we could even decrease the American strategic assets that are deployed to the Korean Peninsula [during the exercises].” “The president‘s other proposal is to link the issue of denuclearizing North Korea with the issue of establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. This issue is much more complicated than the Iranian nuclear negotiations,” Moon Chung-in said. “At any rate, the president has offered two guidelines for pursuing the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” During an event on June 15 commemorating the 17th anniversary of the June 15 Inter-Korean Summit Meeting, President Moon indicated the starting point for negotiations, saying South Korea “could engage in unconditional dialogue if North Korea refrains for additional nuclear and missile provocations” What Moon Chung-in described as “President Moon’s proposals” on June 16 appear to go a step further by offering a specific “payback” for North Korea moving gradually toward denuclearization. During the subsequent meeting with correspondents, the special advisor went into more detail about the proposal for reducing US strategic assets if North Korea freezes its nuclear program. “There‘s no need to deploy strategic assets such as aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines during the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle exercises. Scaling down the strategic assets that have been forward deployed since the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 and running the exercises the way we used to would likely mitigate the crisis,” he said. “In a way, this kind of thing [the deployment of strategic assets] heightens tensions and aggravates North Korea’s response,” Moon Chung-in said. Drawing upon his observations as a scholar, he noted that “Kim Jong-il tested 18 missiles during the 18 years of his rule, but Kim Jong-un has carried out 35 test launches in just five years.” “Since the US has forward deployed its strategic assets, North Korea seems to be responding in this way because it thinks that the US will strike if the North shows any weakness,” Moon Chung-in said. (Yi Yong-in, “Moon Chung-in Says Military Exercies Could Be Scaled down If N. Korea Suspends Nukes,” Hankyore, June 19, 2017) South Korea may consult with the United States about scaling back joint military exercises, such as downsizing the deployment of American strategic assets, if North Korea suspends nuclear and missile activities, Moon Chung-in, a foreign affairs scholar and special presidential adviser, said at a Wilson Center seminar in Washington, adding President Moon has proposed the idea as part of an incremental solution to the nuclear standoff beginning with a freeze of the weapons programs. “He proposed two things. One, if North Korea suspends its nuclear and missile activities, then we may consult with the United States to (on) scaling down ROK-US joint exercises and training. I think what he has in mind is we may scale down deployment of American strategic weapons over the Korean Peninsula,” the adviser said. “Another one is linking North Korea’s denuclearization to creation of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. It is a much more complicated one. It could be much more complicated than the Iranian deal, but anyhow, he laid out those two guidelines to which he would pursue the denuclearization of North Korea,” he said. The adviser later told reporters that U.S. strategic assets, such as aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submarines, began participating in joint exercises only since several years ago, and scaling back their participation could help reduce tensions with the North. Chances are low for the North to accept the proposal, but it’s still worth a try, he said. “What’s important is to reduce tensions,” he said. President Moon’s idea is to seek an “incremental, comprehensive, and fundamental solution” to North Korean problem as he believes “ultimate denuclearization of North Korea will take much longer period, longer time, most likely not during his tenure if he understands the realistic constraints,” the adviser said. The offer to downsize joint exercises could be attractive to North Korea as Pyongyang has long denounced such maneuvers as a rehearsal to invade the country and demanded an immediate halt to them. It is unclear, however, how the U.S. would react to the idea because Washington has flatly rejected the North’s demand, saying such drills are purely defensive. But the adviser said he believes the U.S. would see little problem with downsizing strategic assets deployment. The adviser also said that the environmental assessment that South Korea plans to conduct over the U.S. THAAD missile defense system could take one year because the study should take into consideration the deployment’s impact over four seasons. Earlier this month, South Korea suspended the deployment of an additional four THAAD launchers pending an environmental assessment, spurring doubts the halt might be a precursor to the South ultimately rejecting the THAAD deployment altogether. But Seoul has promised that the environmental review won’t lead to a reversal on the deployment itself. Adviser Moon said that it’s wrong to say the alliance could break up over THAAD. “THAAD is a weapons system, defensive weapons system. Does the alliance break up because of that?” he said. “It’s hard to accept to say as if THAAD is everything about the alliance,” he said. The adviser said that President Moon plans to seek greater exchanges and cooperation with North Korea within the framework of international sanctions on Pyongyang, a remark seen as aimed at dispelling U.S. concerns that a softer approach by the South’s new liberal leader could end up blunting sanctions on Pyongyang. The South seeks a peaceful coexistence or “de-facto unification” with the North through trust-building and exchanges and cooperation and won’t seek to absorb the North, the adviser said. The new government will also not tolerate the North’s provocations, he said. The South should seek dialogue with the North if the North refrains from provocations, the adviser said. “Is there any reason for us not to have a dialogue when North Korea refrains from provocations?” he said. “The point is to improve inter-Korean relations. It’s pretty clear that if the inter-Korean relations improved, it would have a positive effect on the missile and nuclear issues.” The Moon administration also hopes to further strengthen the alliance with the U.S. and take back the wartime operational control (OPCON) of the country’s forces from the U.S. in order to reduce its dependence on the U.S. for its security and to enhance its defense capabilities, the adviser said. But he said the OPCON issue is not expected to be a topic for the upcoming summit. (Chang Jae-soon, “S. Korea May Consult with U.S. about Scaling back Joint Exercises If N.K. Suspends Nuclear Activities: Adviser,” Yonhap, June 17, 2017) President Moon Jae-in’s special aide on unification, diplomacy and security Moon Chung-in took aim at the attempts by US media to pressure the new administration in Seoul, claiming that the THAAD issue is a “red line” for the South Korea-US alliance. Moon’s remarks came while addressing the issue of an environmental impact assessment on the THAAD deployment site during a seminar on “New Administrations and the U.S.-R.O.K. Alliance: Challenges and Way,” which was hosted in Washington by the East Asia Foundation and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. “US Forces Korea cannot be exist above South Korean law,” Moon stressed. “Administrations may have been able to skirt over the law during the dictatorships of the past, but not today,” he added, emphasizing the importance of procedural legitimacy in the THAAD deployment. While Moon conceded that “legal procedures could be carried out more swiftly,” he also stressed that an environmental impact assessment “needs to measure impacts across all four seasons of spring, summer, fall, and winter.” He added, “Perhaps even God himself cannot elide over that regulation.” The remarks are being seen as implying the THAAD deployment could be postponed for around one year. At the same time, Moon stressed that the decision would follow South Korean legal procedure and the agreement on the THAAD deployment would not be overturned. In a talk with South Korean correspondents afterwards, Moon strongly disputed US experts’ claims that failure to resolve the THAAD issue could “break the alliance.” “If that’s true, what kind of an alliance is it?” he asked, adding, “It‘s hard to accept people talking as though THAAD were all there is to the alliance.” “If the alliance breaks down over a defensive weapons system like THAAD, you have to question whether the US military would come running in the event of an emergency [on the Korean Peninsula],” he continued. Moon immediately went to stress he was speaking as a professor rather than as a special presidential aide. “THAAD is a security issue. At the same time, it’s an issue of the rule of law and democracy, including things like environmental impact and the rights to life and property,” he said. “Tremendous [economic] damages have resulted from China’s THAAD sanctions, much larger than we think,” he added. “Look at President Trump. [He’s said] he could change out the alliance because the public’s welfare is important,” Moon continued. “What’s wrong with our President taking that seriously and giving it careful consideration?” Stressing that he was relating his own opinion, Moon described the South Korea-US alliances as “a means of survival and a tool,” adding that it was “difficult to accept that democracy can be compromised and the public’s welfare can be compromised [over the alliance].” Justice Party lawmaker Kim Jong-dae, who participated in the foreign correspondents’ talk, noted that South Korea and the US had “agreed at the time that the THAAD deployment would take place by the end of the year,” adding that the question was “why they had to accelerate things and cause a speeding mishap.” “I cannot contain my astonishment at the way some of the news outlets in Washington have made it out as though [the Moon administration] is deliberately delaying [the THAAD deployment] to weaken the South Korea-US alliance or taking its cues from Beijing,” Kim said. “It‘s not true, and the way THAAD was trotted out in the middle of an election needs to be investigated,” he continued. In terms of a resolution to the THAAD issue, domestic experts said the Moon administration had adopted a solid defensive strategy by using [the deployment’s] procedural legitimacy to buy time. But some also expressed worries about how the situation was playing out. “Supposing we do buy time, the big concern is whether they have any bright ideas for taking advantage to solve the problem,” said Cho Se-young, director of the Dongseo University Japan Center. An expert in US-China relations speaking on condition of anonymity said there were “no signs of an imminent resolution of the THAAD issue.” (Yi Yong-in and Kim Ji-eun, “Moon Chung-in Says If THAAD Breaks S. Korea-U.S. Alliance ‘What Kind of an Alliance Is It?’” Hankyore, June 19, 2017)
DPRK FoMin press statement “over the vicious sanctions and pressure by the U.S. and its followers: The despicable sanctions and pressure imposed on the DPRK by the U.S. and its vassal forces have reached the extreme. The DPRK’s development of nuclear force that the U.S. and its vassal forces use as a pretext for sanctions is an outcome of the extremely hostile policy of the U.S. and its nuclear threat against the DPRK and, hence, it is a legitimate and righteous measure for self-defense to protect the sovereignty and the right to existence of the country and nation. Not a single article or provision in the UN Charter and other international laws stipulates that nuclear test or ballistic rocket launch poses a threat to international peace and security. If, nonetheless, anyone were ever to be held accountable for carrying them out, those countries that have conducted most of the nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches so far should be subject to sanctions before any others. Nevertheless, the U.S. and other hostile forces have constantly waged sanctions and pressure campaign against the DPRK, taking issue with its exercise of the right to self-defense and now they are openly pursuing the criminal intent to completely suffocate the DPRK’s national economy and impoverish the people’s livelihood. Their sanctions have grown utterly vicious and barbaric today as to try to obliterate the rights to existence and development of the state and people of the DPRK, destroy modern civilization and bring the world back into medieval darkness. The very nature of these sanctions running counter to the human ethics and civilization finds its expression in the fact that the hostile forces cooked up the so-called “sanctions resolutions” of the United Nations Security Council(UNSC) in the most despicable and heinous way and are enforcing them upon the international community. The UN “sanctions resolutions” are so preposterous that the wide-ranging import and export prohibition or restriction enforced by them has included even luxury goods while listing numerous entities and individuals to be subject to sanctions, allegedly aiming to contain the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile-related activities. These “resolutions” are producing endless series of bizarre and ridiculous episodes. The prohibition on the export of underground resources including coal was indiscriminately expanded and the control over “dual-use” items was exercised in such a careless way that these measures are having adverse consequences for the people’s livelihood and normal economic activities. Last year, the customs office of a certain country seized even frozen chicken, cosmetics packaging and zipper tab production equipment and materials as well as frequency stabilizers and voltage regulators to be used at fishery stations, and returned them after several months. These are only few of many cases which testify to the fact that the “sanctions resolutions” rigged up at the UNSC allegedly to protect the international peace and security are actually pursuing the nefarious objective of impeding the development of the overall national economy of the DPRK. The “Resolution 2270” coercively adopted at the UNSC was weird enough to include recreational sports equipment in the list of luxury goods. As the result, a country in Europe is prohibiting the export of sports equipment and apparatus to the DPRK such as ski, yacht, mountaineering boots, snowmobile, snow groomer and even billiard table for the reasons of implementation of the “resolution”. Another country prohibits the export of sports apparatus including sports firearms, ammunitions and archery equipment that the DPRK used to import regularly, for fear of violating the “sanctions resolutions”. In November 2016, seven sets of diving flippers addressed to the Rungna Dolphinarium in Pyongyang were confiscated by the customs office in a European country as they were classified as luxury goods. It had been decided to hold the 2017 World Junior Judo Championship and 2018 IWF (International Weightlifting Federation) Junior World Championship in the DPRK, but the venues have now changed to other countries. One country has denied entry visas to the teams and delegations of the DPRK to attend the international sports tournaments while the support grants legally provided by the International Olympic Committee and other international sports federations are not being remitted to the DPRK. Archery equipment would never become ballistic rockets and sports rifles could never be used to launch nuclear warheads, but some countries either being overpowered by or blindly following the high-handed practices of the hostile forces are bringing disgrace to the ideal and purpose of sports. These brutal and barbarous sanctions and pressure have stretched out their claws to the public health and humanitarian areas as well. The UNICEF country office in the DPRK ordered 24.4 tons of malaria mosquito repellent(Insecticide Residual Spray) from other countries in September 2016, but they were unable to sign a contract for the transportation of the goods as that would breach the UN “sanctions resolutions”. The goods could never leave the place of origin and they have remained piled up in the warehouse for 9 months until today. In November 2016, the country office procured 15 mobile X-ray units and the reagent for diagnosis of tuberculosis, but the delivery was delayed for 6 months for the reason that those were classified as “dual-use” items by the UN “sanctions resolutions” on the DPRK. In January 2017, a hundred thousand ampoules of ephedrine being imported by a health company of the DPRK were unreasonably seized although the company had gone through the procedure of informing the International Narcotics Control Board in advance as per the regulations. The fact that the items urgently needed for the treatment of chronic diseases are being subject to sanctions for such absurd reasons as “dual-use” proves that the clause in the “sanctions resolutions” which underlined that the measures imposed by the resolutions are “not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK” is only a deception and that the “sanctions” are actually targeting the daily life and the very existence of the people of the DPRK. Some countries in Europe refuse to grant basic diplomatic privileges and immunities to the DPRK diplomatic passport holders and treat them with impudence by randomly searching their luggage and confiscating used household items, cosmetics, and even carbonated drinks and children’s bicycle in flagrant disregard of the universally recognized legal norms and practices. They are so crazy and obsessed about “sanctions” that diplomats do not make any difference to them and children’s bicycle, refrigerator, kitchen utensils and hairdryer appear to be weapons of mass destruction-related items. As seen above, the sanctions and blockade racket aimed to isolate and suffocate the DPRK is going beyond the limits. The U.S. is the primary mastermind of this frantic campaign of sanctions and pressure on the DPRK. Not only the U.S. fabricated the unprecedented vicious “sanctions resolutions” against the DPRK by abusing the mandate of the UNSC and made attempts to drag all countries of the world into their implementation, but it maliciously resorted to “unilateral sanctions” against the DPRK claiming to close the loophole in the UN sanctions. The “sanctions” of all sorts that the U.S. has imposed on the DPRK for more than half a century are now becoming all the more reckless backed by such evil laws as the “North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016.” The newly emerged Trump administration announced “maximum pressure and engagement” as its policy towards the DPRK, and continues to invent different kinds of “sanctions” including the “sanctions on specially designated nationals” which targeted even the supreme dignity of the DPRK, in attempt to comprehensively furnish its domestic law to accommodate the “unilateral sanctions” on any entity or individual of the DPRK. A quick calculation shows that 15 Party and government organs, 73 other firms and entities and about 90 individuals of the DPRK are currently placed on the sanctions list together with 16 airplanes and 20 trade cargo ships, but hardly any of them are associated with munitions area at all. The U.S. is also making desperate and frenzied moves to involve other countries in the “sanctions” campaign against the DPRK. The U.S. state secretary said on a recent occasion that the U.S. made it clear to all countries including China and Russia that they should join in imposing “sanctions” on the DPRK. He also said if a country claims that the total amount of its trade with the DPRK does not exceed 5 million USD, the U.S. would ask the country to reduce it to 2 million. This fully reveals the true colors of the U.S. as the gang of muggers. The U.S. has employed the “secondary boycott” to achieve its wicked aim, and business persons and firms of several countries including China and Russia have already fallen victim to it and suffered huge losses in their economic activities and business management as they were unreasonably put on the sanctions list of the U.S. Besides, the U.S. is coercing all the countries that established diplomatic relations with the DPRK to sever the relations or scale down the level, in a blatant violation of the international laws including the UN Charter and Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Except one Latin American country and two or three Asian countries that show signs of attempts to reduce the number of the DPRK diplomats in their countries under the pressure of the U.S., the overwhelming majority of the countries resolutely reject the U.S. demand, regarding it an interference in their internal affairs, or simply ignore it. The sanctions campaign waged by the U.S. and its vassal forces is a heinous act of hostility and aggression against the DPRK to deprive it of her sovereignty and rights to existence and development, and to overthrow its ideology and system by all means. If the high-handed and arbitrary practices of the U.S. are tolerated, allowed and sympathized with, their spearhead will eventually be leveled at the other countries adhering to independence and the world will plunge into gloom where the U.S. holds sway on everything. The U.S. and its vassal forces that always suffer crushing defeats in the overall politico-military confrontation with the DPRK may resort to much more despicable and barbarous sanctions, but they can never check the advance of the DPRK marching towards the final victory of the building of a powerful socialist country by dint of self-reliance and self-development. As the U.S. and other hostile forces get more frantic in the moves to impose the toughest sanctions and pressure on the DPRK, the hatred and rage of the army and people of the country will only grow stronger and the DPRK will further speed up the strengthening of its nuclear force to root out the base of aggression and all evils.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of DPRK Foreign Ministry,” June 16, 2017)
There is no foreign leader on whom President Trump has placed a bigger bet than Xi Jinping of China. Trump’s gamble was based on his calculation that Xi, the Chinese president, could put heavy pressure on North Korea to curb its nuclear weapons and missile programs. To secure Xi’s cooperation, the president soft-pedaled his harsh stance on China’s trade practices, and has said little about its adventurism in the South China Sea. But a growing number of Trump’s aides fear that the bet is not paying off. China has not significantly tightened the pressure on North Korea since Trump met with Xi in Palm Beach, Fla., in April. Its failure to do more has frustrated White House officials, who plan to raise the issue with their Chinese counterparts at a high-level meeting here on June 21. China’s reluctance to exert its influence in this regard has left the Trump administration with few good options in dealing with the North Korea crisis. And it may lead the administration to try to negotiate with North Korea’s leaders, an approach that did not work for Trump’s predecessors but which he has periodically seemed to embrace. The White House stepped gingerly in the direction of engagement this week when it sent a senior diplomat to North Korea to obtain the release of Otto F. Warmbier, a gravely ill American prisoner. The encounter, some former American officials said, could lay the predicate for further such conversations. But North Korea’s inhumane treatment of Warmbier complicates the prospects for diplomacy. Still, current and former officials said the administration was unlikely to shift its strategy because of the mistreatment of a single American, no matter how horrific. The most likely outcome, they said, is that any future contacts with North Korea will be conducted in the utmost secrecy. “The Trump administration has made it quite clear that this is an all-of-the-above approach,” said Daniel R. Russel, who served as assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs under President Barack Obama. “They will explore what kind of official or unofficial contacts with North Korea can advance the cause.” Trump’s aides are also motivated by South Korea’s recent election, which brought to power a progressive leader more interested in engagement than confrontation with the North. The president, Moon Jae-in, halted the deployment of an American antimissile system. The Chinese are among those most interested in a meeting between Trump and the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, officials said, in part because that would put the onus for a solution on Washington, not Beijing. For the moment, though, the White House is more focused on getting China to put pressure on its neighbor. Trump came into office promising to challenge China on a range of issues. But the imminent danger posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs changed that calculus. In April, he said Xi would be his partner in curbing Kim. Two weeks later, the Treasury Department declined to designate China as a currency manipulator, something Trump had promised to do during his presidential campaign. Since then, there is scant evidence of a crackdown by Beijing on Chinese trade with North Korea. The Chinese government has not announced the shutdown of any major trading companies, nor have traders in Dandong, the Chinese port city on the North Korean border, reported any signs of movement against their companies. “It is worrisome that the president seems to think he has convinced Xi Jinping to change course,” said Michael J. Green, a senior adviser on Asia in the National Security Council of President George W. Bush. “That’s the position he has staked out publicly, and it has huge implications for the region. He should not have oversold it.” Trump’s quid pro quo has sowed concern in Japan and Southeast Asia, where officials are worried that the United States is muting its response to China’s aggressions in the South China Sea or could put off arms sales to Taiwan — actions that administration officials deny. To raise the pressure on China, administration officials said the United States was considering sanctions on a range of Chinese individuals and banks that do business with North Korea — a step that could aggravate tensions with China and sour Trump’s fledgling relationship with Xi. It is not clear that even these steps would prod China to radically alter its approach to North Korea, which is driven less by concern over its nuclear ambitions than a dread of what a collapsed North would mean for China, with which it shares an 880-mile-long border. Impatience with China has simmered for weeks inside the White House. But only in recent days has it begun to show. “We cannot allow China to use its economic power to buy its way out of other problems, whether it’s militarizing islands in the South China Sea or failure to put appropriate pressure on North Korea,” Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson said last week in Sydney, Australia. Trump himself has withheld public judgment of Xi. At a rally in April to mark his first 100 days in office, the president said it would have been counterproductive to designate China as a currency manipulator at a time when he was seeking the government’s help on North Korea. And he said he had developed a sense for Xi over hours of talks. “He’s a good man,” Trump told his supporters. “Now, he’s representing China. He’s not representing us. But he’s a good man. And I believe he wants to get that situation taken care of. They have tremendous power, and we’ll see what happens.” In his Twitter feed, the president has veered between optimism and mild finger wagging toward China. On April 21, he wrote, “China is very much the economic lifeline to North Korea so, while nothing is easy, if they want to solve the North Korean problem, they will.” On May 29, after another missile test, Trump wrote: “North Korea has shown great disrespect for their neighbor, China, by shooting off yet another missile … but China is trying hard!” In the last month, traders said Chinese exports to North Korea were being inspected more thoroughly. The provincial authorities have warned traders not to hide banned goods that can be used in the North’s nuclear program — chemicals, for example — in general cargo. Some longtime diplomats predicted that the Chinese would announce some modest measures — cracking down on a handful of banks or companies without potent political ties — as a way of giving Trump just enough evidence to show that his confidence in Xi was not wholly misplaced. “There is a perception that the Chinese played to his vanity and fleeced him,” said Christopher R. Hill, a special envoy on North Korea during the George W. Bush administration. “It puts him in an awkward position. My sense is they know that calculation and want to deliver on it.” (Mark Landler, “As Trump Bets on China’s Help on North Korea, Aides Ask: Is It Worth It?” New York Times, June 16, 2017, p. A-21)
The world has become used to terrible stories of brutality from North Korea. The hundreds of thousands who starved during the 1990s famine, the all-encompassing repression, the torture of those who dare to try to escape. But this week, North Korea showed itself capable of an entirely new type of brutality, and one that strikes much closer to home for Americans. Otto Warmbier — a quintessential American, tall and good-looking, from a close-knit family in a leafy Ohio suburb — had joined a group tour to North Korea at the end of 2015 on his way to study in Hong Kong. Instead of graduating with his classmates at the University of Virginia last month and heading to the job on Wall Street he had lined up, the 22-year-old was brought home on a military medical plane and now lies unconscious in a Cincinnati hospital. He suffered extensive loss of brain tissue, a condition usually caused by a lack of blood flow to the brain. How did Warmbier fall into this coma? Once he did, why did North Korea, a country with so few resources, spend 15 months keeping him alive instead of sending him home and getting the problem off its hands? And why did the North Koreans apparently lie about the cause of the coma — claiming it began with a case of botulism — but tell the truth about the length of it? Some answers will come out; some may never be known. In the meantime, Warmbier’s horrific treatment has created a new, pressing concern for the U.S. government: freeing the three American citizens still held in North Korea. Diplomats and former U.S. officials are pushing behind the scenes for the release of Kim Dong-chul, a businessman held for 21 months, as well as Kim Hak-song and Kim Sang-dok (or Tony Kim), both affiliated with the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology. A visit by an unlikely envoy, pro basketball bad boy Dennis Rodman, has raised hopes that he could bring the trio out with him when he departs Pyongyang, probably June 17. “Even if Rodman brings back the remaining three Americans still detained in North Korea, the Otto Warmbier story is not over,” said David Straub, a former State Department official who traveled to North Korea with former president Bill Clinton in 2009 to secure the release of two imprisoned journalists. Indeed, the Warmbier case is very different from those of previous American prisoners in North Korea. For all of its mistreatment of its own citizens and arbitrary detention of foreigners, North Korea generally has lines it does not cross with foreign inmates widely viewed as hostages. While it keeps them in harsh conditions and subjects them to psychological abuse, only 1 of the 18 or so Americans detained in North Korea in the past decade — a Korean American missionary who entered the country illegally from China in 2009 — has said he was beaten. A senior U.S. official rejected reports that Warmbier was beaten in custody, and doctors said there are no signs of trauma or fractures on his body. Furthermore, the regime does not want a prisoner to die on its watch. It has gone to some lengths to care for sick detainees and released an 85-year-old man relatively quickly. One of the most puzzling aspects is why North Korea held onto Warmbier for 15 months after he fell into a coma. Doing so undoubtedly worsened his condition, and caring for him was probably expensive and difficult for a country with limited medical resources. Michael Madden, the editor of the North Korean Leadership Watch website, said that whatever went wrong while Warmbier was in custody, those in charge apparently tried to cover it up. “State security concealed whatever it was and have been concealing it for some time,” Madden said, citing North Korean sources. Straub agreed. “They were probably scared,” he said. “The brain scan would have told them he was in a serious condition.” But security authorities may have been forced to disclose Warmbier’s state after North Korean diplomats met with U.S. officials in Oslo last month and agreed to allow consular access to the four prisoners. If North Korea releases the three Americans still in detention, some analysts think the Trump administration would have little choice but to continue on the path already set. “I don’t know if there is any reason to change course from what the administration is trying to do, and I don’t think they will,” said Stephan Haggard, professor of Korea-Pacific studies at the University of California at San Diego. “They may put some more pressure on the Chinese, but the testimony of [U.S. Defense Secretary Jim] Mattis suggests the administration has made the threat of North Korea its number one priority,” he said. “There seems to be a willingness to engage in some exploratory conversations and some pretty substantial ones,” said Evans Revere, another former State Department official who continues to talk to North Korean officials. The release of all four prisoners would remove a hurdle to talks, he said. But Straub, the official who traveled to North Korea with Clinton, was not optimistic about making progress if talks do resume. “The issues between North Korea and the United States are not fundamentally about hostages; they’re about huge strategic issues — and the gap between the two sides is still huge,” he said. In that regard, the Trump administration’s approach to North Korea is essentially the same as during the last years of President Barack Obama’s presidency: increase the pressure until North Korea is willing to change. (Anna Fifield, “Otto Warmbier Is Home But Questions Abound about His Time in North Korea,” Washington Post, June 16, 2017)
6/18/17:
For more than a year, American diplomats have held secret talks in Pyongyang and European cities with North Korea’s top nuclear negotiator, hoping to free U.S. prisoners and even establish a diplomatic channel to constrain North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. The official dispatched by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un — Madame Choe Son Hui —is well known to U.S. officials, fluent in English and is believed to have direct access to Kim. That raised expectations that the regime eventually might engage with the Trump administration about the future of Pyongyang’s weapons efforts. So did the agreed release this month of 22-year-old American prisoner Otto Warmbier, until it emerged he was in a coma. “Given the reported status of Mr. Warmbier’s condition, any diplomatic path forward is going to be extremely difficult,” said Suzanne DiMaggio of the New America Foundation, a Washington think tank, who helped establish an unofficial channel with the North Koreans early last year. But she had a suggestion for Pyongyang to begin to repair the damage: “If the North Koreans immediately released the remaining three prisoners, it could set up an atmosphere for potentially serious talks.” President Donald Trump has repeatedly said he isn’t seeking regime change in North Korea and hasn’t ruled out negotiations to curb North Korea’s rapidly advancing nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. Early last year, DiMaggio established through interlocutors in Stockholm a “track two” dialogue with North Korea, a term reflecting the fact no active U.S. officials were present at the initial meetings. She made the first of two trips to the North Korean capital in February 2016, in an early bid to help defuse the nuclear crisis. DiMaggio held numerous track two discussions with Iranian officials before the Obama administration formally started nuclear negotiations with Tehran in 2012. Choe was a major player in nuclear and missile negotiations that took place both during the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, current and former U.S. officials said. Her official title now is the director-general of the North America affairs bureau of North Korea’s Foreign Ministry. “When Track Two participants meet with her, what they’re getting is someone who can convey very accurately to us what the North Koreans want us to hear,” said Robert Einhorn, a former senior State Department official who worked on North Korea in the Obama and Clinton administrations and met Madame Choe last month. “She’s a valuable interlocutor because of her experience and connections.” Bill Richardson, the former New Mexico governor and U.S. energy secretary, separately began a string of about 20 meetings with North Korean diplomats in New York at about the same time as DiMaggio’s trips that were focused on gaining Warmbier’s release. The North Koreans’ favorite spot for meetings was The Palm steakhouse in New York, close to their United Nations offices. Richardson sent his own representative to Pyongyang last September to seek Warmbier’s release. “[Mr. Warmbier’s] situation will temper the desire for dialogue for the time being,” said Richardson, a self-proclaimed champion of engagement. “I’m so unhappy and disgusted by what’s happened to him.” The issue of American prisoners, Richardson said, appeared now to be totally under the mandate of the North’s security forces. “It’s conceivable my interlocutors didn’t even know about Otto Warmbier’s status,” Richardson said in an interview. The State Department’s special representative for North Korea, Joseph Yun, was first scheduled to attend a meeting with Madame Choe and other North Korean diplomats in New York this February, these officials said. But the Trump administration canceled the North Koreans’ visas at the last minute after Kim’s half-brother was assassinated in Malaysia. The U.S. believed the killing was state-sanctioned, a charge Pyongyang has denied. In May, Yun attended a meeting with Madame Choe in Oslo that was organized by DiMaggio and the Norwegian government. It largely focused on the status of the American prisoners. Yun and Madame Choe had dinner and a two-hour meeting in the Norwegian capital. But the senior North Korean diplomat didn’t provide any details about Warmbier’s declining health, according to senior U.S. officials. She did promise to provide access to American prisoners in North Korea, using Swedish diplomats in Pyongyang. Choe told reporters in Beijing after leaving Norway that Pyongyang would be willing to meet U.S. officials for talks on the nuclear issue “if the conditions are set.” Americans who have met Choe said the North Korea diplomat is steadfast that Pyongyang will maintain its nuclear weapons arsenal but is open to the possibility of limiting it. “They have not ruled out partial steps, like a cap or freeze as a temporary measure,” said Einhorn, who is now at the Brookings Institution. “They don’t attack that; nor do they says it’s acceptable.” It wasn’t until June 6 that North Korea invited Yun for a direct meeting in New York with Pyongyang’s ambassador to the U.N., according to the State Department. It was here that the U.S. finally was notified that Warmbier was in a coma. The revelation resulted in Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s decision to send a diplomatic and medical team to Pyongyang to bring the University of Virginia student home. Three Americans remain in North Korean prisons. (Jay Solomon, “Top North Korean Nuclear Negotiator Met with U.S. Diplomats,” Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2017)
6/19/17:
Cheong Wa Dae cautioned President Moon Jae-in’s security adviser, Moon Chung-in, to refrain from making controversial remarks that could damage relations between South Korea and the United States. The presidential office said the adviser’s statements were his personal opinion and were not cleared through prior consultation with the President. “We talked to the special adviser who is currently visiting the United States, today” said a ranking official on condition of anonymity. “We told him that his remarks will do little to contribute to Seoul-Washington relations in the future.” The official noted that the adviser’s opinion was just one of a variety of options being developed here to resolve the nuclear and missile threats from the North. “Any decision needs to be made through close consultation between Seoul and Washington. It cannot be said a certain option is feasible simply because one person suggested it,” the official said. He added that President Moon had made no response to the adviser’s controversial comments. U.S. State Department spokeswoman Alicia Edwards also said Saturday that Washington viewed the adviser’s proposal as a personal opinion, not the official stance of the South Korean government, according to Voice of America. Despite Cheong Wa Dae’s efforts to remove controversy, the opposition parties went all out to criticize the adviser, with the conservative opposition Liberty Korea Party (LKP) even calling for him to step down from his position. Rep. Lee Hyun-jae, the LKP’s policy chief, pointed out that Moon Chung-in has been a mentor to President Moon on security and foreign affairs. “If the special adviser’s opinion was different from President Moon’s official stance, the President should receive the adviser’s resignation,” Lee said. Rep. Kim Dong-cheol, floor leader of the center-left opposition People’s Party, said, “The U.S. is seriously concerned about the presidential adviser’s unexpected remarks as well as the Moon Jae-in government’s order to inspect a decision-making process involving the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system here.” Ruling Democratic Party of Korea Chairwoman Rep. Choo Mi-ae said the opposition parties were overacting to his “brave” remarks. (Jun Ji-hye, “Cheong Wa Dae Cautions Presidential Adviser,” Korea Times, June 20, 2017) The Blue House said a warning was issued to Moon Chung-in, presidential special adviser for unification, foreign and national security affairs, who stirred up a controversy with remarks at a forum on the U.S.-Korea alliance at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. on June 16. “An official in charge told him today that his remarks are not helping Korea-U.S. relations looking to the future,” a senior Blue House official said in a background briefing today. The official refused to give a clear answer when asked if the special adviser’s remarks were contrary to the policy of the Moon administration. “I cannot say for sure how far his remarks agree with it or not,” he said. “It was one of many ideas to resolve North Korea’s continuing nuclear tests and missile launches and to create a new breakthrough.” “And that is something to be decided through close consultations between South Korea and the United States,” he said. “It’s not feasible just because one person says it.” Speculation still lingers that the special adviser’s remarks were made on the direct order of the Blue House. If they were, it was a trial balloon that was quickly burst.
The Blue House said yesterday the remarks were the professor’s personal opinion, and added today that the special adviser did not consult with the president before his trip to Washington. It, however, admitted that the special adviser visited the presidential office before his visit to Washington and met with Chung Eui-yong, head of the National Security Office. After the meeting, Chung reportedly said the special adviser spoke about his views, but he thought it was just an unofficial exchange of ideas. “It was not a meeting for them to coordinate what should be said in the United States,” a Blue House source said. “But I don’t know the exact contents of their discussion.” Officials also said President Moon made no reaction to the controversy. A strategist of the Blue House told JoongAng Ilbo that the administration wanted to send a stronger message to the North. “The president already made a proposal to the North that unconditional dialogue will be offered in return for suspending provocations in his speech to mark the anniversary of the June 15, 2000 North-South Joint Declaration,” he said. “There was a need to send a clearer message to the North. Special adviser Moon’s remarks are controversial in terms of strategy for their timing and method, but the substance is not widely different from the framework the Blue House is planning.” Another official who participated in creating foreign and national security policy for Moon’s presidential campaign said special adviser Moon actually “preemptively scratched an itching spot for President Moon.” He said the special adviser’s remarks created room for President Moon to speak more freely at the upcoming summit, scheduled for next week. The ruling Democratic Party also tried to defend the administration and the special adviser. “Prudently informing Washington about comprehensive issues concerning the Korean Peninsula is the right thing to do to protect our national security,” Chairwoman Choo Mi-ae said today at the Supreme Council meeting. “Special adviser Moon’s remarks are a high-level political act to signal that we are reviewing what to offer in order to bring the North to a dialogue,” said Rep. Woo Sang-ho, former floor leader of the party, in a radio interview. A senior opposition politician supported that idea. “The timing and place were inappropriate, but the substance was right,” Rep. Park Jie-won, former head of the People’s Party, wrote on his Facebook page. Park, one of the closest associates of the late President Kim Dae-jung, also quoted former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry as saying it’s too late to dismantle the North’s nuclear programs and that Korea-U.S. joint military drills can be scaled down or stopped in return for Pyongyang freezing its nuclear and missile programs. The conservative opposition Liberty Korea and Bareun Parties, however, demanded special adviser Moon resign. “He is a ticking time bomb,” said Rep. Chung Woo-taik, floor leader and acting chairman of the Liberty Korea Party. “He must resign instead of working as a mentor to the president.” Bareun Party’s acting head, Rep. Joo Ho-young, also said the special adviser must be held accountable for creating turmoil with a “dangerous idea.” The party’s secretary-general, Rep. Kim Se-yeon, said, “We must imagine Kim Jong-un’s satisfied face at this moment.”
Meanwhile, the Blue House said today that Hong Seok-hyun has repeatedly declined to serve as Moon’s special adviser for unification, foreign affairs and national security. Moon announced on May 21 that he named Professor Moon and Hong, chairman of the Korea Peninsula Forum, as special advisers. “After the nomination, Hong repeatedly informed the Blue House of his intention to decline,” a senior presidential aide said. He also admitted that the communication was not smooth for the nomination process. The announcement was made while Hong was returning from Washington after meeting with Trump and other U.S. officials as a special presidential envoy. . (Kang Tae-wha and Ser Myo-ja, “Blue House Tells Adviser His Trial Balloon Failed, JoongAng Ilbo, June 20, 2017) A special adviser to President Moon Jae-in tried to persuade Washington that his controversial suggestions about new approaches to North Korea weren’t actually from Korea’s president. Moon Chung-in, presidential special adviser for unification, foreign and national security affairs, attended a discussion hosted at President Moon’s North Korea policy is in line with the Donald Trump administration’s strategy of “maximum pressure and engagement.” “Look, the South Korean government has been complying with the international sanctions regime,” Moon was quoted as saying by the Voice of America. “We have been fully complying with United Nation’s resolution 2270, 2321 and we closed the Kaesong Industrial complex, we closed Mount Kumgang tourism project. Therefore, at the present moment, we are part of that maximum pressure on North Korea.” He stressed that President Moon is fully aware that current conditions are not proper for restarting inter-Korean dialogues. Moon, a professor at Yonsei University, stirred controversy June 16 with remarks at a forum on the U.S.-Korea alliance at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. If North Korea suspends nuclear and missile activities, he said, South Korea could consult with the United States to scale down joint military exercises and reduce deployment of U.S. strategic weapons to the South. He also dismissed concerns that an environmental probe ordered by Seoul will effectively delay the U.S. deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense antimissile system in Korea. “If the Korea-U.S. alliance is ruptured by the issue,” he said, “that’s not an alliance.” His remarks prompted angry responses in Washington. To distance itself, the Blue House issued a warning to him today in Seoul. Today in New York, Moon stood by his remarks, but claimed they were his personal views as a scholar. He stressed that although he is a special adviser, he has no policy-making authority. Moon elaborated on his idea of scaling down Korea-U.S. joint military exercises. He said it means reducing strategic assets deployed by the United States since the North’s sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. He said Seoul and Washington could make an offer of those gestures to Pyongyang in return for denuclearization, adding that a give-and-take is the essence of a negotiation. Moon also said Moon-Trump summit next week will be an opportunity for the two leaders to ease tensions between Seoul and Washington. Moon will visit Washington for the summit. In an obvious riposte to the special adviser’s remarks, the U.S. military publicized the dispatching of strategic bombers to South Korea on June 20. Two supersonic B-1B Lancer bombers were dispatched to participate in a joint drill with the South Korean Air Force, a Korean official said. “Today’s dispatch was based on the joint exercise plan created earlier this month,” a military official was quoted as saying by Yonhap. “The United States will send the strategic bombers more than once a month and it will not scale down an exercise plan for this year.” General Vincent Brooks, commander of United States Forces Korea, ordered the military to actively promote the strategic bombers’ participation in the drill, a military source also said. Until recently, the United States has not made public its dispatch of strategic assets. The bombers were sent twice last month, but no media coverage was allowed. (Ser Myo-ja, “Moon’s Adviser in New York Backpedals Hard,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 21, 2017)
Otto Warmbier, the University of Virginia student who was detained in North Korea for nearly a year and a half, died this afternoon, six days after he returned home in a coma, his parents announced. Warmbier, 22, had been medically evacuated last week and was being treated at the University of Cincinnati Medical Center. His parents, Fred and Cindy Warmbier, did not specify the cause of death. But they made clear in a written statement that they blamed North Korea for what happened. Their son was arrested in January 2016 at the end of a brief tourist visit to the isolated country. “Unfortunately, the awful torturous mistreatment our son received at the hands of the North Koreans ensured that no other outcome was possible beyond the sad one we experienced today,” the Warmbiers said. Warmbier’s death was mourned by his wide circle of friends and by complete strangers, and it intensified political reaction to his detention, with outraged critics calling it murder. “There is nothing more tragic for a parent than to lose a child in the prime of life,” President Trump said in a statement. “Our thoughts and prayers are with Otto’s family and friends, and all who loved him. “Otto’s fate deepens my Administration’s determination to prevent such tragedies from befalling innocent people at the hands of regimes that do not respect the rule of law or basic human decency. The United States once again condemns the brutality of the North Korean regime as we mourn its latest victim.” Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said in a statement: “Otto Warmbier, an American citizen, was murdered by the Kim Jong-un regime. In the final year of his life, he lived the nightmare in which the North Korean people have been trapped for 70 years: forced labor, mass starvation, systematic cruelty, torture, and murder. North Korea is threatening its neighbors, destabilizing the Asia-Pacific region, and rapidly developing the technology to strike the American homeland with nuclear weapons. Now it has escalated to brutalizing Americans, including three other citizens currently imprisoned in North Korea. The United States of America cannot and should not tolerate the murder of its citizens by hostile powers.” Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin (Md.), ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in a statement that “Otto is dead because of Kim Jong-un’s repressive, murderous regime,” and that North Korea “must be held accountable for their continued barbaric behavior.” Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) also said North Korea must be held accountable for the “murder.” Warmbier’s death could push Congress or the Trump administration to restrict or ban Americans from traveling to North Korea. Reps. Adam B. Schiff (D-Calif.) and Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) have introduced the North Korea Travel Control Act in the House, which would require Americans who want to travel to North Korea to obtain a license. There would be no licenses for tourists. The Senate has been more reluctant to introduce restrictions on Americans — but Warmbier’s death might be the trigger that they need, analysts say. Separately, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has raised the prospect of the administration using an executive order to ban travel to North Korea. “We have been evaluating whether we should put some type of travel visa restriction to North Korea,” Tillerson told a House committee last week. “We haven’t come to a final conclusion, but we are considering it.” Today, Tillerson issued a statement: “Today we received with deep sadness the news that Otto Warmbier has passed away. “On behalf of the entire State Department and the United States government, I extend my condolences to the Warmbier family, and offer my prayers as they enter a time of grief no parent should ever know. We hold North Korea accountable for Otto Warmbier’s unjust imprisonment, and demand the release of three other Americans who have been illegally detained.” (Susan Svrluga and Anna Fifield, “Otto Warmbier Dies Days after Release from North Korea Detention,” Washington Post, June 19, 2017) Analysts said anger over Warmbier’s death would dim, if not scuttle, any prospect of a less antagonistic relationship in the near future between Washington and Pyongyang, which is still holding three other Americans. The White House has quietly pushed for the release of all the Americans as a first step toward better relations, and President Trump has sometimes publicly indicated a willingness to talk with the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, about its pursuit of nuclear arms and missiles capable of striking the United States. “I believe it’s going to set back any serious discussion about a diplomatic dialogue until this is cleared up,” former Gov. Bill Richardson of New Mexico, an expert on North Korea who has helped extricate Americans held there, said of Warmbier’s death. “I think the first objective has to be to get the three other Americans out, and get a full explanation of what happened to Otto Warmbier.” Jae H. Ku, director of the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, agreed that moves toward diplomacy would be delayed. “I think it’s going to be slowed down. There is going to be a lot of anger and venting of frustrations,” he said. But other analysts said that however horrific the case might be, the Trump administration was unlikely to let it upset the momentum toward dialogue it has built in recent months. They said that Yun’s trip was the first fruit of those efforts and that North Korea may have freed Warmbier to open up space for diplomacy with Washington, even if they anticipated the anger that his condition would provoke in the United States. A statement on June 19 from Mr. Trump about Warmbier condemned the North for its “brutality,” but he and Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson both stopped short of announcing fresh sanctions in response. When Yun held a secret meeting with Choe Son-hui, a senior negotiator from the North Korean Foreign Ministry, in Oslo last month, the North Koreans agreed to look into the matter, these people said. But this month, the North Koreans came back with shocking news: They said Warmbier had been in a coma for more than a year and told the Americans to take him home. North Korea has said it released Warmbier on “humanitarian grounds” but did not explain his medical condition. It has told American officials that Warmbier fell into a coma after contracting botulism, according to his family. American doctors found “extensive” brain damage but could not say what had caused the injury. They found no evidence of botulism, or that Warmbier had been beaten, as one American official had asserted. “Perhaps his condition deteriorated and the authorities decided it was better to release him in a coma than as a corpse,” said John Delury, a North Korea expert at Yonsei University in Seoul. “North Koreans might have feelers out to see if there is a deal to be made with the Trump administration, and releasing Mr. Warmbier is a way to move that process along, while also removing what could be an obstacle down the road.” China, North Korea’s main ally, is a strong advocate for negotiations over the North’s nuclear program, and Warmbier’s death seemed unlikely to change that. At a daily news briefing in Beijing, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, Geng Shuang, called the death “really a tragedy” but stopped short of reprimanding North Korea for its treatment of Warmbier. Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, said that China would not punish North Korea over a human rights issue. “What makes China take steps is a missile or nuclear test, not the death of an American student,” he said. Another Chinese analyst, Cheng Xiaohe, an associate professor of international relations at Renmin University, said Warmbier’s death illustrated the “failure of North Korea’s hostage diplomacy” because it would strengthen “hard-liners” in the Trump administration. He said there could be retaliation from the United States unless Pyongyang took a step like freeing the three remaining American captives. “I believe the U.S. will not let the issue slip away quietly and will take retaliatory actions soon if North Korea fails to make a conciliatory move regarding the detainees,” he said. Warmbier’s case has drawn new attention to the other three American prisoners in North Korea, who Yun was allowed to meet when he visited Pyongyang. (Choe Sang-hun, “Otto Warmbier’s Death a New Wedge between U.S., and North Korea,” New York Times, June 20, 2017, p. ) What happened to Otto Warmbier, an American college student who died just days after North Korea released him from detention in a coma, is difficult to make sense of. It jars so strikingly with the fates of most past detained Americans that outside observers are left struggling not only with the mystery of what killed Warmbier but also with what his death means for attempts by Washington and its allies to stop North Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear-tipped ICBM that can target the U.S. mainland. “The treatment of Otto Warmbier is beyond the pale of North Korea’s usual standards,” said John Delury, an Asia expert at Seoul’s Yonsei University. “It’s worth a forceful response. The U.S. government should not just throw up its hands and say, ‘This is just how North Korea is.’ But how do you do that in a smart way where there is some modicum of accountability?” It may never be known, but there are some clues — as well as widespread speculation. The University of Virginia student was medically evacuated from North Korea last week, more than a year after a court sentenced him to 15 years in prison with hard labor for allegedly trying to steal a propaganda banner. North Korean diplomats at the United Nations had urgently requested a face-to-face meeting with U.S. officials in New York. During the June 6 meeting, Washington learned of Warmbier’s condition. His family said it was told he fell into a coma soon after his March 2016 sentencing after contracting botulism and taking a sleeping pill. Doctors in Cincinnati said they found no active sign of botulism or evidence of beatings. They say he had severe brain damage but they don’t know what caused it. Some observers believe that North Korea became worried because Warmbier’s condition suddenly worsened. “North Korea sent him back to the United States before he died because more questions would have been raised about his death and the situation would have gotten worse if it had returned his dead body,” said Cheong Seong-jang, an analyst at the private Sejong Institute in South Korea. Others believe it is unlikely that North Korea intentionally harmed Warmbier because he was valuable as a political pawn. Poor hygienic conditions, diet or bad medical care may have been responsible for a coma that North Korean doctors couldn’t handle. Or maybe North Korea concealed his medical condition for so long in the hopes that he’d recover. Some outside experts see an internal divide in North Korea between officials who believe solving the long standoff with Seoul and Washington is the best way to improve the country’s economy and international standing, and hard-liners who believe that outside pressure, isolation and animosity help keep the ruling Kim family in power by solidifying domestic support. The last thing conservatives want, the argument goes, is curious American tourists talking with citizens and undercutting decades of propaganda that assures North Koreans that they are the envy of the world. But North Korea has also consistently lobbied Washington for specific concessions that would need deep negotiations, something recent U.S. administrations have been reluctant to pursue because of the North’s weapons programs. North Korea’s demands include a peace treaty to officially end the Korean War and the removal of U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula. “I’m sure there are high-ranking North Koreans who regret what happened to Warmbier and who think this was a mistake,” Delury said. “You’ve got to capitalize on this, and influence their internal debates to get them to recognize and acknowledge what happened.” Another reading is that Warmbier’s death may simply show a pattern of North Korean callousness and a lack of concern over diplomatic repercussions. Outside groups say North Korea tortures thousands of its own citizens at prison camps. And earlier this year the North was suspected of arranging the killing of the half-brother of leader Kim Jong Un with VX nerve agent at a Malaysian airport. Outrage in the United States means that more pressure, not dialogue, is the more likely course. But some analysts believe negotiations could happen because of U.S. worries about the safety of the three other Americans still detained in North Korea. South Korean President Moon Jae-in has been unable to pursue the engagement with the North he favors because of a string of North Korean missile tests. Warmbier’s death could make it even harder, although some analysts think Moon could offer talks with the North as a way to get other detainees out of North Korea. “It’s unlikely that Washington and Seoul will let Warmbier’s death entirely derail their efforts at talks because North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is such a serious and immediate threat,” said Koh Yu-hwan, a North Korea expert at Seoul’s Dongguk University. Still, opponents will question whether such negotiations may give the North more time to expand its nuclear weapons program. Moon said in an interview with CBS television broadcast Tuesday that Warmbier’s death showed “we must now have the perception that North Korea is an irrational regime,” but talks are still necessary because “we were unable to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through only the sanctions and pressure.” Delury said the Trump administration may try to pressure China to cut its large numbers of tourists to North Korea until the North apologizes and releases the other Americans. Whether North Korea will actually respond to pressure or talks is unclear. The country may not worry about much of anything externally, even the death of a young tourist, until it reaches its goal of building a nuclear ICBM that can ease what it sees as decades of U.S. and South Korean hostility. (Foster Klug, “Death of American Detained in North Korea Baffles Experts,” Associated Press, June 20, 2017)
6/20/17:
President Trump said that China had not succeeded in getting North Korea to curb its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, an extraordinary admission of failure in his strategy for dealing with the rogue regime of Kim Jong-un. Trump’s statement — delivered in an almost cavalier tweet, given how ardently he had sought the cooperation of President Xi Jinping of China — came a day after the death of Otto Warmbier, an American college student who had been detained and brutalized in North Korea. Taken together, the developments are a major complication for Trump’s approach to North Korea, which he has called America’s most urgent foreign threat. He now faces a range of unattractive options: the use of military force; more coercive sanctions, including on Chinese banks that do business with the North; or some kind of opening to Kim. “While I greatly appreciate the efforts of President Xi & China to help with North Korea, it has not worked out,” Mr. Trump wrote on Twitter on the eve of a high-level meeting of Chinese and American officials in Washington. “At least I know China tried!” It is not clear how Mr. Trump’s statement will affect tomorrow’s Chinese-American meetings. Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson and other American officials had been planning to press their Chinese counterparts on North Korea. On Tuesday afternoon, senior officials said they were still trying to gauge the meaning of the president’s tweet. Reports late today of renewed activity at a North Korean nuclear site added to the sense of urgency, and underlined how China had failed to curb Kim’s provocative actions. Administration officials said they were considering imposing so-called secondary sanctions on a variety of Chinese banks and companies with ties to North Korea. Such a step would greatly increase the pressure on Mr. Kim’s government, but it could also antagonize the Chinese government. In the short run, Warmbier’s death from a brain injury suffered while he was a prisoner makes engagement with the North seem a more remote possibility. “Clearly, we’re moving further away, not closer, to those conditions being enacted,” said Sean Spicer, the White House press secretary. “I would not suggest that we’re moving any closer.” But China’s failure to do more to pressure North Korea — which was little surprise to anyone who follows the issue — also leaves the United States with few better alternatives to diplomacy. Some American officials had hoped to use the secret negotiations to obtain Warmbier’s release as the predicate for a dialogue with the North on other issues. At first, the White House and State Department said very little about the case, beyond expressing relief that he had been reunited with his family. But as outrage over the death of Mr. Warmbier, a 22-year-old college student, grew on social media and cable television, both released statements late yesterday condemning North Korea for his treatment. Even today, however, Trump appeared to place more of the blame on his predecessor, Barack Obama, for failing to negotiate Warmbier’s release than on Kim. “It’s a disgrace what happened to Otto,” the president said. “Frankly, if he were brought home sooner, I think the results would have been a lot different.” But even as he implicitly criticized his predecessor, Mr. Trump appeared to walk away from one of the biggest gambles of his presidency. At a summit meeting in April at his Palm Beach, Fla., estate, Mar-a-Lago, Trump tried to enlist Xi to ratchet up China’s pressure on North Korea — something China has historically avoided because of fears that it would precipitate a collapse in a country with which it shares a 880-mile border. The president made Mr. Xi the centerpiece of his strategy for North Korea, agreeing to soft-pedal his complaints during the 2016 campaign about China’s trade and currency practices in return for Beijing squeezing its neighbor to curb its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. “I explained to the President of China that a trade deal with the U.S. will be far better for them if they solve the North Korean problem,” Trump declared in a morning tweet a few days after the summit meeting. As the evidence accumulated that China was taking only modest steps against North Korea, impatience with Beijing mounted inside the White House. But in his tweet on Tuesday, Trump seemed to take pains not to allow his disappointment to affect the relationship he has cultivated with the Chinese leader. “The question we’ve all been waiting to have answered is, ‘When does President Trump realize that Xi Jinping is not going to deliver North Korea for him, and what does he do when that happens?’” said Ely Ratner, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Otto Warmbier’s death accelerates that day of reckoning.” Some China experts said the administration could use Warmbier’s death as leverage to demand that China put pressure on North Korea to release three other Americans being held there. “The Chinese will only spring into action if they recognize the status quo is unsustainable,” said Evan S. Medeiros, a former senior director for Asia in Mr. Obama’s National Security Council. Even apart from North Korea, relations with China could soon turn more contentious. Within days, the administration is expected to declare that foreign steel imports threaten the domestic steel industry. That will lead Mr. Trump to impose duties that will anger the Chinese, a major steel producer. “This initial period of calm in the U.S.-China relationship was not sustainable,” said Eric Altbach, senior vice president at the Albright Stonebridge Group. “We’re reaching the end of the beginning for the Trump administration, and things are only going to get worse.” (Mark Landler and Gardiner Harris, “Trump Says Push by China Failed on North Korea,” New York Times, June 21, 2017,
Moon interview with Lally Weymouth: “Q: You seem to want to engage with North Korea. During the campaign, you talked about going to Pyongyang to meet Kim Jong Un. Do you think this is a good idea? A: If the right conditions are met, then I still believe it is a good idea. Q: What are those? A: President Trump also mentioned that under the right conditions, he is willing to engage in dialogue with North Korea. Regarding exactly how, we do not have a detailed way forward. It must be in close consultation with the United States. But there is one thing I would like to stress: Korea should now play a larger and more leading role in this process. During the periods when South Korea played a more active role, the inter-Korean relationship was more peaceful, and there was less tension between the United States and North Korea. The last U.S. administration pursued a policy of strategic patience and did not make any effort to improve its relationship with North Korea. Also, the previous Korean government did not make any such efforts. The result is the reality you see today — North Korea continuing to advance its nuclear and missile program. Q: You’ve also discussed reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a joint North-South project from which Seoul withdrew early last year after another rocket test. But this would be a violation of United Nations sanctions. What is your plan? A: The engagement that I am talking about is actually very similar to the engagement that President Trump is talking about. He has put the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue at the top of his priority list, and he has employed a tactic of maximum pressure and engagement, but engagement [can only occur] if the conditions are right. Q: Are you willing to collaborate with the United States on putting maximum pressure on North Korea? A: Yes. As long as North Korea continues its provocations, I believe that we will have no choice but to apply additional and strong pressure on it. At the same time, it is also important to send out a message to North Korea that if it decides to denuclearize and to come to the negotiating table, then we are willing to assist them. Q: What do you mean? Are you talking about a freeze of its weapons program? A: For example, the reopening of Kaesong. This is something we can do at a later stage, when North Korea has made some progress on denuclearization. [For now] we must continue to strengthen our sanctions and pressure on North Korea. Q: Wouldn’t reopening Kaesong violate U.S. and U.N. sanctions? A: Yes, that is true. But what Korea and the U.S. both ultimately seek to achieve is the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program. Q: Do you think that is possible? North Korea has conducted five nuclear tests and is firing off more and more ballistic missiles. Why is Kim Jong Un going to denuclearize? A: It seems Kim Jong Un firmly believes that developing nuclear missile capabilities will provide security and guarantee his regime. We must make it clear that it is not nuclear and missile programs that will protect Kim Jong Un and his regime. The goal of the international sanctions and pressure is to make it unbearable for Kim Jong Un if he does not accept this fact. On the other hand, we are continuously trying to send a message that giving up its nuclear program and coming to the negotiating table is the right path for North Korea to protect itself and achieve its development. North Korea continues to advance its nuclear technology and will soon reach weaponization. Regarding its intercontinental ballistic missiles, it is continuously making progress. So currently, it is urgent for us to freeze North Korea’s program so they will stop additional provocations and stop advancement of its technologies. I believe during my upcoming summit meeting in the U.S. I will be able to discuss a two-phased approach to the North Korean nuclear issue — the first being a freeze and the second being complete dismantlement. Q: You are getting ready to meet Trump. What do you hope will come out of the meeting? A: President Trump and I have a common goal — that is the complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the process of working toward that common goal, the friendship and trust between the two of us will be very important. I hope we will be able to show the world that the collaboration between our two countries is strong and will continue to grow stronger. Q: The United States sent an anti-ballistic-missile system — the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense, or THAAD — to South Korea, but some in Washington are frustrated that your administration has not fully deployed it. A: The decision to deploy was made by the previous administration. I have made it clear that I will not take the decision [to finish installing the final four batteries] lightly. Q: Does that mean you will deploy THAAD? A: It is not that simple. We have deployed the radar component of the THAAD system and two launchers. But we must go through due process, which involves an environmental-impact assessment. Q: When you go to Washington next week, President Trump is obviously going to ask you whether you intend to deploy THAAD. A: Getting the environmental-impact assessment does not mean that we will cancel or reverse the decision to deploy. Q: Before you became president, you were a famous human rights lawyer. People in the United States are very upset about the death of American student Otto Warmbier at the hands of the North Koreans. How do you feel about the overall human rights situation in the North? A: It is very deplorable that North Korea still does not uphold human rights, which are universal values. That includes foreigners. There is still some speculation as to how Mr. Warmbier fell into a coma. [But] the North Korean authorities had the responsibility to immediately inform the family of this fact and to ensure he would receive the best possible treatment. Yet North Korea tried to withhold and hide this fact. This was a cruel act. I would like to extend my deep condolences to Mr. Warmbier’s family and to the American people. Q: In your current agreement with the United States, your wartime forces come under U.S. command. But your new defense minister has long wanted to reverse this policy. Do you agree with him? A: As a sovereign state, we should have operational command of our forces returned to us at an appropriate time. Korea and the United States have already reached an agreement where we will receive operational control of our forces when the conditions are met. I would like to add that Korea and the U.S. have maintained a combined forces command system for a long time. Even if [we] were to get operational control back, as long as this combined system is maintained, our countries will continue to have combined security, and U.S. forces will continue to play their part in our security. Q: What is your assessment of Kim Jong Un? Is he crazy? Or is he being smart by building a nuclear program so that he can have some importance? How do you see him? A: He is an unreasonable leader and a very dangerous person. Yet he is the person who has effective control over North Korea, and he is the person who has the authority to denuclearize North Korea. Q: Or to use the weapons. A: That is correct. So we face the task of the complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program while dealing with such a leader. Q: It won’t be easy to get Kim suddenly to decide to stop his missile tests. I assume he thinks his regime would go if his weapons went. A: When it comes to getting rid of North Korea’s nuclear missile capabilities, it is the Republic of Korea that faces the greatest threat. For the United States, this is a threat, but to us, this is a matter of life and death. Although Kim Jong Un is a very unreasonable leader and has a firm, unreasonable belief that nuclear and missile weapons will protect him and his regime, we will continue to employ all possible means — sanctions, pressure as well as dialogue — to draw North Korea to the negotiating table for denuclearization. To resolve the issue we have to add dialogue to the current menu of sanctions and pressure. Every time North Korea commits an additional provocation, the U.N. Security Council passes another resolution. But when it comes to dialogue, currently there is nothing set. I hope to have frank and open discussions with President Trump on this issue. Q: Do you feel that your administration might have a way to conduct a dialogue with the North that the rest of the world — including the United States — might not have? A: When it comes to dialogue between South and North Korea and between the United States and North Korea, these can go on parallel tracks. South Korea and the United States can each play a role. Q: President Park Geun-hye, who was removed from office this year amid corruption charges, took a tougher line toward Pyongyang. She shut down money flows to North Korea from African countries like Uganda — where she stopped Uganda’s military and security cooperation with North Korea. A: Yes. . . . This had no effect, and North Korea continued to advance its nuclear and missile programs. Q: So your message is that you have to have another approach to North Korea? And South Korea should play a bigger role? A: Yes. The message that we must send to North Korea is twofold — if the North Korean regime believes that it can defend and protect itself through nuclear and missile programs, that is a misjudgment. But if North Korea gives up its nuclear program, we will help it secure and develop itself. We must consistently send these two messages. Q: Does that start with family visits right now? A new kind of Sunshine Policy? A: Humanitarian assistance and exchanges are still allowed, even under the sanctions regime on North Korea. Therefore, in parallel with sanctions and pressure, we must also employ humanitarian assistance. The meeting of separated families is also a measure to ensure human rights. Q: Does humanitarian assistance include sending money and aid? A: Sending money or hard currency to North Korea is prohibited under U.N. Security Council resolutions. Q: You’ve questioned the 2015 “comfort-women” agreement with Japan, in which Prime Minister Shinzo Abe apologized for his country’s use of Korean sex slaves before and during World War II — and established a $9 million victims’ fund. Are you going to revisit that? A: The comfort-women agreement that we made with Japan during the last administration is not accepted by the people of Korea, particularly by the victims. They are against this agreement. The core to resolving the issue is for Japan to take legal responsibility for its actions and to make an official [government] apology. But we should not block the advancement of Korea-Japan bilateral relations just because of this one issue.” (Lally Weymouth, “South Korea’s New President: ‘Trump and I Have a Common Goal,” Washington Post, June 20, 2017)
Two U.S. long-range strategic bombers will train with South Korea’s fighter jets over the peninsula later today as part of a regular combined exercise, defense officials said. “Our Air Force plans to hold a joint drill with two B-1Bs in the sky of the Korean Peninsula today,” Lt. Col. Kim Sung-duk, a public relations officer of the South Korean Air Force, told reporters. The B-1B Lancers are scheduled to fly over Korea for a few hours along with two F-15K fighter jets, he added. He pointed out the allies have regularly conducted such a joint air training. (Lee Chi-dong, “Two B-1 Bombers to Train over Korea,” Yonhap, June 20, 2017)
Namkung: “Hankyoreh (Hani): There are serious concerns that Otto Warmbier being released in a coma could worsen North Korea-US relations. Tony Namkung (Namkung): While this is an unfortunate situation, I think it could actually have a positive effect. Warmbier’s release was the first example in a very long time of cooperation between the US and North Korean governments. Doctors have said that Warmbier was not malnourished and that there was no evidence of torture or other cruel treatment. Hani: Why do you think he was only released now? Namkung: Last year, the so-called “decapitation operation” was included in the South Korea-US joint military exercises, which infuriated North Korea. I think the reason they‘ve released him now is because they consider President Trump to be someone they can negotiate with. Hani: Are you saying that there could be behind the scenes contact between the US and North Korea? Namkung: I think there could be. When Joseph Yun (US State Department special representative for North Korea policy) visited Pyongyang to arrange Warmbier’s release, he visited all three of the Americans detained there. That’s worth paying attention to. North Korea seems to have sent a clear signal. Hani: The Trump administration has chosen “maximum pressure and engagement” as its North Korean policy. Namkung: It’s a two-stage process. The first stage is applying “maximum pressure” to bring North Korea to the table for talks. The second stage of “maximum engagement” implies the possibility of making completely unprecedented proposals to North Korea, such as a peace treaty, normalization of relations and revoking sanctions. But North Korea won‘t be interested in this kind of stage-based strategy. Pressure or engagement-you can only choose one of the two. This policy framework needs to be changed. Hani: Is North Korea’s denuclearization a prerequisite for dialogue? Namkung: Reports of that sort appear in the South Korean media, but I’m not sure what the grounds are for that. Denuclearization is supposed to be what the negotiations culminate in; it can’t be their prerequisite. Hani: Do you think dialogue would be possible if North Korea postpones its nuclear weapons and missile tests? Namkung: On a personal level, I think so. But right now we‘re just at the initial phase. Hani: South Korea’s new administration has expressed its willingness to restore inter-Korean relations. Namkung: North Korea puts a priority on political and military issues, which are issues that it has to work through with the US. Improving inter-Korean relations comes after that. If progress is made on talks between the US and North Korea, that could actually lead to a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations. South Korea can’t take the lead in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, but it can take the lead in North Korea-US dialogue aimed at resolving that issue. Hani: Do you have any advice for the upcoming South Korea-US summit? Namkung: President Trump is completely different from previous politicians. President Moon Jae-in should also deviate from familiar formulas and bring new ideas. It’s important to ask what role South Korea will play [in North Korea-US relations]. (Jung In-hwan and Kim Ji-eun, “Tony Namkung Says Moon Jae-in Should Lead Way to Three-Way Dialogue,” Hankyore, June 20, 2017)
U.S. spy satellites have detected new activity at North Korea’s underground nuclear test site for the first time in several weeks, two US officials told CNN. The activity appears to involve some modifications around one of the tunnel entrances to an underground test area. The officials said it is not yet clear if the activity indicates a sixth nuclear test is imminent, but noted there is concern that North Korea could set off a test during tomorrow’s visit to Washington by top Chinese diplomats and military officials. US officials have known that the site is ready to conduct an underground test for some time. Two senior US officials with direct knowledge also told CNN that military options for North Korea have recently been updated, and will be presented to President Donald Trump for a decision to act if there is a nuclear test. However, there is no indication whether any military response would actually happen. U.S. officials told CNN that if a sixth nuclear test by North Korea were to occur, it would be clear that the existing pressure by China on North Korea is not working. However, other senior US officials said the administration’s policy hinges on pressuring North Korea through China. Trump has often cited China, North Korea’s longtime ally, as a key player in US efforts to rein in North Korea’s quest to develop long-range nuclear missiles. But the US President took to Twitter today to offer a grim assessment of China’s role in restraining North Korea: “While I greatly appreciate the efforts of President Xi & China to help with North Korea, it has not worked out. At least I know China tried!” Multiple US officials told CNN they are checking on what the President meant in his latest tweet about how China’s efforts in North Korea have “not worked out.” One Trump administration official said bluntly they didn’t know what the President was referencing when asked what the tweet meant. Another said there was no meeting earlier today that they believe could have spurred Trump’s comment, and pushed back on the idea that the tweet could be a hint of some forthcoming diplomatic or military action. White House press secretary Sean Spicer painted a rosier picture on Tuesday, telling reporters that the US is continuing to work with China to apply pressure on North Korea and said the US has seen “positive movement” with China. The US will “continue to work with them and others to put the appropriate pressure on North Korea to change the behavior of this regime,” Spicer said. Asked whether Trump would still consider meeting with Kim Jong Un given the right conditions, Spicer said, “Clearly we’re moving further away, not closer, to those conditions being met.” But the U.S. officials said it will be at least a year before they can evaluate whether the North Koreans are feeling pressure because of China. In a recent exchange with Sen. Lindsay Graham on Capitol Hill, Defense Secretary James Mattis took an unusually specific stand on US military policy. Graham asked: “Is it the policy of the Trump administration to deny North Korea the capability of building an (intercontinental ballistic missile) that can hit the American homeland with a nuclear weapon on top? Is that the policy?” Mattis answered simply: “Yes.” (Barbara Starr, Elise Labott and Zachary Cohen, “U.S. Spy Satellites Detect Activity at North Korea Nuclear Test Site,” CNN, June, 20, 2017)
6/21/17:
The Trump administration has come under growing pressure to open negotiations on a temporary freeze on North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests in return for reducing the American military footprint in the Korean Peninsula, according to American officials and foreign diplomats. Versions of the proposal, floated by Beijing for several months, have been revived several times this week, first by South Korea’s newly installed president and then by China’s foreign minister and one of its top military officials in talks on Wednesday with Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis. But White House officials say they are not interested in any proposal that would require the United States to lift military or economic pressure on the North, even in return for a moratorium on tests. Instead, Mr. Tillerson and Mr. Mattis publicly pressed the Chinese to exert more diplomatic and economic pressure on Pyongyang, though President Trump indicated on Twitter on June 20 that he had just about given up on obtaining help from the Chinese. “China understands that the United States regards North Korea as our top security threat,” Tillerson told reporters at a news conference after meetings with his Chinese counterpart, Yang Jiechi, and Gen. Fang Fenghui, in the first security dialogue with Beijing conducted by the Trump administration. “We reiterated to China that they have a diplomatic responsibility to exert much greater economic and diplomatic pressure on the regime if they want to prevent further escalation in the region.” But like his predecessors, Trump is gradually learning that for all its talk about cooperation, China is deeply reluctant to take any measures that could seriously destabilize the North Korean government, for fear the country might collapse or be absorbed by the South. So China’s strategy has been to buy time — and preserve the status quo — with talks that may be linked to some kind of testing freeze. They may now have a new advocate of that approach, President Moon Jae-in of South Korea, who was elected on a platform pledging resumed engagement with the North. On Tuesday, he embraced a similar idea, telling Norah O’Donnell of CBS News in an interview that a freeze could be a way station to a second phase of talks that would “achieve the complete dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear program.” In an interview broadcast on Wednesday, the North Korean ambassador to India, Kye Chun-yong, said his country was willing to consider a moratorium on nuclear and ballistic missile tests if the United States and South Korea stopped their annual joint military exercises. “Under certain circumstances, we are willing to talk in terms of freezing nuclear testing or missile testing,” Mr. Kye said, speaking in English. “For instance, if the American side completely stops big, large-scale military exercises temporarily or permanently, then we will also temporarily stop. Let’s talk about how to solve the Korean issue peacefully.” But to American officials, a freeze is a trap that previous administrations have stepped into. The Clinton administration tried a freeze in 1994 that the North Koreans first cheated on and then openly discarded early in the administration of President George W. Bush. At the end of Bush’s term, a second such freeze and partial dismantlement of a nuclear reactor was negotiated, only to be abandoned by the North Koreans as soon as President Barack Obama entered office. Tillerson himself rejected the idea of such a negotiated freeze when he visited South Korea early this year, saying that it would simply enshrine “a comprehensive set of capabilities” that North Korea has already developed, a reference to its arsenal of a dozen or more nuclear weapons and a growing fleet of short- and medium-range missiles that can hit American troops in the region, along with South Korea and Japan. But the idea has been embraced by some longtime Korea experts, including former Defense Secretary William J. Perry, who say that it is the only way to buy some time before North Korea successfully tests an intercontinental ballistic missile that could reach the United States. All the other options available to the United States have major drawbacks. They include secondary sanctions on Chinese banks and companies doing business with North Korea; a military strike; or simple acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power. Secondary sanctions could ignite a trade war. Even a limited military strike could lead North Korea to attack Seoul with conventional weapons, with potentially catastrophic results. And few in the United States government are ready to accept North Korea as an established nuclear power. Without a clear alternative, the Trump administration remains committed to urging China to crack down on Pyongyang. Some 90 percent of North Korea’s trade is with China. And although China recently banned imports of North Korea coal, overall trade between the two countries has actually been increasing. Tillerson said countries around the world were cracking down on activities North Korea uses to fund its weapons programs, “and we hope China will do their part as well.” Mattis vowed to “continue to take necessary measures to defend ourselves and our allies.” (David E. Sanger and Gardiner Harris, “U.S. Pressed to Pursue Deal to Freeze North Korea Missile Tests,” New York Times, June 22, 2017, p. A-12)
The United States said that China has a responsibility to exert much greater pressure on North Korea to prevent escalating tensions with a government that ignores the law and “provokes and provokes and provokes.” At the security talks, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson hosted Chinese foreign policy chief Yang Jiechi and Gen. Fang Fenghui, chief of the People’s Liberation Army’s joint staff department. “China understands that the United States regards North Korea as our top security threat,” Tillerson said. “We reiterated to China that it has a diplomatic responsibility to exert much greater economic and diplomatic pressure on the regime if they want to prevent further escalation in the region.” Tillerson called for increased efforts to curtail the North’s illicit revenue streams of revenue that allegedly help fund its nuclear weapon and missile programs. He said the two sides agreed on the need for companies not to deal with North Korea in violation of U.N. sanctions, but did not specify any particular action China was promising to take. Mattis said China “continues to work these issues.” Trump tweeted ahead of today’s talks that Beijing’s efforts to sway Pyongyang weren’t working. That comment came amid outrage in Washington over the death of Otto Warmbier days after the comatose American student was released from imprisonment in North Korea. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said Trump’s commentary “represents the American people’s view of North Korea right now. We see a young man go over there healthy and with a minor act of mischief” and come home on the verge of death. “What you are seeing I think is the American people’s frustration with the regime that provokes and provokes and provokes and basically plays outside rules, plays fast and loose with the truth,” Mattis told a news conference. North Korea conducts about 90 percent of its trade through China, which maintains that it implements the U.N. sanctions properly. Chinese officials were not immediately available for comment after the talks. Beforehand, China said it was hoping for “positive outcomes” from today’s dialogue. It had long pushed for a resumption of U.S. negotiations with North Korea, which currently appears a remote prospect. The talks also covered the South China Sea, where Beijing’s island-building and construction of possible military facilities have rattled neighbors and caused tension with Washington. The officials also discussed U.S.-Chinese military cooperation to reduce risk of conflict, as well as efforts to defeat the Islamic State group. Divisive trade issues will be dealt with at a later date. Washington has one threat it can use with Beijing: the possibility of “secondary” sanctions that go after Chinese companies doing business in North Korea. Such a move risks fraying relations between the world’s two biggest economies. The Chinese state-run Global Times warned in an editorial that if Washington imposes sanctions against Chinese enterprises “it will lead to grave friction between China and the U.S.” (Matthew Pennington, “U.S.: China Needs to Exert ‘Much Greater Pressure’ on N. Korea,” Associated Press, June 22, 2017) China and the United States agreed that efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula should be “complete, verifiable and irreversible”, Chinese state media said on Saturday, reporting the results of high level talks in Washington this week. “Both sides reaffirm that they will strive for the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” a consensus document released by Xinhua said. The consensus document also highlighted the need to fully and strictly hold to U.N. Security Council resolutions and push for dialogue and negotiation, which has long been China’s position on the issue. Military-to-military exchanges should also be upgraded and mechanisms of notification established in order to cut the risks of “judgment errors” between the Chinese and U.S. militaries, the statement also said. (Christian Shepherd, “China, U.S. Agree on Aim of ‘Complete, Irreversible’ Korean Denuclearization,” Reuters, June 24, 2016)
Tillerson, Mattis briefing: “…TILLERSON: Hello. Good afternoon, all. I do want to thank Secretary Mattis, State Councilor Yang Jiechi, and PLA Chief of Joint Staff Fang Fenghui for a day of very productive meetings. Secretary Mattis and I were quite pleased to host the first session of the Diplomatic Security Dialogue since we agreed on this format at the presidential summit in Mar-a-Lago. This is one of four distinct dialogue areas that will implement our President’s vision for constructive, results-oriented bilateral relations. We’re sustaining these regular talks at a much higher level than in previous years and among principals in both the civilian and the military agencies. President Trump, I know, looks forward to his state visit to China later this year. …The most acute threat in the region today is posed by the DPRK. We both call for complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. And we call on the DPRK to halt its illegal nuclear weapons program and its ballistic missile test as stipulated in the UN Security Council resolutions. We reaffirmed our commitment to implement in full all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. For example, we both agreed that our companies should not do business with any UN-designated North Korean entities in accordance with these resolutions. China understands that the United States regards North Korea as our top security threat. We reiterated to China that they have a diplomatic responsibility to exert much greater economic and diplomatic pressure on the regime if they want to prevent further escalation in the region. Whether it is money laundering, extorting Korean expatriates, or malicious cyber activity, North Korea has engaged in a number of criminal enterprises that help fund its weapons programs. We must step up our efforts to help to curtail these sources of revenue. Countries around the world and in the UN Security Council are joining in this effort and we hope China will do their part as well. The United States remains committed to …holding North Korea accountable for multiple violations of UN Security Council resolutions which expressly prohibit its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. We regret that it is the North Korean people who suffer when the regime diverts resources to these prohibited programs, and we urge the DPRK regime to choose a better path for its people. … MATTIS: Well, thank you, Secretary Tillerson. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. A few words to add to Secretary Tillerson’s report, to give you something from the defense perspective. This has been a unique opportunity for our nations to engage in philosophical-level discussions about how we discuss these issues and to discuss the way ahead, together hosting our counterparts, State Councilor Yang and General Fang. In this first round of dialogues agreed to by our presidents at the summit at Mar-a-Lago, we gained a glimpse of a mutually beneficial future that we can create. As Secretary Tillerson mentioned, the United State seeks a constructive and a results-oriented relationship with China. Events like the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue we just completed represent our effort to elevate and focus our bilateral discussions. I’m committed to improving the U.S.-China defense relationship so that it remains a stabilizing element in our overall relationship. Our two nations can and do cooperate in mutually beneficial ways. We prioritize mechanisms that contribute to greater risk reduction between our armed forces, that open and maintain effective channels of communication between us, and that expand areas of cooperation where we can. At the same time, we do manage our differences where we have them, and while competition between our nations is bound to occur, conflict is not inevitable. This afternoon, we affirmed North Korea’s nuclear missile program is a threat to peace and security in the Asia Pacific region. We also affirmed our strong commitment to cooperate, including through the UN, to realize our shared goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, we will continue to take necessary measures to defend ourselves and our allies. …MS NAUERT: Barbara Plett from BBC. Q: Thank you. Secretary Mattis, the President seemed to signal yesterday that he was extremely angry and frustrated with North Korea, and that China had failed in its attempt to help on that. Despite these continued efforts at cooperation, is the administration beginning to think that China will not be able to rein North Korea in, and is there any consideration of new, direct action? In particular, has the military posture changed in any way? And if I may, a question on the South China Sea. Control of the South China Sea is a fundamental part of China’s strategic policy. Freedom of navigation efforts notwithstanding, how far is the U.S. willing to go to prevent militarization? Thank you. MATTIS: In regards to the President’s view of North Korea, I believe he represents the American people’s view of North Korea right now. We see a young man go over there healthy, and with a minor act of mischief, come home dead, basically – die shortly – immediately after he gets here. There is no way that we can look at a situation like this with any kind of understanding. This is – goes beyond any kind of understanding of law and order, of humanity, of responsibility towards any human being. So what you’re seeing, I think, is the American people’s frustration with a regime that provokes, and provokes, and provokes, and basically plays outside the rules, plays fast and loose with the truth, that sort of thing. As far as China’s role, China continues to work these issues. We – the reason for this dialogue that we had today was to have an open and frank dialogue about what more can be done in areas of common interest. I would point out to you that China’s end state on the Korean Peninsula in terms of nuclear weapons is the same as ours, and we continue to work towards that end state. On South China Sea, this is a dialogue where we identify areas where we can work together and to understand those areas where we have, I would call them disconnects, where are our understanding of the problem is very different from theirs. And we had that discussion here today, and we’ll continue to work – to close gaps in our understanding and to work some kind of manner in the future that removes these irritants. But I would say for right now that’s the whole purpose for the dialogue that we held here today, and we will be holding more in the future.” (DoS, Secretray of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis at a Joint Press Availability, Washington, June 21, 2017)
North Korea’s ambassador to India says his country may halt its nuclear and missile tests “temporarily” if the U.S. and South Korea cease their joint military exercises near the Korean Peninsula. Under certain circumstances, “we are willing to talk in terms of freezing nuclear testing and missile testing,” Kye Chun Yong said. The rare official comment was aired Wednesday by Indian news channel WION, which recorded the interview with the ambassador Tuesday. Kye discussed the possibility of a “moratorium” on such weapons testing, saying that should the American side “completely stop the big, large-scale military exercises, stopping temporarily or permanently, then we are also temporarily stopping.” The North Korean diplomat noted in the interview that President Donald Trump “said there [were] so many options including [military action], so we should be ready [for] both of them, dialogue and militarily.” North Korea is open to dialogue with the U.S. “anytime,” Kye said, but he deemed “unacceptable” any preconditions such as an advance statement to “withdraw the missile program [and] nuclear program.” But the ambassador offered a moderate gesture to the South, saying Pyongyang is “encouraging the inter-Korean dialogue.” He indicated North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s willingness to have a direct dialogue with Moon Jae-in. “Possessing nuclear weapons is inevitable,” Kye said, emphasizing the “very arduous choice to defend the right of existence.” He cited Pyongyang’s analysis that a denuclearization applying only to the Korean Peninsula carries little meaning because the U.S. and its allies “deployed a lot of nuclear weapons around Korean Peninsula, in Japan, in Guam and some small islands belonging to America.” (Kuronuma Yuji, “North Korean Diplomat Offers Compromise to Halt Nuclear Tests,” Nikkei Asian Review, June 23, 2017)
The short, unexpected honeymoon that China enjoyed with President Trump seems to be in trouble, dashing hopes in Beijing that the two countries had embarked on a new, businesslike relationship. “While I greatly appreciate the efforts of President Xi & China to help with North Korea, it has not worked out,” Trump wrote on Twitter June 20, ahead of a high-level meeting of Chinese and American officials on June 21 in Washington, signaling a harder line. Trump did not detail what might follow that conclusion, but the options on the table with North Korea — including more coercive sanctions that could target Chinese companies trading with the country, a military buildup and even the use of force — are all deeply objectionable to Beijing. At the same time, Trump had previously suggested he was holding off on getting tough on China’s trade policies in return for Xi’s help with reining in North Korea, often engaging in public flattery of the leader. Now, Xi and his colleagues in Beijing must ask — again — whether Trump is serious about the threats he made on the campaign trail. The prospect of a rockier relationship is particularly sensitive now as Xi prepares to preside over the Communist Party’s 19th National Party Congress in the fall. He is said to want to use the gathering to consolidate his authority and reshuffle the leadership, and he does not want any foreign crises to be distractions. “What Trump is saying is, I don’t need you on North Korea now, and therefore maybe we should have it out on these other issues, like trade,” said John Delury, an expert on China and the Koreas at Yonsei University in Seoul. The official response from China was fairly muted, though strained. “I have to say that the crux of the Korean Peninsula problem and the focal point of the conflict is not China,” a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Geng Shuang, said at a briefing today. He added: “Resolving the Korean Peninsula issue requires joint efforts, and it won’t work if it depends on China alone.” At the same time, he said that “China’s role is indispensable.” The statement by Trump, although couched in appreciative words for Xi, surprised and annoyed analysts in Beijing. China had taken significant steps to tighten trade with the North, they said, and the United States had, as always, not given sanctions enough time to take effect. “China has done its best, and these sanctions are working,” said Lu Chao, director of the Border Study Institute at the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences, a government research organization in Shenyang. “Given time, they will have a greater impact on the economy.” Cheng Xiaohe, an associate professor of international relations at Renmin University of China in Beijing, said that Xi’s government had learned not to take Trump’s Twitter messages at face value. “The Chinese government assumes Trump’s tweets do not necessarily represent the administration,” he said. “The government cannot treat them very seriously. Trump changes all the time.” He added that the new round of meetings in Washington came at a “very critical period” and that the government would try to sustain the positive momentum of the first few months of the Trump presidency. Officials in Beijing had expressed confidence that their gestures to Trump — including the lifting on Tuesday of a 14-year embargo on American beef imports — would placate Trump, whose platform as a candidate had signaled a more confrontational policy. “Why would I call China a currency manipulator when they are working with us on the North Korean problem?” he wrote in a tweet in April, defending the reversal of a campaign promise. China’s willingness to help with North Korea — or at least be seen to be helping — became the foundation of that relationship. In recent weeks, however, White House officials signaled a growing frustration with Beijing, arguing that Mr. Trump’s bet had not paid off. The president appears to have reached the same conclusion. “We understand the Americans are angry over the student’s death,” said Jin Qiangyi, director of the Center for North and South Korea Studies at Yanbian University in Yanbian, near China’s border with North Korea. But imposing new sanctions targeting Chinese companies would only lead to more problems, he said. “The United States may want to smoke North Korea out with sanctions so it would drop its nuclear programs, but we doubt this will work,” he said. “This is a country that has managed to go through decades of sanctions.” (Steven Lee Myers, “China’s Trump Honeymoon: Unexpected, and at Risk of Ending,” New York Times, June 22, 2017)
Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country (CPRC) of the DPRK spokesman’s answer to a question raised by KCNA “as regards the fact that the present south Korean chief executive is taking issue with the DPRK: The present chief executive of south Korea continues sinister acts while crying out for implementing the north-south agreement and settling the issues through dialogue after coming to power. …In his official and unofficial appearances, in particular, the chief executive of south Korea unhesitatingly spat out wrong words taking issue with the DPRK over its measures for bolstering up nuclear force, claiming that “it is only international isolation and economic difficulties for the north to get from provocation” and “it is necessary to pressurize and apply sanctions against the north through strong cooperation with the international community”, contrary to the commitment made by him while talking about the improved north-south relations in the past “presidential election.” In a “congratulatory speech” at an “event marking the 17th anniversary of the June 15 south-north summit” he groundlessly slandered the north, claiming that “the north’s nuclear and missile development serves as serious concern threatening peace and stability of the region and international community” and “the north differs in words and acts by highly modernizing nuclear weapons and missiles while urging the south to respect and implement the June 15 joint declaration and the October 4 declaration.” It is needless to say that all these facts are trickeries to shift the blame for not improving the north-south relations on to the DPRK. The south Korean chief executive is working hard to save his face by finding fault with the DPRK. But it is a self-destructive act of pushing him into a quagmire. He should stop a reckless and foolish words and deeds irritating the other party and have a proper attitude toward the north-south relations, to begin with. He should make a responsible start in the fatal crossroads of whether he would leave clean trace in the national history by improving the north-south relations with the stand of By Our Nation Itself and according to the mindset of the candlelight demonstrators or follow in the miserable footsteps of his predecessors by fawning favor with foreign forces and conservatives.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for CPRC Urges S. Korean Chief Executive to Have Proper Attitude to North-South Relations,” June 21, 2017)
North Korea has carried out another test of a rocket engine that the United States believes could be part of its program to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile, a U.S. official told Reuters. The United States assessed that the test, the latest in a series of engine and missile trials this year, could be for the smallest stage of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) rocket engine, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. A second U.S. official also confirmed the test but did not provide additional details on the type of rocket component that was being tested or whether it fit into the ICBM program. One official said he believed the test had taken place within the past 24 hours. North Korea’s state media, which is normally quick to publicize successful missile-related developments, did not carry any reports on the engine test. South Korean officials did not have details about the reported test and declined to comment on the possible nature of the engine. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said China opposed any action that violated UN Security Council resolutions and called for restraint from all parties. (Phil Stewart, “North Korea Tests Rocket Engine, Possibly for ICBM: U.S Officials,” Reuters, June 23, 2017) Joseph Bermudez: “North Korea conducted another test of a rocket engine that could potentially be used on a future intercontinental ballistic missile, Fox News reported June 22, quoting two U.S. officials. Reuters news agency ran a similar report, quoting a U.S. official as saying the test, the latest in a series of engine and missile tests conducted by the country this year, could be for the smallest stage of an ICBM rocket engine. Another U.S. official confirmed the test, but did not provide details such as the type of rocket component that was being tested or whether it fit into the country’s ICBM program, according to Reuters. Although military experts believe North Korea could still be years away from acquiring a reliable ICBM capability, Robert Soofer, deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy, said earlier this month that Pyongyang “is poised to conduct its first ICBM test in 2017.” (Kyodo, “N. Korea Tests Rocket Engine in Suspected ICBM Development,” June 21, 2017) Recent commercial satellite imagery confirms media reports that North Korea conducted a rocket engine test at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station on, or about, June 22. While it was reported that this test “could be for the smallest stage of an ICBM rocket engine,” and the June 22 imagery shows evidence of a recent small rocket engine test, it is not possible to confirm whether this test was for an ICBM engine using imagery alone. Both natural-color and color-infrared imagery of the vertical engine test stand from June 22 show numerous tire tracks on the test stand’s apron and at the nearby garage that were not previously present in a June 10 image, indicating recent heavy vehicular traffic. Such traffic is similar to that seen for previous engine tests. More significantly, the image shows widespread, but minor, damage to vegetation surrounding the base of the test stand where rocket engine exhaust is directed during tests. The minor damage suggests that the recently conducted test was of a relatively small engine. Whether the engine test was “for the smallest stage of an ICBM rocket engine” or some other system cannot be determined from the imagery alone. No vehicles or personnel are observed in or around the test stand. The fact that this test was conducted only twelve days after the June 10 image showed no evidence of test preparations reinforces that North Korea possesses the technical and logistical capabilities to conduct such tests with little or no advance warning.” (Joseph Bermudez, “Imagery Coonfirms Recent Media Reports of Failed Rocket Engine Test,” 38North, June 27, 2017)
Ties between the U.S. and South Korea have cooled after a special adviser to South Korean President Moon Jae-in suggested scaling back joint military exercises, even as Washington ramps up its rhetoric on Pyongyang over the death of a college student. “If North Korea suspends its nuclear and missile activities, then we may consult with the U.S. about scaling down … joint exercises and training,” Moon Chung-in said at an event in Washington on June 16. “We may scale down deployment of American strategic weapons [in] the Korean Peninsula,” the adviser also said. The U.S. reacted quickly to his comments. “We understand these views are the personal views of Mr. Moon [Chung-in] and may not reflect official [South Korean] government policy,” a State Department spokeswoman reportedly told JoongAng Ilbo. The official U.S. stance is that it will consider a dialogue if and only if North Korea clearly expresses its intent to denuclearize. Simply halting its nuclear and missile development, as Moon proposed, would not be enough. If anything, Washington is looking to bolster its joint exercises with the South. “I am never satisfied. I want to do more training,” Maj. Gen. Theodore Martin, a top commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, told Yonhap on June 20. Meanwhile, Washington is ramping up pressure on Pyongyang following the death of an American student who was detained by the North and returned to America in a coma. “The United States once again condemns the brutality of the North Korean regime,” President Donald Trump said in a statement. The U.S. also flew B-1B bombers over the Korean Peninsula on June 20. The deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile shield in the South has strained bilateral relations. President Moon ordered an investigation after the South Korean Defense Ministry apparently failed to inform him about four additional launch pads brought in for the system. An environmental assessment of these pads is expected to delay full deployment by a year. Trump is furious, according to South Korean reports. Seoul is trying to walk back Moon Chung-in’s statement in light of recent developments. On June 19, the president’s office announced that Moon was expressing his personal opinion, and had been reprimanded for not helping South Korean-U.S. relations. But the office did not refute the comment itself. Moon was also a key foreign policy adviser to former President Roh Moo-hyun, for whom the current president served as chief of staff. He is believed to wield significant influence in the current administration as well. (Suzuki Sotaro, “Washington, Seoul Face Growing Rift over North Korea,” Nikkei Asian Review, June 21, 2017)
Reid Kirby: “…North Korea is believed to have placed a high priority on chemical weapons ever since Kim Il-sung’s “Declaration of Chemicalization” in 1961. But the quantity, quality, and durability of the North Korean chemical arsenal are unknown. In the 1970s, intelligence estimates by the United States and South Korea rated North Korea’s chemical warfare potential as mostly defensive. By the late 1980s, views had changed; Pyongyang was believed to have 250 tons of mustard gas and some nerve agents. By 2010, North Korea was estimated to possess 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons, mostly sarin and the nerve agent VX. Furthermore, it is assumed that North Korean military doctrine treats chemical weapons as a natural aspect of the nation’s scheme of maneuver, and that chemical weapons would be used from the outset of hostilities. Chemical weapons are reportedly pre-deployed—with one out of three North Korean projectiles believed to be chemical. The February assassination of Kim Jong-nam in Malaysia with VX was undoubtedly a reminder to North Korea’s enemies of the chemical threat that Pyongyang poses. Bruce Bennett of the RAND Corporation reports that eight manufacturing facilities have been identified in North Korea, capable of producing 5,000 tons of chemical weapons a year during peacetime and 12,000 tons during wartime. The Nuclear Threat Initiative, meanwhile, reports that North Korea has 11 production and storage facilities—in addition to 13 research and development facilities, two test ranges, and four military bases equipped with chemical weapons, as well as facilities near the cities of Kanggye and Sakchu prepared to fill chemical artillery. Earlier, I cited a claim that North Korea’s 170mm and 240mm artillery could fire 10,000 rounds per minute on Seoul. This claim requires validation. While numbers vary, let’s assume that North Korea has 500 170mm guns and 200 240mm guns (the M-1985)—the conservative numbers specified on the Global Security website—and delve into a bit more detail. North Korea has the M-1978 Koksan self-propelled gun; the M-1989 variant of this gun carries 12 rounds. Its estimated range is about 25 miles—and with rocket-assisted projectiles, the range can be extended up to about 37 miles. From North Korea’s firing positions along the Kaesong salient of the demilitarized zone, these 170mm guns can cover a one-third to one-half of Seoul without rocket-assisted projectiles and all of Seoul with them (see Figure 1). North Korea’s 240mm artillery rockets are fired from either the 12-rocket M-1985 or the 22-rocket M-1991 mobile multiple rocket launcher. With their range of about 20 miles, these launchers can cover less than one-third of Seoul from the same firing positions along the Kaesong salient. The Juche 100 variant of the 240mm rocket is reported to have a range of about 37 miles. So the rate of fire of 10,000 rounds per minute appears incorrect—it is apparently based on the rate of fire produced by 155mm artillery pieces (that is, 12 rounds every 3 minutes). The larger-caliber 8-inch gun in the United States has a sustained rate of fire of 10 rounds every 15 minutes, implying that a more appropriate rate for 170mm guns may be 12 rounds per 15 minutes. The firing rate of 240mm rockets is one rocket every 4 seconds, with 5 to 8 minutes to reload after expending either 12 or 22 rockets. Assuming 500 170mm guns and 200 240mm guns, the more likely overall rate of fire is 10,800 rounds every 15 minutes. With that established, we can calculate how much sarin Seoul might receive during a chemical artillery barrage. The sarin payload of each 240mm rocket is known to be 8 kilograms per rocket, based on the Soviet Katyusha. There is little information available on the 170mm projectile, but a chemical payload of 5 kilograms per projectile can be assumed, based on a US chemical shell of comparable size (the experimental 175mm T223, created for the T145 and T256 guns). Misfires and duds for these artillery weapons would reduce the amount of sarin released on Seoul. Overall, the chemical loading would be about 100 kilograms per square kilometer every 15 minutes. How much total sarin North Korea placed on Seoul would depend in part on Pyongyang’s chemical objectives—that is, the casualty rate it hoped to achieve—and on prevailing weather conditions. Anglo-American chemical retaliatory plans during World War II called for a 25 percent casualty rate in urban targets; this objective was retained in the earlier half of the Cold War. Figures from that era for estimating casualties from sarin assumed a median lethal dosage (LCt50) of 70 mg∙min/m3 and a median incapacitating dosage (ICt50) of 35 mg∙min/m3 (for example, if a soldier were breathing 7 milligrams of sarin per cubic meter of air for 10 minutes, there would be a 50 percent probability he would die). The prevailing weather conditions assumed in this analysis are for urban terrain under neutral atmospheric stability, with five-knot winds. A heuristic approach to estimating the total quantity of sarin required to inflict 25 percent casualties on a city such as Seoul under the specified conditions simplifies the problem into a box model of 600 square kilometers, with casualty rates integrated by area to find the necessary quantity. Using this approach, a “sea of sarin” attack on Seoul would require about 400 kilograms of sarin per square kilometer. Such an attack would require a total of 240 tons of sarin, easily within the estimated size of North Korea’s chemical arsenal. It would take one hour for North Korean artillery to mass sufficient sarin on Seoul to attain a 25 percent casualty objective—or three hours if mixed with high-explosive fire at a 1:2 ratio of chemical to high-explosive projectiles or rockets. …Based on Cold War–era dosage figures for sarin, North Korea could, in a matter of hours, inflict around 25 percent casualties by distributing 240 tons of sarin throughout Seoul. But these dosage figures were indexed for soldiers considered among the healthiest third of a population that is relatively young overall (military service age). For a diverse population encompassing all ages and genders, and with a wide range of health statuses, the lethal and incapacitating dosages of sarin are significantly lower. The Institute for Defense Analysis held a workshop in 1998 to assess the state of the art and to arrive at dosage figures appropriate for the general population. The institute estimated that, for the general population, the median lethal dosage would be only half the dosage assumed in the US Army field manual mentioned above. If the institute’s figures for a sarin attack on a civilian population are used, the consequences of a North Korean chemical artillery attack become much more severe:
| Consequences of a 240-ton sarin attack on Seoul (lower lethal dosage assumed) | ||
| Effects | Percentage of population affected | Number of people affected |
| Fatalities | 25 | 2,500,000 |
| Severe Casualties | 10 | 1,000,000 |
| Moderate Casualties | 19 | 1,900,000 |
| Mild Casualties | 40 | 4,000,000 |
The overall expected casualty rate is nearly total. Compared to the military-dosage scenario, there would be more than 3.8 times the number of fatalities and almost 1.5 times as many moderate-to-severe casualties. Estimates of chemical-weapon effects based on Cold War–era dosage figures are a gross understatement of the number of fatalities and casualties that could be expected in a general civilian population. And if Pyongyang expended quantities of chemical weapons appropriate for a military rather than a civilian population—which is logistically feasible even for a large-area target such as Seoul—the probable effect on a general civilian population would be significant overkill. How does one visualize such an attack? In more than half of Seoul, the consequences would be comparable to the worst images from the Ghouta sarin attack; in the remainder of the city, consequences would be similar to the Tokyo subway attack. Long-term consequences might not be immediately appreciated, but would be severe as well. For survivors experiencing cardiopulmonary arrest, a fair number might enter a persistent vegetative state due to anoxia. Neuropathy and ataxia (loss of control over bodily movements) might be present for up to three months after the attack in 10 percent of survivors, and about 8 percent would likely have post-traumatic stress disorder for up to five years afterward. Policy makers also should not discount public perceptions of latent effects, whether real or imagined. Gulf War Syndrome, the 1984 Bhopal Disaster, and the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam all provide cautionary examples of the way lingering doubts, with political importance, can persist for more than a decade after a mass chemical incident. To be sure, South Korea is not defenseless against a sea-of-fire countervalue attack. While it is not logistically or technically feasible for South Korea to directly shoot down 10,800 chemical projectiles and rockets every 15 minutes, Seoul has a formidable counter-battery capability to destroy North Korean artillery pieces. The problem would be responding quickly enough—and prioritizing the destruction of 500 170mm guns, and 200 240mm multiple rocket launchers, in a demilitarized zone crowded with numerous other artillery pieces. The qualitative difference between a nuclear and a chemical deterrent lies in the latter’s mass effect. For example, if three attack aircraft flew on a mission to deliver a nuclear weapon and only one aircraft carried the weapon, a one-in-three probability of losing an aircraft would result in a binary situation: a two-thirds probability that the weapon would have 100 percent of its intended effect or a one-third probability that it would have none of its intended effect. Chemical weapons are different; a one-in-three chance of losing an attack aircraft would mean that two-thirds of the chemical payload would be delivered to the target and mass casualties would still result. Successful counter-battery attrition against a “sea of sarin” attack would require destroying all North Korean chemical artillery in less than 15 minutes. In general terms, the attrition would shrink the portion of Seoul experiencing a Syrian-type casualty scenario, replacing it with a Tokyo-type casualty picture. A chemical load of 100 kilograms per square kilometer would still result in mild casualties for about 93 percent of the affected population, moderate casualties for about 7 percent, and numerous fatalities in the vicinity of each burst. It is this mass effect from artillery which makes the potential of a North Korean chemical countervalue attack a potent possible deterrent. The mass-action nature of a chemical attack would inflict massive numbers of casualties even in the unlikely scenario that South Korea silenced all North Korean artillery within 15 minutes. Civil defense could help reduce casualties. Seoul has 3,321 civil defense evacuation centers. Spread across the country are 17,501 protective shelters. There is even a smartphone app to help direct people to the nearest shelter during an attack. After the 2010 North Korean bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island, South Korean civil defense authorities issued 1,300 protective masks to island residents and made plans to boost the chemical protection capabilities of its civil defense corps, including the renovation of public shelters against chemical weapons. Depending on availability, on how much warning is provided, and on public response time, civil defense measures could substantially reduce chemical casualties. If the typical response time were on the order of two minutes into the attack—unlikely—expected casualties would be only one-quarter of those expected in a population without chemical protections. Details about North Korea’s chemical arsenal are not known with confidence. We do not know for sure what chemical weapons North Korea would use or how it would use them. The North’s repeated threats to turn Seoul into a sea of fire may be only rhetoric. The North’s strategic views concerning deterrence and escalation are also unknown. History shows a willingness in Pyongyang to engage in military provocations short of the level that would justify a renewal of the Korean War. Nonetheless, it is possible to make a rough estimate of the impact of a massive chemical artillery attack on a large urban center such as Seoul. Ultimately, such an estimate is illustrative, representing one of many possible scenarios, yet it can still provide a reasonable understanding of the potential magnitude of a sarin artillery attack against civilian population centers. If publicly stated intelligence estimates are to be believed, North Korea’s chemical arsenal represents a credible and present threat. How North Korea could apply this threat as a deterrent is speculative. But the destructive potential of the threat should give reasonable cause to hesitate regarding preemptive military options against North Korea’s nuclear weapons ambitions.” (Reid Kirby, “Sea of Sarin: North Korea’s Chemical Deterrent,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 21, 2017)
6/22/17:
South Korea cast caution over reading too much into a North Korean envoy’s remarks proposing a conditional moratorium on the North’s nuclear and missile tests. North Korea’s top envoy to India Kye Chun-yong said yesterday that North Korea can place a moratorium on its nuclear and missile tests if the U.S. suspends its annual joint military drillswith South Korea. South Korea’s unification ministry expressed prudence about giving its assessment over Kye’s remark, recalling its January 10, 2015 proposal. “North Korea made a similar offer in 2015. We will closely watch the situation,” said a ministry official. “I think that North Korea is seen as giving its views in various manners as the outside world is talking about its nuclear weapons program.” Kye’s remark came as Moon said in a recent interview with CBS that South Korea has no plans to scale back joint military exercises between Seoul and Washington. Meanwhile, the ministry official said that reported new activity at North Korea’s underground nuclear test site does not seem to be related to signs of an additional nuclear test by the North. Citing two U.S. officials, CNN reported June 20 that U.S. spy satellites have detected new activity at North Korea’s nuclear test site on its northeastern region for the first time in several weeks. “It does not appear to be directly related to (signs of) another North Korea nuke test,” the official added. “But North Korea seems to be ready to conduct an additional nuke test at any time.” (Yonhap, “S. Korea Cautious about Assessing N.K.’s Offer for Moratorium on Nuke Tests,” June 22, 2017)
6/23/17:
South Korea successfully test-fired a new ballistic missile with a range far enough to hit any part of North Korea, as it seeks to counter the North’s growing missile threat. While President Moon Jae-in watched, the weapon, a type of Hyunmoo-2 ballistic missile, blasted off from a test site in Taean, a coastal county south of Seoul, the capital, the president’s office said in a statement. The missile traveled a designated distance before hitting a target, the office said, without disclosing how far it flew. Defense officials and the domestic news media said the missile could fly up to 800 kilometers, or 497 miles — the maximum ballistic missile range allowed under a deal with the United States. South Korea has tested the missile four times so far and will have it ready to use after two additional tests, Moon’s office said. “I am a believer in dialogue, but I also know that dialogue is possible when we have a strong national defense,” Moon was quoted as saying from the missile test site. “A policy of embracing North Korea is possible when we have a defense capability that surpasses that of North Korea.” As that threat by the North has increased, South Korea has also sought to strengthen its capabilities, particularly after the United States agreed in 2012 to let it possess ballistic missiles with a range of up to 497 miles as long as the payload did not exceed 500 kilograms, about half a ton. South Korea can load warheads weighing up to two tons on ballistic missiles with shorter ranges. Until then, the South had been barred from deploying ballistic missiles with a range of more than 300 kilometers, or 186 miles, and a payload of more than half a ton because of concerns about a regional arms race. It first agreed to missile guidelines with the United States in 1979 in return for American technological aid in developing its first ballistic missiles. But South Korea’s desire to improve its weapons gained urgency as the North made gains in its missile programs. South Korea’s ballistic-missile inventory includes the Hyunmoo-2A with a range of 186 miles and the Hyunmoo-2B with a range of 310 miles. Its Agency for Defense Development test-fired the Hyunmoo-2B from a mobile launch vehicle at the Taean site in 2015 as Park Geun-hye, the president at the time, observed. The new missile on Friday was believed to be named Hyunmoo-2C. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Tests Missile Capable of Striking Any Part of North Korea,” New York Times, June 23, 2017)
The Blue House moved quickly to quash a controversy about changes to the THAAD deployment agreement provoked by President Moon Jae-in’s interview with Reuters on June 22. After Moon’s remarks during the interview that “the original agreement [between South Korea and the US] was to deploy one launcher by the end of 2017 and the remaining five launchers next year” unexpectedly caused a disagreement between the two countries, the Blue House explained that “the crux of the president’s remarks was not that the number of launchers changed but rather that the deployment process was pushed forward.” “The remarks came after the Reuters reporter asked questions on the assumption that the THAAD deployment was being delayed and President Moon was explaining that [an environmental impact assessment] has procedural transparency and legitimacy and that [the deployment] could have happened more quickly if this step had been taken,” a senior official at the Blue House told reporters who were asking about the significance of Moon’s remarks during the interview. “The question of whether the original plan was for ‘one plus five’ [one launcher now and five later] or ‘two plus four’ isn’t fundamentally important.” But despite the Blue House’s explanation, questions remain. The first question is why Moon went public with the original terms of the agreement before the South Korea-US summit, considering that those terms had not been previously disclosed. The Blue House only obliquely revealed that Moon became aware of this fact during the Defense Ministry’s investigation at the end of last month into the omission of information about the delivery of four additional launchers from a report. Blue House Senior Secretary to the President for Public Relations Yoon Young-chan was apparently aware that the original agreement had been for ‘one plus five’ during the briefing about the investigation into the omission of information from the Defense Ministry’s report. “We can make some educated guesses [about the change in the deployment schedule], but I’m unable to reveal everything,” Yoon said at the time. According to the Blue House’s explanation, Moon had been aware since the beginning of this month that the original agreement had been changed to move forward the deployment schedule and that he revealed this during the interview to aid the reporter’s understanding while he was explaining that the environmental impact assessment was not intended to delay the THAAD deployment. The Blue House has remained silent about when the ‘one plus five’ agreement mentioned by Moon was reached. “I’m not in a position to know the timing of the original agreement or other details. [This question] will be revealed through a Defense Ministry investigation,” said a Blue House source. But given the context of Moon’s remarks and the information released by the US and South Korea thus far, the original agreement was presumably made before July 8, 2016. That was the date when the South Korean Defense Ministry and the Pentagon announced their agreement to deploy the THAAD system by the end of 2017. When Seongju County in North Gyeongsang Province was announced as the THAAD deployment site on July 13, the size of the THAAD system was specified as “one battery,” which is composed of six launchers. The hypothesis that the original agreement was reached before July 2016 conflicts with Moon’s subsequent remarks in the interview. Immediately after mentioning the original “one plus five” agreement, Moon said, “But for some reason that I do not know, this entire THAAD process was accelerated” over the course of former President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment. This implies that the content of the agreement changed after Nov. 2016, when the impeachment process got underway. Another possibility is that Moon was conflating two different things during the interview. Perhaps the “one plus five” agreement tentatively reached during the initial THAAD negotiations became “one battery by the end of 2017” in the agreement’s final stage, and perhaps the “end of 2017” deadline for completing the deployment was pushed forward during the impeachment process at the end of last year for reasons that are unclear. In that case, Moon may have gotten his facts mixed up. This assumes that what Moon originally wanted to point out was the “lack of transparency” in the entire deployment process. In July 2016, the government announced that the deployment would take place by the end of 2017, but that schedule was pushed forward to September shortly after the National Assembly passed the motion to impeach Park, and then two launchers were unexpectedly delivered at the beginning of March, in the early stage of the presidential election, and then deployed at Seongju at the end of April, shortly before the presidential election. (Lee Se-young, “Blue House Scrambling to Address Controversy Sparked by Moon’s THAAD Remarks,” Hankyore, June 24, 2017)
6/24/17:
South Korean President Moon Jae-in invited North Korea to the Winter Olympic Games to be held in the country early next year, while welcoming a North Korean delegation to the World Taekwondo Championships. “I believe in the strength of sports that has been establishing peace. I am glad to see the first sports exchange of the South and the North under the new (South Korean) government take place at this event,” Moon said in his congratulatory speech marking the opening of the event hosted by the World Taekwondo Federation (WTF). The new South Korean president was speaking before 971 athletes and 796 officials from 183 countries, making the seven-day biennial event in Muju, located 240 kilometers south of Seoul, the largest of its kind ever to be held. The participants included a 36-member delegation, including 32 North Koreans, from the North Korea-led International Taekwondo Federation (ITF), with a 12-member demonstration team also set to stage its first-ever performance in South Korea. “It will mark the first time the ITF will perform at a WTF event held in South Korea,” the president said. “Friendship and goodwill exchanges between the two federations will of course greatly contribute to reconciliation between South and North Korea, as well as the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula,” he added, noting the WTF was set to send a demonstration team to an ITF event to be held in Pyongyang in September. “I wish the achievement made by taekwondo will be repeated at the PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games next year. If a North Korean delegation takes part in the PyeongChang Winter Olympics, I believe it will greatly contribute to realizing the Olympic values of friendship and peace,” President Moon said, according to a script of his remarks released by the presidential office Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul. Also present at the opening of the taekwondo championships in Muju were Chang Ung, North Korea’s sole member of the International Olympic Committee, and Ri Yong-son, the North Korean head of the ITF. Earlier this week, Seoul’s new sports minister, Do Jong-hwan, suggested forming a joint Korean team in women’s hockey and holding skiing events at North Korea’s Masikryong resort during PyeongChang 2018. In his speech, Moon said he’d once again like to feel the emotions from watching the joint march of the two Koreas in the opening ceremony of the 2000 Sydney Olympics. Moon also made references to the 1991 World Table Tennis Championships and the 1991 FIFA World Youth Championship, two competitions where the Koreas fielded joint teams. (Yonhap, “Moon Says Sports Can Create Peace, Invites N. Korea to PyeongChang Olympics,” June 24, 2017)
Shipments of North Korean products to China tumbled more than 30 percent on-year in May, Chinese data showed, an apparent outcome of China’s import ban on North Korean coal as part of international sanctions against the communist North. According to the data from China’s customs office, North Korean exports to China came to US$123.75 million in May, down 31.6 percent from the same month a year earlier. The tally marks the third-lowest level since June 2014. It also marked the third consecutive month of decline. China halted inbound shipments of North Korean coal in February under a sanctions resolution of the U.N. Security Council issued late last year. The new sanctions resolution came in retaliation for the North’s latest and fifth nuclear test in September 2016. North Korea’s exports to China tumbled 51.7 percent on-year to $114.55 million in March, followed by a 40.8 percent plunge to $99.27 million the following month. In the first five months of the year, North Korea’s exports to China slipped 9.3 percent on-year to $722.1 million. China’s shipments to the impoverished North, on the other hand, spiked 32 percent on-year over the cited period, according to the customs data. (Yonhap, “China’s Imports of N. Korea Goods Plunge Nearly 32 Pct. in May: Report,” June 24, 2017)
6/26/17:
As South Korean president, Park Geun-hye approved a covert plan to oust North Korean leader Kim Jong Un — including assassination — and to cover Seoul’s tracks, a source said. The plan was floated when the conservative Park was growing increasingly frustrated and taking a more confrontational stance against the northern neighbor, according to the source knowledgeable about policy toward North Korea during Park’s administration. After a meeting of officials from the two Koreas ended on a negative note in December 2015, Park signed a document that gave the green light for a “leadership change” in North Korea. The National Intelligence Service (NIS) was put in charge of the policy. Although details of the actual plan are sketchy, the options included Kim’s retirement, political exile or even assassination, the source said. Careful planning was conducted to cover any trace of Seoul’s hand in such operations because a change in North Korean leadership that had even an inkling of South Korean involvement would likely lead to military retaliation, the source said. The plotters apparently considered staging an “accident” on the road or over water to eliminate Kim, but tight security prevented any mission from being carried out, the source said. Park was further infuriated by North Korea’s nuclear tests in January and September 2016, and she began to publicly criticize Kim in her speeches. But she also emphasized that she did not view the North Korean populace as the enemy. In a speech given in August 2016, she called out directly to North Korean government officials and the general population for a unification of the two Koreas. Two months later, she urged North Korean citizens to defect from their nation. Another source said Park’s moves were an attempt to spur a “palace revolution” among those in high-ranking positions close to Kim. Sources said plans to bring down Kim were also pushed forward by NIS reports that described an unstable North Korean society suffering from power and water shortages as well as the rule of a paranoid leader fearful of an attack on himself. Those reports apparently led to the belief that a leadership change was possible in North Korea. That may have led the NIS to funnel such intelligence reports to the president, while ignoring analyses of other officials that painted a picture of a stable North Korean economy helped through the partial introduction of capitalist economic measures as well as a unified leadership structure under Kim that would make a regime change very difficult. (Makino Yoshihiro, “Source: Park Signed off on Plot to Oust, even Kill, Kim Jong Un,” Asahi Shimbun, June 26, 2017)
James Clapper, U.S. director of national intelligence for the Barack Obama administration, who was sent to North Korea in November 2014 to secure the release of two American detainees, said the Trump administration should establish a liaison office in Pyongyang and allow the regime to set up a similar presence in Washington, to break the current diplomatic impasses. That measure was the “only path” to what he thought could lead to a “soft implosion” in the North. In coordination with the South Korean leadership and other regional stakeholders, Clapper, who retired as national intelligence director in January, said during his keynote speech that the U.S. should offer to establish an “interest section” in Pyongyang like the one it had in Havana, Cuba for decades. Clapper said the diplomatic representation will serve as a means of regular dialogue between the two countries and, for North Korea, a “critical conduit” for information from the outside world, which would lead to the regime’s “soft implosion.” In return, the U.S. could ask the North’s agreement for a “verifiable stop” of its nuclear and missile tests, which would delay their weapons development capability. The proposal was based on his personal experience in 2014 talking with Kim Won-hong, who at the time was serving as North Korea’s state security minister, and Kim Yong-chol, then-head of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, said Clapper. On November 7, 2014, Clapper flew into Pyongyang and arranged to fly out two American citizens, Kenneth Bae and Matthew Todd Miller. “I was amazed at the magnitude and depth of paranoia, and the overwhelming sense of siege that seems to prevail among the elite leadership in the North,” said Clapper. “Everywhere they look, from their perspective as I heard repeatedly, they see enemies who threaten their very existence.” Clapper stressed that he learned North Korea won’t give up their nuclear weapons because a nuclear capability for them is “their ticket to survival.” “It’s all about face, recognition and leverage,” said the former intelligence director, “They have none of that without their nuclear weapons.” On why a liaison office would work with North Korea, Clapper highlighted that Pyongyang’s leaders “do crave communication” with Washington, and that “they want that dialogue with the United States.” The chances that the Trump administration would actually follow his advice, however, were low, he acknowledged without explaining further. In regards to Otto Warmbier, the 22-year-old American college student who died on June 19 just six days after he was released from the North in a vegetative state, Clapper said the former Obama administration couldn’t get him out because, to his knowledge, North Korea never stipulated any conditions for his release. They “never said anything, never made an offer, never allowed the Swedish delegation in Pyongyang, which acts for us in diplomatic consular affairs… access to Otto Warmbier, which they did with the other prisoners,” Clapper said. “Unless there’s some dialogue, front channel or back channel, it’s very hard to arrange for the release.” Clapper continued that for “whatever reason,” North Korea “singled him out.” “If North Korea expressed what their conditions were, I’m sure we would have addressed those,” he said. “In case of Kenneth Bae and Matthew Miller, they said they wanted a captain-level official who was active in the National Security Council to come to Pyongyang. So we sent somebody – me – to do that. They specifically [had] no conditions whatsoever for the release of Otto Warmbier.” (Lee Sung-eun, “Top Envoy Dismisses Jitters about Summit,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 27, 2017) South Korea’s foreign minister indicated strongly that her government would honor an agreement to deploy an American missile-defense system despite protests and economic retaliation from China. Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha said the domestic review was to strengthen public support for the missile system by shoring up its political legitimacy. Calling the deployment “an alliance decision,” she said South Korea would “continue to collaborate on the basis of mutual trust.” “My government has no intention to basically reverse the commitments made in the spirit of” the alliance, Ms. Kang said at a forum in Seoul jointly organized by JoongAng Ilbo and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Kang also addressed another concern in Washington by saying that her government would not hurry to try to reopen a jointly run industrial complex in the North Korean city of Kaesong. South Korea closed the complex last year after the North’s nuclear and long-range rocket tests. “We will pursue this only under the right circumstances,” Kang said. “It is something that can be pursued at a later stage when we are assured of progress in dealing with the North Korean nuclear and missile threats, and we will do so in closest consultations with the United States.” (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korean Foreign Minister Pledges Support for U.S. Antimissile System,” New York Times, June 27, 2017,
The White House has tapped former State Department advisor Victor Cha as the next U.S. ambassador to Korea, diplomatic sources said last week. A senior State Department official confirmed the news, saying Cha is the most likely candidate for the post. But Cha said he has heard nothing officially from the White House, and understands that no decision has been made. The post has been vacant since the last ambassador, Obama protégé Mark Lippert, left abruptly after the election of Donald Trump to the presidency. Deputy Chief of Mission Marc Knapper is working as chargé d’affaires. (Kang In-sun, “Victor Cha Tapped as U.S. Ambassador to Seoul,” Chosun Ilbo, June 26, 2017)
6/27/17:
The government decided on an ordinance revision aimed at introducing a so-called “catch-all” regulation that enables Japan to seize all cargo items possibly linked to North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. The revision of the ordinance of the special measures law concerning cargo inspections was approved at a Cabinet meeting this morning. It will be promulgated on June 30 and come into effect in mid-July. Under the current regulations, more than 100 items subject to a trade embargo, such as nuclear fuel and weapons, are specified in a list annexed to the ordinance. When third-country vessels or planes that have access to North Korea are suspected of carrying the listed items, the ordinance allows the Japan Coast Guard or Japan Customs to inspect and confiscate the items. However, Pyongyang is believed to have been disassembling weapons and related listed items, and transporting them as raw materials and mechanical parts. As a result, many have pointed out the current system leaves a loophole in the sanctions. “From Japan’s stance, in which we are determined to firmly carry out U.N. sanctions on human-rights issues that include nuclear weapons, missiles and abductions, we’d like to continue to deal with this matter,” said Kato Katsunobu, minister in charge of the abduction issue, at a press conference this morning. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Japan to More Strictly Confiscate Cargo Linked to North Korea’s Nuke Supplies,” June 27, 2017)
North Korea clearly has the ability to produce tritium internally, a basic element for making hydrogen bombs, although the country has yet to weaponize it, an American nuclear expert said today. “The evidence is quite clear that North Korea is able to produce tritium, which is necessary for a hydrogen bomb to create fusion. So you need tritium when you are going to have hydrogen bombs,” Siegfried Hecker, a professor at Standford University, told a group of journalists here. North Korea claimed it used a hydrogen bomb when it conducted its fourth nuclear test in January last year, although it has not been proven. “I believe they have made tritium. In fact, last year there have been some indications that they were trying to market one of the key ingredients for making tritium, something called lithium-6 … So it’s clear they know how to make tritium. We know that’s official,” he noted. Also citing commercial satellite imagery, the nuclear expert also said that North Korea is adding at least one more tritium production facility to an old facility. But he was negative about North Korea being able to weaponize the material. “They can make tritium so they have the basic element for a hydrogen bomb. But it takes much more than that to weaponize hydrogen bombs. I don’t believe they can do that (yet).” Hecker said the first step to denuclearize North Korea should start with a “no-use” agreement with the country to guarantee that Pyongyang would not use its nuclear weapons. Without the agreement, accidental launch, miscalculation or loss of control could wreak unimaginable damage on the Korean Peninsula, he said. “Those possibilities are sufficiently worrisome that I maintain that the crisis is here now, not when they (North Korean missiles) are able to reach the U.S.,” according to Hecker. “Once you do no-use,… then it’s halt, roll back and eliminate,” he said, indicating that the denuclearization process should be carried out in three phases. “It’s (also) important for the U.S. and South Korea to come to an agreement (on how to phase the process) before they would negotiate with North Korea.” In an earlier presentation given to a forum on North Korean nuclear issue, hosted by the Institute of Korean Studies, Hecker also said that North Korea appears to be in possession of enough nuclear fuel to make as many as 25 nuclear weapons in addition to the ability to produce about six or seven additional nuclear weapons every year. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Is Clearly Advancing H-Bomb Development: Hecker,” June 27, 2017)
6/28/17:
South Korea’s new leader vowed to stand firmly with President Donald Trump against North Korea, playing down his past advocacy of a softer approach toward the nuclear-armed nation as he made his first visit as president to Washington. President Moon Jae-in offered an emotional tribute to Marines who fought in a fierce battle in the Korean War that helped in the mass evacuation of Korean civilians, including his own parents. Moon said that without those American sacrifices, he would not be here today. “Together we will achieve the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program, peace on the Korean Peninsula and eventually peace in Northeast Asia,” Moon said, after laying a wreath at a Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virginia, as he began his first overseas trip since taking office. Trump’s National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster said today that the U.S. is preparing “all options” for North Korea, “because the president has made clear to us that he will not accept a nuclear power in North Korea and a threat that can target the United States.” The talks between Moon and Trump, which begin with dinner tomorrow night and then formal talks the next day, come amid intense wrangling over North Korea. (Matthew Pennington, “South Korean Leader Vows to Stand with Trump on North Korea,” Associated Press, June 28, 2017) South Korean President Moon Jae-in said reducing his country’s joint military exercises with the United States was not an option for now, though it may be considered following what he called irreversible and verifiable steps by North Korea to denuclearize. “First of all, the official position we have now is that North Korea’s nuclear freeze and reduction of joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States cannot be linked,” Moon said. “That has been the official position of South Korea and the United States, and that position has not changed,” he added, while aboard Air Force One on his way to Washington for a summit with his U.S. counterpart, Donald Trump. Moon’s remarks came after his special security adviser, Moon Chung-in, claimed Seoul and Washington may consider scaling back their joint military drills staged in South Korea should the North freeze its nuclear activities. “I do believe the notion that we must not reward bad behavior is a principle we must uphold,” the new South Korean president told reporters. Still, Moon noted such a reward may be possible if the North agrees to give up its nuclear ambition and takes verifiable steps towards complete denuclearization. “The most ideal solution would be to completely denuclearize North Korea in an one-shot deal. But more realistically, I believe such a deal will not be easy,” Moon said. “I believe (the North) must at least promise to a nuclear freeze for us to start taking serious measures (discussions) for its denuclearization. In that sense, its nuclear freeze will be the entrance and nuclear dismantlement the exit,” he added. (Yonhap, “Moon Says Reducing Military Drills Not an Option, At Least for Now,” June 29, 2017)
President Donald Trump is growing increasingly frustrated with China over its inaction on North Korea and bilateral trade issues and is now considering possible trade actions against Beijing, three senior administration officials told Reuters. The officials said Trump was looking at options including tariffs on steel imports, which Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross already has said he is considering as part of a national security study of the U.S. steel industry. Whether Trump would take any steps against China remains unclear. The officials said there was no consensus on the way forward with China and they did not say what other options were being studied. No decision was expected this week, a senior official said. Chinese steel already is subject to dozens of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy orders. As a result it has only a small share of the U.S. market. “What’s guiding this is he ran to protect American industry and American workers,” one of the U.S. officials said, referring to Trump’s 2016 election promise to take a hard line on trade with China. On North Korea, Trump “feels like he gave China a chance to make a difference” but has not seen enough results, the official said. The United States has pressed China to exert more economic and diplomatic pressure on North Korea to help rein in its nuclear and missile programs. Beijing has repeatedly said its influence on North Korea is limited and that it is doing all it can. “They did a little, not a lot,” the official said. “And if he’s not going to get what he needs on that, he needs to move ahead on his broader agenda on trade and on North Korea.” U.S. Ambassador to China Terry Branstad, who arrived in Beijing on Tuesday, spoke reporters outside his residence and said the United States hoped to collaborate with China. “We need to work together to deal with some of the pressing, difficult issues, such as the threat from North Korea. We want to work together to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula,” he said. (Steve Holland, “Trump Growing Fruistrated with China, Weighs Trade Steps: Officials,” Reuters, June 28, 2017)
South Korea’s new leader vowed to stand firmly with President Donald Trump against North Korea, playing down his past advocacy of a softer approach toward the nuclear-armed nation as he made his first visit as president to Washington. President Moon Jae-in offered an emotional tribute to Marines who fought in a fierce battle in the Korean War that helped in the mass evacuation of Korean civilians, including his own parents. Moon said that without those American sacrifices, he would not be here today. “Together we will achieve the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program, peace on the Korean Peninsula and eventually peace in Northeast Asia,” Moon said, after laying a wreath at a Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virginia, as he began his first overseas trip since taking office. Trump’s National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster said today that the U.S. is preparing “all options” for North Korea, “because the president has made clear to us that he will not accept a nuclear power in North Korea and a threat that can target the United States.” The talks between Moon and Trump, which begin with dinner tomorrow night and then formal talks the next day, come amid intense wrangling over North Korea. (Matthew Pennington, “South Korean Leader Vows to Stand with Trump on North Korea,” Associated Press, June 28, 2017) South Korean President Moon Jae-in said reducing his country’s joint military exercises with the United States was not an option for now, though it may be considered following what he called irreversible and verifiable steps by North Korea to denuclearize. “First of all, the official position we have now is that North Korea’s nuclear freeze and reduction of joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States cannot be linked,” Moon said. “That has been the official position of South Korea and the United States, and that position has not changed,” he added, while aboard Air Force One on his way to Washington for a summit with his U.S. counterpart, Donald Trump. Moon’s remarks came after his special security adviser, Moon Chung-in, claimed Seoul and Washington may consider scaling back their joint military drills staged in South Korea should the North freeze its nuclear activities. “I do believe the notion that we must not reward bad behavior is a principle we must uphold,” the new South Korean president told reporters. Still, Moon noted such a reward may be possible if the North agrees to give up its nuclear ambition and takes verifiable steps towards complete denuclearization. “The most ideal solution would be to completely denuclearize North Korea in a one-shot deal. But more realistically, I believe such a deal will not be easy,” Moon said. “I believe (the North) must at least promise to a nuclear freeze for us to start taking serious measures (discussions) for its denuclearization. In that sense, its nuclear freeze will be the entrance and nuclear dismantlement the exit,” he added. (Yonhap, “Moon Says Reducing Military Drills Not an Option, At Least for Now,” June 29, 2017) On his way to Washington, Moon revealed his plan to resolve the security crisis prompted by North Korea’s nuclear arms programs. In a meeting with reporters on the presidential plane, Moon explained a two-stage process aimed at ultimately dismantling the nuclear programs. Moon said the summit could address compensation to be offered to the North in return for starting a dialogue and a subsequent verification process of nuclear dismantlement. “A nuclear freeze by the North is the entry to a dialogue,” Moon said. “And the exit of the dialogue is a complete dismantlement. With the nuclear dismantlement, a peace system will be established on the peninsula.” The process won’t be easy, Moon admitted. “We have to start talks with the North, and the minimum conditions I believe will be the North’s promise to stop additional nuclear and missile provocations and to freeze its nuclear program,” he said. “Only then, can we have a full-scale talk about nuclear dismantlement.” (Ser Myo-ja, “Moon Affirms Alliance at Start of His Visit,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 2017) “As it is a matter of top priority for President Trump, the possibility of resolving the issue is higher than ever. In the past, South Korea and the US placed importance in the matter but did not take concrete action. (I) plan to seek fundamental solutions with President Trump,” Moon said during his meeting with House of Representatives’ leaders including Speaker Paul Ryan. At the meeting, Moon also said that while China has had positive influence on Pyongyang in missile and nuclear issues, Beijing’s role in the issue has room to grow. Moon also ruled out resuming inter-Korean business projects without positive developments in the nuclear issue, reflecting his idea of “action for action” in dealing with the North. “Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tours had the effect of educating (North Koreans) that market economy, and (political system of) South Korea is better,” Moon said. “However, the projects cannot be easily resumed. (Resumption) can only be discussed when serious talks on ending the North’s nuclear program begins, and it must be considered within the framework of international cooperation, and requires close negotiations with the US.” (Choi He-uk, “Moon, Trump Hold ‘Frank, Serious’ Talk on Alliance, Trade,” Korea Herald, June 29, 2017)
North Korea secures up to 300,000 tons of oil products from Russia each year through Singapore-based dealers, a defector who formerly managed funds for the leadership has told Kyodo News, posing a challenge for the United States as it seeks to isolate Pyongyang. “North Korea has procured Russia-produced fuel from Singapore brokers and others since the 1990s…It is mostly diesel oil and partly gasoline,” Ri Jong Ho, 59, a former senior official of Office 39 of the Workers’ Party of Korea, said recently in the U.S. capital in his first interview with media under his own name. Ri also said North Korea relies more on Russia than China for fuel to keep its economy moving, indicating that the U.S. drive for Beijing to restrict oil supplies over Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs will only have a limited effect. “It is a wrong perception that North Korea is completely dependent on China,” he said. Petroleum products have been shipped to North Korea by tankers leaving Vladivostok and Nakhodka, both in the Russian Far East, with the fuel widely used for cars, ships and trains, helping to support the North’s economy, Ri said. Other sources familiar with the fuel deals said the petroleum products ending up in North Korea are often purchased by brokers who claim they are destined for China, with the items procured using forged paperwork. Ri, who defected to South Korea with his family in October 2014, provided details of the activities of Office 39. The secretive entity, said to have been established by former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in May 1974, is subject to international sanctions as the United States and other Western countries believe it is engaged in illicit economic activities and the management of slush funds for the leadership. He said North Korea has been trying to reduce its economic reliance on China, Pyongyang’s most important benefactor, since leader Kim Jong Un issued an order to expand trade with Russia and Southeast Asian countries in August 2014. The order followed Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to South Korea a month earlier, during which he and then South Korean President Park Geun Hye expressed opposition to North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. It was the first time for a Chinese president to visit South Korea before traveling to the North. Ri said the North Korean leader was “infuriated” by the visit, going so far as to call China an “enemy state,” and began taking measures to boost trade with Russia. According to Ri, Office 39 has five central groups and systematically acquires foreign currency by sending laborers overseas as well as through gold mining and exports. “It is an organization that manages the supreme leader’s coffers and the party’s funds to rule the country. It also leads trade activities to earn foreign currency,” Ri said. The office has enormous power as it is directly linked to the leadership and is independent of other government organs, he added. Ri admitted that Office 39 has evaded U.N. sanctions by asking Chinese and Russian contacts to allow the use of their names for the opening of bank accounts for trade settlement. The activities of Office 39 require the involvement of hundreds of thousands of people, including those in rural areas who produce items for export. Ri said the bureau is now headed by Chon Il Chun, first vice department director of the party’s Central Committee and a former classmate of Kim Jong Il, the current leader’s father. A native of Wonsan on North Korea’s east coast, Ri was told to work in Pyongyang by the Central Committee in the mid-1980s. He operated a shipping company at Office 39’s Daehung group and later headed a trade control section in the group between 1998 and 2004. The Daehung group earns revenue through farm exports and shipping operations, among other means. With exclusive rights to trade “matsutake” mushrooms and snow crabs, it was actively shipping those products to Japan before Tokyo imposed a total ban on trade with the North about 10 years ago. The four other central groups are Kumgang, which dominates gold export activities, Daesong, involved in the shipment of processed products and intermediate trade overseas, Daesong Bank, in charge of the office’s banking operations, and a group dispatching workers to other countries. Asked about the possibility that the foreign currency earned by North Korea is being used for its nuclear and missile development programs, Ri only said, “It is up to the supreme leader how to use the funds.” North Korea receives 500,000 tons of crude oil each year through a pipeline from China, resulting in around 70,000 to 100,000 tons of gasoline and about 100,000 tons of diesel oil after refining, but the oil products are exclusively used by the North Korean army and are not good enough for cars that carry the elite, Ri said. He also said crude oil purchased from other countries is refined by foreign companies based in China, leading to the importation into North Korea of an additional 50,000 to 100,000 tons of gasoline. Despite holding a high rank, Ri decided to leave North Korea after Kim Jong Un’s once-powerful uncle Jang Son Thaek was executed in December 2013 and other senior officials were purged. Jang, who had close ties with China, was accused of inappropriately selling North Korean coal and other resources to other countries. Many of Ri’s acquaintances were also subject to the purge and sent to political prison camps or executed. “I could no longer tolerate such a cruel and tragic situation,” Ri said, explaining why he fled to South Korea from the port city of Dalian, northeastern China, where he was head of North Korea’s trading company. He moved to the United States in March 2016 and currently lives near Washington. (Inoue Tomotaro, “N. Korea Procuring Russian Fuel Via Singapore Dealers: Defector,” Kyodo, June 28, 2017)
DPRK Ministry of State Security, Ministry of People’s Security and Central Public Prosecutors Office joint statement “as the enemies’ moves to stifle the DPRK at any cost have reached an extremely grave phase of committing hideous state-sponsored terrorism targeting the DPRK supreme leadership. There have been a series of revelation of state-sponsored terrorism of the enemies targeting the supreme leadership of the DPRK. …The revelation showed that Park Geun Hye of south Korea pushed forward the operation of “removing the north’s leadership” in collusion with the Intelligence Service during her tenure, in the wake of the detection of a group of hideous terrorist criminals who were infiltrated by the CIA and puppet IS into the DPRK for the purpose of state-sponsored terrorism against its supreme leadership with the use of bio-chemical substance. It was disclosed that Park had pushed forward the “operation to replace the supreme leadership of the north” in secrecy since the end of 2015 and even the “assassination” plot was included in the secret operational plan that was spearheaded by IS. At that time Park ignored the experts’ report that “the north’s regime change will be difficult” but welcomed IS report to the effect that “the situation is instable in the north and therefore, regime change can be possible” and examined the IS secret operational plan targeting “replacement of the north’s leadership” and directly signed it. The villains even thought about disguising the operation as car or train accident, while calling for paying special attention so that their involvement would not be revealed, as they worried that the successful operation may spill over into armed conflict. But the plan was not put into practice under strict vigilance in the north and afterwards, the secret operational plan was automatically scrapped with Park Geun Hye’s impeachment that led to the regime change in the south. The facts clearly prove that the enemies are employing every possible vicious means and method to put into practice the plan of “replacement of the north’s leadership” while pinning hope on it, the statement said, clarifying: 1. We declare at home and abroad that we will impose death penalty on traitor Park Geun Hye and ex-Director of the puppet Intelligence Service Ri Pyong Ho and their groups, criminals of hideous state-sponsored terrorism who hatched and pressed for the heinous plot to hurt the supreme leadership of the DPRK. IS men, to say nothing of Park Geun Hye and Ri Pyong Ho group, can never make any appeal even though they meet miserable dog’s death any time, at any place and by whatever methods from this moment. 2. The south Korean authorities have to hand over traitor Park Geun Hye and former IS Director Ri Pyong Ho and their groups to the DPRK under international convention as they committed hideous state-sponsored terrorism against the supreme leadership of the DPRK. The south Korean authorities have to judge themselves what adverse effect their act of shunning this crucial demand related to the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK will have on the future north-south relations. 3. We declare that in case the U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces again attempt at hideous state-sponsored terrorism targeting the supreme leadership of the DPRK, we will impose summary punishment without advance notice on those who organized, took part in or pursued the plot, under wartime law. We do not hide that should the U.S. and the south Korean authorities defy this warning and challenge our resolute measure, they will be made to pay a dear price in an irresistible physical way. (KCNA, “DPRK Ministries and Central Public Prosecutors Office Sentence Terrorists to Death Penalty,” June 28, 2017)
The White House said that the U.S. has only recently begun to exert serious pressure on North Korea to halt its nuclear weapons program, and faulted the Obama administration for not imposing stronger sanctions against Pyongyang. As President Trump prepares for his first meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae-in at the White House Thursday, his advisers believe there’s much more that the two nations can do together to get North Korea’s attention. “We are adding pressure and have really only begun to do so,” a senior White House official told reporters. “It’s really the one approach that we haven’t tried yet — acute economic pressure on North Korea. That campaign is only now gathering momentum. And the president is determined to follow through with that and to see how it works.” The North Korean regime has nuclear weapons and is working on development of an intercontinental ballistic missile, which the U.S. views as a direct threat. “It was only really over the course of 2016 that our prior administration began to apply acute pressure through those U.N. sanctions, Security Council resolutions,” the official said. “To say that pressure has not worked, it’s a little early to say that. There is plenty more pressure that could be brought to bear on North Korea in the form of U.N. sanctions, Security Council resolutions and also unilateral sanctions.” The White House aide said China could be doing much more. “China is still falling far short of what it could bring to bear on North Korea in terms of pressure,” the official said. “Coal is only one component of that. We very much want to see China do more than it’s willing to do, while we do recognize that China is doing more than it has done in the past.” (Dave Boyer, “White House Says Pressure on North Korea Has Only Just Begun,” Washington Times, June 28, 2017)
An international group of ex-nuclear commanders issued the first in a series of recommendations to world leaders to head off the rising threat of a nuclear war — calling on the Trump administration to open direct talks with North Korea, urging the United States, Russia and NATO to immediately establish military-to-military talks, and calling on India and Pakistan to set up a nuclear hotline. “The Nuclear Crisis Group assesses that the risk of nuclear weapons use, intended or otherwise, is unacceptably high and that all states must take constructive steps to reduce these risks,” the former military and diplomatic leaders — from nations as diverse as Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and the United States — write in an 11-page report about what they consider the biggest nuclear flashpoints. The crisis group was established earlier this year under the auspices of Global Zero, an leading arms control organization that supports the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons. A primary concern is the deteriorating situation with North Korea, which continues to test long-range missiles and prepare additional nuclear tests, and has been the focus of rising threats from President Donald Trump. Among the group’s recommendations: “To reduce immediate nuclear risks, the United States and North Korea should resume bilateral discussions immediately without preconditions.” It also calls on Washington and Pyongyang to “refrain from nuclear threats and adopt nuclear no-first-use statements” and to further reduce tensions the U.S. should “suspend flights of strategic bombers and visits by strategic submarines in return for key commensurate restraints by North Korea.” The calls for action on North Korea coincided with a letter today to Trump from a bipartisan group of former top U.S. leaders — including former secretaries of State, Defense and Energy — also urging him to open direct talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. “Tightening sanctions can be useful in increasing pressure on North Korea, but sanctions alone will not solve the problem,” the letter states. “Pyongyang has shown it can make progress on missile and nuclear technology despite its isolation. Without a diplomatic effort to stop its progress, there is little doubt that it will develop a long-range missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to the United States.” The letter to Trump was signed by William Perry, former secretary of Defense under Bill Clinton; George Shultz, secretary of State under Ronald Reagan; Robert Gallucci, who was was chief U.S. negotiator during the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994; Siegfried Hecker, the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, who has visited North Korea seven times; former Republican Sen. Richard Lugar, who chaired the Foreign Relations Committee; and Bill Richardson, a former secretary of Energy and another frequent visitor to the isolated communist regime. (Bryan Bender, “Ex-Nuke Commanders: Talk to North Korea, Open NATO-Russia Dialogue,” Politico, June 28, 2017)
6/29/17:
The Trump administration has blacklisted a small Chinese bank accused of illicit dealings with North Korea, escalating pressure to get Beijing to rein in its wayward ally. The Treasury Department says that the Bank of Dandong is a “primary money-laundering concern.” It is proposing severing the bank from the U.S. financial system, pending a 60-day review period. The announcement reflects growing U.S. frustration over China’s efforts to enforce international sanctions intended to starve North Korea of revenue for its nuclear and missile programs. Dandong, a northeastern Chinese city on the North Korean order, is a gateway for trade with the isolated nation. The U.S. also slapped sanctions on a Chinese shipping company and two Chinese people it says have facilitated illegal activities by North Korea. (Matthew Pennington, “U.S. Blacklists China Bank, Revving up Pressure over North Korea,” Associated Press, June 29, 2017)
The International Olympic Committee is not ruling out a proposed joint Korean team at next year’s Pyeongchang Olympics nor North Korea’s hosting a piece of the 2018 Winter Olympics. “Every time the games can play a role, a positive role of this nature, we cannot shut the door,” the Olympic Games’ executive director Christophe Dubi said in an interview with Kyodo News on Thursday. “We are not speaking about must or not must, we are speaking about opportunities. If the games can create these opportunities, let’s seize them.” In an attempt to thaw relations between the two nations, South Korean officials, President Moon Jae In among them, have extended an olive branch to North Korea with ideas of a joint team at Pyeongchang and North Korea co-hosting some events of the games in February. Dubi, the IOC’s chief technical expert on games organization, said a full evaluation has yet to be made on North Korea’s level of participation at Pyeongchang. An IOC team, including Dubi and President Thomas Bach, will head to South Korea from Thursday to hold meetings through Tuesday, during which the dissection will begin. “The matter currently has not been looked into in detail,” Dubi said. “These are expression of ideas that we have been made aware of. No detailed discussions have taken place or no evaluation at this point in time.” “These are expressions of interests for the Koreans of the whole peninsula to collaborate at that point in time. Of course some of the conversation will revolve around the ideas that have been floated because we’ve heard many comments made by different people.” “What we want is a full understanding of what is being proposed and whether at this point in time some studies were made or not. As far as the IOC is concerned, we are looking for additional information which will be provided in the next few days.” Bach arrived in Seoul today, when he supported South Korea’s attempt to engage in dialogue with its neighbor. “We noted with great appreciation the initiative and the speech made by President Moon on the opening of the taekwondo world championships,” Bach said. “I am looking forward to discussing all these issues with President Moon immediately after his return from his talks in Washington.” (Kano Shintaro, “IOC Not Ruling out S. Korea, N. Korea over Pyeongchang Collaboration,” Kyodo, June 29, 2017)
Resolving the issues surrounding North Korea’s nuclear program is more likely than ever before under a Donald Trump presidency, South Korean President Moon Jae-in said. “The ultimate goal of South Korea and the US is to end North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs. This is only possible through a strong Korea-US alliance,” Moon said in his meeting with House of Representatives’ leaders including Speaker Paul Ryan. “As it is a matter of top priority for President Trump, the possibility of resolving the issue is higher than ever. In the past, South Korea and the US placed importance in the matter but did not take concrete action. (I) plan to seek fundamental solutions with President Trump.” Responding to Ryan’s question regarding China’s role in denuclearizing North Korea, Moon said that Beijing is playing a part but that there is room for a bigger role. “I think that China has made an effort after the US-China summit. I think that the fact that North Korea has not conducted a sixth nuclear test nor launched an ICBM is the result of President Trump’s efforts, and the part Beijing is playing,” Moon said. “However, the problem has not been completely solved. North Korea appears to be making preparations, and appears ready (to conduct tests) at any time. So, there is still room for a bigger role from China, and (I) will discuss the matter when I meet President Xi Jinping.” (Choi He-suk, “N.K. Solution More Likely Than Ever under Trump: Moon,” Korea Herald, June 29, 2017)
The option of scaling down the annual joint military exercise between South Korea and the United States is huge leverage in reining in North Korea’s nuclear weapons ambition, a former career diplomat said in a forum co-hosted by Yonhap News Agency and the Ministry of Unification. “I think the scale of the South Korea-U.S. joint exercise could be revised down or readjusted” on the condition that North Korea stops its nuclear and missile tests, freezes its production of weapon-grade plutonium and uranium as well as shutting down its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and letting the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect the country, Shin Bong-kil, formerly a diplomat of 30 years, said in a forum. The annual forum was held to discuss the Moon Jae-in administration’s vision for peace and unification of the Korean Peninsula. Referring to his attendance at a semi-governmental meeting held between North Korea and the South Korea-U.S. side a month earlier in Stockholm, Sweden, the former ambassador to Jordan, said that “From what I have heard there, the thing more painful for North Korea than international sanctions it is now facing was the joint South Korea-U.S. military exercise.” “Given that the recent talk of the possibility of (U.S.) pre-emptive attacks and a (South Korean contingency) operation to decapitate Kim Jong-un put North Korea in a state of sever alertness, it is huge leverage,” Shin said, referring to the option of downsizing the joint Key Resolve and Foal Eagle exercises the allies carry out every spring in South Korea. Shin, now a professor at Yonsei University’s Graduate School of International Studies, also said South Korea may also be able to reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a now-suspended joint inter-Korean factory park in the North Korea border town of Kaesong, if a freeze is agreed on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. The reopening and resumption of inter-Korean economic cooperation would require permission under the United Nations Security Council resolutions, but “easing the U.N. sanctions could be negotiated if there’s a breakthrough in the North Korean nuclear front, he noted. Shin also stressed that South Korea should go beyond its current reliance on the South Korea-U.S. alliance and the U.N. to pursue a regional cooperation mechanism as a means to bring North Korea to the table for negotiations and eventually secure peace in the region. “Northeast Asia should build up a regional cooperation mechanism to take a lead in efforts to solve North Korea’s nuclear issues,” he said, urging the government to capitalize on the trilateral dialogue frame involving South Korea, China and Japan, symbolized by the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat. The secretariat was set up in Seoul in 2011 to back up the arrangement of the three countries’ summit and ministerial meetings. The trilateral body should invite Russia or Mongolia as its dialogue partners who could bring North Korea to the table with them, according to Shin. (Yonhap, “Downsizing S. Korea-U.S. Military Exercise Is Huge Leverage for N. Korea: Ex-Diplomat,” June 29, 2017)
The Defense Department has put together revised military options for North Korea and is ready to present them to President Donald Trump, CNN reported. The options will be presented if the North conducts an underground nuclear or ballistic missile test that indicates the regime has made significant progress towards developing a weapon that could attack the US, CNN reported, citing two unidentified military officials. National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster also confirmed that military options had been prepared, it said. “What we have to do is prepare all options because the president has made clear to us that he will not accept a nuclear power in North Korea and a threat that can target the United States and target the American population,” McMaster was quoted as saying during remarks at a Washington think tank. McMaster also said that the North’s threat is “much more immediate now.” “We can’t repeat the same failed approach of the past,” he said. “The president has directed us to not do that and to prepare a range of options, including a military option, which nobody wants to take.” (Yonhap, “Pentagon Ready to Present Trump with Revised Military Options for N. Korea: Report,” Korea Herald, June 29, 2017)
6/30/17:
President Donald Trump called for a determined response to North Korea after talks with South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in where he stressed the importance of their alliance but took aim at Seoul over trade and sharing the cost of defense. Trump said the United States was renegotiating what he characterized as a “rough” trade deal with South Korea agreed to five years ago by his predecessor, Barack Obama, and reiterated that an era of “strategic patience” over North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs had ended. “Together we are facing the threat of the reckless and brutal regime in North Korea,” Trump said as he stood alongside Moon in the White House Rose Garden. “The nuclear and ballistic missile programs of that regime require a determined response.” Despite the tough rhetoric, it remains unclear how Trump will find a way forward on North Korea, which is working to develop a nuclear-tipped missile capable of hitting the United States. Moon, who warned of a “stern response” to any provocations, urged Pyongyang to return promptly to talks. “Our two leaders will employ both sanctions and dialogue in a phased and comprehensive approach,” Moon said of South Korea and the United States. Trump and Moon have said they are open to renewed dialogue with North Korea but only under circumstances that would lead to Pyongyang giving up its weapons programs. Moon told an event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank that moves by North Korea that could create conditions for dialogue could include a freeze on its nuclear and missile tests, or the release of three Americans it is holding in the country. To be successful, talks would have to involve North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and have as their ultimate aim the complete dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear program, he added. South Korea is a long-standing American ally but Trump has spoken harshly about U.S. trade imbalances and threatened to tear up the bilateral trade pact. “We will do more to remove barriers to reciprocal trade and market access,” Trump said, adding that the two leaders had talked about the thorny trade areas of steel and autos. Trump said he was encouraged by Moon’s assurances that he would seek a level playing field for American workers and businesses, particularly automakers. A joint statement said the two sides had agreed to work together to reduce over supply of basic materials such as steel and non-tariff barriers. It also said Trump had accepted an invitation from Moon to visit South Korea this year. Bonnie Glaser, senior adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank, said it was unwise for Trump to air the trade issue so publicly. “Public complaints by Trump about unfair trade and inadequate defense spending provide opportunities for China and North Korea to drive a wedge between the allies,” she said. Trump also emphasized the need to ensure equitable sharing of costs for defense, returning to a theme he raised during his campaign and brought up with other allies, including NATO countries and Japan. A senior U.S. official said in a briefing before the president’s meeting with Moon that South Korea was in many respects a “model ally,” given its spending of 2.7 percent of GDP on defense and Moon’s plan to grow capabilities. “We shouldn’t view South Korea as somehow laggard on that front,” the official said. The U.S. goods trade deficit with South Korea has more than doubled since the U.S.-Korea free trade pact known as KORUS took effect in 2012. The agreement was forecast to boost U.S. exports by $10 billion a year, but in 2016 they were $3 billion lower than in 2011. At the start of today’s talks, U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross said the largest component of the deficit was automotive trade and many non-tariff barriers to U.S. auto exports to South Korea remained. I think the way to address it is to deal product by product with what we can do to change the export side and what we can do to reduce the bad imports side,” he said. Ross said later today that some progress had been made in the talks. The current pact was agreed to despite protests by supporters of Moon, who was then in opposition. But analysts have suggested that given the need to preserve a unified front in the face of a hostile North Korea, there could be compromise on both sides to resolve issues. (David Brunnstrom and Lisa Lambert, “Trump Calls for Firm Response on North Korea, Targets Seoul on Trade,” Reuters, June 30, 2017) President Moon Jae-in faced a demand by President Donald Trump to resolve trade imbalance between the two countries and pay more of the cost for the presence of U.S. troops in Korea, while winning assurances for stronger defense measures to deter North Korea’s rapidly advancing threats. In the joint press conference that followed the Oval Office summit, Trump said the era of strategic patience with the North Korean regime has failed. “And frankly, that patience is over,” he added. After calling upon regional powers and all responsible nations to implement sanctions and pressure North Korea to end its nuclear and missile programs, Trump said now the goal is “peace, stability and prosperity for the region.” The United States will defend itself and its allies, Trump said, and as part of that commitment, he said he wants to ensure that the cost of U.S. military presence in South Korea is equitably shared. “Burden sharing is a very important factor,” he said. “A factor that is becoming more and more prevalent, certainly in this administration.” Trump also spoke of a “fair and reciprocal economic relationship” with South Korea, while complaining that the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement has increased the U.S. trade deficit with South Korea by more than $11 billion. Trump expressed satisfaction with the fact that South Korean companies are making new investments in the United States in time with Moon’s trip, such as Cheniere’s export of American liquefied natural gas to South Korea in a deal worth more than $25 billion. The U.S. president said he and Moon discussed “tough” trade issues, particularly auto and steel, and that Moon promised to create a level playing field. He said Korean companies are selling cars in the U.S. market and that U.S. automakers should have the same opportunity to compete in the Korean market. “I’ve called on South Korea to stop enabling the export of dumped steel,” Trump said, adding that the two countries will work on the issues and sign a deal that is “great” for both of them. Following Trump’s remarks, Moon gave his own summary of the summit. While he made almost no specific mention of the trade issue or demand that Korea share more of the cost of U.S. troops in Korea, Moon said he recognizes Trump’s “strong commitment towards the development of the ROK-US alliance, the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the establishment of a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.” He added, “President Trump and I agreed that only strong security can make true peace possible,” and that “Through the [South Korea-U.S.] joint defense posture, including extended deterrence, we agreed to strengthen our overwhelming deterrence.” Moon also commented specifically on the issue of denuclearization. “President Trump and I agreed today that the resolution of the North Korea nuclear issue is our top foreign policy priority and that we will closely coordinate our policies,” he said. “In this vein, we agreed to work together toward a fundamental resolution of the North Korea nuclear issue based on a phased and comprehensive approach, utilizing both sanctions and dialogue.” He also warned North Korea to not “underestimate the firm resolution of our two countries” and urged it to return to the negotiation table to discuss denuclearization. Moon also said Korea will strengthen its joint defense capability with the United States as well as the country’s own defensive capabilities. “In this process,” he said, “I hope to see more active technology cooperation in the field of defense industry.” In the morning, Moon and Trump sat down for their first summit at the White House. They started the talks with a one-on-one meeting and then an expanded session with top government officials from both countries. “We accomplished a lot having to do with our thoughts on North Korea and very much our thoughts on trade,” Trump was quoted as saying in a White House pool report. “We are renegotiating a trade deal right now with South Korea, and hopefully it will be an equitable deal. It will be a fair deal for both parties. It’s been a rough deal for the U.S., but I think that it will be much different and will be good for both parties.” “Last night, at the dinner with President Trump,” Moon said, “we discussed various issues through a diverse scope and very honest discussions and on issues to include the North Korean nuclear issue and other issues of mutual interest.” Moon continued, “It was a great opportunity for us to further the trust and friendship between me and President Trump. It was also an opportunity to reconfirm that the United States and Korea are walking together on the same path towards a great alliance. Through this summit today, I hope that our relationship can further develop into a more meaningful and fruitful relationship.” “What many people don’t know,” Trump then said, “is that South Korea is a major trading partner with the United States, and we want something that is going to be good for the American worker, and I think that we will be able to do that today, and I think we’ll be able to do many other things. The relationship is very, very strong, and our personal relationship with President Moon — our personal relationship is very, very good.” Since he took office earlier this year, Trump has repeatedly promised to renegotiate the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement, which was concluded in 2007 and took effect in March 2012, following a renegotiation. Trump has called the free trade pact a “horrible deal” and vowed to either renegotiate or scrap it entirely. Moon, however, has insisted that the deal, a legacy of his political mentor, the late President Roh Moo-hyun, is mutually beneficial for the two countries. Ahead of the summit, Moon began his day by laying a wreath at the Korean War Veterans Memorial, where he paid respect to the American veterans who sacrificed their lives to defend Korea. One inscription in the Pool of Remembrance at the memorial reads, “Our nation honors her sons and daughters who answered the call to defend a country they never knew and people they never met.” Moon’s parents came to South Korea as refugees aboard a U.S. warship during the Korean War. Two years after they arrived in 1951, Moon was born on the island of Geoje in January 1953. (Ser Myo-ja, “Moon and Trump Discuss Security, Trade and Future Alliance at First Summit,” JoongAng Ilbo, July 1, 2017)
President Moon Jae-in stressed the need for improvements in inter-Korean relations, proclaiming a “four no” approach that includes avoiding hostile acts or military attacks against North Korea, attempts to undermine or replace its government, and efforts to artificially hasten reunification.
Moon‘s agreement on these principles during his summit with US President Donald Trump is being seen as laying a foundation for dialogue toward North Korea’s denuclearization. Moon reportedly plans to announce a “Moon Jae-in doctrine” – a vision and proposal for North Korea policy structured around these “four nos” – during his July 5-8 visit to Germany to attend the G-20 Summit. Moon shared the principles during a June 30 dinner for invited Korea experts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) during his Washington visit for the South Korea-US summit. “Neither President Trump nor I will be pursuing antagonistic policies toward North Korea,” he said. “We do not intend to attack North Korea, nor do we want the replacement or collapse of the North Korean regime. We will not artificially hasten unification of the Korean Peninsula either,” he continued. Moon also said Washington‘s relationship with Pyongyang “may improve in the process of South Korea working with the US’s coordination to improve inter-Korean relations.” “I shared a deep conversation on this visit with President Trump. We agreed to work more actively to protect and forge peace,” he added, stressing that the “four nos” had been agreed upon with Washington. “Our new direction will be a move away from ‘strategic patience’ toward using all available means to bring North Korea to the negotiating table,” Moon continued.
“There also needs to be dialogue with [North Korean leader] Kim Jong-un. He is the only person who can make the decision to end North Korea‘s nuclear program,” he said. Moon’s “four nos” approach is significant as an agreement between Seoul and Washington on principles for approaching Pyongyang. The two leaders’ joint statement said they had emphasized that “the United States and the ROK do not maintain a hostile policy toward North Korea.” The approach also echoes the “three nos” stated by US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in a May 3 address to State Department employees: no military attacks, regime replacement or collapse, or artificially hastening of reunification. “The ‘four nos’ stated by President Moon Jae-in were an attempt to bring North Korea into denuclearization dialogue by announcing that it will not do the things North Korea fears most,” explained an inter-Korean relations expert who worked on Moon’s presidential election campaign. Moon is expected to present his visit for North Korean policy – including the “four nos” message – in a Korber Foundation invitational speech scheduled for his July 5-8 Germany visit. Late former President Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) was also in Germany when he delivered his Berlin Declaration of Mar. 9, 2000, which proposed large-scale economic support to North Korea, dialogue between South and North Korea, and the sending of special envoys. Kim‘s Berlin Declaration ended up bearing fruit three months later with the first-ever inter-Korean summit and June 15 Joint Declaration. (Choi Hye-jung and Jung In-hwan, and Yi Yong-in, “In U.S., Pres. Moon Stresses North Korea Policy Based on ‘Four No’s,’” Hankyore, July 3, 2017) The Moon Jae-in administration made a request during its late June summit with the US to amend the two sides‘ New Missile Guidelines (NMG) to increase the maximum permissible warhead weight on a 800-km ballistic missile from its current 500kg to one ton, it was learned on July 24. Seoul proposed the idea to the US at the time, with plans to discuss the details with the US during the two sides’ Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) and Korea-US Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) scheduled for the second half of the year, sources said. The proposal indicates that Seoul is attempting to amend the NMG for the first time in roughly five years. A Ministry of National Defense source said it would be “inappropriate to confirm the specifics of matters discussed at a summit between the South Korean and US leaders,” but did not deny that the proposal to increase the warhead weight had been made. A high-level government source familiar with the situation said, “I think that if you look at the administrations’ response when North Korea launched its [Hwasong-14] missile last month, you can pretty much see its position in terms of responding resolutely to the issue.” A ministry official also responded to questions on whether the administration’s aim in increasing the warhead weight is to develop a “bunker buster” capable of destroying an underground bunker where North Korean leader Kim Jong-un might attempt to hide in an emergency. “I can’t confirm whether such plans exist at present, but it is true that we will require such a development plan in the future,” the official said. But if the accounts are true, the measure could end up being a stumbling block to the Moon administration’s North Korea policy approach of imposing sanctions and pressure to resolve the nuclear issue while attempting to achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula through improvements in inter-Korean relations. It could be interpreted as signaling that the administration, which has repeatedly stressed that it has no intention of attacking North Korea and does not desire a regime change or collapse in Pyongyang, is now attempting to develop technologically that basically targets that same regime. In 2012, the South Korean government concluded negotiations with the US increasing the maximum development range for ballistic missiles from 300km to 800km while keeping the maximum warhead weight at 500kg. (Kim Ji-eun, “In Summit with US, Moon Administration Requested Increase of Warhead Maximum Weight,” Hankyore, July 25, 2017)
President Trump hardened his treatment of allies and adversaries in Asia this week, pressing South Korea’s visiting leader to overhaul a landmark trade agreement with the United States a day after announcing a series of steps that angered China. Meeting with President Moon Jae-in of South Korea, Mr. Trump demanded more access to Korean markets for American cars and less of what he called “dumped” Korean steel in the United States — all part of an overhaul of the five-year-old free trade agreement with South Korea that he derided as “not exactly a great deal.” “Very important steps,” a stern Trump said in the White House Rose Garden, standing next to Moon. “They have to be made. Not fair to the American worker if they are not. And they will be.” The president reaffirmed the American security alliance with South Korea against the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea. But he showed little patience for Moon’s hope for engagement with the North — something analysts said could be a future source of friction between the leaders. Trump’s decision yesterday to impose sanctions on Chinese entities that do business with North Korea was interpreted by some as a shot across the bow not only to Beijing, but also to Moon, since it emphasizes pressure over diplomacy. And the president’s approval of a $1.4 billion weapons sale to Taiwan provoked a sulfurous reaction from the Chinese government. Taken together, the measures signal that Trump has moved into an aggressive, unpredictable phase of his strategy for dealing with one of the world’s tensest regions. On trade, at least, the United States will now be at odds with its two key partners in confronting the rogue government in North Korea. Trump’s new approach will be a test of whether he can pursue the protectionist themes of his presidential campaign while still cooperating with China and South Korea on security issues. “Trump has opted for coercion over engagement with allies and adversaries, even when the adversary is pressuring the ally,” said Evan S. Medeiros, who served as senior director on Asia in the National Security Council during the Obama administration. Given that South Korea is already under intense pressure from the Chinese over THAAD, some analysts said the harshness of Trump’s critique of South Korea on trade had caught them by surprise. During the Oval Office meeting with Moon, Trump invited his commerce secretary, Wilbur Ross, to recite a list of grievances. Ross cited barriers that he said cut down the number of American cars sold in South Korea. He also complained about Chinese steel, which he said was dumped in South Korea and used to manufacture pipes for oil fields, which are then shipped to the United States. The United States ran a $27 billion trade deficit with South Korea in 2016, a modest decline from the previous year but more than double the amount in 2011, the year before the renegotiated trade agreement took effect. “There are a lot of very specific problems,” Ross said. Trump blamed President Barack Obama for the pact, even though the deal was first negotiated by President George W. Bush in 2007 and renegotiated by Obama, which is essentially what Trump is proposing to do. Trump’s aides said he also planned to push ahead with his trade campaign against China — freed up by his conclusion that China’s president, Xi Jinping, had fallen short in pressuring North Korea to curb its behavior. Trump had delayed introducing measures against China to encourage Xi to use his influence with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un. In the coming days, the White House plans to publish the results of an investigation of the steel industry, which could lead to tariffs and other measures against imports. South Korea is the second-largest supplier of steel to the United States, by dollar value, after Canada. China is much further back, but administration officials say the country has a pernicious effect on the global steel market because of its excess capacity. Surplus steel from China is shipped to other countries and ends up in products that are exported to the United States. During the meeting with Moon, Gary D. Cohn, the president’s chief economic adviser, confined his remarks to China’s “many predatory practices in how they deal with us.” He told Moon he would be interested to hear how South Korea deals with its neighbor. It is not yet clear whether Trump has given up on his relationship with Mr. Xi after cultivating him assiduously over a two-day summit meeting at the president’s Florida estate, Mar-a-Lago, in April. Trump has avoided derogatory comments or tweets about Xi, even as his administration has made moves, like the Taiwan arms sale, that angered Beijing. Tellingly, today Trump did not refer to China as an ally in the push to curb North Korea’s nuclear efforts. He said only that “other regional powers and all responsible nations” should join the United States, South Korea and Japan in enforcing sanctions on the North Korean government. “The era of strategic patience with the North Korean regime has failed,” he said. “Frankly, that patience is over.” In the days leading up to his visit, Moon and his aides had tried to erase any signs of daylight between him and Mr. Trump. The South Korean foreign minister said the government would not reverse the deployment of the American antimissile system, which Moon has halted until an environmental assessment can be completed. Though Moon spoke of using “both sanctions and dialogue,” he said he supported Trump’s pressure campaign. “The threats and the provocations by the North will be met with the stern response,” he said. But Moon said nothing about the trade issues that Trump raised. Like other foreign leaders, he came armed with business deals, including a $25 billion agreement to buy American natural gas, which earned perfunctory praise from Trump before he launched his critique. “I saw Moon moving toward alignment and taking issues off the table,” said Scott Snyder, the director of the program on United States-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. “In a way, the only issue he couldn’t take off the table is the one the president holds powerfully and viscerally — the idea that Korea is a free rider.” (Mark Landler, “Trump Adopts More Aggressive Stance with U.S. Allies and Adversaries in Asia,” New York Times, July 1, 2017,
“The two leaders displayed ‘great chemistry’ and were apparently capable of laying the foundation to explore common ground even on sensitive matters,” he said in a commentary, referring to Trump’s portrayal of the summit. Lee Si-hyung, Seoul’s former deputy trade minister and ambassador to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development who currently heads the Korea Foundation, said the summit bears significance in that the two presidents exhibited a united front on North Korea and the alliance with Seoul playing a “leading role.” Though Trump bashed a free trade pact and what he called “imbalance” at the conference, they managed to only carry a basic position on trade expressed in a “refined, well-chosen language in a concise manner,” Lee pointed out. “Unlike security issues, if the two leaders had reached a ‘consensus’ on trade at their very first summit it would be rather difficult to call it success,” he wrote on Facebook. “Now Seoul’s urgent task is to refurbish the trade-related organizations and personnel so that it can devise countermeasures on the US interests in preparation for future dealings.” (Shin Hyeon-hee, “Emboldened Moon to Spur N.K. Dialogue But Challenges Remain,” Korea Herald, July 2, 2017)
Joint Statement: “…Maintaining lock-step coordination on our North Korea policy President Trump and President Moon pledged to continue to coordinate closely to achieve our shared goal of complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. The two leaders called on North Korea to refrain from provocative, destabilizing actions and rhetoric, and to make the strategic choice to fulfill its international obligations and commitments. The two leaders affirmed that North Korea’s nuclear tests and unprecedented number of ballistic missile tests constitute direct violations of multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) and highlight the accelerating threat its programs pose to international peace and security. They affirmed their commitment to fully implement existing sanctions and impose new measures designed to apply maximum pressure on North Korea to compel Pyongyang to cease its provocative actions and return to sincere and constructive talks. The two leaders also urged all UN member states to swiftly and fully implement UNSCR obligations and took note with appreciation of constructive actions by some countries around the world to exert diplomatic and economic pressure on North Korea to return to credible negotiations on denuclearization. They noted the important role China could play to this end. In addition, the two sides committed to enhance cooperation to combat North Korea’s dangerous and destabilizing malicious cyber activity. Noting that sanctions are a tool of diplomacy, the two leaders emphasized that the door to dialogue with North Korea remains open under the right circumstances. In reaffirming our two sides’ shared top priority to resolve the nuclear issue, the two leaders emphasized that the United States and the ROK do not maintain a hostile policy toward North Korea and, together with the rest of the international community, stand ready to offer a brighter future for North Korea if it chooses the right path. The two sides decided to closely coordinate on our joint North Korea policy, including how to create conditions necessary for denuclearization talks, through a high-level strategic consultation mechanism. President Trump supported the ROK’s leading role in fostering an environment for peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula. The two leaders expressed deep concern about the well-being of the North Korean people, including the egregious human rights violations and abuses committed by the government, and noted their intention to ensure sanctions have minimal impact on North Korea’s vulnerable populations. President Trump supported President Moon’s aspiration to restart inter-Korean dialogue on issues including humanitarian affairs. The two leaders reaffirmed the importance of cooperating with the international community to ensure accountability and achieve substantial progress in North Korea’s deplorable human right situation. The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to promote regional relations and enhance U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation. The two leaders affirmed that trilateral security and defense cooperation contributes to enhanced deterrence and defense against the North Korean threat. They decided to further develop this cooperation, using established bilateral and trilateral mechanisms. They also underscored the importance of leveraging the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral relationship to address global challenges such as cancer research, energy security, women’s empowerment, and cybersecurity. President Trump and President Moon decided to discuss further ways to enhance trilateral cooperation together with Prime Minister Abe at the upcoming U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateral Summit on the margins of the G20 in July.” (Joint statement of Presidents of South Korea and the United States, Korea Herald, July 1, 2017)
7/2/17:
President Trump, frustrated by China’s unwillingness to lean on North Korea, has told the Chinese leader that the United States is prepared to act on its own in pressuring the nuclear-armed government in Pyongyang, according to senior administration officials. Trump’s warning, delivered in a cordial but blunt phone call tonight to President Xi Jinping, came after a flurry of actions by the United States — selling weapons to Taiwan, threatening trade sanctions and branding China for human trafficking — that rankled the Chinese and left little doubt that the honeymoon between the two leaders was over. After returning from his weekend getaway in Bedminster, N.J., late the next day, Trump noted on Twitter, “Perhaps China will put a heavy move on North Korea and end this nonsense once and for all!” American officials, talking about the continuing dialogue with the Chinese, said they hoped the tough steps by the United States would spur Xi to reconsider his reluctance to press the North. But Trump, one official said, now has fewer illusions that China will radically alter its approach to its reclusive neighbor, which is driven more by fear of a chaotic upheaval there than by concern about its nuclear and missile programs. That leaves the president in a familiar bind on North Korea as he prepares to leave for a Group of 20 meeting this week in Germany, where he will meet Xi as well as the leaders of Japan and South Korea, nations Mr. Trump has also turned to in navigating his approach to the North. Without the full weight of China, pressure tactics are unlikely to force North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, to change course. Yet diplomatic engagement — which Xi continues to push, according to officials — is not a step that Trump is ready to consider, after the death last month of an American college student, Otto F. Warmbier, who was held captive in Pyongyang for 17 months, then freed in a coma. A go-it-alone approach by Trump would also further antagonize China, since it would require blacklisting multiple Chinese banks and companies that do business with the North. The United States began doing so on a modest scale last week by designating four Chinese entities and individuals. The precarious state of United States-China relations was captured by the way the two sides characterized the call. The White House said only that Trump had raised the “growing threat” of North Korea’s weapons programs with Xi. The Chinese, in a more detailed statement, said the relationship was being “affected by some negative factors.” The latest of these — and perhaps the most grating to the Chinese — was a naval maneuver in which an American guided-missile destroyer sailed near disputed territory claimed by Beijing in the South China Sea. The movement by the warship, the Stethem, off Triton Island in the Paracel archipelago prompted a furious response from China’s government, which called it a “serious political and military provocation.” Still, neither leader appeared ready to abandon the rapport established in April at a summit meeting in Palm Beach, Fla. Trump avoided any personal jabs at Xi; the Chinese government said tensions were to be expected in a relationship this complex. But each leader has learned a hard lesson about the other, according to officials and outside analysts. Xi, they said, miscalculated what China needed to do to satisfy Trump, thinking he could buy him off with a few highly visible measures, like banning coal purchases from the North. Trump overvalued the personal touch by betting that a few hearty handshakes with Xi would overcome China’s deep-rooted resistance to pressuring North Korea. “The Chinese tried to figure out what was the absolute minimum they needed to do,” said Bonnie S. Glaser, director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The administration has signaled repeatedly that they had to shut down these banks and front companies in northeast China that enable North Korea.” Chinese officials professed surprise last week when the White House rolled out three tough steps, back to back. It imposed sanctions on a Chinese bank, accusing it of acting as a conduit for illicit North Korean financial activity, as well as on a Chinese company and two Chinese citizens. It approved the sale of $1.4 billion in weapons to Taiwan, which China regards as a breakaway province. And it labeled China one of the worst offenders in an annual State Department report on human trafficking. The White House also signaled it would act against imported Chinese steel as part of a broader campaign against steel dumping around the world. But the Commerce Department’s report on the steel market, which would be the basis for tariffs and other sanctions, is still undergoing revisions and will not be released before the Group of 20 meeting. The American destroyer’s cruise past Triton appeared to be especially offensive to China. It was only the second time since Trump took office in January that an American warship had ignored China’s claims in the South China Sea. On May 24, another guided-missile destroyer, the Dewey, traversed Mischief Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands. “The Chinese side strongly urges the U.S. side to immediately stop such kind of provocative operations that violate China’s sovereignty and threaten China’s security,” a Foreign Ministry spokesman, Lu Kang, said on Sunday. “The Chinese side will continue to take all necessary means to defend national sovereignty and security.” Washington and Beijing confirmed that Trump requested the call on Sunday. But American officials said their Chinese counterparts signaled that they were eager to clear the air after a bumpy week. Cheng Xiaohe, an associate professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, said it was “a little bit odd” that Xi had agreed to the call. Still, he said, the gesture indicated that China was seeking to maintain “stability and some momentum” with Mr. Trump and perhaps deter him from taking more extreme measures, such as military action. “The actions the administration has taken have upset the Chinese, no doubt about it,” Professor Cheng said. “The conversations demonstrate that China is still willing to talk with Trump and work with the U.S. government to deal with North Korea’s nuclear issues.” China’s resistance has led Trump to turn to other nations, notably Japan and South Korea, for help in resolving the crisis. He had a warmer call with Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan, who praised his decision to penalize Chinese entities accused of doing illicit business with the North, according to Kyodo. Trump will host a dinner with Abe and Moon Jae-in, South Korea’s new president, at the Group of 20 in Hamburg on July 6. Some former officials said the tensions between Mr. Trump and Xi were neither new nor particularly troubling. “We’ve had similar dynamics under Bush, Clinton and Obama,” said Jeffrey A. Bader, a China adviser to President Barack Obama. “It’s not an either-or. We operate in a nether zone with the Chinese.” (Mark Landler and Javier Hernandez, “Trump Calls Xi with a Warning on North Korea,” New York Times, July 4, 2017,
7/3/17:
It wasn’t so long ago that Abe Shinzo appeared on course to becoming Japan’s longest-serving prime minister ever. But after his conservative Liberal Democratic Party’s crushing defeat in today’s Tokyo assembly election, Abe’s iron grip on power has finally shown signs of slipping — a setback critics say is the biggest crisis he has faced since his sweeping return to power in December 2012. “This is a very stern rebuke from the public that we must do some serious soul-searching about,” NHK showed a grim-faced Abe telling reporters at his Tokyo office this morning. “It’s been five years since this administration kicked off, and I believe the public has sent us a tough message that we have lost our discipline,” he said. Although Tokyo assembly elections have often served as a harbinger of national trends, there is no immediate danger of the Abe administration disintegrating, as the next Lower House election isn’t scheduled until next year. Experts say the LDP’s shattering defeat hardly leaves Abe in the mood to call a snap election anytime soon, either. But the results bode ill for the prime minister nonetheless and point to the “beginning of the end of Abe’s invincibility,” according to Narita Norihiko, a political science professor at Surugadai University. Today’s election saw Abe’s LDP lose big to a fledgling party headed by the capital’s popular governor, Koike Yuriko. Tomin First no Kai (Tokyoites First), as it is called, trounced the LDP by capturing 49 seats in the 127-member assembly. The tally, if combined with seats won by its allies, including Komeito, gives the pro-Koike forces a comfortable majority in the assembly at 79 seats. The outcome left the LDP tied with Komeito at 23 seats, followed by the Japanese Communist Party with 19, and the Democratic Party with five. In March, the LDP rubber-stamped a historic rule change to extend the maximum tenure of its president to nine years, up from six, in what was seen as a move to enable a third term for Abe that would continue through 2021. Such a scenario would mean that Abe, who served previously as prime minister from 2006 to 2007, would be remembered as the longest-serving leader in modern Japan, topping Taro Katsura, who held the office for a combined 2,886 days before dying in 1913. But Sunday’s trouncing has “clouded the prospect of a third term,” Narita said. It also places a big question mark over Abe’s recently announced timeline for revising the pacifist Constitution by 2020. His goal is to alter war-renouncing Article 9 to make explicit the status of the Self-Defense Forces. Abe’s sudden mention of a deadline and the unconventional ways in which he said he would go about legalizing the SDF caused murmurs of discord among his rivals in the LDP, such as Shigeru Ishiba, who argued the prime minister’s methods were riding roughshod over his party’s previous internal policies. When he was riding high, Abe couldn’t have cared less about these voices of discontent, but now “it’s not clear whether he can push ahead with his agenda, given an expected rise in momentum within the LDP for questioning his power,” Narita said. Speculation is also rife that Abe will attempt to engineer a make-or-break image makeover, perhaps starting this month, by overhauling his scandal-tainted Cabinet and ousting Defense Minister Tomomi Inada, who violated her obligation to stay politically neutral by hinting that the SDF backed an LDP-backed candidate. But a failure to check the background of her replacement or other new faces would risk the possibility of further scandals, which would be a recipe for disaster, Narita said. Yakushiji Katsuyuki, a professor of political science at Toyo University, said the metropolitan assembly election not only debunked the notion of Abe’s invincibility, but also exposed an uncomfortable truth. With the main opposition Democratic Party so hopelessly unpopular, Abe had faced no real enemy until this election. But when confronted with a powerful alternative in the person of Koike, the fragility of his popularity was made painfully clear. “When there is no real alternative to the LDP, you either refuse to vote or begrudgingly vote for the LDP,” Yakushiji said. “Abe mistook these votes as positive support for his party, which emboldened him into going ahead with all these controversial policies, such as revising the Constitution.” All eyes are now on whether Tomin First’s overwhelming victory will facilitate a foray by Koike into national politics — and ultimately her widely rumored bid to become Japan’s first female prime minister. Asked today about the possibility of returning to national politics, Koike ruled out the idea. Observers, too, are playing it down, saying the fact she is Tokyo governor means she is unlikely to flirt with national politics anytime soon. Doing so, they say, would be taken as a betrayal of Tokyo’s residents that would send her popularity plummeting. “She is not stupid enough to do that,” Yakushiji said. Reports say some prominent lawmakers, including Koike protege Masaru Wakasa and ex-DP member Akihisa Nagashima, are thinking about founding a new “pro-Koike” party at the national level. But Koike’s absence from such a party, coupled with the fact that no national election is scheduled in the immediate future, means the impact of such a move would likely be limited, Narita said. “She’s a very ambitious person, so I’m sure she wants to be prime minister someday,” he said. “But at the same time, she’s also determined not to miss the honor of presiding over Tokyo as it hosts the Olympics and Paralympics in 2020. Her current term is set to expire right before the games, so she has to run for a second term as governor. There are still years to go.” (Osaki Tomohiro, “Tokyo Election Loss Puts Abe in Jeopardy,” Japan Times, July 3, 2017)
President Moon Jae-in appointed his new point man on North Korea. Cho Myoung-gyun, a former official from the unification ministry, as the new unification minister. (Yonhap, “President Appoints Unification, Agriculture Minister,” July 3, 2017) South Korea’s new unification minister vowed today to use all available means to induce North Korea to accept Seoul’s offer to resume exchanges and improve relations. Cho Myoung-gyon also said he will make efforts to resolve North Korea’s nuclear issue and mend inter-Korean relations “with persistence and step by step.” “I will try to mobilize all available means (to improve frayed inter-Korean ties). I think that a long-term perspective and persistence would be needed,” Cho told reporters after taking office earlier in the day. A joint statement adopted after the summit showed that U.S. President Donald Trump “supported President Moon’s aspirations to restart inter-Korean dialogue on issues, including humanitarian affairs,” and hailed South Korea’s “leading role” in creating the conditions for the peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. “Rather than being swayed by the North’s each and every reaction, I believe we need to take a long-term perspective in handling North Korea’s affairs.” Moon is seeking to take a two-phased approach to resolving North Korea’s nuclear standoff — a freeze on Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs and their complete dismantlement. “Based on the outcome of the summit, (I) will make efforts to resolve North Korea’s nuclear issue and mend inter-Korean relations in a way that is mutually beneficial to each other. To this end, I will strive to make such efforts with persistence and step by step,” he said. Cho described reunions of families separated by the 1950-53 Korean War as the “urgent” issue. “I feel strongly that the issue warrants urgency,” the minister said. “(I) will step up efforts to resolve the issue as soon as possible with the hope that specific measures would be drawn up.” He said at his confirmation hearing last week that he would consider proposing the family reunions to the North for Liberation Day on August 15 or the Chuseok fall harvest holiday. (Yonhap, “New Unification Minister Vows Persistent Efforts to Improve Inter-Korean Ties,” July 3, 2017)
7/4/17:
KCNA: “Respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un signed the order to carry out the test-fire of inter-continental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14 on July 3, Juche 106 (2017). There will be a report of the DPRK Academy of Defense Science on the successful launch of Hwasong-14 that was conducted under the personal guidance of Kim Jong Un.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Issues Order for Test-Fire of Intercontinental Ballistic Rocket Hawsong-14,” July 4, 2014) KCNA: “The Academy of Defense Science of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea released the following report Tuesday [July 14]: Scientists and technicians of the DPRK Academy of Defense Science successfully carried out the test-fire of inter-continental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14, newly researched and developed by them under the strategic decision of Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army. The rocket blasted off from the northwestern part of the DPRK at 9:00, July 4, Juche 106 (2017) to make 39 minute flight along its pre-set trajectory before accurately hitting the target waters in the open sea in the East Sea of Korea. The test-launch was carried out at the maximum angle launch system and had no adverse effect on the security of neighboring countries. The rocket flew 933km, reaching an altitude of 2, 802km. Kim Jong Un, Supreme Leader of our party, state and the army, personally observed the process of the test-launch in field and solemnly declared before the world its shining success. The success in the test-fire of inter-continental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14, final gate to rounding off the state nuclear force, at just one go is a powerful manifestation of the invincible state might and the tremendous capability of the self-reliant national defense industry of Juche Korea that has advanced at a remarkably rapid pace under the great Workers’ Party of Korea’s new line on the simultaneous development of the two fronts, and a great auspicious event to be specially recorded in the history of the DPRK which has long craved for powerful defense capabilities. As a full-fledged nuclear power that has been possessed of the most powerful inter-continental ballistic rocket capable of hitting any part of the world, along with nuclear weapons, the DPRK will fundamentally put an end to the U.S. nuclear war threat and blackmail and reliably defend the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula and the region.” (KCNA, “Report of DPRK Academy of Defense Science,” July 4, 2017)
North Korea’s overseas mouthpiece said diplomatic negotiations have risen as the sole clue to address its confrontation with the United States with the success of its recent intercontinental ballistic missile launch. “The ongoing nuclear showdown between Pyongyang and Washington has entered into its final phase with the North’s successful Hwasong-14 ICBM test-fire, and now avoiding armed conflict and seeking ways to find a clue to settle it via diplomatic negotiations have become a pressing issue that the international community can no longer turn away from,” Chosun Sinbo, a pro-Pyongyang newspaper based in Tokyo, said. The nuclear war crisis between the two nations can be resolved not via the abandonment of Pyongyang’s nuclear policy but via that of Washington’s hostile policy, the paper said. “It’s not North Korea but the United States that should change,” it said. The paper’s claim is in line with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s remarks the previous day that the North will never offer to abandon its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in any case unless the U.S.’ hostile policy and nuclear threat are fundamentally cleared away. (Yonhap, “N. Korean Mouthpiece Says Diplomatic Negotiations Emerge as Key to Solving Nuclear Standoff,’ July 5, 2017)
Woodward: “That afternoon, [National Security Adviser] McMaster chaired an emergency principals meeting in the Situation Room. Trump was not present. Director [Mike] Pompeo said there was confirmation of an ICBM. It had been fired via an eight-axl mobile vehicle that had been imported from China. [When?] So much for the hope that China would be a restraining influence on North Korea. Tillerson said he had been unable to contact the Chinese, but had called for en emergency meeting in the U.N. Security Council. …Tillerson raised the concern that the administration was targeting China with steel tariffs at a time when they needed its help to corral North Korea. He was also worried about allies’ reactions to Trump’s threatened steel tariffs, like Japan, South Korea and the European Union. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley said, ‘China has been avoiding us, but eventually they agreed to a U.N. Security Council meeting tomorrow.’ The U.S. needed to identify more companies who did business with North Korea for additional sanctions. ‘We need a persuasive press statement to gain allies on this,’ Mattis said. ‘We don’t want to show any daylight between us and the Republic of Korea. He walked through military contingency plans, including possible strikes in North Korea – the full range, from limited pinpoints to an all-out attack, and even a leadership strike. The U.S. didn’t have all of the ships and other assets it might need in the region. They were not ready for every contingency, and it would take time to get everything in line. ‘Our first choice ought to be U.N.-led sanctions,’ [Treasury Secretary] Mnuchin said. ‘Otherwise we can have another dozen primary sanctions available.’ Mike Rogers, NSA director, outlined the United States’ defensive posture on cyber security. He did not address offensive cyberattack capabilities. ‘There really ought to be a question of how much technical data we share with China and Russia,’ cautioned DNI Dan Coats, ‘in terms of what we picked up about the ICBM and other things.’ U.S. intelligence had a pretty full picture, and it had to be protected. ‘We’re going to find out pretty soon here whether China is with us as promised,’ said Tillerson If the United States was ready to impose a ban on American citizens traveling to North Korea, we ought to get other countries to do the same. ‘The big challenge is going to be the loss of human intelligence,’ Pompeo said, alluding to a possible impact on sensitive CIA sources. ‘I hope we go slow on this,’ said Mattis. He knew the details of the Special Access Programs. ‘That loss of human intelligence would be a big thing.’ ‘Continued travel poses the risk of hostage taking,’ Tillerson said, but he did not disagree with Pompeo and Mattis about the importance of the human sources. The consensus was that without taking bold action, the U.S. risked being seen as tepid and lacking in the new normal of an ICBM-equipped North Korea.” (Woodward, Fear, pp. 177-80)
North Korea said that it had successfully conducted its first test of an intercontinental ballistic missile, claiming a milestone in its efforts to build nuclear weapons capable of hitting the mainland United States. The announcement came hours after a launch that the United States military said sent the missile aloft for 37 minutes. That duration, analysts said, suggested a significant improvement in the range of the North’s missiles, and it might allow one to travel as far as 4,000 miles and hit Alaska. In initial statements, the United States Pacific Command and the State Department described the weapon as an intermediate-range missile rather than an intercontinental ballistic missile. The missile took off from the Banghyon airfield in the northwestern town of Kusong and flew 578 miles before landing in the sea between North Korea and Japan, the South Korean military said in a statement. The Japanese government said the missile landed in its so-called exclusive economic zone off its western coast. It was the first missile test by the North since it launched land-to-sea cruise missiles off its east coast on June 8. Under a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions, North Korea is prohibited from developing or testing ballistic missiles. While the North is believed to have made significant progress in its weapons programs, experts believe it still has a long way to go in miniaturizing nuclear warheads for intercontinental ballistic missiles. The missile test adds a volatile new element to the Trump administration’s efforts to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, which have included naval drills off the Korean Peninsula and pressure on China, Pyongyang’s longtime ally. In a blunt phone call July 2, President Trump warned President Xi Jinping of China that the United States was prepared to act alone against North Korea. On Twitter late last night, Trump was apparently referring to North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, when he wrote: “North Korea has just launched another missile. Does this guy have anything better to do with his life? Hard to believe that South Korea and Japan will put up with this much longer. Perhaps China will put a heavy move on North Korea and end this nonsense once and for all!” If the missile took 37 minutes to fly 578 miles, as the South Korean and United States military analysts said, that would mean that it had a highly lofted trajectory, probably reaching an altitude of more than 1,700 miles, said David Wright, co-director of the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists. Such a missile would have a maximum range of roughly 4,160 miles, or 6,700 kilometers, on a standard trajectory, he said. North Korea said the missile, which it identified as the Hwasong-14, flew for 39 minutes. “That range would not be enough to reach the lower 48 states or the large islands of Hawaii, but would allow it to reach all of Alaska,” Wright wrote in a blog post. The missile looked like the longest-range missile that North Korea had ever tested, and its long flight time was “more consistent with an ICBM that can target Alaska and perhaps Hawaii,” said Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. “It’s a very big deal — it looks like North Korea tested an ICBM,” he said by email. “Even if this is a 7,000-km-range missile, a 10,000-km-range missile that can hit New York isn’t far off.” But analysts also cautioned that although they have been impressed by the rapid and steady progress in the North’s missile programs, the long flight time itself did not suggest that North Korea had mastered the complex technologies needed to build a reliable nuclear-tipped ICBM, such as the know-how to separate the nuclear warhead and guide it to its target. By lofting some of its recent missiles to higher altitudes and letting them crash down toward the Earth at greater speeds, North Korea has claimed that it tested its “re-entry” technology, which can protect a nuclear warhead from intense heat and vibrations as it crashes through the Earth’s atmosphere. But it is still unclear whether the North has successfully cleared that technological hurdle, missile experts said. Kim Dong-yub, a defense analyst at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University in Seoul, said that the Hwasong-12, which the North tested in May, flew 489 miles in 30 minutes, soaring to an altitude of 1,312 miles. Such a missile could deliver a standard 1,430-pound nuclear warhead over a range of 2,800 miles, not enough to reach Hawaii and Alaska, as North Korea claimed at the time. North Korea’s test on Tuesday may have been intended to prove that its missiles could reach Hawaii and Alaska, Kim said. North Korea announced the missile launch in a broadcast on state television after a series of patriotic music videos. “As a proud nuclear power that possesses not only nuclear weapons but also the most powerful ICBM that can target any part of the world, North Korea will root out the United States’ threat and blackmail of nuclear war and solidly defend the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region,” the North Korean statement said. North Korea called the test “a momentous event in the history of the country” and said it had brought a “great joy” to North Koreans. Chinese officials criticized the North’s missile test, saying it violated United Nations rules. At the same time, the Chinese government offered no signs that it was preparing to take more drastic action against the North, urging a return to diplomatic talks instead. “I have to reiterate that the current situation in the Korean Peninsula is complicated and sensitive,” Geng Shuang, a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said at a regular news conference in Beijing. “We hope all sides concerned can remain calm and restrained so that tensions can be eased as soon as possible.” Analysts said the launch would put President Trump’s administration in a precarious position, given that it had indicated that such a missile, capable of reaching parts of the United States, was a critical threshold. In January, Trump tweeted “it won’t happen!” The message set off a cascade of speculation on what exactly he meant. “The important thing is that Donald Trump doesn’t let himself be backed into a corner and that he understands that there are long-term options to contain, constrain and deter the regime,” said Adam Mount, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress in Washington. The United States had hoped North Korea would stop short of developing a long-range missile that could reach its shores, Mount said. Now, he said, the United States and its allies will have to compromise on any expectation that North Korea will ever give up its nuclear program, he added. “Talks can’t proceed from the presumption of denuclearization,” he said. “And we can’t coerce North Korea back to the negotiating table to prevent them from crossing a threshold they have already crossed.” (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Says It Has Successfully Tested ICBM,” New York Times, July 4, 2017; “North Korea Fires Missile amid Rising Tensions with U.S.,” New York Times, July 4, 2017,
South Korean President Moon Jae-in warned North Korea not to cross a “red line” after it claimed a successful test of its first intercontinental ballistic missile. Moon urged the North to immediately halt its provocations, saying he is not sure what kind of consequence the communist state will have to face if it crosses the “red line.” “I hope North Korea will not cross the point of no return,” the South Korean leader said in a meeting with former British Prime Minister David Cameron, according to his chief press secretary Yoon Young-chan. His remarks came shortly after he ordered his top security officials to seek “UN Security Council measures” in close cooperation with the country’s allies, including the United States in an emergency meeting of the National Security Council. Moon earlier noted the North may develop an ICBM in the “not too distant future.” The North Korean reports said the new ICBM, Hwasong-14, reached an altitude of 2,802 kilometers, and flew 933 kilometers. When launched at the right angle, the missile could reach up to 8,000 km, experts have noted. Moon, even prior to the North Korean reports, told his security officials to handle the latest provocation as if it were an ICBM. “We plan to devise necessary measures assuming it may have been an ICBM,” he told the NSC meeting, according to Cheong Wa Dae pool reports. “I strongly urge North Korea to come out of its delusion that nuclear and missile development ensures its safety and make a decision to denuclearize,” he said. Other South Korean officials also warned the North may face “much stronger sanctions” should its latest missile launch be confirmed to have involved an ICBM. “If it is confirmed to have been an ICBM, I believe the level of pressure and sanctions currently imposed on North Korea will likely escalate,” a ranking Cheong Wa Dae official told reporters. The latest North Korean missile launch came shortly after the South Korean president returned home from a visit to Washington, where he and his U.S. counterpart, Donald Trump, agreed to seek a phased denuclearization of the North, enabling a resumption of dialogue with the reclusive state following its initial steps to denuclearize. “I express a deep disappointment and regret over the fact that North Korea staged such a provocation only a few days after President Trump and I urged North Korea to reduce its provocations, refrain from military action that causes instability, and make a strategic decision to abide by international duties and regulations,” Moon said. “North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles are a matter of our life or death that threatens the very safety and lives of our people and our allies. We will not tolerate any such threat under any circumstances.” Still, officials here said the country’s move to resume dialogue with the communist North remained unchanged despite its latest provocation. “The policy to seek the resumption of dialogue while maintaining maximum pressure remains unchanged,” a Cheong Wa Dae official told reporters, while asking not to be identified. (Yonhap, “Moon Urges North Korea Not to Cross ‘Point of No Return,’” July 4, 2017)
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called for global action after North Korea tested a newly developed intercontinental ballistic missile, calling it a new escalation of Pyongyang’s nuclear threat. In a statement, Tillerson warned that any country that hosts North Korea workers, or provides economic or military aid to Pyongyang, or failed to implement United Nations sanctions “is aiding and abetting a dangerous regime.” Tillerson said, “All nations should publicly demonstrate to North Korea that there are consequences to their pursuit of nuclear weapons.” (Lesley Wroughton, “U.S.’s Tillerson Calls for Global Action to End North Korea’s ICBM Threat,” July 4, 2017)
The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China are the Korean Peninsula’s neighbors; therefore the development of the situation in the region concerns the national interests of both countries. Russia and China will closely coordinate their efforts in order to promote a complex solution to the Korean Peninsula’s problems, including that of the nuclear issue, for the sake of achieving a lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. In the spirit of strategic cooperation the foreign ministries of Russia and China (hereinafter referred to as Parties) state the following: 1. The Parties are seriously worried by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s statement of July 4, 2017 about a ballistic missile launch and consider this statement unacceptable and in disharmony with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. 2. The Parties express serious concern about the development of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and around it. Mounting political and military tension in that region, fraught with the eruption of an armed conflict, are calling on the international community to adopt collective measures to settle the situation peacefully through dialogue and consultations. The Parties oppose any statements or moves that might escalate tension or aggravate the contradictions and urge all countries concerned to maintain calm, renounce provocative moves or bellicose rhetoric, demonstrate readiness for dialogue without preconditions and work actively together to defuse tension. 3.The Parties are putting forward a joint initiative, which is based on the Chinese-proposed ideas of “double freezing” (missile and nuclear activities by the DPRK and large-scale joint exercises by the United States and the Republic of Korea) and “parallel advancement” towards the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and the creation of peace mechanisms on the peninsula, and the Russian-proposed stage-by-stage Korean settlement plan. The Parties propose the following: The DPRK, by way of a voluntary political decision, announces a moratorium on the testing of nuclear explosive devices and ballistic missile tests, and the United States and the Republic of Korea should, accordingly, refrain from large-scale joint exercises. Simultaneously, the conflicting parties begin talks and assert common principles of their relations, including the non-use of force, the renunciation of aggression, peaceful coexistence and determination to do all they can to denuclearise the Korean Peninsula with a view to promoting a complex resolution of all problems, including the nuclear issue. During the negotiating process, all parties concerned push forward, in a format suitable to them, the creation on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia of a peace and security mechanism and consequently normalise relations between the countries in question. The Parties urge the international community to support the aforementioned initiative that paves the real way for resolving the Korean Peninsula’s problems. 4.The Parties are resolutely committed to the international non-proliferation regime and are firmly aimed at the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and a comprehensive and full implementation of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The Parties intend, jointly with other parties concerned, to continue making efforts to facilitate the balanced removal of the existing concerns via dialogue and consultations. The Parties confirm that the DPRK’s justified concerns should be respected. Other states must make relevant efforts to have talks resumed and jointly to create an atmosphere of peacefulness and mutual trust. The Parties are calling on all parties involved to comply with the commitments formulated in the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, and to re-launch, as soon as possible, the dialogue on the comprehensive resolution of problems on the Korean Peninsula. Any possibility of using military means to solve the problems of the Korean Peninsula should be ruled out. 5. The Parties express support for the North and the South of the Korean Peninsula to conduct dialogue and consultations, display benevolence towards each other, improve relations, cooperate in the matter of a peaceful settlement, and play a due role in defusing the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in resolving its problems in a proper manner. 6. The Parties confirm that they are paying sufficient attention to the maintenance of the international and regional balance and stability, and emphasise that allied relations between separate states should not inflict damage on the interests of third parties. They are against any military presence of extra-regional forces in Northeast Asia and its build-up under the pretext of counteracting the DPRK’s missile and nuclear programs. The Parties confirm that the deployment of THAAD antimissile systems in Northeast Asia is inflicting serious damage on strategic security interests of regional states, including Russia and China, and does nothing to help achieve the aims of the Korean Peninsula’s denuclearisation, nor to ensure peace and stability in the region. Russia and China are against the deployment of the said systems, call on the relevant countries to immediately stop and cancel the deployment process, and have agreed to adopt the necessary measures to protect the two countries’ security interests and to ensure a strategic balance in the region. This statement was signed on July 4, 2017, in Moscow.” (Joint Russian Chinese Statement on the Korean Conflict, The Duran, July 5, 2017)
7/5/17:
KCNA: “The scientists and technicians of the DPRK Academy of Defense Science on July 4 successfully carried out the test-launch of the inter-continental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14 newly developed by them under the personal guidance of Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army. Respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un supervised the test-launch on the spot. Over a few days ahead of the test-launch, he frequented the place where the general drive for assembling the rocket was underway and meticulously guided the scientists and technicians in their busy preparations for the test-launch. Feasting his eyes on the newly made inter-continental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14, he stressed that the protracted showdown with the U.S. imperialists has reached its final phase and it is the time for the DPRK to demonstrate its mettle to the U.S. which is testing its will in defiance of its warning. At dawn of the day of the test-launch he again came out to the rocket test-launching ground to acquaint himself with the plan for the test-launch. The test-launch was aimed to confirm the tactical and technological specifications and technological features of the newly developed inter-continental ballistic rocket capable of carrying large-sized heavy nuclear warhead and to finally verify all technical features of the payload of the rocket during its atmospheric reentry including the heat-resisting features and structural safety of the warhead tip of ICBM made of newly developed domestic carbon compound material, in particular. By order of the respected Supreme Leader, the inter-continental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14 of Juche Korea was launched on 9:00 a.m. The test-launch confirmed the features of the rocket’s blast-off from its launching pad and technological features of its guidance and stability system in its active-flight stages and structural system. It also reconfirmed the features of starting and stopping the first-stage high-thrust engine and confirmed the starting, stopping and working features of the newly developed second-stage engine of higher thrust under actual flying conditions. It also checked the operational accuracy and creditability of the newly designed stage-separation system, reconfirmed the attitude control features of the heavy warhead in intermediate course after its separation from the rocket and confirmed the homing features and structural safety during the harshest atmospheric reentry environment. Specifically, the inner temperature of the warhead tip was maintained at 25 to 45 degrees centigrade despite the harsh atmospheric reentry conditions of having to face the heat reaching thousands of degrees centigrade, extreme overload and vibration, the nuclear warhead detonation control device successfully worked, and the warhead accurately hit the targeted waters without any structural breakdown at the end of its flight. The test-fire verified that the maneuverability of the mobile launcher loaded with an inter-continental ballistic rocket and all technological specifications of preparatory processes for launch were suited to the tactical and technological requirements of the weapon system. He watched the flight of the rocket displayed on monitors at the observation post. He analyzed the results of the test-fire of Hwasong-14 and declared that it was a very great success. He, with a broad smile on his face, told officials, scientists and technicians that the U.S. would be displeased to witness the DPRK’s strategic option as it was given a “package of gifts” incurring its disfavor by the DPRK on its “Independence Day,” calling on them to frequently send big and small “gift packages” to the Yankees as ever so that they would not feel weary. He highly praised the scientists and technicians of the Academy of Defense Science for thrillingly succeeding at one try in even the test-launch of Hwasong-14 capable of striking the U.S. mainland this time, thus fully demonstrating the dignity of independent Juche Korea and indomitable spirit of its heroic people and devotedly defending the absolute authority of the Workers’ Party of Korea. Saying that the great success in the test-launch of Hwasong-14 is another brilliant victory of the Korean people in their struggle against the U.S.-led imperialists, he expressed high respect and thanks to the great Korean people who have absolutely supported and upheld the WPK’s line of simultaneously developing the two fronts without any vacillation despite the U.S. imperialists’ and their followers’ blatant challenge and manifold hardships. Noting that the overall national power and strategic position of the DPRK have been put on a new level as it is possessed of A-bomb, H-bomb and even inter-continental ballistic rocket, he said that everyone should take pride in having firmly consolidated the powerful nuclear war deterrence despite the hostile forces’ persistent pressure and sanctions. He stressed that the DPRK would neither put its nukes and ballistic rockets on the table of negotiations in any case nor flinch even an inch from the road of bolstering the nuclear force chosen by itself unless the U.S. hostile policy and nuclear threat to the DPRK are definitely terminated. He had a photo session with the scientists, technicians and officials of the Academy of Defense Science who successfully conducted the test-launch of Hwasong-14. He was accompanied by Ri Pyong Chol, Kim Rak Gyom, Kim Jong Sik, Jong Sung Il, Jang Chang Ha, Jon Il Ho, Yu Jin and Jo Yong Won.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Il Supervises Test-Launch of Intercontinental Ballistic Rocket Hwasong-14,” July 5, 2017)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un vowed his nation will “demonstrate its mettle to the U.S.” and never put its weapons programs up for negotiations [??], a day after successfully testing its first intercontinental ballistic missile. The hard line suggests that North Korea will conduct more weapons tests until it perfects nuclear-armed missiles capable of striking anywhere in the United States. Analysts say Kim’s government believes nuclear weapons are key to its survival and could be used to wrest concessions from the United States. South Korea President Moon Jae-in said today that the world should look at tougher sanctions against the North and insisted the problem must be solved peacefully. Speaking through an interpreter in Berlin before the Group of 20 summit, Moon called the test “a big threat and provocation” and that there should be consideration of “more intensive possibilities of sanctions.” Worry also spread in Washington and at the United Nations, where the United States, Japan and South Korea requested an emergency U.N. Security Council session. U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said the U.S. response would include “stronger measures to hold the DPRK accountable,” using the acronym for the nation’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In a show of force, U.S. and South Korean troops fired “deep strike” precision missiles off South Korea’s east coast Wednesday. South Korea’s military later released previously shot video showing the test-firing of sophisticated South Korean missiles and a computer-generated image depicting a North Korean flag in flames with the backdrop of a major building in Pyongyang, North Korea’s capital. North Korean state media described leader Kim as “feasting his eyes” on the ICBM, which was said to be capable of carrying a large nuclear warhead, before its launch. “With a broad smile on his face,” Kim urged his scientists to “frequently send big and small ‘gift packages’ to the Yankees,” it said, an apparent reference to continuing the stream of nuclear and missile tests Kim has ordered since taking power in late 2011. North Korea was also pleased that its test came as Americans celebrated Independence Day. State media said Kim told “scientists and technicians that the U.S. would be displeased to witness the DPRK’s strategic option” on its Independence Day. Kim also said North Korea “would neither put its nukes and ballistic rockets on the table of negotiations in any case nor flinch even an inch from the road of bolstering the nuclear force chosen by itself unless the U.S. hostile policy and nuclear threat to the DPRK are definitely terminated,” the Korean Central News Agency reported. The missile launch was a direct rebuke to U.S. President Donald Trump’s earlier declaration on Twitter that such a test “won’t happen!” and to Moon, who was pushing to improve strained ties with the North. South Korea’s Defense Ministry said it was unable to verify whether North Korea has mastered re-entry technology for an ICBM. It said North Korea may now conduct a nuclear test with “boosted explosive power” to show off a warhead to be mounted on a missile. “An attempt to curb Kim Jong Un’s nuclear and missile ambitions has clearly failed. I think North Korea won’t stop its nuclear drive until it feels that it has reached the level that it wants to reach,” said Lim Eul Chul, a North Korea expert at South Korea’s Kyungnam University. “I don’t know when North Korea can reach that level. But I would say it’s imminent.” There is a consensus among many analysts that Kim’s government won’t give up its nuclear program because it believes it guarantee its survival from outside threats. But once it possesses functioning ICBMs, it would also have a stronger bargaining position and might propose talks with the United States on reducing those threats, possibly in exchange for freezing but not dismantling some of its nuclear or missile activities, the analysts say. (Foster Klug and Hyung-Jin Kim, “Kim Vows North Korea’s Nukes Are Not on Negotiating Table,” Associated Press, July 5, 2017)
A series of recent missile tests has added new urgency to Japan’s debate about how it can defend itself from Pyongyang’s increasingly sophisticated arsenal. Even before the claimed test of a missile with intercontinental range, North Korea had fired a rocket in May that reached an altitude of more than 2,000km before plunging into the Sea of Japan at a speed of more than 5km a second. Meanwhile in late June, Japan and the US tested their new, jointly developed Aegis SM-3 Block 2A interceptor, designed to protect against exactly such a threat. The interceptor failed; the missile got through. The outcome of these respective experiments is amplifying discussions in Japan about the future of missile defense — and whether a more viable option is not defense but attack. This would involve pre-emptive strikes against Pyongyang’s missiles on the ground in the moments before they are launched, stretching the country’s pacifist constitution to the limit. “It requires formidable technology and cost to intercept a missile in flight,” says Onodera Itsunori, former defense minister and a member of parliament for the ruling Liberal Democratic party. “To destroy a missile before it is launched is much easier and cheaper.” Japan’s existing missile defense system has two layers. The first consists of Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers equipped with the Aegis system, designed to intercept rockets mid-flight. The second is the short-range Patriot missile, designed to intercept a ballistic missile in its final moments of descent. Defense analysts in Tokyo say this set-up offers a good chance of success against small numbers of unsophisticated missiles. “If North Korea fired many missiles at once — 10 or more — it would be hard to defend against,” says Ueda Naruhiko, a retired lieutenant-general and now president of the Japan Defense Research Center. The Block 2A interceptors are part of Japan’s efforts to upgrade its defenses. Tokyo is also considering whether to buy the Aegis Ashore system — similar to the sea-based system but installed on land. With just a few sites it would be possible to protect most of Japan, improving coverage and freeing up destroyers for other missions. “The problem with Aegis Ashore is simply cost and time to deploy the system,” says Ben Goodlad, principal analyst at IHS Jane’s in London. An alternative is adding a third layer of interceptors via the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system — whose deployment in South Korea sparked a dispute between Seoul and Beijing because its powerful radar can reach into China. Made by Lockheed Martin, THAAD is similar to Patriot but intercepts at a greater height. It could be installed relatively quickly compared with Aegis Ashore, but covering the whole of Japan would be costly. Nor does it protect against future advances in Pyongyang’s arsenal. Can the U.S. defend itself from a North Korea missile attack? Trump administration seeks to upgrade ‘outdated and unproven’ interceptor technology. This concern is prompting a search for more radical options. One idea is to develop a “boost-phase” defense system designed to intercept missiles shortly after they leave the ground, when they are moving slowly and are much easier to hit. “If it were possible to shoot down a missile in the boost phase reliably, I think it would have a large deterrent effect, because its chemical or nuclear warhead would fall on the aggressor’s country and they would suffer the damage,” says Onodera. A boost phase system appeals to those who want to build up Japan’s defense industry, but development could take decades and cost trillions of yen. “It’s technically very difficult,” says Goodlad. “You have to have weapons in close proximity to the launch.” One possibility would be drones carrying interceptors constantly circling off the North Korean coast — but that would also be problematic under Japan’s constitution. Onodera argues that acquiring the ability to destroy North Korean missiles on the ground before launch would be a constitutional act of self-defense. Unlike the technological arms race of missile defense, he says, the cost of a strike does not increase as Pyongyang’s rockets become more sophisticated. When combined with a strike capacity, says Onodera, Japan’s existing missile shield makes sense as a way to tackle any rockets that do manage to launch. “I don’t think it would be possible to destroy 100 per cent of North Korean missiles on the ground,” he says. “Both are needed.” (Robin Harding, “Pyongyang’s Belligerence Forces Tokyo to Consider Pre-Emptive Strikes,” Financial Times, July 5, 2017)
The United States toughened its military pressure and invective against nuclear-armed North Korea, conducting a missile maneuver with South Korea, hinting of a possible return to war with the North and proposing wider United Nations sanctions against “any country that does business with this outlaw regime.” The proposal for broader sanctions appeared aimed especially at China, North Korea’s most important trading partner. It was part of a vocal public effort by the Trump administration to push President Xi Jinping of China by linking improved American-Chinese trade relations to solving the North Korea problem — and threatening worse trade relations if China does not help more. “There are countries that are allowing, even encouraging, trade with North Korea,” the American ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki R. Haley, told the Security Council at an emergency session on the North Korean missile test. If such countries want good trade relations with the United States, Haley said, “that’s not going to happen.” “We will not look exclusively at North Korea,” Haley said in outlining the toughened American position. “We will look at any country that does business with this outlaw regime.” Haley did not specifically threaten China, but she emphasized that 90 percent of North Korea’s trade is with the Chinese and that “much of the burden of enforcing U.N. sanctions rests with China.” She said the United States was drafting a Security Council resolution that could cut North Korea’s access to foreign currency and restrict oil exports to North Korea, which are mostly supplied by China. “We will not repeat the inadequate approaches of the past that have brought us to this dark day,” Haley said. She also raised the possibility of using America’s “considerable military forces” if necessary, but said, “We prefer not to have to go in that direction.” The chances of Security Council approval for such a resolution appeared dim at best. China and Russia, both veto-wielding members of the Council, generally oppose the use of sanctions. China’s United Nations ambassador, Liu Jieyi, did not address the sanctions question but called North Korea’s missile launch an unacceptable and “flagrant violation” of other Security Council resolutions. He called on all antagonists in the crisis to “exercise restraint, avoid provocative actions and belligerent rhetoric.” American experts on China and North Korea said they saw little hope that the Trump administration’s pressure tactics would succeed with Xi, who does not want to be seen as bullied by the United States. “I guess this is a way of putting pressure on China,” said Bonnie Glaser, senior adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. But, she said, “I’m very reluctant to say this strategy is going to work.” Earlier in the day, the top American general in South Korea said “self-restraint” was all that was keeping the United States and South Korea from going to war with the North. The unusually blunt warning, from Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, the commander of American troops based in Seoul, came as South Korea’s defense minister indicated that the North’s missile, Hwasong-14, had the potential to reach Hawaii. “Self-restraint, which is a choice, is all that separates armistice and war,” General Brooks said, referring to the 1953 cease-fire that halted but never officially ended the Korean War. “As this alliance missile live-fire shows, we are able to change our choice when so ordered by our alliance national leaders. “It would be a grave mistake for anyone to believe anything to the contrary.” Although doubts remained that North Korea had cleared all the technical hurdles to make a fully functional ICBM, the launch prompted Washington and Seoul to conduct a joint missile exercise off the east coast of South Korea on Wednesday. The drill involved firing an undisclosed number of ballistic missiles into the sea. President Moon Jae-in of South Korea asked President Trump last night to endorse the exercise, arguing that the allies had to respond to the North’s provocation with “more than statements,” Mr. Moon’s office said. In Washington, Capt. Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman, said that commercial airplanes, ships and satellites had been put at risk because North Korea did not announce its missile test ahead of time, which would have allowed airspace and sea traffic to be cleared. “We strongly condemn this act by North Korea,” Captain Davis told reporters at the Pentagon. “It is escalatory. It is destabilizing. It is also dangerous.” (Rick Gladstone and Choe Sang-Hun, “After North Korea Tests a Missile, the U.S. Seeks Sanctions and Hints at War,” New York Times, July 6, 2017,
The standoff over North Korea’s nuclear program has long been shaped by the view that the United States has no viable military option to destroy it. Any attempt to do so, many say, would provoke a brutal counterattack against South Korea too bloody and damaging to risk. That remains a major constraint on the Trump administration’s response even as North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, approaches his goal of a nuclear arsenal capable of striking the United States. Over the years, as it does for potential crises around the world, the Pentagon has drafted and refined multiple war plans, including an enormous retaliatory invasion and limited pre-emptive attacks, and it holds annual military exercises with South Korean forces based on them. Today, the Trump administration made a point of threatening a military response. Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, commander of the American forces that conducted a missile exercise with South Korea, said the United States had chosen “self-restraint” with the North. Nikki R. Haley, the American ambassador to the United Nations, said her country’s “considerable military forces” were an option. “We will use them if we must, but we prefer not to have to go in that direction,” she told the Security Council. But the military options are more grim than ever. Even the most limited strike risks staggering casualties, because North Korea could retaliate with the thousands of artillery pieces it has positioned along its border with the South. Though the arsenal is of limited range and could be destroyed in days, the United States defense secretary, Jim Mattis, recently warned that if North Korea used it, it “would be probably the worst kind of fighting in most people’s lifetimes.” Beyond that, there is no historical precedent for a military attack aimed at destroying a country’s nuclear arsenal. The last time the United States is known to have seriously considered attacking the North was in 1994, more than a decade before its first nuclear test. The defense secretary at the time, William J. Perry, asked the Pentagon to prepare plans for a “surgical strike” on a nuclear reactor, but he backed off after concluding it would set off warfare that could leave hundreds of thousands dead. The stakes are even higher now. American officials believe North Korea has built as many as a dozen nuclear bombs — perhaps many more — and can mount them on missiles capable of hitting much of Japan and South Korea. Earlier in his term, President Trump tried to change the dynamics of the crisis by forcing the North and its main economic benefactor, China, to reconsider Washington’s willingness to start a war. He spoke bluntly about the possibility of a “major, major conflict” on the Korean Peninsula, ordered warships into nearby waters and vowed to “solve” the nuclear problem. But Trump has backed off considerably in recent weeks, emphasizing efforts to pressure China to rein in Kim with sanctions instead. After all, a pre-emptive American attack would very likely fail to wipe out North Korea’s arsenal, because some of the North’s facilities are deep in mountain caves or underground and many of its missiles are hidden on mobile launchers. The North has warned that it would immediately retaliate by launching nuclear missiles. But predicting how Kim would actually respond to a limited attack is an exercise in strategic game theory, with many analysts arguing that he would refrain from immediately going nuclear or using his stockpile of chemical and biological weapons to avoid provoking a nuclear response from the United States. Assuming Kim is rational and his primary goal is the preservation of his regime, he would only turn to such weapons if he needed to repel a full-scale invasion or felt a nuclear attack or other attempt on his life was imminent, these analysts say. But anticipating what the North might do with its conventional weapons in the opening hours and days after an American attack is like trying to describe a “very complex game of three-dimensional chess in terms of tic-tac-toe,” said Anthony H. Cordesman, a national security analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. The problem, Mr. Cordesman said, is that there are many ways and reasons for each side to escalate the fighting once it begins. Stopping it would be much more difficult. North and South Korea, separated by the world’s most heavily armed border, have had more than half a century to prepare for a resumption of the war that was suspended in 1953. While the North’s weaponry is less advanced, the South suffers a distinct geographical disadvantage: Nearly half its population lives within 50 miles of the Demilitarized Zone, including the 10 million people in Seoul, its capital. “You have this massive agglomeration of everything that is important in South Korea — government, business and the huge population — and all of it is in this gigantic megalopolis that starts 30 miles from the border and ends 70 miles from the border,” said Robert E. Kelly, a professor of political science at Pusan National University in South Korea. “In terms of national security, it’s just nuts.” North Korea has positioned as many as 8,000 artillery cannons and rocket launchers on its side of the Demilitarized Zone, analysts say, an arsenal capable of raining up to 300,000 rounds on the South in the first hour of a counterattack. That means it can inflict tremendous damage without resorting to weapons of mass destruction. Kim could order a limited response, by hitting a base near the Demilitarized Zone, for example, and then pausing before doing more. But most analysts expect the North would escalate quickly if attacked, to inflict as much damage as possible in case the United States and South Korea were preparing an invasion. “North Korea knows it is the end game and will not go down without a fight,” said Jeffrey W. Hornung of the RAND Corporation, adding, “I think it is going to be a barrage.” The North has often threatened to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire,” but the vast majority of its artillery has a range of three to six miles and cannot reach the city, analysts say. The North has deployed at least three systems, though, that can reach the Seoul metropolitan area: Koksan 170-millimeter guns and 240-millimeter multiple-rocket launchers capable of hitting the northern suburbs and parts of the city, and 300-millimeter multiple-rocket launchers, which may be able to hit targets beyond Seoul. There are perhaps 1,000 such weapons near the Demilitarized Zone, many hidden in caves, tunnels and bunkers. But under a traditional artillery strategy, the North would not fire them all at once. Instead, it would hold some in reserve to avoid giving their positions away and to conserve munitions. How much damage an initial attack would inflict depends on how many are used and on how much of the ordnance explodes. In 2010, North Korean forces fired about 170 shells at an island in the South, killing two civilians and two soldiers. Analysts later concluded that about 25 percent of the North’s shells failed to detonate. A study published by the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability in 2012 accounting for these and other factors such as population density concluded that the initial hours of an artillery barrage by the North focused on military targets would result in nearly 3,000 fatalities, while one targeting civilians would kill nearly 30,000 people. The North could compound the damage by also firing ballistic missiles at Seoul. But Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., a North Korea expert at AllSource Analysis, a defense intelligence consultancy, said it was more likely to use missiles to target military installations, including American bases in Japan. United States and South Korean forces could be put on alert and bracing for retaliation before any attempt to knock out North Korea’s nuclear program. But there is little they can do to defend Seoul against a barrage of artillery. The South can intercept some ballistic missiles, with the recently installed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, as well as Patriot and Hawk systems. But it does not have anything like Israel’s Iron Dome that can destroy incoming artillery shells and rockets, which fly at lower altitudes. Instead, South Korean and American troops would employ traditional “counterbattery” tactics — using radar and other techniques to determine the location of the North’s guns when they are moved out of their bunkers and fired, and then using rockets and airstrikes to knock them out. David Maxwell, associate director for the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University and a veteran of five tours in South Korea with the United States Army, said the Pentagon was constantly upgrading its counterbattery capabilities. But he added, “There is no silver bullet solution that can defeat North Korean fire before they inflict significant damage on Seoul and South Korea.” Based on counterbattery efforts in the Iraq war, the Nautilus Institute study estimates that North Korea might lose about 1 percent of its artillery every hour to American and South Korean counterbattery fire, or more than a fifth of its arsenal after a day of fighting. What makes the situation so dangerous is how easy it would be for either side to take action that leads the other to conclude an all-out war is imminent and escalate the battle. The United States and South Korea could hit targets besides artillery, including supply lines and communication facilities, for example. The North could send tanks and troops across the border and drop special forces into the South’s ports. Especially perilous would be any hint that the United States and South Korea were preparing a “decapitation” strike against the North Korean leadership, which could lead a desperate Kim to turn to nuclear or biochemical weapons. All things considered, analysts say, it could take American and South Korean forces three to four days to overwhelm North Korea’s artillery. How much damage North Korea inflicts in that time depends in part on South Korea’s ability to get people to safety quickly. As more of the North’s guns are destroyed and people take cover, the casualty rate would fall with each hour. The Nautilus Institute study projects 60,000 fatalities in the first full day of a surprise artillery attack on military targets around Seoul, the majority in the first three hours. Casualty estimates for an attack on the civilian population are much higher, with some studies projecting more than 300,000 dead in the opening days. The Seoul metropolitan government says there are nearly 3,300 bomb shelters in the city, enough to accommodate all 10 million of its residents. In Gyeonggi Province, which surrounds the capital like a doughnut, the provincial government counts about 3,700 shelters. Many train stations in the region double as shelters, and most large buildings have underground parking garages where people fleeing artillery attacks can seek cover. But critics say that the local authorities are unprepared for the chaos an artillery attack would cause and that the public is nonchalant about the prospect of war. The South Korean government conducts emergency drills only five times a year, and they are fairly desultory affairs that last about 20 minutes, with people hunkering in buildings or stopping in their cars on the roads after sirens go off. Many residents have no idea where their nearest shelter is. Few people keep stockpiles of food and water, for example, and while the government has indicated it may buy about 1.8 million gas masks for use in the event of a chemical attack, that would not be nearly enough to protect the population. “For the first 72 hours,” said Nam Kyung-pil, governor of Gyeonggi Province, “each individual will have to save their own lives or be prepared by themselves.” (Motoko Rich, “First Strike Is Option Few Can Stomach,” New York Times, July 6, 2017,
7/6/17:
President Donald Trump vowed to confront North Korea “very strongly” following its latest missile test and urged nations to show Pyongyang there would be consequences for its weapons program. Speaking at a news conference with Polish President Andrzej Duda, Trump said North Korea was “a threat, and we will confront it very strongly.” He said the United States was considering “severe things” for North Korea, but that he would not draw a “red line” of the kind that his predecessor, Barack Obama, had drawn but not enforced on the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Trump added: “They are behaving in a very, very dangerous manner and something will have to be done.” Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said the missile test in itself did not bring the parties closer to a war and stressed that America’s focus was on diplomatic efforts to pressure Pyongyang. “We stand ready to provide (military) options if they are necessary. But this is a purely diplomatically led (effort),” Mattis told a small group of reporters at the Pentagon. “Diplomacy has not failed. … Diplomatic efforts remain under way as we speak.” Mattis spoke by phone with South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo today, reaffirming Washington’s commitment to the U.S.-South Korea alliance and promising “the full range of U.S. capabilities.” He spoke with his Japanese counterpart yestrrday. Late today, court filings made public disclosed that U.S. authorities were trying to seize millions of dollars from companies that deal with North Korea, including the country’s military, from eight large international banks. Russia objected on Thursday to U.N. Security Council condemnation of the North Korean rocket launch because the U.S.-drafted statement referred to it as an intercontinental ballistic missile, diplomats said. Moscow has said it believes Pyongyang fired an intermediate-range ballistic missile on Tuesday, while China has not identified the rocket launched. North Korea said it tested an ICBM and the United States said that was likely true. Trump flew to Hamburg today to attend a summit of leaders of the Group of 20 developed nations, and was due to meet with Xi there. His frustration that Beijing has not done more to clamp down on North Korea prompted him to tweet on Wednesday: “Trade between China and North Korea grew almost 40% in the first quarter. So much for China working with us – but we had to give it a try!” Trump did not mention China in his remarks in Poland but his message that other countries needed to do more was clearly meant for Beijing. “President Duda and I call on all nations to confront this global threat and publicly demonstrate to North Korea that there are consequences for their very, very bad behavior,” he said. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley told the U.N. Security Council on Wednesday the United States would propose new U.N. sanctions in coming days, and that if Russia and China did not support the move, then “we will go our own path.” U.S. officials have said the United States might seek unilaterally to sanction more Chinese companies that do business with North Korea, especially banks, echoing a tactic it used to pressure Iran to curb its nuclear program. (Jeff Mason and Roberta Rampton, “Trump Pledges to Act ‘Very Strongly’ on North Korea Missile Threat,” Reuters, July 7, 2017) President Trump warned that North Korea could face “some pretty severe” consequences after its defiant test of an intercontinental ballistic missile, but Washington also confronted firm opposition from Russia and China over any possible response. Trump did not specify potential U.S.-directed punishment for North Korea. Yet efforts to find consensus among world powers appeared to hit a wall — sharply limiting Trump’s options. With key players at odds, Trump must now find a way forward as he heads into Group of 20 meetings in Germany later today. In Germany, Trump is expected to have his second meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping and his first with Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin. In Warsaw, Trump said the United States was considering “some pretty severe things” in response to what he called “very, very bad behavior” from the North, though he did not mention any specific plans. “Something will have to be done about it,” he said. At an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council yesterday, U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley accused China and Russia of “holding the hands” of the North Korean leader Kim. Haley chided Beijing and Moscow for not supporting a resolution that would tighten sanctions and hinted that the United States would consider the use of force. “One of our capabilities lies with our considerable military forces,” she said. “We will use them if we must, but we prefer not to have to go in that direction.” Her words were met with criticism from Vladimir Safronkov, Russia’s deputy ambassador to the United Nations, who called stricter sanctions “not acceptable” and military action “inadmissible.” At a daily briefing in Beijing on Thursday, a spokesman for China’s Foreign Ministry backed him up, calling for calm in response to U.S. remarks. (Emily Rauhala, “Trump Warns of ‘Severe’ Consequences for North Korea as Russia, China Balk at Tough U.S. Talk, Washington Post, July 6, 2017)
The United States will continue to pursue diplomatic options to tamp down tensions with North Korea following that country’s test of an intercontinental ballistic missile, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said. “I do not believe this capability brings us closer to war,” Mattis told reporters at the Pentagon. “Diplomacy has not failed. It is our self-restraint that has prevented war … Our self-restraint holds.” The two-stage missile launched by North Korea was not one that the United States had known about, the Pentagon said. Navy Capt. Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman, said yesterday that several elements of the first-ever launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile by North Korea were worrisome, including the missile was fired into busy commercial airspace with no warning. The missile was fired from a mobile launcher from Panghyon Airport in northwest North Korea, which has not been used in previous missile launches. The missile was assessed to have the capability to travel more than 5,500 miles, making it capable of hitting Alaska, Davis said. The missile was tracked by the destroyer USS Momsen and the tracking ship USNS Howard O. Lorenzen. It flew for 37 minutes before splashing down within Japan’s 250-mile economic zone, he said. However, Mattis said the United States was not caught off guard by the launch. “We knew it as soon as it was fired that it had been launched,” he said. Mattis said the United States is still analyzing the launch to determine what advances North Korea was able to achieve. “It clearly had a booster, which was a new development on a previous missile,” he said. Mattis said the missile advances do not force the United States to pursue a military response at this time. “We stand ready to provide options if necessary but this [response] is purely diplomatically led,” he said. (Stars and Stripes, “Mattis: North Korean Missile Advances Do Not Force U.S. Military Response,” July 6, 2017)
Wit, McKinney: “While many American pundits think this proposal is unacceptable, arguing that it would undermine the conventional defense of the peninsula, in fact, the United States and South Korea have suspended joint exercises in the past in return for steps by North Korea on the nuclear front. From 1991–96 the large Team Spirit exercise became both a carrot and a stick during U.S. negotiations with North Korea over its burgeoning nuclear program. This exercise was canceled in 1992, carried out again in 1993, and planned—but not executed—from 1994–96 as a result of negotiations that led to the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. Changing the program did not undermine our ability to mount an effective conventional defense. Since war is not a game, the practice, that is the exercises, become all that more important and necessary. But not all exercises are the same in importance and contribute the same in war-making capability. Further, time spent conducting military exercises does not have to be lengthy or complicated to achieve the necessary training objectives. Certain parameters exist for all Korean exercises, which if met, will provide excellent war-fighting training. The most important alliance exercise training objectives revolve around command and control, at varying levels of operation, involving actions such as decision-making, information flow, and supervision of subordinate units, particularly within multi-national and combined commands. It is imperative that these exercises stress the alliance commands at all levels and its ability to react to changing operational circumstances. These type of exercises do not have to be conducted on a large-scale or perhaps even in South Korea. Today, the number of personnel participating in exercises can be much smaller, principally because they are normally command post exercises rather than field training exercises—and they consist primarily of headquarters leadership and staffs at the joint and combined level and the immediate subordinate headquarters. Such exercises would achieve their primary purposes: strengthening command and staff capabilities to exercise and improve multinational command and control; attaining more seamless coordination among staffs and between commands; and validating and improving the execution of operational plans. Given these alliance objectives, it is entirely possible for the United States and South Korea to discontinue its two largest exercises—Key Resolve and Ulchi-Freedom Guardian—and work to achieve these important objectives through an alternative program along the following lines. First, conduct a low profile, computer-assisted combined command post exercise at the operational level that would be similar to the Key Resolve exercise but without the high profile publicity and without substantial U.S. or South Korean forces involved. The exercise would focus on operational command and control over South Korean and U.S. subordinate headquarters and staff procedures. Second, conduct series of unilateral and combined strategic table-top exercises at the South Korea and U.S. national levels with focus on high level decisionmaking. There need be no publicity and certainly no large-scale forces. Third, discontinue the Ulchi-Freedom Guardian exercise that meshes a South Korea government exercise with a Combined Forces Command post exercise. U.S. senior officers would only observe the South Korean government exercise. Fourth, conduct operational level naval and air exercises, such as the Foal Eagle exercise, separately and over-the-horizon. Fifth, conduct ground exercises by South Korean and U.S. forces at division level and below. Exercises could include combined-training exercises or separate South Korea and U.S. ground-force exercises. Maintaining North Korea’s healthy respect for the combined force posture of the United States and South Korea on the peninsula is an essential objective that all can agree to. Even better, if that objective can be achieved while also securing a moratorium on North Korean missile and nuclear tests, possibly opening a path to negotiations on solving the security challenge facing all of us, then it’s a risk worth taking.” (Joel Wit and William McKinney, “Is There Still Time for Diplomacy with North Korea?” National Interest, July 6, 2017)
7/7/17:
South Korea said it is considering proposing military and Red Cross talks to North Korea to follow up on President Moon Jae-in’s offer to stop all acts of hostility on the border and hold reunions of separated families. Moon unveiled his broad vision for bringing peace to the Korean Peninsula during his speech in Berlin today, two days after the North test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). He proposed that the two Koreas mutually suspend hostile acts along their tense border on the July 27 anniversary of the armistice treaty that ended the three-year Korean War in 1953. He also offered to hold reunions of families torn apart by the war on Oct. 4, Korea’s lunar fall harvest holiday and the 10th anniversary of the second inter-Korean summit. “The government is working on follow-ups to implement Moon’s proposal. … We expect North Korea’s positive response to South Korea’s offer aimed at bringing peace to the Korean Peninsula,” Lee Eugene, vice spokesperson at Seoul’s unification ministry, told a press briefing. She said that the government is considering proposing the military working-level talks and the Red Cross meeting to the North. Detailed plans will be unveiled soon, Lee added. Seoul’s proposal of military steps may include the suspension of the two Korean armies’ loudspeaker broadcasts on the border. South Korea resumed loudspeaker broadcasts carrying anti-Pyongyang messages in January 2016 in response to North Korea’s fourth nuclear test. It suspended loudspeaker campaigns in August 2015 after a landmark inter-Korean agreement on easing tensions. A reunion of separated families is one of the most urgent and humanitarian affairs as more than 50 percent of some 138,000 people on a waiting list for reunion events have passed away. “Moon has effectively proposed the Red Cross talks, but the government is mulling over the talks to discuss details of the reunions,” a ministry official said. The two Koreas held their last reunions for separated families in October 2015 at a resort at Mount Kumgang on North Korea’s east coast. For separated family events, North Korea is currently demanding South Korea repatriate 12 female North Koreans who worked at a Pyongyang-run restaurant in China and defected to Seoul en masse last year. The North claimed that they were lured and kidnapped by Seoul’s spy agency. “Without hesitation, North Korea should immediately respond to Moon’s offer,” Unification Minister Cho Myoung-gyon said in a speech earlier in the day. Lee, the vice ministry spokesperson, said that the government will make efforts to flesh out Moon’s North Korea policy, based on national consensus and communication with parties. “If necessary, we can seek (to send a special envoy) to help resolve North Korea’s nuclear issue and improve inter-Korean ties,” she said. (Yonhap, “S. Korea Likely to Propose Talks to N.K. Following Moon’s Peace Gesture,” July 7, 2017) President Moon Jae-in proclaimed a vision for peace in Berlin on July 6, calling for the achievement of the Korean Peninsula’s denuclearization through peaceful means. Moon said his aim was to “begin the bold journey of establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, with the Republic of Korea playing more of a guiding role.” As a first step, Moon identified five “policy directions for dismantling the Cold War framework on the Korean Peninsula and establishing permanent peace” – including guaranteeing the security of the regime in Pyongyang with the peninsula’s denuclearization – and proposed four “tasks for practice” to the North as a means of breaking through, including the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue and reunions of divided families. “The complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is a demand shared by the international community and an absolute prerequisite for peace on the Korean Peninsula,” Moon said in the speech, given in Berlin at the invitation of the Körber Foundation that afternoon. “The need for dialogue is more urgent than ever before at a time like now when the vicious cycle of military tensions has reached a critical point,” he said. Moon also said it was “important that the basic conditions have been put in place for restarting the halted Korean Peninsula peace process.” “Recently, South Korea and the US agreed on a general approach in which sanctions are a diplomatic approach and denuclearization of Korean Peninsula is achieved through peaceful means,” he explained. The “vision for peace on the Korean Peninsula” shared by Moon was both a summary of his ideas for North Korea policy and a blueprint for a peaceful future for the Korean Peninsula. It was a reflection of his longstanding ambitions of ending the Cold War-era framework on the peninsula through peaceful denuclearization and a peace regime, while using inter-Korean reconciliation to bring about a united economic community and pave the way for a future of branching out into Northeast Asia. In his speech, Moon gave a three-principle approach to North Korea policy ruling out efforts to hasten a regime collapse in Pyongyang, unification by South Korean absorption of the North, or artificial efforts to accelerate reunification. Moon also sternly criticized North Korea’s recent intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch as an “extremely disappointing and very misguided decision.” “North Korea’s choice this time is a reckless one. It has invited retaliation from the international community,” he said. At the same time, he also stressed that “the need for dialogue is more urgent than ever before at a time like now when the vicious cycle of increasing military tensions has reached a critical point.” “We do not wish for North Korea’s collapse, we will not pursue unification by absorption in any form, nor will be pursue artificial unification,” he said. Moon also emphasized that Seoul and Washington had “recently declared that we do not hold hostile policies against North Korea.” “Reunification will happen naturally at some point based on agreement between South and North once peace has been established,” he said. The message was that Moon plans to continue on with the so-called “four nos” approach he advocated at the recent South Korea-US summit, which took place before North Korea’s ICBM launch. Moon went on to identify five “keywords” for North Korean policies toward ending the Cold War framework and establishing permanent peace: “peace,” “denuclearization,” “peace regime,” “new economic map,” and “exchange and cooperation.” First, Moon stressed that “what we [South Korea] are pursuing is peace, pure and simple.” “A peaceful Korean Peninsula is a Korean Peninsula where South and North acknowledge and respect each other and prosper together without threat of nuclear weapons or war,” he said. Moon also said the path toward a peaceful peninsula lay in “returning to the June 15 Joint Declaration [of 2000] and the October 4 Summit Statement [of 2007].” Pyongyang emphasized execution of the declaration and statement every time difficulties arose in inter-Korean relations during the Lee Myung-bak (2008-13) and Park Geun-hye (2013-16) administrations. Moon’s explicit reference to their execution appeared to his answer to that demand. Second, Moon said he would “pursue denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula that guarantees the security of the North Korean regime.” Observing that the North Korean nuclear issue has become “far more advanced and complex than before,” he stressed that it would require a “step-by-step, comprehensive approach.” Moon has stressed the importance of a two-step approach numerous times in the past, with a nuclear freeze as the entry point and denuclearization as the exit. He also stated plans to “work on comprehensively addressing Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia issues including the complete dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear program, building a peace regime, allaying North Korea’s security and economic concerns, and improving North Korea-US and North Korea-Japan relations.” Third, Moon emphasized establishment of a permanent peace regime and “institutionalization of peace.” To do this, he proposed legislation of inter-Korean agreement terms, a declaration of the Korean War’s end, and the signing of a Korean Peninsula peace agreement with the participation of relevant countries. With this, he sent the message that if North Korea denuclearizes, he plans to take simultaneous steps toward institutionally dismantling the peninsula’s Cold War-era systems. He repeatedly stressed his plans to “pursue total denuclearization and the signing of a peace agreement through a comprehensive approach to North Korean nuclear issues and a peace regime.” Fourth, Moon also made reference to the “new economic map” for the Korean Peninsula that he previously proposed in Aug. 2015 as his vision if he eventually came to power. “Once the North Korean nuclear issue has been resolved and suitable conditions are formed, we will begin drawing a new economic map,” he said. He explained this would involve “restoring a new connection between South and North through an economic belt at the Military Demarcation Line and achieving an economic community where South and North prosper together.” Moon has envisioned an inter-Korean economic community as a means of helping the South Korean economy recover from its loss of growth momentum. Finally, Moon said he planned to “consistently pursue non-political exchange and cooperation efforts while keeping the political and military situations separate.” “Ahead of interchange between governments, interchange at the private level has contributed [in the past] to relaxing inter-Korean tensions and restoring similarity,” he said. “Greater private interchange will be an invaluable force freeing inter-Korean relations from their freeze,” he added. The remarks marked a first practical step toward achieving Moon’s overall vision of North Korea’s denuclearization, followed by establishment of a peace regime and creation of a new economy for the peninsula. (Jung In-hwan, “In Berlin Moon Lays out Vision for Inter-Korean Peace,” Hankyore, July 7, 2017)
President Moon’s Berlin speech: “…Distinguished guests from home and abroad, The Berlin in which we are here today is the very place where 17 years ago President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea introduced the “Berlin Doctrine” which laid out the foundation for reconciliation and cooperation between South and North Korea. Moreover, this Altes Stadhaus is a historic site where the German Unification Treaty was negotiated. Today, at the very place where Berlin’s lesson is still alive, I would like to outline the Korean Peninsula peace initiative of the new Korean Government. Distinguished guests, To Korea, which is the last divided nation on this planet, the experience of Germany’s unification gives hope for unification, and at the same time shows us the path that we need to follow. First and foremost, it is the importance of the process leading to unification. Germany’s unification made us realize how important the process of peace and cooperation based on mutual respect really is. The German people made the decision of unification by themselves based on the trust that was built during this process. The citizens of East and West Germany interacted and cooperated with each other in various areas, and the two Governments guaranteed this institutionally. Nonpolitical exchanges in the private sector unlatched the gate of political ideology and the people from East and West Germany started to open their hearts towards each other. The fact that the Ostpolitik continued for twenty-some years is also an important point. The reason that a consistent policy was possible in spite of the change of governments is because it was supported by the people and was built upon the cooperation of the international community. Germany understood that when a peaceful order is created in Europe, the unification of Germany would also be possible under that structure. By keeping pace with and at times persuading the international community, Germany was able to obtain strong security, and was assured support for inter-German relations. The German unification process, which was initiated by Chancellor Willy Brandt, was completed under Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who was from a different political party. Likewise, I believe that for peace and common prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, there should be continued cooperation that transcends partisan lines. Distinguished guests, For the Korean people who long for peace and unification of the Korean Peninsula, Berlin is remembered together with the “Berlin Declaration” made by President Kim Dae-jung. President Kim’s Berlin Declaration led to the first inter-Korean Summit in 2000, and brought about the great transformation which enabled the South and the North, that had been in confrontation and conflict for more than six decades after the division and war, to enter into a path of reconciliation and cooperation. Following this path, President Roh Moo-hyun set a new milestone for the development of inter-Korean relations and peace and prosperity through the second inter-Korean Summit in 2007. President Kim Dae-jung and President Roh Moo-hyun also promoted international cooperation in order for peace to take root on the Korean Peninsula. At the time, the Six-Party Talks adopted the Sept. 19 Joint Statement and the Feb. 13 Joint Statement that outlined the principles and direction for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. There was also progress in North Korea-US relations and North Korea-Japan relations. I am inheriting these two former government’s efforts and, at the same time, with a more leading role by the Korean government, will embark on a dauntless journey towards establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Respected guests from home and abroad, The biggest challenge that the Korean Peninsula is facing is the North Korean nuclear issue. North Korea is continuing its nuclear and missile provocations and is threatening the peace on the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia, and furthermore, world peace. In particular, the missile provocation just two days ago was a very disappointing and a largely wrong decision. It is not only a clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions, but is also an outright rejection of the repeated warnings by the international community. Above all, for my Government, which at long last had arranged a path towards dialogue through the recent ROK-US Summit, the level of regret is even deeper. This choice by the North was reckless. It incurred punishment by the international community. It is testing my Government’s commitment that if North Korea stops its provocative actions and shows its will towards denuclearization, my Government will lead the way in helping the North receive the international community’s support and cooperation. I hope that North Korea will not cross the bridge of no return. North Korea must give up its nuclear and missile development and find a way in which it can cooperate with the international community. The complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the agreed demand of the international community and is the absolute condition for peace on the Korean Peninsula. This means that the decision for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the only way North Korea will be guaranteed its security. Therefore, I would like to emphasize that now is the last chance for North Korea to make the right decision and also the best time to do so. This is because we have reached the tipping point of the vicious circle of military escalation, and thus, the need for dialogue is more pressing than ever before. It is also important to note that the basic conditions have been met to restart the Korean Peninsula Peace Process which had been halted. Recently, Korea and the United States agreed on the overall direction that sanctions are a diplomatic tool and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be achieved in a peaceful manner. Our two countries also made clear that we do not have a hostile policy towards North Korea. We affirmed that, together with the international community, we can provide a brighter future to North Korea, depending on its decision. Korea and the United States also shared the view that in order to create a breakthrough of the current crisis on the Korean Peninsula, improvement in inter-Korean relations is vital. President Trump supported Korea’s leading role in creating an environment conducive to the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula, and also supported my initiative to reopen inter-Korean dialogue. Chinese President Xi Jinping and I also reached a consensus on this matter. For quite some time, I have argued that my country must sit in the driver’s seat and lead Korean Peninsula-related issues based on cooperation with our neighbors. Now the conditions are finally being fostered. It has also been repeatedly confirmed that if the right conditions are met, the United States, China, and the rest of the international community are keeping the door open for dialogue at any time. Now we are left with North Korea to make its decision. Whether it will come out to the forum for dialogue, or whether it will kick away this opportunity of dialogue that has been difficultly made, is only a decision that North Korea can make. But if North Korea does not stop its nuclear provocations, there is no other choice but to further strengthen sanctions and pressure. Peace on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea’s security will not be guaranteed. I look forward to and urge North Korea to accept this commitment of my Government and the international community towards peace on the Korean Peninsula as a very significant and urgent signal. Distinguished guests, Now I would like to outline my Government’s policy direction that will lead to dissolving the Cold War structure and establishing lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. First, what we are pursuing is only peace. A peaceful Korean Peninsula is a peninsula free from the threat of nuclear weapons and war. It is a peninsula where the South and the North recognize and respect each other and live well together. We already know the road that leads to a peaceful Korean Peninsula. It is returning to the June 15 Joint Declaration and the Oct. 4 Declaration. Through these two declarations, the South and the North clearly stated that the owner of inter-Korean issues is our own nation, and committed to closely cooperate in easing tensions and guaranteeing peace on the Korean Peninsula. The two Koreas also promised to walk the path of common prosperity through cooperative projects in every sector of the society, including in the economic field. This spirit of agreement that was made on the foundation of mutual respect between the South and the North is still valid. And it is also desperate. We must return to that spirit where the South and the North together worked towards realizing a peaceful peninsula. I clearly state the following: we do not wish for North Korea’s collapse, and will not work towards any kind of unification through absorption. Neither will we pursue an artificial unification. Unification is a process where both sides seek coexistence and co-prosperity and restore its national community. When peace is established, unification will be realized naturally someday through the agreement between the South and the North. What my Government and I would like to realize is only peace. Second, my Government will pursue the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula that guarantees the security of the North Korean regime. Last April, rumors that we are on the brink of war swept over the Korean Peninsula and the entire world. The military tension around the Korean Peninsula is like a “powder keg” of the world. We need to urgently ease the military tension on the Korean Peninsula. We need to rebuild the trust that has collapsed between the South and the North. In this regard, we will seek exchanges and dialogue. North Korea also needs to stop from any more nuclear provocations. We need to establish a military management system to prevent accidental clashes. A more fundamental solution is to uproot the North Korean nuclear issue. The North Korean nuclear issue has become much more difficult to deal with than the past with the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. A step-by-step and comprehensive approach is required. My Government, in cooperation with the international community, will work towards a comprehensive solution of the current issues on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, including the complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program and establishing a peace regime, easing North Korea’s security and economic concerns, and improving North Korea-US and North Korea-Japan relations. However, it takes two to tango. This is only possible when North Korea fully stops its nuclear provocations and comes out to the forum of bilateral and multilateral dialogue on denuclearization. Third, my Government will work towards establishing a permanent peace regime. The Korean Peninsula has been under an armistice for more than 60 years since 1953. Firm peace cannot be realized under an unstable armistice system. The invaluable agreements between the South and the North should not be shaken or broken every time there is a change of government. We need to institutionalize peace. Domestically, my Government will work towards enacting into law the inter-Korean agreements. We will make it clear that all agreements between the South and the North are basic assets of the Korean Peninsula that should be inherited even when there is a change of government. In order to establish a permanent peace structure on the Korean Peninsula, we need to conclude a peace treaty with the participation of relevant countries, and formally end the war. Through a comprehensive approach on the North Korean nuclear issue and establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, my Government will pursue the conclusion of a peace treaty along with complete denuclearization. Fourth, my Government will work towards drawing a new economic map on the Korean Peninsula. Economic cooperation where the South and the North prosper together is an important foundation of establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula. I have planned a ‘new economic map for the Korean Peninsula.’ If there is progress in the North Korean nuclear issue and if appropriate conditions are met, my Government will draw a new economic map on the Korean Peninsula. We will freshly connect the South and the North, where it has been disconnected by the military demarcation line, with an economic belt and establish an economic community where the two Koreas proper together. The severed inter-Korean railway will be connected again. A train departing from Busan and Mokpo will run through Pyongyang and Beijing, and head towards Russia and Europe. Cooperation projects in Northeast Asia, such as the gas pipeline project connecting the two Koreas and Russia, may also be implemented. South and North Korea will prosper together as a bridging country connecting the Asian mainland and the Pacific. The South and the North need only to implement the Oct. 4 Declaration together. Then the world will see a new economic model of an economy of peace and co-prosperity. Fifth, my Government will consistently pursue nonpolitical exchange and cooperation projects by separating it from the political and military situation. The exchange and cooperation projects between South and North Korea are the process of healing the wounds and realizing reconciliation among all members on the Korean Peninsula and also efforts towards building peace from within. In both Koreas there are separated families who can no longer visit their hometown due to the division and war. It is truly an embarrassment for both governments of the South and the North for not being able to heal the scars for more than six decades. Among the separated family members who have applied to the Korean Government to meet their families in the North, there are more than 60,000 people who are still alive and their average age is 81 years old. The situation in North Korea should be the same. We need to let them meet their families while they are still alive. This is a pressing humanitarian issue that needs be addressed in front of any political considerations. Issues that the peoples of the South and the North suffer from due to the division need to be addressed by the authorities of the two Koreas. When the rivers in North Korea overflow, the people in South Korea suffer from floods. Infectious diseases, forest pests, and forest fires do not observe the boundaries between the South and the North. My Government will work towards cooperation in which the South and the North jointly addresses these problems. Exchanges among the private sector have contributed to easing tensions and restoring homogeneity between the two Koreas ahead of exchanges between the two governments. Expanding exchanges in the private sector is a valuable asset that can help untie the tight knot between the South and the North. My Government will widely support exchanges of the private sector in various areas. We will also actively support exchanges among different regions. The universal value and international norms of respecting human beings must be observed all around the Korean Peninsula. My Government will join the international community in raising its clear voice against the poor human rights conditions that the North Korean people are living in. In addition, my Government will expand its humanitarian cooperation in a way that actually helps the North Korean people. Distinguished guests, My Government and I are ready to implement while holding firmly to these policy directions. The South and the North need to work hand-in-hand and make a breakthrough in realizing peace on the Korean Peninsula. I suggest to North Korea that we first start with what is easy. First, let us solve the pressing humanitarian issue. This year marks the tenth anniversary of the Oct. 4 Declaration. Also, Chusuk, which is one of our nation’s greatest traditional holidays, falls on Oct. 4 this year. In the Oct. 4 Declaration, the two Koreas agreed to expand the family reunions between the separated families and relatives. If the family reunion event can be held on this day when these two meaningful anniversaries overlap, it will be a meaningful start respecting and observing the agreement already made between the South and the North. If North Korea is ready to take one step further, I suggest that we also include visiting the ancestral graves for this year’s family reunion event. The separated family members of the divided Germany were allowed not only exchanges of letters and phone calls but even exchange of visits and migration. There is no reason why we cannot do the same. Before more members of separated families leave us behind, we must wipe their tears. If North Korea is not ready immediately, our side will allow and open North Korean separated family members to visit their hometown and ancestral graves in the South. I look forward to North Korea’s positive response, and hope that South-North Korean Red Cross talks will be held to discuss the reunion of separated family members. Second, let us make the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics an ‘Olympic of Peace’ with the participation of the North. In Feb. 2018, the Winter Olympics will be held in Pyeonchang, Korea, which is only 100 km away from the military demarcation line. Two years later in 2020, the Summer Olympics will be held in Tokyo, and in 2022, the Winter Olympics will be held in Beijing. My Government would like to suggest to North Korea to utilize these series of precious events held in Asia as an opportunity for building peace on the Korean Peninsula, in Northeast Asia, and the world. Sports have the power of connecting one heart to another. When athletes from South and North Korea, and from the rest of the world, sweat and compete against each other, offer a hand to fellow athletes who have fallen down, and embrace each other, the world will witness peace through the Olympic games. I look forward to opening together a new era of peace on the Korean Peninsula while applauding together with the leaders of the world. As the IOC has promised its cooperation on the participation of North Korea in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, I look forward to North Korea’s active and positive response. Third, let us mutually halt acts of hostility around the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). Even at this moment, a war without gunfire continues along the MDL on the Korean Peninsula. The escalation of military tension between the two militaries remains unchanged. This situation increases the danger of armed conflict between the South and the North and threatens the safety of the people who are living in the areas nearby on both sides. July 27 this year marks the 64th anniversary of the Armistice Agreement. If the two Koreas, starting this day, stop all acts of hostility that escalate military tension on the MDL, it will provide a meaningful opportunity to ease tensions between the two Koreas. Fourth, inter-Korean dialogue is necessary for peace on the Korean Peninsula and South-North cooperation. Easing tension on the Korean Peninsula is the most urgent issue between the South and the North. The current situation where there is no contact between the relevant authorities of the South and the North is highly dangerous. We need to start with contacts to manage the situation and move on to meaningful dialogue. I am ready to meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un of North Korea at any time at any place, if the conditions are met and if it will provide an opportunity to transform the tension and confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. We can place on the dialogue table all issues of interest between the South and the North, including the nuclear issue and the peace treaty, and discuss peace on the Korean Peninsula and inter-Korean cooperation. It will not be solved with only one attempt. However, making a start is important. One can take a step forward only after rising up from one’s seat. I look forward to North Korea’s decision. (Korea Herald, Cheong Wa Dae’s unofficial translation of President Moon Jae-in’s speech delivered at Berlin’s Old City Hall upon the invitation of the Körber Foundation, July 7, 2017
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s statement “as regards the fact that the U.S. is pulling up the DPRK over the successful test-fire of intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14: On July 4, the DPRK successfully carried out the test-fire of inter-continental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14 which stands for the final gate to completing the state nuclear force. The success in the test-fire of Hwasong-14 at just one go is a brilliant victory achieved by the army and people of the DPRK in their more than half-a-century-long anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. showdown and a heroic deed that provided a reliable guarantee of peace and stability of the Korean peninsula and the region. However, the U.S. is condemning the DPRK’s test-fire as a “global threat” and is scheming to increase the international sanctions and pressure on the country to the top notch. The DPRK makes it clear once again that its development of inter-continental ballistic rocket is an option taken to defend itself by completely terminating the hostile policy and nuclear war threat of the U.S. which have lasted for decades over the century. There are several nuclear weapons states in the world today, but the U.S. is the one and only country that makes it its daily business to impose constant nuclear threat upon the DPRK. The issue of the DPRK’s nukes and ballistic rocket is an issue confined to the DPRK and the U.S., and the test-fire of the inter-continental ballistic rocket conducted by the DPRK this time is a “gift package” addressed to none other than the U.S. No other ICBM states had been more transparent than the DPRK in the development and test-fire of inter-continental ballistic rocket. The DPRK officially announced that it would commence the development of inter-continental ballistic rocket as it was the inevitable choice for the country to cope with ever-increasing nuclear threat from the U.S. and opened to public the entire process of combustion test and static firing test of the engine and the actual test-fire of the rocket, and even sensitive information such as tactical and technical data and specifications. That is because the DPRK’s inter-continental ballistic rocket is an unquestionable nuclear war deterrent which is fundamentally different from the military equipment for aggressive war developed in strict confidence by the U.S. with the wild ambition to dominate the world by means of surprise attack on other nations. Nevertheless, the U.S. is branding the DPRK’s legitimate and righteous measure for self-defense as a “global threat” and calling for “global action” against it. This is an explicit illustration of Trump’s “America First Policy” that seeks its own interests by sacrificing others. The mugger’s mentality that tries to engage the entire world in opposing a sovereign state for the reason that the state incurred its displeasure will never find acceptance among any sensible people and independent countries. The complete success in the test-fire of inter-continental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14 significantly enhanced the efficiency of the DPRK’s nuclear force as a war deterrent, thereby more reliably ensuring peace and security in and around the Korean peninsula. Now that the DPRK’s capability to strike the very heart of the U.S. at any given time has been physically proved, the U.S. would find it more difficult to dare attack the DPRK. Herein lies the world historical significance of the measures taken by the DPRK that has strengthened the powerful nuclear war deterrence in every dimension in pursuance of the new line of simultaneously developing the two fronts in the face of persistent pressure and sanctions by the hostile forces. And this is the only way to defend oneself and safeguard the dignity of the nation in the present hostile world where the law of the jungle prevails. It is high time the U.S. completely reoriented its strategic viewpoint on the DPRK, and it should give up its hostile policy against the latter and put a definite end to its nuclear threat and blackmail without further delay. As has been declared by respected Supreme Leader Comrade Kim Jong Un, the DPRK will neither put its nukes and ballistic missiles on the negotiating table in any case nor flinch even an inch from the road of bolstering its nuclear force unless the hostile policy and nuclear threat of the U.S. against the DPRK are thoroughly eradicated. The U.S. will receive more “gift packages” of different sizes from the DPRK in endless succession, as it tries harder to destroy, by means of sanctions and pressure, the overall national power and strategic position of the DPRK which have been drastically boosted.” (KCNA, “Statement of DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman,” July 7, 2017)
Leaders of South Korea, Japan and the United States agreed to work together for tougher sanctions by the international community against North Korea for its latest missile provocation that hinted at its ability to target most countries in the world, South Korea’s presidential office said. “The leaders agreed on the importance and need of intensified pressure on North Korea,” it said. The three-way talks between South Korean President Moon Jae-in, U.S. President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came on the eve of the Group of 20 summit in Hamburg, Germany. The three leaders agreed on the need to quickly halt the North’s missile program to prevent it from advancing further, noting the communist state appears to have already made significant progress, according to Cheong Wa Dae. The U.N. Security Council convened an emergency meeting in New York to discuss the North’s latest missile launch, but failed to produce a joint reaction amid apparent protests from China and Russia, both considered communist allies of North Korea, against pushing Pyongyang too far. The three leaders from the U.S. and its two allies again stressed the importance of a bigger role by China to rein in North Korea’s evolving nuclear and missile capabilities. Trump said the U.S. was considering “pretty severe things” for the North, according to earlier reports. In a bilateral summit in Berlin earlier today (German time), Moon and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, noted tougher measures were needed against North Korea but only to bring it back to the dialogue table so the world can resolve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully. Meeting with the U.S. and Japanese leaders, the South Korean president explained his policy of a phased denuclearization of the North, which calls for a resumption of dialogue with the reclusive state after the latter takes initial steps to denuclearize. He has also proposed to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, partly to discuss such a process, at any time and any place under the right conditions. The possible use of force against the North did not come up at the three-way meeting over dinner hosted by Trump, Cheong Wa Dae said. (Yonhap, “Leaders of S. Korea, U.S., Japan Agree to Draw Tougher UNSC Sanctions on N. Korea,” July 6, 2017) The leaders of South Korea and Japan agreed to improve the countries’ relations, currently at a low ebb over history issues, while intensifying their joint efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully, South Korea’s presidential office Cheong Wa Dae said. South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also agreed to restart summit diplomacy. “The leaders of the two countries agreed to resume shuttle diplomacy between the countries’ leaders, noting their close communication was important for the development of the countries’ bilateral relations,” Cheong Wa Dae spokesman Park Soo-hyun said in a press release. Moon and Abe noted the missile launch was a “very urgent and serious provocation,” Park said at a press briefing in Hamburg, according to Cheong Wa Dae. The two were earlier joined by President Donald Trump for a three-way meeting that focused on ways to bring North Korea to the dialogue table. Moon and other global leaders have called for tougher sanctions to bring the reclusive state back to negotiations aimed at ending its nuclear ambition. In their bilateral talks, Moon and the Japanese leader agreed to keep pressuring North Korea to denuclearize. They said the North’s denuclearization must be achieved in a complete and irreversible manner, but also through peaceful means. The South Korean president stressed the need to resume inter-Korean dialogue to that end, and the Japanese leader expressed his understanding, the Cheong Wa Dae spokesman said. They also agreed to seek a three-way summit with China’s Xi Jinping in the near future. Turning to bilateral issues, Moon and Abe pledged to work together to enhance cooperation between their countries to help expand their economic and trade relations, as well as personnel exchanges. Seoul-Tokyo relations often suffer setbacks over history issues that include Japan’s territorial claim to a set of South Korean islets in the East Sea, called Dokdo. They have again turned sour over what many South Koreans consider a Japanese attempt to whitewash its war atrocities. In a 2015 agreement, Seoul’s former conservative agreement under ousted former leader Park Geun-hye agreed to put an end to disputes over Japan’s sexual enslavement of Korean women during World War II in exchange for a mere 10 billion yen (US$8.79 million). Abe underscored the need to implement the deal to improve the countries’ relations in his meeting with Moon in the German port city, according to the Cheong Wa Dae spokesman. President Moon reiterated that most South Koreans simply could not accept the deal, but said the issue must not keep the two countries from maintaining and further developing their bilateral ties in other areas, Park said. (Yonhap, “S. Korea, Japan Agree to Improve Ties amid N. Korean Missile Provocation,” July 7, 2017)
If North Korea wanted to enter into negotiations, it might decide that it first had to gain the upper hand in a hurry, and it might conclude that the best way to do that was through shooting off one missile after another in rapid succession. As an explanation for all the launches that North Korea has recently conducted — three ballistic missiles launched last month, the salvo of cruise missiles launched Thursday — it seems at first blush like a stretch. But a growing number of analysts with backgrounds in talking to North Korean officials wonder whether the relentless pace of the North’s missile testing is designed to get Kim Jong Un’s regime into its strongest bargaining position before economic sanctions force it to return to the negotiating table. “This is like taekwondo,” said Peter Hayes, executive director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, referring to the Korean martial art. “This is the part where your opponent engages the spiral kick to the head with a bloodcurdling scream to put you off balance at the outset,” said Hayes, who has been dealing with North Koreans for more than 20 years. After the latest launch, Kim said that “the Yankees should be very worried” about North Korea’s capabilities. But beyond the bombastic pronouncements and technical progress, some analysts see familiar signs that North Korea is ratcheting up the tensions before being forced to talk on American terms. “The further they advance towards having an operational arsenal, the more they can get from outside powers just for a freeze when they return to the negotiating table,” said Chun Yung-woo, a former South Korean nuclear negotiator with the North and former national security adviser in Seoul. With more and more sanctions being piled on North Korea, it is just a matter of time until the pressure becomes unbearable, he said. “So before they’re drawn back to the negotiating table, they have every reason to speed up their technical development,” Chun said. At “Track 2” talks in Sweden over the weekend, North Korean representatives told U.S. experts and former officials that they were not interested in discussing an end to their missile or nuclear programs. This was the latest of several periodic meetings with American experts and former officials to send messages to the administration in Washington and to test ideas. The State Department knows about the meetings, but officials say the talks have no impact. “The underlying North Korean message throughout our discussions was that ‘denuclearization is totally off the table and there is nothing that either the U.S. or South Korea could offer that could achieve denuclearization,’ ” said Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation, who participated in the weekend’s talks. Negotiations with North Korea, even when they do happen, do not have a good record of success. The “six-party” talks in 2005 led Pyongyang to agree to dismantle its nuclear program in return for economic assistance and security guarantees, but the deal collapsed in 2009 when North Korea launched what it said was a satellite. The international community said it was part of an intercontinental ballistic missile program. In 2012, Washington and Pyongyang tried to forge a new deal, known as the “Leap Day” agreement because it was announced February 29. Under it, North Korea promised no more nuclear tests or long-range missile launches, while Washington offered new humanitarian assistance. That deal lasted only 16 days before North Korea said it was getting ready to launch another “satellite” — which it duly did. Despite this poor record, there is general agreement that this sort of diplomacy is the least-bad option for dealing with North Korea. And there have been signs of qualified willingness from both sides. President Trump, who prides himself on negotiating skills honed during decades in business, said last month that he would be “honored” to meet Kim, even labeling him a “smart cookie.” A top North Korean diplomat, after talks with former U.S. officials in Norway last month, said the Kim regime would be willing to talk “if the conditions are there.” Recent efforts to resume official talks have broken down because of various preconditions, including Washington’s insistence that there can be no talks unless denuclearization is on the agenda, and Pyongyang’s insistence on instead discussing a peace treaty — a document that would lead to calls for the United States to remove all its troops from South Korea while leaving the North as a nuclear state. At some point Kim could decide that he is in a strong enough bargaining position, said Gary Samore, who served as President Barack Obama’s top nonproliferation official and is at Harvard’s Belfer Center. “Then he can agree to a test moratorium, just like he did with the Leap Day deal,” he said. Adding to North Korea’s incentive to talk: the election last month of a pro-engagement president in South Korea. Moon Jae-in has promised to resume talks with Pyongyang if it will help solve the nuclear problem. “Kim Jong Un could agree to take a pause [from testing] and find out what kind of a deal he could get from Moon, who is clearly more willing to address North Korea’s economic interests and security concerns, and to see what Trump, with all his big talk, has on offer,” Samore said. That could pave the way for further talks. “Frankly, I don’t think it will get very far, but at least it will calm the current situation and slow down the program,” Samore said.
Oh Joon, South Korea’s ambassador to the United Nations until last year, agreed that talks would at least stop North Korea from making progress on its missile program. “The Moon Jae-in government will jump at the opportunity for talks,” Oh said. “And for Trump, if he can bring North Korea back to denuclearization negotiations, he can say, ‘See, I have achieved what Obama couldn’t in eight years.’ It’s good for everyone.” The question now is what Kim Jong Un thinks is enough in terms of his bargaining position. “If he thinks he needs a long-range capability in order to negotiate with the U.S. on strong terms,” Samore said, “then we may have years of testing ahead of us.” (Anna Fifield, “What Does Kim Jong Un Want with All These Missile Tests? Talks Perhaps,” Washington Post, July 7, 2017)
President Moon Jae-in and Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo remained poles apart over a 2015 comfort women deal during their first summit Friday. Despite the different opinions, the two leaders agreed to work to move onto future-oriented relations. But it remains to be seen whether the strained diplomatic ties, which have arisen from historical disputes, can be restored sooner rather than later. The 40-minute summit took place in Hamburg, Germany, on the sidelines of the G20 summit. Moon told his Japanese counterpart, “There is something that blocks the improvement of South Korea-Japan relations,” according to presidential spokesman Park Soo-hyun. Moon said South Koreans cannot accept the deal “emotionally,” signaling his willingness to renegotiate the verbal agreement the former Park Geun-hye administration made with the Japanese government. Moon’s comment was a repetition of what he told Abe when the two held a telephone conversation following the former’s inauguration in May. Abe also stuck to his earlier position, calling on Seoul to implement the agreement. Under the deal, the two nations agreed to “finally and irreversibly” resolve a decades-old dispute over Japan’s sexual enslavement of Korean women before and during World War II. The Japanese government provided 1 billion yen ($9.97 million) to a Korean foundation dedicated to supporting the victims. (Jun Ji-hye, “Moon, Abe Confirm Different Views on Comfort Women Deal,” Korea Times, July 8, 2017)
U.S. authorities have tried to seize millions of dollars associated with several companies that deal with North Korea, including the country’s military, from eight large international banks, according to court filings made public today. The effort was revealed two days after North Korea tested a long-range missile capable of reaching Alaska, ratcheting up tensions with the United States and adding to worries about North Korea leader Kim Jong Un’s nuclear weapons plans. Today’s filings show that Chief Judge Beryl Howell of the federal court in Washington, D.C. on May 22 granted U.S. prosecutors’ applications for “damming” seizure warrants against Bank of America Corp, Bank of New York Mellon Corp, Citigroup Inc, Deutsche Bank AG, HSBC Holdings Plc, JPMorgan Chase & Co, Standard Chartered Plc and Wells Fargo & Co. Prosecutors believe the banks have processed more than $700 million of “prohibited” transactions on behalf of entities tied to North Korea since 2009, including the period after Donald Trump was elected U.S. president, the filings show. Some of the transactions were processed for Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co and four affiliated “front” companies that prosecutors said tried to evade sanctions through transactions that would benefit North Korean entities, “including the North Korea military and North Korea weapons programs,” according to the filings. A person answering the telephone at Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co in northeastern China said the company was not aware of the case, and declined to comment. The company is based in Dandong, a city on the border with North Korea, where the majority of trade between the two countries takes place. On its Alibaba page, the company says annual revenue exceeds $100 million, and it has 12 years of experience in dealing with anthracite, briquettes and graphite. In a 2013 online profile for an industry conference in China, Dandong Zhicheng said it imported 1.8 million tonnes of North Korean anthracite coal, worth about $250 million. Although it did not give a timeframe, that figure makes the company one of the largest suppliers of North Korean coal to major steel producers such as China Minmetels and Hesteel Group. On February 18, China banned the import of North Korean coal for the rest of the year, and in April ordered trading firms, including Dandong Zhicheng, to return their North Korean coal cargoes, sources said at the time. Dandong Zhicheng and the alleged front companies were not the named defendants in the court papers made public. The filings did not say any of the banks knowingly violated sanctions against North Korea. Asked about the issue, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang reiterated that any infringements of U.N. resolutions on North Korea would be dealt with according to Chinese law, and that China opposed “long-armed jurisdiction.” In her decision, Howell authorized warrants requiring the eight banks to accept incoming transactions but not allow outgoing transactions involving the five companies for 14 days, and thereafter to seize what they collected. Howell, an appointee of President Barack Obama, overruled a federal magistrate judge’s May 2 refusal to authorize the warrants, saying prosecutors had probable cause to obtain them. She cited a government affidavit describing in “80 pages of detail” how the five companies conduct transactions “designed to conceal the true origin and destination” of funds being wired, “consistent with generalized patterns of North Korean money laundering” identified by multiple sources, including two North Korean defectors. Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan and Wells Fargo declined to comment. The other banks had no immediate comment or did not immediately respond to requests for comment. (Jonathan Stempel, “U.S. Seeks Fund Tied to North Korea from Eight Big Banks,” Reuters, July 7, 2017)
For years before North Korea fired its first intercontinental ballistic missile this week, the Pentagon and intelligence experts had sounded a warning: Not only was the North making progress quickly, spy satellite coverage was so spotty that the United States might not see a missile being prepared for launch. That set off an urgent but quiet search for ways to improve America’s early-warning ability — and the capability to strike missiles while they are on the launchpad. The most intriguing solutions have come from Silicon Valley, where the Obama administration began investing in tiny, inexpensive civilian satellites developed to count cars in Target parking lots and monitor the growth of crops. Some in the Pentagon accustomed to relying on highly classified, multibillion-dollar satellites, which take years to develop, resisted the move. But as North Korea’s missile program progressed, American officials laid out an ambitious schedule for the first of the small satellites to go up at the end of this year, or the beginning of next. Launched in clusters, some staying in orbit just a year or two, the satellites would provide coverage necessary to execute a new military contingency plan called “Kill Chain.” It is the first step in a new strategy to use satellite imagery to identify North Korean launch sites, nuclear facilities and manufacturing capability and destroy them pre-emptively if a conflict seems imminent. Even a few extra minutes of warning might save the lives of tens of thousands of Americans — and millions of South Koreans and Japanese who already live within range of the North’s missiles. “Kim Jong-un is racing — literally racing — to deploy a missile capability,” Robert Cardillo, the director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which coordinates satellite-based mapping for the government, said in an interview days before North Korea’s latest launch. “His acceleration has caused us to accelerate.” The timeline for getting the satellites in orbit, which defense officials have never discussed publicly, reflects the urgency of the problem. The missile launch by North Korea on Tuesday was initiated from a new site, a mobile launcher at the Pang Hyon Aircraft Factory. Capt. Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman, said the missile “is not one we have seen before.” That mobility is the problem that the new satellites, with wide coverage using radar sensors that work at night and during storms, are designed to address. Less than one-third of North Korea is under spy satellite coverage at a given moment. American intelligence analysts detected indications of an impending launch in the days before the missile firing, according to a spokesman for the Defense Intelligence Agency, Cmdr. William Marks. But even after the launch, the Pentagon misjudged what it was looking at. Minutes after its 37-minute flight ended, the United States Pacific Command described the missile as an intermediate-range model, often seen. Hours later, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson issued a very different conclusion: that the North had tested its first intercontinental ballistic missile, able to reach Alaska. The commercial radar push is one of several new ways the administration is seeking to counter the North Korean threat. President Trump inherited a secret effort to sabotage the North’s missile launches. But its success has been spotty at best, especially of late. And joint American-South Korean missile tests, conducted hours after the ICBM test, appeared to be part of the new strategy that includes Kill Chain — the missiles were designed to reach Pyongyang, where the country’s leadership lives. Kill Chain was also mentioned in a joint statement issued last week by the United States and South Korea, a notable shift for the South’s new president, Moon Jae-in. He has rejected public discussion of pre-emptive military action, arguing it plays into the North Korean paranoia that the United States and its allies are plotting to end the Kim government. The new satellite initiative builds on technology created more for Wall Street than the Pentagon. From an office in an old Defense Department building within view of the Google campus in California, Raj Shah, the director of the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, or DIUx, is already investing in companies that exploit tiny civilian radar satellites, able to pierce darkness or storms, in hopes that the Pentagon can use them by the end of the year, or early in 2018. “It’s a very challenging target,” said Shah, a former F-16 pilot in Iraq whose extensive experience in Silicon Valley appealed to Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter, who set up the unit during Obama’s second term and recruited Mr. Shah. “The key is using technologies that are already available, and making the modifications we need for a specific military purpose,” Shah said. His unit made an investment to jump-start the development efforts of Capella Space, a Silicon Valley start-up named after a bright star. It plans to loft its first radar satellite late this year. The company says its radar fleet, if successfully deployed, will be able to monitor important targets hourly. “The entire spacecraft is the size of a backpack,” said Payam Banazadeh, a founder of the company. Born in Iran, he learned satellite design at the University of Texas and NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, specializing in miniaturization. Once in orbit, the payload, he added, would unfurl its antenna and solar panels. “Everything is getting smaller,” Banazadeh said of the craft’s parts. “Even the next version of the satellite is getting smaller.” Seeing the early fruits of the Pentagon experiment, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is opening its doors to companies that can supply it with satellite radar data in addition to traditional images. Its outpost, set up this year, is in San Jose, the heart of Silicon Valley. Federal officials rarely, if ever, acknowledge the poor reconnaissance coverage of the North from traditional military satellites. But William J. Perry, the former secretary of defense, recently said in Washington that if the North rolled out a missile to hit the United States or its allies, “there’s a good chance we’d never see it.” The threat grew worse last year as North Korea began using solid fuels after decades of relying on liquid propellants to power its big rockets and missiles. While liquid-fueled missiles can take hours or even days of preparation, solid-fueled missiles can be fired with little or no warning. The advances, said Cnhag Young-Keun, director of the Global Surveillance Research Center at the Korea Aerospace University in Seoul, moved the North significantly closer to a mobile intercontinental missile that could eventually pose “a serious potential threat to the United States.” The key to detecting launch preparations is the near-constant presence of satellites that can see through clouds, rain, snow, foliage and camouflage and can detect the movement of military gear, including missiles. That requires space-based radars, which over the years have been highly expensive, with their big antennas and tendency to use large amounts of power. Like any radar, they fire radio waves at targets and gather faint echoes. Space-based radars can also detect changes in ground elevation that signal hidden tunnels, bunkers and even radioactive cavities left by nuclear blasts, experts say, because such hollows cause the surface above them to subside ever so slightly. But building the radars has historically been expensive for the government. In 2007, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that a constellation of 21 radar satellites would cost the nation up to $94 billion — or more than $4 billion each. The report, published shortly after the North’s first nuclear detonation, zeroed in on whether the satellites could track Korean missiles on mobile launchers. It called the goal “highly challenging,” and said 35 to 50 spacecraft would be needed to make such detections rapidly. The new generation of tiny, cheap satellites has made that outcome more achievable. Capella plans to loft its first radar satellite late this year and build up to 36 orbital radars, within the range the congressional report recommended. In addition to Capella, private companies rushing to make and exploit new generations of small radar satellites include Ursa Space Systems in Ithaca, N.Y.; UrtheCast in Vancouver, Canada; and Iceye in Espoo, Finland. Like many new companies seeking to make small satellites, most have strong ties to Silicon Valley. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s initiative, known as the Commercial Geoint Activity, builds on programs in which the agency bought radar-satellite data from Canada, Italy and Germany as part of its evaluation of the new civilian technologies. Cardillo said the new partnerships could help the United States close the gaps in tracking Kim’s rapidly expanding arsenal of threatening missiles. “If any of these companies, new or old, can help fill those gaps,” he said, “then I’m interested.” (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Tiny Satellites Will Track North Korea Missiles,” New York Times, July 7, 2017,
North Korea may be one of the world’s most isolated countries, but the tightening sanctions regime it has lived under for the past two decades is anything but impermeable. An examination of North Korea’s global connections reveals that even as it becomes increasingly dependent on China, Pyongyang maintains economic and diplomatic ties with many nations. Those links—from commercial and banking relationships to scientific training, arms sales, monument-building and restaurants—have helped it amass the money and technical know-how to develop nuclear weapons and missiles. The nature and extent of North Korea’s global ties comes from current and former officials, researchers, North Korean defectors, U.N. decisions, NGOs and an analysis of economic statistics. In some cases, North Korea leans on old allies, particularly those like Cuba from the former Communist bloc, or those like Syria that are similarly hostile to the U.S. In others, notably in Africa, it has more transactional relationships to supply items such as cheap weaponry or military training. In the Middle East, it supplies laborers for construction work and pockets almost all their earnings. Sanctions against North Korea haven’t been as broad as those applied to Iran over its nuclear program, nor as rigidly enforced. David S. Cohen, undersecretary of the Treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence during the Obama administration, wrote in an op-ed in April that “North Korea has gotten off relatively easy, especially as compared with Iran.” Trying to crack down on North Korean business activities is like a game of Whac-A-Mole. North Korean defectors have detailed how the regime uses front companies to conceal its commercial activities in foreign countries, or adopts business names that obscure their identity by avoiding using North Korea’s full name, thereby benefiting from confusion over whether the entity is North or South Korean. Pyongyang maintains diplomatic ties with 164 countries and has embassies in 47, according to the National Committee on North Korea, a Washington-based nongovernmental organization, and the Honolulu-based East-West Center. Although it lags far behind China, India has been North Korea’s second biggest trade partner in the past couple of years, buying commodities including silver and selling it chemicals among other goods. Russia has exported petroleum products to North Korea and imported items such as garments and frozen fish. Last year, North Korea attempted to export military communications equipment to Eritrea via front companies in Malaysia, according to a recent U.N. report. Most North Koreans abroad are involved in providing funds for the state, defectors say. One of the primary roles of North Korean diplomats is to help develop and maintain cash flows for the regime, according to former embassy officials. North Korea missions typically have to be self-financed to maximize revenue for the state, these people say. In recent months, under pressure from the Trump administration, there are signs more countries have begun to clamp down on North Korea. In February, Bulgaria had Pyongyang send home two diplomats in its embassy in Sofia, in line with U.N. Security Council resolutions passed in September calling on countries to reduce the number of North Korean diplomats abroad. Italy this year moved four North Koreans studying at the International Center for Theoretical Physics in Trieste to switch to less-sensitive majors in line with a Security Council resolution calling for member nations not to provide education that could aid Pyongyang’s weapons program. In March, Senegal said it suspended issuing visas for artisans from North Korea’s Mansudae Art Studio, a state-run organization that has erected monumental sculptures across Africa. More than 50,000 North Korean workers are employed abroad, according to the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, a Seoul-based think tank, many in construction or factory jobs. For these workers, wages are paid directly to North Korean officials, raising hundreds of millions of dollars a year for the state, human-rights groups say. U.N. sanctions are primarily intended to block North Korea’s illegitimate trade and revenue streams that have a suspected link to its weapons programs. The U.N. doesn’t target all of Pyongyang’s business activities abroad, such as the chain of restaurants it operates in Asia and the Middle East, or its dispatch of laborers. U.S. sanctions go further in trying to disrupt North Korea’s trade and revenue, including a recent move to block access to the U.S. financial system for a bank in China on which Pyongyang relied. The U.S. has sanctioned North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, a move that would freeze any of his assets in America. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on Tuesday called on the global community to stop doing business with Pyongyang. This week, Sen. Cory Gardner (R., Colo.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s subpanel on East Asia, said he was drafting legislation that he says would create a “global embargo” on North Korea. “We need to shut off North Korea’s access to oil, to trade, to currency, to financial institutions,” he said in an interview Thursday, calling for “Iran-style” sanctions. “They are far from being ‘sanctioned out.’ They are certainly isolated, but they have to recognize they ain’t seen nothing yet.” China has had close ties to North Korea since the 1950s when it sent troops to fight U.S.-led forces backing the South in the Korean War. In 2001, China accounted for around 18% of North Korea’s exports and 20% of its imports, ranking behind Japan on both measures, according to customs figures compiled by Harvard University’s Atlas of Economic Complexity. Since U.N. sanctions on North Korea were tightened in 2009, Japan and other countries have curtailed commercial ties with Pyongyang, leaving China as by far its biggest trade partner. For the past five years, China has accounted for more than 80% of North Korea’s imports and exports, providing an economic lifeline even as political relations between Beijing and Pyongyang have deteriorated. During that period, China has imported mostly industrial raw materials from North Korea, especially coal, but also seafood and clothing such as men’s suits and overcoats. China’s customs figures show that its exports to North Korea have increased this year. Crucially, China continues to be North Korea’s biggest source of crude oil, according to diplomats and experts on the region. Much of North Korea’s trade takes place over the 880-mile land border with China, which is porous and sparsely guarded. Small Chinese and North Korean companies quietly ferry coal, iron ore and other resources over the border, far from checkpoints. U.N. sanctions introduced in March 2016 banned exports of North Korean iron ore unless they were exclusively for “livelihood purposes”—a loophole China continues to exploit. While North Korea gained notoriety in the early 2000s for state-backed exports of illegal drugs and counterfeit U.S. dollars, Pyongyang has mostly shifted its strategy to allow private North Korean enterprises to take the lead, with the regime collecting bribes from these enterprises in a primitive system of taxation, says Justin Hastings, a lecturer at the University of Sydney who has researched North Korea’s overseas smuggling networks. The shift in strategy means that North Korea can outsource some of the risk involved in the trade while continuing to fill its coffers. “North Korea is not infinitely adaptable, but it’s far more adaptable than people have thought and its ability to adapt to sanctions has not been reached yet,” Hastings said. One informal Chinese trader that Hastings interviewed for a soon-to-be-published academic paper was importing truckloads and boatloads of North Korean iron ore and other minerals across the river into China for resale as recently as a year ago, when the interview took place. (Jonathan Cheng, Jeremy Page, and Alastair Gale, “The Global Web That Keeps North Korea Running,” Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2017,
7/8/17:
The two dozen commandos trained to kill North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung on a remote island off the coast of South Korea never made it to Pyongyang. The men of the 2325th Group’s 209th Detachment had been recruited from the country’s poor, desperate, and criminal and brought to Silmido Island to be trained to become assassins. To South Korea’s own authoritarian leaders in 1968, this meant they had to be hardened. They were abused, neglected, and put through grueling exercises with guards shooting at their feet and beating them with bats when they didn’t perform to expectations. Six of them were executed for disobedience; another drowned by accident. Their mission was to infiltrate North Korea, sneak into one of Kim’s palaces, and murder the Great Leader, paying North Korea back in kind for a failed 1968 special operations raid aimed at assassinating South Korean President Park Chung-hee. By 1971, Park had given up on the prospect of revenge. The men of Silmido Island, however, had not. That year, they rose up, killing 18 of their guards with their honed commando skills and stealing a boat across the Yellow Sea to the port of Incheon. There they hijacked two buses and set out to Seoul to kill the men who had ordered them to be turned into weapons. Like many attempts to kill members of the Kim dynasty both before and after, this one ended in ruin, blazing out in a hail of gunfire and grenade explosions as the remaining recruits fought a doomed battle with police in the South Korean capital. But even if they had been launched against the North, their fate would have been the same. Even their handlers believed their chances of survival were slim — a fact they kept hidden from the commandos. The North had long proved inhospitable ground for infiltrators. South Korean intelligence had “made no serious effort” to carry out intelligence operations in the North in the late 1960s “because the expected losses of intelligence agents would be high and the benefits nil or virtually nil,” according to a declassified CIA report. Nearly a half-century later, the Kim dynasty is still in power in North Korea, and talk of decapitation is in the air once again. Seoul has begun to counter Pyongyang’s aggressive messages with threats of its own to kill current leader Kim Jong Un at the outset of any war. But long before Pyongyang began lighting off ballistic missiles and churning out nuclear warheads, the Kim dynasty has been facing down assassination threats, both real and imagined. From the days of Japanese colonialism in the 1930s through the turbulent end of communist regimes in the 1990s, many have tried (and failed) to kill a Kim. But despite facing lethal challenges from within and without, the dynasty has always managed to dodge would-be assassins thanks to canny survival skills, some less than fully baked plots, and an elaborate network of bodyguards, secret police, and informants. The Kim family’s first brush with death came in the 1930s, when Kim Il Sung joined the Chinese 1st Route Army as an insurgent in the resistance against Japanese colonial rule in Manchuria and Korea. Once Kim had made a name for himself in the resistance against Japanese occupation, Japanese police set up a designated “special activities unit” to hunt him down, employing dozens of former guerrillas whom the Japanese lured from Kim’s unit by promising amnesty. Together with a network of police informants, the men stalked their former comrade and leader — a lesson in betrayal that Kim would remember for the rest of his life. Kim was protected during his guerrilla days by a band of bodyguards, which reportedly included his first wife, Kim Jong Suk, the mother of Kim Jong Il. North Korean histories of the period recount a battle in which Kim Jong Suk saved the future North Korean leader’s life in northeastern China, shielding Kim Il Sung from enemy soldiers taking aim at him from a nearby field of reeds and dropping the would-be assassins with her Mauser rifle. The tale has long been a propaganda parable about the need for absolute devotion to the Kims’ security, though there’s little independent evidence to back it up. The first confirmed attempt on Kim Il Sung’s life in the postwar era — though not the last — came during a ceremony at the Pyongyang railway station commemorating the Korean independence movement on March 1, 1946. Assassins reportedly sent by the South Korean government threw a homemade grenade at the podium as Kim spoke, and Yakov Novichenko, a Soviet Army lieutenant guarding the assembled dignitaries, sprang into action and grabbed the grenade, which exploded in his hand, blowing off his arm. The incident spawned a lifelong friendship between Kim and Novichenko, as well as a cheesy Soviet-North Korean biopic in the mid-1980s. (Leonid Vasin, an assistant section chief in the Soviet Army’s special propaganda section who worked closely with Pyongyang later, would in time write a more skeptical account of the incident. Vasin claimed that the homemade grenade landed about 100 feet from Kim and to the right of the podium, posing little threat.) The coterie of guards surrounding Kim in the mid-1940s would eventually evolve into one of the world’s most repressive and pervasive police states, run for the personal benefit of the Kim family. Within that architecture of repression grew an elaborate praetorian guard for the North’s supreme leaders, protecting them with multiple, overlapping rings of security. At the innermost ring are five to six elite, handpicked bodyguards from the brigade-sized Office of Adjutants, also known as Office No. 6, who directly protect the Kims. (It’s the loose equivalent of the U.S. Secret Service — except with 20 times as many people, in a country a fraction of the size of America.) The Kims’ personal guards are senior officers who have proved their reliability and loyalty through years of service in North Korea’s Guard Command, a 100,000-member unit devoted to the security of the Kim family and the upper levels of North Korean officialdom. Other Guard Command soldiers, picked from families with no known ties to Pyongyang’s communist elite, provide the next layers of protection around Kim Jong Un, surrounding him at events, official visits, and on personal travel, as well as protecting his various residences. The capital itself is protected by the Pyongyang Defense Command and Pyongyang Air Defense Command, which would fight within the city and defend its airspace in the event of a major war or coup attempt. Outside of Pyongyang, the 3rd Corps of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) comprises the final, most heavily armed ring, guarding the western approaches to Pyongyang from the port of Nampo north to the Chongchon River. A handful of agencies also conduct surveillance within the North to act as an early tripwire for signs of disloyalty and coup plots in the making. The State Security Department runs an expansive network of eavesdropping and informants to spy on North Korean civilians while the more sensitive work of surveilling senior Workers’ Party officials is carried out by the Organization and Guidance Department. Within the KPA, the Military Security Command acts as a kind of parallel secret police to keep tabs on those in uniform. Together, the domestic intelligence and security agencies are aided by the cultivation of a Kim personality cult, which emphasizes the worship of the Kim family as essentially supernatural beings. Attempting to kill a Kim, for many North Koreans, would be more than treason — it would be blasphemy. Like Chinese emperors, the North Korean state, too, promises suffering not only to “traitors” but to their families, further deterring any attempt. The greatest test of the security apparatus protecting the Kims came in the 1990s as North Korea transitioned from the leadership of Kim Il Sung to his son Kim Jong Il. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, communist states were crumbling, and many wondered if North Korea would be the next to go. In addition to the geopolitical shift, there were also whiffs of discontent about Kim Jong Il’s position as his father’s heir. Rumors of coup plots and assassination attempts began to trickle out of the North and into Japanese and South Korean media. In the early ’90s, news outlets began to report on a supposed assassination plot led by Col. Gen. An Chang Ho and 30-40 military officers who had all studied at the Frunze Military Academy in the Soviet Union. The plotters purportedly planned to turn their tanks’ guns on the two Kims during an April 1992 military parade commemorating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the KPA. “There is a lot of sourcing — from media reports to defector interview data — that establishes that An was dismissed and arrested and that alumna of Russian and East European military universities were subject to investigations,” says Michael Madden, a visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins University and an expert on North Korean leadership. “Whether An actually participated in an assassination attempt or violent power challenge is a different matter altogether.” Shortly after the death of Kim Il Sung, the KPA’s 6th Corps, based in North Hamgyong province, supposedly went on the move in 1995 with the aim of mounting a coup. “The plot was uncovered by elements within the 6th Corps itself, so it wasn’t as if it was found out by the security services,” says Ken Gause, the director of the international affairs group at CNA, a nonprofit research and analysis organization, and an expert on North Korean security institutions. “It was mainly the head of the 6th Corps [Kim Yong Chun] going to the head of the State Security Department and basically ratting out his own corps.” What really happened in North Hamgyong — whether it was the beginning of a coup or a grab for resources, as Gause suspects — is still a matter of some debate and mystery. In any case, the incident represented a worrying breakdown in command for a system premised on absolute control. There were repercussions for the 6th Corps. “The most credible story is that they tied the senior military command of the 6th Corps in a barracks building and then set the building on fire,” Madden says. Today, the 6th Corps has been blotted from the records. Kim Jong Il rode out the rocky years of the 1990s and consolidated his power enough to ensure another hereditary transition of power to his son Kim Jong Un. But the prospect of a nuclear strike, made more likely by Pyongyang’s progress in weapons development, has given new urgency to efforts to disrupt the North’s chain of command in the event of war in a preemptive strike. “This is not anything unusual. People are publicizing it, making a big deal out of it, but there are many leadership targets in North Korea,” says retired Army Col. David Maxwell, a former Special Forces officer who served with U.S. Special Operations Command Korea. “All of the command and control facilities, all of the relocation facilities from Pyongyang, the villas that Kim Jong Un might use during time of war — all of these are potential targets, at minimum, for surveillance and, in extremis, to target people that are at those leadership locations.” While knocking out enemy leadership in a war is hardly a new idea, the South Korean military has gotten more vocal about its decapitation capabilities in recent years. South Korea’s Army Special Warfare Command announced in 2016 that it was standing up a special operations unit tasked with killing Kim Jong In and other senior leaders in the event a preemptive strike became necessary. For its part, North Korea has accused its adversaries in Washington and Seoul of a bizarre plot to “commit state-sponsored terrorism against the supreme leadership of the DPRK by use of bio-chemical substance.” But any special operations team would face steep hurdles in getting close enough to Kim Jong Un to kill him. First, South Korean special operators would have to hitch a ride with their American counterparts in the U.S. Air Force Special Operations or the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment to infiltrate the North. Once across the Northern Limit Line, a team would then have to make it past the KPA’s 3rd Corps, which defends the approaches to the capital against invaders looking to land at Nampo and take the highway up or drop from the sky in an airborne assault. “If the defense by the 3rd Corps and the 4th Corps has failed, the [soldiers of the Pyongyang Defense Command] plan to defend the city section by section, giving time for Kim Jong Un and the Guard Command to move the leadership out into the north-central part of the country,” says Joseph Bermudez, an expert on the North Korean military. American special operators have carried out multiple such raids in places like Pakistan, Somalia, and Libya since 9/11, swooping in with stealth and speed to capture or kill terrorist leaders on the run. Trying to replicate those feats against a heavily armed nation-state lengthens the odds considerably. “It looks good in the movies, but it’s not something that is easily done,” Maxwell says. The most practical method might be a missile barrage by either the United States or South Korea. The South’s “Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation” plan, announced after the North’s September 2016 nuclear test, calls for ballistic and cruise missiles to flatten sections of Pyongyang associated with Kim Jong Un and his commanders should a nuclear strike appear imminent. Four years before the plan’s rollout, Seoul tipped its hand with the public test of a Hyunmoo-3 cruise missile, shown smashing into a target crafted in the shape of Pyongyang’s Kumsusan Palace of the Sun. But all the missiles and special operators are useless unless they have good intelligence to guide them to a leader’s location. Getting that kind of sensitive information in a hard target like North Korea can be a quixotic quest, but that hasn’t dimmed the appetite for the enterprise, says Jeffrey Lewis, the director of the East Asia nonproliferation program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. “Although it never really works, military and political leaders are always drawn to decapitation. It’s catnip for idiots.” Lewis points to the 2003 invasion of Iraq as an example of the problems such missions are likely to hit. In that case, the United States sent stealth aircraft loaded with bunker-buster bombs and cruise missiles to strike a site where American spies believed Saddam Hussein was hiding. Saddam wasn’t there, nor were any leadership bunkers, and the Iraqi dictator wouldn’t be caught for another eight months. But even in a scenario where the United States or South Korea succeeds in a preemptive strike against Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s conventional military capabilities ensure that it’s still capable of inflicting catastrophic damage on the South, where the United States has thousands of troops deployed. Nor is it necessarily clear that the KPA would throw down its weapons in the wake of Kim’s death. Secretary of Defense James Mattis has assured U.S. lawmakers that even though the United States would prevail in a war against the North, any conflict would be “more serious in terms of human suffering than anything we have seen since 1953.” Removing the last Kim — as catastrophically bloody as it would be — might be relatively easy compared with governing the chaotic kingdom left behind. (Adam Rawnsley, “The Many Failed Attempts to Kill the Leaders of North Korea,” Foreign Policy, July 8, 2017)
7/10/17:
Schilling: “After the frenzy of technical speculation over the successful launch of North Korea’s Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the dust seems to be clearing and the emerging reality is that the North has an unreliable missile that can reach Alaska or Hawaii with a single nuclear warhead, and would be lucky to hit even a city-sized target. However, with a year or two of additional testing and development, it will likely become a missile that can reliably deliver a single nuclear warhead to targets along the US west coast, possibly with enough accuracy to destroy soft military targets like naval bases. In perhaps five years, North Korea may be able to incorporate a modest suite of decoys and penetration aids to challenge US missile defenses. Let’s hope US missile defenses are up to that challenge. Contrary to the assertions of some analysts that the missile is currently capable of carrying several warheads, not just one, it may eventually be able to carry a modest suite of decoys or penetration aids, though probably not for several years. A multiple warhead capability, while theoretically possible, would require a very lightweight warhead, which will require a lot more nuclear testing and is probably a decade in the future at best. That said, the Hwasong-14 that flew last week was surprising in several respects. On the surface, it appeared to be a completely different missile than the one North Korea rolled out under the name of “Hwasong-14” back in 2015. On close examination, however, this new Hwasong-14 appears to be closely based on elements of several previous North Korean missiles. In fact, very little of the Hwasong-14 is truly new: it uses the same engine as the Hwasong-12, a structural technology first developed for the original Hwasong-14 and demonstrated on the Hwasong-12; it also featured an upper stage very similar in size and performance to the Hwasong-13 (itself derived from the upper stage of the Unha space launch vehicle), and probably a reentry vehicle (RV) derived from the original Hwasong-14. …The Hwasong-14 was launched on a very high angle “lofted” trajectory to avoid overflying Japan, and might have reached a distance of 7,000-8,000 kilometers if launched on a maximum-range trajectory. If the Hwasong-14 is put together the way we think it is, it can probably do a bit better than that when all the bugs are worked out. … A range of as much as 9,700 kilometers, approximately the distance from North Korean launch sites to the US naval base at San Diego, would be possible with a 500 kg payload. And that raises an obvious question: what is that payload? Most every other North Korean long-range missile is topped with a triconic reentry vehicle sized for a single nuclear warhead about the size of the mock-up Kim Jong Un showed off last year. We’re pretty sure North Korea can actually build nuclear warheads about that size. But where other missiles have visible reentry vehicles, the Hwasong-14 has a detachable payload shroud. We don’t know what goes inside, except that the usual triconic reentry vehicle won’t fit. Those reentry vehicles probably aren’t qualified for reentry at ICBM velocities, and changing that would require an extensive test program. A faster and lower-risk approach to putting a warhead on an ICBM is to use a blunt-body reentry vehicle, like the United States did on its first Thor and Atlas ICBMs. And indeed, the original Hwasong-14 missile from 2015 sported a blunt-body RV at the tip—one that would fit almost perfectly inside the new Hwasong-14’s shroud. Blunt-body RVs have their disadvantages, such as limited accuracy. But, as long as you’re willing to settle for landing within a few miles of the target, they will do the work. In the short term, that’s probably all there is to it—a streamlined fairing over a blunt-body RV, capable of delivering a 500 to 600 kg nuclear payload with limited accuracy to targets on the US west coast. In the longer term, however, there may be something more. Payload shrouds are somewhat failure-prone until they have been thoroughly tested, and usually not worth the bother if all one wants to do is deliver a single warhead. Payload shrouds are designed to provide a clean aerodynamic exterior to a complex assortment of un-aerodynamic payloads. Thus, we expect there will eventually be more than just a single warhead under the shroud. But it probably won’t be multiple warheads, at least not for a decade or more. Multiple warheads of the size North Korea has displayed and can plausibly build today, along with reentry vehicles to carry them, simply wouldn’t fit. To put multiple warheads inside that fairing, at a weight that would still allow intercontinental reach, North Korea would have to develop a lightweight nuclear warhead comparable to the W-68 warhead of the US Poseidon missile. It took the United States almost 15 years to go from building the sort of nuclear weapons North Korea has today to the W-68. And while the North Korean missile program has been conducting tests at an accelerated pace, they have conducted only two nuclear tests in the past four years. So perhaps in 2030 we will see a multiple-warhead Hwasong-14, but probably not before then. A more urgent, and more realistic, priority for North Korea would be a system of decoys and penetration aids to defeat US missile defenses. The US national missile defense system in its current state is limited and unreliable, working only about half the time in tests. But North Korea has to consider that deploying an operational ICBM would motivate the United States to improve its defenses. They can’t possibly hope to build more ICBMs than the US can build missile defense interceptors. But if they can put a dozen or so effective decoys on each missile—that might be enough to maintain a credible deterrent. This is not a trivial matter. One often hears decoys described as “mylar ballons,” as if a simple child’s toy would be sufficient. In reality, a toy balloon probably wouldn’t survive the harsh environment of a missile launch, let alone fool a sophisticated adversary’s defense. As a more realistic example, consider the British “Chevaline” decoy system, developed using the technology of the early 1970s when the United Kingdom faced a similar deterrence credibility problem against Russia’s nascent anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. This is a capability North Korea could reasonably hope to match. It took the UK seven years and seven billion (in current year dollars) to make Chevaline work. The system reportedly shoehorned 27 decoys and their deployment mechanisms into slightly more than 250 kilograms. That’s half the payload of the Hwasong-14, if North Korea is serious about targeting San Diego. Consequently, the North Koreans would probably have to accept a reduced decoy count, and make some progress on warhead weight reduction, to make it all fit. I would be very surprised if they weren’t working on that already, but without a missile to work with, there is a limit to how much progress they can make.” (John Schilling, “What Is True and Not True about North Korea’s Hwasong-14 ICBM: A Technical Evaluation,” 38 North, July 10, 2017)
The outgoing 2nd Infantry Division commander defended the use of rotational forces as the best way to maintain readiness against an increasingly threatening North Korea despite a recent report concluding that forward-based units would be more efficient. Maj. Gen. Ted Martin — who has overseen the transition from the permanently stationed Iron Brigade to the rotational system — said the training dividends from having cohesive units that deploy together outweigh the disadvantages. “I am a big fan of the rotational brigade,” the 56-year-old Jacksonville Beach, Fla., native told Stars and Stripes. The United States maintains about 28,500 servicemembers in the South to help maintain an armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War in lieu of a peace treaty. In July 2015, the Army inactivated the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, known as the Iron Brigade, which had served near the border with North Korea for 50 years. It was replaced with brigades sent to the peninsula on nine-month deployments. So far there have been four of them, with the Fort Hood, Texas-based 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division taking over late last month. It’s the second turn for the Black Jack brigade, which was the first rotational unit to arrive two years ago. A new Army War College report called “Rotational Deployments vs. Forward Stationing” found that the use of rotational forces in Europe and South Korea has cost more than expected and taken a toll on troop morale that has possibly led to lower re-enlistment rates. The author, War College professor John Deni, said basing brigades in the two theaters would also demonstrate stronger commitment to U.S. allies. The report will be released later this summer, but Deni outlined his findings during a recent panel discussion at the Atlantic Council in Washington. Martin, who assumed command in April 2015 and said he was surprised he hadn’t been questioned for the report, insisted the new system provides important continuity by ending a high turnover rate that had plagued the Iron Brigade as soldiers cycled in and out according to individual terms. “So the ability of the unit to get to a high level of collective training efficiency was very difficult and it was even more difficult to sustain it,” Martin said, adding as much as 12 percent of a formation would be transferred in a given month. “While the Iron Brigade was a fantastic outfit, what I got in turn was … a unit that had trained together for almost a year,” he said, adding that’s particularly important for units that need to hit the ground running and adapt to the mountainous terrain in South Korea. Once on the peninsula, the soldiers stay together for nine months and train intensively with their South Korean counterparts. The 2ID is the first division to combine the allied forces. Martin said the result is an overall better prepared fighting force. “What I’m telling you in a nutshell is they came in good. We delivered back to the Army the most combat-ready brigade combat team in the Army,” he said. A major drawback is the potential impact the revolving door of troops can have on relationships with South Korean forces, said Martin, who stressed that can be mitigated. “If we’re not careful we can lose the partnership,” he said. “The battalion brigade level command teams have to invest a lot of time and energy into maintaining and doing the handoff because the personal relationships are just so important. This is not an all-American show. “We found out we have to put much time into getting to know partners. It can’t be all business. It’s got to be soccer games together, spending time eating in mess halls with us, doing combined briefings,” he said, contrasting the environment in South Korea with that in Iraq and Afghanistan. “Even though we were doing things with them you never really want to get too close. Here it’s the other way around,” he said. Martin will hand over his command next week to Maj. Gen. Dennis Scott McKean. (Kim Gamel, “Outgoing 2ID Commander: Rotational Units Increase Readiness in S. Korea Despite Report,” Stars and Stripes, July 10, 2017)
7/11/17:
A pro-North Korean newspaper in Japan said that President Moon Jae-in should not expect a positive response from Pyongyang to his latest reconciliatory proposal, as Seoul is still not giving up its submission to the United States. Chosun Sinbo also called on South Korea to end its joint annual military exercises with the U.S. if it hopes to prove its willingness to improve ties. “If the proposal is based on South Korea’s subversion to the U.S. and hostility toward the North, Seoul cannot expect Pyongyang’s positive response,” the newspaper said. The newspaper hinted that Moon’s handling of Seoul-Washington military drills would be a yardstick in the North’s decision on its policy with South Korea. “South Korea should show a willingness to improve its relations with Pyongyang not by words, but with action,” it said. “It remains to be seen whether South Korea can make a decision to suspend the drills with the U.S., a main source of tension on the Korean Peninsula.” (Yonhap, “No Expectation from N.K.’s Acceptance of Moon’s Peace Proposal: Pro-N.K. Paper,” July 11, 2017)
North Korea has yet to fully secure the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) as it remains unknown whether the country’s recently fired ballistic missile successfully re-entered the atmosphere, lawmakers said quoting the spy agency. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) concluded that the latest missile still lacked re-entry technology although it flew as far as an ICBM does, Rep. Yi Wan-young of the Liberty Korea Party and Rep. Kim Byung-kee of the ruling Democratic Party said following the spy agency’s parliamentary report on the July 4 launch. “Although North Korea claimed that (the missile’s) heat resistance was verified, whether it re-entered (the atmosphere safely) was not confirmed and the country has no relevant test facility, making it look like it has not secured the technology,” the NIS was quoted as reporting to the parliamentary intelligence committee. North Korea may have not attained the technology to guide a warhead precisely to a target either — another key ICBM technology — given that the re-entry technique normally needs to be secured before that, according to the lawmakers. (Yonhap, “North Korea Yet to Obtain Missile Re-Entry Technology: Spy Agency,” July 11, 2017)
The Eighth U.S. Army held a ceremony to mark the opening of its new headquarters in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, after relocating from the Yongsan base in central Seoul. Yongsan was its base for 64 years. The opening ceremony was held at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. (Sarah Kim and Choi Mo-ran, “U.S. 8th Army Finds New Home in Pyeongtaek,” JoongAng Ilbo, July 12, 2017)
North Korea’s dependence on Russia for oil has increased threefold this year compared to the same period the previous year, according to media reports. Citing Russian customs material records, the Voice of America (VOA) said that Russian oil exports to North Korea totaled $2.3 million by April this year, a considerable increase from $740, 000 last year. According to the report, 96 percent of the exports were not crude oil. Reportedly, the North used to import 99 percent of its oil from China, its traditional ally, but recently has reached out to Russia to diversify its oil supplies.
“Half of North Korea’s oil needs are processed oil. North Korea has imported gasoline and jet fuel from Russia, since trade with China is more likely to be detected,” Cho Han-bum, a senior research fellow from the Korea Institute for National Unification, said. Last month, a senior-level North Korean defector who used to deal with the nation’s oil trade told the VOA that North Korea annually imports 200,000 to 300,000 tons of Russian oil through a Singaporean company. “From China, the North receives around 500,000 tons of crude oil per year through pipelines in the form of a loan,” the defector Ri Jong-ho said. (Choi Ha-young, “Russian Oil Exports Surge in North Korea,” Korea Times, July 11, 2017)
The United States said it shot down a simulated, incoming intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) similar to the ones being developed by countries like North Korea, in a new test of the nation’s THAAD missile defenses. Planned months ago, the test was the first-ever of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system against an incoming IRBM, which experts say is a faster and more difficult target to hit than shorter-range missiles. The U.S. Missile Defense Agency said the IRBM was designed to behave similarly to the kinds of missiles that could threaten the United States. “The successful demonstration of THAAD against an IRBM-range missile threat bolsters the country’s defensive capability against developing missile threats in North Korea and other countries,” the Missile Defense Agency said in a statement. The successful THAAD test adds to the credibility of the U.S. military’s missile defense program, which has come under intense scrutiny in recent years, including because of test delays and failures. The U.S. Government Accountability Office, a federal watchdog, noted in a May report that the Missile Defense Agency had not previously tested THAAD against an IRBM, despite having deployed the system to the island of Guam, a U.S. territory in the Pacific, in 2013 amid concerns about North Korea’s missile program. That means that, until the latest test, the THAAD system had an unproven capability against IRBMs, missiles that have a range of between 1,800 and 3,100 miles (3,000 to 5,500 km). Guam is approximately 2,100 miles (3,400 km) from North Korea. In order to hit the mainland United States, North Korea would need to fire an ICBM, which is defined as a missile with a range greater than 3,400 miles (5,500 km). In the latest test, a THAAD in Kodiak, Alaska, intercepted a ballistic missile target that was air-launched from a C-17 aircraft flying north of Hawaii, the Missile Defense Agency said in a statement. A defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the test took place early on Tuesday. This success leaves THAAD with a 100 percent track record for all 14 intercept attempts since flight testing began just over a decade ago. Lockheed Martin Corp, the prime contractor for the THAAD system, said it could intercept incoming missiles both inside and outside the Earth’s atmosphere. THAAD’s success rate in testing is far higher than the one for America’s Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which is designed to shoot down an ICBM headed for the U.S. mainland. That GMD system has only a 55 percent success rate over the life of the program, stoking fierce criticism from groups including the Union of Concerned Scientists, a non-profit science advocacy group. But advocates say the technology has improved dramatically in recent years. The GMD system successfully shot down an incoming, simulated North Korean ICBM in a test in May. That led the Pentagon to upgrade its assessment of the United States’ ability to defend against a small number of ICBMs, according to an internal memo seen by Reuters. A ground-based missile defense system, THAAD is designed to shoot down short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. John Schilling, a contributor to 38 North, a Washington-based North Korea monitoring project, downplayed the idea that THAAD might be seen as a backup to hit a longer range ICBM, saying that THAAD was not designed to hit missiles traveling so fast. “To engage an ICBM with THAAD would be like asking a high school baseball player to hit a fastball from a major-league pitcher – literally out of his league,” Schilling said. The Missile Defense Agency told Congress in June that it planned to deliver 52 more THAAD interceptors to the U.S. Army between October 2017 and September 2018, bringing total deliveries to 210 since May 2011. (Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, “U.S. THAAD Missiel Defenses Hit Test Target as North Korea Tension Rises,” Reuters, July 11, 2017)
Near the southern tip of Africa, 8,000 miles from Pyongyang, this capital city is an unlikely testament to North Korean industry. There’s the futuristic national history museum, the sleek presidential palace, the sprawling defense headquarters and the shadowy munitions factory. They were built — or are still being constructed — by North Korea, for a profit. For years, North Korea has used African nations like this one as financial lifelines, building infrastructure and selling weapons and other military equipment as sanctions mounted against its authoritarian regime. Although China is by far North Korea’s largest trading partner, the smaller African revenue streams have helped support the impoverished Hermit Kingdom, even as its leaders develop an ambitious nuclear weapons program in defiance of the international community. Namibian officials describe North Korea as a longtime ally, a partner in development and an affordable contractor. Since the 1960s, when North Korea began providing support for African nations during their independence struggles with European colonial powers, the regime has fostered political ties on the continent that have turned into commercial relationships. “We’ve relied on them for help to develop our infrastructure, and their work has been unparalleled,” said Frans Kapofi, Namibia’s minister of presidential affairs. Across Africa, such relationships have been common. A United Nations investigation this year described North Korean military radio equipment headed to Eritrea, automatic weapons arriving in Congo and military trainers landing in Angola and Uganda. “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is flouting sanctions through trade in prohibited goods, with evasion techniques that are increasing in scale, scope and sophistication,” the report said. It went on to describe how “the country also uses its construction companies that are active in Africa to build arms-related, military and security facilities.” North Korea’s commercial relationships are only one sign of the surprisingly close ties many African leaders have with the secretive, highly repressive Asian country. Yoweri Museveni, Uganda’s longtime president, said he learned basic Korean from Kim Il Sung, the former leader of North Korea and grandfather of current leader Kim Jong Un, during various visits to that country. Zimbabwean leader Robert Mugabe sent two rhinos to Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, as a show of solidarity in the 1980s (both died shortly after arriving). In Maputo, Mozambique’s capital, a street named Avenida Kim Il Sung runs through the heart of downtown. In Namibia’s national museum, a black-and-white picture of a North Korean soldier leading a group of local soldiers hangs in the foyer. “Our world outlook was determined by who was on our side during the most crucial time of our struggle, and North Korea was there for us,” said Tuliameni Kalomoh, a senior adviser in the Namibian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the country’s former ambassador to Washington. In recent years, African countries have struggled to maintain their ties to North Korea without alienating the United States, the largest aid donor on the continent, or publicly violating U.N. sanctions aimed at curbing the country’s nuclear-weapons program. In measures going back a decade, the United Nations has barred countries from contracting with North Korea for military training or services or arms manufacturing. “Pyongyang’s ties to Africa allow it to show it still has friends abroad and benefit from their political support. They also represent a source of revenue, new entry points into the international financial system, and a haven in which to base North Korean representatives and front companies,” said Andrea Berger, a North Korea expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. The Namibian government has spent about $100 million on North Korean projects since 2002, according to officials here — a sum that goes a long way in an Asian nation where per capita income is about $1,000 per year. But in comparison, China imports about $3 billion in North Korean goods per year. Last year, the United Nations said that Namibia had violated U.N. sanctions by maintaining its commercial ties to North Korea. Among other activities, Namibia had contracted with a North Korean company called Mansudae Overseas Projects to construct a munitions factory as well as a new military academy. A company with links to Mansudae, called the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (known as KOMID) also worked on the munitions factory, according to the U.N. report. The Treasury Department last year called KOMID North Korea’s “primary arms dealer” and sanctioned two North Korean officials based in Windhoek. The department also sanctioned Mansudae, calling it one of a number of companies that sent workers abroad in part to earn money for the government or ruling party. After being accused of violating sanctions, Namibian officials pledged to cut commercial ties with North Korea, which is formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK. The Namibian government said in a statement in 2016 that it “remains committed to the implementation of all U.N. sanctions resolutions,” but added that “the warm diplomatic relations with the DPRK will be maintained.” Over a year later, it appears that North Korean guest workers are still laboring on Namibia’s new Ministry of Defense, a large concrete building just outside of Windhoek’s city center, according to several residents who live nearby. “We see them every day or two,” said one resident who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he didn’t want to be seen as criticizing the government. “They never left.” In interviews, government officials said they were hoping to complete the current projects before expelling the workers — even though allowing the North Korean contractors to linger would probably be a violation of U.N. sanctions if they are still affiliated with KOMID. “We are definitely towards the end of phasing them out,” said Kapofi, who added that he could not confirm the presence of the guest workers at the defense ministry. Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, recently warned that the United States might cut off trade with countries that were violating U.N. sanctions by doing business with North Korea. Namibia did $469 million of trade with the United States in 2013, according to the most recent figures released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. The U.S. government also contributes to Namibian health-care initiatives, particularly related to HIV/AIDS. “As a part of our maximum pressure campaign, we are committed to ensuring that DPRK’s arms-related exports, assistance, training, and support activities are terminated, including in Africa,” said State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert, in response to a question about Namibia’s ties with North Korea. Other African countries were also supposed to end their economic and military relationships with North Korea after the U.N. sanctions were imposed. But it remains unclear whether some have done so. U.N. member states are obliged to issue reports describing their efforts to enforce sanctions. But the U.N. panel of experts report in 2016 noted “an extremely high number of non-reporting and late-reporting States” and the “poor quality and lack of detail of the reports received.” Some African nations have appeared to distance themselves from North Korea. After photos appeared showing North Korean military trainers wearing Ugandan military uniforms last year, Uganda’s foreign minister, Sam Kutesa, said on state television, “We are disengaging the cooperation we are having with North Korea, as a result of U.N. sanctions.” Even if North Korea’s commercial ties to Africa do eventually fade, relics of the engagement will endure. In Dakar, Senegal’s capital, a soaring, North Korea-built statue — larger than the Statue of Liberty — rises from a hilltop, depicting a man holding a baby in one arm and embracing a woman with the other. When the statue was unveiled, it angered many people in the Muslim-majority nation, as the woman was scarcely clad. Other North Korean statues, mostly of African revolutionary leaders, were sold to Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Benin and Congo. U.N. sanctions introduced in 2016 barred countries from buying any more such statues. One of the biggest projects is the war memorial outside of Windhoek, where a towering bronze statue of an unknown soldier carrying a rifle stands in front of a slim obelisk. On a recent sunny afternoon, there were no visitors at the park, and one guard slept on the steps. But from the top of the monument, the view was clear: the city and the rolling hills in the distance, and in the foreground a North Korean-built military base. (Kevin Sieff, “N. Korea’s Unlikely Safety Net: Africa,” Washington Post, July 11, 2017, p. 1)
7/12/17:
Rodong Sinmun: “The U.S. and the south Korean authorities groundlessly hurt the DPRK’s nuclear deterrent for self-defense making rapid progress and steadily introduce nuclear war equipment under the pretext of it, pushing the situation to the brink of a war. …The U.S. is chiefly to blame for spawning the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula by introducing nuclear weapons into south Korea. The DPRK’s nuclear deterrent for self-defense serves as a treasured sword for justice firmly guaranteeing the nation’s sovereignty and right to existence in defiance of the increased nuclear threat of the U.S. Gone are days never to return when the U.S. could flout the destiny of the Korean nation and trample down peace on the Korean peninsula as it pleased through its unilateral nuclear threat and blackmail. If a war breaks out on the peninsula, such land as the U.S. can never be safe. The DPRK is ready for peaceful or non-peaceful means, but it does not want the country to suffer a war and the whole nation to meet the disaster of a war again. Therefore, it strives hard to exercise utmost patience for peaceful reunification. This being a hard reality, if the south Korean authorities misjudge the DPRK’s will to achieve peace and reunification and steadily rush headlong into criminal moves to hurt the latter’s sovereignty and right to existence in collusion with outside forces, they will be held wholly accountable for all the ensuing consequences. The mission of the DPRK’s nuclear deterrent for self-defense remains unchanged until the U.S. imperialist aggressors withdraw from south Korea, taking all lethal weapons with them, and a danger of a nuclear war on the peninsula is brought to a definite end.” (KCNA, “Rodong Sinmun Slams U.S. and S. Korea Authorities for Pushing Situation on Korean Peninsula to Brink of War,” July 12, 2017)
7/13/17:
Pyongyang’s latest successful intercontinental ballistic missile test has given it confidence in its negotiating power and it is seriously considering a return to talks, a top US nuclear expert who helped organize informal talks between Washington and Pyongyang said. Suzanne DiMaggio, senior fellow at the Washington-based New America Foundation, also told the South China Morning Post in an exclusive interview that the U.S. should seize the moment with a dual strategy of “maximum pressure and engagement” to hold talks with Pyongyang, while backing up its move with pressure such as sanctions. “The best bet would be to focus on preventing the further development of Pyongyang’s ICBM capabilities through an agreement that would suspend their nuclear and missile testing,” DiMaggio said. “My sense is that the North Koreans recognize they have to make some consequential decisions in the near term and they are exploring possible options,” she said. “They seem to understand they are going to have to re-engage at some point to reduce tensions because we are fast approaching a point of crisis.” DiMaggio said that while the goal of denuclearising the Korean peninsula shouldn’t be abandoned, “there is a need to be realistic and set it aside, at least in the near term.” Instead, DiMaggio continued that “placing an immediate focus on reducing tensions and deterring North Korea from using and proliferating its nuclear weapons makes greater sense.” “The US must decide on its highest priority with North Korea at this time and set it as an interim goal,” she said. DiMaggio helped establish the unofficial channel with the North Koreans early last year. After informal talks in Oslo, Norway, in early May, Choe Son-hui, the head of the North Korean foreign ministry’s North America bureau, said Pyongyang was open to dialogue with the US under the “right conditions.” “If conditions are met, we will hold dialogue [with Washington],” Choe said. US President Donald Trump made similar statements in May, telling Bloomberg he would be “honored” to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un “under the right circumstances.” “The task at hand is to find out what the ‘right conditions’ might be. We need to test whether the North Koreans are serious about dialogue, and the only way to do so is to talk to them,” DiMaggio said, adding that contact made in an unofficial dialogue such as the Oslo meeting could play a role in starting “talks about talks.” At the official level, DiMaggio stated that “aggressive diplomacy,” including direct engagement, should be backed up in dealing with Pyongyang by the leverage of “maximum pressure,” such as through United Nations Security Council sanctions. North Korea’s self-claimed test-launch on July 4 of an ICBM capable of striking Alaska is widely viewed as crossing the red line. DiMaggio said: “What cannot be denied is that North Korea is clearly focused on developing nuclear weapon delivery systems that can reach the continental United States.” “The rationale behind their single-minded focus is clear – the North Korean leadership sees their nuclear program as the only source of security against regime change. This position has hardened over the past few years. They have concluded that the United States will not attack a country that has nuclear weapons, plus the means to deliver them,” DiMaggio said. “So now, North Korea has the capability of nuclear weapons and an ICBM, they have a strengthened position to go back to negotiation.” DiMaggio said that “in some circles, the possibility of kinetic actions is being discussed, including potential pre-emptive strikes to destroy nuclear capabilities in North Korea.” But she played down the military option. “The reality is that military action is not a viable option,” DiMaggio said. “We cannot dismiss the possibility that they would respond in a way that could inflict mass civilian casualties and severe damage to South Korea, as well as to Japan and potentially American forces based in the region. And how would Beijing react? It could lead to a regional war or even a wider war that could include the use of nuclear weapons,” she said. “The risks are just too great, especially when we haven’t even begun to exhaust diplomatic options.” DiMaggio added that relying on China to solve the North Korea problem is “a misguided approach” mainly because American interests in North Korea do not necessarily align with China’s interests. “The Chinese leadership won’t bring crippling sanctions against North Korea because they won’t risk increasing the possibility of the North Korean regime’s collapse, which could lead to a mass refugee influx into China and bring US troops to the Chinese border,” DiMaggio said. DiMaggio said the US needed to change the way it looked at China in this equation. “One way to do so would be to work with China, along with South Korea and Japan, to put together a diplomatic package of both incentives and disincentives that would be jointly carried out. “Russia would need to be involved and perhaps the Europeans could be brought in,” she said. “The US would need to take on a leadership role to get all of these players on the same page and follow a coordinated strategy.” (Zhengua Lu, “North Korea Weighing a Return to Talks as Missile Launch Boosts Its Bargaining Power, U.S. Nuclear Expert Says,” South China Morning Post, July 13, 2017)
China’s imports from North Korea dropped sharply in the first half of this year, according to figures published Thursday that suggest Beijing is more serious about cracking down on Pyongyang than President Trump has recently claimed. Today’s figures suggest a different picture, although they also showed significant growth in overall bilateral trade in the first six months of the year thanks to a 29 percent spike in Chinese exports to North Korea. The value of imports from North Korea fell to $880 million in the six months to June, down 13 percent from a year earlier, according to the figures released by the Customs office. Notably, China’s coal imports from North Korea dropped precipitously, with only 2.7 million tons being shipped in the first half of 2017, down 75 percent from 2016. This suggests that China has been making good on its February decision to suspend coal imports from North Korea, potentially cutting off a major financial lifeline for Pyongyang, although analysts caution that Chinese figures should be viewed with some skepticism as they are sometimes manipulated for political purposes. About 90 percent of North Korea’s exports go to China, and coal has been the single-biggest export item. But there has been skepticism about the ban, with coal ships and train cars being seen going back and forth between the two countries. Furthermore, as coal exports have reportedly fallen, shipments of iron ore have spiked. Previous releases of Chinese customs data showed that China bought the same amount of iron ore in the first five months of this year as it did in all of last year. Today’s figures showed that total trade between the two countries is still growing, rising 10 percent in the first six months of this year compared with 2016 because Chinese exports to North Korea rose by 29 percent, or $1.67 billion, over the same period. Beijing was quick to pour cold water on the suggestion that the overall rise in trade suggested it was not complying with U.N. Security Council resolutions designed to punish Pyongyang for its nuclear tests and missile launches. The growth bilateral trade “should not be used as basis for questioning China’s solemn attitude towards the implementation of the Security Council’s resolutions,” Huang Songping, a spokesman for Chinese Customs, told reporters in Beijing. Monthly figures were more representative of the trend and China’s imports from North Korea had been “falling sharply for four consecutive months since March,” he said, including by 36 percent in March and 42 percent in April. “The trade growth between China and North Korea in the first half of the year was mainly driven by exports,” Huang said, adding that the exports were mainly labor-intensive products like textiles, which are not banned under U.N. resolutions. Asked about the surge in China’s imports of North Korean iron ore and in China’s ethanol exports to North Korea in recent months, Huang said that trade with North Korea for civilian use was allowed despite the sanctions. “We have carried out the U.N. resolution strictly,” Huang said. “If this is for civilian use and not banned, after we have verified that they are for civilian use, we can still trade.” Huang said the price fluctuation of commodities could also potentially boost the trade figure as measured by value. As the United States has searched for ways to punish North Korea for its repeated defiance of international bans on it testing nuclear weapons and launching ballistic missiles, it has repeatedly turned to China. Trump has urged Chinese President Xi Jinping to use China’s economic leverage over North Korea but, after suggesting that Beijing was not acting to punish Pyongyang, Trump last week suggested he’d given up on Xi. “Trade between China and North Korea grew almost 40% in the first quarter,” Trump tweeted the day after North Korea launched its first intercontinental ballistic missile. “So much for China working with us — but we had to give it a try!” (Anna Fifield, “Chinese Imports from North Korea Fall Sharply; A Sign Beijing Is Cracking down?” Washington Post, July 13, 2017)
Efforts to sanction North Korea into submission won’t work because there are too many ways around them, Ri Jong Ho says. He should know. For about three decades, Ri was a top moneymaker for the Kim regime, sending millions of dollars a year back to Pyongyang even as round after round of sanctions was imposed to try to punish North Korea for its nuclear defiance. “We were never in pain or hurting in our trade business because of the sanctions. Instead, we conducted our first nuclear test in 2006,” Ri said in an interview near Tysons Corner. The 59-year-old, whose job had been to raise money for the North Korean regime, and his family live in Northern Virginia, having defected to South Korea at the end of 2014 and moved to the United States last year. “I used to be sanctioned, as a North Korean who led trade at the front line, but I never felt any pain from the sanctions. The sanctions were perfunctory,” Ri said. He described being able to send millions of U.S. dollars to North Korea simply by handing a bag of cash to the captain of a ship leaving from the Chinese port city of Dalian, where he was based, to the North Korean port of Nampo, or by giving it to someone to take on the train across the border. In first the nine months of 2014 — he defected in October that year — Ri said he sent about $10 million to Pyongyang this way. “Unless China, Russia and the United States cooperate fully to sanction North Korea, it will be impossible to hurt them,” Ri said. China’s interest in North Korea is well known, but Russia has dramatically increased the amount of oil it has sent — some reports suggest exports have quadrupled — to North Korea this year. Ri worked for three decades in Office 39, the Workers’ Party operation responsible for raising money for the North Korean leader. The office has long been associated with both legal trade and illicit activity, including counterfeiting dollars and drug smuggling. Ri said he worked as president of a shipping company and was chairman of Korea Kumgang Group, a company that formed a venture with Sam Pa, a Chinese businessman, to start a taxi company in Pyongyang. Ri suppled a photo of him and Pa aboard a jet to Pyongyang. He was awarded the title “hero of labor” in 2002 for his efforts, and said he lived the good life in Pyongyang, with a color TV and a car. “I was very loyal to Kim Jong Il, so I was rewarded by him,” he said. “I was rich.” His last position was running the Dalian branch of Daeheung, a trading company involved in shipping, coal and seafood exports, and oil imports. The company was given targets to meet in terms of profits, he said, declining to go into details. But in 2014, Ri grew increasingly disillusioned after Kim Jong Un suddenly denounced his uncle, Jang Song Thaek, as a “traitor for all ages” and had him executed at the end of 2013. “It’s always useful when a defector, especially one that knows the internal operations of Office 39 — and my assumption is that he knows the external operations too — can help us,” said Anthony Ruggiero, who worked on sanctions at Treasury and is now with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. The United States has been trying to understand how North Korea uses banks in China in particular to finance its activities. “I hope that the Treasury and some other organizations with ‘agency’ at the end of their name are talking to him,” Ruggiero said. Ri said North Korea has repeatedly found ways to circumvent whatever sanctions are imposed on it. “North Korea is a 100 percent state enterprise, so these companies just change their names the day after they’re sanctioned,” he said. “That way the company continues, but with a different name than the one on the sanctions list.” Ri’s Chinese counterparts weren’t bothered, either, he said. “My partners in China also want to make a profit, so they don’t care much about sanctions,” he said. “When the Chinese government orders them to stop, they stop for a few days and then start up again.” (Anna Fifield, “He Ran North Korea’s Secret Money-Making Operation; Now He Lives in Virginia,” Washington Post, July 13, 2017)
7/14/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s “following answer to the question raised by the KCNA on July 14 as regards the fact that the U.S. is attempting to rig up another “sanctions resolution” against the DPRK, branding its successful test-fire of the intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14 as a “global threat”: The U.S., flabbergasted at the DPRK’s success in the test-fire of the intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14, is making frenzied moves at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to fabricate another “resolution on sanctions” tougher than ever against the DPRK. Right after the emergency meeting of the UNSC, the U.S. began letting out a stream of invectives every day against the DPRK’s test-fire while making frantic efforts together with its vassal forces to produce a “press statement” in order to create the atmosphere of sanctions against the DPRK. At the same time, the U.S. is causing a lot of racket circulating the draft of a new “resolution on sanctions” at the UNSC and prattling that it would to put it to the “vote” without any compromise. The racket of anti-DPRK “sanctions resolutions” being made by the U.S. is the manifestation of the heinous intention to evade the responsibility for having driven the DPRK to bolster its nuclear force by pursuing the policy of extreme hostility and nuclear threat against the latter and obliterate its sovereignty and right to existence. The DPRK’s test-fire of the intercontinental ballistic rocket is an exercise of its legitimate right to self-defense to thoroughly eradicate the over half a century long nuclear threat from the U.S. against the DPRK and reliably defend peace and stability of the Korean peninsula and the region at large. The resounding success of the test-fire of the intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14 has fully demonstrated the will and capability of the DPRK to annihilate the U.S. by a single blow to the very heart of its mainland in case it fails to act with discretion. It is time for the U.S. to renew its perspective on the DPRK’s strategic position which has reached the dazzling heights, and to act with prudence. However, it is inviting its ultimate doom by resorting to the sanctions and pressure campaign against the DPRK. It will be a fatal mistake to consider any chance that the DPRK which rose to a dignified nuclear power and an ICBM state would tolerate the reckless “sanctions” racket of the U.S. and other hostile forces. Should the UNSC adopt another “resolution on sanctions”, this will trigger corresponding measures by the DPRK and respond to the “resolution” with its act of justice.” (KCNA, “FM Spokesman on UNSC ‘Resolution on Sanctions,” July 14, 2017)
Bermudez., Eley, Liu and Pabian: “Thermal imagery analysis of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center indicates that from September 2016 through June 2017: The Radiochemical Laboratory operated intermittently and there have apparently been at least two unreported reprocessing campaigns to produce an undetermined amount of plutonium that can further increase North Korea’s nuclear weapons stockpile. This suggests batch rather than continuous processing of spent fuel rods from the 5 MWe Reactor during the period of analysis. Increased thermal activity was noted at the Uranium Enrichment Facility. It is unclear if this was the result of centrifuge operations or maintenance operations. Centrifuge operations would increase the North’s enriched uranium inventory; however, based on imagery alone, it is not possible to conclude whether the plant is producing low or highly enriched uranium. The thermal patterns at the probable Isotope/Tritium Production Facility have remained consistent, suggesting that the facility is not operational, or is operating at a very low level. This means, the facility is likely not producing tritium, which is an essential isotope used in the production of boosted yield nuclear weapons and hydrogen bombs. From December 2016 through January 2017, the thermal pattern over the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) was elevated. While that might indicate that the reactor was operational, the likelihood is low since the pattern does not appear in subsequent imagery over the last six months. It is possible that there are alternative explanations for the elevated pattern, for example, short-term activity at the ELWR such as the heating of pipes to prevent freezing. Regardless, any activity at the ELWR is cause for concern and bears continued monitoring. The 5 MWe Reactor has either been intermittently operating at a low-level or not operating. The notable exception to this was during December 2016 and January 2017 when thermal patterns suggests a higher level of operations. Analysis: While commercial satellite imagery is now widely used to analyze important developments overseas, including in North Korea, thermal imagery can provide additional important insights. Landsat 7 imagery from September 2016 through June 2017 was used for this analysis, although heavy cloud cover precluded the use of imagery from last November and no night-time imagery was available for the entire time period of this study. A total of 19 images are available and of these, 10 were chosen with approximately one-month time intervals between them to provide a consistent periodicity for the analysis. Seven images were deemed too cloudy for analysis and thus weren’t considered. Developments noted at key Yongbyon installations were as follows: Examination of the thermal patterns associated with the Radiochemical Laboratory (reprocessing facility) show significant deviations from month to month. Concentrated heat patterns were observed with stronger temperature differences from the surrounding area between September to October of last year. The thermal patterns then returned to lower levels until March 2017, when a distinct increase in thermal activity is observed that has continued through last month. These intermittent surges in thermal activity suggest North Korea has conducted batch rather than continuous processing of spent fuel rods from the 5 MWe Reactor. It is typical to allow the spent fuel rods to rest for a while in cooling ponds to both cool and allow less stable plutonium isotopes (PU-238, etc.) to bleed off. These reprocessing campaigns do not necessarily occur immediately after spent fuel rods are removed from the 5 MWe reactor. The June 2017 thermal activity coincides with an increase in activity noted in a March 2017 analysis based upon natural color imagery. The thermal patterns at the Uranium Enrichment Facility were elevated during September and October 2016, then decreased in November 2016 and remained low until March 2017 when it increased slightly. It is unclear if the period of elevated activity from September through November was related to centrifuge operations or the maintenance activity that was observed during this period. The same elevated thermal patterns over the 5 MWe Reactor observed in imagery during December 2016 and January 2017 also extended over the area of the ELWR. This was likely the result of steam being released into the air when the turbines adjacent to the 5 MWe Reactor were being run, operation of the 5 MWe Reactor itself, mid-winter heating of both structures, prevailing weather patterns, or some combination of the above. We cannot completely, however, eliminate the possibility that this elevated thermal pattern was the result of short-term activity at the ELWR itself—for example, heating the structure to prevent pipes from freezing, allowing ongoing internal construction work, or pre-startup testing. It is important to note that no other significant patterns of thermal activity were observed over the ELWR throughout the study period. Importantly, the ELWR did not operate at all from February through June 2017. Any activity at the ELWR is cause for concern and its operational status bears continued monitoring as it would be an indicator of North Korean ongoing intentions and capabilities. The thermal patterns observed at the 5 MWe Reactor remain relatively consistent with those observed in the previous report indicating either intermittent low-level or no operation of the reactor. There was a notable deviation in the December 2016 and January 2017 images, suggesting a period of higher level reactor operation that lends support to a previous analysis based upon natural color imagery. The thermal patterns at the probable Isotope/Tritium Production Facility have remained consistently low throughout the period under study, suggesting that the facility is not operational, or is operating at a very low level. (Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Mike Eley, Jack Liu and Frank V. Pabian, “North Korea’s Yongbyon Facility: Probable Production of Additional Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons,” 38North, July 14, 2017)
North Korea has little the world wants. But it does have iron. Despite the international opprobrium over its nuclear ambitions, North Korea has managed to take advantage of a loophole in United Nations sanctions by increasing its exports of iron ore. The key buyer, as usual, is China. In global terms, the dollar figure is small: North Korea exported an estimated $74 million of iron ore and concentrates to China during the first five months of 2017. Still, that’s real money for the economically isolated country — which shares a land border with China — and represents a 212 percent increase from the year before, according to data from the Korea International Trade Association. North Korean iron tends to be of higher quality than the ore found in China, according to Sabrin Chowdhury, a commodities analyst with BMI Research in Singapore. That makes it attractive to some state-owned Chinese steelmakers looking to reduce costs, she said. “There is genuine demand for North Korean iron ore,” said Chowdhury. North Korea is a minor player compared with suppliers like Australia and Brazil. China imported about 445 million metric tons of iron ore in the first five months of 2017, according to Bloomberg Intelligence, of which just 1.1 million metric tons came from North Korea. Two-way trade between China and North Korea rose 10.5 percent to $2.55 billion in the first half of 2017, according to data released by the Chinese government on Thursday. China’s exports to North Korea rose 29 percent from the same period in 2016, General Administration of Customs spokesman Huang Songping said at a briefing in Beijing. Imports from North Korea fell 13 percent. China has seriously carried out United Nations sanctions on North Korea, said Huang. Chinese exports to the North were mainly consumer goods such as textiles, which aren’t on the list of sanctioned items, the spokesman said. For the Chinese government, purchases of iron ore provide a way to support the regime of Kim Jong Un now that sanctions more strictly cover North Korean coal. The Security Council approved a resolution in November that exempted transactions in iron and iron ore intended “exclusively for livelihood purposes.” The volume of Chinese imports of North Korean iron ore nearly doubled in the first five months of 2017 compared to the same period last year, according to Bloomberg Intelligence. “According to UN Security Council resolution 2321, iron and iron core imported from DPRK for the purpose of people’s livelihood, and not for the purpose of generating profits for its nuclear program, is not on the sanctions list. The Chinese side will continue to comprehensively, accurately, earnestly and strictly comply with UNSC resolutions,” ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said in a briefing in Beijing. In the 1980s and 1990s, North Korea was a major supplier of iron ore to Chinese steelmakers, according to Philip Kirchlechner, director of Iron Ore Research Pty in Perth. Since then, the country has fallen far behind industry leaders. Exports to China have moved within a relatively narrow range, reaching 3 million metric tons in 2013 and falling to 1.6 million tons last year. “There hasn’t been a dramatic change in volume,” said Kirchlechner. “In terms of economic significance today, it’s been reduced to nothing.”
While a further tightening of U.N. sanctions could jeopardize that trade, for now the North Koreans stand to benefit as Chinese state-owned enterprises saddled with debts look for inexpensive raw materials. Given their proximity to that market, North Koreans can make money without having to be as efficient as industry leaders, said BMI’s Chowdhury. “Even if their cost is double that of Australia’s,” said Chowdhury, “they’re still making a profit.” (Bruce Einhorn and Jiyeun Lee, “For North Korea This Element Matters, and It’s Not Uranium,” Bloomberg, July 14, 2017)
7/17/17:
South Korea proposed holding inter-Korean military talks on July 21 to ease tensions along the border, South Korean Vice Defense Minister Suh Choo Suk said. In the proposal, South Korea wants to have the meeting at Tongilgak, a North Korean building in the truce village of Panmunjeom, Suh said in a press briefing. He said South Korea wants the meeting to help halt “all acts of hostility” near the Military Demarcation Line that bisects the two Koreas. The South Korean government separately proposed reopening Red Cross talks to discuss ways to resume family reunions. The South’s Red Cross proposed holding the talks on August 1 at the Peace House, a Panmunjeom building controlled by the South. “We anticipate the North’s side making a positive response” to the proposal, Suh said. If North Korea accepts the South’s offer for the military talks, it would be the first official governmental talks between the two Koreas since vice ministerial talks were held in December 2015. The temporary reunions of families that remain separated since the end of the Korean War were last held in October 2015. Later today, South Korean Unification Minister Cho Myong Gyon urged North Korea to accept the South Korean offer for talks. “If the South and the North sit down face to face, matters of mutual interest could be discussed in a candid manner,” Cho told reporters. Cho said South Korea does not have a hostile policy against North Korea and does not seek North Korea’s collapse or unification through absorption. South Korea’s policy is consistently centered on making the Korean Peninsula free from the threats of nuclear weapons and war, he said. “We want to cooperate with the international community in opening up a more bright future with North Korea if North Korea chooses to take a right path,” Cho said. (Kyodo, “S. Korea Proposes Military Talks with N. Korea on Friday,” July 17, 2017) Suh Choo-suk, South Korea’s vice defense minister, said in a statement that the military talks would be aimed at ceasing all “acts of hostility” near the border line, but did not specify any agenda items nor mention who from South Korea would take part. Cho Myoung-gyon, head of the Unification Ministry, which handles inter-Korean relations, later today said in a press briefing that South Korea had left enough wiggle room for the North, adding that the local government would flesh things out once Pyongyang reacts. Asked whether Seoul was open to talks on halting joint military drills with the United States, which Pyongyang has persistently demanded in the past, Cho said only that the two Koreas would “freely discuss matters of mutual interest.” Cho added, “In principle, we haven’t changed our basic stance that we would use whatever method we have to press North Korea towards denuclearization, including sanctions [against the regime] when the North carries out a nuclear or missile provocation, and dialogue.” Cho added that the South did not engage in any back-channel dialogue with the North before making the proposals. When asked whether Seoul consulted with Washington, Cho replied that the countries “mutually cooperated” on the matter. The unification minister refused to answer whether Seoul was considering any incentives for North Korea if it accepts, saying, “It’s not right to make any predictions on such matters at this point.” On the separate offer to hold family reunions, the Korean Red Cross asked the North to hold relevant talks on August 1 at the Peace House, a South Korea-controlled building in the truce village, known as the equivalent to North Korea’s Tongilgak. The group proposed the family reunion to be held on October 4, in time for the Chuseok holiday, Korea’s harvest festival. Three people, including the general secretary of the Korean Red Cross, would attend the Aug. 1 discussions if they are given the green light, the group said in its statement. Without directly mentioning the proposals, Rodong Sinmun said today that Moon’s Berlin speech was “fortunate” in that it pledged to respect and implement the June 15, 2000, inter-Korean joint declaration of peace and prosperity, but that it contained “ill intention.” Referring to Moon as the “chief executive of South Korea,” without directly mentioning his real name, the commentary read that his speech meant to “escalate confrontation with the compatriots in the North and stifle them with the backing of outsiders,” and that it was “characterized by nonsensical sophism putting a brake on the efforts” for achieving inter-Korean peace and repairing bilateral relations. North Korea once again urged Seoul to ditch its pro-U.S. stance, saying it was the “starting point” of improved relations with the regime. “South Korean authorities should not persistently depend on outsiders…but opt for improving the North-South relations and achieving independent reunification by pooling efforts with the compatriots in the North.” (Lee Sung-eun, “South Asks North to Hold Military Talks This Week,” JoongAng Ilbo, July 17, 2017)
The Trump administration fell short of showcasing support for Seoul‘s overture, reflecting North Korea’s evolving threats following its recent test of an intercontinental ballistic missile and refusal to even discuss denuclearization. “Well, obviously those comments came out of the Republic of Korea and I would refer you back to them,” White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer said at a briefing in Washington, stressing that the current conditions for talks with the North remain inadequate. “That being said, I think the president has made clear in the past with respect that any type of conditions that would have to be met are clearly far away from where we are now.” Seoul’s Foreign Ministry said it has provided a sufficient explanation to the US before the announcement, and will continue working on the issues based on a “clear and realistic” understanding of Pyongyang’s nuclear threats, Foreign Ministry spokesman Cho June-hyuck said Tuesday. “We provided an explanation of our proposal (to the North) to the US and other nations before the announcement. …Now we are currently waiting for the North’s response,” Cho said.
The sides are also expected to further discuss the matter, with Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha scheduled to attend the ASEAN Regional Forum early August in Manila and meet her key counterparts. A Unification Ministry official also said the allies are on the same page, noting yesterday’s offer is not an indication that the conditions for full-fledged dialogue have been met and is merely an attempt to host “the early stages of talks.” “There is ‘no big gap’ between the White House’s statement (on the inter-Korean talk proposals) and our stance,” the official told reporters. Experts are saying that Spicer’s reaction embodies the discomfort the US holds over South Korea’s decision. “Spicer’s reaction reflects the US’ discomfort over South Korea’s decision to offer the military talk to the North during a diplomatically sensitive time,” Choi Kang, vice president for research at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, told Korea Herald. “This may sour the Seoul-Washington relationship, but it’s more complicated than it seems because the allies need to display a tight bilateral bond in order to stop North Korea from getting the better side of the bargain.” Japan, for its part, struck a more downbeat tone, expressing open disagreement toward the Moon administration’s offer. “This is a time for pressure,” said Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio told reporters in New York yesterday, according to Kyodo. “We will closely work with the international community including South Korea in making North Korea take certain steps towards solving several issues.” Maruyama Norio. Japan’s foreign ministry spokesperson who accompanied Kishida in New York echoed the minister’s remark saying that the pressure must come before conducting “a serious dialogue.” (Jung Min-kyung, “U.S. Wary over Seoul’s Proposal of Talks with N.K.,” Korea Herald, July 18, 2017) The White House and State Department showed a subtle difference in their responses to Seoul‘s July 17 proposal of inter-Korean military talks and Red Cross talks toward divided family reunions. When asked about Trump’s response at a regular briefing the same day, White House spokesperson Sean Spicer replied, “Obviously those comments came out of the Republic of Korea and I would refer you back to them.” He went on, “That being said, I think the President has made clear in the past with respect that any type of conditions that would have to be met [by North Korea for dialogue to take place] are clearly far away from where we are now.” When asked by Hankyore on July 17 for the US position on the South Korean proposal, State Department East Asia-Pacific spokesperson Katina Adams curtly suggested the reporter “ask the South Korean government.” A diplomatic source in Washington interpreted this as a “neutral expression,” indicating neither active support and welcoming nor opposition. A joint statement agreed upon on June 30 by South Korean President Moon Jae-in and President Donald Trump indicated that Trump “expressed support for President Moon’s aspiration to restart inter-Korean dialogue on certain issues, including humanitarian affairs.” The statement also said Trump “supported the ROK’s leading role in fostering an environment for peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.” The State Department‘s determination appeared to be that Seoul’s proposal was not a departure from this agreement in the broader scheme of things. Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio also responded to questions from reporters about Seoul‘s proposal the same day during his visit to New York. “This is the time to apply pressure,” Kyodo reported Kishida as saying. (Yi Yong-in, “White House and State Department with Subtly Different Responses to Inter-Korean Dialogue Overture,” Hankyore, July 19, 2017)
7/18/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s answer to the question raised by the “as regards the fact that the U.S. made an apology and returned the diplomatic package to the DPRK which it had seized from a DPRK delegation in New York: As reported, on June 16, the delegation of the DPRK which was en route home after attending the Conference of States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was literally mugged at the John F. Kennedy International Airport by the U.S. authorities that forcibly took away a diplomatic package from the delegation in an illegal and heinous act of provocation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK termed this mugging by the U.S. an intolerable act of infringement upon the sovereignty of the DPRK and a malicious provocation, and condemned it in the strongest terms while strongly demanding an explanation and an official apology from the U.S. government. At the meeting of the UN Committee on Relations with Host Country, convened at the request of the permanent mission of the DPRK to the UN, the Cyprian representative chairing the committee and other representatives from many countries attending the session including China, Russia, Cuba and Syria acknowledged the mugging of the diplomatic package as a grave infringement upon the sovereignty of a UN member state which can never be tolerated. The U.S. Department of State made an official apology to the DPRK on behalf of the U.S. government acknowledging that its security officials concerned made a mistake and expressed its hope that the DPRK would understand that the mistake was due to the security officials being oversensitive amid the deteriorating security situation in the U.S. The U.S. eventually returned the diplomatic package and all its contents to the DPRK. The U.S. should learn a due lesson from the incident and never again commit such an act of infringing the sovereignty of other countries, in flagrant violation of the universally recognized international norms and regulations.” (KCNA, “FM Spokesman on U.S. Return of DPRK’s Diplomatic Package,” July 18, 2017)
Efforts to hold the Kim regime accountable for decades of brutality against the North Korean people have so far amounted to little, but that isn’t stopping human rights activists from trying to document the abuses. The latest effort is an ambitious project by the Seoul-based Transitional Justice Working Group that aims to map sites of mass killings and mass burials in North Korea so that — one day — evidence can be collected and the regime can be held responsible. “Victim testimony was often given a limited place in previous hearings, like those on the former Yugoslavia and on the Holocaust,” said Sarah Son, one of the authors of the mapping report, which will be published tomorrow. “But location-based data provides a bigger picture on patterns of abuse within a country.” The research was backed by the National Endowment for Democracy, which seeks to bolster civil society and democratic institutions around the world and is financed by the U.S. Congress. The working group interviewed 375 defectors from North Korea over the past two years. They were shown maps of their home towns and asked to identify places where abuses occurred. The researchers say they have been able to pinpoint 47 sites where bodies were buried or dumped, and hundreds more that might yield documentary evidence in the future. “People who have done this kind of work in Croatia or Southeast Asia keep telling us we can’t be too prepared for what might happen in the future,” she said. The report says that the mapping project could contribute to “the collective effort to support the push for accountability, as well as . . . future efforts to institute a process of transitional justice following a change in the political conditions in North Korea.” “The commission of inquiry report was not the end, it was just the start,” said Oh Se-hyek, a North Korean defector and another of the report’s authors. “We must continue that work.” The group asked North Korean defectors to point out places in their home towns where they had directly seen or heard executions or mass burials taking place, or where they had heard from a witness of such an event happening. By cross-referencing the places the defectors identified, the group came up with 47 sites where forensic evidence might be collected in the future, and sites such as police stations or security offices where documents might be found. Most of the sites were in North Hamgyong, a province that shares a long border with China. This province is the source of most defectors from North Korea because of the ease in crossing into China from there and because the residents — whose loyalty Pyongyang considers suspect — are most neglected by the regime. Some interviewed defectors reported seeing or hearing about mass executions by hanging or shooting. Others described burial sites on or near the grounds of prison camps, or on mountainsides near police and state security buildings. Former prisoners described seeing or hearing of places where bodies were incinerated. One former political prisoner reported having seen a list of more than 100 inmates who had been executed in secret over the course of a year, in 1999. The list was held by the state security agency and the local police office operating within the camp, the former prisoner said. North Korea, like other authoritarian regimes, keeps systematic records, so securing these documents could be important for future trials, just as Stasi documents were important after the collapse of East Germany, the report’s authors wrote. “We aim to record the locations of these sites for future safeguarding of documents.”
The group did not disclose the locations of the burial sites, saying it feared that the North Korean regime would seek to destroy any evidence if it knew certain sites had been identified. Sandra Fahy, an expert on North Korean human rights who teaches at Sophia University in Tokyo, said that the report was an “important and critical step in a long process of keeping track of North Korea’s atrocities.” “Its impact could be two-fold,” she said. “First, it will further the process of accountability and recordkeeping — with a move toward justice for victims and family members — in the future.” But, Fahy said, it could also inspire North Korean officials to take more precautions in killing and disposing of victims. “North Korea does keep track and respond domestically to the pressures of the international community, but not always in ways we might like,” Fahy said. (Anna Fifield, “Where Are the Bodies Buried in North Korea? Investigators Try to Prepare for Future Trials,” Washington Post, July 18, 2017)
Kim Jung-un’s June 2015 visit to a pesticide facility—Pyongyang’s Bio-technical Institute—rekindled long-standing suspicions that North Korea might be developing bioweapons. Photos of the tour, shown on North Korean television, showed a smiling Kim. He posed with military officers and personnel in lab coats in front of apparently new buildings, with sparkling laboratories and shiny equipment. The tour took place amid tensions with the United States—and soon after a US military laboratory accidentally shipped live anthrax to a US airbase in South Korea, an accident that Pyongyang translated as an act of aggression. These circumstances contributed to a belief that the visit to the pesticide facility was designed to send a message to the United States: that North Korea has an active bioweapons program. Very little is known for sure about North Korea’s alleged bioweapons program. Much of the available data is drawn from scant intelligence estimates issued by the US, Russian, and South Korean governments, most of these estimates over a decade old. Additional information can be found in the media and from other independent sources, but such information cannot be corroborated and some of it is of questionable reliability. Most government sources seem to agree that North Korea’s interest in biological weapons started in the 1960s, in the same era when Pyongyang launched its chemical weapons effort. On December 25, 1961, President Kim Il-sung issued a “Declaration of Chemicalization,” ordering the military to develop chemical weapons. Around the same time, he reportedly instructed the Academy of Defense Sciences to investigate biological weapons. According to South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, North Korea established a testing center at the academy in the 1960s, and reportedly acquired strains of the causative agents of anthrax, plague, and cholera from an unidentified source in Japan in 1968. The program’s research and production infrastructure is difficult to discern with any precision. The South Korean government estimates that 10 facilities might be involved in bioweapons activities—seven research centers and three production facilities. Four facilities are often mentioned in academic publications and other media sources as carrying out activities dedicated to biological weapons (with the South Korean government sometimes cited as a source): the Germ Research Institute, established in the 1970s; as well as the Central Biological Research Institute, the military biodefense unit, and the No. 5 Factory (sometimes referred to as the February 25 Factory, or No. 25 factory), all created in the 1980s. South Korean and Japanese media outlets list up to a dozen other dual-use and medical facilities that are potentially connected to the program, but do not provide clear evidence of bioweapons activities at these facilities. Government and open-source documents are also decidedly vague about the activities of the program and the agents under study. Several sources claim that North Korean bioweapons research has focused on 13 agents, including the usual suspects: anthrax, plague, botulinum toxin, and hemorrhagic fevers (link in Korean). In the 1990s, US intelligence suspected that North Korea was working on a smallpox weapon based on samples obtained from the Soviet Union in the 1980s. But these claims have not been substantiated. In addition, several defectors have made allegations of human testing at military and medical institutions. None of these claims has been confirmed. Furthermore, some of the defectors later acknowledged that they had no first-hand knowledge of bioweapons activities. Experience shows that one always needs to be cautious about defector testimony. The evolution and current status of the North Korean program are equally uncertain—government estimates generally provide no details on these issues, or on the possible achievements of a bioweapons program. For example, US assessments are consistently vague and continually changing. While some US estimates have taken the view that North Korea is engaged in research and development but that the country has not yet weaponized bio-agents or produced bioweapons, others state that North Korea may already possess ready-to-use biological weapons. A 1997 CIA assessment indicated that North Korea was “capable of supporting a limited [biological weapons] effort.” Defense Department assessments of the late 1990s and early 2000s concurred, describing North Korea’s bioweapons infrastructure as “rudimentary” and capable of producing “limited quantities” of bio-agents. Starting in 2000, CIA estimates began to change, placing more emphasis on North Korea’s production capabilities and indicating that “North Korea [was] capable of producing and delivering via munitions a wide variety of chemical and biological agents,” and “possibly [had] biological weapons ready to use.” In 2002, State Department official John Bolton dialed up the threat dramatically, declaring during a meeting of the Korean-American Association in Seoul that the North “has one of the most robust offensive bioweapons programs on Earth … and … has developed and produced, and may have weaponized, [biological weapons] agents… .” He added that “North Korea likely has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents within weeks of a decision to do so.” It is worth noting that in 2002 John Bolton also accused Cuba of having a biological weapons program. His claims were soon contradicted by US intelligence. A 2011 report by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence sharply deflated the North Korean threat, merely stating that North Korea has “a biotechnology infrastructure that could support the production of various [biological weapons] agents” and that the country could use its conventional munitions production infrastructure to weaponize bio-agents. More recent reports issued by the office provide no assessment of a potential bioweapons program in North Korea. It remains to be seen whether this indicates the absence of a bioweapons program or the absence of evidence to substantiate suspicions. In a rare assessment made public in 1993, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service seemed to agree with pre-2000 US assessments that North Korea’s biological activities were of a defensive nature. The report indicated that various research institutes, universities, and medical institutions were engaged in “applied military-biological research” and that “bio-agents are being tested on the island territories belonging to the DPRK.” The report, however, noted that “there is no evidence of offensive bioweapons activities” (link in Russian). A 2005 report by the Swedish Defense Research Agency came to the same conclusion, indicating that no evidence suggested a large-scale bioweapons program with dedicated production facilities in North Korea. South Korea, on the other hand, has consistently claimed that the North Korean bioweapons program has advanced to the production phase—but official reports do not explicitly state that North Korea has produced or stockpiled bioweapons. Reports published by South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense generally state that Pyongyang has been producing biological agents since the 1980s, but the reports are more cautious about the North’s weaponization capabilities, indicating that North Korea is “likely capable” or is “suspected” of being able to produce bioweapons including anthrax, plague, and smallpox. But like the United States, Seoul provides few details and little evidence to support its assessments. It is not surprising that Kim Jung-un’s visit to a pesticide facility resulted in alarming analyses—government threat assessments are inconsistent and vague, international access to North Korea is extremely limited, and fear about bioterrorism has been elevated since 9/11 and the US anthrax-letter episode. But recent history demonstrates that access to relevant material and equipment is hardly a guarantee of a successful bioweapons program. When threat assessments are made solely on the basis of the equipment to which nations have gained access, grossly exaggerated evaluations of capabilities are possible—just witness Libya and Iraq’s nuclear and biological weapons programs. Images of dual-use equipment at the pesticide facility do not reveal anything about the activities occurring there. One can’t assess the activities occurring at the site without knowing whether personnel can actually use the dual-use equipment and adapt its technology to bioweapons development. Iraq, for example, acquired drying equipment necessary for bioweapons development but was not able to use it for lack of expertise. Also, claims that because the pesticide facility might produce Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), and that therefore it can produce anthrax, are shortsighted at best. Bt has indeed been used as a simulant for anthrax, but individuals who have expertise working with Bt cannot automatically produce an anthrax weapon. As is known from the Soviet bioweapons program, scientific expertise in the civilian field does not necessarily translate into expertise in the weapons field. For example, when the Soviet research facility “Vector” was created in the 1970s, its staff of virology experts (including smallpox experts) all came from the university system and had no weapons expertise. Five years of experimentation and testing—and the help of experienced bioweapons scientists from another facility—were required for the university experts to master the specialized bioweapons knowledge needed to succeed. Further, several pieces of laboratory equipment that could be used in a bioweapons program, such as the autoclave shown in the North Korean television report about Kim Jong-un’s visit to the pesticide facility, require electricity. If the power supply at the facility is intermittent—and power in North Korea is indeed intermittent—it is unlikely that such devices can be used effectively. Finally, to ascertain the existence of bioweapons activity, one needs to visit a site and determine whether it displays hallmarks or signatures of bioweapons infrastructure or activity. Analyses of past state and terrorist bioweapons programs indicate that the continuity and stability of scientific and production work must be ensured over a long period of time to allow scientists and technicians to accumulate the knowledge necessary for development of a working bioweapon. In addition, because bioweapons are based on fragile microorganisms that are sensitive to their handling and to environmental conditions, the development stages of bioweapons are highly interdependent—a stage cannot occur until the previous stage has been successfully completed. This calls for an organizational structure that carefully coordinates and synchronizes the work of the teams involved. It also requires a management model that allows scientists to communicate freely, share information, and openly acknowledge failures in order to learn from them. When these conditions are not met, programs face steeper learning curves, long delays in project development, and numerous failures. Very few of the known state bioweapons programs have produced a working weapon, and many have failed despite having access to the required material and financial resources. In North Korea’s case, the data available from open sources and government assessments raise many questions about the country’s ability to produce a working bioweapon. The North Korean bioweapons program is suspected of having been launched in the 1960s, with new infrastructure built in the 1970s and 1980s. But was this a continuous program—or a series of separate and independent programs? Did the team that reportedly started to investigate bioweapons with strains obtained from Japan in 1968 continue its involvement in the 1970s and 1980s when new facilities were established, or did the work switch to new teams at those facilities? Did the original teams transfer their expertise and accumulated knowledge to the new teams? What was the knowledge base of both teams when they started, and did they have expertise working with the agents selected for work? Answers to these questions could provide important clues about the continuity and speed of the program and about the personnel’s ability to accumulate knowledge and make progress. If the North Korean program has faced similar issues, it is unlikely that it has made substantial progress over the past 30 years. Another issue that requires investigation is the impact of North Korea’s economic circumstances on a potential bioweapons program. Some would argue that the defense sector gets priority in allocation of resources and therefore is shielded from incessant economic crises. But this is a faulty assumption. The Soviet Union also had a planned economy, with centralized allocation of resources and a defense sector that received priority status. Yet the defense complex could not escape the shortages that plagued the Soviet system. For example, bioweapons facilities routinely lacked the required equipment or reagent necessary for their work. The output objectives set by central authorities did not always take into account scientific realities, nor did they factor in the difficulties that the economic system itself imposed on obtaining the required technical and human resources. As a result, scientists sometimes had to stop work in order to independently procure material and equipment that they could not get through official procurement routes, creating substantial delays in bioweapons development. And when they failed to meet centrally set objectives, they either lied about the outcome of their work or produced bad science. Thus, despite its priority status, the Soviet bioweapons program suffered due to an inefficient economic system, and its achievements were much reduced as a result. It is likely that North Korean facilities suffer from much greater challenges: While the Soviet economy could obtain some resources from overseas and send some personnel to learn new techniques in the West, North Korea is a closed country due both to its own system and to international sanctions. Pyongyang’s bioweapons program is unlikely to benefit from outside expertise. North Korea could in theory obtain missing equipment or material illegally—the country is adept at establishing illicit procurement networks. But in the bioweapons field, illicit procurement can harm scientific work, especially when laboratory equipment or material is obtained from different suppliers. For example, a change in the quality or characteristics of reagents can doom an experiment because unknown variables can be introduced. Furthermore, North Korea experiences regular power outages, and the quality of its water is notoriously bad. These factors too can affect scientific work. Power outages can cause fragile microorganisms to die due to improper storage or working conditions—and if outages occur during production, they can compromise weeks, or possibly months, of work. North Korea’s unsanitary water might also harm experiments by introducing foreign organisms that could contaminate a batch of bio-agents. Such challenges ultimately create additional disruptions in scientific work and lengthen the time required to obtain positive results. Understanding Pyongyang’s alleged bioweapons efforts also requires a good understanding of the status of natural and medical science in North Korea. Without a solid foundation in natural and medical sciences, a bioweapons program cannot succeed. When Soviet authorities issued a decree to expand the country’s bioweapons program in the early 1970s, they had to face the reality that Soviet science had fallen behind and needed modernization. Years of Stalin’s purges, along with the policy of Lysenkoism—which negated the role of genetics in science—had resulted in the elimination of a whole generation of competent scientists. Some of them had been at the forefront of bioweapons development, but now they were replaced with a new generation of scientists educated in flawed science. It took the Soviet Union close to a decade to catch up and create the modern infrastructure needed to meet the bioweapons challenge. The Soviet Union procured some needed equipment overseas and sent some of its scientists for training in Western laboratories. Even so, Soviet scientists could not reach the objectives set by central authorities to create new types of bioweapons. Decades of economic sanctions, and the desperate state of North Korea’s economy and society, have undoubtedly had an effect on the scientific sector. Reports about the nation’s health care system are revealing: Hospitals are reportedly unable to procure medication for patients and are otherwise poorly equipped. If North Korean natural science is in as bad a state as the medical sector, it is likely that North Korea does not have the knowledge base required to support bioweapons development. A poor public health system also places a country at risk if an accident should occur in a bioweapons facility. And such an accident would ensure international detection of the program. One can develop a more accurate assessment of a country’s bioweapons capabilities, and the speed of its progress, by gathering data about the scientific, economic, political, and social conditions in which scientific work occurs than by relying solely on isolated pieces of information about equipment acquisition. Reaching an evidence-based assessment is all the more important in North Korea’s case because the regime often builds Potemkin villages for internal and external consumption. From fake missiles displayed during military parades to malls filled with modern electronics and clothes that are only for show and not for sale, to the incessant barrage of reports on North Korean television showing a smiling Kim Jong-un visiting technology fairs or plants that produce food products, the regime aims to project an image of strength and abundance both to the outside world and to its starving population. The visit to the pesticide facility might well have been another Potemkin exercise. It is quite possible that North Korea has engaged in exploratory bioweapons research, but it is unlikely that the country has been able to establish the conditions required to achieve a working bioweapon. The poor state of North Korea’s medical and (most probably) science sector implies that the country does not have a sufficient knowledge base to research, design, produce, and dry bio-agents, not to mention weaponize them. The deficiencies of North Korea’s economic system, along with the weight of decades of international sanctions, cast doubt on the country’s ability to acquire but also to ensure a continuous supply of equipment and material needed in bioweapons work. Little is known about the organization of scientific work in North Korea, but it is more than likely that science is managed in an autocratic manner, and that subordinates do not challenge orders from higher-ups or openly report failures, particularly if they risk sanctions for doing so. All this casts doubt on the ability of scientists and technicians to learn from each other, accumulate knowledge, and acquire outside expertise when needed—traits that have been a hallmark of past successful bioweapons programs. Without a solid knowledge base and a continuous and stable work environment and infrastructure, scientists are less likely to overcome the challenges of working with fragile, living microorganisms. One might ask why, if North Korea has been able to produce a nuclear weapon in the same adverse conditions, it shouldn’t also be successful in the bioweapons field. The answer lies in the decidedly different nature of bio-agents and nuclear weapons. Unlike nuclear material, living microorganisms are fragile and unpredictable. They are more sensitive than nuclear material to changes in work conditions, equipment, laboratory materials, and other disruptions. A country that cannot ensure a stable and continuous work environment is unlikely to operate a successful bioweapons program. More research is needed to characterize North Korea’s political, economic, organizational, and managerial circumstances, and probe the effects of these circumstances on bioweapons work. But if the United States and the international community are serious about preventing the emergence of a North Korean bioweapons threat, they might seek to forestall the threat by means of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). North Korea has been a party to the convention since 1987—but the BTWC lacks a verification mechanism. If a verification regime for the treaty were instituted, the United States could not only obtain more accurate data about the North’s program but, more importantly, promote routine inspections that would prevent progress in Pyongyang’s bioweapons development. Conducting international inspections, or merely threatening to do so, has proved to be an effective strategy in creating disruptions and delays in past biological weapons programs, including in the Soviet Union and Iraq, and even in the program of the terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo. (Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, “Potemkin or Real: North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 18, 2017)
Kim, Phillipp, and Chung: “Limited information on North Korea’s BW program leads to a low threat perception that may undermine preparation and response efforts. Nonetheless, preparation against BW is urgent and necessary, which will also serve as defense against naturally occurring epidemics that increasingly threaten the 21st century. Military and public health sectors should cooperate to urgently prepare for “dual-response” mechanisms. Components of a well-established “dual-response” program should include the best possible threat assessment by military and intelligence communities, a strong public health detection and response system, a well-coordinated crisis communication strategy among multiple stakeholders, and compliance from an informed public. …South Korean sources report that North Korea established a biological weapons program under Kim Il-Sung. During the Korean War (1950-1953), North Korea’s population experienced outbreaks of cholera, typhus, typhoid, and smallpox, which North Korea falsely attributed to biological weapons attacks by the United States. This provided an impetus for creating its own BW program. The exact timeline is unclear. According to recent defector Tae Young-Ho, a former North Korean diplomat, North Korea’s chemical and biological weapons program started in the early 1960s, and according to a South Korean Defense White Paper, North Korea began weaponizing biological agents in the 1980s. Furthermore, it is known that North Korea’s soldiers are vaccinated against smallpox, suggesting either an interest in an offensive BW program or a biodefense precaution. Unlike its current rhetoric regarding its nuclear program, however, North Korea has at times adamantly denied the existence of its BW program. In 2005, in response to a U.S. State Department report to Congress alluding to North Korea’s BW development, North Korea stated through their state newspaper Rodong Sinmun that it “does not possess any biological weapon and has been implementing the Biological Weapons Convention with good will.” North Korea has even attempted to reverse the narrative around its BW program by falsely claiming that the United States is willing to engage in biological warfare against North Korea as it did in the Korean War. In 2015, when U.S. forces accidentally brought live Bacillus anthracis test samples and Yersinia pestis samples to the Osan Air Force base in South Korea, North Korea immediately issued a statement denying the existence of its BW program and accused the United States of targeting North Korea with a biological weapons attack. It even called on the UN Security Council to investigate the United States. The current status and the future of North Korea’s BW program remain unclear. Sources from the 1990s claim that North Korea intends to develop an offensive BW program, but recent official statements from North Korea do not support this claim. Regardless, it is certain from government statements, defector testimonies, and circumstantial evidence such as the smallpox vaccination of North Korean soldiers that at least in the past, North Korea has held an interest in developing biological weapons. Accurately assessing North Korea’s BW capability is challenging without access to classified intelligence. The ROK Ministry of National Defense has disclosed partial intelligence reports via White Papers, reports, and testimonies at the request of the South Korean legislature. These reports, in addition to several sources from the United States, South Korea, and the former Soviet Union, indicate that North Korea has the capability to cultivate pathogens for BW purposes and weaponize them. However, language describing North Korea’s BW program has been softened in some U.S. assessments. With a healthy grain of skepticism, a reasonable assessment is that North Korea has the capability to cultivate and produce biological weapons. North Korea is assumed to have several pathogens in possession. The 2000 ROK Defense White Paper mentions anthrax and smallpox most frequently. Since 2012, the plague (Yersinia pestis) and others have been on the list as well. Agents mentioned in the White Papers, however, are not exhaustive. More information on North Korea’s BW has been disclosed through other occasions, which maps out 13 agents: Bacillus anthracis (Anthrax), Clostridium botulinum (Botulism), Vibrio cholerae (Cholera), Bunyaviridae hantavirus (Korean Hemorrhagic Fever), Yersinia pestis (Plague), Variola (Smallpox), Salmonella typhi (Typhoid Fever), Coquillettidia fuscopennata (Yellow Fever), Shigella (Dysentery), Brucella (Brucellosis), Staphylococcus aureus (Staph), Rickettsia prowazekii (Typhus Fever), and T-2 mycotoxin (Alimentary Toxic Aleukia). In addition to possessing these agents, the Ministry of National Defense assessed that North Korea may even have capabilities to weaponize them. …
North Korea’s BW capability is difficult to verify in part due to the dual-use nature of equipment and facilities used for culturing BWs. As seen in the cases of Iraq’s Al Hakam Factory and the Soviet Union’s ‘Progress Scientific and Production Association’ in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, bio-pesticide plants can be covers for bioweapons production. Here we evaluate the possibility of dual-use in North Korea. Since his inauguration, Kim Jong-Un has clearly stated the importance of
agricultural reform as “the frontline of socialism.” A large aspect of this reform is to increase pesticide production. While most pesticides worldwide are chemical, North Korea’s interest in organic, biological pesticides has increased. Some point out that this shift from chemical to bio-pesticides could signal an expansion of North Korea’s BW program, though it could simply be a consistent part of Kim Jong-Un’s priority to enhance agricultural productivity. In March 2017, according to the Rodong Sinmun, North Korea built an organic fertilizer production complex that covers “thousands of square meters” in Gangnamgun, Pyongyang that is claimed to be capable of producing thousands of tons of organic fertilizers. North Korea intends to continue exponential increase in bio-pesticide production to achieve Kim Jong-Un’s goal of producing “Juche fertilizer,” named after North Korea’s self-reliance ideology. Such emphasis on agricultural self-reliance suggests the legitimate use of pesticide facilities for civilian use only. However, a series of photos of the Pyongyang Bio-technical Institute released by the North Korean state media in 2015 raised concerns for dual-use. Analysis of these images revealed that the Pyongyang Bio-technical Institute could produce military-sized batches of BWs, specifically anthrax. The modern equipment visible in these images also showed a violation of the Australia Group’s dual-use items list, and showed that it is possible to convert the facility from pesticide to BW production. In response to this study, North Korea’s National Defense Commission (NDC) issued a statement strongly refuting the claim that the Biotechnology Institute is an anthrax production facility. It furthermore invited every member of the U.S. Congress to inspect the Pyongyang Bio-technical Institute. South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense pointed out that the facilities in the images were not equipped with biosafety equipment and that staff were not wearing protective suits, emphasizing that the possibility of the Institute being a dual-use facility should be considered with caveats. North Korea may not, however, adhere to international biosafety standards, considering its historical record of treating people as expendable entities; testimonies from defectors allege that North Korea uses human subjects in testing biological and chemical weapons. Also, biosafety equipment and protective suits would only be required during the actual production of BW agents. Thus, the fact that the Pyongyang Bio-technical Institute was not equipped with a Level 3 biosafety cabinet and safety suits does not necessarily rule out its dual-use. Altogether, we cannot exclude the possibility that these large-scale pesticide production facilities and Bio-technology Institute have dual-use potential. The ambiguity surrounding the dual-use potential of bio-pesticide facilities could be used to North Korea’s advantage. For example, the date of Kim Jong-Un’s visit to the Pyongyang Bio-technical Institute, which is run by the Korean People’s Army Unit 810, could be interpreted as strategic messaging. The visit took place only ten days after the U.S. Forces Korea’s accidental import of live anthrax samples into a South Korean air base was publicized. It is plausible that North Korea intended to signal its BW capability to the United States and South Korea by showing its leader praising the military-run Bio-technical Institute. Furthermore, the Pyongyang Bio-technical Institute has been recently alleged to be responsible for the implementation of the assassination of Kim Jong-Nam as well. Separately, the South Korean government believes that North Korea maintains at least three possible BW production facilities and seven BW or BW-related research centers. These facilities include the No. 25 Factory in Chongju, the Central Biological Weapons Research Institute in Pyongyang, and a plant in the City of Munchon, Kangwon Province. All of these circumstances considered, it is reasonable to conclude that North Korea has dual-use facilities. It would be difficult to analyze the state of facilities at each institution and whether they are used for their BW program, but investing in efforts to monitor the flow of dual-use equipment would be an important part of BW preparedness. … There is much debate on the extent to which North Korea can weaponized biological agents. Some claim that North Korea has already weaponized biological agents that are only waiting to be loaded onto missiles, while others believe that it only has samples of BW agents. The most recent statement made by the South Korean Defense Ministry is that “North Korea has 13 types of BW agents which it can weaponize within ten days, and anthrax and smallpox are the likely agents it would deploy.” Weaponization requires stabilizing and formulating biological agents for dissemination. Stabilization prevents degradation of biological agents from environmental factors such as high salt concentrations, dryness, and heat. How to achieve these technical challenges depends on the agent. Some pathogens such as Bacillus and Clostridium naturally form spores that allow survival in heat, dryness, and excessive radiation. Once stabilized, typically by freeze-drying (lyophilization), biological agents can be disseminated by spraying. … It is unknown whether North Korea has the capability to weaponize all 13 types of agents, and whether North Korea has the capacity to produce a mass stockpile of stabilized biological agents. Regarding the first aspect, little information is available. The ROK Defense White Paper mostly mentions anthrax and smallpox, so these could be agents that North Korea has higher capability to weaponize. However, it is important to note that despite an investment of 40,000 personnel over 63 years (1928-1991), the Soviet Union’s BW program yielded only 13 weaponizable agents. Although increase in biological knowledge in the modern era could expedite weaponization, it is highly unlikely that all of North Korea’s agents are ready for weaponization. Regarding the second aspect of mass production, Kim Jong-Un’s visit to the Pyongyang Bio-technical Institute showed bio-pesticide production facilities at a massive scale, which could allude to its capacity to mass-produce BW agents. However, some experts doubt that North Korea can mass produce BWs and little is verified by publicly available information. … Images of the Pyongyang Bio-technical Institute in 2015 revealed that North Korea has dual-use equipment that violates export control based on the Australia Group. Compared to the thorough monitoring of dual-use items used for North Korea’s nuclear program, procurement channels and the flow of BW dual-use items are less well understood. Part of the reason for this is that in the case of BW, distinguishing between items intended for military purposes, agricultural applications, and public health efforts is difficult. For example, a European non-governmental organization provided training and basic equipment for bio-pesticide production to the North that may have inadvertently contributed to North Korea’s ability to produce BW. Currently there is a need for clearer identification of procurement channels through which North Korea obtains its equipment and technology to produce BW. In this section, we examine the current policies of the United States and the Republic of Korea on North Korea’s BW program, and identify areas where further policies are needed. Vaccination of U.S. Troops on the Ground: As a preventive measure against North Korea’s BW threat, U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) are vaccinated against smallpox and anthrax since 2004, as decided by the U.S. Department of Defense. Anthrax and smallpox vaccination is also mandatory for Department of Defense personnel and contractors assigned or deployed to the Korean Peninsula for 15 consecutive days or longer, which will also include forward-deployed naval forces. Korea-U.S. Joint Exercise: The ROK and the United States have held joint exercises to respond to bio-threats since 2011. The Able Response (AR) exercise aims to “coordinate inter-ministerial procedures inside Korea and international procedures in requesting the medical resources urgently between the ROK and USA, and among the ROK, the UN, and nongovernmental organizations.” The exercises hosted by the Korean Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Health and Welfare encompass related military and civilian agencies from both South Korea and the United States. It started as a tabletop exercise in 2011 in which virtual scenarios were presented and discussed. In the 2013 and 2015 exercises, these exercises had a greater focus on operational aspects. In 2016, the exercise was conducted during the Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) maneuvers indicating that bio-threats from North Korea are real, and that response against bio-threats should take a more integrated approach. The JUPITR Program: The Joint United States Forces Korea portal and Integrated Threat Recognition (JUPITR), a program led by the U.S. Army’s Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense is underway in the ROK as well. The JUPITR program supports new bio-surveillance equipment that increase the speed and ease of monitoring bio-threats. For example, new equipment such as the BioFire Array can run Dry Filter Unit samples in five to six hours, compared to the current system that runs samples in a couple days. In January 2017, the USFK decided to deploy JUPITR equipment in the port of Busan. The USFK has not confirmed whether the equipment has already deployed. U.S. Government Funded Programs for Rapid Detection and Response to Pathogens: The U.S. Department of Defense, through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), supports academic and industry research for rapid detection and response to pathogens. DARPA’s Biological Technologies Office (BTO), with an annual budget of $296 million, has prioritized the “Outpacing Infectious Disease” program to rapidly identify pathogens via DNA and RNA sequencing. Pathogen sequences would be then used to make DNA/RNA vaccines within a matter of days or weeks, compared to the months or years required for traditional vaccine pipelines. In particular, DARPA has funded Moderna Therapeutics, a biotech startup, to develop RNA vaccine platforms. Such public-private partnerships ensure the development of technologies important for national security that may not be incentivized by commercial profits. Multiple benefits will ensue from such government-funded innovation: the United States will be more resilient and better prepared for pandemics, and technological innovations could boost the economy; for example, DARPA-funded research programs contributed to the digital revolution in Silicon Valley. Government-funded research is also supporting the use of DNA sequencing to conduct detailed analysis on possible BWs. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security recently funded a project that used DNA sequencing to assess whether a Soviet strain of anthrax could have been genetically engineered. In 1979, a military facility in Sverdlovsk accidentally released anthrax spores, causing about 100 deaths. During the Cold War, the Soviets were rumored to have genetically manipulated Bacillus anthracis to be resistant to vaccines and antibiotic treatment. By sequencing the genomes of anthrax from two victims, the study authors found no trace of genetic manipulation. Instead, they found that the Sverdlovsk strain was a wildtype anthrax strain endogenous to Russia. This study led to determining a unique, geographical molecular fingerprint, which could be important for tracing the source of potential biological weapons attacks. International Limits to North Korea’s Biological Sciences: North Korea’s access to WMD-relevant training in biological sciences and access to dual-use items is purposefully limited by UN resolutions and other voluntary international coalitions. UN Resolutions since UNSCR 1718 (2006) have decided that member states “shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer” to North Korea of “items, materials, equipment, goods and technology” that are deemed by the Security Council or 1718 Committee as potential contributors to any weapons of mass destruction related programs. Furthermore, member states are banned from providing “technical training, advice, services or assistance” to North Korean nationals that would contribute to its advancement of WMD programs. However, as earlier evidence demonstrated, such international resolutions may not be sufficient as North Korea is still able to obtain restricted dual-use materials. The Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement are two international nonproliferation regimes that maintain export control lists, including biological weapons dual-use items. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) includes binding obligations for member states to adopt domestic legislation to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons and their means of delivery, and to establish domestic controls to prevent the illicit trafficking of their related or component materials. Unsurprisingly, North Korea does not participate in these regimes and has never submitted a compliance report to the 1540 Committee. Gaps in the Current Policies Vaccination of the ROK military: Unlike the USFK, the ROK military is not vaccinated against anthrax and smallpox. The main reason for this is the lack of vaccines. According to open sources, the Korean Center for Disease Control and Prevention had smallpox vaccines for less than 30 percent of the Korean population as of 2014, and the Ministry of National Defense had stockpiled vaccines since only 2014.48 The Ministry aims to secure the appropriate amount of anthrax and smallpox vaccines by 2020, but it is likely that this goal would not be met by then considering the delay in the anthrax vaccine clinical trial. The Defense Ministry budget for smallpox vaccines was earmarked in 2015, and the actual vaccines will not be distributed to the military until 2019. Open sources indicate that the United States declined to provide vaccines to the ROK military as vaccine stockpile is insufficient, and there is no precedent for overseas vaccines sales. Dismantlement of the BW Program: The United States and South Korea should prepare to lead the dismantlement of the North Korean biological weapons program in the event that the state collapses and reunified with South Korea, or it reaches a comprehensive disarmament agreement with the international community. Troop units should be designated and trained for this task, and vaccinated ahead of time. Units should also stockpile the necessary equipment to carry out the neutralization of biological weapons production facilities and stockpiles. The procedure for neutralizing any biological agents will depend in part on the state in which they are stored. The United States military has experience with assisting others in efforts to dismantle biological weapons program infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program effort in the former Soviet Union in 1991 is one such example. Efforts to Close Procurement Channels: Despite the international community’s efforts to stem North Korea’s various illicit trade and money laundering activities, it continues to evade sanctions with “techniques that are increasing in scale, scope and sophistication.” The international community should, therefore, increase its efforts to close off North Korea’s illicit procurement channels, which may provide it with infrastructure, funds, and knowledge that enable it to advance its biological weapons program. The international community should be cautious in providing scientific training to North Korea without mechanisms to conduct follow-up surveillance for potential misuse. For example, the Center for Agriculture and Biosciences International (CABI), an international non-profit agency that runs agricultural aid programs, established a facility in North Korea for producing Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) as a bio-pesticide. This facility and the knowledge for Bt cultivation could be easily used to manufacture Bt’s close relative Bacillus anthracis (anthrax). While bio-pesticide production is an appropriate goal for North Korea to achieve food security for its population, there should be policies in place to ensure that scientific knowledge and infrastructure provided by the international community under the intentions of aid are not misused for biological weapons production. The international community should also prioritize better accounting of existing biological weapons to prevent stockpiles from falling into the wrong hands. A 2014 report from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security revealed that 27 biological agents and toxins used in research in the U.S. – including Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Yersinia pestis (the plague), and botulinum neurotoxin – were not properly registered with the Federal Select Agent Program. Although these agents have since been secured, and the U.S. government is clearly taking these alarming gaps in inventory control with serious concern, it is worth noting that missing laboratory inventory could easily end up in the wrong hands. Effective Communication Strategy between Stakeholders: Effective communication between stakeholders including the ROK, the United States, and the public is lacking. The live anthrax incident at Osan Air Force base in 2015 demonstrates miscommunication between the South Korean and the U.S. governments, as well as poor communication to the public on the risk posed by these agents. The public ought to have been alerted of the import of biological agent samples and provided information on preparation efforts against biological threats. In fact, a large number of the Korean public wrongly perceived that the United States was unjustly conducting bio-hazardous activity on Korean soil, exploiting the alliance. After the incident, the South Korean and U.S. governments increased their communication efforts by disclosing the Able Response exercise for the first time in September 2015. The South Korean public, however, is still averse even to the idea of having biological agent-related equipment on their soil. When it became public that the USFK is deploying the JUPITR biodefense equipment at the ports of Busan, there were public protests. For a more robust and effective preparation effort, the ROK and the U.S. government should effectively coordinate information-sharing, and communicate facts and risks accordingly to the public. Biological weapons policy and preparedness for BWs incidents have been undertaken by the United States, South Korea, and other members of the international community. More must be done, however, to enhance intelligence on this vital issue and to pursue non-military tracks to improve understanding, preparedness, deterrence in this area. Intelligence Gathering and Validation of Sources The international community, led by the United States, South Korea, and China, should invest in further efforts to gather intelligence on North Korea’s biological weapons capability. This should be done at the governmental level as well as through open source research at the level of think-tanks, universities, and other research institutions. The North Korea security studies community has a strong precedent of analyzing open source information such as publicly released photos and video footage from North Korea and satellite images of industrial sites for the country’s nuclear and missile programs. More must be done to cultivate intelligence on its biological weapons facilities. Gathering Intelligence Online: Internet usage in North Korea has been increasing despite tight government control of access. In September 2016, an accident allowed worldwide access to all websites hosted on North Korean servers, revealing 28 websites. Screenshots revealed that many of these sites were available in both Korean and English, and some in Russian, Mandarin, German, French, and Arabic, pointing to a possibility that their websites are accessed by non-Korean speakers. As more communication, both internal and external to North Korea, takes place on the web, there is potential to mine information from these websites. In particular, websites that are not indexed by search engines, referred to as the “deep web,” may hold valuable information. The continual growth of open source data on the internet provides a means by which North Korea could potentially acquire third-party knowledge relevant to developing internal BW capability. In turn, it also offers the potential to identify and monitor activities of organizations and individuals that may be engaging in biological research with North Korea. Emerging intelligence tools that mine the internet with data processing are making it possible to generate surveillance intelligence at a scale and speeds that have previously not been possible; one such example is AMPLYFI’s artificial intelligence platform DataVoyant. Applying machine learning algorithms to analyze the deep web for key trends, people, and patterns, to assess whether any signal can be detected for associations between North Korea and biological weapons-related search terms could open new leads of information and investigation. Such tools can be used to monitor activity on North Korea hosted websites. To date, AMPLYFI has mined 840,000 websites that contain a curated list of pertinent biological search terms. Of these, they found 23,000 websites with weak associations to North Korea, 170 of which point to particular organizations and institutions. While it remains to be seen whether any meaningful signals exist after rigorous follow-up analyses to eliminate false positives, such new algorithms should be considered as an additional tool to strengthen surveillance and detect North Korea’s biological activities. Assessing North Korea’s Research Interests: Similar to efforts for its nuclear weapons program, North Korea may seek training for its scientists abroad, particularly in Russia and China. Documentation of these international exchanges are not always publicly recorded and are thus difficult to access. North Korea’s international research and training efforts, however, can be evaluated if they result in academic publications. UN member states are banned from providing BW development training to North Korean nationals as noted above. As part of this effort, it is important to monitor other biology-related training that North Korean nationals receive. On January 25, 2016, North Korea acceded to the Svalbard Treaty, announcing through its state news agency, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), that its accession provided North Korea “with an international legal guarantee for conducting economic activities and scientific researches in the Svalbard Islands.” The treaty affords parties equal rights to access the Norwegian islands for commercial, mining, and industrial purposes, including scientific research and the procurement of biological samples. North Korea’s research participation in the Svalbard is worth monitoring for two reasons: to gain a better understanding of North Korean life science research capabilities, and to monitor specimens it procures from permafrost. Few states maintain active economic and research activities on the islands. In 2015 and 2016, Chinese and North Korean academic scientists jointly published research undertaken in the Svalbard Islands: on the detection of novel bacterial species from permafrost. These studies employed DNA sequencing to identify novel species of bacteria isolated from the tundra soil of Svalbard islands, resulting in new species of the Hymenobacter, Terrimonas, and Roseomonas genera. It is highly unlikely that the typing of these genomes will provide know-how for biological weapons development efforts. It is unclear whether North Korean scientists involved in these works were commissioned to do so from a high level within the North Korean government, or part of a basic science inquiry in conjunction with Chinese scientists, as studying organisms that live in extreme conditions is important for advancements in basic science and bio-technology. It is noteworthy, however, that North Korean scientists undertook these studies as the first authors, i.e. the lead scientist, given that its capacity and track record of conducting research internationally is limited. Improving Nonproliferation Policy The international community should improve policy to cut off dual-use supply chains to North Korea. The 1540 Committee, established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, maintains frameworks for assessing these efforts and conducts an annual review. The Committee’s implementation matrix for UN member states is designed to facilitate assistance to states and act as a tool to enhance dialogue among member states on implementation. In 2016, the Committee reported increased adherence to the terms of UNSCR 1540 pertaining to states’ obligations in biological weapons amounting to a 62 per cent overall implementation rate. These efforts, however, are targeted more towards preventing non-state actors from producing or procuring biological weapons, and less focused on trans-shipment issues and limiting access of states like North Korea to dual-use materials. Improving national export control lists is one such effort that stands to stem proliferation of BW dual-use items to both North Korea and non-state actors of concern. The Committee noted that the overall number of states that maintain control lists pertaining specifically to biological weapons has increased to 77 since its last count. Engaging North Korea through Multilateral Global Health Efforts The United States and South Korea should use existing frameworks to engage North Korea in dialogue regarding its illegal biological weapons program. The United States, South Korea, and other international partners maintained a dedicated effort for advancing negotiations on the North Korean nuclear program throughout the 1990s and 2000s, but have made little progress on such negotiations for the last half-decade. These negotiations have not extended to North Korea’s biological weapons capability. The new presidential administrations inaugurated in the United States and South Korea in 2017 may choose to prioritize WMD talks with North Korea, but it is too early to assess their policies. A path forward outside of the traditional negotiation pathway includes engaging North Korea through “softer” issues of public health, agricultural health, or laboratory safety. The goal of these fora would be to improve public health and safety around biological sciences that will have positive impact on North Korean citizens, and to improve information sharing about the current state of standards in North Korea. The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), a multilateral effort launched in 2014, may provide one avenue through which to engage North Korea on issues tangential to its biological weapons program. The GHSA is a voluntary partnership of more than 50 states and non-governmental organizations that engages in “capacity-building efforts to achieve specific and measurable targets around biological threats.” North Korea’s health infrastructure stands to benefit from improvements included in the GHSA’s expert-developed “Action Packages,” including those for bio-safety and bio-security, or the national laboratory system package. Engagement in these health or agricultural fora present opportunities to build relationships between negotiators and representatives from respective parties, and offer a chance to glean information about North Korea’s biological weapons program. Increase Interdisciplinary Exchange As part of the preparedness effort against pandemics and bioweapons, it is important to continually engage scientists and healthcare workers. While there is no evidence that North Korea is genetically modifying biological agents for weaponization, the ease in genome engineering thanks to new tools such as CRISPR warrants new frameworks for monitoring in the future. Currently, senior level scientists in synthetic biology and epidemiology in the United States have been part of national committees on biosecurity. It is important to continue such engagement with the scientific community to ensure that governments are up-to-date and informed about the latest tools for effective response, should North Korea’s bioweapons program advance to a new level of sophistication. Additionally, unless North Korea makes an explicit announcement, the first signs of a BW attack will likely be encountered by a nurse or a physician, as pathogens typically require several days of incubation before the onset of symptoms. As the expectation of a BW attack is very low by healthcare workers, misdiagnosis is highly possible. Healthcare providers, particularly those in primary care and infectious disease in select geographical locations, should be regularly engaged by government officials and trained to detect and treat these rare disease scenarios. Improve “Dual-Response” Health Preparedness Effort Against Pandemics and BWs Investing resources to strengthen health systems will mitigate against the risk posed by North Korea’s BW program as well as against natural infectious disease outbreaks, which we label as “dual-response.” Preparedness efforts should be undertaken even if the international community makes incremental progress on engaging North Korea on this issue. One such measure is improving continually-deployed and nationally-funded surveillance technology in South Korea along the border, at border crossings, and in major cities to detect pathogens and BWs in the atmosphere. Systems that conduct environmental sampling or “sniff ” the air for aerosolized biological agents are examples. Another example is deploying technologies that detect water-viable BW agents and harmful toxins for screening water supplies in major cities and near U.S. military bases, which are likely targets for North Korean biological operations. These systems can be built into South Korea’s existing efforts in environmental surveillance, including air pollution monitoring and water quality control. Such systems may also be designed to detect chemical weapons. When the MERS epidemic spread through major South Korean cities in 2015, the country implemented screening of commuters at transportation hubs such as intercity bus terminals, visually inspecting passengers as they disembarked. Screening at airports, bus terminals, and train stations may be useful to monitor for human vectors of biological weapons once knowledge of an imminent attack is known; however, this approach would be cost-ineffective, and it may not be useful in catching the initial infected person(s). Unless law enforcement agencies have additional intelligence to indicate an impending biological weapons attack, these screening mechanisms may be useful to mitigate spread of a suspicious infectious disease. Increase the Effectiveness and Transparency of Risk Communication As seen in the live anthrax import incident in 2015 and the controversy around the USFK’s deployment of the JUPITR program, preparation efforts against BW would not be fully effective without the understanding and approval of the general public. It is important to communicate the risk and needs for preparation measures against North Korea’s potential BWs more effectively to the public. The ROK and the United States should design their risk communication with the “Comprehensive Risk Management Framework” in mind, establishing strategies appropriate to each phase of management: prevention, protection, response, recovery, and resilience. Notwithstanding the sensitive nature around North Korea’s BW program and preparation efforts, government agencies should include discussions on effective communication strategies when they are making decisions that affect the health and safety concerns of the general public at the prevention stage. In order for the ROK government to effectively communicate with the public, the United States should also maintain transparency regarding its preparedness efforts on the Korean Peninsula with the Korean people.” (Hyun-kyung Kim, Elizabeth Phillipp, and Hattie Chung, North Korea’s Bioweapons Proghram: The Known and Unknown, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2017)
7/19/17:
South Korean President Moon Jae-in is seeking a deal with North Korea in 2020 to bring about the “complete denuclearization” of the isolated nation in return for a peace treaty that would guarantee the survival of Kim Jong Un’s regime. Moon set out his ambitious goal today in a special presidential Blue House report outlining his objectives for his five-year term. It’s the first time the new president has provided a timeline for his engagement policy. “We will come up with a negotiation plan for comprehensive denuclearization that will lead a nuclear freeze to a complete dismantling,” of weapons, the Blue House said in the report, which stated Moon would propose a road map this year. “The treaty will be signed when denuclearization is complete and the peace regime will be maintained in a stable way.” While his olive-branch approach doesn’t differ greatly from President Donald Trump’s policy of maximum pressure and engagement, the devil will be in the details, according to analyst Ralph Cossa. “Moon apparently has Trump’s support in playing a lead role in dealing with the North,” Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, said before the statement was released. “Both have agreed to a mix of pressure and dialogue but neither is an end in itself. The end is changing North Korea behavior, and the prospects of that remain very slim.” Cossa added that Moon’s desire to take the lead on nuclear discussions is “a total non-starter” for Kim. On July 15, Rodong Sinmun criticized Moon’s approach as a “series of sleep-talking sophistries that create even greater hurdles” to talks. Still, the paper expressed “relief” that Moon has signaled a departure from the policies of his conservative predecessors. The reclusive state has yet to respond to Moon’s demilitarization timetable. North Korea is likely to agree to military talks by suggesting an alternative date and “there are a few easy carrots for Moon to offer, such as an end to propaganda broadcasts and balloons,” said Cossa. The sticking point is that Kim will want more than Moon can promise, such as an end to the South Korea-U.S. joint military drills. Today’s report details 100 tasks that Moons plans to tackle during his single, five-year term. While they also cover areas such as the domestic economy and welfare policies, below are some of his objectives for relations on the Korean peninsula: Seek early return of wartime operational control to South Korea from the U.S. Connect the two Koreas by building an energy belt along the east coast to Russia, a logistics and transportation belt on the west coast, and a tourism belt around the demilitarized zone on the border. Establish an inter-Korean joint market, if conditions allow, to boost private sector economic exchanges. Reopen the joint industrial park on the northern side of the border and resume tourist visits to North Korea’s Mt. Geumgang — again, if conditions improve. Complete the nation’s three main defense systems earlier than scheduled in early-2020: Kill Chain, aimed at striking North Korea’s nuclear and missile system: Korea Air & Missile Defense to intercept North Korean missiles targeting South Korea; Korea Massive Punishment & Retaliation to remove the North’s leadership should it use nuclear weapons. (Kanga Kong, “Moon Seeks 2020 Deal for Peace with a Nuclear-Free North Korea,” Bloomberg, July 19, 2017)
An advisory panel to South Korean President Moon Jae In said that the country will separate history issues from its bilateral cooperation with Japan to deal with North Korea’s missile and nuclear development programs. In a five-year state policy plan, the panel said that history issues, including the one on so-called comfort women, should not disturb the development of future-oriented bilateral relations with Japan. On the comfort women issue, the plan called for producing a solution that victims and other citizens can support, suggesting that the country may review its 2015 deal with Japan to “finally and irreversibly” resolve the issue. But there was no reference to the possibility of renegotiating the accord on the women. The panel also mentioned plans to launch a related memorial day, a research center and a history museum. (Jiji, “Seoul to Keep History Issues, North Korea Separate,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 19, 2017) South Korea’s new government has pledged to take “strong action” against Japan in long-running territorial and “comfort women” disputes, raising concerns about the further straining of bilateral ties. President Moon Jae-in’s policy toward Tokyo was spelled out in the administration’s five-year management plan that was published July 19. On the disputed Takeshima islets and nearby Ulleungdo island, Seoul plans to bolster its ability to control the islands from 2018. Berthing and security facilities at key ports on the islets will be expanded and strengthened for use by the South Korean Coast Guard. (Takeda Hajimu and Makino Yoshihiro, “Seoul to Take Strong Line on Disputed Isles, ‘Comfort Women,’” Asahi Shimbun, July 20, 2017)
South Korea’s Unification Ministry approved Hyundai Asan Corp.’s bid to contact North Korea as the company seeks to visit the North next month to mark the anniversary of the death of its former chairman. The operator of the now-suspended inter-Korean tour to Mount Kumgang on North Korea’s east coast has held the memorial service for Chung Mong-hun at the mountain since his death in August 2003. But it did not seek approval for the visit last year due to tensions sparked by the North’s nuclear and missile tests. If approved, it would mark the first visit by South Koreans to the North under the government of President Moon Jae-in. (Yonhap, “Seoul Approves Hyundai Asan’s Bid for N.K. Contacts over Memorial Service,” July 19, 2017) North Korea on July 27 rejected Hyundai Asan Corp.’s request to hold a memorial service in the reclusive country next month to mark the anniversary of the death of its former chairman, a corporate source said. (Yonhap, “Pyongyang Rejects Hyundai Asan’s Bid to Hold Memorial Service in N. Korea,” Korea Herald, July 27, 2017)
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has sent an “urgent directive” to diplomats to “negotiate a peace treaty with the U.S.,” Asahi Shimbun reported. Sources told the daily that Kim considers South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s term in office a “golden opportunity” to sign the peace treaty. The paper said Kim sent the directive to the North’s overseas diplomatic mission during the G20 Summit in Germany from July 7-8, apparently emboldened by the successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile. “The Moon Jae-in administration is providing a golden opportunity for us. Before hostile forces cause a stir, we must realize our duty of reunification,” it quoted the directive as saying. (Lee Dong-hwi, “Kim Jong Un Wants PPeace Treaty with U.S.,” Chosun Ilbo, July 20, 2017)
John Park testimony: “The key takeaway is not that the North Korean regime has been evading sanctions – they’ve been engaged in this activity for decades. Rather it’s the story of how North Korea’s sanctions evasion techniques have improved significantly because of North Korea, Inc.’s migration to the Chinese marketplace. As a result, U.S. policymakers need to factor in these growing gaps and consider under-utilized measures – like Chinese domestic policy tools – to disrupt Chinese-North Korean business partnerships and restrict North Korea’s access to finance. My MIT colleague, Dr. Jim Walsh, and I recently completed a three-year study assessing the application of targeted sanctions to halt the North Korean regime’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Based on interviews with former managers of “North Korea, Inc.” – the web of state trading companies (STCs) that the regime operates to procure licit and illicit items – we were able to map North Korea, Inc.’s practices, partners, and pathways. We found that STC managers were able to significantly increase the effectiveness of their procurement activities by 1) hiring more capable Chinese middlemen who can more effectively handle financing, logistics, and doing business with private Chinese firms and foreign firms operating in China, 2) taking up residence and embedding themselves on the mainland, which increases their effectiveness, 3) expanding the use of Hong Kong and Southeast Asian regional commercial and banking hubs, and 4) increasing the use of embassies as a vehicle for procurement. 1) The Unique Role of Chinese Middlemen By working directly with local Chinese middlemen, North Korean STC managers have been able to better evade sanctions. These middlemen charge their North Korean clients a fee to purchase dual-use technologies – items that can be used for either civilian or military purposes, such as industrial equipment and components. Following the application of additional rounds of sanctions, these local Chinese middlemen began to charge larger fees to reflect the increased risk of doing business with North Korean STC clients. Instead of impeding procurement activities, we found that additional sanctions have actually attracted more capable middlemen, incentivized by a bigger payday. The North Korean regime has financed these larger paydays by drawing on sizeable slush funds on the mainland that it amassed during the lucrative North Korea-China coal trade in the late 2000s. 2) Embedding in Commercial Hubs in China Using diplomatic credentials, former North Korean STC managers noted that they were able to reside longer in commercial hubs on the mainland. What’s new was not that STC managers had been engaged in procurement activities – they’ve been doing so for decades – rather it was how and where they had conducted business. Previously, STC managers would go on the equivalent of a business trip from Pyongyang to Eastern Europe to procure an item ordered by the regime. They acquired very limited information about local market dynamics on such transactional trips. What was striking about interviewing former STC managers was the normalcy of their business practices. Like American or European expatriate businessmen, they explained the challenges and opportunities of operating in a particular local market in Asia. Gaining the tacit business knowledge that resides in these networks was critical to increasing the procurement effectiveness of North Korean managers. By acting more like regular businessmen, STC managers were able to form improved business partnerships with local middlemen. 3) Leveraging Commercial and Banking Hubs in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia North Korean STC managers have operated in Hong Kong and Southeast Asian hubs for many years. As global trends in trading and banking shifted to this part of Asia, these managers have benefited from increased access to business partners with an international reach. In the case of Hong Kong, we documented how a former STC manager based there was able to procure high tech medical equipment from Japan through a local business partner. This partner filled out all the required documentation using the details from its own registrations and licenses. It also coordinated with other companies on the logistics of delivery. In the case of Singapore, it has been a particularly useful venue for North Korean STC managers to pay local firms to arrange wire transfers for payments to foreign counterparties. As Singapore has rapidly risen to be a global center for money management, opportunities abound for the North Korean regime to benefit from illicit financial service offerings. 4) Extensive Use of Embassies as a Vehicle for Procurement North Korean embassies serve two key functions with respect to the operation of North Korea, Inc.’s illicit activities. The first is serving as a vehicle for procuring controlled items in a foreign country. Former North Korean STC managers note that the regime co-locates shell companies with its embassies in countries that offer unique access to sought-after items ordered by the regime. Business cards of these shell companies list the local embassy’s address and fax number. The second function is the ability to credential an STC manager as a North Korean diplomat. In addition to gaining valuable tacit business knowledge by embedding in a country for a longer duration, STC managers are also able to use diplomatic pouches for illicit purposes related to transporting a banned item or couriering unreported cash. The Sanctions Conundrum In examining U.S.-led efforts to counter these sanctions evasion techniques, we observed what we call the “sanctions conundrum” – one of the key negative unintended consequences of applying more sanctions on North Korea, Inc. The net effect of sanctions was that they, in practice, ended up increasing the regime’s procurement capabilities. Because of the elevated risk of doing business, an STC had to pay higher commission fees to private Chinese companies that played a middleman role. The elevation of risks and rewards attracted more capable, professional middlemen into illicit network activities on behalf of North Korean clients. Accelerating this trend in this niche marketplace was the Chinese middlemen’s monetization of political relationships. Linked to local corrupt Chinese officials, the private companies used portions of the elevated commission fees to clear a path for efficiently completing a procurement transaction on behalf of a North Korean client. In sum, targeted sanctions – unintentionally and counterintuitively – helped to create more efficient markets in China for North Korea, Inc. If one were to view sanctions as the antibiotics in the U.S. national security toolkit, increasing the dosage on the North Korean regime has triggered, in some instances, the development of drug-resistance. This resistance is in the form of alternative, more effective commercial channels. We need to better target sanctions and strengthen law enforcement and other measures, based on an improved understanding of how North Korea, Inc. has devised innovative techniques to evade them. Stopping North Korea, Inc. by Disrupting its Business Partnerships in China An important starting point is setting the strategic goal of disrupting the North Korean regime’s procurement networks. While we need to develop ways to bolster the impact of sanctions, we should also explore other policy tools. Diversifying the set of policy tools and coordinating with different policy actors will significantly constrain the remarkably open space within which North Korea, Inc. currently operates. If we widen the aperture and view the target as the business partnership between a private Chinese company linked to a local corrupt party official on one side and an elite North Korean STC on the other, we can apply tailored policy tools to disrupt this partnership. These specialized partnerships have created largely unconstrained opportunities for the North Korean regime to procure the critical components for its nuclear and ballistic missile development programs. Using the definition of technology as the knowledge of techniques and processes, these partnerships constitute a “dual-use” technology in that they are essentially commercial channels that can be readily used to move either illicit or licit goods. A key reason behind the procurement effectiveness of these business partnerships is that they hide in the open. Given the massive quantity of business transactions that occur daily in the Chinese marketplace, filling out documents, signing contracts, and taking out insurance on freight enables illicit consignments to “blend in.” A top priority is to disrupt these partnerships upstream – before the procured item moves through this dual-use technology and literally becomes a part of globalized trade flows. In addition to the policy recommendations offered by my distinguished colleagues on the panel, I’d like to bring to the Subcommittee’s attention the “Three Antis” which are a set of China’s domestic policy tools – anti-corruption apparatus, anti-narcotics campaign, and anti-counterfeiting activities. U.S. policymakers can coordinate closely with their Chinese counterparts on redirecting these Chinese domestic policy tools to counter North Korean procurement in China. (Contrary to common perception there are precedents of bilateral cooperation, such as the U.S.-China Joint Working Group on the Nonproliferation of WMD, which was established during the July 2014 round of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue). With respect to current policy cooperation, the U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue (CED) and the U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue (D&SD) could serve as effective mechanisms for building and sustaining high-level political support. Collaboration on the “Three Antis” would advance the U.S. and China’s common goal of stopping North Korea, Inc.’s illicit activities in China. 1) Anti-Corruption Apparatus Perhaps the highest impact policy tool in disrupting North Korea, Inc. is China’s anti-corruption apparatus. The September 2016 case of the Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Company serves as an important precedent for scaling up the application of the anti-corruption apparatus to target corrupt party officials involved in these Sino-North Korean business partnerships. Given the link between private Chinese middlemen and local corrupt party officials, using the anti-corruption apparatus for this specialized function would have an immediate impact on procurement deals. Of all the policy tools, this substantial one is readily available, but dependent on the senior Chinese leadership’s decision to go down this path. The United States should use policy cooperation mechanisms like the CED and D&SD to regularly provide commercial intelligence to the Chinese authorities so that they can apply their domestic policy tools on Chinese entities engaged in criminal activities. Secondary sanctions could raise the appeal of pursuing this path. 2) Anti-Narcotics Campaign An open secret in China’s northeastern provinces is that there’s an expanding narcotics problem emanating from North Korea. Called “ice,” this cheap and potent form of methamphetamine is produced in large quantities in North Korean pharmaceutical factories. Drawing on the precedent of Sino-U.S. cooperation in the late 2000s when China was confronting an inflow of opiates through its border with Afghanistan, there’s an opportunity to adapt the previous program to China’s northeastern provinces. Although aimed at the narcotics trade, the positive spillover effect of increased Chinese law enforcement activities would further constrain the areas in which North Korea, Inc. and its Chinese partners operate. 3) Anti-Counterfeiting ActivitiesThe North Korean regime is well documented as the creator of “supernotes” – counterfeited US$100 bills. What’s not so well known in the West is that there’s strong concern in China that its neighbor has been counterfeiting Chinese currency. From Beijing’s perspective, this criminal activity is a direct threat to China’s economic security. U.S. policymakers could leverage this Chinese concern to elevate channels of bilateral cooperation drawing on U.S. experience tracking down the North Korean regime’s sophisticated counterfeiting operations. Given the high threat level, the United States should encourage China to further expand the deployment of Chinese law enforcement resources trained on counterfeiting activities, with special authorization to investigate and inspect consignments and facilities. Objectively assessing how criminal North Korean activities affect China’s national interests yields a clear view of areas of common ground upon which we can build a common cause in stopping North Korea, Inc. In this endeavor, it’s important to reassure the Chinese authorities that these measures are intended to “sanitize” China’s growing bilateral trade with North Korea, not to cut it off. The majority of the bilateral trade is in non-sanctioned goods and services that are a significant element of the economies of Chinese provinces near the border with North Korea. Stopping North Korea, Inc.’s illicit procurement and blocking its access to finance constitute a top priority in slowing down the regime’s rapid advances in its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The work of the Subcommittee, the panel members, as well as sanctions-focused officials is critical in finding new, adaptive, and effective ways to counter the North Korean regime’s WMD threat to the United States, its Northeast Asian allies, and the international community.” (U. S. House Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade, Hearing on Restricting North Korea’s Access to Finance, John Park testimony July 19, 2017)
7/20/17:
CNN has learned that US intelligence indicates that North Korea is making preparations for another intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or intermediate range missile test. Two administration officials familiar with the latest intelligence confirm there are indicators of test preparations that could lead to a potential launch in about two weeks. US satellites have detected new imagery and satellite-based radar emissions indicating North Korea may be testing components and missile control facilities for another ICBM or intermediate launch, officials say. The US is watching in particular for further testing of North Korean radars and communications that could be used in a launch. The next test launch would be the first since North Korea successfully launched an ICBM on July 4. Officials also say that North Korea is continuing to test components to launch a missile from a submarine but the US intelligence assessment is that program remains in early stages. When taken together, these developments are concerning because North Korea says it is trying to develop a missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to the United States. The latest intelligence about a potential second ICBM test comes as the second highest ranking US military officer has warned Congress that North Korea’s deception techniques to mask their missile launches have grown in sophistication. “I am reasonably confident in the ability of our intelligence community to monitor the testing but not the deployment of these missile systems. Kim Jong Un and his forces are very good at camouflage concealment and deception” General Paul Selva, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Senate armed services committee on July 18. Selva gave the strongest public indication so far that the US believes the current North Korean ICBM still has limitations, saying that Pyongyang has yet to demonstrate the “capacity to strike the United States with any degree of accuracy or reasonable confidence of success.” When asked about the possibility of a preemptive US military strike, Selva said, “I think we have to entertain that potential option. That would be a policy choice by the President of the United States to execute or not execute that option.” But Defense Secretary James Mattis has long warned against letting the North Korean situation get to the point of a US military strike and has strongly and publicly advocated for a diplomatic solution led by the State Department. Selva, who is deeply involved in the US nuclear weapons and missile defense programs, noted a parallel line of effort is underway to “provide for the defense of the United States with a suitable ballistic missile defense system that can handle the low volume at this point of missiles that he (Kim Jong Un) might be able to deploy that could strike us here across all of US territory, Alaska, Hawaii and the lower 48.” The preparations for a potential new launch come as the US military has observed North Korea carrying out an “unusual level” of submarine activity as well as testing a critical component of a missile that could potentially be launched from a submarine. Two US defense officials told CNN that that a North Korean Romeo-class submarine is currently engaged in “unusual deployment activity” in the Sea of Japan/East Sea and has been under way for about 48 hours. The US is observing the sub via reconnaissance imagery and the officials said the submarine’s patrol had taken it farther that it has ever gone, sailing some 100 kilometers out to sea in international waters. The submarine’s activity was different than the typical training activity usually observed closer to shore, according to the officials. The diesel-electric-powered North Korean sub spotted far from port is about 65 meters long and the US does not assess it capable of venturing very far from its home port. The activity caused US and South Korean forces to slightly raise their alert level, according to one official. The US military pays close attention to North Korean submarine activity following the 2010 Cheonan incident where a North Korean sub torpedoed a South Korean Naval vessel. North Korea’s submarine fleet is believed to encompass around 70 subs, though the majority are quite old and likely cannot fire missiles. The deployment comes days after Pyongyang tested a critical component for a missile that could potentially be launched by a submarine The test took place on land at the Sinpo shipyard in North Korea. The current US intelligence assessment is that the missile program aboard submarines remains in the very early stages. An ejection test in may tested the missile’s “cold-launch system,” which uses high pressure steam to propel the missile out of the launch canister into the air before the missile’s engines ignite, preventing damage to the submarine or submersible barge that would launch the missile. It is the type of technology that allows missiles to be launched underwater from submarines. (Barbara Starr and Ryan Browne, “U.S. Intelligence Shows North Korean Preparations for a Possible Missile Test,” CNN, July 20, 2017)
Bermudez: “Recent media reports indicate that North Korea’s sole SINPO-class experimental ballistic missile submarine (SSBA) has been engaged in “‘unusual deployment activity’ over the past 48 hours,” sailing approximately 100-km out into the East Sea (Sea of Japan). If correct, this would be the submarine’s longest known voyage to date. Most previous voyages have been far shorter and within the waters near its home port at the Sinpo South Shipyard. A 100-km voyage would also likely place the submarine in international waters—a first for the vessel. While there are several possible explanations, the most likely is preparations for a test in the near future of an updated Pukguksong-1 (KN-11) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) or a potentially newer system. Commercial satellite imagery from June 30 of the Sinpo South Shipyard shows activity at the facility’s secure boat basin, where both the SINPO-class submarine and the submersible test stand barge have been repositioned. While the precise reason for this movement is unclear, one possibility is that it may have been long-term preparations for the recently reported voyage or an upcoming missile test.” (Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr.’ “Sinpo South Shipyard: Preparations for a New SLBM Test?” 38North, July 20, 2017)
Woodward: “[In a meeting at the Pentagon in the Tank:] ‘We spend $3.5 billion a year to have troops in South Korea,’ Trump said angrily. The South could not decide if they wanted to THAAD antimissile system or not! And whether they are going to pay for it or not! Some South Koreans believed the system could provoke war with North Korea and protested the installation, arguing it was for the benefit of the U.S. and Japan. ‘Pull the fucking thing out!’ Trump said. ‘I don’t give a shit.’ ‘The South Koreans subsidize the hell out of us,’ Cohn said, challenging the president directly. The trade deal was good for th United States economy, he said again. ‘We buy the most amazing TV sets in the world for $245. Which means that people are spending less money on TVs and more money on other products in the United States.’ If the U.S. pulled its troops out, it would require more Navy carrier groups in that part of the world to feel comfortable. That might cost 10 times as much, Cohn stated. Then there was the ultra-sensitive intelligence gained through the Special Access Programs South Korea allowed the U.S. to run. Trump seemed not to comprehend the value and the necessity. ‘Like $3.5 billion, 28,000 troops,’ the president said. He was really hot. ‘I don’t know why they’re there. Let’s bring them all home!’ ‘So, Mr. President,’ Cohn said, what would you need in the region to sleep at night?’ ‘I wouldn’t need a fucking thing,’ the president said. ‘And I’d sleep like a baby.’ Priebus called an end to the meeting. …All the air seemed to have come out of Tillerson. … ‘Are you okay?’ Cohn asked him. ‘He’s a fucking moron,’ Tillerson said so everyone heard. …in the car, Trump described his advisers, ‘They don’t know anything about business. All they want to do is protect everybody – that we pay for. He said that the South Koreans, our allies, won’t cut a new deal on trade. ‘And they wants us to protect them from that crazy guy in the North.’ …A senior White House official who spoke contemporaneously with participants in the meeting recorded this summary: ‘The president proceeded to lecture and insult the entire group about how they didn’t know anything about defense or national security. It seems that many of the president’s senior advisers, especially those in the national security realm, are extremely concerned with his erratic nature, his relative ignorance, his inability to learn, as well as what they consider his dangerous views.’” (Woodward, Fear, pp. 224-6)
7/21/17:
The Trump administration said that it would bar Americans from traveling to North Korea, a month after the death of Otto F. Warmbier, a 22-year-old college student from Ohio who was arrested while trying to leave the country and returned to his parents, more than a year later, in a coma. The announcement came only hours after Mike Pompeo, the director of the C.I.A., strongly hinted that the United States was considering a regime change in North Korea. Pompeo told an audience at the Aspen Security Forum last night that President Trump had ordered him to come up with options that would “separate the capacity” to build and deliver nuclear weapons from “someone who might well have intent,” a clear reference to Kim Jong-un. Pompeo was pressed several times in an interview here last evening conducted by Bret Stephens, a New York Times columnist, about what he meant by that phrase, and whether it was code for regime change. Pompeo would not utter that phrase, saying instead, “As for the regime, I am hopeful we will find a way to separate that regime from these” missiles and nuclear weapons. C.I.A. officials noted that Pompeo’s language was deliberately ambiguous, and that there were ways to “separate” Kim from his arsenal without overthrowing the government. Pompeo, when pressed on the point, noted that there were risks if Kim left office, because it was unclear who might succeed him. But his statement did not exactly echo how Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson has talked about the administration’s approach to North Korea. In April, Tillerson said: “Our goal is not regime change. Nor do we desire to threaten the North Korean people or destabilize the Asia Pacific region.” While the State Department has long warned Americans about the risks of detention in the North — leading to high-drama cases in which the United States has sent former presidents, intelligence chiefs and special envoys to win the release of detainees — it has not previously banned all travel. The new rules will allow for a special certification, granted at the State Department’s discretion, for Americans to enter the country on aid missions or in other special circumstances. The ban was expected to be announced formally July 27, a major holiday in North Korea, and go into effect 30 days later, to allow any Americans in the country to leave. Heather Nauert, a State Department spokeswoman, said in a statement that once the ban is in effect, “U.S. passports will be invalid for travel to, through and in North Korea, and individuals will be required to obtain a passport with a special validation in order to travel to or within North Korea.” How much a travel ban will hurt the North is unclear, since not many Americans travel there. But some North Korea experts have been urging the ban for some time, as a way both to squeeze the government and to prevent other Americans from being taken prisoner. “It’s important to stop the flow of cash and prospective hostages into North Korea, especially after the recent death of Otto Warmbier,” said Evans J.R. Revere, a former State Department official who specializes in North Korea. None of the three Americans who are known to remain in prison in North Korea were tourists. All three are Korean-Americans, and two of them worked at Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, teaching the children of the country’s elite. Pompeo’s discussion of how the president had given him and the Defense Department the task of coming up with ways to undermine the missile program omitted any discussion of opening negotiations with the North, as South Korea, China and Russia have urged. During the Obama administration, the C.I.A. and the Pentagon were deeply involved in a sabotage program to use cyber- and electronic-warfare techniques to destroy the North’s missiles just before, or in the early moments of, tests. But after a long string of failures, the North has been more successful in the last eight months or so, using missiles that employ different fuels and other technologies. (David E. Sanger, “U.S. to Bar Americans from North Korea Travel,” New York Times, July 22, 2017,
“It would be a great thing to denuclearize the Peninsula, to get those weapons off of that, but the thing that’s the most dangerous about it is the character who holds the control over them today. So from the administration’s perspective the most important thing we can do is separate those two, separate capacity and someone who might well have intent and break those two apart, and I’m confident that the intelligence community will present a set, a wide range of options for the president about how we might go about that.” Pompeo later tried to walk back the threat of killing the North Korean leader, but he fumbled that effort. Dunford and Pompeo spoke after U.S. officials leaked to the media that they had a clean shot on the Kimster on July 4, the day of the North’s initial flight test of the Hwasong-14, the country’s first proven intercontinental ballistic missile. American targeters, we learned, watched him smoke cigarettes and mill around the launch site for about 70 minutes, giving them a marvelous opportunity to end dynastic rule in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. This particular U.S. health warning—about puffing too long in one pot—did not come from the surgeon general. Rodger Baker of Stratfor believes the Trump administration sent, in the words of Business Insider, two “powerful messages” with the leak. In comments to that site, he said that by not killing Kim, Washington was indicating it was not seeking regime change. The second message is that there’s “no need to continue” the missile program. If the North insists on doing so, however, the U.S. is warning it can “strike it and Kim.” As Business Insider noted, on the following day the U.S. and South Korea engaged in a live-fire exercise “demonstrating they could have both killed Kim and stopped the launch.” Maybe all these developments are coincidental, but it does appear the Trump administration is fast losing patience with Kim and, by implication, his friends in Beijing. After all, there seems to be concerted messaging. So after the last several weeks of dire-sounding warnings, war on the Korean Peninsula appears not only imaginable but also close at hand. (Gordon Chang, “Top U.S. General Hints at Military Action in a Few More Months,” Daily Beast, July 25, 2017)
Myanmar’s military has maintained ties with North Korea, even though the civilian-led government denies any cooperation, and the Trump administration is pressing for a complete break-off of remaining links, current and former U.S. officials said. Washington made its case to Myanmar’s de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the army chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing during a visit to the country this week by the U.S. special envoy for North Korea. Ambassador Joseph Yun’s trip to Myanmar underlined continuing U.S. worries over North Korean links that date back to Myanmar’s decades of military rule, according to a senior State Department official. “It was an opportunity to message that any engagement with North Korea, particularly military engagement, is counterproductive to trying to end this threat that North Korea poses to the region and to the globe,” the official told Reuters, speaking on condition of anonymity. He declined to specify what kind of military cooperation had continued between North Korea and Myanmar. There was no immediate response to a request for comment from Myanmar’s embassy in Washington. The official said U.S. sanctions leveled this year against the Myanmar army’s procurement body were meant to “reflect long-standing concerns” about the military’s dealings with Pyongyang. Myanmar insists that arms deals and other military relations with North Korea stopped before Myanmar’s transition to a nominally civilian government in 2011. Myanmar’s military was believed in the past to have imported North Korean-made weapons and North Korean personnel also worked in Myanmar, two former U.S. officials said. Any residual ties may be unfinished business between the two armies dating back to Myanmar’s previous military-led government, one of the former officials said, adding there was no indication of a “nuclear component to the relationship.” The State Department official did not rule out the possibility of imposing further North Korea-related measures on Myanmar, saying: “If a situation becomes so egregious and serious for our national security interests, there are a variety of tools, including sanctions.” For now, though, Washington was relying mostly on diplomacy with Myanmar, a resource-rich and strategically placed country that Washington wants to keep out of China’s orbit. He stressed, however, that it would be difficult to proceed toward full normalization of U.S. relations with Myanmar until Washington was convinced of a halt to ties with North Korea. As Yun arrived in Yangon for talks on July 17, Kyaw Zeya, permanent secretary at Myanmar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, insisted Myanmar no longer had military ties with Pyongyang and was complying with U.N. resolutions banning such links. “It’s normal relations between the two countries,” he told reporters. “As I understand, there’s no such relations between military to military. Definitely not.” The State Department official told Reuters that Myanmar authorities did not explicitly deny that some vestiges of the previous North Korea relationship remained but said “those ties are not what they were in the past.” Myanmar’s former ruling junta, which, like North Korea, was widely shunned by the outside world over its suppression of human rights, was known to have ties to Pyongyang. This included sending missile experts and material for arms production to Myanmar. Myanmar’s Directorate of Defense Industries (DDI) was sanctioned in March under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act. The DDI was previously sanctioned in 2012 and accused of materially assisting North Korea but had fallen off the sanctions list in October after the Obama administration dropped most measures against Myanmar in recognition of a successful political transition. (Antoni Slodkowski, David Brunnstrom and Matt Spetalnick, “U.S. Presses Myanmar to Cease Military Ties with North Korea,” Reuters, July 21, 2017)
The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK said he believes there are “inconsistencies” in South Korea’s narrative of the case of 12 high-profile North Korean defectors. Speaking at a news conference in Seoul, Tomas Ojea Quintana said the issue of the group defection had been “brought to his attention” among other “contentious issues” on the Korean Peninsula during his trip to Seoul from 17 to 21 July. “I have interacted with a wide range of the interlocutors here to gather as much information as possible on the situation of these women,” Ojea Quintana told assembled local and foreign media. “Whereas I am pleased to learn that these women are safe and not held in detention, I see inconsistencies in the narrative concerning their cases, and will be following up with concerned governments.” Ojea Quintana declined to give specifics on his doubts on the case, but said he would “further address this issue to the stakeholders and definitely try to avoid that the situation of these women becomes obstacles” to inter-Korean efforts. “Here let me urge the two Koreas to avoid politicizing the situation of these women, and strictly focus on their interests, protection needs and the needs of their families.” The restaurant workers, consisting of 12 female employees and one male manager, arrived in Seoul on April 7 last year via Malaysia and Thailand, having allegedly fled a North Korean government-run restaurant in the Chinese city of Ningbo. Pyongyang has repeatedly insisted that the group was “abducted” and that their male manager colluded with South Korea in the plot. North Korea has said that reunions between families separated by the Korean War will not be held until South Korea repatriates the 12 women – along with Kim Ryon Hui – who has said she wishes to return to the DPRK after, she claims, mistakenly defecting in 2011. During his five-day visit to the South, the UN Special Rapporteur said he had met “North Koreans who wish to return to the DPRK”, saying he could understand their reasons for wanting to return and the “difficulties of the integration.” “So my first recommendation in regard to this kind of integration to the authorities is to listen to people and focus on people,” Ojea Quintana told reporters. “We are talking about livelihood of the specific people in the situation which is extremely complex between the North and the South where there is mounting escalations in the military side and the sanctions regime of the Security Council implements resolutions.” “There is no easy solution to this problem,” the UN Special Rapporteur said. “But we need to listen and we need to remember many of these people who came from the North and defect to the South they left behind their families and relatives.” In early May, North Korea expressed its willingness to “faithfully implement” international conventions on human rights, while casting doubt on the legitimacy of UN Special Rapporteurs. The DPRK has not allowed Ojea Quintana to visit since his appointment by the UN Human Rights Council in March 2016. UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of people with disabilities Catalina Devandas-Aguilar visited the North from 3 to 8 May as “the first visit ever to the DPRK by an independent expert designated by the Human Rights Council.” (Dagyum Ji, “UN Special Rapporteur Reports Inconsistencies in Restaurant Defection Case,” NKNews, July 21, 2017)
North Korea is suffering its worst drought in 16 years, a United Nations agency reported, raising fears of worsening food shortages in the country, where children and other vulnerable groups have been malnourished for years. North Korea’s production of staple crops for this year, including rice, corn, potatoes and soybeans, has been severely damaged by prolonged dry spells “threatening food security for a large part of its population,” the agency, the Food and Agriculture Organization, said in a report prepared in collaboration with the European Commission’s Joint Research Center. Seasonal rainfall in the main cereal-producing regions is below that of 2001, when grain production fell to a record low of two million tons, Vincent Martin, the agency’s representative in North Korea, said in a news release. Although some rain has fallen this month, it was likely to be too late to allow the normal planting and development of main crops that would be harvested in October and November, the report said. Because of the drought, the production of early season crops that are harvested in June, including wheat, barley and potatoes, dropped to 310,000 tons, more than 30 percent below last year’s 450,000 tons, it said. The early season harvest usually accounts for 10 percent of the country’s total annual cereal production. “Increased food imports, commercial or through food aid, would be required during the next three months at the peak of the lean season, ensuring adequate food supply for the most vulnerable, including children and elders,” the agency said in a statement. North Korea experienced chronic food shortages in the 1990s, when a famine caused by years of bad weather and economic mismanagement forced the country to issue a rare appeal for international help. By some estimates, more than a million people died in the famine. The country has since allowed more market-oriented activities and encouraged trade with China to increase access to food. Its own food production has also improved in recent years. But humanitarian relief groups still call for donations, warning that shortages remain widespread. But international donors have become increasingly reluctant to provide humanitarian aid in recent years, as North Korea has continued to test nuclear weapons and missiles in defiance of United Nations resolutions. In September, after the North’s fifth nuclear test, South Korea did not offer humanitarian aid to tens of thousands of flood victims in North Korea, saying that the country should divert the money spent on weapons to buy food for its people. President Park Geun-hye took a hard-line stance on the North, but under President Moon Jae-in, a liberal who took office in May, the South Korean government has indicated it will be readier to consider humanitarian aid. But North Korea did not appear to be helping itself. It has not responded to the South Korean proposal on July 17 that the two sides hold military and humanitarian talks on the border to discuss easing tensions. North Korea has not yet reported any damage from the drought. Instead, Rodong Sinmun urged the country today to produce more goods locally, especially raw materials and fuel, to overcome what it called “barbaric” international sanctions pushed by the United States. In a separate commentary, the newspaper criticized Washington’s efforts to pressure China to use its economic leverage to force the North to abandon its nuclear and missile programs. The American tactic will never break the Communist neighbors’ “friendly ties sealed in blood,” it said, referring to when China and North Korea joined to fight the Americans during the 1950-53 Korean War. The newspaper also warned that the Chinese would gain little if they succumbed to pressure from the United States and hurt their neighbor. Despite United Nations sanctions, North Korea’s external trade grew by an estimated 4.7 percent to $6.55 billion last year, the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, a government-invested organization in South Korea, said today. North Korea’s trade with China grew 6.1 percent to $6 billion last year, the agency said. China accounts for more than 90 percent of the North’s external trade. Also today, South Korea’s central bank, the Bank of Korea, said that the North Korean economy grew by about 3.9 percent last year. That was the highest annual growth rate the Bank of Korea has reported for the North in 17 years and was another indication that the economy there has been growing under its leader, Kim Jong-un. Economists caution that it is difficult to offer reliable economic growth estimates for North Korea because it does not release its economic data. Analysts have often said the central bank’s estimates on North Korean economic growth are too conservative. (Choe Sang-hun, “U.N. Agency Reports the Worst Drought in 16 Years in North Korea,” New York Times, July 22, 2017,
7/22/17:
Rodong Shimun: “The U.S. talk about “China responsible” for bolstering up nuclear force of the DPRK is no more than despicable and cynical ploy to pass the blame upon others. The DPRK’s access to H-bomb, strategic sub-based ballistic missile and ICBM, the final gate to rounding off the national nuclear force, is the “feats” of the U.S., which has compelled it to bolster up the nuclear force through persistent nuclear blackmail. The U.S. pressure upon the DPRK by wooing China can never break the tradition of friendship sealed in blood through the anti-imperialist and anti-U.S. resistance of the peoples of the two countries. The history of traditional friendship of the two peoples, the masters and makers of history, cannot be written off no matter how impudently such gangster-like state as the U.S. behaves. In protest against the U.S. pressure, the public is becoming vocal in China that “China is not a country which carries out a decision according to the domestic law of any other country”, “China resolutely rejects other’s interference in internal affairs as a “law-governed state” and “China is maintaining the blood-sealed relations with the DPRK.” The U.S. should behave with discretion, mindful that it will meet shame and rebuff only if it calculates it could disregard self-respect of a sovereign state and the tradition of history and consider someone as its sentry and chariot run by its whip. (Jo Nam Su commentary, “U.S. Shameless Trick to Pass Buck to Others,” Rodong Shimun, July 22, 2017
North Korea’s ambassador to the United Nations had problems renewing his visa, which was delayed for nearly two months beyond its expiry, according to a diplomatic source familiar with U.S.-North Korea ties. Ja Song Nam, who has served as ambassador to the United Nations since Feb. 28, 2014, applied to extend his visa in March, before it expired on May 22, the source said. However, the renewal was only granted after North Korea raised the issue on July 13 at a closed meeting of a U.N. committee dealing with the host country. As the host, the United States is charged with issuing visas and renewals to the government officials representing the 193 member states at the international body. That paperwork is processed through the U.S. mission in New York, rather than through Washington, where the New York-based diplomats can process their renewal requests without leaving the country. A North Korean official said that no explanation was offered about why the process took so long. “We believe it’s a sort of hostile act,” the official said. When contacted by Kyodo, a U.S. mission representative declined to comment, saying visa records are considered to be confidential. Others U.N. diplomats suggested that it was “rare” for such a request to have been delayed for so long. Although the ambassador was legally able to remain in the United States, it could have become problematic if he had tried traveling abroad. Another diplomat believed that the time lag could be seen as a “message” to the country, especially in light of the heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula, with Pyongyang test-launching its first intercontinental ballistic missile on July 4. (Kyodo, “N. Korean UN Envoy’s Visa Renewal Delayed for Nearly 2 Months,” July 22, 2017)
7/23/17:
The Moon Jae-in administration has begun internal discussions on whether it is possible to replace the 1950-53 Korean War armistice with a peace treaty, sources said Sunday. The talks follow a proposal from a presidential advisory panel — the administration’s de-facto transition committee — that Moon laid the groundwork for peace on the Korean Peninsula. Sources said the Office of the Korean Peninsula and Security Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will lead the discussions. As part of a five-year policy roadmap, the committee said it was necessary to forge an agreement with North Korea on its complete denuclearization by 2020, President Moon’s fourth year in office. The committee also advised offering help to the North in freezing its nuclear program in advance; while signing a peace treaty when the program enters “the final phase for complete denuclearization.” “The government should work closely with the United States and maintain international cooperation to reach its joint goals of denuclearization and peace,” a source said.
The formal ending of the war will be impossible should North Korea keep its nuclear program.
However, critics say the Moon government is taking an unrealistic approach to resolve the nuclear issue when the North is refusing all proposals for dialogue from the South, and the U.S. is strengthening sanctions against it. They said Pyongyang appears to be unwilling to engage in dialogue and Washington seems to be against accelerating inter-Korean dialogue without its consent. “The peace treaty with North Korea must follow as part of steps to build a peace network,” said Paik Hak-soon, a senior researcher at the Sejong Institute. “And we’ll need to convince the U.S. and North Korea as well as China.” (Yi Whan-woo, “Gov’t Begins Internal Talks on Peace Treaty,” Korea Times, July 23, 2017)
Congressional leaders have reached an agreement on sweeping sanctions legislation to punish Russia for its election meddling and aggression toward its neighbors, they said Saturday, defying the White House’s argument that President Trump needs flexibility to adjust the sanctions to fit his diplomatic initiatives with Moscow. Congress has complicated his choice because the legislation also encompasses new sanctions against Iran and North Korea, two countries the administration has been eager to punish for their activities. In a statement from two California Republicans — Kevin McCarthy, the House majority leader, and Ed Royce, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee — the lawmakers said, “North Korea, Iran and Russia have in different ways all threatened their neighbors and actively sought to undermine American interests.” They added, “The bill the House will vote on next week will now exclusively focus on these nations and hold them accountable for their dangerous actions.” The House version of the bill includes a small number of changes, technical and substantive, from the Senate legislation, including some made in response to concerns raised by American energy companies. Those tweaks — and the addition of North Korea sanctions to a Senate package that included only Russia and Iran, months after the House approved sanctions against North Korea by a vote of 419 to 1 — helped end the impasse. The House version of the bill was set for a vote on Tuesday, according to McCarthy’s office. (Matt Flegenheimer and David E. Sanger, “As Congress Aims To Punish Russia, Trump Faces Bind,” New York Times, July 23, 2017,
7/24/17:
North Korea is said to be willing to hold ministerial talks with South Korea if the South allows and supports a peace treaty between Pyongyang and Washington. Besides, the North seems to have a plan to freeze its nuclear program and ultimately discuss the issue of Korean reunification. In other words, North Korea has clearly set its policy not to respond to South Korea’s proposal to hold inter-Korean military and Red Cross talks as long as the South keeps its stance as in the past. According to influential Korean and Chinese sources familiar with North Korea’s information, North Korea is ready to respond to inter-Korean talks at any time. But the biggest obstacle seems to be the fact that there aren’t much benefits in return to attract North Korea. Y, who served as a senior official in Liaoning provincial government situated on the China-North Korea border, said, “North Korea is not opposed to inter-Korean dialogue itself. It wouldn’t want to talk for nothing.” He said it’s obvious that North Korea rejected the South’s recent proposal for military talks. He claimed that the North Korea might accept the South’s offer if the South shows a positive attitude toward signing of Pyongyang-Washington peace agreement, saying, “I recently met a senior official of the North Korean Embassy. He talked about a precondition to the talks. It was South Korea’s acceptance and support for conclusion of Pyongyang-Washington peace treaty.” K, a Korean source who recently contacted a number of North Korean senior officials staying in Beijing and Dandong, had a similar opinion. “On the surface, North Korea claims that it is not open to dialogue because the South refused to repatriate 13 North Koreans restaurant workers who it claimed were abducted by South Korea. However, if South Korea does not oppose the North Korea-U.S. peace treaty, it is expected to pass the problem. I was also asked to deliver this position to the authorities,” he said. ” North Korean high-ranking officials in China insist that there is no reason to seek a nuclear program if a North Korea-U.S. peace treaty is signed. The ultimate goal of North Korea is normalization of the US-North Korea diplomacy through a peace treaty and guarantee of its system.” According to the source, since some of North Korean officials revealed that the North would be able to hold ministerial talks if the atmosphere heightens, it’s clear that North Korea has adopted a bold strategy to link the North Korea-U.S. peace agreement with the inter-Korean talks. This means that South Korea should be free from its existing framework in order to resume inter-Korean conversation. (Hong Soon-do, “North Korea Would Hold Talks If South Korea Supports Peace Treaty with US,” Asia Today, July 24, 2017)
North Koreans are becoming more independent of the ruling Kim regime, with the vast majority of households earning their living through markets rather than relying on the state, according to a new survey that attempts to shed light on ordinary life inside North Korea. The latest “micro-survey” by the Beyond Parallel project run by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that 72 percent of respondents — or 26 of the 36 North Koreans questioned — said they earned all or almost all income through the markets. Nine others said they earned more than three-quarters of their living this way, according to the survey, published today. “Of all the respondents that we talked to, the people who were most upset about the government impeding market activities were women rather than men,” said Victor Cha, who holds the Korea chair at CSIS and runs the Beyond Parallel project, which focuses on Korean unification. When asked what caused them to feel the greatest animosity toward the Kim Jong Un regime, 11 of the 16 women surveyed said low salaries or market interference. This is probably a reflection of the fact that it is overwhelmingly married women who work in the markets, while their husbands have low-paying but compulsory jobs in state factories or agencies. The finding was consistent with a 2015 survey of North Korean defectors conducted by researchers at Seoul National University. Three-quarters of respondents in that survey estimated that 70 percent or more of North Koreans were engaged in market activity or some other kind of personal business. “Second, the influence of the markets in North Korea, in terms of the percentage of household income that comes from the markets, is clearly not limited to the border areas,” Cha said. While the provinces running along the border with China are the first stop for many of the goods and ideas that come into North Korea, the mini survey found no difference in responses between border areas and other parts of the country. The only person who reported that less than three-quarters of their income came through the markets lived in Pyongyang, the capital and home to those most loyal to the regime. There are now more than 400 markets, called “jangmadang,” where ordinary North Koreans can buy and sell and keep their profits, in addition to the state-run markets, which also have grown in number under Kim’s rule. This has brought about a huge change in the way that people interact with one another and has loosened the regime’s ability to use food as a method of control, analysts say. Getting reliable information from North Korea is notoriously difficult given the restrictions on movement and information inside the totalitarian state. Beyond Parallel is trying to extract ever more information from North Koreans who live and work in the country, as opposed to the more prevalent surveys of those who have escaped from the nation. Beyond Parallel has asked a nongovernmental agency that works inside North Korea to conduct the mini-surveys, in which 36 people — 20 men and 16 women — ages 28 to 80 are polled.
They come from a variety of backgrounds — working such jobs as doctor, laborer, homemaker, factory worker and company president — and live across the country. Most of the questioning in the mini-surveys has been done in and around markets, where there is freer communication, Cha said. But, given the constraints of working in tightly controlled North Korea, the surveys are not carried out by a person with a name badge and a clipboard. Some respondents might not even know they’re being surveyed. Other subjects explored in earlier surveys have included how North Koreans think and talk about the regime in private and the broken-down government rations system. (Anna Fifield, “Markets Helping North Koreans Become More Independent of the Regime,” Washington Post, July 24, 2017)
Western researchers recently began sifting through troves of North Korean Internet data, looking for activity related to missile launches or malicious cyber activity within the famously isolated country. What they found instead surprised them. North Korea’s tiny circle of elite families — among the few people in the country with unfettered access to the Internet — turned out to be strikingly like the rest of the world in their digital habits. They use their smartphones to check Gmail, call up their Facebook accounts and browse for goods at Amazon and Alibaba, a Chinese e-commerce company, according to a report released Tuesday. “These leaders are doing many of the same things that we do when we wake up in the morning,” said Priscilla Moriuchi of Recorded Future, a threat intelligence firm that wrote the report. “They’re not isolated.” These observations apply to only a tiny sliver of North Koreans because the vast majority of the nation’s 25 million people are poor and have no access to the Internet. Even the few who have mobile devices — a number estimated as high as 4 million people — are confined to a heavily censored, government-run national network called Kwangmyong. But some North Koreans do have direct access to the Internet through universities, select businesses and perhaps the homes of top government or military officials. Whoever they are, 65 percent of their overall Internet traffic was devoted to gaming and streaming online content. Among the most popular streaming services are China’s Youku video-hosting service and iTunes. North Koreans with Internet access have a particular fondness for Baidu, a Chinese search engine and Internet services firm, as well for a multiplayer online game called World of Tanks, the researchers found. The researchers also found that few of the elites on the Internet in North Korea used virtual private networks or other tools for cloaking the origin of digital activity, although one iPad used a virtual private network “to check a Gmail account, access Google Cloud, check Facebook and MSN accounts, and view adult content,” the report found. Other people with Internet access used virtual private networks to make purchases using bitcoin, follow Twitter and upload documents to Dropbox. “If it’s real, it’s very interesting because it shows more access from North Koreans to the Internet and more access to information,” said technology journalist Martyn Williams, who runs the North Korea Tech website from his home in Northern California. Recorded Future, based in Somerville, Mass., reached its conclusions by examining data collected by Team Cymru, a nonprofit Internet security research group, between April 1 and July 6 on three sets of Internet address blocks they think are used by North Koreans. The trove of data probably did not include Internet use by foreign embassies or international groups based in the country, which typically use their own Internet links, the researchers said. But the data may have included some small amount of traffic from foreign journalists or other visitors to the country. The findings track loosely with other research showing that North Koreans are more plugged in to global information flows than commonly assumed, said Victor D. Cha, a former White House North Korea expert and now a senior adviser to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. He said interviews conducted with people living in the country have revealed alternative sources of information for North Koreans beyond government propaganda, and that people working in professional settings often speak privately of their frustrations with the regime of Kim Jong Un. “There’s a surprising level of awareness of the inadequacies of the government,” Cha said. The report by Recorded Future also shows that North Koreans are reaching the Internet through access available in India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nepal, Kenya, Mozambique and Indonesia — all countries where North Korea also has at least some small base of operations through government programs, universities or other institutions.
Recorded Future researchers said they saw a “near absence of malicious cyber activity” from the North Korean mainland in the April to July time frame, which indicated to them that the regime is conducting most of its malicious activity from abroad. U.S. intelligence analysts say that North Korea conducts most of its cyber operations from outside the country — primarily in China, but from other countries, such as Malaysia, as well. That is not to say that North Koreans don’t use online resources to communicate about missile launches or unleash cyberattacks, such as the devastating WannaCry ransomware attack in May. The National Security Agency has assessed that the attack was conducted by Pyongyang, although the U.S. government has not publicly blamed the country. But those activities happen on networks beyond the reach of the data set studied by the researchers. The intelligence analysts say that North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau, its military spy agency, has an overseas network of RGB-trained hackers and North Korean workers moonlighting as hackers. China has the single largest network of such hackers, said one analyst, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive information. Many of these individuals operate in a gray area, as legal software developers abroad who moonlight for the regime, the U.S. intelligence analysts said. “North Korean cyber activity abroad presents huge opportunities for the United States to put financial pressure on the regime via third countries to expel cyber actors and to reduce malicious cyber activity,” said one U.S. intelligence analyst. (Craig Timberg and Ellen Nakashima, “Not So Isolated: North Korean Elites Are Digitally Savvy,” Washington Post, July 25, 2017, p. A-14)
7/25/17:
North Korea will be able to field a reliable, nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile as early as next year, U.S. officials have concluded in a confidential assessment that dramatically shrinks the timeline for when Pyongyang could strike North American cities with atomic weapons. The new assessment by the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which shaves a full two years off the consensus forecast for North Korea’s ICBM program, was prompted by recent missile tests showing surprising technical advances by the country’s weapons scientists, at a pace beyond what many analysts believed was possible for the isolated communist regime. The U.S. projection closely mirrors revised predictions by South Korean intelligence officials, who also have watched with growing alarm as North Korea has appeared to master key technologies needed to loft a warhead toward targets thousands of miles away. The finding further increases the pressure on U.S. and Asian leaders to halt North Korea’s progress before Pyongyang can threaten the world with nuclear-tipped missiles. President Trump, during his visit to Poland this month, vowed to confront North Korea “very strongly” to stop its missile advances. The DIA has concluded that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will be able to produce a “reliable, nuclear-capable ICBM” program sometime in 2018, meaning that by next year the program will have advanced from prototype to assembly line, according to officials familiar with the document. Already, the aggressive testing regime put in place in recent months has allowed North Korea to validate its basic designs, putting it within a few months of starting industrial production, the officials said. The DIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to address any classified assessments. But Scott Bray, ODNI’s national intelligence manager for East Asia, said in a statement: “North Korea’s recent test of an intercontinental range ballistic missile — which was not a surprise to the intelligence community — is one of the milestones that we have expected would help refine our timeline and judgments on the threats that Kim Jong Un poses to the continental United States. This test, and its impact on our assessments, highlight the threat that North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs pose to the United States, to our allies in the region, and to the whole world. The intelligence community is closely monitoring the expanding threat from North Korea.” One of the few remaining technical hurdles is the challenge of atmospheric “reentry” — the ability to design a missile that can pass through the upper atmosphere without damage to the warhead. Long regarded as a formidable technological barrier for impoverished North Korea, that milestone could be reached, beginning with new tests expected to take place within days, U.S. analysts said. U.S. officials have detected signs that North Korea is making final preparations for testing a new reentry vehicle, perhaps as early as July 27, a North Korean national holiday marking the end of the Korean War. “They’re on track to do that, essentially this week,” said a U.S. official familiar with the intelligence report who, like others, insisted on anonymity to discuss sensitive military assessments. North Korea has not yet demonstrated an ability to build a miniaturized nuclear warhead that could be carried by one of its missiles. Officials there last year displayed a sphere-shaped device the regime described as a miniaturized warhead, but there has been no public confirmation that this milestone has been achieved. Preparations reportedly have been underway for several months for what would be the country’s sixth underground atomic test. The last one, in September, had an estimated yield of 20 to 30 kilotons, more than double the explosive force of any previous test. “There has been alarming progress,” said Joseph DeTrani, the former mission manager for North Korea for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and a former special envoy for negotiations with Pyongyang. “In the last year they have gained capabilities that they didn’t have, including ones that we thought they would not have been able to obtain for years.” The July 4 missile test also caught South Korea’s intelligence service off guard, prompting a hasty revision of forecasts, according to South Korean lawmakers who have received closed-door briefings. “The speed of North Korea’s ICBM missile development is faster than the South Korean Defense Ministry expected,” said lawmaker Lee Cheol-hee of the left-wing Minjoo party, who attended an intelligence committee briefing after the July 4 test. The South Korean government, which is actively trying to engage the regime in Pyongyang, has declined to call the most recent test a success. North Korea still has not proved it has mastered some of the steps needed to build a reliable ICBM, most notably the reentry vehicle, Lee said. Still, officials across the political spectrum acknowledged that North Korea is rapidly gaining ground. “Now they are approaching the final stage of being a nuclear power and the owner of an ICBM,” said Cha Du-hyeogn, who served as an adviser to conservative former president Lee Myung-bak. U.S. spy agencies have detected multiple signals that North Korea is preparing to test a reentry vehicle. Analysts believe that the July 4 test was intended to demonstrate range — the ability of its new two-stage ICBM prototype to reach altitude and distance milestones — while the new launch will seek to validate engineering features designed to protect the warhead as it passes through the upper atmosphere and then is delivered to a distant target. The latest designs appear to cobble together older systems — including portions of a missile frame used to launch satellites into orbit — with a more advanced engine that North Korea began testing earlier this year. Much of the technology is based on old Soviet-era designs that have been reworked by what U.S. experts describe as an increasingly capable cadre of homegrown engineers, goaded along by a leadership that has pursued nuclear weapons and delivery systems with single-minded zeal.
Kim vowed in January to successfully test a nuclear-capable ICBM in 2017, achieving a long-sought goal that North Koreans believe will serve as the ultimate deterrent against threats to the communist regime’s survival. At the time, the U.S. intelligence community’s formal assessment still held that a credible ICBM threat would not emerge until 2020 at the earliest. “North Korea’s timeline moved faster than we expected,” said the U.S. official familiar with the new DIA assessment. “We weren’t expecting an ICBM test in July.” Former U.S. officials and weapons experts said a successful test of a nuclear-capable ICBM would dramatically raise the stakes in the North Korean crisis, putting new pressure on North Korea’s neighbors and increasing the risk of miscalculation. “The danger is that decision time and warning is greatly reduced when North Korea has the weapons, and that escalation can happen quickly,” said Jon Wolfsthal, senior director for arms control and nonproliferation with the Obama administration’s National Security Council. The specter of a nuclear-armed, ICBM-capable Kim “takes the risk to a new level but does not change the nature of the threat we have faced for some time,” Wolfsthal said. “We have to deter North Korea from ever using any nuclear weapons and make clear that any move to use these weapons is suicide.” (Ellen Nakashima, Anna Fifield and Joby Warrick, “N. Korea on Fast Track to Nuclear Missile,” Washington Post, July 26, 2017 p. A-1) U.S. officials said they have seen increased North Korean activity that could be preparations for another missile test within days. The officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that over the past week intelligence has spotted equipment, possibly for launching an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or an intermediate-range missile, moving into a site in the western city of Kusong. Earlier this month, reclusive North Korea, which regularly threatens to destroy the United States and South Korea, said it had conducted its first test of an ICBM and mastered the technology needed to deploy a nuclear warhead via the missile. Pyongyang’s state media said the test verified the atmospheric re-entry of the warhead, which experts say may be able to reach the U.S. state of Alaska. However, the vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recently said the July 4 test stopped short of showing North Korea has the ability to strike the United States “with any degree of accuracy.” The Washington Post reported today that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIAL), the Pentagon spy agency, has assessed that North Korea will be able to field a nuclear-capable ICBM by next year, earlier than previously thought. According to two U.S. officials, however, some other analysts who study North Korea’s missile program do not agree with the DIAL assessment. “DIA and the South Koreans tend to be at the leading edge of estimates on North Korea’s military programs, and that’s understandable,” said one of the U.S. officials, who both agreed to speak only on the condition of anonymity. “There is no question that the DPRK has moved further and faster with its effort to develop a reliable, nuclear-capable ICBM that can be built in quantity, but there are still doubts about whether it can cross that threshold in a year.” A second U.S. official familiar with the science of ICBMs said that North Korea still has not demonstrated the ability to design and build nuclear warheads small enough to be delivered on its long-range missiles and tough enough to survive re-entry into the atmosphere. A third official said that even if Pyongyang develops a workable ICBM from its “tinker-toy mix of old Russian missiles,” it would pose a threat to the United States and its allies only if North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s regime is suicidal. Speaking in Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang said on Wednesday he was aware of the reports of a possible new North Korean missile test. U.N. resolutions were clear when it came to North Korean missile launches and China opposed any move that ran counter to them, Lu told reporters. “We hope all sides can bear in mind the broad situation of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and exercise restraint,” he added. (Idrees Ali and John Walcott, “North Korea Could Carry out Missile Test Soon: U.S. Officials,” Reuters, July 26, 2017)
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s answer to question put by KCNA “over the fact that the director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) dared to talk about “removal of the supreme leadership” of the DPRK: On July 20, the U.S. CIA Director Pompeo mentioned impertinently, at a security forum hosted by a civilian organization, about the “removal of the supreme leadership” of the DPRK, saying that what is most dangerous about the north Korean nuclear issue is the character who holds the control over the nuclear weapons and that the intelligence community and the Department of Defense are figuring out the way to separate the weapons from someone who might well have intent to use them. Although his reckless remarks are just balderdash of a guy who has become so angrily desperate due to the ever-increasing nuclear strike capability of the DPRK, they have gone over the line, and it has now become clear that the ultimate aim of the Trump administration’s hostile policy towards the DPRK is the “regime change” in the DPRK. That the person who is supposed to be in charge of all foreign intelligence in the U.S., harbors an illusion that it could separate our army and people from our supreme leadership is an expression of his illiteracy about the DPRK and an explicit illustration of incompetence of the U.S. intelligence community. The successive U.S. administrations could not but fail in the DPRK-U.S. confrontation. That is also attributable to the “merits” of such stupid intelligence community of the U.S. Our army and people have never thought about their destiny and future separated from their supreme leadership. The first and foremost mission of our revolutionary armed forces with the nuclear force as their backbone is to defend the leader at the cost of their lives. The DPRK legally stipulates that if the supreme dignity of the DPRK is threatened, it must preemptively annihilate those countries and entities that are directly or indirectly involved in it, by mobilizing all kinds of strike means including the nuclear ones. We will find out and smash all those who intend to do something against our supreme leadership, wherever they are. This is an immutable and indomitable will of the army and people of the DPRK. We once again felt deep in our hearts from the reckless remarks of the CIA director how just it was that we have achieved the great historic cause of completing the nuclear force by overcoming all difficulties and trials. Should the U.S. dare to show even the slightest sign of attempt to remove our supreme leadership, we will strike a merciless blow at the heart of the U.S. with our powerful nuclear hammer, honed and hardened over time. The likes of Pompeo will bitterly experience the catastrophic and miserable consequences caused by having dared to shake their little fists at the supreme leadership, our eternal sun and everything of life for our nation.” (KCNA, “DPRK FM Spokesman Slams CIA Director’s Remarks,” July 25, 2017)
The US may target Chinese companies as part of new North Korea sanctions, an administration official said, even as diplomats are working with Beijing at the UN to reach a new international agreement. Speaking to a US Senate Foreign Affairs subcommittee, Susan Thornton, acting assistant secretary of the State Department’s East Asia bureau, said “the Chinese are now very clear that we’re going to go after Chinese entities if need be.” Thornton’s testimony came as the House of Representatives was voting on a sweeping bill with new sanctions targeting Russia, Iran and North Korea. Her comments show the delicate balancing act President Donald Trump’s administration is walking on North Korea, where China is both a key ally for bringing pressure to bear on Pyongyang, but also a major potential target for sanctions designed to limit North Korean trade and imports. Speaking to reporters Tuesday, the US ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley said progress was being made with China on new international sanctions targeting North Korea. “We’re constantly in touch with China … things are moving but it’s still too early to tell how far they’ll move,” she told reporters. “The true test will be what (the Chinese) have worked out with Russia (and whether) Russia comes and tries to pull out of that.” Tong Zhao, an analyst at the Carnegie Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, said that while China has long been supportive of sanctions, confusion about the ultimate policies both countries are pursuing remains. “The US strategy only makes sense to China if the ultimate US objective is to directly threaten the stability of the North Korean regime through a comprehensive economic embargo,” he said. “China has big concerns about that approach, but on the other hand US officials have also repeatedly said they are not trying to threaten the regime.” Apparent contradiction between statements and action causes confusion, Zhao said. He added the two countries “need to stop focusing on debating the specific tactics” and instead focus on overall strategy and goals with regard to North Korea. Even as Washington attempts to thread the needle on North Korean sanctions, some analysts argue they won’t have much effect. “If Kim and his generals have to tighten their belts, the nuclear and missile programs are about the last things they will cut,” John Delury, an expert at the Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies in Seoul, wrote for CNN Opinion in December. “On the contrary, in the absence of diplomatic talks and under intensified pressure, Pyongyang is likely to double-down on its nuclear deterrent, which it sees as its best guarantee of national security and regime survival.” Thornton echoed Delury’s comments today, even as she called for greater implementation of sanctions against North Korea. “North Korea has no intention of abandoning its nuclear program in the current environment,” she said. “North Korea will not give up its weapons in exchange for talks, even with economic concessions that provide sorely needed assistance to the North Korean people.” Washington, she added, would also not consider talks at this time, despite calls for just this from Beijing and Seoul. “We will not negotiate our way to talks,” Thornton said. That has led some to advocate for a military option, with Trump’s CIA director Mike Pompeo last week appearing to indicate support for regime change in Pyongyang — something Thornton said the State Department was not pursuing. (James Griffiths, “Does Sanctions Bill Risk US-China Relationship?” CNN, July 26, 2017) The United States is making progress in talks with North Korean ally China on imposing new United Nations sanctions on Pyongyang over its latest missile test, but Russia’s engagement will be the “true test,” U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley said. The United States gave China a draft resolution nearly three weeks ago to impose stronger sanctions on North Korea over the July 4 missile launch. Haley had been aiming for a vote by the 15-member Security Council within weeks, senior diplomats said. “We’re constantly in touch with China … Things are moving but it’s still too early to tell how far they’ll move,” Haley said today, adding that she was pleased with China’s initial response to the U.S. proposal because it showed “seriousness.” “We know that China’s been sharing and negotiating with Russia, so as long as they are doing that, we’re going to continue to watch this closely to make sure it is a strong resolution,” she told reporters. China’s U.N. Ambassador Liu Jieyi told reporters: “We are making progress, it requires time, but we’re working very hard.” Speaking in Beijing on July 26, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang said any United Nations’ moves should help ensure peace, stability and denuclearization. “All sides need to maintain pressure, and also work hard to ease the tense situation on the peninsula as soon as possible, creating a beneficial environment and atmosphere for resuming contacts and talks,” Lu told a daily news briefing. Traditionally, the United States and China have negotiated sanctions on North Korea before formally involving other council members, though diplomats said Washington informally keeps Britain and France in the loop. Along with Russia, those five countries are veto-wielding Security Council members. “The true test will be what (the Chinese) have worked out with Russia (and whether) Russia comes and tries to pull out of that,” said Haley. China’s Ambassador to Washington Cui Tiankai said today that Beijing objected to secondary sanctions. In June, the United States blacklisted two Chinese citizens and a shipping company for helping North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. “Such actions are unacceptable. They have severely impaired China-U.S. cooperation on the Korean nuclear issue, and give rise to more questions about the true intention of the U.S.,” he told the Institute for China-America Studies in Washington. (Michelle Nichols, “U.S. Says Progress on Sanctions with China, True Test Is Russia,” Reuters, July 25, 2017) In retrospect, said Vladimir Bogdanov, it wasn’t the best time to start the first passenger-ship service between Russia and North Korea shortly before Kim Jong Un shocked the world by announcing he’s successfully tested a missile capable of striking the U.S. mainland. “We were in a hurry, thinking we’d be too late. We should have slowed down,” said Bogdanov, who’s organized nine trips since May between Russia’s far east port of Vladivostok and Rajin in North Korea’s Rason special economic zone. “Still, there’s no turning back” for the service, which is loss-making so far after filling at best a quarter of its 193 places each time, he said. Economic ties between Russia and North Korea, which share a narrow land border, are similarly beleaguered, with trade down for a third year to just $77 million in 2016, according to the Russian customs service. While the volume is small, it’s becoming a point of tension between President Vladimir Putin and his U.S. counterpart Donald Trump, who’s pressing Russia and other powers to ramp up opposition to the Communist regime’s nuclear-missile program. Russia regards the trade relationship as a means to safeguard its position with Kim in diplomacy to try to defuse the crisis on the Korean peninsula. “We can’t afford to argue with North Korea because it will completely cast Russia to the sidelines,” said Georgy Toloraya, head of the Russian Academy of Science’s Center for Asian Strategy. “Our interests will not be considered” if North Korea sees Russia siding with the U.S., he said. Putin is unwilling to isolate North Korea completely. He opposes tougher sanctions because he believes they won’t affect the North Korean leadership, said two senior Kremlin officials, who asked not to be identified discussing internal policy. The U.S. is pressing Russia to end a program for taking 30,000 to 50,000 North Korean migrant workers, in order to “deprive Kim Jong Un of all his money,” Toloraya said. “This is what they demand from Russia right now, very actively.” Any country that hosts North Korean workers “is aiding and abetting a dangerous regime” that’s “a global threat,” U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said after Kim announced the successful missile test on July 4. “Russia has never been a supporter of dialogue by sanctions,” which is a “futile approach,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters in April. That position hasn’t changed after Putin and Trump met at this month’s Group of 20 summit, he said. While Trump and Putin had “a pretty good exchange on North Korea,” they differ in tactics and pace for dealing with the threat, Tillerson said after the Hamburg talks. Russian diplomat Oleg Burmistrov presented proposals for resolving the confrontation during a visit to North Korea this week, the Interfax news service reported today, citing a Foreign Ministry source it didn’t identify. North Korean officials told him they won’t negotiate its nuclear or ballistic-missile programs unless the U.S. “terminates its hostile policy,” according to the state-run Korean Central News Agency. Russia and China blocked U.S.-led efforts to expand penalties against North Korea in a draft United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the missile test. While Trump has accused China of doing too little to pressure its neighbor, officials in Beijing said they’ve been “strictly abiding” by U.N. sanctions and that imports from North Korea fell 13.2 percent to $880 million in the first six months of 2017 compared to a year earlier. “No one has any real leverage on North Korea to convince them to give up nuclear weapons, including the Chinese,” Alexander Gabuev of the Moscow Carnegie Center said. Kim’s regime may earn $30-$50 million a year from the migrant workers, who labor in remote Russian forest camps or on construction sites, he said. Russian imports from North Korea slumped to just $421,000 in the first quarter of 2017 from the same period last year, while exports, mainly of foodstuffs and fuel, more than doubled to $31.4 million, according to customs service data. Nobody knows the real level of trade since many goods go via third countries, though it may be worth $500 million, according to Toloraya. Migrant workers take the boat between Vladivostok and Rajin alongside Russian and Chinese visitors, according to Bogdanov, who said his business was contracted to run the route by a Hong Kong-registered company through an entity in North Korea that he didn’t identify. The service may break even in a few months and will continue even amid the U.S. demands for isolating North Korea, he said. “We’re not afraid of Trump,” said Bogdanov. “We see the unanimity of Russia and China in pursuing the route to peace. And our poorly-painted little ship is also a path of peace.” (Ilya Arkhipov, “Putin Defies Trump on North Korea,” Bloomberg, July 26, 2017)
The U.S. House of Representatives overwhelming passed legislation that authorizes measures against exports of crude oil to Pyongyang as well as North Korean forced labor overseas and online gambling as part of a larger package of sanctions bills also targeting Iran and Russia. The House voted 419-3 in support of bipartisan legislation referred to as the “Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act,” against Russia, Iran and North Korea. This legislation encompasses the “Korean Interdiction and Modernization of Sanctions Act” on Pyongyang, passed in May by the House in vote of 419-1, which seeks to bolster the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions and cut off cash used for the regime’s weapons of mass destruction programs. The bill penalizes anyone who “knowingly, directly or indirectly, sold, transferred, or otherwise provided significant amounts of crude oil, condensates, refined petroleum, other types of petroleum or petroleum byproducts, liquefied natural gas, or other natural gas resources to the government of North Korea,” with some exceptions for humanitarian uses. China, Pyongyang’s main trading partner, is the main supplier of crude oil to North Korea, and Washington has been seeking to restrict oil exports to North Korea in the UN Security Council. Amid other efforts to limit the flow of foreign currency that may be funneled into North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, the bill prohibits the supporting of North Korean government’s commercial activities over the internet, including online gambling. It also authorizes sanctions against people involved in the forced labor and slavery overseas of North Koreans and further prohibits “significant goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part” by North Korea from entering any ports of the United States. The bill calls for a report assessing the extent of cooperation between North Korea and Iran related to nuclear and ballistic missile development, or their chemical or biological weapons development and conventional weapons programs. This bill also prevents President Donald Trump from lifting sanctions on Russia without congressional approval. It has been referred to the Senate. Republican Rep. Ed Royce of California, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, told the floor, “These three regimes, in different parts of the world, are threatening vital U.S. interests and destabilizing their neighbors. It is well past time that we forcefully respond.” “Believe me, these sanctions are going to have very real impact,” Royce told Fox News the same day. He pushed for cutting off “all the hard currency going into North Korea,” referring to Washington’s sanctions on the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia for its role in laundering money for North Korea in 2005. “They didn’t have the hard currency to go forward. We need that kind of strength and action at this point in time.” White House spokeswoman Sarah Huckabee Sanders said in a briefing, “While the president supports tough sanctions on North Korea, Iran and Russia, the White House is reviewing the House legislation and awaits a final legislative package for the president’s desk.” Washington also plans to blacklist additional entities in China “fairly soon” for their ties with North Korea’s weapons programs, said Susan Thornton, acting assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, at a hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy. “I think the Chinese are now very clear that we’re going to go after Chinese entities if need be, if we find them to be in violation, and if the Chinese feel they can’t cooperate in going after those targets”. The Trump administration has been urging China to exert it unique leverage over North Korea as its main economic and diplomatic benefactor. Thornton said, “But we are perfectly prepared to act on our own.” While Washington has not relisted North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, the latest bill urges a reassessment, and Thornton said Washington is still reviewing this. (Sarah Kim, “U.S. reps Try Block Oil to North,” JoongAng Ilbo, July 25, 2017)
North Korea’s state-sponsored hackers are increasingly going after money rather than secrets, according to a report published today by a South Korean government-backed institute. Cybersecurity experts have noticed a shift in the hacking attacks they suspected were mounted by North Korea. In the last few years, North Korean hackers seem to have become more interested in stealing cash, the Financial Security Institute said in its report. The report said North Korean-linked hackers were behind the recent digital theft of $81 million from Bangladesh’s central bank. The North Koreans also tried to breach Polish banks, leaving traces that led anti-hacking experts to believe the hacking group also planned to steal money from more than 100 other organizations around the world. North Korea is isolated, impoverished and desperately short of foreign currency to pay for imports. Even so, it has trained a large army of hackers, originally as an inexpensive means of espionage, sabotage and propaganda, but now also as a moneymaker. The Russian cybersecurity firm Kaspersky Lab has identified a hacking group called Bluenoroff that it says is to blame for attacks on foreign financial institutions, like those in Poland and Bangladesh. Bluenoroff is said to be an offshoot of Lazarus, the North Korea-linked hacking group implicated in earlier attacks. The new report identified another Lazarus spinoff, which it named Andariel, and said that group was responsible for at least seven hacking attacks on banks, defense contractors and other businesses in South Korea over the last two years. (The names Lazarus and Andariel apparently refer to characters in a video game called Diablo.) ”Bluenoroff and Andariel share their common root,” the report said. “If Bluenoroff has attacked financial firms around the world, Andariel focuses on businesses and government agencies in South Korea using methods tailored for the country.” The report said the Andariel group had increasingly shifted from destructive attacks on computer networks to crimes like stealing bank-card data and using it to draw cash from bank customers’ accounts or selling the data on the black market. The group also used malware to cheat at online poker and on other gambling websites. “Andariel is believed to focus on earning hard currency,” the report said. The Financial Security Institute, which is financed by the South Korean government, cautioned that the report was partly conjectural and did not represent an official view. South Korean cybersecurity officials began detecting attacks attributed to North Korean hackers around 2009. North Korea is now believed to have 1,700 state-sponsored hackers, aided by more than 5,000 supervisors, trainers and other support staff, South Korean officials estimate. The hackers typically do their work abroad, taking legitimate software programming or other jobs in China, Southeast Asia or Europe and waiting for instructions from Pyongyang to mount an assault, they said. Going abroad is a rare privilege for North Koreans, and those who are allowed to work outside the country are required to send the government a quota of foreign currency every year, according to North Korean defectors. North Korea has been accused of illicit moneymaking schemes to pay for its huge military, its nuclear weapons program and its leaders’ luxurious lifestyle, including gunrunning, drug trafficking and counterfeiting. As the United Nations has tightened sanctions and made those avenues more difficult, cyberattacks have loomed larger as a source of cash. Some hacking experts suspect North Korean involvement in the recent wave of global ransomware attacks. North Korea has denied any involvement in hacking attacks, accusing South Korea and the United States of slander. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Tries to Make Hacking a Profit Center,” New York Times, July 27, 2017)
After an intense battle with the White House over his first choice to become the top US diplomat to Asia, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is considering a new candidate with a deep resumé in business and economics but little diplomatic experience, BuzzFeed News has learned. Tillerson’s consideration of a new candidate underscores the limited options he faces between an adversarial White House and a Congress adamant that he fill a State Department replete with vacancies six months into the presidency. Olin Wethington, a former Treasury Department official and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council, is now a contender for the nomination of assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, four individuals familiar with the matter said. If nominated and confirmed, Wethington’s portfolio would include some of Washington’s most sensitive national security issues, including the accelerating nuclear weapons program of North Korea, China’s growing naval posture in the South China Sea, and heightened tensions between Beijing and Taiwan over a new US arms sale to the island. A senior State Department official cautioned that no nominees have completed the vetting process and the State Department has no new appointments to announce. The official also said three other individuals are under consideration for the position. Tillerson originally wanted the job to go to Susan Thornton, a veteran diplomat who speaks Mandarin Chinese, two US officials told BuzzFeed News. But White House officials opposed her due to concerns that her views were out of step with the president’s agenda — a claim State Department officials deny. Tillerson’s anger over the White House’s objection to Thornton and his other picks boiled over in a June meeting at the White House when he “ripped into” Johnny DeStefano, the head of the presidential personnel office, a US official said. Details of that meeting were first reported by Politico. The former Exxon Mobil CEO, used to having absolute authority over staffing decisions, told DeStefano that the president had given him autonomy over staffing decisions and that he knew best who to hire in Foggy Bottom. The explosive nature of the exchange prompted Jared Kushner to inform Tillerson’s chief of staff, Margaret Peterlin, that Tillerson’s outburst was unprofessional and unacceptable. On July 23, CNN reported that Tillerson has told some of his close friends that he may quit his position by the end of the year due to his frustrations with White House interference, citing anonymous sources. Tillerson’s senior aide RC Hammond denied the story, telling BuzzFeed News the secretary is determined to carry out the president’s agenda. “As long as there are rogue regimes pursuing nuclear weapons or terrorists seeking safe haven the secretary will remain on the job,” Hammond said. Ultimately, in shifting to Wethington, Tillerson appears to be acquiescing to the White House, which has shown a preference for appointments with a strong business background over career diplomatic experience. The challenge for Wethington would be taking on a job that is much more diplomatic in nature than his previous positions at Commerce and Treasury. “Wethington’s overall policy orientation is good — he’s just going to have a high learning curve on security and political issues,” said Scott Kennedy, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. There is a risk, Kennedy noted, when an assistant secretary comes in without detailed knowledge and experience on issues of language and diplomacy related to highly sensitive issues such as Taiwan, South China Sea, and North Korea. Wethington is the founder and chairman of Wethington International, a firm that focuses on investment and business advisory in emerging markets. He met Tillerson recently and the meeting “went well,” said one person familiar with the vetting process. Another acquaintance of Wethington said “he’s been around talking to people about taking the job so it’s pretty far along.” The source noted that one factor that may delay an appointment announcement is the process of disentangling Wethington’s investments to avoid conflicts of interest. “He worked for some real businesses where he probably accumulated stock,” said the person. When asked about a pending nomination, Wethington told BuzzFeed News, “I have no comment.” Wethington’s supporters said his deep familiarity with the region from his work at Treasury and the private sector will be a major asset. “It’s good to have someone who really knows Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia,” said Doug Paal, an Asia scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “He’s got a real depth of experience on the financial and economic side that’s really important to the partners out there.” A State Department official said Thornton’s nomination was jeopardized by her status as a career foreign service officer, a cohort some White House officials see as reluctant supporters of the president’s “America First” agenda at best. A White House official denied that being career service had anything to do with it and said the Oval Office’s resistance was purely due to policy differences. Thornton, who is currently serving as acting assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, did support the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the massive trade pact forged under President Barack Obama that Trump withdrew the US from and called “a rape of our country.” But a review of Wethington’s past scholarship shows he too supported the agreement. “The Trans-Pacific Partnership represents the kind of forward-looking leadership the United States must be exerting,” Wethington wrote in a June 2015 report. “The TPP is strategically important because it incentivizes others to follow our rules.” Kennedy suggested that the White House may be looking for a nominee who’s more willing to risk a major escalation with Beijing. Thornton is “not a panda hugger,” Kennedy said, using a term for analysts sympathetic to the Beijing government. “But she believes in extensive diplomacy and long term approaches and integration in the global system as an approach toward China,” he said. “So if you wanted to take a harder line approach she could talk to you about the challenges of that — and that probably wouldn’t be her approach.” Hammond said the secretary “holds Susan in the highest regard” and credited her with having a very positive impact in the early months of the Trump administration. (John Hudson, “After Heated Clash with White House, Tillerson Eyes New Pick for Top Asia Envoy,” BuzzFeed News, “July 25, 2017)
7/28/17:
KCNA: “The second test-fire of ICBM Hwasong-14 was successfully carried out at night of July 28, Juche 106 (2017) under the supervision of Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army. Kim Jong Un guided the test-fire on the spot. He, who is always bringing about ceaseless miracles and victories, baffling imagination of the world people with his rare military wisdom, great guts and stratagem, set forth the militant task for the rocket research field to conduct another test-fire simulating the maximum range of Hwasong-14 at an early date to prove once again the reliability of the whole rocket-system. The scientists and technicians in the field of defense industry, loyalists of the Party sharing the intention, breath and step with the leader with the absolute trust in it, rounded off earlier than scheduled the preparations for the second test-fire of Hwasong-14 through decisive campaign with confidence and will to fully demonstrate the powerful might of the strategic nuclear force of the WPK. During the preparation period, respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un received report about the preparations and gave detailed instructions every day. At night of Friday he visited the rocket-launching site to guide the test-fire on the spot. The test-launch was aimed to finally confirm the overall technological specifications of the weapon system of Hwasong-14 capable of carrying large-sized heavy nuclear warhead, including its maximum range. By order of the Supreme Leader, the inter-continental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14 loaded with the tremendous might of heroic Korea roared into space, leaving a column of flames behind. The rocket that blasted off from the northwestern part of the DPRK reached an altitude of 3, 724.9km and flew 998km for 47 minutes and 12 seconds before landing in the target waters in the open sea. The test-fire was carried out at the maximum angle launch system for the maximum range, and had no adverse effect on the security of the neighboring countries. The test also reconfirmed the specific features of the rocket system such as the rocket’s separation from its launching pad, stage-separation, structural system, etc. which were confirmed at the first test-fire, and confirmed the performing features of motors whose number has increased to guarantee the maximum range in the active-flight stage as well as the accuracy and reliability of the improved guidance and stability system. The attitude control features of heavy warhead in the middle flight stage after the separation of warhead were reconfirmed, and the accurate guidance and attitude control of warhead was ensured at the atmospheric reentry at the angle launch system harsher than the actual maximum range flying conditions. The structural stability of warhead was maintained and the warhead explosion control device showed normal operation even at the thousands of degrees of Centigrade. Expressing great satisfaction over the results of the test-fire of ICBM which proved to be a perfect and big success without an inch of error, Kim Jong Un highly praised the scientists, technicians and officials in the field of rocket research and gave them special thanks in the name of the Party Central Committee. The test-fire reconfirmed the reliability of ICBM system, demonstrated the capability of making surprise launch of ICBM in any region and place any time, and clearly proved that the whole U.S. mainland is in the firing range of the DPRK missiles, he said with pride. The maximum range simulation test-fire of ICBM conducted by the DPRK today is meant to send a grave warning to the U.S. making senseless remarks, being lost to reason, he said, adding this would make the policy-makers of the U.S. properly understand that the U.S., an aggression-minded state, would not go scot-free if it dares provoke the DPRK. The U.S. trumpeting about war and extreme sanctions and threat against the DPRK only emboldens the latter and offers a better excuse for its access to nukes, he said, stressing: To the Korean people who experienced disastrous disturbances of war on this land by the beast-like U.S. imperialists, the powerful war deterrence for defending the state is an inevitable strategic option and it is a precious strategic asset that cannot be bartered for anything. If the Yankees brandish the nuclear stick on this land again despite our repeated warnings, we will clearly teach them manners with the nuclear strategic force which we had shown them one by one, he emphasized. Kim Jong Un warmly congratulated the scientists and technicians in the field of rocket research who demonstrated once again the independent prestige and dignity of Juche nuclear power, the world-level rocket power by succeeding in the second test-launch of ICBM Hwasong-14. He, taking them in his arms, had a photo session with them which will go down in history. The DPRK, advancing along the new line of the great Workers’ Party of Korea on simultaneously developing the two fronts, will develop much more the most powerful strategic weapons, Juche weapons which will display the invincible might of Juche Korea and its inexhaustible potentiality of development to the world until the U.S. and its vassal forces trying to undermine the DPRK’s dignity and its right to existence are eliminated, and will achieve the final victory in the showdown with the imperialists and the U.S. without fail. Accompanying him were Ri Pyong Chol, Kim Rak Gyom, Kim Jong Sik, Jang Chang Ha, Jon Il Ho, Yu Jin and Jo Yong Won.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Guides Second Test-Fire of the ICBM Hwasong-14,” July 29, 2017)
North Korea has taken another step toward achieving its stated goal of being able to send a nuclear weapon to the U.S. mainland, apparently firing another ballistic missile late today. It was not immediately clear whether the missile was capable of reaching the continental United States, but the fact that it flew for some 45 minutes suggested it had an even longer range than the intercontinental ballistic missile that North Korea launched on July 4, analysts said. The Pentagon and South Korea’s joint chiefs of staff both said they had detected the launch, which occurred today at about 11:11 p.m. North Korea time(10:41 a.m. Eastern time). The late-night launch was unusual as North Korea usually fires missiles soon after dawn. “I can confirm that we detected a launch of a ballistic missile from North Korea. We are assessing and will have more information soon,” Navy Capt. Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman, said. The missile was launched from Jagang province in northwestern North Korea, near the border with China, South Korea’s joint chiefs said. President Moon Jae-in convened an emergency national security meeting. In Tokyo, chief cabinet secretary Suga Yoshihide said the missile landed within Japan’s exclusive economic zone, and he condemned the latest launch. “We cannot tolerate North Korea’s repeated provocations like this,” Suga told a news conference convened early July 29 at 1 a.m. Tokyo time. “We have made a strong protest to North Korea and condemned this act in the strongest terms.” A launch had been anticipated. Not only has Kim Jong Un repeatedly said he wants a nuclear-tipped missile that can reach the United States, but U.S. intelligence agencies in recent days had spotted preparations for another test. On July 26, the day before the anniversary of the end of the 1950-1953 Korean War, North Korea threatened to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against the United States. “If enemies misunderstand our strategic status and stick to options of staging a preemptive nuclear attack against us, we will launch a nuclear attack on America’s heart as the most relentless punishment without warning or prior notice,” Pak Yong Sik, North Korea’s defense minister, said at a ceremony to mark the conclusion of the Korean War, which ended in an armistice but which Pyongyang claims it won. The test comes barely three weeks after North Korea fired its first missile technically capable of reaching the United States, launched as July 4 dawned in Asia. That missile, which North Korea called the Hwasong-14 (or Mars-14), was fired from Panghyon, a northwestern part of the country not far from the border with China, and flew to an altitude of 1,741 miles – seven times as high as the International Space Station. It landed 577 miles from its launch site, splashing down in the sea between the Korean Peninsula and Japan. If fired on a trajectory designed to maximize its range, rather than a “lofted” flight path, the missile could have flown 4,970 miles, according to the missile defense project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think-tank. That would put Hawaii and Alaska within reach. But analysts at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in California have suggested that the missile was capable of reaching New York City. Jeffrey Lewis, head of the East Asia program at CNS, said that if this was an ICBM test, it would have been designed to demonstrate that North Korea could hit more of the mainland United States. “My guess is that they want to show more range,” Lewis said, adding that North Korea was essentially calling the Pentagon’s bluff. “We basically dared them to do this. We said, ‘It’s not really an ICBM until it can hit Alaska,’ and they’re like, ‘okay.'” The Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency has shaved two full years off the consensus forecast for North Korea’s ICBM program, now estimating that North Korea will be able to field a reliable, nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile as early as next year. The aggressive testing schedule has already allowed North Korea to validate its basic designs, putting it within a few months of starting industrial production, the officials said. The July 4 test, which violates United Nations resolutions against North Korea, was met with the usual rounds of international condemnation, but the world has not found a way to persuade North Korea to stop. The United States has been leading the charge for more and more sanctions against North Korea, but Russia and China – both veto-wielding permanent members of the U.N. Security Council – have been reluctant to impose painful measures and are instead calling for a “de-escalation plan” to deal with Pyongyang. The United States won’t know anything about North Korea’s intentions unless it engages the regime seriously and at length, said Sharon Squassoni, head of the proliferation prevention program at CSIS. “Kim Jong Un does seem hell-bent on acquiring the capability to reach the United States with nuclear weapons,” she said. “Although some experts judge this means he will never negotiate, it could also mean that he’s looking for the capability that forces the United States to the table.” The Trump administration needs to commit resources and real expertise to reshaping peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, she said. Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, agreed that sanctions alone will not change North Korea’s behavior. “A deployed North Korean ICBM is not inevitable, but it will be if policymakers in Washington keep putting the cart before the horse and demanding Pyongyang meet onerous preconditions to begin talks,” she said. The Trump administration, like the Obama administration before it, has said that North Korea must agree to freeze its weapons program before talks can begin. “Washington’s diplomacy deficit is further compounded by the dangerous illusion that sanctions alone will push North Korea to negotiate,” Davenport said, “when the Trump administration and Congress should be focused on signaling support for talks without conditions.” (Anna Fifield, “North Korea Fires Another Missile, Its Latest Step toward Putting the U.S. within Reach, Washington Post, July 28, 2017)
Elleman: “With its second—apparently successful—flight test of the Hwasong-14 on July 28, North Korea may soon be able to field an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). However, a number of critical questions remain about how soon Pyongyang could field a reliable weapon, not the least of which is whether or not North Korea can shield a nuclear warhead from the rigors of re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere at ICBM velocities. Video of the Hwasong-14 test has emerged that casts doubt on the North’s ability to do so. The Japanese television station, NHK, has a weather camera mounted on the roof of its Hokkaido Prefecture affiliate, located in Muroran City. The camera looks east, across a bay, and in the direction where the Hwasong-14’s re-entry vehicle (RV) crashed into the sea, about 200 km from Japan. Based on the camera’s position, and the RV’s impact point, the camera’s view is obscured by the small mountain range located across the bay and the earth’s curvature when the RV is about 2 km above the ocean’s surface. Given the range, peak altitude and time of flight of the Hwasong-14 test, the RV is traveling at just over 6 km per second when it enters the atmosphere. At about 25 to 30 km altitude, the air is dense enough to slow and heat the RV. At about 20 km above sea level, the RV has become so hot that it begins to glow as its descent is recorded by the camera. It continues to slow and its temperature further rises as it approaches impact with the sea. In the video, peak radiance—when the clouds reflect the RVs radiance resulting in a bright flash—occurs when it is at 6 to 8 km altitude, and a fraction of a second before it passes through or behind a layer of clouds. Soon after the flash, the RV descends to roughly 4 or 5 km altitude, where the frictional forces that slow and heat the RV reach a maximum. At this point, the RV appears to be shedding small radiant objects and is trailed by an incandescent vapor. At an altitude of 3 to 4 km, the RV then dims and quickly disappears. This occurs before the RV passes behind the mountain range and is obscured from the camera’s view, indicating that it disintegrated about the time it experienced maximum stressing loads. Had the RV survived the rigors of re-entry, it would have continued to glow until disappearing behind the mountains. In short, a reasonable conclusion based on the video evidence is that the Hwasong-14’s re-entry vehicle did not survive during its second test. If this assessment accurately reflects reality, North Korea’s engineers have yet to master re-entry technologies and more work remains before Kim Jong Un has an ICBM capable of striking the American mainland. (Michael Elleman, “Video Casts Doubt on North Korea’s Ability to Field an ICBM Re-Entry Vehicle,” 38North, July 31, 2017)
No longer sure they can rely on the United States, an increasing number of South Korean lawmakers say their country should develop its own nuclear arsenal to deter an attack by Kim Jong Un, their belligerent neighbor to the north. North Korea’s rapid missile advances, including successful tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in July and again on Friday, are reviving calls for South Korea to assert its “nuclear sovereignty.” South Koreans are wary of President Donald Trump’s isolationist rhetoric and his calls for Asian allies to shoulder more of the defense burdens borne by the U.S. military. “Trump’s ‘America-first’ policy has triggered this kind of public sentiment,” said Moon Chung In, a top national security adviser to South Korean President Moon Jae In. Trump also has wavered on his commitment to defending South Korea, he said, including suggesting during the campaign that South Korea and Japan should develop their own nuclear arsenals. While President Moon, a liberal who took office in May, does not support calls for South Korea to join the nuclear club, polls show that a majority of South Koreans surveyed favor the idea. Support bumps higher whenever North Korea conducts a nuclear or missile test and members of South Korea’s two major conservative parties are pressing Moon to at least explore the nuclear option of developing nuclear weapons. “They want to strike a better balance of power between South and North Korea, and I also support that position,” said Yoon Young Seok, an elected member of South Korea’s National Assembly who belongs to the conservative Liberty Korea Party. Yoon said that half of his party’s 107 lawmakers support South Korea arming itself with nuclear weapons. Up until the early 1970s, South Korea was actively pursuing development of nuclear warheads. But because of pressure from the United States, it abandoned those efforts in 1975, when it signed the international nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Since then, it has relied on the deterrence capacity of the United States, which has a stockpile of roughly 4,000 nuclear weapons. Now, North Korea’s advances in nuclear weaponry and missiles are changing South Korea’s strategic calculus. Since 1953, South Korea and the United States have been bound by a mutual defense treaty to aid each other in the event of war. On the campaign trail, however, Trump said he’d like to see South Korea and Japan develop their own nuclear weapons to deter a North Korean attack. He also said he’d be open to withdrawing U.S. forces from Japan and South Korea if the two nations did not shoulder more of the costs of keeping troops in the region. Trump’s latter comment caused a stir in South Korea, partly because North Korea quickly applauded it and also South Korea is hardly a slacker when it comes to national defense. The country spends more than $34 billion yearly on its military, requires compulsory military service and fields more than 620,000 active troops. By comparison, the United States — with more than six times the population — is defended by 1.28 million active duty military. The White House did not respond to a request for comment. Since Trump took office, his national security team has worked to rebuild trust with South Korea, arguably the most crucial U.S. ally in Asia. When Defense Secretary Jim Mattis visited Seoul in February, he told his counterparts he was there “to make clear the administration’s full commitment to the United Nations mission in defense of your democracy.” Even so, several of Trump’s actions have left South Korean leaders uneasy. Upon taking office, Trump pulled the United States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade deal aimed at undermining China’s rising influence in the region. Trump also has accused South Korea of “horrible” trade policies, and at one point suggested that South Korea pay $1 billion for a missile defense system known as THAAD that is being deployed, in part, to protect U.S. troops and military assets in the region. Daniel Pinkston, a U.S. Air Force veteran and security expert at Troy University in Seoul, said that Trump’s collective actions have sent a negative signal to friends and adversaries. Past presidents, said Pinkston, have bolstered the U.S.-South Korea alliance through trade and support of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Trump has taken a different stance. “Lack of support for these shared values has a lot of people alarmed in the region, from Australia to Japan to South Korea,” said Pinkston. Uncertainty about the U.S. commitment is emboldening South Koreans who want to pursue the nuclear option, a move that Pinkston calls “reckless and dangerous.” South Korea is home to more than 20 nuclear power plants, and if it decided to pursue a nuclear weapons program, it would have both the expertise and material to do so. Still, it would be no simple task for South Korea to “go nuclear.” Building nuclear weapons would jeopardize South Korea’s alliance with the United States, and also force Seoul to withdraw from a U.S. nuclear agreement that bans it from independently enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium. In turn, it would expose South Korea to international sanctions, similar to those imposed on North Korea after its first nuclear test, in 2006. It is also unlikely that Beijing would sit idly by while South Korea deployed nuclear weapons nearby. China would likely ramp up its own arsenal, especially if Japan followed Seoul’s lead and launched its own nuclear weapons program. There are strategic reasons for South Korea not to go down this road, said Pinkston. Even with its technological know-how, South Korea would need several years to develop a reliable nuclear arsenal, leaving it exposed during that time. “North Korea would have an incentive to strike first,” said Pinkston. “South Korea would be in a very vulnerable position.” Currently, South Korea’s pro-nuclear contingent of lawmakers does not have the votes to pursue a nuclear weapons program. But that could change in subsequent elections, depending on what happens in Washington, Pyongyang and Seoul. “There are an increasing number of lawmakers who are studying armament, or what we call nuclear sovereignty,” said lawmaker Kim Jong Dae, a member of the Justice Party, which is generally aligned with President Moon’s Democratic Party. “This will definitely emerge as a mainstream political issue,” he added, if North Korea demonstrates it possesses the capability to launch a missile strike against major U.S. cities. In the meantime, President Moon’s foreign policy staff is keeping a close eye on the White House, including which advisers are ascending or descending. Trump’s decision to remove hardline nationalist Steve Bannon from the National Security Council in April was “a good sign,” said Moon Chung In, the South Korean president’s national security consultant. Seoul’s new leadership is holding out hope that Defense Secretary Mattis and National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster will hold sway over policy toward the Korean peninsula. Said Moon, the adviser, “If Trump listens to Mattis and McMaster, there won’t be any kind of disaster.” (Stuart Leavenworth, “South Korea Considers a Nuclear Arsenal to Counter the North,” McClatchy, July 28, 2017)
7/29/17:
The South Korean government wants greater firepower to counteract the growing threat from North Korea’s missiles, which have apparently led the new liberal government in Seoul to prioritize tougher action against Pyongyang over diplomatic engagement. This represents a significant shift for Moon Jae-in, who was elected president just two months ago and will be welcomed in Washington, where the Trump administration has been growing frustrated with South Korea’s heel-dragging. The catalyst for the sudden change was North Korea’s second launch in a month of an intercontinental ballistic missile technically capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. The Pentagon said that the missile, launched close to midnight North Korea time yesterday, flew about 2,300 miles almost straight up before crashing into the sea off Japan about 620 miles from its launch site. Fixed cameras for NHK appeared to capture the missile crashing into the sea not far from the coast of Hokkaido, the northern Japanese island. If the ICBM had been launched on a normal trajectory, the missile could theoretically have reached Chicago and perhaps even New York, experts said after analyzing the launch. North Korean state television today broadcast footage of the launch, showing leader Kim Jong Un in a grassy area surrounded by trees in the middle of the night, as the missile was wheeled out on the back of a modified truck. Rodong Sinmun ran a large front-page photo of Kim signing the order to launch the missile that North Korea calls the Hwasong-14. It was just one of many photos showing the 33-year-old North Korean leader in the control room and at the launch site. The launch confirmed several key technical advances, showing the power of the motors and the ability of the missile to survive reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere, KCNA reported. Within hours of the North Korean launch, South Korea showed off a more powerful ballistic missile of its own — although it still pales in comparison with the North’s ICBM — in drills with the U.S. military. “Our combined efforts showcase the capabilities of this alliance,” Lt. Gen. Thomas Vandal, the commander of the Eighth Army, said in a statement. The allies were ready to deter North Korean provocations and defend South Korea, he said. The South’s Defense Ministry released footage of two missiles being fired from a launcher in quick succession, the first hitting a target and the second destroying a bunker. The system can launch four missiles back to back, giving the South the ability to carry out fast and lethal strikes, the ministry said. “In particular, it can destroy not only North Korea’s nuclear and missile bases but also the tunnel-shaped strongholds of its artillery posing a threat to Seoul and nearby Gyeonggi province,” the ministry said in a statement, according to Yonhap. As part of a flurry of phone calls after the launch, South Korea’s national security adviser, Chung Eui-yong, called his American counterpart, H.R. McMaster, to seek revisions to their countries’ bilateral ballistic missile guidelines. Under an agreement written in 1979 but revised in 2001 and 2012, South Korea is limited in the capabilities it can pursue with its own missile program. The guidelines limit South Korean ballistic missiles with a range of 500 miles to carrying a half-ton payload, but the Moon administration is now seeking to double that to one ton. “It is fair to say that more weight will be given to the payload part rather than the missile range issue,” the South Korean president’s chief press secretary told reporters Saturday in Seoul. South Korean officials have been concerned about the growing “missile gap” between South and North Korea, but any increases are likely to alarm China in particular. South Korea recently test-fired a new ballistic missile called the Hyunmoo-2 that has a range of 500 miles, enough to reach all of North Korea. The president watched the launch. Earlier, Moon signaled a willingness to accept the planned deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Air Defense, or THAAD, system in South Korea. The previous South Korean government had agreed to host the U.S. antimissile system, and the deployment was expedited as it became increasingly clear that Moon, who had vowed during the election campaign to review the process, was going to win.
The radar and launch system, along with two launchers, had been deployed and was operational before his election in May. But Moon professed outrage when he discovered that four additional launchers had been brought into South Korea after his election without his knowledge. American analysts said that a full battery comprised six launchers and that this had always been the agreement. But after last night’s launch, Moon said that he was willing to discuss the “temporary” deployment of the four additional launchers. The Trump administration has been frustrated by Moon’s unwillingness to join its efforts to crack down on North Korea. Moon’s administration had declined to categorize North Korea’s July 4 launch as an intercontinental ballistic missile and has not signed on to U.S. sanctions against a bank in China accused of helping the North Korean regime skirt sanctions. Japan had done both. (Anna Fifield, “In Shift, South Korea, Angles for More Firepower against North,” Washington Post, July 30 2017, p. A10) South Korea and the United States have agreed to open negotiations to revise a bilateral ballistic missile guideline to allow the former to develop a more powerful missile amid North Korea’s continued provocations, Seoul’s presidential office Cheong Wa Dae said. President Moon Jae-in instructed his government to begin bilateral consultations to rewrite the guideline that bans Seoul from developing ballistic missiles with a range of over 800 kilometers and a payload exceeding 500 kilograms, said Yoon Young-chan, his chief press secretary. In a phone call, Chung Eui-young, top presidential security adviser, made an official proposal to his U.S. counterpart H.R. McMaster to open negotiations over the revision, and McMaster agreed, Yoon said. The agreement came hours after the North fired off what it claims to have been an intercontinental ballistic missile in a stinging blow to Moon’s pursuit of dialogue and rapprochement with the wayward regime. The focus of the negotiations is expected to be on doubling the payload weight limit to 1 ton, a source said, declining to be named. “During the summit between the allies’ leaders, there was a discussion regarding the payload part (in the guideline), and (the negotiations) will be in line with that,” Yoon said. “It is fair to say that more weight will be given to the payload part rather than the missile range issue,” he added, noting the negotiations would open “at the earliest date.” A senior presidential official said that there has yet to be any concrete consultations with Washington over how much the payload weight limit needs to be increased. “Given the U.S. shares (the need) for increasing the warhead weight, the heavier the better,” the official told reporters. Asked whether there were prior consultations with Beijing and Tokyo over the issue, he said, “There is no need for us to definitely inform them of it in advance … We will do if need be.” (Yonhap, “South Korea, U.S. Agree to Open Negotiation on Missile Guideline after N.K. Missile Launch,” Korea Herald, July 29, 2017) Hours after yesterday’s test, some former American officials said President Trump’s options were limited. “In the White House you have a threshold decision: Can you get them back to the table or not,” Mark W. Lippert, President Barack Obama’s ambassador to Seoul, said Saturday about negotiating with the North Koreans — a step Trump said during the 2016 campaign, and again several months ago, he was willing to try. Lippert said he supports Washington’s current diplomatic efforts as well as United Nations sanctions against the North. But so far, the North has not responded, perhaps calculating that it first wanted to demonstrate it was a permanent member of the club of nuclear-armed nations, and able to strike American cities, to strengthen its position before any negotiation. Lippert, speaking at a conference in Kent, Conn., said that barring negotiations, “the question gets binary pretty quick: containment or some kind of military operations.” Others question whether this administration, immersed in its own internal upheavals, can focus on the problem. “It takes a president of the United States who has the intellectual, global and historical depth” to deal with the Korean crisis, said R. Nicholas Burns, who served as undersecretary of state for political affairs in the Bush administration. Some believe the United States will simply learn to live with the North’s new capability, despite the words of Trump and his predecessors. “We are left in a situation where they believe we will ultimately acquiesce,” said Christopher R. Hill, an American diplomat who led nuclear negotiations with North Korea during the last Bush administration, which resulted in the dismantlement of part of a plutonium reactor. Hill is now dean of the Korbel School at the University of Denver. Today, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the resumed deployment of THAAD, in a statement that was in some ways more strongly worded than its statement earlier in the day criticizing North Korea’s missile test. “China is gravely concerned with the course of action taken by South Korea,” a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Geng Shuang, said in the statement. “Deploying Thaad won’t solve South Korea’s security concerns, won’t solve the related issues on the Korean Peninsula and will only further complicate issues.” In Washington, Trump accused China of failing to curb North Korea’s aggression and signaled he would restrict trade with Beijing as a consequence. “I am very disappointed in China,” Trump said tonight in a post on Twitter. “Our foolish past leaders have allowed them to make hundreds of billions of dollars a year in trade, yet they do NOTHING for us with North Korea, just talk. We will no longer allow this to continue.” He said, “China could easily solve this problem!” Yesterday, just as news of the North Korean test was breaking, the man who engineered the opening of America’s diplomatic relations with China, former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, argued the administration needed a new and different approach to convincing the Chinese to take a more forceful stance. “I believe we have a better chance of getting to the nuclear problem with North Korea if we first come to an agreement with China about what follows after the collapse of the North Korean regime,” Kissinger said. That would include a commitment from the United States to withdraw most of its troops from the Korean Peninsula after a North Korean collapse, to allay the Chinese fear that, with the buffer of North Korea gone, the United States military would be right on its border. Kissinger has made the proposal to Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson and other officials, according to people familiar with those conversations. But many doubt the Chinese would trust the American commitment, perhaps noting that the promises to integrate Russia into the West after the fall of the Berlin Wall never came to pass. Missile analysts remain uncertain and even doubtful that North Korea has cleared all the technical hurdles to build a reliable nuclear-tipped ICBM. But the test yesterday night left little doubt that the country, although cut off from most of the global economy and hit with several rounds of United Nations sanctions, was getting closer to its goal of arming itself with long-range missiles that can deliver nuclear warheads to the United States. South Korea fears that by building nuclear missiles that can reach major American cities, North Korea is trying to weaken the United States’ resolve over whether to intervene on the South’s behalf should war break out on the Korean Peninsula. “We must actively look for measures to secure our military’s own forces to deter and effectively deal with North Korea’s nuclear threats,” Moon said after an emergency meeting of his National Security Council today. South Korea wants to build ballistic missiles that can deliver more powerful payloads to targets in the North, including the location of its leadership and its missile and nuclear sites, most of which are hidden deep underground, defense officials here said. A hurdle to that ambition has been a treaty signed with Washington in the 1970s in return for American help in building its missiles. (South Korea can already load warheads weighing up to two tons on ballistic missiles with shorter ranges, but those missiles cannot reach key missile bases in northern North Korea.) The South Korean demands reflected growing regional jitters over how the North’s growing missile capabilities may affect Washington’s defense commitment to its allies in the region. Today, Moon warned that the latest North Korean test could lead to “a fundamental change in the security structure in Northeast Asia.” “U.S. policy for 21 years has been to prevent this day from coming, and now it has,” said Adam Mount, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. “North Korea didn’t test an ICBM to launch a bolt from the blue against Washington; they’re hoping to split the United States from its allies.” Barry Pavel, director of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council, said North Korea could use a nuclear-tipped ICBM capability to “target the United States and deter U.S. security cooperation with its close Asian allies.” “Once it is assured that it has a ‘nuclear shield,’ North Korea is likely to act much more aggressively in every other area of its foreign and military policies,” said Pavel. In “Rolling Back the Growing North Korean Threat,” the Atlantic Council’s memo to Trump published last month, Pavel and the co-author Robert A. Manning said that such North Korean aggressions could include “increasingly dangerous provocations and the sale of weapons of mass destruction to other nations and terrorist groups for much-needed cash.” Today, in what the U.S. military called a demonstration of America’s “ironclad commitment” to its allies, two American B-1B bombers flew from an air base on Guam to Japan and then South Korea, conducting joint exercises with each of the two countries’ air forces. Tillerson yesterday reaffirmed that the United States “will never accept a nuclear-armed North Korea nor abandon our commitment to our allies and partners in the region.” At the United Nations Security Council, Washington is urging China and Russia to agree to a new set of economic sanctions against North Korea, including severely curtailing the country’s access to oil supplies from the outside. China and Russia supply nearly all of North Korea’s oil imports and also host tens of thousands of the North workers. A bulk of the workers’ earnings end up in the coffers of the North Korean leadership, according to human rights groups and defectors. “As the principal economic enablers of North Korea’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development program, China and Russia bear unique and special responsibility for this growing threat to regional and global stability,” Tillerson said. But there is a growing frustration over China’s reluctance to use its economic leverage to rein in the North’s nuclear ambitions and over Washington’s inability to persuade Beijing. China accounts for more than 90 percent of North Korea’s external trade, but it fears the collapse of the Communist government on its border more than a nuclear-armed North. (Choe Sang-Hun and David E. Sanger, “To Counter North Korea, South Seeks U.S. Nod to Bolster Arms,” New York Times, July 30, 2017,
Suga: “Yesterday, at 11:42 PM, it was observed that a missile was fired from central North Korea and flew for 45 minutes before falling into the exclusive economic zone of our country in the Sea of Japan. Now, as of this time, we have not confirmed any reports of damage to ships and aircraft operating in the area. With regards to this incident, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has immediately issued a report, ordered a collection of information and analysis with full strength. With regards to our countrymen, we will offer timely and accurate information; ensure the complete safety of ships and aircraft; and take a thorough stance for preparing for unexpected circumstances. There are instructions for these three points. Now, with regards to the government, in addition to collecting information, we called for an emergency meeting in the Prime Minister’s Countermeasure Room, which is responsible for North Korean affairs and is part of the Prime Minister’s Emergency Response Center, to debate our response to this action. At the end, we decided to consider debate regarding the collection of information and possible responses after quickly opening a meeting of the National Security Council. With regards to this ballistic missile launch, in addition to being an extremely problematic action from the view of the safety of our ships and aircraft, this is a clear violation of various United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Our country cannot accept and must reject these frequent provocations from North Korea. We strictly protest and use the strongest language to criticize North Korea. We will continue with all efforts to collect information and conduct analyses. If we obtain information in the future that should be made public, we will quickly make an announcement.” (Statement of Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide, Sankei, July 28, 2017)
South Korea and the United States conducted another round of combined ballistic missile drills in a show of firepower against North Korea, their armed forces said. The live-fire exercise held along the east coast involved the South’s Hyunmoo-2 and the U.S. Eight Army’s Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). Two missiles were fired from the Hyunmoo-2 launcher, along with two others from the ATACMS. “The munitions impacted in the sea east of the Korean Peninsula,” where the North lobbed what it claims to be an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) hours earlier, according to the Eighth Army. The Hyunmoo-2 is a road-mobile tactical ballistic missile with a range of 300 kilometers. The ATACMS is a similar-range guided missile. The allies reaffirmed their capabilities for “precise strikes on the enemy’s leadership,” the South’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a statement. The Eighth Army also said the two sides demonstrated their ability to work together to defend South Korea. “The ROK-U.S. Alliance remains ironclad, and our combined efforts showcase the capabilities of this alliance,” said Lt. Gen. Thomas Vandal, who commands the unit, a core element of the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea. “I assure you we are ready to fight tonight, will deter North Korean provocations and if necessary defend the Republic of Korea.” The Eighth Army stressed that the ATACMS can be rapidly deployed and provide “deep-strike precision capability.” It enables the allied forces to engage a full array of time-critical targets under all weather conditions, it added. The allies held such joint ballistic missile drills early this month following the communist nation’s firing of the Hwasong-14 ICBM. (Yonhap, “S. Korea, U.S. Stage Ballistic Missile Exercise,” Korea Herald, July 29, 2017)
The United States flew two supersonic B-1B bombers over the Korean peninsula in a show of force today after Pyongyang’s recent tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), the U.S. and South Korean Air Forces said. The B-1B flight was in direct response to the missile test and the previous July 3 launch of the “Hwansong-14” rocket, the U.S. statement said. The South Korean air force said the flight was conducted early on Sunday. The bombers took off from a U.S. air base in Guam, and were joined by Japanese and South Korean fighter jets during the exercise, according to the statement. “North Korea remains the most urgent threat to regional stability,” Pacific Air Forces commander General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy said in the statement. “If called upon, we are ready to respond with rapid, lethal, and overwhelming force at a time and place of our choosing.” (James Pearson and Jack Kim, “U.S. Flies Bombers over Korean Peninsula after North Korea Test,” Reuters, July 29, 2017)
?/?/17:
General Brooks ordered more demonstration missile firings and issued a statement that the test “provided deep-strike precision capability, enabling the Republic of Korea/United States alliance to engage a full array of time-critical targets under all-weather conditions.” (Woodward, Rage, p. 75)
7/30/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesman: “The resounding success in the second test-fire of ICBM Hwasong-14 conducted on July 28 is a great victory of the DPRK that demonstrated once again the independent prestige and dignity of Juche nuclear power, the world-level rocket power. The test-fire confirmed the DPRK’s capability of making surprise launch of ICBM in any place and location any time, and clearly proved that the entire U.S. mainland is in the firing range of the DPRK’s missiles. The maximum range simulation test-fire of ICBM conducted by the DPRK this time is meant to send a stern warning to the U.S. making senseless remarks, being lost to reason in the frantic sanctions and pressure campaign against the DPRK. The policy-makers of the U.S. who must have closely observed the successful second ICBM test-fire would now properly understand that the U.S., an aggression-minded state, would not go scot-free if it ever dared provoke the DPRK. The U.S. trumpeting about war and threat to impose extreme sanctions on the DPRK only emboldens the latter and provides further justification for its access to nukes. To the Korean people who experienced disastrous disturbances of war on this land by the U.S. imperialist brutes, the powerful war deterrence for defending the state is an inevitable strategic option and it is a precious strategic asset that cannot be discarded or bartered for anything. If the Yankees, who have imposed pain and misfortune upon the Korean people for over half a century through their bloody war of aggression and heinous hostile policy against the DPRK, dares brandish the nuclear stick on this land again despite the DPRK’s repeated warnings, the DPRK will clearly teach them manners with the nuclear strategic force which it had so far shown the U.S. one after another. The U.S. should clearly understand the strategic position of the DPRK which has become a world nuclear power and a rocket power and the resolve of its army and people for retaliation, and wake up from the foolish dream of doing any harm to the DPRK. In case the U.S. fails to come to its own senses and continues to resort to military adventure and “tough sanctions”, the DPRK will respond with its resolute act of justice as already declared.” (KCNA, “DPRK Warns U.S. to Wake up from Foolish Dream of Doing Any Harm to DPRK: FM Spokesman,” July 30, 2017)
China hit back after President Donald Trump tweeted he was “very disappointed” in China following Pyongyang’s latest missile test, saying the problem did not arise in China and that all sides need to work for a solution. China has become increasingly frustrated with American and Japanese criticism that it should do more to rein in Pyongyang. China is North Korea’s closest ally, but Beijing is angry with its continued nuclear and missile tests. China’s Foreign Ministry, in a statement sent to Reuters responding to Trump’s tweets, said the North Korean nuclear issue did not arise because of China and that everyone needed to work together to seek a resolution. “All parties should have a correct understanding of this,” it said, adding the international community widely recognized China’s efforts to seek a resolution. The essence of Sino-U.S. trade is mutual benefit and win-win, with a vast amount of facts proving the healthy development of business and trade ties is good for both countries, the ministry added. Chinese Vice Commerce Minister Qian Keming, weighed in too, telling a news conference there was no link between the North Korea issue and China-U.S. trade. “We think the North Korea nuclear issue and China-US trade are issues that are in two completely different domains. They aren’t related. They should not be discussed together,” Qian said. China, with which North Korea does the large majority of its trade, has repeatedly said it strictly follows U.N. resolutions on North Korea and has denounced unilateral U.S. sanctions as unhelpful. “Pyongyang is determined to develop its nuclear and missile program and does not care about military threats from the U.S. and South Korea,” state-run Global Times said on July31. “How could Chinese sanctions change the situation?” said the paper, which is published by the ruling Communist Party’s official People’s Daily. China wants both balanced trade with the United States and lasting peace on the Korean peninsula, its official Xinhua news agency added in a commentary. “However, to realize these goals, Beijing needs a more cooperative partner in the White House, not one who piles blame on China for the United States’ failures,” it added. Nikki Haley, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, said in a statement China must decide if it is willing to back imposing stronger U.N. sanctions on North Korea over Friday night’s long-range missile test, the North’s second this month. Any new U.N. Security Council resolution “that does not significantly increase the international pressure on North Korea is of no value”, Haley said, adding that Japan and South Korea also needed to do more. Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo Abe spoke with Trump and agreed on the need for more action on North Korea just hours after the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations said Washington is “done talking about North Korea”. A White House statement after the phone call said the two leaders “agreed that North Korea poses a grave and growing direct threat to the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and other countries near and far”. It said Trump “reaffirmed our ironclad commitment” to defend Japan and South Korea from any attack, “using the full range of United States capabilities.” Abe told reporters after his conversation with Trump that repeated efforts by the international community to find a peaceful solution to the North Korean issue had yet to bear fruit in the face of Pyongyang’s unilateral “escalation”. “International society, including Russia and China, need to take this seriously and increase pressure,” Abe said. He said Japan and the United States would take steps towards concrete action but did not give details. Abe and Trump did not discuss military action against North Korea, nor what would constitute the crossing of a “red line” by Pyongyang, Deputy Chief Cabinet spokesman Koichi Hagiuda told reporters. (Ben Blanchard and Elias Glenn, “China Hits Back at Trump Criticism over North Korea,” Reuters, July 30, 2017)
7/31/17:
Analysts examining video of North Korea’s July 29 launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile that appeared capable of reaching the West Coast of the United States say they saw evidence of a setback the North never mentioned: The mock warhead on the missile shattered into pieces during its fiery re-entry to earth. If the analysis is correct, it would mean that North Korea suffered a significant, but not decisive, setback. It suggests that the country, for all its success as it works toward its goal of putting American cities under threat, has not yet mastered the difficult aerodynamics of designing a warhead that can survive re-entry. News of the video analysis came as President Trump, asked about the launch for the first time, offered vague assurances that he was on top of the problem. “We’ll handle North Korea,” he said, heading into a cabinet meeting. “We’re going to be able to handle them. It will be handled. We handle everything.” The findings about the North’s difficulties with a re-entry vehicle came from Michael Elleman, a missile expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. He said the malfunction of the warhead as it re-entered the earth’s atmosphere “casts doubt” on the North’s ability to shield a nuclear warhead from the blistering heat and vibrations as it heads to its target at the high speeds that intercontinental ballistic missiles typically achieve. In a news conference today, Elleman said North Korea would have to conduct a minimum of two or three more ICBM test flights to make sure its rocket designers have fixed the warhead problem. Still, he said, the nation will probably be able to develop a workable missile with a reliable warhead by early next year. That would put the country within the rough time period described in recent American intelligence analyses, which predicted that sometime in 2018 all the technologies needed by the North were likely to come together in a single weapon. Fixing the design flaw “might take them another six months,” Mr. Elleman told reporters on a conference call organized by 38 North at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. “But the key is that they’ll have to do additional flight tests.” The need for more tests creates an opening for the Trump administration. Under President Barack Obama, North Korean missile tests were regularly subject to cyber and electronic attacks. Among its military options, the Trump administration could accelerate those attacks, but they appeared less effective over the past six months. The United States could also position more naval craft in international waters off the North Korean coast. That would give it the option of conducting pre-emptive attacks on missiles on their launch pads — a risky approach because it could incite a war — or trying to shoot down test missiles as they are rising through the atmosphere. The videotape of the warhead’s breakup came from the Japanese television station NHK. An affiliate in Muroran City, a port in Hokkaido, Japan’s northernmost large island, keeps a weather camera mounted on a roof. On Friday, in a stroke of luck, the camera was trained on the area of the sky where the mock warhead appeared to plunge back to earth, about 125 miles from the Japanese coast. The incoming mock warhead, Elleman said, should have shone brightly and continuously as it fell — like a shooting star streaking to Earth. But in this case, he said, the video shows the bright incoming projectile starting to shed into small radiant objects. Then, quite suddenly, it dims and disappears altogether. It should have continued to glow until it hit the ocean, he told reporters. “Most likely it broke up,” he said. How long it will take the North to fix the design, Elleman said, depends largely on “how much they learn from this particular test.” His six-month estimate, he said, assumes that the North’s engineers have the ability to correctly diagnose the technical problem and fix it. “It could be done in three months,” he said. “It may take six months. If they continue to fail, however, it could take a longer period of time. We just don’t know.” (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Video Analysis Creates Doubts about the Success of North Korea’s Missile Test,” New York Times, August 1, 2017, p. A-10)
John Schilling: “Less than a month after their first successful ICBM test, North Korea has done it again. The missile tested on July 28 appears to be identical to the liquid-fueled KN-20 (Hwasong-14) missile launched on July 4. This missile, however, demonstrated substantially greater range—possibly sufficient to reach the east coast of the United States—but only with a substantially reduced payload. Second, possibly because of the reduced reentry vehicle (RV) weight, the RV appears to have disintegrated before reaching the ground, and thus the test may not have been completely successful. Third, this was the first time the North Koreans have conducted at launch at night, suggesting an emphasis on demonstrating operational rather than experimental launch procedures. While Pyongyang may have an ICBM, the threat is currently limited to unsophisticated warheads against targets on the US west coast. North Korea will likely have to turn to an upgraded design to achieve their goal of a robust capability to retaliate against targets on the east coast, including Washington, for any attack on North Korea. While the KN-20 may have some deterrent value even in its current, unreliable form, it will likely take another year or two of work to achieve full operational capability. If the North pursues the objective of fielding a new solid-propellant ICBM, that will likely only be another few years beyond that. The combination of increased performance and a night launch, contrary to North Korea’s hopes, reveal the probable failure of this test. Rather than landing far out to sea, this missile entered the atmosphere within sight of Japan, and it did so in a clear night sky. Several cameras on the Japanese island of Hokkaido caught the incandescent trail of the reentry vehicle. As my colleague Michael Elleman notes, the trail flashes briefly and brightly as the missile descends for 6-8 km, and a second or so thereafter breaks up into at least two visible objects and a vapor trail. The initial flash could be due to the reentry vehicle passing close to a reflective cloud, or it could be a part of the heat shield breaking off and vaporizing. Whatever the cause of the flash, the subsequent breakup is telling. We cannot be certain, but it seems unlikely that a warhead would have survived that experience. The missile was reported to have reached an altitude of over 3,700 km, remaining airborne for 47 minutes. That’s a substantially higher level of performance than what the missile displayed on its first launch. This means, if the missile had been launched on a maximum-range trajectory, it could have reached Chicago or possibly even New York City. North Korea has given us a clue as to how that happened, with a press release indicating that the number of engines has increased. The trajectory of the first KN-20 indicates that its upper stage was propelled by a set of two vernier engines from an old Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile whose technology is known to have fallen into North Korean hands. This same propulsion system was used on North Korea’s successful Unha space launch vehicle, but doesn’t produce enough thrust for optimal performance with heavy nuclear warheads. There is room in the upper stage to add a second pair of vernier engines, and we suspect this was done. But this alone wouldn’t explain the performance observed from the second test. In order to reach a 3,700 km altitude, compared to 2,800 km in the first test, North Korea would probably have needed to reduce the missile’s payload from roughly 500 kg in the first test to 300-350 kg in the second. This may explain the failure. The first test was conducted with a conservative design, with all of the key elements of the missile’s design having been successfully demonstrated in other systems and with a heavy, robust reentry vehicle. The second test included a new upper-stage propulsion system and a much lighter reentry vehicle. The propulsion system worked, but that led to the lighter reentry vehicle hitting the atmosphere at a higher velocity than in the first tests, and that didn’t work so well. Based on those tests, and on performance data from other missiles whose technology has been incorporated into the KN-20, everything depends on the weight of the payload. 300 kg is almost certainly too small for a reentry vehicle that must carry one of North Korea’s nuclear warheads and survive reentry at ICBM speeds. If they can manage to squeeze a warhead and survivable reentry vehicle into a 400 kg package (a very low possibility), New York might barely be within range. For more realistic 500-600 kg warheads, the KN-20 would be limited to west coast targets. Interestingly, adding extra engines does little to improve long-range performance with the lightest warheads, where the extra thrust isn’t needed and the weight of the engines competes with the warhead. North Korea’s press report alluded to “heavy warheads,” and their chosen missile design supports that interpretation. If North Korea continues with the current design, their near-term objective will likely be to overcome this latest partial failure in order to field a missile capable of delivering nuclear warheads of reasonable weight to targets on the US west coast. They will presumably want to conduct another test combining the four-vernier engine upper stage and the heavy reentry vehicle to validate that configuration, after which, they may feel ready to go into production and training. And to do that, they may require more tests. The fact that last week’s test was conducted at night and from a site not normally used for missile testing may signal that they are getting a head start on the crew training part already, treating the launch as an operational exercise as well as an engineering test. If they fast-track this version of the missile, they may have a robust, reliable nuclear strike capability against US west coast targets sometime next year, and may have already fielded a few unreliable prototypes to provide minimal deterrence in the interim. The emphasis on heavy warheads suggests North Korea has plans to use any extra payload capability they can squeeze out of the design. One obvious possibility is a thermonuclear warhead. North Korea has never successfully tested such a device, and the sophisticated designs that allow the major nuclear powers to deliver hundreds of kilotons of yield from a package of only a few hundred kilograms weight are probably beyond Pyongyang’s reach for now. But there are ways for North Korea to incorporate a thermonuclear element to increase the yield of their current 10-20 kiloton fission warheads, and we expect they will seek to incorporate them in any ICBM design they field.
They will probably also seek to incorporate more advanced reentry vehicles, along with decoys and other penetration aids to defeat missile defenses. The successful July 4 test most likely used a simple blunt-body RV, but the payload shroud used on the KN-20 and the post-boost propulsion system demonstrated on the KN-17 (Hwasong-12) would both support a more advanced payload with a low-drag RV and set of decoys. These advances will not come quickly or easily to North Korea, but we should be looking for them perhaps five years down the road. While North Korea’s ambitions reach beyond the west coast to places like Washington, DC, if they want to accomplish that with this missile, they will have to change the design substantially. The extra engines on the upper stage currently aren’t enough; they will also need to stretch the propellant tanks. Additionally, they will need to demonstrate a lightweight warhead capable of surviving the faster and hotter reentry of such a long-range missile. This missile’s design may not stretch that far without breaking, but North Korea may try anyway. If so, they probably won’t succeed this year or next. They may not try at all. Earlier this year, canisters representing solid-propellant ICBMs were paraded through the streets of Pyongyang. Those canisters were probably empty; North Korea has an ambitious solid-rocket development program but has so far only been able to build smaller medium-range missiles using solid propellant. But the greater mobility and responsiveness afforded by solid propellant makes it the clear choice for ICBMs as well. North Korea may consider the liquid-propellant KN-20 to be strictly an interim system to provide limited deterrence by threatening US west coast targets and to support technology development for advanced warheads and other systems to be incorporated in a new solid-propellant ICBM in perhaps 2025. The bottom line today is that North Korea has tested two versions of the KN-20 ICBM which seem to work, and two reentry vehicles, one of which probably didn’t work. Using the more conservative RV design, they can field a system that can threaten US west coast targets. At first, this threat will consist of a handful of unreliable prototype missiles, but as early as next year they could begin production and deployment of a proven, reliable design with trained crews. After that, they might be able to stretch the KN-20 design to reach Washington, DC, with a light warhead. Or they might use the system’s increased payload capability at short ranges to experiment with more advanced warheads and decoys, which in the longer term could be incorporated in a new solid-fuel ICBM.” (John Schilling,“What Next for the North Korea’s ICBM?” 38North, August 1, 2017) North Korea may not yet have mastered the re-entry technology necessary to deliver a payload aboard an intercontinental missile (ICBM), South Korea’s defense chief said today. “It’s too early to see [Friday’s launch] as a test of re-entry technology,” South Korean Minister of National Defense Song Yong-moo told lawmakers during an emergency meeting of the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee. Re-entry technology, which allows a missile warhead to survive the heat and pressure sustained when reentering the Earth’s atmosphere, is a key technological threshold required in order to field a reliable ICBM force. Today’s emergency meeting of the National Defense Committee was held after Pyongyang launched a Hwasong-14 ICBM three nights ago. While South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) told media two days ago that the North test-launched “an advanced-type of ICBM” according to the range it flew, the minister cast doubt as to whether Pyongyang has a capacity to put a nuclear warhead on an ICBM. “Even though the development of the intercontinental missile was completed, it’s difficult to judge whether the [technology] of mounting the nuclear [warhead] at the very last stage is complete or not.” The defense minister said the North appeared to focus on both speed and range during Friday’s test-firing. And despite it being the same type of missile as was tested on July 4, Song said it appeared from the second launch that the North increased the maximum range of the missiles’ engine. “[The South Korean military] confirmed and judged that [the North] increased the efficiency of the engine and reduced the payload of the warhead to 300kg,” Song said. (Dagyum Ji, “Uncertainty over N. Korean Warhead Reentry Capabilty: S. Korea Defense Chief,” NKNews, July 31, 2017)
The US military has detected “highly unusual and unprecedented levels” of North Korean submarine activity and evidence of an “ejection test” in the days following Pyongyang’s second intercontinental ballistic missile launch this month, a defense official told CNN. An ejection test examines a missile’s “cold-launch system,” which uses high pressure steam to propel a missile out of the launch canister into the air before its engines ignite. That helps prevent flames and heat from the engine from damaging either the submarine, submersible barge or any nearby equipment used to launch the missile. Carried out on land at Sinpo Naval Shipyard, Sunday’s ejection test is the third time this month — and fourth this year — that North Korea has conducted a trial of the missile component that is critical to developing submarine launch capabilities, according to the US defense official. (Zachary Cohen and Ryan Browne, “U.S. Detects ‘Highly Unusual’ North Korean Submarine Activity,” CNN, August 1, 2017)
KCNA: “The south Korean authorities recently revealed their true colors as confrontation maniacs through the “strategy on the north” of the “five-year program of state administration.” They recklessly set “denuclearization of the north” until 2020 as the general orientation of the “north policy”, although the DPRK declared that it can never talk about the inter-Korean relations with the “nuclear issue” as a precondition. This is absolutely unpardonable as it blocks the road for improved north-south relations, disregarding the principled stand of the DPRK on the “nuclear issue.” The south Korean authorities’ “strategy on the north” has no essential difference from “denuclearization, opening and 3 000 dollars” and “confidence-building process on the Korean peninsula” touted by the Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye groups of traitors, and it is more cunning and disgusting in sinister intention. In the “strategy” they called for the establishment of “human rights foundation”, settlement of the issues of “POWs of south Korean army and south Korean abductees”, support to the “defectors from the north” and promotion of the plan for the establishment of the “Center for Unification” openly showing the scheme for “unification through absorption” and confrontation of social systems. Turning blind eyes to the basic problems such as defusing of politico-military confrontation between the north and the south, they talked about “new economy guidance idea” and “unification of economy.” This proves that the present south Korean authorities are interested in making “administrative achievements” and claptrap tactics. The “strategy on the north” after the “new Berlin declaration”, which has already been denounced by Koreans, is an intolerable insult to the north and a declaration of the overall confrontation between compatriots. The north-south relations will never improve with the “nuclear issue” as a precondition. The powerful nuclear deterrence of the DPRK is the righteous option for self-defense to protect the dignity and destiny of the nation from the U.S. nuclear threat and blackmail and it is now guaranteeing peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. The south Korean authorities should not imprudently talk about “denuclearization of the north” but make efforts to scrap nuclear weapons of the U.S. which reduced south Korea to the world’s biggest arsenal of nukes. If they challenge the just demand of the north and mindset of south Koreans who took part in the candlelight actions, they would meet the miserable end of the predecessors.” (KCNA, “KCNA Commentary on S. Korea’s ‘Strategy on North,’” July 31, 2017)
8/1/17:
President Donald Trump said that there will be war with North Korea if the regime continues to aim an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) carrying a nuclear warhead at the United States.
Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina said on NBC’s Today show that President Trump told him in person, “There will be a war with North Korea over their missile program if they continue to try to hit America with an ICBM.” Graham continued, “If there’s going to be a war to stop them, it will be over there. If thousands die, they’re going to die over there, they’re not going to die here, and he’s told me that to my face.” A war scenario on the Korean Peninsula would put millions of lives in the region in danger and many defense experts, as well as U.S. government officials and congressmen, have warned against a military option. But while Graham acknowledged that “Japan, South Korea, China would all be in the cross hairs of a war if we started one with North Korea,” he pointed out that Trump would ultimately choose U.S. security over regional stability. “It’s inevitable unless North Korea changes,” Graham said of a war scenario, “because you’re making our president pick between regional stability and homeland security.” He indicated options are running out, adding, “They kicked the can down the road for 20 years – there’s no place else to kick it.” “When you’re the president of the United States, where does your allegiance lie? To the people of the United States,” said Graham. The senator pointed out that both the Chinese and North Koreans are “miscalculating” Trump, and urged Beijing to choose to pressure North Korea diplomatically or else face military action. “The only way that they [North Korea] are going to change is if there is a credible threat of military force on the table,” said Graham. “President Trump has said, ‘I will not allow them to get an ICBM with a nuclear weapon on top to hit America.’ They’re heading that way.” “He has told me that. I believe him,” the lawmaker said. “If I were China, I would believe him, too, and do something about it. You can stop North Korea, militarily or diplomatically.” Graham, a former Republican presidential candidate who dropped out of the 2016 race in December 2015, was vocally critical of Trump during his campaign. When reminded that defense experts have underscored that there is no good military option, Graham declared, “They’re wrong. There is a military option: To destroy North Korea’s program and North Korea itself.” Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified to a U.S. House Armed Services Committee in June that of some 25 million people in Seoul, 30,000 are Americans “who are within range of thousands of rockets, missiles and artillery pieces along the border.” Dunford said while he is confident the United States would be victorious in a war with North Korea, “We will see casualties unlike anything we’ve seen in 60 or 70 years,” referring to the Korean War of 1950-53. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis echoed a similar message during the same meeting. He had warned in an interview with CBS in May that military conflict with the North would probably be “the worst kind of fighting in most people’s lifetime.” He elaborated that “it would be a catastrophic war,” and urged diplomacy.
When asked to verify if destroying North Korea is an option, as Graham indicated, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, the White House press secretary, said “The president has been very outspoken about the need to stop North Korea. We’ve been very focused on stopping the nuclear program, stopping the missiles, stopping the aggression.” She added, “That still continues to be the focus, and we’re keeping… all options on the table in order to do that.” But Sanders didn’t straight out deny Graham’s assertions about Trump’s statements. Washington is considering dispatching two U.S. aircraft carriers to the Korean Peninsula, according to Seoul government officials, in an apparent show of force following North Korea’s ICBM launches. A Blue House official, however, recommended focusing on Secretary Tillerson’s statements on North Korea, while adding on Graham’s remarks, “We are watching over this part. Our two countries’ leaders will have a chance to hold a phone conversation, so there will be various discussions back and forth.” (Sarah Kim, “Senator Warns of U.S. War with North Korea,” JoongAng Ilbo, August 3, 2017)
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called for a dialogue with North Korea and acknowledged that U.S. relations with Russia have worsened during the Trump administration. [?] During wide-ranging comments at the State Department marking six months since his confirmation, Tillerson told reporters that the United States does not aim to depose the government in Pyongyang or use military force. “We do not seek a regime change, we do not seek a collapse of the regime, we do not seek an accelerated reunification of the peninsula, we do not seek an excuse to send our military north of the 38th Parallel,” he said. “We are trying to convey to the North Koreans: ‘We are not your enemy, we are not your threat. But you are presenting an unacceptable threat to us, and we have to respond.’ ” Tillerson added that the United States hopes that “at some point,” North Korea will understand and sit down for a dialogue. The secretary of state said the administration has been attempting to exert “peaceful pressure” on North Korea, “because the options available to us are limited, particularly if we think we are operating under a short period of time.” Tillerson talked to reporters during a surprise appearance in the briefing room, his first since becoming secretary six months ago. He expressed concern about Iran’s regional ambitions, unrest in Venezuela and war in Ukraine. He also said he has a “good” relationship with President Trump, who calls him daily, including late at night and on weekends, “when something comes to his head.” (Carol Morello and Anne Gearan, “Tillerson Seeks Talks with North Korea,” Washington Post, August 2, 2017,
Tillerson: “One of the first threats we were confronted with upon entering office is North Korea, and it was the first policy area that we felt an urgency to deal with. And I think, as many of you have watched over the last several months, that threat has materialized in the ways that we expected it would. And that’s why early on we identified it as a very urgent matter, and the North Koreans have certainly proven the urgency of that to us. We initiated a sustained and continued intensified campaign on what I like to call peaceful pressure, because the options available to us, I think as all of you well understand, are limited, and particularly if we think we are operating under a short period of time. So we felt the appropriate thing to do first was to seek peaceful pressure on the regime in North Korea to have them develop a willingness to sit and talk with us and others but with an understanding that a condition of those talks is there is no future where North Korea holds nuclear weapons or the ability to deliver those nuclear weapons to anyone in the region much less to the homeland. In doing so, we’ve sought to partner with China. China does account for 90 percent of economic activity with North Korea. The Chinese have been very clear with us that we share the same objective, a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. They do not see it in their interest for North Korea to have nuclear weapons, just as we do not see it in anyone’s interest. China has ways that they can put pressure on and influence the North Korean regime because of this significant economic relationship that no one else has. We’ve been very clear with the Chinese we certainly don’t blame the Chinese for the situation in North Korea. Only the North Koreans are to blame for this situation. But we do believe China has a special and unique relationship because of this significant economic activity to influence the North Korean regime in ways that no one else can. And that’s why we continue to call upon them to use that influence with North Korea to create the conditions where we can have a productive dialogue. We don’t think having a dialogue where the North Koreans come to the table assuming they’re going to maintain their nuclear weapons is productive. So that’s really what the objective that we are about is. We have reaffirmed our position towards North Korea, that what we are doing, we do not seek a regime change; we do not seek the collapse of the regime; we do not seek an accelerated reunification of the peninsula; we do not seek an excuse to send our military north of the 38th parallel. And we’re trying to convey to the North Koreans we are not your enemy, we are not your threat, but you are presenting an unacceptable threat to us, and we have to respond. And we hope that at some point, they will begin to understand that and that we would like to sit and have a dialogue with them about the future that will give them the security they seek and the future economic prosperity for North Korea, but that will then promote economic prosperity throughout Northeast Asia. This is going to be a continued effort to put ever greater pressure on the North Korean regime because our other options, obviously, are not particularly attractive. Now, in saying that, I want to – I want to acknowledge a couple of people, and I’m going to give some credit to people as I go through this. These first six months, we’ve been carrying out this activity, as you know, with largely people in acting assistant secretary positions, using our ambassadors, the strength of the organization, and I’m quite proud of what we’ve accomplished. In dealing with North Korea, Acting Assistant Secretary Susan Thornton and Ambassador Joseph Yun have been stellar in helping us develop these policies and carry them out. Susan Thornton also has been key to our relationship with China, and I think it’s important that everyone understand that North Korea does not define the relationship with China. …So these are very in-depth conversations and discussions we have with the Chinese, and we test this relationship through things like the situation in North Korea. Can we work together to address this global threat where we have a common objective? And where we have differences – in the South China Sea, and we have some trading differences that need to be addressed – can we work through those differences in a way without it leading to open conflict and find the solutions that are necessary to serve us both? Out of Mar-a-Lago came, I think, some very important commitments to one another. We established four very high-level dialogues. We had many, many dialogues with the Chinese in the past – over 20 dialogues – but these were at a level that we felt were insufficient to deal with this question of our relationship, so the Chinese agreed to designate very high-level individuals so we have four dialogues. The Diplomatic and Security Dialogue is led by myself and Secretary Mattis with our counterparts in China. We have had two meetings of the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue. The Economic and Trade Dialogue has met twice. That’s led by Secretary Mnuchin and Secretary Ross. We have two other dialogues that are yet to meet: law enforcement and cyber security; and then social or people-to-people. And so these are really to help us explore the tough issues that exist for the two largest economies in the world and two significant military powers, as to how do we want to deal with these issues, and they’ve served – I think they’ve served us well to this point, and they’ve been quite helpful in us advancing this understanding of one another’s interests, so we will continue those. And again, I want to thank Assistant Secretary Susan Thornton for her help in advancing these. …” (DoS, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, Remarks at a Press Availability, Washington, August 1, 2017)
The operational test launch of a Cold War-era Minuteman III ICBM from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California took place today. “The launch is not in response to any real world events,” said Navy Capt. Brooke DeWalt. “The purpose of the ICBM test launch program is to validate and verify the effectiveness, readiness, and accuracy of the weapon system,” according to a release from Air Force Global Strike Command. The launch is a way to test the reliability of the missiles, as well as the proficiency of the crews who are trained to launch nuclear wepaons within minutes of receiving a validated president order. The unarmed Minuteman III will be equipped with a single test reentry vehicle, which contains a telemetry package that will provide data for evaluating the launch. The last test of a Minuteman was May 3. (Jamie McIntyre, “U.S. Says Planned ICBM Launch Not Related to North Korea,” Washington Examiner, August 1, 2017)
The U.S. Defense Department said yesterday that it is ready to install four more Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense battery launchers in South Korea. Pentagon spokesman Jeff Davis told reporters in Washington, “We made an alliance decision with the [South Korean] government last year to deploy THAAD to the Korean Peninsula as a defensive measure. We have gotten that to an initial missile defense ability just within the past few months. We are certainly ready to bring additional pieces in as quickly as we can.” The U.S. brought six THAAD interceptor launchers to South Korea in March but set up only two in Seongju, North Gyeongsang Province while the other four remain in storage. “A lot of people question the need for THAAD; they question the requirement for us,” Davis said. “But the North Koreans are being far better spokespeople on that than we’re capable of. They’re making the case for us rather effectively.” A Defense Ministry official here said today, “The deployment of additional launchers will be handled through a transparent process. That entails convincing local residents and notifying them beforehand of the deployment.” He added, “That means we will not deploy them by surprise in the middle of the night as the first two THAAD launchers were in Seongju in April.” A Cheong Wa Dae official said, “We will convince local residents and then deploy the THAAD launchers according to the agreement between the defense ministries of both countries.” (Kim Jin-myung, “U.S. Ready to Set up 4 More THAAD Launchers,” Chosun Ilbo, August 2, 2017)
American humanitarian agencies that work in North Korea and Americans with relatives there are expressing grave concerns about the new restrictions on U.S. citizens traveling to the country. The restrictions, due to be announced in the Federal Register Tuesday, will require all American citizens who hope to travel to North Korea to apply to the State Department for a passport with a special validation. This, some say, will mean that previously private and non-political work – sometimes already viewed with suspicion by the regime in Pyongyang – will now have a literal U.S. government seal of approval. “When the North Koreans look at our delegation, they cannot assume that we got permission from anybody,” said Stephen Linton, an American who heads the Eugene Bell Foundation, a non-governmental organization that treats thousands of people with multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis inside North Korea. His is one of about 25 American humanitarian groups that are active in North Korea. The Eugene Bell Foundation administers medicines to TB patients who have proven resistant to previous rounds of treatment, and the treatment must follow a strict schedule in order to be effective. “As soon as you have a licensing system, the immediate question is why did you get permission?” said Linton, who has been working inside North Korea since 1979. “What was in it for the U.S. government to issue you the permission to come here? And there’s nobody in North Korea that I’ve ever met who would believe that the U.S. government would issue that permission purely for humanitarian reasons.” The new “geographic travel restriction” will come into effect in 30 days’ time. Every year, about 1,000 Americans had been going to North Korea on organized tours, but tourism will be outright banned for U.S. citizens from next month. This new rule is much stricter than the policy the Trump administration has implemented towards Cuba, which Americans are still allowed to visit if they travel with a licensed tour company under U.S. jurisdiction. Independent travel is still allowed for Americans to visit their family members in Cuba and for religious activities and humanitarian projects. Just four categories of Americans will be allowed the special endorsed passports: journalists, Red Cross representatives on official missions, humanitarian workers and anyone else whose trip is “in the national interest.” Those who are approved will be issued “a limited validity U.S. passport permitting one-time travel to North Korea,” according to the State Department. Humanitarian groups have been appealing to the State Department not to make the new rule bureaucratically burdensome. Some are asking for a system where blanket approval can be given to their organization, rather than every person having to get approval for every trip. “U.S. humanitarian workers have been providing relief to the poorest and most deprived of North Korea’s population for over 20 years,” said Keith Luse, executive director of the National Committee on North Korea, a Washington-based NGO that promotes cooperation between the United States and North Korea. “A majority of them have built meaningful relationships with North Koreans at the local level and not been confronted by the authorities. As travel ban details are finalized, we hope the State Department will consider their experience,” Luse said. Amid years of failed nuclear talks and an enduring reluctance to engage with North Korea, private sector activities like humanitarian work have been “the only positive aspect” in the relationship between the United States and North Korea, said Linton of the Eugene Bell Foundation. “Make no mistake: if the American private sector is now banned from travel, it will be another major step toward diminishing of U.S. influence in East Asia,” Linton said. “Asians are well aware of this downward trend and are already thinking about how to resolve challenges related to North Korea should the U.S. government and its private sector be unwilling or unable to play a major role in the region.” The new rules will particularly affect Korean Americans. Between 200 and 500 Korean Americans travel to North Korea each year, a significant proportion of them for reunions with family members from whom they were separated during the Korean War. Many of them travel to North Korea as tourists and they would not appear to qualify for travel permission under the new restrictions. There are also as many as 100 Korean Americans living or working in North Korea at any given time. Most are associated with Kim Il Sung University or the private American-run Pyongyang University of Science and Technology. Two of the Americans detained in North Korea earlier this year, Tony Kim and Kim Sang-dok, were affiliated with the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, which was started by Korean American Christians. The third detainee, Kim Dong-chul, was working in the Rajin-Sonbong Special Economic Zone in the northeast of the country near the Chinese border and has now been held for almost two years. Efforts to free the men are continuing. But there are also some Americans who live in North Korea permanently in the Rajin-Sonbong zone. “To the extent that the permanent residents need to travel back and forth to the U.S. from time to time, the travel ban would adversely impact them,” said Sam Yoon, executive director of the Council of Korean Americans. There are about 1.8 million Korean Americans in the United States, according to population estimates from the Census Bureau. “One could argue that the travel ban – especially for families – would in fact hurt them the most,” Yoon said. (Anna Fifield, “U.S. Rules on North Korea Trips Fuel Worry,” Washington Post, August 2, 2017,
A total of 800 tons of flour donated by Russia arrived at a North Korean port this week to help meet the North’s food shortages, Radio Free Asia reported. Citing the Facebook page of the Russian Embassy in Pyongyang, RFA said a Russian ship carrying the wheat flour, provided as humanitarian aid through the World Food Program, docked yesterday in the North’s northeastern port city of Chongjin. The donation will be used to make dietary supplements for the North’s vulnerable people, including children in the Kangwon and Ryanggang provinces, lactating mothers and pregnant women, and baby biscuits. The arrival of Russian-donated flour came on the heels of 2,400 tons of flour being delivered to the North as part of Russia’s implementation of the WFP project to help the North ease its food shortages. (Yonhap, “Russia-Donated Grain Arrives in Food-Short N. Korea,” Korea Times, August 1, 2017)
8/2/17:
Washington is seeking talks on how North Korea can be suspended from Asia’s biggest security forum as part of a broader effort to isolate Pyongyang diplomatically and force it to end its missile tests and abandon its nuclear weapons program, U.S. and Philippine officials said. Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Susan Thornton told reporters in Washington that North Korea’s actions have violated the conflict-prevention aims of the ASEAN Regional Forum, which groups the United States and North Korea with 25 other countries. The Philippines is hosting an annual ministerial meeting of the 27-nation ARF which will be attended by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho. Tillerson has no plans to meet Ri on the sidelines of the meeting, Thornton said. With the U.S., Japan and South Korea expected to push for stronger actions against the North, a verbal showdown looms at the forum. “What we have been sort of looking at is having a serious discussion of what it would take for a member to be suspended from this organization that is dedicated to conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy,” Thornton said. “I think we’re going to continue to have that conversation as it regards North Korea.” She said, “What we’ve been doing is going around talking to partners about what more could they do to contribute to that increasing pressure on the regime and the increasing sort of diplomatic isolation of the regime.” Two Filipino officials told The Associated Press that U.S. officials have discussed such a prospect with Philippine officials, who told them it may be better to keep North Korea in the forum, where it can be persuaded to stop provocations through dialogue. A North Korean delegation led by its vice foreign minister flew to Manila last week and told Philippine officials of their hope for a “favorable environment” when Pyongyang’s top diplomat attends the ARF meetings in Manila, said the officials, who spoke to AP on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the matter publicly. In response, the Philippine officials told the North Koreans they could not guarantee that because other member states, like South Korea, Japan and the United States, would definitely raise alarm over Pyongyang’s continued missile tests. They asked the delegation why North Korea staged an intercontinental ballistic missile test last week, days before the ARF meeting, and then expected not to be confronted by other nations over it, the officials said. While it may be too late for Pyongyang to be barred from the ARF meeting this year, Thornton said Washington would continue to “push the organization to think about what kinds of suspension measures or requirements or stipulations might be included in the future.” (Associated Press, “U.S. Moves to Have North Korea Barred from Asian Forum,” August 2, 2017)
8/3/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s “answer to a question raised by the KCNA on August 3 as regards the fact that the U.S. has rigged up another heinous sanctions law to suffocate the DPRK: On August 2, U.S. President Trump signed the “Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act” which recently passed the U.S. Congress. Thus, additional sanctions against the DPRK, Russia and Iran were formally adopted as the law. The U.S. adoption of sanctions law against the DPRK is no more than last-ditch efforts by those who are terrified at the series of measures taken by the DPRK in rapid succession to develop a sophisticated nuclear force.The act of the U.S. which is so fond of rigging up sanctions law and brandishing the sanctions club against other sovereign states is no better than that of a hooligan which cannot be allowed by international law as well. The adoption of another unilateral sanctions law against sovereign states by the U.S. is a criminal conduct whereby it tried to apply its federal law to international relations which constitutes a direct challenge to the UN Charter and international law. That is why the DPRK strongly condemns and rejects the so called unilateral sanctions by the U.S., and all other countries in the world also need to seriously ponder over the outrageous and unlawful act of the U.S. It is an undeniable realty that the DPRK has manufactured atomic bomb and hydrogen bomb, and even ICBM despite harsh sanctions continuing for more than half a century. It is really pathetic to see the lawmakers of the U.S. still running foolish and impudent failing to grasp the key to the DPRK’s success. The sanctions campaign by the U.S. might work on the other countries, but never with the DPRK. As the respected Supreme Leader with far-sighted wisdom, outstanding leadership art and incomparable grit and courage stands in the van of our revolution and there are the single-minded unity of the army and people around their leader and the great might of self-development, the DPRK scores only victory one after another. The sanctions by the U.S. has only worked to redouble the indomitable spirit of our army and people closely rallied around the leader and their unfathomable strength of self-reliance and self-development and increase the DPRK’s defense capability. The recent second test-launch of ICBM Hwasong-14 by the DPRK was meant to send a stern warning to the U.S. which is going reckless and frantic, having suffered only crushing defeats in the all-out showdown with the DPRK. The U.S. trumpeting about war and threat to impose extreme sanctions on the DPRK only increase the latter’s vigilance and stamina, and provides further justification for its access to nukes. The anachronistic daydream of the U.S. politicians of damaging by means of sanctions the overall national power and strategic prestige of the DPRK which have been markedly boosted, is being subject to humiliation within the U.S. as well. The U.S. sanctions provide further justification for the DPRK’s measures to intensify the development of its nuclear force. The countries abiding by this sanctions regime, instead of criticizing it, can’t be seen otherwise than the ones fueling the tensions on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. had better deliberate on the ways to ensure its home security rather than wasting its energy on the hopeless sanctions racket against the DPRK.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Slashes at U.S. Adoption of Independent Sanctions Law,” August 3, 2017)
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s “answer to a question raised by the KCNA on August 3 as regards the fact that the U.S. is escalating its military threat to the DPRK by deploying strategic nuclear assets in the Korean peninsula: Recently, the U.S. is continuously deploying a huge amount of its latest strategic assets in the Korean peninsula in a bid to resort to military adventure, calling for military response to the DPRK’s successful second test-launch of ICBM Hwasong-14. The U.S. carried out a joint missile launching drill together with south Korea targeting the DPRK and dispatched two of its B-1B strategic bombers into the air above the Korean peninsula to conduct aerial bombardment drill for ten hours. It also waged a drill simulating the interception of the DPRK’s ballistic missile while finalizing in haste the decision on the deployment of additional THAAD launchers in south Korea. No sooner had the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Pacific Command chief admiral of the U.S. held a consultation with their south Korean counterparts about the so-called military response than the U.S. openly stated that it will concentrate its latest strategic assets on the vicinity of the Korean peninsula in an explicit manifestation of its intention to carry out an armed attack on the DPRK. The second test-launch of ICBM Hwasong-14 by the DPRK was meant to send a stern warning to the U.S. going reckless and making senseless remarks about threatening the DPRK with military pressure and extreme sanctions. Unfortunately, the U.S. still thinks that its military bluff would work, and it seems like the U.S. has not yet realized that its opponent is a mighty nuclear power which is capable of smashing the U.S., an aggressor state, into smithereens. Any form of military threat or blackmail by the U.S. can never scare the DPRK and, on the contrary, it will only redouble the resolve of the Korean army and people to annihilate the enemy. If the U.S. is stupid enough to shove its stinky face on this land again and keep brandishing its nuclear club despite our repeated warnings, the DPRK will teach the U.S. some manners with the strategic nuclear force that it had so far shown to the world.” (KCNA, “DPRK FM Spokesman Denounces U.S. Reckless Move,” August 3, 2017)
The top national security officials in South Korea, the US and Japan expressed their agreement that dialogue with North Korea is possible under the right conditions and that the international community, under the lead of these three countries, should keep working to apply sanctions and pressure on the North to bring it to the negotiating table. “National Security Advisor Chung Eui-yong held a video conference with White House National Security Advisor Herbert McMaster and Japanese National Security Council Secretary-General Yachi Shotaro and discussed ways for the three countries to respond to North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations,” said Blue House Senior Secretary for Public Communication Yun Young-chan this evening. This was the first time that the top national security advisors to the leaders of the three countries discussed urgent security issues together over video conference. During the video conference, which began at 9 pm and lasted for one hour and 10 minutes, the three security officials “reconfirmed that North Korea’s missile launches represent a serious challenge and threat not only to the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia but also to the peace and stability of the entire world and agreed to strengthen pressure as much as possible through UN Security Council resolutions to deter additional North Korean provocations,” Yun Young-chan said. During the meeting, Chung reportedly emphasized “the need to make clear that the ultimate goal of maximum pressure and sanctions is to bring North Korea to the negotiating table and make sure that tensions on the Korean Peninsula are not raised needlessly.” “The security officials also agreed that the three countries would continue working together closely in the future on North Korean nuclear weapons and missile issues,” Yun added. The focus on close trilateral cooperation is an apparent attempt to downplay the controversy over “Korea passing,” or the claim that South Korea is being excluded from the discussion of Korean Peninsula issues amid speculation about a military strike or a grand bargain between the US and China to resolve the North Korean nuclear and missile issue following North Korean missile provocations. (Lee Jung-se, “S. Korean, U.S., and Japanese Top Security Officials Hold First Videoconference on North Korea,” Hankyore, August 5, 2017)
8/4/17:
The United States hit North Korea at the United Nations with a proposed set of unprecedented economic penalties, punctuated by a one-third cut in its export revenue, to punish the isolated country for its missile and nuclear tests. The penalties were contained in a draft Security Council resolution that American diplomats have been working on since North Korea launched its first successful intercontinental ballistic missile a month ago, demonstrating an ability to attack the United States homeland. The U.S.-drafted resolution, which was circulated today to all 15 Security Council members, is scheduled to be put to a vote tomorrow afternoon. It was circulated after American diplomats held extensive discussions about the language with China and Russia, suggesting that the two will back the measure or at least not block it with their veto power. The draft resolution, which needs at least nine yes votes for approval, would be the most punitive of any resolution over the past 11 years aimed at pressuring North Korea into abandoning its nuclear arms ambitions. A Security Council diplomat told reporters that the draft resolution’s provisions banning North Korea’s exports of coal, iron, iron ore, lead, lead ore and seafood would together lop roughly $1 billion from the country’s $3 billion in annual export revenue. The diplomat said it was the first time that entire sectors of North Korea’s export economy would be banned. He called it “the most impactful and expansive set of sanctions to date.” The draft resolution, which “condemns in the strongest terms” the July 4 and July 28 missile tests, would also place new limits on North Korea’s joint ventures and Foreign Trade Bank, and prohibit the country from sending more workers to overseas jobs — another important source of revenue for the impoverished nation of 25 million people. Nonetheless, the draft resolution did not go nearly as far as what the American ambassador, Nikki R. Haley, had demanded after the July 4 ballistic missile test. Haley called for cutoffs of North Korea’s access to foreign money and oil for its military. Those steps were not taken. Whether the resolution’s penalties would have much effect on North Korea’s actions is a matter of debate. Despite the country’s longstanding economic isolation, it has repeatedly defied Western-led efforts to change its behavior through sanctions. “I don’t think this is something that will bring North Korea to its knees,” said Jae H. Ku, the director of the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington. “This might be the gradual wringing of the neck of North Korea, but we’ve been down this road many times,” he said. “North Korea has always been able to find loopholes.” American intelligence assessments have generally concluded that the North Korean leader has no incentive to negotiate with the United States until his country emphatically shows that it could arm a missile with a nuclear weapon that could reach the American mainland. (Rick Gladstone, “U.N. Action Could Cost North Korea $1 Billion in Exports,” New York Times, August 5, 2017,
8/5/17:
The United Nations Security Council unanimously imposed new sanctions on North Korea that could slash by a third the Asian state’s $3 billion annual export revenue over its two ICBM tests in July. The U.S.-drafted resolution bans North Korean exports of coal, iron, iron ore, lead, lead ore and seafood. It also prohibits countries from increasing the current numbers of North Korean laborers working abroad, bans new joint ventures with North Korea and any new investment in current joint ventures. “We should not fool ourselves into thinking we have solved the problem. Not even close. The North Korean threat has not left us, it is rapidly growing more dangerous,” U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley told the council. “Further action is required. The United States is taking and will continue to take prudent defensive measures to protect ourselves and our allies,” she said. Washington would continue annual joint military exercises with South Korea, Haley said. North Korea has accused the United States and South Korea of escalating tensions by conducting military drills. China and Russia slammed U.S. deployment of the THAAD anti-missile defense system in South Korea. China’s U.N. Ambassador Liu Jieyi called for a halt to the deployment and for any equipment in place to be dismantled. Liu also urged North Korea to “cease taking actions that might further escalate tensions.” President Donald Trump hailed the vote in a Twitter message on this evening. “The United Nations Security Council just voted 15-0 to sanction North Korea. China and Russia voted with us. Very big financial impact!” Trump wrote. Trump “appreciates China’s and Russia’s cooperation in securing passage” of the resolution, the White House said in a later statement. The president “will continue to work with allies and partners to increase diplomatic and economic pressure on North Korea to ends its threatening and destabilizing behavior,” it said. Russia’s U.N. Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia said he hoped recent remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson “were sincere – that the U.S. is not seeking to dismantle the existing situation or to forcibly unite the peninsula or to militarily intervene in the country.” The United States negotiated with China for a month on the resolution, then expanded negotiations to the full council yesterday. “We had tough negotiations this week,” Haley told reporters. “I think that the Chinese realized that the United States was going to push, but they responded and we appreciate how they cooperated with us during these negotiations.”
Liu, asked about U.S. negotiating pressure, said China has been consistent on trying to achieve denuclearization, peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and “to re-launch negotiations to achieve this end.” He told reporters China was “opposed to any unilateral sanctions outside the agreed framework set by the U.N. Security Council resolutions.” It had been unclear whether strained U.S.-Russia relations would hamper negotiations on North Korean sanctions. “We are not hostages to our relations when we have to work together on issues which are far more important,” Russia’s Nebenzia told Reuters. The new U.N. resolution adds nine individuals and four entities to the U.N. blacklist, including North Korea’s primary foreign exchange bank, subjecting them to a global asset freeze and travel ban. “I would think China and Russia signed on the sanctions hoping that they would force North Korea back to the negotiating table,” said Thomas Byrne, president of the New York-based Korea Society. “However, North Korea will try to evade the new sanctions.”
The new resolution completely bans North Korean exports of coal. In November, the Security Council capped the North’s coal exports at $400 million annually. China, its largest buyer, halted imports in February. A U.N. diplomat said North Korea had been expected to earn an estimated $251 million from iron and iron ore in 2017, $113 million from lead and lead ore, and $295 million from seafood. The diplomat said it was difficult to estimate how much North Korea was earning from sending workers abroad. A United Nations human rights investigator said in 2015 that North Korea had forced more than 50,000 people to work abroad, mainly in Russia and China, earning between $1.2 billion and $2.3 billion a year for the government. Joseph DeThomas, a former State Department official who worked as an adviser on Iran sanctions and on previous rounds of North Korea sanctions, said freezing foreign labor would be difficult to enforce. “Overall I doubt that $1 billion number. I doubt it will hit that hard in terms of economic damage,” he said. “You cannot expect North Korea to buckle for anything less than the sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1990.” These sanctions, he said, remain “a very long way” from there. (Michelle Nichols, “United Nations Bans Key North Korea Exports over Missile Tests,” Reuters, August 5, 2017) Both Beijing and Moscow, in casting their votes for the new sanctions, said they appreciated statements by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson last week that the United States does not seek North Korea’s collapse, replacement of its government or “accelerated reunification” of the Korean Peninsula, and has no intention of sending troops there. “Our hope is that the United States will translate these ‘four no’s’ into a firm policy,” Liu Jieyi, China’s U.N. ambassador, told the council. In addition to reducing U.S. military exercises in the region, he repeated China’s objection to deployment of sophisticated U.S. antimissile systems, known as THAAD, in South Korea. “THAAD will not bring a solution,” he said. “What it will do is to seriously undermine the strategic balance of the region.” China also called for the resumption of talks among North Korea, regional powers and the United States. In his August 1 statement, Tillerson said Washington was interested in a “productive dialogue” but only on the basis of Pyongyang’s acceptance of nuclear disarmament. “We don’t think having a dialogue where the North Koreans come to the table assuming they’re going to maintain their nuclear weapons is productive,” he said. In addition to banning exports, the resolution also prohibits all countries from increasing the number of North Korean laborers they employ, prohibits any new joint ventures and commercial agreements with North Korea, and forbids increased investment in existing ventures. It also adopts new measures to strengthen previous measures and improve sanctions enforcement. The goal is to prevent North Korea’s access to hard currency, which Haley and other delegates at the council session said are not used for the welfare of the North Korean people. The United States had initially hoped to ban oil exports and additional banking and commercial penalties, which were opposed by China and Russia. (Karen DeYoung, “U.N. Imposes Export Sanctions on North Korea,” Washington Post, August 6, 2007,
UN Security Council Resolution 2371: “PP1: Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013), resolution 2094 (2013), resolution 2270 (2016), resolution 2321 (2016), and resolution 2356 (2017), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13), (updated PP1 of UNSCR 2321)
PP2: Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security, (PP2 of UNSCR 2321)
PP3: Expressing its gravest concern at the July 3 and July 28 of 2017 ballistic missile tests by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“the DPRK”), which the DPRK has stated were tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles, in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) 2321 (2016), and 2356 (2017), and at the challenge such tests constitute to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“the NPT”) and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger they pose to peace and stability in the region and beyond, (PP3 of UNSCR 2321)
PP4: Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community, (PP4 of UNSCR 2321)
PP5: Underlining also that measures imposed by this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK, (PP5 of UNSCR 2321)
PP6: Expressing serious concern that the DPRK has continued to violate relevant Security Council resolutions through repeated launches and attempted launches of ballistic missiles, and noting that all such ballistic missile activities contribute to the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension in the region and beyond, (PP6 of UNSCR 2321)
PP7: Expressing continued concern that the DPRK is abusing the privileges and immunities accorded under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, (PP7 of UNSCR 2321)
PP8: Expressing great concern that the DPRK’s prohibited arms sales have generated revenues that are diverted to the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles while DPRK citizens have unmet needs, (PP8 of UNSCR 2321)
PP9: Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and determining that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security, (PP9 of UNSCR 2321)
PP10: Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,
- Condemnsin the strongest terms the ballistic missile launches conducted by the DPRK on 3 July and 28 July of 2017, which the DPRK has stated were launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and which used ballistic missile technology in violation and flagrant disregard of the Security Council’s resolutions; (Based on OP1 of UNSCR 2270)
- Reaffirms its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation; shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches; shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; and shall abandon any other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; (OP 2-4 of UNSCR 2270, adapted and combined)
Designations
- Designate individuals and entities for asset freeze/travel ban: Decidesthat the measures specified in paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and decides furtherthat the measures specified in paragraph 8(e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction; (OP3 of UNSCR 2321)
- Designation of additional WMD-related Items: Decides to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution through the designation of additional goods, directsthe Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days of adoption of this resolution, and further decides that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report; (OP25 of UNSCR 22270)
- Designation of additional Conventional Arms-related Items:Decides to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 7 of resolution 2321 (2016) through the designation of additional conventional arms-related items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology, directs the Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within thirty days of adoption of this resolution, further decides that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report, and directs the Committee to update this list every 12 months; (Based on OP7 of UNSCR 2321 and OP25 of 2270)
Transportation
- Prohibit port calls by designated vessels tied to illicit activities:Decides that the Committee may designate vessels for which it has information indicating they are, or have been, related to activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution and all Member States shall prohibit the entry into their ports of such designated vessels, unless entry is required in the case of emergency or in the case of return to its port of origination, or unless the Committee determines in advance that such entry is required for humanitarian purposes or any other purposes consistent with the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution; (New)
- Prohibit chartering of vessels flagged by the DPRK:Clarifies that the measures set forth in paragraph 20 of resolution 2270 (2016) and paragraph 9 of resolution 2321 (2016), requiring States to prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction from owning, leasing, operating any vessel flagged by the DPRK, without exception, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance, apply to chartering vessels flagged by the DPRK;
Sectoral
- Full ban on coal, iron and iron ore:Decides that paragraph 26 of resolution 2321 (2016) shall be replaced by the following: “Decides that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, coal, iron, and iron ore, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, decidesthat for sales and transactions of iron and iron ore for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution, all States may allow those shipments to be imported into their territories up to 30 days from the date of adoption of this resolution with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 45 days after the date of adoption of this resolution, and decides further that this provision shall not apply with respect to coal that the exporting State confirms on the basis of credible information has originated outside the DPRK and was transported through the DPRK solely for export from the Port of Rajin (Rason), provided that the exporting State notifies the Committee in advance and such transactions involving coal originating outside of the DPRK are unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution; (New)
- Prohibit seafood exports from the DPRK: Decidesthat the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, seafood (including fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms), and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, and further decides that for sales and transactions of seafood (including fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms) for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution, all States may allow those shipments to be imported into their territories up to 30 days from the date of adoption of this resolution with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 45 days after the date of adoption of this resolution;
- Prohibit lead exports from the DPRK: Decidesthat the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, lead and lead ore, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, and further decides that for sales and transactions of lead and lead ore for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution, all States may allow those shipments to be imported into their territories up to 30 days from the date of adoption of this resolution with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 45 days after the date of adoption of this resolution;
- Ban the hiring and paying of additional DPRK laborers used to generate foreign export earnings: Expresses concernthat DPRK nationals frequently work in other States for the purpose of generating foreign export earnings that the DPRK uses to support its prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile programs, decides that all Member States shall not exceed on any date after the date of adoption of this resolution the total number of work authorizations for DPRK nationals provided in their jurisdictions at the time of the adoption of this resolution unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance that employment of additional DPRK nationals beyond the number of work authorizations provided in a member state’s jurisdiction at the time of the adoption of this resolution is required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, denuclearization or any other purpose consistent with the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution; (New)
Financial
- Prohibiting new or expanded joint ventures and cooperative commercial entities with the DPRK:Decides that States shall prohibit, by their nationals or in their territories, the opening of new joint ventures or cooperative entities with DPRK entities or individuals, or the expansion of existing joint ventures through additional investments, whether or not acting for or on behalf of the government of the DPRK, unless such joint ventures or cooperative entities have been approved by the Committee in advance on a case-by-case basis; (New)
- Clarifies that the prohibitions contained in paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013) apply to clearing of funds through all Member States’ territories; (New)
- Clarifiesthat companies performing financial services commensurate with those provided by banks are considered financial institutions for the purposes of implementing paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013), paragraphs 33 and 34 of resolution 2270 (2016), and paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016); (New)
Chemical Weapons
- Prohibiting use of chemical weapons and calling for accession to the CWC: Recalls paragraph 24 of resolution 2270 (2016), decides that the DPRK shall not deploy or use chemical weapons, and urgently calls uponthe DPRK to accede to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction, and then to immediately comply with its provisions; (Based on OP24 of UNSCR 2270)
Vienna Convention
- Abiding by the VCDR/VCCR:Demands that the DPRK fully comply with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; (New)
Impact on the People of the DPRK
- Regrets the DPRK’s massive diversion of its scarce resources toward its development of nuclear weapons and a number of expensive ballistic missile programs, notes the findings of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance that well over half of the people in the DPRK suffer from major insecurities in food and medical care, including a very large number of pregnant and lactating women and under-five children who are at risk of malnutrition and nearly a quarter of its total population suffering from chronic malnutrition, and, in this context, expresses deep concern at the grave hardship to which the people in the DPRK are subjected; (New)
Sanctions Implementation
- State implementation report: Decides that Member States shall report to the Security Council within ninety days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, requests the Panel of Experts, in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist Member States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner; (based on OP36 of UNSCR 2321)
- Redouble implementation efforts:Calls upon all Member States to redouble efforts to implement in full the measures in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), and 2356 (2017), and to cooperate with each other in doing so, particularly with respect to inspecting, detecting and seizing items the transfer of which is prohibited by these resolutions; (OP38 of UNSCR 2321)
- Update Committee and POE mandate:Decides that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution and further decides that the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and modified in paragraph 1 of resolution 2345 (2017), shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution; (OP39 of UNSCR 2321)
- Standard “seize and dispose” provision: Decidesto authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution that are identified in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Development of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972; (OP40 of UNSCR 2321)
- Force majeureclause: Emphasizes the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions; (OP41 of UNSCR 2321)
- Request Interpol notices: Requeststhat Interpol issue Special Notices with respect to designated individuals, and directs the Committee to work with Interpol to develop the appropriate arrangements to do so; (New)
- Expand POE capacity and resources: Requeststhe Secretary General to provide additional analytical resources needed to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) to strengthen its ability to analyze the DPRK’s sanctions violation and evasion activities; (Based on OP42 of UNSCR 2321)
Political
- Reiterates its deep concern at the grave hardship that the people in the DPRK are subjected to, condemns the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles instead of the welfare of its people while people in the DPRK have great unmet needs, and emphasizes the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare and inherent dignity of people in the DPRK; (OP45 of UNSCR 2321)
- Reaffirms that the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively or restrict those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017) and this resolution, and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK and decidesthat the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions, and further decides that the measures specified in paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall not apply with respect to financial transactions with the DPRK Foreign Trade Bank or the Korea National Insurance Corporation if such transactions are solely for the operation of diplomatic missions in the DPRK or humanitarian assistance activities that are undertaken by, or in coordination with, the United Nations; (Based on OP46 of UNSCR 2321)
- Reaffirmsits support for the Six Party Talks, calls for their resumption, and reiterates its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each other’s sovereignty and exist peacefully together, that the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments; (OP47 of UNSCR 2321)
- Reiteratesthe importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, and expresses its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic, and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by the council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and stresses the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond; (OP48 of UNSCR 2321)
- Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance, and, in this regard, expressesits determinationto take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch; (OP49 of UNSCR 2321)
- Decidesto remain seized of the matter. (OP50 of UNSCR 2321)
Annex I Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)
CHOE CHUN YONG Description: Representative for Ilsim International Bank, which is affiliated with the DPRK military and has a close relationship with the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation. Ilsim International Bank has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions. A.K.A.: Ch’oe Ch’un-yo’ng Identifiers: Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 654410078; Gender: male
HAN JANG SU Description: Chief Representative of the Foreign Trade Bank. A.K.A.: Chang-Su Han Identifiers: DOB: November 08, 1969; POB: Pyongyang, DPRK; Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 745420176, expires on October 19, 2020; Gender: male
JANG SONG CHOL Description: Jang Song Chol is a Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) representative overseas. AKA: n/a Identifiers: DOB: 12 March 1967; Nationality: DPRK
JANG SUNG NAM Description: Chief of an overseas Tangun Trading Corporation branch, which is primarily responsible for the procurement of commodities and technologies to support the DPRK’s defense research and development programs. A.K.A.: n/a Identifiers: DOB: July 14, 1970; Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 563120368, issued on March 22, 2013; Passport expiration date: March 22, 2018; Gender: male
JO CHOL SONG Description: Deputy Representative for the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation, which provides financial services in support to Tanchon Commercial Bank and Korea Hyoksin Trading, a subordinate entity of Korea Ryonbong General Corporation. A.K.A.: Cho Ch’o’l-so’ng Identifiers: DOB: September 25, 1984; Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 654320502, expires on September 16, 2019; Gender: male
KANG CHOL SU Description: Official for Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, which specializes in acquisition for the DPRK’s defense industries and support for the DPRK’s military-related overseas sales. Its procurements also likely support the DPRK’s chemical weapons program. A.K.A.: n/a Identifiers: DOB: February 13, 1969; Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 472234895
KIM MUN CHOL Description: Representative for Korea United Development Bank. A.K.A.: Kim Mun-ch’o’l Identifiers: DOB: March 25, 1957; Nationality: DPRK
KIM NAM UNG Description: Representative for Ilsim International Bank, which is affiliated with the DPRK military and has a close relationship with the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation. Ilsim International Bank has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions. A.K.A.: n/a Identifiers: Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 654110043
PAK IL KYU Description: Official for Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, which specializes in acquisition for DPRK’s defense industries and support to Pyongyang’s military-related sales. Its procurements also likely support the DPRK’s chemical weapons program. A.K.A.: Pak Il-Gyu Identifiers: Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 563120235; Gender: male
List Update for Aliases:
JANG BOM SU (KPi.016) – New AKA: Jang Hyon U with date of birth 22 February 1958 and diplomatic passport number 836110034, which expires on 1 January 2020.
JON MYONG GUK (KPi.018) – New AKA: Jon Yong Sang with date of birth 25 August 1976 and diplomatic passport number 836110035, which expires on 1 January 2020.
Annex II Asset Freeze (Entities)
- FOREIGN TRADE BANK (FTB) Description: Foreign Trade Bank is a state-owned bank and acts as the DPRK’s primary foreign exchange bank and has provided key financial support to the Korea Kwangson Banking CorporAKA: n/a Location: FTB Building, Jungsong-dong, Central District, Pyongyang,
- DPRKKOREAN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY (KNIC) Description: The Korean National Insurance Company is a DPRK financial and insurance company and is affiliated with Office 39. AKA: Korea Foreign Insurance Company Location: Central District, Pyongyang,
- DPRKKORYO CREDIT DEVELOPMENT BANK Description: Koryo Credit Development Bank operates in the financial services industry in the DPRK’s economy. AKA: Daesong Credit Development Bank; Koryo Global Credit Bank; Koryo Global Trust Bank Location: Pyongyang,
- DPRKMANSUDAE OVERSEAS PROJECT GROUP OF COMPANIES Description:Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies engaged in, facilitated, or was responsible for the exportation of workers from the DPRK to other nations for construction-related activities including for statues and monuments to generate revenue for the Government of the DPRK or the Workers’ Party of Korea. The Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies has been reported to conduct business in countries in Africa and Southeast Asia including Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Benin, Cambodia, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Malaysia, Mozambique, Madagascar, Namibia, Syria, Togo, and Zimbabwe. AKA: Mansudae Art Studio Location: Pyongyang, DPRK (UN Security Council Resolution 2371, August 5, 2017)
Southeast Asia’s top diplomats slammed North Korea with a sharp rebuke over its intercontinental ballistic missile tests and admonished Pyongyang to comply with its duty to help avert conflicts as a member of Asia’s biggest security forum. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations foreign ministers, however, were split on an American proposal to suspend Pyongyang from the ASEAN Regional Forum, a 27-nation bloc that includes North Korea and its bitter adversaries the U.S., South Korea and Japan. The ASEAN ministers reiterated in a joint statement their grave concerns over the escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula due to the North’s two ICBM tests last month, saying the launches threaten world stability. The ministers traditionally issue a communique containing their diverse concerns, and their issuance of a separate statement on North Korea’s missile tests and nuclear weapons program reflects their deep worries about the issue. “These developments seriously threaten peace, security and stability in the region and the world,” the ministers said in their statement. They urged the North to immediately and fully comply with its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions. They also backed efforts to improve relations between the two Koreas and said their 10-nation bloc was ready “to play a constructive role in contributing to peace and stability” on the Korean Peninsula. All the countries involved in the so-called six-party talks aimed at taming the North’s nuclear ambitions belong to the ASEAN Regional Forum, but Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs spokesman Robespierre Bolivar said at a news conference Saturday that there was no plan for those nations to meet on the sidelines of the Manila meetings. North Korea pulled out of the talks — which also include South Korea, the U.S., China, Japan and Russia — in 2009 to protest international condemnation of a long-range rocket launch. Philippine Foreign Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano said the ministers were divided over a U.S. proposal to suspend the North from the ASEAN Regional Forum, which will hold its annual meeting in two days. North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho will attend that meeting. With the U.S., Japan and South Korea expected to push for stronger actions against the North, a verbal showdown looms. “There were views that, ‘How can we hear them out or confront them if they’re not there?’ But there’s also a view that we should give them an ultimatum,” Cayetano said late yesterday after discussing the issue with other foreign ministers. The ministers “strongly call upon” North Korea, as a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum, to help “maintain the Asia Pacific as a region of lasting peace, stability, friendship and prosperity,” the ministers said in their statement. (Teresa Cerojano and Jim Gomez, “Associated Press, August 5, 2017)
McMaster interview: “HH: All right, let me switch if I can to North Korea, which is really pressing. And– and remind our audience, at the Aspen Institute ten days ago, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Joe Dunford, said, “There’s always a military– option. It would be horrific.” Lindsey Graham on Today Show earlier this week said– “We need to destroy the regime and their deterrent.” Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said on Tuesday, I believe, to North Korea, “You are leaving us no choice but to protect ourselves.” And then the Chairman of the Chief of Staff of the Army said, “Just because every choice is a bad choice doesn’t mean you don’t have to choose.” Are we looking at a preemptive strike? Are you trying to prepare us, you being collectively, the administration and people like Lindsey Graham and Tom Cotton for a first strike North Korea? HRM: Well, we really, what you’re asking is–are we preparing plans for a preventive war, right? A war that would prevent North Korea from threatening the United States with a nuclear weapon. And the president’s been very clear about it. He said, “He’s not gonna tolerate North Korea being able to threaten the United States.” Look at the (UNINTEL) for that regime if it– if– if they have nuclear weapons that can threaten the United States. It’s intolerable from the president’s perspective. So– so of course, we have to provide all options to do that. And– and that includes a military option. Now, would we like to resolve it short of what would be a very costly war, in terms of– in terms of the suffering of mainly the South Korean people? The– the ability of– of that North– North Korean regime to hold the South hostage to conventional fire’s capabilities, artillery and so forth, Seoul being so close. We’re cognizant of all of that. And so what we have to do is– is everything we can to– to pressure this regime, to pressure Kim Jong-un and those around him such that they conclude, it is in their interest to denuclearize. And there are really I think three critical things, came out of the president’s very successful summit with– President Xi of China that were different– that were different from past efforts to work with China, which has always been, you know, the– the desire, right, to work with China– on the– on the North Korean problem. The three things that came out of that are, first of all, that North Korea, Kim Jong-un s– armed with nuclear weapons is a threat not only to the United States, not only to our great allies, Japan and South Korea, but also to China. So that’s a big acknowledgement. The second thing was that– was that, we’re, the goal– the goal of working together with them cannot be the so-called “freeze for freeze.” Where we freeze our– our– our training and then they freeze their program. Because they’re at a threshold capability now. Freeze for freeze doesn’t work anymore. Right? It’s– it’s intolerable. So the goal is denuclearization of the– of the peninsula. That’s the second big thing. The third big thing that came out of it is, China acknowledged they have tremendous coercive economic influence here. They may not have a great political relationship with Kim Jong-un. I mean, who does these days, right? But– but they recognize that they do have a great deal of agency and control over that situation. And so we are prioritizing Secretary of State in the lead obviously, prioritizing an effort to work with the Chinese. As the president has said, as the president has tweeted, right? We– we also though have to be prepared to walk down a path that assumes not as much help from China as we would like. HH: So that would mean, back to the preemptive strike or some kind of action against Kim Jong-un, should he be sleeping easily at night? HRM: No, I think– I think he should not be, because he– he has the whole world against him. Right? He’s– he’s isolated– he’s isolated on this. Si– since 1953, the Korean Peninsula has been in a state of armistice. Right? The war never formally ended. And there has been no aggression– no aggression from– from the United States, South Korea, any– any of our allies. HH: If he were removed, General, would the regime’s behavior change? If that one individual were removed? HRM: Well, I– I’m not sure about that. I mean, I don’t think anybody has a very clear picture of the inner workings of that regime. What is clear is that it is– it is an authoritarian dictatorship that– that has existed since the end– end of World War II. It is now in its third generation. And there is a difference in this third autocratic ruler, in that he’s as brutal as the previous two have been, but he’s doing some things differently. He’s killing members of his own family even. And so what– what this means for the future of that regime. I mean, I think it’s really almost imp– it’s impossible to predict. HH: Is it legitimate? You’ve done a lot of strategic thinking about this. Is it legitimate to attempt to achieve regime change by the removing of one– leader of a regime? Is that a legitimate tool of international affairs? HRM: Well, di– well, I think it depends on– on really the– the– the legal justifications for that, right? And– and this goes back to, you know– j– just war theory. And– and– what is the nature of– of the risk? And– and does that risk justify acting in defense of– of your people and– and your vital interests? HH: We know the risk a little bit. In 1994, when the first nor– North Korean deal with signed– the people who executed it, Gallucci, Dan Poneman, Joel Wit wrote a book. And they quoted a general saying, “If there is a conflict,” called Going Critical, “there will be a million casualties.” A million casualties. Is that still a good estimate of what happens if– preemptive strike unfolds in North Korea, General? HRM: You know, wa– one– one thing about war. It’s impossible oftentimes to predict. It’s always impossible to predict the future course of events. Because war is a continuous interaction of opposites, a continuous interaction between your forces and those of the enemy. It– it involves not just the capability to use force, but also intentions and things that are just unknowable at the outset. And so I think it’s important to– to look at– range of estimates of what could happen, because it’s clear that at war, it’s– it’s unpredictable. And so you al– always have to ask the question, “What happens next? What are the risks? How do you mitigate those risks?” And– and obviously, you know, war is– is– is the most serious decision any leader has to make. And so what can we do to make sure we exhaust our possibilities and exhaust our– our other opportunities to accomplish this very clear objective of denuclearization of the peninsula short of war? HH: If we were to go into a preemptive strike, General McMaster, of some sort, large, small, whatever, would we tell the Chinese before we did that in order to manage their expectations and to limit the possibility of a replay of the Korean War? HRM: Well, I can– I can’t really talk about any details associated with operational plans or– or strategies. But– but– it would depend on the circumstances I guess— HH: Have you– have you sat with the president and walked through how China might or might not react to a preemptive strike and how they unpredictably entered the war in the– in the first Korean War? HRM: Well, as– as a rule, we don’t talk about deliberations with the– with the president, but he’s been very much involved and– and has– has been– deeply briefed, you know, on– on all aspects of the– the strategy– on North Korea. HH: How concerned should the American people be that we are actually on the brink of a war with North Korea? HRM: Well, I think– I think it’s– it’s impossible to overstate the danger associated with this. Right, the, so I think it’s impossible to overstate the danger associated with a rogue, brutal regime, I mean, who murdered his own brother with nerve agent in a p– in– in an airport. I mean– I mean, think– think about what he’s done– in terms of his– his own brutal repression of not only members of his regime but his own family. HH: That’s a prison camp run by the Mafia with nuclear weapons. HRM: As one author has called it, it’s an “impossible state.” Right? HH: Or as the chief of staff said, “Just because all the choices are terrible doesn’t mean we don’t have to choose.” Will this administration choose or will it, as some people said about the last administration, “lead from behind,” when it comes to North Korea? HRM: Well, there’s a big difference, right? There’s a big difference in the situation that President Trump inherited from previous administrations. It’s worse. Situation’s worse. Whereas before there’s– there’s been this cycle over the years as you– as you know, from demanding that— that— that North Korea stop its missile program, stop its nuclear program. After those demands, pressure is brought on the regime. The regime then says, “Oh, I would like to talk.” And then there– then there’s long, drawn-out negotiations during which the North Korean regime continues to work on its program. And then a weak agreement is decided upon, which then North Korea immediately violates, right? Okay, so that’s, so we’re just not gonna repeat that failed cycle. We can’t do it. And so the– the, it has progressed too far as you’ve seen with these recent missile tests. And as you’ve seen– they’ve done five nuclear tests. And so– so I– I think what you’ll see increasingly is that a rec– this is a recognition that North Korea is a global threat. It requires global action. And so what– what are you seeing now? You’re seeing countries expel North Korean, so-called “guest workers,” who– who they export overseas to send money back to the regime. You’re seeing squeezing of a lot of their other illicit activities globally. You’re seeing economic sanctions now being enforced more rigorously. And so that’s the path everybody needs to be on. This isn’t, this is a problem for the United States. It is. But this is a big problem for, not only Japan, South Korea, but also Russia, China, everybo– ever– of course, all of our allies are with this on us. HH: The– the– Reuters had a story earlier this week. Two U.S. officials, senior officials confirm that, “The I.C.B.M.s that North Korea tested can reach anywhere in the United States.” Can you confirm that, General? HRM: No. (LAUGH) I’m not gonna confirm it. But– it’s– it is– but, as I mentioned really, I mean, it’s– the, whether it could reach– you know– San Francisco or– or Pittsburgh or Washington, I mean, how much does that matter, right? It’s– it’s a grave threat. HH: Does South Korea need its own nuclear deterrent? HRM: Well, here’s, this is what’s an important, this is a very important question, right. And—and of course, it’s– it’s– it’s U.S., United States extended deterrence, nuclear deterrence extended to our allies that has been really a key to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. If that regime is broken, that nonproliferation regime is broken, it’s bad news for everybody. And so imagine now a Northeast Asia with a nuclear armed North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, right? All of– all countries– (UNINTEL) HH: Pakistan and India, yeah. HRM: And so, is that what China wants? Is that what Russia wants? No. I mean, so it is in all of our interest to insure that North Korea denuclearizes. HH: Last North Korea question. Is there a red line about which K.J.U. should know? HRM: Well, you know, President Trump’s been very clear about this, right? That– that he does not advance, he does not announce red lines in– in advance. But I– I think his overall intention is very clear, to insure that North Korea does not have the capability to threaten the United States with a nuclear weapon.” (Duane Patterson, National Security Adviser General H.R. McMaster Interview on Hugh Hewitt, MSNBC, August 5, 2017)
8/7/17:
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that North Korea could show it is ready for negotiations by stopping missile launches. North Korea, meanwhile, reacted to the U.N. Security Council’s new sanctions by threatening a “thousands-fold” retaliation against the United States and asserting that sanctions would never force the country to abandon its nuclear program. “There is no bigger mistake than the United States believing that its land is safe across the ocean,” according to the government statement carried by the official media. Yet in his remarks to reporters at a regional conference in which North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests have dominated discussions, Tillerson held out an olive branch to Pyongyang by saying the United States will sit down for talks “when conditions are right” to discuss denuclearization and steps to ensure North Korea can feel secure and prosperous. “The best signal that North Korea could give us that they’re prepared to talk would be to stop these missile launches,” he said. “We’ve not had any extended period of time where they have not taken some type of provocative action by launching ballistic missiles. I think that would be the first and strongest signal they could send to us, would be to stop these missile launches.” Pressed for a time frame, Tillerson said, “We’ll know it when we see it.” “We’re not going to give someone a specific number of days or weeks,” he added. “This is not ‘Give me 30 days and we’re ready to talk.’ It’s not quite that simple. It is all about how we see their attitude in approaching a dialogue with us.” Tillerson has used the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gathering here in the Philippine capital to hold meetings on the sidelines with allies and adversaries. Following a meeting with his counterparts from Australia and Japan, the three countries issued a statement urging the international community to pressure North Korea to abandon its “threatening and provocative” actions, urging the new sanctions be strictly implemented. Yesterday, China delivered frank advice to North Korea, its outcast neighbor, telling Pyongyang to make a “smart decision” and stop conducting missile launches and nuclear tests. The statement by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi came on the heels of a U.N. Security Council decision to impose additional sanctions on North Korea and its exports, and it suggested that the American push to further isolate the regime of Kim Jong Un is reaping some dividends. But Wang also called on the United States to dial back the tension. After meeting with North Korea’s top diplomat at the ASEAN gathering here, Wang said that the situation on the Korean Peninsula is critical — but that it could be a turning point for negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear proliferation. “Do not violate the U.N.’s decision or provoke international society’s goodwill by conducting missile launching or nuclear tests,” Wang said after talks with Ri Yong Ho, North Korea’s foreign minister. Wang, however, quickly added, “Of course, we would like to urge other parties like the U.S. and South Korea to stop increasing tensions.” Tillerson arrived in Manila on the night of August 5 in what State Department officials said would be a concerted effort to enlist other countries in the campaign to get North Korea to abandon its missile and nuclear tests. Concern has mounted that North Korea is developing its missile technology more quickly than expected, after tests last month of missiles that experts said are capable of striking the U.S. mainland, perhaps as far inland as Chicago. “Certainly we want to resolve this issue through negotiations, and this pressure campaign, the sanctions, it’s all about trying to convince the North Koreans that the fast way forward is to come back to the table and talk,” said Susan Thornton, assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs. President Trump, who is at his golf club in New Jersey, tweeted on Sunday night: “Just completed call with President Moon of South Korea. Very happy and impressed with 15-0 United Nations vote on North Korea sanctions.” In the hour-long phone call, Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-in agreed to cooperate and apply maximum pressure and sanctions on North Korea in a telephone call today, the South’s presidential office said, according to Reuters. Moon was quoted as saying there is a need to show North Korea that the door to dialogue is still open, should Pyongyang give up its nuclear program. In Washington, White House counselor Kellyanne Conway reveled in the vote, which took place August 5. On ABC’s “This Week,” she said Sunday: “And then you also just yesterday saw a unanimous rebuke of North Korea. The greatest economic sanctions package ever levied against them, it’ll cost about $1 billion. Even allies in the region like China, Japan, South Korea, all agreeing with the United States that North Korea and its nuclear capabilities must be stopped.” But Tillerson also has pointedly stated several times that the United States does not seek regime change or a rapid reunification of the Koreas, which have been in a state of suspended hostility since an armistice was declared in 1953. Yesterday, he declared the latest U.N. sanctions a “good outcome.” That prompted South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha to correct him slightly. “It was a very, very good outcome,” she said. South Korean officials told reporters that Kang and Tillerson had agreed to pursue the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through peaceful measures. But the diplomatic road ahead is rocky. U.S. officials rejected Beijing’s call for the North to halt its nuclear program in exchange for the United States and South Korea suspending joint military exercises, which Pyongyang considers a prelude to an invasion and regime change. “This kind of moral equivalency that’s implied by the freeze for freeze, which is between the North Koreans shooting off missiles that are prohibited and our reasonably defensive exercises that we undertake in our alliance with the South Koreans to protect them from these launches, is not a reasonable kind of a trade,” Thornton said. Thornton also said the United States would be “watchful” to ensure that China did not slip from its adherence to the new sanctions, which she characterized as the strongest in a generation. “We want to make sure China is continuing to implement fully the sanctions regime,” she said. “Not this kind of episodic back and forth that we’ve seen.” The United States has unsuccessfully lobbied for the 27 members of the ASEAN Regional Forum to suspend North Korea’s membership. The response has been polite but noncommittal. U.S. officials have been adamant that there will be no direct meetings with North Koreans in Manila, even among lower-level officials. (Carol Morello, “Tillerson to North Korea: No Talks Until Missiles Stop,” Washington Post, August 7, 2017,
Tillerson: “TILLERSON: Good morning. …Obviously, high on the agenda in the time that we’ve been here has been the situation with the DPRK and North Korea. And I think the strong UN Security Council resolution unanimously approved, working in coordination with China and Russia both to put out a statement from the Security Council that I think is quite clear in terms of there being no daylight among the international community as to the expectation that North Korea will take steps to achieve all of our objectives, which is a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. I think there should be no question in anyone’s mind as to the common view held by everyone on that Security Council as that being the ultimate objective. I think we also – as you well know, ASEAN released a – what I consider to be a very strong statement as well demonstrating their commitment as well to support a denuclearized Korean Peninsula – I think a statement that’s probably stronger than any we’ve ever seen from ASEAN in terms of a view on this particular issue. So I think two very important actions taken to hopefully send a strong message that North Korea understands the expectation of the rest of the international community going forward. So the next steps obviously are to see that the Security Council resolution sanctions are enforced by everyone. We will be monitoring that carefully and certainly having conversations with any and all that we see who may not be fully embracing not just the spirit of those sanctions but the operational execution of those sanctions. And we hope, again, that this ultimately will result in North Korea coming to the conclusion to choose a different pathway, and when the conditions are right that we can sit and have a dialogue around the future of North Korea so that they feel secure and prosper economically. …I did have the opportunity yesterday for an exchange of views with our Chinese counterparts, and we really went through a bit of reflection on the relationship since the first summit between the two presidents at Mar-a-Lago, the creation of the four high-level dialogues between our two countries, two of which are already actively meeting – the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue and the Economic and Trading Dialogue. Both of those are very active. The two remaining dialogues that we hope to convene in the next several weeks are the Law Enforcement and Cyber Security Dialogue and the Cultural or People-to-People Dialogue. I think all four of these dialogues, which are conducted at a very high level, are really advancing our two countries’ understandings of the nature of this relationship between the U.S. and China and how we should strive to strengthen this relationship so that it benefits both of our countries from an economic prosperity standpoint but also benefits the world in terms of maintaining a secure world absent of conflict. I also had the opportunity to sit and exchange views with our Russian counterparts, Sergey Lavrov. We discussed several issues during the course of that meeting. We also had some exchange of views about the nature of the relationship between our countries, and a lot of work, obviously, that has to be done in that regard. I told the foreign minister that we had not made a decision regarding how we will respond to Russia’s request to remove U.S. diplomatic personnel. We had – I asked several clarifying questions just to ensure I understood kind of their thinking behind that diplomatic note we received, but told him we would respond by September the 1st. … Q: Thank you, Secretary Tillerson, for doing this. On North Korea, I’m wondering if you can discuss more specifically what the exact preconditions are for the U.S. to engage in the type of talks that you said we ultimately would like to have with them. And given that these new sanctions are going to take a while for them to have a desired economic effect and we’re under a time crunch with North Korea’s rapid development of this technology, how can you be confident that these sanctions will change North Korea’s calculus before it’s too late? TILLERSON: Well, the best signal that North Korea could give us that they’re prepared to talk would be to stop these missile launches. We’ve not had an extended period of time where they have not taken some type of provocative action by launching ballistic missiles. So I think that would be the first and strongest signal they could send us is just stop, stop these missile launches. Obviously, we have other means of communication open to them, to certainly hear from them if they have a desire to want to talk. In terms of the most recent round of sanctions, I think your point is well taken that when do these actually have a practical bite on their revenues. I think perhaps the most – the more important element of that is just the message that this sends to North Korea of how unacceptable the entire international community finds what they’re doing to be. And I think also it sends a strong message to two parties that we think can have some influence on how the North Koreans come to grips with the reality of what they’re facing, that being China and Russia. So I think their – again, their support for the Security Council resolution itself I think also sends a message. But I think the world is also expressing a view to China and Russia that we do have an expectation that you will do everything you possibly can to help North Korea understand the reality of the future as well and bring them to the negotiating table. …Q: Secretary, you said earlier to Josh that preconditions for North Korea would be stopping missile launches. So how long do they need to stop those missile launches for in order to have conversations? And do they need to dismantle – say that they’re going to dismantle their nuclear program? … TILLERSON: With respect to the North Korean missile launches, we’ll know it when we see it. We’re not going to give someone a specific number of days or weeks. This is really about the spirit of these talks, and they can demonstrate they’re ready to sit with a spirit of finding a way forward in these talks by no longer conducting these missile tests. So this is not a give me 30 days and we’re ready to talk. It’s not quite that simple. So it is all about how we see their attitude towards approaching a dialogue with us.” (DoS, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, Press Availability in Manila, August 7, 2017)
North Korea spurned harsh new U.N. sanctions and threatened to defend itself with nuclear weapons if necessary, as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson repeated an offer to bargain with the outcast nation under the right circumstances. There was no sign at a major Asian security conference here that the sanctions hailed by President Trump as a foreign policy achievement would succeed where past efforts have failed in trying to persuade the country to give up its nuclear weapons. North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho told diplomats that his country will never negotiate away what he called a rational “strategic option” against the threat of attack from the United States. “We will, under no circumstances, put the nukes and ballistic rockets” up for negotiation”, Ri said in prepared remarks, adding that the entire United States is within range of its missiles. approved Saturday as illegal, appearing to rule out talks that the Trump administration, in a diplomatic partnership with China and Russia, is offering North Korea as a way out of its economic and diplomatic pariah status. He dismissed the U.N. Security Council sanctions approved Saturday as illegal, appearing to rule out talks that the Trump administration, in a diplomatic partnership with China and Russia, is offering North Korea as a way out of its economic and diplomatic pariah status. “The best signal that North Korea could send that they’re prepared to talk would be to stop these missile launches,” Tillerson told reporters today at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gathering. The security conference in the Philippine capital was dominated by the rising threat posed by North Korea’s rapid advances in nuclear and ballistic missile technology. Those capabilities are already a threat to neighbors and U.S. allies South Korea and Japan. In two tests last month, North Korea demonstrated that it could hit major population centers in the United States, and the country is now working to perfect the technology to allow those missiles to carry nuclear warheads. The new economic sanctions were approved amid the discussions here. The penalties are the toughest to date against a country that has been under international sanctions for more than a decade, and they carry the symbolic weight of approval by Pyongyang’s closest ally, China. They also approximate a trade embargo by targeting some of North Korea’s biggest exports, including coal. The sanctions can work only if North Korean leader Kim Jong Un concludes that he has too much to lose by hanging on to his weapons. Kim’s calculation has been the opposite — that his weapons and the means to deliver them buy him irreplaceable leverage over the United States, his principal adversary. China is urging Kim to consider negotiations, and also worked alongside the United States to develop the new U.N. sanctions. Days before the unanimous Security Council vote, Tillerson had made a point of saying that the United States does not consider North Korea its enemy and does not seek to invade the country or unseat Kim. Those reassurances were meant to encourage North Korea to meet at the bargaining table. At the same time, Washington has issued blunt warnings that the United States will use military force if necessary, and North Korea has answered in kind. In the printed version of his speech, Ri said Pyongyang will use nuclear weapons only against the United States or any other country that might join it in military action against North Korea. Ri’s address here was closed to the media, so it could not be determined whether he stuck to a script delivered to reporters. Another direct warning was aimed at the United States in a government statement published by the state-run Korean Central News Agency. “There is no bigger mistake than the United States believing that its land is safe across the ocean,” it said. North Korea “will make the U.S. pay dearly for all the heinous crimes it commits against the state and people of this country,” the statement said. Tillerson would not spell out a deadline for North Korea to respond to the diplomatic overture. “We’ll know it when we see it,” he said. “We hope again that this ultimately will result in North Korea coming to a conclusion to choose a different pathway, and when the conditions are right that we can sit and have a dialogue around the future of North Korea so that they feel secure and prosper economically,” he told reporters. Tillerson avoided running into Ri, who attended the related ASEAN Regional Forum. The State Department said he skipped one event where the two men might have met and left another early to attend a scheduled meeting with Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. Tillerson and Trump spoke by phone for about an hour today, and Tillerson detailed the results of his discussions in Manila, the White House said. “United Nations Resolution is the single largest economic sanctions package ever on North Korea,” Trump wrote in a Twitter message Saturday. “Over one billion dollars in cost to N.K.” Today, Trump complained that the U.S.-led sanctions vote at the United Nations is not getting enough attention, writing, “The Fake News Media will not talk about the importance of the United Nations Security Council’s 15-0 vote in favor of sanctions on N. Korea!” North Korea rarely attends, or is even invited to, international forums such as the ASEAN meeting. Ri tried to make the most of it, holding meetings with the top diplomats from China and Russia, two countries that trade with North Korea and employ North Koreans as contract workers. China alone is responsible for 90 percent of North Korea’s trade. Moscow and Beijing have proposed a “freeze for a freeze” approach, in which North Korea would suspend its missile and nuclear testing if the United States and its allies stop conducting joint military exercises in the region. Washington has rejected that. After meeting with Ri, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called on all parties “to show maximum restraint to avoid the projection of military power on the Korean Peninsula and immediately start seeking a political and diplomatic resolution to the problems of the peninsula, including its denuclearization.” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said he told Ri that North Korea should abide by U.N. prohibitions against missile and nuclear testing. But he also said that sanctions, while needed, “are not the final goal,” and he called for dialogue. Wang urged the United States and South Korea, as well as the North, not to increase tensions, saying the situation already is at a “critical point.” Chinese state media today acknowledged that North Korea had to be punished for its missile tests, but criticized the United States for its “arrogance.”
The effectiveness of the new sanctions depends on how well China, in particular, decides to enforce them, said Michael J. Green of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, an Asia expert in the George W. Bush administration. More broadly, Green said, the time for effective diplomacy has almost certainly run out. There is little to no chance that North Korea can be talked out of weapons it considers essential, he said. “The North Korea strategy for decades has involved both carrots and sticks. The problem is that the carrots are no longer credible,” he said. (Carol Morello and Anne Gearan, “North Korea Rejects Talks,” Washington Post, August 8, 2017 p. A-1)
President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump shared concerns about North Korea’s missiles and agreed to impose a “maximum level of pressure and sanctions” to induce it to abandon its missile and nuclear ambitions during a56-minute phone conversation, the Blue House said. Blue House Spokesman Park Soo-hyun reported that the two leaders agreed that they should pursue “the maximum level of pressure and sanctions” to induce the North to “make the right choice of giving up its nuclear and missile programs.” According to a presidential secretary, Moon did most of the talking while the businessman-turned-president mostly listened. On Resolution 2371, unanimously approved by 15 UN Security Council member states, Trump said it was a sign of a “very important change” in the global community over how to tackle the North Korean nuclear problem, an apparent reference to votes by Moscow and Beijing, according to the Blue House. Trump also emphasized that inducing change in the North’s behavior requires a “firm stance” composed of “strong pressure and sanctions.” During the nearly one-hour talk, Trump inquired about Seoul’s recent dialogue overtures to Pyongyang to discuss holding family reunions and easing military tensions along the border, which were ignored by Pyongyang. Moon told Trump that the international community needs to show North Korea that the “door for dialogue” is open as long as Pyongyang makes the prudent decision to give up its nuclear weapons. Spokesman Park said Moon explained to Trump that his proposal to hold reunions of families separated by the Korean War was made on a humanitarian basis and that a proposed military talk was intended to prevent unexpected military clashes along the border by restoring a military communications hotline. Moon stressed that North Korea “should be brought to the point” that it can no longer withstand crushing sanctions. Moon also stressed there should be no outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula, which was devastated by the 1950-53 Korean War, expressing the need to solve the North Korean problem “in a peaceful and diplomatic” manner through close Seoul-Washington coordination. Moon also asked Trump for his assistance in revising bilateral missile guidelines signed by the two, which prohibits Seoul from developing a ballistic missile with a range of over 800 kilometers (497 miles) and a payload of over 500 kilograms (1,102 pounds). Seoul wants to raise the cap to 1,000 kilograms so that its missiles can be more effective against North Korean threats. While calling Seoul-Washington relations a “great partnership,” Trump pointed out that the U.S. spent a lot on the bilateral alliance, a reiteration of his campaign theme that U.S. allies should pay more for their military defense, according to the Blue House. He also said revising the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement was needed, citing trade deficits with Korea.
Moon expressed his hopes for smooth talks between the countries on the FTA issue as Korea’s new chief trade representative, Kim Hyun-chong, was recently appointed. On the U.S.’s defense budget for Korea, Moon said a large portion of an increase in Seoul’s defense budget would be spent on purchase of cutting-edge American weapons, helping to narrow the U.S. trade deficit with Korea. Following his talk with Trump, Moon also conversed with Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo for 23 minutes from 4 p.m. During the talk, the two shared concerns over the North’s growing missile capability. As in his talk with Trump, Moon said the North Korean issue should be addressed and resolved in a “peaceful and diplomatic manner” and close coordination among Seoul, Tokyo and Washington was required to that end, the presidential spokesman said.
“President Moon and Prime Minister Abe shared their judgement that they should strengthen pressure and sanctions as North Korea shows no interest in talk amid its repeated provocations,” said spokesman Park. Abe told Moon that while it required dialogue to resolve North Korea’s nuclear and missile problems at the final stage, he highly valued the fact that the two leaders were on the same page that they should impose pressure on the North to bring it to the negotiating table.
The two did not discuss the issue of Korean women forced to work as sexual slaves for the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II. (Kang Jin-kyu, “Moon Talks to Trump, Abe about North,” JoongAng Ilbo, August 8, 2017)
The 2017 Chicago Council on Global Affairs Survey finds that the US public senses an increased threat from North Korea’s nuclear program, rating it one of the top threats facing the United States. Nine in ten Americans reject the idea that North Korea should be allowed to produce nuclear weapons. While Americans broadly support sanctions against North Korea and against Chinese banks and companies that do business with North Korea, they continue to have little appetite for overt military action. Three-quarters of Americans (75%) now say that North Korea’s nuclear program is a critical threat facing the United States, placing it among the top threats facing the country.
Concern over North Korea’s nuclear program has spiked 15 percentage points since 2016 (60%) and 20 percent from 2015 (55%). This is also the largest increase in any of the potential threats included in the 2017 survey. The public’s sense of a heightened threat from North Korea has also strengthened their expressed commitment to US ally South Korea if it were attacked by North Korea. In Chicago Council Surveys since 1990, steadily increasing percentages—but fewer than half—have favored using US troops to defend South Korea in the event of an attack by North Korea. In the 2017 survey, for the first time a majority of Americans express support for using US forces to defend South Korea (62%, up from 47% in 2015).
Policy options on North Korea are constrained, and no administration has been able to successfully convince North Korea to cease its nuclear and missile programs. While there has been ongoing debate among experts about accepting a North Korea with nuclear weapons in exchange for an agreement guaranteeing it will not produce more of them, only 21 percent of the American public—17 percent of Republicans and 26 percent of Democrats—say they support this option. Even fewer are willing to simply accept that North Korea will produce more nuclear weapons (11%; 11% of Republicans, 13% Democrats). While sanctions have yet to slow North Korea’s progress, increasing sanctions is the option that receives the most support from the American public (76%). On this, there is strong partisan agreement. While 84 percent of Republicans support this approach, 76 percent of Democrats agree. There is also strong support (68%) for placing sanctions on Chinese banks and companies that do business with North Korea. Military action carries with it the very real risk of retaliation and escalation, and as in past surveys, lacks public support. Overall, 28 percent of Americans favor sending US troops to destroy North Korea’s nuclear facilities and 40 percent favor conducting airstrikes against North Korea’s nuclear production facilities. But there are partisan differences on these potential responses, most notably on airstrikes. A majority of Republicans (54%) support such airstrikes versus 33 percent of Democrats. Republicans (37%) are also more likely than Democrats (24%) to favor sending US troops to destroy DPRK’s nuclear facilities, though still a minority. In the United States, there is no love for North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un. His frequent portrayals in the media cast him as a madman, making him notorious for missiles, nuclear weapons, threats to the United States, and human rights abuses. Accordingly, just 6 percent of the American public holds a favorable view of Kim. Nine in ten (91%) hold unfavorable views of him, with 79 percent holding very unfavorable views. This makes him the least favorable leader included in the survey. By contrast, a majority (54%) hold a favorable view of South Korean President Moon Jae-In.
Dina Smeltz and Karl Friedhoff, “North Korea Now Seen As Top Threat Facing the United States,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, August 7, 2017)
Carlin: “The reports came fast and furious from Manila the other day. Hello, sweetheart, give me rewrite! North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho says the North will never negotiate on nuclear or missiles! North Nixes Tillerson Talk Offer! The stories were breathless, and they were wrong. Anyone familiar with the North’s statements knows that over the past month there has been a major shift in Pyongyang’s formulation about negotiating. The real story starts with Kim Jong Un’s remarks on July 4, after the North’s first ICBM test-launch, Kim Jong Un introduced a new element to the North’s public position on the nuclear issue. He said: ‘[T]he DPRK would neither put its nukes and ballistic rockets on the table of negotiations in any case nor flinch even an inch from the road of bolstering the nuclear force chosen by itself unless the US hostile policy and nuclear threat to the DPRK are definitely terminated.’ In the past month, that formulation has been repeated several times (at least five) in DPRK media. Significantly, it appeared in the August 7 Government statement responding to the recent UNSC sanctions. Government statements are not chopped liver. They are vetted, and possibly written, at the highest levels of the regime. Kim’s formulation was somewhat vague in the original Korean—does the qualifier “unless” modify the entire sentence, or only the second half? Yet the question arises, why would Kim have even raised the image of the “table of negotiations”? It’s not normally part of the North’s public discussion. Previously, a couple of years ago, the routine formula in lower level media commentaries was that the nuclear deterrent was ‘…not a mere bargaining chip to put on the table for negotiations with the United States.’ Then what about Ri Yong Ho’s remarks in Manila on August 7? Didn’t he say the North would “never” negotiate? The media rushed to report that. And here we have an interesting lesson. Ri would not on his own have altered a top-level formulation, certainly not one that had appeared in a Government statement the same day. Well then, what? Did he receive new instructions? Possible, but at the time I thought it unlikely. In fact, when the North Korean English language text of Ri’s remarks finally became available, it was clear that he had used exactly the same formulation, almost word for word, as the one that has been in play for over a month. The same formulation … except it was now split into two sentences: ‘We will, under no circumstances, put the nukes and ballistic rockets on the negotiating table. Neither shall we flinch even an inch from the road to bolstering up the nuclear forces chosen by ourselves, unless the hostile policy and nuclear threat of the U.S. against the D.P.R.K. are fundamentally eliminated.’ So, what do we did we have? Sleight of hand, splitting the formulation, essentially putting nuclear and missiles off the table, while suggestinug a moratorium (that’s essentially what “flinching an inch from the road of bolstering” means) can be achieved? The August 7 KCNA English report on Ri’s remarks is of no help. It is a brief summary that wriggles around the question of what the foreign minister said, or meant to say, on the key formulation. Luckily, we have the Korean version of Ri’s speech. And there the key formulation is exactly as it was originally minted—all one sentence. That odd English version? We can only assume it was an editing/printing mistake, probably not career enhancing. Final point—isn’t the very broad language of the qualifying phrase (“unless the hostile policy and nuclear threat of the U.S. against the D.P.R.K. are fundamentally eliminated”) a mountain impossible to climb? Experience in past negotiations tells us that the North Koreans can use this sort of vague conditionality however it suits them. Sometimes it prevents progress, but sometimes it actually gives Pyongyang the maneuver room it needs to move ahead. How will we find out? One way seems obvious: go and talk to them.” (Robert Carlin, “Door to Negotiations or No?” 38North, August 8, 2017)
DPRK Government statement “over the fact that the U.S. and other hostile forces, terrified at the growth of the DPRK’s state nuclear force in quality and quantity, are steeped in the most intensive sanctions, pressure and provocations against it: On August 6, the U.S. framed up “sanctions resolution” 2371 at the United Nations Security Council which is geared to completely block the DPRK’s economic development and improvement of the people’s livelihood, branding its test-launch of ICBM as “a threat to international peace and security.” This UN “sanctions resolution”, to all intents and purposes, is an outcome of diabolical attempts of the U.S. to isolate and stifle the DPRK, which constitutes a flagrant infringement upon its sovereignty and an open challenge to it. The DPRK’s access to the strongest nuclear force is a fair and legitimate measure for self-defense to protect the country’s sovereignty and the nation’s right to existence from the high-handed and arbitrary acts of the U.S. which has made it its business to pursue the policy of extreme hostility and pose nuclear threat to the DPRK well over half a century. The successive test-launch of ICBM by the DPRK was a stern warning to the U.S. which, being entrenched far across the Pacific, wages reckless and perilous military provocation and despicable campaign of sanctions on the DPRK. However, the U.S. goes more frenzied and desperate instead of accepting the DPRK’s existence and learning to coexist with the latter. It is trying to drive the situation of the Korean peninsula to the brink of nuclear war, running amuck to conduct missile drill against the DPRK and deploying massive strategic equipment to the peninsula. It was against this backdrop that the U.S. manipulated UNSC to rig up the “sanctions resolution” more heinous than ever, placing a total ban even on normal trade activities and economic exchange, thereby disclosing before the whole world its evil intention to obliterate the ideology and system of the DPRK and exterminate its people. On the other hand, the U.S. causes such a racket with no time to wipe their mouth, making impudent remarks that it is considering the so-called military option targeting the DPRK. There are countries to which the ridiculous threats of the U.S. are working and there are countries which lie prostrate at the bluff of the U.S. The U.S. claiming to be the “only superpower of the world” and the DPRK’s neighbors hardly any smaller in size than the U.S. are all so frightened at merely two ICMB test-launches by the DPRK that they are making much a scene baying at each other. Watching them go frantic only redoubles the DPRK’s pride in the country’s great might and reaffirms its faith that the path it had chosen is the only way to survive and prosper. The DPRK has already gained everything it needed while having everything wanted in its hands through an arduous struggle under the harshest sanctions regime created by numerous UN “sanctions resolutions” adopted at the instigation of the U.S during the last several decades. It is only a forlorn hope to consider any chance that the DPRK would be shaken an inch or change its stance by the sanctions of this new kind imposed upon by the hostile forces. As the U.S. launched full-scale provocation against the DPRK across all fields of politics, economy and military, nothing can alter the will and resolve of the army and people of the DPRK to respond by taking resolute retaliatory measures. The DPRK Government solemnly states as follows to cope with the grave situation created by the frantic acts of the U.S. and other hostile forces: First, the DPRK condemns in the strongest terms and totally rejects the anti-DPRK “sanctions resolution” of the UNSC rigged up by the U.S. and other hostile forces as a wanton infringement upon the sovereignty of the country. The DPRK is taking measures to strengthen the self-defensive nuclear deterrence in order to counter the policy of extreme hostility and nuclear threat against it from the U.S., the biggest nuclear weapons state of the world. Terming these measures “a threat to international peace and security” is a gangster like logic indicating that the rest of the world should either become U.S. colonies serving its interests or fall victim to its aggression. The countries, that openly pursue their ambition to maintain permanent nuclear hegemony by conducting most of the nuclear tests in the world and launching ICBM whenever they please, are adopting illegal and unlawful “sanctions resolutions” to incriminate the DPRK’s bolstering of self-defensive nuclear force and enforcing those sanctions over its alleged “violation” of them. This constitutes the height of outrageous double standard. As long as the U.S. hostile policy and nuclear threat continue, the DPRK, no matter who may say what, will never place its self-defensive nuclear deterrence on the negotiation table or flinch an inch from the road chosen by itself, the road of bolstering up the state nuclear force. Second, now that the U.S. did forge the “sanctions resolution” by manipulating the UNSC to obliterate the DPRK’s sovereignty and rights to existence and development, the DPRK will move into its resolute action of justice as it had already clarified. The U.S. is acting absurd by resorting to the anachronistic sanctions and pressure campaign against the DPRK, instead of appreciating the strategic status of the DPRK and paying proper attention to its repeated warnings. The unwise conduct of the U.S. will only speed up its own extinction. As the gangsters of the U.S. remain unabated in their mean and heinous provocation, the DPRK will further increase the strength of justice to thoroughly eradicate the cause of war and aggression and never back away from this fight to a finish. Third, the DPRK will make the U.S. pay dearly for all the heinous crime it commits against the state and people of this country. The U.S. once waged a tragic war that plunged this land into a sea of blood and fire, and has been leaving no stone unturned to obliterate the DPRK’s ideology and system century after century. The U.S. is sadly mistaken if it considers its mainland a safe haven for being on the other side of the ocean. Those countries which were offered “thanks” from the U.S. as a reward for taking part in the conspiracy to invent the heinous “sanctions resolution” against the DPRK through their backdoor arrangement this time, too, would never be able to evade the responsibility for increasing the tensions on the Korean peninsula and jeopardizing peace and security of the region. If the U.S. fails to act with discretion, persisting in its reckless attempts to stifle the DPRK, we will not waver or hesitate to use any form of ultimate means. The DPRK will hold fast to the line of simultaneously developing the two fronts, the lasting banner of defending peace, and continue to march straight forward to the end of the road chosen by itself without the slightest deviation.” (KCNA, “Statement of DPRK Government,” August 7, 2017)
8/8/17:
KPA General Staff statement: “Timed to coincide with the fabrication of the heinous “sanctions resolution” against the DPRK at the UN, the U.S. war-thirsty forces are engrossed in war hysteria without discretion. In the U.S. Trump is talking rhetoric without hesitation that “he will not rule out a war against the north rather than taking a folded-arm approach towards its development of long-range nuclear missile advancing with a rapid speed” and “even if a war breaks out, it will be fought on the Korean peninsula and even though thousands are killed, they will be there, not in the U.S. mainland.” U.S. Ambassador to the UN Haley is openly saying that the “U.S. has the inexhaustible power” and “it will exercise the right to all the military options.” An assistant to the President for National Security is saying that “if the north has access to the nuclear weapons capable of threatening the U.S., it is an intolerable thing for the president. Therefore, the U.S. is preparing all the military options including a fresh preventive war for neutralizing the north’s nuclear strike capabilities.” The military warmongers of the Pentagon such as Secretary of Defense Mattis, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Dunford and commander of the U.S. combined special warfare are chiming in, unhesitatingly talking about the necessity of the “beheading operation”, “preemptive strike at the north”, “secret operation”, “internal harassing operation” and “special operation.” Timed to coincide with this, the 82nd airborne division, the U.S. imperialist forces’ only air-dropping one, went into a large-scale airdrop and mobile drill, anticipating its involvement in the Korean front and the 25th light infantry division and the 10th mountain division are running high fever in their drills for getting familiar with the terrain of the Korean peninsula. Navy SEAL which earned an ill-fame across the world and other special warfare units specializing in terrorist operations were urgently dispatched to south Korea. The plan for bringing strategic assets including B-52, B-1B, B-2A and F-22 formations to south Korea is in the pipeline. At the Edward Air Force Base in California State B-52H formations are busy making preparations for a “secret operation” aimed to create chaos within the depth of the KPA, while staging a drill of dropping PDU-5/B bombs containing propaganda leaflets for psychological warfare. The U.S. plans to bring huge naval forces including its two nuclear aircraft carrier task forces and a nuclear sub to the waters off the Korean peninsula. All these military actions being conducted in the ground, sea and air clearly go to prove that the nuclear war hysteria of the U.S. authorities including Trump has reached an extremely reckless and rash phase for an actual war after crossing the red line. Under the prevailing grave situation, the General Staff of the KPA clarifies at home and abroad its resolute stand as follows to mercilessly smash all sorts of military provocation, being planned by the U.S. imperialist warmongers, with the inexhaustible military might of the powerful revolutionary Paektusan army which has so far been built. 1. The KPA will start the Korean-style preemptive retaliatory operation of justice to wipe out the group of despicable plot-breeders once a slight sign of the U.S. provocation scheming to dare carry out a “beheading operation” against the supreme headquarters of the Korean revolution out of wild calculation is detected. The “beheading operation” being pursued by the U.S. is just an extremely imprudent and heinous operation for “eliminating” the supreme headquarters of the DPRK, which has long been premeditated by the U.S. to “put under its control” Pyongyang where the supreme headquarters of the Korean revolution are located and neutralize the use of nukes and strategic rockets. Once the U.S. shows a sign of starting to carry out the foolhardy plot, we will launch the Korean-style pre-emptive retaliatory operation of justice to annihilate the masterminds of the thrice-cursed operation and all the criminals involved in it. No matter how much specially they have been trained and prepared, the commandos group will be completely eliminated outside the blockade lines of the seas, underwater and air of the DPRK in which its sovereignty is exercised and on the line before the Military Demarcation Line before they reach the supreme headquarters. We have a world’s best special operation force, not merely a “team” or platoon or company or battalion in its scale. Once the pent-up indignation of the service personnel of the special operation force of the KPA, which regards it as the greatest mission of the army of the leader and the party and the first maxim of soldiers to devotedly defend the headquarters of the revolution, against the U.S. and other enemies erupts, the U.S. will be forced to suffer an imaginably terrible disaster for the “beheading operation.” The world will clearly witness how the fate of Trump and war merchants crying out for “not ruling out a war” and daring attempt to hurt the supreme dignity of the DPRK and eliminate its supreme headquarters will end in miseries once the fully prepared heroic special operation force group of the KPA on standby launches its operation. 2. The provocative “preventive war” the U.S. has devised and plans to execute will be countered with a just all-out war of wiping out all the strongholds of the enemies including the U.S. mainland. The “preventive war” allegedly under the preparations by the security think tank of Trump is an extremely provocative aggression war concept envisaging a sudden strike at the nuclear and rocket bases of the DPRK, which have the U.S. mainland within their striking range, and preventing possible danger of the U.S. Inventors of the “preventive war” admitted themselves that their act is a brigandish military option that can cause an international uproar. Yet, they set the northern half of the Republic, in which the sovereignty of the DPRK is exercised, as the theatre of the “preventive war” and claim it can be an “ideal option” unharmful to them as only Koreans will die there. This is a silly idea bereft of elementary sense, cognition and discretion of those ignorant of how things change, who their rival is and where the trend goes. War is by no means a game. The U.S. should remembered, however, that once there observed a sign of action for “preventive war” from the U.S., the army of the DPRK will turn the U.S. mainland into the theatre of a nuclear war before the inviolable land of the DPRK turns into the one. We do not hide that we already have in full readiness the diversified strategic nuclear strike means which have the U.S. mainland in our striking range. 3. The attempt at “preemptive attack” oft-repeated by the U.S. military warmongers will be mercilessly foiled by the Korean style preemptive attack which will be mounted earlier. Preemptive strike is no longer the monopoly of the U.S. The DPRK has its own style peculiar preemptive strike mode capable of holding back any military preemptive attack of the U.S. in advance as it has made preparations for a do-or-die confrontation with the U.S. imperialist aggressors for decades. It is ridiculous to talk about preemptive strike at the nuclear and rocket bases of the DPRK. The Korean-style earlier preemptive attack will burn up all the objects in the areas under the control of the first and third field armies of the puppet forces including Seoul the moment the U.S. reckless attempt at preemptive attack is spotted, and will lead to the all-out attack for neutralizing the launch bases of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces in the Pacific operational theatre together with the simultaneous strike at the depth of the whole of the southern half. All the strike means to be involved in the Korean-style earlier preemptive strike are ready to open fire of justice by order which can be made any moment. 4. The U.S. “secret operation” targeting the creation of disorder inside the DPRK and a regime change in it will be foiled by its all-people resistance. The “secret operation” touted by the U.S. policy-makers is a foolish scheme aimed at bringing down the social system of the DPRK, in combination with psychological warfare after creating disarrangement with such disorderly conducts as murder, arson, destruction with the use of rogue-like special commandoes to be infiltrated into the DPRK. In order to realize this scheme, a large-size bomb-dropping drill for psychological warfare is being conducted in the U.S. mainland. The “secret operation” is a type of special operation which the U.S. applied to countries in Mid-east like Iraq and Libya and several other countries in Africa and Europe. The anti-U.S. resistance of all the people including three million Children’s Union members and five million youths will smash to pieces the “secret operation” which the U.S. dreams to conduct in the DPRK. A saying goes that a war with full knowledge of oneself and one’s rival will emerge ever-victorious but a war without knowledge of oneself and one’s rival would always end in loss. The U.S. has gone hysteric, being quite unaware of the army and people of the DPRK. The DPRK is an invincible ideological power in which all the service personnel and people are united around their leader in single mind and a country of an impregnable fortress in which all the people are armed and the whole country has been fortified. The U.S. policy-makers have no idea that the country on a declining slope is none other than the American empire where they reside. Herein lies their tragedy. This means that the U.S. is bound to meet a miserable end as it goes helter-skelter without knowledge of itself and its rival. Those who make their way to this land for their dirty dream can never be scot-free as the entire army and people tightly hold arms with strong hatred and hostility toward the U.S. The officers and men of the Korean People’s Army and the members of the Worker-Peasant Red Guards and the Young Red Guards replete with the transparent spirit of devotedly safeguarding the leader and defending the country are waiting for the time of do-or-die battle while closely following the every move of the U.S. imperialist aggressors. The U.S. should not forget even a moment that its mean and crafty attempt at an aggression war against the DPRK will further strengthen the intensity of the military counteraction of the Korean People’s Army. Should the U.S. finally opt for a reckless military adventure, defying the stern warning of our revolutionary armed forces, the tragic end of the American empire will be hastened.” (KCNA, “U.S. War Hysteria Will Only Bring Miserable End of American Empire: Spokesman for KPA General Staff,” August 8, 2017)
North Korea has successfully produced a miniaturized nuclear warhead that can fit inside its missiles, crossing a key threshold on the path to becoming a full-fledged nuclear power, U.S. intelligence officials have concluded in a confidential assessment. The new analysis completed last month by the Defense Intelligence Agency comes on the heels of another intelligence assessment that sharply raises the official estimate for the total number of bombs in the communist country’s atomic arsenal. The U.S. calculated last month that up to 60 nuclear weapons are now controlled by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Some independent experts believe the number of bombs is much smaller. The findings are likely to deepen concerns about an evolving North Korean military threat that appears to be advancing far more rapidly than many experts had predicted. U.S. officials last month concluded that Pyongyang is also outpacing expectations in its effort to build an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking cities on the American mainland. While more than a decade has passed since North Korea’s first nuclear detonation, many analysts believed it would be years before the country’s weapons scientists could design a compact warhead that could be delivered by missile to distant targets. But the new assessment, a summary document dated July 28, concludes that this critical milestone has already been reached. “The IC [intelligence community] assesses North Korea has produced nuclear weapons for ballistic missile delivery, to include delivery by ICBM-class missiles,” the assessment states, in an excerpt read to The Washington Post. The assessment’s broad conclusions were verified by two U.S. officials familiar with the document. It is not yet known whether the reclusive regime has successfully tested the smaller design, although North Korea officially last year claimed to have done so. The DIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment. An assessment this week by the Japanese Ministry of Defense also concludes there is evidence to suggest that North Korea has achieved miniaturization. President Trump, speaking at an event at his Bedminster, N.J. gold course, said North Korea will face a devastating response if its threats continue. “They will be met with the fire and fury and frankly power, the likes of which this world has never seen before,” Trump said. Earlier today, North Korea described a new round of United Nations sanctions as an attempt “to strangle a nation” and warned that in response “physical action will be taken mercilessly with the mobilization of all its national strength.” Determining the precise makeup of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal has long been a difficult challenge for intelligence professionals because of the regime’s culture of extreme secrecy and insularity. The country’s weapons scientists have conducted five nuclear tests since 2006, the latest being a 20- to 30-kiloton detonation on Sept. 9, 2016, that produced a blast estimated to be up to twice that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945. “What initially looked like a slow-motion Cuban missile crisis is now looking more like the Manhattan Project, just barreling along,” said Robert Litwak, a nonproliferation expert at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and author of “Preventing North Korea’s Nuclear Breakout,” published by the center this year. “There’s a sense of urgency behind the program that is new to the Kim Jong Un era.” While few discount North Korea’s progress, some prominent U.S. experts warned against the danger of overestimating the threat. Siegfried Hecker, director emeritus of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the last known U.S. official to personally inspect North Korea’s nuclear facilities, has calculated the size of North Korea’s arsenal at no more than 20 to 25 bombs. Hecker warned of potential risks that can come from making Kim into a bigger menace than he actually is. “Overselling is particularly dangerous,” said Hecker, who visited North Korea seven times between 2004 and 2010 and met with key leaders of the country’s weapons programs. “Some like to depict Kim as being crazy — a madman — and that makes the public believe that the guy is undeterrable. He’s not crazy and he’s not suicidal. And he’s not even unpredictable. The real threat,” Hecker said, “is we’re going to stumble into a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula.”
In the past, U.S. intelligence agencies have occasionally overestimated the North Korean threat. In the early 2000s, the George W. Bush administration assessed that Pyongyang was close to developing an ICBM that could strike the U.S. mainland — a prediction that missed the mark by more than a decade. Recently, however, analysts and policymakers have been taken repeatedly by surprise as North Korea achieved key milestones months or years ahead of schedule, noted Jeffrey Lewis, director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ East Asia Nonproliferation Program. There was similar skepticism about China’s capabilities in the early 1960s, said Lewis, who has studied that country’s pathway to a successful nuclear test in 1964. “There is no reason to think that the North Koreans aren’t making the same progress after so many successful nuclear explosions,” Lewis said. “The big question is why do we hold the North Koreans to a different standard than we held [Joseph] Stalin’s Soviet Union or Mao Zedong’s China? North Korea is testing underground, so we’re always going to lack a lot of details. But it seems to me a lot of people are insisting on impossible levels of proof because they simply don’t want to accept what should be pretty obvious.” (Joby Warrick, Ellen Nakashima and Anna Fifield, “U.S.: North Korea Has Missile-Ready Nuclear Weapon,” Washington Post, August 9, 2017,
President Trump used his harshest language yet to warn North Korea that it will be “met with fire and fury and frankly power, the likes of which this world has never seen before,” if it does not stop threatening the United States. “North Korea best not make any more threats,” Trump told reporters at his Bedminster, N.J., golf club, where he is vacationing. Saying that the threats had gone “beyond a normal state,” he twice repeated the “fire and fury” warning. It was not immediately clear what Trump was responding to. A North Korean military spokesman said today that Pyongyang was considering a plan to fire missiles at Guam and that it would carry out a preemptive strike if there were any signs of U.S. provocation, Reuters reported, quoting state media. Earlier in the day, North Korea said it would “ruthlessly take strategic measures involving physical actions,” in the wake of new economic sanctions approved Saturday by the U.N. Security Council. Yesterday, Pyongyang threatened retaliation against the United States “thousands of times.” Trump’s statement also followed a report in The Washington Post that North Korea has successfully produced a miniaturized nuclear warhead that can fit inside its ballistic missiles, crossing a key threshold on the path to becoming a full-fledged nuclear power. The report quoted a confidential assessment by U.S. intelligence officials. Trump’s late-afternoon statement today came after he took to Twitter in the morning to amplify a Fox News report, based on anonymous sources, that U.S. spy satellites had detected North Korea loading two cruise missiles on a patrol boat on the country’s coast in recent days. Without adding any comment of his own, Trump, who regularly decries leaks to the media, retweeted to his more than 35 million followers a link to the day-old story, which was featured Tuesday morning on “Fox & Friends,” a program on Fox News. A White House spokesman did not respond to a question about whether Trump’s retweet amounted to a confirmation of the story, which was attributed to unnamed “U.S. officials with knowledge of the latest intelligence in the region.” Trump’s comments drew criticism from senior lawmakers. “The great leaders I’ve seen don’t threaten unless they’re ready to act, and I’m not sure President Trump is ready to act,” Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) told a Phoenix radio station. Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-Md.) said the remarks were “not helpful and once again show that he lacks the temperament and judgment” to deal with a serious crisis. “We should not be engaging in the same kind of blustery and provocative statements as North Korea about nuclear war.” The escalated rhetoric and talk of war came as the administration is trying to push North Korea toward direct talks. “The strategy has been pretty clear,” said a senior administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal policymaking, “to increase economic pressure and diplomatic isolation, with the goal of getting the North Koreans to come to their senses and begin reducing the threat, so that we can have a meaningful dialogue.” “Right now, there is nothing that North Korea is doing that suggests to us that they are willing to have a serious dialogue with us,” the official said. Even if Pyongyang expressed interest, the administration has been intentionally ambiguous about what it would consider a sufficient change by North Korea. The administration has made clear that it is no longer adhering to the policy of previous administrations requiring North Korea to commit to giving up its nuclear weapons before talks can begin. While denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the ultimate goal, it is no longer a U.S. prerequisite for talks. Repeating comments he made in the spring, Tillerson last week said the United States is not seeking regime change in North Korea. If Tillerson’s remarks were the carrot, Trump’s are clearly the stick. The White House has said it is “keeping all options on the table” regarding North Korea, including the use of military force. Short of war, the administration is already drawing up plans for additional sanctions, including on North Korean oil imports. “We’re still far short of the kind of pressure that we brought to bear against Iran, or even Iraq” under Saddam Hussein, the senior official said. Trump, who receives daily intelligence briefings, including while on his current 17-day stay in New Jersey, would presumably be in a position to know whether U.S. intelligence believes that the North Koreans did, in fact, load cruise missiles onto a patrol boat recently, and its significance. Asked about the report Tuesday morning on Fox, Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said she could not comment. “I can’t talk about anything that’s classified, and if it’s in the newspaper, that’s a shame,” Haley said. “It’s incredibly dangerous when things go out to the press like that.” (Karen DeYoung and John Wagner, “Trump Warns N. Korea of ‘Fire and Fury’ If Threats Persist,” Washington Post, August 9, 2017,
Trump: “Q. Any comment on the reports about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities? THE PRESIDENT: North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen. He has been very threatening beyond a normal state. And as I said, they will be met with fire, fury, and, frankly, power, the likes of which this world has never seen before.” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President before a Briefing on the Opioid Crisis, Trump National Golf Club, Bedminster, New Jersey, August 8, 2017)
Japan has upgraded its official warning on North Korea, saying that the threat had entered a “new stage” and that the regime may have already acquired the ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons. Japan’s annual defense white paper — a hefty document that also highlights China’s “attempts at changing the status quo by coercion” — said that the threat posed by Pyongyang had been reassessed after two nuclear tests and more than 20 test-firings of ballistic missiles since last year’s report. “It is possible that North Korea has already achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and has acquired nuclear warheads,” said the white paper. In its overview of Japan’s defense priorities, the white paper described the security environment as increasingly severe, with “destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute”. The report highlighted the test launch carried out by North Korea on July 4, concluding that this was a ballistic missile with intercontinental range. The North Korea warning comes less than a week after Prime Minister Abe Shinzo re-installed Onodera Itsunori as defense minister — a political veteran who has stated publicly that Japan should consider acquiring the technology to strike overseas missile bases. Although it would take many years to develop the technology, such a move would mark a radical shift in Japan’s pacifist defense posture. Facing depressed approval ratings, Abe appears to have put constitutional revision on the back burner. More immediately, he said at the weekend that Tokyo had “no plan” to give Japan’s self defense forces permission to begin the development process that would allow them to strike a North Korean missile base. But some analysts judge that Abe, or a future successor, might not encounter heavy resistance to changes aimed at reducing the threat of North Korea. The procession of missile tests, any one of which would be capable of hitting Japan, has prompted many Japanese municipalities to run evacuation drills — alarming exercises that may harden the public view that Japan should equip itself with more offensive capabilities. Onodera, in his first press conference on returning to the role of defense minister, said that he had been instructed by Abe to review the national defense program guidelines. “I would like to study, with ceaseless effort, a review of the guideline from the perspective of what must be done to protect the lives and peace of the Japanese public,” said Onodera. “Compared to the last time I was defense minister [three years ago], the improvement of North Korea’s ballistic missile ability is amazing,” he added. The 2017 white paper added to last year’s already substantial warnings on China, noting that Beijing “remains poised to fulfil its unilateral demands without compromise”, and the risks this posed to the regional security environment. For the first time, the white paper made specific mention of China’s activities in the Sea of Japan — flights by military aircraft and the fact that the number of scrambles by Japan’s air self-defense forces had increased to a record high in the 12 months to March 2017. (Leo Lewis, “Japan Upgrades North Korea Missile Threat,” Financial Times, August 9, 2017, p. 4)
8/9/17:
KPA Strategic Force spokesman’s statement: “Recently, the U.S. test-fired ICBM Minuteman-3 at its Vandenberg Air Force Base in California State targeting the DPRK, the fourth one this year, openly staged an actual nuclear strike drill targeting the strategic objects of the DPRK by mobilizing its nuclear strategic bombers formation stationed at its Anderson Air Force Base on Guam in the Pacific. It is driving the regional situation to an extreme pitch by bringing various kinds of nuclear strategic hardware before the very eyes of the DPRK. The Strategic Force of the KPA has taken special note of such maneuvers. Such military maneuvers of the U.S. may provoke a dangerous conflict under the present extremely acute situation prevailing on the Korean peninsula. Typically, the nuclear strategic bombers from Guam frequent the sky above south Korea to openly stage actual war drills and muscle-flexing in a bid to strike the strategic bases of the DPRK. This grave situation requires the KPA to closely watch Guam, the outpost and beachhead for invading the DPRK, and necessarily take practical actions of significance to neutralize it. In the morning of August 8 the air pirates of Guam again appeared in the sky above south Korea to stage a mad-cap drill simulating an actual war. Supreme Commander of the revolutionary forces of the DPRK Kim Jong Un, estimating the nature of the military action taken by the U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region, once recommended examination of a powerful and effective action plan for containing the U.S. imperialists’ aggression hardware as the U.S. forces are resorting to inappropriate and reckless military actions in the sensitive area, while going on the rampage in the waters off the Korean peninsula and the Pacific waters. The KPA Strategic Force is now carefully examining the operational plan for making an enveloping fire at the areas around Guam with medium-to-long-range strategic ballistic rocket Hwasong-12 in order to contain the U.S. major military bases on Guam including the Anderson Air Force Base in which the U.S. strategic bombers, which get on the nerves of the DPRK and threaten and blackmail it through their frequent visits to the sky above south Korea, are stationed and to send a serious warning signal to the U.S. The plan is to be soon reported to the Supreme Command soon after going through full examination and completion and will be put into practice in a multi-concurrent and consecutive way any moment once Kim Jong Un, supreme commander of the nuclear force of the DPRK, makes a decision. The execution of this plan will offer an occasion for the Yankees to be the first to experience the might of the strategic weapons of the DPRK closest. Explicitly speaking again, the strategic weapons which the DPRK manufactured at the cost of blood and sweat, risking everything, are not a bargaining thing for getting acknowledgement from others and for bartering for anything, but they serve as substantial military means for resolutely countering the U.S. political and economic pressure and military threat as what has been observed now. Will only the U.S. have option called “preventive war” as is claimed by it? It is a daydream for the U.S. to think that its mainland is an invulnerable Heavenly kingdom. The U.S. should clearly face up to the fact that the ballistic rockets of the Strategic Force of the KPA are now on constant standby, facing the Pacific Ocean and pay deep attention to their azimuth angle for launch. It should make a proper option so as not to regret today in the future.” (KCNA, “U.S. Should Be Prudent under Present Acute Situation: Spokesman for KPA Strategic Force,” August 9, 2017)
President Trump retweeted messages blaming former President Obama for not doing enough to protect the U.S. from North Korea. Trump first retweeted former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and Fox News contributor John Bolton, who blamed former President Obama for increased tensions with North Korea. “Our country [and] civilians are vulnerable today because Barack Obama did not believe in national missile defense. Let’s never forget that,” Bolton said in the tweet Trump retweeted. The president also retweeted “The Five,” which quoted host Jesse Waters as saying “[Trump]being unpredictable is a big asset, North Korea knew exactly what President Obama was going to do.” The president wrapped his retweet storm with a tweet from Bloomberg showing the stock market openings surging. Tensions reached a new high yesterday after it was reported that North Korea had developed a miniaturized nuclear warhead capable of being attached to a missile. Trump responded furiously to that development, telling reporters at his Bedminster, N.J., golf club that if Pyongyang’s threats against the U.S. continued, North Korea would “be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.” Today he continued by tweeting about the nuclear arsenal. (Julia Manchester, “Trump Retweets Fox News Takes on North Korea,” August 9, 2017)
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson defended President Trump’s forceful warning to North Korea to stop threatening the United States, and dismissed concerns Guam is in any imminent danger from Pyongyang’s missiles. “What the president is doing is sending a strong message to North Korea in language that Kim Jong Un would understand, because he doesn’t seem to understand diplomatic language,” Tillerson said during an interview with two pool reporters while flying from Malaysia to a scheduled refueling stop in Guam. “I think the president just wanted to be clear to the North Korean regime that the U.S. has the unquestionable ability to defend itself, will defend itself and its allies, and I think it was important that he deliver that message to avoid any miscalculation on their part.” Tillerson said Guam is in no more danger than anywhere else, and naming the island as a target did not deter him from making a scheduled refueling stop. “Well, the North Korean missile capability can point at many directions,” he said. “So Guam is not the only place that can be under threat. No, I never considered rerouting the trip back. And I do not believe that there is any imminent threat, in my own view.” Tillerson said North Korea’s rhetoric shows that the campaign to turn North Korea’s allies against it is working.
Tillerson said he knew of no significant changes in the last 24 hours that could speed the move to military action. Nor does he see any reason for a change in strategy. Diplomatic and economic isolation is working, he said, even if it could take a long time to materialize. “I think in fact the pressure is starting to show,” he said. “I think that’s why the rhetoric coming out of Pyongyang has gotten louder and more threatening.” Tillerson said Americans should not worry about the increasingly angry tone displayed in recent days. “I think what the president was just reaffirming is that the United States has the capability to fully defend itself from any attack, and our allies, and we will do so,” he said. “So the American people should sleep well at night.” (Carol Morello, “Tillerson Backs Trump’s Strong Warnings to North Korea after No Headway with ‘Diplomatic Language,’” Washington Post, August 9, 2017)
Tillerson: “Q: Mr. Secretary, President Trump said that North Korea’s threats against the United States, if they continue, will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen before. Is this part of a diplomatic strategy or did you find those remarks to be unhelpful? TILLERSON: Well, I think the U.S. and international community with respect to North Korea has actually had a pretty good week. We had a unanimous UN Security Council resolution strengthening sanctions against North Korea with China and Russia joining us in that vote, and then at ASEAN, a lot of strong statements coming out of ASEAN, and I think also reinforced with a global community that has expressed its view that North Korea really needs to stand down this program. And so I think in response to that, North Korea’s rhetoric has just ratcheted up louder and louder and more threatening. So I think the President – what the President is doing is sending a strong message to North Korea in language that Kim Jong-un can understand, because he doesn’t seem to understand diplomatic language. I think the President just wanted to be clear to the North Korean regime on the U.S. unquestionable ability to defend itself, will defend itself and its allies, and I think it was important that he deliver that message to avoid any miscalculation on their part. Q: Well, one of their – one of North Korea’s responses was to say it’s going to direct missiles on Guam. That’s exactly where you are headed right now. Would you consider re-routing? TILLERSON: Well, the North Korean missile capability can point in many directions, so Guam is not the only place that would be under threat. No, I never considered re-routing the trip back, and I do not believe that there is any imminent threat, in my own view. Q: Do you think there’s a longer-term threat, specifically about Guam, against the region in general? TILLERSON: Well, I hope not. Again, what we’re hopeful is that this pressure campaign, which the entire world now has joined us in, and with the engagement of China and Russia, two of North Korea’s closest neighbors – that they can begin to persuade the regime that they needed to reconsider the current pathway they’re on and think about engaging in a dialogue about a different future. Q: Have China and Russia been helpful at all to you in the last 24 hours? Have you spoken with your counterparts and have they helped in any way? TILLERSON: Well, I haven’t spoken to them since we left Manila, which was, I guess, about a day and a half ago. But we had direct discussions in Manila about the situation. I know that they were having talks as well with the representative from North Korea. I think that is evidence that they have very good, open channels of communication to be able to talk to the regime of North Korea, and we hope that they will be encouraging them to stand down their program and abide by the UN Security Council resolutions, which both China and Russia have voted for in the past. So I’m hopeful that they can use their influence – and I think they do have influence with the regime – to bring them to a point of dialogue, but with the right expectation of what that dialogue (inaudible). Q: Has anything happened in the last 24 hours to lead you to believe that we are moving towards a military option perhaps more quickly than anticipated? TILLERSON: Nothing that I have seen and nothing that I know of would indicate that the situation has dramatically changed in the last 24 hours. Q: Do you have any immediate diplomatic plans to de-escalate the situation that could have an impact within days instead of months or years? TILLERSON: Well, we have a very active, ongoing diplomatic effort, most of which is behind the scenes because that’s where diplomacy is most effective. We had very open conversations and our telephone lines remain open, certainly, to China and Russia as well as our allies, and I think publicly, we’ve been pretty clear in our statements directed at the North Koreans as to what we would like to see happen and make clear to them that we do not seek to be a threat to them, but we have to respond to the serious threats that they make towards us. Q: There have been calls for you to launch a new diplomatic effort. Do you feel that a new strategy may be warranted? TILLERSON: I do not. I think the strategy we’re currently on is working. In fact, again, we have now garnered widespread international support, obviously, not just with the UN Security Council resolution, but globally, countries are speaking out and expressing the same view as to what North Korea should do, which is not be a threat to the stability of the region. I think, in fact, the pressure is starting to show. I think that’s why the rhetoric coming out of Pyongyang is beginning to become louder and more threatening. Whether we’ve got them backed into a corner or not is difficult to say, but diplomatically, you never like to have someone in a corner without a way for them to get out. Q: And what is Pyongyang’s way out? TILLERSON: Talks. Talks with the right expectation of what those talks will be – will be about. Q: Do you have any advice for Americans? Should they be worried? TILLERSON: I think Americans should sleep well at night, have no concerns about this particular rhetoric of the last few days. I think that the President, again, as commander-in-chief, I think he felt it necessary to issue a very strong statement directly to North Korea. But I think what the President was just reaffirming is the United States has the capability to fully defend itself with any attack, will defend our allies, and we will do so. So the American people should sleep well at night. (DoS, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, Remarks En Route to Guam, August 9, 2017)
Tensions around the Korean Peninsula remain high after North Korea’s recent missile tests followed by its provocative threat to engulf a U.S. territory in a barrage of missiles, a ranking South Korean official said. However, the situation does not represent a crisis, the official from Seoul’s presidential office Cheong Wa Dae said, noting the North Korean threat may have been multipurposed but not to incite an actual conflict. “I do not agree with the claim that the Korean Peninsula faces an imminent crisis,” the official told reporters. “It is true the situation on the Korean Peninsula is becoming very serious due to North Korea’s repeated provocations though many believe they are rather strategic provocations. We are working to fundamentally resolve the North Korean nuclear and missile issues at the earliest date possible, and are working with a belief that the possibility is very high,” the official said. “However, I do not believe the situation has reached a state of crisis, and rather think we may turn this into an opportunity to overcome the serious security condition.” (Yonhap, “Seoul Says Fundamental Resolution of N. Korea Issue ‘Highly Possible,’” August 9, 2017)
KCNA: “Rim Hyon Su, a Canadian civilian, was released on sick bail according to the decision of the Central Court of the DPRK on August 9, 2017 from the humanitarian viewpoint. He had been under the penalty of indefinite hard labor as he conducted hostile deeds against the DPRK.” (KCNA, “Canadian Rim Hyon Su Released,” August 9, 2017)
8/10/17:
General Kim Rak Gyom, commander of the KPA Strategic Force of the Korean People’s Army, statement on August 9: “As already clarified, the Strategic Force of the KPA is seriously examining the plan for an enveloping strike at Guam through simultaneous fire of four Hwasong-12 intermediate-range strategic ballistic rockets in order to interdict the enemy forces on major military bases on Guam and to signal a crucial warning to the U.S. On Tuesday [August 8], the KPA Strategic Force through a statement of its spokesman fully warned the U.S. against its all-round sanctions on the DPRK and moves of maximizing military threats to it. But the U.S. president at a golf links again let out a load of nonsense about “fire and fury,” failing to grasp the on-going grave situation. This is extremely getting on the nerves of the infuriated Hwasong artillerymen of the KPA. It seems that he has not yet understood the statement. Sound dialogue is not possible with such a guy bereft of reason and only absolute force can work on him. This is the judgment made by the service personnel of the KPA Strategic Force. The military action the KPA is about to take will be an effective remedy for restraining the frantic moves of the U.S. in the southern part of the Korean peninsula and its vicinity. The Hwasong artillerymen of the KPA Strategic Force are replete with a strong determination to fully demonstrate once again the invincible might of the force, which has developed into a reliable nuclear force of the Workers’ Party of Korea and the world’s strongest strike service, through the planned enveloping strike targeting the U.S. imperialist bases of aggression. The Strategic Force is also considering the plan for opening to public the historic enveloping fire at Guam, a practical action targeting the U.S. bases of aggression. This unprecedented step is to give stronger confidence in certain victory and courage to the Korean people and help them witness the wretched plight of the U.S. imperialists. The Hwasong-12 rockets to be launched by the KPA will cross the sky above Shimane, Hiroshima and Kochi Prefectures of Japan. They will fly 3 356.7 km for 1 065 seconds and hit the waters 30 to 40 km away from Guam. The KPA Strategic Force will finally complete the plan until mid-August and report it to the commander-in-chief of the DPRK nuclear force and wait for his order. We keep closely watching the speech and behavior of the U.S.” (KCNA, “KPA Will Take Practical Action: Strategic Force Commander,” August 10, 2017)
President Trump escalated his war of words with North Korea by declaring that his provocative threat to rain down “fire and fury” might not have been harsh enough, as nuclear tensions between the two nations continued to crackle. Rejecting critics at home and abroad who condemned his earlier warning as reckless saber-rattling, Trump said North Korea and its volatile leader, Kim Jong-un, have pushed the United States and the rest of the world for too long. “Frankly, the people who were questioning that statement, was it too tough? Maybe it wasn’t tough enough,” he told reporters at his golf club in Bedminster, N.J. “They’ve been doing this to our country for a long time, for many years, and it’s about time that somebody stuck up for the people of this country and for the people of other countries. So if anything, maybe that statement wasn’t tough enough.” Trump noted that North Korea, which has made significant progress toward developing long-range nuclear weapons, responded to his original warning by threatening to launch a missile strike toward the Pacific island of Guam, an American territory and strategic base. “If he does something in Guam, it will be an event the likes of which nobody has seen before, what will happen in North Korea,” he said. Asked if that was a dare, Trump said: “It’s not a dare. It’s a statement. Has nothing to do with dare. That’s a statement. He’s not going to go around threatening Guam and he’s not going to threaten the United States and he’s not going to threaten Japan, and he’s not going to threaten South Korea. No, that’s not a dare, as you say. That is a statement of fact.” Trump made his latest comments on North Korea during a pair of televised media events that covered a dizzying array of topics. After nearly a week of his working vacation here, the president was in an expansive mood and seemingly eager to talk and take on all issues. While his press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders, held a sign in the back of the room saying “one more question,” Trump kept plowing ahead, taking one after another until he was satisfied.Joining him at the club were Vice President Mike Pence and several aides, including Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, his national security adviser, who has been under fire from the alt-right media after purging his staff of several hard-liners thought to be close to Stephen K. Bannon, the president’s chief strategist. Trump said he “absolutely” had confidence in General McMaster. Trump’s rhetoric on North Korea has reached a level that has alarmed allies in Asia and many Americans at home. Investors were unnerved yesterday by the increasing tension. The Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index fell by 1.45 percent as investors sold out of highflying stocks such as Amazon, Facebook and Netflix. It was the sharpest daily decline in the benchmark S.&P. 500 since May 17. Democrats complained that the president was inflaming the confrontation and called for diplomacy instead. “President Trump’s escalatory rhetoric is exactly the wrong response to dealing with North Korea’s provocative behavior,” said Senator Ed Markey of Massachusetts, the top Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee’s East Asia Subcommittee. “It unnecessarily heightens the risk of miscalculation and creates the very fog that can lead to war.” More than 60 House Democrats sent a letter to Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson asking him to restrain the president. “These statements are irresponsible and dangerous, and also senselessly provide a boon to domestic North Korean propaganda, which has long sought to portray the United States as a threat to their people,” the letter said. Former President Jimmy Carter, who has visited North Korea three times as a private citizen, added his voice to the criticism. “In addition to restraining the warlike rhetoric, our leaders need to encourage talks between North Korea and other countries, especially China and Russia,” he said in a statement. He added that all parties must assure the North Koreans that they would forgo “any military action against them if North Korea remains peaceful.” For all the bellicose words, Trump said that he was open to negotiations, as Tillerson has urged. But the president expressed skepticism that talks would lead to a reasonable outcome, given the experiences of his predecessors Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama, none of whom was able to resolve the issue through negotiations. “Sure, we’ll always consider negotiations,” Trump said. “But they’ve been negotiating now for 25 years. Look at Clinton. He folded on the negotiations. He was weak and ineffective. You look what happened with Bush, you look what happened with Obama. Obama, he didn’t even want to talk about it. But I talk. It’s about time. Somebody has to do it.” Trump likewise said he doubted that sanctions passed unanimously by the United Nations Security Council last weekend would ultimately succeed. But he again suggested that he would bargain with China by backing down from a planned trade war if Beijing did more to resolve the North Korea impasse. “We lose hundreds of billions of dollars a year on trade with China,” he said. “They know how I feel. It’s not going to continue like that. But if China helps us, I feel a lot differently toward trade, a lot differently toward trade.” He was vague about exactly where the line would be if North Korea did not back down, and refused to say whether he would consider a pre-emptive military strike without an attack by Pyongyang. Asked what would be “tougher” than “fire and fury,” he demurred. “Well, you’ll see, you’ll see.” Stress within the administration over North Korea again spilled over and into public view. Speaking with reporters en route to Seattle, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said the president was entitled to use whatever language he thought appropriate. “I was not elected,” he said. “The American people elected the president.” But asked about his own equally tough but less colorful statement about North Korea, issued yesterday, Mattis said, “The rhetoric is up to the president. This is my rhetoric.” A White House aide, meanwhile, said no one should listen to Tillerson on military matters related to North Korea after the secretary of state said he saw no imminent likelihood of war and urged Americans to sleep soundly. “The idea that Secretary Tillerson is going to discuss military matters is simply nonsensical,” Sebastian Gorka, a deputy assistant to the president, told BBC Radio. “It is the job of Secretary Mattis, the secretary of defense, to talk about the military options.” That drew a sharp retort from Tillerson’s spokeswoman. “He’s a cabinet secretary,” Heather Nauert, the State Department spokeswoman, told reporters. “He’s fourth in line to the presidency. He carries a big stick.” Gorka went on Fox News to say his comment was misunderstood. “I was admonishing the journalists of the fake news industrial complex who are forcing our chief diplomat into a position where they are demanding he makes the military case for action when that is not the mandate of the secretary of state,” he said. (Peter Baker, “President Says Threat of ‘Fury’ May Be Too Tepid,” New York Times, August 11, 2017,
President Trump’s aides knew he planned to deliver a tough message to North Korea today, but they did not expect a threat that rivaled the apocalyptic taunts often used by his target, Kim Jong-un. The president’s language, which aides say he had used in private, escalated the long-running dispute with North Korea to a new level and left members of the Trump administration scrambling to explain what he meant. But the process, or lack of one, that led to the ad-libbed comments embodied Trump’s overall approach to foreign policy, an improvisational style that often leaves his national security team in the dark about what he is going to say or do, according to several people with direct knowledge of how the episode unfolded. The president was in a confrontational mood yesterday afternoon after The Washington Post reported that Pyongyang had developed nuclear warheads small enough to be placed on ballistic missiles. His team assumed that he would be asked about North Korea during a scheduled media appearance tied to a meeting the president was planning to hold at his golf club in Bedminster, N.J., about the opioid epidemic. But during a conference call beforehand that focused on North Korea, Trump did not offer a preview of what he planned to say — and aides did not press the president, who resists being told what to say, even on a tinderbox issue that has induced his predecessors to seek the safety of a script. He told his aides only that he wanted to signal to Kim, the North Korean leader, that he was not backing down — while turning up the pressure he has tried to place on China to tame its troublesome neighbor and on-and-off ally. Trump’s aides braced as he began to speak at the opioid event — his arms folded, jaw set and eyes flitting on what appeared to be a single page of talking points set before him on the conference table where he was sitting. The piece of paper, as it turned out, was a fact sheet on the opioid crisis. Sarah Huckabee Sanders, the White House press secretary, said Trump’s national security team was “well aware of the tone of the statement of the president prior to delivery.” “The tone and strength of the message were discussed beforehand,” she said. The words he used, she added, “were his own.” And they revealed what some longtime associates of Trump say is a simmering frustration with the velvet handcuffs slapped on him by John F. Kelly, his new White House chief of staff, who has cracked down on walk-in visitors to the Oval Office and keeps tabs on some of the president’s after-hours phone calls to ensure that he is not being fed bad information or reckless advice. Trump has embraced the new, more disciplined approach of the former Marine general, but he has made it clear that he will not cede control of what he says or tweets to anybody. If nothing else, yesterday’s statement proved that he cannot be muzzled by his staff or decorous diplomatic protocol. The president, people close to him say, believes he has a better feel for Kim than his advisers do. He thinks of Kim as someone used to pushing people around, and Trump thinks he needs to show that he cannot be pushed. The episode also reflects an evolving and unsettled approach to one of the world’s most dangerous hot spots as Trump and his team debate diplomatic, economic and military options, none of them particularly attractive. The president’s aides are divided on North Korea, as on other issues, with national security veterans like Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, the national security adviser, on one side and Stephen K. Bannon, the president’s chief strategist, and his allies on the other. While General McMaster and Mattis consider North Korea a pre-eminent threat that requires a tough response, Bannon and others in the nationalist wing argue that it is really just a subset of the administration’s conflict with China and that Trump should not give more prominence to an unstable rogue operator like Kim. In the North Korea debate, like a similar one over Afghanistan, Bannon has been arguing against what his side considers the overly aggressive approach of the “war party” of General McMaster. While Bannon has his own channel to the president, he has been shut out of most formal discussions of North Korea by the national security team. But neither camp, hawks or doves, advocated language like “fire and fury,” according to the people involved. Among those taken by surprise, they said, was Kelly, who has accompanied the president on his working vacation. The “fire and fury,” line, which echoed biblical passages and President Harry S. Truman’s statement after the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945, was Trump’s idea — despite similarities to the end-of-days style of his chief speechwriter, Stephen Miller, people with knowledge of the situation said. Trump has used the phrase repeatedly in private to express his anger at North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons — one of the few public policy problems he has been focused on since his pre-political days in the 1990s. After his comments, Trump headed into an hourlong meeting on opioids, but his national security team huddled to figure out how to proceed. Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, who has been trying to induce Pyongyang to negotiate, became the obvious choice to calm the waters, which he did during a refueling stop in Guam, the same island threatened by North Korea. Tillerson told reporters that “Americans should sleep well at night,” and that nothing indicated that relations with North Korea had “dramatically changed in the last 24 hours.” For his part, Trump seemed pleased with the uproar caused by his remarks, and was in good spirits on Wednesday. And some of his aides did not back off from the sharp language. “He’s saying don’t test America and don’t test Donald J. Trump,” Sebastian Gorka, a hard-line adviser and one of the president’s favorite surrogates, told Fox News today. “We are not just the superpower. We were a superpower, we are now a hyperpower. Nobody in the world, especially not North Korea, comes close to challenging our military capabilities.” (Glenn Thrush and Peter Baker, “Trump’s Words Hinting at War Were Offhand,” New York Times, August 10, 2017,
Mattis: “Q: What would North Korea do that would sort of the — prompt any kind of action from the U.S.? SEC. MATTIS: Oh, I won’t speculate on that. No, no. No. Q: It says any arms race or conflict that initiates. So what would that mean? What would that mean? MATTIS: I can’t really expand on it. Thanks for asking. The DPRK-regime deck will continue to be grossly overmatched by ours, OK, and would lose any arms race or conflict it initiates. Q: …This morning, the President specifically tweeted out this idea that, when he came into office, one of his first orders was to modernize … the nuclear arsenal … as part of improving readiness, et cetera. You talk about the improved readiness when it comes to nuclear infrastructure — the emphasized readiness of the ballistic missile defense, nuclear deterrent forces — you mentioned specifically in your statement. Can you give us any greater detail as to — SEC. MATTIS: For the growing threat, in the first part, I emphasized the readiness of our ballistic missile defense and nuclear deterrent forces, yeah. Q: Right. So can you give us any greater details — since President Trump said, that was one of his first orders, was to improve the existing nuclear readiness — the existing arsenal, can you give us any greater sense as to what’s been done during your tenure to try to improve that? MATTIS: No, I don’t think I want to tell the adversary what we’ve done. Yeah, I had to think my way through it. I think it’s a very good — it’s a very legitimate question.
I think also you’re aware that we are reviewing our nuclear posture right now. Obviously, we’re reviewing our ballistic missile defense. You know that’s going on. We’ve been very open about it. So there are any number of things underway, but I don’t want to get into the specifics. I hope for confidentiality on those things. Q: Can I ask you – the President — yesterday when he said “fire and fury.” Were you surprised by that or did they give you a heads-up he was going to articulate that view? MATTIS: Yeah, again, Tony, what I want to do is say this is my statement. This is where I stand on it. And I want to make certain that this is where I stand right now. The President is — I was not elected. The American people elected the President. And I think what he’s pointing out is simply that — that these provocations — you can see his diplomatic effort to try and stop it. And he’s just showing the concern he has, that is shared, obviously, globally, when you see that kind of unanimous Security Council result. That’s what he’s conveying. Q: But his rhetoric — the world will — “fire and fury, the world” – is unlike anything we’ve seen before. MATTIS: The rhetoric is up to the President. This is my rhetoric. Q: Can you define “stand down” in pursuit of nuclear weapons? …MATTIS: Yes. What we’re — what we’re looking at here is if you look at, for example, South Korea’s — what their policy is on nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, if you look at Japan’s policy on nuclear weapons on the Korean [Peninsula], if you look at China’s policy, if you look at our policy, it is a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. So, they are the only ones who are trying to nuclearize — who are nuclearizing this through provocations and rhetoric that is alarming to the entire world. I mean, I get questions about this every time I meet with foreign leaders. Not just — not just about South Korea. This is not just about Japan. It’s not just about the United States. And it’s not just about China or Russia. These are the nations that border or have interests, alliances right there. This is a global problem. I hear about this every time I meet. I won’t go into those details and say what each one said, but it comes up from Brussels to — to Singapore, Shangri-La — from NATO to Shangri-La, put it that way. Q: So the goal is still a denuclearized Korean Peninsula? … MATTIS: Absolutely. Absolutely. That’s the goal of the Chinese. It’s the same policy goal of the United States, of Japan. Q: What do you make of the reports that North Korea now can fit a miniaturized warhead on a missile now? MATTIS: Yeah, I’m not — I’m not going to discuss that. Q: Should folks in Guam be worried in response to North Korea’s threat? SEC. MATTIS: No. Q: Is there a military solution to North Korea’s nuclear program? You recall, three years ago, before the Iran agreement, there was a lot of discussion on whether conventional attacks could delay or derail Iran’s capabilities. …What’s your take on North Korea, in terms of the use of military force to derail … Korea’s capabilities? MATTIS: What we’re doing is a diplomatically-led effort that is succeeding in drawing the international community together and speaking with one voice. You just saw it. That’s where we’re at. Do I have military options? Of course I do. That’s my responsibility, to have those. And we work very closely with allies to ensure that this is not unilateral either — this is multilateral military options that we have. And of course there’s a military solution. But what we’re trying to do here is leave it loud and clear …in the diplomatic arena: It is North Korea’s choice. Do you want a much better future — the entire world community is saying one thing — or do you want a much worse future? And I’m not going to go into the military options themselves, but of course there’s a military option. We want to use diplomacy. That’s where we’ve been, that’s where we are right now and that’s where we hope to remain. But at the same time, our defenses are robust. Q: Is Kim Jong-un a rational actor? MATTIS: I’ll leave that to you to figure out. (DoD, Media Availability by Secretary Mattis en route to Seattle August 10, 2017)
South Korea’s National Security Council (NSC) strongly urged North Korea to immediately stop provocations and return to the dialogue table, saying dialogue was still possible should the communist state decide to cooperate. “The standing committee of the NSC noted the security condition surrounding the Korean Peninsula was becoming serious due to North Korea’s repeated provocations and threats,” Park Soo-hyun, a spokesman for the presidential office Cheong Wa Dae, told reporters. “The NSC called on the North to immediately stop all activities that will further escalate tension on the Korean Peninsula.” Today’s NSC meeting marked a regular session of its standing committee, but the Cheong Wa Dae spokesman noted the latest meeting required long, in-depth discussions due to the seriousness of the current condition surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Also, the meeting involved all top security-related government officials, including both defense and foreign ministers, as well as the head of the National Intelligence Service. A Cheong Wa Dae official earlier noted the ministers and the spy agency chief had often sent their deputies in their place to standing committee meetings in the past. “Noting that military tension or an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula will not benefit any country, the NSC standing committee decided to take all necessary steps to ease tension and maintain peace under close cooperation with the United States and other key nations based on the strong joint defense readiness of South Korean and U.S. joint forces,” Park told a press briefing. The Cheong Wa Dae spokesman refused to elaborate on the steps to be taken, citing the sensitivity of such information, but said they “literally meant every possible measure we can take.” Also, they apparently included resuming dialogue with the reclusive North. “In addition, the NSC standing committee decided to take active diplomatic measures to help ease tension while keeping the country’s door for dialogue with North Korea,” Park said. (Yonhap, “Seoul Urges Pyongyang to Stop All Provocations, Says Door for Dialogue Still Open,” August 10, 2017)
Donald Trump’s threat to unleash “fire and fury” on North Korea might have been written by Pyongyang’s propaganda mavens, so perfectly does it fit the North’s cherished claim that it is a victim of American aggression. Not since George W. Bush labeled North Korea part of an “axis of evil” has the nation had such a strong piece of presidential evidence to back up its argument that only nuclear and missile development can counter “hostile” U.S. policies aimed at ending the rule of the latest member of the Kim family of dictators. Trump now runs several risks by matching his rhetoric to that of the North, which has regularly vowed to reduce archrival Seoul to a “sea of fire.” Word choice matters on the Korean Peninsula. A torrent of belligerent warnings by the North in 2013, for instance, including nuclear strike threats against specific U.S. targets, led to an anxious, weeks-long standoff that saw the United States fly its most powerful warplanes — nuclear capable B-2 and B-52 bombers, and F-22 stealth fighters — near the North Korean border. The risk, now as then, is that heated words could cause a miscalculation that might trigger real fighting across the most heavily armed border on earth, a border that’s only a short drive from greater Seoul’s 25 million people. Though it seems unlikely it was directly responding to those comments, the North on Wednesday repeated past warnings that it’s examining operational plans for attacking the U.S. territory of Guam. This is mostly a bluff: North Korea is extremely unlikely to follow through on a suicidal pre-emptive attack on the United States. But there is also almost zero chance that the North will miss the opportunity to put its propaganda specialists to work topping Trump’s threat of total war. Pyongyang, after all, may be the world’s leading producer of such threats — against Seoul, against Tokyo, against Washington, against essentially anything or anyone seen as hostile. As John Delury, an Asia specialist at Seoul’s Yonsei University, tweeted following Trump’s comments, “Trying to out-threaten North Korea is like trying to out-pray the Pope.” Trump now confronts a problem that North Korea has long faced: Over-the-top threats are one thing, but what do you do when you can’t back them up? So far, of course, North Korea has favored smaller scale sneak attacks over following through with its threats to launch missiles into Seoul, let alone a U.S. territory. North Korea will surely continue its nuclear bluster, but Trump cannot bring “fire and fury” without risking the destruction of Seoul, and the deaths of tens of thousands of U.S. troops and citizens in South Korea. Trump’s “fire and fury” line might also hurt his efforts to get China, the North’s economic and diplomatic enabler, to do more to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. China, though it does not want a nuclear North Korea, sympathizes with Pyongyang’s claim that it is under real threat from Washington. “The U.S. is trying to tell China, ‘We’re not in this for regime change; we’re not trying to take down (leader) Kim Jong Un; we’re not trying to reunify the Korean Peninsula; what we want is to negotiate their nukes away,’ ” Delury said in an interview. “To use unprecedented, inflammatory language, to threaten war on North Korea because they make threats, undermines the work the U.S. is trying to do to keep the Chinese on board.” (Foster Klug, “Word Choice Matters in Pyongyang: Trump’s Threat Fits with North Korea’s Image of a Hostile U.S.,” Associated Press, August 10, 2017)
Top security advisers of South Korea and the United States agreed to discuss in advance any steps they could take to contain provocative North Korea, Cheong Wa Dae said, apparently suggesting the U.S. will not pre-emptively strike the communist North without informing Seoul beforehand. The agreement came in a telephone conversation between Chung Eui-yong, the head of South Korea’s Presidential National Security Office, and his U.S. counterpart H.R. McMaster. The two “discussed current security conditions surrounding the Korean Peninsula caused by North Korean provocations and heightened tension, and ways to deal with such threats,” Cheong Wa Dae spokesman Park Soo-hyun told a press briefing. “The two sides reaffirmed their promise to closely and transparently cooperate on the steps to be taken in each stage to help ensure the security and safety of both South Korea, the United States and their people.” The telephone conversation started at 8 a.m. (Seoul time) and lasted 40 minutes. (Yonhap, “S. Korea, U.S. Agree to Discuss All Steps against N. Korea in Advance,” August 11, 2017)
8/11/17:
President Trump continued to beat war drums against North Korea and, unexpectedly, said he would consider a military option to deal with an unrelated crisis in Venezuela. But though he declared that the armed forces were “locked and loaded,” there were no indications of imminent action in either part of the world. For all the bellicose language emerging from the president’s golf club in Bedminster, N.J., the United States military was taking no visible steps to prepare for a strike against North Korea or Venezuela. The Pentagon reported no new ships being sent toward the Korean Peninsula or forces being mobilized, nor were there moves to begin evacuating any of the tens of thousands of Americans living in South Korea. The contrast between the heated words and the lack of apparent preparations suggested that Trump may still be counting on a resolution to the standoff with North Korea as it works to develop a nuclear arsenal capable of reaching the United States. After escalating his rhetoric against North Korea twice today, Trump emerged from a late-afternoon meeting with his national security team offering a somewhat more restrained message, vowing to give diplomacy a chance. “Hopefully it’ll all work out,” Trump told reporters. “Nobody loves a peaceful solution better than President Trump, that I can tell you. Hopefully it’ll all work out, but this has been going on for many years.” Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, who traveled to New Jersey today to brief Trump after returning from Asia, said the president’s tough language was part of an overall strategy intended to bring North Korea to the negotiating table. “It takes a combined message there if we’re going to get effective movement out of the regime in North Korea. I think the president’s made it clear he prefers a diplomatic solution,” Tillerson said, standing next to Trump. “What the president’s doing is trying to support our efforts by ensuring North Korea understands what the stakes are.” The president’s repeated threats against North Korea, starting with his “fire and fury” warning earlier in the week, have fueled deep anxiety in Asia and elsewhere in the world. Australia’s prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull, said, “We stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States,” but his New Zealand counterpart, Bill English, hedged, saying his country would consider its options “on its merits.” In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed disapproval of Trump’s approach. “I consider an escalation of rhetoric the wrong answer,” she said, adding, “I do not see a military solution to this conflict.” China, the key player in the region, offered a typical statement pleading for restraint and dialogue, asking that all parties “speak and act with caution and do more things that are conducive to de-escalating the tense situation and enhancing mutual trust among parties, rather than relapse into the old path of showing assertiveness and escalating tensions,” as the Foreign Ministry put it in a statement. In a call today, Trump and President Xi Jinping of China maintained their shared commitment to a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and “agreed North Korea must stop its provocative and escalatory behavior,” the White House said in a statement released early August 12. It described the relationship between the two leaders as “an extremely close one, and will hopefully lead to a peaceful resolution of the North Korea problem.” Trump started the morning with a Twitter message saying the American military was “locked and loaded” for conflict “should North Korea act unwisely.” To reinforce the point, the president later shared a post from the United States Pacific Command stating that it was standing by for orders, should the need arise. “#USAF B-1B Lancer #bombers on Guam stand ready to fulfill USFK’s #FightTonight mission if called upon to do so,” the original tweet said. The president followed up in the afternoon by telling reporters in the first of two media appearances that he hoped the North Koreans “fully understand the gravity of what I said.” He singled out Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, saying that Kim has gotten away with destabilizing the region for too long. “This man will not get away with what he’s doing,” the president told reporters before the late afternoon meeting with Tillerson; Nikki R. Haley, the ambassador to the United Nations; and Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, the national security adviser. “If he utters one threat in the form of an overt threat” or takes action against the United States territory of Guam or against America’s allies, “he will truly regret it and he will regret it fast.” As a practical matter, Trump’s comments do not necessarily indicate a change in military readiness. The motto of American forces based alongside allied troops in South Korea has long been “Ready to Fight Tonight,” mainly a slogan emphasizing preparedness rather than a statement of hostility. United States Navy officials said today that despite Mr. Trump’s heightened rhetoric, the Navy had not repositioned any ships near the Korean Peninsula, nor were there any plans to do so, which would be a prelude to an American strike. The business-as-usual posture from the Pentagon does not necessarily mean that the American military is not ready to strike North Korea, or defend American allies in the event of a Pyongyang strike. The nearly 25,000 American troops serving in South Korea pride themselves on being in a constant state of alert. But military officials say that given how quickly North Korea could retaliate against an American strike — and that retaliation could encompass an attack on Seoul, home to more than 130,000 Americans — it is doubtful that the Defense Department would advise a strike without first moving assets and organizing an evacuation. “It’s a couple of dogs barking at each other with a chain-link fence in the middle,” said Adm. Dennis C. Blair, the retired head of the Pacific Command and a former director of national intelligence. Any operation would involve extensive preparations and consultations, he noted. “You’d know that something big is afoot, and that is simply not the case now. In answer to the question, are we about to go to war? I’d say no.” The Trump administration has repeatedly said its diplomatic initiative to pressure North Korea into abandoning its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program is still in its early phases, with much work remaining to be done. If Trump was hoping his sharp warnings would provoke a response from China, he chose an odd moment. Chinese leaders, including Xi, are largely focused on domestic politics. Top officials have gathered at Beidaihe, a seaside retreat more than 170 miles east of Beijing, to map out a once-every-five-years leadership reshuffle of the ruling Communist Party to take place this fall. Bonnie S. Glaser, a senior adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said Chinese leaders would probably conclude that both Washington and Pyongyang are dangerous and unpredictable. “It’s unlikely that Xi will seek support from his colleagues for greater cooperation with an unpredictable U.S. president,” she said. Analysts said that Beijing’s role in resolving the current crisis might be limited. “It’s unclear Beijing would have much of a role right now beyond their usual platitudes calling on all parties to exercise restraint,” said Ely Ratner, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Neither Washington or Pyongyang is interested in the diplomatic solution Beijing has put on the table.” (Peter Baker, “As World Waits, President Warns Forces Are Ready,” New York Times, August 12, 2017,
Trump: “Q Mr. President, what did you mean by military solutions are locked and loaded as it relates to North Korea? THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think it’s pretty obvious. We are looking at that very carefully, and I hope that they are going to fully understand the gravity of what I said. And what I said is what I mean. So hopefully they’ll understand, Peter, exactly what I said and the meaning of those words. Those words are very, very easy to understand. Q Any progress on the diplomatic backchannel? THE PRESIDENT: Well, we don’t want to talk about progress, we don’t want to talk about backchannels. We want to talk about a country that has misbehaved for many, many years — decades, actually — through numerous administrations. And they didn’t want to take on the issue, and I have no choice but to take it on, and I’m taking it on. And we’ll either be very, very successful quickly or we’re going to be very, very successful in a different way, quickly. Q Angela Merkel says she sees no military solution to a fight with North Korea. Why is she wrong? THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think maybe she’s speaking for Germany. Let her speak for Germany. She’s a friend of mine, she’s a very good person, a very good woman. She’s a friend of Ivanka. Perhaps she’s referring to Germany. She’s certainly not referring to the United States, that I can tell you. Q Mr. President, you’ve said you want to send a strong message to North Korea. What do you say to your critics who say that your rhetoric is actually raising the tension? THE PRESIDENT: Well, you know, my critics are only saying that because it’s me. If somebody else uttered the exact same words that I uttered, they’d say, “What a great statement, what a wonderful statement.” They’re only doing it — but I will tell you, we have tens of millions of people in this country that are so happy with what I’m saying — because they’re saying, finally we have a President that’s sticking up for our nation and, frankly, sticking up for our friends and our allies. And this man will not get away with what he’s doing, believe me. And if he utters one threat, in the form of an overt threat — which, by the way, he has been uttering for years, and his family has been uttering for years — or if he does anything with respect to Guam, or anyplace else that’s an American territory or an American ally, he will truly regret it and he will regret it fast.” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President before Workforce/Apprenticeship Discussion, Trump National Golf Club, Bedminster, New Jersey, August 11, 2017)
Trump: Q Mr. President, what have you been able to do to reassure South Korea given the recent tensions? THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think as far as reassurance, they probably feel as reassured as they can feel. Certainly, they feel more reassured with me than they do with other Presidents from the past because nobody has really done the job that they’re supposed to be doing. And that’s why we’re at this horrible situation right now. And it is a very bad situation. It’s a very dangerous situation. And it will not continue, that I can tell you. So I think South Korea is very happy. And you don’t mention Japan, but I think Japan is very happy with the job we’re doing. I think they’re very impressed with the job we’re doing, and let’s see how it turns out. … Q Mr. President, a lot of Americans are on edge with this rhetoric going back and forth between the United States and North Korea. What can you tell them? What do you tell them — THE PRESIDENT: You know what I can say? Hopefully it will all work out. Okay? Nobody loves a peaceful solution better than President Trump. That I can tell you. Hopefully it will all work out. But this has been going on for many years. It would have been a lot easier to solve this years ago before they were in the position that they’re in. But we will see what happens. We think that lots of good things could happen, and we could also have a bad solution. But we think lots of good things can happen. Q What would be a bad solution, sir? THE PRESIDENT: I think you know the answer to that. Q Mr. President, when you say bad solution, are you talking about war? Is the U.S. going to go to war? THE PRESIDENT: I think you know the answer to that. …Q Have you spoken to the governor of Guam? And what did you tell him? THE PRESIDENT: No, I have not. But I feel that they will be very safe. Believe me, they will be very safe. And if anything happens to Guam, there’s going to big, big trouble in North Korea. Q Have you ordered any change in our military readiness? THE PRESIDENT: I don’t want to say. That I just don’t — I don’t talk about it. You know that. I’m not one that says we’re attacking Mosul in four months. We do it or we don’t do it. …Q Secretary Tillerson has spoken emphasizing diplomacy. You’ve spoken increasingly emphasizing the potential for military options. Are you two on the same page? THE PRESIDENT: Totally. I can tell you, totally on the same page. And, Secretary, maybe you’d like to make a statement. SECRETARY TILLERSON: Well, I think it takes a combined message there if we’re going to get effective movement out of the regime in North Korea. I think the President has made it clear he prefers a diplomatic solution. I think he responded to that, in effect, just a moment ago. And so I think what the President is doing is trying to support our efforts by ensuring North Korea understands what the stakes are. … Q We heard the North Korean state TV saying we consider the U.S. no more than a lump which we can beat to a jelly anytime. THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me hear others say it. Because when you say that, I don’t know what you’re referring to and who is making the statement. But let me hear Kim Jong-un say it, okay? He’s not saying it. He hasn’t been saying much for the last three days. You let me hear him say it. Q Mr. President, do you support regime change in North Korea or in Venezuela? Do you think a regime — THE PRESIDENT: I don’t want to comment because I think they’re very different places, so I don’t want to comment. But I support peace, I support safety, and I support having to get very tough if we have to, to protect the American people and also to protect our allies. .” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Trump after Meeting with National Security Officials, Trump National Golf Club, Bedminster, New Jersey, August 11, 2017)
North Korea’s prospective test also includes some maneuvering room for a possible compromise, South Korean analysts said. North Korea said the missile launches were still in the planning phase and would not be finalized until later this month, raising the possibility of delay or cancellation. The four Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missiles to be aimed toward the vicinity of Guam, home to a strategic American base, would fly 2,085.7 miles in 17 minutes, 45 seconds, North Korea said in announcing the plan. The missiles would splash down 18.6 to 24.8 miles from Guam’s coast, the North said. “By revealing this detailed plan, North Korea is trying to show that its Hwasong-12 missile is a reliable system and that it has capabilities of operating nuclear missiles,” said Shin Beom-chul, a security expert at the government-run Korea National Diplomatic Academy in Seoul. Even though North Korea has conducted 80 missile tests under Kim, it has never launched a missile toward a target as far as Guam and has never disclosed such precise flight data in advance. The North also said its Hwasong-12 missiles would fly over southern Japan en route toward Guam, which would be the first time a North Korean missile flew over the country. Analysts said the North Korean missiles, if launched as the North described, would fall outside Guam’s territorial waters, which extend 13.8 miles from the coast. When the missiles cross Japan, they would also fly far higher than 62 miles above sea level, customarily considered the upper limit of a country’s territorial airspace, they said. South Korean analysts said the plans reflected a calculated strategy by Kim. At home the North Korean leader must rally his impoverished people by showing off his daring in the standoff with the United States, his country’s sworn enemy for more than six decades. Today, the newspaper of the country’s ruling Workers’ Party, Rodong Sinmun, dedicated all six pages to the mass gathering, which brimmed with anti-American slogans and shouts of a “do-or-die determination to defend the fatherland.” Even while the missile test is not finalized, it would be difficult for Kim to reverse course once he approves, analysts said. If he did, Kim would be seen as weak in the standoff with the United States, said Kim Dong-yub, an analyst at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul. “Amid all the confidence and daring, North Korea may be paradoxically asking the United States to help it stop itself with some form of overture,” Kim said. A North Korean missile salvo around Guam would present challenges for the United States and its allies. If the United States were to decide to intercept the missiles, it would be the first test of its missile defense system’s ability to shoot down actual missiles from an enemy state. Even though missiles from the North would almost certainly carry dummy warheads, analysts said, a failure to intercept them would deal Trump a mortifying setback and could even weaken the rationale for installing an American missile defense system in South Korea. A more aggressive response from the United States, like a military strike on the North’s weapons facilities, would carry huge risks. Today, NBC News reported that the Pentagon had prepared a specific plan for a pre-emptive strike on North Korea’s missile sites should Trump order such an attack. It quoted two senior United States military officials — and two senior retired officers — as saying that the key to the plan would be a B-1B heavy bomber attack originating from Andersen Air Force Base on Guam. Pairs of B-1s from there have conducted frequent practice runs over Japan and South Korea in recent months, accompanied by fighter jets from the two allies. The B-1B does not carry nuclear weapons. But Kim would be bound to respond, analysts said. This week, North Korea hinted at the possible response when its military threatened to “burn up all the objects” in South Korean provinces near the border, including Seoul, a metropolitan area of 25 million people. Despite such rhetoric, North Korean leaders are careful strategists who have created a reputation as irrational adventurists to intimidate their enemies, South Korean analysts say. “The North Korean response will be proportional, depending on where the United States strikes,” said Cheon Seong-whun, who served as a presidential secretary for security strategy in Seoul until a few months ago. But Cheon said he feared that what appeared to be a duel of bluffing between Trump and Kim could lead to a military strike and counterstrike “through misperception and misunderstanding.” (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korean Threat to Test Missiles near Guam Poses Risks to Kim and Trump,” New York Times, August 11, 2017,
North Korea’s threat to test-fire ballistic missiles soon near the American territory of Guam deepened the challenge confronting the Trump administration: how to defang Pyongyang’s missile programs without risking all-out war. President Trump has made clear that his goal is to deny North Korea the capability to field a long-range nuclear-tipped missile that could strike the United States. And though the Pentagon still hopes for a diplomatic solution, highly classified military options are at the ready, last seriously debated when the Clinton administration pondered pre-emptive action to try to thwart North Korea’s nuclear program. Even a limited strike against a North Korean missile on its launching pad or the shooting down of a missile in midair would pose risks that the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, might retaliate, setting off a spiral of escalation that could plunge the Korean Peninsula into war. “In the event of a first strike against Kim, even a non-nuclear option, it is highly likely that Kim would retaliate at least conventionally against South Korea,” said James Stavridis, a retired four-star admiral who is now dean of Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. “This almost certainly would create an upward spiral of violence which would be extremely difficult to manage or to mitigate.” The administration’s first recourse has been diplomacy. Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson sought to head off North Korea’s missile program this week by suggesting that the United States could open talks with Pyongyang if North Korea would halt its missile tests. Yesterday, however, North Korea raised the stakes by saying that it was considering a plan to test-fire four intermediate-range Hwasong-12 missiles in international waters near Guam, home to American air and naval bases as well as a Thaad antimissile system. Trump hinted broadly later in the day that he has his own military options in mind. “Obviously we’re spending a lot of time looking at, in particular, North Korea,” he told reporters, “and we are preparing for many different alternative events.” But few of the military options are straightforward, and some former Pentagon officials involved in war planning for North Korea pointed to the complexities. A major consideration would be whether and when to evacuate American and other allied civilians, which is no small feat as Seoul, a city of about 10 million, is within range of North Korea’s rockets and artillery and the North Korean military is also armed with chemical and biological weapons. “With all this talk, what I worry about is a serious miscalculation,” said James D. Thurman, a retired Army general who served as the top United States commander in South Korea from 2011 to 2013. “Before we start talking about all these military options, we have to decide what are we going to do with the U.S. citizens over there.” He estimated that at least a quarter-million Americans would have to be moved. If the United States was prepared to go beyond a limited strike, it could conduct a surprise attack on North Korea’s missile garrison and weapon storage areas, using American aircraft stationed in Guam, in Japan and on aircraft carriers as well as strategic bombers that would be refueled in flight. American officials, however, do not have high confidence that the military could find and destroy North Korea’s entire arsenal of long-range missiles and nuclear warheads. It would be up to American missile defenses to knock out any that survived and that North Korea might use to attack the United States or its allies. North Korea could also use its artillery, rockets and special operations forces to attack South Korea. To better defend against the threat, the United States could deploy more of its own artillery, counterbattery and reconnaissance aircraft to South Korea and send more air and naval forces to the region. But that would forfeit any element of surprise. “I can’t underscore enough how unappealing all the military options are,” said Christine Wormuth, the Pentagon’s top policy official at the end of the Obama administration. “This wouldn’t end well. The U.S. would win, but it would be ugly.” Diplomatic efforts are also deeply complicated. Unless China believes the United States is serious about using military options to head off North Korea’s emerging missile threat, it may be difficult to gain the cooperation from Beijing needed to fashion a political solution. “I am 100 percent sure from a number of conversations that, as a last resort, he would use military force to deny them the capability to strike the homeland with a nuclear weapon,” said Senator Lindsey Graham, a South Carolina Republican, who met privately with Trump on the issue a month ago. “He has convinced me,” Mr. Graham added. “Now it is up to him to convince the Chinese and North Koreans.” To prevent nuclear attacks from elsewhere, namely Russia and China, the United States has relied on its potent nuclear arsenal. Some experts say the approach could also work with North Korea — a “least-bad option,” said Jeffrey A. Bader of the Brookings Institution. But Trump has indicated that he does not want to rely on deterrence for a country he sees as bellicose and unpredictable. Discouraging the enemy from massive escalation has worked even in the midst of war. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the administration of George Bush led an effort to push Iraqi forces out of Kuwait while dissuading Saddam Hussein from employing chemical weapons. The Iraqis were warned shortly before the conflict by Secretary of State James A. Baker III that they would pay a heavy price if they used weapons of mass destruction. The Iraqi government interpreted that as meaning that the United States would rush to Baghdad to topple their government. The United States could try a similar approach: attacking North Korea’s missiles while warning Kim that his government would be the next target if he dared to strike back. But few analysts are confident he would be restrained. Those urging firmer action assert that a military buildup in and around South Korea could give economic sanctions and diplomacy more time to work while providing American negotiators with more leverage. Graham asserted that diplomatic efforts would fail unless the United States made clear that North Korea’s deployment of an intercontinental missile would cross a “red line” and that military options were available if the talks faltered. But General Thurman worried that the war of words was fueling tensions and adding to the risk of miscalculation. “We are playing right into Kim Jong-un’s hands,” General Thurman said. “That is what he wants. He wants to be on the world scene.” “I really would want to tamp down this rhetoric, maintain armistice conditions, keep the force ready and,” he said, “not get the herd spooked.” (Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Wrestling with North Korea, Trump Finds Perilous Options,” New York Times, August 11, 2017,
Global Times: “The US and North Korea have both ramped up their threatening rhetoric. The Pentagon has prepared plans for B-1B strategic bombers to make preemptive strikes on North Korea’s missile sites. US Secretary of Defense James Mattis issued an ultimatum to North Korea on Wednesday to “cease any consideration of actions that would lead to the end of its regime and destruction of its people.” Meanwhile, North Korea issued plans to fire four intermediate-range missiles to land 30-40 kilometers from Guam and claimed it would finalize the plan by mid-August. Some people in Guam have already expressed panic for the first time after the end of the Cold War. The US has already got the worst of the confrontation with North Korea. Many people believe the possibility of war is very low. If war really breaks out, the US can hardly reap any strategic harvest and North Korea will face unprecedented risks. North Korea aims to propel the US to negotiate with it, while the US wants to put North Korea in check. Neither can achieve its goal, so they compete to escalate tensions, but neither wants to take the initiative to launch a war.
The real danger is that such a reckless game may lead to miscalculations and a strategic “war.” That is to say, neither Washington nor Pyongyang really wants war, but a war could break out anyway as they do not have the experience of putting such an extreme game under control. In the near future, it would be highly sensitive if US B-1B fighter jets fly over the Korean Peninsula or North Korea launches missiles in the direction of Guam. Both sides would upgrade their alert to the highest level. The uncertainty in the Korean Peninsula is growing. Beijing is not able to persuade Washington or Pyongyang to back down at this time. It needs to make clear its stance to all sides and make them understand that when their actions jeopardize China’s interests, China will respond with a firm hand. China should also make clear that if North Korea launches missiles that threaten US soil first and the US retaliates, China will stay neutral. If the US and South Korea carry out strikes and try to overthrow the North Korean regime and change the political pattern of the Korean Peninsula, China will prevent them from doing so. China opposes both nuclear proliferation and war in the Korean Peninsula. It will not encourage any side to stir up military conflict, and will firmly resist any side which wants to change the status quo of the areas where China’s interests are concerned. It is hoped that both Washington and Pyongyang can exercise restraint. The Korean Peninsula is where the strategic interests of all sides converge, and no side should try to be the absolute dominator of the region. (Global Times, “Reckless Game over the Korean Peninsula Runs Risk of Real War,” August 10, 2017)
Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori suggested that the Self-Defense Forces could take part in a war between the United States and North Korea if Pyongyang attacks the U.S. island territory of Guam. At a Lower House Security Committee meeting, Onodera said an attack against Guam, a U.S. military hub, would weaken the power of the United States, thereby putting Japan’s existence in danger. In such a case, Japan could exercise its right to collective self-defense, which enables the country to help the United States militarily, he said. “Japan has a role as a shield. The United States has a role of heightening deterrence with its striking power. We cannot rule out the possibility that a U.S. loss of striking power would correspond to a situation that endangers Japan’s existence,” Onodera said in response to questions from Yuichi Goto, a lawmaker of the main opposition Democratic Party. “If the situation meets the three conditions to use force in exercising the right to collective self-defense, we will be able to do so,” Onodera said. It is extremely rare for a Japanese defense minister to refer to the possibility of entering a war, even in general terms. Sakata Masahiro, former director-general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, said Onodera’s remarks correspond to the expanded interpretation of a “situation that will endanger Japan’s existence as a country.” However, in order for Japan to recognize such a situation, the United States must first exercise the right to individual self-defense after it was attacked. “If the United States has not exercised the right to individual self-defense yet, Japan cannot recognize the situation as one that endangers its existence,” Sakata said. Concerns have been raised that the government’s broader interpretation of such a situation will make it easier for SDF to take part in wars abroad. “The situation that endangers Japan’s existence must be interpreted strictly,” Sakata said. “Unless the government does so, the SDF will easily participate in overseas wars.” There are doubts about whether Japan has sufficient capabilities to intercept North Korean missiles that are flying toward waters off Guam. A senior official of the Defense Ministry said it is technically difficult to shoot down such missiles, which would fly over the Chugoku and Shikoku regions in western Japan, with SM3 interceptor missiles loaded on Aegis ships. Japan and the United States are currently jointly developing “SM3 Block 2A” missiles that have longer flying distances and higher accuracy than the SM3 missiles. (Aibara Ryo and Sonoda Koji, “Defense Chief: Japan Could Enter War between U.S., N. Korea,” Asahi Shimbun, August 11, 2017)
Former Ambassador to Washington Lee Tae-sik is being tapped for a repeat run in the job by the Moon Jae-in administration, sources said. President Moon is expected to officially announce his nomination, and will also name Noh Young-min as ambassador to China, government sources said. An experienced diplomat, Lee was vice foreign minister and ambassador to Washington in the Roh Moo-hyun administration but left the job in January 2009, a year after Lee Myung-bak was sworn in as president. During the last presidential election, Lee Tae-sik assisted Moon as a member of a policy think tank. Cheong Wa Dae originally tapped politicians who share Moon’s philosophy instead of career diplomats as ambassadors to the four major powers — the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia. But the presidential office finally decided on Lee. “The prevailing view at Cheong Wa Dae was that we need a person who is well versed in both U.S. affairs and diplomacy,” a senior presidential official said. (Jeong Woo-sang, “Lee Tae-shik Tapped for Fresh Run as Ambassador to U.S.,” August 11, 2017)
Senior American officials sent mixed signals on North Korea as President Trump’s “fire and fury” warning rattled allies and adversaries alike, a sign of his administration’s deep divisions as the outcast state once again threatened to wage nuclear war on the United States. The president’s advisers calibrated his dire warning with statements that, if not directly contradictory, emphasized different points. Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson stressed diplomacy and reassured Americans that they could “sleep well at night,” while Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said North Korea risked “the end of its regime and the destruction of its people” if it did not “stand down.” North Korea gave no indication that it would do so. In a statement late today, the North Korean military dismissed Trump’s fire-and-fury warning as a “load of nonsense” and said only “absolute force” would work on someone so “bereft of reason.” The military threatened to “turn the U.S. mainland into the theater of a nuclear war” and added that any American strike on North Korean missile and nuclear targets would be “mercilessly repelled.” The statement also said that the North Korean military would finalize a plan by mid-August to fire four midrange missiles into the waters off the Pacific island of Guam, a United States territory used as a strategic base, to create a “historic enveloping fire.” The spiral of fighting words left the Trump administration debating how to handle a standoff that has defied three presidents and only grown more ominous in recent weeks as North Korea successfully tested intercontinental ballistic missiles for the first time. Neither Tillerson nor Mattis had reviewed in advance Trump’s threat when he said North Korea “will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.” And the dissonance in their own follow-up statements reflected the struggle inside the Trump administration. “I don’t think there is a single policy at work,” said Ellen L. Frost, a longtime Asia specialist at the East-West Center, a Honolulu-based research organization. “I’m not even sure that Trump cares about having a consistent policy on any subject.” Instead, she said, the president’s fire-and-fury threat was a play to demonstrate toughness to his political base “followed by more nuanced cleanup operations on the part of Tillerson and Mattis, who are walking a political tightrope.” American allies Japan and South Korea were caught off guard by Trump’s threat, as were other regional players like China and Russia. Analysts reported deep anxiety in the region over the prospect that a war of words could easily turn into a real one. But some discounted Mr. Trump’s comments as the sort of bombast they have become accustomed to from a president who has publicly assailed not just enemies, but even allies like Germany, Canada and Mexico. The difference is that Germany is unlikely to respond to a presidential tirade with an attack on Guam, as North Korea threatened after Trump’s warning. Tillerson took on the role of soother, telling reporters as he returned from a trip to Asia that he saw no reason to believe that war was imminent. He urged North Korea to engage in talks about its nuclear program. “I think Americans should sleep well at night, have no concerns about this particular rhetoric of the last few days,” Tillerson said as his plane stopped to refuel in Guam, the very island that North Korea threatened to target. He added, “Nothing I have seen and nothing I know of would indicate that the situation has dramatically changed in the last 24 hours.” “North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States,” President Trump said after the isolated nuclear-armed country criticized the United States earlier in the day. Tillerson said Trump simply chose the sort of attention-grabbing words that Kim would use. “What the president is doing is sending a strong message to North Korea in language that Kim Jong-un would understand, because he doesn’t seem to understand diplomatic language,” Tillerson said. Hours later, Mattis issued a written statement that, while not as florid as Mr. Trump’s comments yesterday, still held out the possibility of a massive retaliation that could destroy much of North Korea. “While our State Department is making every effort to resolve this global threat through diplomatic means, it must be noted that the combined allied militaries now possess the most precise, rehearsed and robust defensive and offensive capabilities on Earth,” Mr. Mattis said. North Korea’s military, he added, “will continue to be grossly overmatched by ours and would lose any arms race or conflict it initiates.” Mattis, in his statement, stressed the international solidarity against North Korea: “Kim Jong-un should take heed of the United Nations Security Council’s unified voice and statements from governments the world over, who agree the D.P.R.K. poses a threat to global security and stability. The D.P.R.K. must choose to stop isolating itself and stand down its pursuit of nuclear weapons.” While the State Department insisted that the administration was speaking with “one voice,” analysts said that voice was not necessarily a consistent one. “Clearly there is not a coordinated messaging strategy,” Evan Medeiros, the managing director at the Eurasia Group and a former Asia adviser to President Barack Obama, said by telephone from Tokyo. “This is being put together incrementally and of all the countries and all the issues you deal with, North Korea is not the one to be kludging together statements by the president and cabinet secretaries because the risk of miscalculation is so high.” Alexander Vershbow, a former ambassador to South Korea, said the Trump administration “policy seems incoherent” and the threat of military action “will likely harden the North Koreans’ stance” and make it more difficult to get China to follow through on its support for the United Nations sanctions. “If denuclearization is still the goal, the only way to get there is through increased Chinese pressure,” Vershbow said. “Since there is no viable military option, the only other course of action is to develop a long-term deterrence and containment strategy — but that means accepting the unacceptable,” North Korea as a nuclear power. Tillerson emphasized today that he is engaged in an ongoing diplomatic effort and that “our telephone lines remain open, certainly to China, Russia as well as our allies.” Tillerson said that his strategy of gradually increasing the diplomatic and economic costs for the North Korean government is working. “I think in fact the pressure is starting to show,” he said. “I think that’s why the rhetoric coming out of Pyongyang has gotten louder and more threatening.” Medeiros questioned whether Mr. Trump’s warning, combined with sanctions, would prompt North Korea to return to the negotiating table. “That’s the big strategy question here,” he said. “Trump has clearly calculated that it will. But that’s a huge gamble, and it’s one that it’s not clear to me that the Chinese would necessarily agree with.” (Peter Baker and Gardiner Harris, “U.S. Aides Offer Mixed Messages on Korea Risks,” New York Times, August 10, 2017,
Few foreign leaders have courted President Donald Trump as assiduously as the prime minister of Japan, Abe Shinzo. Since Trump’s election victory in November, Abe has been an eager guest at Trump Tower in New York and at Mar-a-Lago. Now, as Trump and Kim Jong Un exchange increasingly fiery words over the North’s nuclear weapons program, Abe’s relationship with the president is being tested. The North’s accelerating military advances — and Trump’s volatile response — could complicate Japan’s close alliance with the United States and Abe’s political future. Abe, analysts say, has sought favor with Trump for two reasons: to blunt the president’s criticism of Japan on trade issues — a recurring theme for Trump during his run for office — and to ensure the president’s commitment to Japan’s defense. During the campaign, Trump sometimes suggested he would scale back the United States’ global military commitments, a policy that would have left Japan, a U.S. treaty ally, exposed. But now, if anything, Abe faces the opposite problem: a U.S. president who seems overtly eager to confront their mutual adversary, North Korea. “If it looks like the U.S. set off the chain of events that led to escalation, and Abe didn’t use his relationship with Trump to moderate that, it’s easy to imagine that there would be a domestic price to pay,” said Tobias Harris, a Japan analyst at Teneo Intelligence, a political risk consultancy based in New York. The Japanese public has much less appetite for brinkmanship than Trump appears to have, Harris said. Abe, a staunch conservative, has made a career of arguing for a tougher line against North Korea. The growing threat from the North has bolstered his drive to strengthen Japan’s military, which has long been constrained by the country’s war-renouncing constitution. Because of that, the latest escalation of tensions might seem to play into Abe’s hands. Yesterday, North Korea said it was drawing up plans to launch intermediate-range ballistic missiles into waters near Guam. The missiles, it said, would fly over western Japan — reviving memories of a North Korean missile that flew over northern Japan in 1998, causing a national uproar. “The DPRK has already acquired the capabilities of reducing the Japanese archipelago to ashes in a second once it makes up its mind,” the North’s state news agency said in a statement accompanying the Guam plan. Japan is already moving to strengthen its anti-missile defenses, and officials are debating whether to acquire weapons like long-range cruise missiles that would allow the country to strike targets in North Korea, either in retaliation or pre-emptively if it concluded that an attack by the North was imminent. Deploying such weapons would break with decades of precedent, and the idea is contentious. In keeping with the pacifist constitution, Japan’s military is meant to protect the country from direct attack, while its partner the United States handles offensive duties like striking enemy bases — a shield and spear arrangement. Most Japanese appear happy with that division of labor, despite concerns about North Korea, and Abe needs to tread carefully if he hopes to change it. The prime minister’s approval ratings have tumbled in recent months, specialists say, in part because voters believe he is overreaching in his efforts to roll back restrictions on the military, including with controversial proposed changes to the constitution. Polls show that only about one-third of voters support such constitutional changes. “Abe will want to spend his dwindling political capital on his long-held goal of constitutional revision,” James L. Schoff, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote in an article posted yesterday. A “bold move” to acquire offensive weapons, he added, “would undermine this effort.” Abe faces a leadership contest in the governing Liberal Democratic Party next year. His main rival, Kishida Fumio, a former foreign minister, appears to be betting that the public favors a more cautious approach to transforming the military. “In terms of our philosophies as politicians, to put it simply, Abe is a conservative. One might even call him a hawk,” Kishida said yesterday on a television debate program, adding, “I’m a liberal, a dove.” Trump’s combative language on North Korea makes matters trickier for Abe. The president has doubled down on his war of words with Kim’s government, saying a previous threat to rain down “fire and fury” on the North might not have been tough enough. In Japan, such comments have served as a reminder of the risks involved in confronting the North militarily. Despite the North’s recent development of ballistic missiles that experts say could reach the United States, North Korea’s neighbors would probably bear the brunt of its attacks. For that reason, support for military action against the North is low in both South Korea and Japan — a fact that Trump’s statements are hardly helping to change. “There’s growing concern,” said Takesada Hideshi, a specialist on defense issues at the Institute of World Studies at Takushoku University, “about whether the U.S. is really thinking about the security of Japan and South Korea.” (Jonathan Soble, “Neighbor’s Escalation Puts Japanese Premier in a Delicate Position,” New York Times, August 12, 2017,
Bermudez: “Recent commercial satellite imagery reveals several developments suggesting that North Korea may be accelerating the development of the sea-based leg of its nuclear forces. Of particular interest in the imagery is that netting or tarps have been suspended above both the fore and aft decks of the SINPO-class submarine obscuring any activity taking place beneath them. This was last done prior to the July 9, 2016 test of the Pukguksong-1, suggesting that the North may be preparing for a new series of “at sea” test launches, has undertaken modifications or upgrades to the submarine’s launch systems, or is developing a more advanced version of the Pukguksong-1. Recent ejection tests of an SLBM also support the assessment that an at-sea SLBM test may be forthcoming. Additionally, imagery of the Mayang-do Navy Shipyard and Submarine Base shows the same number of ROMEO-class submarines that are usually berthed there, indicating that a recent spike in ROMEO activity in the East Sea (Sea of Japan) was a singular rather than force-wide event. Commercial satellite imagery from August 7, although partially cloud covered, provides a limited look at the status of the SINPO-class experimental ballistic missile submarine (SSBA), the submersible test stand barge and parts of the Mayang-do Navy Shipyard and Submarine Base. As noted in our July report, sometime during the last week in May, the SINPO-class submarine was repositioned forward along its dock and the submersible test stand barge was moved to a position aft of the submarine (both had previously been in their former positions since December 9, 2016). Since the July report, netting or tarps have been suspended above both the fore and aft decks of the submarine obscuring any activity taking place beneath them. The only other time this was seen was during May-July 2016 and prior to the failed July 9, 2016 Pukguksong-1 test. It is unclear if this activity is signaling a forthcoming at sea SLBM test, although the recent ejection tests would support such an assessment. No activity is noted on or near the submersible test stand barge in the latest image.” (Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “High Levels of Activity at Sinpo South Shipyard,” 38North, August 11, 2017)
8/12/17:
After a four-day fusillade of apocalyptic threats against North Korea, President Trump left many in Washington and capitals throughout the Pacific wondering whether it was more method or madness. Among those wondering were members of Trump’s own administration. It was not the first time in his unconventional presidency that Trump had unnerved friend and foe alike, but never before had it seemed so consequential. But as with so much with Mr. Trump, the line between calculation and impulse can be blurry. In the broadest sense, Mr. Trump’s “fire and fury” and “locked and loaded” warnings fit the strategic imperatives of the advisers who gave him classified briefings at his golf club in Bedminster, N.J., over the last week. The president showed resolve in the face of Pyongyang’s defiance, as his aides had counseled, while increasing pressure on China to broker some kind of deal to denuclearize the tinderbox Korean Peninsula. But Trump, who bridles at being stage-managed, ignored their advice to project dignified steadfastness. Carefully calibrated briefings for the president by Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, the national security adviser, and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis came out through a Trump bullhorn, magnified and maximized for effect. For perhaps the first time in generations, an American leader became the wild card in a conflict typically driven by a brutal, secretive despot in Pyongyang. “On the U.S. side, the tradition has been steely resolve and preparation,” said Dennis C. Blair, a retired admiral and head of the United States Pacific Command who went on to serve as director of national intelligence. “But now we have a president who reacts to braggadocio with an attempt to top it on his own side. He’s out there in territory he thinks is familiar, which is meeting exaggerated statement with exaggerated statement, convincing the other side that we’re tough, you’re going to fold.” In other words, the magnitude of the challenges that Trump faces has grown dramatically, but his tone has not. And it remains to be seen if the don’t-mess-with-me attitude that cowed Republican primary rivals like Jeb Bush will have a similar effect on a regime that has managed to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile that could reach the United States while making progress toward miniaturizing a nuclear warhead that would fit on top. In this case, Trump has told people around him that he thinks Kim Jong-un, the unpredictable North Korean leader, will ultimately be prodded to cut a deal, and that the bluntness of his language is intended to create a crisis that drives him to negotiate before North Korea perfects a nuclear-tipped missile capable of striking the American mainland. “If Kim were to respond positively, Trump might end up as his best friend,” said Scott Snyder, director of the program on United States-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. “I think it is as plausible that we could end up with a ‘hamburger summit’ between Trump and Kim as that we will end up in a second Korean War.” While Trump and his staff say his statements reflect a desire to deal with the North Korea problem once and for all, they also have an unmistakable domestic political component, according to people in the president’s orbit. He feels besieged by the investigation into his campaign’s possible collusion with Russia and frustrated by his sinking poll numbers, and he is seeking targets to attack. Asserting his strength abroad in such stark terms when he is so weak at home helps him politically and, more important, improves his wavering state of mind, according to current and former advisers. The tough talk also seems to appeal to many of his most ardent supporters. As for the effect on North Korea, Blair said the dictatorship has stood down from confrontations when convinced that the United States was serious. “It’s probably good to throw back at them what they throw at us,” he said. “When they think we’re angry, they back off.” To much of the foreign policy establishment in both parties, however, the approach is alarming. “When I was watching the president talk, I thought, ‘Oh, my god, why is he doing this?’” said Senator Dianne Feinstein, Democrat of California and the former chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. “Anybody who knows anything about this young Korean leader knows it’s going to promote an even more aggressive response.” “I just wished he’d stop it, with the tweeting one day and the next day, it’s something else,” Feinstein added. “Why isn’t the secretary of state the one making the statements? Why didn’t he at least make it at the White House and not some golf course, or wherever he was? He speaks for the whole country, not just for his feelings at the moment. It’s just dangerous.” Trump’s statements have been as vague as they have been vivid, not clearly defining what his red line would be. What would prompt an American strike? When Trump made his fire-and-fury comment August 8, he said it would come in reaction to a threat to the United States, not necessarily an attack. In subsequent comments, he has said he would react if North Korea launched a strike against American interests, like the Pacific territory of Guam, or United States allies in the region. What would he require as the goal of any negotiations? Would North Korea have to freeze its nuclear program or give it up altogether? Could he live with a deal that merely puts off the problem, like the Iran nuclear agreement brokered by his predecessor that he routinely excoriates? Trump said in recent days that he wanted to “denuke the world,” but many doubt North Korea would ever surrender its weapons now that it has developed them. Some of Trump’s advisers, including Stephen K. Bannon, his chief strategist, have urged him to take a less interventionist stance, but Bannon has been kept out of most of the deliberations. Mattis, for his part, has advised Trump to project strength and resolve. But he has quietly lamented to lawmakers from both parties the absence of military options against North Korea that would not imperil the lives of millions of civilians in South Korea and Japan. And Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, who flew to New Jersey to meet with Trump after consulting with leaders in Asia over the past week, has complained privately about the lack of coordination between the White House and his department, which has often been blindsided by the president’s statements. Even some of the president’s own advisers have quietly asked each other in recent days if Trump’s bellicosity toward North Korea is part of some thought-out strategy that they have not been told about or what they suspect is just more on-the-fly instinct. But some aides have found themselves surprised at other moments when Trump has done something unexpected and seemingly random, only to explain his thinking afterward in a way that indicated more calculation than they had thought. Aides do know that after a lifetime in the real estate business, Trump starts a negotiation with an extreme position intended to ensure that the other side meets him not just in the middle but closer to his side. While he has little experience in translating that into international diplomacy, Trump has shown that he is not so wedded to any particular position on almost any issue, meaning he might be more likely to accept a compromise that would seem unthinkable judging by the stark language he uses at the start. Snyder of the Council on Foreign Relations said that Trump could be North Korea’s greatest nightmare and its greatest opportunity. He might be a nightmare, Snyder said, because he would not be constrained by norms that would favor acquiescence over military force. And he might be an opportunity because, Snyder said, “the chances of Kim being able to cut a deal with an unconventional Trump are higher than they would be with a president more sensitive to the politics of nuclear diplomacy with North Korea.” Still, many former diplomats remain deeply skeptical. Ivo H. Daalder, a former ambassador to NATO who is now the president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, said the likelihood of forging a workable agreement with North Korea was so slim that it suggested Trump’s language of the past week was meant more for domestic audiences and to show his base that he was tough. “If their bottom line is denuclearization or even eliminating a nuclear capability that can reach the U.S., that strikes me as unrealistic,” Daalder said. “Pyongyang has gone through great effort to acquire this capability, which its leaders judge necessary to ensure their survival. They’re not about to give it up. So that leaves me to think that strong rhetoric is its own purpose.” (Glenn Thrush and Peter Baker, “Leader of U.S. Has a New Role: Wild Card,” New York Times, August 13, 2017,
In a diplomatic gamble, President Trump is seeking to enlist China as a peacemaker in the bristling nuclear-edged dispute with North Korea at the very moment he plans to ratchet up conflict with Beijing over trade issues that have animated his political rise. Trump spoke late August 11 with President Xi Jinping to press the Chinese to do more to rein in North Korea as it races toward development of long-range nuclear weapons that could reach the United States. Xi sought to lower the temperature after Trump’s vow to rain down “fire and fury” on North Korea, urging restraint and a political solution. But the conversation came as Trump’s administration was preparing new trade action against China that could inflame the relationship. Trump plans to return to Washington tomorrow to sign a memo determining whether China should be investigated for intellectual property violations, accusing Beijing of failing to curb the theft of trade secrets and rampant online and physical piracy and counterfeiting. An investigation would be intended to lead to retaliatory measures. The White House had planned to take action on intellectual property earlier but held off as it successfully lobbied China to vote at the United Nations Security Council for additional sanctions on North Korea a week ago. Even now, the extra step of determining whether to start the investigation is less than trade hawks might have wanted, but softens the blow to China and gives Trump a cudgel to hold over it if he does not get the cooperation he wants. While past presidents have tried at least ostensibly to keep security and economic issues on separate tracks in their dealings with China, Trump has explicitly linked the two, suggesting he would back off from a trade war against Beijing if it does more to pressure North Korea. “If China helps us, I feel a lot differently toward trade, a lot differently toward trade,” he told reporters August 10. In their phone conversation on Friday night, Xi stressed that it was “very important” for the two leaders to maintain contact to find “an appropriate solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula,” according to a statement carried in the Chinese state-run media. The language indicated China wants to push forward with a diplomatic proposal for North Korea that the Trump administration has brushed aside. The Chinese statement urged the “relevant sides” — a reference to North Korea and the United States — to “avoid words and actions that exacerbate tensions.” It did not explicitly criticize North Korea, which issued its own searing rhetoric all week, including a threat against Guam, and did not draw a clear distinction between Washington and Pyongyang. In its own account of the call, the White House emphasized points of concurrence. “President Trump and President Xi agreed North Korea must stop its provocative and escalatory behavior,” read a statement from the White House issued early Saturday morning. “The presidents also reiterated their mutual commitment to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” If Trump was trying to move Xi toward bolder action against the North, he did so while the Chinese leader is preoccupied with his own domestic political machinations, attending to a once-every-five-year political shake-up in the top ranks of the Communist Party. Xi is believed to be at the beach resort at Beidaihe on the coast east of Beijing, where the leadership conducts a secretive retreat every summer, sometimes emerging casually dressed in open neck shirts and Windbreakers for photographs on the strip of sand along the beachfront. The final stages of the political process to win Xi’s favor for a place on the standing committee of the party, now a seven-member body that makes the final decisions on the nation’s affairs, is underway among the resort’s villas and hotels, China’s political analysts said. The selection will be unveiled at a national congress in Beijing sometime between September and November. Until then, almost all other matters, including foreign policy, are put on hold, the analysts said. Still, the leadership has been vexed that the Trump administration has paid scant attention to China’s proposal for a “freeze for freeze” solution to North Korea. Instead, to China’s irritation, the United States is looking to increase missile defenses in South Korea. In some respects, though, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson has tried to please Beijing by pledging that Washington does not seek to overthrow the North Korean leader, and does not plan to send American troops north of the 38th parallel that divides North and South Korea. In rebuffing the “freeze for freeze” proposal, Washington has raised suspicions in Beijing about its true intentions, said Yun Sun, a China expert at the Stimson Center in Washington. Chinese leaders believe the United States sees its true rival as China, a mammoth economy, and not North Korea, one of the poorest countries on earth, Sun said. In this estimation, Washington is merely using North Korea to mount a military containment strategy around China, she said. “The Chinese operate from the conviction that China remains and will always be the No. 1 strategic threat to the U.S., so the issue of North Korea will be used against China — through sanctions, provocations and everything else,” she said. China was also annoyed, Ms. Sun said, that the United States refuses to discuss a “grand bargain” or “end game” on the future of the Korean Peninsula. Of most interest to China, she said, is the future disposition of American forces in South Korea, now standing at 28,500 troops. The phone conversation between Trump and Xi will be followed by a visit from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., who is expected in Beijing August 14. The general’s visit, planned earlier this summer, is the first by a senior American official to Beijing since Tillerson met with Xi in March. Much of the diplomacy between China and the United States has been conducted between Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and the Chinese ambassador in Washington, Cui Tiankai. Those talks have concentrated on Cui’s efforts to stave off punishing trade tariffs against China that are gathering momentum in White House discussions. During his two-day visit, General Dunford is likely to use the opportunity to drive home arguments for the Chinese to put more pressure on the Kim government, said Brian McKeon, who was a senior Pentagon official in the Obama administration. A major point of dispute will likely be American plans to deploy more missile defenses in South Korea, he said. China vehemently opposes the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, or THAAD, that has already been deployed in South Korea, calling it a threat to its own security. “I would expect that Dunford will make the usual request that they put more pressure on the regime to behave, and to recognize that Kim’s actions threatens our core interests, which means we will have to continue to take measures that Beijing doesn’t like, for example the deployment of Thaad,” McKeon said. (Jane Perlez and Peter Baker, “To Enlist China, Trump Gambles on Dual Fronts,” New York Times, August 13, 2017,
In preparation for North Korea’s possible firing of ballistic missiles toward Guam, the Defense Ministry deployed surface-to-air Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) guided missiles at Ground Self-Defense Force camps in four prefectures in the Chugoku and Shikoku regions. As the trajectory of North Korean missiles fired toward Guam means they would fly over the four prefectures if they were launched, the ministry is preparing for a state of emergency to mitigate a scenario in which shells or debris land in these regions. Trucks carrying equipment for PAC-3 units arrived at the GSDF’s Kochi Camp in Kochi Prefecture at around 2:45 a.m. Soon after, vehicles carrying the launchers arrived and GSDF personnel checked the equipment. PAC-3 units were also deployed at GSDF camps in Matsuyama; Izumo, Shimane Prefecture; and Kaitaichi, Hiroshima Prefecture. Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori yesterday issued an order to destroy North Korean missiles. A destruction order has been in place since August last year. However, because PAC-3 deployment locations have changed, the order was issued anew on procedural grounds. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “PAC-3 Units Deployed in Chugoku, Shikoku,” August 12, 2017)
Kissinger: “For more than 30 years, the world’s response to North Korea’s nuclear program has combined condemnation with procrastination. Pyongyang’s reckless conduct is deplored. Warnings are issued that its evolution toward weaponization will prove unacceptable. Yet its nuclear program has only accelerated. The August 5 sanctions resolution passed unanimously by the United Nations Security Council marked a major step forward. Still, an agreed objective remains to be established. But the North Korean success in testing a prototype intercontinental ballistic missile eliminates the scope for further equivocation. If Kim Jong Un maintains a nuclear program against the opposition of China and the U.S. and a unanimous Security Council resolution, it will alter the geostrategic relationship among the principal players. If Pyongyang develops a full-scale nuclear capacity while the world dithers, it will seriously diminish the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella in Asia, especially for our allies in Tokyo and Seoul. The long-term challenge reaches beyond the threat to American territory to the prospect of nuclear chaos. An operational North Korean ICBM arsenal is still some time away given the need to miniaturize warheads, attach them to missiles, and produce them in numbers. But Asia’s nations are already under threat from North Korea’s existing short- and intermediate-range missiles. As this threat compounds, the incentive for countries like Vietnam, South Korea and Japan to defend themselves with their own nuclear weapons will grow dramatically—an ominous turn for the region and the world. Reversing the progress Pyongyang has already made is as crucial as preventing its further advancement. American as well as multilateral diplomacy on North Korea has been unsuccessful, owing to an inability to merge the key players’ objectives—especially those of China and the U.S.—into an operational consensus. American demands for an end to the North Korean nuclear program have proved unavailing. U.S. leaders, including in the military, have been reluctant to use force; Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has described the prospect of a war over Korea as “catastrophic.” Thousands of artillery tubes entrenched within range of the South Korean capital demonstrate Pyongyang’s strategy of holding hostage greater Seoul’s population of 30 million. Unilateral pre-emptive military action by the U.S. would involve a risk of conflict with China. Beijing, even if it temporarily acquiesced, would not long abide an American strategy of determining by itself outcomes at the very edge of China’s heartland, as its intervention in the Korean War of the 1950s demonstrated. The use of military force must be carefully analyzed, and its vocabulary must be restrained. But it cannot be precluded. Considerations such as these have caused the administration’s attempt to enlist China in a diplomatic effort to press Korea toward denuclearization. These efforts so far have had only partial success. China shares the American concern regarding nuclear proliferation; it is in fact the country most immediately affected by it. But while America has been explicit about the goal, it has been less willing to confront its political consequences. Given North Korea’s enormous and disproportionate allocation of national resources to its nuclear-weapons program, abandoning or substantially curtailing it would produce a political upheaval, perhaps even regime change. China surely understands this. Therefore one of the most conspicuous events of current diplomacy is Beijing’s support in principle of North Korean denuclearization. At the same time, the prospect of disintegration or chaos in North Korea evokes at least two major concerns in China. The first is the political and social effects of a North Korean internal crisis on China itself, re-enacting events familiar from millennia of Chinese history. The second involves security in Northeast Asia. China’s incentive to help implement denuclearization will be to impose comparable restraints on all of Korea. To be sure, South Korea has no visible nuclear program or announced plans for it, but an international proscription is another matter. China would also have a stake in the political evolution of North Korea following denuclearization, whether it be a two-state solution or unification, and in restrictions on military deployment placed on North Korea. Heretofore, the administration has urged China to press North Korea as a kind of subcontractor to achieve American objectives. The better—probably only feasible—approach is to merge the two efforts and develop a common position jointly pursued with the other countries involved. Statements defining the U.S. goal as bringing Pyongyang to the conference table reflect the assumption that negotiations are their own objective, operating according to their own momentum, separate from the pressures that brought them about and are needed to sustain them. But American diplomacy will, in the end, be judged by the outcome, not the process. Repeated assurances that the U.S. seeks no unilateral advantage are not sufficient for countries that believe the Asian security structure is at risk. So which parties should negotiate, and over what? An understanding between Washington and Beijing is the essential prerequisite for the denuclearization of Korea. By an ironic evolution, China at this point may have an even greater interest than the U.S. in forestalling the nuclearization of Asia. Beijing runs the risk of deteriorating relations with America if it gets blamed for insufficient pressure on Pyongyang. Since denuclearization requires sustained cooperation, it cannot be achieved by economic pressure. It requires a corollary U.S.-Chinese understanding on the aftermath, specifically about North Korea’s political evolution and deployment restraints on its territory. Such an understanding should not alter existing alliance relationships. Paradoxical as it may seem in light of a half-century of history, such an understanding is probably the best way to break the Korean deadlock. A joint statement of objectives and implicit actions would bring home to Pyongyang its isolation and provide a basis for the international guarantee essential to safeguard its outcome. Seoul and Tokyo must play a key role in this process. No country is more organically involved than South Korea. It must have, by geography and alliance relationship, a crucial voice in the political outcome. It would be the most directly affected by a diplomatic solution and the most menaced by military contingencies. It is one thing for American and other leaders to proclaim that they would not take advantage of North Korea’s denuclearization. Seoul is certain to insist on a more embracing and formal concept. Similarly, Japan’s history has been linked with Korea’s for millennia. Tokyo’s concept of security will not tolerate indefinitely a nuclear Korea without a nuclear capability of its own. Its evaluation of the American alliance will be importantly influenced by the degree to which the U.S. management of the crisis takes Japanese concerns into account. The alternative route of a direct U.S. negotiation with Pyongyang tempts some. But it would leave us a partner that can have only a minimum interest in implementation and a maximum interest in playing China and the U.S. off against each other. An understanding with China is needed for maximum pressure and workable guarantees. Instead, Pyongyang could best be represented at a culminating international conference. There have been suggestions that a freeze of testing could provide an interim solution leading to eventual denuclearization. This would repeat the mistake of the Iranian agreement: seeking to solve a geostrategic problem by constraining the technical side alone. It would provide infinite pretexts for procrastination while “freeze” is defined and inspection mechanisms are developed. Pyongyang must not be left with the impression that it can trade time for procedure and envelop purpose in tactics as a way to stall and thus fulfill its long-held aspirations. A staged process may be worth considering, but only if it substantially reduces the Korean nuclear capacity and research program in the short term. A North Korea retaining an interim weapons capability would institutionalize permanent risks: • that a penurious Pyongyang might sell nuclear technology; • that American efforts may be perceived as concentrating on protecting its own territory, while leaving the rest of Asia exposed to nuclear blackmail; • that other countries may pursue nuclear deterrent against Pyongyang, one another or, in time, the U.S.; • that frustration with the outcome will take the form of mounting conflict with China; • that proliferation may accelerate in other regions; • that the American domestic debate may become more divisive. Substantial progress toward denuclearization—and its attainment in a brief period—is the most prudent course.” (Henry A. Kissinger, “How to Resolve the North Korea Crisis,” Wall Street Journal, August 12, 2017)
8/13/17:
Wit: “While the Trump administration’s policy on North Korea is gyrating in all directions—mostly bad—someone in Washington is keeping hope alive. Namely, despite escalating tensions which appear to be approaching a violent breaking point, there might be a peaceful way out of what some pundits are calling a “slow-motion Cuban missile crisis.” Reports emerged last week that American and North Korean diplomats were holding secret meetings in New York City. In fact, the “New York” channel between the United States and North Korea has existed since the early 1990s. For decades after the Korean War, there were no official contacts between the two countries as Washington pursued a policy of isolating Pyongyang. The Reagan administration shifted gears in the late 1980s and began a policy of limited engagement with North Korea because of concerns about its nascent nuclear weapons program and a desire to support South Korea’s policy of reaching out to Pyongyang. American and North Korean diplomats in Beijing held occasional meetings to discuss important issues. But as the crisis over Pyongyang’s nuclear program mounted at the beginning of the Clinton administration, the U.S. decided that it was more convenient for executive branch officials to hop on an airplane shuttle for the short ride from Washington to New York to meet North Korean diplomats at the United Nations than to endure the grueling 14-hour trek to Beijing. Those New York sessions often took place in isolated, dingy basement rooms at UN headquarters beyond the prying eyes of reporters. The New York channel has had highs and lows. In its heyday in the 1990s, frequent meetings laid the groundwork for the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, the first denuclearization arrangement with the North—as well as other initiatives to improve bilateral relations. The channel’s low point came at the end of the Obama administration, when the North Koreans shut it down after U.S. sanctions for the first time personally targeted Kim Jong Un in July 2016. But the channel had already fallen on hard times, prompting North Korean officials to rename it the “Kenneth Bae” channel since, according to them, the Obama administration only wanted to meet to press for the release of the detained Korean American missionary who spent 18 months in a North Korean jail from 2013 until late 2014. Almost immediately after the election of President Trump, North Korean government officials, meeting with myself and other former U.S. officials in Geneva, stated that they were willing to wipe the slate clean and revive the New York channel once the Obama administration left office. Moreover, they also expressed an interest in starting a security dialogue with the new administration, one that could serve as a stepping-stone to the resumption of formal negotiations for the first time since the Six Party Talks ended in 2008. This wasn’t new news; the concept of “talks about talks” had been discussed in meetings between the North Koreans and former U.S. officials in Geneva, Berlin, London, and Ulan Bator dating back to fall 2013. But it was important that they were still open to the idea with a new administration entering office. While those contacts have resumed, getting a serious security dialogue off the ground will be much more challenging. First, the North Korean view has been that initial discussions must be held without preconditions. They would not agree to the Obama administration’s demands for much of its last few years in office that Pyongyang sign on to giving up its nuclear program even before discussions were held, a non-starter for any country since it would mean preemptive capitulation. Rather, they insisted that denuclearization could be a subject of discussion for these preliminary talks and might even be addressed in formal negotiations. But as time has gone by, as the North has conducted test after test of missiles and nuclear weapons, and as Pyongyang’s WMD arsenal has grown, it has become clear that achieving denuclearization, if possible at all, would have to be a long-term, not a short-term objective. A second challenge for backchannel talks is to agree to tension-reducing measures intended to create the right political atmosphere that would give formal negotiations some breathing room to move forward. The North has indicated that it could agree to a temporary end to threatening missile and nuclear tests, a requirement Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has frequently mentioned for resuming negotiations. But that would come at a price. The United States would have to cancel joint military exercises with South Korea that Pyongyang finds threatening. For the same reason that the U.S. will not sit at the negotiating table while Pyongyang continues missile and nuclear tests, North Korean Foreign Ministry officials will refuse to negotiate while the U.S. and South Korean militaries practice killing their leaders and Americans fly bombers over the Korean peninsula capable of dropping nuclear weapons on the North. Pyongyang first floated the proposal in a private meeting in Ulan Bator in 2014 and then publicly six months later. It was quickly rejected by the Obama administration. American pundits argued that it would seriously undermine Washington’s ability to protect its ally, South Korea, and didn’t seem to care that it would check Pyongyang’s continued development of missiles and nuclear weapons. However, if Washington had taken the time to discuss the idea with the North Koreans, the U.S. would have learned that they did not mean the complete cancellation of all exercises, only the end of activities intended to show that the U.S. and South Korean could remove Kim Jung Un from power and use nuclear weapons against the regime. As any informed military planner will tell you, that’s possible while also maintaining the readiness of American forces on the Korean peninsula. And had Pyongyang halted testing in 2015, Washington wouldn’t be facing the imminent threat of a North Korean ICBM today. It is unclear whether backchannel contacts can still take us down this peaceful road and help ease tensions. Aside from pressing security challenges, the Trump administration is rightly concerned about securing the freedom of three Americans still detained in North Korean jails, particularly in the aftermath of the late spring release of a fourth detainee—American university student Otto Warmbier—who tragically died soon afterwards. That will not be easy as Washington and Pyongyang hurl threats back and forth. But Mr. Warmbier’s release might never have happened without backchannel discussions between the U.S. and North Korean diplomats. If the three remaining detainees are freed, that might also pave the way to a further easing of tensions and provide some momentum to diplomacy, although the relentless growth of the WMD threat and the deterioration in U.S.-North Korean relations from bad to worse will make it harder to move down this path. There are reasons, however, for both sides to find a way out of this confrontation. The North Koreans face the immediate danger of an armed clash with the U.S. that could lead to the destruction of their country. Easing tensions could also help lessen the North’s dependence on China, a country it distrusts almost if not just as much as the United States, by opening the possibility of better ties with the United States and South Korea. In the long run that might help the North modernize its economy—an important priority for Kim Jung Un. The Trump administration confronts the horrendous prospect of an armed clash that could result in millions of casualties and trillions of dollars in economic damage in South Korea and Japan, triggering a word-wide recession if not depression. But beyond that, Washington’s confrontational and sometimes erratic behavior in dealing with Pyongyang is undermining confidence in its alliance leadership at a time when Asians have serious doubts about America’s commitment to remaining a Pacific power. Most Americans have forgotten or never knew that the Cuban missile crisis, which brought the United States and Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war, was not solved by public threats or by playing a successful game of nuclear chicken. Rather it was solved through quiet backchannel diplomacy between Robert Kennedy, the president’s brother and attorney general, and the Soviet ambassador in Washington who crafted a face-saving solution for both countries. Let’s hope for the same peaceful outcome today.” (Joel S. Wit, “Back Channel to North Korea,” The Atlantic, August 13, 2017)
Jean Lee: “A few years ago, when I was a reporter working in Pyongyang, North Korea’s capital, I went to visit a kindergarten. While I was there, I picked up a children’s book called “A Hedgehog Defeats the Tiger.” It was a tale, a North Korean told me, about a feisty little hedgehog that bests a much larger and fiendishly ravenous tiger using the only weapons at its disposal: the small but sharp quills on its back. The tiny but clever hedgehog pounces on the big nose of the blundering tiger, blinding him into submission. “Do you know who the tiger is?” the North Korean asked me, an American, with a slight smirk. From kindergarten classrooms to the halls of power, this is how North Korea views itself: as a scrappy little country that has been bullied by the United States for far too long and is willing to fight back. North Korea takes pride in standing up to its much larger archenemy. That is why the Korean War armistice of 1953 — a truce that was seen in Washington as a failure to bring the conflict to a close and to stop the march of communism in Asia — is celebrated in Pyongyang as Victory Day. To fight the United States to a draw is tantamount to victory, as far as the North Koreans are concerned. If President Trump thinks that his threats last week of “fire and fury” and weapons “locked and loaded” have North Koreans quaking in their boots, he should think again. If anything, the Mao-suit-clad cadres in Pyongyang are probably gleeful that the president of the United States has played straight into their propaganda. They know that their country is a tiny hedgehog, but it seems to have disturbed the tiger. Inside North Korea, this propaganda is everywhere: The big, bad United States is preparing to attack us, and our leader, Kim Jong-un, is building nuclear weapons to defend us. With his threats, Mr. Trump has given Mr. Kim exactly the justification he needs to keep his nuclear and missile programs going, even as his countrymen go hungry. From the time they are toddlers, North Koreans are raised to see the United States as their enemy. At that same kindergarten, there were two rooms devoted to teaching children to hate Americans. The walls of one were plastered with posters depicting American missionaries torturing boys tied to trees and hooked-nose American soldiers setting wild dogs on Korean girls. A second room housed toy weapons with which children practiced stabbing and attacking the “imperialist aggressors.” It’s shockingly violent stuff for 4- and 5-year-olds, but it works. A few years ago Mr. Kim poured millions of dollars into a museum in the farming town of Sinchon that serves as a mecca of anti-Americanism, a house of horrors with room after room cataloging — in full, bloody, life-size detail — the (largely unsubstantiated) war crimes pinned on the Americans. All spring and summer, students are taken by bus to the museum for field trips intended to scare them into hating and fearing the United States. There is method to the madness. Mr. Kim is using the threat of attack from the United States to enforce a sense of unity among North Koreans. He knows that few things work better to inspire nationalism and patriotism than the threat of invasion. (Mr. Trump’s xenophobic presidential campaign suggests that he recognizes that, too.) This propaganda is especially effective with Koreans, whose cultural identity has been shaped by thousands of years of aggression from outside forces: the Chinese, the Mongols, the Japanese, the Americans. That’s why Korea became known as the Hermit Kingdom. For centuries, long before the Korean Peninsula was divided, guarding against foreign infiltration was a national creed. Now in his mid-30s, Mr. Kim inherited in 2011 the leadership of a people who didn’t know anything about him until three years before he took power, and perhaps were disgruntled by another hereditary succession. To maintain power and promote stability, Mr. Kim and his strategists have worked to obtain the modern equivalent of a hedgehog’s quills — nuclear weapons — and the simple narrative that with this “treasured sword,” and the clever wits of his atomic scientists, Mr. Kim will protect his country from imminent destruction by the “marauding” United States. The regime has used this narrative to justify pouring more than a fifth of its meager national budget into defense at a time when millions of North Koreans go hungry every day, according to the World Food Program. The leadership also uses this David vs. Goliath narrative to explain to North Koreans why they must suffer ever-tightening sanctions that, if enforced, will make their already difficult lives even more onerous. Mr. Trump’s fiery rhetoric mainly serves to advance Kim Jong-un’s agenda by giving him more reason and justification to build nuclear weapons under the guise of protecting his people. This is not to say the North Koreans weren’t thrown off by Mr. Trump’s comments. No previous American president since Harry Truman has returned rhetorical fire with fire quite so enthusiastically, not even George W. Bush when he grouped North Korea in with the “axis of evil” in his 2002 State of the Union speech. And the North Koreans know they would quickly be overwhelmed in a conflict with the United States, which has stationed powerful weaponry in the Pacific and conducted sporadic flyovers of B-52s and B-1 bombers to remind and warn them. But with nuclear weapons, they feel somewhat invincible. North Korea responded to Mr. Trump’s recent threats with a warning that it was devising a plan to fire missiles into waters near Guam, a United States territory with two military bases and 160,000 residents. Whether or not it follows through on that threat, the North will keep test-firing missiles, improving the technology with every launching. The savvy move by Washington would be to find a face-saving way to back down from the escalating rhetoric and to stop giving Kim Jong-un what he wants: propaganda victories and a justification to keep building bombs and missiles. But perhaps Mr. Trump is taking a page out of Mr. Kim’s playbook: He’s drumming up fear and provoking America’s enemies in order to distract from his own problems and establish his reputation as a leader who can defend his people, even if it comes at a cost to global peace and security.” (Jean H. Lee, “What Kim Jong Un Wants,” New York Times, August 13, 2017, p. E-1)
8/14/17:
KCNA: “Respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un inspected the Command of the Strategic Force of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) on August 14. He waved back to enthusiastically cheering service members and posed for a picture with them. He went round historical mementoes and data displayed at the Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism Study Hall. Going round them, he looked back with deep emotion on the great leadership feats of the brilliant commanders of Mt. Paektu, recorded on every page of the history of the KPA Strategic Force displaying its might with the strength unprecedented in the world as a powerful strike service, symbolic of the dignity and power of Korea. Then he listened to General Kim Rak Gyom’s decision on the Strategic Force’s plan for an enveloping fire at Guam at the command post. He examined the plan for a long time and discussed it with the commanding officers in real earnest. He praised the KPA Strategic Force for drawing up a close and careful plan as planned and intended by the Party and examined the preparations for a [fire]power demonstration. After listening to the commander of the Strategic Force that it is waiting for the order of the Party Central Committee after rounding off the preparations for the enveloping fire at Guam, he said with great satisfaction that the spirit of Hwasong artillerymen is very high and he was freshly determined, seeing by himself the combat preparedness and the sky-high spirit of the Hwasong artillerymen of the large combined unit. He said that the U.S. imperialists caught the noose around their necks due to their reckless military confrontation racket, adding that he would watch a little more the foolish and stupid conduct of the Yankees spending a hard time of every minute of their miserable lot. He said that he wants to advise the U.S., which is driving the situation on the Korean peninsula into the touch-and-go situation, running helter-skelter, to take into full account gains and losses with clear head whether the prevailing situation is more unfavorable for any party. In order to defuse the tensions and prevent the dangerous military conflict on the Korean peninsula, it is necessary for the U.S. to make a proper option first and show it through action, as it committed provocations after introducing huge nuclear strategic equipment into the vicinity of the peninsula, he said, adding that the U.S. should stop at once arrogant provocations against the DPRK and unilateral demands and not provoke it any longer. He said that if the Yankees persist in their extremely dangerous reckless actions on the Korean peninsula and in its vicinity, testing the self-restraint of the DPRK, the latter will make an important decision as it already declared, warning the U.S. that it should think reasonably and judge properly not to suffer shame that it is hit by the DPRK again. He said that if the planned fire of power demonstration is carried out as the U.S. is going more reckless, it will be the most delightful historic moment when the Hwasong artillerymen will wring the windpipes of the Yankees and point daggers at their necks, underlining the need to be always ready for launching to go into action anytime once our Party decide. … Accompanying him were KPA Vice Marshal Hwang Pyong So, director of the KPA General Political Bureau, and Kim Jong Sik, vice department director of the C.C., the Workers’ Party of Korea.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Inspects KPA Strategic Force Command,” August 15, 2017)
Carlin: “The North Korean report that Kim Jong Un has said he will wait and see what the United States does before deciding whether or not to order execution of a plan to envelope Guam with four Hwasong-12 missiles signals a decisive break in the action. This is no mixed message. It is exactly how the North moves back from the edge of the cliff. It’s classic, and anyone paying attention could have seen it coming. This is not a question of parsing the precise language Kim used. It’s the act itself that speaks volumes. Put that together with the fact that the regime hadn’t been mobilizing the population for imminent crisis over the preceding four or five days, and you get a familiar North Korean dance move. Didn’t Kim say he was just giving the Americans a little more time? Of course! He’s not going to say “I surrender” or “I’ve decided that launching missiles would be a bad idea.” This way he can project the aura of the one still in control of the situation, of the one who scored the victory, of the one who kept the region from descending into war. He can be seen as the one who has the whip hand. Who is Kim Jong Un? That seemed to be the core question asked many times this past week. But it was the wrong question. There was no way to answer something like that. The real question, the important question, the one that could be answered was: what were the North Koreans doing from August 9-14 while the US was huffing and puffing over Pyongyang’s threat about Guam? The answer, it turns out, was easy: almost nothing. There were rallies in Pyongyang and the provinces. (The two laggards held their rallies yesterday.) There were reports of youths and students rushing to declare their willingness to enlist in the army. But for the rest of the country, the message was that the way to defeat the Americans was: Stay at work! Produce more! In other words, there was no mobilization of the population in preparation for a military confrontation. Even more telling, although Western media were fixated on Guam during this period, North Korean media barely mentioned it after the initial statements appeared announcing the planning. None of the reports on the rallies mentioned Guam. The focus, instead, was on the August 7 DPRK Government statement issued in response to the new UN Security Council sanctions resolution passed just a few days before. What’s next? At this point, having broken the tension, it would not be unusual for Pyongyang to pivot to diplomacy. Kim had already signaled in early July that the North was open to putting the topics that interested the US—the DPRK nuclear and missile programs—“on the table.” In their Wall Street Journal op-ed, Secretaries Tillerson and Mattis underlined Washington’s interest in negotiations. There are still hurdles to jump over and potholes to avoid, but both sides may now be in position to probe to see if they can take a step down that road. Today, in fact, the North Korean foreign ministry put out a two sentence statement denying that the Americans “being detained” were a topic of US-DPRK talks in the New York channel. But what else does that do? It essentially admits in public that the channel is in operation, and that the Americans could become the topic of conversation at some point.” (Robert Carlin, “Kim Jong Un Steps back from the Nuclear Cliff,” 38North, August 15, 2017)
Tillerson and Mattis: “In the past few months, multiple illegal North Korean ballistic-missile and ICBM tests—coupled with the most recent bellicose language from Pyongyang about striking the U.S., Guam, our allies and our interests in the Asia-Pacific region—have escalated tensions between North Korea and America to levels not experienced since the Korean War. In response, the Trump administration, with the support of the international community, is applying diplomatic and economic pressure on North Korea to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and a dismantling of the regime’s ballistic-missile programs. We are replacing the failed policy of “strategic patience,” which expedited the North Korean threat, with a new policy of strategic accountability. The object of our peaceful pressure campaign is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. has no interest in regime change or accelerated reunification of Korea. We do not seek an excuse to garrison U.S. troops north of the Demilitarized Zone. We have no desire to inflict harm on the long-suffering North Korean people, who are distinct from the hostile regime in Pyongyang. Our diplomatic approach is shared by many nations supporting our goals, including China, which has dominant economic leverage over Pyongyang. China is North Korea’s neighbor, sole treaty ally and main commercial partner. Chinese entities are, in one way or another, involved with roughly 90% of North Korean trade. This affords China an unparalleled opportunity to assert its influence with the regime. Recent statements by members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as well as other regional and global voices, have made clear the international community holds one view regarding North Korea’s provocative and dangerous actions: They must stop. Pyongyang must stand down on those actions. China has a strong incentive to pursue the same goals as the U.S. The North Korean regime’s actions and the prospect of nuclear proliferation or conflict threaten the economic, political and military security China has worked to build over decades. North Korea’s behavior further threatens China’s long-term interest in regional peace and stability. If China wishes to play a more active role in securing regional peace and stability—from which all of us, especially China, derive such great benefit—it must make the decision to exercise its decisive diplomatic and economic leverage over North Korea. Our diplomatic approach also proceeds through the United Nations. The Security Council’s recent unanimous vote imposes new sanctions on North Korea and underscores the extent to which the regime has chosen to isolate itself from the international community. This vote, which also had Russia’s support, reflects the international will to confront the North Korean regime’s continuing threat to global security and stability. We urge all nations to honor their commitments to enforce U.N. Security Council sanctions against North Korea and to increase diplomatic, economic and political pressure on the regime, specifically through the abandonment of trade, which finances the development of ballistic and nuclear weapons. The U.S. continues to consolidate international unity on the North Korean issue through increased engagement at the U.N., at regional diplomatic forums, and in capitals around the world. While diplomacy is our preferred means of changing North Korea’s course of action, it is backed by military options. The U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan are strong. But Pyongyang has persistently rebuffed Seoul’s attempts to create conditions whereby peaceful dialogue can occur, and has instead proceeded on its reckless course of threats and provocation. As a result of these dangers, South Korea’s new government is moving forward with the deployment of U.S. Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense against the threat. We commend South Korea’s decision to deploy this purely defensive capability. Installing Thaad launchers on the Korean Peninsula and conducting joint military exercises are defensive preparations against the acute threat of military actions directed against the U.S., our allies and other nations. China’s demand for the U.S. and South Korea not to deploy Thaad is unrealistic. Technically astute Chinese military officers understand the system poses no danger to their homeland. Absent China using its influence to show the world how a great power should act to resolve such a well-defined problem as North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range missile capability, others in the region are obliged to pursue prudent defensive measures to protect their people. China’s Security Council vote was a step in the right direction. The region and world need and expect China to do more. The U.S. is willing to negotiate with Pyongyang. But given the long record of North Korea’s dishonesty in negotiations and repeated violations of international agreements, it is incumbent upon the regime to signal its desire to negotiate in good faith. A sincere indication would be the immediate cessation of its provocative threats, nuclear tests, missile launches and other weapons tests. The U.S. will continue to work with our allies and partners to deepen diplomatic and military cooperation, and to hold nations accountable to their commitments to isolate the regime. That will include rigorous enforcement of sanctions, leaving no North Korean source of revenue untouched. In particular, the U.S. will continue to request Chinese and Russian commitments not to provide the regime with economic lifelines and to persuade it to abandon its dangerous path. As always, we will embrace military preparedness in the defense of our homeland, our citizens and our allies, and in the preservation of stability and security in Northeast Asia. And we will say again here: Any attack will be defeated, and any use of nuclear weapons will be met with an effective and overwhelming response. North Korea now faces a choice. Take a new path toward peace, prosperity and international acceptance, or continue further down the dead alley of belligerence, poverty and isolation. The U.S. will aspire and work for the former, and will remain vigilant against the latter.” (Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, “We’re Holding Pyongyang to Account,” Wall Street Journal, August 14, 2017, p. A-17)
President Moon Jae-in said there cannot be another war on the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean nuclear and missile issues should be resolved peacefully. Moon vowed that the government will make all-out efforts to resolve tension through close cooperation with major allies including the United States. Stressing the top priority of South Korea is maintaining peace, Moon said North Korean issues should be resolved peacefully and that the U.S. government’s position is the same. “A tragic war can never be allowed to break out on the Korean Peninsula again,” Moon said. “I am sure the U.S. will keep itself calm and respond to the current situation responsibly.” Moon added that peace on the peninsula will not be achieved through the use of arms. Moon’s comments were construed as putting the brakes on the North’s young leader and President Trump, as well as some U.S. politicians’ increasingly mentioning various military options including a pre-emptive strike or a war on the peninsula. Later in the day, President Moon held a meeting with Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Gen. Joseph Dunford at Cheong Wa Dae to discuss how to deal with rising tensions and enhance the two countries’ security cooperation. During the meeting, Moon called on the U.S. to play a leading part in resolving North Korea nuclear issues and the crisis facing the peninsula, according to presidential spokesman Park Soo-hyun. Moon also called on the North to come forward for negotiations after stopping its provocations, apparently considering his previous proposals to hold military and Red Cross talks, which the North has not responded to. In response, Gen. Dunford said the U.S. armed forces are putting top priority on supporting Washington’s diplomatic and economic efforts to better deter the Kim regime, according Park. The top U.S. general noted that the armed forces are also preparing for military options if these efforts fail. Park quoted Gen. Dunford as saying that the U.S. will keenly cooperate with South Korea in carrying out any measures; and that the U.S. hopes that the situation will be resolved without a war. At the meeting at Cheong Wa Dae, the general was accompanied by U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Vincent Brooks as well as Marc Knapper, the acting U.S. ambassador to Seoul. From the South Korean government, National Security Office (NSO) head Chung Eui-yong and the deputy commander of the Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), Gen. Kim Byeong-joo, were present. NSO chief Chung earlier canceled his summer vacation plans amid mounting military tension here. Regarding the North’s threats to strike areas around Guam, Gen. Dunford said any military action in response to the North’s possible attack will be made by the U.S. president and in the context of the alliance. “Our job is to make sure our leadership has an option available to them,” he said at a press meeting held at the CFC headquarters in Yongsan after his meeting with Moon. “I believe there are two things we are clear about _ one is our responsibility to defend against attack, and two is our requirement to make sure we have a decisive response in the event of attack.” The general, however, again stressed that Washington’s current policy is focused on diplomatic and economic pressure, and sanctions. “We are seeking a peaceful resolution to the crisis. That is an important message,” he said. Prior to the visit of Gen. Dunford to three Asian countries including Japan and China, the U.S. Department of Defense said in a statement that the visit was to “support Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s diplomatic and economic campaign to deter North Korea.” Dunford visited Japan before coming to South Korea, and then left for China later after wrapping up his two-day trip here. When asked what he will discuss in China, he said he will require Beijing “not only to do what they did at the U.N. Security Council, which was to vote for sanctions, but to enforce those sanctions.” Earlier in the day, Dunford held separate talks with Defense Minister Song Young-moo at the Ministry of National Defense in Seoul. After the meeting with Song, Gen. Dunford also held short talks with his South Korean counterpart, JCS Chairman Gen. Lee Sun-jin. A statement on the U.S. Joint Staff Facebook page said, “The trip highlights our ironclad commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea in the face of North Korea’s provocations and threats.” (Jun Ji-hye, “Moon Stresses Peaceful N.K. Resolution,” Korea Times, August 14, 2017)
North Korea’s success in testing an intercontinental ballistic missile that appears able to reach the United States was made possible by black-market purchases of powerful rocket engines probably from a Ukrainian factory with historical ties to Russia’s missile program, according to an expert analysis published today and classified assessments by American intelligence agencies. The studies may solve the mystery of how North Korea began succeeding so suddenly after a string of fiery missile failures, some of which may have been caused by American sabotage of its supply chains and cyberattacks on its launches. After those failures, the North changed designs and suppliers in the past two years, according to a new study by Michael Elleman, a missile expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Such a degree of aid to North Korea from afar would be notable because President Trump has singled out only China as the North’s main source of economic and technological support. He has never blamed Ukraine or Russia, though his secretary of state, Rex W. Tillerson, made an oblique reference to both China and Russia as the nation’s “principal economic enablers” after the North’s most recent ICBM launch last month. Analysts who studied photographs of the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, inspecting the new rocket motors concluded that they derive from designs that once powered the Soviet Union’s missile fleet. The engines were so powerful that a single missile could hurl 10 thermonuclear warheads between continents. Those engines were linked to only a few former Soviet sites. Government investigators and experts have focused their inquiries on a missile factory in Dnipro, Ukraine, on the edge of the territory where Russia is fighting a low-level war to break off part of Ukraine. During the Cold War, the factory made the deadliest missiles in the Soviet arsenal, including the giant SS-18. It remained one of Russia’s primary producers of missiles even after Ukraine gained independence. But since Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, was removed from power in 2014, the state-owned factory, known as Yuzhmash, has fallen on hard times. The Russians canceled upgrades of their nuclear fleet. The factory is underused, awash in unpaid bills and low morale. Experts believe it is the most likely source of the engines that in July powered the two ICBM tests, which were the first to suggest that North Korea has the range, if not necessarily the accuracy or warhead technology, to threaten American cities. “It’s likely that these engines came from Ukraine — probably illicitly,” Elleman said in an interview. “The big question is how many they have and whether the Ukrainians are helping them now. I’m very worried.” Bolstering his conclusion, he added, was a finding by United Nations investigators that North Korea tried six years ago to steal missile secrets from the Ukrainian complex. Two North Koreans were caught, and a U.N. report said the information they tried to steal was focused on advanced “missile systems, liquid-propellant engines, space craft and missile fuel supply systems.” Investigators now believe that, amid the chaos of post-revolutionary Ukraine, Pyongyang tried again. Elleman’s detailed analysis is public confirmation of what intelligence officials have been saying privately for some time: The new missiles are based on a technology so complex that it would have been impossible for the North Koreans to have switched gears so quickly themselves. They apparently fired up the new engine for the first time in September — meaning that it took only 10 months to go from that basic milestone to firing an ICBM, a short time unless they were able to buy designs, hardware and expertise on the black market. Last month, Yuzhmash denied reports that the factory complex was struggling for survival and selling its technologies abroad, in particular to China. Its website says the company does not, has not and will not participate in “the transfer of potentially dangerous technologies outside Ukraine.” American investigators do not believe that denial, though they say there is no evidence that the government of President Petro O. Poroshenko, who recently visited the White House, had any knowledge or control over what was happening inside the complex. Today, after this story was published, Oleksandr Turchynov, a top national security official in the government of Poroshenko, denied any Ukrainian involvement. “This information is not based on any grounds, provocative by its content, and most likely provoked by Russian secret services to cover their own crimes,” Turchynov said. He said the Ukrainian government views North Korea as “totalitarian, dangerous and unpredictable, and supports all sanctions against this country.” How the Russian-designed engines, called the RD-250, got to North Korea is still a mystery. Elleman was unable to rule out the possibility that a large Russian missile enterprise, Energomash, which has strong ties to the Ukrainian complex, had a role in the transfer of the RD-250 engine technology to North Korea. He said leftover RD-250 engines might also be stored in Russian warehouses. But the fact that the powerful engines did get to North Korea, despite a raft of United Nations sanctions, suggests a broad intelligence failure involving the many nations that monitor Pyongyang. Since President Barack Obama ordered a step-up in sabotage against the North’s missile systems in 2014, American officials have closely monitored their success. They appeared to have won a major victory last fall, when Kim ordered an end to flight tests of the Musudan, an intermediate-range missile that was a focus of the American sabotage effort. But no sooner had Kim ordered a stand-down of that system than the North rolled out engines of a different design. And those tests were more successful. American officials will not say when they caught on to the North’s change of direction. But there is considerable evidence they came to it late. Leon Panetta, the former C.I.A. director, said on CBS’ “Face the Nation” yesterday that the North Korean drive to get workable ICBMs that could be integrated with nuclear weapons moved more quickly than the intelligence community had expected. “The rapid nature of how they’ve been able to come to that capability is something, frankly, that has surprised both the United States and the world,” he said. It is unclear who is responsible for selling the rockets and the design knowledge, and intelligence officials have differing theories about the details. But Elleman makes a strong circumstantial case that would implicate the deteriorating factory complex and its underemployed engineers. “I feel for those guys,” said Elleman, who visited the factory repeatedly a decade ago while working on federal projects to curb weapon threats. “They don’t want to do bad things.” Dnipro has been called the world’s fastest-shrinking city. The sprawling factory, southeast of Kiev and once a dynamo of the Cold War, is having a hard time finding customers. American intelligence officials note that North Korea has exploited the black market in missile technology for decades, and built an infrastructure of universities, design centers and factories of its own. It has also recruited help: In 1992, officials at a Moscow airport stopped a team of missile experts from traveling to Pyongyang. That was only a temporary setback for North Korea. It obtained the design for the R-27, a compact missile made for Soviet submarines, created by the Makeyev Design Bureau, an industrial complex in the Ural Mountains that employed the rogue experts apprehended at the Moscow airport. But the R-27 was complicated, and the design was difficult for the North to copy and fly successfully. Eventually, the North turned to an alternative font of engine secrets — the Yuzhmash plant in Ukraine, as well as its design bureau, Yuzhnoye. The team’s engines were potentially easier to copy because they were designed not for cramped submarines but roomier land-based missiles. That simplified the engineering. Economically, the plant and design bureau faced new headwinds after Russia in early 2014 invaded and annexed Crimea, a part of Ukraine. Relations between the two nations turned icy, and Moscow withdrew plans to have Yuzhmash make new versions of the SS-18 missile. In July 2014, a report for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace warned that such economic upset could put Ukrainian missile and atomic experts “out of work and could expose their crucial know-how to rogue regimes and proliferators.” The first clues that a Ukrainian engine had fallen into North Korean hands came in September when Kim supervised a ground test of a new rocket engine that analysts called the biggest and most powerful to date. Norbert Brügge, a German analyst, reported that photos of the engine firing revealed strong similarities between it and the RD-250, a Yuzhmash model. Alarms rang louder after a second ground firing of the North’s new engine, in March, and its powering of the flight in May of a new intermediate-range missile, the Hwasong-12. It broke the North’s record for missile distance. Its high trajectory, if leveled out, translated into about 2,800 miles, or far enough to fly beyond the American military base at Guam. On June 1, Elleman struck an apprehensive note. He argued that the potent engine clearly hailed from “a different manufacturer than all the other engines that we’ve seen.” Elleman said the North’s diversification into a new line of missile engines was important because it undermined the West’s assumptions about the nation’s missile prowess: “We could be in for surprises.” That is exactly what happened. The first of the North’s two tests in July of a new missile, the Hwasong-14, went a distance sufficient to threaten Alaska, surprising the intelligence community. The second went far enough to reach the West Coast, and perhaps Denver or Chicago. Last week, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists featured a detailed analysis of the new engine, also concluding that it was derived from the RD-250. The finding, the analysts said, “raises new and potentially ominous questions.” The emerging clues suggest not only new threats from North Korea, analysts say, but new dangers of global missile proliferation because the Ukrainian factory remains financially beleaguered. It now makes trolley buses and tractors, while seeking new rocket contracts to help regain some of its past glory. (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Tracing of North Korea to Ukraine Plant,” New York Times, August 14, 2017,
Just over three months in office, South Korea’s president is finding little room to maneuver between old enemy North Korea and increasing combativeness from long-time ally, the United States. North Korea has snubbed offers for talks from President Moon Jae-in, the South’s first liberal leader in a decade. And U.S. President Donald Trump has alarmed Seoul with his warnings that the United States will unleash “fire and fury” if threatened by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Any confrontation between the two will inevitably draw in South Korea, which faces thousands of North Korean troops and artillery guns across the heavily militarized border. With few options at his command, Moon has been encouraging Washington to talk directly to Pyongyang to resolve differences, according to senior officials and advisers to the president. “Dialogue is urgently needed to stop the North from developing its weapons programs further,” said Moon Chung-in, a special adviser to the president on foreign affairs and national security. “But North Korea sees the South as powerless and won’t negotiate with us. They want to have direct talks with the United States,” said Moon, who also holds the post of distinguished professor at Yonsei University in Seoul. Washington is insistent on maximizing economic sanctions and keeping up pressure on the North to stop its pursuit of nuclear weapons. “Moon has been telling Trump that a military option should never be considered, but there is not much we can do when two strong leaders (of North Korea and the United States) are clashing,” said Lee Su-hoon, who headed a group of national security advisers for the president until July. “But no one wants a catastrophic end. Down the road, I expect there will be a compromise and dialogue.” In comments today, President Moon insisted on dialogue to resolve differences with the North, “whatever ups and downs we face.” “I am certain the United States will respond to the current situation calmly and responsibly in a stance that is equal to ours,” he said in opening remarks at a meeting with senior aides. But there seems little likelihood of dialogue at this point. (Ju-min Park and Heekyong Yang, “Between Old Foe and Aggressive Ally, No Honeymoon for South Korea’s Moon,” Reuters, August 14, 2017)
President Moon Jae-in said there cannot be another war on the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean nuclear and missile issues should be resolved peacefully. Moon vowed that the government will make all-out efforts to resolve tension through close cooperation with major allies including the United States. Stressing the top priority of South Korea is maintaining peace, Moon said North Korean issues should be resolved peacefully and that the U.S. government’s position is the same. “A tragic war can never be allowed to break out on the Korean Peninsula again,” Moon said. “I am sure the U.S. will keep itself calm and respond to the current situation responsibly.” Moon added that peace on the peninsula will not be achieved through the use of arms. Moon’s comments were construed as putting the brakes on the North’s young leader and President Trump, as well as some U.S. politicians’ increasingly mentioning various military options including a pre-emptive strike or a war on the peninsula. Later in the day, President Moon held a meeting with Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Gen. Joseph Dunford at Cheong Wa Dae to discuss how to deal with rising tensions and enhance the two countries’ security cooperation. During the meeting, Moon called on the U.S. to play a leading part in resolving North Korea nuclear issues and the crisis facing the peninsula, according to presidential spokesman Park Soo-hyun. Moon also called on the North to come forward for negotiations after stopping its provocations, apparently considering his previous proposals to hold military and Red Cross talks, which the North has not responded to. In response, Gen. Dunford said the U.S. armed forces are putting top priority on supporting Washington’s diplomatic and economic efforts to better deter the Kim regime, according Park. The top U.S. general noted that the armed forces are also preparing for military options if these efforts fail. Park quoted Gen. Dunford as saying that the U.S. will keenly cooperate with South Korea in carrying out any measures; and that the U.S. hopes that the situation will be resolved without a war. At the meeting at Cheong Wa Dae, the general was accompanied by U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Vincent Brooks as well as Marc Knapper, the acting U.S. ambassador to Seoul. From the South Korean government, National Security Office (NSO) head Chung Eui-yong and the deputy commander of the Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), Gen. Kim Byeong-joo, were present. NSO chief Chung earlier canceled his summer vacation plans amid mounting military tension here. Regarding the North’s threats to strike areas around Guam, Gen. Dunford said any military action in response to the North’s possible attack will be made by the U.S. president and in the context of the alliance. “Our job is to make sure our leadership has an option available to them,” he said at a press meeting held at the CFC headquarters in Yongsan after his meeting with Moon. “I believe there are two things we are clear about _ one is our responsibility to defend against attack, and two is our requirement to make sure we have a decisive response in the event of attack.” The general, however, again stressed that Washington’s current policy is focused on diplomatic and economic pressure, and sanctions. “We are seeking a peaceful resolution to the crisis. That is an important message,” he said. Prior to the visit of Gen. Dunford to three Asian countries including Japan and China, the U.S. Department of Defense said in a statement that the visit was to “support Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s diplomatic and economic campaign to deter North Korea.” Dunford visited Japan before coming to South Korea, and then left for China later after wrapping up his two-day trip here. When asked what he will discuss in China, he said he will require Beijing “not only to do what they did at the U.N. Security Council, which was to vote for sanctions, but to enforce those sanctions.” Earlier in the day, Dunford held separate talks with Defense Minister Song Young-moo at the Ministry of National Defense in Seoul. After the meeting with Song, Gen. Dunford also held short talks with his South Korean counterpart, JCS Chairman Gen. Lee Sun-jin. A statement on the U.S. Joint Staff Facebook page said, “The trip highlights our ironclad commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea in the face of North Korea’s provocations and threats.” (Jun Ji-hye, “Moon Stresses Peaceful N.K. Resolution,” Korea Times, August 14, 2017)
President Trump, following days of bellicose threats toward North Korea and jitters about a looming trade war with China, moved on several fronts to ease tensions in East Asia, after making the region a flash point for his administration. As he opened a long-awaited trade action against China, Trump used uncharacteristically restrained language and a multistep bureaucratic process that will likely put off punitive steps against Beijing for months, if not forever. On North Korea, several of the president’s top advisers tried to tamp down fears of a clash after his threat to rain “fire and fury” on the regime there. In Seoul, Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assured President Moon Jae-in of South Korea that military options against North Korea were a last resort. His message was the latest effort to reinforce a sense of calm that was earlier telegraphed by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson. Taken together, the administration’s tempered words underscored the complex reality that Trump faces in Asia: Having explicitly linked China’s cooperation on North Korea with his trade policy toward Beijing, the president is now softening his tough trade rhetoric to enlist China’s support in combating a nuclear threat from Pyongyang. Trump campaigned against China as a relentless thief of American jobs, and promised to stand up to Beijing. But today, as he signed a memo authorizing an investigation of China’s theft and forced transfer of technology from American companies, the president mentioned China by name only once, and framed the issue as a broader problem. That all but guarantees that the United States will not take any action against China, at least until after Trump meets President Xi Jinping in Beijing this fall. Trump, a senior official said, warned Xi of the impending trade action in a phone call late on August 11 that was largely devoted to cooperating on the North Korea threat. The White House had deferred the announcement of the trade investigation until this week to secure China’s support for additional sanctions against North Korea at the United Nations Security Council earlier this month. It was only the latest example of Trump pulling back on the trade front to encourage a more constructive Chinese role on North Korea. Chinese officials have historically tried to link disparate issues, like North Korea and American arms sales to Taiwan. Trump’s modulated tone seemed calculated to open a negotiation with China rather than ignite a trade war. “The big issue is, what does Trump do? After you find that China has acted unreasonably, what is the remedy?” said Gary Clyde Hufbauer, a trade expert at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. If the United States pursued China through the World Trade Organization, the case could stretch out through the remainder of the Trump administration. Trump could impose tariffs, but Hufbauer said, “You can be sure that the Chinese will retaliate.” Some senior officials said Trump’s decision to lead with an intellectual property case after weeks of talking about steel amounted to a “head fake” on the Chinese. But while Trump is delivering on one of his core campaign promises, the protection of intellectual property is not an issue that particularly animates his political base. Today, before Trump’s announcement, the official China Daily newspaper warned that his investigation would poison relations between the two countries. “Given Trump’s transactional approach to foreign affairs,” the paper said, “it is impossible to look at the matter without taking into account his increasing disappointment at what he deems as China’s failure to bring into line the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” Far from giving him leverage, however, experts said Trump’s linkage of trade and security was binding his hands. “It implies that China’s action on North Korea is a gift to the United States, and not that these actions are in China’s own interests,” said Evan S. Medeiros, a former top China adviser to President Barack Obama. “It is a wrong assumption, and it plays into China’s own strategy.” On the diplomatic front, administration officials fanned out in an attempt to lower the temperature following Trump’s remarks last week. “The United States military’s priority is to support our government’s efforts to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through diplomatic and economic pressure,” General Dunford was quoted as saying in a statement released by Moon’s office. He was echoing a point made by Mattis and Tillerson in an opinion column posted yesterday by The Wall Street Journal. “The U.S. has no interest in regime change or accelerated reunification of Korea,” they wrote. “We have no desire to inflict harm on the long-suffering North Korean people, who are distinct from the hostile regime in Pyongyang.” Today, Mattis sent a message of deterrence. When asked about North Korea’s threat to fire ballistic missiles into the waters off Guam, an American territory in the Pacific, he said, “If they fire at the United States, it could escalate into war very quickly.” Kim has been told that his military is ready to launch ballistic missiles toward Guam, but he said he would wait before telling them to proceed, the North’s state-run news media reported on August 15. (Mark Landler, “After Promising ‘Fire and Fury,’ a Push to Assuage Fears,” New York Times, August 15, 2017,
8/14?/17:
Woodward: “[National Economic Council Director] Gary Cohn and Robert Lighthizer, the U.S. trade representative, had worked for months to get Trump to agree to authorize an intellectusal property inquiry into China’s trade practices. …Trump had finally agreed to sign a memo and announce in a speech a year-long investigation of China’s intellectual property violations. …During an August meeting in the residence with his economic and trade teams, Trump balked. He had just talked to President Xi. He didn’t want to target China. ’We’re going to need their help for North Korea,’ he said. ‘It’s not just one U.N. Security Council vote. We’ll need help on an ongoing basis. I want to take all references to China out of the speech.’ He did not want to jeopardize his great relations with President Xi.” (Woodward, Fear, pp. 272-73)
8/15/17:
Respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un inspected the Command of the Strategic Force of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) on August 14. He waved back to enthusiastically cheering service members and posed for a picture with them. He went round historical mementoes and data displayed at the Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism Study Hall. Looking round them, he recalled with deep emotion the great leadership feats of the brilliant commanders of Mt Paektu, recorded on every page of the history of the KPA Strategic Force displaying its might with the strength unprecedented in the world as a powerful strike service, symbolic of the dignity and power of Korea. Then he listened to General Kim Rak Gyom’s decision on the Strategic Force’s plan for an enveloping fire at Guam at the command post. He examined the plan for a long time and discussed it with the commanding officers in real earnest. He praised the KPA Strategic Force for having drawn up a close and careful plan as intended by the Party and examined the firing preparations for power demonstration. Being told by the commander of the Strategic Force that it is waiting for the order of the Party Central Committee after rounding off the preparations for the enveloping fire at Guam, he said with great satisfaction that the spirit of Hwasong artillerymen is very high and he was freshly determined, seeing by himself the combat preparedness and the sky-high spirit of the Hwasong artillerymen of the large combined unit. He said that the U.S. imperialists put their own necks into the noose through their reckless military confrontation racket, adding that he would watch a little longer the conduct of the foolish and stupid Yankees spending a hard time of every minute for their miserable lot. He said that he wants to advise the U.S., which is running helter-skelter to driving the situation on the Korean peninsula into the worst brink of explosion, to take into full account the gains and losses with clear head, whether the present situation is more unfavorable for which side. In order to defuse the tensions and prevent the dangerous military conflict on the Korean peninsula, it is necessary for the U.S. to make a proper option first and show it in action, as it deployed huge nuclear strategic equipment around the peninsula to provoke the DPRK, he said, adding: The U.S. should stop at once its arrogant provocation and unilateral pressure on the DPRK and provoke the latter no longer. He said that if the Yankees persist in their extremely dangerous actions around the Korean peninsula, testing the self-restraint of the DPRK, the latter will make a crucial decision as it had already declared, warning the U.S. that it should think reasonably and judge properly so as not to suffer another shame by the DPRK under the eyes of the world. If the planned fire of power demonstration is carried out due to the U.S. rashness going beyond the limit line, this will be the most delightful historic moment when our Hwasong artillerymen wring the windpipes of the Yankees and point daggers at their necks, he said, underlining the need to always stand on fire readiness for going into action once our Party decides. Then the Supreme Leader went round a military training school and a gymnasium and called for firmly establishing Juche in education and steadily improving the quality of military training to prepare all the Hwasong artillerymen of the large combined unit to be fighters good at the campaign of brains, well versed in the modern military science and technology, the enemy’s changed ways of war and Korean-style war methods against them. He stressed the need to establish a system of reeducating commanding officers and technical personnel of the Strategic Force in line with the modernization and upgrading of ballistic rockets. Going round the supply service facilities of the large combined unit, including a dining hall of sub-unit, he showed paternal care for servicepersons’ life. He enjoyed a performance given by an art squad of the large combined unit at the soldiers’ hall. Expressing satisfaction over the good performance which vividly represented the operational mission and features of the Strategic Force and the desire, thoughts and feelings of the Hwasong artillerymen, he gave precious teachings for the art squad’s performance activities. The Strategic Force has a very important position and duty to play in carrying out the strategic plans of the Workers’ Party of Korea, he said, calling on the Strategic Force to firmly establish the monolithic leadership system, the monolithic command and management system of the Supreme Commander over the nuclear force and further complete the Juche-oriented rocket strike methods. Saying with deep trust that it is reassuring to have the KPA Strategic Force, reliable treasured sword guaranteeing the everlasting future of the country and nation, he expressed expectation and belief that all the officers and men of the Strategic Force would bring about a fresh turn in rounding off the combat preparedness, well aware of the important mission they have assumed before the Party, the country and the people. With his deep trust, the officers and men of the KPA Strategic Force hardened their resolve to win the final victory in the standoff with the U.S. by scorching with super strong strikes the targets in south Korea, Japan, operational area in the Pacific and the U.S. mainland, flying the sacred red flags of the Party and flags of the Supreme Commander at every matchless launching pad once he gives an order. Accompanying him were KPA Vice Marshal Hwang Pyong So, director of the KPA General Political Bureau, and Kim Jong Sik, vice department director of the C.C., Workers’ Party of Korea. (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Inspects KPA Strategic Force,” August 15, 2017)
“There’s news,” Pak [Song-il, Foreign Ministry’s Institute for American Studies] said. The broadcast showed photographs of Kim Jong Un in a dark pin-striped suit, surrounded by military men in uniform. The announcer reported that the missile unit had been tasked with preparing to strike the Pacific Ocean near Guam. Another photograph showed Kim beside a screen bearing a satellite image of Andersen Air Force Base, in Guam. The announcer quoted Kim as saying that he “would watch a little more of the foolish and stupid conduct of the Yankees” before making his final decision to launch. The segment ended with orchestral music over a video montage of missiles soaring from the launch pad, rockets blazing out of their launchers, and soldiers cheering as fighter jets screamed overhead. I glanced around the room and noticed that the other diners were engrossed in lunch. I was confused. “So is he going to launch them or not?” I asked. “I don’t know,” Pak said. “It depends on whether the United States sends another nuclear asset, like a B-1B, over the Korean Peninsula.” “Does the U.S. know that’s the determining factor?” I asked. “We haven’t told them! But they should know, because we said they should not send any further ‘nuclear provocations.’ ” (Evan Osnos, “The Risk of Nuclear War with North Korea,” The New Yorker, September 18, 2017, p. 46)
With his public alarmed by President Trump’s recent threats to North Korea, President Moon Jae-in of South Korea issued an unusually blunt rebuke to the United States, warning that any unilateral military action against the North over its nuclear weapons program would be intolerable. “No one should be allowed to decide on a military action on the Korean Peninsula without South Korean agreement,” Moon said in a nationally televised speech. As a candidate for the presidency, Moon, a liberal who took office in May, said he would “say no to the Americans” if necessary. But he has aligned South Korea more closely with its military ally than many had expected. Though he suspended the deployment of a United States missile defense system opposed by China, he reversed that decision last month after North Korea tested two intercontinental ballistic missiles. But President Trump’s threat to bring “fire and fury” to North Korea, along with other statements from American officials about the possibility of war, has unnerved many South Koreans and put pressure on Moon to live up to his campaign promise. “Our government will do everything it can to prevent war from breaking out,” he said in his speech. Moon’s pushback was the latest indication that Trump’s unorthodox approach to foreign policy, coupled with Pyongyang’s rapid progress toward its goal of nuclear missiles that can reach the mainland United States, was putting new strain on the longstanding alliance. And it underscored how Trump’s volatile language is sowing division with an ally whose help would be vital to the success of any American military campaign on the divided peninsula. ”The Americans had always been an ally who would prevent, not start, war on the Korean Peninsula,” said Kim Ji-woon, a college student attending a rally yesterday in central Seoul that featured a large banner reading: “Trump, shut up!” “With his trash war talk, Trump makes me wonder what’s the use of the alliance.” Moon has been careful not to do anything that his conservative enemies could use to accuse him of undermining the relationship with the United States. But all South Korean leaders have learned that it is political suicide to look too weak to stand up to a bigger power, even if it happens to be the country’s main ally. Many South Koreans have seethed in recent days over what they considered irresponsible statements from American leaders about the possibility of war, particularly since comments by Senator Lindsey Graham were widely reported here. “If thousands die, they’re going to die over there — they’re not going to die here,” Graham, a South Carolina Republican, told NBC’s “Today Show” this month, summing up what he said were the views of Trump. “He’s told me that to my face — and that may be provocative, but not really. When you’re president of the United States, where does your allegiance lie?” Around the same time, Trump’s national security adviser, H.R. McMaster, said the American military options for North Korea included launching a “preventive war.” South Korean newspapers have reacted with dismay. Kim Young-hie, a prominent columnist at JoongAng Ilbo, a conservative mass-circulation daily, called Mr. Trump “a dangerous president who doesn’t understand the basic concept of war.” “It is shameless for someone to openly say that he does not care if Korea is destroyed and that hundreds of thousands of Koreans might die in military action aimed at defending the U.S. mainland,” he wrote last week. Members of Moon’s governing Democratic Party have also been critical, including its chairwoman, Choo Mi-ae, who accused “high-ranking American officials” of worsening the situation with their “impromptu and not carefully thought-out messages.” Moon has faced pressure from the conservative opposition as well. The Korea Liberty Party called him an “invisible man” for failing to defuse the standoff between Washington and Pyongyang. Trump and Moon have spoken only a handful of times, most recently in an Aug. 6 phone call. Trump has yet to appoint an ambassador to South Korea. South Koreans had chafed at some of Trump’s remarks well before the latest tensions with Pyongyang. As a presidential candidate, Trump repeatedly accused the country of not contributing enough to the American military presence. In April, he caused offense by saying that Korea “used to be a part of China.” His policy toward North Korea has been baffling to many in the region. “We are very much confused,” Moon Jung-in, a special policy adviser to President Moon, told ABC News on Sunday. “Therefore, we think that now the American government has moved from strategic patience” to “strategic confusion.” In his speech today, President Moon repeated his argument that sanctions and pressure alone would not deter North Korea from its nuclear pursuits, but he said war should not be an option. “The purpose of strong sanctions and pressure against North Korea is to bring it to the negotiating table, not to raise military tensions,” he said. Analysts expect North Korea to conduct more missile tests after the United States and South Korea begin annual joint military exercises on August 21. The North regards those drills as rehearsals for invasion. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea’s President Bluntly Warns U.S. against Striking North,” New York Times, August 15, 2017)
In a 30-minute telephone talk this morning, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Donald Trump confirmed their cooperation to deal with a possible North Korean missile launch that might travel over Japan toward waters off Guam. Abe told reporters at the Prime Minister’s Office, “We’ve agreed it is most important to prevent North Korea from going through with launching missiles.” Abe added: “To be prepared for every possible situation, we’ll make utmost efforts to ensure the safety of the public by establishing advanced monitoring and missile defense systems under the solid Japan-U.S. alliance.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Abe, Trump Agree to Prevent N. Korea’s Missile Launches,” August 15, 2017)
You might think from recent press accounts that Steve Bannon is on the ropes and therefore behaving prudently. In the aftermath of events in Charlottesville, he is widely blamed for his boss’s continuing indulgence of white supremacists. Allies of National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster hold Bannon responsible for a campaign by Breitbart News, which Bannon once led, to vilify the security chief. Trump’s defense of Bannon, at his press conference yesterday, was tepid. But Bannon was in high spirits when he phoned me this afternoon to discuss the politics of taking a harder line with China, and minced no words describing his efforts to neutralize his rivals at the Departments of Defense, State, and Treasury. “They’re wetting themselves,” he said, proceeding to detail how he would oust some of his opponents at State and Defense. Needless to say, I was a little stunned to get an email from Bannon’s assistant midday, just as all hell was breaking loose once again about Charlottesville, saying that Bannon wished to meet with me. I’d just published a column on how China was profiting from the U.S.-North Korea nuclear brinkmanship, and it included some choice words about Bannon’s boss. “In Kim, Trump has met his match,” I wrote. “The risk of two arrogant fools blundering into a nuclear exchange is more serious than at any time since October 1962.” Bannon began, “It’s a great honor to finally track you down. I’ve followed your writing for years and I think you and I are in the same boat when it comes to China. You absolutely nailed it.” “We’re at economic war with China,” he added. “It’s in all their literature. They’re not shy about saying what they’re doing. One of us is going to be a hegemon in 25 or 30 years and it’s gonna be them if we go down this path. On Korea, they’re just tapping us along. It’s just a sideshow.” Bannon said he might consider a deal in which China got North Korea to freeze its nuclear buildup with verifiable inspections and the United States removed its troops from the peninsula, but such a deal seemed remote. Given that China is not likely to do much more on North Korea, and that the logic of mutually assured destruction was its own source of restraint, Bannon saw no reason not to proceed with tough trade sanctions against China. Contrary to Trump’s threat of fire and fury, Bannon said: “There’s no military solution [to North Korea’s nuclear threats], forget it. Until somebody solves the part of the equation that shows me that ten million people in Seoul don’t die in the first 30 minutes from conventional weapons, I don’t know what you’re talking about, there’s no military solution here, they got us.” Bannon went on to describe his battle inside the administration to take a harder line on China trade, and not to fall into a trap of wishful thinking in which complaints against China’s trade practices now had to take a backseat to the hope that China, as honest broker, would help restrain Kim. “To me,” Bannon said, “the economic war with China is everything. And we have to be maniacally focused on that. If we continue to lose it, we’re five years away, I think, ten years at the most, of hitting an inflection point from which we’ll never be able to recover.” Bannon’s plan of attack includes: a complaint under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act against Chinese coercion of technology transfers from American corporations doing business there, and follow-up complaints against steel and aluminum dumping. “We’re going to run the tables on these guys. We’ve come to the conclusion that they’re in an economic war and they’re crushing us.” But what about his internal adversaries, at the departments of State and Defense, who think the United States can enlist Beijing’s aid on the North Korean standoff, and at Treasury and the National Economic Council who don’t want to mess with the trading system? “Oh, they’re wetting themselves,” he said, explaining that the Section 301 complaint, which was put on hold when the war of threats with North Korea broke out, was shelved only temporarily, and will be revived in three weeks. As for other cabinet departments, Bannon has big plans to marginalize their influence. “I’m changing out people at East Asian Defense; I’m getting hawks in. I’m getting Susan Thornton [acting head of East Asian and Pacific Affairs] out at State.” But can Bannon really win that fight internally? “That’s a fight I fight every day here,” he said. “We’re still fighting. There’s Treasury and [National Economic Council chair] Gary Cohn and Goldman Sachs lobbying.” “We gotta do this. The president’s default position is to do it, but the apparatus is going crazy. Don’t get me wrong. It’s like, every day.” Bannon explained that his strategy is to battle the trade doves inside the administration while building an outside coalition of trade hawks that includes left as well as right. Hence the phone call to me. (Robert Kuttner, “Steve Bannon, Unrepentent,” American Prospect, August 16, 2016)
8/16/17:
Kim Jong Un made a “very wise and well-reasoned decision” to delay any military action against the United States and back away from his threat to strike near the U.S. territory of Guam, President Donald Trump said today. “The alternative would have been both catastrophic and unacceptable!” President Trump wrote on Twitter. (Veronica Stracqualursi, “Trump Praises North Korea’s ‘Wise’ Decision to Back off Guam Threats,” NBC, August 16, 2017)
The United States Forces in Korea said on Wednesday that it has completed a large-scale improvement project of the Patriot systems (PAC-2 and PAC-3) operated by the Dragon Brigade (35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade) and confirmed its operational status. The USFK completed the Patriot modernization project intended to counter sophisticated nuclear and missile threats from North Korea in seven months after its kickoff in early January. The USFK has replaced all components of the Patriot systems, including detection radar, engagement control station and communication and generation installations, deployed and operated in the Gunsan Air Base in North Jeolla Province and the Osan Air Base in Gyeonggi Province with the newest versions. According to the USFK, a touch screen and high-tech computer and communication technology of the systems will drastically streamline the existing detection and interception process for missiles fired by an enemy. “The Dragon Brigade will have the most powerful and advanced defense capability against the lower-tier layer of a ballistic missile among U.S. air defense artillery units. The systems will help soldiers detect the North’s ballistic missiles more precisely and swiftly and destroy,” said the USFK. “This is the largest Patriot modernization project ever conducted outside the U.S. It shows that the U.S. Department of Defense considers nuclear and missile threats from the North very seriously.” (Yun Sang-ho, “USFK Upgrades Patriot Missile Defense System to Counter N. Korea,” Donga Ilbo, August 17, 2017)
James Acton: “The time for denial is over. North Korea has — or will very shortly have — the capability to launch a nuclear weapon against the United States. In the coming decades, historians can assign blame. For now, it is the task of policymakers to ensure that historians will still be around in the future to dissect this failure. While denuclearization should remain the international community’s formal goal, it is no longer a practical policy. A freeze on missile and nuclear testing, which I advocated only seven months ago, has lost value as North Korea’s capabilities have rapidly advanced. Analysts can happily theorize about a disarming preventative strike, but the risks — to both the United States and its allies — are so serious that no sane politician would authorize one. Instead, Washington should try to establish some basic rules of the road with a newly nuclear Pyongyang. The first priority must be to create a plausible off ramp to the current standoff. Contrary to media reporting, North Korea has not backed off its threat to “bracket” Guam with missiles, and could enact its plan during U.S.-South Korea military exercises that begin next week. Before then, North Korea could agree not to conduct missile tests that overfly South Korea or Japan, in return for the United States ending strategic bomber training flights within an agreed distance of North Korean airspace. The restriction on North Korea would preclude it from firing ballistic missiles anywhere near Guam. Given that Kim Jong Un would want to demonstrate to military and party elites, rather than the population at large, that he had won a concession in return, face-saving might not even require the agreement to be made public. Indeed, an unacknowledged agreement (officially shared only with the Japanese, South Korean, Chinese, and Russian governments) might be more palatable to all concerned. More generally, an agreement over missile testing and bomber flights would exemplify how mutually agreed rules could reduce the likelihood of U.S.-North Korea crises in the future. Without an agreement regulating military activities, Pyongyang could interpret U.S. bomber training flights near its borders, especially at a time of heightened tensions, as the opening salvo of a sneak attack to destroy its nuclear forces or “decapitate” its leadership (especially given the inconsistent U.S. position on whether or not it seeks regime change). Meanwhile, North Korean missile tests over Japan or South Korea would be extremely provocative, regardless of the target, and create pressure within the “hub-and-spoke” alliance for a forceful response. Foreclosing these escalation pathways is in the interests of Washington, its allies, and Pyongyang. Another immediate initiative should be a hotline between Washington and Pyongyang. Given how difficult it is to foresee exactly how and why future crises could arise, risk-reduction measures that are useful in a wide range of circumstances would be particularly valuable.” (James Acton, “Some Nuclear Ground Rules for Kim Jong Un,” Foreign Policy, August 16, 2017)
Adam Mount: “US President Donald Trump implied in one of his latest tweets that he forced North Korea to back down over its threat to Guam. It’s a dangerous misperception that could cause the crisis to escalate and Trump to miss what could be the best chance he will have to halt the tests of missiles that can now threaten the American homeland. Anxious about annual US-South Korea military exercises that begin next week, Pyongyang has presented the United States with a clear, coercive choice: reduce tensions or face a highly destabilizing missile strike to the waters around Guam. A close reading of the threat shows it remains very much in effect and deserves a firm and deliberate response. For the last year, US conventional B-1B bombers have flown missions from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam to the Korean Peninsula, most recently on August 8. The next day, North Korea’s state media service, KCNA, declared that the regime’s strategic force was “carefully examining the operational plan for making an enveloping fire at the areas around Guam.” The statement designated a specific missile (the Hwasong-12) and said that B-1B flights had provoked the threat. Two days later, KCNA refined the threat, specifying the launches would be a salvo fire of four missiles and detailing their trajectory over Japan. The Strategic Force would report the option to Kim in mid-August. In short, North Korea presented the United States with a clear choice: stop B-1B flights or risk highly destabilizing missile launches. These statements represent a new model of threat for North Korea: the threat of damaging or menacing missile launches to coerce its enemies into altering their military posture. The United States should expect more threats of this sort from Pyongyang, potentially threatening more dangerous strikes to coerce US allies or demand withdrawal of US forces, a fact that makes it even more important that the United States make a firm and deliberate response quickly. On August 15, KCNA reported that Kim Jong Un was briefed on the plan and released pictures of Kim dutifully inspecting maps in front of a satellite image of Andersen. It was a textbook and skillful display of brinksmanship intended to remind the United States that the threat is still on the table. However, the threat also evolved in a critical way: it was no longer explicitly linked to B-1B flights. The statement has been widely misreported as North Korea unilaterally backing down from its earlier threat or putting it off indefinitely. In fact, Pyongyang took the next step down the path that it had clearly telegraphed and says it is waiting “a little more” for a response: “If the Yankees persist in their extremely dangerous reckless actions… [we] will make an important decision as it already declared…” The threat has not been lifted; they have thrown the ball into our court. Because North Korea has consistently cheated on its agreements, in no circumstance should the United States make an offer that would degrade its deterrent capabilities. For example, the United States should not offer to halt upcoming military exercises summarily but—provided Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, commander of US Forces Korea, can certify that military readiness could be maintained—we might offer to modify the scope, scale, and location of US exercises, including the largely symbolic B-1B flights. If this is successful—and the test freeze holds—the next step would be to build out to other areas of conventional arms control to decrease the possibilities for escalation along the land and naval borders that separate the two Koreas. The chance of talks remains low. Trump administration officials have repeatedly denigrated the Iran nuclear deal; any talks with North Korea would be even more grueling, any agreement modest and prone to failure. Though Secretaries James Mattis and Rex Tillerson support negotiations, their insistence that North Korea indicate its good faith through “immediate cessation of its provocative threats, nuclear tests, missile launches, and other weapons tests” may in practice prevent talks. Yet (intentionally or not) North Korea has not tested a missile since it crossed the critical ICBM threshold three weeks ago. The United States (intentionally or not) has not flown a B-1B to the peninsula since the Guam threat was first issued. There is also significant risk that a White House distracted by domestic crisis, that has little experience with diplomacy, and that has walled itself off from the State Department rank-and-file, never understood the nature of the threat to Guam or that there was an opening for restraint. If the United States does not respond by the start of exercises next week, North Korea will likely take it as a sign that their threat was deliberately defied, and Kim could decide to order the launch. This is precisely the kind of miscalculation and miscommunication that history tells us can lead to a war nobody wants. This is the best opportunity the United States has had to restrict North Korea’s missile program in more than a decade. It is very possibly the Trump administration’s only chance. If the United States fails to seize it, the missiles will continue to fly. Without a negotiated constraint, the threatened launches toward Guam may or may not occur—but North Korea will certainly continue to perfect its new ICBM.” (Adam Mount, “North Korea Gives U.S. a Clear Choice: Restraint or Missile Launch,” CNN, August 16, 2017)
Twice a year, American and South Korean troops get together for large-scale war games to prepare for a possible attack by North Korea. And year after year, the North condemns the joint exercises as a rehearsal for an invasion and demands that they be called off. Now, with President Trump and North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, recently trading threats of nuclear war, another round of the biannual drills is set to begin August 21 in South Korea. They are the first to be conducted since North Korea test-fired missiles that appear capable of hitting the United States, and some are asking whether they might be used as a bargaining chip to persuade the North to freeze its nuclear program. The United States and South Korea describe the exercises as defensive in nature. North Korea, on the other hand, views them as much more threatening, particularly components that include plans for assassinations of the country’s leadership in the event of an outbreak of war. Last weekend, the North said the exercises were “kicking up war zeal.” Two years ago, the North proposed a temporary moratorium on nuclear tests if Washington canceled the joint biannual military exercises. The exercises starting on August 21are known as Ulchi-Freedom Guardian and consist mainly of computer simulations carried out in a large bunker in mountains south of Seoul. Much larger war games in the spring usually involve live-fire training and tank movements as well as drills with ships and aircraft. China has also recently suggested a similar two-sided freeze, although the United States has so far refused. In a statement released yesterday by North Korea’s state media, Kim Jong-un, the country’s leader, said the country would wait before carrying out its threat to launch ballistic missiles into the waters off the American territory of Guam. But in order for the United States to prevent “dangerous military conflict on the Korean Peninsula,” Kim added, it needed to “show it in action.” That language is vague enough to encompass a wide range of American behavior. But the military exercises are a continuing flash point, said Adam Mount, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress in Washington, and curtailing them could be an important gesture that could coax North Korea toward dialogue. “There is an opportunity here to put an offer on the table,” Mount said. Even if the United States does not want to suspend or cancel the exercises entirely, he said, “we absolutely should be considering ways to modify their scope.” But using the exercises as leverage for talks is likely to meet resistance from military and political officials. “It would take a pretty extraordinary act of leadership to do something like that,” said Robert Carlin, a retired C.I.A. and State Department analyst of North Korea. “You’re going to take a lot of flak from a lot of people.” Carlin, who agrees with proposals to scale back the exercises, said many policy makers would regard any concessions on the annual drills as rewarding North Korea’s bad behavior. “You have a huge crowd saying, ‘You’ve given in to this dictator and he will take advantage of us.’” Heather Nauert, spokeswoman for the State Department, said at a briefing on Tuesday that there was “no moral equivalency” between joint military maneuvers and the North’s missile tests, adding that there would be no change in the exercises. The August exercises typically involve around 30,000 American soldiers and about 56,000 South Korean troops. The numbers swell to a total of about 530,000 because government officials and civilians also take part in some of the exercises. In the spring, about 300,000 South Korean soldiers participate, along with about 17,000 American troops. “Anyone who wants to cancel exercises has to realize that we make ourselves weaker and vulnerable,” said David Maxwell, associate director for the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University and a veteran of five tours in South Korea with the United States Army. Maxwell said the United States and South Korea had previously agreed to cancel military maneuvers, known as Team Spirit, in the early 1990s, in exchange for North Korea allowing international inspections of its secret nuclear installations. But the North quickly reneged and continued to develop its nuclear program. “I think it is a fool’s errand to think that our postponing or canceling exercises will cause a positive reaction from the North,” Maxwell said. With the United Nations Security Council adopting punishing new sanctions on North Korea earlier this month, some analysts said those measures should be allowed to work first. “If we concede our military drills as an incentive to North Korea, North Korea will see that as a weakness of South Korea and the United States,” said Shin Beom-chul, a professor of national security at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy in Seoul and a former defense ministry adviser who has participated in the exercises. “To bring North Korea back to the table, we need pressure and to bring problems to Kim Jong-un.” But with tensions so high on the peninsula, some analysts say that rigid thinking could lead to miscommunication or military escalation.The worry, analysts say, is that if the exercises proceed as usual — and if the United States decides to add other maneuvers like flying B-1B bombers over the Korean Peninsula or bringing aircraft carriers into nearby waters — the North may revive its plan to launch missiles near Guam or conduct some other act of aggression. In November 2010, North Korea shelled the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, killing two soldiers, after the South fired test shots during a military drill. If the North were to react to the joint exercises between South Korea and the United States in a similar way, the violence could spiral out of control. “I simply want somebody to help cool the temperature,” said Katharine H.S. Moon, a professor of political science and Asian studies at Wellesley College, “to buy time for the U.S. and North Korea to cool off and eventually figure out how to talk, what to talk about, when to talk about it and for what end.” Even if the two sides could agree to some kind of temporary suspension of the exercises to open the way to talks, said Lee Jong-won, professor of East Asian international relations at Waseda University in Tokyo, “that will be only the beginning of very long and tough negotiations, because the positions of the two are very far apart.” The question is how to get either side to agree to any kind of concession before talks take place. “It’s hard to go to a quid pro quo when we’ve not had any form of negotiations to build any sense of trust in the two parties,” said Col. William R. McKinney, a retired Army officer and adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies who had extensive experience on the Korean Peninsula during his military career. But some analysts worry that the longer the United States waits to engage in talks, the more tensions will rise. If talks do not happen, said John Delury, associate professor of Chinese studies at Yonsei University in Seoul, “then the risks of a match falling on the kindling is very real on the Korean Peninsula.” (Motoko Rich, Looming War Games in South Korea Could Be Bargaining Chip,” New York Times,” August 17, 2017,
U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned that tensions on the Korean peninsula are at their highest level in decades and said it’s important “to dial down the rhetoric and to dial up diplomacy.” Guterres warned that “as tensions rise, so does the risk of misunderstanding, miscalculation or escalation.” “The solution to this crisis must be political,” he added. “The potential consequences of military action are too horrific to even contemplate.” Guterres said the recently adopted U.N. Security Council resolution imposing the toughest sanctions yet on North Korea also represents “an opportunity for diplomatic engagement and renewed dialogue to solve this crisis.” The secretary-general said there are “many possible avenues for this dialogue” including bilateral talks and reviving the six-party negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear program that have been stalled since 2009 when Pyongyang pulled out.
Guterres said that on Tuesday he told representatives of the countries in the six-party talks — North Korea, South Korea, the United States, Russia, China and Japan — that he “will remain in close contact with all concerned parties and stand ready to assist in any way.” He also said the international community must send a clear message to North Korea’s leadership to fully comply with its international obligations, reopen communication channels and deescalate the situation. The U.N. chief said he supports South Korea’s call on North Korea “to engage in a credible and meaningful dialogue,” adding, “This includes through confidence-building measures to defuse tension and to enable steps aimed at the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.” (Edith M. Lederer, “U.N. Chief: It’s Time for Diplomacy on Tense Korean Peninsula,” Associated Press, August 16, 2016)
The United States has agreed not to take any military action against North Korea without first getting South Korea’s approval, President Moon Jae-in said as he marked 100 days in office. Backing up the president’s assertion, Gen. Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in Beijing that there was “no question” that South Korea would be consulted before any possible military action was taken on the Korean Peninsula. “South Korea is an ally and everything we do in the region is in the context of our alliance,” Dunford told reporters traveling with him on a trip that has taken him to Seoul and then to Beijing, where he met with President Xi Jinping. Dunford will later travel to Tokyo. A strike on North Korea would likely cause Pyongyang to unleash conventional artillery at Seoul, just over the border. Ten million people live in the South Korean capital but as many as 25 million people — half the population — live in the greater Seoul region and within North Korean artillery range. Although the U.S. and South Korean militaries would respond quickly, the initial volleys could cause significant damage and panic. Moon, the liberal president elected in May, ruled out the prospect of another war on the Korean Peninsula, even as he warned Pyongyang that it was rapidly approaching a “red line” with its missile program. “I would define the red line as completing the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile and being able to weaponized it with a nuclear warhead,” Moon said. “In that respect, North Korea is nearing the red line.” The U.S. Embassy in Seoul had no immediate response, instead referring requests for comment to the White House. “We can’t afford to lose all that we’ve built from the ashes of the Korean War. I will prevent another war at all cost,” Moon said at the presidential Blue House, which lies just 30 miles south of the Demilitarized Zone that separates the two Koreas. Analysts said that, for all the recent bluster, there seemed to be little dispute that military action would be catastrophic. “It struck me that Steve Bannon said more or less the same thing, but in more colorful language,” said Christopher Green, senior adviser on the Korean Peninsula at the International Crisis Group. Bannon, Trump’s chief strategic, was quoted Wednesday as saying that “there’s no military solution” to the North Korean problem. “Until somebody solves the part of the equation that shows me that 10 million people in Seoul don’t die in the first 30 minutes from conventional weapons … there’s no military solution here, they got us,” Bannon said in an interview with American Prospect magazine. His words echo statements by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, both of whom have spoken about the problems involved in any military action on the Korean Peninsula. “So behind the scenes, there seems to be a fair amount of consensus,” Green said. In Beijing, Gen. Dunford agreed that a military solution to the North Korean problem “absolutely horrific.” Fan Changlong, a vice chairman of China’s powerful Central Military Commission, told his American counterpart that military means should not be an option in solving the Korean Peninsula issues. “China insists that consultation through dialogue is the only effective way to solve the problems on the peninsula, and military means cannot be an option,” Fan said when meeting with Dunford. “At the moment, all parties concerned should maintain restraint, and avoid words and actions that would intensify the tension of the situation on the Korean Peninsula.” Still, Dunford said that Trump had told American military leaders “to develop credible viable military options and that’s exactly what we’re doing.” Kim appeared to back away from action this week, with state media reporting that he would “watch a little longer” before deciding whether to go ahead with a plan to launch missiles toward the American territory of Guam. Trump tweeted that Kim had “made a very wise and well-reasoned decision.” Still, even amid calls for a combination of diplomacy and pressure to dissuade North Korea, some conservatives in South Korea are calling for the U.S. to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to the southern half of the peninsula. The main South Korean opposition Liberty Korea Party, the reincarnation of the conservative party that had been led by disgraced former president Park Geun-hye, this week added bringing American nuclear weapons back to its party platform. The United States withdrew its nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991, when the two Koreas signed an agreement to make the peninsula nuclear-free. “The joint declaration for a nuclear-free peninsula has already been scrapped by the North, and I believe it has become virtually meaningless for us to hold fast to it,” Chung Woo-taik, the conservative party’s floor leader, said during its meeting yesterday. Amid the current tensions, these calls have been gaining ground. A survey conducted by polling company Embrain this week found that two-thirds of respondents wanted South Korea to have tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered submarines. “The time is ripe for us to hold in-depth discussions over the redeployment of the U.S. military’s tactical nukes to cope with the dangers of the North’s nuclear and missile programs and deter any conflict on the Korean Peninsula,” Chung said, according to the Yonhap News Agency. However, analysts say the idea has little chance of becoming reality as long as Moon’s liberal government is in power. (Anna Fifield, “No Military Strike on North Korea without My Permission, Says South’s President,” Washington Post, August 17, 2017)
North Korea will be crossing a “red line” if it builds intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, President Moon Jae-in said, warning that the regime is “approaching” that very threshold. “I think the red line is when North Korea completes intercontinental ballistic missiles and weaponizes them with nuclear warheads,” Moon said. “And the North is nearing that red line.” But he said there will not be war on the Korean Peninsula, stressing that the United States has promised to seek the South’s consent before taking any military action against the North.
Moon addressed a wide range of issues including the latest security crisis in a press conference marking his 100th day in office. Moon said the North will face tougher sanctions if it stages another provocation. “And the North won’t be able to endure it,” he said, “I want to warn the North that it must stop this dangerous brinkmanship.” But he assured the public there will not be another war on the peninsula. “I will stop a war at all costs,” he said. “And it is the international community’s agreement that the North Korean issue must be resolved peacefully in the end.” The latest sanctions on the North are meant to prevent a war, Moon said, explaining that they are intended to force the North to negotiate. “Furthermore, only South Korea can decide a military action on the Korean Peninsula,” Moon said. “Without our consent, no one can decide to take a military action. The United States and President Trump have promised to consult with us and seek our consent for all options they will take against the North. This is a firm agreement between South Korea and the United States, and I want the people to trust my word that there will be no war.” He said the U.S. is entitled to take measures if the North acts aggressively toward it, but the South’s permission is necessary for military action on the peninsula. “Even if the United States takes a military action outside the peninsula, I believe the United States will still consult with us in advance if it will escalate inter-Korean tensions. I believe that is the spirit of the Korea-U.S. alliance.” Moon also dismissed concerns that Trump will follow through with his threats to the North. “I don’t think they were made with an absolute intention for a military action,” Moon said. “I want to assure that Seoul and Washington are having enough communication and agreement on this.” Moon admitted his offers for inter-Korean talks were all snubbed by Pyongyang. But he expressed a reluctance to send a special envoy to achieve some kind of breakthrough. “To have talks, we need the right condition and a guarantee that the talks will produce a good outcome. At the least the North must stop additional provocations to create the conditions for talks,” he said. “If the conditions for talks are created and if it will be helpful to improve inter-Korean relations and resolve the nuclear crisis, then I will consider sending a special envoy.” Moon was questioned by a Japanese journalist about his position on relations with Japan, particularly the ongoing efforts to address Japan’s wartime sexual slavery and conscription of Korean laborers. Rejecting Japan’s position that the comfort women issue was settled by the Korea-Japan normalization treaty in 1965, Moon said it was never addressed at the time. “It was an issue that we did not know back then,” he said. “The comfort women issue was made public and became a social issue far after the treaty. So it is wrong to say that the treaty settled the issue.” He also said the Foreign Ministry is reviewing the legitimacy of the controversial 2015 agreement between Seoul and Tokyo to settle the comfort women issue, hinting at a possible annulment. The deal was concluded by the governments of now-impeached President Park Geun-hye and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in December 2015. Moon has repeatedly expressed his own doubts about that arrangement. “A Foreign Ministry task force is investigating the process of how the two sides reached agreement and evaluating its contents,” he said. “After the review is over, the ministry will make a decision on what to do with it.” He said Koreans subjected to forced labor during World War II and colonial times have not been fully compensated by the 1965 treaty. “The agreement between the two governments cannot infringe upon individual victim’s right,” he said. He cited Constitutional Court and Supreme Court decisions that the forced laborers have valid rights to seek compensation from Japanese companies through civil suits (Ser Myo-ja, “Moon Sets a ‘Red Line’ for North,” JoongAng Ilbo, August 18, 2017)
When Kim Yong-nam, North Korea’s ceremonial leader, attended the Iranian presidential inauguration this month, he flew via Moscow, even though a flight via Beijing would have been much more convenient. To some observers, the choice of stopover is emblematic of a North Korean regime that seems increasingly estranged from its Chinese ally and more reliant on longstanding ties with Russia. Pyongyang’s shift of attention also creates a potential opening that U.S. diplomats are keen to explore as they search for ways to curb North Korea’s fast-developing nuclear missile program. “The North Koreans are offended with China, and many of their political contacts are either frozen or seriously narrowed,” said Valeriy Sukhinin, Russia’s former ambassador to Pyongyang. Some Western observers believe that insuide North Korea, contacts between Pyongyang officials and Russian diplomats now surpass those with China. Even though relkations between the U.S. and Russia are poor, Washington has begun to look to Moscow to hold sway in Pyongyang. “You can see the U.S. testing Russian access and influence in North Korea,” Said a Western diplomat. In March and April Tillerson was testing Chinese access and influence and that’s being tested now with Russia.” This month, Tillerson spoke of China and Russia in the same breath when he said the pair had “very good open channels of communication” with Pyongyang. “I’m hopeful that they can use their influence – and I do think they have influence with the regime – to bring them to a point of dialoge,” he said. Moscow has in recent months tried to appear reasonably neutral as tensions rose. “The U.S. is waiting to see if there’s a positive response from Pyongyang or if it’s dismissive, to see how much leverage Russia Has in terms of bringing them to the table,” said the diplomat. But U.S. expectations are treated with skepticism in Moscow. Russian experts warn that Moscow’s support for the latest U.N. Security Council sanctions on North Korea has undermined what little leverage it had left. More than 17 years ago, Russia relaced the Soviet Union’s treaty with North Korea, under which it was required to come to Pyongyang’s aid in the event of attack, with a friendship treaty without this clause. “North Korea has therefore long lowered it expectations towards us,” Sukhinin said.He added that President Trump’s public expression of thanks to China and Russia for supporting the last U.N. Security Council resolution has been particularly unhelpful. “If this continues, they may distance themselves from us, too. They feel isolated, and their response to that is to ratchet up their nuclear program.”Perhaps most importantly, the Kremlin has a radically different assessment from the U.S. of the standoff over North Korea’s nuclear program. “From the Russian government’s point of view, the disruptive power in the crisis is still the U.S.,” said Alexander Gabuev, an Asia expert at the Carnegie Moscow Center. Russian officials see North Korea’s obsession with developing nuclear weapons as the understandable attempt of a weak, isolated country to protect itself. (Kathrin Hille and Katrina Manson, “U.S. Looks to Russia for North Korea Solution,” Financial Times, August 17, 2017, p. 4)
8/17/17:
A military solution to the North Korean missile threat would be “horrific” but allowing Pyongyang to develop the capability to launch a nuclear attack on the United States is “unimaginable,” the top U.S. military officer said in Beijing. The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Corps Gen. Joseph Dunford, told reporters that President Donald Trump directly has “told us to develop credible viable military options and that’s exactly what we’re doing.” Dunford was responding to questions about Trump’s chief strategist Steve Bannon saying in a new interview that there’s no military solution to the threat posed by North Korea. In Beijing, Dunford said it’s “absolutely horrific if there would be a military solution to this problem, there’s no question about it.” But, he added, “what’s unimaginable is allowing KJU [North Korean leader Kim Jong Un] to develop ballistic missiles with a nuclear warhead that can threaten the United States and continue to threaten the region.” Dunford has met with his Chinese counterpart Fang Fenghui, chief of the People’s Liberation Army’s joint staff department. He also met with Fan Changlong, vice chairman of the ruling Communist Party’s Central Military Commission, and Yang Jiechi, China’s top diplomat. Fan, the Chinese general, told Dunford that Beijing insists military action should be ruled out and “negotiations are the only effective option” in addressing the situation on the Korean Peninsula, according to a statement by China’s defense ministry. Dunford also told reporters in Beijing that “there’s no question” any potential military action in the Korean Peninsula would be taken only in consultation with South Korea. “South Korea is an ally and everything we do in the region is in the context of our alliance,” Dunford said. Dunford told reporters that he has advised the U.S. leadership not to dial back on the exercises with South Korea. “As long as the threat in North Korea exists we need to maintain a high state of readiness to respond to that threat,” he said. (Christopher Bodeen, Hyung-Jin Kim & Kim Tong-Hyung, “U.S.: War Would Be ‘Horrific’ but N. Korea Nukes ‘Unimaginable,’” Associated Press, August 17, 2017)
2+2: “TILLERSON: …Secretary Mattis and I are grateful for the opportunity today to host Foreign Minister Kono and Defense Minister Onodera today. …We agreed to bolster our alliance capabilities to deter and respond to North Korea’s unacceptable behavior and other challenges to regional security. In cooperation with other nations, we will continue to employ diplomatic and economic pressure to convince North Korea to end its illegal nuclear and ballistic missile program. I think, as was clear by all peace-seeking nations and the unanimous UN Security Council resolution that was adopted, as well as very strong statements being made by the ASEAN nations and others throughout the world, we all seek the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea. We again call upon all nations to fully enforce the UN Security Council resolution imposing additional sanctions on the regime in North Korea. We will remain vigilant against the North Korean threats through our military preparedness. The United States will honor our treaty agreements with Japan without reservation, whether in times of peace or in the face of conflict. We will also cooperate to advance trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation with other partners in the region, notably the Republic of Korea, Australia, India, and other southeast Asian countries. …FOREIGN MINISTER KONO: (Via interpreter) My name is Taro Kono, Foreign Minister. … At this first 2+2 conference since the start of the Trump administration we were able to reaffirm the strong commitment of the United States and Japan, which is extremely significant, the strong commitment to the region, which is extremely significant. On North Korea, towards its denuclearization, we agreed we would ramp up effective pressure. We will call on China to take specific measures to make North Korea change its behavior. On the threat of ballistic missiles, as an alliance, we will strengthen our defense posture and capabilities and respond. We have agreed on this point. We have confirmed the importance of cooperation through the security treaty. We shared our concerns regarding the situation surrounding East and South China Sea. We reaffirmed that the Senkaku Islands are within the scope of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and that we would oppose any unilateral behavior attempting to undermine Japan’s administration of the Senkaku Islands. For the peace and stability of East Asia and the East China Sea, we will continue to cooperate with the United States. …At the conference today, we reaffirmed that it is indispensable to steadily promote realignment of the U.S. armed forces in Japan from the perspective of maintaining the deterrence of Japan-U.S. alliance while mitigating the impact on Okinawa and other local regions. In order to avoid Futenma Air Station becoming a permanent facility, it was reaffirmed between the U.S. and Japan that the only solution was relocation to Henoko. I explained that in compliance with the present agreement between Japan and the United States that we would proceed with relocation to Henoko with strong resolve. We will make an all-out effort to realize the complete return of Futenma Air Station. I also pointed out that it is important to make the effort to have the understanding of the local citizens on issues such as that of Kadena Air Base. As a result of the conference today, we were able to elucidate the path that the Japan-U.S. alliance should pursue in a security environment that is becoming increasingly severe. Based on the results obtained today, we want to firmly move forward with measures to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of a Japan-U.S. alliance. Thank you. MATTIS: It’s been an honor for us to host Japan’s defense and foreign ministers here. I don’t think anything better demonstrates that importance that our two nations place on this alliance than our counterparts traveling here so soon after assuming their positions. …Today’s meeting is a reminder that each nation gains security in concert with other nations. The international community is speaking with one voice: North Korea must stop its dangerous actions as we work to maintain security and denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. In light of the serious situation we face, we are accelerating implementation of the 2015 Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and continuing to realign U.S. forces in Japan and Guam. Our militaries are also cooperating in new ways, and you’ve heard several of them mentioned here already. This includes our emerging cooperation in such areas as space and counterspace – cyberspace as well as ballistic missile defense and maritime security. Together, we will deter and, if necessary, defeat any threat. Any initiation of hostilities will be met with an effective and overwhelming response. Our two nations will demonstrate the strength of our alliance by continuing those bilateral activities and by enhancing cooperation with the Republic of Korea. We call on North Korea to choose a better path than one of provocation and threats. Such a path is not in its own best interests nor in the best interest of any other nation. DEFENSE MINISTER ONODERA: (Via interpreter) My name is Onodera. …In light of the threat of North Korea, the four of us confirmed the importance of the unwavering U.S. commitment to extended deterrence. Also, the U.S. forces have been deploying even more assets in the Asia Pacific region and has been showing their commitment visibly to this region. I would like to highly evaluate the efforts of the United States and also, continuing with the United States, I would like to make efforts to enhance the defense capability and defense posture of Japan. … Moving forward, we will accelerate the implementation of a guideline and we will further promote cooperation under the peace and security legislation. We will expand peacetime cooperation such as surveillance and joint training. And furthermore, we will continue to promote cooperation in ballistic missile defense, including acquisition of new assets, and enhanced capability in new domains such as space and cyberspace. Through this, we intend to strengthen further our joint responsive posture. Along with this, in order to strengthen our own defense capability, we intend to review the national defense program and also work on the new midterm defense program, and this was explained in the meeting today. The presence of the U.S. forces in Japan is at the core for the alliance to function as deterrence. At the same time, the operation of U.S. forces should take into consideration the local residents and secure safety. These are indispensable. From this standpoint, we were able to confirm our steady advancement of the realignment of the U.S. forces in order to reduce the burden on the local people, maintaining the deterrence at the same time. The transfer of Futenma Air Station to Henoko would – is the only solution to avoid continuous usage of the Futenma Air Station, so we will steadily proceed with the construction of this transfer. Kadena Air Base issue and the Osprey are matters that I have renewed my request for the consideration to the local residents and securing the safety. In light of today’s outcome, we would – I would devote myself even further for the securing the safety and security of the people in preparation for any situation to occur. MS NAUERT: Elise Labott from CNN for Secretary Tillerson. Q:, I’d love if both Secretary Tillerson and Mattis could answer a question on North Korea. You wrote in your op-ed last week that, obviously, the U.S. prefers a diplomatic solution to the crisis in North Korea, but you said that that diplomatic and economic efforts and pressure were, quote, backed by a credible military option. In recent days, the White House strategist Steve Bannon called the ratcheting – the diplomatic and economic ratcheting up of North – tensions with North Korea a, quote, “sideshow.” He said that there was no military solution and that the real issue is an economic war with China. Does this reflect some kind of new opinion by the administration or was he speaking for himself, and are you afraid that comments like this might dilute the credible military deterrent that is backing your diplomatic and economic efforts? TILLERSON: Well, I don’t really have a comment on what Mr. Bannon’s remarks were in that particular interview. I read those. I think we have been quite clear as to what the policy and the posture towards North Korea is, and I think Secretary Mattis and I in that op-ed wanted to inform – as best we were able to do, inform the American people first, but also inform our important friends and allies as to what our approach is. And our approach has been endorsed by the President. It is reviewed with him periodically in terms of the status of how the approach is working, and it is first and foremost, as you have seen, to undertake a very concerted, deliberate campaign of exerting pressure on the regime in North Korea to an extent that, as best we can tell – and we did study previous attempts over the past two decades. What’s different about this campaign is, I think, the level of international unity around this campaign, the level of cooperation we are getting from China and from others in the region, and the intensity with which we are carrying out the campaign. Obviously, any diplomatic effort in any situation where you have this level of threat that we’re confronted with – a threat of proportions that none of us like to contemplate – has to be backed by a strong military consequence if North Korea chooses wrongly. And I think that is the message that the President has wanted to send to the leadership of North Korea, and it was really in response to this ever-escalating levels of threat and rhetoric that were coming from the regime in Pyongyang. And you’ve heard the words; you’ve seen the videos that they have produced. I think the President just felt it was necessary to remind the regime of what the consequences for them would be if they chose to carry out those threats. We … are prepared militarily, we’re prepared with our allies to respond if that is necessary. That is not our preferred pathway, and that was – that’s been made clear as well. So we continue our full-out efforts, working with partners, working with allies, to bring that pressure on the regime in North Korea with a view that at some point, with a unified international message like we’ve never had before, they will realize the level of isolation they find themselves in and that the future that they will face with that level of isolation is bleak and will only become bleaker if they continue this pathway. So that is – our effort is to cause them to want to engage in talks, but engage in talks with an understanding that these talks will led to a different conclusion than talks of the past. And so we will continue that effort diplomatically first and foremost, but knowing that North Korea sits with a significant capability already within their grasp, I think it is only prudent that they fully understand the consequences should they make a bad choice for themselves and, obviously, there are consequences for others as well. Q: (Via interpreter) My name is Sugimoto from Sankei Shimbun newspaper. My question is addressed to Minister Kono and Secretary Tillerson. The question is the following: It’s related to dialogue and pressure in connection with North Korea. With regard to North Korea, what conditions must be met for you to decide that you can start a dialogue? Could you outline your thinking? And in addition, at today’s conference, to China, which has influence over North Korea, you’ve asked for resolute measures to be taken. However – and there was agreement on this. However, up until now, with regard to China, they have not sufficiently applied the kind of pressure that the United States and Japan are seeking. In the efforts made by Japan and the United States, in what respect is it lacking so that you’re – China is not being fully mobilized, please? KONO: (Via interpreter) The July Japan-U.S.-ROK summit meeting confirmed that North Korea, if it changes its course and if it refrains from intimidating and provocative action and toward denuclearization, if it is ready to come back to serious dialogue, these measures to be taken are important, first and foremost. There’s no sense to dialogue for the sake of dialogue; we agreed on this point between Japan and the United States, or Japan, U.S., and ROK at the center. The international community will continue to apply maximum pressure to North Korea. I think there’s a necessity of doing so. The trade amount with North Korea is such that 90 percent is accounted for by China, and their role is very important. And I agree with that. The new UNSC Resolution 2372, if that’s fully implement – strictly and fully implemented, foreign reserves of North Korea can be decreased to the tune of over $1 billion. China must fully and strictly implement – we would like to encourage China to strictly and fully implement these measures after the 15th. Oil and steel and seafood – China announced that it would restrict importation of this. As we saw an agreement to encourage a specific action by North Korea, we will work on China to take responsible and constructive action, and we would like to continue to seek that China do this. … MATTIS: Certainly. First, in response to CNN’s earlier question, I can just assure you that in close collaboration with our allies, there are strong military consequences if DPRK initiates hostilities. …Q: My name is Shiga from NHK. I have a question to Secretary Mattis and to Minister Onodera on the missile defense. North Korea has plan to launch some ballistic missile to the surrounding waters of Guam and we are seeing tension mount. In the 2+2 joint statement, the – it is incorporated that Japan’s role would be expanded in the alliance. When the missile is launched, what specific actions would the U.S. take? And then for Japan, what would Japan’s role be in the missile defense? Also, what would the U.S. expect Japan to do in the case of the launch of the missile? MATTIS: In the event of a missile launch towards the territory of Japan, Guam, United States, Korea, we would take immediate, specific actions to take it down. ONODERA: (Via interpreter) Yes, simply if – my response would be in the event there’s an attack on Japan, then we will use the asset available to us for the missile defense and we will defend Japan. But should different circumstances occur, then we will solidify the relation that we have with the U.S. with a closer communication, we will defend the country. And that is – we discussed today.” (DoS, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Remarks with Secretray of Defense James Mattis, Japanese Foreign Minister Kono Taro, and Japanese Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori, Washington, August 17, 2017)
Like all North Korean adults, Song Un Pyol wears the faces of leader Kim Jong Un’s father and grandfather pinned neatly to her left lapel, above her heart. But on her right glitters a diamond-and-gold brooch. Song, who manages a state-run supermarket with freezers stocked full of pork and beef and rows of dairy, bakery and canned goods, is part of a paradigm shift within North Korea. Three generations into the Kim family’s ruling dynasty, markets have blossomed and a consumer culture is taking root. From 120 varieties of May Day Stadium-brand ice cream to the widespread use of plastic to pay the bills, it is a change visibly and irreversibly transforming her nation. While Kim has in recent weeks gained attention for his threat to fire missiles near Guam, his trademark two-track policy focuses on the development of both nuclear weapons and the economy. But like nuclear weapons, a more consumer-friendly economy is a risky business. Facing even more international sanctions and a flood of Chinese imports that has generated a huge trade imbalance, the North Korean economy may be in a bubble that could soon burst. Prices for gasoline imports have soared more than 200 percent in less than six months, the AP has found. The wealth brought by new markets could also come with political instability. Kim Jong Un’s slogan of “Parallel Development” — guns and butter, so to speak — reflects an inescapable reality of his era. In the 1990s, reeling from floods, famine and the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea could no longer afford to provide its citizens with basic needs. North Koreans turned to grass roots barter and trade, which has swollen into today’s market economy. Life in rural North Korea is still marked by far more hardship and scarcity than in its urban areas. Yet there is, surprisingly, a bustling, almost booming, feeling in much of the country. North Korean factories are putting a new priority on making more and better daily-life products. Managers, meanwhile, have more freedom to decide what to make, how much to pay workers and how to forge profitable partnerships. Along the roads into virtually every city, street vendors, usually weather-beaten old women, sell fruits, vegetables and other food. In specialty shops, the latest “Pyongyang” model smartphones go for $200, with apps like the popular “Boy General” role-playing game at $2 a pop. Pyongyang’s premier brewery, Taedonggang, just added an eighth kind of beer to its product line. Despite the ever-tightening sanctions, foreign products are still available. A can of Pokka coffee from Japan costs about 80 cents. Purchasing a Mercedes-Benz Viano might require some connections, but is doable — for a $63,000 sticker price. Some blatant manifestations of commercialism remain taboo. There are only three billboards in Pyongyang, a city of about 3 million, and no advertisements on television or in the newspapers. But stores are under instructions to be more consumer-friendly. “At first, we opened the store from 10 in the morning to 6 in the evening,” said Song. “But in 2015, our dear respected Marshal Kim Jong Un made sure that we serve from 10 in the morning to 8 in the evening so one can use late (nights) at any given time, as many working people often used the shop during the evening after work.” Stores commonly offer buy-two-get-one-free type sales. Posters for new medicines or sports drinks can be seen inside shops, and customers can sign up for loyalty cards to earn discounts. “In today’s North Korea there is a growing competition between the domestic companies themselves as they try to attract customers and establish reputable brands,” said Michael Spavor, a Canadian entrepreneur who is one of the only Westerners to have ever met Kim Jong Un. Spavor calls it a “brilliant strategy.” The emphasis on locally produced consumer goods is partially an attempt to counter China’s gravitational pull. China accounts for nearly all of North Korea’s trade and fuel. The North did $2 billion in business with China in the first five months of this year alone. Cutting off trade with China would be catastrophic for Pyongyang. But North Korean leaders, including Kim Jong Un himself, have also shown concern over what might happen if trade continues, or grows even larger. North Korea imports from China far more than it exports, particularly because of its energy needs. That imbalance widened dramatically this year as China cut back on buying from the North. The new U.N. sanctions will further squeeze the North’s export income. The result could be shortages and inflation. Right around April, according to data compiled by the AP, gasoline prices started to soar. Many stations either closed their gates or restricted sales. Georgetown University economist William Brown says the price of rice was also up nearly 20 percent in July from May, and estimates the North is suffering an outflow of $200 million in foreign exchange every month. “This may represent the greatest near-term threat to the regime stability,” Brown said, although he also cautioned that North Korea often finds its way out of economic problems. The goods and trading opportunities spilling across the Chinese border are also spurring the growth of profitable enterprises, which has substantial financial benefits for well-connected individuals and, at least initially, the regime’s elite. However, the same opportunities have widened the gap between the haves, who benefit disproportionately from the new economy, and the far larger number of have-nots living mostly outside the Pyongyang bubble of affluence. The regime is not blind to what is happening. Kang Chol Min, a researcher with the Economics Institute of the Academy of Social Science, said it is trying to produce more, and better, goods to woo consumers back to state-run businesses. “The number of people relying on the state-run commercial networks is increasing,” he told AP Television News. But many outside experts believe state enterprises and farms are too inefficient to provide enough goods and services without the help of markets and private activities. In the end, North Korea’s economic future might lie with stores like the new Miniso. It is an international brand name — found in Hong Kong, Tokyo, Sydney — selling bargain-priced goods such as backpacks and consumer electronics. Its Pyongyang store just opened in April. It is the trendiest shop in town. It is also a joint venture. With China. (Eric Talmadge, “The Real Revolution in North Korea Is Rise of Consumer Culture,” Associated Press, August 18, 2017)
8/18/17:
Woodward: “’Off the record,’ Trump said to his senior staff on Air Force One, though there was no press present on Friday, August 18, ‘I just fired Bannon. Did you see what he said about North Korea and have no military option. Motherfucker!’” (Woodward, Fear, p. 259)
8/19/17:
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan has never seemed to waver in his support for President Trump, seeking out meetings and regularly speaking by telephone. He is one of a few world leaders who rarely criticize or even comment onTrump’s political turmoil at home. That approach, as much as a personal relationship, reflects Japan’s keen awareness that it needs the United States as its primary protector in a volatile region. But amid public proclamations that appear to show little difference between the countries — and as North Korea accelerates its nuclear program — Abe has started to consider a more independent role for Japan in Asia: one that looks beyond the current White House as Japan prepares for an era in which American influence may be waning. Japan is beginning to confront whether it wants to assert itself as a regional leader and carry on the values that have long been the foundation of American policy. “In the long term, Japan has to think about how to preserve liberal order and free trade,” said Hikotani Takako, associate professor of modern Japanese politics and foreign policy at Columbia University. “That’s not just in the interest of Japan, but the region as a whole.” Last month, Japan led trade talks among 11 countries that had negotiated the so-called Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Trump abandoned in his first week in office. Japan is eager to salvage the deal and proceed, even if it means forging ahead without the United States. And in a sign that Japan recognizes it may need to build a stronger relationship with China independent of its American ally, Mr. Abe, in a reversal, said this summer that his country would cooperate with Beijing’s “One Belt, One Road” infrastructure initiative. Japan, for its part, has been investing in infrastructure projects throughout Southeast Asia. Of course, Japan, whose military has long been constrained by its pacifist Constitution, has no intention of weakening its ties with the United States, particularly when it comes to security. In Washington on August 17, Onodera Itsunori, Japan’s defense minister, and Kono Taro, the foreign minister, met with Jim Mattis, the United States defense secretary, and Rex W. Tillerson, the secretary of state, to cement the alliance between the two countries at a time of heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula. A joint statement from the officials confirmed that the United States would offer its full protection, “including U.S. nuclear forces,” to Japan. As the United States and North Korea trade saber-rattling threats and China continues to send ships into disputed waters near Japan, “the reality is Japan just doesn’t have a choice,” said Tobias Harris, a Japan analyst at Teneo Intelligence, a political risk consultancy based in New York. To deal with the standoffs in its backyard, Japan “needs the U.S. engaged.” But even on policy toward North Korea, some in Japan have called for the government to cut a separate path. An editorial in the right-wing Sankei Shimbun yesterday suggested that Japan “get between the two who don’t have any room to accept the other” — referring to the United States and North Korea — and approach Pyongyang to negotiate the return of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea four decades ago. Others wondered whether Trump’s bellicose talk this month, including a promise to bring “fire and fury” to North Korea, could spook Japan into distancing itself from the United States. “There might be a question of how far Japan is willing to put up with Trump’s tough stance against North Korea,” said Kotani Tetsuo, a senior fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs. The Japanese news media fanned such speculation this week after reporting that Kono, the foreign minister, had met with his North Korean counterpart, Ri Yong-ho, at a regional security forum in Manila this month. The news media said that Ri indicated that North Korea was open to talks with Japan, although Japan’s Foreign Ministry declined to confirm those reports. Some analysts suggested Japan should help mediate dialogue between North Korea and the United States. “To keep pressing on North Korea with military power is not effective,” said Yanagisawa Kyoji, a former assistant chief cabinet secretary and the director of a foreign policy think tank in Tokyo. “Japan should be softening the tension between the U.S. and North Korea,” he added. But Japan is unlikely to play a meaningful role in instigating talks, said a person familiar with the thinking of Mr. Abe and his cabinet. Neither North Korea nor China see Tokyo as capable of laying the groundwork for multilateral talks, said the person, who was not authorized to speak publicly. Both assume that it is either Beijing or Washington, not Moscow, Seoul or even Tokyo, that could pursue such a role. For now, Japan plans to increase its ballistic missile defense. The Defense Ministry said that it would request funding to buy an American system known as Aegis Ashore that can intercept missiles mid-flight above the earth’s atmosphere. Critics say Abe should use his close relationship with Trump to nudge him toward dialogue. “I don’t think there is any reason for Japan to break its ties with the United States,” said Koichi Nakano, a political scientist at Sophia University in Tokyo. “But being a real partner should also include being able to give honest — and maybe painful — advice to calm down.” But other analysts said Abe is capable, when he sees it in the interests of Japan, of diverging from the United States. Under the Obama administration, Japan imposed more limited sanctions on Russia than the White House wanted after Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula in 2014. And Japan’s efforts to revive the Trans-Pacific Partnership could also offer a template for some independence. “That’s an example of Prime Minister Abe deftly keeping the right positive tone on the alliance at the highest levels,” said Oba Mintaro, a former State Department diplomat specializing in the Korean Peninsula and now a speechwriter in Washington, “but still managing to do his own thing outside of it.”(Motoko Rich, “Japan Still Seeks U.S. Protection but Quietly Stakes Its Own Path,” New York Times, August 19, 2017,
8/20/17:
South Korea’s military said that Seoul and Washington will stage joint military drills starting next week at a similar level to those last year, despite North Korea’s warning of a “catastrophe” over the exercises. The allies’ Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) exercises will kick off August 21 and run until August 31. North Korea has long denounced the drills as war rehearsal for a northern invasion. It is a computerized command post exercise (CPX) without field maneuvers. “This year’s military drills will be similar in size to those conducted last year,” an official at the Joint Chiefs of Staff told a press briefing. Seoul’s defense ministry said that it has not considered whether to adjust the size of the drills. But this year’s exercises will involve smaller U.S. forces compared to last year. The upcoming exercises are expected to involve about 17,500 U.S. servicemen including around 3,000 forces outside of South Korea. Last year, the drills brought in some 25,000 U.S. soldiers including about 2,500 forces from the U.S. mainland and the U.S. Pacific Command. Some 50,000 South Korean forces will join the drills, according to the ministry. It is not known whether the U.S. would send strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula. (Yonhap, “Allies to Conduct Military Drills Similar to Last Year’s: Military,” August 18, 2017) South Korea has no plans to reduce the scale of an annual joint military exercise with the United States or demand the withdrawal of US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, the man set to become Seoul’s chief of Joint Chiefs of Staff said. “We have never considered such measures,” Air Force Gen. Jeong Kyeong-doo said during a parliamentary hearing when asked about whether the military would seek to scale back the military drill or withdraw the US troops to bring about suspension on North Korea’s nuclear and missile program. In a parliamentary hearing devoted mostly to the military’s response to North Korea’s escalating nuclear and missile threat, the JCS chairman nominee expressed confidence that South Korea would overwhelm the North in the event of war. The former Air Force chief predicted that it would take “less than three days” to seize air supremacy over North Korea, suggesting that the allies’ air forces can neutralize the North Korean Air Force and its densely deployed missile defense system. The general also said although it is “threatening” to see North Korea enhance its asymmetrical capability — such as nuclear and biological weapons — South Korea still has military edge over the North, even without the US military presence on the peninsula. “North Korea has devoted most of their focus on developing nuclear and missile capabilities,” said Jeong. ”I will build the military that brings fear to the enemy and accomplish my mission by uniting our forces.” The general reiterated that South Korea is working on improving its counter-fire capability against North Korea’s long-range artillery units, which Bannon said would kill ten million people in Seoul in the first 30 minutes of the war. “I don’t think there is a big problem (in our capability). We are ready to respond,” said Jeong, when asked about whether he agreed with Bannon’s assessment. “We are doing our best to neutralize North Korea by minimizing our sacrifice.” The lawmakers passed the motion to approve Jeong. If he takes office as scheduled, Jeong will become the second Air Force officer to take the highest active-duty post, which was mostly devoted by the Army generals who have graduated from the elite Army military Academy. When grilled by conservative opposition lawmakers about the Moon Jae-in administration’ security policy, Jeong defended the president’s initiatives, such as his “phased approaches” toward the North’s nuclear crisis and pledge not to redeploy US tactical nuclear weapon. “I think we should stick to the principle of denuclearization (on the Korean Peninsula),” he said when asked about lawmakers from the main opposition Liberty Party of Korea, who vowed to push for redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons to prevent against the North’s military threat. When asked about how to resolve the North Korean nuclear program, Jeong said he agrees with President Moon’s two-phased approach to resolving the standoff, starting with a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear and missile development followed by complete dismantlement. ”I think it is important for us to use dialogue and pressure the resolve the situation diplomatically. We have to do our best to prevent North Korea from declaring (full nuclear armament),” the Air Force general told the lawmakers. (Yeo Jun-suk, “JCS Chief Nominee Says No Plans to Scale back Korea-U.S. Drill,” Korea Herald, August 18, 2017) The Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise, a computer-based military drill, is to kick off with some 50,000 South Korean and 17,500 US troops participating to simulate a war with North Korea. It will last until the end of the month. The number of US forces mobilized this year is markedly lower than last year’s 25,000. This year’s exercise will focus on deterring North Korea from launching nuclear attacks and preparing the allies’ forces for a pre-emptive strike against it. The drill is reportedly based on Operational Plan 5015, which contains a scenario for carrying out a pre-emptive “decapitation” of North Korean leadership. “If the enemy provokes, (our military) will retaliate resolutely and strongly to make it regret it bitterly,” Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force Gen. Jeong Kyeong-doo said during a change of command ceremony held at the Ministry of National Defense compound in Seoul. President Moon Jae-in attended the event. The exercise comes amid under Pyongyang’s looming threat to fire ballistic missiles to waters near the US island of Guam. Delaying a decision on the island attack plan last week, the North’s Kim Jong-un said he would “wait and see” how Washington reacts. On August 20, Pyongyang’s state-run media lashed out at the allies for holding the exercise, saying they were “adding fuel to the fire.” North Korea and the US have traded warlike rhetoric since the North succeeded in launching two intercontinental ballistic missiles in July. “It would be a great mistake for the US if they have such a delusion that the war is somebody else’s business happening across the Pacific,” said North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun, the communist party’s official newspaper. In recent years, North Korea has also conducted military provocations around the time the UFG is held. Pyongyang launched a submarine-based ballistic missile last year and fired off antiaircraft guns at an anti-North Korea propaganda loudspeaker unit on the cross-border region in 2015. The reduced number of US participants — which includes 3,000 reinforcements — has sparked speculation the allies might have scaled back the annual exercise in consideration of military tensions with North Korea. Korea’s Ministry of National Defense, however, has dismissed such a view, stressing the exercise would be played out on a level similar to that of last year. “The number of US troops participating in the exercise can vary depending upon circumstances,” said a Seoul military official who declined to be identified, rejecting any link between the numbers and current tensions on the peninsula. The US is also unlikely to send to the peninsula its strategic assets, such as nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, submarines and long-range fighter-jets carrying nuclear bombs, according to Seoul’s military officials. Those assets were not deployed here during the UFG in 2016. Meanwhile, a group of top US military leaders paid a visit to South Korea and met with their counterparts in Seoul on Sunday to ease jitters over the US commitment to defend South Korea following the North’s successful ICBM tests. Among them were Adm. Harry Harris, commander of the US Pacific Command, Air Force Gen. John Hyten, commander of the US Strategic Command. Samuel A. Greaves, director of the US Missile Defense Agency, is to visit later this week. During his meeting with Defense Minister Song Young-moo, Commander Harris pledged an “iron-clad” defense commitment to the South against North Korea’s “ever-evolving” nuclear and missile threats. “In order to respond to any provocation from North Korea, it is more important than ever before to maintain a robust Korea-US alliance,” Song was quoted as saying by the Defense Ministry during the closed-door meeting. Harris and other military leaders are expected to observe the UFG exercise and meet with other South Korean senior military officers this week. They will also hold a press conference with local reporters. (Yeo Jun-suk, “U.S., Korea Kick off Military Drills amid Tensions on Peninsula,” Korea Herald, August 20, 2017) According to Seoul’s defense ministry, the exercise will be carried out on a similar scale as last year. But the likelihood is that South Korea and the U.S. could keep it low-key to avoid provoking North Korea. U.S. strategic assets such as B-1B heavy bombers and nuclear-powered submarines are unlikely to participate in the exercise. North Korea has reacted angrily about the deployment of such assets to the Korea Peninsula. And the number of U.S. forces has fallen this year: approximately 17,500 U.S. service members are expected to participate in the exercise, with about 3,000 coming from outside the peninsula. About 25,000 U.S. service members participated in the exercise last year. A government official said the government will be keeping a close eye on North Korea during the joint exercise, calling for Pyongyang to stop provocations and take steps toward denuclearization. UFG will also include forces from Australia, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The Swiss and Swedish delegations of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission will monitor the exercise to ensure that it complies with the Armistice Agreement. The United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission informed Pyongyang of the exercise dates and the non-provocative nature of the routine training, the allies’ Combined Forces Command. (Rachel Lee, “S. Korea, U.S. Joint Drill Begins Monday amid N. Korean Threats,” Korea Times, August 20, 2017)
8/21/17:
Top South Korea and U.S. defense officials sought to dispel public concerns that North Korea’s fast-evolving nuclear and missile program may undermine the alliance as they discussed joint deterrence strategies. Meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Song Young-moo in Seoul, Gen. John Hyten, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, promised all efforts to effectively offer strategic assets and missile defense means for the defense of the ally, according to Song’s ministry. Hyten is on a visit here, along with Pacific Command chief Adm. Harry Harris, to inspect the allies’ annual combined command post training, named Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG), that opened earlier in the day. In separate talks with Hyten, Gen. Jeong Kyeong-doo, chairman of South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), requested the “aggressive and timely” deployment of U.S. strategic assets to Korea for deterrence, the JCS said. The U.S. has sent strategic bombers, aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submarines here in a show of force and the robust alliance against North Korea for its provocative acts. (Lee Chi-dong, “U.S., S. Korea Seek Closer Ties on Deterrence against N. Korea,” Yonhap, August 21, 2017)
The collision of a second guided-missile destroyer in Asian waters within two months will seriously hobble the Japan-based U.S. Seventh Fleet, whose main aim is to contain an ambitious China and counter an ICBM-armed North Korea. Rescue operations were on for 10 missing sailors when the USS John S. McCain collided with a merchant ship east of the Straits of Malacca early this morning. On June 17, seven sailors were killed when another guided-missile destroyer, the USS Fitzgerald, collided with a container ship off the coast of Japan. The Fitzgerald and John S. McCain are both ballistic missile defense (BMD) ships and part of the same destroyer squadron based on Yokosuma. The Seventh Fleet is the largest of the US Navy’s deployed sea forces, with roughly 50-70 ships and submarines, and 140 aircraft across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. It is the only one that is “forward deployed,” meaning it is the first to respond when something happens in the region, the Associated Press reported. The USS Ronald Reagan, a nuclear-powered supercarrier, is permanently deployed as the fleet’s flagship carrier at Yokosuma. The fleet also includes up to 14 destroyers and cruisers at any given time armed with long-range Tomahawk land attack missiles, anti-aircraft missiles; and up to 12 nuclear-powered submarines. The threat from North Korea escalated swiftly when the country conducted two ICBM tests in July and announced the “entire” US mainland within range of its missiles.With two ships — capable of provide missile defense against short to intermediate-range ballistic missiles and fitted with the most advanced anti-submarine warfare equipment — retiring hurt, the Navy has lost critical assets in the western Pacific. Both were Arleigh Burke- class destroyers equipped with the Aegis missile defense system. They are part of a multibillion-dollar mission to protect the United States from foreign ballistic missiles, especially from North Korea. The Aegis system on the ships can track ballistic missiles and provide targeting data for ground-based interceptors stationed in Alaska and California. Another layer of this shield is the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system, or THAAD, that the U.S. has installed in South Korea, and which is capable of intercepting or destroying incoming missiles mid-flight. There are more destroyers and cruisers based in Japan that can be used to destroy North Korean missiles. (Chandan Prasad, “USS John McCain: Destroyer Collision Opens Gap in Missile Defense against North Korea,” International Business Times, August 21, 2017)
Not since 2002, as the United States built a case for war in Iraq, has there been so much debate inside the White House about the merits — and the enormous risks — of pre-emptive military action against an adversary nation. Like its predecessors, the Trump administration is trying to pressure North Korea through sanctions to dismantle its nuclear program. But both President Trump and his national security adviser, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, have talked openly about a last-resort option if diplomacy fails and the nuclear threat mounts: what General McMaster describes as “preventive war.” Though the Pentagon has prepared options to pre-emptively strike North Korea’s nuclear and missile sites for more than a decade and the past four presidents declared that “all options are on the table,” the rote phrase barely seemed credible, given the potential for a North Korean counterstrike against Seoul, South Korea, that could result in tremendous casualties in a metropolitan area of 25 million people. But as the Trump administration moves ahead today with a new round of long-planned military exercises that involve tens of thousands of American and South Korean troops, computer simulations of escalating conflict and perhaps overflights of nuclear-capable aircraft, the White House is determined to leave the impression the military option is real. “Are we preparing plans for a preventive war?” General McMaster asked recently in a television interview, defining the term as “a war that would prevent North Korea from threatening the United States with a nuclear weapon.” He answered his own question: “The president’s been very clear about it. He said he’s not going to tolerate North Korea being able to threaten the United States.” Much of this could be posturing, designed to convince the North’s unpredictable dictator, Kim Jong-un, and Chinese leaders who are eager to preserve the status quo, that they are dealing with a different American president who is determined to “solve” the North Korean problem, as Trump puts it, rather than hope that sanctions will eventually take their toll. But even if Trump has no real intention of using military force, convincing adversaries and allies that he is willing to make a move that Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama all considered too dangerous has significant value. Whether. Trump is truly prepared or bluffing, presidential advisers, military officials and experts whom the White House has consulted leave little doubt in conversations that the Trump administration is confronting North Korea’s nuclear program with a different set of assumptions than its three immediate predecessors. There are two notable departures from past assumptions. General McMaster, a military historian, insists that the United States cannot count on containing or deterring North Korea the way it deterred the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War. That runs contrary to the conclusion of past senior policy makers that what worked against large nuclear powers will suffice against an economically broken nation with a modest arsenal. And General McMaster and other administration officials have challenged the long-held view that there is no real military solution to the North Korea problem — though they are quick to acknowledge that it would be “horrible,” as Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis put it. Already those two new assumptions have prompted a sharp reaction. President Moon Jae-in of South Korea, in an effort to calm his own public, insisted at a news conference last week that he holds a veto to any military action. “No matter what options the United States and President Trump want to use, they have promised to have full consultation with South Korea and get our consent in advance,” he said. “The people can be assured that there will be no war.” The North has also seized upon General McMaster’s line and declared yesterday that as the military exercises begin, “the Korean People’s Army is keeping a high alert” and “will take resolute steps the moment even a slight sign of the preventive war is spotted.” Trump’s top national security officials seem to be trying to walk a fine line, stopping short of the kind of bald threats that the president has issued in tweets but making clear he is ready to wield a big stick. “Knowing that North Korea sits with a significant capability already within their grasp, I think it is only prudent that they fully understand the consequences should they make a bad choice for themselves,” Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson told reporters on August 17 after meeting with the Japanese foreign and defense ministers in Washington. He never specified the “bad choice.” At the same news conference, Mattis described a situation in which the United States would act without seeking agreement from the South. If American forces in the Pacific detected a missile launch by North Korea toward American or allied soil, “we would take immediate, specific actions to take it down,” he said. Mattis’s assertion left open the question of whether the United States would, through direct attack or cybersabotage, try to destroy North Korea’s missiles before they left the launchpad. That, in turn, could trigger a bigger operation — a plan called Kill-Chain that was named in a recent joint statement from the United States and South Korea — to systematically wipe out North Korea’s launch sites, nuclear facilities and command and control centers. Its own authors have doubts about whether Kill-Chain could be executed swiftly enough to work, but the decision to publicly refer to it was deliberate, senior officials say. While the plan itself is classified, its goal is a systematic elimination of the North’s ability to threaten South Korea, Japan and the United States. Among the skeptics of a pre-emptive strike was Stephen K. Bannon, Trump’s chief strategist, who was fired on August 18. Just days before, he had declared in an interview with The American Prospect, a liberal magazine, that “there is no military solution here, they got us.” That is the conventional view. But General McMaster took issue with his predecessor in the Obama administration, Susan E. Rice, who argued in a recent Op-Ed in The New York Times that preventive war would be “lunacy.” (Preventive war describes a conflict that a stronger power starts to defeat a weaker rival and is widely considered illegal under international legal conventions. A pre-emptive strike involves attacking first when an imminent attack is detected. In American history, the debate over the two goes back 180 years, to an 1837 dust-up with Canada.) “History shows that we can, if we must, tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea — the same way we tolerated the far greater threat of thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons during the Cold War,” she wrote. General McMaster, appearing on ABC’s “This Week” a few days later, shot back, “How does that apply to a regime like the regime in North Korea?” Kim is more unpredictable than the Soviet Union was, aides to Trump have argued. And they have raised the possibility that Kim’s real motive is blackmail, according to officials familiar with Situation Room discussions about the North. By threatening Los Angeles or Chicago, they argued, he may be hoping to intimidate the United States into providing aid, or cast doubt in South Korea and Japan that the United States would come to their aid if a regional war broke out. White House and Pentagon strategists have internally talked about another scenario, in which an uprising in North Korea leads American, South Korean and Chinese forces into a scramble to find the weapons, or tempts a rogue North Korean military officer to let loose a single nuclear device to take out Americans or their allies in one last blast of retribution. All these factors, American officials insist, lie behind the public talk about taking military action. And they expect diplomacy to fail, they say, doubting that Kim would ever give up the nuclear deterrent that he views as his only insurance policy. Pyongyang’s official newspaper declared anew on August 18 that the country “will never put the nuclear deterrent for self-defense on the negotiating table and flinch even an inch from the road of bolstering up the state nuclear force.” That leaves Trump facing the potential consequence of his own threats. If he lets Tillerson try to negotiate a freeze of nuclear and missile tests in North Korea, as many experts argue he should, he will have delayed the crisis, but not resolved it. If he orders more cyber and electronic attacks, he may delay progress on weapons, but little else. And yet the military options he has so openly threatened may prove hollow. “There is no such thing as a surgical strike against North Korea,” Bruce Bennett, a North Korea expert at the RAND Corporation, said in one of its recent publications. “We don’t really know for sure where all their weapons are.’’ (David E. Sanger, “To ‘Solve’ North Korea Issue, White House Mulls Military Option,” New York Times, August 21, 2017,
8/22/17:
President Donald Trump said North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is beginning to respect the U.S., the latest comments that suggest his administration is moving closer to seeking talks over Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal. “I respect the fact that I believe he is starting to respect us,” Trump said of Kim at a rally in Phoenix, Arizona this evening. “Maybe, probably not, something positive will come out of it.” Secretary of State Rex Tillerson went out of his way earlier today to note that North Korea hadn’t carried out “provocative acts” since the UN Security Council imposed new sanctions on the country. “I am pleased to see that the regime in Pyongyang has certainly demonstrated some level of restraint that we have not seen in the past,” Tillerson told reporters at the State Department. “Perhaps we are seeing our pathway to sometime in the near future having some dialogue.” Tillerson volunteered the remarks on North Korea without prompting at a briefing that was arranged to discuss the Trump administration’s new approach to Afghanistan. That suggested his intent was to give Kim Jong Un’s regime an opening and a signal. (Nick Wadhams and Jennifer Epstein, “Trump Says North Korea’s Kim Is ‘Starting to Respect’ America,” Bloomberg, August 23, 2017)
Tillerson: “And before taking your questions, I do want to make one comment on North Korea. I think it is worth noting that we have had no missile launches or provocative acts on the part of North Korea since the unanimous adoption of the UN Security Council resolution. And I want to take note of that; I want to acknowledge it. I am pleased to see that the regime in Pyongyang has certainly demonstrated some level of restraint that we’ve not seen in the past. We hope that this is the beginning of this signal that we’ve been looking for that they are ready to restrain their level of tensions, they’re ready to restrain their provocative acts, and that perhaps we are seeing our pathway to sometime in the near future having some dialogue. We need to see more on their part, but I want to acknowledge the steps they’ve taken thus far. I think it’s important to take note of that.” (DoS, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson Press Availability, Press Briefing Room Washington, August 22, 2017)
A group of U.S. military leaders stressed the importance of getting a credible military option ready to support diplomacy in efforts to resolve the North Korea issue. Speaking at a rare joint press conference in South Korea, they agreed that diplomacy is a priority but it’s a tall order without powerful deterrence. “We hope and we work for diplomatic solutions to the challenge presented by Kim Jong-un,” Adm. Harry Harris, chief of the Hawaii-headquartered Pacific Command (PACOM), told reporters, calling the North’s leader by his name. “A strong diplomatic effort backed by a strong military effort is key.” He added, “credible combat power” should be used to support diplomacy. Harris made the remarks in a press conference at the Osan Air Base in Gyeonggi Province along with Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, commanding general of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), the Strategic Command chief Gen. John Hyten, and Missile Defense Agency Director Lt. Gen. Samuel Greaves. The Osan base is the U.S. Air Force base closest to the North and home to the U.S. Patriot missile defense system. In that sense, the USFK emphasized the need for continuing regular combined military drills with South Korea. Some observers here raised the possibility that Seoul and Washington many seek to downsize the drills. “These exercises are very important,” Brooks said, pointing out that the U.S. leadership has been clear that “the actions and activities of North Korea are dangerous.” The commander of the 28,500-strong USFK said his troops have the responsibility for providing military options to their leaders. “And exercises are a way of making sure that the option is a ready option and it’s a capable option. And that’s what underpins deterrence,” he stressed. He said the allies should continue combined training despite “routine noise” from the North until they have a reason not to do. Hyten said his STRACOM is committed to providing the USFK with “all strategic capabilities” including missile defense systems. It’s quite unusual for the U.S. commanding generals serving abroad to gather in South Korea and release public statements together. It apparently reflects Washington’s alertness against North Korea’s rapid development of nuclear bombs and missiles. The commanders inspected the UFG command-post drills scheduled to last through August 31. They then headed to the new USFK base for the THAAD missile defense system in Seongju, some 300 kilometers southeast of Seoul. Their simultaneous trips here are also intended for introductory meetings with South Korea’s new military leaders, including Defense Minister Song Young-moo and Gen. Jeong Kyeong-doo, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Lee Chi-dong, “U.S. Military Leaders: Diplomacy Is Backed by Viable Military Options,” Yonhap, August 22, 2017) “The most important starting point is the diplomatic starting point,” Adm. Harry Binkley Harris, chief of the United States Pacific Command, told reporters at the Osan Air Base in Gyeonggi. “So we hope, and we work for a diplomatic solution to the challenge presented by [North Korean leader] Kim Jong-un. And a strong diplomatic effort — backed by a strong military effort — is key because credible combat power should … support diplomacy, and not the other way around.” Harris explained that the ballistic missile defense destroyers and cruisers in the region are part of a layered defense to protect the United States and its allies, along with its Patriot interceptor missiles and THAAD battery. “A diplomatic lever has to be applied first and a diplomatic lever is stronger, more effective, more powerful, if backed it’s backed by credible military power,” Harris said. “And that is what the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance represents. It represents a very strong military back-up to our diplomats who should take the frontline, in my estimation.” Harris said he did not publicly describe “tripwires in advance” — what sort of red line North Korea would have to cross for Washington to take military action. “These exercises are very important,” Gen. Brooks said on the ongoing joint military drills. “We have had the responsibility of providing military options to our national leaders, and exercises are a way of making sure that the option is a ready option, a capable option. And that’s what really underpins deterrence. So in our view, we have to continue to exercise until we have a reason not to.” He continued, “That may cause some noise from North Korea. That’s what we routinely expect. But it doesn’t stop us in our resolve to be as ready as possible and leave the greatest number of options.” Brooks also addressed North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) threat and said, “We have seen through demonstrated ability that there is a rapidly developing capability in North Korea; they’re learning quickly, and they’ve stated what they’re after.” He continued, “As a military man, I take them at their word and have to be prepared to counter that if possible and to ensure that it doesn’t happen in the first place if we can – that’s the credible deterrence that we spoke about earlier, while we are giving diplomatic actions and economic actions a chance to be successful.” Brooks said that whether North Korea has mastered the technology to miniaturize a nuclear warhead and place it on an ICBM is “frankly a bit academic … Their expressed intent is what I operate off of.” Harris stressed a similar message in a meeting with South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Kyung-wha the same day, saying, “Diplomacy should always be the main battery,” supported by military defense. A bipartisan, bicameral U.S. congressional delegation led by Sen. Edward J. Markey of Massachusetts, the senior Democrat on the U.S. Foreign Relations Committee’s East Asia Subcommittee, likewise emphasized there is no military option and called for a peaceful solution to the North Korea issue. “We must acknowledge that a preventive war will not solve this problem and it would make matters much, much worse,” Markey said at a press conference Tuesday at the Four Seasons Hotel in central Seoul. His remarks come after a period of escalated tensions following President Donald Trump’s “fire and fury” warning to the North, which threatened to strike the waters near Guam. Markey was joined by Democratic lawmakers Sen. Jeff Merkley of Oregon, Sen. Chris Van Hollen of Maryland and Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney of New York, as well as Republican Rep. Ann Wagner of Missouri. They were on the second leg of a three-country tour of Japan, South Korea and China to meet with elected leaders and military and government officials to discuss the North Korean threat to the region. The group also met with President Moon Jae-in yesterday, and Markey said based on his discussions with the South Korean leader, “I have concluded that the United States can only peacefully resolve the threat of a nuclear North Korea by pursuing a bold, realistic strategy in close concert with our allies in [South] Korea and Japan.” Markey called for direct diplomacy with Pyongyang. “Talking with North Korea is not a concession; it is the only way to reach agreement to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.” The congressional delegation called for intensifying economic pressure to bring Pyongyang to the negotiating table and urged China to exercise its economic leverage and cut the flow of oil to North Korea. (Sarah Kim, “Visiting U.S. Bigwigs Talk Peace,” JoongAng Ilbo, August 23, 2017)
“We must acknowledge that a preventive war would not solve this problem, and it would make matters much, much worse,” Sen. Edward Markey (D-MA) told a press conference held in Seoul. “I should say people who live in the region should understand that overwhelmingly American people understand that a preemptive war on Korean Peninsula would turn into a catastrophe, leading to hundreds of thousands, if not millions of deaths,” he noted. Markey is a ranking member of the Senate Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs. He is in Seoul leading a congressional delegation that includes Sens. Jeff Merkley (D-OR) and Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), as well as two members of the House of Representatives: Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) and Ann Wagner (R-MO). Their trip to South Korea comes as tensions remain high after the U.S. and the North recently exchanged bellicose rhetoric, some of which even alluded to military actions on and around the Korean Peninsula. To defuse tensions on the Korean Peninsula, Markey underlined the need for negotiations, saying, “Talking with North Korea is not a concession. It is the only way to reach agreement to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. He proposed a “two-track” negotiation approach. “We must begin direct discussions with North Korea on two closely coordinated tracks. On track one, the United States will lead direct negotiations toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” the senator said. “On track two, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) will lead direct negotiations toward social, cultural and inter-governmental relations necessary for the long-term wellbeing of the people on both sides of the border,” he added. Markey still emphasized the need for tougher sanctions to bring the North to the negotiating table, calling on China, the closest ally to the reclusive Pyongyang, to do more to be able to produce more substantial progress. “North Korea’s trading partners must intensify economic pressure to bring North Korea to the negotiating table. That starts with getting China cut off the flow of oil to North Korea. That is the one sure way to have a decisive impact on North Korea’s decision-making,” he said. “Later this afternoon, we will depart for China, where we will visit Dandong, the gateway city on the border of China and North Korea,” he added. “We hope to learn what our Chinese partner can do to exercise economic leverage to get Kim to the table.” Saying that the existing sanctions imposed on the North are so “porous” and easy to be circumvented, he vowed to seek legislation that would make any countries maintaining economic relations with the North pay a “price,” in an apparent bid to put more pressure on China and other traditional allies of the North. “We’ve come to the conclusion that the system of sanctions that already exist are too porous and it is too easy for there to be a black market economy, for there to be strategies to skirt the attempt to put a ‘closed for business’ sign on North Korea,” he said. “So we are going to be returning to Washington with the goal of constructing legislation that can ensure that China and other countries in their economic relations with North Korea understand that there will be a price that will be paid economically,” he added. (Koh Byung-joon and Park Boram, “Senior U.S. Senator Says Preventive War Will Make N.K. Issue Worse, Calls for Peaceful Approach,” Yonhap, August 22, 2017)
Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono Japan said the world must keep pressure on North Korea to rein in its nuclear and missile programs as the United States spelt out the choice for impoverished Pyongyang between belligerence and prosperity. “It’s not the time to discuss (the resumption of) six-party talks,” Kono said, referring to international negotiations involving both Koreas, the United States, Russia, China and Japan for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. “It’s time to exert pressure,” he told reporters. “It’s time to exert pressure,” he told reporters. (Kiyoshi Takenaka and Stephanie Nebehay, “Japan Urges Pressure on North Korea as US. Spells out Choices,” Reuters, August 22, 2017)
As part of a broad effort to further isolate North Korea, the Treasury Department placed sanctions on Chinese and Russian individuals and firms it said had conducted business with the country in ways that advanced its missile and nuclear weapons program. The sanctions against 10 companies and six individuals are designed to disrupt the economic ties that have allowed Pyongyang to continue funding its missile and nuclear program despite strict United Nations sanctions prohibiting it. U.S. sanctions, even though they are imposed by just one country, have an outsized influence because most international banking is conducted in U.S. dollars. The measures prohibit U.S. citizens and companies from doing business with the sanctioned companies. The sanctions announced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control were predominantly against Chinese companies that have dealt with North Korea by purchasing and selling coal, oil and mineral resources, or have provided banking services that made the transactions possible. The sanctions also hit two companies that arranged for North Korean laborers to build statues in foreign countries. Tillerson has been urging countries that have relations with North Korea to downsize Pyongyang’s diplomatic presence, and refuse to hire North Korean labor. Overseas labor is a source of revenue for the North Korean government, and the Treasury Department contends some of the laborers’ income helped finance ballistic missile testing. “Treasury will continue to increase pressure on North Korea by targeting those who support the advancement of nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and isolating them from the American financial system,” Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said. He added: “It is unacceptable for individuals and companies in China, Russia, and elsewhere to enable North Korea to generate income used to develop weapons of mass destruction and destabilize the region.” The sanctions hit three specific types of business dealings that provide a window into how North Korea uses companies in other countries to evade sanctions. China-based Dandong Rich Earth Trading Co. was sanctioned for buying vanadium ore from a company tied to North Korea’s atomic energy agency. The Russian firm Gefest-M allegedly procured metals for a North Korean mining company with a Moscow office. The Chinese company Mingzheng International Trading was accused of facilitating dollar transactions on behalf of North Korea’s proliferation network.
In addition, three Chinese coal companies were sanctioned for importing nearly $500 million of North Korean coal between 2013 and 2016. The Treasury Department said coal trade generates more than $1 billion a year for North Korea, an activity that was targeted in U.N. sanctions imposed last November. One company sold North Korean anthracite coal and allegedly used the proceeds to buy goods it shipped to North Korea, including nuclear and missile components. Three Russian individuals and two Singapore-based companies were accused of buying millions of dollars of oil that was delivered to North Korea. In a blow to North Korea’s revenue from overseas labor, the Treasury Department sanctioned Mansudae Overseas Projects for helping North Koreans work abroad, usually in countries with authoritarian rulers, to build statues that immortalize the dictators. According to the Treasury, Kim Tong-Chol, Mansudae’s managing director, arranged for Qingdao Construction, a Namibia-based subsidiary of a Chinese company, to take over four Namibian government-sponsored construction projects as well as the employees and materials associated with the work. (Carol Morello, “U.S. Sets New Sanctions Related to North Korea,” Washington Post, August 23, 2017, p.A-1)
Sigal: “Nuclear diplomacy with North Korea has a bad history by most journalistic accounts. That bad history, however, is mostly just bad journalism. The latest example is Russell Goldman’s erroneous account in the August 18 edition of the New York Times.[1] The negotiating record is much more successful than he or other journalists acknowledge and far superior to the record of pressure of sanctions and isolation without negotiations. Any achievements have been temporary, however, because neither side kept its commitments or sustained negotiations. At the root of that bad history is a misreading of Pyongyang’s purpose, which has never been about blackmail or money. During the Cold War, Kim Il Sung played China off against the Soviet Union to maintain his freedom of maneuver. In 1988, anticipating the collapse of the Soviet Union, he reached out to improve relations with the United States, South Korea and Japan in order to avoid becoming overly dependent on China. That has been the Kims’ main aim ever since. From Pyongyang’s vantage point, that aim was the basis of the 1994 Agreed Framework, which committed Washington to “move toward full normalization of political and economic relations,” or, in plain English, end enmity. That was also the essence of the September 2005 Six Party Joint Statement in which Washington and Pyongyang pledged to “respect each other’s sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies” as well as to “negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.” For Washington, suspension of Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs was the point of these agreements, which succeeded for a time in shuttering the North’s production of fissile material and stopping the test-launches of medium and longer-range missiles. Would North Korea have kept its word? No one will ever know because both agreements collapsed when Washington did little to implement its commitment to improve relations and Pyongyang reneged on denuclearization. The 1994 agreement is a case in point. Not only did the North shut down its 5 MWe reactor and reprocessing facility at Yongbyon under inspectors’ watchful eyes, but it also stopped construction of two much larger reactors that together were capable of generating 30 bombs’ worth of plutonium a year, by US estimates. No sooner had the agreement been concluded than Republicans took control of the House and Senate, putting it in jeopardy. In 1997, after the Clinton administration had taken only minimal steps to end enmity, was slow to get the reactor project off the ground, and seldom delivered promised heavy fuel oil on schedule, Pyongyang began warning that if Washington did not live up to the Agreed Framework, it was not obliged to either. It then began to acquire the means to enrich uranium from Pakistan and elsewhere. Yet it made no attempt to reprocess the spent fuel stored under inspection at Yongbyon or to restart its reactor. Indeed, it let its other nuclear facilities deteriorate to a point where they could not be salvaged. Pyongyang tried again to get Washington to end enmity, this time offering to curtail its missile programs as an inducement. The United States had begun missile negotiations with North Korea in 1996 but had held just two rounds of talks, hardly a sign of seriousness. On June 16, 1998, North Korea made public an offer to negotiate an end not only to its missile exports but also to “development”—its word—of new missiles. It linked that offer to the conclusion of a “peace agreement.”[2] Along with the offer, it issued a threat to resume missile tests, a threat the North carried out on August 31 when it launched a three-stage rocket, the Taepodong, in a failed attempt to put a satellite into orbit. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry broached the possibility of a missile deal in talks in Pyongyang in May 1999. He also gave the North a draft of a joint communiqué that would be issued during the visit to Washington of Marshal Jo Myung Rok, vice chairman of the National Defense Commission, in October 2000, pledging “steps to fundamentally improve…bilateral relations,” including “replacing the 1953 Armistice Agreement with permanent peace arrangements.” It was explicit about an end to enmity: “As a crucial first step,” it noted, “neither government would have hostile intent toward the other.”[3] That helped pave the way for the first ever North-South summit meeting. It also led to the resumption of missile talks and North Korean acceptance of a test-launch moratorium while the talks proceeded. Within weeks of Jo’s visit, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright went to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong Il, who offered to end not only exports of missile technology but also development, production and deployment of all medium and longer-range missiles in return for an end to enmity.[4] In Perry’s recollection: ‘In October of 2000, we had already come to a full verbal agreement on a detailed agreement on North Korea, by which they would agree to give up their nuclear program, and their long-range missile program. We were, I think, three to six months from having a signed, formal, agreement for doing that.’[5] Persuaded that President-elect Bush would continue the negotiation once in office, Clinton decided to leave the matter to him. Clinton’s assumption proved wrong. In October 2002, having balked at talks for nearly two years, President Bush sent James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, to Pyongyang—not to negotiate but to confront it over its clandestine uranium enrichment program. The North Koreans offered to forego uranium enrichment, as well as plutonium production, in return for diplomatic recognition, legal assurances of nonaggression, including nonuse of nuclear weapons, and not impeding its economic development, as Kelly himself acknowledged three weeks later: “They did suggest after this harsh and—personally, to me—surprising admission that there were measures that might be taken that were generally along those lines.”[6] Under strict instructions, Kelly ignored the offer. In her memoir, Condoleezza Rice is more forthcoming. Kelly, she recalls, was bound in a diplomatic straitjacket: ‘Usually there is enough trust in an experienced negotiator that the guidance is used more as points of reference than as a script. But in this case, given the fissures, the points were to be read verbatim. There were literally stage directions for Kelly. He was not to engage the North Koreans in any side conversation in any way. That left him actually moving to the corner of the table to avoid Pyongyang’s representatives’.[7] Rice’s conclusion is worth underscoring: “Because his instructions were so constraining, Jim couldn’t fully explore what might have been an opening to put the program on the table.”[8] Instead, administration officials claimed that the North Koreans had “admitted” they had an enrichment “program” and said they should be punished. They overcame resistance from South Korea and Japan to suspend shipments of heavy fuel oil, thereby tearing up what little was left of the Agreed Framework. While US forces were tied down preparing to invade Iraq, North Korea retaliated by reprocessing the five or six bombs’ worth of plutonium, which, when weaponized, would allow it to conduct nuclear tests for the first time. It also moved to restart its plutonium reactor, ramped up imports of enrichment equipment, and aided Syria in constructing a reactor of its own. The North’s nuclear effort, largely held in check for a decade through negotiations, was now unleashed. Bush’s initial response was to ignore North Korea’s nuclear actions while hard-liners in his administration began touting regime change. On the very day that Saddam Hussein’s statue was toppled from its pedestal in Baghdad, Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton said, “We are hopeful that a number of regimes will draw the appropriate lesson from Iraq.”[9] Far from making Pyongyang more pliable, however, the war on Iraq strengthened its determination to arm. As a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman noted on April 6, 2003, “Only military deterrent force, supported by ultra-modern weapons, can avert a war and protect the security of the nation. This is the lesson drawn from the Iraqi war.”[10] Yet Pyongyang was still prepared to suspend arming if Washington moved to end enmity. Pressed by President Kim Dae Jung in Seoul and Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro in Tokyo, President Bush eventually relented and resumed talks in 2003. It took two years before Washington, again under allied pressure, allowed its negotiators to meet directly with the North Koreans in August and September 2005. Diplomacy worked. Pyongyang grudgingly accepted a Six Party joint statement, incorporating the main goal Washington was seeking, a pledge to abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.” Yet Pyongyang was not about to settle for fine words any more than Washington was. It insisted on phased reciprocal steps by Washington to reconcile—end enmity—as it eliminated its nuclear programs. The September 19, 2005, joint statement embodied that point: “The six parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the aforementioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle ‘commitment for commitment’ and ‘action for action.’”[11] The accord laid out some of the steps Pyongyang sought. The United States undertook to “respect [the DPRK’s] sovereignty,” diplomatic code for not attempting to overthrow its government. It stopped short of agreeing to normalize relations, wanting the North to reduce its forces along the DMZ and embrace human rights first. At the urging of the other parties, Washington committed to “respecting” Pyongyang’s right to nuclear power and “agreed to discuss at an appropriate time the subject of the provision of light-water reactors [LWRs] to the DPRK.” The North would not be entitled to reactors until it eliminated its weapons and weapons programs to the satisfaction of the International Atomic Energy Agency and rejoined the NPT as a member in good standing. Yet the ink was hardly dry on the September 19 accord when administration hard-liners struck back, undoing the deal and hamstringing US negotiators. In a closing plenary statement, US negotiator Christopher Hill announced a decision, dictated by the hard-liners, to “terminate KEDO,” the international consortium set up to provide the reactors.[12] Later that day, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice implied that the “appropriate time” for discussion of replacement reactors was when hell froze over: “When the North Koreans have dismantled their nuclear weapons and other nuclear programs verifiably and are indeed nuclear-free…I suppose we can discuss anything.”[13] Pyongyang reacted sharply. “The basis of finding a solution to the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. is to wipe out the distrust historically created between the two countries and a physical groundwork for building bilateral confidence is none other than the US provision of LWRs to the DPRK,” said a Foreign Ministry spokesman. “The U.S. should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK’s dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing LWRs, a physical guarantee for confidence-building.”[14] Even worse, having declared in the September 19 accord that it had “no intention” of attacking the North “with conventional or nuclear weapons” and having pledged to “respect [DPRK] sovereignty,” renounce military attack and regime change, and “negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,” the Bush administration backed away. Under pressure from hard-liners, Hill undercut those commitments in prepared testimony to Congress days later by echoing a familiar refrain, “All options remain on the table.” Worse yet, the administration began taking action under the Illicit Activities Initiative (IAI) to put a roadblock in the way of negotiations. On September 15, the day that the Six Party accord was reached but two days before it was made public, it had capitalized on a Treasury Department investigation of money-laundering at the Banco Delta Asia in Macao to convince banks around the globe to freeze North Korean hard currency accounts—some with ill-gotten gains from illicit activities, but many with proceeds from legitimate foreign trade. By late summer, a senior official told the New York Times, the administration decided “to move toward more confrontational measures.” He described the strategy: “Squeeze them, but keep the negotiations going.” In the words of Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph, “We believe that they will reinforce the prospect for success of those talks.” What did success mean? Another senior State Department official put it this way: IAI turned Six Party Talks into nothing more than “a surrender mechanism.”[15] How much the freezing of North Korea’s hard currency accounts curtailed its trade is unclear, but it looked a lot like regime change to Pyongyang, which responded by refusing to return to Six Party Talks until its accounts at the Banco Delta Asia were unblocked. In talks in New York on March 17, 2006, it proposed a bilateral US-DPRK mechanism to resolve the issue.[16] Hill, however, was not allowed to meet with the North Koreans. Far from giving Washington leverage, the financial sanctions provoked Pyongyang to begin preparations for missile test launches. When a high-level Chinese delegation came to Pyongyang to urge top officials to call them off and warn of UN action, they were kept waiting for three days—and then ignored. The July 4, 2006, fireworks display, conducting seven test launches including the Taepodong-2, prompted China to vote for a US-backed resolution in the UN Security Council condemning the tests and threatening sanctions. Undaunted, North Korea immediately began preparations for a nuclear test, which it carried out on October 9, 2006. It was demonstrating that it would never bow to pressure—whether from the United States or China or both. Only US moves to end enmity would get it to change course. In announcing the nuclear test three days before conducting it, the DPRK Foreign Ministry denounced the UN Security Council resolution and warned, “The U.S. extreme threat of a nuclear war and sanctions and pressure compel the DPRK to conduct a nuclear test, an essential process for bolstering [our] nuclear deterrent, as a corresponding measure for defense.” Nevertheless, the North insisted, its aim of negotiated denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remained unchanged. So did its price—an end to enmity: ‘The ultimate goal of the DPRK is not “denuclearization” to be followed by its unilateral disarmament but one aimed at settling the hostile relations between the DPRK and the U.S. and removing the very source of all nuclear threats from the Korean Peninsula and its vicinity.’[17] “The North Koreans successfully gamed the United States,” Russell Goldman claims. Far from it: when President Bush took office, thanks to diplomacy, North Korea had stopped testing longer-range missiles. It had less than a bomb’s worth of plutonium and was verifiably not making more. Six years later, as a result of Washington’s broken promises and financial sanctions, it had seven to nine bombs’ worth, had resumed longer-range test launches, and felt free to test nuclear weapons. The strategy of pressure had failed. On October 31, just three weeks after the nuclear test, President Bush returned to diplomacy, permitting US negotiator Hill to meet bilaterally with his DPRK counterpart. Hill offered a compromise on North Korean accounts frozen in the Banco Delta Asia. That opened the way to negotiations to implement the September 2005 joint statement, which yielded a first-phase agreement on February 13, 2007, suspending nuclear testing, and shutting down the North’s reactor and reprocessing facility at Yongbyon. [18] A second-phase agreement on October 3, 2007, committed the North to provide “a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs” and put Pyongyang on a path to disable its plutonium facilities at Yongbyon, making it more time-consuming and costly to restart and thereby whittling away its nuclear leverage. In return, the other parties pledged to supply the North with energy aid and the United States agreed to ease sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act and delist the DPRK as a “state-sponsor of terrorism.”[19] The second-phase agreement said nothing about verifying the North’s declaration, which was left to a subsequent phase of implementation. Once again, however, Washington failed to sustain this promising diplomatic course, this time with enthusiastic backing from the incoming president in Seoul, Lee Myung-bak, who was determined to back away from his predecessors’ “sunshine policy” and impede implementation of the Six Party agreements. [20] On June 26, 2008, the DPRK handed China a written declaration of its plutonium program, as required by the October 2007 accord. North Korea reportedly declared it had separated 38 kilograms of plutonium—within the range of US estimates, albeit at the low end. In a side agreement with Washington, Pyongyang committed to disclose its enrichment and proliferation activities, including its help for Syria’s reactor. Many in Washington, Tokyo and Seoul questioned whether the declaration was “complete and correct,” as required by the October 2007 agreement. The crux of the dispute was how much plutonium the North had separated before the end of 1991. Washington decided to demand arrangements to verify the declaration. The trouble was the October 2007 agreement contained no provision for verification in the second phase of denuclearization. The day that Pyongyang turned in its declaration, the White House announced its intention to relax sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act and to delist the DPRK as a “state-sponsor of terrorism”—but with a caveat. As Secretary of State Rice told the Heritage Foundation on June 18, “[B]efore those actions go into effect, we would continue to assess the level of North Korean cooperation in helping to verify the accuracy and completeness of its declaration. And if that cooperation is insufficient, we will respond accordingly.” Rice acknowledged Washington was moving the goalposts: “What we’ve done, in a sense, is move up issues that were to be taken up in phase three, like verification, like access to the reactor, into phase two.”[21] In bilateral talks with Hill, the DPRK agreed to allow “sampling and other forensic measures” at the three declared sites at Yongbyon—the reactor, reprocessing plant, and fuel fabrication plant—which might suffice to ascertain how much plutonium it had produced. If not, he also accepted “access, based on mutual consent, to undeclared sites,” according to a State Department announcement.[22] Yet Japan and South Korea insisted the North’s commitment be put in writing and insisted on halting energy aid. Washington went along. The North responded to the suspension of promised energy aid by assembling a rocket at its Musudan-ri launch site starting in late January 2009. It did not launch the rocket until April 5, giving the incoming Obama Administration more than two months to undo North Korea’s walk-back or open talks to resolve the issue. It did neither. On June 12, the Security Council, with China’s backing, responded to the launch by enacting Resolution 1874, which “sharpened its weapons import-export ban…by calling on States to inspect, seize and dispose of the items and by denying fuel or supplies to service the vessels carrying them,” including intercepting vessels at sea. It also banned “the provision of financial services…that could contribute to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programs or activities.” The DPRK Foreign Ministry responded within hours, saying that “nuclear abandonment has now become absolutely impossible” and warning that all the plutonium it had just removed from its reactor would “be weaponized” and that its uranium-enrichment program would move beyond the test phase to an operational plant.”[23] As it had in 2006 when Washington and Beijing had agreed on sanctions at the UN Security Council, Pyongyang then conducted a nuclear test to drive them apart. It was demonstrating once again that an end to enmity with Washington, not tougher sanctions by Beijing, was the key to denuclearization. Once again, the resort to pressure had failed to stop North Korean nuclear and missile advances. Now, Washington is again pressing Pyongyang to accept talks on its terms. If the past is prologue, pressure without negotiations to end enmity is a recipe for failure. [1] Russell Goldman, “How Trump’s Predecessors Dealt with Korean Threat,” New York Times, August 18, 2017, p. A-10. [2] “Nobody Can Slander DPRK’s Missile Policy,” Korean Central News Agency, June 16, 1998. [3] US-DPRK Joint Communique, October 12, 2000. [4] As President Clinton described the deal this way, “They stop missile development and the sale of missiles. Now, they obviously need to earn some funds from some other places and we think there are ways they can do that.” (White House transcript of Associated Press interview aboard Air Force One, November 4, 2000.) North Korea’s version is in “Conclusion of Non-Aggression Treaty between DPRK and US Called for,” Korean Central News Agency, October 25, 2002. [5] William J. Perry, Transcript of a 38 North Press Briefing, Washington, January 9, 2017. [6] Doug Struck, “North Korean Program Not Negotiable, US Told N. Korea,” Washington Post, October 20, 2002, A-18. [7] Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Crown, 2011), 161 (emphasis in original). [8] Ibid., 162 (emphasis added). [9] Guy Dinmore, “Heed Lesson of Iraq, US Tells Iran, Syria, and North Korea,” Financial Times, April 10, 2003, 4. [10] “Statement of Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts UNSC’s Discussion of Korean Nuclear Issue,” Korean Central News Agency, April 6, 2003. [11] Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks, September 19, 2005. [12] Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, “Statement at the Closing Plenary,” Six-Party Talks, September 19, 2005. [13] Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Press Availability at UN Headquarters, September 19, 2005. [14] “Spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry on Six-Party Talks,” Korean Central News Agency, September 20, 2005. [15] David E. Sanger, “US Widens Campaign on North Korea,” New York Times, October 24, 2005, p. A-7. [16] Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), 269. [17] “DPRK Foreign Minister Clarifies Stand on New Measures to Bolster War Deterrent,” Korean Central News Agency, October 3, 2006. [18] Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement, February 13, 2007. [19] Second Phase Agreement for Implementation of the Joint Statement, October 3, 2007. [20] Choe Sang-hun, “Lee Plans to Harden Seoul’s Line with North Korea,” International Herald Tribune, December 20, 2007; Jung Sung-ki, “Peace Zone Project Faces Derailment,” Korea Times, December 30, 2007. [21] Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Address at the Heritage Foundation, “US Policy towards Asia,” June 18, 2008. [22] US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “US-North Korea Understandings on Verification,” October 11, 2008. [23] “DPRK Foreign Ministry Statement,” Korean Central News Agency, June 13, 2009.” (Leon V. Sigal, “Bad History,” 38North, August 22, 2017)
8/23/17:
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has ordered the country’s key science institute to produce more solid-fuel rocket engines and warhead tips, state media reported. Kim was briefed about the process to manufacture intercontinental ballistic missile warhead tips and solid-fuel rocket engines during his inspection of the Chemical Material Institute of the Academy of Defense Science, the Korean Central News Agency said without mentioning when the visit was made. “He instructed the institute to produce more solid-fuel rocket engines and rocket warhead tips by further expanding the engine production process and the production capacity of rocket warhead tips and engine jets by carbon and carbon compound material,” KCNA said. The institute produces intercontinental ballistic missile warheads and also develops carbon compound materials used in rocket engines. KCNA said Kim “gave special thanks and a special bonus” to officials at the institute, describing them as “unassuming heroes” and “patriotic scientists.” Kim’s order to increase production of solid-fuel rocket engines and warhead tips is seen as reflecting Pyongyang’s resolve, despite international condemnation, to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. Solid-fuel engines help cut the required preparation time for a missile launch and make it more difficult for outside observers to detect a launch in advance. For example, the Pukguksong-2 missile, a new medium- to long-range ballistic missile tested by the North, is known to be using pre-loaded solid fuel. Meanwhile, Rodong Sinmun released photos that appear to show the country may be developing a new submarine-launched, solid-fuel ballistic missile. On a wall at the institute inspected by Kim was a sign board showing a concept diagram for the underwater strategic Pukguksong-3 missile. It also showed Kim picking up an object that could be the tip of a missile warhead, which appeared to be intended to counter skepticism of experts in the United States, South Korea and Japan as to whether North Korea has mastered the technology needed to ensure the survival of an ICBM-mounted nuclear warhead when re-entering the Earth’s atmosphere from space. Despite the start of a 10-day joint military exercise by U.S. and South Korean troops this week, Today’s KCNA report did not include any provocative rhetoric against the United States nor remarks regarding a plan to launch another missile.In the United States, President Donald Trump expressed cautious hope yesterday for possible improvement in relations with North Korea, saying at a campaign rally in Phoenix, Arizona, that Kim “is starting to respect us.” “And maybe, probably not, but maybe something positive can come about,” Trump said. (Kyodo, “N. Korea Orders More Rocket Engine, Warhead Production,” August 23, 2017)
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army, gave field guidance to the Chemical Material Institute of the Academy of Defense Science. Shaking hands of officials who came out to greet him, respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un said that he came to learn about the situation of the institute and help its work. He noted that in recent years the institute has done a lot of jobs in a patriotic drive for breaking through the cutting edge, whether they are known or not, true to the Workers’ Party of Korea’s policy of attaching importance to the defense science and technology and policy of the munitions industry. After looking round the newly-built room for the education in the revolutionary history and exhibition hall of scientific and technological achievements, he learned about the processes for manufacturing ICBM warhead tip and solid-fuel rocket engine. Acquainting himself with the processes for preform weaving by carbon fiber, chemical deposition, high pressure liquid deposition and final treatment, he learned about in detail the density of preform, deposition temperature, vacuum degree and deposition time in the chemical deposition process, deposition temperature, pressure, working medium and deposition frequency in the high pressure liquid deposition process and technological specifications in the final treatment process. He then made a field survey of the process for manufacturing solid-fuel rocket engine and specified tasks and ways for normalizing the production at a higher level. He set forth important tasks facing the institute. He instructed the institute to produce more solid-fuel rocket engines and rocket warhead tips by further expanding engine production process and the production capacity of rocket warhead tips and engine jets by carbon/carbon compound material. Highly appreciating that it is the pride of our Party to have such unassuming heroes, unit of patriotic scientists as the officials of this institute who have devoted themselves to carrying out the Party’s policy of defense science, keeping in mind the pure single mind of loyalty to the Party, whether they are appreciated or not, and gave special thanks and special bonus to them in the name of the Party Central Committee. He had a photo session with the scientists, technicians and workers of the Chemical Material Institute of the Academy of Defense Science. Accompanying him were Jo Yong Won and Kim Jong Sik, vice department directors of the C.C., the Workers’ Party of Korea.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Inspects Chemical Material Institute of Academy of Defense Science,” August 23, 2017)
North Korea denounced the ongoing joint U.S.-South Korea drills on the peninsula and warned Washington and Seoul not to engage in “rash acts.” A Pyongyang “peace” committee specializing in propaganda called the annual Ulchi Freedom Guardian drills a “provocative war exercise” targeting North Korea, Yonhap reported. “Needless to say, we will ultimately not stand by and watch the dangerous pranks of the stupid fools before our nuclear and chemical weapons. Our blood boils with the will to retaliate and destroy our enemy,” the committee said. (Elizabeth Shim, “North Korea Condemns ‘Dangerous Pranks’ of U.S., South Korea,” UPI, August 23, 2017)
James Clapper, former director of National Intelligence, this morning questioned President Donald Trump’s fitness for office. “I really question his ability to be — his fitness to be — in this office, and I also am beginning to wonder about his motivation for it,” Clapper told CNN’s Don Lemon on “CNN Tonight.” Hours after Trump delivered a defiant speech in Phoenix, Arizona, Clapper said he found the President’s rally “downright scary and disturbing.” Clapper denounced Trump’s “behavior and divisiveness and complete intellectual, moral and ethical void.” “How much longer does the country have to, to borrow a phrase, endure this nightmare?”
“He should have quit while he was ahead after last night,” Clapper referring to Trump’s announcement on US strategy in Afghanistan. “Again, I think the real Trump came through.” Clapper also said he is worried about the President’s access to the nuclear codes. “In a fit of pique he decides to do something about Kim Jong Un, there’s actually very little to stop him,” Clapper said. “The whole system is built to ensure rapid response if necessary. So there’s very little in the way of controls over exercising a nuclear option, which is pretty damn scary.” (Leinz Vales, “James Clapper Calls Trump Speech ‘Downright Scary and Disturbing,’” CNN, August 24, 2017)
China decried “secondary sanctions” as an act of “long-arm jurisdiction” that violates its sovereign right to police companies using local laws. “If there are suspected violations of [UN] resolutions on the part of Chinese enterprises and individuals, we will investigate and dispose according to our domestic law,” the Chinese foreign ministry said. “”The [U.S. sanctions] do not help solve the problem, nor are they conducive to China-U.S. cooperation and mutual trust.” Most analysts believe China is unlikely to do more than engage in another war of words as it puts diplomatic stability ahead of a leadership transition this year. “China has foreseen and priced in secondary sanctions and will refrain from responses beyond verbal protests,” said Xie Yanmei at Gavelkal Dragonomics, a Beijing consultant. “China wants to mollify rather than provoke.” The Trump Administration’s latest sanctions have targeted only small private sector companies rather than large state-owned enterprises. “The sanctions have a modest reputational cost as they imply China is not serious about curbing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program,” Ms. Xie said. “But they have neglible material effect as most entities that deal with it are marginal private players.” (Tom Mitchell, Charles Clover, and Demetri Sevastopulo, “China Limits Protest over N. Korea Sanctions,” Financial Times, August 24, 2017, p. 4)
8/25/17:
North Korea has increased its efforts to produce parts for a new nuclear reactor it is building while continuing to operate the main existing one that provides fuel for its atom bombs, the U.N. nuclear watchdog has said in an annual report. Its effort to produce material for nuclear bombs, however, has rumbled on, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said in a report to its annual general conference. The IAEA does not have access to North Korea and monitors its activities mainly by satellite imagery. “There were indications in the LWR (light-water reactor) construction yard of an increase in activities consistent with the fabrication of certain reactor components,” the IAEA report posted on the General Conference’s website said. “The agency has not observed indications of the delivery or introduction of major reactor components into the reactor containment building,” it said. The new reactor is expected to be larger than the current experimental one at Yongbyon. There was no indication in the past year, however, that the Communist state had used the laboratory near its main reactor where it usually produces plutonium from spent fuel rods, the IAEA said. That appeared to contradict a recent report by a U.S. think tank that said the lab had operated intermittently. There were indications the experimental reactor had kept running, the IAEA said. Its previous report said the reactor had been refuelled in 2015 and those fuel rods would probably be removed two years later. Today’s report confirmed that prediction, saying this fuel cycle should last until late 2017. Even less is known about North Korea’s efforts to produce another material that can fuel nuclear weapons — highly enriched uranium — but the report suggested those had continued at Yongbyon. “There were indications consistent with the use of the reported centrifuge enrichment facility located within the plant. Construction work was undertaken on a building which adjoins the reported centrifuge enrichment facility,” it said. (Francois Murphy, “North Korea Steps up Work on Parts for New Reactor, IAEA Says,” Reuters, August 25, 2017)
Woodward: “On August 25, the president decided he was going to make a sweeping decision on NAFTA, KORUS and the World Trade Organization. ‘We’ve talked about this ad nauseam,’ Trump said. ‘Just do it. Just do it. Get out of NAFTA. Get out of KORUS. And get out of the WTO. We’re getting out of all three.’ Cohn and Porter enlisted Kelly, who didn’t want trade to roil national security. Kelly and Porter went to the Oval Office. ‘South Korea is an ally,’ Kelly told Trump. ‘The KORUS deal is actually better than you think.’ Kelly presented some studies showing that KORUS kept the trade deficit down. ‘This is a really important time with North Korea and that whole region,’ Kelly said. ‘We don’t want to do anything on the trade side, especially given how peanuts this is in the grand scheme of things. It’s going to blow things up.’ He recommended that the President call Tillerson. Tillerson made the same arguments. Tillerson, Mattis, McMaster, Kelly – everyone on the national security side – agreed that if the trade deficit had been 10 times greater it still wouldn’t justify withdrawing. It was insane to even be thinking of that, they agreed. ‘All right,’ Trump finally said on Friday, September 1, ‘we’re not going to do the KORUS 180-day thing today. It’s not that we’re not going to do it, but all right, we won’t do it today.’” (Woodward, Fear, pp. 264-65)
Japan’s Cabinet approved the imposition of new unilateral sanctions on a number of companies and individuals from China, Namibia and North Korea in a bid to further pressure Pyongyang over its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Tokyo identified four Chinese companies and two Namibian firms, as well as one Chinese individual and one North Korean individual as new targets for sanctions. While Beijing is widely considered to have significant influence over Pyongyang, the southern African nation of Namibia has been deepening relations with North Korea in recent years, a source close to the matter said. “North Korea has been repeatedly carrying out provocative acts…we have decided to work in close coordination with the United States and have taken these new measures reflecting on those taken by the United States on the 22nd (of August),” Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide told a press conference. (Kyodo, “Japan Freezes Assets of More Firms, Individuals Linked on N. Korea,” August 25, 2017)
South Korea’s point man on North Korea said that the now-suspended joint industrial town in Kaesong will be the first issue to be reviewed if Pyongyang halts provocations and international sanctions are eased. Speaking at a forum here, Unification Minister Cho Myoung-gyon reaffirmed the Moon Jae-in administration’s resolve to maintain economic sanctions to punish the impoverished communist neighbor for its repeated nuclear and missile tests. Asked about the possibility of reopening the joint industrial complex in Kaesong, a North Korean border city, he said, “Realistically, it’s difficult in the current situations.” But the government plans to put a priority on resolving the issue if there’s a change in the “sanctions phase” some day, he added. The minister stressed that there’s no better way he thinks to bring a change to the isolated communist nation. He said the resumption of the inter-Korean program may proceed gradually starting from the on-site management of related facilities and assets that remain in the zone. Until the closure, 124 South Korean firms hired around 54,000 North Korean workers to produce socks, wristwatches and other goods there. On the North’s missile capability, meanwhile, Cho predicted that it will take around two more years for the North to perfect its intercontinental ballistic missile technology. “It may be shorter than we expect as it’s pushing for that faster than our judgment,” he said. “Now is viewed as a stage (for the North) to escalate tensions, and there’s a possibility of additional provocations.” (Yonhap, “Kaesong Revival Will Be the First Issue Pushed If N.K. Sanctions Ease: Minister,” August 25, 2017)
Among 10 businesses and six individuals of China and Russia, which dealt business transactions with North Korea, the U.S. has decided to levy sanctions and forfeit 11 million U.S. dollars from three companies. Furthermore, Washington is reportedly undergoing investigations into around 100 companies as well. As the U.S. Treasury Department is highly likely to announce additional companies subject to the sanction next month, a fierce backlash from Beijing awaits Washington. “There are hundreds of Chinese companies directly and indirectly supporting the North Korean nuclear and missile development by providing luxury goods and facilitating financial transactions, but the Chinese government never seems to hold grasp of their existence,” said a U.S. State Department official during a telephone interview. “An additional announcement on other companies subject to the sanctions will be made next month regardless of whether China is cooperating with the North Korean nuclear issue.” The U.S. Treasury Department has designated this year a total of 23 institutions and 22 individuals for sanctions, and is reviewing plans on sanctioning a state-owned large bank in China. “The recent move comes as an effort from Washington that will bind Beijing to participate with the international society by disclosing the violations on UNSC resolutions, so that China as the permanent member of the UNSC cannot side with North Korea with no rational grounds,” said a diplomacy expert in Washington. (Park Jeong-Hun, “U.S. Claims over 100 Chinese Companies Covertly Deal with N. Korea,” Dong-A Ilbo, August 25, 2017)
Rodong Sinmun commentary: “The U.S. and the south Korean puppet warmongers started Ulji Freedom Guardian joint military exercises for invading the DPRK on August 21. This is a clear indication of the attempt to mount a preemptive attack on the north and an unpardonable provocation against it. The warmongers at home and abroad are veiling the Ulji Freedom Guardian military exercises as “annual” ones just as they used to do in the past. …But with nothing can the U.S. and the puppet warmongers cover up the aggressive and provocative nature of the joint military exercises. The exercises are the ones for a war of aggression for mounting a surprise preemptive attack on the DPRK from all aspects. A clear proof is that OPLAN 5015 has been applied to the exercises this time. OPLAN 5015 is a hideous preemptive strike scenario focusing on the “precision strike” at the supreme headquarters and major strategic strongholds of the DPRK. The warmongers at home and abroad are working hard to master and perfect the performance procedures and the actual maneuverability of “beheading operation” and “secret operation” under OPLAN 5015. This clearly proves the nature of the U.S. and the puppet warmongers who work hard to stifle the DPRK in a military way even though they talk about “annual” and “defensive.” It is a very ill-boding development that timed to coincide with the exercises, the U.S. Pacific Command chief, the U.S. Strategic Command head, the Missile Defense Agency director and other U.S. high-ranking military officers flew into south Korea to hold confabs against the DPRK. The situation clearly proves that the U.S. and the warmongers’ scenario for provoking a nuclear war against the north has reached the phase of implementation.” (KCNA, “Rodong Sinmun on Danger of U.S.-S. Korea Joint Exercises,” August 25, 2017)
8/26/17:
North Korea launched three missiles into the sea between the Korean Peninsula and Japan this morning, reigniting tensions after a month of heated rhetoric between Pyongyang and Washington and dispelling President Trump’s assertion that Kim Jong Un had come to “respect” him. The missiles appeared to be short-range and at least one of them quickly failed. Still, the latest launches underscore Kim’s continued focus on making strides in his weapons program and his continued defiance of international calls for him to desist. Analysts said the launches appeared to be a response to the ongoing joint exercises between the United States and South Korean militaries, exercises that North Korea always strongly protests because it considers them preparation for an invasion. Furthermore, South Korea fired three missiles of its own this week. “When they [North Korea] fire salvos of missiles, it’s usually because they’re training, so in a way, they’re doing their own exercises,” said Melissa Hanham of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in California. Kim had just supervised a special forces target-striking contest, practicing attacks on two South Korean islands, KCNA reported separately Saturday. The North Korean People’s Army “should think of mercilessly wiping out the enemy with arms only and occupying Seoul at one go and the southern half of Korea,” Kim told his special forces. Today’s salvo was composed of three short-range missiles fired over the course of half an hour from Kittaeryong on North Korea’s east coast, according to U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii. The first and third missiles flew 150 miles before falling into the sea, according to South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. The second missile appears to have blown up almost immediately. “We are working with our interagency partners on a more detailed assessment and we will provide a public update if warranted,” Cmdr. Dave Benham, a spokesman for the U.S. Pacific Command, said in a statement. The missiles did not pose a threat to the United States, he added. The launches puzzled analysts because North Korea does not typically have problems with tried and tested short-range missiles like Scuds. The White House said that the president had been briefed on the launches and that it was monitoring the situation. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said they were working to determine the types of missiles fired. South Korea’s national security council convened to discuss the latest provocations. (Anna Fifield, “Defiant North Korea Launches Three More Missiles,” Washington Post, August 26, 2017,
8/27/17:
South Korea’s presidential office said that North Korea’s latest low-intensity provocation may indicate its intent not to aggravate the security situation, voicing hope for future dialogue with Pyongyang. The assessment came after North Korea fired what’s seen as three short-range ballistic missiles yesterday, the first provocative act in a month after its tests of two intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) last month. Cheong Wa Dae is viewing the North’s latest test as a widely expected move as North Korea made provocative acts before or during joint military drills between Seoul and Washington. “It is clear that the current situation has nothing to do with strategic provocations,” a senior official at the presidential office told reporters. The office said that Seoul thinks the projectiles were artillery rockets fired from a multiple-rocket launcher, while the U.S. military reaffirmed its assessment characterizing those as short-range ballistic missiles. A government source said that they may be artillery rockets from a new multiple-rocket launcher, given that their altitude is far lower than that of a ballistic missile. Cheong Wa Dae refrained from issuing a statement condemning the North’s act, which experts say reflects South Korea’s hope that the current situation could set the tone for dialogue with the North. “It seems that North Korea is trying not to aggravate the situation,” a presidential official said. “This kind of low-intensity provocation can be read as a signal that a mood for dialogue can follow the allies’ military exercises.” He said that President Moon Jae-in called for the need to review whether North Korea’s restraint from provocative acts could pave the way for dialogue. Tensions somewhat eased after exchanges of bellicose rhetoric between U.S. President Donald Trump and the North Korean leadership. Experts said that if North Korea does not make additional provocations until Sept. 9, an anniversary of the establishment of its regime, anticipation for dialogue could gain traction. The government is hoping that the two Koreas hold a joint civilian event to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the second inter-Korean summit on Oct. 4 and have reunions for families separated by the 1950-53 Korean War on the occasion. “We hope that North Korea could positively respond to our offer of talks,” said an official at Seoul’s unification ministry. (Yonhap, “N.K.’s Low-Intensity Provocation Prompts Expectation for Dialogue,” August 27, 2017)
8/28/17:
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said on “Fox News Sunday,” he is willing to have talks with North Korea even after its latest missile provocation. “The firing of any ballistic missile is a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions,” the secretary said. “We do view it as a provocative act against the United States and our allies.” He said the launches sent a signal that Pyongyang is still not prepared to back away from its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. “Having said that, we’re going to continue our peaceful pressure campaign, as I have described it, working with allies and working with China as well to see if we can bring the regime in Pyongyang to the negotiating table with a view to begin a dialogue on a different future for Korean Peninsula and for North Korea,” he said. Tillerson last week noted that North Korea has exercised “restraint” since the U.N. Security Council sanctioned it on August 5 for testing two intercontinental ballistic missiles in July. U.S. President Donald Trump later said North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was “starting to respect us.” Tillerson denied they were wrong to say that. “I think it’s going to take some time to tell,” he said. “We continue to want the Kim regime to understand there is a different path he can choose,” Tillerson said. “There is also a unified international voice echoing our messages that no one wants to see a nuclear Korean Peninsula. We hope for the opportunity to engage with them as to how we might achieve that.” South Korea’s presidential office, Cheong Wa Dae, played down the missile launch as a typical response to the drills. “It seems that North Korea is trying not to aggravate the situation,” a presidential official said on the customary condition of anonymity. “This kind of low-intensity provocation can be read as a signal that a mood for dialogue can follow the allies’ military exercises.” (Yonhap, “U.S. Open to Talks with N. Korea despite Missile Launch: Tillerson,” August 27, 2017)
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is moving to eliminate or downgrade special envoy positions at the State Department. In a letter obtained by CNN and written to Senator Bob Corker, the Tennessee Republican who heads the foreign relations committee, Tillerson said he would end or transfer as many as three dozen special envoy positions. A State Department official said that of 66 positions outlined in the letter, Tillerson will keep 30 envoys and representatives with their title. The work of another 21 will be integrated into bureaus, nine positions will be eliminated entirely and another five will be folded into existing positions. Corker expressed support for Tillerson’s move, noting that the State Department reauthorization bill his committee passed directed Foggy Bottom to tell Congress which special envoys it wanted to keep in place. “Through the years, numbers of special envoys have accumulated at the State Department, and in many cases, their creation has done more harm than good by creating an environment in which people work around the normal diplomatic processes in lieu of streamlining them,” Corker said in a statement to CNN. The functions and staff of the special envoy for North Korean human rights issues would now fall under the office of the undersecretary for civilian security, democracy and human rights, who will now also assume that title. The position of special envoy for the six-party talks dealing with North Korea will be removed, as the talks ended in 2008. (Elise Labott, Nicole Gaouette and Jeremy Herb, “Tillerson Moves to Ditch Special Envoy, CNN, August 29, 2017)
Despite unabated tensions, denuclearization talks with North Korea would be possible if Pyongyang refrains from additional provocations until its major holidays in October, South Korea’s Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha said. Recent signs of de-escalation from both Pyongyang and Washington are nurturing expectations for a “window of new opportunity,” she said. The Moon Jae-in government, meanwhile, will soon announce measures to squeeze the Kim Jong-un regime, Kang said, stressing the significance of tougher sanctions and robust security posture. “The possibility that another provocation will take place at any time, and it’s never acceptable for us to be unguarded,” Kang said at a news conference in Seoul. “At the same time, if we manage well the situation from now until key events in October, I think there could be room for diplomacy to be activated for denuclearization dialogue,” she added, referring to the Oct. 4 anniversary of a watershed inter-Korean declaration and October 10 anniversary of the founding of the North’s ruling Workers’ Party. She acknowledged that the administration has, since it took off in May, been facing “extremely difficult” circumstances due to an ongoing, various series of the North’s ballistic missile tests, which put to test the new government’s resolve to respond.
This appeared to have taken into account the Donald Trump administration’s recent softened tone toward Pyongyang, with top diplomatic and security officials and military commanders relaying calls for a diplomatic solution to the drawn-out standoff. Hopes for a turnaround in the mood accelerated after North Korea fired three short-range rockets into the East Sea on August 26 in an apparent display of force against an ongoing South Korea-US military exercise. The relatively weaker response prompted Cheong Wa Dae to speculate that Pyongyang might now move toward dialogue. Kang, however, refused to set a time frame that might define how long the allies would wait to consider talks, saying it would “constrain our own flexibility.” “We’re looking at North Korea’s record of provocations that coincided with major events,” she said. “It’s hard for me to tell you that how many days the North shouldn’t commit provocations but we’re having close consultations with the US and the military and intelligence authorities.” (Shin Hyon-hee, “Talks Possible If No N.K. Provocations until October: Kang” Korea Herald, August 28, 2017)
North Korea launched a ballistic missile this morning that flew over the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido, the most brazen provocation of Kim Jong Un’s five-year-long rule and one that elicited strong condemnation from U.S. allies Japan and South Korea. This missile appeared to have broken into three during flight, but all of the parts landed in the sea. The missile appears to have been a Hwasong-12, the intermediate-range ballistic missile technically capable of flying 3,000 miles that North Korea has been threatening to launch toward the U.S. territory of Guam. But North Korea launched today’s missile to the east, over Hokkaido and into the Pacific Ocean, rather than on a southward path toward Guam, apparently to test its flight on a normal trajectory without crossing a “red line” of aiming at the United States. The missile was launched at 5:58 a.m. Japan time from a site at Sunan, north of Pyongyang and the location of the country’s main international airport. U.S. intelligence agencies were monitoring the site and had seen signs of the impending launch hours earlier, when they spotted Hwasong-12 missile equipment being moved into place. The Hwasong-12, known to American agencies as the KN-17, is fired from a road-mobile launcher — usually a modified truck — making it easy to move around the country and launch on short notice. North Korea has sent rockets over Japan before, in 1998 and again in 2009. But both times it claimed that they were satellite launches, and in the second case, it gave Japan notice before the launch. This time, there was no notice, and analysts said that this launch was clearly for military purposes. The missile traveled almost 1,700 miles in total, flying over Hokkaido at 6:06 a.m. before landing in the Pacific Ocean 730 miles to the east of Hokkaido’s Cape Erimo at about 6:12 a.m. During this time, it traveled through Japanese airspace for about two minutes, government officials said. The Pentagon said it had detected the launch but was still in the process of assessing it. Japanese military aircraft and ships headed to the landing site this morning to try to recover debris from the missile, which could yield important information about its technical capabilities. The launch poses a further challenge, in particular, to President Trump, who has made North Korea a favorite rhetorical target. In Japan, the prime minister was visibly agitated by North Korea’s actions. “A missile launch across Japan is an outrageous act that poses an unprecedented, grave and serious threat, and significantly undermines the peace and security of the region,” Abe Shinzo said after an emergency national security council meeting. Japan’s upgraded missile response system swung into action, sending emergency alerts through cellphones and over loudspeakers shortly after 6 a.m., warning people on the potential flight path of the threat and advising them to take cover. Kim has now ordered the launch of 18 missiles this year alone, compared with the 16 missiles his father, Kim Jong Il, fired during 17 years in power. The White House did not immediately respond to the latest provocation, but the Japanese prime minister’s office said Trump and Abe talked by phone for 40 minutes after the launch, agreeing that the test was unprecedented and that they should further increase the pressure on North Korea. The U.N. Security Council confirmed it would hold an emergency meeting in New York today to discuss the latest provocation. In Seoul, President Moon Jae-in, a liberal who has promoted engagement with Pyongyang, ordered an “overwhelming show of force” in response to the missile launch. Analysts said today’s launch marked a worrying escalation from North Korea. “This is a much more dangerous style of test,” said Abraham Denmark, director of the Asia program at the Wilson Center and a former top East Asia official at the Pentagon. North Korea’s recent missile tests had been carefully calibrated to go nearly straight up and land in the sea between the Korean Peninsula and Japan, rather than overflying Japan. “North Korean missiles have a habit of breaking apart in flight, so if this happened and parts of it landed in Japan, even if it was not North Korea’s intention, this would amount to a de facto attack on Japan,” Denmark said. The Japanese broadcaster NHK showed Patriot missiles installed at sites around the country. “We will make every possible effort to protect citizens’ lives and property,” Abe told reporters before heading into the national security council meeting. However, the Japanese military did not attempt to intercept the missile. Government officials said they could tell the missile was heading into the sea, rather than toward Japanese territory. But analysts said that the PAC-3 missile defense system has a range of less than 20 miles and is designed to intercept the missile as it’s coming down, meaning that even the batteries on Hokkaido would not have been able to intercept this one. Today’s launch, on the heels of three short-range missiles fired Saturday, comes amid ongoing joint exercises between the United States and South Korean militaries, exercises that North Korea always strongly protests because it considers them preparation for an invasion. The exercises, which mainly involve computer simulations rather than battlefield maneuvers, are due to end in two days. “We should expect a kinetic reaction from North Korea during the exercises, but this pushes the boundaries of an ordinary response,” said Daryl Kimball, the director of the Arms Control Association. However, Kimball said that talks still remain the best course of action for dealing with North Korea. “The U.S. and Japan have so few options to respond to these ballistic missile tests short of negotiations that would have North Korea agree to halt these launches in return for a modification of future military exercises,” he said. “This is why North Korea is such a problem — there are no good options.” (Anna Fifield, “N. Korean Missile Flies over Japan,” Washington Post, August 29, 2017 p. A-1) Public television programs in Japan were interrupted with a rare warning screen announcing the missile’s flight over the country. Several bullet train lines were temporarily halted, and the government spoke of the missile — only the third North Korean projectile to fly over the country since 1998 — in unusually dire terms. “North Korea’s reckless action of launching a missile that passed over Japan is an unprecedented, serious and grave threat,” said Japan’s prime minister, Abe Shinzo. He later told reporters that he had spoken by telephone with President Trump. “Japan and the U.S. stances are completely matched,” he said, adding that they discussed ways to tighten pressure on North Korea. Only twice before has the North fired projectiles over Japanese territory: once in 1998, prompting a minor diplomatic crisis in Asia, and once again at the beginning of the Obama administration in 2009. In both those cases, the North said the rockets were carrying satellites into orbit. In this case, it made no such claim. Notably, the missile fired today took off from near Pyongyang, North Korea’s capital. Early reports, which are often corrected later, indicated it was launched from a site near Pyongyang’s international airport, not the usual launch site in the northeast, according to the South Korean military. They said they were still trying to determine what type of missile was launched. U.S. officials noted that if it was in fact launched from the capital’s outskirts, it may have been meant to complicate recent American threats to hit the North with pre-emptive strikes. That possibility was explicitly raised this month by Trump administration officials, as a way of seeking to deter the North Koreans. While the North’s usual launch sites are in remote areas, where there would be little concern about civilian casualties, any strike near Pyongyang would risk many civilian deaths and would suggest the real goal was to strike at the regime. An attack near Pyongyang would also be far more likely to result in North Korean retaliation against Seoul. Lt. Gen. Maehara Hiroaki, the commander of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s Air Defense Command, said that the armed forces did not try to shoot down the missile from North Korea because they did not detect a threat to Japanese territory. But when the government detected the launch and followed the path of the missile, it warned citizens in its path to take cover — just in case any parts fell on Japan. The North Korean missile tests came during joint military drills that the United States and South Korea started a week ago. The United States has also been conducting joint exercises with Japanese forces for the past two weeks, and it was Japan that seemed most directly affected by today’s launch. Speaking on national television, Abe said his government “was prepared to take all the measures to protect people’s lives.” “We have lodged a firm protest to North Korea. We have requested an urgent meeting of the U.N. Security Council,” he added. The Japanese government sent a text alert to citizens about the launch and advised them to take protective cover. In a post on Abe’s Twitter account, the government confirmed that the missile was fired at 5:58 a.m. local time, before breaking into three pieces and landing about 730 miles off the coast of Cape Erimo on Hokkaido, around 6:12 a.m. Uesugi Takaaki, a security guard at the town hall of Erimo, on the southern tip of Hokkaido, said he first heard about the launch from an alert on his phone. “I’m really worried about how America will react,” he said. “It’s possible that Japan could be dragged into a dangerous situation depending on how President Trump responds to this.” A woman in Tokyo, Kuroko Kaoru, also said she had heard an alarm on her telephone soon after the missile was launched. “It was scary,” she said. “I wondered, where will the missile go to?” South Korea said it was ready to defend itself from the North Korean threat. “North Korea must come to the negotiating table, realizing that denuclearization is its only way to ensure its security and economic development,” the South Korean Foreign Ministry said in a statement. With China to the west and Russia to the north, North Korea can flight-test its mid- or intermediate-range missiles only to the south or to the east, analysts said. “In a way, this was a hard choice to make for the North because it meant to fire the missile over Japan or toward Guam,” said Kim Yong-hyun, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University in Seoul. “In the end, it chose to fire over Japan, demonstrating its capability to launch a missile to Guam but without actually launching one in that direction, which would have been a huge provocation to the United States.” Along with South Korea, Japan and Guam would most likely be the first targets of a North Korean attack should war break out on the Korean Peninsula, analysts said. Both are home to major American military bases. (Choe Sang-Hun and David E. Sanger, “Route of Missile by North Korea Unnerves Japan,” New York Times, August 29, 2017,
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army, guided an intermediate-and-long range strategic ballistic rocket launching drill of the KPA Strategic Force on the spot. The drill was observed by senior officials of the Central Committee of the WPK including Ri Pyong Chol, Kim Jong Sik, Jo Yong Won and Yu Jin, and officials in the field of defense scientific research including Jang Chang Ha and Jon Il Ho. Respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un was greeted by commanding officers of the KPA Strategic Force including its General Kim Rak Gyom, commander of the KPA Strategic Force. Involved in the drill were Hwasong artillery units of the KPA Strategic Force tasked with striking the bases of the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces located in the Pacific operational theater in contingency and intermediate-range strategic ballistic rocket Hwasong-12.As known to the world, the intermediate-and-long range strategic ballistic rocket launching drill of the KPA Strategic Force was conducted as a part of the muscle-flexing to counter the Ulji Freedom Guardian joint military drills the U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces finally kicked off in disregard of the DPRK’s meaningful and crucial warning. The drill was carried out through the combination of sudden maneuvers and strike in order to estimate and examine the posture of the KPA Strategic Force for prompt counteraction in contingency on the Korean peninsula and to confirm the actual war operation capacity of the intermediate-and-long range strategic ballistic rocket newly equipped by it. The Hwasong artillery personnel, who were to conduct the launching drill for the first time in the capital city of the DPRK by order of Kim Jong Un, were all filled with strong militant enthusiasm. Kim Jong Un arrived at the launching ground early at dawn and watched the artillerymen promptly moving and deploying the Hwasong-12 rocket launcher, praising them for their smart and accurate movement. He learned in detail about the launch plan, preset flight track and target waters and issued an order to launch the rocket. The fired ballistic rocket reflecting the dignity and might of the Juche-based nuclear power crossed the sky above Oshima peninsula of Hokkaido and Cape Erimo of Japan along the preset flight track and accurately hit the preset target waters in northern Pacific. The drill had no impact on the security of the neighboring countries. In the drill the rocket operational capacity of the Hwasong artillery units of the KPA Strategic Force for an actual war and the combat efficiency of the intermediate-and-long range strategic ballistic rocket it is newly equipped with were all proved perfect. Kim Jong Un expressed great satisfaction over the successful launching. Praising the Hwasong artillerymen of the Strategic Force for being well versed in the new ultra-modern rocket system and properly operating it, he said the drill would offer them an opportunity for gaining a good experience in their rocket operation for an actual war. Noting that the current ballistic rocket launching drill like a real war is the first step of the military operation of the KPA in the Pacific and a meaningful prelude to containing Guam, advanced base of invasion, he said that it is necessary to positively push forward the work for putting the strategic force on a modern basis by conducting more ballistic rocket launching drills with the Pacific as a target in the future. Sternly saying that the U.S. answered the DPRK’s warning that it will closely watch the U.S. behavior with the bellicose war exercises for aggression, he added that the drill conducted by the Strategic Force is a curtain-raiser of its resolute countermeasures against the Ulji Freedom Guardian joint military exercises being conducted by the U.S. and its stooges. Noting that it is a lesson the DPRK drew this time again that it should show action, not talk, to the U.S. imprudently denying the DPRK’s initiative measure for easing the extreme tension, he stressed that the DPRK will continue to watch the U.S. demeanors as was already declared and decide its future action according to them. He expressed great belief and conviction that the officers and men of the Strategic Force will further strengthen the combat preparations of Hwasong artillery pieces as required by the grim situation, be fully ready to go into action for decisive battle so as to launch powerful ballistic rockets anytime and thus check military racket of the U.S. imperialists and their followers and firmly guarantee the security of the country and the happiness of the people. Officers and men of the KPA Strategic Force extended the warmest thanks to Kim Jong Un, peerless patriot and hero of the nation, who gave vent to the long-pent grudge of the Korean people by mapping out a bold plan to make the cruel Japanese islanders insensible on Aug. 29 when the disgraceful “Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty” was proclaimed 107 years ago and approving ballistic rocket launching in the capital region, and pledged that once the Party Central Committee issues an order, they will fulfill their sacred mission and duty as the reliable nuclear force of the WPK in the van of the final sacred war which will win victory in the standoff with the imperialists and the U.S.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Guides Strategic Missile Rocket Drill of KPA Strategic Force,” August 30, 2017)
Elleman: “While North Korea’s missile test on August 28, reportedly of the intermediate range Hwasong-12 (KN-17), broke up into three pieces during flight only flying 2,700 kilometers—far short of its 4,000 kilometer range—the launch was a disturbing development in Pyongyang’s continuing program to develop long-range missiles. The test launch had two primary objectives. First, Kim Jong Un likely sought to take measure of the international community’s response to the overflight of Japanese territory. Though North Korea twice before attempted to launch a satellite using a flight path that passed over Japan, the Hwasong-12 is the first ballistic missile to overfly the island nation. If the U.S. response to the test firing is judged to be mild by Pyongyang, North Korea may feel that future flights will be similarly accepted by Washington and its regional allies. Second, the flight was likely intended to evaluate the missile’s performance and reliability under operational conditions. Before the Hwasong-12 and the intercontinental range Hwasong-14 can be deployed, engineers must demonstrate that they work reliably when flown to maximum range. To date, the two missiles have been launched on steep flight paths that reach high altitudes, ensuring that the mock warheads land in the sea just short of Japan. Much can be learned from the tests, but full-range flights replicating the conditions a combat-capable missile would experience are needed. This flight begins to address that requirement. The most recent Hwasong-12 flight ended with the mock warhead landing in the Pacific Ocean about 2,700 km from the launch site, well short of its maximum range. North Korean engineers may have shut the Hwasong-12’s engine down early, resulting in a shorter flight. Turning off the engine roughly five seconds early would yield a range and apogee matching the reported values. Or the payload mass of the first test may have been considerably lighter than that of North Korea’s nuclear warhead, allowing the missile to achieve a much higher altitude, thus exaggerating the derived maximum range when the missile is flown on a standard flight path. For example, if the May flight carried a payload of 250 kg, and the most recent test fitted the Hwasong-12 with a 1,250-kg package, the range is reduced to about 2,700 km, with a peak altitude of roughly 550 km. Finally, the Hwasong-12 may have been flown on a non-optimal trajectory, one that was steeper or flatter than a normal flight path employed to maximize achievable range. However, the reported apogee of the Hwasong-12 flight is inconsistent with this explanation. An alternative disturbing hypothesis is that tests of the missile have included a small post-boost vehicle (PBV) to provide extra boost to the payload after the main stage is discarded. The May 14 test of the Hwasong-12 was previously modeled, but could not replicate the flight’s reported apogee and range, without the addition of a small PBV. The increased velocity provided by the PBV allows the payload to reach an apogee of 2,000 km and travel about 700 km in range. The hypothesis is consistent with observations made by others, including Norbert Brugge, who identified the existence of fuelling ports located just under the Hwasong-12’s reentry vehicle. There are logical reasons for employing a PBV. In addition to boosting range, it can be used to make fine adjustments to payload’s velocity after engine shut-down. ICBMs fielded by the US, Russia, France and China all employ PBVs to achieve better accuracy. PBVs also provide a platform to carry a warhead, plus lightweight decoys or other penetration aids capable of impairing effectiveness against missile defenses. The presence of a PBV on the Hwasong-12 is just a hypothesis for now, although reports that the missile “broke into three pieces” are consistent with PBV engine failure. As the PBV separates from the main booster, its engine should activate and accelerate the reentry vehicle to the pre-defined velocity. If the PBV’s engine fails to initiate, and the reentry vehicle separates from the PBV, all three components (main booster, PBV and warhead) follow an approximately similar trajectory. To a distant radar, the missile appears to separate into three disparate pieces at the end of boost for no obvious reason. Without the added velocity provided by a properly functioning PBV, the reentry vehicle along with the main stage and PBV, land in the ocean 2,700 km from the launch site—well short of the missile’s maximum range. In other words, the dead weight of the non-functioning PBV, if it was fully fueled, is equivalent to launching the missile with a 1,200 to 1,300 kg payload, as described above. While it is impossible to know with certainty why the most recent test flew only 2,700 km, if it was the result of a failed PBV, its use on North Korea’s long-range missiles is ominous. It is another sign that Pyongyang is deadly serious about developing and fielding nuclear-tipped missiles capable of striking the US mainland, and critical U.S. military bases in the Pacific Ocean. North Korea has much work remaining—perhaps a year or two—before it matures the technologies and systems needed to credibly threaten the U.S.” (Michael Elleman, “North Korea’s Hwasong-12 Launch: A Disturbing Development,” 38North, August 30, 2017)
Daily NK: “To North Koreans, marketization is the antithesis of the bedrock of state socialism, which is the system of planning, allocation and distribution. Marketization does not merely mean the emergence and spread of markets, but also indicates changes in the way North Koreans live. Likewise, it speaks to the fact that the way the North Korean state seeks to control its people has changed. Hence, “marketization” must be seen as the transformation of the social system of the North Korean state. …At the microeconomic level, consumer, financial, labor, service and real estate markets have developed as separate sub-sections of the emergent market economy. Marketization has exercised a transformative influence on the way North Koreans think and behave. Marketization began with the collapse of the planned economy. As state distribution of food and consumer goods ceased, many were faced with the impending prospect of starvation. The North Korean government continued to uphold the principles of state socialist economics, meaning that all market activities were initially conducted underground. The state pursued a variety of contradictory policies in the face of this rising underground economy including control, punishment and tacit acceptance, while suppressing dissent where it arose. However, with the July1st Measures of 2002, the state recognized the existence of certain markets and related practices, and reorganized the institutional and legal order. Accordingly, from 2004, General Markets – legalized consumer markets – emerged across the country. In November 2009, however, Kim Jong II, apparently believing that continued marketization posed a threat to the sustainability of the North Korean political system, took the extreme step of closing General Markets and implementing a snap currency reform policy. However, the clampdown on market forces was abruptly halted just weeks later in late January in order to forestall rising instability. The government quickly allowed the reopening of the General Markets, and gradually readopted the position of tacit acceptance of marketization as a whole. Indeed, since 2012 the state has actually begun to promote marketization with policies designed to strengthen incentives at the individual and production-unit level. Hence, North Korean marketization under Kim Jong Un does not just mark a change in the economic system; it is a phenomenon that helps us further understand the thoughts and actions of the North Korean people today. It can be seen as a response of the North Korean state to how the people, their ideas and actions change over time. The North Korean people define these changes as an “irresistible current.” Because market practices and forces are becoming ever more widespread and prevalent, the North Korean government cannot readily reverse course by simply enacting new policies. Daily NK concludes that there are 387 General Markets in North Korea across 66 urban areas, 147 counties, 66 districts and three larger districts, each of which has a population large enough to support a General Market. In those administrative units with high population densities, there are 2-3 General Markets. North Korea has an estimated population of 24,851,627 ; thus there is roughly one General Market for every 64,216 North Korean people. There are approximately 612,661 stalls across all General Markets, one for every 40 North Koreans. Pyongyang has 4,000 such stalls across Kwanmun, Chilgol, Songsin and Pyongchon markets, among others. Each province has a major General Market: South Pyongan Province has Toksan Fanners Market (8,658 stalls), North Pyongan Province has Chaeha Market (5,685), Chagang Province has Huichon Market (2,840), Ryanggang Province has Hyesan Farmers Market (4,092), North Hamgyong Province has Sunam Market (12,098), South Hamgyong Province has Sapo Market (8,692), Kangwon Province has Kalma Market (4,860), South Hwanghae Province has Tonghaeju Market (4,230), and North Hwanghae has Kuchon Market (4,860). There are also makeshift street markets that do not have fixed locations and whose size can therefore not be verified. However, evidence from sources across the country indicates that makeshift markets near General Markets average 30 percent of the scale of official General Markets. From these numbers, it is thus estimated that around one million people are involved in the market retail sector, most of whom engage in market activities to ensure the survival of their families. The average size of a North Korean household is 4.1, meaning that around four million people survive directly through market activities or the market activities of family members. This represents 15 percent of the population. According to South Korean Government statistics, a total of 8.23 million North Koreans either work at collective farms or are family members of collective farm workers. There are also two million family members of North Korean soldiers. Thus, the non-military, non-farm population of North Korea is estimated at around 15 million people, of whom four million survive directly or indirectly through activities linked to the General Market system. This group has been decisive in the North Korean marketization process. Physically, General Markets are comprised of entrances, signs, walls and fences, market stalls, toilet facilities, and market management offices. Above the entrance is a sign, and next to the entrance sits the market management office with its staff and a police office with its assignment of officers. Stalls specialize in different kinds of goods, everything from industrial produce to shoes, secondhand clothing to pharmaceuticals, rice to fish, and meat to accessories. Sellers of food have to wear hygienic clothing. Each is also required to wear a ser vice permit indicating name, address, stall number and the type(s) of goods on sale on the right side of the chest (a Kim Il Sung/Kim Jong Il badge is worn on the left side). Management staff at the market management center wear armbandsindicating their position. Many General Markets lack mains electric lighting and water, and most have very limited heating or insulation. Only General Markets in large cities are connected to main electricity, which allows for refrigeration of foodstuffs, with stallholders paying extra for electricity consumption. As long as a woman pays her market usage fee to the market management office and taxes on income, she is permitted to trade. Merchants with stalls are required to purchase usage operations permits, and when purchased, a service permit is issued – with merchants required to wear such permits when sitting at their stalls. Each stall has its own number assigned by the market management office. Stalls may be traded between individuals; market management offices do not regulate or otherwise control that trade. For example, in May 2015 a stall in Hyesan Farmers Market from which industrial goods could be sold could be bought for six million Korean People’s Won (KPW). At the time this was the equivalent of one ton of rice. Compared to the average wage of a North Korean worker (5,000 KPW/m), this indeed represents a substantial sum. Market merchants pay 500-1,500 KPW per day in usage fees to market management offices. The fee is determined by the price range of the products each sells. The average is estimated at around 1,000 KPW/day. It is thus estimated that 64 million KPW is collected daily in the form of market usage fees. When public holiday market closures are factored in, a total of 22.4 billion KPW is collected over the course of a year. At market exchange rates, this equals approximately 2.8 million USD, enough to buy 4,400 tons of rice. This is a non-trivial quantity of unearned income going directly to the state. There are five major markets in North Korea today, each of which is growing more and more complex over time. In addition to (1) the market for consumer goods, these are (2) the market for services; (3) the market for real estate; (4) the financial market; and (5) the labor market. Each one impacts state- society relations in a variety of ways. There are four main types of economic entity in the consumer goods market. The dominant one is general markets. The others are state retail outlets, direct-sales points, and department stores. General Markets are the largest single provider of consumer goods in North Korea today. They have been around since 2003, when legal restrictions on trade in consumer goods were, to an extent, lifted. The development of the General Market system also stimulated the development of logistics networks, and expanded the scope of financial and labor markets. In the past, North Korean markets did not develop much beyond exchanges of consumer goods, and until the reforms that created the General Market network were implemented in 2003, the only legal markets were Farmers’ Markets. However, since long before the 2003 reforms took effect, North Korea had suffered from chronic shortages of consumer goods, a situation that stimulated the development of unofficial, illegal markets. In the 1990s, with famine (the period known as “the Arduous March” in Korean) and the collapse of the Public Distribution System (PDS), the size and capacity of consumer goods markets expanded dramatically. The period prior to 1994 is known as the Farmers Market (fangmadang) period. As the state socialist system was established in the 1950s, consumer goods markets largely disappeared in North Korea. Markets survived in the cities as “night markets,” and in the countryside “between individuals” (i.e. farmers). The scale was also very small, the number of transactions being small, and the products usually being limited to basic daily necessities and farm produce. From 1994, with the collapse of the PDS, between one and two million North Koreans starved to death. As a result, state retail units ceased to function and Jangmadang began to proliferate in a disorderly fashion. Amidst these developments, Kim Jong Il introduced “Military-first Politics”and began to attempt repairs to the old system. With this began state attempts to regulate the market system. Officials tasked with monitoring and regulating the Jangmadang, with market management offices central to this process, were dispatched and began to work onsite at market places. However, in spite of this, with serious consumer goods shortages remaining unresolved, the scale and number of markets continued to increase. Kim Jong Il’s approval of the General Market Plan in 2003 meant that by the spring of 2004, General Markets were to be found in every city and county in the country. These were the first permanent marketplaces that the country had ever seen – complete with fences, roofs, stalls and designated entrances. At the same time, up until that point, imported consumer goods had been sold at state operated Foreign Currency Shops, but market reforms led state Foreign Trade Companies (FTCs) to open sales points (branches) in General Markets. For many years there were state retail outlets that specialized in foodstuffs, industrial goods, vegetables, pharmaceuticals et al., but the famine meant that many of these outlets were put in financial difficulties. As a result, the number of individuals entering into partnerships with state organizations to sell goods inside state retail outlets increased. Such people are investors who have reliable s uppliers and cash holdings. There are also merchants who obtain large consignments of products from wholesalers on credit and sell them in state retail outlets, dividing the profits post -sale, and a large number of nominally state retail outlets that sell goods unavailable in General Markets, including construction materials, and household appliances like rice cookers, computers and freezers that are comparatively expensive. They also sell furniture. Since 2010, there has also been an increase in state investment in the retail sector in Pyongyang, with the rise of meat and seafood outlets. Although they are state outlets, they do not sell at state-set prices, but rather at market prices. Thus, the state is profiting from the consumer goods market. There are also a growing number of stalls run by individuals, not by the state itself, State-owned enterprises (SOE) or other state institutions, with these individuals paying for the use of their stalls. For example, the state gives the right to operate a stall to a factory enterprise, the factory sets up the stall and gives the right to use it to an individual, or sells said right to an individual who then sets up the stall himself/herself. These stalls usually sell food (noodles for instance), but sometimes also sell industrial goods. As the consumer goods situation worsened in the 1980s, the North Korean government created a single direct-sales point for every county/township that would sell 8.3 Products only. A direct-sales point is a retail outlet directly managed by a factory. 8.3 Products are products made from raw materials unused after all goods have been produced in accordance with the command economic plan. These instructions were handed down on August 3rd, 1984 by Kim Jong Il, hence the name. Factories that produced 8.3 Products are known as 8.3 Factories, while workers who work at such factories are known as 8.3 Workers. On the basis of these instructions, 8.3 Products were sold directly by the factories where they were produced. At times, products brought from China by relatives were sold in such outlets, and helped them to gain market share. In the 2003 General Market Plan, it was decided that these direct-sales points would be further expanded, but they were not able to successfully compete against General Markets in many areas. From the late 2000s, individuals started to take over old state retail outlets, and direct-sales points also got taken over by private capital. All state factories and institutions are permitted to operate direct-sales points or other kind of outlet of a certain size. SOEs that produce products are also allowed to operate such outlets for the sale of their produce, as well as engage in commercial activities to fulfill their 8.3 Plans. Independent budgetary institutions and cooperatives are permitted to open retail outlets in order to obtain necessary financial resources. The market for consumer goods also includes large-scale department stores. While there remain some large stores, like Pyongyang’s No. 1 Department Store, that sell at state prices, most large-scale retail outlets sell at market prices. Department stores differ from General Markets and direct-sales points only in the price and type of goods offered; they are essentially the same in all other respects. That said, the creation of large, modern retail operations requires large investments that are beyond the capacity of most private investors. Thus, foreign capital, in cooperation with the state, or local governments themselves, modernize existing facilities and import goods directly from China for sale; alternatively, they rent space out and subcontract sale to individual merchants. State-centered marketized large retail outlets come in several forms. The most typical is the use of Chinese capital or domestic state funds to construct and operate the facility. The Kwangbok Street Commercial Center, completed in 2010, is a typical example of this; akin to a Walmart, it mainly sells products imported from China, along with domestic vegetables, seafood, and alcoholic beverages. While this facility is state-owned and operated, it is not part of the PDS. It is effectively a massive, foreign currency earning retail outlet, and that is how it is run. There are seven main actors in the consumer goods market: Overseas Chinese (Hwagyo) are people who were born in China, or the children of those who were. Korean-Chinese (Joseonjok) are also Chinese nationals, but being considered part of the Korean nation, if they moved to North Korea they were absorbed into the North Korean population. Overseas Chinese residents of North Korea have a different status from normal North Koreans. Their identity papers indicate that they are “Han [Chinese].” They are thus, as the name implies, Chinese people living in North Korea. They do not serve in the North Korean armed forces, nor are they permitted to join the Korean Workers’ Party. They have permanent residency, but do not have the same rights as North Korean citizens. From the Korean War in the 1950s through the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, a fair number of Chinese people moved to North Korea and settled there. Unless they commit very serious criminal offenses, they are allowed to travel relatively freely between China and North Korea, and buy and bring back Chinese goods and Chinese RMB. As North Korean dependency on China deepened in the 2000s, controls on overseas Chinese became laxer still. Some overseas Chinese took the opportunity to relocate back to China with their families, while others travelled to their northern neighbor on the pretext of visiting relatives in order to bring back much-needed products to sell, beginning a cycle of trade and import, and reaping significant profits. North Korean officials soon sought to forge special relationships with overseas Chinese so as to take advantage of their privileges. Overseas Chinese were compliant; they needed the help of officials to get passports issued and overcome other immigration hurdles. By way of example, in the 2000s it was with the help of overseas Chinese that the ministries of State Security and People’s Security, North Korea’s two main security services, were able to install computers in their offices. As we can see, the overseas Chinese community has played a decisive role in the development of consumer, producer, and capital markets in North Korea, and is still a vital network for the country. With the withdrawal of Chinese forces (that had fought in the Korean War) in 1958, the North Korean government launched a campaign encouraging overseas Koreans in Japan to return home and contribute to the reconstruction of the country. Their principal target arrived in large numbers, and soon played a key role in nurturing the seeds of capitalism in the form of underground markets during the early stage of socialist construction. They brought high-quality Japanese products to the North, which had grave problems with scarcity; this had a significant impact. Living standards were extremely low in the country, such that North Koreans were exposed to a completely new world through returnees, whose watches were worth more than local residents could earn in a decade. The North Korean government recognized the right of the returnees to private property, but by the 2000s relations between Japan and North Korea had soured, the returnees’ cash reserves had become exhausted, and their influence on economic development had decreased markedly. Whereas Japanese Koreans saw their economic standing decline in the 1990s, from the 2000s KoreanChinese, the aforementioned Joseonjok, became an important supplier of products to the North Korean market. Korean-Chinese living on the Chinese side of the Sino-North Korean border worked with relatives on the North Korean side to begin small-scale trading operations. They would visit relatives on the North Korean side, stay with them for a time, and utilize family networks in-country to buy and sell to North Koreans in the area. From the 1990s, they assembled in officially designated locations to sell Chinese produce to North Koreans, and would go to and from China daily by truck. As a result, Namyang, Hoeryong, Musan, Hyesan and Sinuiju, the major cities on the North Korean side of the border, witnessed the emergence of markets exclusively for Chinese goods and merchants. There are two kinds of farmland in North Korea: (1) collective farms; and (2) tacitly recognized private plots. Private lots have developed in small and medium-sized cities as well as in rural areas. From the 1970s, the North Korean government distributed private plots of 30 pyong to each family on collective farms, and allowed farmers on collective farms to sell the produce thereof in Farmers Markets. These plots became sources of income for farmers, and naturally incentivized them to focus their major energies in that direction. This was a major cause of the marketization of the village economy. Farmers used money generated from selling produce to buy daily necessities, going to local markets to sell and buy directly. With the emergence of General Markets, many of these entrepreneurial individuals became merchants. In recent years, cultivation of cash crops like chili, garlic, tomatoes and tobacco have become more widespread; in other words, crops are increasingly being grown for sale not merely for subsistence, and with the passage of time the marketization of private fanning has become more pronounced. Many have taken to farming products like tobacco, fruit and vegetables as cash crops, while there are also private enterprises turning harvested crops into processed foods like tofu and alcoholic drinks. Livestock farming has also become a way to make money. These trends are indicative of the fact that the economic lives of North Koreans have improved. Items that were previously impossible to get from the state distribution system are now easily obtained, and at prices within the reach of many North Koreans. Smuggling grew along the Sino-North Korean border in the 1990s. Peddlers began to profit from arbitraging price differentials between the borderland and inland markets. These price differences drove many merchants to move to the borderlands. The biggest customers of border market merchants are inland wholesalers. By utilizing price differentials, a network encompassing Chinese traders on the Chinese side of the border, North Korean borderland traders and “runners” who buy low on the border and sell higher inland has taken shape. As merchants from all over the country have concentrated on the border, a single borderland market for goods, personnel, and even information has developed, and the area has become the principal location for wholesale distribution nationwide. However, with Kim Jong Un’s rise to power, volumes of official cross-border trade have risen and the power of the market middlemen and middle-women has begun to decline. Items can now go directly from China to Pyongyang and other inland regions. The development of scaled up logistics networks within North Korea is an important driver of these developments. The North Korean government’s General Market reforms of 2003 meant that a diverse range of actors were empowered to participate in market activities. This was also the time when FTCs expanded the bounds of the market. Until then, FTC imports had only been sold in Foreign Currency Shops, but following the establishment of General Markets, FTCs were able to sell their products directly. North Korean FTCs were entirely beholden to the state until well into the 1990s, fulfilling orders on its behalf. However, since 2004, FTCs have been constructing warehouses and stockpiling Chinese products autonomously. Middlemen and entrepreneurs have become involved in these operations, selling many goods across the country through the General Market system. As the FTCs as institutions have become more active, as foreign currency earning activities have taken off, the availability of products has expanded, and the size of consumer product markets has also expanded. The development of consumer markets has stimulated productivity. As consumer markets have expanded, the number of people involved in production has also risen. First, “cottage industry” production increased. In the 1990s, food security was the most pressing problem, but everything else was in short supply, too. In response, individuals began to produce all kinds of daily necessities, from toothbrushes and toothpaste to footwear, underwear and much more. There also emerged merchants who specialized in selling these commodities. From the 2000s, individual and SOE production began to merge in the drive for various efficiencies. Shoe factories produce rubber soles, for instance, and assembly of the final shoes is done in homes. Since Kim Jong Un came to power, mechanized production has grown more widespread, with individuals introducing machines and attempting to achieve economies of scale. Of course, because the North Korean state does not recognize private ownership over the means of production, individuals first have to “borrow” the name of a SOE. Mechanized production is dependent upon regular supplies of electrical power; thus, business people seek out SOEs with reliable access to electricity supplies in order to maximize production. Factories have also embraced division of labor to further improve performance. To the average North Korean person, consumer markets are the means by which food and daily necessities are obtained. The construction of General Markets in various parts of the country meant that it has become easier to enter the marketplace. It is no longer necessary to travel in order to obtain the tools of survival. As the selection of goods available in markets has diversified, the desires of consumers have been satisfied, and expectations have risen naturally in response. With money, one can obtain almost anything. The market system provides a degree of comfort that was unimaginable under the PDS of the Kim Il Sung era. The development of consumer markets has not merely increased levels of consumption, it has also led to a concomitant rise in private production, from foodstuffs like bread and alcohol in private homes to the cottage industry production of toothbrushes, toothpaste and shoes. Moving up the value chain, there are private companies working with SOEs to produce pharmaceuticals. Furniture is mostly made by individuals, and the market for home renovation projects is expanding. It is not only consumer goods that are made privately, but also capital goods like injection molds and the essential tools of the engineering trade. The development of consumer markets has also stimulated SOE production. State-run brick factories now distribute their produce primarily through markets, and it is thanks to the existence of wholesale merchants that this is possible. A growing number of SOEs employ existing facilities and workers to produce machines to order, and pay their workers autonomously from the profits they generate. The development of consumer markets has reduced unemployment from its peak in the 1990s. The development of consumer markets has also spurred the development of markets for factors of production – labor, capital, land, etc. Individual enterprises hire workers, lease land, and borrow funds from the rich in order to expand production and generate profits. With food and consumer goods shortages leading to mass starvation, the North Korean government had no choice but to permit the spread of consumer markets. The supply of consumer goods is a fundamental problem facing the socialist planned economy. If supply is disrupted, the socialist system effectively ceases to function, and at the time this had the potential to lead to the collapse of the Kim government. Hence, the North Korean government had no choice but to permit the distribution of consumer goods via the market. This can be seen as the gradual collapse of state power over the people due to the state’s inability to supply consumer goods. In the 2000s, the Kim Jong Il government tried twice to suppress markets and revive the PDS as a source of consumer goods. Clearly the state was aware of the dangers it faced. However, since Kim Jong Un came to power, market disrupting or control policies have vanished. At the same time, the state has raised market taxes, and under Kim Jong Un it has sought to co-opt the credit for living standard improvements brought by marketization. These circumstances seem to indicate that consumer goods will continue to foster rapid economic growth in North Korea- at least for the time being. The development of consumer markets resulting from the establishment of General Markets has also had a dramatic impact on how North Koreans see the world. The most important features of this are arguably the emergence of a self-reliant attitude and disappearance of dependence on the ruling Korean Workers’ Party and state. Many witnessed deaths firsthand with the collapse of the PDS in the 1990s, and with the establishment of General Markets in the 2000s they also saw the emergence of nouveau riche. Marketization has been a relatively welcome development for Kim Jong Un. Indeed, while the early Kim Jong II era was characterized by mass starvation, the Kim Jong Un era has accompanied more opportunities to get rich. Kim Jong Un continues to test nuclear weapons, and indeed, has unleashed a reign of terror amongst the elite, but to the average North Korean without political ambitions, this is the first genuine economic boom they have ever experienced. That said, however, in fostering a wide range of collaborative relations between individuals, the consumer market system has the potential to act as a threat to the system. Buyers, sellers, lenders, borrowers and contractors; cooperative sets of relations are becoming more varied and extensive. Middle- and low-ranking officials are already dependent on the market for their survival, hence the potential for social upheaval is immense. These phenomena are not welcome to some in the top leadership, which desires a vertical, hierarchical power relationship between citizen and state. If Kim Jong Un were to implement policies that damaged market interests, active resistance to the regime could in principle break out.” (Park In-ho, “The Creation of the North Korean Market System,” Daily NK, August 28, 2017)
8/29/17:
“The world has received North Korea’s latest message loud and clear: this regime has signaled its contempt for its neighbors, for all members of the United Nations, and for minimum standards of acceptable international behavior,” President Trump said in a statement, taking a more measured tone than in his previous remarks. “Threatening and destabilizing actions only increase the North Korean regime’s isolation in the region and among all nations of the world. All options are on the table.” (Joshua Berlinger, Yoko Wakatsuki and Will Ripley, “Trump Says ‘All Options on Table’ after North Korea Fires Missile over Japan,” CNN, August 29, 2017) Shortly after the U.S. detected the launch of a North Korean missile that soared over Japan, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and United Nations Ambassador Nikki Haley joined national security aides on calls to craft an urgent response. The idea was to reach out first to reassure allies and ensure the initial response came not as an off-the-cuff presidential tweet but a statement that reflected measured thinking, according to people familiar with the process, who asked not to be identified discussing internal policy. Deliberations were cut off early in the evening as National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster — who was joined in his office by Tillerson for the calls on how to respond — prepared a statement for President Donald Trump’s approval, the people said. The response, announced this morning in Washington, said North Korea’s latest launches “signaled contempt” for its neighbors and restated the U.S. position that “all options are on the table.” There was no repeat of Trump’s “fire and fury” comment from earlier this month. The more restrained approach helped ease market jitters, as the dollar erased losses and U.S. stocks gained. But the brief remarks were also a tacit concession that officials were unable to articulate a response equal to Kim’s latest move. Facing an acceleration in North Korea’s weapons testing, Trump finds himself confronting the same predicament that bedeviled predecessors Barack Obama, George W. Bush and Bill Clinton. “Kim Jong Un is pretty much in the driver’s seat,” said former U.S. Ambassador to China Max Baucus. The Trump administration “is in a real tough spot,” he added. That view was echoed by Gary Samore, former White House coordinator for arms control and weapons of mass destruction under Obama. “The fundamental obstacle to negotiations is Kim Jong Un, not President Trump,” Samore said in an interview. “At this time, Kim is not interested in negotiations until he’s demonstrated that he has the capacity to attack the United States directly.” Tillerson himself acknowledged the dilemma in July, when he said the U.S. wouldn’t have “very many good options left” if diplomacy fails. But the administration’s earlier comments have also boxed itself in. “These folks ought to stop talking,” Robert Gallucci, a former chief North Korea negotiator in the Clinton administration, said by phone. “We should stop talking and engage them quietly because anything done publicly requires the other side to do something in response.” For now, several officials said it was a victory that various arms of the administration were on the same page and that Trump — as of late this evening — had not written a tweet that contradicted his morning statement. Some staff had wanted an immediate statement after the missile launch but the decision was made to consult with allies — Tillerson spoke by phone with his counterparts in Japan and South Korea while Trump had a 40 minute call with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe — before going public. The effort was aided by the fact that Tillerson and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis had already, with Trump’s support, settled on a plan that outlines possible U.S. responses to North Korean actions. The more restrained response may also reflect the fact that North Korea’s move occurred with the U.S. and South Korea in the midst of major annual military exercises, an event that has long infuriated the Pyongyang regime. “There is a large-scale exercise ongoing now and it was way beyond reality to think that the North Koreans were going to do nothing,” said Joel Wit, a senior fellow at the US-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. “We need to get through this without losing our heads. We can’t run off half-cocked every time these guys test a missile.” (Nick Wadhams and Jennifer Jacobs, “Latest North Korean Missile Launch Spurred White House Game Plan,” Bloomberg, August 29, 2017)
A squadron of four South Korean F-15K fighter jets staged a live-bombing drill against North Korea’s leadership in response to its latest ballistic missile launch, the Air Force announced. The aircraft dropped eight MK-84 bombs, each weighing about a ton, at a simulated target at the Pilseung Range in the eastern province of Gangwon. They hit the target accurately, it said, adding the practice was aimed at sharpening the capability of completely destroying “the enemy’s leadership” in case of an emergency. The MK-84 general-purpose bomb is known to be mainly used for destroying underground bunkers. It confirmed the South Korean Air Force’s attack ability for a strong warning message to the North, defense officials said. “Our Air Force will wipe out the leadership of the North Korean regime with the strong strike capability if it threatens the security of our people and the South Korea-U.S. alliance with nuclear weapons and missiles,” Maj. Lee Kuk-no, who led the training mission, was quoted as saying. South Korea also made public rare footage of its testing on new ballistic missiles. The 86-second-long video clip shows the vivid scene of the test-firing of a 500-kilometer-range ballistic missile, Hyunmoo-2B, with improved warhead power and that of another one with a range of 800km, called Hyunmoo-2C. It was released by the state-run Agency for Defense Development (ADD). In the footage, the missiles are fired and accurately hit mock targets on the ground and in the water. The tests were conducted last week and were the last ones before the deployment of the missiles, the ADD said. It added the missiles will serve as core elements in South Korea’s Kill Chain pre-emptive strike system and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) scheme. “Our military has the missile capability with top-level precision and power to strike any place in North Korea if necessary,” the ADD said. “It will greatly reinforce missile forces and power down the road as well.” The U.S. is expected to dispatch strategic bombers or an aircraft carrier in a show of force and security commitment to the defense of South Korea. (Yonhap, “Four F-15K’s Hold Exercises against N. Korea’s Leadership,” August 29, 2017)
UN Security Council presidential statement S/PRST/2017/16: “The Security Council strongly condemns the 28 August 2017 (local time) ballistic missile launch by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that flew over Japan, as well as the multiple ballistic missile launches it conducted on 25 August 2017. “The Security Council further condemns the DPRK for its outrageous actions and demands that the DPRK immediately cease all such actions. The Security Council stresses that these DPRK actions are not just a threat to the region, but to all United Nations Member States. The Security Council expresses its grave concern that the DPRK is, by conducting such a launch over Japan as well as its recent actions and public statements, deliberately undermining regional peace and stability and have caused grave security concerns around the world. The Security Council, resolute in its commitment to a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, emphasizes the vital importance of immediate, concrete actions to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond. The Security Council demands that the DPRK not proceed with any further launches using ballistic missile technology and comply with resolutions 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), and 2371 (2017), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13), by suspending all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches. The Security Council further demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with all of its other obligations under all relevant Security Council resolutions, including that it shall: abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; not conduct any further nuclear tests or any further provocation; and abandon any other existing weapons of mass destruction in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. The Security Council calls on all States to strictly, fully, and expeditiously implement all relevant Security Council resolutions, including 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), and 2371 (2017). The Security Council reiterates the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia at large, expresses its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation, and welcomes efforts by Council members, as well as other States, to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue.” (UN Security Council 8034th Meeting, “Security Council Presidential Statement Strongly Condemns Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Conducting Missile Launching over Japan,” August 29, 2017)
8/30/17:
“The U.S. has been talking to North Korea, and paying them extortion money, for 25 years,” the President tweeted. “Talking is not the answer!” (Emily Shugerman, “Donald Trump Says ‘Talk Is Not the Answer in North Korean Nuclear Standoff,” The Independent, August 30, 2017)
Mattis: “Q: Secretary Mattis, you’ve often said that you seek a diplomatic solution with North Korea. The president this morning tweeted that talking isn’t the answer. Are we out of diplomatic solutions for North Korea? MATTIS: No.
Q: What additional diplomatic solutions could be taken? And then, for Minister Song, what additional U.S. military support might South Korea need to be able to increase pressure on North Korea? MATTIS: Now, you’re testing us, here, you know. We bring you up here to take pictures.
But, no, the — we’re never out of diplomatic solutions. We continue to work together, and the minister and I share a responsibility to provide for the protection of our nations, our populations and our interests, which is what we’re here to discuss today — and look for all the areas which we can collaborate within an already very strong collaboration. We always look for more. We’re never complacent.” (DoD, Remarks by Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and Minister Song Young-moo at the Pentagon,” August 30, 2017) Defense Secretary Mattis insisted on Thursday that he was not at odds with President Trump over North Korea and asserted that the media had misinterpreted his recent remarks on how to deal with Pyongyang. Meeting with reporters at the Pentagon on August 31, Mattis insisted that the two statements were not, in fact, at odds. “I was asked if there are any diplomatic efforts left, and I said, ‘Of course,’” Mattis said. “And diplomatic can include economic sanctions, not just talking. It didn’t contradict anything the president said.” He added, “I agree with the president we should not be talking right now to a nation that’s firing missiles over the top of Japan, an ally.” Asked if he had ever considered resigning because of policy differences, Mattis said he was committing to serving as secretary of defense. ”I don’t care if it’s Republican or Democrat, we all have an obligation to serve,” Mattis said. “That’s all there is to it.” “I mean, the first time I met with President Trump, we disagreed on three things in my first 40 minutes with him — on NATO, on torture and something else — and he hired me,” he added. “This is not a man who’s immune to being persuaded if he thinks you’ve got an argument.” (Michael R. Gordon, “Defense Secretary Says He Contradict President,” New York Times, September 1, 2017,
The Japanese government has insisted that it is taking necessary steps to counter North Korea’s missile threat, but the ballistic missile that flew over northern Japan yesterday exposed the limits to which the country can fully prepare for the highly unpredictable launches. “We’ve been completely tracking the movement (of the missile) ever since its launch and are thoroughly ready to protect the lives of the people,” Prime Minister Abe Shinzo told reporters as he announced that a missile had crossed over Japan before splashing into the Pacific Ocean. The Self-Defense Forces did not take actions to intercept the missile, with Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori saying the decision not to blow it out of the sky had been taken because radar data ruled out the possibility of the projectile falling on Japan. Despite reassurances from the government leadership, Lt. Gen. Maehara Hiroaki — the Air Self-Defense Force commander in charge of anti-missile operations — admitted the same day that the timing of the launch was “a total surprise.” Under the country’s current two-tier ballistic missile-defense system, the Maritime Self-Defense Force’s Aegis destroyers, equipped with Standard Missile-3 interceptors, are tasked with stopping missiles in the outer atmosphere. If they fail, the ASDF’s ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptors are the next line of defense against missile attacks. Japan has more than 30 PAC-3 batteries deployed nationwide, each with a range of several dozen kilometers. While the government plans to introduce interceptors that would double their range, the current system does not have the coverage to defend the entire landmass of Japan, and the SDF have adjusted the locations of the batteries to prepare for the eventuality of missiles coming down due to malfunctions or other reasons. After the North said earlier in the month that it is considering launching ballistic missiles over Japan, into waters near the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam, some PAC-3 units were moved to four prefectures in the country’s west along a projected path of the projectiles. But the missile Pyongyang launched yesterday headed in a completely different direction, passing Cape Erimo in Hokkaido and dropping into the sea 1,180 kilometers east of the cape. At the U.S. Air Force’s Yokota Air Base in a Tokyo suburb, where the ASDF practiced the deployment of the PAC-3 system the same day, Maehara stressed the importance of positioning the batteries near areas where a missile is projected to fall, saying, “PAC-3 units need to be deployed at the right location at the right time.” In Hokkaido, there was only one anti-missile group stationed at the ASDF’s Chitose base, some 160 km away from Cape Erimo. There was apparently no time to bring in other units. As North Korea continues the test-firing of ballistic missiles, many of which have fallen into the Sea of Japan, the Defense Ministry has stepped up efforts to improve Japan’s defense capabilities. Among the options being considered is introducing a land-based Aegis missile defense system known as Aegis Ashore. The system uses similar components to those fitted on MSDF Aegis destroyers, but is expected to reduce the workload of SDF members in missile intercept operations because it will be permanently installed on land. The ministry plans to secure funds in the next fiscal year, starting in April, for possible introduction of Aegis Ashore, but installing the new system is expected to take several years. Japan only needs three Aegis ships equipped with the missile shield capability to protect all of the nation’s territory, and it has four now, though this “barely” enables the country to continuously keep watch on missile threats because there are times when ships cannot be used due to maintenance, a government official said. The Defense Ministry plans to double the number of its Aegis vessels to eight, but those warships are unlikely to be plying nearby waters until around 2021. The ministry has also been growing wary about what seem to be demonstrations by North Korea of its ability to conduct a surprise attack, using mobile launchers and firing missiles during the night. The fact that North Korea launched the missile from a location it had never used before — Sunan in the capital, Pyongyang — may also be a sign that it was testing its abilities to conduct a sneak attack, one ministry official said. “No matter how much we strengthen our missile defense, there will still be holes,” another senior ministry official said. “It’s endless.” (Kyodo, “As North Korea’s Missile Capabilities Grow, Japan’s Defensive Capabilities Fail to Keep up,” Japan Times, Aug 30, 2017)
President Moon Jae-in nominated Cho Yoon-je, an economist who served as ambassador to the United Kingdom and economic adviser to the Roh Moo-hyun Blue House, as ambassador to the United States. During the presidential campaign, Cho headed Moon’s policy think tank. After Moon took office in May, he visited the European Union and Germany as a special presidential envoy. The appointment of the ambassador to Washington was delayed because the Blue House wanted a heavyweight candidate who can deal with the Donald Trump administration amid the latest security crisis. Former lawmaker Noh Young-min of the Democratic Party was selected as the ambassador to China, the Blue House said. Lee Su-hoon, a professor at Kyungnam University, was named ambassador to Japan. Noh, a former three-term lawmaker, was named ambassador to China despite concerns within the ruling party about losing a key politician ahead of next year’s local elections. Lee, an international relations professor, is an advocate of inter-Korean dialogue. He served as chairman of the presidential advisory group for Northeast Asia policy during the Roh administration. In Moon’s transition team, he headed the foreign affairs and security division. The appointments were announced as Reuters reported that the Trump administration plans to name Victor Cha as U.S. ambassador to Seoul. Cha served as a director for Asian affairs on the White House National Security Council during the George W. Bush administration. He was also deputy head of the U.S. delegation in multilateral talks with North Korea over its nuclear program. Cha, a Korean-American, is currently the Korea Chair at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies and director of Asian Studies at Georgetown University’s Department of Government and School of Foreign Service. (Ser Myo-ja, “Cho Yoon-je Going to Washington, Victor Cha Coming to Seoul,” JoongAng Ilbo, August 30, 2017)
Just days after North Korea tested an intermediate range ballistic missile that overflew Japan, the U.S. Navy intercepted a medium range ballistic missile target on August 30 using a Raytheon Standard SM-6 missile. The weapon, which was launched from USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53), intercepted the target in its final seconds of flight. “Earlier this year, our customer requested an enhanced capability to deal with a sophisticated medium-range ballistic missile threat,” Mike Campisi, Raytheon’s SM-6 senior program director, said. “We did all this – the analysis, coding and testing – in seven months; a process that normally takes one to two years.” Unlike dedicated ballistic missile interceptor versions of the Standard missile, the SM-6 is a multirole weapon that can perform anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare and the ballistic missile defense (BMD) at sea. According to Raytheon, this marked the third time that the SM-6 missile successfully engaged a ballistic missile target in its terminal phase. The weapon was first tested in the ballistic missile defense role in August 2015 and then again in late 2016. Raytheon has delivered more than 330 SM-6 missiles with production continuing indefinitely. However, while the SM-6 will become the mainstay of the fleet, the dedicated ballistic missile defense role falls to the SM-3 variants of the Standard missile. The Standard missile family—and indeed most U.S. theatre missile defenses—has a good track record, but they only offer a limited defense. In the event of a war, thousands of North Korean ballistic missiles would likely overwhelm the system. Indeed, a 2016 report from the Pentagon’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation bears that out. “The Regional/Theater BMDS demonstrates a limited capability to defend the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) areas of responsibility for small numbers of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats (1,000 to 4,000 km), and a fair capability for short-range ballistic missile threats (less than 1,000 km range),” reads the report. Kingston Reif, director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association told The National Interest that he agrees with the report. “Even though these systems have good test records, the capability of our and Japan’s regional defenses (Patriot PAC-3, Aegis capable ships armed with SM3-IA and IB interceptors and THAAD) against small numbers of missiles that travel within the defended area of these systems is limited,” Reif said. Moreover, shooting down North Korean test missiles would be even more difficult—despite the ill-informed pontifications of various commentators. “Shooting down a North Korean missile on a test trajectory—as was the case with the 8/29 HS-12 test — is an entirely different and even more difficult challenge,” Reif said. “Our BMD systems are not designed or postured to defend the open ocean. And we couldn’t rely on THAAD, since there are no THAAD batteries in the Japan. Patriot is also a no go, since it is designed to defend against slower short-range missiles during their terminal phase.” In theory, it might be possible to shoot down North Korean ballistic missiles below the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) class using the U.S. Navy’s Aegis cruisers and destroyers. However, it would be extremely difficult—and would compromise the defenses of populated areas. “Shooting down a North Korean non-ICBM test might theoretically be possible using SM-3 interceptors launched from Aegis ships in the region,” Reif said. “But it would be a highly demanding task and entail a significant amount of guesswork, as the ships would have to be in the right place at the right time to stop a test at sea. Doing so also would mean taking them away from optimal positions to defend actual targets on land.” But even then, Reif notes that the SM-3 has only been tested against an IRBM target once. “According to Missile Defense Agency data, the existing Aegis interceptors have only been successfully tested once against an IRBM-class target. The faster SM3-IIA under development by the United States and Japan will provide much great capability versus IRBMs, but it is not yet deployed.” At best, the SM-3 would be able to intercept a ballistic missile in the mid-course part of its flight. “We’d have no shot against an IRBM, or a MRBM or SRBM for that matter, during the missiles boost phase as that is beyond the capability of the SM-3 interceptor,” Reif said. “For a midcourse intercept, that would depend on the trajectory, how much warning we had, and how many ships were deployed and where (Note: that the recent accidents involving the Aegis-equipped USS Fitzgerald and McCain how many ships the U.S Navy could bring to bear in the region).” It would have taken an incredible stroke of luck for the United States and Japan to have intercepted the recent North Korean IRBM test. “Aegis ships positioned in the Sea of Japan to protect key populations centers and critical military assets in Japan against SRBMs/MRBMs likely would not have been able to engage an IRBM flying over northern Japan,” Reif said. “Unless a ship happened to be positioned exactly along or near the flight path of the test, midcourse intercept is probably out of the question. A terminal shot—as the RV is reentering the earths atmosphere—might have been possible, but the SM3 has never been tested in that mode and would require North Korea to tell us where the missile would land.” In Reif’s view, shooting down a North Korean ballistic missile—or worse—trying to shoot one down and missing would be counterproductive. “Even if the stars were aligned however, attempting to shoot down a non-threatening missile test would be hugely provocative act and supply invaluable data to adversaries,” Reif said. “A miss, which is more likely than an intercept, would be embarrassing and undermine confidence in U.S. defenses. Even a hit would be escalatory, expend an expensive round, and create an expectation to shoot down future tests, which could lead to a failure down the road.” Ultimately, the problem is that missile defenses can be overcome easily by adding more or better decoys and other countermeasures—or simply overwhelming the system with numbers. Interceptors are expensive and several missiles have to be launched at an incoming target to ensure a reasonable probability of kill. “Calls to shoot down DPRK missiles tests reflect widespread overconfidence in the efficacy and importance of missile defense,” Reif said. “Missile defense is not an escape route from our and our allies vulnerability to a nuclear-armed North Korea, which is taking steps to evade our defenses and can build more missiles to overwhelm our defenses.” In the end, only diplomacy has any chance of resolving the North Korea problem. (Dave Majumdar, “There May Be Now Way to Counter North Korea’s Missiles,” The National Interest, August 30, 2017)
8/31/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s answer to a question raised by KCNA “as regards the fact that the U.S. and its vassal forces rigged up a “presidential statement” of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemning the intermediate-range strategic ballistic rocket launching drill of the Strategic Force of the Korean People’s Army (KPA): On August 30, the UNSC released a “presidential statement” distorting the truth as if the DPRK’s launch of intermediate-range strategic ballistic rocket Hwasong-12 undermined regional peace and stability and caused grave security concerns around the world. The DPRK categorically rejects the “presidential statement” of UNSC that flagrantly violated the right to self-defense of a sovereign state. We had already warned the U.S. that we would be closely monitoring its conduct. The intermediate-range strategic ballistic rocket launching drill carried out by the Strategic Force of the KPA this time is only a curtain raiser to the resolute countermeasures to be taken against the U.S. as it responded to our warning by waging belligerent Ulji Freedom Guardian joint military exercises. The said drill is the first step taken by the KPA in its Pacific operation and a meaningful prelude to restraining Guam, the front-line base for invasion. The U.S. had denied the DPRK’s proactive measures to defuse the extreme tension and acted with imprudence. It is another lesson learned by the DPRK that only actions speak to the U.S., not polite words. The revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK shall conduct many more of ballistic rocket launching drill targeting the Pacific to further modernize and increase the actual combat efficiency of its strategic force.” (KCNA, “FM Spokesman Rejects ‘Presidential Statement’ of UNSC,” August 31, 2017)
The United States flew some of its most advanced warplanes in bombing drills with ally South Korea, a clear warning after North Korea launched a midrange ballistic missile designed to carry nuclear bombs over Japan earlier this week, the U.S. and South Korean militaries said. North Korea hates such displays of U.S. military might at close range and will likely respond with fury. Two U.S. B-1B supersonic bombers and four F-35B stealth fighter jets joined four South Korean F-15 fighters in live-fire exercises at a military field in eastern South Korea that simulated precision strikes against the North’s “core facilities,” according to the U.S. Pacific Command and South Korea’s Defense Ministry. The B-1Bs were flown in from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam while the F-35Bs came from a U.S. base in Iwakuni, Japan. The North, which claims Washington has long threatened Pyongyang by flaunting the powerful U.S. nuclear arsenal, describes the long-range B-1Bs as “nuclear strategic bombers” although the United States no longer arms them with nuclear weapons. A strong North Korean reaction to the drills is almost certain. The dueling military displays open up the risk that things will get worse as each side seeks to show it won’t be intimidated. North Korea has made it clear that it sees its weapons program, which demands regular testing to perfect, as the only way to contest decades of U.S. hostility, by which it means the huge U.S. military presence in South Korea, Japan and the Pacific. Washington, in turn, seeks with its joint drills with Seoul and bomber flights to show that it will not be pushed from its traditional role of supremacy in the region. The U.S. Pacific Command said the exercises were conducted in direct response to North Korea’s recent missile launch. Over the course of a 10-hour mission, the B-1Bs, F-35Bs and two Japanese F-15 fighters first flew together over waters near Kyushu, Japan. The U.S. and South Korean warplanes then flew across the Korean Peninsula and participated in the live-fire training before returning to their respective home stations, according to the Pacific Command. “North Korea’s actions are a threat to our allies, partners and homeland, and their destabilizing actions will be met accordingly,” Gen. Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, commander of the U.S. Pacific Air Forces, said in a statement. “This complex mission clearly demonstrates our solidarity with our allies and underscores the broadening cooperation to defend against this common regional threat. Our forward-deployed force will be the first to the fight, ready to deliver a lethal response at a moment’s notice if our nation calls.” (Kim Tong-hyung, “U.S. Flies Bombers, Fighters in Show of Force against North Korea,” Associated Press, August 31, 2017)
“We continue to work together, and the minister and I share a responsibility to provide for the protection of our nations, our populations and our interests.” Japanese Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori spoke to Mattis by telephone and agreed to keep putting pressure on North Korea in a “visible” form, Japan’s defense ministry said. The 15-member U.N. Security Council two days ago condemned the firing of an intermediate range ballistic missile over Japan as “outrageous,” and demanded that North Korea halt its weapons program, but the U.S.-drafted statement did not threaten new sanctions. Japan was pushing the United States to propose new U.N. Security Council sanctions, which diplomats said could target North Korea’s laborers working abroad, oil supply and textile exports. Diplomats expected resistance from Russia and fellow veto-wielding power China, particularly given new measures were only recently imposed after North Korea staged two long-range missile launches in July. Asked if Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and Trump talked about restricting North Korea’s fuel supply when the two spoke by telephone on Wednesday, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide said an embargo on oil and oil-related products would be an option. China, North Korea’s neighbor and main ally and trading partner, again urged restraint from all parties. Defense ministry spokesman Ren Guoqiang told a monthly briefing that China would never allow war or chaos on the Korean peninsula, its doorstep, and military means were not an option. “China strongly demands all sides to exercise restraint and remain calm and not do anything to worsen tensions,” Ren said, adding that Chinese forces were maintaining a normal state of alert along the North Korean border. Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said the situation on the peninsula was serious. “I also want to stress that the current tense situation on the peninsula isn’t a screenplay or a video game,” she told reporters. “It’s real, and is an immense and serious issue that directly involves the safety of people from both the north and south of the peninsula, as well as peace and stability of the entire region.” (Jack Kim and Kaori Kaneko, “U.S. Bombers Drill over Korean Peninsula after North Korea’s Latest Launch,” Reuters, August 31, 2017)
Talk of South Korea’s nuclear armament resurfaced, after Seoul’s defense chief raised the issue in a meeting with his U.S. counterpart. Meeting Defense Secretary James Mattis yesterday, Seoul’s Defense Minister Song Young-moo floated the idea of South Korea manufacturing indigenous nuclear-powered submarines and bringing back U.S. tactical nukes that were withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula in 1991. The proposal was discussed in the context of the allies’ efforts to enhance their deterrence against escalating threats from North Korea. The government, however, sought to quell the speculation, with the Foreign Ministry saying South Korea continues to observe the current nuclear-free principle and the Defense Ministry downplaying Song’s remark as an “introduction” of calls for nuclear armament here. “I don’t think it was a serious discussion,” Vice Defense Minister Seo Joo-seok told lawmakers today at the National Assembly. “My understanding is that the South Korean and U.S. defense ministers only mentioned such ideas (of redeploying US tactical nukes and developing nuclear submarines).” Mattis’ response has yet to be confirmed. Washington has previously opposed the measure out of concern it would prompt backlash from China and Russia and deepen an already-intense arms race in Northeast Asia.
Since taking office in July, Defense Minister Song has hinted at pursuing the development of a nuclear-powered submarine. On August 1, days after North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting the contiguous US, Song said Seoul was “ready” to consider the development. Pyongyang’s successful ICBM launch and ensuing missile provocations have also prompted calls to bring back U.S. nuclear weapons, particularly among conservative opposition parties who criticized President Moon Jae-in’s approach of engaging with North Korea in dialogue to address its military threats. The Moon administration has thus far remained skeptical of redeploying US tactical nukes, saying the move would violate Seoul’s previous pledge to stay nuclear-free in 1991. Seoul is also banned from developing nuclear weapons under various international agreements, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty. “The government’s basic position is denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by ensuring North Korea completely abandons its nuclear weapons,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Cho June-hyuck said in a press briefing today. Given the diplomatic and institutional hurdles facing efforts to deploy nuclear weapons, Song’s remark appeared to be in line with pressure on Washington to send more strategic assets and honor its commitment to providing extended nuclear deterrence, analysts said.
Today, the US deployed its stealth fighters and strategic bombers to take part in bombing drills aimed at North Korea. Two US B-1B supersonic bombers and four F-35 stealth fighter jets joined four South Korean F-15 fighters in live-fire exercises at a military field in eastern South Korea that simulated precision strikes against the North‘s “core facilities,” an official from Seoul’s Defense Ministry said. (Yeo Jun-suk, “Talk of Tactical Nuclear Weapons Resurfaces,” Korea Herald, August 31, 2017) The Blue House dismissed the possibility of bringing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea after reports got out that Korean Defense Minister Song Young-moo mentioned the idea in a meeting with his counterparts in Washington. “We have not discussed anything related to the tactical nuclear weapons in this administration,” said a senior government official of the Blue House. “The Korean government respects the international efforts on nonproliferation and its policies have been and will be in line with these efforts. What Minister Song Young-moo talked about in the meeting in Washington was part of his explanation of domestic issues in Korea,” the official added, “and we have also confirmed with Song that he wasn’t requesting the U.S. government to deploy nuclear weapons here.” In a meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis, Song mentioned that conservative opposition parties were demanding the redeployment of nuclear weapons to resolve the security crisis. Song also met with U.S. Pacific Command (Pacom) chief Adm. Harry Harris in Hawaii on August 30. “[Adm. Harris] reaffirmed the ironclad U.S. commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty, which states that a North Korean attack on one is an attack on both nations,” said Pacom’s spokeswoman Marine Capt. Cassandra Gesecki on its website. “He emphasized U.S. preparedness to fight tonight if called upon, using a full range of military options in defense of the U.S. homeland and Allies. Adm. Harris encouraged greater trilateral cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and the ROK – a partnership with a purpose to meet the North Korean threat.” (Esther Chung, “U.S. Nukes Are Not Coming, Blue House Says,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 2, 2017)
Armchair experts on North Korea — and a fair few who watch from their desks too — like to write off Kim Jong Un as unpredictable. Who knows what this nuclear-armed madman might do next, the refrain goes. But anyone who’s surprised by the last month’s events — from North Korea’s threat to fire missiles close to Guam, to the actual launch of a missile over Japan — hasn’t been paying attention. For Pyongyang’s actions have been clearly telegraphed. Take the August 9 statement from the North’s official Korean Central News Agency. The army’s top missile unit was drafting a plan to create “an enveloping fire” around Guam with Hwasong-12 missiles, KCNA reported. The plan would be sent to Kim, who would make a decision mid-month. Sure enough, on August 15, the agency reported Kim had been to see the missile unit’s leaders — he had a great time there, if his broad smile in the photos is anything to go by — and had reviewed the plan. He was going to keep an eye on “the foolish and stupid Yankees” a bit longer, KCNA quoted him as saying, making it clear he was talking about the joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises starting on August 21. North Korea always protests against the exercises, which it views as a pretext for an invasion, and China and Russia had been urging the United States to tone it down a bit. But they went ahead as planned. So what did Kim do? On August 29, two days before the end of the exercises, he fired a Hwasong-12 intermediate range ballistic missile technically capable of reaching beyond Guam. The United States responded by sending stealth planes and fighter jets on a bombing drill near South Korea’s border with North Korea Thursday, the final day of the exercises. “You can go back years and find them pretty clearly stating that this is what they’re going to do and this is why they’re going to do it,” said Van Jackson, an international security expert at Victoria University in New Zealand. “And now it’s just happening.” In a statement after the launch, KCNA said the missile units were practicing “striking the bases of the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces located in the Pacific operational theater” — an apparent reference to Guam. There have been clear signals before many of North Korea’s recent provocations. Take its launch of an inter-continental ballistic missile technically capable of reaching the mainland United States. In his New Year’s address on January 1, Kim said his rocket scientists were in the final stages of preparing for launch. On July 4, he made good on this. “They show their hand when they’re going to do something that could create actual instability,” Jackson said, citing aircraft and maritime warnings head of missile launches over the years, and the advance notification to Japan before it launched a rocket over its neighbor in 2009. So, despite its often over-the-top language, there’s plenty of reason to take North Korea seriously when it warns, as it did this week, there will be more missile launches. Kim called Tuesday’s launch a “meaningful prelude to containing Guam” and ordered his missile unit to be “fully ready to go into action for decisive battle.” North Korea is doing several things with these launches, analysts said. One of them is practicing launching under a variety of conditions and from a variety of places. “This was an operational test,” said Vipin Narang, an expert on nuclear proliferation and strategy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, noting this launch took place at a new site, just north of the capital. “They’re getting units ready to fire a missile without being destroyed,” he said, adding KCNA has emphasized this was a rehearsal for a real-life situation. North Korea was also testing its technology. The August 28 missile was fired at only half-range, South Korea’s defense ministry said in a report to the National Assembly today. The missile had a full range of 3,100 miles, the ministry said. Guam is 2,100 miles from Pyongyang. North Korea is also taking advantage of the mayhem in Washington, said Robert Carlin, a retired U.S. intelligence specialist on North Korea. “The North Koreans read our media, they know that Trump is in trouble and that Washington is dysfunctional,” Carlin said. “They know that, for all of the fist-shaking, the United States really is a headless giant right now. They know that there’s not much we can do, so they’re willing to press us.” The Trump administration has not reciprocated with a clear message to the Kim regime, analysts say. President Trump has vacillated between calling Kim a “smart cookie” and warning him the U.S. military is “locked and loaded.” Sanctions have been Washington’s main tool for dealing with North Korea, but Pyongyang has found ways to get around them. “Sanctions are always one step behind,” Jackson said. “It’s a whack-a-mole problem.” A forthcoming report from the U.N. panel of experts on North Korea, seen by The Washington Post, says North Korea “continues to flout the arms embargo and robust financial and sectoral sanctions, showing that as the sanctions regime expands, so does the scope of evasion.” Military action against North Korea would have “horrific” consequences, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said earlier this month, not least because of the devastation North Korea could inflict on the South with its conventional artillery. Even as his officials try to find an opening for negotiations, Trump yesterday ruled out diplomacy. “Talking is not the answer!” he tweeted. But the president’s message was quickly undercut by his own defense secretary.
“We are never out of diplomatic solutions,” Jim Mattis said at the Pentagon before meeting his South Korean counterpart, as if to back up Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s comment a few days earlier that “the president speaks for himself.” Narang of MIT said the recent muddling of messages goes beyond ambiguity. “Incoherence is not a strategy, and this is really starting to look incoherent,” he said. For that reason, North Korea is likely to continue lobbing threats and firing missiles for the foreseeable future. As Carlin, the former intelligence analyst puts it: “Until the United States gives them a good reason to stop testing, they’re not going to stop.” (Anna Fifield, “Don’t Be Surprised by North Korea’s Missile; Kim Jong Un Is Doing What He Said He Would,” Washington Post, August 31, 2017)
When Russia sent its bombers flying over the Korean peninsula last week, it was as much a signal to its allies in Beijing as it was a telegraph to Washington that Moscow too, was pivoting to Asia. The Kremlin may not become Pyongyang’s most steadfast and critical defender in this newest conflagration, but its cameo in the region is another attempt by Russian President Vladimir Putin to insert himself into a geo-political stalemate involving the U.S. Experts say it may also help deflect attention from upcoming military exercises in Belarus and western Russia next month, which have upset NATO members concerned about what amounts to a mass buildup of Russian troops on the edges of eastern Europe. China, which sent bombers into the air itself shortly after, declined to comment about the show of force from Moscow. In its regular press briefing on Wednesday, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said it would not “quantify how close China and Russia are cooperating on the North Korean nuclear issue,” said Hua Chunying, a ministry spokeswoman. “Just like China, Russia plays a pivotal role in maintaining global peace and stability as well as promoting peaceful solutions to hotspot issues in the region,” Hua said. “China is willing to strengthen its cooperation and coordination with Russia to jointly preserve peace and stability in the region and around the world.” If China is perturbed by its once-dominant Communist partner seeking to commandeer more influence in the region, it’s not outwardly displaying those concerns. “I think China is confident that its economic development, its military development, takes place at a faster pace than Russia, so in the long run Russia is in no position to seriously challenge Chinese core interests,” said Tong Zhao, a fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. “There are certain elements of competition between the two countries, but their shared concerns about the US very much outweigh that right now.” Both Moscow and Beijing “share the basic perception of who is the real trouble maker and who is the biggest common threat in the Korean peninsula,” Tong told CNN. That trouble maker, he said, is the United States, and more specifically, the occupant in the White House. “Secretary (Rex) Tillerson says he wants to do diplomacy before considering other options but the rhetoric from other people in the White House — (US President Donald) Trump tweeting that talking is not the answer, I think from the Chinese perspective the US is still considering a military option so that doesn’t reassure leaders in North Korea or China,” Tong said. Putin appeared to reiterate this today when he called attempts to get the regime of Kim Jong Un to cease its nuclear program “a dead-end road.” “Russia believes that the policy of putting pressure on Pyongyang to stop its nuclear missile program is misguided and futile,” Putin said in an article released by the Kremlin. “Provocations, pressure and militarist and insulting rhetoric are a dead-end road.” Russia has recently been making inroads to counter China’s perceived clout with North Korea. Overtures include Russia’s forgiveness of Soviet-era debt, of which $10 billion due from Pyongyang was written off by the Kremlin. Moscow is one of the largest donors of food aid to North Korea, and alongside Beijing, was recently hit with U.S. Treasury sanctions for selling oil to the North Korean regime. This is all intentional, says Samuel Ramani, a Russian foreign policy specialist. “As Russia takes an increasingly assertive approach to world affairs, it reminds its citizens of the Soviet Union’s status as a superpower that could influence conflicts worldwide,” Ramani wrote in the Washington Post in late July. “In this respect, Russia’s increased attention to North Korea is much like its military intervention in Syria and its expanded diplomatic presence in Libya and Afghanistan. Moscow is trying once again to project itself as a global power.” The jostling between the two powers over North Korea has decades-long historical roots. “To an extent it began when China and Russia became competitors for influence in the Communist world, they fought border battles in the late 1960s,” said Carl Schuster, retired Navy Captain and now adjunct professor at Hawaii Pacific University. “Russia had the greater advantage, they had much more influence in the region,” Schuster recalled. “When the Berlin Wall came down, Russia became very poor and China came to dominate.” Over the last 25 years Russia had virtually no ability to sway Pyongyang; it wasn’t able to provide technological support or invest significantly in North Korean industry. Now, Schuster says, “Putin sees an opportunity to increase his influence, probably not by much, but it would be better than what he has, and it distracts America.” Whatever little sway he may obtain, that, coupled with China’s own shaky standing with North Korea, highlights the possibility that neither power enjoys particularly friendly relations with the isolated regime. “There is a profound sense of mistrust at the basis of the relationship North Korea has with China and even with Russia,” said James Person, an expert on Korea at the Wilson Center. “There’s a perception particularly with China that Beijing has been overly interventionist over the years and not respectful of Korean sovereignty.” Person said that China’s determination to establish regional hegemony, or a “zone of deference” which takes in North Korea has created confusion among Western observers about China’s capacity to rein Pyongyang in. “People in Washington, including President Trump, believe China can just pick up the phone and solve the problem but because of this tortured history of relations they don’t have the ability to exercise at will political influence over North Korea.” Moreover, there is risk in China’s chastising North Korea any further, something that has been compounded by statements as far back as May in which the North Korean state-run news agency publicly rebuked China for banning coal imports from North Korea after a February missile test. The North Korean statements warned China of “grave consequences,” and said Beijing should “no longer try to test the limits of the DPRK’s patience.” “The DPRK will never beg for the maintenance of friendship with China, risking its nuclear program which is as precious as its own life, no matter how valuable the friendship is,” the commentary declared. Yet China chooses to endure this apparent belligerence. Beijing will always prefer the current leadership in Pyongyang to any that might follow should the Kim dynasty fall, says Person. “I think they would rather deal with the current North Korean regime with nuclear weapons than they would with a basically reunified Korea that places a US treaty ally at the Chinese doorstep,” he said. “The important thing is, the U.S. has to recognize that only it has the ability to give Pyongyang what it wants,” Person said. “Yes, China is important in the region, but let’s not outsource to China anymore, especially given the fact that China is trying to reassert this hegemony in the region. By outsourcing our North Korea policy to China, we’re only abetting them in doing this.” The U.S. must also contend with the notion that Moscow too will embrace a larger role. “Russia wants to be, and be seen as, a great power. It wants to lead the nations that resist Western power and influence. In defying the United Nations and supporting North Korea, Russia bolsters that status at home and abroad,” Ramani says. “And so Moscow’s alignment with North Korea will likely get stronger in the near future.” (Jamie Tarabay, “Russia’s Power Play in North Korea Aimed at Both China and U.S.,” CNN, September 1, 2017)
9/1/17:
The leaders of South Korea and the United States have agreed to enhance Seoul’s deterrence against North Korea by increasing its missile capabilities, but also reaffirmed the need to bring the communist state back to the dialogue table, Seoul’s presidential office, Cheong Wa Dae, said September 2. The agreement came in a telephone conversation between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and his U.S. counterpart, Donald Trump, yesterday, three days after Pyongyang staged its latest missile provocation. “President Moon and President Trump reaffirmed their view that it was important to have North Korea come out to the dialogue table to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue by applying maximum sanctions and pressure on the North,” Cheong Wa Dae spokesman Park Soo-hyun said in a press release. Trump stressed the importance of sending a strong and clear message to the reclusive North. “The two leaders noted the need to strengthen the Republic of Korea’s defense capabilities to counter provocations and threats from North Korea, and reached an agreement in principle to revise the ‘missile guideline’ to the extent hoped by the South Korean side,” the Cheong Wa Dae spokesman said. Seoul earlier cited a need to revise the guideline between the allies to increase the maximum payload of South Korean missiles to 1 ton from the current 500 kilograms. The two leaders also noted a need to further expand three-way cooperation with Japan to rein in North Korea’s evolving nuclear and missile capabilities. In a separate statement, the White House made no mention of dialogue with North Korea. “President Trump and President Moon pledged to continue to apply strong diplomatic and economic pressure on North Korea and to make all necessary preparations to deter and defend against the growing threat posed by North Korea,” it said. “The two leaders agreed to strengthen our alliance through defense cooperation and to strengthen South Korea’s defense capabilities.” Trump also provided his “conceptual approval” of South Korea’s plan to purchase American military equipment worth billions of dollars, it added, without giving further details. (Yonhap, “Moon Trump Agree to Boost Missile Deterrence, Bring North back to Dialogue,” September 2, 2017) President Donald Trump agreed with South Korean President Moon Jae-in to revise a joint treaty capping the development of the South’s ballistic missiles, Moon’s office said September 2. Trump also gave “conceptual” approval to the purchase by the South of billions of dollars of U.S. military hardware, the White House said. The South wants to raise the missile cap to boost its defenses against the reclusive North. “The two leaders agreed to the principle of revising the missile guideline to a level desired by South Korea, sharing the view that it was necessary to strengthen South Korea’s defense capabilities in response to North Korea’s provocations and threats,” South Korea’s presidential Blue House said. South Korea’s development of its ballistic missiles is limited to range of 800 km (500 miles) and payload weight of 500 kg (1,100 pounds) under a bilateral treaty revised in 2012. South Korea has said it wants to revise the agreement to increase the cap on the payload. The two countries agreed to the cap as part of a commitment to a voluntary international arms-control pact known as the Missile Technology Control Regime, aimed at limiting the proliferation missiles and nuclear weapons. The White House did not mention the voluntary bilateral agreement but said the two leaders agreed to strengthen their defense cooperation and South Korea’s defense capabilities. Trump “provided his conceptual approval of planned purchases by South Korea of billions of dollars in American military equipment”, the White House said. (Jack Kim in Seoul and Eric Beech, “U.S., South Korea Agree to Revise Missile Treaty in Face of North Korean Threats,” Reuters, September 1, 2017)
A group of American and Canadian humanitarian workers who were traveling in North Korea recently had to make a tough decision: leave the country immediately and hope to return to their lifesaving work in the future, or stay in the North and face possible problems trying to go home later. This time, however, the uncertainty of their situation was not because of the North Korean government, but rather because of the Trump administration’s intention to bar Americans from traveling to the already isolated country. Under the order, announced in July, Americans must leave the North by today. “I didn’t want any of the staff or any of the colleagues to potentially face issues when they were getting out,” said Kim Taehoon, founder of DoDaum, a humanitarian group based in the United States that has organized an H.I.V.-diagnosis and treatment program in North Korea for the past several years. “Because of the uncertainty of the travel ban, we don’t know if we will be able to do on-the-ground work anymore.” Washington announced the ban in response to the death of Otto F. Warmbier, 22, an American college student who had been serving a 15-year sentence of hard labor in North Korea after being convicted of trying to steal a political poster and died in June shortly after the North released him in a coma. The travel restrictions also reflected the United States’ growing impatience with North Korea over its missile tests and pursuit of nuclear weapons. By imposing the travel restriction, Washington hopes to discourage people from visiting North Korea, but at the same time, the sweeping ban threatens the efforts of hundreds of humanitarian workers in the North — Americans and those who collaborate with them — and the lives of North Koreans who badly need help. “One way or another, this program must go on. Otherwise, lives are lost,” said Stephen W. Linton, an American who oversees the Eugene Bell Foundation, a nonprofit group that has treated 250,000 tuberculosis patients in North Korea since 1997, including those with multidrug-resistant strains of the disease that are costlier to treat and harder to cure. Every six months, Linton leads a delegation of about 12 volunteer health care specialists, half of them American, on a three-week trip to North Korea. During the visits, which take place in May and November, they examine new patients and discharge from care those who have completed an 18-month treatment program. The treatment must follow a strict schedule to be effective, hence the delegation’s fixed schedule for trips. Now, Linton is fretting over whether his team can visit in November. Under the ban, American passports are invalid for travel “to, through and in North Korea,” according to the State Department. The department says that “in extremely limited circumstances,” it can consider a special validation visa for humanitarian workers, Red Cross officials, journalists and others traveling for “the national interest.” They must apply for it each time they want to visit North Korea. Before the ban, about 1,000 Americans had been traveling to North Korea on organized tours each year. Hundreds of humanitarian workers operated there at any given time, with most allowed to stay for only a limited duration. As the travel restriction loomed, major humanitarian groups, like World Vision or the American Friends Service Committee, said they had no resident or visiting workers in the North. It is unknown how many Americans are still in the North in ignorance or defiance of the ban. Also unclear is how effectively the United States will enforce it. “U.S. citizens are not required to register their presence with the U.S. government,” said William Cocks, a spokesman for the State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs. North Korea has called the ban “childish” and has said it will keep its doors “wide open to any U.S. citizen who would like to visit our country out of good will.”Kim, the DoDaum founder, said a 15-member delegation from his group had been cleared by the North Korean authorities to visit in mid-September to deliver H.I.V. medication and help treat patients, but the trip had to be canceled. Kim is a Canadian citizen, but key members of the delegation are Americans affected by the ban. As a way around the restriction, DoDaum is joining with the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology to create an online medical education program so that volunteer professors can offer lessons remotely, Kim said. The university, a private one that is financed by evangelical Christians, has relied on dozens of volunteer teachers, mostly Korean-Americans. Now, it must find non-American replacements if no exemptions are offered. ”I think this travel ban is being seen by North Korean officials as an explicitly inflammatory measure,” Kim said. “When we informed them of the need to pull out, there was a sense of understanding but at the same time, there was a sense of disappointment on both sides really.” The ban, by squeezing the flow of tourist cash, helps international efforts to undermine North Korea’s ability to finance its nuclear and missile programs. But critics of the ban say it will further restrict people-to-people interactions between the United States and North Korea. Among the hardest hit will be Korean-Americans who have been visiting to trace their family roots or for reunions with long-lost relatives. “Restricting humanitarian access puts lives in immediate jeopardy and increases the likelihood of humanitarian disaster,” said Daniel Jasper, advocacy coordinator for the American Friends Service Committee, a Quaker organization that has provided humanitarian relief in North Korea for decades. “Our long history in the region leads us to believe that the travel restrictions will greatly reduce the likelihood for peaceful relations on the Korean Peninsula.” American humanitarian workers said that the travel ban endangered the trust with the North Koreans that they had spent years building. To the North Korean authorities, who are hard-wired to consider Washington a mortal enemy, the fact that these American workers volunteered to visit despite their government’s warnings had been part of their credibility. “Getting permission from the government to go puts an X mark on your back because the North Koreans will never believe that you are there just for humanitarian purposes if the government gave you permission to go,” Linton said. “In fact, this travel ban, the way it’s set up, puts N.G.O.s in much greater danger by requiring official government permission to travel to North Korea. “There is no one I know in North Korea who would believe that there isn’t some connection between the N.G.O. and the government that made that permission possible,” he added. For Linton, helping Koreans has been a family mission for more than a century. His grandfather’s father-in-law, Eugene Bell, arrived in Korea in 1895 as an American missionary to engage in medical and evangelical activities. Mr. Linton’s grandfather, William Linton, also a missionary, served in Korea for half a century. In 1995, Linton established the Eugene Bell Foundation to help tuberculosis patients in North Korea. The members of Mr. Linton’s North Korean mission show that same dedication, including an 83-year-old Catholic priest who has been visiting the North despite a heart condition. They are determined to return, even if that means signing a waiver forsaking their right to consular service — a move they hope will make it easier for them to receive permission from the United States government to travel to the North. “We are not going to hold the U.S. government responsible for trying to get us out if we get into trouble,” Linton said. “We are doing this as mature adults who have made a decision that this program is worth the risks involved.” (Choe Sang-hun, “Groups Fault Trump Ban on Travel to North Korea,” New York Times, September 1, 2017,
9/2/17:
KCNA: “The DPRK delegation clarified the following principled stand categorically rejecting the “presidential statement”, cooked up by the UNSC over the DPRK’s recent successful launch of intermediate-range strategic ballistic rocket, at the plenary third session of the Geneva Disarmament Conference on August 30: The intermediate-range strategic ballistic rocket launching drill staged by the Strategic Force of the Korean people’s Army on Aug. 29 is a curtain-raiser to strong countermeasures against the hostile forces’ Ulji Freedom Guardian joint military exercises. We had already served a meaningful warning that we would keep an eye on the U.S. moves, but the U.S. responded to it with the bellicose war exercises for aggression. There is no guarantee that the huge armed forces which amassed in south Korea will not go over into action, now that the military tension on the Korean peninsula has reached its climax. The present touch-and-go situation on the peninsula is entirely attributable to the U.S. The UNSC turned its face away from our complaint over the said joint war exercises and again cooked up the “presidential statement”, a product of the U.S.-led anti-DPRK plots and clear evidence of unfair double standards. We, therefore, categorically reject it. If the U.S. acts rashly, despite our repeated warnings that the U.S. should ponder over the disastrous consequences to be entailed by its reckless military provocation, we will take a more powerful counteraction.” (KCNA, “DPRK Delegation Rejects UNSC’s ‘Presidential Statement,’” September 2, 2017)
President Trump has instructed advisers to prepare to withdraw the United States from a free-trade agreement with South Korea, several people close to the process said, a move that would stoke economic tensions with the U.S. ally as both countries confront a crisis over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Withdrawing from the trade deal would back up Trump’s promises to crack down on what he considers unfair trade competition from other countries, but his top national security and economic advisers are pushing him to abandon the plan, arguing it would hamper U.S. economic growth and strain ties with an important ally. Officials including national security adviser H.R. McMaster, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and National Economic Council director Gary Cohn oppose withdrawal, said people familiar with the process who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal White House deliberations. Although it is still possible Trump could decide to stay in the agreement to renegotiate its terms, the internal preparations for terminating the deal are far along, and the formal withdrawal process could begin as soon as this week, the people said. A White House spokeswoman said “discussions are ongoing, but we have no announcements at this time.” Trump has threatened before to withdraw from trade pacts only to pull back, but his threat to South Korea comes as the two countries look to create a united front against North Korea at a time when military tensions are at their highest level in years. The U.S.-South Korea deal, which was reached in 2007 and went into effect in 2012, reduces trade barriers between the two countries. Proponents say it gives U.S. companies more access to the wealthy South Korean economy, but critics charge that South Korea has reaped a greater share of the benefits of the deal, an allegation Trump has personally echoed multiple times since his election while calling for changes to the deal. South Korea elected a new president, Moon Jae-in, in May, and Trump has been frustrated that Moon is not willing to accept the initial U.S. trade demands, several trade experts said. Foreign leaders at first worked hard to build strong relations with Trump, but there has been a marked change in recent months as numerous leaders have stood up to his brand of nationalism. South Korean media have been telling trade representatives in Seoul to stand their ground against the United States in the renegotiations. “The North Korean nuclear crisis is pushing tension on this divided peninsula to new highs,” the Korea Times wrote in an editorial. “But that should be no reason for Seoul to put its economic interests far behind security matters, weakening its bargaining leverage and playing into the hands of the U.S. leader, the self-styled ‘artist of the deal.’ ” Trump is “playing with fire,” said Gary Schmitt, co-director of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. “There is a new president in South Korea whose instincts probably are to be probably not as pro-America as his predecessor, and now you are putting him in a situation where he has to react. In fact, what you need now is as much cooperation as possible.” White House advisers are trying to stop Trump from withdrawing from the South Korea free-trade agreement in part because they do not want to isolate the government in Seoul during a perilous time on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has become increasingly adversarial with its missile program, testing nuclear weapons and firing missiles over Japan in a way that has alarmed the international community. Wendy Cutler, who was the chief U.S. negotiator for the free-trade agreement, said the prospect of canceling the deal could not come at a worse time. “If not handled carefully, the latest impasse could lead to renewed trade tension between the U.S. and Korea,” she wrote in the Hill this week. “It also takes place at a time, after exceedingly threatening North Korean missile tests, when the bilateral alliance could not be more important.” South Korea is the sixth-largest goods trading partner with the United States, accounting for $112.2 billion in two-way trade last year, according to the U.S. trade representative. U.S. companies exported $42.3 billion in goods to South Korea and imported $69.9 billion in goods last year, leaving a trade deficit of $27.7 billion. Trump and Moon spoke on the phone late Friday, but a readout of the call provided by the White House referenced only national security issues and did not mention the escalating trade dispute. Withdrawing from the deal could lead to a large increase on tariffs levied against products the United States imports from South Korea, such as electronics, cellphones and automobiles. South Korea would also immediately start charging very high tariffs on goods and services imported into its country. Chad Bown, who served as an economist in the White House during the Obama administration, said the tariff the U.S. government charges against many Korean imports would rise from 0 to 3.5 percent. The tariff South Korea charges against U.S. imports would rise from 0 to almost 14 percent, making it harder for U.S. companies to find buyers there. The Pentagon referred a request for comment to the Commerce Department, which did not respond. Trump’s consideration of starting the process to pull out of the deal was first reported by Inside U.S. Trade. In July, U.S. Trade Representative Robert E. Lighthizer revealed some of Trump’s complaints with the South Korea deal during a special session that was called in an attempt by the White House to begin renegotiations. Lighthizer said at the time that since 2012, the U.S. “trade deficit in goods with Korea has doubled from $13.2 billion to $27.6 billion, while U.S. goods exports have actually gone down. This is quite different from what the previous Administration sold to the American people when it urged approval of this Agreement. We can and must do better.” In an April interview with the Washington Post, Trump called the agreement “a horrible deal” that has left America “destroyed.” “With the Korean deal, we terminate and it’s over,” Trump told The Post in that interview. The U.S.-South Korea free-trade agreement, known as KORUS, allows the United States to terminate it after six months if it wishes to. So if Trump signed a letter to withdraw from the agreement, the deal would effectively be terminated in March 2018. KORUS was approved by Congress, but Trump could to pull out of the agreement on his own. (Damian Paletta, “Trump targets S. Korea Accord,” Washington Post, September 3, 2017 p. A-1)
9/3/17:
North Korea sharply raised the stakes in its stand-off with the rest of the world, detonating a powerful nuclear device that it claimed was hydrogen bomb that could be attached to a missile capable of reaching the mainland United States. Even if the regime led by Kim Jong Un is exaggerating its feats, scientific evidence showed that North Korea had crossed an important threshold and had detonated a nuclear device that was exponentially more powerful than its last — and almost eight times the size of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. Today’s blast — North Korea’s sixth nuclear test but the first since Trump took office — could escalate those tensions to a new level. The nuclear device that North Korea tested appeared to be so large that Vipin Narang, an expert on nuclear proliferation and strategy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, called it a “city buster. “Now, with even relatively inaccurate intercontinental ballistic missile technology, they can destroy the better part of a city with this yield,” Narang said. North Korea’s latest nuclear test took place at exactly noon local time at its Punggye-ri testing site and was recorded as a magnitude 6.3 earthquake, according to the United States Geological Survey. It was followed eight minutes later by a 4.1 magnitude earthquake that appeared to be a tunnel collapsing at the site. Japan immediately sent up sniffer planes to try to measure radiation levels. North Korean state media said that the test was carried to test “the accuracy and credibility” of its “H-bomb to be placed at the payload of the ICBM.” North Korea tested its intercontinental ballistic missile for the first time in July, and its second test later the same month showed the rocket could theoretically reach Denver or Chicago. Those launches caused Trump to tell reporters that if North Korea continued its nuclear provocations, it would feel “fire and fury.” He later tweeted that the American military was “locked and loaded.” North Korean television broadcast footage of Kim signing the order to detonate. Today’s test, part of the regime’s plan for building “a strategic nuclear force,” was a “perfect success,” KCNA said. Earlier today, KCNA had released photos of Kim inspecting what was described as a hydrogen bomb that could be attached to an ICBM — the same device that appeared to be detonated just hours later. All the components of the “H-bomb” were “homemade” so North Korea could produce “powerful nuclear weapons as many as it wants,” the state-run agency quoted Kim as saying. Analysts were poring over the photos and the data today, especially questioning North Korea’s claim to have produced a “two-stage thermonuclear weapon.” David Albright, a nuclear weapons expert and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, was skeptical of North Korea’s claims and said that the photos were likely “propaganda.” But there was no doubt that North Korea was making progress. South Korean government officials and independent nuclear scientists estimated the yield — the amount of energy released by the weapon — to be 100 kilotons. That would make it almost eight times as strong as the American atomic bomb that destroyed the Japanese city of Hiroshima in 1945. At that level, North Korea’s nuclear device would be “very significant and destabilizing,” Albright said. “It would show that their design, whatever the specific design, has achieved a yield that is capable of destroying substantial parts of large modern cities.” Still, Albright doubted that North Korea had been able to make such a warhead small enough to fit onto a missile. Although governments and experts would continue to assess the technical aspects of the latest nuclear test, MIT’s Narang said the danger is significant, regardless of whether this was a lesser boosted fission device or a true hydrogen bomb, or whether North Korea had mastered the technology to deliver this accurately to a target. “It really doesn’t matter now from a deterrence perspective,” he said. “Mated on the ICBM, you don’t want this thing anywhere near a city near you.” Today’s test caused anger across the region, with South Korean President Moon Jae-in saying he would “never allow North Korea to continue advancing its nuclear and missile technologies,” according to his national security adviser. South Korean military leaders warned North Korea that they, together with their American allies, were “fully equipped” to punish North Korea. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said he “would not tolerate” the nuclear test. Abe had spoken with Trump earlier in the day, and said afterwards that they had agreed to “increase pressure on North Korea and make it change its policies.” All eyes will now turn to China to see if it will be angry enough to impose true punishment on North Korea. China has expressed annoyance at North Korea’s frequent ballistic missile launches, but analysts have said Beijing probably would not take serious action unless there is another nuclear test. China’s primary concern is stability on its borders, and it has shied away from implementing sanctions that would seriously undermine the regime in Pyongyang, analysts have said. Almost all international sanctions, such as bans on recent bans on coal and seafood exports, rely on Chinese enforcement because about 90 percent of North Korean trade goes through China.
China’s foreign ministry said today that North Korea had conducted the nuclear test “with no regard to the general objections of the international community.” “The Chinese government resolutely opposes and strongly condemns this,” the ministry said in a statement. “China will work together with the international community to comprehensively and completely implement the relevant resolutions of the Security Council of the UN, unswervingly push forward the denuclearization of the peninsula, and unswervingly maintain the peace and stability of the peninsula,” it said. (Anna Fifield, “In Latest Test, North Korea Detonates Its Most Powerful Nuclear Device Yet, Washington Post, September 3, 2017) North Korea’s detonation of a sixth nuclear bomb today prompted the Trump administration to warn that even the threat to use such a weapon against the United States and its allies “will be met with a massive military response.” The test — and President Trump’s response — immediately raised new questions about the president’s North Korea strategy and opened a new rift with a major American ally, South Korea, which Trump criticized for its “talk of appeasement” with the North. Though it was far from clear that the North had set off a hydrogen bomb, as it claimed, the explosion caused tremors that were felt in South Korea and China. Experts estimated that the blast was four to sixteen times more powerful than any the North had set off before, with far more destructive power than the bombs dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The United States Geological Survey estimated that the tremor set off by the blast, detected at 12:36 p.m. at the Punggye-ri underground test site in northwestern North Korea, had a magnitude of 6.3. The South Korean Defense Ministry’s estimate was much lower, at 5.7, but even that would mean a blast “five to six times” as powerful as the North’s last nuclear test, a year ago, said Lee Mi-sun, a senior analyst at the South Korean Meteorological Administration. The South’s National Fire Agency, which operates an emergency hotline, said it had received 31 calls about buildings and the ground shaking, the first time that South Koreans had reported tremors after a North Korean nuclear detonation. The blast was so powerful that the first tremor was followed by a second, weaker one minutes later, which the United States Geological Survey called a “collapse,” probably a cave-in at the North’s underground test site. Yet after a day of meetings in the Situation Room involving Trump and his advisers, two phone calls between the president and Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan, and even demands from some liberal Democrats to cut off North Korea’s energy supplies, Trump’s aides conceded that they faced a familiar conundrum. While the Pentagon has worked up a series of military options for targeted strikes at North Korea’s nuclear and missile sites, Trump was told that there is no assurance that the United States could destroy them all in a lightning strike, according to officials with knowledge of the exchange. Cyberstrikes, which President Barack Obama ordered against the North’s missile program, have also been judged ineffective. Trump hinted at one extreme option: In a Twitter post just before he met his generals, he said that “the United States is considering, in addition to other options, stopping all trade with any country doing business with North Korea.” Taken literally, such a policy would be tantamount to demanding a stoppage of any Chinese oil to North Korea, essentially an attempt to freeze out the country this winter and bring whatever industry it has to a halt. The Chinese would almost certainly balk; they have never been willing to take steps that might lead to the collapse of the North Korean regime, no matter how dangerous its behavior, for fear that South Korean and American troops would occupy the country and move directly to the Chinese border. Beyond that, the economic disruption of ending all trade with China would be so huge inside the United States that Trump’s aides declined today to discuss the implications. After meeting with Mr. Trump, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis emerged to warn North Korea that “any threat to the United States or its territory, including Guam or our allies, will be met with a massive military response.” But Mattis, in a terse statement delivered on the White House driveway with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., also offered a word of reassurance to the North’s reclusive leader, Kim Jong-un. “We are not looking to the total annihilation of a country, namely North Korea,” he said. “But as I said, we have many options to do so.” Still, Mattis’s statement left open many questions. His formulation seemed to rule out the kind of “preventive war’’ that the national security adviser, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, warned last month might be necessary after the North tested two intercontinental ballistic missiles in an effort to demonstrate that it could reach Los Angeles and beyond. Instead, Mr. Mattis seemed to be talking about “pre-emptive strikes,” which the United States might order if it determined that an attack seemed imminent. There was no public discussion of pursuing a diplomatic opening to the North. The North Korean leader has tried to portray his nuclear program as unstoppable and nonnegotiable, posing by a picture of what the North’s official news agency today called a hydrogen bomb that could be fitted into the nose cone of the ICBMs tested last month. Experts warned that the weapon, while shaped like a hydrogen bomb, could well have been a mock-up or decoy, one of the many steps the North takes to make it appear more powerful than it truly is. On September 4, South Korea’s army fired short-range ballistic missiles off its east coast in a simulated attack on North Korea’s nuclear test site, its military said in a statement. F-15K fighter jets also joined in the show of force, firing air-to-land missiles, it said. Only hours earlier, Trump reacted to the North Korean test by lashing out at South Korea. “North Korea is a rogue nation which has become a great threat and embarrassment to China, which is trying to help but with little success,” he said. “South Korea is finding, as I have told them, that their talk of appeasement with North Korea will not work, they only understand one thing!” Trump appeared to be referring to the offers by South Korea’s new president, Moon Jae-in, to enter into some kind of negotiations with the North that might lead to a renewal of the “Sunshine Policy,” an effort by some of his predecessors to lure the North into disarmament with economic engagement. Those efforts failed. Trump’s undisguised swipe at the South for “appeasement” was certain to exacerbate fears that the United States might put it in danger. And it came only a day after Trump threatened a new rift in relations with suggestions that the United States might withdraw from a trade deal with South Korea — one that was intended to bolster the alliance. In response to Trump’s criticism, Moon’s office said it was working closely with Washington to exert “maximum sanctions and pressure.” But it also reiterated that the allies shared the understanding that the goal of these sanctions and pressure was to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table. “We have experienced an internecine war and can never tolerate another catastrophic war on this land,” Moon’s office said in a statement. “We will not give up our goal of working together with allies to seek a peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” China expressed “strong condemnation” of the test, according to Xinhua, but suggested no new action. Its leaders feel as stymied as their American counterparts, according to many China experts. The test’s timing was a major embarrassment for President Xi Jinping of China, who today was hosting a summit meeting of the so-called BRICS countries — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Peter Hayes, director of the Nautilus Institute, a U.S.-based research group specializing in North Korea, said the test seemed intended to jolt Xi and convince him that he needed to persuade the United States to talk to North Korea. Japan requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council, as it did earlier in the week after a missile test over Hokkaido, its northernmost island. In Europe, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that North Korea “deserves absolute condemnation,” and a joint statement from Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and President Emmanuel Macron of France said “the most recent provocation from Pyongyang reaches a new dimension.” The timing of the test was almost certainly no coincidence: It came during the American Labor Day weekend, and the anniversary of the founding of the North Korean government is September 12. “Pyongyang has a playbook of strategic provocations, throws off its adversaries through graduated escalation, and seeks maximum political impact by conducting weapons tests on major holidays,” said Lee Sung-yoon, a Korea expert at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. (David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-Hun, “Nuclear Blast by North Korea Amplifies Crisis,” New York Times, September 4, 2017,
KCNA: “Respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un guided the work for nuclear weaponization on the spot. He was greeted by senior officials of the Department of Munitions Industry of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and scientists of the Nuclear Weapons Institute before being briefed on the details of nuclear weaponization. The institute recently succeeded in making a more developed nuke, true to the strategic intention of the WPK for bringing about a signal turn in nuclear weaponization. He watched an H-bomb to be loaded into new ICBM. Saying that he felt the pride of indomitably bolstering up the nuclear forces at a great price while seeing the Juche-oriented thermonuclear weapon with super explosive power made by our own efforts and technology, he expressed great satisfaction over the fact that our scientists do anything without fail if the party is determined to do. He acquainted himself with technical specifications and structural and operational characters of the H-bomb. The scientists further upgraded its technical performance at a higher ultra-modern level on the basis of precious successes made in the first H-bomb test. The H-bomb, the explosive power of which is adjustable from tens kiloton to hundreds kiloton, is a multi-functional thermonuclear nuke with great destructive power which can be detonated even at high altitudes for super-powerful EMP attack according to strategic goals. All components of the H-bomb were homemade and all the processes ranging from the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials to precision processing of components and their assembling were put on the Juche basis, thus enabling the country to produce powerful nuclear weapons as many as it wants, he said. Noting that the scientists, technicians, workers, soldiers and officials in the atomic power industry, who have made devoted efforts to raising the level of nuclear weaponization up to its perfection as intended by the Party, are creditable “nuclear combatants” of the Party who are upholding its line of simultaneously developing the two fronts with the strongest nukes, he highly praised their exploits. Underlining the need for the institute to dynamically conduct the campaign for successfully concluding the final-stage research and development for perfecting the state nuclear force, he set forth important tasks to be fulfilled in the research into nukes.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Gives Guidance to Nuclear Weaponization,” September 3, 2017)
DPRK Nuclear Weapons Institute’s statement “in connection with the perfect success in the test of a hydrogen bomb for ICBM: Scientists in the nuclear field of the DPRK successfully carried out a test of H-bomb for ICBM in the northern nuclear test ground of the DPRK at 12:00 on September 3, true to the Workers’ Party of Korea’s plan for building a strategic nuclear force. The H-bomb test was carried out to examine and confirm the accuracy and credibility of the power control technology and internal structural design newly introduced into manufacturing H-bomb to be placed at the payload of the ICBM. The result of the experimental measurements showed that the power specifications of nuclear warhead including total explosion power and fission to fusion power rate and all other physical specifications reflecting the qualitative level of two-stage thermo-nuclear weapon fully complied with design figures. It was also confirmed that even though the recent test was carried out with the bomb of unprecedentedly big power, there were neither emission through ground surface nor leakage of radioactive materials nor did it have any adverse impact on the surrounding ecological environment. The test re-confirmed the precision of the compression technology and the fission chain reaction start control technology of the first system of the H-bomb and proved once again that the nuclear material utility rate in the first system and the second system reached the levels reflected in the design. Symmetrical compression of nuclear charge, its fission detonation and high-temperature nuclear fusion ignition, and the ensuing rapidly boosting fission-fusion reactions, which are key technologies for enhancing the nuclear fusion power of the second-system of the H-bomb, were confirmed to have been realized on a high level. This helped prove that the directional combination structure and multi-layer radiation explosion-proof structural design of the first system and the second system used for the manufacture of the H-bomb were very accurate and the light thermal radiation-resisting materials and neutron-resisting materials were rationally selected. The test helped draw the conclusion that the Korean-style analytic method and calculation programs for the complicated physical processes occurring in the first and second systems were put on the high level and that the engineering structure of the H-bomb as a nuclear warhead designed on the Juche basis including the structure of the nuclear charge of the second system was creditable. The test once again confirmed the reliability of the concentration-type nuke detonation control system fully verified through a nuclear warhead detonation test and test-launches of various ballistic rockets. The perfect success in the test of the H-bomb for ICBM clearly proved that the Juche-based nukes of the DPRK have been put on a highly precise basis, the creditability of the operation of the nuclear warhead is fully guaranteed and the design and production technology of nuclear weapons of the DPRK has been put on a high level to adjust its destructive power in consideration of the targets and purposes. It also marked a very significant occasion in attaining the final goal of completing the state nuclear force. The Central Committee the WPK extended warm congratulations to the scientists and technicians in the nuclear field in the northern nuclear test ground on their successful H-bomb test for ICBM.” (KCNA, “DPRK Nuclear Weapons Institute on Successful Test of H-Bomb,” September 3, 2017)
KCNA: “The Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea was convened in the morning on September 3, Juche 106 (2017). Present there were Kim Jong Un, Kim Yong Nam, Hwang Pyong So, Pak Pong Ju and Choe Ryong Hae who are Presidium members of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee. The Presidium first analyzed and estimated the current international political situation and the military tension created on the Korean peninsula. Then they heard a report about the study on nuclear weaponization made by the Nuclear Weapons Institute of the DPRK, and discussed the issue of conducting test of H-bomb for ICBM as part of the efforts to attain the final goal of completing the state nuclear force set forth at the 7th Congress of the WPK. Adopted at the Presidium was a decision of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee “On carrying out test of H-bomb for ICBM as part of efforts to attain the final goal of completing the state nuclear force” and Kim Jong Un signed the order for conducting the test. Also discussed at the Presidium were detailed ways and measures for containing the U.S. and other hostile forces’ vicious moves for sanctions against the DPRK and for making tasks of different fields set forth at the 7th Congress of the WPK be implemented with success.” (KCNA, “Presidium of Political Bureau of C.C., WPK Held,” September 3, 2017)
Not all nuclear arms are created equal. They have four main designs that progressively raise the destructive power of the weapons and their ability to obliterate large targets. Nuclear experts say that unusually large test explosions can be achieved in a variety of ways, making the field of atomic forensics quite difficult for distant experts. With today’s large North Korean blast, Norsar, short for the Norwegian Seismic Array, a research group based in Kjeller, noted that global shock waves alone provide insufficient information to determine if the detonation was a true hydrogen bomb, as the North declared. “But we can say in general,” the group added, “that the credibility of the claim increases with increasing explosive yield.” It said other evidence, such as leaks of radioactivity from the underground test site, might solve the riddle of the bomb type in the weeks to come. Nuclear experts said the blast was somewhere between four and 16 times as powerful as North Korea’s previous largest explosion, which was about the size of the Hiroshima bomb. The most basic kind of nuclear weapon — the kind experts say the North began with — is known as an atomic bomb. It gets its energy from splitting heavy atoms in chain reactions. The main fuels of atomic bombs are uranium or plutonium, both heavier than lead and both far more expensive than gold. The secret to achieving more destructive power is to increase the amount of thermonuclear fuel that an exploding atomic bomb can ignite. North Korea said that today’s test was a hydrogen bomb, but analysts were skeptical of this claim. A cheaper and more powerful way of freeing the atom’s hidden energies is to fuse two light atoms into one. The main fuels are deuterium and tritium, both rare but inexpensive forms of hydrogen. They are known as thermonuclear fuels because their ignition requires the blistering heat of an exploding atomic bomb, which acts like a match. The United States in 1951 injected a tiny amount of thermonuclear fuel into the core of an atomic bomb, enhancing its power. The explosion was roughly three times as strong as the Hiroshima blast. Some experts say the North is now taking this second step in bomb design. Others say the isolated state may have raced ahead to the third stage. That method wraps alternating layers of thermonuclear fuel and uranium around atomic bombs, and burns more hydrogen than simple boosting. David Albright, a former United Nations weapons inspector and the president of the Institute for Science and International Security, noted in a recent report that Russians who first tried that approach produced a blast more than 25 times as strong as the Hiroshima bomb. A true hydrogen bomb, the fourth stage of development, works by positioning near the triggering atomic bomb a separate capsule that can hold a much larger amount of thermonuclear fuel. In 1954, on Bikini Atoll in the Pacific, the United States tried that approach. The fireball expanded for miles. The shock wave swept neighboring atolls clean of vegetation and animals. In minutes, the mushroom cloud rose some 25 miles. Slowly, its radioactivity spread around the globe. The force of that device turned out to be far greater than all explosives used in World War II, including the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1,000 times as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb. Experts say North Korea is unlikely to achieve that kind of destructive power anytime soon, if ever. But they say the accumulating evidence suggests that the reclusive state is trying to do so — and trying hard. (William J. Broad, “Was It a Hydrogen Bomb? It’s Too Soon to Determine,” New York Times, September 4, 2017,
Mattis: “We had a small group national security meeting today with the President and the Vice President about the latest provocation on the Korean peninsula. We have many military options, and the President wanted to be briefed on each one of them. We made clear that we have the ability to defend ourselves and our allies – South Korea and Japan – from any attack. And our commitments among the allies are ironclad. Any threat to the United States, or its territories – including Guam – or our allies will be met with a massive military response – a response both effective and overwhelming. Kim Jong Un should take heed the United Nations Security Council’s unified voice – all members unanimously agreed on the threat North Korea poses, and they remain unanimous in their commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula – because we are not looking to the total annihilation of a country – namely, North Korea. But, as I said, we have many options to do so.” (DoD, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis Statement at the White House,” September 3, 2017)
Trump tweets: 9/3/17, 06:46: “South Korea is finding, as I have told them, that their talk of appeasement with North Korea will not work, they only understand one thing!”
9/3/17, 06:46: “South Korea is finding, as I have told them, that their talk of appeasement with North Korea will not work, they only understand one thing!”
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump)
South Korea will discuss with the United States deploying the “most powerful US tactical weapons” here, in response to North Korea’s sixth test of nuclear weapons, its chief security officer said. Chung Eui-yong, President Moon Jae-in’s top security adviser, also said the country would push for the “strongest sanctions” against the defiant regime led by Kim Jong-un in order to “completely” isolate it. “President Moon Jae-in said the country would not allow North Korea to continue advancing its nuclear and missile technologies,” Chung said after an emergency meeting of the National Security Council. The top security adviser did not elaborate, but the move comes amid a growing call here for nuclear rearmament. To beef up the South’s military capacity and the allies’ defense posture against the increasingly provocative North, the allies are likely to roll out this week four additional launchers for the US-led missile shield Terminal High Altitude Area Defense as well as US fighter jets. Two batteries and a powerful X-band radar are already deployed and operational in Seongju, North Gyeongsang Province. A typical THAAD battery consists of six launchers and a radar. Before today’s test, Seoul officials had revealed an ongoing discussion between the two sides for a possible rotational deployment of the US stealth jets F-22 and F-35B. The allies are known to be discussing the deployment of US strategic assets on a quarterly basis at the US air base in Osan, Gyeonggi Province, or Kunsan Air Base in North Jeolla Province, they added. The US has periodically sent strategic assets to South Korea, including B-1B bombers, as a show of force when North Korea’s provocative acts escalate. “It is believed that the US is positive toward rotational deployment of F-22 and F-35B jets over Korea as it remains firm in countering North Korea’s provocations,” a government source said. Chung said that he had two telephone conversations with his US counterpart H.R. McMaster before and after Seoul’s NSC meeting today. South Korea’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Jeong Kyeong-doo also spoke with his US counterpart Gen. Joseph Dunford in a phone conservation, during which they stressed the need for “effective military responses” to the provocation, aimed at demonstrating the allies’ force and resolve, according to Jeong’s office. (Jung Min-kyung, “Seoul to Consider Deploying Most Powerful U.S. Weapons,” Korea Herald, September 3, 2017)
9/4/17:
South Korea’s top security officials are beginning to lean towards strengthening military measures rather than dialogue with North Korea in response to the wayward regime’s latest nuclear test, Seoul’s defense minister said. “During a National Security Council meeting [held shortly after the nuke test yesterday], views converged on a direction that strengthens the military standoff (for now), rather than (pursuing) the Berlin declaration or dialogue,” Defense Minister Song Young-moo told a parliamentary session. The Berlin initiative refers to Moon’s policy that pursues Pyongyang’s denuclearization with a security guarantee and economic and diplomatic incentives while seeking a peace treaty and dismissing the prospect of forced unification. During the session, Song also said that during his recent talks with U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis, he demanded the U.S. deploy its strategic assets to Korea on a “regular” basis. But he dismissed the news report that during the talks in Washington he demanded the redeployment of the U.S. nuclear arsenal that had been withdrawn from the peninsula in the early 1990s. In its report to the legislature’s defense committee, the defense ministry said that it, in consultation with Washington, will seek to deploy a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, strategic bombers and other powerful assets to the peninsula as a response to the North’s nuclear experiment. It also unveiled its plan to stage unilateral live-fire drills involving Taurus air-to-surface guided missiles mounted on its F-15K fighter jets. The missile, with a range of 500 kilometers, is capable of launching precision strikes on the North’s key nuclear and missile facilities. In his assessment of the sixth nuke test, Song said that the North is presumed to have reduced the weight of a nuclear warhead to below 500 kilograms. “Yes, we presume so,” he said. “The smaller it becomes, the better it gets.” Song added that the North’s warhead is seen as being able to be fitted onto an ICBM. In its parliamentary report, the ministry also said that it has continuously detected signs of the North’s preparations for ballistic missile launches. “To show that it has secured a delivery vehicle that can target the U.S., the North could launch an ICBM-class ballistic missile,” the ministry said. (Yonhap, “Seoul Officials Leaning towards Military Measures than Dialogue with N.K.: Defense Chief,” September 4, 2017) South Korea’s defense minister said it was worth reviewing the redeployment of American tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula to guard against the North, a step that analysts warn would sharply increase the risk of an accidental conflict. Defense Minister Song Young-moo said that he asked his American counterpart, Jim Mattis, during talks at the Pentagon last week that strategic assets such as U.S. aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and B-52 bombers be sent to South Korea more regularly. “I told him that it would be good for strategic assets to be sent regularly to the Korean Peninsula and that some South Korean lawmakers and media are strongly pushing for tactical nuclear weapons [to be redeployed],” Song told a parliamentary hearing on North Korea’s nuclear test, without disclosing Mattis’s response. A poll that YTN, a cable news channel, commissioned in August found that 68 percent of respondents said they supported bringing tactical nuclear weapons back to South Korea. “The redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons is an alternative worth a full review,” Song said, echoing a position closely associated with conservatives in South Korea but not with progressives like Moon, who was elected president in May after vowing to engage with the North. After the defense minister spoke at the hearing, the South Korean president’s office said that it was not considering redeploying tactical nuclear weapons. “Our government’s firm stance on the nuclear-free peninsula remains unchanged,” said Kim Dong-jo, a spokesman for Moon. In Seoul, the Defense Ministry warned that Pyongyang might be preparing to launch another missile into the Pacific Ocean, perhaps an intercontinental ballistic missile theoretically capable of reaching the mainland United States. President Trump and his South Korean counterpart, Moon Jae-in, spoke on the phone for 40 minutes tonight, Korean time — 34 hours after the nuclear test and more than 24 hours after Trump took to Twitter to criticize Moon’s “talk of appeasement.” The two agreed to remove the limit on allowed payloads for South Korean missiles — something Seoul had been pushing for — as a way to increase deterrence against North Korea, according to a statement from South Korea’s Blue House. They agreed as well to work together to punish North Korea for yesterday’s nuclear test, pledging “to strengthen joint military capabilities,” a White House statement said, and to “maximize pressure on North Korea using all means at their disposal.” As concern over Korea deepened following North Korea’s huge nuclear test Sunday, Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said the regime of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was “begging for war.” At a U.N. Security Council meeting, Haley pressed for the “strongest possible” sanctions against the North. The administration plans to circulate a new sanctions draft this week. Haley did not spell out how she would overcome the objections of veto-wielding permanent members China and Russia. But she cautioned, “War is never something the United States wants. We don’t want it now. But our country’s patience is not unlimited. We will defend our allies and our territory.” Haley ruled out the “freeze for freeze” proposal backed by China and Russia, which would suspend U.S. joint military exercises with South Korea in return for suspension of North Korean nuclear and missile tests. “When a rogue regime has a nuclear weapon and an ICBM pointed at you, you do not take steps to lower your guard. No one would do that. We certainly won’t,” she said. Instead, she reiterated a White House threat from Sunday to cut off trade with any countries that also trade with North Korea. That would presumably include China, with which the United States had nearly $650 billion worth of trade in goods and services last year. “The United States will look at every country that does business with North Korea as a country that is giving aid to their reckless and dangerous nuclear intentions,” she said. Her remarks appeared to be unpersuasive. “China will never allow chaos and war” in Korea, said Liu Jieyi, the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations. Sanctions alone will not solve the crisis, said Russia’s U.N. ambassador, Vassily Nebenzia. Military experts in the United States are almost universally opposed to the idea of deploying strategic or tactical weapons in South Korea. “The thing that most concerns me about redeployment is that it introduces more room for miscalculation or unintended escalation,” said Catherine Dill of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif. In that situation, the ability to react more quickly could be a negative factor. From the perspective of the military alliance between the United States and South Korea, having long-range ballistic missiles or strategic bombers is “perfectly sufficient” to continue to deter North Korea, Dill said. As the North Korean threat has increased this year, the United States has sent F-35 stealth aircraft and other strike fighters on flyovers across the southern half of the peninsula in a not-so-thinly veiled warning to Kim. The U.S. Pacific Command even released photos last week of B-1B Lancers dropping bombs on a range on the southern side of the demilitarized zone that separates the two Koreas. But a growing number of policymakers in Seoul say that Guam is too far away and that, if the South comes under attack from North Korea, it can’t wait the two-plus hours it would take American bombers to arrive from their base in the Pacific. “We need these strategic or tactical assets that can destroy North Korea’s nuclear-capable missiles before they can inflict harm on us,” said Chun Yung-woo, a former South Korean national security adviser. “Right now they can retaliate, but by that time, tens of thousands of people might have been killed,” Chun said. “We need a first layer of offensive weapons stationed closer to North Korea’s nuclear and missile sites.” Jon Wolfsthal, a nuclear expert who served on President Barack Obama’s National Security Council, said that in the South Korean context, “strategic assets” are all about giving “a tangible sense of reassurance” to the government in Seoul. “The reassurance bucket is bottomless,” Wolfsthal said. “You can pour stuff into it and it’s never going to fill up.” South Korean officials have been asking for fighter jets and ballistic missile-equipped submarines to be based on the peninsula, and have long wanted B-1Bs and B-52s to land rather than just fly over — all to give a greater sense of U.S. commitment to South Korea. But there are good logistical reasons that can’t happen, Wolfsthal said. For one, South Korea doesn’t have airstrips long enough for big, heavy B-52s, and second, the United States does not want its high-tech fighter jets sitting within North Korean artillery range. (Anna Fifield, “Return of U.S. Arms Discussed in Seoul,” Washington Post, September 5, 2017,
The Trump Administration, warning that North Korea is “begging for war,” is pressing China and other members of the United Nations Security Council to cut off all oil and other fuels to the country. The effort, which senior administration officials described as a last best chance to resolve the standoff with the North using sanctions rather than military means, came as South Korean officials said that they had seen evidence that North Korea may be preparing another test, likely of an intercontinental ballistic missile. The call for the fuel cutoff, which is expected to be part of a draft resolution that the United States is beginning to discuss privately with other members of the Security Council, came a day after North Korea’s most powerful nuclear test in the 11 years it has been detonating nuclear weapons. It is far from clear that China’s president, Xi Jinping, would be willing to go along with the highly aggressive step of cutting off fuel to the North. Roughly 90 percent of North Korea’s trade, and nearly all of its imported energy supplies, come from China. China’s overall trade with the North was up significantly in the past 12 months, and it has long feared that an oil cutoff would lead to the collapse of the regime. That, in China’s eyes, would only invite South Korea to take over the North, and put an American ally on China’s border. The subject of fuel cutoff is likely to come up in a phone call with President Xi that the White House was trying to arrange. Speaking to the Security Council in an emergency session on Monday, Nikki R. Haley, the American ambassador to the United Nations, said North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, “is begging for war.” “We have kicked the can down the road long enough,” Haley told the council in an emergency meeting. “There is no more road left.” She said that “the time has come for us to exhaust all of our diplomatic means before it’s too late.” Even as Haley called for more diplomacy[??], Trump agreed in a phone call this evening with South Korea’s president, Moon Jae-in, to allow South Korea to build more powerful non-nuclear ballistic missiles, said Park Soo-hyun, a spokesman for Moon. While the South has pressed for such permission for many years, the change is unlikely to alter the strategic balance on the Korean Peninsula. “President Trump reaffirmed the United States’ ironclad commitment to defend South Korea,” Park said. “The two leaders also agreed to push for maximum pressure and sanctions against North Korea.” Inside the White House, there is little expectation that the drive to cut off North Korea’s fuel — which echoes the energy embargo that the United States used to try to force Japan to change its behavior in 1941, before the attack on Pearl Harbor — will work because of the Chinese reluctance to take that step. Haley’s comments were notable in part because while they called for a last stab at diplomacy, they also ruled out the one diplomatic option considered the most viable first step — a Chinese and Russian proposal for a “freeze” on the North’s nuclear and missile testing in return for some kind of freeze on United States military exercises. (David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-Hun, “U.S. Is Pressing For Oil Embargo on North Korea,” New York Times, September 5, 2017,
Haley: “…To the members of the Security Council, I must say, “enough is enough.” We have taken an incremental approach, and despite the best of intentions, it has not worked. Members of this Council will no doubt urge negotiations and a return to talks. But as I have just outlined, we have engaged in numerous direct and multilateral talks with the North Korean regime, and time after time, they have not worked. The time for half measures in the Security Council is over. The time has come to exhaust all of our diplomatic means, before it’s too late. We must now adopt the strongest possible measures. Kim Jong-Un’s action cannot be seen as defensive. He wants to be acknowledged as a nuclear power. But being a nuclear power is not about using those terrible weapons to threaten others. Nuclear powers understand their responsibilities. Kim Jong-Un shows no such understanding. His abusive use of missiles, and his nuclear threats show that he is begging for war. War is never something the United States wants. We don’t want it now. But our country’s patience is not unlimited. We will defend our allies and our territory. The idea that some have suggested of a so-called freeze-for-freeze is insulting. When a rogue regime has a nuclear weapon and an ICBM pointed at you, you do not take steps to lower your guard. No one would do that. We certainly won’t. The time has come to exhaust all diplomatic means to end this crisis, and that means quickly enacting the strongest possible measures here in the UN Security Council. Only the strongest sanctions will enable us to resolve this problem through diplomacy. We have kicked the can down the road long enough. There is no more road left. This crisis goes well beyond the UN. The United States will look at every country that does business with North Korea as a country that is giving aid to their reckless and dangerous nuclear intentions. And what we do on North Korea will have a real impact on how other outlaw nations who seek nuclear weapons choose to conduct themselves in the future. The stakes could not be higher. The urgency is now. Twenty-four years of half measures and failed talks is enough.” (DoS, Ambassador Nikki Haley, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Remarks at an Emergency UN Security Council Briefing on North Korea, September 4, 2017)
The Moon Jae-in administration is being marginalized in its trilateral alliance with Washington and Tokyo as Pyongyang ratchets up its nuclear brinkmanship. As of 8 p.m. today, President Moon and President Donald Trump had yet to talk, although Trump did discuss the nuclear test with Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. “We are currently coordinating the schedule,” a spokesman for Seoul’s presidential official said this afternoon, hinting that the Moon and Trump may talk late today. “Remember that the last call took place at 10 a.m. in Washington time and 11 p.m. in Seoul time.” Moon and Trump had their last call at 11 p.m. on September 1, after the North fired an intermediate-range ballistic missile over Japan on August 26. While Seoul struggled to set up a call with the White House, Trump and Abe spoke on the phone call 11 p.m. Tokyo time, hours after the nuclear test. According to the Japanese government, they talked for about 10 minutes and agreed to put unprecedented pressure on North Korea. It was Abe and Trump’s second phone call Sunday. They talked earlier in the morning before reports of the nuclear test. Following their second call, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishimura Yasutoshi briefed reporters shortly after midnight. “The two leaders reaffirmed that Japan and the United States will stay 100 percent together,” Nishimura said. “The two leaders also shared the perception that the roles of China and Russia are important and they also reaffirmed the position that Japan and the United States will closely cooperate in dealing with the situation including the UN measures.” A Japanese reporter, then, asked why South Korea was left out, pointing out that Trump and Abe stressed in the past the importance of trilateral cooperation among the South, Japan and the United States. “It was because this phone call was too short,” said Nishimura.
When the North fired an intercontinental ballistic missile on July 28, Trump and Abe spoke on July 31. Moon, however, only talked to Trump 10 days after the test. The Blue House blamed Moon’s summer vacation for the delay. When concerns have been expressed about the delay in communications between Moon and Trump, the Blue House said there was no need for the two presidents to talk urgently because cooperation between Seoul and Washington is extremely close.
Discord between Seoul and Washington on how to deal with Pyongyang is starting to show. Trump slapped down the Moon government with a tweet yesterday. “South Korea is finding, as I have told them, that their talk of appeasement with North Korea will not work, they only understand one thing!” he wrote. The Blue House issued a statement that day rebutting that tweet and defending Moon’s policy of wanting to negotiate with Pyongyang. “We have experienced the tragedy of fratricidal war. We cannot repeat it again on this land. We will seek denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through peaceful means with our allies,” it said. “Trump’s tweet was quickly reported [to the Blue House],” a presidential official said Sunday. “So we had a discussion and decided to issue the statement.” The Blue House also said today that the National Security Council of the White House confirmed that Seoul and Washington have no differences over policies toward the North. The Blue House said it asked the White House through a diplomatic channel about Trump’s tweet. “We got the reply last night,” said a presidential official. “It said there was no disagreement between the South and the United States.” Today, the South Korean military conducted a live missile firing drill, designed to practice a strike on the North’s nuclear test site in Punggye-ri, North Hamgyong Province. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army’s ground-to-ground ballistic missile and the Air Force’s air-to-ground missile accurately hit a target set up in open waters east of the peninsula. The Blue House also issued a press release today to dismiss concerns that the Moon administration was being neglected. Chung Eui-yong, the head of the Blue House’s National Security Office, talked to his U.S. counterpart, H.R. McMaster, for 30 minutes from 10:15 a.m. today to discuss the two countries’ coordinated countermeasures, presidential spokesman Park Soo-hyun said. “It was their third phone call since the North’s sixth nuclear test,” he added. (Ser Myo-ja and Seo Soong-wook, “Seoul Being Marginalized by U.S.,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 5, 2017)
Hayes and Von Hippel: “We estimate that the following measures could be taken by the DPRK line agencies to either substitute non-oil energy supplies for imported oil; or simply cut end use by fiat: 1. Curtailment of diesel fuel availability for half of users of on-site generation. 2. A 50 percent reduction in the use of heavy fuel oil as a starter fuel for coal-fired plants, and in the few heavy-oil-fired power plants in the DPRK. 3. A reduction in 80% of Minerals Subsector heavy fuel oil use due to sanctions, and a curtailment in heavy oil use in cement and other subsectors, as those sectors revert entirely to use of coal; or shut down anyway due to already imposed sanctions on minerals exports. 4. A 15% reduction in diesel truck use by substitution for diesel with biomass/charcoal/coal in older gasifier trucks, plus a 10% reduction from use curtailment/mode shifting in diesel trucks, trains, and ships/boats. 5. A 50% reduction in the use of gasoline in autos (and gasoline trucks) by imposition of curtailments for many vehicle owners. 6.A shift (50%) in the residential and commercial sectors from use of kerosene to electricity (including from solar photovoltaic panels) use for lighting, and curtailment in some instances, plus a reduction of LPG use for cooking by half through the use of substitute fuels (biomass and coal). Note that these reductions do not touch either the military sector; nor the fisheries and agriculture sector, which are needed to feed the DPRK population. …Please note that these are very rough and preliminary estimates, and should be set in the context of an updated estimate of supply and demand for oil products and other fuels in the DPRK, which is not yet available. Nonetheless, these calculations reveal that should the DPRK choose to take these measures to reduce oil consumption in the face of a supply cut-off, the result could be an annual reduction in oil demand nearly equivalent to the DPRK’s typical imports of crude oil in recent years (500,000 tonnes), or nearly 40 percent of what we (albeit very crudely and preliminarily) estimates to be DPRK oil and oil products demand in 2017. Thus, if China were to cut its roughly 500,000 tonnes of oil exports to the DPRK by 50 percent, that is, by 250,000 tonnes, the substitutions and cuts that the DPRK could achieve would enable it to buffer against major effects on its economy for at least a year—similar to the buffer that is already likely in place for the military users of oil in the DPRK by past stockpiling. This analysis assumes no prior stockpiling in the non-military sector, which is unrealistic. It also takes no account of very small-scale oil production in the DPRK itself, which may be on-going. This is a very crude estimate of the possible impacts of implementing energy sanctions on the DPRK. It assumes that such drastic measures could be implemented in a few months by fiat—North Korea being one of the few places where such command directives could be undertaken with some hope of success. It also does not account for local resilience whereby local coal, hydro and biomass resources could be drawn on quickly by mobilizing labor. And, it does not reflect the additional resilience that the existence of private markets for fuels would lend to the overall system, with likely emergence of shadow prices and black markets that would drive supply towards those with the greatest purchasing power. A detailed study is needed to understand more fully how various levels of cuts to Chinese and Russian oil supplies to the DPRK would play out. Even these basic estimates, however, suggest the following with regard to even massive (say 50 percent) Chinese oil export cuts to the DPRK: a) The DPRK could quickly cut its non-military use by about 40% of its annual oil use with a variety of end use reduction and substitution measures. b) There will be little or no immediate impact on the Korean Peoples’ Army’s (KPA’s) nuclear or missile programs. c) There will be little or no immediate impact on the KPA’s routine or wartime ability to fight due to energy scarcity, given its short war strategy and likely stockpiling. d) The DPRK has the ability to substitute coal and electricity for substantial fractions of its refined product use, as well as its heavy fuel oil use (the product of oil refining) for heat production. e) The immediate primary impacts of responses to oil and oil products cut-offs will be on welfare; people will be forced to walk or not move at all, and to push buses instead of riding in them. There will be less light in households due to less kerosene, and less on-site power generation. There will be more deforestation to produce biomass and charcoal used in gasifiers to run trucks, leading to more erosion, floods, less food crops, and more famine. There will be less diesel fuel to pump water to irrigate rice paddies, to process crops into foodstuffs, to transport food and other household necessities, and to transport agricultural products to markets before they spoil. f) Past experience—including extensive field observations of the DPRK populace responding to prior deprivations—suggests that even these deep cuts and resulting scarcity and welfare impacts will not lead to social instability. North Koreans mostly will obey and endure the strictures resulting from these sanctions. g) China cannot force the DPRK to the negotiating table by means of energy sanctions, and it is unreasonable to demand that it do so, at least not before the United States demonstrates incontrovertibly that it is closing on engagement of the DPRK. Indeed, such demands are highly unrealistic and reflect “strategic confusion” in American policy towards the DPRK. h) If such demands were heeded and acted on now, the results would be counterproductive with respect to the overarching primary goals of avoiding war, resuming negotiations, and ending the North Korean nuclear threat. (Peter Hayes and David von Hippel, “Sanctions on North Korean Oil Imports: Impacts and Efficacy,” NAPSnet, September 4, 2017)
9/5/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesman answer to a question put by KCNA “as regards the fact that the U.S. is attempting to impose additional sanctions and pressure on the DPRK over its test of H-bomb for ICBM: The U.S. is taking the lead in “condemning” the DPRK over its test of H-bomb for ICBM and going frantic in the sanctions campaign against the DPRK. At the emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council convened on Monday [September 4], the U.S. representative demanded the adoption of a new “sanctions resolution” against the DPRK while dwelling on the ridiculous rhetoric that the DPRK is begging for war in defiance of their collective voice. The U.S. is running amuck to defame the DPRK, taking issue with our measures to bolster the self-defensive nuclear force, but this is only a sophistry to hide true colors of the U.S. as the main culprit for escalated tension and nuclear threat. The wild and belligerent remarks of “fire and fury” let loose by Trump and the frenzied moves of the U.S. to stifle the DPRK testify that the U.S. is indeed the heinous aggressor who is begging for war in defiance of the collective voice of the international community calling for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. No one has the right to make a fuss about our test of H-bomb for ICBM as it is a routine and indispensable process for the implementation of the strategic line that we have chosen for ourselves, the line of simultaneously developing the two fronts. In order to thoroughly eradicate the hostile moves and nuclear threat of the U.S. going on for decades, the DPRK chose to possess nuclear weapons and is holding fast to the strategic line of simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear force. With the emergence of the Trump administration, the U.S. has become all the more reckless in its attempts to completely obliterate the sovereignty and the rights to existence and development of the DPRK, and we were left with no other choice than redoubling our efforts to strengthen the state nuclear force. The recent test of H-bomb for ICBM is part of our efforts to attain the final goal of completing the state nuclear force. Now we are armed with the ultimate nuclear deterrence by which we can resolutely repel any aggression forces in any part of the world and reliably defend peace and security in the Korean peninsula and the region. The U.S. is terribly mistaken if it thinks it can frighten or persuade the DPRK by talking about “all options” on the table and imposing the toughest sanctions and pressure upon the latter in every dimension of political, economic and military fields. We will respond to the heinous sanctions and pressure of the U.S. with our own mode of counteroffensive and the U.S. shall be held totally responsible for all catastrophic consequences to follow. The U.S. should not forget even for a moment about the presence of the DPRK, the full-fledged nuclear power in possession of ICBM as well as A-bomb and H-bomb.” (KCNA, “FM Spokesman Denounces U.S. for Trying Impose Additional Sanctions on DPRK,” September 5, 2017)
Han Tae Song, DPRK ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, told the U.N. Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, “I am proud of saying that just two days ago on the third of September, DPRK successfully carried out a hydrogen bomb test for intercontinental ballistic rocket under its plan for building a strategic nuclear force.” “The recent self-defense measures by my country, DPRK, are a ‘gift package’ addressed to none other than the U.S.,” Han said. “The U.S. will receive more ‘gift packages’ from my country as long as its relies on reckless provocations and futile attempts to put pressure on the DPRK,” he added without elaborating. Han said military measures being taken by North Korea were “an exercise of restraint and justified self-defense right” to counter “the ever-growing and decade-long U.S. nuclear threat and hostile policy aimed at isolating my country.” “Pressure or sanctions will never work on my country,” Han declared, adding: “The DPRK will never under any circumstances put its nuclear deterrence on the negotiating table.” (Stephanie Nebehay, “North Korea Warns of ‘More Gift Packages’ for the United States,” Reuters, September 5, 2017)
President Moon Jae-in said today that he sees the present moment as “not a time for dialogue, but a time for strong denunciations and pressure in response to North Korea’s dangerous provocations.” Moon’s remarks came in an interview with Russia’s TASS news agency a day ahead of his scheduled attendance of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok and a summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The message stood in stark contrast to the one delivered in a July 6 speech in Germany at the invitation of the Körber Foundation, when Moon stressed that the “need for [inter-Korean] dialogue is more urgent than ever before.” “We are not attempting to bring down the North Korean regime or achieve unification [of Korea] by absorption. We are working to resolve the nuclear issue while guaranteeing the [security of] the North Korean regime, and we want to build a robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,” Moon said in the TASS interview. At the same time, he also said that “achieving a peaceful resolution [to the nuclear issue] will require North Korea to stop additional nuclear and possible provocations, and I believe the international community needs to apply tougher sanctions and pressure to make that happen.”
“Dialogue” and “peace,” two words that had previously appeared like mantras after every conversation or meeting between Moon and Trump, were completely absent from a press release issued by the Blue House after their telephone conversation the day before. Instead, the first line of the briefing referred to the US’s “abrupt agreement to remove limits on the weight of South Korean missile warheads according to the South Korea-US missile guidelines.” In place of references to a “peaceful, dialogue-based resolution” to the North Korean nuclear issue, the two leaders characterized North Korea’s sixth nuclear test as a “serious provocation of a different order from the past” and reaffirmed the US’s “ironclad pledge to defend the Republic of Korea,” while announcing their plans to pursue the “toughest possible pressure and sanctions” against the North and a “tougher UN Security Council resolution for sanctions.” Regarding the change, a Blue House source said the briefing had “merely made separate reference to the agreement to lift warhead weight [restrictions] because it accounted for a larger part [of the conversation].” “President Moon consistently talked about [a peaceful dialogue-based resolution] throughout his conversation with President Trump, and with an agreement already reached at one stage that there was ‘no need for dialogue for the sake of dialogue,’ this was not a case of different views by the two leaders,” the source added. Moon’s “not the time for dialogue” remarks also appeared aimed at maintaining leadership in North Korea policy by preemptively quieting accusations by conservatives about “incompetence at national security,” which have been rearing their head as the North Korean nuclear crisis mounts. Analysts suggested they may have further been based on a conclusion that by remaining on more or less the same page with Trump in dismissing the usefulness of dialogue, the administration may be able to quiet calls for a preemptive strike. But others said that in the absence of any “creative solutions” for peace on the peninsula as requested from the Blue House and government agencies, the tactical U-turn could end up deepening the same dependence on US and China diplomacy that Moon has been trying to get away from. “A ‘conditional dialogue’ approach is the same in direction and substance as the policies during the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations, which did nothing at all in the name of ‘strategic patience,’” said an inter-Korean relations expert who worked with Moon’s camp during the presidential election. The expert also said Moon’s remarks “could end up an obstacle in getting inter-Korean dialogue off the ground in the future.” (Lee Jung-ae and Noh Ji-won, “Moon Eschews Talk of Dialogue as Standoff Continues over Nuclear Program,” Hankyore, September 6, 2017)
DoS: “North Korea’s dangerous and destabilizing pursuit of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles represents a threat to all nations in the region and beyond. These actions will not alter the ironclad commitment of the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Alliance to defend the ROK. North Korea’s recent provocations and belligerent rhetoric only drives the United States and the ROK to work more closely to defend against and counter this grave threat. In line with President Donald J. Trump’s and President Moon Jae-in’s decision to regularize the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), the foreign affairs and defense agencies of the two countries have approved a new framework for the group and committed to holding an EDSCG meeting in the near future. This codification highlights the commitment by both partners to more closely consult and coordinate across the whole of our respective governments to strengthen the Alliance’s posture and reinforce the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence. Going forward, the EDSCG will hold a plenary session annually. A senior level Executive Session will take place in conjunction with the plenary session on years when a U.S.-ROK 2+2 ministerial meeting does not occur. The EDSCG will coordinate whole-of-government efforts to employ all elements of national power to strengthen extended deterrence. Designated officials from both countries will use the EDSCG mechanism to improve the Alliance’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis North Korea through deeper coordination on diplomatic, information, military, and economic actions; to inform the 2+2 ministerial on Alliance efforts and advance whole-of-government deterrence; and to consult on strategic policy issues impacting deterrence and assurance from a regional security perspective.” (DoS Media Note, “Joint Statement on the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group,” September 5, 2017)
Russian President Vladimir Putin said that imposing tougher sanctions on North Korea over its nuclear missile program would be counter-productive and said threats of military action could trigger “a global catastrophe.” Putin, speaking after a BRICs summit in China, criticised U.S. diplomacy in the crisis and renewed his call for talks, saying Pyongyang would not halt its missile testing program until it felt secure. “Russia condemns North Korea’s exercises, we consider that they are a provocation … (But) ramping up military hysteria will lead to nothing good. It could lead to a global catastrophe,” he told reporters. “There’s no other path apart from a peaceful one.” While describing additional sanctions as “the road to nowhere”, Putin said Russia was prepared to discuss “some details” around the issue, without elaborating. The Russian leader also lashed out at the United States. “It’s ridiculous to put us on the same (sanctions) list as North Korea and then ask for our help in imposing sanctions on North Korea,” said Putin. “This is being done by people who mix up Australia with Austria,” he added. (Denis Pinchuk, “Putin Calls Tougher North Korea Sanctions Senseless, Warns of ‘Global Catastrophe,” Reuters, September 5, 2017)
Further hardening his stance against North Korea, President Moon Jae-in said that it is time for the international community to consider cutting oil supplies to the defiant regime. The remark came in a late-night phone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin today, which capped a long day of trying to rally leaders of major powers against the North’s fast-advancing nuclear weapons program, while beefing up the South’s own military capabilities. “It is time that measures for fundamentally cutting off North Korea’s foreign currency income and cutting off crude oil supply should be considered by the UN Security Council,” Moon was quoted as saying by his chief press officer Yoon Young-chan. Moon’s remarks to Putin, which was not met by a direct answer, hints at Seoul’s desire to see a bigger role from Russia. While China is thought to be Pyongyang’s main source of crude oil, Russia is a major trading partner. According to reports, North Korea-Russia trade, which mainly consists of fuel, doubled from a year ago to come in at over $31 million in the first quarter of the year. Russia, along with China, had also opposed clauses prohibiting North Korea from importing fuel in the US sanctions adopted in August. (Choi He-suk, “Time to Consider Cutting Oil Supplies to NK: Moon,” Korea Herald, September 5, 2017)
9/5/17:
On the “Resolute Desk in the Oval Office … was a one-page draft letter from the president to the president of South Korea, terminating the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, known as KORUS. [Gary] Cohn was appalled. For months Trump had threatened to withdraw from the agreement, one of the foundations of an economic relationship, a military alliance and, most important, top secret intelligence operations and capabilities …the most classified and sensitive Special Access Programs (SAP). …These programs enabled the United States to detect an ICBM launch within seven seconds. …But there was the letter, dated September 5, 2017, a potential trigger to a national security catastrophe. [How would Cohn be cleared to know?] … Cohn removed the letter from the Resolute Desk. He placed it in a blue folder marked ‘KEEP.’ ‘I stole it off his desk,’ he later told an associate. ‘I wouldn’t let him see it. He’s never going to see that document. Got to protect the country.’ In the anarchy and disorder of the White House, and Trump’s mind, the president never noticed the missing letter. Ordinarily Rob Porter, the staff secretary and organizer of presidential paperwork, would have been responsible for producing letters like this to the South Korean president. But this time, alarmingly, the letter draft had come to Trump through an unknown channel. …Porter later discovered there were multiple copies of the draft letter, and either Cohn or he made sure none remained on the president’s desk. …Although Trump never mentioned the missing September 5 letter, he did not forget what he wanted to do about the trade agreement. ‘There were several different iterations of that letter,’ Porter told an associate. Later in an Oval Office meeting, the South Korean agreement was being heatedly debated. ‘I don’t care,’ Trump said. ‘I’m tired of these arguments! I don’t to hear about it anymore. We’re getting out of KORUS.’ He started to dictate a new letter he wanted to send. Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law, took Trump’s words seriously. …Jared started to write down what Trump was saying, taking dictation. Finish the letter and get it to me so I can sign it, Trump ordered. Jared was in the process of turning the president’s dictation into a new letter when Porter heard about it. ‘Send me the draft,’ he told him. ‘If we’re going to do this, we cannot do it on the back of a napkin. We have to write it up in a way that isn’t going to embarrass us.’ Kushner sent down a paper copy of his draft. It was not of much us. Porter and Cohn had something typed up to demonstrate they were doing what the president had asked. …The draft was part of the subterfuge. At a formal meeting, the opponents of leaving KORUS raised all kinds of arguments – the United States had never withdrawn from a free trade agreement before; there were legal issues, geopolitical issues, vital national security and intelligence issues; the letter wasn’t ready. They smothered the president with facts and logic. ‘Well, let’s keep working on the letter,’ Trump said. ‘I want to see the next draft.’ Cohn and Porter did not prepare a next draft. …Trump got busy with other things. But the KORUS issue would not go away. Cohn spoke to Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis. … ‘We’re teetering on the edge,’ Cohn told the secretary. ‘We may need some backup this time.’ Mattis … came to the Oval Office. ‘Mr. President,’ he said, ‘Kim Jong Un poses the most immediate threat to our national security. We need South Korea as an ally. It may not seem like trade is related to all this, but it’s central.’ …Why is the U.S. paying $1 billion a year for an anti-ballistic missile system in South Korea? Trump asked. He was furious about the Terminal High-Altitude Defense (THAAD) missile defense system, and had threatened to pull it out of South Korea and move it to Portland, Oregon. ‘We’re not doing this for South Korea,’ Mattis said. ‘We’re helping South Korea because it helps us.’” (Bob Woodward, Fear: Trump in the White House (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2018) pp. xvi-xxii) …Cohn, Porter, and the others went to the Oval Office. Trump had in his hands a draft letter giving notice of the required 180 days that the United States was withdrawing from KORUS. Porter had not written it and he was never sure who had, probably Navarro or Ross, but he never found out for sure. “I’ve got a draft,” Trump said. “Were going to withdraw from this. I just need to wordsmith this and we’re going to get it on official stationery and send this off. We need to do it today.” McMaster made the national security arguments. Cohn and Porter made the trade and economic arguments. “Until I actually take such actions to demonstrate my threats are real and need to be taken seriously,” Trump said, “then we’re going to have less leverage in these things.” He then left the Oval Office. … Cohn was really worried. He removed it from the president’s desk.” (p. 265)
9/6/17:
The Trump administration circulated a draft resolution at the UN Security Council that would effectively empower the U.S. Navy and Air Force to interdict North Korean ships at sea, inspect them to determine whether they are carrying weapons material or fuel into the country, and use “all necessary measures” to enforce compliance. The language is included in a remarkably broad draft that would ban the shipment of all crude oil, refined petroleum and natural gas to North Korea, essentially seeking to plunge a country of 25 million people into a deep freeze this winter if its leaders fail to begin giving up their nuclear weapon and missile programs. The resolution — circulated three days after the North conducted its largest nuclear test to date — would also seek to block all the assets of Kim Jong-un, the country’s leader, and virtually all the assets of the country’s military and its sole political party. The resolution, which the American ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki R. Haley, said this week she wanted to bring to a vote by September 11, seems certain to meet vociferous objections from China and Russia. Both hold veto power at the Security Council. The resolution calls for something far less comprehensive than a total blockade, which is widely considered an act of war. But it would authorize a committee of the Security Council to “designate vessels for nonconsensual inspections” and authorize all members of the United Nations — using military vessels and aircraft — “to inspect on the high seas any vessel designated by the committee.” That could set up the conditions for a conflict at sea. If the crew of a North Korean ship failed to stop or resisted a boarding party, one senior military official acknowledged in recent days, the result could be an exchange of fire at a time when Pyongyang is threatening to use its nascent nuclear arsenal, and the United States is warning of a “devastating response.” President Trump spoke with Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, from the White House this morning, just hours before the United States sent its draft of the resolution to all 15 members of the Security Council. Both Xi and Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, have opposed further sanctions, even after North Korea tested what it called a hydrogen bomb — experts have their doubts. “We should not act out of emotions and push North Korea into a dead end,” Putin said at a meeting in Vladivostok, according to dispatches from South Korean reporters. “We must act with calm and avoid steps that could raise tensions.” That sets up a confrontation at the Security Council pitting the United States, Britain and France against the other two permanent members. Trump appears to be using the resolution to highlight the contrast between the nations that support maximum sanctions pressure against the North and those seeking the status quo. The Trump administration repeated a drastic — if highly unlikely — warning if UN action is blocked. The Treasury secretary, Steven Mnuchin, told reporters aboard Air Force One during a flight from North Dakota that an executive order had been prepared that would authorize a halt in trade with “anybody that does trade with North Korea.” China is among dozens of nations that trade with the North. Even some Democrats have joined the Trump administration in calling for an oil cutoff, including Senator Edward J. Markey of Massachusetts. In an interview with CBS News today, President Barack Obama’s former defense secretary, Ashton B. Carter, said he supported “a strategy of coercive diplomacy” that would steadily increase pressure on the North if it continued to test its missiles and nuclear weapons, and would reduce sanctions if it complied with United Nations resolutions. Carter, now the director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, said he considered it “in China’s interest” to “strangle North Korea,” but said he was not optimistic, “because China has consistently disappointed.” The fate of the Trump administration’s resolution may hinge in part on North Korean actions in the next few days. South Korea’s intelligence and defense agencies have said they see preparations for another missile test from the North’s main missile launch site on the northeast coast. There is some speculation that the test could be aimed at the waters off Guam, which Kim has said will be among his next targets. That has created a behind-the-scenes debate inside the Trump administration over how to respond — whether to consider a pre-emptive strike on the missile, try to intercept it with antiballistic missile batteries, or simply let the test proceed, especially if the missile appears headed for splashdown in international waters. Administration officials briefed members of Congress on the North Korean standoff, but they were vague about their plans, according to people who attended. Even if the United States managed to win approval of a complete ban on energy exports to the North, there is skepticism that it would be successful. Peter Hayes and David Von Hippel of the Nautilus Institute, experts on North Korea’s energy policies, argued in a paper this week that the country would adjust to an energy embargo. The country, they wrote, “could quickly cut its nonmilitary use by about 40 percent of its annual oil use,” substituting other fuels. “There will be little or no immediate impact on the Korean People’s Army’s nuclear or missile programs,” they added, and “little or no immediate impact on the K.P.A.’s routine or wartime ability to fight due to energy scarcity, given its short war strategy and likely stockpiling.” In a Skype conversation from Australia, Hayes said that “what worries me is that the American government may not understand that this will not work.” (David E. Sanger, “U.S. Seeks Power to Interdict Ships,” New York Times, September 7, 2017,
President Moon Jae-in’s attempt to get Vladimir Putin to put greater pressure on Pyongyang failed today, as the Russian president said he opposed cornering the North with “emotional” sanctions. Moon and Putin’s failure to agree was evident when the two leaders addressed the press after a summit in Vladivostok on the sidelines of a regional economic forum hosted by Russia. Putin said Russia is not interested in participating in stronger economic sanctions on the North. “The North Korean nuclear issue cannot be resolved by pressures and sanctions alone,” he said. “Without political and diplomatic resolutions, it is impossible to resolve the current situation.” The remark was a clear rejection of Moon’s requests. During a phone talk with Putin two days ago, Moon revealed a glimpse of the key points to be proposed in upcoming UN sanctions and asked for Moscow’s support. He asked Putin to support sanctions such as an oil embargo and a ban on North Korea’s labor exports. In July, China and Russia protested a proposal of an oil embargo when the United Nations discussed a new resolution. According to Yoon Young-chan, Moon’s senior press secretary, Moon made a particularly earnest request to Putin during the summit to support an oil embargo this time but was rejected. Moon reminded Putin of a precedent: China’s three-day cutting off of oil in 2003, which forced the North to attend six-party talks. “No matter how hard we press, the North won’t give up the nuclear weapons to protect its security. Russia only exports a tiny amount of oil to the North, about 40,000 tons a year,” Putin was quoted by Yoon as telling Moon. “We oppose and condemn the North’s nuclear development. But we are concerned that cutting the oil supply will hurt civilians and places such as hospitals.” Putin also said Russia and China created a road map to resolve the nuclear crisis, and asked concerned countries to pay attentions to it. Moon’s failure to persuade Putin makes it clear that an upcoming UN resolution to punish the North will be another slap on the wrist. China, the main fuel oil supplier of the North and the largest importer of North Korean laborers, is expected to protest the proposal. Russia is also a main importer of Russian laborers. They are generally hired in the logging and mining industries, receiving relatively high incomes. Before the summit, Moon expressed a hope of winning Putin’s support to end Kim’s nuclear brinkmanship, warning that the situation could become “uncontrollable” if they fail to act now. “Because of the North’s repeated provocations, the international political situation has grown extremely serious,” Moon said. “Unless we stop the North’s provocations now, the situation could sink into an uncontrollable state.” While the two leaders disagreed on North Korea, their discussion on economic cooperation was more fruitful. They said they agreed to create a free trade zone between Korea and the Eurasian Economic Union. They also agreed on energy cooperation, including Korea’s imports of Russian liquefied natural gas and Korea’s construction of 15 tankers for Russia. Moon and Putin also said they will try to expand economic cooperation with North Korea to build a trilateral network. In remarks before the summit, Moon said his “new Northern policy,” designed to boost economic cooperation with countries in Northeast Asia and Eurasia, has the same ambitions as Putin’s new Eastern policy. “Korea is the best partner for Russia’s development of the Far East,” Moon said. “If the two countries will cooperate, the Far Eastern region will be an outpost of regional peace and prosperity.” Putin also expressed a hope for improved economic cooperation between Korea and Russia. “Bilateral trade went down by 16 percent last year, but increased about 50 percent during the first six months of this year,” Putin said. “I hope for further cooperation.” A key project in Moon’s New Northern Policy is linking railways and pipelines of South Korea and Russia through the North. In a speech at the Koerber Foundation in Germany in July, Moon described this vision. “The severed inter-Korean railway will be connected again. A train departing from Busan and Mokpo will run through Pyongyang and Beijing, and head towards Russia and Europe,” Moon said in the speech. “Cooperation projects in Northeast Asia, such as the gas pipeline project connecting the two Koreas and Russia, may also be implemented.” Connecting the South’s railway with Russia’s Trans-Siberian Railroad, a 9,288-kilometer (5,771-mile) railway between Vladivostok and Moscow, has been an ambition of all South Korean presidents since Seoul established diplomatic relations with Moscow in 1990. It has never made progress because North Korea’s participation is a must. (Ser Myo-ja, “Moon Fails to Sway Putin on Sanctions,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 7, 2017)
9/7/17:
President Trump renewed a threat to use military force against North Korea and raised doubts about whether negotiations could succeed in resolving the brewing crisis over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons. “Military action would certainly be an option. Is it inevitable? Nothing’s inevitable,” Trump said during a news conference. “It would be great if something else could be worked out. We would have to look at all of the details, all of the facts.” U.S. officials said an offer to negotiate with North Korea remains on the table, but Trump has repeatedly discounted the value of beginning another effort to talk North Korea out of its arsenal. All previous efforts have failed, and North Korea now possesses both a stockpile of weapons and missiles capable of threatening U.S. shores. “We’ve had presidents for 25 years now, they’ve been talking, talking, talking, and the day after an agreement is reached, new work begins in North Korea” on its rogue nuclear weapons program, Trump said. “So I would prefer not going the route of the military, but it’s something certainly that could happen.” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Thursday that Beijing would support further U.N.-imposed “measures” against North Korea but stopped short of saying whether China would back crippling economic sanctions such as a halt to fuel shipments. “Given the new developments on the Korean Peninsula, China agrees that the U.N. Security Council should respond further by taking necessary measures,” Wang told reporters. “We believe that sanctions and pressure are only half of the key to resolving the issue. The other half is dialogue and negotiation.” Trump did not address sanctions as he spoke at the White House, where he appeared alongside Sheikh Sabah Ahmed al-Sabah, the visiting Kuwait ruler. Trump did not rule out an eventual U.S. strategy of containing North Korea’s nuclear weapons instead of eradicating them, saying he will not bargain with North Korea in public. “I don’t put my negotiations on the table, unlike past administrations. I don’t talk about them,” he said. “But I can tell you that North Korea’s behaving badly and it’s got to stop, Okay?” A U.S. official who briefed reporters later today suggested that Trump is merely being careful and has not backed off the demand that North Korea give up its nuclear weapons. That demand has been a mainstay of U.S. policy for more than a decade and was the basis for extensive negotiations under former president George W. Bush, which ultimately failed. “The president likes to keep his cards close to his chest, especially on matters of national security,” the senior administration official said. “I wouldn’t read too much into the absence of an assertion” that North Korea must renounce its nuclear weapons, said the official, who requested anonymity to discuss some aspects of the evolving U.S. policy toward North Korea. The kind of nuclear deterrence policy that the United States adopted toward the former Soviet Union would probably not work with North Korea, the official said. That policy relied on each nation’s interest in self-preservation to prevent either from launching a first strike. “We are very concerned that North Korea might not be able to be deterred, that there are real differences between North Korea and the small, small group of nations that have these weapons,” the official said. The official said the United States is worried about a rising threat of “miscalculation” by North Korea, which may think the warnings of U.S. force are hollow. That partly explains the recent emphasis by Trump, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and others on the overwhelming strength of U.S. military capabilities. “Our military has never been stronger,” Trump said today. “Each day, new equipment is delivered; new and beautiful equipment, the best in the world — the best anywhere in the world, by far.” “Hopefully, we’re not going to have to use it on North Korea. If we do use it on North Korea, it will be a very sad day for North Korea.” State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert insisted the strategy of applying diplomatic pressure on North Korea, while slow going, is effective. Several countries, including Spain, Peru and Kuwait, she said, have set numerical limits on guest workers and Pyongyang’s diplomats.
“It will take time to help remove that money that the DPRK is getting, and which we believe is going to illegal nuclear and ballistic missile programs,” she said. The threat of force and the offer of negotiations can coexist, U.S. officials said. “We’ve left the door open to talks with the North Koreans from the earliest days of this administration,” said an official, noting that Pyongyang has responded with ballistic missile and nuclear tests. “Their actions have spoken louder than words. It’s just not the time to negotiate with North Korea. That’s plainly clear to us.” (Anne Gearan and Emily Rauhala, “Trump Renews Threat of Force against North Korea over Nuclear Weapons,” Washington Post, September 8, 2012, p. A-12)
Trump: “Go ahead, CBS. Q Thanks. Mr. President, on the question of North Korea, the country feels that a crisis is coming. Some lawmakers, Lindsey Graham among them, have almost described the situation as inevitably leading to war. I don’t want to ask you if you think it’s inevitable. What I do want to ask you is, as President of the United States, would you tolerate a nuclearized North Korea that is contained and deterred but still nuclear? Or would it have to abandon nuclear weapons? And would military action on the part of the United States be one of the options necessary to achieve that goal? TRUMP: Military action would certainly be an option. Is it inevitable? Nothing is inevitable. It would be great if something else could be worked out. We would have to look at all of the details, all of the facts. But we’ve had Presidents for 25 years now — they’ve been talking, talking, talking — and the day after an agreement is reached, new work begins in North Korea, continuation on nuclear. So I would prefer not going the route of the military, but it’s something certainly that could happen. Our military has never been stronger. We are in a position now — and you know the new orders. You see the new numbers just like I see the new numbers. It’s been tens of billions of dollars more in investment. And each day new equipment is delivered — new and beautiful equipment, the best in the world, the best anywhere in the world, by far. Hopefully we’re not going to have to use it on North Korea. If we do use it on North Korea, it will be a very sad day for North Korea. … Q Follow-up: Is it acceptable for you, as President, for North Korea to be nuclearized but contained and deterred? Is that a strategy you would …prefer? PRESIDENT TRUMP: No, I’m not negotiating with you. Maybe we’ll have a chance to negotiate with somebody else, but I don’t put my negotiations on the table. Unlike past administrations, I don’t talk about them. But I can tell you that North Korea is behaving badly, and it’s got to stop. …” (The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Trump and Emir Saber Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber of Kuwait at Joint Press Conference, September 7, 2017)
Japan must consider whether the three principles of not producing, possessing or bringing in nuclear weapons offer a “sufficient deterrent,” former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba told TV Asahi. While acknowledging the “emotional” aspects of the other side of the debate, Ishiba questioned whether it is “really right to say we’ll be protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella while not allowing [nuclear weapons] in Japan.” That a Japanese national-security veteran is making this argument could create a stir inside and outside the country. At the same time, Ishiba opposed the idea of Japan getting nuclear arms of its own. “If Japan, the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack, possessed nuclear weapons, it would send a message that it’s fine for anyone in the world to have them,” he argued. Asked about Ishiba’s comments, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide asserted that the government “firmly stands by the three non-nuclear principles as a matter of policy.” “We have not discussed reviewing them thus far, and we have no plans to consider it in the future,” Suga told reporters. He also noted that Japan is “obligated not to receive or build” such arms under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (Nikkei Review, “Former Defense Minister Questions Japan’s Anti-Nuclear Policy,” September 7, 2017)
It has become commonplace for observers to speculate that North Korea will launch a missile or detonate a nuclear device on or near one of its big letter days. But how evidence-based is this speculation? We checked the dates of the DPRK’s 75 rounds of missile testing since 1990 and six nuclear tests against the DPRK’s most important anniversaries: 14 February (when Kim Jong Il was posthumously given the story of generalissimo); 16 February (Kim Jong Il’s birthday); 15 April (Kim Il Sung’s birthday); 25 April (foundation of the guerrilla army in 1932); 1 May (labor day); 19 June (Kim Jong Il’s appointment to the Central Committee of the WPK); 3 July (foundation of the strategic forces in 1999); 27 July (victory against the U.S. in 1953); 15 August (victory against Japan in 1945); 25 August (Songun day); 9 September (DPRK’s Foundation Day, 1948); 10 October (WPK’s Foundation Day, 1945); 12 December (Constitution Day). Against all these dates, there has only ever been one round of missile testing that has actually fallen on a special day (15 April 2016), and one nuclear test (9 September 2016). In addition, there have been eight missile tests and one nuclear test which fell one day next to one of these special days. Once we look at the mathematical probabilities of a test happening on one of the DPRK’s special days, however, it looks like there is little significance to the correlation: there are so many special days, and so many tests, that some are bound to fall on special anniversaries whether intended to or not. In fact, based on tests so far, the probability of any test falling purely by chance on or immediately next to one of the special days listed above is 10.7% (39 days out of 365). The probability of the current track record (nine missile tests on or next to a special day) emerging from a purely haphazard testing program, with no special thought given to domestic anniversaries, is 44% (thanks to Dr. Stephen Sawiak of Cambridge University for running the numbers here). When a missile or nuclear test has fallen squarely on one of the DPRK’s major anniversaries, state media has placed very little emphasis on the fact. The 9 September 2016 nuclear test was mentioned in a couple of DPRK media reports covering the Foundation Day anniversary, but did not form an especially central part of the celebrations. The 15 April 2016 missile test was a failure, so was not reported by the DPRK at all. Rather than looking at the DPRK’s domestic anniversaries to anticipate and explain its testing schedule, we ought, therefore, look at other possible factors. CSIS break down their analysis of North Korean tests by elections in South Korea, elections in the USA, visits by Chinese delegations, and U.S.-ROK military exercises. Presumably, they too have found little evidence to support a firm link between test dates and anniversaries. The suggests that for anticipating upcoming tests we should not look to DPRK anniversaries, but to foreign events – and the technical constraints and testing requirements of the missile and nuclear programs themselves. (Tristan Webb, “North Korea’s Anniversaries: Not Linked to Nuclear and Missile Tests, Data Suggests,” NKNews, September 7, 2017)
The Ministry of National Defense said that four launchers for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antimissile system were moved to a U.S. base in Seongju County, North Gyeongsang, completing the deployment of the American antimissile battery. Today’s installation of the four launchers completed the deployment of a THAAD battery, which typically consists of six launchers, 48 interceptors, a fire control and communications unit and radar. Two launchers were installed in Seongju in April. “With the deployment of the four launchers, the U.S. military secured the field operation capability of one Thaad battery,” said Moon Sang-gyun, spokesman of the National Defense Ministry. “We will make necessary preparations to use the capability as soon as the internal procedures are completed on the U.S. side.” (Ser Myo-ja, “THAAD Battery Fully Deployed in Seongju,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 7, 2017)
President Donald Trump, like his predecessors, may find that neither negotiations nor economic and military pressure can force North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, and that the United States has no choice but to try to contain it and deter North Korean leader Kim Jong Un from ever using a nuclear weapon. U.S. officials declined to discuss operational planning, but acknowledge that no existing plan for a preemptive strike could promise to prevent a brutal counterattack by North Korea, which has thousands of artillery pieces and rockets trained on Seoul. In an implicit recognition that the military options against the North are unpalatable at best and pyrrhic at worst, U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis last week told reporters: “We are never out of diplomatic solutions.” U.S. and Asian officials believe it is necessary to try negotiations and more economic pressure but concede these are unlikely to curb, let alone eliminate, the nuclear and missile programs that North Korean considers essential to its survival. That leaves Washington and its allies in South Korea, Japan and elsewhere with an unwelcome question: Is there any way to live with a nuclear-armed North Korea, one that is contained and deterred from using its nuclear weaponry? Trump declined to answer that question at a news conference today, saying he would not disclose his negotiating strategy publicly and adding it would be a “very sad day” for North Korea if the U.S. military settles the matter. Still, a senior Trump administration official said it is unclear whether the Cold War-era deterrence model that Washington used with the Soviet Union could be applied to a rogue state like North Korea, adding: “I don’t think the president wants to take that chance.” “We are very concerned that North Korea might not be able to be deterred,” the official said, speaking to reporters on condition of anonymity shortly after Trump’s remarks. Among the U.S. options to strengthen its deterrent is the long-planned modernization of America’s aging nuclear forces that would assure that North Korea would be destroyed if it fired a nuclear-tipped missile at the United States, a U.S. military base, Japan, or South Korea. Another is stepped-up investment in U.S. missile defenses, particularly testing, research and development of technologies that could defeat a significant number of incoming missiles. Both steps would need to avoid triggering new arms races with Beijing and Moscow, experts say. Another factor weighing on Pentagon planners is their readiness for a major conventional conflict after 16 years of war in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. There has been no sign the White House, which has been cool to the idea of talks and hopes pressure can change the North’s calculus, is ready to settle for a containment strategy. Despite pessimism about talks, a U.S. official said there was a chance that economic pressure, especially from China, combined with an agreement to negotiate could convince Pyongyang to limit its nuclear arsenal or even sign the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. “Signing the CTBT would give the North tacit admission to the nuclear club but end its testing program,” the official said. “That, along with assured destruction, might be the best that could be done.” The remaining question, however, is whether Trump would be willing to settle for that. “Discipline and steadiness are not words one usually uses in a sentence that also has the name Donald Trump,” said Robert Einhorn, a former State Department official who negotiated with North Korea and is now at the Brookings Institution think tank. “Would he over time recognize that he may have no choice?” Frank Jannuzi, president of the Mansfield Foundation, which promotes U.S.-Asia relations, is more optimistic. “Does he have the patience to manage a difficult process of deterrence and containment against the (North) rather than doing something impulsive? I think so,” he said. “Some of his deals have taken years to come to fruition.” (Arshad Mohammed and Phil Stewart, “Trump May Have to Settle for Deterring, Not Disarming, North Korea,” Reuters, September 7, 2017)
South Korea’s prime minister is saying publicly what American officials will not: In the next few days, intelligence reports predict, North Korea will launch another intercontinental ballistic missile. “A special measure is urgently needed to stop their recklessness,” Lee Nak-yon, told defense ministers in Seoul. He may be wrong about the timing. But at the White House and the Pentagon, and out in the Pacific, American officials are scrambling to decide how the United States should react, particularly if the North Koreans demonstrate without doubt that they can reach the American territory of Guam, or even a distance equivalent to striking the West Coast of the United States. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis said this week that President Trump had been presented with all military options and would meet threats with a “massive military response” that would be “effective and overwhelming.” Trump’s aides will not indicate whether fueling up another ICBM constitutes a threat, saying they want to keep North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, guessing. The options for a nonmilitary response are becoming clear. Yesterday, the United States circulated to members of the United Nations Security Council a draft resolution that would require all countries to cut off the North’s oil and all refined petroleum products; it would also allow the Security Council to designate North Korean ships that could be boarded and inspected using “all necessary measures,” meaning whatever force was needed. Ultimately, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson has said, the idea is to force North Korea to the negotiating table, but only after it begins to show a willingness to stop testing and gradually disarm. But as several of Trump’s advisers have noted in recent days, United Nations resolutions and negotiation strategies are for the medium term. How to handle the launch is the immediate, urgent question. Here is a look at the president’s choices, and their downsides: Trump told friends that he was proud of the moment in April when he ordered an airstrike on an air base where the Syrian government was believed to have launched chemical weapons attacks. The bombing unfolded during a visit to the United States by President Xi Jinping of China, giving Trump the chance to tell him about it during dinner and to send an unspoken message about what might happen in North Korea if it, like Syria, crossed a “red line.” Technologically, it would not be difficult to destroy North Korea’s missiles. American warships off the Korean coast could easily hit the North Korean launch site, which is near the Sea of Japan. They might even provide warning to the North Koreans to evacuate the base. But unlike the Syrians, the North Koreans know how to strike back — on the South Korean capital, Seoul, or American bases in Japan. Not long ago, President Moon Jae-in of South Korea said he had a veto on American attacks on North Korea, and promised “there will be no war” on the Korean Peninsula. (The Americans have a different view, saying that when it comes to defending American territory, no other country has veto rights.) But destroying one missile would do nothing to the North’s many others. And the United States might have a difficult time proving that the missile was truly threatening without proof of where it was aimed. American officials could argue, though, that Kim offered an unsubtle hint when he was photographed recently by state-run media examining maps of targets in Guam, including an American air base that houses bombers that can reach North Korea. Never has there been a bigger moment for American missile defenses — or greater reluctance to use them. In the vision the Pentagon has sold to Congress for decades, the warhead of an adversary’s missile could be tracked and destroyed in mid-flight or closer to landing, known as the terminal phase. That’s the event for which the United States often trains, with decidedly mixed results. If the North Korean missile’s target was Guam or the waters near it, shooting it down would be an iffy proposition. The first shots would be taken, most likely, by Aegis destroyers armed with what are called Standard missiles, the most successful antimissile system in the American arsenal. But to make it work, the destroyers would have to be in the right place, former senior officials say. A THAAD missile defense system, like the ones the United States has placed in South Korea, could also be employed. If the missile were headed toward the continental United States, it could be taken out by one of the antimissile systems in Alaska and California. In tests, they hit the target about half the time, under perfect conditions. “That’s the approach I’d take,” former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry said during a visit to Washington a few months ago, as tensions mounted. “Ten years ago I would advocated destroying it on the pad, but today that’s too risky. Intercepting it looks far more like a purely defensive measure.” But American officials are haunted by one question: What if they miss? It would be obvious to all. That could leave Mr. Trump humiliated and call into question the wisdom of antimissile defenses, which the United States has spent $300 billion to develop. This has been the approach thus far: Track the missile, determine quickly whether it is a threat to a populated area and let it fall into the sea. That is the most cautious response, and Trump could use it to press China and Russia to drop their objections to more United Nations sanctions. But it is not cost-free. In each test, the North Koreans get more information to perfect their future launches. And after Trump warned that any threat to the United States would be met with “fire and fury,” he is acutely aware that making no active response might make it look as if he had ignored his own red line, exactly what he accused President Barack Obama of doing with Syria. In the cyber age, perhaps the most tempting solution for presidents is to reach for America’s most stealthy weapon. That is what Obama did in 2014, when he ordered an acceleration of cyberattacks aimed at preventing launches. But there is debate over the effectiveness of that operation and little visible evidence that the cyberattacks, if continuing, are working now. Perhaps the United States is waiting for the right moment, but as one former senior cyber operator said, no target is harder than North Korea. And the North Koreans know it. (David E. Sanger, “Options for the U.S. If North Korea Tries Another Missile Launch,” New York Times, September 8, 2017,
Hecker: “BAS: To the general public, there has been so much nuclear news out of North Korea lately that this one might sound like “just another test.” So please put it in context for us: What was different about North Korea’s September 3rd nuclear test? How did it differ in magnitude from previous tests, and what does that tell us? SH: The destructive power of North Korea’s previous five nuclear tests had progressed to about 25 kilotons, roughly the same as the bomb dropped on Nagasaki in 1945. This test was greater than 100 kilotons; that’s a big deal. It indicates they have progressed considerably beyond primitive fission-bomb technologies. BAS: Was this one really a hydrogen bomb, and how would we know? SH: The size of the blast was consistent with a hydrogen bomb—that is, a fusion-based bomb. However, it could also have been a large “boosted” fission bomb, in which the hydrogen isotopes deuterium and tritium were used to enhance the fission yield. If any telltale radioactive debris leaked from the underground test site, that could help us differentiate, but so far none has been found. So we can’t be certain. BAS: What would it mean if it was a hydrogen bomb? Would that be a game changer? SH: No, I don’t see a hydrogen bomb as a game changer. The North has been steadily enhancing its nuclear weapons in that direction. It was only a matter of time before it got there—although, if this one was a small, modern, two-stage hydrogen bomb, then I am surprised it got there so quickly. For years, I have followed the country’s steady progress on producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the fuels for fission bombs. And I concluded some time ago that it also has the ability to produce tritium, which is necessary for a boosted fission bomb or a hydrogen bomb. BAS: But hydrogen bombs are a thousand times more powerful than fission bombs. Doesn’t that change the military threat? SH: True, hydrogen bombs can be a thousand times more powerful. In fact, there is no theoretical limit to their destructive power. However, what is much more important is whether any nuclear bomb—fission or a fusion—can be made sufficiently small and light to mount on a missile, as well as robust enough to survive the missile’s launch, flight and atmospheric re-entry. Even a fission bomb of 25 kilotons delivered to Seoul or Los Angeles would cause horrific damage. So sure, a hydrogen bomb with very high destructive power would be worse, and have the advantage of being deliverable on a much-less-accurate missile, but the damage from a fission bomb would already be unacceptable. BAS: Does the latest test change the political dynamics? SH: Yes, it does. Washington was already suffering from its preoccupation with keeping North Korea from developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) instead of dealing with the nuclear crisis that already threatened Northeast Asia. President Trump seemed to have made ICBMs his red line, but North Korean leader Kim Jong-un blasted right past that in July and August. If you add the specter of a hydrogen bomb, that creates an enormous dilemma for the Trump administration in terms of how to assure the American public it will be protected. In Pyongyang, meanwhile, they surely must see being able to field hydrogen bombs as leveling the playing field. A hydrogen bomb would put them in the elite company of the so-called P-5 states, the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France. It would increase Pyongyang’s leverage should it ever come back to the negotiating table. BAS: When we spoke in August, you said that Pyongyang’s ability to reach the continental United States with a nuclear-tipped missile was still some years away. Has last Sunday’s nuclear test changed your view? SH: Well, they got closer with this test, as they do with each missile and nuclear test. They may still be a few years away, but they are very competent at climbing a learning curve and making rapid progress. Besides, they are determined. Continued progress with either boosted fission bombs or hydrogen bombs—through more nuclear testing—will make it possible to fit the bombs on an ICBM. However, they still need to do a lot of work to get their weapons to survive the extreme launch, flight, and re-entry conditions. …BAS: Several hours before the test, the North Korean official news agency KCNA posted photos of Kim Jong-un inspecting what it called a two-stage thermonuclear bomb. Do you believe that is what was tested? SH: The images undoubtedly showed a model rather than the real device, but it had features generally consistent with a two-stage thermonuclear device, that is, a modern hydrogen bomb. The photos showed Kim inspecting the model in front of a schematic of the Hwasong-14 ICBM re-entry vehicle, and next to a mockup of its nose cone. The model appeared to have dimensions that would allow it to be mounted inside the ICBM. Clearly, that’s what the North Koreans would like us to believe, that they have mastered the ability to deliver a thermonuclear-tipped missile to the US mainland. However, we have no way of knowing if the device tested was of this design. The model could quite easily be constructed based on drawings of two-stage thermonuclear bombs available on the Internet. Nevertheless, I have learned not to underestimate the North Korean nuclear specialists. BAS: Does the time interval between this nuclear test and North Korea’s last nuclear test tell us anything about technological progress they may be making? SH: North Korea has been very methodical and deliberate about nuclear testing. The fact that it conducted six tests over such an extended period, beginning in October 2006, gave its nuclear scientists a chance to learn a lot between tests. I believe North Korea learned much more from its tests than did India or Pakistan, which conducted almost all of their six respective tests over a short time period with little chance to learn from one to the next. However, there was another reason for the slow, deliberate pace: North Korea lacked sufficient fissile materials, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium, until quite recently. The regime must also have weighed the likelihood of adverse actions from China, but as this last test shows, it was determined to proceed regardless of Chinese and international reaction. BAS: The news coverage sometimes implies that Kim Jong-un, who took power in 2011 after his father and grandfather before him, is especially impatient and determined to develop a threatening nuclear arsenal. Do you see it that way? SH: Not necessarily. North Korea has been making deliberate, steady progress on nuclear and missile advances since at least 2009, when all serious dialogue with Pyongyang ended. Progress, particularly on the missile front, has accelerated since Kim Jong-un took the reins at the end of 2011, but the foundations for the nuclear and missile programs were already built. It does appear that Kim Jong-un has brought a more effective, hands-on management style to move the programs forward. BAS: In photos the KCNA released last weekend, one of the men alongside Kim Jong-un appears to be Ri Hong-sop, head of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute. A Reuters news report, which identifies Ri in an earlier photo, says you met with him during your visits to Yongbyon. Is that so, and what can you tell us about him? SH: Dr. Ri Hong-sop was director of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center during my first visit in January 2004. I was impressed with his technical competency as well as his honest and direct answers to my technical questions during the tour, in which he gave our Stanford team remarkable access to the Yongbyon plutonium facilities. In a fascinating exchange about the intricacies of plutonium metallurgy, he even allowed me to hold a sample of recently produced plutonium—in a sealed glass jar—to convince me it really was plutonium. BAS: Was that the only time you met with Ri? SH: No, we met during several of my seven visits to North Korea, although by the fourth visit in 2007, he was no longer director of the Yongbyon Nuclear Center. I was told he had moved to Pyongyang to advise the General Department of Atomic Energy. When I asked about him during my last visit in November 2010, my host told me somewhat sarcastically that my government wouldn’t let me meet him because the latest UN sanctions had put him on a blacklist. Much of what we know about the North Korean nuclear complex comes from discussions we had with technical professionals in Yongbyon. So much for the benefits of sanctions: They didn’t slow down the North’s progress on its nuclear program, but eliminated one of the few windows we had into it. BAS: An official KCNA statement quoted Kim Jong-un as saying, “all components of the H-bomb were homemade … thus enabling the country to produce powerful nuclear weapons as many as it wants.” You have previously said that North Korea has only limited inventories of fissile materials, the fuel required for bomb making. Do you still consider that to be the case? How many bombs could it make now? SH: North Korea cannot produce “as many as it wants,” although it is making progress on both fusion and fission fuels. It appears to have produced lithium deuteride, which can be used to produce the tritium fuel for hydrogen bombs, but likely has only small inventories of tritium for boosted fission devices. And it still has relatively small inventories of fissile materials for the fission bombs that are required to trigger the fusion device. Although they do involve great uncertainty, I believe my previous estimates still hold: By the end of 2016, North Korea had enough bomb fuel—roughly 20 to 40 kilograms of plutonium and 200 to 450 kilograms of highly enriched uranium—to make 20 to 25 nuclear weapons, with an annual production capacity of six to seven bombs’ worth. If they continue to test and develop more sophisticated hydrogen bombs that could use less fissile material, we’ll have to revise that upwards. However, I don’t concur with the leaked intelligence estimate that they have up to 60 nuclear weapons now. BAS: The KCNA statement also touted North Korea’s ability to launch a “super-powerful EMP attack” against the United States. EMP is short for electromagnetic pulse. Could you explain what an EMP attack is, and whether this is a credible threat? SH: The idea of an EMP attack would be to detonate a nuclear weapon tens of miles above Earth’s surface with the goal of knocking out the US power grid and causing other electrical disruptions. I don’t see this as something the United States needs to worry about now. First, North Korea has a lot of work to do to develop the right nuclear device for an intense EMP weapon. Second, how would an EMP attack help Pyongyang achieve its objective of deterring the United States? If Pyongyang used such a weapon against the United States, Washington would consider that an act of war, which would likely lead to the end of the Kim Jong-un regime. What the EMP comment does show, however, is how closely the North Koreans follow the American press, which has published reports by some American alarmists wringing their hands about this threat. The North Koreans were even clever enough to have researchers from Pyongyang’s Kim Chaek University of Technology write a short brief about EMP, with the conclusion that it represents an important “strike” method. BAS: Could the comment by American UN Ambassador Nikki Haley that North Korea is “begging for war” hold any truth—that is, might Kim Jong-un see some benefit in getting to the point of actual military conflict? I know he’s probably a pretty rational actor, but leaders have been known to think they might benefit from war. SH: I don’t think so. Kim Jong-un’s only hope of survival is to avoid war. He apparently believes that in order to survive, he has to be able to threaten the United States not only with ICBMs, but with ICBMs tipped with hydrogen bombs. BAS: You’ve previously argued that the Trump administration must talk directly to North Korea as the next step in resolving the nuclear crisis. But both Haley and Trump have said the “time for talking is over.” So now what? SH: I’m afraid the Trump administration is compounding the mistakes of past US administrations with such comments, along with threats of “fire and fury.” This rhetoric will make it all the more difficult for Washington to take the necessary steps to avoid a nuclear confrontation with North Korea. We need to face reality—the way we got into this situation is that we haven’t talked seriously since 2009. BAS: “Talks” can mean different things to different people. Should the US negotiate? Or accept a nuclear-armed North Korea? Does talking constitute “appeasement,” as Trump accused South Korean President Moon Jae-in of pursuing? SH: The US administration should dispatch a small team to talk to Kim Jong-un to establish mechanisms to avoid misunderstandings, miscalculations, or misinterpretations that could quickly send us over the cliff into nuclear war. The talks would not be a reward or a concession to Pyongyang, nor should they be construed as signaling acceptance of a nuclear-armed North Korea. Such talks are not meant to appease Pyongyang as they would not offer any rewards. They could, however, deliver the message that while Washington fully intends to defend itself and its allies from any attack with a devastating retaliatory response, it does not otherwise intend to attack the North or pursue regime change. I realize that talking so soon after North Korea made such a major nuclear weapons advance may make it look like the US administration blinked first. But I consider that much less dangerous than stumbling into a nuclear war, which could happen if we pursue other actions being considered by the administration. These talks would not be negotiations—not yet. Rather, they are a necessary step toward re-establishing critical lines of communication to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. Negotiations on denuclearization might follow, but that would require a much longer time frame and coordination with China, Russia, and US allies.” (Elisabeth Eaves, “North Korean Test Shows Steady Advances: Interview with Siegfried Hecker,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 7, 2017)
9/?/17:
Woodward: “[National Security Adviser H.R.] McMaster issued a new strategy outlining a North Korea Pressure Campaign. …Treasury would work on sanctions. State would work on engagement with China to pressure the North. The State Department was to make military incursions such as overflights, going into their airspace in exercises called Blue Lightning, and engage in limited cyber activity to demonstrate capability and show the threat. But these actions were not to trigger an unintended conflict. McMaster kept repeating in the NSC that Trump could not accept a nuclear North Korea. But the president summed up his position on almost everything in an interview [December 28] with The New York Times, ‘I’m always moving. I’m moving in both directions.’ Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman [Joseph] Dunford formed a strategic communications cell in his Operations Directorate, J3, to look at the messaging opportunities in North Korea. What actions could be taken that were just threatening enough to be a deterrent? When there were three aircraft carriers in the vicinity, [Defense Secretary Jim] Mattis voiced discomfort. Could this trigger an unanticipated response from Kim? Could the United States start the war they were trying to avoid? He showed more concern about this than many others in the Pentagon and certainly in the White House. Mattis was student of historian Barbara Tuchman’s book The Guns of August about the start of World War I. ‘He’s obsessed with August 1914,’ one official said, ‘and the idea that you take action, military actions, that are seen as prudent planning, and the unintended consequences are you can’t get off the war train.’ A momentum to war builds, ‘and you just can’t stop it.’ …The official summed it up: ‘Mattis’ and Dunford’s view is that North Korea can be contained. Dunford actually said, ‘This was my advice to the President.’’” (Woodward, Fear, pp. 279-81) Dunford in meeting with Joint Chiefs in the Tanks, asks for military options to pressure North Korea. (Woodward, Rage, p. 79)
9/11/17:
DPRK FoMin statement: “The sanctions and pressure racket of the U.S. to completely obliterate the DPRK’s sovereignty and right to existence is reaching an extremely reckless phase. The U.S. is going frantic to fabricate the harshest ever “sanctions resolution” by manipulating the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) over the DPRK’s ICBM-ready H-bomb test. The DPRK has developed and perfected the super-powerful thermo-nuclear weapon as a means to deter the ever-increasing hostile moves and nuclear threat of the U.S. and defuse the danger of nuclear war looming over the Korean peninsula and the region. However, instead of making a right choice based on rational analysis of the overall situation, the U.S. is trying to use the DPRK’s legitimate self-defensive measures as an excuse to strangle and completely suffocate it. Since the U.S. is revealing its nature as a blood-thirsty beast obsessed with the wild dream of reversing the DPRK’s development of the state nuclear force which has already reached the completion phase, there is no way that the DPRK is going to wait and let the U.S. feast on it. The DPRK is closely following the moves of the U.S. with vigilance. In case the U.S. eventually does rig up the illegal and unlawful “resolution” on harsher sanctions, the DPRK shall make absolutely sure that the U.S. pays due price. The DPRK is ready and willing to use any form of ultimate means. The forthcoming measures to be taken by the DPRK will cause the U.S. the greatest pain and suffering it had ever gone through in its entire history. The world will witness how the DPRK tames the U.S. gangsters by taking series of action tougher than they have ever envisaged. The U.S. should be fully aware that as long as it persists with intense political, economic and military confrontation with the DPRK in defiance of its repeated stern warning, the former will never be able to avoid its permanent extinction.” (KCNA, “DPRK FM Warns U.S. Frantic to Fabricate Harshest Ever ‘Sanctions Resolution,’” September 11, 2017)
The United Nations Security Council ratcheted up sanctions yet again against North Korea, but they fell significantly short of the far-reaching penalties that the Trump administration had demanded just days ago. While the sanctions were described in Washington and other capitals as the most extensive yet, in the end they amounted to another incremental increase of pressure on the country, even after it detonated its sixth and most powerful nuclear device. It was far from clear that the additional penalties would accomplish what the Trump administration said was its goal: To force North Korea to halt its nuclear and ballistic missile tests and reopen some kind of negotiation toward eventual nuclear disarmament. Although the resolution won backing from all 15 council members, the weakened penalties reflected the power of Russia and China. Both had objected to the original language calling for an oil embargo and other severe penalties — with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia declaring last week that such additional sanctions would be counterproductive and possibly destabilizing. The original demands from the United States for a new resolution, made by the American ambassador, Nikki R. Haley, were toned down in negotiations that followed with her Russian and Chinese counterparts. Late last night, after a series of closed-door meetings, a revised draft emerged, setting a cap on oil exports to North Korea, but not blocking them altogether. The resolution asks countries around the world to inspect ships going in and out of North Korea’s ports (a provision put in place by the Security Council in 2009) but does not authorize the use of force for ships that do not comply, as the Trump administration had originally proposed. The resolution also requires those inspections to be done with the consent of the countries where the ships are registered, which opens the door to violations. Under the latest resolution, those ships could face penalties, but the original language proposed by the United States had gone much further, empowering countries to interdict ships suspected of carrying weapons material or fuel into North Korea and to use “all necessary measures” — code for military force — to enforce compliance. The resolution also does not impose a travel ban or asset freeze on Kim, as the original American draft had set out. And the new measure adds a caveat to the original language that would have banned the import of North Korean laborers altogether, saying that countries should not provide work authorization papers unless necessary for humanitarian assistance or denuclearization. The resolution does ban textile exports from North Korea, prohibits the sale of natural gas to North Korea and sets a cap on refined petroleum sales to the country of two million barrels per year. That would shave off roughly 10 percent of what North Korea currently gets from China, according to the U.S. Energy Information Agency. Even so, American officials asserted that the resolution would reduce oil imports to North Korea by 30 percent. China had long worried that an oil cutoff altogether would lead to North Korea’s collapse. And even some British officials warned, in private, that if the original American proposal went forward, this winter the North Koreans would be showing photographs of freezing children, and portraying the West as architects of a genocide. A recent analysis by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies suggested that an oil embargo would not have much impact in the long run anyway; Pyongyang, the analysis said, could replace oil with liquefied coal. In contrast to her assertion last week that the North was “begging for war,” U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley said today that Pyongyang still has room to change course. “If it agrees to stop its nuclear program it can reclaim its future,” she said. “If it proves it can live in peace, the world will live in peace with it.” Ultimately, analysts said, diplomatic success would be measured not by the strictness of sanctions, but by the ability of world powers to persuade Pyongyang to halt its nuclear and ballistic missile tests. “There’s no only-sanctions strategy that will bring the North Koreans to heel,” said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, a disarmament advocacy group based in Washington. “It has to be paired with a pragmatic strategy of engagement. But those talks are not yet happening.” In a nod to Chinese and Russian arguments, the resolution also calls for resolving the crisis “through peaceful, diplomatic and political means.” That is diplomatic code to engage in negotiations. In his remarks, the Chinese envoy, Liu Jieyi, warned the United States against efforts at “regime change” and the use of military force. “China will continue to advance dialogue,” he said. China and Russia have jointly proposed a freeze on Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear tests in exchange for a freeze in joint military drills by South Korea and the United States. The Americans have rejected that proposal. Russia’s envoy, Vassily A. Nebenzia, said it would be “a big mistake” to ignore the China-Russia proposal. “We will insist on it being considered,” he said. The French ambassador François Delattre, told reporters that a unified Security Council position was “the best antidote to the risk of war.” “By definition, this is a compromise in order to get everyone on board,” he said before the vote. “Everyone should be able to live with the resolution as it now stands,” said the Swedish ambassador, Olof Skoog. American intelligence agencies say they are expecting North Korea to test another intercontinental ballistic missile, building on two tests in July. But the new test, they speculate, will not be into a high launch into space, but will be flattened out to demonstrate how far the missile can fly. In reality, the Trump administration has relatively low expectations for the new sanctions, American officials say. But it is discussing how to use them, the officials say, with a mix of overt military pressure, covert action, and steps to punish any Chinese banks that do business with North Korea, by banning them from also doing business with the United States. That is exactly the combination of actions that was used by the Obama administration to drive Iran into negotiations over its nuclear activities for what became the 2015 deal that Trump has often denounced as a giveaway. (Somini Sengupta, “U.N. Compromise Tightens Clamp on North Korea,” New York Times, September 12, 2017,
UN Security Council resolution 2375:
PP1: Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013), resolution 2094 (2013), resolution 2270 (2016), resolution 2321 (2016), resolution 2356 (2017), resolution 2371 (2017) as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7), 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13), and 29 August 2017 (S/PRST/2017/16),
PP2: Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
PP3: Expressing its gravest concern at the nuclear test by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“the DPRK”) on September 2, 2017 in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), and 2371 (2017) and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“the NPT”) and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,
PP4: Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community and expressing great concern that the DPRK continues to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by diverting critically needed resources away from the people in the DPRK who have great unmet needs,
PP5: Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities have destabilized the region and beyond, and determining that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,
PP6: Underscoring its concern that developments on the Korean Peninsula could have dangerous, large-scale regional security implications, (New)
PP7: Underscoring its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all States in accordance with the Charter, and recalling the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, (New)
PP8: Expressing also its desire for a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the situation, and reiterating its welcoming of efforts by Council members as well as other Member States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue, (New)
PP9: Underlining the need to ensure international peace and security, and ensure lasting stability in north-east Asia at large and to resolve the situation through peaceful, diplomatic and political means, (New)
PP10: Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,
- Condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on September 2 of 2017 in violation and flagrant disregard of the Security Council’s resolutions;
- Reaffirms its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation; shall immediately suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on all missile launches; shall immediately abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; and shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;
- Decides that the measures specified in paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individual and entities listed in Annex I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and decides further that the measures specified in paragraph 8(e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individual listed in Annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;
- Decides to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) through the designation of additional WMD-related dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology, directs the Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days of adoption of this resolution, and further decides that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report, and directs the Committee to regularly update this list every twelve months;
- Decides that the measures imposed in paragraphs 8(a), 8(b) and 8(c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the conventional arms-related items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology listed in document S/2017/XXXX;
- Decides to apply the measure imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 2371 (2016) on vessels transporting prohibited items from the DPRK, directs the Committee to designate these vessels and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days of adoption of this resolution, further decides that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report, and directs the Committee to regularly update this list when it is informed of additional violations;
[NOTE: The below provisions would update the high seas inspection provisions in UN Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to cover all items, including coal, whose transfer is prohibited by the relevant Security Council resolutions. This provision would not authorize the use of force. This provision would also ask the Committee to consider imposing an asset freeze on any vessel for which a flag State both refuses a high seas inspection and also refuses to divert to a port for inspection; it would also require de-registering by the flag State. Finally, it would prohibit ship-to-ship transfers of items to or from DPRK-flagged vessels (a method of sanctions evasion).]
- Calls upon all Member States to inspect vessels with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) or this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions; (New)
- Calls upon all States to cooperate with inspections pursuant to paragraph 7 above, and, if the flag State does not consent to inspection on the high seas, decides that the flag State shall direct the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection by the local authorities pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016), and decides further that, if a flag State neither consents to inspection on the high seas nor directs the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection, or if the vessel refuses to comply with flag State direction to permit inspection on the high seas or to proceed to such a port, then the Committee shall consider designating the vessel for the measures imposed in paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 12 of resolution 2321 (2016) and the flag State shall immediately deregister that vessel; (New)
- Requires any Member State, when it does not receive the cooperation of a flag State of a vessel pursuant to paragraph 8 above, to submit promptly to the Committee a report containing relevant details regarding the incident, the vessel and the flag State, and requests the Committee to release on a regular basis information regarding these vessels and flag States involved; (New)
- Affirmsthat paragraph 7 contemplates only inspections carried out by warships and other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect, and underscores that it does not apply with respect to inspection of vessels entitled to sovereign immunity under international law; (New; text based on Ops 6-7 of UNSCR 2292)
- Decides that all Member State shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction, entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction, and vessels flying their flag, from facilitating or engaging in ship-to-ship transfers to or from DPRK-flagged vessels of any goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or transferred to or from the DPRK; (New)
[NOTE: These proposals: a) bans all condensates and natural gas liquids, b) impose a cap of 2 million barrels/year on refined petroleum products, and c) cap crude oil exports at their current level.]
- Decides that all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all condensates and natural gas liquids, and decides that the DPRK shall not procure such materials; (New)
- Decides that all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all refined petroleum products, decides that the DPRK shall not procure such products, decides that this provision shall not apply with respect to procurement by the DPRK or the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of refined petroleum products in the amount of up to 500,000 barrels during an initial period of three months beginning on 1 October 2017 and ending on 31 December 2017, and refined petroleum products in the amount of up to 2,000,000 barrels per year during a period of twelve months beginning on 1 January 2018 and annually thereafter, provided that (a) the Member State notifies the Committee every thirty days of the amount of such supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK of refined petroleum products along with information about all the parties to the transaction, (b) the supply, sale, or transfer of refined petroleum products involve no individuals or entities that are associated with the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) or this resolution, including designated individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, directly or indirectly, or individuals or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions, and (c) the supply, sale, or transfer of refined petroleum products are exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) or this resolution, directs the Committee Secretary to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 75 per cent of the aggregate amount for the period between 1 October 2017 and 31 December 2017 has been reached, and again notify all Member States when 90 percent and 95 percent of such aggregate amount has been reached, directs the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 75 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached, also directs the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 90 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached, and further directs the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 95 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached and to inform them that they must immediately cease selling, supplying, or transferring refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year, directs the Committee to make publicly available on its website the total amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK by month and by source country, directs the Committee to update this information on a real-time basis as it receives notifications from Member States, calls upon all Member States to regularly review this website to comply with the annual limits for refined petroleum products established by this provision, directs the Panel of Experts to closely monitor the implementation efforts of all Member States to provide assistance and ensure full and global compliance, and requests the Secretary General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect and provide additional resources in this regard; (New)
- Decides that all Member States shall not supply, sell, or transfer to the DPRK in any period of twelve months after the date of adoption of this resolution an amount of crude oil that is in excess of the amount that the Member State supplied, sold or transferred in the period of twelve months prior to adoption of this resolution, unless the Committee approves in advance on a case-by-case basis a shipment of crude oil is exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals and unrelated to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) or this resolution; (New)
- Decides that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, textiles (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products), and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance, and further decides that for such sales, supplies, and transfers of textiles (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products) for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution, all States may allow those shipments to be imported into their territories up to 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 135 days after the date of adoption of this resolution; (New)
- Expresses concern that DPRK nationals frequently work in other States for the purpose of generating foreign export earnings that the DPRK uses to support its prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile programs, decides that all Member States shall not provide work authorizations for DPRK nationals in their jurisdictions in connection with admission to their territories unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis in advance that employment of DPRK nationals in a member state’s jurisdiction is required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, denuclearization or any other purpose consistent with the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), or this resolution, and decides that this provision shall not apply with respect to work authorizations for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution, provided that the Member State notifies the Committee by 15 December 2017 of the number of DPRK nationals subject to these contracts and the anticipated date of termination of these contracts; (Expansion of OP11 of UNSCR 2371)
- Decides that States shall prohibit, by their nationals or in their territories, the opening, maintenance, and operation of all joint ventures or cooperative entities, new and existing, with DPRK entities or individuals, whether or not acting for or on behalf of the government of the DPRK, unless such joint ventures or cooperative entities, in particular those that are non-commercial, public utility infrastructure projects not generating profit, have been approved by the Committee in advance on a case-by-case basis, further decides that States shall close any such existing joint venture or cooperative entity within 120 days of the adoption of this resolution if such joint venture or cooperative entity has not been approved by the Committee on a case-by-case basis, and States shall close any such existing joint venture or cooperative entity within 120 days after the Committee has denied a request for approval, and decides that this provision shall not apply with respect to existing China-DPRK hydroelectric power infrastructure projects; (Expansion of OP12 of UNSCR 2371)
- Decides that Member States shall report to the Security Council within ninety days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, requests the Panel of Experts, in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist Member States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner; (OP18 of UNSCR 2371)
- Calls upon all Member States to redouble efforts to implement in full the measures in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), and this resolution and to cooperate with each other in doing so, particularly with respect to inspecting, detecting and seizing items the transfer of which is prohibited by these resolutions; (OP19 of UNSCR 2371)
- Decides that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution and further decides that the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and modified in paragraph 1 of resolution 2345 (2017), shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution; (OP20 of UNSCR 2371)
- Decides to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal)of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), or this resolution that are identified in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Development of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972; (OP21 of UNSCR 2371)
- Emphasizes the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions; (OP22 of UNSCR 2371)
- Reiterates its deep concern at the grave hardship that the people in the DPRK are subjected to, condemns the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles instead of the welfare of its people while people in the DPRK have great unmet needs, and emphasizes the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare and inherent dignity of people in the DPRK; (OP25 of UNSCR 2371)
- Regrets the DPRK’s massive diversion of its scarce resources toward its development of nuclear weapons and a number of expensive ballistic missile programs, notes the findings of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance that well over half of the people in the DPRK suffer from major insecurities in food and medical care, including a very large number of pregnant and lactating women and under -five children who are at risk of malnutrition and nearly a quarter of its total population suffering from chronic malnutrition, and, in this context, expresses deep concern at the grave hardship to which the people in the DPRK are subjected; (OP17 of UNSCR 2371)
- Reaffirms that the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively or restrict those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) and this resolution, and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK and decides that the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions; (Based on OP26 of UNSCR 2371)
- Emphasizes that all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) (iii) and 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of the diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; (OP21 of UNSCR 1874)
- Reaffirms its support for the Six Party Talks, calls for their resumption, and reiterates its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each other ’s sovereignty and exist peacefully together, that the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments; (OP27 of UNSCR 2371)
- Reiterates the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, expresses its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic, and political solution to the situation, and welcomes efforts by the Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and stresses the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond; (OP28 of UNSCR 2371)
- Urges further work to reduce tensions so as to advance the prospects for a comprehensive settlement; (New)
- Underscores the imperative of achieving the goal of complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner; (New)
- Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance, and, in this regard, expresses its determination to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch; (OP29 of UNSCR 2371)
- Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Von Hippel and Hayes: “On September 11, 2017, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 2375 (2017), which strengthens sanctions on the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the wake of the latter’s sixth nuclear weapons test on September 2, 2017. As of time of writing, the approved text of the resolution and any explanatory annexes it may contain are not on-line and press reports have varying and sometimes contradictory accounts of what it says. However, the US Mission to the UN stated that: “This resolution reduces about 30% of oil provided to North Korea by cutting off over 55% of refined petroleum products going to North Korea.”[1] This outcome will be achieved, US Mission to the UN continued, by “imposing an annual cap of 2 million barrels per year of [imports of] all refined petroleum products (gasoline, diesel, heavy fuel oil, etc.).” The US Mission to UN Factsheet added that North Korea “currently receives about 8.5 million barrels of oil/petroleum: 4.5 million in refined form and 4 million in crude form.” The Factsheet also notes: “The resolution freezes the current amount of crude oil provided to North Korea by banning countries from providing additional crude oil beyond what China provides through the Dandong-Sinuiju pipeline.” The Dandong-Sinuiju pipeline has historically, for most of the last two decades, been the major source of crude oil imports to the DPRK. Crude oil passing through the pipeline is refined in the DPRK’s refinery at Sinuiju. This clause pertaining to imports of oil to the DPRK through the pipeline is the key to interpreting the sanctions. The resolution also bans importation outright of all natural gas and condensates to prevent North Korea from obtaining substitutes for oil imports. There are some ambiguities in this cannot be readily resolved without additional information, though the overall meaning seems relatively clear. First among the ambiguities, there is no such thing as a “barrel of refined product” as each type of refined product has a different energy content and density. For example, gasoline, being lower in density (though higher in energy content per unit mass) than diesel oil or heavy fuel oil, has a lower energy content per barrel than those fuels. Thus, there is no simple and precise way to interpret a cap on such as “2 million barrels per year of all refined petroleum products”. As stated, it means North Korea could import any mix of these fuel types provided that the volumetric sum is no greater than 2 million barrels. In practice, this may not be too much of an issue, as the DPRK may not be able to quickly change the relative proportion of the fuels it would use for its existing equipment and vehicles, but there may be some difficulties arising from it when it comes time to enforce this clause. The accounting methodology related to implementation may be stated in an annex to the resolution; but if not, this phrasing presents problems for monitoring and tracking energy flows and determining compliance. Second, although we assume that the resolution should be interpreted as limiting imports to the DPRK (or exports from other nations to the DPRK) of refined product to no more than 2 million barrels, the text of the Factsheet is somewhat ambiguous in its phrasing. If it refers to the DPRK having no more than 2 million barrels of refined product overall, whether imported as refined product, or produced in the DPRK from imported crude, then the sanctions are far more stringent than appears at first glance. However, this is unlikely to be the case because the approval of current Chinese crude exports untouched by sanctions would give the DPRK more than 2 million barrels of refined product overall in any case—which would be contradictory. So we assume that the cap of 2 million barrels of refined product refers only to imports of refined product, not to overall use from imported oil, whether it is refined product or crude oil from which refined product is derived. Finally, the figures given for total oil use in the DPRK of 8.5 million barrels, of which 4.5 million is refined product, and 4 million is in crude oil form, comes from an unstated source, though it is plausible based on our crude estimates of 2017 DPRK oil use. …Crude oil exports from China to the DPRK, as recorded in Chinese customs statistics, were in the range between about 470 and 580,000 tonnes in each year between 2001 and 2013, which was the last year that China reported crude oil exports. We estimate (based on end use analysis) that crude oil exports have continued at about 500,000 tonnes per year. Different crude oils have slightly different energy contents per unit volume, but using a conversion of 7.33 barrels or bbl/tonne yields about 3.7 million barrels per year. Our estimate for 2010 was that the DPRK imported about 570,000 tonnes of crude oil which converts to 4.2 million bbl. So the US Mission to the UN estimate of 4 million barrels per year is plausible. And the total crude oil and oil products imports to the DPRK in 2017 really might be in the range of 8.5 million bbl, as the Factsheet indicates, especially if China provided the UNSC with current export information. …In short, the sanctions would cut refined product imports by about 56% (whereas our estimates suggest more like 60 percent if imports are limited to 200,000 barrels because we suggest imports were higher at 494,000 barrels to begin with. The difference is impossible to resolve without access to the energy accounting methodology used by the UNSC to aggregate refined products into “barrels.” Overall, the US Mission to the UN estimated that the DPRK would forego about 29% of total imported oil from crude and refined product; whereas our estimate is lower at 25%, because we believe that the total import figure used by the UN may be low). But overall, these figures generally align. If the sanctions work as intended (that is, are not circumvented in some of many possible ways by smuggling etc.), then sanctions significantly reduce the DPRK’s future oil products imports and use, relative to current levels (putting them back to where they were in about 2010); but will have no significant effect on crude oil imports, relative to recent levels. The levels of reduction outlined above for refined product are unlikely, for the reasons we outlined in our September 5 report, to have a significant impact on the DPRK military or nuclear weapons/missile programs. These military sectors will have priority access to refined fuels, including likely fuel caches of significant volume that have already been stockpiled and provide a substantial buffer against the sanctions. Primarily these sanctions will affect the civilian population whose oil product uses are of lower priority to the DPRK state. The DPRK will quickly effect a combination of additional energy end use efficiency, outright cuts, and substitution of non-oil energy forms to manage the cuts. We estimated in our September 5 report that six measures along these lines could cut the equivalent of 3.7 million bbls of crude oil use per year—more than enough to offset the cuts imposed by this sanctions resolution. Moreover, the more that the DPRK invests now in these workarounds, the more resilient it becomes against future sanctions-driven cuts. The cost of imposing these sanctions now when they will have little effect on the desired goal—reversing the DPRK’s missile and nuclear programs—is that the UNSC members will have even less leverage in the future when it is most needed—which is when the DPRK needs some “suasion” to meet the United States in talks over freezing, dismantling, and disarming its nuclear weapons over the coming years—or decades. It is also noteworthy that the new sanctions also ban exports to the DPRK of natural gas and natural gas liquids. These fuels are not widely used in the DPRK, and the DPRK largely lacks the infrastructure to use, especially, natural gas. As a consequence, this ban will have no immediate effect on DPRK energy use, though it might cut off some options for fuel switching in the medium term (many months to years) that the DPRK might have implemented. Finally, we note that the resolution added a ban on textile exports from the DPRK to cut off a source of foreign exchange earnings. The US Mission to the UN suggested that textile exports “earned North Korea an average of $760 million in the past three years.” Speakers to the UN Security Council deliberations suggested that this figure was $800 million. Although that may indeed be true, it is only part of the story. Textile exports from the DPRK are value added goods for which components were imported from China (that is, cut cloth is exported to the DPRK, it is sown into clothing in the DPRK, then re-exported back to China). The value of those components imported to the DPRK for textile processing and then re-export appear in China’s customs statistics. The net income to the DPRK—assuming that the labor used to finish the garments and other goods was paid relatively little by those running the factories in the DPRK—may have been in the range of few hundred million dollars annually. Thus, the net effect on income, if the sanctions are enforced and effective, will be much less than the $760 million annually implied in the Factsheet. (David Von Hippel and Peter Hayes, “Impact of UNSC Resolution 2375 on North Korean Oil Imports,” NAPSnet, September 12, 2017)
9/12/17:
North Korea rejected a U.N. Security Council resolution imposing tougher sanctions and said the United States would soon face the “greatest pain” it had ever experienced. “My delegation condemns in the strongest terms and categorically rejects the latest illegal and unlawful U.N. Security Council resolution,” Pyongyang’s ambassador, Han Tae Song, told the U.N.-sponsored Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Han accused the U.S. administration of being “fired up for political, economic, and military confrontation,” and of being “obsessed with the wild game of reversing the DPRK’s development of nuclear force which has already reached the completion phase.” The DPRK is “ready to use a form of ultimate means,” Han said without elaborating. “The forthcoming measures by DPRK will make the U.S. suffer the greatest pain it ever experienced in its history,” he said. U.S. disarmament ambassador Robert Wood took the floor to say that the Security Council resolution “frankly sent a very clear and unambiguous message to the regime that the international community is tired, is no longer willing to put up provocative behavior from this regime.” “My hope is the regime will hear the message loud and clear and it will choose a different path,” Wood said. “We call on all countries to vigorously implement these new sanctions and all other existing sanctions,” he added. (Stephanie Nebehay, “North Korea Warns U.S. of ‘Greatest Pain,’ Rejects U.N. Sanctions,” Reuters, September 12, 2017)
The latest UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea are a small part of the process and “nothing compared to what ultimately will have to happen,” President Donald Trump said. “We think it’s just another very small step — not a big deal,” said Trump in a joint statement with Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak at the White House, following the 15-member Security Council’s unanimous adoption of the latest resolution on North Korea the previous day. Trump appeared to be downplaying the impact of UNSC Resolution 2375, which is considered a watered-down version of the original U.S. draft in response to the North’s sixth nuclear test, which called for a complete oil embargo. “I don’t know if it has any impact, but certainly it was nice to get a 15-to-nothing vote,” said Trump on the resolution, which also drew in the support of veto-wielding council members China and Russia. Trump said he and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson discussed the sanctions, which he described as “not big” compared to what ultimately will have to happen, though he did not elaborate further. The president lauded the Malaysian prime minister, remarking, “He does not do business with North Korea any longer, and we find that to be very important.” When asked by a reporter what Trump meant went calling the UN sanctions “not a big deal,” Sarah Huckabee Sanders, the White House press secretary, elaborated later in the day, “I think he actually said this is a small step and part of the process.” She said that the “ultimate goal here is a denuclearized Korean Peninsula,” and that is “what we have to push towards.” Sanders added, “We’re going to continue taking those small steps, but at the same time we know that those very parties that voted to do this all have to do more.” Her response appears to be directed at China, the North’s main trading partner and primary oil supplier. When asked if Trump is considering cutting off Chinese banks from the U.S. financial system when he warned of the UN action being “nothing compared to what ultimately will have to happen,” Sanders replied that all options are on the table. “This was a small step in that process, and we’re hoping that they’ll take a greater role and a more active role in putting pressure on North Korea,” said Sanders. Despite the latest UN Security Council passing with the support of China and Russia, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin similarly indicated today that Washington may impose further secondary sanctions on China should it not fully implement existing ones. “These sanctions work,” said Mnuchin at the CNBC Institutional Investor Delivering Alpha conference, adding that “they worked with Iran,” though he said Washington could have ultimately “cut a better deal.” “And in North Korea, economic warfare works,” added Mnuchin. “We sent a message that anybody that wanted to trade with North Korea, we would consider them not trading with us. We can put on economic sanctions.” His remarks echoed the president’s tweet earlier this month saying he is considering stopping trade with any country doing business with North Korea. Mnuchin said he is “pleased” with the latest Security Council resolution, adding, “This is some of the strongest items. We now have more tools in our toolbox, and we will continue to use them and put additional sanctions on North Korea until they stop this behavior.” He added, “I think we have absolutely moved the needle on China,” describing what Beijing agreed to in the latest resolution as “historic.” He also recalled the U.S. Treasury’s sanctioning of a Chinese bank. “And if China doesn’t follow these sanctions, we will put additional sanctions on them and prevent them from accessing the U.S. and international dollar system,” he added. “And that’s quite meaningful.” While so-called secondary sanctions on Chinese banks and entities, which the Trump administration has been forecasting ahead of the Security Council vote, appear to be on hold to give China time to enforce the latest round of sanctions, the United States is also warning that they are still an option. Experts and officials have noted that sanctions were effective in bringing Iran to a nuclear deal, though the case for North Korea is different because they are further along in their nuclear program. South Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Cho Tae-yul told reporters in New York that the expected result of the latest UNSC resolution goes beyond simply reducing oil provided to North Korea by around 30 percent. “The effectiveness of sanctions can be measured when the other side changes their position, so we will have to go to the end.” He continued, “While there are differences between Iran and North Korea, which is excluded from the international economy, ultimately Iran reached out for negotiating a nuclear deal because of the effectiveness of sanctions.” Cho added, “The United States is using the most pain-inducing card, secondary boycotts, in the process of negotiating the resolution and in its implementation,” referring to the possibilities of sanctions on third-country entities. “When the United States indicated it could move forward with secondary boycotts, there has been the cooling effect of Chinese financial institutes trying to avoid transactions with North Korea.” (Sarah Kim, “Trump Says Sanction ‘Not a Big Deal’ While Aides Say Iran Deal Worked,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 13, 2017) Trump’s remarks came just hours after House lawmakers from both parties expressed frustration that the U.S. isn’t exerting greater pressure on China to stop North Korea’s march toward developing nuclear weapons capable of striking the continental United States. “We don’t threaten China, even a little bit, with country sanctions because that would be difficult, politically,” to do, said Rep. Brad Sherman, a California Democrat. China, North Korea’s closest diplomatic ally and largest trading partner, is seen as key to solving the standoff with Pyongyang. The committee chairman, Republican Rep. Ed Royce of California, said he agreed with Sherman and urged more sanctions against Chinese banks that do business with North Korea. “It’s been a long, long time of waiting for China to comply with the sanctions we pass and, frankly, the sanctions the United Nations passes.” Meanwhile, Democrats charged that Trump is exacerbating the increasingly tense standoff with North Korea with his belligerent comments and tweets. “He talked about the response of the United States of ‘fire and fury,'” said Democratic Rep. Gerald Connolly of Virginia. “Frankly, the policy looks more like fecklessness and failure.” The lawmakers aired their frustration as US officials outlined ways in which China and Russia are failing to do everything they can to rein in North Korea, even as the nuclear threat from the rogue regime grows more intense. China’s leaders are looking the other way as DPRK uses its banking system and front companies to do business, while Russian companies continue to provide support to Pyongyang, said Marshall Billingslea, assistant secretary in the Treasury Department’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “It is essential that the international community work together to increase economic pressure on North Korea,” Billingslea told the committee. But “DPRK bank representatives operate in Russia in flagrant disregard of the very resolutions adopted by Russia at the UN,” he said in prepared remarks. And while China accounts for 90% of North Korean exports, Billingslea said he “cannot assure the committee today that we have seen sufficient evidence of China’s willingness to truly shut down North Korean revenue flows, expunge the North Korean illicit actors from its banking system, and expel the North Korean middlemen and brokers who are establishing webs of front companies.” Billingslea said the US is “capable of tracking North Korea’s trade on banned goods… and we will act even if China does not.” He said that the US has recently caught North Korea trying to disguise the origin of ships it’s using — and added that cracking down on North Korean ship traffic will be crucial to enforcing sanctions.
These vessels have been spotted entering North Korean ports with their transponders turned off in violation of international law, Billingslea said. They have then been seen loading cargo such as coal, sailing to a Russian port where the coal is offloaded and then put on a vessel bound for China. (Nicole Gaouette and Zachary Cohen, “Trump Says UN Sanction Are ‘Not a Big Deal,’” CNN, September 12, 2017)
The last time South Korea is known to have plotted to assassinate the North Korean leadership, nothing went as planned. In the late 1960s, after North Korean commandoes tried to ransack the presidential palace in Seoul, South Korea secretly trained misfits plucked from prison or off the streets to sneak into North Korea and slit the throat of its leader, Kim Il-sung. When the mission was aborted, the men mutinied. They killed their trainers and fought their way into Seoul before blowing themselves up, an episode the government concealed for decades. Now, as Kim’s grandson, Kim Jong-un, accelerates his nuclear missile program, South Korea is again preparing to target the North’s leadership. A day after North Korea conducted its sixth — and by far most powerful — nuclear test this month, the South Korean defense minister, Song Young-moo, told lawmakers in Seoul that a special forces “decapitation unit” would be established by the end of the year. The brigade-size unit, unlike its earlier counterpart, would operate officially. The military has been retooling helicopters and transport planes to penetrate North Korea at night so that the forces, known as the Spartan 3000, can carry out raids. Rarely does a government announce a strategy to assassinate a head of state, but South Korea wants to keep the North on edge and nervous about the consequences of further developing its nuclear arsenal. At the same time, the South’s increasingly aggressive posture is meant to help push North Korea into accepting President Moon Jae-in’s offer of talks. It is a difficult balancing act, pitting Moon’s preference for a diplomatic solution against his nation’s need to answer an existential question: How can a country without nuclear weapons deter a dictator who has them? “The best deterrence we can have, next to having our own nukes, is to make Kim Jong-un fear for his life,” said Shin Won-sik, a three-star general who was South Korean military’s top operational strategist before he retired in 2015. The measures have also raised questions about whether South Korea and the United States, its most important ally, are laying the groundwork to kill or incapacitate Mr. Kim and his top aides before they can even order an attack. While Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson has said the United States does not seek leadership change in North Korea, and the South Koreans say the new military tactics are meant to offset the North Korean threat, the capabilities they are building could be used pre-emptively. The tactics led to a breakthrough last week when President Trump agreed to lift payload limits under a decades-old treaty, allowing South Korea to build more powerful ballistic missiles. The United States helped South Korea build its first ballistic missiles in the 1970s, but in return, imposed restrictions to try to prevent a regional arms race. “We can now build ballistic missiles that can slam through deep underground bunkers where Kim Jong-un would be hiding,” Shin said. “The idea is how we can instill the kind of fear a nuclear weapon would — but do so without a nuke. In the medieval system like North Korea, Kim Jong-un’s life is as valuable as hundreds of thousands of ordinary people whose lives would be threatened in a nuclear attack.” Although a majority of South Koreans, especially conservative politicians and commentators, call for arming their country with nuclear weapons of its own, Moon has repeatedly vowed to rid the Korean Peninsula of such weapons. In June, Trump reiterated Washington’s nuclear-umbrella doctrine, promising to protect the South with “the full range of United States military capabilities, both conventional and nuclear.” But after North Korea tested two intercontinental ballistic missiles in July, including one that appeared capable of hitting the mainland United States, South Koreans are not so sure the Americans would follow through. “Would the Americans intervene in a war on the peninsula if their own Seattle were threatened with a North Korean nuclear ICBM?” said Park Hwee-rhak, a military analyst at Kookmin University in Seoul. South Korea has now introduced three arms-buildup programs — Kill Chain; the Korea Air and Missile Defense program; and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation initiative, which includes the decapitation unit. Moon has vowed to expand the defense budget to 2.9 percent of South Korea’s gross domestic product during his term, from 2.4 percent, or $35.4 billion, as of this year. For next year, his government has proposed a budget of $38.1 billion, nearly $12 billion of it for weapons to defend against North Korea. In a Twitter post September 5, Trump said, “I am allowing Japan & South Korea to buy a substantially increased amount of highly sophisticated military equipment from the United States.” Under the Kill Chain program, South Korea aims to detect impending missile attacks from North Korea and launch pre-emptive strikes. North Korea keeps artillery and rocket tubes near the border, and is capable of delivering 5,200 rounds on Seoul in the first 10 minutes of war, military planners in South Korea say. The North also operates hundreds of missiles designed to hit South Korea and United States bases in Japan and beyond to deter American intervention should war break out. The need to detect an impending strike has become more critical. North Korea has made its nuclear bombs small and light enough — weighing under 500 kilograms, or about 1,100 pounds — to be fitted onto its missiles, though it is still unclear whether they are fully weaponized, Mr. Song, the defense minister, said last week. But detection has also become harder. North Korea hides missiles in its many underground tunnels. Switching to solid fuel has made some of its missiles easier to transport and faster to launch. In recent years, North Korea also has flight-tested missiles from submarines, which are tougher to detect. And the potential consequences are huge. Miscalculation could prompt an unwarranted pre-emptive strike, which could start a regional nuclear war. Speaking to a United States congressional hearing in June, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., said, “We will see casualties, unlike anything we’ve seen in 60 or 70 years.” Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are crucial, said Daniel A. Pinkston, a defense expert at the Seoul campus of Troy University. Without those capabilities, “they would be ‘shooting blind’ because the missile units could not identify the targets,” he added. Last month, South Korea said it would launch five spy satellites into orbit from 2021 to 2023 to better monitor weapons movements in North Korea. In the interim, it is talking with countries like France and Israel to lease spy satellites. It also plans to introduce four American RQ-4 Global Hawk surveillance drones by next year. If pre-emptive attacks failed, South Korea would hope its Korea Air and Missile Defense would shoot down any rockets from the North. South Korea is planning to upgrade its PAC-2 interceptor missiles for a better low-altitude defense. Last week, South Korea helped the United States military install a Thaad missile-defense battery, which intercepts enemy rockets at higher altitudes. For additional protection, South Korea is developing its own L-SAM interceptor missiles, as well as installing more early warning radars for ballistic missiles. After the North’s latest nuclear test, South Korea fired its Hyunmoo-2 short-range ballistic missiles in a drill simulating an attack on the North’s test site. In July, the South’s military also released simulated images of Taurus bunker-buster missiles hitting the defense ministry in the North Korean capital, Pyongyang. South Korea is buying 260 Taurus missiles from a German and Swedish joint venture. The weapons are part of the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation plan. Under that program, South Korea would try to divide Pyongyang into several districts and wipe out the area where Kim Jong-un is believed to be hiding, defense analysts said. Washington’s decision to lift the missile payload limits may allow South Korea to develop new Hyunmoo missiles capable of destroying weapons sites and leadership bunkers deep underground, said Shin Jong-woo at Korea Defense Forum, a Seoul-based network of military experts. Shin said there was talk of building a Hyunmoo with a two-ton warhead. The earlier restrictions barred South Korea from attaching a payload weighing more than half a ton to its Hyunmoo missile when the rocket had a range of up to 497 miles. As word of South Korea’s new assassination plans has spread, Kim has used his deputies’ cars as decoys to move from place to place, South Korean intelligence officials told lawmakers in June. Still, many say they doubt that the threat is enough to deter Kim. Only the prospect of nuclear retaliation will suffice, they say. “The balance of terror is the shortest cut to deterring war,” Yoon Sang-hyun, a conservative opposition lawmaker, told Parliament a week ago. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Plans ‘Decapitation Unit’ to Try to Menace North,” New York Times, September 13, 2017,
Joseph Yun, the State Department’s special representative for North Korea policy, made a quiet trip to Moscow yesterday to urge Russia to support new United Nations sanctions on North Korea. The Russian government had invited Yun as part of President Vladimir Putin’s larger effort to elevate Russia’s role in the ongoing North Korea crisis, which involves resistance by Moscow to further sanctions and a push for a return to the negotiating table with Pyongyang. As of last week, Yun’s trip was on hold, administration officials said. But after the Kim regime’s latest nuclear test, the drive for another Security Council resolution created new urgency and Yun was dispatched to Moscow.
“This visit is an example of our ongoing discussions with the international community to increase pressure on [North Korea],” said State Department spokesman Justin Higgins. “The United States seeks stability and the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We remain open to negotiations towards that goal.” The Russia foreign ministry issued a statement today with a very different take on Yun’s meeting with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov. According to Moscow, the meeting was about dialogue, not pressure. “The Russian side stressed that there is no other way to settle the problems of the Korean Peninsula, including the nuclear problem, other than by political and diplomatic means,” the ministry said. “The sides noted readiness for joint efforts in the interests of finding comprehensive approaches to ensuring security [in] Northeastern Asia, including in the context of the implementation of the Russian-Chinese roadmap for the Korean settlement.” nuclear tests. President Trump played down the new Security Council resolution and promised further sanctions today at the White House, speaking to the press after his meeting with Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak. “We think it’s just another very small step — not a big deal,” Trump said about the latest U.N. resolution. “[Secretary of State] Rex [Tillerson] and I were just discussing not knowing if it has any impact, but it’s nice to get a 15-to-nothing vote. Those sanctions are nothing compared to ultimately what will have to happen.” A senior administration official briefed reporters last week and also said that the Trump administration has no intention of sitting down with the Kim regime under current conditions and that the plan is to continue to increase pressure on Pyongyang. “The amount of pressure North Korea has been put under economically is still far short of what we applied to Iran or even Iraq,” the official said. “There is a long way to go before North Korea is going to feel the pressure they would need to feel to change their calculus.” (Josh Rogin, “State Department Official Quietly Visits Moscow to Discuss North Korea,” Washington Post, September 12, 2017)
Yun last visited Moscow in April. He has also kept open a channel to the North Korean regime through its U.N. representatives in New York. Working with the Russian government is a part of his diplomatic responsibilities, and he often travels to other countries involved in the North Korea issue as well. Some experts hold out hope that Yun’s efforts will produce an opening for direct dialogue with the Kim regime that the Trump White House might take advantage of. “The smart strategy is to keep pushing the sanctions ball forward with the [Russians and Chinese], but at the same time showing them we are serious about their interests, which is starting a dialogue,” said former nuclear negotiator Joel Wit. “It takes away their opportunity to blame us, and probably makes them willing to be more cooperative with us.” Others are skeptical there is enough common ground between the United States on one side and Russia and China on the other to build on. On Capitol Hill on Tuesday, lawmakers from both parties grilled Trump administration officials to move forward with tougher sanctions on North Korea, even without China’s or Russia’s permission. “Unfortunately, years have been wasted as sanctions have been weak, allowing North Korea to have the financial access to build its nuclear and missile programs,” said House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Edward R. Royce (R-Calif.). “The time for that pressure is now.”
9/13/17:
DPRK FoMin “report: The U.S. and its vassal forces have rigged up yet another “resolution on sanctions” harsher than ever against the DPRK at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on September 12, condemning its ICBM-ready H-bomb test as a “threat” to international peace and security. The “resolution” was cooked by the U.S. employing all sorts of despicable and vicious means and methods. The DPRK condemns in the strongest terms and categorically rejects the UNSC “resolution 2375” on sanctions as a product of heinous provocation aimed at depriving the DPRK of its legitimate right to self-defense and completely suffocating its state and people through full-scale economic blockade. The adoption of another illegal and evil “resolution on sanctions” piloted by the U.S. served as an occasion for the DPRK to verify that the road it chose to go down was absolutely right and to strengthen its resolve to follow this road at a faster pace without the slightest diversion until this fight to the finish is over. Since the scheme of the U.S. to impede the DPRK’s development, disarm it through the unprecedented sanctions and pressure and conquer it with the help of nuclear weapons has become clearly evident, the DPRK will redouble the efforts to increase its strength to safeguard the country’s sovereignty and right to existence and to preserve peace and security of the region by establishing the practical equilibrium with the U.S. (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Rejects Fresh UNSC ‘Resolution,’” September 13, 2017)
South Korea has successfully conducted its first live-fire exercise for an advanced long-range cruise missile capable of striking North Korea’s underground military facilities and command centers, Seoul’s Air Force said. According to the military, the Taurus missile fired from a F-15K fighter jet traveled about 400 kilometers before hitting a target on Jikdo in the West Sea on Tuesday. It flew through obstacles at a low altitude of 500 meters and rose up to 3 kilometers before hitting the target, the Air Force said. “Through the exercise, (South Korea) showcased its capability to conduct a strong response to the enemy’s provocations and demonstrated the ability to carry out a precision strike at a long distance,” the Air Force said in a statement. Deployed here in 2016 for the first time, the Taurus missiles will boost South Korea’s capability to conduct its own pre-emptive strikes and military operations in taking out North Korea’s underground missile and nuclear facilities, analysts said. Boasting a maximum range of 500 kilometers, the Taurus is equipped with stealth technology and GPS, allowing the missile to strike a long-distance target precisely without being disturbed by North Korea’s radar system and jamming attacks. With the ability to carry a 480-kilogram warhead thought to be able to penetrate reinforced concrete, the missile is expected to play a vital role in conducting the “decapitation plan” against North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un by destroying his underground wartime command. “Through the live-fire exercise, we managed to confirm Taurus’ operational capability,” said Air Force Maj. Lee Hyeon-woo, who piloted the F-15k that launched the missile. “We are ready to retaliate against the enemy’s provocations with precision strike capability.” Due to safety concerns, the missile fired Tuesday was adjusted to fly only 400 kilometers and carry an inert ordnance without explosives. The military had planned to conduct the drill in April, but delayed it to avoid the migration season for birds. South Korea is seeking to adopt a total of 260 Taurus missiles by 2018 and mount them onto fighter jets such as the F-15K. Currently, about 80 units are thought to be fielded after the military received 40 in 2016 from Taurus Systems, a German-Swedish arms developer. The Air Force had initially planned to acquire 170 Taurus missiles, but decided to increase the amount last October after North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test. The missile costs about 2 billion won ($ 1.8 million) each. “Considering the current security situation, we will do our utmost to adopt the [additional] Taurus as soon as possible and help the Air Force boost its capability,” said Lee Sang-moon, who oversees Taurus acquisition at the Defense Acquisition Program Administration. (Yeo Jun-suk, “Seoul Carries out Missile Drill Targeting N.K.’s Missile Sites,” Korea Herald, September 13, 2017)
UN SecGen: “The nuclear and missile tests by the DPRK have created great instability and tension on the Korean peninsula, throughout the region and beyond. Unity in the Security Council is critical. This week’s unanimous adoption of a new resolution sends a clear message that the DPRK must comply fully with its international obligations. I call on all Member States to ensure the full implementation of this and other relevant Security Council resolutions. But Security Council unity also creates an opportunity for diplomatic engagement – an opportunity that must be seized. The solution can only be political. Military action could cause devastation on a scale that would take generations to overcome.” (UN Secretary-General’s Press Conference Prior to the Oepning of the 72nd General Assembly, New York, September 11, 2017)
Funabashi: “Pyongyang’s recent missile launch over Hokkaido and its underground nuclear test have laid bare Japan’s Achilles’ heel: Our country’s national security policy is still woefully ill equipped for this mounting danger. The new sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council on Monday will hardly limit Japan’s exposure. North Korea’s latest provocations pose an unprecedented threat. Even during the Korean War in the early 1950s, Japan, as a rear support base for United States forces, was somewhat insulated; today, it is in the same theater as South Korea, also on the front lines. Any American military strike against North Korea would likely trigger retaliatory measures against Japan. Japan is in a terrible predicament: Highly exposed but with very few options, military or diplomatic, to help itself. Its defense ministry plans to double, to eight, the number of ships equipped with the Aegis missile-defense system. But the new fleet won’t be operational before 2021. Even if Japan also acquires the land-based Aegis Ashore system, as it is contemplating doing, none of this additional capacity could offer it enough protection against North Korea’s increasingly lethal missiles — much less deter North Korea from further developing its own arsenal. This is one reason Onodera Itsunori, the new defense minister, has been making a case for developing Japan’s offensive capabilities, so that it could strike military bases in North Korea, perhaps even preemptively. But such a move faces numerous obstacles — financial, tactical and strategic. No budget decision for such capabilities is expected to even be made until at least late 2018. Acquiring offensive weaponry would require redefining the terms of Japan’s existing security agreement with the United States, which relegates Japan to a purely defensive role and places all responsibility for any offensive action solely with America. In the face of these constraints, some pundits and officials in Washington are arguing that Japan, as well as South Korea, might, and perhaps should, consider acquiring nuclear weapons themselves. The idea is a nonstarter. According to an opinion poll conducted in June and July, only 9 percent of Japanese respondents think Japan should acquire nuclear weapons. (About 67 percent of South Koreans polled said that South Korea should get such weapons.) The nuclearization of Japan — or South Korea — would undermine nonproliferation efforts, as well as validate North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship to date. Given the difficulties of developing an independent military capability, Tokyo has no choice but to pursue a diplomatic solution with the help of other states — even though several multilateral efforts have failed in the past and bilateral relations between some of the main players today arguably are more fraught than ever. Tensions are mounting between the United States and China, for example, over dominance in the South China Sea. South Korea’s decision to deploy the missile-defense system known as Thaad to protect itself from North Korea has riled Beijing, which says the system is in fact designed to track missiles from China. Relations between Tokyo and Seoul have long been uneasy, largely because of unresolved issues from Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula in the 1930s and 1940s, including about so-called comfort women, Korean women who were coerced or compelled into having sex with Japanese soldiers. And the new South Korean president, Moon Jae-in, appears to be taking a firmer stand on that question than his predecessor, who signed an agreement with Japan in 2015 hoping to finally settle the matter. It is now very difficult to imagine, for example, that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces could ever operate on South Korean soil, even to assist with, say, an evacuation after an attack by North Korea. At the same time, however, as the threat from Pyongyang becomes more ominous, the pressing need for an effective response may suggest, even create, new diplomatic opportunities. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan and President Trump seem to have quickly developed an intimate working relationship, and that — along with South Korea’s moves to strengthen its security ties with the United States — may allow for more effective cooperation among the three countries, despite difficulties between Japan and South Korea. This trilateralism, in turn, could form the basis for five-party talks including China and Russia, and eventually lead to the resumption of negotiations with Pyongyang as well. The U.N. Security Council’s decision to cap North Korea’s oil imports, though a watered-down version of the penalties sought by the United States government, was significant nonetheless. For one thing, it was a reminder that coordinated action with China and Russia, which have been wary of imposing more sanctions against Pyongyang, is possible. On this front, too, North Korea’s recent brinkmanship may have unexpectedly paved the way for new (if slim) possibilities for cooperation. Abe and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia seem to have developed an effective line of communication, including on intractable-seeming issues, like the status of contested islands in the Pacific. And the chances for at least some measure of rapprochement between Japan and China may be growing. Building bridges with Beijing remains a loaded notion for many Japanese people, but Mr. Abe now has more clout and political capital to try, in the name of protecting Japan against the more immediate threat posed by North Korea. The recent escalation of the North Korea crisis seems to have validated Abe’s controversial efforts to strengthen Japan’s defense posture. The Japanese public is now more open to adopting a tougher stance. The new leader of the opposition Democratic Party, Maehara Seiji, is a hawk, and under his leadership the party, traditionally an advocate of pacifism, is likely to support, if perhaps reluctantly, the Abe Administration’s hard-nosed approach to security. There is no viable military solution to the North Korea crisis. Japan, like the other main parties, must make the most of the slivers of opportunity created by the escalating threat to renew efforts at finding a multilateral diplomatic solution.” (Funabashi Yoichi, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons, Japan’s Bind,” New York Times, September 13, 2017)
9/14/17:
South Korean President Moon Jae-in has dismissed the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons in his country, warning it could “lead to a nuclear arms race in northeast Asia.” “I do not agree that South Korea needs to develop our own nuclear weapons or relocate tactical nuclear weapons in the face of North Korea’s nuclear threat,” he told CNN Thursday in his first televised interview since North Korea’s sixth nuclear test. Though he was not supportive of deploying or pursuing nuclear weapons, Moon said South Korea “needs to develop our military capabilities in the face of North Korea’s nuclear advancement.” Earlier this month, South Korea’s defense minister suggested it was worth reviewing the redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula in order to deter threats from the North, something conservative US Sen. John McCain said should be “seriously considered.” A recent Gallup Korea poll found 60% of respondents were in favor of South Korea having its own nuclear weapons, with 35% opposed. “To respond to North Korea by having our own nuclear weapons will not maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula and could lead to a nuclear arms race in northeast Asia,” Moon said. (Paula Hancocks and James Griffiths, “No Nuclear Weapons in South Korea, Says President Moon,” CNN, September 14, 2017)
South Korea said that it is considering providing US$8 million in aid to North Korea via international organizations as it seeks to spur inter-Korean exchanges regardless of political considerations. The government plans to hold a meeting on inter-Korean cooperation September 21 to finalize whether to offer humanitarian assistance to those who are vulnerable in North Korea, according to Seoul’s unification ministry. Seoul suspended its aid to North Korea through U.N. agencies after the North’s nuclear and missile tests in 2016. If approved, the South would provide $4.5 million for a project to help infants and pregnant women by the World Food Program, and $3.5 million for the U.N. International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF). The two agencies have asked Seoul to resume its financial support. “The government’s basic stance is that humanitarian assistance to those who are vulnerable in North Korea should be continued regardless of political considerations,” a ministry official said. “Seoul plans to decide the details of the aid and its timing after taking into account the inter-Korean situation,” he added. If agreed, it would mark the resumption of aid via U.N. organizations after a hiatus of nearly two years. President Moon said at the Group of 20 summit in July that assistance in the welfare and medical sectors should not be linked to political situations, citing the issue of malnutrition among North Korean infants. South Korea offered humanitarian assistance to the North even under conservative administrations, but Moon’s predecessor under an ousted President Park Geun-hye held off the aid after the North’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016. The ministry official said he believes that Seoul’s move would not hamper the sanctions regime. The government said that it has explained its aid plan to the United States in order not to give a wrong message to the international community focusing on pressure and sanctions on the wayward regime. In May, the South announced that it will permit civic groups to seek inter-Korean exchanges to an extent that such a move would not compromise the international sanctions regime. But North Korea has rejected it in protest at Seoul’s support for U.N. sanctions against it. It claimed that sanctions and dialogue cannot go together. The ministry also added that it is “positively” considering chipping in $6 million for the U.N. agency’s census on North Korea. North Korea earlier said that it plans to conduct a preliminary survey of its population in October with technical support from the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). The census is slated for next year. “Seoul is mulling over the support,” the official noted. “It will be a good chance to get an idea of the current state of the North Korean population with reliable international methods and the ministry feels the need (for supporting) such project.” It would mark the North’s first census since 2008, when the South provided Pyongyang with $4 million by tapping its inter-Korean cooperation fund. (Yonhap “S. Korea Mulling over US$8 Million in Aid to N.K. via Int’l Organs,” September 14, 2017)
China’s biggest banks have banned North Koreans from opening new accounts. Multiple bank branches, including those of the big five – Bank of China, China Cionstruction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, IUndustrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the Bank of Communications – said they had imposed a freeze on new accounts by individuals and companies. Three are going further, saying they are cleaning out” existing accounts held by North Koreans by vetoing new deposits. (Yuan Yang and Xinning Liu, “China Banks Freeze New Accounts for N. Koreans,” Finanacial Times, September 14, 2017, p. 5)
9/15/17:
North Korea fired another ballistic missile over Japan this morning, a direct challenge to the United States and China just days after a new sanctions resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council that was intended to force the country to halt its accelerating nuclear and missile tests. The missile was not aimed at the Pacific island of Guam, which President Trump had warned could prompt a military response after North Korea threatened to fire missiles into the sea near the island last month. Instead, it blasted off from near the Sunan International Airport north of Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, and flew about 2,300 miles directly east, flying over northern Japan and falling into the Pacific Ocean, according to the South Korean military. That is a slightly greater distance than between the North Korean capital and the American air base in Guam, and American officials, scrambling to assess both the symbolism and importance of the test, said it was clearly intended to make the point that the North could reach the base with ease. One senior American military official called it a test shot that was also meant as a warning that the primary American bomber base in the Pacific, which would be central to any military action on the Korean Peninsula, was within easy reach of the North’s intermediate-range missiles. At the White House, the launching came at the end of the working day, and senior officials gathered in the Situation Room to weigh a response. But the Trump administration chose not to take out the missile on the launching pad, even though they saw it being fueled up a day ago. Vice President Mike Pence, officials said, was even shown images of the missile during a visit to one of the nation’s intelligence agencies. Neither the United States nor Japan tried to shoot down the missile, perhaps because it was clear moments after the launching that it was not aimed at land. “The North American Aerospace Defense Command determined this ballistic missile did not pose a threat to North America,” Cmdr. Dave Benham, a spokesman for United States Pacific Command, said in a statement. It also concluded that the missile “did not pose a threat to Guam.” Nonetheless, in Japan, an alert was issued on television and via cellphones, warning people to take shelter inside a building or underground. Japan said the missile landed in waters about 1,370 miles east of the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. Intelligence officials have said in recent days that they believe that if Kim is willing to enter talks over a freeze of his nuclear and missile testing — and they are uncertain that he is — he will only do so after he has established that he can launch a nuclear weapon capable of hitting American territory. Today’s flight, with a long arc that peaked at an altitude a little less than 500 miles, took him close to demonstrating that he can accomplish just that. Trump is scheduled to meet with South Korea’s president, Moon Jae-in, and Japan’s prime minister, Abe Shinzo, in New York next week. Trump’s aides say that they have not ruled out using pre-emptive strikes to stop North Korea’s tests. But they also acknowledge that such strikes could result in retaliation and escalation, putting tens of millions of South Koreans, Americans and Japanese at risk.. Abe, after returning to Tokyo from a visit to India, said, “We need to let North Korea realize that if they keep taking this path, they will have no bright future.” In a statement, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson used a line that many of his predecessors have used, to no effect, in the past: “These continued provocations only deepen North Korea’s diplomatic and economic isolation.” But Tillerson turned the issue back to China and Russia. “China supplies North Korea with most of its oil. Russia is the largest employer of North Korean forced labor,” he said. “China and Russia must indicate their intolerance for these reckless missile launches by taking direct actions of their own.” The Security Council will hold “urgent consultations” today at the request of the United States and Japan, the office of Ethiopia’s ambassador said. Ethiopia holds the Council’s rotating presidency for September. South Korean officials said they were still analyzing the flight data to determine what type of missile was launched. In any event, it flew farther than any other missile North Korea has fired. As the missile blasted off at 6:57 a.m., South Korea almost simultaneously launched its Hyunmoo-2 ballistic missile off its east coast in a simulated pre-emptive strike, South Korean defense officials said. Moon approved the South Korean launching and ordered his national security council to meet to discuss the North’s missile test. A proponent of dialogue with North Korea, he has joined Washington in campaigning for tougher sanctions and pressure against the North after its nuclear test. It was the 15th missile test by North Korea this year and the first since North Korea detonated its most powerful nuclear bomb to date on September 3. On the eve of the latest missile test, a North Korean government organization said that the United States should be “beaten to death” like a “rabid dog” for spearheading new United Nations sanctions and that its ally Japan should be “sunken into the sea.” “Now is the time to annihilate the U.S. imperialist aggressors,” a spokesman for the North’s Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee said yesterday, according to KCNA. “Let’s reduce the U.S. mainland into ashes and darkness.” The spokesman accused Japan of “dancing to the tune of the U.S.” and warned of a “telling blow” against Japan. “The four islands of the archipelago should be sunken into the sea by the nuclear bomb of juche,” he said, referring to the North’s ruling philosophy of juche, or self-reliance. (Choe Sang-Hun and David E. Sanger, “North Korea Launches New Missile, Defying U.N. Security Council,” New York Times, September 15, 2017,
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army, guided once again a launching drill of the medium-and-long range strategic ballistic rocket Hwasong-12 on the spot. He was greeted by Ri Pyong Chol, Kim Jong Sik, Jo Yong Won, Yu Jin and other leading officials of the C.C., WPK, General of the Strategic Force Kim Rak Gyom, commander of the KPA Strategic Force, and Jang Chang Ha, Jon Il Ho and other officials in the field of defense scientific research. Participating in the drill were scientists and technicians in the field of rocket research and the Hwasong-12 rocket operation unit of the KPA Strategic Force. The launching drill was conducted with the aim at calming down the belligerence of the U.S. which has recently cried out for using military muscle against the DPRK, and at bolstering up operation capability for attack and counterattack to counter it with swift and powerful military counteraction, examining the order to deal with nuclear warheads and confirming action procedures of actual war. The Hwasong artillerymen were rapidly deployed to the launching ground at early morning under a sudden order of respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un. They were waiting for the moment to launch ballistic rocket after launching preparation under skillful organization and command. He arrived at the launching ground, learned about the launch plan and preparation and issued an order to launch the medium-and-long range strategic ballistic rocket Hwasong-12. At the moment, Hwasong-12 zoomed to the sky with dazzling flash and big explosion. The fired ballistic rocket crossed the sky above Hokkaido of Japan along the preset flight track and accurately hit the preset target waters in the Pacific. Highly appreciating that the current launching drill of very great meaning in increasing combat power of the nuclear force attained its aim, Kim Jong Un expressed great satisfaction over the successful launching drill. Praising the Hwasong artillerymen for handling the rocket well with skillful firepower service, he said with pride that the combat efficiency and reliability of Hwasong-12 were thoroughly verified, operation members’ capacity for actual war is also very perfect and the work for increasing combat power of Hwasong-12 has been realized. He noted that all drills should become meaningful and practical ones for increasing combat power of the nuclear force like the current drill in the future, and the order to deal with nuclear warheads should be strictly established suited to their deployment for actual war. He underlined the need for the scientists and technicians in the field of rocket research and Hwasong artillerymen to put rockets on a modern and ultra modern basis and develop the operation level onto a higher stage with their close combination. He told leading officials of the Department of Munitions Industry of the Party Central Committee and the field of defense scientific research accompanying him that our final goal is to establish the equilibrium of real force with the U.S. and make the U.S. rulers dare not talk about military option for the DPRK. And he stressed the need to run at full speed and straight, continuing to qualitatively consolidate the military attack capacity for nuclear counterattack the U.S. cannot cope with. As recognized by the whole world, we have made all these achievements despite the UN sanctions that have lasted for decades and none of them was made under any “benefit” of the UN, he said, adding it is narrow-minded for those countries styling themselves big powers to calculate the DPRK may yield to UN sanctions. We should clearly show the great-power chauvinists how our state attain the goal of completing its nuclear force despite their limitless sanctions and blockade, he said, underlining the need to finalize the work with mobilization of all-state efforts as it nearly reached the terminal.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Guides Hwasong-12 Launching Drill Again,” September 16, 2017)
North Korea said it aims to reach an “equilibrium” of military force with the United States, which earlier signaled its patience for diplomacy is wearing thin after Pyongyang fired a missile over Japan for the second time in under a month. “Our final goal is to establish the equilibrium of real force with the U.S. and make the U.S. rulers dare not talk about military option,” North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was quoted as saying by KCNA. Kim was shown beaming as he watched the missile fly from a moving launcher in photos released by the agency, surrounded by several officials. “The combat efficiency and reliability of Hwasong-12 were thoroughly verified,” said Kim as quoted by KCNA. Kim added the North’s goal of completing its nuclear force had “nearly reached the terminal.” After the latest missile launch yesterday, White House National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster said the United States was fast running out of patience with North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs. “We’ve been kicking the can down the road, and we’re out of road,” McMaster told reporters, referring to Pyongyang’s repeated missile tests in defiance of international pressure. “For those … who have been commenting on a lack of a military option, there is a military option,” he said, adding that it would not be the Trump administration’s preferred choice. Also yesterday, the U.N. Security Council condemned the “highly provocative” missile launch by North Korea. The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, echoed McMaster’s strong rhetoric, even as she said Washington’s preferred resolution to the crisis is through diplomacy and sanctions. “What we are seeing is, they are continuing to be provocative, they are continuing to be reckless and at that point there’s not a whole lot the Security Council is going to be able to do from here, when you’ve cut 90 percent of the trade and 30 percent of the oil,” Haley said. President Donald Trump said that he is “more confident than ever that our options in addressing this threat are both effective and overwhelming.” He said at Joint Base Andrews near Washington that North Korea “has once again shown its utter contempt for its neighbors and for the entire world community.” Yesterday, Secretary of State Tillerson called on China, Pyongyang’s only ally, and Russia to apply more pressure on North Korea by “taking direct actions of their own.” Beijing has pushed back, urging Washington to do more to rein in North Korea. “Honestly, I think the United States should be doing … much more than now, so that there’s real effective international cooperation on this issue,” China’s ambassador to the United States, Cui Tiankai, said today. “They should refrain from issuing more threats. They should do more to find effective ways to resume dialogue and negotiation,” he said, while adding that China would never accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. Russia’s U.N. ambassador, Vassily Nebenzia, said the United States needed to begin talks with North Korea, something that Washington has so far ruled out. “We called on our U.S. partners and others to implement political and diplomatic solutions that are provided for in the resolution,” Nebenzia told reporters after the Security Council meeting. “Without implementing this, we also will consider it as a non-compliance with the resolution.” Asked about the prospect for direct talks, a White House spokesman said, “As the president and his national security team have repeatedly said, now is not the time to talk to North Korea.” South Korean President Moon Jae-in also said dialogue with the North was impossible at this point. He ordered officials to analyze and prepare for possible new North Korean threats, including electromagnetic pulse and biochemical attacks. (Jeff Mason and Michelle Nichols, “North Korea Says Seeking ‘Military Equilibrium’ with U.S.,” Reuters, September 15, 2017)
A majority of Americans support military action against North Korea if economic and diplomatic efforts fail, according to a Gallup poll released today amid rising tension over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program and recent missile launches. The survey of 1,022 U.S. adults last week found that 58 percent said they would favor military action against North Korea if the United States cannot accomplish its goals by more peaceful means first. Such support, however, was largely split along political party lines. Among Republicans, 82 percent would back military action compared with 37 percent among Democrats. Among political independents, 56 backed such action. “Half still think the situation can be resolved with sanctions and diplomacy,” and the majority of Americans doubt any U.S. military attack is imminent in the next six months, Gallup said. “A majority of Americans appear ready to support military action against that country, at least as a last resort,” Gallup wrote in its report. But, it added “Americans still think North Korea is bluffing.” The findings were a shift from 2003, when it last asked about U.S. support for military action against Pyongyang and 47 percent said they backed it, according to Gallup. Most of the shift was seen among Republicans and independents, it added. “A sharp increase in support among Republicans – possibly mirroring President Donald Trump’s promise to respond with “fire and fury“ to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s threats – explains much of this,” Gallup said. In August, Trump warned North Korea it would face “fire and fury” if it threatened the United States. The survey, conducted by telephone interviews September 6-10, has a sampling error of plus or minus 4 percentage points. (Reuters, “U.S. Majority Backs Military Action vs. North Korea: Gallup Poll,” September 15, 2017)
When North Korea launched a missile that flew over Japan yesterday morning, prompting the authorities to broadcast an alert on cellphones and television, many people wondered: Why didn’t the Japanese military shoot it down? The government quickly judged that the missile was not targeting Japan, and it landed in the Pacific Ocean, about 1,370 miles east of Hokkaido, Japan’s northernmost island. But officials in Japan who may have considered intercepting the missile faced two immediate constraints: The country’s missile defenses are limited, and the Constitution limits military action only to instances of self-defense. Those same constraints have weighed heavily on the debate in recent weeks over how Japan should be responding to the North’s rapidly advancing nuclear program, including what role it should play as an American ally and to what extent it should upgrade its armed forces. Though Japan provided rear support for the United States during the Vietnam and Korean Wars, this alliance has never been tested as it would be in a conflict with North Korea. Any military action by the Trump administration against the North risks a retaliatory missile attack on Japan, where 54,000 American troops are based. Yesterday, North Korea threatened to “sink” Japanese islands with nuclear weapons, adding that “Japan is no longer needed to exist near us.” Japan’s position east of North Korea also means that missiles fired by the North toward the United States, including Guam, almost certainly would have to fly over Japanese territory. But the missile defense systems stationed across Japan on mobile launchers are designed only to intercept missiles as they are descending, not in midflight as they are headed to the United States. Other defense systems on four naval destroyers can target missiles midflight, but they have to be in the right place at the right time. It is also unclear whether the pacifist Constitution allows Japan to shoot down a missile headed for the United States, much less initiate a pre-emptive attack on a missile on a launchpad in North Korea, as some in Japan believe it should be prepared to do. In recent months, the government of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has revived a long-simmering discussion over whether to acquire cruise missiles — which can be fired from land, air or sea — that would allow it to strike a launch site in North Korea if it detected signs of an imminent attack. The Japanese government ruled in 1956 that such a pre–emptive strike fell under its right of self-defense, but some lawmakers say deploying cruise missiles could cross a line and break with longstanding policy established after World War II to eschew offensive weapons. While the Japanese public is anxious about North Korea, it is torn about developing the nation’s military capabilities. “The Japanese public is still not so sure about this,” said Richard Samuels, a Japan specialist and the director of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. President Trump signaled this month that he wanted Japan, along with South Korea, to bolster arms spending. In a Twitter post two days after North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test, Trump said he would allow the two countries to “buy a substantially increased amount of highly sophisticated military equipment from the United States.” It is unclear whether Trump had specific equipment in mind, or whether that included cruise missiles. In Japan, part of the political calculation is how China or South Korea might react to such a purchase. “It will be an excuse to China for further military buildup,” said Murata Koji, a professor of international relations at Doshisha University in Kyoto. “And even in South Korea, some kind of anti-Japanese sentiment will be further facilitated.” Onodera Itsunori, Japan’s defense minister, has avoided discussing a pre-emptive strike on North Korea. Instead, he speaks of counterstrikes, suggesting a more passive interpretation of the country’s legal rights under the Constitution. “In Japan’s case, I don’t think we can shoot before we are shot,” said Yamaguchi Noboru, a professor of international relations at the International University of Japan in Niigata and a retired lieutenant general in Japan’s army, known as the Ground Self-Defense Force. “Most likely, once we are shot and the second or third missiles are coming and they are on the ground, we can shoot back.” Some analysts say that officials in Abe’s administration have been careful to use language that will not alarm the public. In polls, about half those surveyed say they would oppose Japan’s acquiring missiles to be used in pre-emptive strikes. But as North Korea steps up missile launches and nuclear tests, Abe and his cabinet can make a stronger argument for such missiles. “They can say, ‘Look at what North Korea is doing. Yes, we have to protect ourselves,’” said Jeffrey W. Hornung, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation. An upgrade of the country’s ballistic missile defenses would be a much easier sell politically. To best protect itself from a missile attack, some experts say, Japan should buy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, or THAAD, which intercepts enemy rockets at higher altitudes than its current land-based systems. Instead, Japan has said it plans to equip and deploy more destroyers with the Aegis missile defense system. The Defense Ministry has also indicated it wants to acquire a land-based system, known as Aegis Ashore, which can intercept missiles above the atmosphere and above THAAD’s range. Still, most experts say that missile defense is hardly foolproof. “Missile defense is still limited and very expensive, so you have to be somewhat lucky at this point,” said Patrick M. Cronin, senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security in Washington. “To have the political will to fire, you are taking a big gamble. Because if you miss, how does that look?” Two years ago, Abe helped push through security legislation that authorized overseas combat missions by the Japanese military alongside allied troops in the name of “collective self-defense.” For Japan to participate in such collective action, the new laws say, its own security must also be under threat. Some analysts question whether, under that definition, lawmakers would authorize an effort to shoot down missiles en route to the United States. “Japan’s security and legal restrictions are absurdly complex,” said Watanabe Tsuneo, a senior research fellow at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Tokyo. Others contend that an attack on Japan’s most important ally surely should be interpreted as a threat to Japan itself, given that the United States is essentially Japan’s protector. “If Japan sees U.S. bases almost being hit, that may be regarded as a situation where, if we don’t save them, Japan’s existence is in danger,” said Professor Yamaguchi of the International University of Japan. “In such a case we could legally engage.” Although the Defense Ministry recently increased its annual budget request to a record high of 5.26 trillion yen, or about $48 billion, its military spending relative to gross domestic product is minimal compared with those of other countries. And Japan may have other military equipment on its wish list, including amphibious vehicles or more fighter jets. “If the resources are limited, we have to prioritize,” Professor Yamaguchi said. “North Korea is not the only problem. We have to deal with global terrorism, and we need to deal constructively with China,” he added, referring to Beijing’s territorial incursions in the East and South China Seas. Looming in the background is the question of whether Japan should develop nuclear weapons to counteract North Korea’s threat. During the presidential campaign last year, Trump suggested Japan might be “better off” with its own nuclear arsenal. But public opinion in Japan is firmly against it. The White House now opposes Japan — and others in Asia — acquiring nuclear weapons, a senior administration official said, but it has also warned China and Russia that such proliferation may be inevitable if North Korea does not abandon its program. Jimbo Ken, an associate professor of policy management at Keio University in Tokyo, noted Japan’s status as the only country to have ever suffered nuclear attacks, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States. “So our own nuclear option will be our last resort, always,” he said. (Motoko Rich, “Korean Threat Pushes Japanese to Reassess Military Constraints,” New York Times, September 16, 2017,
South Korea and Japan, the United States’ two main East Asian allies, differed today over providing humanitarian aid to North Korea’s malnourished children and pregnant women, hours after that country launched a ballistic missile over Japan. President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and the Japanese prime minister, Abe Shinzo, talked on the phone today, sharing their condemnation of North Korea’s latest missile test and vowing to work together to bring about more sanctions against the country, Moon’s office said. But Abe took issue with South Korea’s plan to donate $8 million to two United Nations humanitarian programs in North Korea. He asked Moon to reconsider the timing of the aid, Moon’s office said. Yessterday, South Korea announced plans to donate $4.5 million to help the World Food Program provide nutrition-rich supplies to North Korean hospitals and day care centers. It also plans to donate $3.5 million to United Nations Children’s Fund projects that supply vaccines, medicine and malnutrition treatment to children and pregnant women. Suga Yoshihide, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, said yesterday that providing aid for North Korea could undermine international efforts to pressure Pyongyang. But hours after the North’s missile launch on Friday, South Korea reconfirmed its humanitarian aid plans. “We began considering humanitarian aid upon requests from the World Food Program and Unicef,” Moon was quoted in a statement from his office as saying to Abe. “In principle, giving support for infants and small children and pregnant women should be handled separately from politics.” When Moon took office in May, promising to push for dialogue with the North, there were concerns about clashes with Abe, who is widely considered a hawk on North Korea. As North Korea accelerated its nuclear and missile programs with a spate of tests in recent months, Moon joined President Trump and Abe in advocating tougher sanctions. But he also insists that the crisis must be resolved through negotiations. Trump has often cast doubt on Moon’s approach. On August 30, he said that “talking is not the answer” in dealing with North Korea. Hours after the North conducted its sixth and most powerful nuclear test, on Sept. 3, he criticized South Korea’s “talk of appeasement with North Korea.” Japan has been particularly alarmed by the last two missile tests because the projectiles flew over northern Japan before landing in the Pacific Ocean. The Japanese were told to take cover indoors or underground in case the missiles malfunctioned and crashed. Trump administration officials suggested today that their patience had worn thin over the North’s repeated defiance of Security Council resolutions on missile and bomb testing. “What we’re seeing is, they are continuing to be provocative, they are continuing to be reckless and at that point there’s not a whole lot the Security Council is going to be able to do from there, when you’ve cut 90 percent of the trade and 30 percent of the oil,” Nikki R. Haley, the United States ambassador to the United Nations, told reporters at a White House briefing. Later today at the United Nations Security Council, the 15 members held consultations on yesterday’s missile launch and issued a statement that denounced it as “highly provocative,” but they took no further action. The latest sanctions would further isolate North Korea’s economy, making more vulnerable its malnourished classes, including children, nursing mothers and older people, said Lee Eugene, a spokeswoman for South Korea’s Ministry of Unification. South Korea plans to complete the timing and details of its humanitarian aid package next week. “They are for providing cereals and vaccines for these vulnerable classes,” Ms. Lee said, referring to the United Nations aid programs. “I don’t think this violates the spirit of the United Nations.” Such an attitude differs sharply from that of South Korea’s previous conservative governments, which drastically curtailed humanitarian aid for North Korea, accusing its government of squandering on nuclear weapons programs the resources it should spend on its impoverished people. But supporters of humanitarian aid say that United Nations’ and other penalties were hurting poor North Koreans more than the country’s leaders. North Korea’s economy has improved under its leader, Kim Jong-un, but United Nations relief agencies have appealed annually for donations, reporting widespread malnourishment among children and nursing mothers. Amid tensions over North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, international donors have become increasingly reluctant to chip in. (Choe Sang-hun, “Aid for Poor in North Korea Divides Two Neighbors,” New York Times, September 16, 2017,
As North Korea continues to launch test missiles and issue provocative threats against the U.S. and its allies in the region, a majority of Americans appear ready to support military action against that country, at least as a last resort. More specifically, 58% say they would favor taking military action against North Korea if economic and diplomatic efforts fail to achieve the United States’ goals. This is significantly higher than the 47% in favor the last time Gallup asked this, in 2003. If the United States does not accomplish its goals regarding North Korea with economic and diplomatic efforts, would you favor or oppose using military action against North Korea?U.S. attitudes about striking North Korea are partisan, as they were in 2003. Eighty-two percent of Republicans in the Sept. 6-10 Gallup poll say they would favor military action if peaceful means fail, compared with 37% of Democrats. The percentage of Democrats who favor military action has hardly changed since 2003: 37% now vs. 41% then. The major shift has been among Republicans, whose support for military action is up 23 percentage points, while independents’ support is up 15 points. (Lydia Saad, “More Back U.S. Military Action vs. North Korea Than in 2003,” Gallop, September 15, 2017)
9/16/17:
There are few areas in the North Korean economy, outside its nuclear weapons program, that could be called booming. But the garment industry has been one of them. Over the past few years, North Korea has been sending increasing numbers of seamstresses to China to sew clothes for international buyers, and it also has been encouraging the expansion of the garment industry at home. There are factories around the country producing suits, dresses and children’s clothes — almost all of which are labeled “Made in China.” That should all theoretically come to an end now, after the United Nations Security Council unanimously decided this week to prohibit North Korea from exporting labor and textiles, adding to existing sanctions on coal, iron ore and seafood. “Today’s resolution bans all textile exports,” Nikki Haley, the United States’ ambassador to the United Nations, said Monday when the resolution passed. “That’s an almost $800 million hit to its revenue.” North Korea exported about $725 million worth of clothing last year, according to South Korea’s trade-promotion agency, making it a significant source of income for the cash-strapped country. Adding textiles to the sanctions list means that more than 90 percent of North Korea’s publicly reported exports last year are now banned, Haley said. Coal, iron ore and seafood exports were prohibited in a previous resolution. While diplomats have been describing this week’s ban as being on “textiles,” economists say it should more accurately be called a “garment” ban. North Korea does not export bolts of fabric but instead produces labor-intensive articles of clothing. “When you make simple clothes like T-shirts, the machinery is important. The labor is not so important. So it makes no sense to do things like this in North Korea,” said Paul Tjia, a Dutch consultant who helps businesses operate in North Korea, especially in the garment industry. “But for garments that require a lot of manual work, like bras or winter sports clothes, it makes a lot of sense to make those in North Korea because the price-to-quality ratio is very attractive,” said Tjia, who most recently went to Pyongyang in May. Tjia helps mainly European companies outsource sewing to North Korea and espouses the selling points of North Korean labor. At one conference in Seoul, he showed photos of intricately made dresses that he said North Korean workers had made for a major European fashion label — although he declined to say which one. He also declined to say who his current clients are, for fear of attracting unwanted attention to the provenance of their clothes. The Australian surfing label Rip Curl found itself in hot water last year when it was revealed that some of its clothes had been made not in China, as the company thought, but in North Korea. With almost all of the North Korean-made clothes leaving through China, the effectiveness — or otherwise — of this crackdown will depend on Beijing’s willingness to enforce it. “If a container coming from North Korea says it contains sweet potatoes, is the Chinese customs department going to crack it open to check that it does not contain underpants?” asked Andray Abrahamian, a visiting scholar at University of California at Berkeley’s Center for Korean Studies. Although China supported the new U.N. resolution, its implementation of previous sanctions has been spotty at best, analysts say. But if Beijing is serious about stopping North Korea’s exports of apparel and workers to sew garments in Chinese factories, it would have a significant impact on the North’s economy, said Marcus Noland of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “The reason that this is important is not only because apparel exports are a significant number but because it’s the one non-resource area that’s really growing,” Noland said, differentiating it from mineral exports such as coal and iron ore. “So it’s not just the static number that’s important. It’s the fact that this sector was emerging as an area of comparative advantage.” There is another thing that makes the crackdown on clothing exports different from previous actions against North Korea. Previously, governments had stressed that the sanctions were targeting the regime and were aimed at cutting off its access to the money or equipment it needed for its nuclear weapons program. This effort to shut down North Korea’s garment industry is one that will have wide-reaching ramifications across North Korea. “Assuming the ban is enforced, it will have a huge impact,” said Abrahamian, who visited North Korean garment factories several times while working for Choson Exchange, an NGO focused on business training for North Koreans. “Tens of thousands, possibly even hundreds of thousands, of North Koreans are employed in this industry, and 98 percent of them are women. That’s the demographic that’s clearly going to suffer as a result of this,” he said. Noland agreed with the assessment that the sanctions would hurt ordinary people and especially women, but he said this was a toll that the United Nations should be prepared to inflict to punish the regime.
It is not known how much the women working in garment factories are paid. In North Korea, wages paid by the state are paltry. But as joint ventures have developed, the regime has been allowing workers to keep a share of earnings — while taking the majority for itself. While Tjia does not know how much the workers in these factories are paid, he said that workers in factories that export products and have contracts with foreign clients are much better off. He reported seeing an increasing number of seamstresses with cellphones. For that reason, outsourcing to North Korea should be seen in a wider context, he said. “If you want to see a change or an improvement in North Korea, the only way is to see economic development in the country, like we have seen in China over the last 40 years,” Tjia said. “Only when an economy grows and a middle class emerges — that’s when we will see change.” (Anna Fifield, “Ban on North Korean Clothing Exports Will Hurt Women the Most, Experts Say,” Washington Post, September 18, 2017, p. A-10)
9/17/17:
The Pentagon deployed a formation of 14 bombers and fighters over the Korean Peninsula that also included South Korean and Japanese aircraft, the latest show of force in response to North Korea’s missile launches and nuclear tests. The warplanes were dispatched after North Korea launched a ballistic missile over northern Japan on Thursday, triggering a widespread emergency alert for those who call the region home. Two Air Force B-1B bombers from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam and four Marine Corps F-35B fighters from Iwakuni, Japan, combined with four South Korean F-15K fighters and four F-2 Japanese fighters, U.S. defense officials said. The aircraft carried out a simulated attack on the Pilsung training range in South Korea, a few dozen miles from the demilitarized zone separating the North and South, while using live bombs. The U.S. and Japanese jets also flew in formation over waters near Kyushu, Japan, a southern portion of the country that is the closest major island to the Korean Peninsula. (Dan Lamothe, “U.S. Warplanes Drop Live Bombs in a New, Massive Show of Force Aimed at North Korea,” Washington Post, September 18, 2017)
The Trump administration escalated its rhetoric against North Korea, warning that time is running out for a peaceful solution between Kim Jong Un’s regime and the United States and its allies. Administration officials said the risk from North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is rising, and they underscored that President Trump will confront the looming crisis at the U.N. General Assembly this week. Trump, who spoke by phone with South Korean President Moon Jae-in yesterday, referred to Kim on Twitter as “Rocket Man” and asserted that “long gas lines” are forming in the North because of recent U.N. sanctions on oil imports. “If North Korea keeps on with this reckless behavior, if the United States has to defend itself or defend its allies in any way, North Korea will be destroyed,” Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said on CNN’s “State of the Union.” “None of us want that. None of us want war. But we also have to look at the fact that you are dealing with someone [in Kim] who is being reckless, irresponsible and is continuing to give threats not only to the United States, but to all of its allies. So something is going to have to be done.” The question remains, however, how realistic the Trump administration’s threats are as the North quickly advances its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. “He’s going to have to give up his nuclear weapons, because the president has said that he is not going to tolerate this regime threatening the United States and our citizens with a nuclear weapon,” national security adviser H.R. McMaster said on ABC’s “This Week.” Trump, McMaster added, has “been very clear about that, that all options are on the table.” Tillerson said North Korea does not appear to be interested in denuclearization talks. “I’m waiting for the regime in North Korea to give us some indication that they’re prepared to have constructive, productive talks,” he said on CBS’s “Face the Nation.” “We have tried a couple of times to signal to them that we’re ready when they’re ready,” Tillerson added, “and they responded with more missile launches and a nuclear test. All they need to do to let us know they’re ready to talk is to just stop these tests, stop these provocative actions, and let’s lower the threat level and the rhetoric.” McMaster said Washington isn’t assuming the sanctions will work or buy time. “We all have our doubts about whether or not that’s going to be enough,” he said, “and so we have to prepare all options. We have to make sure all options are under development to ensure that this regime cannot threaten the world with a nuclear weapon.” Asked on CNN whether the Trump administration should continue to deny the North diplomatic talks until it ends its nuclear program, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said no. “I think that North Korea is not going to give up its program with nothing on the table,” she said. “I think that what could happen is that we could have reliable verification of a freeze of both the nuclear program and the missile arsenal, and that we could conceivably talk China into supporting that kind of a freeze, because it would carry with it no regime change and no war.” (David Nakamura and Anne Gearan, “Fresh Warning Sent to N. Korea,” Washington Post, September 18, 2017,
When North Korea launched long-range missiles this summer, and again on September 15, demonstrating its ability to strike Guam and perhaps the United States mainland, it powered the weapons with a rare, potent rocket fuel that American intelligence agencies believe initially came from China and Russia. The United States government is scrambling to determine whether those two countries are still providing the ingredients for the highly volatile fuel and, if so, whether North Korea’s supply can be interrupted, either through sanctions or sabotage. Among those who study the issue, there is a growing belief that the United States should focus on the fuel, either to halt it, if possible, or to take advantage of its volatile properties to slow the North’s program. But it may well be too late. Intelligence officials believe that the North’s program has advanced to the point where it is no longer as reliant on outside suppliers, and that it may itself be making the potent fuel, known as UDMH. Despite a long record of intelligence warnings that the North was acquiring both forceful missile engines and the fuel to power them, there is no evidence that Washington has ever moved with urgency to cut off Pyongyang’s access to the rare propellant. Classified memos from both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations laid out, with what turned out to be prescient clarity, how the North’s pursuit of the highly potent fuel would enable it to develop missiles that could strike almost anywhere in the continental United States. In response to inquiries from The New York Times, Timothy Barrett, a spokesman for the director of national intelligence, said that “based on North Korea’s demonstrated science and technological capabilities — coupled with the priority Pyongyang places on missile programs — North Korea probably is capable of producing UDMH domestically.” UDMH is short for unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine. Some experts are skeptical that the North has succeeded in domestic production, given the great difficulty of making and using the highly poisonous fuel, which in far more technically advanced nations has led to giant explosions of missiles and factories. In public, at least, the Trump administration has been far more focused on ordinary fuels — the oil and gas used to heat homes and power vehicles. The United States has pushed to cut off those supplies to the North, but it settled last week for modest cutbacks under a United Nations resolution. Nonetheless, on Sunday the president made a case that those sanctions were having an effect. He wrote on Twitter that he had spoken with South Korea’s president, Moon Jae-in, and tossed out a new nickname for the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un. “Asked him how Rocket Man is doing,” President Trump wrote. “Long gas lines forming in North Korea. Too bad!” But inside the intelligence agencies and among a few on Capitol Hill who have studied the matter, UDMH is a source of fascination and seen as a natural target for the American effort to halt Mr. Kim’s missile program. “If North Korea does not have UDMH, it cannot threaten the United States, it’s as simple as that,” said Senator Edward J. Markey, Democrat of Massachusetts, who sits on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “These are the issues that the U.S. intelligence community has to answer: from which countries they receive the fuel — it’s probably China — and whether North Korea has a stockpile and how big it is.” Today, the chemical is made primarily by China, a few European nations and Russia, which calls it the devil’s venom. Russia only recently resumed production of the fuel, after Western supplies were cut off over its annexation of Crimea. But the Russians are leery of the propellant: It triggered the worst disaster of the space age, in 1960, when scores of Soviet workers and spectators died during a test firing of one of Moscow’s early intercontinental ballistic missiles. The United States no longer produces the fuel — NASA warned of its toxic and explosive dangers as early as 1966, producing a video that opens with a spectacular explosion. Long ago, the American nuclear fleet turned to more stable solid fuels, a move the North Koreans are now trying to replicate. But it may be a decade, experts say, before the North masters that technology to power intercontinental missiles. The White House and American intelligence agencies declined to answer questions about what, if anything, they were doing to cut off North Korea’s supplies, citing the highly classified nature of their effort to disrupt the North Korean missile program. Those efforts have included cyberattacks authorized by President Barack Obama in 2014. But in interviews with four senior American officials who served as the North advanced its program, none could recall any specific discussion of how to disrupt North Korea’s access to the one fuel that now powers its long-range missiles. All four said that while there were wide-ranging discussions about how to penalize the North, they could not remember any that focused specifically on the propellant. Twice — in 2012 and 2014 — the fuel was included in United Nations Security Council lists of prohibited export items. Experts say few paid attention to that fine print. “All sorts of things banned for export to North Korea find their way in,” said Vann H. Van Diepen, a former State Department official who was at the center of many American efforts to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction. But the public and involuntarily public record of American efforts to track North Korea’s progress shows a growing concern dating back a decade that the North was obtaining Russian-designed engines to power its missiles, and the fuel to pour into them. A memo designated “secret” and signed in October 2008 by Condoleezza Rice, then the secretary of state, warned allies that the North had obtained an engine powered by UDMH that “represents a substantial advance in North Korea’s liquid propellant technology,” adding that it “allows North Korea to build even longer-range missiles.” The memo, which was included in documents later released by WikiLeaks, was evidence of early efforts to get countries that had signed the Missile Technology Control Regime to keep such technologies out of the hands of North Korea, Iran and other nations. When Hillary Clinton succeeded Rice in 2009, she issued a similar warning. “North Korea’s next goal may be to develop a mobile ICBM that would be capable of threatening targets around the world,” she wrote to member states in the missile control group. The missile launch that took place on the 15th, in which the projectile was lofted over northern Japan, was from one of those mobile launchers, fueled by UDMH, spy satellites showed. The North’s growing dependency on the fuel was reinforced after a military parade in late 2010, when Pyongyang unveiled an intermediate-range missile known as the Musudan. Most of its flight tests failed, some in enormous fireballs. Federal officials, congressional aides and rocket scientists say emerging clues suggest that, over the years, Pyongyang obtained the fuel, its precursors, its secret formula and its manufacturing gear from China, the North’s main trading partner. Beijing still uses UDMH to loft satellites and warheads and has long exported the toxic substance around the globe. China has always denied aiding North Korea’s missile program, and the fuel is included on a 15-year-old list of missile-related materials that Beijing has put on an export control list. But a secret report from 2008 that was included in the WikiLeaks disclosures found evidence of an “uneven track record in enforcing its missile-related export controls.” One senior administration official acknowledged that, as a matter of politics, winning a specific ban on the fuel should not be difficult. While cutting off access to oil would raise fears of a humanitarian disaster as 25 million North Koreans freeze through the winter, the missile fuel is not a petroleum product, instead being made from a family of chemicals used in high explosives. The question now is whether the North Koreans have developed their own capabilities to produce the fuel. Given the country’s determination — and success — in proving it could launch a nuclear attack on the United States, experts believe it is just another hurdle to be surmounted. Eckhart W. Schmidt, who has written a two-volume textbook on fuels like UDMH and toured fuel plants around the globe, said his own judgment was that North Korea could learn how to achieve industrial production “if the supply from China or Russia is cut off.” Van Diepen, the former State Department official, said that in the quarter-century that the North Koreans have worked on increasingly sophisticated missiles, they have gone through many stages of foreign assistance in obtaining the fuel, the precursors, the formula and the manufacturing gear. He said the North was likely to have achieved some ability to make the volatile fuel — even if that resulted in occasional tragedies. “My guess,” Van Diepen said, “is that the North Korean tolerance for casualties is probably pretty high.” (William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, Nuclear Boasts of North Korea Hinge on a Fuel,” New York Times, September 18, 2017,
Elleman: “North Korea’s missile program has made astounding strides over the past two years. An arsenal that had been based on short- and medium-range missiles, along with an intermediate-range Musudan that repeatedly failed flight tests, has suddenly been supplemented by two new missiles: the intermediate-range Hwasong-12 and the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Hwasong-14. No other country has transitioned from a medium-range capability to an ICBM in such a short time. What explains this rapid progression? The answer is simple. North Korea acquired a high-performance liquid-propellant engine (LPE) from a foreign source. Available evidence clearly indicates that the new LPE is derived from the Soviet RD-250 family of engines, and has been modified to operate as the boosting force for the Hwasong-12 and -14. An unknown number of these engines were probably acquired though illicit channels operating in Russia or
Ukraine, or both. North Korea’s need for an alternative to the failing Musudan and the recent appearance of the modified RD-250 engine, along with other evidence, suggests the transfers occurred within the past two years. Tests reveal recent technical gains North Korea ground tested a large LPE in September 2016, which it claimed could generate 80 tonnes’ thrust. The same LPE was again ground tested in March 2017. This test included four smaller, steering engines. On 14 May 2017, with Kim Jong-un overseeing test preparations, North Korea launched a new intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Hwasong-12. The single-stage missile flew on a very steep trajectory, reaching a peak altitude of over 2,000 kilometers. If the Hwasong-12 had used a normal flight path, it would have travelled between 4,000 and 4,500km, placing the American territory of Guam, just 3,400km away, within range. The success of the Hwasong-12 flight in May gave North Korean engineers the confidence needed to pursue a more ambitious goal: the initial flight testing of a two-stage missile capable of reaching the continental United States. On 4 July, less than two months after the Hwasong-12 test, the two-stage Hwasong-14 was launched. A second Hwasong-14 was tested on 28 July. The Hwasong-14 launches flew on very steep flight paths, with the first shot reaching an apogee of 2,700km.2 The second test peaked at about 3,800km. North Korea’s announced results were independently confirmed by South Korea, Japan and the U.S. In both tests, the mock warheads plummeted towards the East Sea, 900–1,000km from the launch point. If flown on a trajectory that maximises range instead of peak altitude, the two missiles would have reached about 7,000km and 9,000km respectively, well exceeding the 5,500km minimum distance for a system to be categorized as an ICBM. The mock warhead carried by the Hwasong-14 during the two flight tests was less than 500 kilograms, perhaps as little as 300 kg, so it is difficult to estimate how far the ICBM can travel if armed with a real nuclear warhead. An authoritative analysis completed by German and American missile experts indicates that Hwasong-14 may not be able to reach the lower 48 states of the United States if the nuclear device weighs 500kg or more. The present author’s analysis concludes that Seattle, but not San Francisco, could be reached if the Hwasong-14 carries a 500kg warhead. The dimensions and visible features of the Hwasong-12 indicate an overall mass of between 24,000 and 25,000kg. The Hwasong-12’s acceleration at liftoff, as determined by the launch video aired by KCNA, is about 8.5–9.0m/s2. Assuming North Korea did not manipulate the launch video, the thrust generated by the Hwasong-12’s complete engine assembly is between 45 and 47 tonnes’ thrust; the main engine contributes between 39 and 41 tonnes’ force, and the auxiliary engines about six tonnes’ force. The Hwasong-14 has an estimated mass of 33,000–34,000kg, and an initial acceleration rate of about 4–4.5m/s2, resulting in a total thrust of 46–48 tonnes’ force. The origins of the new engine are difficult to determine with certainty. However, a process of elimination sharply narrows the possibilities. There is no publicly available evidence to suggest that North Korea successfully
designed and developed the LPE indigenously. Indeed, although this is subject to lively debate, available evidence indicates that North Korea has not succeeded in producing its own clones of the Scud and Nodong engines it imported from Russia during the 1980s and 1990s. Even if North
Korea had mastered the production of clones, this does not mean that it could design, develop and manufacture a large LPE from scratch, especially one that uses higher-performance propellants and generates 40 tonnes’ thrust. Claims that the LPE is a North Korean product would be more believable if the country’s experts had in the recent past developed and tested a series of smaller, less powerful engines, but there are no reports of such activities. Indeed, prior to the Hwasong-12 and -14 flights, every liquid-fueled missile launched by North Korea – all of the Scuds and Nodongs, even the Musudan – was powered by an engine developed and originally produced by the Russian enterprise named for A.M. Isayev; the Scud, Nodong and R-27 (from which the Musudan is derived) missiles were designed and originally produced by the Russian concern named for V.P. Makeyev. It is, therefore, far more likely that the Hwasong-12 and -14 are powered by an LPE imported from an established missile power. If this engine was imported, most potential sources can be eliminated because the external features, propellant combination and performance profile of the LPE in question are unique. The engine tested by North Korea does not physically resemble any LPE manufactured by the U.S., France, Japan, India or Iran. Nor do any of these countries produce an engine that uses storable propellants and generates the thrust delivered by the Hwasong-12 and -14 LPE. The LPE vaguely resembles the Chinese YF-21 engine, but there are also distinct differences which rule out that possibility. Thus. by a process of elimination, the former Soviet Union is the most likely source. Given North Korea’s reliance to date on technologies originating with the Isayev and Makeyev enterprises, one might suspect one or both as the probable supplier. However, neither enterprise has been associated with an engine that matches the performance of LPE used by Hwasong-12 and -14. The three missiles tested by North Korea are powered by the same engine complex, with one main engine and four steering engines. An exhaustive search of engines produced by other manufacturers in the former Soviet Union yields a couple of possibilities, all of which are associated with the Russian enterprise named after V.P. Glushko, now known as Energomash. The RD-217, RD-225 and RD-250 engine families use high-energy, storable-liquid propellants similar to those employed by engines tested by North Korea. Neither the RD-217 nor RD-225 have external features matching those of North Korea’s new engine. The RD-250 is the only match. The RD-250 engine is normally configured as a pair of combustion chambers, which receive propellant from a single turbopump. When operated in tandem, the two chambers generate roughly 78–80 tonnes’ thrust. This level of thrust is similar to the claims North Korea made when the first ground test was conducted and publicized in September 2016. The RD-250 engine consists of a pair of combustion chambers fed by a single
turbopump. Each chamber produces about 394,000 Newtons of thrust, or about 40 tonnes’ force, when relying on UDMH as the fuel, and N2O4 as the oxidiser. The RD-250’s nozzle also features a cooling tube and a compliance ring that resemble those found on the engines tested by North Korea. The small engine with its nozzle pointed upward and displayed in the foreground is not associated with the RD-250 engine. It gradually became clear, however, that the Hwasong-12 and -14 use single-chamber engines. Note, for example, that Pyongyang claimed that a new pump design was used for the September ground test. This makes sense, because operating the RD-250 as a single-chamber LPE would necessitate a new or highly modified turbopump to deliver propellant for one, not two chambers. Having no demonstrated experience modifying or developing large LPE turbopumps, Pyongyang’s engineers would have been hard pressed to make the modifications themselves. Rather, the technical skills needed to modify the existing RD-250 turbopump, or fashioning a new one capable of feeding propellant to a single chamber, would reside with experts with a rich history of working with the RD-250. Such expertise is available at Russia’s Energomash concern and Ukraine’s KB Yuzhnoye. One has to conclude that the modified engines were sourced from one of those factories. The alternative hypothesis, that Russian or Ukrainian engineers were employed in North Korea, is less likely, given the absence of any known production facility in North Korea for large LPEs. This is not to say North Korea does not have missile production and assembly plants. There is plenty of publicly available evidence showing facilities where missile bodies are manufactured and assembled. But airframe-production and missile-assembly facilities are common, and have been seen in Iraq, Syria and Iran. Yet these countries do not produce LPEs. Engine production is a very different endeavor. For example, the Nodong engines found on the first stage of the Unha launcher, retrieved from the ocean by South Korea in 2012 and 2016 and inspected by international experts, show that they contain foreign-made components, such as ball bearings from the Soviet-produced Scud-B missile engine. The Nodong engine itself exhibits all the hallmarks of a Soviet-made product, as well. If it had been fabricated in North Korea, by North Korean specialists, one would expect to see minor alterations to the engine’s external features. The Soviets produced Scud and Nodong engines five decades ago, using materials and machine tools unique to Russian manufacturing at the time. North Korea would not have access to precisely the same materials, and would likely opt to use more modern production equipment and make minor adjustments to increase performance and reliability. But these differences are not seen on the retrieved Nodong engines. Nor have they been observed on the engines found on Scud missiles exported from North Korea. Further undermining the alternative hypothesis, Western experts who within the past year visited KB Yuzhnoye in Ukraine told the author that a single-chamber version was on display at a nearby university and that a local engineer boasted about producing it. While this does not prove the
engine was developed at KB Yuzhnoye, or produced at its machine-building unit, Yuzhmash, it offers strong evidence that the modified RD-250 engine has been seen outside of North Korea.
Why single-chamber engines were transferred rather than the more powerful double-chamber original versions is unclear. One possible hypothesis is that the exporters, for whatever reason, exercised restraint in what they were willing to transfer to North Korea. Combined with a second stage, however, the single-chamber RD-250 engine is powerful enough to send an ICBM armed with a very compact and light warhead to cities on the American west coast. The RD-250 was originally designed by the Glushko enterprise of Russia, and produced and incorporated into the first stage of the R-36 (SS-9) ICBM and the Tsiklon-2 satellite launcher by KB Yuzhnoye of Ukraine. The Tsiklon-2 carrier rocket lofted its first satellite into orbit in 1969, with the last of 106 launches occurring in 2006.8 While Yuzhnoye was responsible for producing the Tsiklon-2 rocket, Russian entities launched the satellite. The relationship survived the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 primarily because of long-standing institutional linkages, and the commercial interests of both enterprises and both countries. However, despite the Tsiklon-2’s unsurpassed reliability record, Russia stopped purchasing the Yuzhnoye rocket in 2006 in favor of an indigenous system. KB Yuzhnoye’s repeated attempts to market the rocket and related technologies to other potential
customers, including Boeing and Brazil, yielded little. The once vaunted KB Yuzhnoye has been near financial collapse since roughly 2015. The total number of RD-250 engines fabricated in Russia and Ukraine is not known. However, there are almost certainly hundreds of spares stored at KB Yuzhnoye’s facilities and at warehouses in Russia where the Tsiklon-2 was launched. Spares may also exist at one or more of Energomash’s many facilities spread across Russia. Because the RD-250 is no longer employed by operational missiles or launchers, facilities warehousing the obsolete LPEs are probably loosely guarded. A small team of disgruntled employees or underpaid guards at any one of the storage sites, and with access to the LPEs, could be enticed to steal a few dozen engines by one of the many illicit arms dealers, criminal networks and transnational smugglers operating in the former Soviet Union. The engines (less than two meters tall and one meter wide) could be flown or, more likely, transported by train through Russia to North Korea. One cannot exclude the possibility that the engines transited through China on their way to North Korea. Pyongyang has many connections in Russia, including with the illicit network that funnelled Scud, Nodong and R-27 (Musudan) hardware to
North Korea in the 1980s and 1990s. United Nations sanctions imposed on Pyongyang have likely strengthened the Kim regime’s ties to these criminal networks. North Korean agents seeking missile technology are also known to operate in Ukraine. In 2012, for example, two North Korean nationals were arrested and convicted by Ukrainian authorities for attempting to procure missile designs from Yuzhnoye.9 Today, Yuzhnoye’s facilities lie close to the front lines of the Russian-controlled secessionist territory. Clearly, there is no shortage of potential routes through which North Korea might have acquired the few dozen RD-250 engines that would be needed for an ICBM program. When and from where RD-250 engines may have been shipped to North Korea is difficult to determine. It is possible the transfers occurred in the 1990s, when North Korea was actively procuring Scud– and Nodong-related hardware, as well as R-27 technology and its Isayev 4D10 engine. But this seems unlikely for three reasons. Firstly, the network North Korea relied on in the 1990s focused on products originating from Russia’s Makeyev and Isayev enterprises. Energomash and Yuzhnoye had limited connections to Makeyev or Isayev; indeed, they were rival enterprises competing for contracts as the Soviet Union crumbled. It is, therefore, a stretch to assume the illicit channels Pyongyang was using in the 1990s had access to products manufactured or used at either Yuzhnoye or Energomash two decades ago. Secondly, until recently, North Korea appeared to focus on exploiting R-27 hardware for its long-range missile ambitions. Pyongyang’s first intermediate-range missile, the Musudan, which was first displayed in a 2010 parade, is derived from the R-27 technology acquired in the 1990s. Moreover, until the Hwasong-12 launch in March 2017, Pyongyang’s design concepts for a prospective ICBM featured a first stage powered by a cluster of two Isayev 4D10 LPEs. Photographs taken while Kim Jong-un toured a missile plant in March 2016 captured the back end of an ICBM prototype that appeared to house a pair of 4D10 engines, not a modified, single-chambered RD-250 LPE. A month later, Kim attended a ground test featuring a cluster of two 4D10 engines operating in tandem,10 a clear indication that North Korea’s future ICBM would rely on this configuration. There is no evidence during this period to suggest that North Korea was developing a missile based on the modified RD-250 engine. Thirdly, the Isayev 4D10 engine, which relies on staged combustion, is a complicated closed-cycle system that is integrated within the missile’s fuel tank. If the open-cycle, externally mounted, single-chamber RD-250 engine had been available in 2015, engineers would have likely preferred to use it to power a new long-range missile, as it shares many features with the engines North Korea has worked with for decades.
However, when North Korean specialists began flight testing the Musudan in 2016, the missile repeatedly failed soon after ignition. Only one flight test is believed to have been successful. The cause of the string of failures cannot be determined from media reports. That many failed very early in flight suggests that problems with either the engine itself, or the unique ‘submerged’ configuration of the engine, were responsible. If this was the case, North Korea’s engineers may have recognised that they could not easily overcome the challenges. This might explain why the Musudan has not been tested since 2016. The maiden appearance of the modified RD-250 in September 2016 roughly coincides with North Korea’s decision to halt Musudan testing. It is
reasonable to speculate that Kim’s engineers knew the Musudan presented grim or insurmountable technical challenges, which prompted a search for an alternative. If North Korea began its quest to identify and procure a new LPE in 2016, the start of the search would have occurred in the same year Yuzhnoye was experiencing the full impact of its financial shortfalls. This is not to suggest that the Ukrainian government was involved, and not necessarily Yuzhnoye executives. In fact, Kiev’s 2012 arrest of North Korean agents seeking missile technologies indicates otherwise. However, workers at Yuzhnoye facilities in Dnipropetrovsk and Pavlograd were likely the first ones to suffer the consequences of the economic misfortunes, leaving them susceptible to exploitation by unscrupulous traders, arms dealers and transnational criminals operating in Russia, Ukraine and elsewhere. The fact that Russian-backed separatists are waging war against the Ukraine government fewer than 200km east of Yuzhnoye’s facilities provides ample opportunity and motivation for criminal elements to pilfer facilities containing highly valued hardware. Their connections to illicit-trade networks would seem to make partnerships inevitable. Acquisition of the modified RD-250 engine enabled North Korea to bypass the failing Musudan development effort and begin work on creating an ICBM sooner than previously expected. The Hwasong-12 and -14 missiles, however, are not yet operationally viable systems. Additional flight tests are needed to assess their navigation and guidance capabilities, determine overall performance under a range of operational conditions and demonstrate their reliability. Empirical data derived from tests to validate the efficacy of warhead re-entry technologies are also needed. Pyongyang could elect to deploy the Hwasong-12 and -14 as early as 2018, after only a handful of additional test launches, but at the risk of fielding missiles with marginal reliability. The risks could be reduced over time by continuing flight trials after the missiles are assigned to combat units. But for the immediate future, the Hwasong-12 and -14 have limited military value. For example, consider Kim Jong-un’s request for his military to prepare plans for ‘enveloping’ Guam with a Hwasong-12 attack. The attack,
according to KCNA, would not target Guam itself. Rather, North Korea would attempt to land the missiles 25 to 40 km from the island’s coastline. This would be risky, at best, because Pyongyang has no established measure of the Hwasong-12’s accuracy, meaning there is a finite possibility
that the missiles could overshoot their targets and strike Guam itself. Rough estimates suggest the probability of accidently landing on the island could be greater than 1%. Perhaps of greater importance is the limited capacity of the Hwasong-14 ICBM. The missile’s underpowered second stage is sufficient for threatening Hawaii, and possibly Seattle, with a small nuclear warhead, but it
cannot target the entire US mainland. Arguably, the Hwasong-14 is an interim ICBM that satisfies Kim Jong-un’s immediate strategic needs. It seems probable that North Korea will want to field a more capable ICBM in the future. This could be achieved by developing a first stage consisting of two or more modified RD-250 engines, and a second stage powered by either a Musudan engine or a single-chamber RD-250. Such a missile could carry larger warheads and simple decoys to render less effective U.S. missile defenses deployed in Alaska and California. Developing and testing an improved ICBM, however, will require more time. It is not too late for the U.S. and its allies, along with China and perhaps Russia, to negotiate an agreement that bans future missile testing, and effectively prevents North Korea from perfecting its capacity to terrorize all of America with nuclear weapons. But it will be very difficult, and the window of opportunity will soon close. Diplomatic action that seeks to freeze North Korea’s missile capabilities must be taken immediately.” (Michael Elleman, “The Secret to North Korea’s ICBM Success,” Survival, 59, 5 (October-November 2017) , pp. 25-36)
9/18/17:
The United States and its allies have not shot down any North Korean missiles because Pyongyang has yet to launch one that directly threatens American or Japanese territory, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said. But he said that could change. North Korean missiles have been falling “in the middle of the ocean,” Mattis said. “Were they to be aimed at Guam, or U.S. territory,” he added, “that would elicit a different response.” The defense secretary also said he believed that the United States had found military options to handle the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula that would not put the South Korean capital, Seoul, at grave risk, though he refused to elaborate on what those might be. Most military experts believe that because Seoul is only 35 miles from the demilitarized zone along the border between North and South Korea, the city and its more than 10 million inhabitants would be put in Pyongyang’s immediate cross hairs for retaliation if the United States made a pre-emptive strike on the North. As a first strike would be unlikely to eliminate all of North Korea’s conventional and nuclear weapons — not to mention its chemical or biological ones — American policy makers have traditionally held the view that a pre-emptive strike would likely put an untenable number of civilians at risk. American officials also do not have high confidence that the military could find and destroy North Korea’s entire arsenal of long-range missiles and nuclear warheads. It would then be up to American missile defenses to knock out any that survived and that North Korea might use to attack the United States or its allies. Even a limited strike — on, say, a North Korean missile on its launching pad or a missile in midair — would pose risks that the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, might retaliate, setting off a spiral of escalation that could plunge the Korean Peninsula into war. Mattis would not say how the United States might bypass that risk while exercising military options. “I won’t go into detail,” he told reporters at the Pentagon during an unannounced news conference. He also declined to say specifically whether those options would be “kinetic” — military-speak for lethal force like bombings, airstrikes or ground combat. Military experts said options that might not prompt immediate retaliation against Seoul could include cyberwarfare or even an assassination attempt on Kim — though such an attempt would have to be successful. Other potential options are a naval blockade of North Korea, or a deployment of additional troops to the region. But signs that the United States is actually preparing a military option in North Korea — like a repositioning of military assets or an evacuation of American citizens in the region — have not appeared so far. Mattis also said that he believed that North Korea, which most recently launched two missiles that flew over Japan, was deliberately carrying out tests that came as close as possible to provoking the United States, without eliciting a military response. His comments come as the Trump administration has struck increasingly bellicose tone toward Pyongyang in the face of a sharply accelerated pace of missile tests from North Korea. But today, Mattis said he believed that diplomacy and sanctions were managing to put pressure on Pyongyang, which he said was finding itself increasingly isolated. Mattis cited as proof a recent decision by the Mexican government to declare the North Korea ambassador there “persona non grata” — a move which essentially expelled him from the country. (Helen Cooper, “U.S. Has Military Options for North Korea, Mattis Says,” New York Times, September 19, 2017,
Mattis: “Q: Well, sir, while you were up in — visiting the ICBM units, you got news that North Korea had fired another missile. … And a lot of people are wondering why you don’t shoot them down. Q: Could you say on the record, by chance? A lot of people asking that question. MATTIS: Yes. Okay, we’ll be on the record here for a minute, you know, why we don’t shoot down the missiles. Number one, those missiles are not directly threatening any of us. Obviously, Japan’s missile defenses are up, and their radars are operating. Ours are. And they are intentionally doing provocations that seem to press against the envelope for just how far can they push without going over some kind of a line in their minds that would make them vulnerable. So they aim for the middle of the Pacific Ocean, as you know, where at least we hope no ships are around, right? And the bottom line is that, when the missiles — were they to be a threat, whether it be to U.S. territory, Guam, obviously Japan — Japan’s territory, that would elicit a different response from us. Q: And Ambassador Haley said today that there are many military options for North Korea — at the U.N., she says this. Is that your perspective? And is that the message that you want to be out there? MATTIS: Ambassador Haley is correct. There are many military options, in concert with our allies that we will take to defend our allies and our own interests. … On the record. Q: Do you think the sanctions are actually working now? Or do you think they have a prospect for working? Or are we reaching kind of a deadend moment? MATTIS: What we’ve done with the sanctions is we are putting the leader in North Korea in a position to be aware that the international community, voting unanimously twice now in the United Nations Security Council, seeing the increasing diplomatic isolation that comes with it, comes with the economic sanction that there’s a penalty to be paid for ignoring international concerns and norms. I noticed while I was in Mexico, that Mexico had declared the DPRK ambassador persona non grata and he was dispatched home. That’s an example of what is working. It’s a pressurization effort to raise the cost. You notice Peru has done the same. Other nations have ordered their workers home. So yes, it’s working. Q: Sir, is there any military option the U.S. can take with North Korea that would not put Seoul at grave risk? MATTIS: Yes, there are, but I will not go into details. Q: Do you think the increased rhetoric could lead to miscalculation on the North Korean site and lead to sort of an intentional conflict? MATTIS: I believe there is always the potential for miscalculation by the DPRK leader.
Q: On the question about shooting down their missiles when they’re testing them; would that not be a further strengthening of deterrence if you were to do that? Do you think along those lines? SEC. MATTIS: I cannot make that calculation as far as the DPRK leader. But we will defend ourselves, our interests, our allies. And we work together very transparently and openly with our allies for the very reason that we just mentioned. Q: And, secretary, just to clarify; you said that there were possible military options that would not create a grave risk to Seoul. Are we talking kinetic options as well? MATTIS: Yes, I don’t want to go into that. Q: When Defense Minister Song was here, he went back and told his parliament that you two at least discussed the possibility of small tactical nukes. Is that one of the many wide options under consideration? MATTIS: We have open dialogue with our allies on any issue that they want to bring up. We’re not only friends, we’re trusted allies. And we bring up all issues with one another. Q: Sir, there’s a chance that small tactical nukes might be redeployed to the Korean peninsula? MATTIS: No, I said that we discussed the option. But that’s all the further I want to say.” (DoD, Media Availability with Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, September 18, 2017)
DPRK FoMin statement: “Recently, the U.S. and its vassal forces rigged up the UNSC “resolution 2375” on sanctions harsher than ever against the DPRK branding its measures to strengthen the state nuclear force as “a threat” to international peace and security, and released a UNSC “press statement” calling for the implementation of the “resolution” as a follow-up. The anti-DPRK sanctions campaign of the U.S. has grown so reckless as to impose a full-scale blockade of all sections to include areas directly related to the livelihood of civilian population as well as foreign trade of the country. This is the most vicious, unethical and inhumane act of hostility to physically exterminate the people of the DPRK, let alone its system and government. What is more deplorable is that the U.S. is misleading public opinion by disseminating the fraudulent claim that the sanctions and pressure are geared to the so-called peaceful solution. The U.S. is strangling and suffocating a country and breaking its will to impose U.S. intention upon it. Is it a peaceful and diplomatic solution? The U.S. blustered that it would not rule out “military option” while making absurd assertion that the sanctions are a peaceful solution. This constitutes an open extortion against the international community as it implies that if they do not join the U.S.-led sanctions campaign against the DPRK, the U.S. will start a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula. The true intention of the U.S. is to appease the opposition from several countries against the escalation of tension and the outbreak of war in the Korean peninsula and the region and involve them in the sanctions and pressure campaign against the DPRK by all means. Although the U.S. is acting so shameless and devious to justify the sanctions and pressure against the DPRK, it will not be able to delude even a single country. It is a foolish dream to hope that the sanctions could work with the DPRK while the sanctions have failed to stop it from becoming a full-fledged nuclear weapons state and making rapid progress in the building of an economic power for more than half a century. The increased moves of the U.S. and its vassal forces to impose sanctions and pressure on the DPRK will only increase our pace towards the ultimate completion of the state nuclear force. The countries joining the U.S. in imposing sanctions on the DPRK should start working on a good explanation for the day when an actual balance of power is established between the DPRK and the U.S.” (KCNA, “FM Spokesman Discloses U.S. Intention of Claiming Implementation of ‘Resolution on Sanctions,’” September 18, 2017)
China’s central bank has told banks to strictly implement United Nations sanctions against North Korea, four sources told Reuters, amid U.S. concerns that Beijing has not been tough enough over Pyongyang’s repeated nuclear tests. Chinese banks have come under scrutiny for their role as a conduit for funds flowing to and from China’s increasingly isolated neighbor. The sources said banks were told to stop providing financial services to new North Korean customers and to wind down loans with existing customers, following tighter sanctions against Pyongyang by the United Nations. The sources said lenders were asked to fully implement United Nations sanctions against North Korea and were warned of the economic losses and reputational risks if they did not do so. Chinese banks received the document today, the sources said. China’s central bank did not immediately respond to a request for comment. “At present, management of North Korea-related business has become an issue of national-level politics and national security,” according to the document seen by the sources. The document directed banks to explain to any North Korean customers that “our bank is fulfilling our international obligations and implementing United Nations sanctions against North Korea. As such, we refuse to handle any individual loans connected to North Korea.” The document did not specify whether existing North Korean account holders could still deposit or remove money from their accounts. (Reuters, “Chna’s Central Bank Tells Banks Not to Do Business with North Korea: Sources,” September 21, 2017)
Abe: “The whole world confronts an unprecedented, grave and imminent threat from North Korea. On September 3, the regime carried out a reprehensible nuclear test. Late last week, it launched a ballistic missile over my country, Japan, only two weeks after a similar missile launch. By repeatedly testing missiles — in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions — Pyongyang has shown its reach now extends to the United States and Europe. North Korea’s actions are an outright challenge to the international community. On September 11, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution on a new round of strict sanctions that restrict member states from selling oil to the North, ban North Korean textile exports and ban member states from authorizing North Koreans to work abroad. They are an important step, but the leadership in Pyongyang has consistently ignored previous resolutions. The international community must stay united and enforce the sanctions. Here in northeast Asia, the North Korean threat has been real for more than a quarter-century. We face the threat of missiles — short and medium range — together with the possibility of chemical weapons attacks. North Korea has targeted Japan in particular by abducting many innocent Japanese citizens, including a 13-year-old girl who was abducted in 1977. Most of them have been held in North Korea since the 1970s and 1980s. Everyone aspires to a peaceful solution to these challenges. And global solidarity is of utmost importance. Still, prioritizing diplomacy and emphasizing the importance of dialogue will not work with North Korea. History shows that concerted pressure by the entire international community is essential. In the early 1990s, North Korea’s announcement to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency was a wake-up call. In response, Japan, the United States and South Korea engaged in dialogue with North Korea and agreed to construct two light-water reactors and to provide heavy fuel oil in exchange for freezing and ultimately dismantling its nuclear program. Japan, the United States and South Korea shouldered most of the financial burden, with the cooperation of Europe and other Asian countries. We know what happened next: Several years after the heavy fuel oil was delivered and construction started on the light-water reactors, North Korea admitted to having a uranium enrichment program in violation of the agreement. [??] By the end of 2002, North Korea expelled I.A.E.A. inspectors, followed by an official withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. China and Russia then joined Japan, the United States and South Korea to create the six-party talks with the North. Pyongyang again agreed to the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. But instead, it declared itself a nuclear power in 2005 and carried out a nuclear test in 2006. The five countries’ attempt to solve the problem through dialogue failed. In short, while the international community provided North Korea with sanctions relief and support as “compensation” for its pledges, the regime ignored most of its commitments. Considering this history and its continuing missile launches and nuclear tests, more dialogue with North Korea would be a dead end. Pyongyang would see more talks as proof that other countries succumbed to the success of its missile launches and nuclear tests. Now is the time to exert the utmost pressure on the North. There should be no more delays. How could North Korea relentlessly pursue missile development and nuclear tests over almost half a century? How could North Korea, under successive United Nations sanctions for a decade, acquire enormous resources to obtain crude materials, components and powerful engines? Statistics show that there are countries, mainly in Asia, that continue trading with North Korea; and for some, as recently as in 2016, their trade even exceeded that of the previous year. According to the United Nations, foreign-made parts have been used in North Korea’s ballistic missiles. There are countries buying products and services from North Korea or accepting its workers. Front companies established in Asia enable North Korea access to foreign currencies. Japan has responded by reaffirming the ironclad Japan-United States alliance, and Japan has coordinated in lock step with the United States and South Korea. I firmly support the United States position that all options are on the table. As a response to the latest nuclear test, I value the swift and unanimous adoption of Security Council Resolution 2375 on September 11, which puts significantly tougher sanctions on North Korea. But I stress that we must not be simply complacent with the adoption of these sanctions. We must thoroughly enforce the successive resolutions in order to prevent North Korea from obtaining the goods, technologies, funds and people to further develop its missiles and nuclear program. North Korea poses a serious threat and challenge to our world, and its actions flout the international nonproliferation regime. As swiftly as possible, we must make North Korea end its provocations, abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile development, and return the abductees in North Korea to their homes. Solidarity and concerted effort among the international community, together with the effective role of the United Nations, are more vital than ever.” (Abe Shinzo, “Solidarity against North Korea,” New York Times, September 18, 2017, p. A-23)
Ruediger Frank: “…The latest tests have once again intensified the international debate on how to respond to such provocations. Knowing military actions could have devastating results, discussion of response options quickly falls back on finding a stronger formula for economic sanctions to stop the funding stream to North Korea’s WMD programs. When considering new sanctions measures, it is important to understand three main issues: Where does North Korea get the money for its weapons program? Why have sanctions been unable to stop them? And will more sanctions, for example a ban on the export of oil to North Korea, be effective in curbing the North’s nuclear WMD development? The budget reports imply that the North Korean state has for many years run a surplus, to which revenue from “local” sources—including markets—has contributed. This could help finance part of the trade deficit shown below. It is difficult to estimate the actual size of this factor since we neither have absolute budget numbers nor do we know how far the state is able to convert North Korean won into hard currency for imports. We also do not know whether the latter is necessary—for example, in case some of the state’s budgetary revenue is coming directly in the form of hard currency. Nevertheless, it is important not to see the trade reports below without some domestic context. In the latter half of 2016, the South Korean Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) unveiled its report on North Korean trade for the year 2015. The data showed that the phase of 16 years of continuous growth of North Korea’s trade since the dramatic low in 1998 had ended. In 2015, North Korea’s overall trade volume declined from 7.61 billion to 6.25 billion USD. Were the sanctions finally biting? But which sanctions, in 2015? UNSC resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087 and 2094 were all passed either before or during 2013, the year of the third North Korean nuclear test. But in 2014 and 2015 no tests happened, and no new UN resolutions leading to new sanctions on North Korea were passed. The reasons for the drop in North Korea’s trade volume in 2015 were rather profane. Referring to the work of Lee Jong-Kyu, Li Tingting suggests that the reasons for this decline were reduced demand by the Chinese steel industry for North Korean coal and growing environmental concerns, combined with a decline of world market prices for anthracite. Simply speaking, North Korea has witnessed the fate of any country with a trading structure that is disproportionally dependent on only one or two major export items. This example shows how careful we need to be with interpreting trade data, especially if they are strongly aggregated. The most recent KOTRA report was released in July 2017, covering North Korea’s trade during 2016. This time, common sense would indeed tell us to expect a drop in North Korea’s trade volume. Responding to two North Korean nuclear tests in January and in September, along with a few missile launches, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2270, further tightening its sanctions. In March, South Korea closed the Kaesong Industrial Zone which has been accused of providing over 100 million USD annually for the regime’s imports. Even China, with great fanfare, made a point of reducing its coal imports from North Korea since March 2016. An informed discussion of these questions requires knowledge of hard facts. Unfortunately, these are particularly difficult to acquire in the case of North Korea. Among the only regular sources of information are the annual reports of Pyongyang’s state media on the state budget and the annual KOTRA reports on North Korean trade. Needless to say, both documents should be taken with a good grain of salt; we are in the middle of a propaganda war, and truth is a quick and easy victim in such cases. But in particular, the trade data do not only suggest that sanctions have not worked so far; more importantly, they show that sanctions are unlikely to produce the desired results in the future even if they are tightened further. If this analysis is true, it is time to find a new strategy. The country has made progress but is still far away from achieving its often ambitious economic goals. In his speech at the Parliamentary session in April 2017, the North Korean Prime Minister admitted that his country was experiencing difficulties in the field of electric energy, and that the dependency on imports of oil was a major strategic problem. Despite Chinese announcements of a drastic reduction of the import of coal, the North Koreans declared their determination to increase the production of anthracite, which points at more domestic use of this resource. In the same report, the Prime Minister hinted at the support of the North Korean state for the production of consumer goods, which is an indicator of moderately growing wealth among at least a part of the population. People who fight for survival are not primarily concerned with shoes, household appliances or electronic gadgets. The Prime Minister’s remarks on agriculture supported the impression of an economy that is still poor, but not in crisis anymore. Rather than stressing the need to increase the production of staple food, he promised an increase in the production of higher-quality products such as meat, milk, fruits, mushrooms and vegetables. A look at the state’s data on the budget reveals a moderate but steady growth in the range of 4 to 6 percent in 2016. Considering the dominant state ownership in the North Korean economy, these numbers are at least correlated, if not equivalent to, what we would call GDP growth. But against all expectations, the updated graph shows that the trade volume has actually recovered, although it still remains below the level of 2012. It is obviously premature to speak about a crisis or a collapse of foreign trade that would be comparable to the catastrophe of the mid-1990s. The question remains, however, how it is possible that the North Korean trade data show such a more or less continuous upward trend despite the international sanctions. To start, we need to be aware that the KOTRA reports offer ample room for interpretation and speculation. They typically do not include inner-Korean trade. About 90 percent of the overall recorded volume is based on bilateral exchanges between North Korea and China; Boydston argues that not much else matters, especially for sanctions. Indeed, trade with other nations is so small that a single successful or failed deal, no matter how profane and non-political the reasons, can have a significant impact. In other words, most of the time, when we talk about North Korea’s foreign trade, we actually talk about trade with China. Moreover, aggregate trade data hide the fact that North Korean exports had reached their peak already in 2013, and have been lower ever since. The drop after 2013 does correspond with known facts. Li (op. cit.) points at the case of Jang Song Thaek and convincingly argues that his execution in late 2013 seems to be responsible for the absence of a successful major initiative that would have made up for the reduced world market value of North Korea’s coal. The destiny of the various ill-fated Special Economic Zones in or near the Northwestern border town of Sinuiju is a case in point. They were said to be closely related to Jang and have seen little progress since his death. On the other hand, many other bilateral trade initiatives remained intact and operating. This includes tourism, business via Dandong, the export of North Korean labor force to sunset industries such as textile factories in China, and the operation of the Rason Special Economic Zone in the Northeast. Haggard notes that the drop in global commodity prices might have affected North Korean exports, but it also made its imports cheaper, thus at least partly offsetting the loss in revenue through lower expenditures. Considering that most of North Korea’s exports are in natural resources, this could indeed explain the shrinking value. Another hypothesis—that North Korea would try to substitute sanctioned export items by other products—seems to have been confirmed, at least in principle. Noland, referring to the work of Choi and Im, argues that North Korea would try to substitute minerals textiles. Numbers of HS 61 and 62 are indeed high, see Table 1. But this is not the whole story; substitution could also take place within the minerals section. In 2016, the exports of metals such as iron and steel have increased by over 42 percent compared to the previous year. So far, and despite this impressive growth rate, their export value (HS 72-83) still stands at relatively modest 143 million USD, which is still far below the 245 million in 2013. It is thus too early to identify a real change of strategy here. But if North Korea’s revenue through the export of coal is dropping, should this not have an impact on its imports and on its trade deficit? The logic is, again, quite simple: if you earn less money, and if nobody is giving you a loan, then you can spend less money. In fact, such considerations are behind sanctions that try to curb North Korean exports. However, a look at the latest KOTRA report reveals that the North Korean trade deficit declined from 1.28 billion USD in 2014 to 0.86 billion USD in 2015 and remained at about that level at around 0.9 billion USD in 2016. It is now way below the trade deficit average of 1.1 billion USD for the years 2005-2012. This is an interesting observation considering the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Zone in early 2016 by the South Korean side. Supporters of the measure argued that cutting off this rare source of hard currency revenue would hit the North Korean economy hard. However, the KOTRA data neither reveal a reduction in North Korean imports nor in its trade deficit. In fact, North Korean imports in 2016 increased by 170 million USD over the previous year. One way for North Korea could be the revenue generated from transfers, including remittances from workers employed abroad. Their number is in the range of 50,000 people. If their annual income is around 10,000 USD, then they earn their country 500 million USD in hard currency income. This alone would cover two-thirds of the annual trade deficit. Considering the current debate about cutting off North Korea’s oil supply, it is interesting to note that the import value of mineral oil and oil products from China in 2016 was only less than half of such imports in 2012, when they stood at 773 million USD. Measured in tons, the amount in 2016 was 799,000 while it was 705,000 in 2012. The imported amount of oil from China has remained more or less stable, but it now costs only half as much as it did a few years ago. A hike in world market prices for oil would thus have a much more serious effect on North Korean oil imports than most sanctions. We also find that at current prices, with cash reserves of, for example, 2 billion USD, the North Korean government could easily cover their oil imports for the next five years without exporting a single item. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are a means towards an end, not an end in and of themselves. A case in point was the announcement of the byungjin policy in 2013—of simultaneously developing the economy and nuclear weapons—which replaced the military-first policy of the Kim Jong Il era. Kim Jong Un made his order of priorities very clear: He does not just want to develop the economy so that the military would be financed properly. Rather, he repeatedly stressed that he regards a reliable nuclear deterrent as the safety guarantee that would allow him to focus on economic development. At the 7th Party Congress in May 2016, Kim pronounced, albeit in somewhat nebulous terms, a five year plan for economic development. If the above is true, then Kim Jong Un is indeed more vulnerable to economic sanctions than his predecessors. So do more sanctions have a chance to stop the North Korean WMD program? My answer is a plain “No.” I am not even asking whether China would ever let a collapse of North Korea happen, or whether an immediate collapse would trigger a desperate last-ditch military adventure that would result in North Korea’s annihilation but would cost hundreds of thousands of lives. A sober reality check is sufficient. Both North Korean programs—nuclear and missile—have a history of decades. This means that critical knowledge and hardware have been acquired long before the current sanctions have been put in place. We cannot prevent them from acquiring what they already have. Furthermore, North Korea has been pursuing self-reliance since the early 1960s even though they have actively exploited international economic cooperation from aid to trade. Nevertheless, this long-standing focus on autonomy helps explain the resilience of the North Korean national economy against measures that would have brought most other economies to their knees. Worse even, North Korea now seems able to manufacture many if not all components of its WMD program by itself. If the North Korean military is mainly or exclusively purchasing from the North Korean state, then even the availability of hard currency is not an issue. All this helps explain the so far low effectiveness of any sanctions, even including those that try to curb North Korea’s overall trade. Those who believe that a drastic reduction in trade will lead to an immediate change of mind in Pyongyang should consider this: Only ten years ago, North Korea was able to exist comfortably with just one third of its current trade. The only ray of hope for supporters of total sanctions is offered by the new middle class. Their emergence is closely connected to foreign trade, which is a source of items to sell and to buy, but also a source of cash and, most importantly, domestic demand. North Koreans will only buy more, and thus provide more growth opportunities for existing or new businesses, if they have more income. My impression is that the fast growth of market activities in North Korea of the past years has recently started to slow down. Some ventures I know have already been forced out of the market due to declining sales. North Korea needs to open its economy to provide enough demand for further growth, but this requires cooperation, not sanctions. The problem with this situation is that it assumes North Koreans are only driven by greed, and that the state has no means to put the genie back in the bottle. Both are true, but only to some extent: let’s not forget the massive repression apparatus. But more importantly, North Koreans are nationalists. If their government can make them believe that the country is really on the brink of a war, then they will postpone their desire for profit and rally ‘round the flag and the leader. Admittedly, North Koreans are used to a high dose of tension and bellicose rhetoric, but the utterances of Donald Trump (“fire and fury”) and people around him, like Nikki Haley (Kim is “begging for war”) constitute a new level of verbal threat. Combine this with the annual joint US-ROK military maneuvers, the stationing of THAAD in Seongju and China’s open criticism to it, Japan’s push for remilitarization, and new UNSC Resolutions and sanctions, and you might see exactly what Kim Jong Un needs to keep his system stable. (Ruediger Frank, “Economic Sanctions and the Nuclear Issue: Lessons from North Korean Trade,” 38 North, September 18, 2017)
9/19/17:
President Trump delivered a toughly worded defense of his “America first” foreign policy in his inaugural address to the United Nations and threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea if necessary. The president also excoriated the international nuclear deal with Iran as an “embarrassment” and strongly hinted that his administration would soon back out, against the wishes of many nations in the room. The defiant and pugilistic speech put the General Assembly hall of more than 150 delegations on notice that the United States, under Trump’s leadership, is willing to pursue an unpopular and unpredictable course to protect its interests across the globe. Trump called on world leaders to rally in the fight to defeat murderous regimes and “loser terrorists,” and he derisively referred to North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, who oversees an expanding nuclear arsenal, as “Rocket Man.” Most of the president’s views were well known before he arrived at the annual U.N. gathering. But his 42-minute speech, delivered in a combative tone rare for an American leader, put them in stark relief at a time of widespread anxiety among U.S. allies and partners over the nation’s traditional role of world leader. In contrast to Trump, French President Emmanuel Macron used his own first U.N. address later today to defend the principle of global cooperation. “Today, more than ever before, we need multilateralism” to deal with worldwide threats such as climate change and terrorism, Macron said. “We can only address those challenges through multilateralism,” he said, “not through survival of the fittest.” Macron, in an interview with CNN, also said the rhetoric toward North Korea should be toned down and warned against abandoning the nuclear deal with Iran. “Look at the map — if we talk of a military solution, we speak about a lot of victims,” he told the network about the tensions on the Korean Peninsula. “Building peace is what we have to do in this region.” If Trump was eager to use his U.N. address to set the terms for his engagement with an international organization that he derided as ineffectual during his presidential campaign, his rhetoric also set up a potentially dangerous test of his administration’s credibility to carry out the promises and threats he issued. The president said the United States has “great strength and patience,” but he emphasized that if forced to defend America or its allies, “we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea.” He said that Kim “is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.” Kim, the leader of a nation of 25 million, has responded to past threats from Trump by highlighting his government’s nuclear weapons program and conducting ballistic missile tests. He also called repeatedly for all nations to embrace sovereignty and self-reliance at a body founded after World War II on the idea that all countries are stronger when they work together. “As president of the United States, I will always put America first, just like you, as the leaders of your countries, will always, and should always, put your countries first,” Trump said, returning to a campaign theme and the “America first” phrase, which has been criticized as isolationist and nationalistic. At the same time, however, he took care today to send signals to the mostly white, middle-class voters who form the core of his political support. He took a swipe at “mammoth multinational trade deals” and “powerful global bureaucracies,” and he emphasized that “uncontrolled migration is deeply unfair.” “The substantial costs . . . are borne overwhelmingly by low-income citizens whose concerns are often ignored by both media and government,” Trump said. But it was Trump’s strong criticism of authoritarian regimes that drew the most reaction in the U.N. assembly hall and on Capitol Hill. “The goals of the United Nations are to foster peace and promote global cooperation,” Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) said. “Today, the president used it as a stage to threaten war.” After the president’s address, White House press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders sought to temper the idea that Trump’s remarks on North Korea represented a break from long-standing U.S. policy. In a tweet, she cited President Barack Obama’s U.N. address last year when he said that the United States “could, obviously, destroy North Korea with our arsenals” — though Obama appeared to be stating a fact rather than a step that his administration was considering. On Iran, Trump called the U.N.-backed nuclear deal “one of the worst and most one-sided” agreements ever. His administration has said that Tehran is violating the spirit if not the letter of the landmark 2015 accord through its alleged support for terrorism and other activities. Iran, the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency and other parties to the deal disagree. “We cannot let a murderous regime continue these destabilizing activities while building dangerous missiles, and we cannot abide by an agreement if it provides cover for the eventual construction of a nuclear program,” Trump said Tuesday. His voice rising, Trump strongly hinted that his administration could soon declare Tehran out of compliance, which could unravel the accord. “I don’t think you’ve heard the last of it — believe me,” he said. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a vehement opponent of the deal, looked pleased as he and his wife, Sara, listened to Trump’s address. “In more than 30 years of my acquaintance with the U.N., I have not heard a more courageous and sharp speech,” Netanyahu said of Trump in his own speech Tuesday. Iranian leaders sharply rebuked the U.S. president. In a meeting with American media executives ahead of the speech, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said Iran has complied fully and predicted that the United States will be the loser if it “tramples upon” the agreement.
“Everyone will clearly see that Iran has lived up to its agreements and that the United States is therefore a country that cannot be trusted,” Rouhani said. On Twitter, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said that Trump’s threats amount to “ignorant hate speech” that “belongs in medieval times.” Aides have rejected the notion that Trump’s rhetoric and name-calling fall outside the bounds of international norms, suggesting that the president is merely employing language his rivals understand. (David Nakamura and Anne Gearan, “Trump Defends ‘America First’ Foreign Policy at U.N., Threatens to ‘Totally Destroy’ North Korea,” Washington Post, September 19, 2017)
Trump at UNGA: “To overcome the perils of the present and to achieve the promise of the future, we must begin with the wisdom of the past. Our success depends on a coalition of strong and independent nations that embrace their sovereignty to promote security, prosperity, and peace for themselves and for the world. We do not expect diverse countries to share the same cultures, traditions, or even systems of government. But we do expect all nations to uphold these two core sovereign duties: to respect the interests of their own people and the rights of every other sovereign nation. This is the beautiful vision of this institution, and this is foundation for cooperation and success. Strong, sovereign nations let diverse countries with different values, different cultures, and different dreams not just coexist, but work side by side on the basis of mutual respect.Strong, sovereign nations let their people take ownership of the future and control their own destiny. And strong, sovereign nations allow individuals to flourish in the fullness of the life intended by God. In America, we do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example for everyone to watch. This week gives our country a special reason to take pride in that example. We are celebrating the 230th anniversary of our beloved Constitution — the oldest constitution still in use in the world today. This timeless document has been the foundation of peace, prosperity, and freedom for the Americans and for countless millions around the globe whose own countries have found inspiration in its respect for human nature, human dignity, and the rule of law. …In foreign affairs, we are renewing this founding principle of sovereignty. Our government’s first duty is to its people, to our citizens — to serve their needs, to ensure their safety, to preserve their rights, and to defend their values. As President of the United States, I will always put America first, just like you, as the leaders of your countries will always, and should always, put your countries first. (Applause.) All responsible leaders have an obligation to serve their own citizens, and the nation-state remains the best vehicle for elevating the human condition. But making a better life for our people also requires us to work together in close harmony and unity to create a more safe and peaceful future for all people. The United States will forever be a great friend to the world, and especially to its allies. But we can no longer be taken advantage of, or enter into a one-sided deal where the United States gets nothing in return. As long as I hold this office, I will defend America’s interests above all else. But in fulfilling our obligations to our own nations, we also realize that it’s in everyone’s interest to seek a future where all nations can be sovereign, prosperous, and secure. …America does more than speak for the values expressed in the United Nations Charter. Our citizens have paid the ultimate price to defend our freedom and the freedom of many nations represented in this great hall. America’s devotion is measured on the battlefields where our young men and women have fought and sacrificed alongside of our allies, from the beaches of Europe to the deserts of the Middle East to the jungles of Asia. It is an eternal credit to the American character that even after we and our allies emerged victorious from the bloodiest war in history, we did not seek territorial expansion, or attempt to oppose and impose our way of life on others. Instead, we helped build institutions such as this one to defend the sovereignty, security, and prosperity for all. For the diverse nations of the world, this is our hope. We want harmony and friendship, not conflict and strife. We are guided by outcomes, not ideology. We have a policy of principled realism, rooted in shared goals, interests, and values. That realism forces us to confront a question facing every leader and nation in this room. It is a question we cannot escape or avoid. We will slide down the path of complacency, numb to the challenges, threats, and even wars that we face. Or do we have enough strength and pride to confront those dangers today, so that our citizens can enjoy peace and prosperity tomorrow? If we desire to lift up our citizens, if we aspire to the approval of history, then we must fulfill our sovereign duties to the people we faithfully represent. We must protect our nations, their interests, and their futures. We must reject threats to sovereignty, from the Ukraine to the South China Sea. We must uphold respect for law, respect for borders, and respect for culture, and the peaceful engagement these allow. And just as the founders of this body intended, we must work together and confront together those who threaten us with chaos, turmoil, and terror. The scourge of our planet today is a small group of rogue regimes that violate every principle on which the United Nations is based. They respect neither their own citizens nor the sovereign rights of their countries. If the righteous many do not confront the wicked few, then evil will triumph. When decent people and nations become bystanders to history, the forces of destruction only gather power and strength. No one has shown more contempt for other nations and for the wellbeing of their own people than the depraved regime in North Korea. It is responsible for the starvation deaths of millions of North Koreans, and for the imprisonment, torture, killing, and oppression of countless more. We were all witness to the regime’s deadly abuse when an innocent American college student, Otto Warmbier, was returned to America only to die a few days later. We saw it in the assassination of the dictator’s brother using banned nerve agents in an international airport. We know it kidnapped a sweet 13-year-old Japanese girl from a beach in her own country to enslave her as a language tutor for North Korea’s spies. If this is not twisted enough, now North Korea’s reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles threatens the entire world with unthinkable loss of human life. It is an outrage that some nations would not only trade with such a regime, but would arm, supply, and financially support a country that imperils the world with nuclear conflict. No nation on earth has an interest in seeing this band of criminals arm itself with nuclear weapons and missiles. The United States has great strength and patience, but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea. Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime. The United States is ready, willing and able, but hopefully this will not be necessary. That’s what the United Nations is all about; that’s what the United Nations is for. Let’s see how they do. It is time for North Korea to realize that the denuclearization is its only acceptable future. The United Nations Security Council recently held two unanimous 15-0 votes adopting hard-hitting resolutions against North Korea, and I want to thank China and Russia for joining the vote to impose sanctions, along with all of the other members of the Security Council. Thank you to all involved. But we must do much more. It is time for all nations to work together to isolate the Kim regime until it ceases its hostile behavior.” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the U.N. General Assembly, September 19, 2017)
Mattis: “Q: Mr. Secretary, just briefly. What message was President Trump trying to send by calling Kim Jong-un “Rocket Man” at the UN today? MATTIS: We are dealing with the North Korean situation through the international processes, and we will continue to do so with Secretary Tillerson leading the effort. And we will hopefully get this resolved through diplomatic means.” (DoD, Remarks by Secretary Mattis at an Enhanced Honor Cordon Welcoming Mihal-Viorel Fifor, Minister of Defense of Romania, to the Pentagon,” September 19, 2017)
The Blue House has moved to censure Defense Minister Song Young-moo for his provocative statements with a ‘stern warning’. The warning appears to be a hasty attempt to deflect criticism that Korea’s top diplomacy and security officials are fighting amongst themselves amidst a tense security crisis. Song later ‘apologized’ for his statements in a National Assembly standing committee meeting. In a press conference on September 19, Blue House Senior Secretary for Public Relations Yoon Young-chan stated, “Regarding Minister Song’s statement in a National Assembly National Defense Committee (NDC) meeting, we believe that the language used was inappropriate and lacked refinement. Considering that it could lead to policy confusion, Minister Song has been given a stern warning.” In a Blue House Action Agenda Meeting held that morning, Chief of Staff Lim Jong-seok and director of the Blue House National Security Office Chung Eui-yong agreed that a stern warning should be issued to Song, with Lim making the phone call to pass on the warning and express concern over the minister’s remarks. During a National Assembly NDC meeting the previous day, Song had described Yonsei University professor and special presidential advisor Moon Chung-in as “deplorable” for making remarks as an academic that were “not fit for a special presidential advisor.” Regarding eight million dollars in humanitarian aid that was to be provided to North Korea through an international organization under the government, Song said he would “significantly postpone the aid provision date.” The Defense Minister has already been embroiled in controversy many times before for openly making statements that conflict with official Blue House guidelines, including comments that “the deployment of tactical US nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula is an option we should consider.” Until now, there have been complaints within the Blue House about Song’s outspoken comments, but this sentiment had been conveyed to the minister in more subtle ways or through Prime Minister Lee Nak-yeon as a sign of respect. This was because if the government was seen making public reference to the problem or speaking out against Song’s remarks, it could cause unwanted speculation about conflict amongst top diplomacy and security officials. However, the issuance of a strong public warning to Song demonstrates that the Blue House has decided it can no longer remain silent or ignore his statements, possibly concerned about the reoccurrence of future ‘mishaps.’ “Song has been making too many provocative statements,” said a high level official from the Blue House. “He has been given a stern warning for his statements, including comments about the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons.” The official went on to say, “Any change to the schedule of humanitarian aid provision to North Korea is not within the Ministry of National Defense’s jurisdiction,” criticizing Song for overstepping his ministerial boundaries and making unrefined remarks. After publicly announcing the warning issued to Song, the Blue House official went to the Press Center and stated, “There is no chance that this will lead to a personnel change, and it is incorrect to talk about disarray amongst diplomacy and security officials. Issuing statements about government ministers or cabinet members falls within the realm of Blue House affairs. The comments made by the Defense Minister, who is a cabinet member unlike Moon Chung-in, can appear to be official statements of the government’s position. This is why Minister Song was asked to be more careful. But it is plain wrong to talk about confusion among diplomatic and security officials.” On the same day, Song later apologized for his criticism of Professor Moon in a plenary session of the National Assembly Legislation and Judiciary Committee, stating that his remarks “went too far.” In response to a question by Liberty Korea Party lawmaker Kim Jin-tae about whether it was unfair for the Blue House National Security Office Director to reprimand the Defense Minister for having a different opinion from a presidential advisor, Song once again bowed his head and stated, “I don’t think it’s unfair, and I apologized for my unrefined comments.” (Jung Yu-gyung and Kim Kyu-nam, “Blue House Censures Defense Minister for Critical Comments,” Hankyore, September 20, 2017)
9/20/17:
North Korea’s foreign minister likened President Trump to a “dog barking,” ridiculing him for threatening to “totally destroy” his country if it persists in its nuclear and missile threats. “Back home, we have a saying: The dog barks, but the caravan continues,” Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho told reporters in New York when he was asked about Trump’s comment. “If he thought he could scare us with the noise of a dog barking, well, he should be daydreaming.” Ri arrived in New York today to attend the United Nations General Assembly. When asked about Trump’s Rocket Man comment, Ri said: “I am sorry for his aides.” (Choe Sang-hun, “Trump Likened to ‘a Dog Barking’ by North Korea’s Top Envoy,” New York Times, September 20, 2017)
“President Trump has handed the North Koreans the sound bite of the century,” said Marcus Noland of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and one of the authors of its “North Korea: Witness to Transformation” blog. “That footage will be used time and time and time again on North Korea’s state television channel.” Since the Korean War ended in an armistice in 1953, the Kim regime has portrayed the United States as an “imperialist aggressor” pursuing “hostile policy” to crush North Korea — again. To keep control of and unify the populace, the regime has kept alive the memories of the Korean War, when the U.S. destroyed 80 percent of all the buildings in the North and killed as many as 20 percent of its people. The “threat” from the United States is the whole reason why North Korea needs nuclear weapons, the regime tells the people, while denying them access to the Internet or any other outside information. “The Kim regime argues that only it is capable of protecting the country from the existential threat North Korea faces from ‘hostile foreign forces’ led by the United States,” Noland said. “All of the depravity and the denial of rights is all justified by this.” Trump’s words feed right into that narrative, analysts say. “This will reinforce the leadership’s position that the United States is hostile to North Korea,” said Jung H. Pak, chair of Korea studies at the Brookings Institution. “This is exactly what North Korea is talking about, and [Trump] said it right there on TV in front of the whole world.” Furthermore, Trump’s “demonizing” of Kim personally would inflame the situation, she said. Previous attacks on Kim Jong Un personally have elicited an outsized response from North Korea’s apparatchiks. “This slander against the supreme leader in front of an international audience that is going to cause the Foreign Ministry to have to leap to the defense of Kim, whether or not Kim orders it,” said Robert Carlin, a former CIA analyst on North Korea who remains a close reader of its statements. If Trump’s words are aimed at calling Kim’s bluff and forcing him to stand down, they will almost certainly backfire. “His speech could give Pyongyang an excuse or incentive to redouble its nuclear and missile development, which means more testing,” said Duyeon Kim, visiting senior fellow at Korean Peninsula Future Forum in Seoul. The whole rationale of deterrence is to persuade the opponent not to carry out an intended action because the costs outweigh their benefits, Kim said. The question now is whether the Kim regime, which is struggling to interpret Trump’s unconventional style, considers the threat real. “Pyongyang might interpret his bluster as credible and work harder on its nuclear weapons,” she said. “Or, Pyongyang might laugh and not take his warnings seriously, which is also a big problem too. We just don’t know for sure.” North Korea is, however, likely to glean one clear message from Trump’s speech, analysts said: there’s no point signing a denuclearization deal with the president because he won’t honor it. Trump called the international nuclear deal with Iran an “embarrassment” and “one of the worst and most one-sided” agreements ever forged. He strongly hinted that his administration would soon back out of the deal with Iran’s “murderous regime.” “His trashing of the Iran nuclear deal will raise warning signs for North Korea,” said Pak of Brookings. “This is not going to get them to talk if the U.S. is just going to tear it up.” Instead, North Korea would likely just wait out Trump, she said. “They think in terms of dynasties, and they know that we think in terms of electoral cycles.” (Anna Fifield, “Threats May Feed Kim’s Narrative,” Washington Post, September 21, 2017, p. A-11)
President Moon Jae-in’s ambition to build nuclear-powered submarines gained momentum today, despite the Blue House denying that there was an agreement with the United States on the issue.
Quoting multiple senior government officials, JoongAng Ilbo published an exclusive report earlier in the morning saying Seoul and Washington have agreed in principle that South Korea will build nuclear-powered submarines. Moon would bring the news home from his New York trip this week, one of the sources said. “Until now, the two countries had close consultations on the issue,” another senior official was quoted as saying. “The discussion was already over among the officials working on the issue. The agreement can be made public at an appropriate time after Moon meets with U.S. President Donald Trump during the UN trip.” “South Korea’s procurement of nuclear-powered submarines is a key mission of Moon’s New York trip,” he continued. “None of his predecessors accomplished it, but Moon has been able to persuade the U.S. government.” The Blue House said today that the report is not entirely true. “Some media reports about an agreement between Seoul and Washington on the South Korea’s procurement of nuclear-submarines are different from facts,” Yoon Young-chan, senior presidential press secretary, said. “Until now, no agreement has been reached between the two countries.” The statement, however, did not say whether there were discussions or not. Moon is scheduled to have a bilateral summit with Trump tomorrow. A presidential aide was quoted by local media saying there is no plan to address the submarine issue at the summit. Chung Ui-yong, head of the National Security Office of the Blue House, left for the United States today to set the agenda for the summit. Moon left for New York on Monday, but Chung stayed behind. Moon has long promoted the need to bolster the country’s military capabilities against growing asymmetrical threats from the North. In a phone call with Trump on August 7, Moon specifically mentioned the need for South Korea to own nuclear-powered submarines and build more powerful ballistic missiles. It appeared that Moon wants to deter the North’s submarine-launched ballistic missiles with nuclear submarines while countering the North’s intercontinental ballistic missile technology with more powerful South Korean missiles. Moon and Trump already agreed to lift payload limits on South Korean missiles to counter the North’s escalating threats. The Roh Moo-hyun administration, which Moon served as a senior presidential aide, planned to build and deploy three 4,000-ton nuclear submarines by 2020. The plan was secretly initiated in 2003 and later canceled after media reports. Current Defense Minister Song Young-moo participated in the project while serving in the Navy. Seoul was reluctant to develop nuclear-powered submarines due to Washington’s disapproval. Sources, however, told JoongAng Ilbo that the latest provocations by the North led Washington to allow Seoul’s plan. Uranium enrichment technology is a key to building nuclear-powered submarines. JoongAng Ilbo reported that a vice foreign minister from the Moon government and a deputy head of the U.S. Department of Energy will hold a high-level committee meeting to discuss U.S. supplies of enriched uranium for nuclear submarines. Under the current Korea-U.S. agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation, South Korea is prohibited from enriching uranium or using enriched uranium for military purposes but allowed to purchase low-enriched reactor-grade uranium for power generation. In contrast, highly-enriched uranium is the source of nuclear weapons. “The United States banned Korea from building nuclear arms, but it didn’t prohibit Korea from nuclear power generation and nuclear-powered military vessels,” said Shin Beom-chul, professor of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy. Even before he took office, Moon stressed the country’s need to build nuclear-powered submarines. During a presidential debate in April, Moon said he would seek revision of the nuclear agreement with the United States, if he won the election, to push the submarine project. Defense Minister Song has also advocated the need to build nuclear-powered submarines since July. Experts said nuclear-powered submarines are particularly crucial to counter the North’s submarine-launched ballistic missile technology. The North successfully launched a ballistic missile from a 2,200-ton submarine on April 23, 2016. The North currently operates about 70 submarines and is expanding their sizes to carry more missiles. “Because they fire ballistic missiles secretly from underwater, it is hard to detect the signs of launch or their locations,” said Kwon Yong-soo, a former professor at the Korea National Defense University. “As of now, we don’t have means to intercept them.” Moon Geun-sik, a former South Korean Navy captain who led the Roh administration’s nuclear submarine project, said nuclear-powered submarines are perhaps the only effective deterrence of submarine-launched missiles. “Our submarines should track down enemy submarines from the moment they start sailing and sink them when there is a sign of missile launch,” he said. “That is probably the best option.” According to Moon, nuclear submarines can operate underwater as long as they have food supplies. The South Korean Navy’s diesel-electric submarines, however, need to surface to recharge. A 1,200-ton Chang Bogo-class submarine needs to surface at least once a day. The larger 1,800-ton submarines can stay underwater for up to two weeks. The Roh administration completed the basic designs for nuclear submarines, Moon said. It even planned to purchase uranium from Russia or France if the United States opposed. Moon said it will take no more than five years for the country to build nuclear subs. “The small-sized SMART [System-integrated Modular Advanced ReacTor], developed by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, can be downsized further to power a submarine,” said Moon. “If this is pushed forward as a state project, we can sail a nuclear submarine within five years.” As of now, only six countries — the United States, Russia, England, France, China and India — operate nuclear-powered submarines. They are all nuclear-armed states. China is destined to protest South Korea’s plan to build nuclear submarines. “The Navy will likely arm the nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles,” said Kim Jin-hyung, who formerly headed the Joint Chief of Staff’s strategic and planning department. “China will hate them operating in the Yellow Sea.” (Wie Moon-hee and Ser Myo-ja, “Korea, U.S. Agree on Nuclear Subs,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 20, 2017)
9/21/17:
President Trump said that his administration will enact additional sanctions on North Korea, but he declined to elaborate in brief remarks to reporters during a meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. “We will put more sanctions on North Korea,” Trump said, responding to a question. The announcement came hours before the president was set to meet with the leaders of South Korea and Japan to discuss strategy to confront Pyongyang over its nuclear and ballistic missile tests. The Security Council had also applied tough new export penalties in August, and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said yesterday that there are signs those restrictions are having an economic effect. “We have some indications that there are beginning to appear evidence of fuel shortages,” Tillerson said in a briefing for reporters. “And look, we knew that these sanctions were going to take some time to be felt because we knew the North Koreans, based on information that the Chinese had shared with us and others had shared with us, had basically stockpiled a lot of inventory early in the year when they saw the new administration coming in, in anticipation of things perhaps changing. So I think what we’re seeing is a combined effect of these inventories are now being exhausted, and the supply coming in has been reduced.” (David Nakamura and Abby Phillip, “Trump Says the United States Will Impose More Sanctions on North Korea,” Washington Post, September 21, 2017)
North Korea’s foreign minister has delivered a scornful response to US President Donald Trump’s threat to destroy the hermit kingdom, likening it to the sound of “a dog barking.” Ri Yong Ho, who is in the US for the United Nations General Assembly, in his country’s first response to Trump’s speech, was derisive. “If he was thinking he could scare us with the sound of a dog barking, that’s really a dog dream,” Ri told reporters outside his hotel in New York. In Korean, a dog dream is one that is absurd and makes little sense. When asked about Trump’s use of the “rocket man” nickname, Ri said: “I feel sorry for his aides.” Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is also in New York, but played down the possibility of a meeting his North Korean counterpart. Tillerson told reporters he did not believe he could have a “matter-of-fact discussion with North Korea because we don’t know how their means of communication and behavior will be.” Tillerson claimed there were signs that increased international pressure on North Korea was starting to bear fruit. He said there was evidence of fuel shortages in the country after the passage of recent UN sanctions, which targeted oil imports among other things. However, analysts pointed out that fuel shortages did not necessarily prove that sanctions were having an effect, as most North Koreans don’t own cars or use fuel at anywhere near the rate of the rest of the world. Anthony Ruggiero, an expert in the use of targeted financial measures at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, said sanctions rarely hit fast. Any lines for gas were “probably more due to the regime stockpiling fuel in anticipation that China would implement the restriction,” Ruggiero, who worked at both the State Department and Treasury Department, told CNN. Trump is scheduled to meet with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and South Korean President Moon Jae-in Thursday, two important US allies on North Korea’s doorstop. Top of the agenda is likely to be South Korea’s surprise decision to send an $8 million aid package to North Korea. The move, which runs contrary to the US and Japan’s calls for an increase in economic and diplomatic pressure, marks a resumption in South Korean aid after a break of almost two years. In statement today, the South’s Unification Ministry said the decision to resume aid was in line with “the government’s stance that it separates the provision of humanitarian aid from politics and it continues to provide aid to improve the humanitarian situation of North Korean residents and the quality of their lives.” The South said it planned to send $4.5 million worth of medical treatments, nursery facilities and nutritional products for children and pregnant women through the World Food Programme, and $3.5 million worth of medicinal treatments and nutritional products through UNICEF. The precise timing and actual provision would be dependent on various factors, including “inter-Korean relations,” the ministry said in a statement. (Joshua Berlinger, “North Korea: Trump’s UN Speech Amounted to ‘The Sound of a Dog Barking,’” CNN, September 21, 2017)
President Trump ordered a widening of American sanctions on North Korea to further choke off its trade with the outside world, in what some experts described as perhaps the most sweeping set of punitive economic measures enacted by the United States in many years. A new executive order signed by Trump aimed to cut North Korea out of the international banking system while targeting its major industries and shipping. The move suggested that for now, at least, the president was still committed to applying economic pressure rather than military action, despite his vow this week to “totally destroy North Korea” if the United States were forced to defend itself or its allies. “North Korea’s nuclear weapons and nuclear development is a grave threat to peace and security in our world, and it is unacceptable that others financially support this criminal, rogue regime,” Trump said as he hosted President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan for lunch in New York. “The brutal North Korean regime does not respect its own citizens or the sovereignty of other nations.” The action came amid news reports that China’s central bank had instructed the country’s banks not to do new business with North Korea and to wind down old loans, in keeping with United Nations sanctions. As North Korea’s dominant economic partner, China holds the most sway with Pyongyang, but it remained unclear if its latest action would be enforced enough to have any real impact. For all of the headline-grabbing pugnacity of Trump’s United Nations speech earlier this week, in which he mocked North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, as “Rocket Man” on a “suicide mission,” the president made it clear on Thursday that he was still open to negotiations. Asked by a reporter whether dialogue was still possible, he said, “Why not?” This action sounds good in theory, but in the case of WWII Japan, it is wise to remember that it was the blockade and sanctions that angered…But it has withstood an array of American and international sanctions for years, and it remains unclear whether the latest round will have any greater effect. Just last week, the United Nations Security Council approved an American-drafted resolution tightening limits on North Korean trade, although it did not go as far as the Trump administration wanted. Some critics of Trump praised him for focusing on diplomatic pressure rather than saber rattling. R. Nicholas Burns, a former undersecretary of state under President George W. Bush, said the new American sanctions were “a smart move” because the latest United Nations resolution was insufficient. “The U.S. sanctions will help to raise the cost to North Korea of its nuclear weapons buildup,” said Burns, who now teaches at Harvard. Referring to the United Nations Security Council, he added: “The Bush and Obama administrations pursued a similar path on Iran sanctions — both U.N.S.C. and American unilateral sanctions — which proved effective.” David S. Cohen, who directed sanctions for President Barack Obama at the Treasury Department, was impressed. “I think it is reasonably significant,” said Cohen, who now works on sanctions issues at the law firm of Wilmer Hale. “These sanctions combine the sectoral sanctions we used against Russia with the effort to shut down banking relationships we used with Iran.” Trump’s order in some ways went even beyond the sanctions that ultimately brought Iran to the bargaining table during Obama’s administration. It bars international banks from the American market if they facilitate transactions with North Korea, targeting not just what are called correspondent accounts as the Iran measures did but blocking all assets in the United States held by such a bank. It also punished those doing business with major North Korean industries including textiles, fishing, information technology and manufacturing and imposed a 180-day ban on foreign-owned aircraft and ships entering the United States after leaving North Korea. But while in some ways they went beyond the Iran sanctions, they may not have as much impact since North Korea is less reliant on the international banking system. The North has proved adept at evading sanctions and Pyongyang may have already moved more of its transactions to cash or barter. Nikki R. Haley, the American ambassador to the United Nations, acknowledged that even ratcheted-up measures were unlikely to change Kim’s behavior. “We always knew that the sanctions may not work,” she said. “What the goal of the sanctions was always intended to be is to cut the revenue so they could do less of their reckless behavior.” For the Trump administration, though, even failed sanctions will help make the case to China and others that at least it tried. The new sanctions came as Trump, Moon and Abe presented a show of solidarity. The most important regional player, however, was not in New York: President Xi Jinping of China. He skipped this year’s United Nations session. But Trump spent an hour on the telephone with him earlier in the week. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin called China’s central banker in advance of today’s executive order and later told reporters that the American measures were not targeted in particular at Beijing. China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, sought today to cast Beijing as a mediator, calling on Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program and on Washington to compromise. “Negotiation is the only way out, which deserves every effort,” he said. “Parties should meet each other halfway by addressing each other’s legitimate concerns.” The meetings with Abe and Moon came on the fourth and final day of Trump’s visit to New York for the annual session of the United Nations General Assembly. Abe, who has been largely aligned with Trump’s approach, offered words of support. “Dialogue for the sake of dialogue would not produce anything,” Abe said after meeting with the president. “The key at this moment is to exercise and apply pressure against North Korea in a robust manner. And together with Donald, we’ve been successfully demonstrating our strong will to exercise pressure against North Korea.” Moon has been the odd man out of the three, arguing for more engagement and opposing any military action. Mr. Trump has derided this approach, calling it “appeasement,” but no mention was made of that today. “North Korea has continued to make provocations, and this is extremely deplorable and this has angered both me and our people,” Moon said. “But the United States has responded firmly and in a very good way.” He told Trump: “You made a very strong speech, and I believe the strength of your speech will also help to change North Korea.” Still, earlier in the day, Moon used his own address to the General Assembly to urge world leaders to “peacefully solve the North Korea nuclear issue,” step up diplomatic pressure and do everything possible to prevent war on the Korean Peninsula. (Peter Baker and Somini Sengupta, “Trump Moves to Widen U.S. Trade Sanctions against North Korea,” New York Times, September 22, 2017, p. A-11)
EXECUTIVE ORDER IMPOSING ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO NORTH KOREA: By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287c) (UNPA), section 1 of title II of Public Law 65-24, ch. 30, June 15, 1917, as amended (50 U.S.C. 191), sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a)), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code; and in view of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2321 of November 30, 2016, UNSCR 2356 of June 2, 2017, UNSCR 2371 of August 5, 2017, and UNSCR 2375 of September 11, 2017, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that:
The provocative, destabilizing, and repressive actions and policies of the Government of North Korea, including its intercontinental ballistic missile launches of July 3 and July 28, 2017, and its nuclear test of September 2, 2017, each of which violated its obligations under numerous UNSCRs and contravened its commitments under the September 19, 2005, Joint Statement of the Six‑Party Talks; its commission of serious human rights abuses; and its use of funds generated through international trade to support its nuclear and missile programs and weapons proliferation, constitute a continuing threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and a disturbance of the international relations of the United States.
In order to take further steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13466 of June 26, 2008, as modified in scope by and relied upon for additional steps in subsequent Executive Orders, I hereby find, determine, and order:
Section 1. (a) All property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in: Any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State: (i) to operate in the construction, energy, financial services, fishing, information technology, manufacturing, medical, mining, textiles, or transportation industries in North Korea; (ii) to own, control, or operate any port in North Korea, including any seaport, airport, or land port of entry; (iii) to have engaged in at least one significant importation from or exportation to North Korea of any goods, services, or technology; (iv) to be a North Korean person, including a North Korean person that has engaged in commercial activity that generates revenue for the Government of North Korea or the Workers’ Party of Korea; (v) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; or (vi) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order.
(b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the effective date of this order. The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section are in addition to export control authorities implemented by the Department of Commerce.
(c) I hereby determine that the making of donations of the types of articles specified in section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2)) by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection (a) of this section would seriously impair my ability to deal with the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13466, and I hereby prohibit such donations as provided by subsection (a) of this section.
(d) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section include: (i) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection (a) of this section; and (ii) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
Sec. 2. (a) No aircraft in which a foreign person has an interest that has landed at a place in North Korea may land at a place in the United States within 180 days after departure from North Korea. (b) No vessel in which a foreign person has an interest that has called at a port in North Korea within the previous 180 days, and no vessel in which a foreign person has an interest that has engaged in a ship‑to‑ship transfer with such a vessel within the previous 180 days, may call at a port in the United States. (c) The prohibitions in subsections (a) and (b) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the effective date of this order.
Sec. 3. (a) All funds that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person and that originate from, are destined for, or pass through a foreign bank account that has been determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be owned or controlled by a North Korean person, or to have been used to transfer funds in which any North Korean person has an interest, are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in. (b) No United States person, wherever located, may approve, finance, facilitate, or guarantee a transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited by subsection (a) of this section if performed by a United States person or within the United States. (c) The prohibitions in subsections (a) and (b) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the effective date of this order.
Sec. 4. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to impose on a foreign financial institution the sanctions described in subsection (b) of this section upon determining that the foreign financial institution has, on or after the effective date of this order: (i) knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant transaction on behalf of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13551 of August 30, 2010, Executive Order 13687 of January 2, 2015, Executive Order 13722 of March 15, 2016, or this order, or of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13382 in connection with North Korea‑related activities; or (ii) knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant transaction in connection with trade with North Korea.
(b) With respect to any foreign financial institution determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, in accordance with this section to meet the criteria set forth in subsection (a)(i) or (a)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of the Treasury may: (i) prohibit the opening and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintenance of correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts in the United States; or (ii) block all property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person of such foreign financial institution, and provide that such property and interests in property may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.
(c) The prohibitions in subsection (b) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the effective date of this order.
(d) I hereby determine that the making of donations of the types of articles specified in section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2)) by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection (b)(ii) of this section would seriously impair my ability to deal with the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13466, and I hereby prohibit such donations as provided by subsection (b)(ii) of this section.
(e) The prohibitions in subsection (b)(ii) of this section include: (i) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection (b)(ii) of this section; and (ii) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
Sec. 5. The unrestricted immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens determined to meet one or more of the criteria in section 1(a) of this order would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and the entry of such persons into the United States, as immigrants or nonimmigrants, is therefore hereby suspended. Such persons shall be treated as persons covered by section 1 of Proclamation 8693 of July 24, 2011 (Suspension of Entry of Aliens Subject to United Nations Security Council Travel Bans and International Emergency Economic Powers Act Sanctions).
Sec. 6. (a) Any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.
(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.
Sec. 7. Nothing in this order shall prohibit transactions for the conduct of the official business of the Federal Government or the United Nations (including its specialized agencies, programmes, funds, and related organizations) by employees, grantees, or contractors thereof.
Sec. 8. For the purposes of this order: (a) the term “person” means an individual or entity; (b) the term “entity” means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization; (c) the term “United States person” means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States; (d) the term “North Korean person” means any North Korean citizen, North Korean permanent resident alien, or entity organized under the laws of North Korea or any jurisdiction within North Korea (including foreign branches). For the purposes of section 1 of this order, the term “North Korean person” shall not include any United States citizen, any permanent resident alien of the United States, any alien lawfully admitted to the United States, or any alien holding a valid United States visa; (e) the term “foreign financial institution” means any foreign entity that is engaged in the business of accepting deposits, making, granting, transferring, holding, or brokering loans or credits, or purchasing or selling foreign exchange, securities, commodity futures or options, or procuring purchasers and sellers thereof, as principal or agent. The term includes, among other entities, depository institutions; banks; savings banks; money service businesses; trust companies; securities brokers and dealers; commodity futures and options brokers and dealers; forward contract and foreign exchange merchants; securities and commodities exchanges; clearing corporations; investment companies; employee benefit plans; dealers in precious metals, stones, or jewels; and holding companies, affiliates, or subsidiaries of any of the foregoing. The term does not include the international financial institutions identified in 22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(2), the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the North American Development Bank, or any other international financial institution so notified by the Secretary of the Treasury; and (f) the term “knowingly,” with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.
Sec. 9. For those persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States, I find that because of the ability to transfer funds or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of measures to be taken pursuant to this order would render those measures ineffectual. I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13466, there need be no prior notice of a listing or determination made pursuant to this order.
Sec. 10. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including adopting rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me by IEEPA and UNPA as may be necessary to implement this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may, consistent with applicable law, redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States. All agencies shall take all appropriate measures within their authority to implement this order.
Sec. 11. This order is effective at 12:01 a.m., Eastern Daylight Time, September 21, 2017.
Sec. 12. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. DONALD J. TRUMP THE WHITE HOUSE, September 20, 2017.
DeThomas: “President Trump’s new Executive Order on North Korea sanctions is a unilateral declaration of economic warfare designed to bring the North to its knees through the aggressive use of secondary sanctions against any country that trades with or finances trade with North Korea. Rather than bring North Korea closer to the negotiating table for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, they are likely to hasten war and even the collapse of the regime if effectively enforced. It is unlikely, however, that this severe tightening of the sanctions screw will be successful. …When reading President Trump’s comments on the new Executive Order (EO) imposing new sanctions on North Korea, the author’s initial reaction was that they are, in part, a logical, intelligent next step after the passage of the recent UN Security Council Resolution (2375), which named additional North Korean economic sectors to the international sanctions campaign. Many of the industries targeted such as seafood and textiles have been flagged in recent UN resolutions. To this extent, the new Executive Order appeared to be adding the threat of US asset seizures and denial of access to the US financial system for any entity that violates the caps and bans on trade in those industries. This is an excellent and sensible way to deter sanctions evasion at least by firms with a significant stake in international commerce. …But upon reading the text of the Executive Order, this view is 180 degrees at variance with the truth. The EO includes within it provisions that will allow the US to impose a full trade and financial embargo on North Korea unilaterally through the use of secondary sanctions. Section 1 (a) (iii) of the order permits the Secretary of Treasury to seize the assets or property of any person who “engages in one successful importation from or exportation to of any goods, services or technology.” Section 4 of the EO brings the full power of the US Treasury to bear against any bank that facilitates any trade with North Korea. Financial dealings with essentially any element of the government of North Korea are sanctionable (Section 4 (a) (i)). Facilitating any trade with North Korea is equally sanctionable (Section 4 (a) (ii)). The penalties prescribed are fatal to any bank using the dollar. They can have their assets seized and can be banned from the US financial system (Section 4 (b) (i) and (ii). In short, the United States is asserting the intention and right to ban from the US financial system and the dollar any entity from any country that trades with or finances trade with North Korea. In combination with the President’s UN speech, we are witnessing the final phases of an effort to use sanctions against North Korea. Sanctions are no longer to be international instruments to coerce North Korea to the negotiating table. They are now unilateral instruments of a US economic war against North Korea in which states and firms will all have to comply or be US targets. This is consistent with the President’s UN speech in which he slammed the door on any hope of a negotiated settlement of this crisis (the subject of a separate article). They are, of course, not in the least consistent with his hymns to national sovereignty in that speech. Based on this EO, sanctions are no longer to bring North Korea to the negotiating table. Their only purpose can be to force the regime to capitulate under crushing economic pain or to create the conditions for regime collapse if it does not capitulate. It is not impossible for this approach to work. It is possible that the Trump administration has managed to work things out behind the scenes with China to prevent a US-China trade and financial war from emerging from America’s attempt to enforce this EO against key Chinese entities. It is also possible that North Korea might eventually be willing to pursue some diplomatic option, such as trying to negotiate some limit on long-range missile and nuclear testing in return for suspension of some sanctions in the EO. But this latter possibility seems highly unlikely given the recent statement by Kim Jong Un. We are in new and dangerous territory. Sanctions are no longer the alternative to war. They may well be its prelude: First, the US will have to make its unilateral embargo stick globally. To do so, it will have to enforce its will and it is not certain it can do so only with secondary sanctions. (China is a master of finding small-scale banks and other entities with no stake in the US financial system to trade where it needs to trade in the face of US secondary sanctions.) There will be a temptation if things get frustrating either to expand the reach of secondary sanctions to whole countries or to enforce an embargo with military means such as a naval “quarantine” or blockade. Second, the effort may fail at a high humanitarian cost. While this effort may severely reduce the North’s access to foreign exchange and goods through legal means, the North Korean government has funded a great deal of its operations through illegal means such as smuggling, illicit drug dealing, counterfeiting and large-scale cyber-crime. It has also shown an annoying capability to adapt to and defeat past sanctions. Black money alone may be enough to keep the regime elites and the nuclear weapons program funded while letting the general population suffer all the shortages, unemployment, hunger and disease that will come from a successful cutoff of global commerce. We could inflict a great deal of suffering on voiceless every day North Koreans before Kim Jong Un and his cronies feel a pinch. Third, there isn’t enough time to be sure this strategy will work. Crushing even a poor country like North Korea economically is not the work of a couple of weeks; it takes years. The US does not have years. It has months or maybe a year before North Korea reaches its goal of being able to target US cities in the lower 48 states with a thermonuclear weapon. This is very likely the point at which the inner councils of the Trump administration have already decided informally that war is inevitable. Their words increasingly reflect a view that preventive war is a preferable and feasible end state compared to the North Korean acquisition of a nuclear-armed ICBM capability of any size. And, of course, Kim Jong Un will respond somewhere and somehow—whether through cyber-attacks on the US or terrorism directed at Japan or the ROK or with some military action designed to create economic costs that cannot be predicted, but could spark conflict as well. In sum, the new EO is probably the last word on sanctions as a mechanism to resolve the North Korean crisis. It is unlikely to be successful largely because the US does not have the time, the patience or the diplomatic possibilities to make it work. The author concluded after hearing the President’s UN speech that the probability that the North Korean crisis would end in a large war in East Asia is growing by the day. While intended to be an alternative to military conflict, this set of sanctions takes us another step down the road to that war.” (Joseph DeThomas, “The New U.S. Sanctions: Moving from Sanctions to Economic War,” 38North, September 22, 2017)
North Korea may conduct the most powerful test of a hydrogen bomb in the Pacific Ocean in its possible “highest-level” actions against the United States, Forign Minister Ri Yong Ho said yesterday after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said that he is considering the strongest actions in response to US President Donald Trump’s threat to “totally destroy” the country. It could be the most powerful detonation of an H-bomb in the Pacific,” Ri told reporters. “We have no idea about what actions could be taken as it will be ordered by leader Kim Jong-un.” (Yonhap, “N.K. FM Says ‘Highest-Level’ Actions in Kim’s Remarks May Be H-Bomb Test in Pacific,” September 21, 2017)
An artillery unit from the U.S. mainland practiced firing precision-guided munitions in South Korea today. The 18th Field Artillery Brigade based at Fort Bragg in North Carolina staged the live-fire drill in Daecheon, South Chungcheong Province, according to the eighth U.S. Army. On being flown in by transport plane, the unit fired long-range munitions. The weapons they came with were two HIMARS light multiple rocket launchers. Each HIMARS launcher carries six 227 mm rockets with a range of more than 70 km or an ATACMS missile with a range of 300 km. HIMARS provides a counterweight to North Korea’s long-range artillery pieces and is so light that it can be deployed rapidly anywhere by C-130 transport aircraft. Guided rockets fired from the HIMARS launchers hit the target some 60 km away. The launchers had been deployed for live-fire drills here several times before. Today’s drill was a show of force after North Korea’s latest nuclear test and launch of Hwasong-12 ballistic missiles over Japan. (Yu Yong-weon, “U.S. Artillery Unit Stages Live-Fire Drill in Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, September 22, 2017)
Presidents Moon Jae-in and Donald Trump agreed to expand the deployment of U.S. strategic assets to South Korea and surrounding areas. During their summit on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York, they underscored the need to maintain overwhelming deterrence against North Korea, presidential spokesman Park Soo-hyun said at a press briefing. To this end, they agreed to strengthen their countries’ joint defense capabilities, partly through Seoul’s acquisition and development of “the most advanced military assets,” Park said. The two leaders strongly condemned North Korea’s latest nuclear provocation as a serious and escalating threat.
“The two leaders shared a view on the need for the strongest pressure and sanctions against North Korea to deter North Korea’s provocative activities and make it start taking steps toward denuclearization,” he said. The Blue House spokesman refused to confirm whether Seoul’s acquisition of the most advanced military assets would include nuclear-propelled submarines. Moon expressed satisfaction with what he called the United States’ “firm” reaction to the North’s latest nuclear provocation. “North Korea’s latest provocation is very deplorable, and it greatly outraged us, but the U.S. firmly and greatly responded and I am very satisfied that cooperation between South Korea-U.S. was realized without any gap,” he said while meeting with Trump, according to pool reports. “President Trump has also delivered a very powerful speech at the U.N. General Assembly and I am confident such power will certainly change North Korea,” he added.
Immediately following their bilateral summit, Moon and Trump were joined by Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo for a three-way summit over lunch. The three leaders vowed to put maximum pressure on North Korea. “The three leaders noted North Korea’s nuclear and missile development posed a grave threat to peace in Northeast Asia and the world and that they cannot accept this,” South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha told a press briefing. “Under such understanding, the leaders of the three countries agreed on the need for the international community to put maximum pressure and sanctions to the level that North Korea cannot withstand and voluntarily come to the dialogue table,” she added. (Yonhap, “Moon Trump Agree to Boost Military Deterrence, Put Maximum Pressure on N. Korea,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 22, 2017)
9/22/17:
KCNA: “Respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK, released a statement on Thursday. The full text of the statement reads: The speech made by the U.S. president in his maiden address on the UN arena in the prevailing serious circumstances, in which the situation on the Korean peninsula has been rendered tense as never before and is inching closer to a touch-and-go state, is arousing worldwide concern. Shaping the general idea of what he would say, I expected he would make stereotyped, prepared remarks a little different from what he used to utter in his office on the spur of the moment as he had to speak on the world’s biggest official diplomatic stage. But, far from making remarks of any persuasive power that can be viewed to be helpful to defusing tension, he made unprecedented rude nonsense one has never heard from any of his predecessors. A frightened dog barks louder. I’d like to advise Trump to exercise prudence in selecting words and to be considerate of whom he speaks to when making a speech in front of the world. The mentally deranged behavior of the U.S. president openly expressing on the UN arena the unethical will to “totally destroy” a sovereign state, beyond the boundary of threats of regime change or overturn of social system, makes even those with normal thinking faculty think about discretion and composure. His remarks remind me of such words as “political layman” and “political heretic” which were in vogue in reference to Trump during his presidential election campaign. After taking office Trump has rendered the world restless through threats and blackmail against all countries in the world. He is unfit to hold the prerogative of supreme command of a country, and he is surely a rogue and a gangster fond of playing with fire, rather than a politician. His remarks which described the U.S. option through straightforward expression of his will have convinced me, rather than frightening or stopping me, that the path I chose is correct and that it is the one I have to follow to the last. Now that Trump has denied the existence of and insulted me and my country in front of the eyes of the world and made the most ferocious declaration of a war in history that he would destroy the DPRK, we will consider with seriousness exercising of a corresponding, highest level of hard-line countermeasure in history. Action is the best option in treating the dotard who, hard of hearing, is uttering only what he wants to say. As a man representing the DPRK and on behalf of the dignity and honor of my state and people and on my own, I will make the man holding the prerogative of the supreme command in the U.S. pay dearly for his speech calling for totally destroying the DPRK. This is not a rhetorical expression loved by Trump. I am now thinking hard about what response he could have expected when he allowed such eccentric words to trip off his tongue. Whatever Trump might have expected, he will face results beyond his expectation. I will surely and definitely tame the mentally deranged U. S. dotard with fire.” (KCNA, “Statement of Chairman of State Affairs Commission of DPRK,” September 22, 2017)
Trump tweet: “Kim Jong Un of North Korea, who is bviously a madman who doesn’t mind starving or killing his people, will be tested like never before!” (Woodward, Rage, p. 79)
North Korea has long cultivated an image of defiant belligerence, punctuating its propaganda and diplomacy with colorful threats, insults and bluster. But by addressing President Trump in a personal statement today, the nation’s leader, Kim Jong-un, has pushed his government’s brinkmanship to a new, potentially more perilous level. In a statement written in the first person, published on the front pages of state newspapers and read on national television, Mr. Kim called Trump a “mentally deranged U.S. dotard” who had “denied the existence of and insulted me and my country in front of the eyes of the world.” Kim vowed to take the “highest level of hard-line countermeasure in history.” Kim’s father and grandfather, who ruled North Korea before him, never made such a statement, South Korean officials said. In effect, Kim, whose cultlike leadership rests upon his perceived daring toward North Korea’s external enemies, has turned the nation’s standoff with the United States into a personal duel with Trump, analysts said. The North Korean news media carried photographs of Kim sitting in his office and reading his statement, but his voice was not broadcast. On the country’s state-run Central TV, a female announcer read his statement. “This is totally unprecedented,” said Paik Hak-soon, a longtime North Korea analyst at the Sejong Institute, a think tank outside Seoul, referring to Kim’s statement. “The way North Korea’s supreme leadership works, Kim Jong-un has to respond more assertively as its enemy gets more confrontational, like Trump has. “There is no backing down in the North Korean rule book,” Paik said. “It’s the very core of their leadership identity and motive.” In a country where the leader is essentially portrayed as a god, Kim’s decision to respond personally to Trump’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly and pledge reprisals escalated the standoff over the North’s nuclear program in a way that neither he nor his predecessors had done before. Shortly after Kim’s statement was released, his foreign minister, Ri Yong-ho, delivered prepared remarks to reporters outside his hotel in New York, saying it was up to Kim to decide what to do, but that North Korea might conduct the “biggest ever hydrogen bomb test in the Pacific.” Ri could not have made such an alarming comment without approval from Kim, although some analysts question whether North Korea has the technology or political daring to conduct an atmospheric nuclear test, something the world has not seen for decades. Trump responded today by further personalizing the dispute. On Twitter, the president pronounced Mr. Kim to be “obviously a madman.” Koh Yu-hwan, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University in Seoul, said that Kim, faced with Trump’s threat of annihilation, could respond only with equal force. “When Trump stood before the United Nations General Assembly and threatened to totally destroy his country, Kim Jong-un had to take that as the United States telling the world of its intention for possible military action,” Koh said. “He had to respond in kind, launching the same kind of verbal bombs.” Analysts said that by putting his reputation on the line with his statement, Kim was now far more unlikely to stand down. Instead, his government was likely to conduct more nuclear and missile tests, they said. “Trump shot himself in the foot with his unabashedly undiplomatic United Nations General Assembly speech,” said Lee Sung-yoon, a Korea expert at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. “By threatening to totally destroy North Korea, he created the impression around the world that it is actually the United States — instead of North Korea — that’s motivated by aggression. In effect, Trump gave Kim Jong-un a freebie for another major provocation. Kim will oblige, and claim that it was in ‘self-defense’ against Trump’s unnerving threats.” Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, compared the Korean standoff to the October 1962 crisis over Soviet missiles in Cuba, urging the United Nations secretary general, António Guterres, to convene the six parties that were previously involved in talks on denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula — China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the United States — to discuss reducing fever-pitch tensions. “We are in a cycle of escalation that leads to a very bad end,” Mr. Kimball said. North Korea has conducted all of its six nuclear tests within deep underground tunnels to diminish the spread of radioactive materials, and has stepped up the pace of its missile tests. Some analysts fear that the next step might be for North Korea to try to prove that it can deliver a nuclear warhead on a long-range missile, no matter how dangerous and provocative that might be. It has been 37 years since any nation tested a nuclear weapon in the planet’s atmosphere, reflecting the nearly universal opposition to such tests over fears of the effects of radioactive fallout on human health and the environment. The last atmospheric test took place in 1980, when China fired what experts believed to be a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile into a desert salt flat more than 1,300 miles west of Beijing. Shin Beom-chul, a security expert at the government-run Korea National Diplomatic Academy in Seoul, said that even if North Korea wanted to conduct an atmospheric nuclear test in the Pacific, it did not have the ability to dispatch test-monitoring ships to the open ocean while the United States military was on the prowl. Mr. Shin said North Korea probably would not risk the radioactive fallout and other grave dangers involved in a nuclear missile test. The country has yet to master the technologies needed to prevent the warhead at the tip of its long-range ballistic missile from burning up while re-entering Earth’s atmosphere, South Korean officials said. “What if the nuclear missile goes wrong midflight and detonates over Japan? It would mean a nuclear war,” Shin said. “More likely, North Korea will graduate its provocations, as if moving on steppingstones.” Analysts said North Korea had been escalating tensions in stages in what they called a “salami tactic,” as in slice by slice. Kim Dong-yub, a defense analyst at the Seoul-based Institute for Far Eastern Studies of Kyungnam University, said that North Korea would probably try to disprove skeptics in the West over its ability to strike long-range targets by firing its Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile over Japan and farther into the Pacific — but without a nuclear payload. Some analysts said the North Korean leader was acting more defensively than offensively, with his threats aimed at forcing the Trump administration to ease sanctions. But other analysts warned that North Korea’s determination to improve its nuclear capabilities — and act offensively — had long been underestimated. “If we follow what North Korea has been doing, it will be almost certain that it will fire its missile sooner or later to demonstrate an ICBM range,” Kim, the Kyungnam University analyst, said. “I don’t think the missile will carry a nuclear warhead, but I can’t shake off the fear that it might, because North Korea has time and again carried things beyond my expectation.” (Choe Sang-hun, “Dictator’s Reply Turns Personal,” New York Times, September 23, 2017,
President Donald Trump will take the “appropriate” action if North Korea tests a nuclear bomb over the Pacific Ocean as threatened, his top diplomat said. “We will continue our efforts in the diplomatic arena, but all of our military options — as the president has said — is on the table,” Tillerson said in an interview on ABC. “And once we can assess the nature of this threat, the president will make a decision regarding the appropriate actions.” Pressed to answer if there could be military action, he said: “That will be the president’s decision. There will be assembled and there is assembled on a standing basis a National Security Council that meets on each of these issues to advise the president. Ultimately, it will be his decision.” A day earlier, Trump announced new sanctions on North Korea that aim to cut off sources of revenue for the regime’s nuclear and missile programs. Tillerson said the measures are the “strongest economic sanctions ever” to target Kim. “He is being tested with these sanctions,” the secretary said. “Voices from every corner of the world are calling on him to cease his program, come to the table and let’s talk about the future of North Korea and the North Korean people.” So far, Pyongyang has not demonstrated an interest in serious discussions, Susan Thornton, acting assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said later in a meeting with reporters in New York. “A lot of our sort of attempts to open up some diplomatic space have been met by additional missile launches with longer ranges or more dramatic nuclear tests,” she said. “So I think I wouldn’t want to indicate that there’s anything other than that kind of a situation on the diplomatic front at the moment.” Should North Korea detonate an H-bomb over the Pacific, she added, it would be an “unprecedented act of aggression.” “I certainly hope that they would not engage in that behavior, but I’m sure there will be a very concerted and determined international response to such an act.” (Yonhap, “Trump Will Take ‘Appropriate’ Action in the Evenet of N.K. H-Bomb Test: Tillerson,” September 23, 2017)
9/23/17:
North Korea’s foreign minister warned that a strike against the U.S. mainland is “inevitable” because President Trump mocked leader Kim Jong Un with the belittling nickname “little rocketman.” U.S. bombers, escorted by fighter jets, flew off the North Korean coast in a show of force shortly before Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho strode to the podium to address the United Nations General Assembly in New York, capping an extraordinary week of militaristic threats from both nations before an organization founded to maintain international peace and security. Ri said that Trump’s bombast had made “our rockets’ visit to the entire U.S. mainland inevitable” and linked it to Trump’s insulting shorthand references to Kim. Harsh sanctions placed on North Korea’s trade with the outside world will have no impact on its ability to complete building a nuclear bomb capable of reaching the United States, Ri said, suggesting that stage is imminent. “Through such a prolonged and arduous struggle, now we are finally only a few steps away from the final gate of completion of the state nuclear force,” he said. “It is only a forlorn hope to consider any chance that the DPRK would be shaken an inch or change its stance due to the harsher sanctions by the hostile forces,” he said, using the acronym for North Korea’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In response to Ri’s threats at the U.N., Trump tweeted Saturday night: “If he echoes thoughts of Little Rocket Man, they won’t be around much longer!”A mass rally was also held Saturday in central Pyongyang to express support for “final victory” over the United States, the regime’s KCNA news agency reported. The rally in Kim Il Sung square was attended by over 100,000 people, KCNA reported, “full of the spirit of annihilating the enemies.” Speaking at the rally, a Pyongyang official said the people of the capital were “aflame” with the desire to wipe their sworn enemy, the U.S. imperialists, off the globe. The rhetoric between Trump and Kim has grown exceptionally personal. At a rally Friday night in Alabama, Trump called Kim “little rocketman,” magnifying the disparaging label he slung at Kim in his U.N. speech Tuesday in which he threatened that the United States would “totally destroy” North Korea in defense of itself or its allies. He said Kim was on a “suicide mission.” Kim, in turn, called Trump a “frightened dog” and a “mentally deranged U.S. dotard.” Ri echoed those sentiments Saturday, calling the president a “mentally deranged person full of megalomania” and at one point referring to him as “President Evil.” Ri emphasized that North Korea has the know-how to carry out its threat. He said Pyongyang has a hydrogen bomb that can fit on an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States. (Carol Morello, “Pyongyang Keeps up Military Threats While Washington Suggests Restraint,” Washington Post, September 24, 2017 p. A-14)
Ri Yong Ho: “Before going into the main points in my debate, I feel forced to make comments on the speech uttered 4 days ago by someone called the U.S. president that rendered this sacred UN arena tainted. Since Trump uttered such reckless and violent words provoking the supreme dignity of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) at this very platform, I think it is fair enough for me to make a response in the corresponding tone. During his 8 months in power, he has turned the White House into a noisy marketing place full of crackling sounds of abacus beads and now he has tried to turn the UN arena into a gangsters’ nest where money is respected and bloodshed is the order of the day. The absurd reality that the person like Trump, a mentally deranged person full of megalomania and complacency, the person who is chastised even by American people as ‘Commander in Grief,’ ‘Lyin King,’ ‘President Evil’ is holding the seat of the U.S. President, and the dangerous reality that the gambler who grew old using threats, frauds and all other schemes to acquire a patch of land holds the nuclear button; these are what constitute the gravest threat to the international peace and security today. Due to his lacking of basic common knowledge and proper sentiment, he tried to insult the supreme dignity of my country by referring it to a rocket. By doing so, however, he committed an irreversible mistake of making our rockets’ visit to the entire U.S. mainland inevitable all the more. None other than Trump himself is on a suicide mission. In case innocent lives of the U.S. are lost because of this suicide attack. Trump will be held totally responsible. The respected supreme leader Comrade Kim Jong Un stated: as a man representing the DPRK and on behalf of the dignity and honor of my state and people and on my own, I will make the man holding the prerogative of the supreme command in the U.S. pay dearly for his speech calling for totally destroying the DPRK. Trump might not have been aware what is uttered from his mouth but we will make sure that he bears consequences far beyond his words, far beyond the scope of what he can handle even if he is ready to do so. …Our national nuclear force is, to all intents and purposes, a war deterrent for putting an end to nuclear threat of the U.S. and for preventing its military invasion; and our ultimate goal is to establish a balance of power with the U.S. Distinguished delegates of all countries attending this session are aware of the fact that the DPRK, unlike other nuclear weapon states, made public every time to the world the test process and its results at all stages of the development and advancement of the nuclear force. …We do not need anyone recognition of our status as a nuclear weapons state and our capability of nuclear strike. …Although our decision to possess nuclear weapons was an inevitable option forced by the United States, it resulted in our country achieving the status of a nuclear weapons state and rocket power, and this prestige has now become an immortal destiny of the DPRK. …We will take preventive measures by merciless preemptive action in case the U.S. and its vassal forces show any signs of conducting a kind of ‘decapitating’ operation on our headquarters or military attack against our country. However, we do not have any intention at all to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the countries that do not join the U.S. military actions against the DPRK.” (DPRK Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Statement by Ri Yong Ho, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the 72nd Session of the UN General Assembly, September 23, 2017)
Trump tweet: “Just heard Foreign Minister of North Korea speak at the U.N. If he echoes thoughts of Little Rocket Man, they won’t be around much longer!” (Woodward, Rage, p. 79)
A 3.5-magnitude earthquake was detected in northern North Korea this afternoon, near the nation’s known nuclear test site, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. But experts said seismic data suggested that it was probably not caused by a new nuclear test, although it could have been a delayed geological reaction to the last test nearly three weeks ago. There were no reports of radiation around the site. “This event occurred in the area of the previous North Korean Nuclear tests,” the USGS said on its website. “We cannot conclusively confirm at this time the nature (natural or human-made) of the event.” The earthquake-monitoring agency in neighboring China initially said it suspected that the North Korean quake, which occurred at 3:59 p.m. local time, was caused by an explosion, but South Korea’s meteorological agency said the incident appeared to be a natural quake. Nuclear proliferation watchdog CTBTO said the quake was unlikely to have been man-made. CTBTO Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo tweeted seismographic graphs from Saturday’s quake alongside those from the second quake on September 3, with both data patterns looking broadly similar. “Indication event natural and same epicentral distance,” he tweeted. He also said there had been a smaller quake nearly four hours earlier Saturday. “Two #Seismic Events! 0829UTC & much smaller @ 0443UTC unlikely Man-made! Similar to “collapse” event 8.5 mins after DPRK6!,” he tweeted. Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, said he had spoken to Zerbo. “While the data analysis is preliminary, the early indications strongly suggest that the smaller events today (which are in a seismically inactive area) are likely further geologic disturbances created by the Sept. 3 nuclear test explosion,” he said. (Simon Denyer, “Earthquake Strikes North Korea near Nuclear Test Site but No Radiation Reported,” Washington Post, September 23, 2017)
Woodward: “Trump and [Presidential Secretary] Rob Porter were together in the president’s front cabin on Air Force One. Fox News was on the TV. ‘Little Rocket Man,’ Trump said proudly. ‘I think that may be my best ever, best nickname ever.’ ‘It is funny,’ Porter said, ‘and certainly seems to have gotten under Kim’s skin.’ But, he asked, ‘What’s the endgame here? If we continue to amp up the rhetoric and get into a war of words and it escalates, what are you hoping to get out of this? How does it end?’ ‘You can never show weakness,’ Trump replied. ‘You’ve got to project strength. Kim and others need to be convinced that I’m prepared to do anything to back up our interests.’ ‘Yes, you want to keep him on his toes,’ Porter said, ‘and you want some air of unpredictability from you. But he seems pretty unpredictable. And we’re not sure, is he even well? Is he all mentally there? He doesn’t have the same political constraints that other people do. He seem very uch to want to be taken seriously on the international stage.’ ‘You’ve got to show strength,’ the president repeated. ‘I wonder,’ Porter plowed on, ‘if embarrassing is more likely to sort of get him into submission or if it could also provoke him.’ … [Trump said,] ‘This is all about leader versus leader. Man versus man. Me versus Kim.’” ” (Woodward, Fear, p. 281)
The Pentagon flew its Air Force B-1B Lancer strategic bombers today east of North Korea, near the demilitarized zone, demonstrating President Donald Trump’s resolve. The Department of Defense announced later that day that the bombers flew from Guam, escorted by F-15C Eagle fighters from Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan, to international airspace over waters east of North Korea. “This is the farthest north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) any U.S. fighter or bomber aircraft have flown off North Korea’s coast in the 21st century,” said Pentagon Spokesperson Dana White, “underscoring the seriousness with which we take reckless behavior.”
The B-1B is able to deliver a heavier payload than the B-52 and B-2 bombers, and is also quicker than the other two, capable of reaching the Korean Peninsula from Guam in two hours. “This mission is a demonstration of U.S. resolve and a clear message that the President has many military options to defeat any threat,” White said, underscoring the “grave threat” that the North’s weapons program poses to the Asia-Pacific region and the international community. She continued, “We are prepared to use the full range of military capabilities to defend the U.S. homeland and our allies.” South Korea’s Blue House said today in a statement that the flyover of the B-1B bombers near the military demarcation line “came with close cooperation between South Korea and the United States.” The South Korean Air Force did not accompany the B-1Bs this time around, according to the Blue House, because the U.S. bombers flew over international airspace.
President Moon Jae-in and Trump agreed in their bilateral summit September 21, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, that the U.S military will expand rotational deployments of strategic assets to the South and neighboring areas, which could include B-1B bombers, F-35B stealth fighter, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submarines.
Late today, Trump tweeted, “Just heard Foreign Minister of North Korea speak at U.N. If he echoes thoughts of Little Rocket Man, they won’t be around much longer!” This came after he threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea in his address to the UN General Assembly. “We can’t have mad men out there shooting rockets all over the place,” said Trump in a rally in Arizona September 22. “Rocket Man should have been handled a long time ago.” He added, “I’m going to handle it because we have to handle it,” warning of North Korea’s threats of “a massive weapon exploding over…the Pacific Ocean, which causes tremendous, tremendous calamity.” In another tweet that day, Trump called Kim Jong-un “a madman who doesn’t mind starving or killing his people,” and added that he “will be tested like never before!” But military action on North Korea would “ultimately” be Trump’s decision, according to U.S. State Secretary Rex Tillerson. “We will continue our efforts in the diplomatic arena but all of our military options – as the president has said – are on the table,” Tillerson told ABC News’ “Good Morning America” today. “Once we can assess the nature of this threat, the president will make a decision regarding the appropriate actions.” When asked how the United States would respond if North Korea drops a hydrogen bomb on the Pacific, Tillerson said, “That will be the president’s decision,” adding “there is assembled on a standing basis a National Security Council that meets on each of these issues to advise the president.” (Sarah Kim, “U.S. Flies Strategic Bombers East of North Korea in Show of Force,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 24, 2017) North Korea appears to have failed to detect a flight by US bombers near its airspace on Saturday, undermining the feasibility of Pyongyang’s latest threats against the US, lawmakers said September 26. According to members of South Korean parliamentary intelligence committee, North Korea may be incapable of detecting US Air Force maneuvers near its borders. Lawmakers on the committee told the media that Seoul’s National Intelligence Service reported that Pyongyang appears to have been unaware of the operation involving B-1B bomber and F-15 fighter jets. The NIS also told the lawmakers that North Korean military took no measures in response around the time of the flight. “In short, North Korea took no actions when the B-1B (bombers) approached (North Korea),” intelligence committee chief Rep. Lee Cheol-woo said, citing information revealed by the NIS. Lee added that the US military informed the NIS that the flightpath of the B-1B was disclosed because North Korea appeared to have failed to detect the maneuver on its own, and appears to have conferred with China and Russia regarding the matter. According to the NIS, North Korea repositioned some military aircraft to the east coast, and carried out a surveillance flight in the region sometime after the US aircraft withdrew from the area. (Choi He-suk, “N.K. Failed to Detect B-1 Bombwers off East Coast: NIS,” Korea Herald, September 26, 2017)
North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are etched into the landscape of Pyongyang, its showcase capital city. A giant sculpture of the atom sits on top of a new apartment tower built for nuclear scientists. Atom designs adorn road overpasses, lampposts and building facades. Bomb imagery colors daily life. At an orphanage, children play with plastic mobile rocket launchers instead of toy trucks. Shops sell commemorative intercontinental ballistic missile stamps, while a bakery sells cakes featuring an upright rocket, ready for launch. During a recent visit, the first by The Wall Street Journal since 2008, the city’s atomic aesthetics reinforced the message government officials conveyed repeatedly to the Journal reporters: North Korea won’t part with its nuclear weapons under any circumstances and is resolved to suffer economic sanctions and risk war with the U.S. to keep them. “It is too late, we have grown up,” said Ri Yong Pil, the vice president of the Institute for American Studies, a division of North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “We are not interested in dialogue to undermine our newly built strategic status.” The North Korean officials expressed curiosity about difficult-to-answer questions such as: Who is Mr. Trump’s chief adviser? And will Secretary of State Rex Tillerson keep his job? One official had followed the heated U.S. debate over transgender soldiers, and wondered if the U.S. had many. Several people, including some government officials, expressed wariness of China, a longtime friend of Pyongyang that historically has opposed any talk of regime change. China supported recent steps to tighten sanctions against North Korea, and some residents said they question the quality and safety of Chinese foods and other products. Elites appear to be living well. A sushi restaurant run by deceased leader Kim Jong Il’s former sushi chef serves $100 platters of raw fish. A supermarket in Kwangbok Street had products ranging from locally made tea to $70 imported Japanese whisky. People are playing videogames on locally made smartphones that are becoming more common yet remain disconnected from the global internet. One of the Journal’s handlers said some parents worry about how much screen time their children get, much like Americans. Solar panels have sprung up across Pyongyang, appearing on apartment balconies, providing an alternate power source for individuals and insulating them from power outages while also easing their reliance on government-supplied power. Although the Journal‘s team didn’t leave Pyongyang, foreign aid workers who have access to other parts of the country describe a strikingly different scene in the provinces. Even on the city’s outskirts, the drop-off in living standards is stark. Journal reporters saw farmers relying on ox carts in fields just a short drive from the new dolphin-show facility and science complexes. North Korea’s economy grew 3.9% last year to around $32 billion, according to South Korea’s central bank, which makes estimates about the economy of its northern neighbor in the absence of reliable figures from Pyongyang. That is the fastest growth since 1999, according to South Korea, and may have been helped by government spending on weapons manufacturing. The U.S. strategy is to squeeze Kim by snuffing out North Korean growth with sanctions, including limits on purchases of oil. The supervised nature of the Journal’s trip made it impossible to draw conclusions about whether Pyongyang can outlast the sanctions. During the trip, Trump suggested in a tweet that new sanctions were causing long lines at Pyongyang gas stations. A European aid worker in Pyongyang told the Journal gas prices had risen significantly since November. But there were no lines at four gas stations that reporters saw while touring the city. At one station where reporters waited for 20 minutes seeking permission to take a photograph, two cars came in to fill up. Ri Gi Song, an economist at North Korea’s Academy of Social Sciences, said North Korea was well positioned to weather sanctions after enduring them since the end of the Korean War. Cryptically, he said the country could rely on oil-producing North Korean allies to get around the sanctions. “I’ll let you guess which,” he said. When the Journal suggested a few possible countries, including Iran and Venezuela, he smiled and repeated his answer. What’s more, he said, the nuclear-weapons program was already allowing the country to reduce spending on conventional weapons and channel that money to economic development. (John Lyons and Jonathan Cheng, “Letter from North Korea: As the Nuclear Crisis Mounts, Reporters from the Journal Were Able to Visit Pyongyang and See Life There in a Tightly Controlled Government Tour,” Wall Street Journal, September 23, 2017, p. C-1)
Two-thirds of Americans oppose launching a preemptive military strike against North Korea, with a majority trusting the U.S. military to handle the escalating nuclear crisis responsibly but not President Trump, a new Washington Post-ABC News poll conducted September 18-21 finds. Roughly three-quarters of the public supports tougher economic sanctions on North Korea in an attempt to persuade it to give up its nuclear weapons, while just about one-third think the United States should offer the isolated country foreign aid or other incentives. The Post-ABC poll finds 37 percent of adults trust Trump either “a great deal” or “a good amount” to responsibly handle the situation with North Korea, while 42 percent trust the commander in chief “not at all.” By comparison, 72 percent trust U.S. military leaders, including 43 percent saying they trust them “a great deal.” A scant 8 percent of Americans surveyed think North Korean leader Kim Jong Un can act responsibly. Overall, Trump’s image continues to be negative, with 39 percent of Americans approving and 57 percent disapproving of the president’s job performance. Faith in Trump’s handling of the biggest foreign policy crisis of his presidency is colored sharply by partisanship. While 11 percent of Democrats and 36 percent of independents say they trust Trump to act responsibly in dealing with North Korea, more than three-quarters of Republicans say they trust the president, although just over half trust him “a great deal.” Partisans are relatively united, however, in their concern about nuclear-armed North Korea. A record high 70 percent of Americans say North Korea poses a “serious threat” to the United States, including roughly 7 in 10 Democrats and independents and about 8 in 10 Republicans. Trump’s overall job approval rating has stabilized at 39 percent in the new poll after slipping to 36 percent in July. The shift is within the poll’s margin of sampling error but is mirrored in the small rise in other recent national polls. Still, more Americans “strongly” disapprove of his job performance, 48 percent, than approve of it either “strongly” or “somewhat.” On North Korea specifically, most Americans are hesitant to support preemptive military action. Fewer than a quarter — 23 percent — of Americans say the United States should strike North Korea first, while 67 percent say there should be U.S. military action only if North Korea attacks the United States or its allies. Over 6 in 10 Republicans and independents along with more than 7 in 10 Democrats say the United States should not launch a preemptive strike. Even among those who “strongly approve” of Trump’s job performance, a majority, almost 6 in 10, oppose preemptive military action. If the United States did first launch a military strike on North Korea, 82 percent of Americans say it would risk starting a larger war in East Asia, including 69 percent citing a “major risk.”
Despite resistance to preemption, however, Americans are much more supportive of military intervention generally than they have been in the past. In a question that did not contrast preemption and retaliation, the new poll finds roughly 4 in 10 Americans support bombing North Korean military targets, up from 2 in 10 in 2005, when North Korea declared itself a nuclear power. Republican support for bombings has more than doubled, from 29 percent in 2005 to 63 percent today. Most Democrats and independents still are opposed. Beyond military strikes, toughening sanctions on North Korea garners widespread support across party lines, with 76 percent of Americans overall approving. Other nonmilitary options aimed at pushing North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons are less popular. About one-third of Americans support offering the country financial incentives, such as aid money or more trade, down from about half supporting this approach in 2005. And while Russia and China have called on the United States to reduce its military exercises with South Korea, a key U.S. ally, American public opinion is roughly divided. Forty-three percent think the United States should agree to stop conducting the exercises, while 47 percent oppose doing so. (Scott Clement and Philip Rucker, “Military Trusted on N. Korea,” Washington Post September 25, 2017, p.A-1)
9/24/17:
Simulated U.S. air attack sending B-1 bombers and 20 other planes to cross the Northern Limit Line, stopping short of North Korea airspace. South Korea President Moon Jae-in meets with his National Security Council, which sends send word the United States may have gone too far. (Woodward, Rage, p. 80)
When President Trump gave a fiery campaign speech in Huntsville, Ala., on the evening of September 22, he drew a rapturous roar for his warlike language, cheering as he renewed his threats and added a dig at Kim’s stature. “He should have been handled a long time ago,” Trump said, “but I’m going to handle it because we have to handle it: Little Rocket Man.” “I’m sure he’s listening, because he watches every word,” Trump said. “He’s watching us like he never watched anybody before — that I can tell you.” We’re dealing with somebody that we’ll figure out,” Trump said at the rally. “He may be smart, he may be strategic — and he may be totally crazy.” Among diplomats and national security specialists, the reaction was decidedly different. After Trump repeated his taunt in a tweet late the next day and threatened that Kim and his foreign minister “won’t be around much longer” if they continue their invective against the United States, reactions ranged from nervous disbelief to sheer terror. His strengths as a politician — the ability to appeal in a visceral way to the impulses of ordinary citizens — are a difficult fit for the meticulous calculations that his own advisers concede are crucial in dealing with Pyongyang. The disconnect has led to a deep uncertainty about whether Trump is all talk or actually intends to act. The ambiguity could be strategic, part of an effort to intimidate Kim and keep him guessing. Or it could reflect a rash impulse by a leader with little foreign policy experience to vent his anger and stoke his supporters’ enthusiasm. His new chief of staff and his national security team have drawn a line at trying to rein in his more incendiary provocations, fearing that their efforts could backfire with a president who bridles at any effort to control him. What remains unclear — and the source of much of the anxiety in and out of the government and on both sides of the Pacific — is whether they would step in to prevent the president from taking the kind of drastic action that matches his words, if they believed it was imminent. “It does matter, because you don’t want to get to a situation where North Korea fundamentally miscalculates that an attack is coming,” said Sue Mi Terry, a former intelligence and National Security Council specialist who is now a senior adviser for Korea at Bower Group Asia. “It could lead us to stumble into a war that nobody wants.” Some senior administration officials acknowledge privately that Trump’s rhetoric on North Korea is not helpful, although they question whether it will alter the discussion, given how far Kim has come in his quest to develop a nuclear weapon that could reach the United States. The three current and retired generals advising Trump — Jim Mattis, the defense secretary; Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, his national security adviser; and John F. Kelly, his chief of staff — as well as Rex W. Tillerson, the secretary of state, have all chosen their words on North Korea more carefully, emphasizing the role of diplomacy and the grave stakes of any military confrontation. “All three of the generals fully realize the carnage that would result from a war on the Korean Peninsula,” James G. Stavridis, the former NATO commander and current dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, said today. “Knowing each of them personally, I am certain they are counseling operational caution, measured public commentary and building a coalition approach to dealing with Kim Jong-un,” Stavridis, a retired admiral, said in an email. “But controlling President Trump seems incredibly difficult. Let’s hope they are not engaged in mission impossible, because the stakes are so high.” Christopher R. Hill, a former ambassador to South Korea who served Republican and Democratic presidents, argued that the comments could badly undercut Trump’s ability to find a peaceful solution to the dispute, playing into Kim’s characterization of the United States as an evil nation bent on North Korea’s destruction and relieving pressure on the Chinese to do more to curb Pyongyang. “The comments give the world the sense that he is increasingly unhinged and unreliable,” said Hill, the dean of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. Hill, who as envoy to South Korea under George W. Bush was the last American to hold formal talks with the government in Pyongyang, said he and Condoleezza Rice, then the secretary of state, routinely advised Bush to “avoid the personal invectives,” because “they never help.” “My sense from four years of those talks is that getting personal is not helpful,” Hill said. “Who could be telling Trump otherwise?” Yet current and former senior officials said it was clear that Trump would continue his brinkmanship, particularly his belligerent tweets, no matter what his advisers do or say. One former administration official said nobody, including Kelly, could control the president’s social media utterances, despite what his military advisers thought about them. His maiden speech to the United Nations General Assembly drew audible gasps from the diplomats and national security officials in the hall. Some of Trump’s allies argue that his behavior is strategic, a way of telegraphing to North Korea — and to its primary patron, China — that the United States is taking a tougher line under this administration. There may be wisdom, they argue, in spurring fear and confusion in the mind of a leader who frequently relies on both. (Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “In Risky Game, Trump Taunts a Touchy Dictator,” New York Times, September 25, 2017,
President Trump issued a new order indefinitely banning almost all travel to the United States from seven countries, including most of the nations covered by his original travel ban, citing threats to national security posed by letting their citizens into the country. The new order is more far-reaching than the president’s original travel ban, imposing permanent restrictions on travel, rather than the 90-day suspension that Trump authorized soon after taking office. But officials said his new action was the result of a deliberative, rigorous examination of security risks that was designed to avoid the chaotic rollout of his first ban. And the addition of non-Muslim countries could address the legal attacks on earlier travel restrictions as discrimination based on religion. Starting next month, most citizens of Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Chad and North Korea will be banned from entering the United States, Trump said in a proclamation released this evening. Citizens of Iraq and some groups of people in Venezuela who seek to visit the United States will face restrictions or heightened scrutiny. Trump’s original travel ban was followed in March by a revised ban, which expired on today even as the Supreme Court is set to hear arguments about its constitutionality on October 10. The new order — Chad, North Korea and Venezuela are new to the list of affected countries and Sudan has been dropped — will take effect October 18. “As president, I must act to protect the security and interests of the United States and its people,” Trump said in the proclamation, which White House officials said had the same force as an executive order. He added that the restrictions will remain in effect until the governments of the affected nations “satisfactorily address the identified inadequacies.” Officials described the new order as a much more targeted effort than the president’s earlier one. Each of the countries will be under its own set of travel restrictions, though in most cases citizens of the countries will be unable to emigrate to the United States permanently and most will be barred from coming to work, study or vacation in America. “Six of President Trump’s targeted countries are Muslim. The fact that Trump has added North Korea — with few visitors to the U.S. — and a few government officials from Venezuela doesn’t obfuscate the real fact that the administration’s order is still a Muslim ban,” said Anthony D. Romero, the executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union. “President Trump’s original sin of targeting Muslims cannot be cured by throwing other countries onto his enemies list,” Romero said. The proclamation imposes the most severe restrictions on Syria and North Korea, which Trump says fail to cooperate with the United States in any respect. All citizens from those countries will be denied visas to enter the United States once the proclamation goes into effect. (Michael D. Shear, “Trump Imposes New Travel Ban on 7 Countries,” New York Times, September 25, 2017,
Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, Trump’s national security adviser, said he saw no prospect of talks with North Korea that would allow its “de facto nuclear capability.” Kim Jong-un has already ruled out giving up nuclear weapons. McMaster said the administration does not want to negotiate in a way that “locks in the status quo as the new normal.” Asked about the option of a maritime blockade, he said it would probably provoke retaliation by North Korea. He also said many people seem to think — incorrectly — that there is an easy military option. “What we’re not assuming is that anything we do will go without some kind of response to the situation,” he said. McMaster would not comment on the North Korean threat to shoot down American warplanes. (Rick Gladstone, “North Koreans Issue a Threat to U.S. Planes,” New York Times, September 26, 2017,
President Trump’s extension of his travel ban to North Korea is mostly symbolic and will have little to no effect on Kim Jong Un’s regime, experts said September 25. Trump issued an executive order indefinitely banning travel to the United States by citizens of seven countries and the ruling class of an eighth. The list includes all but one of the countries covered by the original ban plus three more: Chad, Venezuela and North Korea. The restrictions on Venezuela apply to that country’s leaders and their families. In the context of this escalating conflict, the North Korea travel ban may appear to be part of a U.S. push to isolate the regime. But experts said the provisions are unlikely to do so — or, in fact, accomplish anything concrete at all. Trump pitched the new order as a measure designed to keep Americans safe. “Making America Safe is my number one priority. We will not admit those into our country we cannot safely vet,” he tweeted. The problem with punishing Pyongyang by stopping North Koreans from traveling to the United States is that very few — almost none — make the trip. The new executive order suspends “immigrant and nonimmigrant” travel from North Korea to the United States. But people cannot emigrate from North Korea to the United States to begin with. “They should have checked if there is North Korean immigration before they banned it,” said John Delury, an associate professor at Seoul’s Yonsei University. “Why are you banning something that doesn’t exist?” North Korean defectors who end up in the United States usually arrive via South Korea and are typically traveling on South Korean, not North Korean, passports. Although North Korean diplomats do travel to the United States, mostly to United Nations headquarters in New York, the order notes that diplomatic visits are exempt from the ban. That only leaves the handful of officials or academics who attend conferences in the United States each year, a group that is already closely vetted by the State Department. Given all this, Cheng Xiaohe, a North Korea expert at Renmin University of China in Beijing, predicted that the impact of the ban on North Korea would be “very limited.” Lu Chao, a Korea specialist at the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences in Shenyang, China, said there would by no practical impact at all. “It’s propaganda,” he said. Yet, if this is a message, nobody seems certain what message Trump is trying send — or to whom.
Delury said the move may be aimed at a domestic audience, not an international one. The original travel ban was widely criticized for targeting Muslims — adding North Korea and Venezuela changes the conversation. “There’s no logic in the North Korea context, so we can conclude this is not really about North Korea,” Delury said. “This is not part of real North Korea policy at all.” (Emily Rauhala, “Almost No North Koreans Travel to the U.S., So Why Ban Them?” Washington Post, September 25, 2017)
9/25/17:
North Korea’s foreign minister said President Donald Trump had declared war on North Korea and that Pyongyang reserved the right to take countermeasures, including shooting down U.S. bombers even if they are not in its air space. Ri Yong Ho said a Twitter message by Trump on September 23 in which the president warned that the minister and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un “won’t be around much longer” if they acted on their threats amounted to a declaration of war. Earlier in New York, where he had been attending the annual U.N. General Assembly, Ri told reporters today: “The whole world should clearly remember it was the U.S. who first declared war on our country.” ”Since the United States declared war on our country, we will have every right to make countermeasures, including the right to shoot down United States strategic bombers even when they are not inside the airspace border of our country. The question of who won’t be around much longer will be answered then,” Ri added. White House spokeswoman Sarah Saunders denied the United States had declared war and called the suggestion “absurd.” (Michelle Nichols and Christine Kim, “North Korea Says U.S. ‘Declared War,’ Warns It Could Shoot down U.S. Bombers,” Reuters, September 25, 2017)
Lt. Gen. HR McMaster made a rare public appearance at the Institute of the Study of War’s invite-only, off-camera security conference. On North Korea, McMaster said they know there is no military quick hit to stop Kim’s nuclear progress: “There’s not a precision strike that solves the problem.” The White House would start talks with Pyongyang — but not like before, he said, and not if they continue to advance missile and nuclear bombs at the same time. (Kevin Baron, “McMaster: I’m Here to Serve, Not ‘Control the President,’” Defense One Newsletter, September 26, 2017) President Donald Trump’s national security adviser said North Korea should consider accepting inspections of its nuclear facilities and declare it’s willing to give up its atomic weapons, moves that could lead to the U.S. negotiating with its government. H.R. McMaster said he wouldn’t lay out preconditions for talks with North Korea but described confidence-building steps the country could take. He also said the Trump administration has gamed out “four to five” scenarios in which the North Korea nuclear threat is resolved.“Some are uglier than others,” he said in a speech on Monday hosted by the Institute for the Study of War. “What we hope to do is avoid war, but we cannot discount that possibility,” McMaster said. He said it would be “unacceptable” for North Korea to achieve a ballistic missile tipped with a nuclear warhead, technology the country has not yet demonstrated. (Margaret Taley, “McMaster Says North Korea Should Accept inspections before Talks,” Bloomberg, September 25, 2017) Asked September 25 about whether there were any contacts with the North, General McMaster said no, then quickly left the door open to doing exactly that. “When we do,” he said, “hopefully it will not make it into The New York Times.” (David E. Sanger, “On Tillerson’s Stop in China, Questions on North Korea,” New York Times, September 30, 2017,
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo called an election a year ahead of schedule, saying that Japan was facing a “national crisis” that must be dealt with now. Citing the rapid pace at which Japan was facing a graying population and falling birthrate, he said a national crisis loomed that must be addressed immediately to bring about a brighter future. Abe also touched on North Korea’s repeated nuclear and ballistic missile tests as another threat facing the nation. He promised to make every effort to protect the lives and peace of the people. “I am determined to resolve what can be called a national crisis together with the public by concentrating my entire being and soul into this issue,” he said. After lashing out at Pyongyang over its repeated provocations, Abe stated: “Elections that are the starting point of democracies should not be affected by any threats that may emerge from North Korea. Because of the situation that we currently face, I want to hold an election in order to ask the public to make a decision on how the North Korean issue should be dealt with.” Abe vowed to implement a strong foreign policy if he wins the election. While the government and ruling coalition will now coordinate the timing of the Lower House election, indications are that it will likely be held on October 22. (Asahi Shimbun, “Abe Cites ‘National Crisis’ in Calling an Early Election,” September 25, 2017)
9/26/17:
President Trump thanked China for helping rein in North Korea and claimed that international pressure on the nuclear-armed outlaw nation is beginning to work, marking a change in tone amid concerns that tensions with Pyongyang are escalating dangerously. Trump made a point of praising Chinese President Xi Jinping for his efforts to squeeze “I applaud China for breaking off all banking relationships with North Korea, something that people would have thought unthinkable even two months ago,” Trump said. “I want to thank President Xi.” Although the president repeated a threat of military action, his language was mild by comparison to his branding of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un as “a madman” and his vow last week to “totally destroy” North Korea if necessary to protect the United States or its allies. Trump also expressed confidence he could solve a decades-long impasse that has bedeviled his predecessors. “North Korea is a situation that should have been handled 25 years ago, 20 years ago, 15 years ago, 10 years ago, and five years ago, and it could have been handled much more easily,” Trump said. “Yet various administrations, many administrations — which left me a mess. But I’ll fix the mess.” The president’s remarks appear to reflect an attempt at lowering the temperature after days of heated rhetoric and threats from both sides. Just before Trump spoke in the Rose Garden, the Treasury Department announced new sanctions on eight North Korean banks, 26 people in China and three other countries that the Trump administration says are linked to North Korean financial networks. The penalties come on top of unilateral U.S. sanctions announced last week that are meant to close off the U.S. financial system to Pyongyang and anyone doing business with it, as well as the international import and export restrictions approved since early August. The Trump administration says there are signs that North Korea is starting to feel the pinch from international pressure, especially with the addition of restrictions on fuel oil and other forms of energy that will affect the ruling elite. The penalties have not yet worked to deter Kim, who says the United States is bent on war. “Reversing strategic patience was the first foreign policy decision the Trump administration made,” State Department adviser R.C. Hammond said, referring to the prior policy of waiting Kim out. “There’s no more time to wait while North Korea develops its nuclear capabilities.” The international pressure campaign involving China was born out of that decision and Trump’s successful summit with Xi at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida this year, according to Hammond. “Strategies work when we stick to them,” he said.
The State Department announced y that Secretary of State Rex Tillerson will travel to Beijing this week for talks on North Korea, trade and other issues, including Trump’s visit to China later this year. State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert stepped around the question of whether Trump’s name-calling or threats issued via Twitter are a helpful part of the U.S. strategy. “The president is an effective communicator. I think people know exactly where he stands. We have had a good deal of success in pushing forward with our diplomacy campaign,” Nauert said. “The president has done a strong job” of leading that diplomacy, she said. “Some may not want to give him credit for that.” Trump said Kim is the aggressor and instigator. “He’s acting very badly. He’s saying things that should never, ever be said,” the president said. “And we’re replying to those things, but it’s a reply. It’s not an original statement, it’s a reply.” (Anne Gearan, “Trump Tones down Rhetoric on North Korea, Says Pressure Works,” Washington Post, September 27, 2017, p. A-14)
Trump: “We thank Spain for its recent decision to expel its North Korean ambassador and for standing with us in our efforts to isolate the brutal North Korean regime. It is time for all responsible nations to join forces to isolate the North Korean menace. North Korean nuclear weapons and missile development threaten the entire world with unthinkable loss of life. All nations must act now to ensure the regime’s complete denuclearization. I appreciate the United Nations Security Council voting twice, unanimously — 15 to nothing, twice — to adopt hard-hitting resolutions against North Korea. I have recently issued tough new sanctions against those who do business with this outlaw regime, and I applaud China’s latest action to restrict its trade with North Korea. And, in particular, I applaud China for breaking off all banking relationships with North Korea — something that people would have thought unthinkable even two months ago. I want to thank President Xi. … TRUMP: Major Garrett, CBS. Q. … And on North Korea, very quickly, the Foreign Minister said you have declared, effectively, war on North Korea. And the North Korean government has threatened to shoot down or aim at American planes flying in international airspace. I would like your reaction to that. TRUMP: … We’re totally prepared for the second option; not a preferred option. But if we take that option, it will be devastating — I can tell you that — devastating for North Korea. That’s called the military option. If we have to take it, we will. He’s acting very badly. He’s saying things that should never, ever be said. And we’re replying to those things, but it’s a reply. It’s not an original statement; it’s a reply. But the things that he said over the last year — and if you look back, the things that he said to past administrations — North Korea is a situation that should have been handled 25 years ago, 20 years ago, 15 years ago, 10 years ago, and five years ago, and it could have been handled much more easily. You had various administrations — many administrations which left me a mess. But I’ll fix the mess. So we’ll see what happens with North Korea.” (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Trump and President Rajoy of Spain in Joint Press Conference, September 26, 2017)
The United States added eight North Korean banks and 26 individuals operating in four countries to its sanctions blacklist, part of an intensified effort to starve North Korea financially in response to the country’s nuclear weapons and missile testing. The action by the Treasury Department came less than a week after President Trump announced an executive order that broadly expanded the punitive economic measures he can apply against North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, and his subordinates. A Treasury statement said the sanctions singled out North Koreans working in China, Russia, Libya and the United Arab Emirates. Nineteen of the 26 North Koreans under sanctions are in China, underscoring the dependence of North Korea on its Chinese economic connections. “We are targeting North Korean banks and financial facilitators acting as representatives for North Korean banks across the globe,” Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in announcing the sanctions. He said the sanctions were imposed to complement a Security Council resolution on September 11 that represented the strongest penalties yet imposed by the world body on North Korea for its repeated nuclear and missile tests over the past decade. The eight banks, which the Treasury statement described as operators in North Korea’s financial services industry, were identified as: Agricultural Development Bank; Cheil Credit Bank; Hana Banking Corporation Ltd.; International Industrial Development Bank; Jinmyong Joint Bank; Jinsong Joint Bank; Koryo Commercial Bank Ltd.; and Ryugyong Commercial Bank. Under American sanctions, any property under United States jurisdiction that is owned by designated entities or people can be seized. Those targeted by the sanctions also are banned from doing business with American citizens. “This is a valuable step forward because it will further squeeze the North Korean regime, interdict its access to foreign exchange, and narrow Pyongyang’s options as it seeks to do business around the world,” said Evans J.R. Revere, a Korea expert who is a former deputy assistant secretary of state. (Rick Gladstone, “U.S. Orders More Sanctions against North Korea,” New York Times, September 27, 2017, p. A-13)
President Donald Trump accused North Korea of brutally abusing an American student who had been held captive in North Korea, saying the young man had been “tortured beyond belief.”
Trump had previously blamed Pyongyang’s “brutal regime” for Otto Warmbier’s plight but it was the first time the president publicly accused North Korea of torture in the case. U.S. officials have said Trump was personally taken aback by Warmbier’s death and his comment Tuesday ratchets up the pressure on Kim Jong-Un’s regime. “Otto was tortured beyond belief by North Korea,” Trump said on Twitter. His post followed the airing of an interview with Warmbier’s parents. “They kidnapped Otto, they tortured him, they intentionally injured him. They are not victims, they are terrorists,” Fred Warmbier said today on “Fox and Friends.” (Rumy Doo, “Trump Says U.S. Captive in North Korea Was ‘Tortured beyond Belief,’” Korea Herald, September 26, 2017) A U.S. coroner has concluded that Otto Warmbier’s death shortly after he was released by North Korea in June was the result of oxygen deprivation but it remains unclear how that occurred. Local media in Cincinnati, Ohio, reported that the coroner also said there were no indications that Warmbier had been subjected to torture, contradicting claims by his parents that he had been mistreated in captivity. Dr. Lakshmi Sammarco said 22-year-old Warmbier suffered brain damage about six months after he was arrested in January 2016 for allegedly stealing a propaganda poster from a hotel in Pyongyang where he was staying. Dr. Sammarco said Warmbier suffered brain damage that had been caused by oxygen deprivation, but the medical examination had been unable to determine why he had suffocated. In a report dated September 11, Dr Sammarco’s office concluded that the victim had been starved of oxygen as a result of “an unknown insult more than a year prior to death”, the Associated Press reported. (Julian Ryall, “Coroner Says She Cannot Find Clear Evidence That North Korea Detainee Otto Warmbier Was Tortured Before He Did, Daily Telegraph, September 28, 2017)
In the dead of night on September 23, American B-1B long-range bombers, escorted by F-15 fighter jets, prowled along North Korea’s east coast, in one of the United States military’s most daring maneuvers on the peninsula in decades. Two days later, North Korea’s foreign minister, Ri Yong-ho, declared that Pyongyang had the right to shoot down American bombers even if they were outside its airspace — another escalation in the war of words between the North and President Trump. But when those planes were near its shores, North Korea did nothing. South Korean intelligence officials told lawmakers on Tuesday that the North’s air-defense radar may have failed to detect their presence. Or, they said, Pyongyang may have simply chosen to avoid a confrontation. Either possibility would seem to contradict the image North Korea has sought to project: that of a nuclear power eager and able to take on the United States. Behind the North’s belligerent rhetoric, some analysts see a leadership anxious to avoid a war it can’t win, and careful to leave itself a rhetorical way out even as it makes threats. “I hear fear in their voice,” said Shin Won-sik, a three-star general who was the South Korean military’s top operational strategist before he retired in 2015. “They can’t fight a war with the Americans when their fighter jets don’t even fly far because of lack of fuel and fear of crashing.” Even as the North has matched Mr. Trump’s recent bellicose rhetoric, its military has warned units on the border with South Korea against rash decisions and reminded them to report up the chain of command before taking any action, according to South Korean intelligence officials who briefed lawmakers on today. “They are careful to avoid an accidental provocation or clash,” Lee Cheol-woo, chairman of the South Korean Parliament’s intelligence committee, quoted officials as saying during the closed-door session. “They may have the will but not the means to fight the Americans,” said Shin In-kyun, a military expert who runs the Korea Defense Network, a civic group. The threat to shoot down a United States bomber is a case in point. North Korea last shot down an American warplane in 1969, killing all 31 members of the crew of a spy plane that was flying off its coast. In 1994, it shot down a United States Army helicopter that accidentally crossed into its airspace. But today, military analysts said, it would be all but impossible for North Korea to shoot down American warplanes like B-1B strategic bombers, F-15 fighter jets or F-35 stealth fighters, especially if they were flying in international airspace well off the North’s coasts. North Korea’s SA-5 land-to-air missiles have a range of only 155 miles, they said. American warplanes operate under the protection of radar-jamming technology, and North Korea’s aging MiG fighter jets, which are often grounded for lack of fuel and parts, are no match for them, Shin and other analysts said. Much as Trump’s aggressive rhetoric — like his threat to “totally destroy” the country — appeals to his core supporters, Kim needs to demonstrate to his people that he is not backing down from foreign threats, analysts said. But they noted that the North tends to couch its threats, however lurid, with carefully worded conditions. When North Korea threatened in August to create an “enveloping fire” around the American territory of Guam with ballistic missiles, its original statement said only that it was “seriously examining” a plan. Responding on September 22 to Trump’s United Nations speech, Kim did not commit to a course of action, saying only that he would “consider” the “highest level of hard-line countermeasure in history.” Ri Yong Ho, the foreign minister, did not say yesterday that North Korea would shoot down American bombers, only that it had “the right” to do so. “The North Koreans know how to choose their words,” said Cheon Seong-whun, a visiting research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, who served as a presidential secretary for security strategy in South Korea until early this year. “They know how to calculate their stakes. They are not reckless.” With its threats, North Korea is trying to make the United States think twice about further shows of force, even as it seeks to portray itself as playing defense against an American bully, said Lee Sung-yoon, a Korea expert at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. At the same time, Pyongyang probably hopes China and South Korea will call for calm and restraint, while using Mr. Trump’s threats as justification to conduct another missile or nuclear test, Lee said. “North Korea has to sound tough because it fears that if it is pushed back under American pressure now, it will never regain its ground,” said Kim Yong-hyun, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University in Seoul. “It fears that if it backs down, China and Russia won’t come to its aid.” Analysts said the lack of a regular, high-level diplomatic contact between Pyongyang and Washington made it likelier that one side would misread the other, rendering the recent bombastic rhetoric all the more dangerous. “The level of mutual understanding between the United States and North Korea is low, while the chances of miscalculation are high,” Cheon said. (Choe Sang-hun, “Through the Bluster, Some See Caution,” New York Times, September 27, 2017,
North Korean government officials have been quietly trying to arrange talks with Republican-linked analysts in Washington, in an apparent attempt to make sense of President Trump and his confusing messages to Kim Jong Un’s regime. The outreach began before the current eruption of threats between the two leaders but will probably become only more urgent as Trump and Kim have descended into name-calling that, many analysts worry, sharply increases the chances of potentially catastrophic misunderstandings. “Their number one concern is Trump. They can’t figure him out,” said one person with direct knowledge of North Korea’s approach to Asia experts with Republican connections. To get a better understanding of American intentions, in the absence of official diplomatic talks with the U.S. government, North Korea’s mission to the United Nations invited Bruce Klingner, a former CIA analyst who is now the Heritage Foundation’s top expert on North Korea, to visit Pyongyang for meetings. Trump has close ties to Heritage, a conservative think tank that has influenced the president on everything from travel restrictions to defense spending, but no personal connection to Klingner. “They’re on a new binge of reaching out to American scholars and ex-officials,” said Klingner, who declined the North Korean invitation. “While such meetings are useful, if the regime wants to send a clear message, it should reach out directly to the U.S. government.” North Korean intermediaries have also approached Douglas Paal, who served as an Asia expert on the National Security Council under presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush and is now vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. They wanted Paal to arrange talks between North Korean officials and American experts with Republican ties in a neutral location such as Switzerland. He also declined the North Korean request. “The North Koreans are clearly eager to deliver a message. But I think they’re only interested in getting some travel, in getting out of the country for a bit,” Paal said. North Korea currently has about seven such invitations out to organizations that have hosted previous talks — a surprising number of requests for a country that is threatening to launch a nuclear strike on the United States. Over the past two years in particular, Pyongyang has sent officials from its Foreign Ministry to hold meetings with Americans — usually former diplomats and think-tankers — in neutral places such as Geneva, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. They are referred to as “Track 1.5” talks because they are official (Track 1) on the North Korean side but unofficial (Track 2) on the American side, although the U.S. government is kept informed of the talks. But since Trump’s election in November, the North Korean representatives have been predominantly interested in figuring out the unconventional president’s strategy, according to almost a dozen people involved in the discussions. All asked for anonymity to talk about the sensitive meetings. Early in Trump’s term, the North Koreans asked broad questions: Is President Trump serious about closing American military bases in South Korea and Japan, as he said on the campaign trail? Might he really send American nuclear weapons back to the southern half of the Korean Peninsula? But the questions have since become more specific. Why, for instance, are Trump’s top officials, notably Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, directly contradicting the president so often? “The North Koreans are reaching out through various channels and through various counterparts,” said Evans Revere, a former State Department official who dealt with North Korea and is a frequent participant in such talks. There are a number of theories about why North Korea is doing this. “My own guess is that they are somewhat puzzled as to the direction in which the U.S. is going, so they’re trying to open up channels to take the pulse in Washington,” Revere said. “They haven’t seen the U.S. act like this before.” Revere attended a multilateral meeting with North Korean officials in the picturesque Swiss village of Glion earlier this month, together with Ralph Cossa, chairman of the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and another frequent interlocutor with Pyongyang’s representatives. The meeting is an annual event organized by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a government-linked think tank. But it took on extra significance this year due to the sudden rise in tensions between North Korea and the United States. All the countries involved in the now-defunct six-party denuclearization talks — the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and the two Koreas — were represented, as were Mongolia, the Swiss government and the European Union. The Swiss invited the U.S. government to send an official, but it did not. The North Koreans at the meeting displayed an “encyclopedic” knowledge of Trump’s tweets, to the extent that they were able to quote them back to the Americans present. Pyongyang’s delegation was headed by Choe Kang Il, deputy director of the Americas division in the Foreign Ministry, and he was accompanied by three officials in their late 20s who wowed the other participants with their intellectual analysis and their perfect American-accented English. One even explained to the other delegates how the U.S. Congress works. “They were as self-confident as I’ve ever seen them,” said Cossa. Revere added: “They may be puzzled about our intentions, but they have a very clear set of intentions of their own.” The participants declined to divulge the contents of the discussions, as they were off the record. But others familiar with the talks said the North Koreans completely ruled out the “freeze-for-freeze” idea being promoted by China and Russia, in which Pyongyang would freeze its nuclear and missile activities if the United States stopped conducting military exercises in South Korea. The United States, Japan and South Korea also outright reject the idea.
Participants left the day-and-a-half-long meeting with little hope for any improvement anytime soon. “I’m very pessimistic,” said Shin Beom-chul, a North Korea expert at the South’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, after participating in the meeting in Glion. “They want to keep their nuclear weapons, and they will only return to dialogue after the United States nullifies its ‘hostile policy.’ They want the U.S. to stop all military exercises and lift all sanctions on them.” Ken Jimbo, who teaches at Keio University in Japan and was also at the meeting, said that North Korea may still be interested in dialogue, but on terms that are unacceptable to the other side. “North Korea wants to be recognized as a nuclear-weapons state,” Jimbo said. “But when is North Korea ready for talks? This is what I kept asking the North Koreans: How much is enough?” (Anna Fifield, “N. Korea Seeks GOP Help on Trump,” Washington Post, September 26, 2017, p. A-14)
The United States was “very unpleasant” toward South Korea’s decision to propose military talks with North Korea to ease tension on the Korean Peninsula in July, President Moon Jae-in’s adviser, professor Moon Chung-in, said. “U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson used a strong tone to protest against the decision when he met (South Korean) Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha.” Moon Chung-in’s statement, which came during an event marking the 10-year anniversary of the October 4 inter-Korean joint peace declaration, contradicts the Foreign Ministry’s earlier announcement that it had provided the U.S. with sufficient explanation on the proposal. In July, the Moon Jae-in administration proposed military talks and a separate Red Cross meeting with North Korea at the truce village of Panmunjeom. The invitation was aimed at reviving inter-Korean dialogue channels and a fresh round of reunions for families separated during the Korean War. But North Korea had remained silent toward both proposals, which many government officials and experts here interpreted as a sign of refusal. Shortly after, Washington expressed “veiled discomfort” over Seoul’s decision. Then-White House press secretary Sean Spicer said that the U.S. believed the conditions “that would have to be met” to initiate dialogue with the North “are clearly far away from where we are now.” Moon Jung-in also underlined the need for an inter-Korean dialogue channel to prevent a full-scale war. “With the escalating tension on the Korean Peninsula, an accidental clash near the armistice line or the western sea border could lead to a full-scale war,” he said. “Both Koreas must talk with each other to prevent (a war). Inter-Korean talks must be revived. … So Pyongyang can talk with Washington through us when the dialogue channel between the two is closed.” (Jung Min-kyung, “U.S. ‘Very Unpleasant’ toward Seoul’s Push for Military Talks with N.K.: Report,” Korea Herald, September 27, 2017) The situation on the Korean Peninsula “is graver than at the time of the axe murder incident at Panmunjom in 1976. The deployment patterns [of US military assets] are being carefully coordinated,” The most critical prerequisite, he said, is “dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea.” “The ideal option is for the US to send a secret envoy to reach a dramatic agreement,” he added. “What is also necessary is inter-Korean dialogue,” Moon went on to say. “North Korea’s behavior serves as a decisive opportunity for overcoming the peace crisis on the Korean Peninsula and turning the situation around. I hope that North Korea will adopt a forward-looking attitude,” he said. One noteworthy remark that Moon made during the lecture was that “the US was extremely uncomfortable” about the overture for military talks that Seoul made to North Korea in July. “U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson protested this to South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-hwa in strong language,” Moon said as he explained that the government had pushed for the talks out of concern about the possibility of an unplanned military clash in the West Sea. (Kim Ji-eun, “Chung Moon-in Pushes for U.S.-North Korean Dialogue as Way to Resolving Crisis,” Hankyore, September 27, 2017)
It’s hard to imagine rhetoric more stark-and dangerous-than the words now flying back and forth between the leaders of the United States and North Korea. President Donald Trump over the weekend called North Korean leader Kim Jong Un a “madman,” after declaring a few days earlier the U.S. might have to “destroy” his country if forced to act. Mr. Kim called the American president “mentally deranged,” while his foreign minister said Monday the U.S. had essentially declared war on North Korea and his country felt free to shoot down American bombers in international air space. As a result, it may appear that the options facing the U.S. now are just as stark: all-out military conflict or simple acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear advances. In fact, there are other, more creative options in America’s tool kit. None is a silver bullet, and ultimately they may be more useful in freezing and containing North Korea’s nuclear program than reversing it. Still, conversations with experts suggest a series of such options to increase pressure: Economic strangulation: This is the path the Trump administration already is traveling, particularly after announcing last week sanctions to cut off banks and companies that do business with Pyongyang. But there are further steps-provocative, to be sure-that could be taken to back up financial sanctions. The U.S. Navy could begin patrolling more intensively the waters around North Korea to interdict ships believed to be taking goods to North Korean ports. That would further discourage commerce and military technology trade with North Korea. A full blockade of North Korean ports is possible, though it would be “extremely intensive to execute,” says Kathleen Hicks, a former Pentagon official now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Unconventional warfare: In defense circles, this approach is called “nonkinetic” warfare, meaning tactics that aren’t designed to kill or destroy. Cyberattacks, if successful, could hamper North Korea’s ability to continue its nuclear and missile research or to use its weapons. Electromagnetic attacks could cripple communications. “I know there are things that can be done that could suppress information systems, communications systems and military systems that would send a clear signal to Kim Jong Un about his own vulnerability,” says Patrick Cronin, an Asian analyst at the Center for a New American Security. Subversion and psychological warfare: A proliferation of modern communications technology-cellphones, DVDs and flash drives-in long-closed North Korea has made it possible to crack through official propaganda with messages from the outside, seeking to sow internal unrest with the regime. In a paper written last fall for a Korea study group, Navy Commander Fredrick “Skip” Vincenzo explored using such technology to launch an “influence campaign” to reach top Korean officials. He concluded that such a campaign is unlikely to spark an antiregime uprising because “the regime’s harsh, pervasive security apparatus is too well entrenched.” But it’s possible, he wrote, to deliver a message to North Korean military and civilian leaders that, in the event of a crisis, they will be protected by the U.S. if they peel away from the regime. Vincenzo called it a strategy for “convincing regime elites that their best options in these circumstances would be to support” the U.S. and South Korea. Downing a missile: The U.S. could choose to try to shoot down one of the ballistic missiles North Korea has been firing. The Pentagon has space-based systems and powerful radars in Japan that can detect a missile launch, and the Aegis missile-defense system based on ships near North Korea could target a missile launch. The U.S. and its allies have more work to do to build a truly reliable missile-defense system, though. If the U.S. tries to down a missile, it had better succeed; failure might only further embolden Kim. Intensified diplomacy: Michele Flournoy, a former undersecretary of defense in the Obama administration, says “the missing piece” in American strategy is a high-level diplomatic push. Whatever options the administration chooses for increasing pressure on North Korea, she notes, that pressure needs to lead somewhere. That somewhere likely is diplomacy designed, in the first instance, to freeze North Korea’s weapons programs. To make that more likely, she suggests appointment of a high-profile presidential envoy to China, North Korea’s key ally, to deal specifically with the North Korean problem. “We are reaching a fork in the road with China,” where there will either be a plan to freeze North Korea’s nuclear program or the U.S. will prepare further to deal with the problem militarily. Using high-level envoys to open the diplomatic track “is a method we have used successfully in the past.” And if North Korea proves, as it has before, to be dishonest or insincere about negotiated agreements? In that case, Ms. Flournoy says, a negotiating track at least “buys us time to get other things to work.” (Gerald Seib, “U.S. Has Options As Tension with North Korea Escalates,” Wall Street Journal, September 26, 2017)
Person: “…A review of North Korea’s perspective on Sino-Korean relations reveals a profound sense of mistrust that goes back decades and a long-term effort to resist China’s influence. This ultimately limits Beijing’s ability to exercise, at will, political influence over Pyongyang. This mistrust, one could argue, pre-dates the establishment of the DPRK and the People’s Republic of China in 1948 and 1949 respectively. For Kim Il Sung, the founding leader of North Korea (and grandfather of current leader Kim Jong Un), the mistrust likely went back to the 1930s when Chinese communists nearly executed him on suspicion of being a member of a pro-Japanese Korean group called the “People’s Livelihood Corp” or Minsaengdan. Up to 1,000 Koreans, who like Kim were members of the Chinese Communist Party, were caught up in an atmosphere of extreme paranoia and were persecuted by reason of their ethnicity. Nearly half were executed. One can only imagine how this incident sowed a seed of mistrust toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) not just for Kim Il Sung, but for many of the Korean members of the CCP who survived the affair. While we can only speculate about the psychological impact of the so-called Minsaengdan incident on Kim Il Sung, declassified Cold War-era records from the archives of the former Soviet Union, East Germany, Bulgaria, Mongolia and others—all former allies of North Korea—provide tangible proof that from North Korea’s perspective, the relationship with China has been fraught with tension and mistrust since at least the 1950-1953 Korean War. Thus, the very event that many point to as the origins of the Sino-DPRK alliance was actually a source of tension and conflict. In the late fall of 1950, the so-called Chinese People’s Volunteers, who had taken command of field operations in Korea, vetoed North Korean proposals to continue offensive operations against US and South Korean troops in 1951. Consequently, North Korean leaders blamed Chinese military officials for failing to reunify the Korean peninsula, even though Chinese forces had, in fact, rescued the DPRK from certain defeat. During the war, disagreements also arose over control of North Korea’s railroad system. Chinese forces prohibited their use for anything other than military operations, including reconstruction after battle lines stabilized, a decision North Korean officials disputed, especially as many trains, standing still, fell prey to US bombs. Soviet records reveal that the relationship between North Korean and Chinese officials remained strained years after the 1953 Korean War armistice. In December 1955, Kim Il Sung utilized the concept “Juche,” a term typically translated as “self-reliance,” to minimize Chinese and Soviet influence on political, economic and cultural developments in North Korea. In August 1956, he purged pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet party officials for challenging his autarkic economic development strategies and personality cult at a plenary meeting of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). Three of Kim’s victims fled to China, where they briefed Mao Zedong on recent developments in the DPRK. Soviet Vice Premier Anastas Mikoyan, in Beijing at the time to attend the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, also learned of the situation in Pyongyang. Mao and Mikoyan dispatched a joint Sino-Soviet party delegation to investigate the incident. The joint delegation, headed by Chinese Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, the former commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers during the Korean War, and by Mikoyan, forced Kim Il Sung to convene a new meeting of the KWP, reappoint purged officials, and release others from prison. While there was no direct challenge to Kim’s authority, he clearly perceived the intervention as a violation of Korean sovereignty. Within months of the visit, Kim began to take steps to register his displeasure with China and the Soviet Union. He resumed the purge of those with close ties to Beijing and Moscow. According to Polish reports, up to 3,000 officials suffered as a result. Mao Zedong was so frustrated by Kim Il Sung’s actions that in a November 1956 conversation with the Soviet Ambassador to Beijing, Pavel Yudin, the Chairman equated Kim with Imre Nagy, the Hungarian “traitor,” and to Joseph Broz Tito, the overly independent Yugoslav leader. Mao even suggested that Kim could be acting in collusion with his South Korean nemesis, President Syngman Rhee. Mao’s remarks would later come back to hurt him. In 1960, as Sino-Soviet relations soured, Moscow sought to drive a wedge between Pyongyang and Beijing, and Khrushchev ordered that the Soviet record of the discussion be shared with Kim. Soviet reports describe Kim being visibly shaken after reading the cable. Kim’s learning of the conversation likely had a lasting impact on the North Korean leader’s perception of Mao and of China. In later decades, Kim harshly criticized the Chinese for interfering in an internal party matter in 1956. Relations between Pyongyang and Beijing briefly improved in the early 1960s when, in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the North Korean leadership split with Moscow over Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s “revisionist” policies toward the United States. This period of Sino-DPRK accommodation was short lived however. As soon as Khrushchev was forced from office in the fall of 1964, Kim took steps to put space between himself and the Chinese leadership. By the mid-1960s, relations between Pyongyang and Beijing rapidly deteriorated. Throughout China’s Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution, Kim Il Sung was a direct target of criticism by China’s Red Guards for allegedly “sitting on the fence” in the ongoing Sino-Soviet split. China’s leadership, which was in disarray, tolerated and even abetted these attacks. Relations deteriorated to the point where the Chinese and North Korean militaries clashed in the vicinity of Mt. Paekdu in 1969. According to a 1973 conversation between Kim and Bulgaria’s Todor Zhivkov, on another occasion Chinese troops crossed into North Korean territory and occupied a town. Kim ordered an attack, but the Chinese slipped back across the border. The damage to the Sino-DPRK relationship was irreparable. Faith would never be fully restored, even though—on the surface—the relationship seemed to get back on track from the early 1970s. There were other episodes in the Sino-DRPK relationship that reinforced Pyongyang’s belief that China was overly interventionist and not respectful of Korean sovereignty. For example, in 1980, when Kim Jong Il was declared successor at the sixth congress of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee, China openly denounced hereditary succession as a vestige of feudalism. For the North Koreans, this was unconscionable. Until China’s defeat at the hands of Japan in the 1894-1895 first Sino-Japanese War “de-centered” the Middle Kingdom, the Chinese emperor did enjoy the privilege of conferring legitimacy on Korean monarchs. However, by 1980, the North Koreans were likely appalled by the Chinese declaration, revealing a belief that Beijing still had the authority to voice an opinion on leadership succession in the DPRK. Kim Il Sung, an anti-colonial revolutionary nationalist who was hard wired to the post-Westphalian notion of sovereign equality, resented such remnants of the suzerain-vassal relationship that characterized Sino-Korean relations until the late nineteenth century. Despite a shared history, border, and, at least ostensibly, ideology, from the 1980s, China and North Korea grew further apart when Deng Xiaoping emphasized the modernization of the Chinese economy. In the eyes of the North Koreans, China had abandoned revolution for a place in the existing international system. In the ultimate act of betrayal, Beijing recognized Seoul in 1992. As a result of this tortured history, pressuring China to exercise political influence over North Korea means the United States is asking Beijing to do precisely what Pyongyang has most resented over the years. This will only antagonize North Korea even more. This does not mean that the United States should abandon efforts to encourage China to exert pressure on North Korea. While China does not have the ability to exercise political influence over the DPRK, it enjoys greater material leverage over, and access to, Pyongyang than any other country. Indeed, some 80 to 90 percent of the DPRK’s foreign trade is with China. Surely that has to account for something. Without greater participation from China, the US policy of relying on sanctions to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs is doomed to fail. Yet, there are also limits to a policy of relying on China to utilize its material leverage over North Korea. In any unequal alliance relationship, there exist clear limits to the ability of the patron ally to utilize its material leverage over its protégé to influence, at will, the latter’s policies. Protégé allies on both sides of the Cold War conflict often exhibited a far greater degree of autonomy than had been previously assumed. One only need think of the US relationship with South Korea’s Syngman Rhee or Taiwan’s Chiang Kai-shek. Despite being wholly dependent on the United States for economic support and security, both Rhee and Chiang were obstreperous allies. China’s ability to utilize its support to North Korea to influence Pyongyang’s policies for most of the past half-century was similarly limited. There is no reason to believe that this fundamental dynamic will change no matter how much the United States expresses its disappointment with China or imposes sanctions on it for Beijing’s failure to rein in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Moreover, carrying Washington’s water is also not in Beijing’s interests. To be sure, China’s interests on the Korean peninsula and in East Asia do not align with those of the United States, and no amount of arm twisting will get Beijing to do the US’ bidding. While China prefers a nuclear-free and more compliant North Korea, it is not willing to bring the DPRK to its knees to achieve this goal. China’s enormous material leverage over North Korea is a double-edged sword. Cutting off the lifeline could lead to state and societal collapse in North Korea. This is the last thing Beijing wants. It would invite instability on China’s borders, precipitate a refugee crisis, or worse. The collapse of North Korea would be a national security nightmare for China, bringing a US treaty ally to its doorstep at a time when Beijing aspires to reassert its regional hegemony in East Asia. Moreover, China’s support to the DPRK in “The War to Resist America and Aid Korea” is central to the legitimacy narrative of the Chinese Communist Party. Following a “century of humiliation,” a brutal invasion by Japan, and a fierce civil war, the PRC—just one year after coming to power—fought the greatest power in the world to a standstill in a war to help its smaller communist ally.” (James Person, “Chinese-North Korean Relations: Drawing the Right Historical Lessons,” 38North, September 26, 2017)
9/27/17:
North Korea’s bombastic threats are jangling nerves in both the United States and in Asia, with many analysts worried that the war of words between President Trump and Kim Jong Un will turn into an actual war — and possibly a nuclear one. Although the threats are colorful — on both sides — experts on North Korea say they are in keeping with North Korea’s history of bluster and do not signal a significant change in North Korea’s thinking. “I’m not concerned. North Korea likes colorful rhetoric and they always have,” said Tatiana Gabroussenko, a specialist on North Korean propaganda who teaches at Korea University in Seoul. “The problem now is Mr. Trump. He reacts, he answers, he tweets, so he’s making it visible.” Trump yesterday warned that if the United States decides to take military action against North Korea it would be “devastating.” The comment prompted a rebuke from Pyongyang. “Trump declared a war against the DPRK through his wild remarks,” declared an editorial today in Rodong Sinmun. “The army and people of the DPRK will surely make the old lunatic pay for his rude speech,” it said, using the official abbreviation for North Korea. With American fighter jets now doing drills across South Korea, near the border with the North, on a regular basis, many experts are worried about the possibility for miscalculation or misunderstanding. North Korea has continued churning out propaganda with its trademark braggadocio. “U.S. imperialist warmongers are bluffing, being buoyed by war fever, after proposing ‘military counteraction’ against the DPRK again,” KCNA reported yesterday, using the country’s official abbreviation. “Literally, the whole country is permeated with the spirit to annihilate war maniac and old lunatic Trump on the earth.” These threats have gone the North Korean version of viral. More than 100,000 people took part in a regime-organized rally in Pyongyang on Saturday, to show they were ready to “remove the U.S. imperialists, the sworn enemy, from the globe,” KCNA reported. Photos from the rally showed orderly columns of men in workers’ suits and students in white shirts and red ties, some holding signs declaring “The U.S. is the headquarters of evil.” KCNA quoted one participant as saying that Trump’s recent comments were the “most ignorant remarks ever known in history,” while another said they were “insane.” But Gabroussenko said these kinds of demonstrations are not new in North Korea. The change has been in the attention being paid to the rhetoric, not in the rhetoric itself. “You can go back to North Korean rhetoric from the 1950s and find this kind of anti-Americanism,” she said. “Anti-Americanism is the basis of North Korean culture and history.” Shen Dingli, deputy dean of the Institute of International Affairs at Fudan University in Shanghai, agreed the rhetoric was overblown. “All these provocations are verbal,” Shen said, adding that Pyongyang does not want war. “North Korea already threatened to attack Guam, but they didn’t. Its artillery can blast Seoul and any of its nuclear weapons could turn northeast Asia upside down. But would they start a war first?” he said. “No, their nuclear weapons are for self-defense, and they are aware the United States will wipe them off from the Earth if they hit it.” At the same time as North Korea has been making these incendiary statements about the United States, there has also been a remarkable — and almost entirely overlooked — outburst directed at China. A commentary published September 22 on KCNA and signed by “Jong Phil” ostensibly attacked China’s “rude” and “shameless” media for saying North Korea deserved to be sanctioned by the United Nations over its nuclear weapons program. But this was a veiled criticism of Chinese President Xi Jinping just three weeks before he opened the Congress of the Communist Party, which is held every five years. Adam Cathcart, a China scholar at Leeds University who reads North Korea’s propaganda closely, believes that “Jong Phil” is a pen-name for Kim Jong Un himself, just as Mao and Stalin used aliases to write signed editorials. This is the third such editorial by “Jong Phil” — which means “Righteous Pen” — this year, and the most pointed. The week after China backed tough new sanctions on North Korea through the U.N., it accused Chinese state media of “kowtowing to the ignorant acts of the Trump administration.” North Korea was wondering how a fellow “socialist” country could “maliciously” collude with “the imperialists,” the editorial said. “This leaves us thinking whether they should be entitled to enter the coming party conference hall only when they register the dirty reptile records of betraying the peoples of the two countries,” the editorial said, alluding to the upcoming Congress. Cathcart said the statement was extraordinary, given that China is North Korea’s biggest trading partner and protector. “They’re basically accusing China of being revisionists who have no idea how happy the people of North Korea are,” he said. Nor was it clear why North Korea would risk making such a statement at such an important time for the Chinese Communist Party. “They’re basically telling China to go back to their socialist roots. What’s the long-term tactical thinking here?” But Cathcart was encouraged by recent efforts to forge new links with the Trump administration.
Shen added that all of this rhetoric is designed to increase the temperature and bring about a return to talks, albeit on North Korea’s terms of being recognized as a nuclear weapons state. That means the United States now has two options, he said: reject talks with North Korea and watch it build more and more nuclear weapons, or hold talks with North Korea so Pyongyang will suspend its nuclear development. “The United States needs to choose the less harmful option of the two,” Shen said. (Anna Fifield and Emily Rauhala, “North Korea’s Rhetoric Hasn’t Changed – Only the U.S. Response to It Has,” Washington Post, September 28, 2017, p. A-14)
Lankov: “The involvement of state institutions in the market commercial activities is one such feature of North Korean life. The experience of my contact Ms. Roh [not her real name] is a great example of how the commercial spirit infiltrates even institutions which are decisively anti-commercial in nature. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, she, then a young woman and a daughter of a naval officer, was involved with the commercial fishing activities of the North Korean navy. At first glance, this does not sound too unusual. It is widely known that from the late 1970s (and especially since the late 1990s), the North Korean military began to establish foreign trade companies whose official goal was to earn foreign currency income for their units, while in practice such companies often enriched commanding officers and their families. Many of such companies indeed deal with fishing, since seafood is one of few North Korean exports which sells well. Many North Korean military units have a fishing boat, often bought by private entrepreneurs, but are registered with foreign trade companies owned by the military. Instead of chasing Chinese intruders, the boat crew was busily catching and processing seafood. However, the case of Ms. Roh was different. Neither her father nor his superiors established a separate foreign trade company – even though he thought about it in the later stages of his military career, once he had enough capital to buy a fishing boat or two. For most of the time, he used the naval ships under his command for commercial shipping. The relatively large seagoing patrol boats whose official task was to protect the North Korean waters and, especially, prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing illegally there, began being used as part-time fishing boats by entrepreneurial commanders. Every patrol boat, apart from cannons and machine-guns, carried large nets and other fishing equipment. When on patrol, instead of chasing Chinese intruders, the boat crew was busily catching and processing seafood. The crew was unusual in its composition as well. Each boat had a standard crew of seven sailors and one or two commissioned officers. However, in most cases, a patrol boat also carried five to ten non-military passengers: wives and older children of the naval officers who boarded the ship to conduct fishing and trade. In the naval base on the coast of the Yellow Sea, where Ms. Roh’s father served, most of the officers’ wives went to sea regularly, acting as a sort of supplementary crew. The patrol boats left the base to spend a few days at sea, and those days were filled with frantic activity. The women fished and processed the catch, assisted by the sailors when the situation permitted (they were rewarded for their assistance). Being a naval ship, designed and built in the Soviet Union, the patrol boat had no refrigeration equipment, so the only way to preserve the catch was to apply salt. This seafood was to be sold at the coast upon arrival to the base and was less valuable as a result of its storage. But the really valuable and delicious items were not normally transported to the port. While at sea, the North Korean naval boat approached the boats of Chinese fishermen, and then sold them the best part of their catch. Wireless communication with the Chinese, while possible, was discouraged. In most cases, the commander told his Chinese partner where and when they should meet, and which items the Chinese ought to bring to pay for the catch. There were a few cases when the patrol boat traded with Russians, but Russian fishing boats are rare in the Yellow Sea, so such encounters were rare and largely incidental. The Chinese fishermen did not usually pay currency to their North Korean suppliers – it made more sense for both sides to pay in kind, with items which could be smuggled to land and then profitably resold at North Korean markets. Technically, the Koreans could accept currency – Chinese yuan widely circulated at the markets around the naval base where the patrol boats were stationed. However, officers’ families made more money by selling consumer goods and food. Chinese tobacco and strong liquor were potentially the most profitable merchandise, but pretty much everything, from socks to rice cookers, would be welcomed by the entrepreneurial naval wives. Re-sale allowed them to make good money, so most were rich by the standards of North Korea in the early 2000s. As Ms. Roh said: “we heard about the ‘Arduous March’, but felt little of hardship. The world changed after Kim Il Sung’s death, to be sure, and everybody began to trade, but our lives hardly became more difficult.” Sailors who were quite ready to assist the fishermen (or rather fisherwomen) with handling heavy nets and other duties were rewarded for this assistance. Sometimes a boat would stop near a remote island, and the entire crew – sailors and officers’ families together – would use low tide as an opportunity to collect shellfish, much prized by the Chinese customers. However, women seldom if ever paid the sailors: their reward was delivered as Chinese tobacco or good food. Whenever possible, women cooked not only for themselves but for the sailors as well. Nonetheless, the sailors, who were overwhelmingly draftees, got little monetary income from the unorthodox use of their ships. Out of the official crew, only two officers made money from the operations, while the rank-and-file had to be content with a good diet (far better than in other units) and easy access to Chinese tobacco and other manly luxuries. On the other hand, after each trip the commander had to handle a certain amount of money to his superior, just to ensure that they would turn a blind eye to the unusual use of naval force. And what about the main job of the patrol, catching the foreign ships which would enter the waters of the DPRK? This job was done, from time to time, and occasionally could be quite profitable: to ensure prompt release, the crews of intercepted Chinese boats were willing to pay hefty bribes, often not in money, but in consumption items. Most were rich by the standards of North Korea in the early 2000s. Nonetheless, it was a sideshow: as most officers were concerned, the main task of their ships, with all guns and other naval equipment, was not to catch border intruders but to catch fish.” (Andrei Lankov, “How North Korea’s Navy Was Appropriated by the Market Economy,” NKNews, September 25, 2017)
9/?/17:
Woodward: “At the end of September, [White House Chief of Staff] Kelly asked [Senator Lindsay] Graham to come to the White House for an upcoming tabletop exercise on North Korea. Contradictory messages from Trump and [Secretary of State Rex] Tillerson were flood the news. …Graham made a dramatic proposal to Kelly and [National Security Adviser H.R.] McMaster. ‘China needs to kill him and replace him with a general they control,’ Graham said. China had at least enough control so the North would not attack. ‘I think the Chinese are clearly the key here and they need to take him out. Not us, them. And control the nuler inventory there. And wind this thing down. Or control him. To stop the march to a big nuclear arsenal. My fear is that he will sell it.’ He proposed that Trump tell China: ‘The world is a dangerous place. I am not going to let this regime threaten our homeland with a nuclear weapon.’” (Woodward, Fear, pp. 281-82)
9/28/17:
The United States will send “strategic” military assets to South Korea on a more regular basis to better deter North Korea, the South’s national security adviser said. The decision, which has not yet been confirmed by the Pentagon, comes at a time of escalating tensions between the United States and North Korea, with many analysts concerned that incendiary rhetoric, combined with more frequent flyovers by American bombers, could lead to a catastrophic miscalculation. Chung Eui-young, national security adviser to President Moon Jae-in, told lawmakers in Seoul that American “strategic assets” could be deployed to South Korea on a “rotational” basis before the end of the year. “This will help us expand our defense capabilities,” he told the lawmakers, according to Park Wan-joo, spokesman of the ruling Democratic Party. He did not define “strategic assets,” but South Korean officials usually use the term to refer to B-52 bombers, stealth warplanes, nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers. South Korean lawmakers were told that Washington had put its pledge on the deployment in writing, Park confirmed. A spokesman for the U.S. Pacific Command, based in Hawaii, did not immediately respond to a request for confirmation or comment. To celebrate its Armed Forces Day, which falls on October 1, South Korea’s military showed off some of its new weapons during a parade today. For the first time, the military displayed its Hyunmoo ballistic missiles, which can reach all of North Korea and are a key element of its “Kill Chain” preemptive-strike system. “Our government’s determination to protect peace requires strong defense capabilities, and we will stand up against reckless provocations with strong punishment,” Moon said after inspecting the weapons. “Securing counter capabilities against North Korean nuclear and missile threats is the most urgent task. We must further strengthen our Kill Chain and Korean missile defense system,” the president said. South Korean Defense Minister Song Young-moo last month asked his American counterpart, Jim Mattis, to send such military hardware to the southern half of the peninsula on a regular basis. A poll that YTN, a cable news channel, commissioned in August found that 68 percent of respondents said they supported bringing tactical nuclear weapons back to South Korea. North Korea has enough conventional artillery trained on the greater Seoul area, home to 25 million people as well as several large U.S. military bases, to cause widespread devastation before the American and South Korean militaries can respond. If North Korea were to start unleashing its artillery on the South, it would be able to fire about 4,000 rounds an hour, Roger Cavazos of the Nautilus Institute estimated in a 2012 study. There would be 2,811 fatalities in the initial volley and 64,000 people could be killed that first day, the majority of them in the first three hours, he wrote. As North Korea has continued to show off its growing arsenal — detonating a hydrogen bomb and firing increasingly long-range missiles — the U.S. and South Korean militaries have been conducting drills as a “show of strength.” But South Korean officials have been pushing for more than just flyovers from warplanes based in Japan or Guam: They want them to land in South Korea to show greater commitment to the military alliance. But there are logistical reasons that cannot happen, Jon Wolfsthal, a nuclear expert who served on President Barack Obama’s National Security Council, has said. Military airstrips in South Korea are not long enough for big, heavy B-52s, and the United States does not want its high-tech fighter jets sitting within North Korean artillery range, he said. The United States regularly sends aircraft carriers, as well as Los Angeles-class submarines, to South Korea during annual joint military exercises. But the South Koreans are seeking a more consistent and higher-power show of American military commitment. (Anna Fifield, “U.S. to Send ‘Strategic’ Military Assets to South Korea,” Washington Post, September 28, 2017)
“It’s only when we regain wartime operational control of our military that North Korea will fear us more and the South Korean public will trust the military more. The goal of this administration is to accelerate the transfer of wartime operational control,” South Korean President Moon Jae-in said today. “As the commander-in-chief of the military, I will do everything in my power to ensure the success of the reform of the national defense,” Moon said, as he called for the military to do its best to speed up the construction of South Korea’s three-axis weapons program, which consists of a preemptive defense system known as the “kill chain,” the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and the Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR). Moon’s remarks are thought to emphasize his determination to take the initiative in resolving the security crisis on the Korean Peninsula based on South Korean military capabilities. Moon made the remarks during a commemorative address at the Second Fleet Command of the South Korean Navy in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, just before Armed Forces Day on Oct. 1, which marks the 69th anniversary of the establishment of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces. “What we are seeking is clear — peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. Our government’s commitment to defend peace is based on a strong national defense,” he said. Achieving that requires “an army that wins,” Moon said, declaring this to be the top priority of defense reform. Moon reiterated his strong commitment to peace as he emphasized keeping tensions in check. “The current security crisis on the Korean peninsula is graver than ever before, which is very trying and painful for us, but it cannot shake our commitment to peace. As the government further bolsters its military readiness based on the firm joint defense stance of the South Korea-US alliance, we are focusing all our capabilities on maintaining stability so that heightened tensions do not lead to a military clash,” he said. (Lee Jung-ae, “President Moon Reiterates Need for OPCON Transfer,” Hankyore, September 29, 2017) The president of South Korea vowed to accelerate efforts to strengthen its pre-emptive strike, missile defense and retaliatory capabilities against North Korea, and he renewed his call for the armed forces to become more independent from the United States. In a speech to mark South Korea’s Armed Forces Day, the president, Moon Jae-in, said he would push for the South to move more quickly to retake wartime operational control of its military from its American ally. Since the Korean War in the early 1950s, the terms of the countries’ alliance have called for an American general to command the South’s 650,000-member military should war break out. Moon and other liberals have campaigned for South Korea to play a greater role in the alliance, and they have long called for the country to resume responsibility for wartime command as soon as it can feasibly do so. But the idea has gotten more public support as remarks by President Trump have led many South Koreans to doubt his commitment to defend their country. . Moon said today that a more self-reliant military could make itself stronger and more feared by North Korea. But he also said the South should strengthen its alliance with Washington. An aide to Moon said this week that the allies were working on ways to move strategic American military assets into the region more frequently, to help deter North Korea. “The top priority is to secure abilities to counter the North Korean nuclear and missile threats,” Moon said. Moon has been more aggressive than his conservative predecessors about building up the South Korean military. After he met with Trump in New York during the United Nations General Assembly last week, Washington agreed to sell more sophisticated weapons to South Korea. During that meeting, the United States and South Korea also agreed to expand the deployment of American strategic military assets to South Korea on a rotating basis, possibly by the end of the year, Moon’s national security adviser, Chung Eui-yong, told South Korean political leaders on yesterday. Chung did not identify those assets, but in recent years the United States has often sent long-range strategic bombers and nuclear-powered submarines to South Korea for military drills. In his speech today, Moon said his government was accelerating work on three military programs: a pre-emptive strike system known as Kill Chain that would target North Korean missile sites; an air and missile defense system; and a program devised to launch devastating strikes against North Korea’s military and political leadership should it start a war. He said the South Korean military should become strong enough to retake its wartime control from the Americans and to “play a leading role in establishing a stronger and more stable combined defense system” together with the United States. Washington agreed in 2007 to return wartime command to Seoul by 2012. But the date was pushed back to 2015, then to the mid-2020s, as North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs advanced and doubt surfaced over whether the South’s military could build capabilities quickly enough to take the lead in its defense. In a new sign of China’s exasperation with Kim, the Ministry of Commerce today published a formal notification of intent to close Chinese-North Korean joint venture businesses, in accordance with a provision of the latest United Nations Security Council resolution penalizing North Korea adopted on September 11. With some notable exceptions, including nonprofit enterprises and Chinese-North Korean hydropower projects, the provision specifies that foreign joint ventures with North Korea must be closed within 120 days of the resolution’s adoption, which places the deadline in early January. Political analysts said it was premature to judge the effect of the Chinese announcement, partly because the true extent of China’s joint ventures with North Korea is vague. It is also unclear how seriously China intends to enforce the provision. Still, the announcement appeared to threaten the most visible joint ventures — about 100 North Korean restaurants in China, staffed by North Koreans, that provide a stream of cash for Kim’s government. “At a minimum, it is a signal of displeasure to the North Koreans and a nod to the United Nations Security Council,” said Marcus Noland, executive vice president and director of studies at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. “And check back in 120 days and see what happens.” Jonathan D. Pollack, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, said if China was serious about enforcement, “I have little doubt that this is going to hurt the North Koreans.” But he also was cautious about the potential impact. “The North Koreans are remarkably adept at circumventing sanctions,” he said. “They do a lot of activities in China that I don’t think the Chinese would count as North Korean entities.” In a further sign of North Korea’s isolation, Malaysia on Thursday barred its citizens from traveling to North Korea. Relations between Malaysia and North Korea have deteriorated since the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, the estranged half-brother of Kim Jong-un, at Kuala Lumpur International Airport in February. Malaysia is scheduled to face North Korea in an Asian Cup match in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, on Oct. 5, already delayed twice over security concerns. It was not clear if the Malaysian team would be exempted from the new travel ban. (Choe Sang-Hun and Rick Gladstone, “South Korea Seeks Military Buildup and a Greater Wartime Role,” New York Times, September 29, 2017,
KCNA: “Bilateral talks between the DPRK and Russia took place in Moscow, capital of the Russian Federation, [today]. Choe Son Hui, director general of the North American Department of the DPRK Foreign Ministry, had a talk with Burmistrov, roving ambassador of the Russian Foreign Ministry, and met with Vice Foreign Minister Morgulov. At the talks and meeting there were in-depth exchanges of views on mutual concerns such as the situation of the Korean Peninsula and bilateral relations. Choe stressed that it is necessary for the U.S. to stop its hostile policy toward the DPRK in order to defuse tension and ensure peace and security in the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asian region. Expressing its understanding of the DPRK’s stand, the Russian side said that it had intent to make joint efforts for detente on the Korean Peninsula.” (KCNA, “DPRK-Russia Talks Held in Moscow,” September 30, 2017)
Otto F. Warmbier, the college student imprisoned in North Korea and returned to the United States in a vegetative state, suffered extensive brain damage following interrupted blood flow and a lack of oxygen, according to the coroner who examined his body. But an external examination and “virtual autopsy” conducted by the coroner’s office in Hamilton County, Ohio, could not determine how his circulation had been cut off. “All we can do is theorize, and we hate to theorize without science backing us up,” Dr. Lakshmi Sammarco, the county coroner, said in an interview today. His parents requested that a full autopsy not be performed. Today, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement denying again that Warmbier had been tortured and accusing the United States of “employing even a dead person” in a “conspiracy campaign” against North Korea. Dr. Sammarco’s examination, which was concluded earlier this month, did not find signs of torture but could not rule out the possibility. “There are a lot of horrible things you can do to a human body that don’t leave external signs behind,” Dr. Sammarco said.“One of the frustrating things is the lack of information about what happened to him in North Korea,” she added. In a virtual autopsy, pathologists rely on an examination of the body and on scans to determine what has happened to it. Warmbier was returned with brain scans done in North Korea in April 2016 and again in July 2016. M.R.I. scans were done at the medical center after he arrived, which also performed a whole-body CT scan after Warmbier’s death. The images clearly showed that his brain had been starved of oxygen and that large tracts of cells had died, Dr. Sammarco said. The medical diagnosis is anoxic-ischemic encephalopathy. That condition differs from the damage that occurs during a stroke, when a single blood vessel is blocked, said Dr. Lee H. Schwamm, executive vice chairman of neurology at Massachusetts General Hospital. With an injury like Warmbier’s, “blood flow is reduced everywhere — the pump is turned off,” said Dr. Schwamm, who reviewed the coroner’s report at The Times’s request. In the United States, the most common cause is a cardiac arrest, often precipitated by a heart attack. While cardiac arrests are unlikely in healthy young men, they can happen if the victim is malnourished and suffers an imbalance of blood electrolytes, such as potassium, calcium, or magnesium, Dr. Schwamm said. The damage is quick: It takes just four minutes without blood for brain cells to start to die. Blood flow to the brain can be interrupted for any number of reasons. The whole-body CT scan did not find injuries associated with hanging, for example, but Dr. Schwamm said the evidence might not be visible if a bedsheet were used and the spine were not dislocated. Warmbier had a scar at the base of his neck that was probably caused by the insertion of a tube into his trachea as he was hooked up to a ventilator. This may indicate that he was not breathing on his own for a long period of time, Dr. Sammarco said. He was weaned from the ventilator in North Korea, though; he was not using it when he was returned. There were few other signs of injury on Warmbier’s body. There were no bedsores, and his skin condition was excellent, Dr. Sammarco said. “His muscle volume was pretty good for someone who was bedridden for over a year,” she said. “If there were national or international implications, we would be happy to relinquish jurisdiction and cooperate in any way necessary,” she said. Federal officials declined, she added. (Gina Kolata, “Ohio Coroner Issues Report On Captive of North Korea,” New York Times, September 29, 2017,
In the remote North Korean city of Hamhung, separated from the capital by vast, jagged mountains, an inconspicuous chemical plant may be secretly fueling the growing missile array that threatens the United States. Researchers think that the plant is producing a specialized rocket fuel known as UDMH, which is used in the long-range missile launches that have escalated tensions between North Korea and the United States. This would settle an esoteric but crucial debate among North Korea watchers, and not to Washington’s favor. Some have argued that North Korea cannot produce the fuel, implying that the country imported it from Russia or China. Those countries could then be pressured to cut off exports, grounding North Korea’s missiles without firing a shot. But the new finding, produced by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Middlebury College, suggests that North Korea has mastered UDMH production, closing off one of the last avenues for outside curbs on the country’s increasingly sophisticated weapons programs. Though North Korea may have previously relied on foreign assistance in obtaining or making the fuel, as some analysts believe, it no longer appears to need the help. Vipin Narang, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor who studies nuclear issues, called the discovery “very important.” “If they are not dependent on foreign suppliers,” he said, then “even the most targeted sanctions on, and monitoring of,” countries that might assist North Korea “will be mostly futile.” Short of war or the country’s collapse, he added, “there’s nothing to stop this program from becoming a monster.” The finding is based on satellite imagery, a technical analysis of UDMH production methods, information from a North Korean official who defected, and a set of obscure North Korean technical documents. Jeffrey Lewis, the director of the Middlebury center’s East Asia Nonproliferation Program, had been hunting for weeks for hints of UDMH production. “There are no real, obvious signatures for it,” he said, because it can be made with common chemicals like chlorine and ammonia using a variation of a process developed in 1906. India, while quietly developing its missile program in the 1970s, had produced UDMH in an old sugar factory. The breakthrough came when his team found and translated a set of highly technical articles in an official North Korean science journal, Chemistry and Chemical Engineering, that referred to the fuel. The articles, which ran between 2013 and 2016, discussed mundane matters like managing highly toxic wastewater, a notorious problem in UDMH production. But they betrayed suspiciously sophisticated knowledge. One explored methods for improving purity, crucial in advanced missiles. “They don’t read like this is a speculative or nascent endeavor,” Lewis said. “They read like this is a problem they’ve been working on for a while,” describing problems a country would encounter only after producing large quantities of the fuel. But the documents betrayed something else: conspicuous secrecy. Unlike others in the journal, these three articles listed no affiliation or biography for its authors, suggesting their work was more sensitive than it looked. Lewis’s team cross-referenced the authors’ names with every scrap of North Korean chemical research they could find, until they noticed something odd. One of the authors, Cha Seok Bong, had published three papers on more anodyne matters out of a place called the February 8 Vinalon Plant, based in remote Hamhung. It was an odd location for a highly trained rocket fuel specialist to work. The plant normally produces vinalon, a cheap synthetic material sometimes called “juche” fiber — a reference to North Korea’s tenet of juche, or self-reliance — that is often used in North Korean textiles and uniforms. But it had long been, Lewis said, “our No. 1 candidate for UDMH production.” His team had initially flagged the plant after scrutinizing, in painstaking detail, satellite images of Hamhung for clues. The remote city is not an obvious home for sensitive military sites. Sitting on the country’s eastern coast, it is exposed to airstrikes, like the American bombing missions that devastated it in the Korean War. But Ko Chong-song, a North Korea official who defected in the early 1990s, indicated in a 2001 book that it was the center of secret military chemical work. The Central Intelligence Agency had suspected as much since at least 1969, when it published a secret assessment of chemical production in Hamhung. Now, Lewis’s team, looking again at the plant, noticed two unusually large wastewater pools, which aligned with standard UDMH production methods — and with the paper describing wastewater challenges. And Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, they found, had made a series of trips to the plant, underscoring its importance. “That’s about as clear-cut as it gets,” Lewis said. While the finding reveals important information about the extent of North Korea’s progress, it may come too late for the United States to act. The country has most likely already stockpiled enough fuel to fight an extended war, Lewis said. And the fuel is designed to remain potent for years. Soviet UDMH lasted so long that, after the country collapsed, the United States had to help de-fuel its ICBMs. Asked how North Korea could have so extensively developed this fuel without apparent outside notice, Lewis said outside analysts too often saw the country as primitive and backward. “If you watch them in satellite photos and read their technical publications, it looks like a totally different country,” he said. He added, sighing, “We’re in full-scale denial about North Korea’s capabilities.” (Max Fisher, “Remote Textile Plant May Secretly Power North Korea’s Missiles,” New York Times, September 28, 2017,
The North Korean spy, posing as a member of his country’s trade delegation in Belarus, thought he was photographing a secret scientific report on missile technology as he snapped away with a small camera in a dingy garage in the Ukrainian city of Dnipro, the home of Ukraine’s Soviet-era rocket industry. But the report he took pictures of was a fake, part of a sting operation mounted by Ukraine’s security service to prevent the leak of missile secrets, and now the spy, 56-year-old Ri Tae-gil, is in prison convicted of espionage. He sleeps on the bottom bunk in a cell shared with eight Ukrainian inmates, four of them convicted murderers. His July 2011 arrest in eastern Ukraine along with a fellow North Korean spy, which was first reported earlier this month by CNN, shows the extent to which Pyongyang has scoured the world for foreign technology to reinvigorate what had been a faltering program to develop long-range missiles. Ri and his partner, Ryu Song-chol, 46, were arrested just a few days before North Korea’s then leader, Kim Jong-il, announced during a visit to Russia that Pyongyang was considering a moratorium on missile production and nuclear weapons testing. The moratorium never came about. Instead, following Kim’s death in December 2011 and the ascent to power of his son Kim Jong-un, Pyongyang ramped up both its nuclear and missile programs. In July this year, North Korea for the first time launched missiles that experts said were capable of hitting the United States. While speaking good Russian, which is widely spoken in Ukraine, Ri does not talk much, his cellmates said, but he does watch a lot of television, particularly reports on the accelerating progress of a North Korean missile program that he had tried in vain to serve. Instead of prized secrets, he received an eight-year prison term for espionage. His fourth floor cell at the No. 8 Prison in Zhytomyr, a hulking brick building built during the reign of Russia’s last czar, has cable TV. A brick wall in the courtyard below offers a grim reminder of less accommodating times: it is pockmarked with bullet holes left by Stalin’s secret police, the NKVD, later renamed the KGB, which used the spot to execute prisoners. Asked in an interview whether he felt pride at North Korea’s recent string of successful launches, Ri, who has a family back in Pyongyang, blanched and said he did not want to talk about rockets. Apparently eager to counter a widespread belief that North Korea had made such fast progress by stealing foreign technology, he said that his country “has had good rockets for more than 20 years” and also very good engineers. Denys Chernyshov, Ukraine’s deputy minister of justice, described Ri and Ryu as “very well trained. They are tough guys, real spies,” he said. He noted that, despite six years of detention, they had never written or received letters from family or friends. “They live in a total vacuum,” he said. After a string of failed tests with an intermediate range missile, Musudan, that had been the target of American sabotage, North Korea last year suddenly and mysteriously found success. It began with the rollout of a new missile in September that not only worked but also demonstrated a capability to travel ever further distances in a series of tests since then. In July, Pyongyang launched a missile capable of reaching the United States. Seeking to explain North Korea’s mysterious success, some experts have pointed a finger at Ukraine, particularly the Yuzhmash rocket factory and its Yuzhnoye design bureau in Dnipro, the town where Ri and Ryu were arrested. Ukraine has adamantly denied allowing leaks of missile technology, pointing to the arrest and conviction of the two spies as proof that the country is capable of combating North Koreans hunting for missile secrets. Ukrainian rockets mostly date to Soviet times but are still far more advanced than anything Pyongyang had until recently been able to produce. Oleksandr Turchynov, the head of Ukraine’s security and defense council, said it was “completely impossible” that North Korea obtained either missile engines or their design documents from Ukraine. The RD-250, a Soviet-era rocket engine that some experts say resembles engines used in recent North Korean launches, used to be produced in Dnipro, Mr. Turchynov said, but production stopped in 1991. The entire production line, he said, was dismantled in 1994. Moreover, he added, Ukraine never made whole engines but only supplied parts to the RD-250’s main manufacturer, Energomash, in Russia. When The New York Times requested permission to visit the Dnipro complex, however, the Yuzhmash factory declined to receive a reporter from the paper. This was despite a plea in August by Ukraine’s president, Petro O. Poroshenko, made in response to a Times article about possible technology leakage from Dnipro, that reporters from the paper visit the factory to “meet Ukrainian partners who have been wrongfully blamed.” Ukraine is particularly sensitive to allegations that it has undermined nonproliferation efforts because it voluntarily gave up a nuclear arsenal it inherited from the Soviet Union. That surrender of power left it highly vulnerable to nuclear-armed Russia when Moscow annexed Crimea in March 2014. Ukraine’s domestic intelligence agency, known as the S.B.U., says it has been tracking North Korean efforts to steal missile technology for years. In addition to arresting Ri and Ryu, Ukraine expelled two North Korean diplomats accredited in Moscow who were accused of trying to obtain Ukrainian secrets. Ri and Ryu were caught red-handed taking photographs of what had been presented to them as a classified dissertation by a rocket scientist, S.A. Davidov, titled “Forecast methods of the performance capability of capillary intake devices in the fuel tanks of space vehicles.” Mastery of such intake devices would have helped North Korean engineers ensure the steady, uninterrupted flow of fuel, a hurdle that can impede the construction of reliable rocket engines. The dissertation the North Korean pair were given to photograph, however, had been gutted of secret information and filled with useless technical details. Ri received the fake secrets from V.A. Plekhanov, an employee at Dnipro’s Yuzhnoye design bureau, whom the North Korean had first tried to suborn by appealing to him on ideological grounds as a Communist before offering him about $1,000, the Ukrainian authorities said. Unbeknown to the North Koreans, Plekhanov alerted the S.B.U. and a trap was set in a cluttered back street garage where he had agreed to hand over the missile secrets. The North Koreans were both seized, along with the camera they used to take photos of the documents. With Ri and Ryu now approaching the end of their prison terms — they are scheduled for release next September because their sentences were reduced by two days for every day served in pretrial detention — Ukraine is wondering what will happen to them next. Neither man, according to their cellmates and prison officials, has expressed any eagerness to go back to North Korea, fearing what awaits them and their families. Ukrainian officials believe they may request political asylum in Ukraine or another country after their release, though neither has so far made a request to stay. When Ryu, who is held in a correctional facility next door to Ri’s prison in Zhytomyr, was led into a visiting room for an interview he quickly covered his face and tried to run away. “I have nothing to say. Get away from me,” he shouted. “I want to live safely.” Ri, in a separate meeting, was less abrupt but also declined to answer all but a few preliminary questions. Anatoli Gabitov, the deputy warden, described Ri as a “super inmate” who never causes trouble. “I wish all our prisoners were like him,” he said. The North Korean spy, however, may not be quite what he seems: On a bookshelf next to his bed is a Russian-language translation of “The Count of Monte Cristo,” the French novel whose protagonist considers himself wrongly imprisoned and, after a spectacular escape, sets about taking revenge on all those responsible for his incarceration. (Andrew Higgins, “North Korean Spies, a Ukrainian Jail and a Murky Tale,” New York Times, September 29, 2017,
The trucks still rumble across the Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge, and a nearby pipeline still pumps crude oil to keep the regime alive in Pyongyang. But here in the Chinese city of Dandong, at the center of this country’s trade with North Korea, pain and frustration are mounting. Sanctions approved by the U.N. Security Council to punish North Korea for its nuclear and missile tests and bring it to the negotiating table are starting to bite. “Personally, the sanctions are hurting me a tremendous amount,” one Chinese trader said, explaining that almost 80 percent of the goods he used to move back and forth across the border — ranging from textiles to chemicals — are now forbidden. “Both Chinese and North Korean business executives have the same thought — whatever happens, let it happen quickly,” he said. “If we have to have war, at least let it happen soon. We have to settle this quickly. Things can’t go on like this.” Successive rounds of U.N. sanctions have cut off more than 90 percent of North Korea’s publicly reported exports — including coal, iron ore, seafood and, most recently, textiles — and have restricted the regime’s ability to earn foreign currency income by sending workers abroad. The trader, of ethnic Korean descent, said he had not seen a worse climate in nearly two decades of doing business across the border. Nor had he seen the Chinese government so determined to impose its will — despite a lobbying effort from the local business community. Customs checks have become more stringent at the border, traders said, causing delays in addition to making it harder to smuggle banned items. In August, protests erupted near the northern end of the border, in the Chinese city of Hunchun, after Beijing moved to ban seafood imports from North Korea. Lu Chao, a Korea expert at the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences, said Chinese cold-storage plants and seafood processing workshops across the border have fallen idle, while companies involved in textiles, coal and iron ore are also suffering. Travel agents sending Chinese tourists to North Korea have seen their revenue affected. “Sanctions bring a huge loss to Chinese traders,” Lu said. “Many companies doing border trade have gone bankrupt, and their owners run away, leaving people unemployed.” Outside the customs depot on the edge of town — where trucks are loaded and inspected before rolling across the border — two packers said traffic was falling. So far, though, sanctions have had a relatively modest effect on the overall trade numbers. In August, China’s imports from North Korea fell a modest 1 percent from a year ago, while exports were down 6.2 percent. On a cumulative basis, total trade was actually up 7.5 percent in the first eight months of the year. That may partly reflect North Korea’s ability to adapt to sanctions, as well as stockpiling by the regime and an attempt by traders to move goods across the border before sanctions hit, experts said. Chinese exports of corn, bananas and rice rose sharply, and there was even a shipment of 1.8 million tons of coal in August — six months after a ban was supposedly implemented. Commerce Ministry spokesman Gao Feng told reporters in Beijing that U.N. sanctions allowed a “cushioning” period after a ban is imposed, Reuters reported. Experts said China normally allowed shipments to go through if they had been agreed on before sanctions were announced. But a bigger question perhaps is whether smugglers can bypass the sanctions. In the seafood markets of Dandong, there are signs that they can — to some extent. Water-filled tanks of crabs and clams dominate the offerings. With Chinese waters overfished, most would have come from North Korean waters in the Yellow Sea, one trader said. Another man, delivering crabs to the market from the back of his truck, complained that the ban had pushed up the price of the North Korean crustaceans by roughly 50 percent, which in turn had depressed demand. “The formal trade from North Korea has stopped,” a third trader said, “but there are still ways of getting it for people who are brave and willing to take the risk.” Fishing boats from Dandong used to cross to North Korea to pick up seafood, bringing it back to China to pass off as their own catch, bypassing customs. Until recently, many did so openly during the day, but now the boats travel only at night, traders and fishermen said. At the small but usually thriving Yicuomao port on a small channel of the Yalu River, scores of blue-painted wooden and steel fishing boats lay idle. Some fishermen said they were losing money, but not everyone was. “If you have connections, you can still go out,” said one fisherman, unhappy at the unfairness of the situation. “On the surface, China is implementing sanctions, but it isn’t really. If it really wanted to, it could just put a warship here to close off the estuary.” Experts said China can’t be expected to completely shut down smuggling across the 880-mile border, any more than the United States can easily end illegal immigration from Mexico. But there are also reasons to doubt whether local officials are trying as hard as they might, said Christopher Green, senior adviser for the Korean Peninsula at the International Crisis Group. While Chinese President Xi Jinping is reported to have disdain for his North Korean counterpart, Kim Jong Un, relationships at provincial and municipal levels, especially in security services, have always been very good. A little leakage serves to defuse domestic tensions and maintain that cross-border network, Green says. Within North Korea, the economy is almost designed to withstand sanctions. When times are tough, trade will be even more strictly cornered by the military and security apparatus. The ban on textiles, meanwhile, will have a disproportionate effect on women in North Korea who assemble garments. “The pain is felt at lower levels,” Green said. “That is not to say sanctions are bad, but invariably the effects flow downhill at the end of the day.” Near the village of Xingguang on the outskirts of Dandong, paramilitary troops and a fire company guard 10 large oil storage tanks, the start of an underground pipeline that supplies North Korea with the crude it needs to keep its military and industry running. It is a symbol of Beijing’s bottom line: keeping the Pyongyang regime alive. North Korea has apparently been stockpiling fuel, experts said, one reason that civilian fuel prices there have risen significantly this year. It also means that the North could probably withstand a temporary cut in oil supplies. But Beijing will never completely cut the regime’s jugular vein, experts said. It fears that a cut in oil supplies could leave China facing a nightmare scenario: either a hostile and desperate nuclear-armed enemy or, if the regime collapsed, a refugee crisis followed by an American puppet state right on its border. “Why do we sanction?” asked Lu at the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences. “We believe that wrongdoings deserve punishment, but punishment should not be seizing them by the throat and trying to choke them to death.” (Simon Denyer, “On the N. Korea-China Border, a Constricted Lifeline Is Still a Lifeline,” Washington Post, October 1, 2017, p. A-20)
Schiller: “On the morning of its Independence Day on July 4 this year, the United States was greeted with a special present: North Korea had just launched a rocket that met every defined specification of a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Seemingly out of the blue, the reclusive state passed a threshold that very few nations have managed before. Just six months earlier, US President Donald Trump had tweeted of this level of threat that “it won’t happen.” But it has. Some analysts had warned of this for years, and North Korea led up to the launch with a long series of publicity events that were communicated as serious milestones of ICBM development. Two different types of ICBM mock-ups were paraded through Pyongyang in 2012 and 2015; a long-range nuclear warhead design was presented in March 2016; and a week later, a spectacular “heat-shield test” had a warhead tip being burned by a rocket engine. There were also static rocket-motor tests in April 2016, September 2016 and March 2017 of large engines and engine clusters that seemed powerful enough to propel an ICBM. On top of that, North Korea was presenting one new missile after another at an ever-increasing pace. While only five different guided ballistic-missile types (plus two different space launchers) were known to have lifted off in North Korea before Kim Jong Un took over, the total range of functional ballistic missiles and large rockets rose to 15 with the Hwasong-14 ICBM launch in July this year; an additional five missiles that have not left the ground yet were hinted at in parades or other occasions. This pace is nearly unheard of. To give an example, Russia’s most recent submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the Bulava, took almost 20 years to develop, and failed again and again, while North Korea’s very first SLBM, the KN-11 or Pukguksong-1, was apparently developed in a tenth of that time (some experts even claim that North Korea initially developed a liquid-fueled version, and switched to solid fuel after the first tests, within less than a year — something that has never been done anywhere before). Granted, the Bulava is a lot bigger, more complex and powerful than the KN-11, but Russia already had decades of experience with solid-fueled missiles, while North Korea basically started from scratch. This should raise questions about how North Korea could achieve these feats. However, many experts just shrug that off, stating that Kim just decided to focus all his resources on missiles. This may be true. But can a state under almost total international sanctions with little known high-tech industry really pull off something like this? If yes, why did North Korea choose ballistic missiles as its showcase? Why not aircraft, or surface-to-air missiles? Why not push an indigenous automotive industry and earn some hard currency abroad instead of getting additional sanctions for every missile launched? Is it really the fear of forced regime change initiated by the US and its allies that drives the missile program to unprecedented achievements? Other countries, from the US to Russia, China, France or India, required many more years and resources for comparable achievements. These questions can be answered two ways: One is quick and easy, the other requires a very comprehensive look at various parts of a huge puzzle. Let’s try both. The quick and easy answer is best done by referring to what could be called “public knowledge” about North Korea. And the easiest place to look is Wikipedia, which is a democratic instrument of agreement on issues of public interest due to its open editing structure. The various articles about North Korea’s missiles all paint a picture that can be summarized as this: North Korea obtained Soviet Scud missiles from Egypt sometime in the 1980s and quickly reverse-engineered these to build indigenous copies, building more advanced versions of these missiles over the years. Having mastered Scud technology, North Korea switched to more capable technologies that are also mostly based on other old Soviet designs. Next was the so-called SS-N-6 technology, and, most recently, the engines that were observed in the Hwasong-14 ICBM (even though they have been referenced simply as “Ukrainian” in many news outlets, the whole family of engines was developed in Soviet times at an institute in Moscow). As proof for this narrative, it is common to hint at papers that tell the same story, referencing back to other papers that tell the same story, until the trace is lost, or ends at some “secret government source.” The other approach is painful and challenges the “known truths.” It is based on rules that apply everywhere else in the world, and for every other technological field, and it requires accepting “Murphy’s Law,” the old saw that states that where something can go wrong, it will go wrong. You know how this goes: The new IKEA wardrobe usually is harder to assemble than expected and in the end, one or two screws are missing. The new piece of software that “quickly” reorganizes all your favorite photos and music will do a lot of things, but not organize your files in the way you intended. The picture you just wanted to hang on the wall is now lying on the floor, broken, while you stare at the hole where the nail should have been. Things just go wrong because plans never play out as originally intended. This has two very important consequences: • Things must be tested, again and again and again. • If something doesn’t work, it has to be changed. In terms of a rocket system, this not only applies to its complete form, but filters down to every single component, element and part of a rocket. Indeed, virtually every known attempt at reverse-engineering leads to a similar product, but never to an identical product. This is because the details of a complex piece of hardware get changed along the way not only because they did not work the intended way, but also for other possible reasons. Maybe the original materials are not available and have to be substituted, requiring a redesign of the part; perhaps misunderstood design solutions are “improved” on the go, leading to different details being changed. It could be that the manufacturing process is unknown, so a different approach is selected — in chemical engineering, this can be compared to trying to cook a meal by only seeing the finished food on the plate. As a result, simple parts of the original hardware that apparently do not serve any special purpose may be substituted with different parts, materials or looks. Therefore, a reverse-engineered Swiss watch will be different from the original just as a reverse-engineered rocket engine or missile will be different — and the higher the number of parts and elements, the more the differences will be visible. What does this have to do with North Korea? The thing is: North Korea did not really test its missiles back in the 1980s and 1990s. Nonetheless, it seems they worked very well. And the Scuds looked exactly like the Soviet originals — they even sported Cyrillic letters. Oh, and they came with all the required support systems for a Scud B, a weapons system that included more than a dozen specialized vehicles, and the vehicles seen so far in North Korea look exactly like the Soviet originals, too. Did they quickly reverse-engineer these, too? Didn’t they receive just three missiles from Egypt, without any support equipment? The fact is that North Korea exported at least 100 (some sources say more) of these Scud clones to Iran in the late 1980s, where they were fired against Iraq with a very low failure rate. It might have been a coincidence, but at that time, the Soviets were just phasing out the Scud B system. Today, no one knows what became of these systems, comprised of hundreds of missiles and support vehicles. It therefore seems likely that North Korea did not quickly reverse-engineer its first ballistic missile, the Scud B, but simply received the system from the Soviets. But this was three decades ago, why is this relevant now? This can only be explained by following North Korea’s missile program step by step. If North Korea did not reverse-engineer the Scud B in the late 1980s, it therefore did not have any experience in building missiles in the early 1990s. So, it should have been hard for it to design and produce the Scud C, a more advanced Scud version that appeared in 1990. But it was not. Only two launches of the Scud C are known in North Korea, in 1990 and 1991, and both were successful. This is not what you would expect from the very first indigenous missile development in any country. The same happened with the next missile, the Nodong, which looks like an enlarged Scud. It flew once in 1993 (successfully), and from 1998 on, the missile system was transferred to Pakistan and Iran in noteworthy numbers. Interestingly enough, there are also Soviet counterparts of both the Scud C and the Nodong. To drive home the point, we briefly have to delve into engineering details to point out another mystery: The Scud C featured many smart design solutions that increased its range compared to its predecessor, from 300 kilometers to 500 kilometers. But not a single one of these design solutions was incorporated into the Nodong missile, not even at later stages — while Iran slowly evolved the Nodong design into something far more capable (the Ghadr missile), North Korea still sticks to the original version. Why design the Nodong as a large Scud B, and not as a large Scud C? The story goes on. In 1998, a large space launcher, the Taepodong I, appeared, and in its first and only flight it almost succeeded in putting a satellite into orbit. Remember, this was done by the same people who had gained no experience through Scud B, Scud C or Nodong development. There must have been massive help from outside to explain that success. However, North Korea apparently scrapped the promising Taepodong I design and went for a very different, and much bigger, rocket, what was later known as the Taepodong II, or the Unha space launcher. The first rumors of this go back to the early 1990s, and a mock-up was observed in 1994. However, the first launch only occurred in 2006 (a failure), and later in 2009 and April 2012 (both failures). Only in December 2012 did the rocket successfully complete its first mission, about 20 years into development. This time, the pace and failure record made sense — orbital launch success at fourth launch after two decades is still an impressive feat. South Korea recovered the first stage of this rocket from the ocean, and what they found does not fit well into the “indigenous reverse-engineering” theory. The United Nations identified many parts as being imported from abroad, and the ball bearings inside the engines (which were clustered Nodong engines) clearly were of Soviet production. Judging by published photos of the wreckage, the manufacturing quality of these engines looked very good, while the airframe production quality was rather poor, which would imply that the engines were produced somewhere else than the rest of the rocket. If North Korea could produce complete Scuds, why use foreign parts in their flagship space launcher? In parallel, however, North Korea watchers had already identified another new missile development. The old but highly advanced Soviet SS-N-6 submarine missile technology was allegedly used to build a road-mobile missile, the Musudan. This technology was far more capable than the Scud technology used for the Unha, but for some reason, North Korea decided not to use it for the space launcher. The Musudan missile was declared operational in the 2000s without a single test launch. No launch was known until 2016, and when North Korea finally started to launch this missile in 2016, reportedly eight out of nine test launches failed. All these issues — missing test launches, overly reliable missiles and clear links to old Soviet technology — were summarized in a late 2012 public report. Then, all of a sudden, starting in early 2014, the North Korean program went into overdrive. It seemed that Kim wanted the world to know that he could build rockets on his own. But he overdid it. All the “new” rockets flown since then showed some dubious characteristics: • The “improved” KN-02 looks exactly like the old Soviet SS-21, as does its predecessor, the KN-02. It also boasts unrealistic performance claims. • The KN-11 SLBM came out of nowhere, and shows some disturbingly familiar characteristics with Chinese/Pakistani solid rocket motors. • The Musudan uses an engine that looks a lot like that of the Soviet SS-N-6. • The Scud ER, which is not new, was rumored to exist in North Korea around 2000, after it had already received other Soviet Scud versions. • The KN-15 is a land-based version of the KN-11 SLBM, with the same, familiar solid rocket motors. • The Hwasong-12 uses a completely different engine than any previous North Korean rocket. The engine looks like it is from the Soviet/Ukrainian RD-250 family. • The KN-18 is just a Scud C with a different warhead and unrealistic accuracy claims. • The Hwasong-14 uses the same Soviet/Ukrainian design engine as the Hwasong-12. Even though North Korea now launches rockets frequently, including some failures, the track record of success is still unusually high. Especially considering that there had been no prior experience from Scud reverse-engineering, so they actually had to start from zero. There also remains the question of why North Korea seems to start over again and again, using completely new (but nonetheless familiar) technology for its various missiles — almost as if they get access to new proliferation sources time and again. All this can only be explained by some sort of external help, combined with the insight that the North Korean program still is not exactly what they want the world to believe it is. This, however, also means that there might be more surprises coming. So there are at least two ways to explain North Korea’s missile program. The quick and simple “reverse-engineering” explanation is favored not only by Wikipedia, but also by a broad community of experts and institutions that focus their research on North Korea and other problematic states. Interestingly enough, these institutions usually cover technical questions about both missiles (meaning rocket technologies) and weapons of mass destruction (meaning chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons), while being rooted in political science. The other way around rarely happens: There is not a single department of engineering that has an audible voice in the North Korean threat assessment community. Perhaps people that actually build rockets are not interested in political assessments, or they are not allowed to join public conversations for security reasons (which is certainly true for people building nuclear weapons). However, in the few times that real rocket people — meaning those with hands-on rocket program experience — are asked about their thoughts on North Korean successes, they answer with statements that could be summarized as this: “They easily succeed where we keep failing. Our rockets always explode.” This sounds a lot like they would tend toward the second way of explaining the North Korean rocket mystery. (Markus Schiller, “North Korea’s Missile Progress: Spectacular Success — with No Easy Explanation for It,” Global Asia, 12, 3 (Fall 2017), pp. 16-23)
DeVore: “China responded to the South Korean government’s July 2016 agreement to allow the United States to deploy an anti-missile system, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), with a harshness that surprised observers. China punished South Korea economically by preventing Chinese tourists from vacationing in South Korea and by shutting down Korean department stores in China, among other moves. Quasi-official sources, more ominously, suggested that China would expand its nuclear arsenal and target South Korea should hostilities erupt between China and the U.S. These actions were all the more dramatic considering that China had enjoyed better relations with South Korea than most other neighboring states and that Beijing therefore risked alienating a key regional partner. China’s hostility towards the US deployment of THAAD is puzzling at first glance. Although states occasionally react with similar animus to foreign weapons deployments, it is offensive systems rather than defensive ones that generally spark controversy. It was the deployment of offensive ballistic missiles that triggered the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1977-87 Euromissile dispute. Lesser crises, such as that sparked by the Soviet construction in 1970 of a nuclear submarine base at Cienfuegos, Cuba, likewise centered on offensive weapons. The question must therefore be asked as to why China is expending significant political capital to halt the deployment of a defensive weapon. Chinese rhetoric suggests that the answer lies in either China’s belief that missile defenses are intrinsically destabilizing or that THAAD’s radar will undermine China’s nuclear deterrent. I argue, however, that neither explanation holds up under scrutiny despite their superficial plausibility. Chinese strategists do not regard missile defenses as especially destabilizing and are actively developing a gamut of missile defenses equivalent to those of the US. Arguments about THAAD’s radar, despite their veneer of technical believability, also cannot account for China’s behavior. Although the range of THAAD’s radar indeed reaches into China from South Korea, it cannot provide the tracking data that would help the US intercept Chinese strategic missiles. If China’s public critiques of THAAD lack credibility, then what other factors account for its policy response? I answer this question by demonstrating that China’s behavior is, first and foremost, driven by its government’s fears that US missile-defense deployments will bolster and multilateralize U.S. alliances in Asia. Chinese leaders have long expressed their fear that the U.S. will transform its fragile “hub-and-spoke” Asian alliance architecture into a solid multilateral alliance more akin to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Missile defenses, by virtue of their technical characteristics, generate technical imperatives and opportunities for precisely this form of alliance transformation. The Chinese government is therefore willing to risk political capital to oppose THAAD because it fears that deployment of it and other similar systems will enable the US to consolidate and strengthen its Asian alliances. Recent Chinese rhetoric suggests that its opposition to the THAAD deployment is part and parcel of a principled opposition to missile defense per se. China’s use of this argument resonates so widely because it taps into an intellectual commonplace that has evolved since the 1960s. Missile defenses are, within this context, decried because they are allegedly inherently incapable of protecting a country, yet will aggravate arms races and the likelihood of nuclear war. This principled critique was originally developed by American scientists in the 1960s and later gained traction in Europe before being adopted in the rhetoric of Chinese diplomats in the late-1990s. Missile defenses are, according to this critique, uniquely pernicious because successful defense against ballistic missiles is technologically unfeasible, yet the existence of missile defenses aggravates arms races and creates incentives for a nuclear first strike because states cannot accurately assess exactly how (in)effective enemy anti-missile systems will be. According to this critique, penetrating missile defenses will always be technologically simpler and economically cheaper than building defenses impervious to penetration. Missile designers can equip strategic missiles with cheap penetration aids, such as chaff and decoys, since for most of their trajectory longer-range missiles travel in orbit, where penetration aids possess the same flight characteristics as missile warheads. Within the atmosphere, at terminal ranges, missile designers can build warheads that are both stealthy, because they are constructed out of radar-absorbent materials, and maneuverable, because gravity grants them greater aerodynamic potential than anti-missile interceptors. Scholars of international relations argue that the uncertainties that missile defenses generate are even worse than the defenses’ intrinsic shortcomings. Since attackers can conceal their penetration aids from defenders until they use them in combat, defenders must design defenses to defeat an attack whose precise characteristics they ignore. Neither attackers nor defenders can therefore accurately anticipate what proportion of missiles will penetrate defenses. The resultant uncertainty arguably increases war’s likelihood because it drives states to develop doctrines based on worst-case scenarios, such as destroying much of an opponent’s missile force in a surprise attack and then intercepting the remainder with its anti-missile systems. States are driven by fear of “disarming” first strikes to engage in arms racing and adopting “launch on warning” doctrines, which raise the likelihood of nuclear war. Missile defenses are, thus, intrinsically destabilizing according to the principled critique. Although American, European and Russian critics first popularized this argument, Chinese diplomats have evoked it since 1999. China’s government, however, employs the principled critique in an instrumental fashion. It was Russia, in fact, that convinced China to adopt its rhetoric beginning in January 1999, when both countries protested against the missile defense plans that US President Bill Clinton was then adopting under pressure from a Republican Congress. China’s embrace of this argument only tightened once President George W. Bush’s administration accelerated the US’s missile-defense programs and openly questioned the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty’s relevance. The director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Arms Control Department, Ambassador Sha Zukang, used this principled critique in communiqués and UN resolutions that China co-sponsored in opposition to US missile defenses. The sincerity of Chinese leaders’ adherence to the principled critique is, however, belied by China’s own vigorous missile defense efforts. Mao Zedong authorized China’s first missile-defense program in 1964, the same year that the country detonated its first atomic bomb. The resultant Project 640 enjoyed considerable support and was pursued until 1983, but failed because China’s technology was inadequate at that time. Although Deng Xiaoping cancelled Project 640, he authorized new anti-missile research programs three years later under Project 863. Chinese missile-defense research has been continuous ever since then, and political leaders reaffirmed their commitment to missile defenses with Project 998. China began purchasing mature Russian anti-missile systems to supplement its indigenous efforts in the 1990s. It first acquired Russia’s S-300PMU missile and its accompanying radars in 1991 and followed up by buying improved S-300PMU-1s (1994), upgraded S-300PMU-2s (2003) and the naval variant S-300F (2002). China’s defense industry then developed the HQ-9 based on the S-300PMU. Altogether, China has amassed at least 192 land-based missile launchers and 12 warships equipped to fire S-300 or HQ-9 variants. More recently, China in 2014 concluded a US$3 billion deal to import 48 units of Russia’s latest anti-missile system, the S-400 Triumf. This system, which Russia only introduced in 2007, fulfils the same functions as THAAD and possesses a missile, the 48N6, which exceeds THAAD’s in range (250 km) and velocity (4.8 km/s). China’s indigenous anti-missile systems are today approaching maturity even as it continues amassing Russian-designed systems. China’s first major accomplishment was the successful testing in 1999 of a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) designed to destroy opposing missiles through impact. China, meanwhile, developed three distinctive anti-missile systems — the HQ-19, HQ-26 and HQ-29 — that employ KKVs. The first system, the HQ-19, is designed as a Chinese equivalent to THAAD and will reportedly be deployed in 2018. The other two, the HQ-26 and HQ-29, entered development somewhat later, but reportedly entered flight testing in 2016 and 2011, respectively.Taken as an ensemble, China’s missile defense investments place it as one of the world’s most enthusiastic proponents of this technology. China, indeed, lagged behind only the US and the Soviet Union in establishing missile-defense research programs and led Asia’s other great powers by decades in this process. Whereas China initiated anti-missile research in 1964 and fielded its first missile defenses in 1991, Japan did not tentatively initiate research until 1989 and refrained from purchasing an operational system until 2003. South Korea, for its part, did not even pursue missile defenses until 2006. China’s own longstanding commitment to missile defenses suggests, in sum, that the principled arguments of its leaders against US anti-missile deployments must be regarded as an opportunistic tactic. The other major argument that China advances to oppose the THAAD deployment is that this system will undermine China’s nuclear deterrent. Proponents of this argument insinuate that THAAD’s true purpose is to intercept Chinese, rather than North Korean, missiles. Although the range of THAAD’s radar’s lends superficial verisimilitude to this argument, it is nonetheless technically flawed. Any argument about THAAD’s utility against China’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) is undermined by the inability of THAAD’s interceptors to reach such missiles. THAAD interceptors can hit targets at a maximum altitude of 150 km, which pales in comparison to the altitudes of 1,200 km that strategic missiles attain. To make matters worse, the velocity of THAAD’s interceptors of 2.6-2.8 km/s renders it all but impossible for them to destroy Chinese ICBMs travelling at 7 km/s. It is, in sum, all but impossible for THAAD missiles to intercept Chinese strategic missiles travelling over South Korea. Chinese claims, however, focus mainly on THAAD’s AN/TPY-2 radar. The most valuable function that radars provide for missile defenses is to provide tracking data on an incoming missile, which is necessary to calculate an intercept flight path to enable the missile interceptor to destroy the missile. Chinese statements about THAAD imply that the AN/TPY-2 radar can provide such data on Chinese missiles, which will then be used to calculate intercept trajectories for the United States’ longest-range missile defenses, which are based in California and Alaska. Tracking data requires, however, that multiple radar pulses from the same radar observe the missile at close intervals and identify the missile’s precise location at each interval. Radars can only scan a very narrow segment of the sky and must do so at very high frequencies to produce tracking data. This, in turn, means that complex phased-array radars like the AN/TPY-2 have much shorter tracking than identification ranges. The best available data on the AN/TPY-2 suggests a tracking range of 1,000 km. While such a range enables the radar to track targets within China, it cannot track Chinese strategic missiles along their predicted flight paths. China’s static ICBMs are, within this context, deployed westwards of the radar’s tracking range and its ballistic-missile submarines reportedly patrol in the South China Sea. Launched from these positions, the flight paths of China’s ICBMs and SLBMs would circumvent the THAAD radar’s coverage. While the AN/TPY-2 cannot track Chinese strategic missiles, it can identify them. The missile’s identification range, which involves collecting less precise information, covers China’s ICBM launch zones. This capability contributes nothing new to American anti-missile capabilities since the US already possesses three means of detecting Chinese missiles. The US’s premier detection system is its infrared DSP satellites, which can detect a missile’s hot exhaust plumes as soon as it is launched. The United States has also already deployed two AN/TPY-2 radars in Japan and built a massive PAVE PAWS radar complex in Taiwan. These radars collectively cover much of China and already provide identification data on the zones that a South Korean-based AN/TPY-2 would cover. THAAD, in sum, offers the US no additional anti-missile capabilities that it does not already possess vis-à-vis China. THAAD interceptors cannot reach Chinese missiles bound for the US and the AN/TPY-2 cannot provide any relevant data from intercepting Chinese strategic missiles that the US does not already possess. So, what motivates China’s opposition to THAAD if it can’t be explained by either a principled rejection of missile defenses or by fears for its own nuclear deterrent? The answer to this conundrum lies in China’s fear of encirclement by a US-led alliance system. Although many of China’s neighbors have formal alliances or security relationships with the US, America’s Asian alliances do not as yet constitute a robust multilateral alliance equivalent to NATO. Chinese leaders fear, however, that the U.S. is using missile defenses to transform its loose hub-and-spoke alliance system into a more robust multilateral alliance. Anti-missile systems, by their nature, enable such an evolution. Missile defenses must operate at short notice after long periods dormant. Since they are designed to counter surprise attacks and first strikes, they must also be fully integrated and operational in peacetime. This implies that allies collaborating on missile defense need to network their radars in peacetime and establish common battle management centers. Allies must, in sum, pursue a higher degree of peacetime command-and-control integration for collaborative missile defense than other forms of combined warfare. Chinese decision-makers have consistently evinced this fear: that anti-missile co-operation will lead to structurally tighter relationships between the U.S. and its Asian allies. Chinese leaders first raised this concern in the late 1990s with regard to Taiwan by arguing that American anti-missile assistance could result in a level of military-to-military integration tantamount to an alliance. Chinese Ambassador Sha explicitly warned that US missile defense transfers to Taiwan would constitute “a serious infringement of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” even though he tacitly accepted America supplying Taiwan with other forms of defensive weaponry. Anti-missile co-operation between the U.S. and Japan, meanwhile, generated precisely the type of integration that China fears. The Japanese government’s 2003 decision to procure Patriot PAC-3 and SM-3 IA anti-missile systems incentivized Japan and the US to integrate their armed forces more fully. The two governments established a Bilateral Joint Operations Co-ordination Center at Yokota Air Base in 2005 to fuse data collected by each country’s radars and sensors into a common operational picture. The two countries then set up a joint operations room in the Japan Air Self-Defense Forces’ basement to divvy up incoming missiles for destruction, and Japan approved the deployment of two American AN/TPY-2 X-Band radars to Japan. Many regard these measures as reinforcing the two countries’ bilateral anti-missile integration to the point that they “have essentially created a joint command relationship … from the perspective of any potential adversary.” South Korea long appeared the exception to the process of ballistic-missile defense driving the US and its Asian allies closer together. Under former President Lee Myung-bak, South Korea’s government committed itself to developing a Korean Air Missile Defense architecture independent of the US. Even if this system received data from American early warning (DSP) satellites, it would not share data from its own Israeli-built Green Pine radars and would not establish a common battle-management center with the U.S. Later, in 2012, South Korea aborted a general sharing of military information agreement that would have facilitated trilateral anti-missile co-operation with Japan and the U.S. South Korean President Park Gyun-hye’s July 2016 decision to welcome the deployment of THAAD altered this state of affairs. The US deployment of a THAAD battery and AN/TPY-2 radar to Seongju will generate strong incentives for the US and South Korea to integrate their missile defenses. For one thing, the two countries can only obtain the significant advantages associated with launching sequential interceptors against incoming missiles — termed “shoot-look-shoot” tactics — by networking the United States’ upper-tier THAAD system with South Korea’s lower-tier Patriot, M-SAM and L-SAM systems. Furthermore, integrating data from America’s AN/TPY-2 X-band radar with South Korea’s Green Pine L-band radars would greatly increase their collective efficiency. The threat of a North Korean surprise attack, or one with minimal warning, necessitates that the US and South Korea integrate their missile defenses in peacetime, not wait for a crisis. Once U.S. and South Korean radar data are integrated within a single ballistic-missile acquisition-and-tracking center, which would also receive cuing data from American DSP satellites, little would hinder the US from sharing data trilaterally with Japan. Once Japan and South Korea are benefitting from one another’s early warning assets, it would only take a small, yet logical, step for them to begin preparing for how they would co-operatively engage enemy missiles, divvying up targets between Japanese cruisers with SM-3 missiles, America’s THAAD and South Korea’s L-SAM. Thus, the deployment of THAAD to South Korea, in China’s eyes, opens the door for functional spillovers that will reinforce America’s Asian alliances and possibly multilateralize them. It is therefore hardly surprising that Chinese leaders view South Korea’s decision to deploy THAAD as a betrayal of the two countries’ détente. The proliferation of missiles and missile-defense systems in Asia will likely increasingly strain China’s relations with its neighbors. Growing regional ballistic-missile arsenals, whether driven by North Korea, Indo-Pakistani rivalries or China itself, compel Asian states to acquire missile defenses. Many of these states turn to the US, because they possess security relationships with it and because the US and its regional allies share tracking data and establish joint command protocols. A technical problem, ballistic-missile proliferation, thus generates political effects in terms of bolstered and multilateralized alliances. Chinese leaders cannot but view such developments as threatening. Their reaction to South Korea’s decision on THAAD shows just how seriously China’s government takes the potential reinforcement of America’s Asian alliances. Missile defenses, in sum, cannot be examined as a purely military issue, but must rather be conceptualized as systems whose political effects, for good or ill, exceed their military impact. (Marc R. DeVore, “Off the Radar? China, THAAD and Northeast Asia’s Alliances,” Global Asia, 12, 3 (Fall 2017), pp. 69-73)
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President Trump has delegated authority to Defense Secretary Mattis to use a conventional interceptor to shoot down any North Korean missile that might be headed for the United States. “If the word had come that it was inbound for Seattle, we were already launching interceptors,” Mattis privately told others. If the North Koreans realized the United States had shot down their missile, or even tried to, they would likely prepare to fire more missiles. “The potential we’d have to shoot to prevent a second launch was real,” according to Mattis. (Woodward, Rage, pp. 71-2) He did not think that President Trump would launch a preemptive strike on North Korea, though plans for such a war were on the shelf. The Strategic Command in Omaha had carefully reviewed and studied OPLAN 5027 for regime change in North Korea – the U.S. response to an attack that could include 80 nuclear weapons. A plan for a leadership strike, OPLAN 5015, had been updated. “This weighed heavily on me every day. I had to consider every day this could happen. This was not a theoretical concern.” (Woodward, Rage, p. 74)
9/30/17:
The Trump administration acknowledged for the first time that it was in direct communication with the government of North Korea over its missile and nuclear tests, opening a possible way forward beyond the escalating threats of a military confrontation from both sides. “We are probing, so stay tuned,” Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson said, when pressed about how he might begin a conversation with Kim Jong-un that could avert what many government officials fear is a significant chance of open conflict between the two countries. “We ask, ‘Would you like to talk?’ We have lines of communications to Pyongyang — we’re not in a dark situation, a blackout,” he added. “We have a couple, three channels open to Pyongyang,” a reference to North Korea’s capital. Tillerson gave no indication of what the administration might be willing to give up in any negotiations, and Trump has made clear he would make no concessions. Speaking at the residence of the United States ambassador to Beijing after a meeting with China’s top leadership, Tillerson, the former chief executive of Exxon Mobil and a newcomer to diplomacy, was cagey about whether the inquiries yielded anything, or seem likely to. He would not say if the North Koreans had responded. “We can talk to them,” Tillerson said at the end of a long day of engaging China’s leadership. “We do talk to them,” he added, without elaborating or saying whether serious conversations are actually taking place. When asked whether those channels ran through China, he shook his head. “Directly,” he said. “We have our own channels.” Tillerson seemed to suggest that the urgency of the problem, with Kim “launching 84 missiles” in his brief few years as the country’s leader, and its efforts to develop a hydrogen bomb, called for direct talks. And while he said the ultimate goal of those talks had to be denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula — something the two Koreas agreed on in 1992 — progress toward that goal would be “incremental.” Tillerson said it was important to lower the temperature of threats being exchanged between the United States and North Korea. His comments marked the first sign that the Trump administration has been trying its own version of what the Obama administration did with Iran: using a series of backchannel, largely secret communications that, after years of negotiation, resulted in a nuclear accord. But Tillerson was quick to distinguish the very different circumstances of North Korea and Iran — Pyongyang has nuclear weapons, Tehran just a program that could have led to them — and then added: “We are not going to put together a nuclear deal in North Korea that is as flimsy as the one in Iran.” Tillerson’s comments came as the administration was nearing major decision points about North Korea. While he argued that economic sanctions were finally beginning to bite — “the Chinese are saying it is having an effect,” he argued — he did not claim they would change the North’s behavior. His visit to China came as the Pentagon was considering a variety of far more aggressive military moves, including whether to strike at North Korea’s missile launching sites if it sees preparations for an atmospheric test – which would spew radioactivity into the skies — or use missile defenses to try to shoot down missiles. But all those approaches risk public failure, and if they did not stop Kim he would appear able to absorb, and ignore, an American effort to strip North Korea of its nuclear arms. American intelligence agencies are looking for ways to step up sabotage of the program, beyond the intensification of cyberattacks launched against some of its missile sites, secretly ordered by President Barack Obama in 2014. Speaking less than an hour after he left a meeting with President Xi Jinping of China, Tillerson said the most important thing was to lower the temperature of the threats being exchanged in recent days between Kim and President Trump. “The whole situation is a bit overheated right now,” he said. “If North Korea would stop firing its missiles, that would calm things down a lot.” When asked whether that caution applied as well to Trump, who tweeted last weekend that if the North were to keep issuing threats, “they won’t be around much longer,” he skirted any direct criticism of the president. “I think everyone would like for it to calm down,” he said. A study conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank, and released in recent days, suggests that at times of diplomatic engagement with the United States, North Korean provocations usually decline. But it is unclear that the trend applies to Kim, who at 33 has invested dramatically in the nuclear capability, seeing it as critical to his hold on power. But there are risks in the talks, too. American intelligence officials believe Mr. Kim is racing ahead to complete his ability to strike the United States with a weapon, figuring that at a minimum that would give him huge negotiating leverage. Some former officials, like Michael J. Morell, who served as acting director and deputy director of the C.I.A., have written in recent weeks that Washington should give up on the hopeless goal of denuclearization, and work on how to deter the North from ever using its weapons. In Japan, where Prime Minister Abe Shinzo recently dissolved the lower house of Parliament and called a snap election, the news that the United States was already in direct contact with North Korea could give ammunition to Mr. Abe’s opponents. The Japanese leader has steadfastly maintained that it is not the time for dialogue with North Korea, arguing in a recent Op-Ed article in The New York Times, that “emphasizing the importance of dialogue will not work with North Korea.” “Now,” Michishita added, “the opposition party members can say, ‘Look, you have been talking about pressure, but the U.S. is just leaving you behind.’ ” Tillerson’s comments came after three back-to-back meetings in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People. Tillerson had just six hours or so to meet with Beijing’s leadership before most of the country shut down for Golden Week, a holiday that starts with China’s national day. That will be followed by the 19th Communist Party Congress, a meeting that occurs once every five years. In the period leading up to the Congress, Beijing has sought to preserve the status quo. That was reflected in the public comments of Tillerson and his Chinese interlocutors, none of whom mentioned the words “North Korea” in public. Xi told Tillerson earlier that he wanted to ensure that a planned visit by Mr. Trump to China in November would be a success, according to a summary of their meeting issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Chinese Foreign Ministry noted that China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, and state councilor, Yang Jiechi, who also oversees foreign policy, did discuss the North Korean crisis with Tillerson. Those accounts did not give any details. But at the end of the day, settling into a couch at the residence of Ambassador Terry Branstad, Tillerson tried to sound optimistic that traditional diplomacy would help resolve the North Korean issue, even though it has failed past presidents. He insisted that the ultimate goal of the negotiations would be complete denuclearization, a goal many experts believe is foolhardy to attempt, because the North has made clear that its nuclear arsenal is a pillar of the state. That is acknowledged in the North Korean Constitution. “They can change their Constitution,” Tillerson said. “Especially the people running North Korea — it’s pretty easy for them to change it.” (David E. Sanger, “U.S. Reaching out to North Korea on Nuclear Tests,” New York Times, October 1, 2017,
TILLERSON: … “We now have four, and we – and they’re at a much higher level now. So we have a Security and Diplomatic Dialogue that Secretary Mattis and I chair from our own side; we have an Economic and Trade Dialogue that Secretary Ross and Secretary Mnuchin chair; we have a Social, People-to-People Dialogue which I’m facilitating along with Secretaries Chao and Secretary DeVos that met – that dialogue met last week; and then we have a Law Enforcement and Cyber Dialogue that’s upcoming, and Attorney General Sessions will be involved in that one. So those are the four major dialogues that are really driving the agenda for U.S.-China relations and the discussions between the leaders. So this trip was to get some agreement around the details for the upcoming visit, and then, obviously, an opportunity to have some discussion around issues that are current, like North Korea. So we did have discussions about North Korea as well. So that’s really – it was kind of a real quick trip. We wanted to get it in before they got too busy with their party congress. And so that was – and also well enough in advance that we could get the preparations ready for the President’s visit. So I’ll stop right there and — MODERATOR: Nick Wadhams. Q: …There’s certain widespread belief that sanctions alone will not change North Korea’s behavior. And if you look at Iran, it was a combination of sanctions, military buildup, and then cyber sabotage in Natanz plant. So that’s what brought them to the table. Do you think that all three of these in some sort of combination would be required to bring North Korea to the table? TILLERSON: Well, I do think the broad-based sanctions are beginning to have an effect. We’re seeing it from some of what we can observe, and the Chinese are also telling us that it’s having an effect, and they have a pretty close-up view of it. But I think it’s also the uniform voice coming from the international community, and there’s almost no one aligning with North Korea on this nuclear program of theirs. And they clearly – they are seeing a military response in the region with a greater defense posture on the part of the Republic of Korea, Japan taking steps to beef up its defense posture. And so there is in that respect a regional military response. But I think it’s – it is also gaining – we’re gaining the support of the Chinese. They are actively engaged in putting pressure on the regime in Pyongyang. And so we’re hopeful that, as you’ve heard me refer to the peaceful pressure campaign is going to cause the leadership in North Korea to want to engage, and engage in the right conversation. And we’ve made it clear that we hope to resolve this through talks as well. That’s our principal objective, is a peaceful resolution. Q: …Mr. Secretary, as you have thought about and described your strategic objectives with the North Koreans, you have said repeatedly that you’re moving toward – ultimately toward denuclearization. But maybe in the intelligence community, many of your own colleagues, have said you’re not going to see that for years. So can you talk us through a little bit of what your medium-term objective here is? We’ve heard General McMaster say the other day it’s not just a freeze, because that would enshrine the current level of nuclear capability. So you might have been able to do that 10 years ago; not now. So what is it that you need to see the North Koreans do that would resolve the current crisis or that would actually get you engaged in conversation with them? TILLERSON: Well, look, the objective of denuclearization is not just ours. That’s the objective of the Chinese as well. They’ve been very clear in their policy. And it’s the objective of the Russians, it’s the objective of everybody in the neighborhood, is a denuclearized peninsula. So that’s not a policy that only the U.S. holds. I think in terms of how you realize that, it’s going to be an incremental process to get there. I don’t think anyone – you’d be foolish to think you’re going to sit down and say, “Okay, done, nuclear weapons are gone.” This is going to be a process of engagement with North Korea that will be stepwise. I think the most immediate action that we need is to calm things down. They’re a little overheated right now, and I think we need to calm them down first. And then first conversation is around: What are we going to talk about? Because we’ve not even had that conversation. And so the first time I would have the opportunity to sit with the North Koreans, it would be to say: What do you want to talk about? We haven’t even gotten that far yet. But the objective is clear. We’ve been clear publicly, the region’s been clear publicly, that we’re not going to accept a nuclear-armed North Korea. That is never going to be acceptable. Q: It’s in their constitution. They’ve also made it clear they’re not going to get into a conversation that involves their denuclearizing. TILLERSON: They could change their constitution. I think they created it, they can change it. Especially the guys who are running North Korea – it’s pretty easy for them to change it. Q: …Emily Rauhala, Washington Post. I wanted to talk about the idea of regime change. … Your objective is not regime change in North Korea. Why not? TILLERSON: Well, I think if you – everyone who has studied the situation and – to try to understand what is motivating North Korea, and more particularly what is motivating Kim Jong-un to step up the pace of this weapons development program, I think – and all of you are aware I think he has conducted some 84, 85 missile tests; he’s conducted, I think, four nuclear tests, in the short of, time of his regime. His father conducted, I think, only 10 missile tests over 20 years. So this is clearly someone that’s different. Why is he doing that? And obviously, the stated reason is for his own security and his own regime’s survival. So I think it was important to say, to us, “Look, our objective is denuclearization. Our objective is not to get rid of you. Our objective is not to collapse your regime. That’s not our objective. Our objective is denuclearization. So if you’d like to meet with us on a way to do that, that’s what we prefer to do.” So I said that because that is the case. Q: Hi. If North Korea conducts an atmospheric test, if it flies an ICBM over Japanese air space to do so, would that require an immediate military response? TILLERSON: That would be the Commander-in-Chief’s decision. Q: But that – is that a red line for the United States? TILLERSON: As far as I know, the Commander-in-Chief has issued no redlines. Q: Matt Rivers with CNN. Over the last couple days, we’ve been up in the northeastern part of China, and we’ve seen at least on a small scale some evidence that sanctions against North Korea have been violated, at least in terms of what’s being sold up in the northeastern part of China. Not sure about the scale, but how comfortable are you – a knock against the Chinese for a long time is that they’ve not been willing to really enforce the sanctions that they’ve signed onto. Are you confident that they’re really enforcing at this time? BRANSTAD: I was in Jilin Province, which borders on North Korea, I think three days after the nuclear test. I met with the party secretary of that province; I also went to the border at Tumen. The party secretary assured me that they are indeed enforcing the sanctions, and I saw very little activity on the border. So I have every reason to believe – and I’ve talked to a lot of people here as well. And obviously, that – it is a significant economic impact on Jilin Province, because that’s their neighbor, and they have a significant number of North Koreans employed there. But – and we’re trying to do everything we can to verify that they’re doing that, but I think the situation has changed a lot in the last few months. And frankly, they felt the impact of that nuclear test, and they’re testing their water and their air. So they’re very concerned about the situation, and I feel that they’re conscientiously trying to do what they can to enforce the sanctions. Q: Would you call that a significant shift in what you’ve seen from the Chinese in the last couple years? BRANSTAD: Yeah. Obviously, I’ve only been here three months, but I think we’ve seen significant change. I want to give the President, the Secretary of State, and Haley – our ambassador to the United Nations – I think the two resolutions that have been approved recently are much stronger than a lot of people thought could be approved. They were approved unanimously with the cooperation of China, and I think China probably played a role in getting Russia’s support as well. Q: Chris Bodeen from Associated Press. When you talk about the rhetoric being a little overheated, does that apply also to President Trump? And should President Trump maybe tone down some of his comments as well? TILLERSON: I think the whole situation’s a bit overheated right now. I think everyone would like for it to calm down. Obviously, it would help if North Korea would stop firing off missiles. That would calm things down a lot. Q: …You just were talking about the actions that China has taken recently. And what’s behind that shift that the ambassador talked about what – China’s concerns, and how that might be playing into the shift. But what about the threats of trade actions from the United States? Do you think that that’s playing a role here — that China’s feeling pressure on the trade side, and that’s having some impact on their actions? TILLERSON: Well, I think you’d have to ask the Chinese that question. I think we have not deliberately linked those two actions. Trade is a – obviously, it’s an extremely important issue to the President, because it’s an important issue to the American people. We have a very significant trade imbalance, as you’re well aware. The President knows that’s important to the American people. It’s important to the American economy and jobs, and he intends to address it. We’ve never directly connected those two. I think the reason we’re seeing a very different posture on the part of China and the uptake on enforcing sanctions and their support for sanctions is because they too see how advanced this program now has become in North Korea. And I think they also have a sense that we’re beginning to run out of time, and that we really have to change the dynamic. Perhaps in years past when this was attempted – and we’ve said this before – unfortunately, our predecessors burned up a lot of runway, and I think even the Chinese realize that there’s not a lot of runway left now to solve this. And so that – I think perhaps that is what motivates them, because I do know that they are – they’re very committed to that policy of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, because they understand the implications of just allowing North Korea to become a nuclear state. If North Korea becomes a nuclear state, they want it to become the last country to become a nuclear state in this region. Q: I’m Anthony Kuhn with NPR. Secretary Tillerson, I’m very curious about a statement you made in a speech at the State Department about the difference between values and policy. And it seems to me that implies very much in China. So what does that mean in terms of our policy towards China? Does that mean we adjust our expectations? Does it serve as a justification for dealing with people or actors that we wouldn’t otherwise? What does it mean, in terms of policy? TILLERSON: Well, what I said is that policies can and do change based upon conditions, based upon circumstances with a particular country, based upon the issues. Your values never change. And so those values that the American people hold dear around human rights, treatment of people, of freedom – all of that is constant. And my point is if you try to shape policy around those values, in my view, what are you saying? Because policy can change. And so my view is the values are with us everywhere. They’re – you could say they’re embedded in everything we do. Policies, though, have to be crafted to deal with the circumstances at hand. And that’s – and when you – if you try to condition everything, one on the other, then you may not be able to create conditions on the ground to achieve your values. I think people are getting killed because of conflict and wars – the most important thing to them is to not get killed anymore. Not the most important – the most important thing to them may not be women’s empowerment or other issues. And that’s not to diminish those, but it’s to say that policies to deconflict need to be focused on deconfliction. And if we can create the conditions on the ground that allow us to advocate our values, we have a better chance of those values becoming more widespread. So I just – maybe it’s the way I tend to think about things, but I craft the policies, and the values are always embedded in those policies. The policies don’t – are going to have to fit the circumstance; the values are constant. Q: You’re not by any means saying – de-emphasizing human rights — TILLERSON: Not at all. Not at all. BRANSTAD: I would say – I’ve had an opportunity now to respond and meet with the Chinese on some of these issues involving human rights, and I’ve tried to – it’s part of our DNA. It’s part of what we – values that we have. And yet we need to recognize that they have a different system, and they may not share some of the values we have, but we still need to articulate those values and stand for those values that we think are universally human rights. Q: … Ben Tracy from CBS News. You mention that we’re not even at a point yet where we’re sitting down with the North Koreans to ask them what they want to talk about. Has the U.S. Government or the Chinese Government or the South Korean Government, for that matter, have any indication that they actually want to talk? Or do you think they want to complete their program first? TILLERSON: We are probing. So stay tuned. Q: How do we probe? TILLERSON: We ask, “Would you like to talk?” … We have lines of communications to Pyongyang. We’re not in a dark situation, a blackout. We have a couple, three channels open to Pyongyang. We can talk to them. We do talk to them. Q: Through China? TILLERSON: Directly, through our own channels. Q: Given the current debate from the administration over whether or not to withdraw from UN-endorsed multilateral deal with Iran over their nuclear program, does that – do you have concern over what effect that might have on North Korea’s willingness to come to the table to discuss a possibility of their own denuclearization or drawdown? TILLERSON: Well, we’re dealing with two very, very different situations in Iran, which does not have a nuclear weapons program and was not nearly as far advanced as North Korea is. We’re also – in Iran you’re also dealing with a very large nation, 60 million people, largely participating in the global economy, participating in global affairs. North Korea is a small, isolated country; they don’t participate in global affairs. Very limited participation in the global economy. So it’s – you have to use very different approaches with the two of them. I think in terms of how they – I don’t know if they’re watching what we do on the Iranian situation or not. And I don’t want to suggest to you that we’re not going to stick with the Iranian deal. The President will have to make that decision; ultimately, it’s what he wants to do. Having said that, we’re not going to put a nuclear deal in place in North Korea that’s as flimsy as the one we have in Iran. I can tell you that.” (DoS, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Ambassador Terry Branstad, Remarks, Beijing, September 30, 2017)
Early in his administration, President Trump signed a directive outlining a strategy of pressure against North Korea that involved actions across a broad spectrum of government agencies and led to the use of military cyber-capabilities, according to U.S. officials. As part of the campaign, U.S. Cyber Command targeted hackers in North Korea’s military spy agency, the Reconnaissance General Bureau, by barraging their computer servers with traffic that choked off Internet access. Trump’s directive, a senior administration official said, also included instructions to diplomats and officials to bring up North Korea in virtually every conversation with foreign interlocutors and urge them to sever all ties with Pyongyang. Those conversations have had significant success, particularly in recent weeks as North Korea has tested another nuclear weapon and ballistic missiles, officials said. So pervasive is the diplomatic campaign that some governments have found themselves scrambling to find any ties with North Korea. When Vice President Pence called on one country to break relations during a recent overseas visit, officials there reminded him that they never had relations with Pyongyang. Pence then told them, to their own surprise, that they had $2 million in trade with North Korea. Foreign officials, who asked that their country not be identified, described the exchange. The directive also instructed the Treasury Department to outline an escalating set of sanctions against North Korean entities and individuals, and foreigners who dealt with them. Those instructions are reflected in a steady stream of U.S. and international sanctions in recent months. The directive was not made public at the time it was signed, following a policy review in March, because “we were providing every opportunity as a new administration to North Korea to sit down and talk, to take a different approach,” said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss closed-door policy decisions. “We made clear the door was open for talks before the president had even signed off on this strategy, but North Korea continued to launch missiles, continued to kidnap Americans to keep as hostages . . . all the things they did when we were early in the administration and sending signals that the door was open to talks.” That door remains open, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said today in Beijing. Speaking to reporters following talks with Chinese officials, Tillerson for the first time acknowledged that the United States was in direct communication with North Korea. “We are probing, so stay tuned,” he said. “We ask, ‘Would you like to talk?’ We have lines of communications to Pyongyang. We’re not in a dark situation, a blackout. We have a couple, three, channels open. . . . We can talk to them; we do talk to them.” In Washington, however, officials quickly played down any idea that negotiations were underway or that anything had yet come of the talks. State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert issued a statement saying that “North Korean officials have shown no indication that they are interested in or are ready for talks regarding denuclearization.” The senior administration official said it would be wrong to “read too much into” Tillerson’s remarks. “The U.S. has always maintained some kind of channel, kept some channel open even in the darkest days of previous administrations.” Those channels include conversations between the State Department’s special representative for North Korea, Joseph Yun, and Pak Song Il, a senior member of Pyongyang’s delegation to the United Nations. They have met several times this year to discuss American prisoners being held by North Korea, among other matters. Other contacts have taken place through the “track two” process, which regularly brings together nongovernmental U.S. experts — and occasionally U.S. officials — and North Korean officials. The Cyber Command operation, which was due to end today, was part of the overall campaign set in motion many months ago. The effects were temporary and not destructive, officials said. Nonetheless, some North Korean hackers griped that lack of access to the Internet was interfering with their work, according to another U.S. official, who also spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a secret operation. Cyber Command and the White House had no comment. But the senior administration official said, “What I can tell you is that North Korea has itself been guilty of cyberattacks, and we are going to take appropriate measures to defend our networks and systems.” Eric Rosenbach, who led the Pentagon’s cyber-efforts as assistant secretary of defense in the Obama administration, said the operation “could have the advantage of signaling to the North Koreans a more aggressive posture. However, there’s accompanying risk of an escalation and a North Korean cyber-counterattack.”
Rosenbach, now co-director of the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School, said that he was not aware of the actual operation but that if it is “truly a military operation,” he sees no reason to hide it. “The Department of Defense should probably own it,” he said. Aaron Hughes, a former senior cyber-official in the Obama administration, said he, too, was not aware of the actual operation. But “if I was still in my [Pentagon] seat, I would actively be advocating we do these types of things. . . . We should be using all elements of national power to deter and message the North Koreans, to include our military, including cyber,” Hughes said. Others said they would be cautious about using even minor cyber-capabilities against North Korea and doing it openly because of the risk of retaliation. “I wonder what the disruptive payoff is that we’re getting that’s worth even a marginal extra chance of nuclear war?” said Jason Healey, a former military cyber-operator and now a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. (Karen DeYoung, Ellen Nakashima and Emily Rauhala “Trump Signed Directive That Officials Should Pressure N. Korea,” Washington Post, October 1, 2017, p. A-14)
10/1/17:
President Trump undercut his own secretary of state, calling his effort to open lines of communication with North Korea a waste of time, and seeming to rule out a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear-edged confrontation with Pyongyang. Trump was privately described by advisers as furious at Tillerson for contradicting the president’s public position that now is not the time for talks. “I told Rex Tillerson, our wonderful Secretary of State, that he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man,” Trump wrote on Twitter, using the derogatory nickname he has assigned to Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader. “Save your energy Rex,” he added, “we’ll do what has to be done!” While some analysts wondered if the president was intentionally playing bad cop to the secretary’s good cop, veteran diplomats said they could not remember a time when a president undermined his secretary of state so brazenly in the midst of a tense situation, and the episode raised fresh questions about how long Tillerson would remain in his job. Tillerson has been deeply frustrated and has told associates that he tries to ignore the president’s Twitter blasts. “It may be intended as a good-cop, bad-cop strategy, but the tweet is so over the top that it undercuts Tillerson,” said Sue Mi Terry, a former Korea analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Council. “It’s hard to imagine any other president speaking in this manner.” Christopher R. Hill, who under President George W. Bush was the last American negotiator to reach a significant agreement with North Korea, said, “Clearly, it is part of his management style, which seems to be to undermine his people at every turn.” While Hill took issue with the way Tillerson handled his disclosure in Beijing, “Trump’s tweet undermines Tillerson’s visit, leaving his interlocutors wondering why they are wasting the time to speak with him.” But Michael Green, who was Bush’s chief Asia adviser, said the time was not ripe yet for talks. “The president is right on this one in the sense that Pyongyang is clear it will not put nuclear weapons on the negotiating table, nor will the current level of sanctions likely convince them to do so, though an effective sanctions regime might in time,” he said. Indeed, several hours after his initial tweets, Mr. Trump seemed to preclude the possibility that the time might ever be ripe, without laying out his own preferred strategy. “Being nice to Rocket Man hasn’t worked in 25 years, why would it work now?” he wrote. “Clinton failed, Bush failed, and Obama failed. I won’t fail.” Negotiations with North Korea have long proved frustrating to American leaders. Bush and Clinton both tried talks and granted concessions while ultimately failing to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. But national security analysts have said there is no viable military option at this point without risking devastating casualties. White House officials made no official comment on Tillerson’s disclosure or Trump’s reaction, but advisers privately said the president was upset at being caught off guard. At the same time, they did not rule out diplomacy as a possible path forward eventually. Despite the president’s message, Tillerson’s spokeswoman said diplomacy remained possible. “#DPRK will not obtain a nuclear capability,” Heather Nauert, the State Department spokeswoman, wrote on Twitter after Mr. Trump’s tweet, using initials for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. “Diplomatic channels are open for #KimJongUn for now. They won’t be open forever.” She did not explain what she meant about not obtaining a nuclear capability, which North Korea already has. Senator Bob Corker, Republican of Tennessee and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the United States had no choice but to seek a diplomatic agreement. “I think that there’s more going on than meets the eye,” he said on “Meet the Press” on NBC before the president’s tweets. “I think Tillerson understands that every intelligence agency we have says there’s no amount of economic pressure you can put on North Korea to get them to stop this program because they view this as their survival.” While advisers said Mr. Trump’s comments were born out of aggravation at Tillerson, he could be attempting his own version of Richard M. Nixon’s “madman” theory, casting himself as trigger-happy to bolster the bargaining power of his aides. Trump has often talked about the value of seeming willing to pull out of agreements like the Iran nuclear deal, South Korea free trade pact and Paris climate accords, to stake out a position in negotiations. But this is qualitatively different. A misreading of North Korea could result in an atmospheric nuclear test or an artillery barrage against Seoul, the South Korean capital. Kim likes to play madman as well. Yet he has little incentive to begin talks now and may be betting that in the end the Trump administration would settle for a freeze in testing, leaving him with a medium-size nuclear force that serves his purposes. (Peter Baker and David Sanger, “Trump Squelches Tillerson’s Plan on North Korea,” New York Times, October 2, 2017,
Last August, a secret message was passed from Washington to Cairo warning about a mysterious vessel steaming toward the Suez Canal. The bulk freighter named Jie Shun was flying Cambodian colors but had sailed from North Korea, the warning said, with a North Korean crew and an unknown cargo shrouded by heavy tarps. Armed with this tip, customs agents were waiting when the ship entered Egyptian waters. They swarmed the vessel and discovered, concealed under bins of iron ore, a cache of more than 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades. It was, as a United Nations report later concluded, the “largest seizure of ammunition in the history of sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” But who were the rockets for? The Jie Shun’s final secret would take months to resolve and would yield perhaps the biggest surprise of all: The buyers were the Egyptians themselves. A U.N. investigation uncovered a complex arrangement in which Egyptian business executives ordered millions of dollars’ worth of North Korean rockets for the country’s military while also taking pains to keep the transaction hidden, according to U.S. officials and Western diplomats familiar with the findings. The incident, many details of which were never publicly revealed, prompted the latest in a series of intense, if private, U.S. complaints over Egyptian efforts to obtain banned military hardware from Pyongyang, the officials said. It also shed light on a little-understood global arms trade that has become an increasingly vital financial lifeline for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in the wake of unprecedented economic sanctions. A statement from the Egyptian Embassy in Washington pointed to Egypt’s “transparency” and cooperation with U.N. officials in finding and destroying the contraband. “Egypt will continue to abide by all Security Council resolutions and will always be in conformity with these resolutions as they restrain military purchases from North Korea,” the statement said. But U.S. officials confirmed that delivery of the rockets was foiled only when U.S. intelligence agencies spotted the vessel and alerted Egyptian authorities through diplomatic channels — essentially forcing them to take action — said current and former U.S. officials and diplomats briefed on the events. The officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss U.S. and U.N. findings, said the Jie Shun episode was one of a series of clandestine deals that led the Trump administration to freeze or delay nearly $300 million in military aid to Egypt over the summer. Whether North Korea was ever paid for the estimated $23 million rocket shipment is unclear. But the episode illustrates one of the key challenges faced by world leaders in seeking to change North Korea’s behavior through economic pressure. Even as the United States and its allies pile on the sanctions, Kim continues to quietly reap profits from selling cheap conventional weapons and military hardware to a list of customers and beneficiaries that has at times included Iran, Burma, Cuba, Syria, Eritrea and at least two terrorist groups, as well as key U.S. allies such as Egypt, analysts said. Some customers have long-standing military ties with Pyongyang, while others have sought to take advantage of the unique market niche created by North Korea: a kind of global eBay for vintage and refurbished Cold War-era weapons, often at prices far lower than the prevailing rates. Over time, the small-arms trade has emerged as a reliable source of cash for a regime with considerable expertise in the tactics of running contraband, including the use of “false flag” shipping and the clever concealment of illegal cargo in bulk shipments of legitimate goods such as sugar or — as in the case of the Jie Shun — a giant mound of loose iron ore. “These cover materials not only act to obfuscate shipments, but really highlights the way that licit North Korean businesses are being used to facilitate North Korean illicit activity,” said David Thompson, a senior analyst and investigator of North Korean financial schemes for the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, a nonprofit research organization based in Washington. “It is this nesting which makes this illicit activity so hard to identify.” With North Korea’s other profitable enterprises being hurt by international sanctions, Thompson said, such exports are now “likely more important than ever.” Even by North Korean standards, the Jie Shun was a veritable rust bucket. The freighter’s steel frame was corroded from bow to stern, and its fixtures caked with coal dust from previous voyages, U.N. investigators would later report. The desalination system had stopped working, judging from crates of water bottles officials would find strewn around the crew compartments. Whether its weapons were discovered or not, the ship’s 8,000-mile voyage last summer was probably destined to be its last. “The ship was in terrible shape,” said a Western diplomat familiar with confidential reports from the official U.N. inquest. “This was a one-shot voyage, and the boat was probably intended for the scrap yard afterward.” Seaworthy or not, the ship set sail from the port city of Haeju, North Korea, on July 23, 2016, with a 23-member North Korean crew that included a captain and a political officer to ensure Communist Party discipline on board. Although North Korean-owned, the vessel had been registered in Cambodia, allowing it to fly a Cambodian flag and claim Phnom Penh as its home port. Using a “flag of convenience,” as the tactic is called, allows North Korean ships to avoid drawing unwanted attention in international waters. So does the practice of routinely shutting off a vessel’s transponder, behavior documented in a February U.N. report that described the Jie Shun’s voyage. “The vessel’s automatic identification system was off for the majority of the voyage,” the report said, “except in busy sea lanes where such behavior could be noticed and assessed as a safety threat.” Still, a 300-foot-long freighter big enough to hold 2,400 passenger cars is not easily concealed. U.S. intelligence agencies tracked the ship as it left North Korea, and then monitored it as it steamed around the Malay Peninsula and sailed westward across the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The vessel was heading northward through the Red Sea in early August when the warning was passed to Egyptian authorities about a suspicious North Korean vessel that appeared bound for the Suez Canal. “They were notified by our side,” said a former senior U.S. official with direct knowledge of the events. “I give their foreign ministry credit for taking it seriously.” The Jie Shun had not yet reached the canal when an Egyptian naval vessel ordered the crew to halt for an inspection. At first, the cargo hold appeared to match the description on the manifest: 2,300 tons of loose yellow rocks called limonite, a kind of iron ore. But digging beneath stone and tarp, the inspectors found wooden crates — stacks of them. Asked about the boxes, the crew produced a bill of lading listing the contents, in awkward English, as “assembly parts of the underwater pump.” But after the last of the 79 crates was unloaded and opened at Egypt’s al-Adabiyah port, it was clear that this was a weapons shipment like none other: more than 24,000 rocket-propelled grenades, and completed components for 6,000 more. All were North Korean copies of a rocket warhead known as the PG-7, a variant of a Soviet munition first built in the 1960s. A closer examination by U.N. experts would reveal yet another deception, this one apparently intended to fool the weapons’ Egyptian recipients: Each of the rockets bore a stamp with a manufacturing date of March 2016, just a few months before the Jie Shun sailed. But the label, like the manifest, was false. “On-site analysis revealed that they were not of recent production,” the U.N. report said, “but rather had been stockpiled for some time.” North Korea’s booming illicit arms trade is an outgrowth of a legitimate business that began decades ago. In the 1960s and ’70s, the Soviet Union gave away conventional weapons — and, in some cases, entire factories for producing them — to developing countries as a way of winning allies and creating markets for Soviet military technology. Many of these client states would standardize the use of communist-bloc munitions and weapons systems in their armies, thus ensuring a steady demand for replacement parts and ammunition that would continue well into the future. Sensing an opportunity, North Korea obtained licenses to manufacture replicas of Soviet and Chinese weapons, ranging from assault rifles and artillery rockets to naval frigates and battle tanks. Arms factories sprouted in the 1960s that soon produced enough weapons to supply North Korea’s vast military, as well as a surplus that could be sold for cash. By the end of the Cold War, North Korea’s customer base spanned four continents and included dozens of countries, as well as armed insurgencies. The demand for discount North Korean weapons would continue long after the Soviet Union collapsed, and even after North Korea came under international censure and economic isolation because of its nuclear weapons program, said Andrea Berger, a North Korea specialist and senior research associate at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, Calif. “North Korea’s assistance created a legacy of dependency,” said Berger, author of “Target Markets,” a 2015 monograph on the history of Pyongyang’s arms exports. “The type of weaponry that these [client] countries still have in service is largely based on communist-bloc designs from the Cold War era. North Korea has started to innovate and move beyond those designs, but it is still willing to provide spare parts and maintenance. As the Russians and Chinese have moved away from this market, the North Koreans have stuck around.” As a succession of harsh U.N. sanctions threatened to chase away customers, North Korea simply changed tactics. Ships that ferried artillery rockets and tank parts to distant ports changed their names and registry papers so they could sail under a foreign flag. New front companies sprang up in China and Malaysia to handle transactions free of any visible connection to Pyongyang. A mysterious online weapons vendor called Glocom — jokingly dubbed the “Samsung of North Korean proliferators” by some Western investigators — began posting slick videos hawking a variety of wares ranging from military radios to guidance systems for drones, never mentioning North Korea as the source. The sanctions stigma inevitably scared away some potential buyers, but the trading in the shadows remains brisk, intelligence officials and Western diplomats say. Some remaining clients are fellow pariah states such as Syria, whose recent purchases have included chemical-weapons protective gear. Other long-term customers are nonstate actors such as the militant group Hezbollah, which has acquired North Korean rockets and missiles from arms smugglers and sympathetic regimes. North Korean-made rifles have even been recovered from the bodies of Islamic State fighters in Iraq and Syria, although U.S. officials believe the guns were probably looted from stocks sold to the late Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi years earlier. Still other customers look to North Korea as one of the last suppliers of low-cost parts and ammunition for older weapons systems that are scarcely found in commercial markets. The list includes sub-Saharan African countries such as Uganda and Congo, which for decades relied on North Korea to train and equip their armies. The list also includes Egypt, a major U.S. aid recipient that still maintains diplomatic ties and has a history of military-to-military ties dating back to the 1970s with Pyongyang, said Berger, the Middlebury researcher. Although Cairo has publicly sworn off dealing with North Korea, she said, incidents such as the Jie Shun show how hard it is to break old habits, especially for military managers seeking to extend the life of costly weapons systems. Egypt’s army today still has dozens of weapons systems that were originally of Soviet design. Among them are at least six types of antitank weapons, including the RPG-7, the 1960s-era grenade-launcher that uses the same PG-7 warhead as those discovered on the Jie Shun. The number of Egyptian RPG-7 tubes in active service has been estimated at nearly 180,000. “Egypt was a consistent North Korean customer in the past,” Berger said. “I would call them a ‘resilient’ customer today.” When Egyptian officials were first confronted about their country’s possible ties to the Jie Shun’s rockets, the response was denial, followed by obfuscation, Western diplomats said. At the time of the discovery, Egypt was a newly elected nonpermanent member of the U.N. Security Council, and its delegation resisted including information in official reports linking Egyptian officials or businesses to illicit North Korean weapons, said U.S. officials and diplomats familiar with the discussions. The embassy statement said Egyptian officials sought only minor delays to ensure that their views on the events were properly reflected. It noted that Security Council officials had “recognized and praised Egypt’s role” in assisting the investigation. In any case, the February U.N. report on the incident sidesteps the question of who was meant to receive the rockets, saying only that the munitions were destroyed by Egypt under U.N. supervision, and that “the destination and end user of the equipment was investigated by the Egyptian general prosecutor.” But evidence gathered by U.N. investigators and later shared with diplomats left little doubt about where the rockets were bound. An early clue was the nature of the rockets themselves: All were practice rounds — fitted with removable, nonlethal warheads of the type used in military training — and the large quantity suggested that the purchaser had a sizable army with many thousands of recruits. Egypt’s active-duty military is 438,000 strong, with another 479,000 reservists.
The most damning evidence was discovered on the crates. Each had been stenciled with the name of an Egyptian company, but someone had taken the trouble of covering the lettering with a canvas patch. Diplomats familiar with the investigation confirmed the involvement of the Egyptian company, but declined to name it and it is identified nowhere in the U.N. report. A single footnote states, cryptically: “National authorities closed the private company and revoked its license.” While U.S. officials have declined to publicly criticize Egypt, the Jie Shun incident — coming on top of other reported weapons deals with North Korea in recent years — contributed to the diplomatic turbulence that defined relations between Cairo and the Obama and Trump administrations. U.S. officials confirmed that the rockets were among the factors leading to the Trump administration’s decision in July to freeze or delay $290 million in military aid to Egypt. During Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al-Sissi’s visit to Washington that month, President Trump praised the military strongman before TV cameras for “doing a fantastic job.” But a White House statement released afterward made clear that a warning had been delivered in private. “President Trump stressed the need for all countries to fully implement U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea,” said the official statement, including the need to “stop providing economic or military benefits to North Korea.” (Joby Warrick, “Illicit Cargo Exposes N. Korea’s Arms Trade,” Washington Post, October 2, 2017,
Italy has become thefifth country to expel a North Korean ambassador, saying that isolation was “inevitable” if Pyongyang continued to push ahead with its nuclear weapons program. The decision comes as the United States urges countries that have diplomatic relations with North Korea to sever or at least scale them back. Angelino Alfano, Italy’s foreign minister, said the North Korean ambassador in Rome, Mun Jong Nam, had been ordered to leave. “We want to make Pyongyang realize that their isolation is inevitable if they don’t change tack,” Alfano told Italian newspaper la Repubblica in an interview published today. Mun had been in Rome barely a month, with his appointment announced by the North’s Korean Central News Agency on August 28. Italy follows in the footsteps of Spain, Mexico, Peru and Kuwait. A United Nations Security Council resolution passed late last year required member states to reduce the number of staff at North Korean diplomatic missions and consular posts, and to limit the number of bank accounts to one per diplomatic mission and one per diplomat. The Trump administration has been vigorously lobbying governments that have diplomatic relations with North Korea to curtail them as punishment for North Korea’s continued defiance of the international community’s calls to stop missile launches and nuclear tests.
In the interview with la Repubblica, Alfano also said that he was “comforted” by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s remarks that the United States had a direct channel to North Korea, signaling that diplomacy remained on the table for dealing with a defiant Pyongyang. The Italian government would not completely sever all diplomatic relations with North Korea, the minister said, because it was useful to have a line of communication to Pyongyang. Italy, which chairs the sanctions committee of the Security Council, has also been calling on the international community to apply strong pressure on the Pyongyang regime, Alfano said. Italy’s Foreign Ministry convened a meeting on North Korea in Rome last week, it said in a statement. Members of the Group of Seven countries, together with the European Union, South Korea and Australia, met to discuss how sanctions are being applied, the ministry said in a separate statement. (Anna Fifield, “Italy Becomes Fifth Country to Expel North Korean Ambassador,” Washington Post, October 1, 2017)
10/3/17:
“The Defense Department supports fully Secretary Tillerson’s efforts to find a diplomatic solution, but remains focused on defense of the United States and our allies,” Mattis told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. He added that Trump’s guidance to both Tillerson and himself has been “very clearly” to pursue the diplomatic effort. “I do not see the divergence as strongly as some have interpreted it,” Mattis said, recalling that Tillerson had said the US is “probing” for opportunities for dialogue with the North, not looking to talk immediately. Mattis argued Trump demonstrated his intent to work diplomatically with other nations on the North Korea issue by dispatching Tillerson to China last week. But the recalcitrance of Kim’s regime may call for still tougher sanctions, said the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “If there was one area that has been identified by many people as maybe being the one that would most profoundly change his behavior, it would be the loss of oil,” Marine Gen. Joe Dunford said at the same hearing. “We’ve seen in the past, when he’s had a cut — when the oil has been cut off, there’s been a change in Kim Jong-un’s behavior.” (Yonhap, “Mattis: Pentagon ‘Supports Fully’ Diplomatic Solution to N.K.” Korea Herald, October 4, 2017)
Ignatius: “Consider what is, for the moment, an entirely hypothetical question: What might Defense Secretary Jim Mattis do if he received an order from President Trump to launch a nuclear attack on North Korea in retaliation, say, for a hydrogen bomb test that had gone awry? Certainly, Mattis could try to talk the president out of the attack, if he thought the action was unwise. He could request delays to prepare for contingencies or gather intelligence. He could even, perhaps, argue that the action raised legal questions, because it might cause disproportionate civilian casualties in North and South Korea and thereby violate the laws of war. Yet, in the end, legal experts argue that Mattis would have to follow the orders of his commander in chief. That’s the way our system works. If Mattis’s efforts at persuasion failed, he could resign. But if he stayed on the job and refused a lawful presidential order, he could be fired.
“The president’s view, and whatever orders stem from that view, carry the day,” wrote Jack Goldsmith, a Harvard University professor and a widely respected authority on national security law, in a recent post on the Lawfare blog. (Harvard law student Sarah Grant co-wrote the post.) But take a closer look if you worry that Trump’s impulsive decisions could crash the ship of state against the rocks. Research reveals some fascinating instances when another erratic president, Richard Nixon, was checked by his subordinates. Let’s start with a little-known confrontation that involves, yes, North Korea. On April 14, 1969, North Korean fighters shot down a Navy EC-121 reconnaissance plane over international waters, killing all 31 crew members. Nixon wanted to retaliate militarily, as did his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. But Defense Secretary Melvin Laird was wary, fearing that the United States wasn’t ready for the consequences that might follow. So Laird slow-rolled the process. He delayed action. He presented studies. He halted the additional surveillance flights needed to gather intelligence before a strike. Citing a Pentagon logistics study, he told Nixon that he doubted “we have the capability now to handle a major confrontation in Korea.” And Laird prevailed. The retaliatory strike Nixon wanted never happened. Reading the account by Richard Hunt published by the Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense, it seems that Laird accomplished a classic case of bureaucratic obstruction. Nixon could make mercurial, intemperate statements, much like Trump. In August 1969, terrorists hijacked a TWA flight and flew the plane to Damascus, Syria. According to Evan Thomas in “Being Nixon,” the president received the news as he was having cocktails in San Clemente, Calif. “Bomb the airport,” Nixon ordered. This time, Kissinger was cautious. Thomas quotes him as deciding “to give the president the opportunity to have second thoughts.” Kissinger slowed movement of aircraft carriers to the eastern Mediterranean. Laird was also wary. He planned to cite “weather delays” to tarry the carriers even more. The next morning, while being briefed on carrier movement, Nixon asked Kissinger if “anything else” had happened. Kissinger said, “No,” and Nixon answered, “Good.” Kissinger wrote later that he “never heard another word about bombing Damascus.” A final example of sand in the presidential gears comes from Jeffrey H. Smith, a former CIA general counsel who during the Nixon era was a young Army lawyer. Smith recalled in a recent post on Just Security that in 1974, a few days before Nixon’s resignation, he was shown a message from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to subordinate commanders, advising that if they received any White House “execute orders” to use force, they should confirm them first with the chairman or the secretary of defense. Thomas explains in his book: “Worried that the president might do something desperate, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger passed the word that all commands to the troops from the White House must pass through him.” Schlesinger later claimed that he just wanted to reinforce the chain of command. This episode has also been explored by Garrett Graff in Politico. What could our imaginary Mattis do if he tried similar methods of caution but the president still wanted to launch what Mattis and his commanders viewed as an unwise attack? Well, there’s a remedy for that in our Constitution. The 25th Amendment provides that the vice president and a majority of the Cabinet officers can inform Congress that the president is unable “to discharge the powers and duties” of his office. The vice president would take over, unless more than a third of the House and Senate backed the president. But mind you, this is all hypothetical. As the Nixon stories show, even the most willful presidents usually end up listening to Pentagon advice. (David Ignatius, “Our Best Hope against Nuclear War,” Washington Post, October 3, 2017)
For the first time in Chicago Council Survey history, a majority of the U.S. public are willing to commit US troops to defend South Korea if it comes under attack. Six in 10 Americans (62%) support defending South Korea from North Korean invasion, up from 47 percent in 2015. In both scenarios, cross-partisan majorities of Democrats (59%), Independents (61%), and Republicans (70%)—and a majority of core Trump supporters (71%)—favor using U.S. troops to defend these allied nations. While Americans clearly value their ties to Japan, they remain more hesitant about intervening in a hypothetical confrontation between Japan and China. Although they are more likely now (40%) than they were in 2015 (33%) to support using US troops in a confrontation between Japan and China over disputed islands, a majority still oppose US military involvement (58%). (Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, and Craig Kafura, What American Thins of America First, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, October 2017)
10/4/17:
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was on the verge of resigning this past summer amid mounting policy disputes and clashes with the White House, according to multiple senior administration officials who were aware of the situation at the time. The tensions came to a head around the time President Donald Trump delivered a politicized speech in late July to the Boy Scouts of America, an organization Tillerson once led, the officials said. Just days earlier, Tillerson had openly disparaged the president, referring to him as a “moron,” after a July 20 meeting at the Pentagon with members of Trump’s national security team and Cabinet officials, according to three officials familiar with the incident. While it’s unclear if he was aware of the incident, Vice President Mike Pence counseled Tillerson, who is fourth in line to the presidency, on ways to ease tensions with Trump, and other top administration officials urged him to remain in the job at least until the end of the year, officials said. Officials said that the administration, beset then by a series of high-level firings and resignations, would have struggled to manage the fallout from a Cabinet secretary of his stature departing within the first year of Trump’s presidency. Pence has since spoken to Tillerson about being respectful of the president in meetings and in public, urging that any disagreements be sorted out privately, a White House official said. The official said progress has since been made. Yet the disputes have not abated. This weekend, tensions spilled out into the open once again when the president seemed to publicly chide Tillerson on his handling of the crisis with North Korea. NBC News spoke with a dozen current and former senior administration officials for this article, as well as others who are close to the president. Tillerson, who was in Texas for his son’s wedding in late July when Trump addressed the Boy Scouts, had threatened not to return to Washington, according to three people with direct knowledge of the threats. His discussions with retired Gen. John Kelly, who would soon be named Trump’s second chief of staff, and Defense Secretary James Mattis, helped initially to reassure him, four people with direct knowledge of the exchanges said. After Tillerson’s return to Washington, Pence arranged a meeting with him, according to three officials. During the meeting, Pence gave Tillerson a “pep talk,” one of these officials said, but also had a message: the secretary needed to figure out how to move forward within Trump’s policy framework. Kelly and Mattis have been Tillerson’s strongest allies in the cabinet. In late July, “they did beg him to stay,” a senior administration official said. “They just wanted stability.” At that time, however, State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert responded to speculation that Tillerson was thinking about resigning by saying he was “committed to staying” and was “just taking a little time off” in Texas. Tillerson’s top State Department spokesman, R.C. Hammond, said Tillerson did not consider quitting this past summer. He denied that Tillerson called Trump a “moron.” Hammond said he was unaware of the details of Tillerson’s meetings with Pence. Hammond said he knew of only one time when the two men discussed topics other than policy: A meeting where Pence asked Tillerson if he thought Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, was helpful to the administration, or if he was worried about the role she was playing. He added that whenever the vice president gives advice on how processes could run more smoothly, the advice is a good thing. Hammond also said that he wouldn’t characterize the secretary’s conversations with Mattis or Kelly as attempts to convince Tillerson to stay in his position. A Pentagon official close to Mattis denied any awareness of a specific conversation about Tillerson’s future in the administration. But the official said the two men speak all the time and have a regular breakfast together. The White House declined to comment on the record for this story. Tillerson and Trump clashed over a series of key foreign policy issues over the summer, including Iran and Qatar. Trump chafed at Tillerson’s attempts to push him – privately and publicly – toward decisions that were at odds with his policy positions, according to officials. Hammond said Tillerson has had no policy differences with Trump. “The president’s policy is his policy,” Hammond said. In August, Trump was furious with Tillerson over his response to a question about the president’s handling of the racially charged and deadly violence in Charlottesville, Virginia, administration officials said. Trump had said publicly that white nationalists and neo-Nazi sympathizers shared blame for violence with those who came out to protest them. “The president speaks for himself,” Tillerson said at the time, when asked on “Fox News Sunday” about Trump’s comments. Hammond said Trump addressed the issue with Tillerson in a meeting the next day. He said that during the meeting, Trump congratulated another White House official, Homeland Security Adviser Tom Bossert, for his performance on the Sunday news talk shows. Bossert had defended Trump’s controversial pardon of former Arizona sheriff Joe Arpaio. The president, according to Hammond, told Tillerson he was upset with his comments when he saw them the first time. But, Hammond said Trump told Tillerson, after watching the interview a second and third time, the president understood that Tillerson was trying to say Trump is the best person to convey what his values are. Still, the message was clear that Trump wanted Tillerson to defend him more, Hammond said. The frustrations run both ways. Tillerson stunned a handful of senior administration officials when he called the president a “moron” after a tense two-hour long meeting in a secure room at the Pentagon called “The Tank,” according to three officials who were present or briefed on the incident. The July 20 meeting came a day after a meeting in the White House Situation Room on Afghanistan policy where Trump rattled his national security advisers by suggesting he might fire the top U.S. commander of the war and comparing the decision-making process on troop levels to the renovation of a high-end New York restaurant, according to participants in the meeting. It is unclear whether Trump was told of Tillerson’s outburst after the Pentagon meeting or to what extent the president was briefed on Tillerson’s plan to resign earlier in the year. Tillerson also has complained about being publicly undermined by the president on the administration’s foreign policy agenda, officials said. Those strains were on display this past weekend when Tillerson said, to the White House’s surprise, that the U.S. is attempting diplomatic talks with North Korea. Trump quickly took the opposite position, writing on Twitter “I told Rex Tillerson, our wonderful Secretary of State, that he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man…,” using his latest epithet for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. “…Save your energy Rex, we’ll do what has to be done!” Trump added in a second tweet. Asked whether the president still has confidence in Tillerson, White House spokeswoman Sarah Sanders said yesterday that he does. Trump has already seen an unusually high level of turnover in his administration, with the departures of his national security adviser, deputy national security adviser, his chief of staff, press secretary, communications director — twice — his chief strategist, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the acting head of the Justice Department. On September 30 Trump accepted the resignation of Tom Price, the Health and Human Services secretary. One senior administration official described late July as “a tough period of time” for Tillerson. His frustrations appeared to mount in the preceding weeks. Trump publicly undermined Tillerson in June over a dispute between Qatar and other Persian Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Tillerson had called on the countries to ease their blockade of Qatar, yet just hours later Trump said the Saudi-led effort was necessary. Tillerson also pushed Trump to certify in July that Iran was complying with the 2015 nuclear deal. Tillerson has been at odds with Trump on other issues as well, arguing against sanctions on Venezuela and reportedly suggesting Israel return to the U.S. $75 million in aid. Tillerson also is seeking to use the implementation of arms deals Trump struck with Saudi Arabia and the UAE as leverage to prod the two countries to resolve the dispute with Qatar, according to U.S. and Arab officials. Administration officials speculate that Tillerson would be succeeded by Haley if Tillerson were to depart. Tillerson’s tenure has been rocky from the start. He was confirmed by a Republican-led Senate on 56-to-43 vote. That represents the most votes against a secretary of state in Senate history. Since then, Tillerson, the former chief executive of ExxonMobil, has been slow to fill jobs within his department and appears to have alienated officials in the White House, the Cabinet and Congress. He has become known for being difficult to reach and tends to take his time returning phone calls, administration and congressional officials said. Congressional Republicans balked at his proposed cuts to the State Department budget. “It’s hard to get him to return phone calls,” a senior Republican congressional aide said of Tillerson. “It’s hard to get him to answer letters.” Hammond said Tillerson is quick to return calls and respond to lawmakers. Tillerson has clashed with the president’s son-in-law and senior adviser Jared Kushner, who has a broad portfolio that includes policies in the Middle East, officials said. A second White House official downplayed any tensions between Tillerson and Kushner, noting that Kushner’s efforts on an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement are run through the relevant agencies and that a State Department representative went on his most recent trip to the region. A third White House official disputed the notion that Tillerson has alienated people in the White House, Cabinet and Congress. Trump’s July 24 speech at the Boy Scouts gathering struck a political tone unusual for the event, with the president talking about his electoral victory and the “cesspool” of Washington. He also joked about firing his Health and Human Services secretary if congressional Republicans didn’t pass a health care bill. The head of the Boy Scouts later apologized for the political tone of the speech. Tillerson is an Eagle Scout and a former president of the Boy Scouts. He had appeared at the gathering just three days before Trump. Hammond, his spokesman, said Tillerson was not upset with Trump’s speech. He said Tillerson told him that at the end of the day the scouts are going to remember that the president came to speak at their event, and their parents can answer any questions they might have about the message he delivered. It’s unclear if the latest disagreement between the White House and Tillerson on North Korea spells an end to the late-July reset. Nicholas Burns, former undersecretary of state for political affairs under President George W. Bush, said Trump “completely undercut Tillerson” with his tweets. “This was a direct public, I thought, repudiation of what Tillerson said,” Burns said. “It feeds the perception that Tillerson does not have a trusting relationship with the president, and that’s very harmful.” (Carol E. Lee, Kristen Welker, Stephanie Ruhle and Dafna Linzer, “Tillerson’s Fury at Trump Required Intervention from Pence,” NBC News October 4, 2017) Ignatius: “Secretary of State Rex Tillerson symbolically kissed the ring of President Trump on Wednesday in affirming his desire to remain in his post, despite reports of sharp friction between him and the White House. But how long will this gesture of loyalty secure his position? Tillerson’s desire to remain on the job is a stabilizing move, at a moment when the United States is locked in a potential nuclear confrontation with North Korea and Trump is headed for a key November meeting in Beijing. Although Tillerson has been a poor public communicator at the State Department, he knows the world and can speak the language of America’s global partners and potential adversaries. His departure now would be widely seen as damaging to America’s already fragile position in a world disrupted by Trump’s erratic policies. The question, as always with Trump, is whether this profession of loyalty will appease what has appeared to be the president’s growing anger with his chief diplomat. For Tillerson, the question is whether, after humbling himself in such a public manner, he can remain an effective and confident representative for the United States abroad. Tillerson sought to rebut an NBC News report that he had to be talked out of quitting in frustration last summer and that he had called the president a “moron” after a meeting at the Pentagon. He said he had never considered resigning. But on the “moron” comment, he refused to answer such “petty nonsense,” a non-answer that to some ears will sound like a confirmation. Tillerson rang all the bells in his adulatory comments about Trump. He said he had learned that Trump “loves his country,” is “smart” and properly insists on “accountability.” Tillerson also listed the administration’s foreign-policy accomplishments, including working with China to pressure North Korea, traveling to the Riyadh summit in May and strengthening the commitment of Saudi Arabia and its neighbors to fight terrorism, pushing NATO to spend more on defense, recommitting to remain in Afghanistan and being on the brink of extinguishing the Islamic State. That’s probably the same list that the White House would draw to assert Trump’s “wins.” “What we have accomplished, we have done as a team,” Tillerson said. He invoked other key players, including Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, with whom Tillerson said he communicated almost daily. Tillerson’s reference to Mattis is especially important, because the bond between these two has been something of an anchor in the storm of the Trump presidency. Mattis has never swayed from s commitment, expressed during his first weeks as defense secretary, to coordinate all major policy positions with Tillerson. Mattis’s camp has been steadfast in supporting Tillerson, seemingly unaware of any White House unhappiness and standing by the secretary of state. But presidential pique has been growing in recent weeks. It’s said that the president felt undercut by Tillerson’s separate positions on the Qatar-Saudi dispute, by his public statement that Trump “speaks for himself” after the Charlottesville unrest, and by his lean toward keeping the Iran nuclear deal intact. Tillerson’s public discussion of diplomatic channels with North Korea last weekend in Beijing also angered the White House, since it came at a time when Trump was advertising his confrontation with “Little Rocket Man,” his mocking description of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Trump was upset that Tillerson hadn’t cleared his comments with the White House. Whether Tillerson’s recommitment to the job is temporary — sufficient to get the president through the Beijing meeting in November, but not long-term — remains to be seen. In a sense, Tillerson faces a paradox: To be effective as secretary of state, he must communicate better with the country and the world; but to maintain the confidence of this prickly president, he must avoid comments that seem to question the president’s personality or policies. Tillerson, like everyone else in Trump’s world, is living under a volcano. The former ExxonMobil chief executive doesn’t need this job; he’s a wealthy man who obviously dislikes Washington. He probably should be be taken at his word when he says that he remains in his post at the State Department, despite the constant nastiness and occasional humiliation, because he’s trying to serve his country.” (David Ignatius, “Why Tillerson Kissed Trump’s Ring Today,” Washington Post, October 4, 2017)
Tillerson: “Good morning. There were some news reports this morning that I want to address. First, my commitment to the success of our President and our country is as strong as it was the day I accepted his offer to serve as Secretary of State. President Trump’s “America first” agenda has given voice to millions who felt completely abandoned by the political status quo and who felt their interests came second to those of other countries. President Trump’s foreign policy goals break the mold of what people traditionally think is achievable on behalf of our country. We’re finding new ways to govern that deliver new victories. Our job is now to achieve results on behalf of America, and we are doing that. We’ve created international unity around our peaceful pressure campaign against North Korea, including influencing China to exert unprecedented economic influence on North Korea. At the Riyadh summit, the President rallied Muslim-majority nations to assume new responsibilities for stopping terrorism. NATO members are now contributing more to shared security. And our approach to South Asia, and specifically Afghanistan, means building upon our relationships with India and Pakistan to stamp out terrorism and support the Afghan Government in providing security for their own people. And ISIS’s fraudulent caliphate in Iraq and Syria is on the brink of being completely extinguished thanks to an aggressive new strategy led by the President. What we have accomplished, we have done as a team. Similarly, Secretary Mnuchin has levied economic sanctions on North Korea and related entities. Countries must increasingly decide whether they will do business with North Korea or with the community of peace-loving nations. Ambassador Haley has spearheaded and achieved enormous success, passing the toughest UN sanctions to date on North Korea. General Mattis and I communicate virtually every day, and we agree that there must be the highest level of coordination between our diplomatic efforts and our military efforts. You can’t have a stronger partner than a secretary of defense who embraces diplomacy, and I hope he feels he has the partner he needs at the State Department. And this is just the beginning of the list of partners and friends across the government who are all working for the American people. There is much to be done, and we’re just getting started. To address a few specifics that have been erroneously reported this morning, the Vice President has never had to persuade me to remain the Secretary of State because I have never considered leaving this post. I value the friendship and the counsel of the Vice President and I admire his leadership within President Trump’s administration to address the many important agendas of President Trump, both from a foreign policy perspective and a diplomatic – I’m sorry, a domestic objective. Let me tell you what I’ve learned about this President, whom I did not know before taking this office. He loves his country. He puts Americans and America first. He’s smart. He demands results wherever he goes, and he holds those around him accountable for whether they’ve done the job he’s asked them to do. Accountability is one of the bedrock values the President and I share. While I’m new to Washington, I have learned that there are some who try to sow dissension to advance their own agenda by tearing others apart in an effort to undermine President Trump’s own agenda. I do not and I will not operate that way, and the same applies to everyone on my team here at the State Department. When I wake up in the morning, my first thoughts are about the safety of our citizens at home and abroad. There is no more important responsibility I carry with me than ensuring that Americans are safe. Providing for the security of the United States must be the number-one goal of our American foreign policy. President Trump and his administration will keep moving forward as one team with one mission: doing great things for the United States of America to make America great again. Thank you
Q: Is that the only thing that you consider to be erroneous in that article? TILLERSON: I think it’s the most important element of the article, is to reaffirm my commitment to this role that President Trump’s asked me to serve, and to dispel with this notion that I have ever considered leaving. I have answered that question repeatedly; for some reason, it continues to be misreported. There has never been a consideration in my mind to leave. I serve at the appointment of the President and I am here for as long as the President feels I can be useful to achieving his objectives. Q: Mr. Secretary, do you agree with Secretary Mattis that the United States should stay in the JCPOA? TILLERSON: We’ll have a recommendation for the President. We’re going to give him a couple of options of how to move forward to advance the important policy towards Iran. As you’ve heard us say many times, the JCPOA represents only a small part of the many issues that we need to deal with when it comes to the Iranian relationship. So it is an important part of that, but is not the only part. And I’ve said many times we cannot let the Iranian relationship be defined solely by that nuclear agreement. …Q: Could you address the main headline of the story, that you called the President a moron? And if not, where do you think these reports — TILLERSON: I’m just – I’m not going to deal with petty stuff like that. I mean, this is what I don’t understand about Washington. Again, I’m not from this place, but the places I come from, we don’t deal with that kind of petty nonsense. And it is intended to do nothing but divide people. And I’m just not going to be part of this effort to divide this administration. Q: Mr. Secretary, did you speak with the President about the report and did he ask you to make a statement, or is — SECRETARY TILLERSON: I have not spoken to the President this morning. I think he’s on his way to Las Vegas, is my understanding.” (DoS, “Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, Remarks, Treaty Room, Washington, October 4, 2017)
Q Mr. President, any response to Rex Tillerson’s comments — THE PRESIDENT: Yeah. I’m very honored by his comments. It was fake news. It was a totally phony story. Thank you very much. It was made up. It was made up by NBC. They just made it up. Thank you all.
Q Do you have confidence in him? THE PRESIDENT: Total confidence in Rex. I have total confidence.
While European powers France and Britain are lobbying Washington to cool tensions since North Korea’s most powerful nuclear test a month ago, a group of seven European Union countries with embassies in Pyongyang — the Czech Republic, Sweden, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Britain and Germany — held at least two formal meetings with North Korean officials in Pyongyang in September, three EU diplomats said. But they felt frustrated because the higher-level access that they had obtained in Pyongyang last year had fallen away, with only medium-ranking foreign ministry officials now attending the meetings. “There was a sense that we weren’t really getting anywhere because they sent these department heads,” said a Brussels-based diplomat who had been briefed on the meetings, which were described as “very serious” in atmosphere and tone. “They want to talk to the United States.” In contrast to recent meetings, when North Korean officials met EU envoys in the Czech Republic’s embassy in 2016 to discuss issues including cultural programs and regional security, a deputy foreign minister would attend, one EU diplomat said. For the small club of European Union governments with embassies in North Korea, that reflects Pyongyang’s anger at the EU’s gradually expanding sanctions that go beyond those agreed on by the United Nations Security Council. It could have repercussions for broader EU efforts to help mediate in the nuclear crisis, according to the EU diplomats briefed by their colleagues in Pyongyang, as the bloc prepares more measures against North Korea. EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, who chaired talks on the historic 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, says the bloc is ready to mediate in any talks aimed at freezing North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons programs. But at the same time, the European Union wants an oil embargo on Pyongyang that it hopes other countries will follow. Some EU governments are pushing to cancel North Korean work permits in Poland and other Eastern European countries because EU officials believe workers’ salaries are deposited in bank accounts controlled by the regime in Pyongyang. “The North Koreans are starting to see the EU as a U.S. puppet, but we stress that we are an honest broker,” said a second EU diplomat. The EU’s status as a potential broker relies, in part, on Sweden, which in 1973 was the first Western European nation to establish diplomatic relations with the North. Sweden is a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which was set up to oversee the 1953 armistice between North and South Korea, undertake inspections, observe military exercises and promote trust between the two sides. Czechoslovakia was also a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission until the early 1990s. Sweden played a key role in the release of Canadian pastor Hyeon Soo Lim and of U.S. student Otto Warmbier earlier this year. But Sweden has strongly backed the EU sanctions. The seven European embassies are limited in what they can say because North Korean staffers — whom Pyongyang requires the EU embassies to use — are expected to double as informants, the diplomats said. “Sanctions and pressure. … Sadly, we don’t have anything else,” said an EU diplomat in Brussels. The joint meetings with the North Koreans, usually held at a single European mission, have been focused on the release of imprisoned Westerners, not big diplomatic initiatives. But as efforts intensify to calm U.S. and North Korean threats of war, they could still prove an important channel to pass messages between Pyongyang and Washington. “In the best case, we could perhaps facilitate an opening of a diplomatic track between the North Koreans and the United States,” said Carl Bildt, a former Swedish prime minister and foreign minister from 2006 to 2014. Bildt said anything the EU does must be kept secret. “If the EU does something along these lines, the first thing the EU should do is not to talk about it. Talking about it is a pretty good way to ensure that one can’t do it,” he said. Mathieu Duchatel, a North Korea expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank that Bildt also now helps oversee, said the European Union could chair talks between China and the United States. Washington and Pyongyang have no hot-lines to prevent crises from spinning out of control, and it is not clear what Beijing’s reaction would be if the United States intercepted a North Korean missile test, Duchatel said. For now, Paris is in contact with White House National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster and White House chief of staff John Kelly, diplomats said, noting French President Emmanuel Macron’s budding relationship with U.S. President Donald Trump. Lt. Gen. McMaster and Kelly, a retired four-star Marine Corps general, have a soft spot for France born of their admiration for the French military, the diplomats said. It is unclear if that translates into a direct impact on Trump’s thinking on North Korea, European diplomats said. “They are trying to normalize Trump, but I don’t think Trump can be normalized,” said a senior French diplomat. “To get him to listen, heads of state need to speak to him directly.” (Reuters, “North Korea Seen Seeking Direct U.S. Talks as EU Diplomatic Back Channel with Pyongyang Goes Cold,” October 4, 2017)
Japan will not seek to shoot down North Korean missile tests unless they threaten its territory, the country’s defense minister has signalled in an interview with the Financial Times. Some US analysts have suggested intercepting ballistic missile tests as a way of stepping up pressure on Pyongyang, but Onodera Itsunori said Japan had not shot at two recent missiles passing through its airspace because they were projected to land safely in the Pacific. “Whether it is Japan or any other country, I think that shooting down a ballistic missile could be construed as a military action,” said Onodera. “Unless you judge it is an attack on your own country, I think it is difficult to shoot down such missiles.” North Korea fired Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missiles over Japan’s northern island of Hokkaido on August 29 and September 15, prompting thousands of residents to evacuate, but Japan did not try to intercept them using the destroyers it keeps constantly at sea. “The recent missile tests by North Korea passed at high altitude and there was no fear of them falling in our territory or territorial waters so we did not shoot them down,” Onodera said. Were a missile targeted at US territory in Hawaii or Guam, then Japan could intercept them under its new national security legislation, he said. Intercepting a ballistic missile test would require a destroyer equipped with the Aegis defense system to be in the right place at the right time. Security analysts who oppose shooting down test missiles say a failed interception could embolden Pyongyang. Japan is planning to acquire a land-based Aegis missile defense system to supplement its destroyers and its short-range Patriot missiles. “To be at sea around the clock, 365 days a year, is tough in terms of equipment and personnel. Therefore I think it is important to strengthen our deployment of ground assets, including Aegis Ashore,” he said. Despite the unpredictability of President Donald Trump, Onodera said he had “no doubts whatsoever” about US commitment to defending Japan. He welcomed Trump’s tough rhetoric, including calling the North Korean leader “Rocket Man” in a recent speech at the UN. “As part of putting pressure on North Korea, we welcome President Trump’s strong language,” Onodera said. He said America’s security commitment in the region was crucial. “If a conflict breaks out in east Asia, even temporarily, then Asian economic growth will halt. That will have a direct effect on the US economy. I think regional stability is very important not just for the United States and Japan, but for China and South Korea as well.” Onodera said Japan was strengthening its cyber defenses but had not detected a particularly large volume of hacking attacks from North Korea. He said Japan’s current stance on cyber warfare was defensive, indicating Tokyo was not seeking to launch its own hacking attacks against Pyongyang, which was a possible option for the US. “Whether as a nation Japan is permitted to conduct a cyber offensive attack — I don’t think that discussion is settled,” he said. “It would help if society, especially in the United States, could define what constitutes a cyber attack and what form a counterattack can take.” (Robin Harding, “Japan Rules out Intercepting Missile Tests,” Financial Times, October 4, 2017)
Despite Kim Jong Un’s repeated provocations and willingness to engage in heated rhetoric, top U.S. intelligence officials say the North Korean leader is not crazy. “Kim Jong Un is a very rational actor,” the deputy assistant director of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Korea Mission Center said Wednesday.”Bluster and rhetoric aside, Kim Jong Un has no desire to go toe to toe with [U.S. and South Korea’s] combined forces command,” Yong Suk Lee said at a CIA-sponsored intelligence conference in Washington. “Kim Jong Un wants what all authoritarian rulers want … to rule for a long time and die peacefully in his own bed,” Lee said. The intelligence assessment would appear to run counter to the rhetoric being used by President Donald Trump. Lee and other CIA officials believe there has been a “clarity of purpose” to the way the North Korean ruler is acting on the world stage. Pyongyang’s goal, they say, is to gain recognition as a major nuclear power and eventually negotiate a deal with the United States that sees American forces leave the Korean peninsula. Intelligence officials see North Korea’s repeated nuclear and missile tests as a way to create some space and give Pyongyang room to maneuver as it pursues its goals on the peninsula. “He wants to keep us out of his sandbox,” Lee said, predicting another test or provocation could be coming as soon as October 9, which marks the founding of the country’s ruling political party, as well as the Columbus Day holiday in the U.S. But current and former officials worry about the risk of miscalculation by Pyongyang. “They’re not suicidal,” according to the former U.S. special envoy for Six-Party Talks with North Korea, Joseph DeTrani, who warned that Pyongyang was playing a risky game, especially as the White House has ruled out any meaningful talks with the North Korean regime. “We could stumble into conflict,” DeTrani said. “They’re hearing from the president of the United States unfiltered [via Twitter], so this has to have significant impact.” There are also questions about what role China is willing to play. “China itself is wrestling with concerns about instability on its border, but at the same time is also trying to establish a stable relationship with the United States,” said CIA Deputy Assistant Director Michael Collins. “There is more China could do,” Collins said. “What effect that will have on Kim Jong Un’s calculus is a different matter.” Officials also say U.S. efforts to work with China have been hampered by Beijing’s own global strategy, which is aimed at frustrating the United States and limiting Washington’s influence in areas when the two countries do not see eye to eye. There are some indications Beijing’s influence over North Korea’s Kim Jong Un is limited. “He’s not afraid of China’s abandonment. He’s not afraid of a U.S. strike,” said the CIA Korea Mission Center’s Lee. (Jeff Seldin, “U.S. Intelligence Officials Call North Korean Leader ‘Very Rational,’” VOA, October 4, 2017)
The United States has decided to sell 56 advanced medium-range missiles to Japan for an estimated $113 million, the State Department said as the two allies face the growing missile and nuclear threat posed by North Korea. The planned sale of the AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles “will provide Japan a critical air defense capability to assist in defending the Japanese homeland and U.S. personnel stationed there,” the department said in a statement. The arms deal, pending approval by Congress, comes at the request of the Japanese government, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of the matter earlier today, it said. Aside from the missiles, the deal includes containers, weapon support and support equipment, spare and repair parts, U.S. government and contractor engineering, as well as technical and logistical support services, according to the department. “Japan will have no difficulty absorbing these additional munitions into the Japan Air Self-Defense Force,” it said. (Kyodo, “U.S. Oks Missile Sales to Japan amid N. Korea Threat,” October 4, 2017)
10/5/17:
President Donald Trump delivered a foreboding message tonight, telling reporters as he posed for photos with his senior military leaders that this might be “the calm before the storm.” White House reporters were summoned suddenly this evening and told the president had decided he wanted the press to document a dinner he was holding with the military leaders and their wives. Reporters were led hastily to the grand State Dining Room, where they walked into a scene of the president, his highest-ranking military aides and their wives posing for a group photo. The cameras clicked and they smiled. A joke was made about someone’s face being tired. Live classical music played. Then, Trump gestured to the reporters in the room. “You guys know what this represents?” Trump asked. “Maybe it’s the calm before the storm. Could be the calm, the calm before the storm.” “What storm Mr. President?” one reporter shouted. ISIS? North Korea? Iran? “You’ll find out,” the president said. He also praised those assembled for the photo, saying: “We have the world’s great military people in this room, I will tell you that.” Earlier in the evening, the president had lauded the group, including his defense secretary and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and said they would be discussing the most pressing military issues facing the country, including North Korea and Iran. He also denounced Iran, saying the country should not be allowed to obtain nuclear weapons, and offered another stark warning to North Korea’s Kim Jong-un. “We cannot allow this dictatorship to threaten our nation or allies with unimaginable loss of life,” he said, vowing to “do what we must do to prevent that from happening and it will be done, if necessary. Believe me.” He also said that, moving forward, he expects those in the room to provide him with “a broad range of military options, when needed, at a much faster pace.” (Associated Press, “Trump Talks of ‘Calm before the Storm,’” Korea Herald, October 6, 2017)
President Donald Trump is expected to revoke longstanding sanctions on Sudan ahead of an October 12 deadline after the North African countery ended ties with North Korea, according to three people briefed on the matter. The Trump administration had delayed a decision in July but senior oifficials from Sudan and the U.S. have ironed out their differences in a series of bilateral meetings, including over cutting support for North Korea. (Katrina Hanson, “U.S. to Lift Sudan Sanctions after Deal on North Korea,” Financial Times, October 5, 2017)
U.S. Customs and Border Protection says it is ready to block US imports of seafood – as well as any other goods – produced by North Korean laborers who work in China. An Associated Press investigation tracked salmon, squid and cod processed by North Koreans working at Chinese factories and shipped to American stores, including Walmart and ALDI. The North Korean workers found in Chinese factories aren’t allowed to leave, and receive only a fraction of their pay – most goes straight to the North Korean state. This means that American consumers buying seafood labeled “Caught in the USA, Processed in China” may inadvertently be subsidizing the government of Kim Jong Un as it builds nuclear weapons, and also supporting forced labor. US Customs and Border Protection said in a statement today it is reviewing the allegations and if warranted, would “pursue all enforcement actions and prohibit goods from importation as appropriate.” The companies that responded also vowed to investigate ties with suppliers. GOP Congressman Chris Smith from New Jersey, who has repeatedly called for tougher enforcement, said the Labor Department has already identified trafficking in 12 sectors of goods exported by China. “CBP should be stopping every shipment from those sectors _ and now trafficking-tainted salmon too,” he said. A White House National Security Council spokesman said the North Korean government’s scheme to outsource its labor underscores why the United States has pushed for restrictions on North Korean foreign workers. The spokesman said all countries should, at a minimum, ban companies from bringing in North Korean crews, as pledged in recent United Nations sanctions. China is among the countries that have promised to comply, already banning imports of North Korean seafood, and saying no more North Korean workers will be allowed starting next year. “But all nations must go further and reject what is clearly a despicable practice that only serves the regime’s nuclear ambitions,” said the NSC spokesman, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn’t authorized to comment. Walmart said its supplier has addressed the problem, although it did not specify how. Walmart and ALDI said they are committed to human rights and fair labor practices, and expect the same from their business partners. At a time when North Korea faces sanctions on many exports, the government is sending tens of thousands of workers worldwide, bringing in revenue estimated at anywhere from $200 million to $500 million a year. That could account for a sizable portion of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs, which South Korea says have cost more than $1 billion. North Koreans overseas work in construction in the Gulf states, shipbuilding in Poland, logging in Russia. In Uruguay, authorities told AP, about 90 North Koreans crewed fishing boats last year.
“I am not surprised at all,” said Anthony Talbott, who directs the University of Dayton’s Human Rights Center. “North Korea has probably the single highest level of state-sanctioned slavery in the world, it’s a major source of income for them.” Among those North Korean laborers in China, roughly 3,000 are believed to work in the northeast industrial hub of Hunchun, just a few miles from the borders of both North Korea and Russia. AP documented North Koreans in several Hunchun seafood processing plants, and tracked their supply chains to importers, including Sea-Trek Enterprises in Rhode Island, where managers said they are being inundated with phone calls from customers and suppliers since the AP story. Sea-Trek’s owners said that they hadn’t visited China and were unaware of the makeup of the workers, but would immediately cease dealings with the plant until the situation is resolved. “Sea-Trek will not purchase product from any company using forced labor,” said vice president Mitch Sarnoff. Mark Liszt, owner of Lawrence Wholesale, a national food distributor in Southern California, said it would investigate its suppliers as well. “We’re middlemen,” said Liszt. “We do make a practice of trying to go and visit the plants that we buy from in person, but it’s not a perfect world that we can see into every single one.” Some US brands and companies had indirect ties to the North Korean laborers in Hunchun, including Chicken of the Sea, owned by Thai Union. Trade records show shipments came from a sister company of the Hunchun factory in another part of China, where Thai Union spokeswoman Whitney Small says labor standards are being met and the employees are all Chinese. Small said the sister company should not be penalized. AP observed North Korean workers in Chinese factories building hardwood flooring, sewing garments and manufacturing electronics. Fordham University economics professor Giacomo Santangelo said he doubts it’s just fish processed by North Korean workers that reaches the US markets. “Now we need to ask, how many other products imported from China are made with North Korean labor?” he said. Top Senate Democrat Chuck Schumer of New York said US officials must keep products made by North Koreans out of the United States. “The administration needs to ramp up the pressure on China to crack down on trade with North Korea across the board,” he said. Ohio’s Democratic Sen. Sherrod Brown, who helped pass North Korea, Iran and Russia sanctions this summer, said corporations also have a responsibility to make sure they are abiding by UN sanctions and US laws. However, Bucknell University political science professor Zhiqun Zhu said a sanction-based approach that cracks down on imports isn’t going to solve the problem. “It has so many loopholes,” he said. “All sticks and no carrots will not make the North Korea problem disappear.” (Associated Press, “U.S. Customs Vows to Bloc Imports Made by North Korean Workers,” Korea Herald, October 5, 2017)
To fly into North Korea on an old Russian aircraft is to step into an alternate universe, one in which “the Supreme Leader” defeats craven American imperialists, in which triplets are taken from parents to be raised by the state, in which nuclear war is imminent but survivable — and in which there is zero sympathy for American detainees like Otto Warmbier. “He broke the law in our country,” said Ri Yong-pil, a senior Foreign Ministry official, adding that Warmbier was returned (a week before his death) as a “humanitarian” act. Another senior ministry official, Choe Kang-il, insisted that North Korea had provided excellent care and spent “all the money for nursing” him. Something in me snapped. I asked how North Koreans could possibly boast about their spending on a young man when he was in a coma only because of them. Choe replied just as hotly that Warmbier had not been mistreated and was in fine condition when he was sent back home. “The U.S. administration, or some people with a certain intention, let him die,” Choe said. “This must be intended to foster and spread anti-Communist hatred within America.” Officials offered no apology and gave no ground, reflecting a hard line toward the United States that I found everywhere on this visit; Choe derided President Trump as “a crazy man,” “a thug” and “a pathetic man with a big mouth.” I’ve been covering North Korea on and off since the 1980s, and this five-day trip has left me more alarmed than ever about the risks of a catastrophic confrontation. I was given a visa to North Korea, as were three other New York Times journalists. The U.S. State Department promptly gave us an exemption from the travel ban to North Korea and issued special passports good for a single trip here. Far more than when I previously visited, North Korea is galvanizing its people to expect a nuclear war with the United States. On past trips (my last was in 2005), we journalists stayed at hotels in the capital and were free to walk around on our own, but this time the Foreign Ministry housed us at its own guarded Kobangsan Guest House east of the capital. At first I thought this was simply to restrict us, but increasingly I saw signs of something more interesting and menacing: The Foreign Ministry was also protecting us from hard-liners in the military or in the security services. “Someone might hear you are from America,” and there could be trouble, one official explained. Hard-liners seem to have gained greater power this year, especially after Trump’s threat to “totally destroy” North Korea, and we were told that military officers sometimes mock their own country’s diplomats for being wimpish “American cronies.” Foreign Ministry officials escorted us every time we left the compound, probably both to keep us out of mischief and to protect us from the security agencies. Yes, all this has been a little discomfiting. The upshot is that I have felt more constraint than on past visits to North Korea, and considerably more tension. Before, I had been able to see senior generals, but this time the military flatly refused to consider my interview requests. The security forces also refused my request to meet the three Americans whom they still detain, one for two years now, without consular access. A basic problem is that hard-liners seem ascendant in both Washington and Pyongyang. Trump’s policy toward North Korea is founded on false assumptions that the Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un, will give up his nuclear weapons, that China can save the day and that military options are real. In Pyongyang, North Korea’s capital, which is full of wide streets and monumental buildings, officials also express little interest in the kind of tough compromises that would be necessary to resolve the crisis. “The situation on the Korean Peninsula is on the eve of the breakout of nuclear war,” Choe, the Foreign Ministry official, told me. “We can survive” such a war, he added, and he and other officials said that it was not the right time for talks with the U.S. The North Koreans insist that the U.S. make the first move and drop its sanctions and “hostile attitude” — which won’t happen. And the U.S. is equally unrealistic in insisting that North Korea give up its entire nuclear program. I told Choe that my visit gave me a sense of déjà vu, reminding me of a trip to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq on the eve of the American invasion. The difference is that a war here would be not just a regional disaster but a nuclear cataclysm. Choe was unimpressed by my warning. He said that Iraq and Libya had made the mistake of giving up their nuclear programs; in each case, America then ousted the regime. He added that the lesson was obvious, so North Korea will never negotiate away its nuclear warheads. Still, for all the shadow of possible war, North Korea has had some positive changes. The famine is over (although malnutrition still leaves one in four children stunted), the economy has developed and government officials are far more open and savvy than a generation ago. Officials used to deny that there was ever any crime in North Korea — but now they freely concede that this country has thieves, that young women sometimes become pregnant before marriage, that inevitably there’s a measure of corruption. (They do deny that North Korea has any gay people.) North Korea is no longer hermetically sealed, and South Korean pop music and soap operas are smuggled in on flash drives and DVDs from China (watching them is a serious criminal offense). There is also an intranet — a rigidly controlled domestic version of the internet — and students learn English from about the third grade. Yet this is still North Korea. Radios or televisions that might get foreign broadcasts are illegal, and there is no access to the internet except for foreigners and senior officials. When I arrived at the airport, my luggage was closely searched for pernicious publications, and even my phone was examined. Each home or village has a speaker, a link from Big Brother, that drums in propaganda each morning. Religion and civil society are not allowed. Government controls frayed during the terrible famine of the 1990s, when perhaps 10 percent of the population died, but the controls have returned with the economic recovery. This is the most totalitarian state in the history of the world, because it has computers, closed-circuit cameras, mobile phones and other monitoring technologies that Stalin or Mao could only have dreamed of. North Korea is also sometimes simply weird. Every year, people die trying to rescue the Kim portraits from house fires (whether because of genuine loyalty or to win credit with the authorities), and now this Confucian-style reverence is directed to Kim Jong-un, 33, the scion of the dynasty. His name means “just and merciful,” and the state media are worshipful about his “brilliant intelligence, military acumen, matchless courage and outstanding art of command,” as one publication put it. Do people really believe this stuff? I’ve interviewed countless defectors over the years, and they say that there’s more disenchantment among the youth and in the China border area, where Koreans realize that their country has been left behind. But the defectors add that many North Koreans, especially older ones and those distant from the China border, genuinely believe in the system and worship the Kim family — because they know nothing else. “Much of the older generation still remains loyal to the regime,” agreed Jieun Baek, author of a recent book on how information reaches North Koreans. Attitudes are changing among younger people and those involved in the market economy, she said, but she doesn’t foresee a grass-roots uprising any time soon. What makes this moment so perilous is that North Koreans are steeped in the idea that they have repeatedly defeated the U.S. — and can do so again. I suspect North Korea is rational and cares about self-preservation, and I don’t believe that it would fire off a nuclear missile at Guam or Los Angeles just for the thrill. But a dogfight between a North Korean and an American plane could cause a crisis that escalates. Or Trump could order an airstrike on a North Korean missile during fueling on the launchpad — and that, every North Korean official said, would lead to war. Both sides are on a hair trigger. That’s why in war games, conflicts quickly escalate — and why the American military estimated back in 1994 that another Korean war would cause one million casualties and $1 trillion in damage. Today, with the possibility of an exchange of nuclear weapons, the toll could be far greater: One recent study suggested that if North Korea detonated nuclear weapons over Tokyo and Seoul, deaths in those two cities alone could exceed two million. My sense is that both sides are fearful of appearing weak and are trying to intimidate the other with military bluster, but that each would prefer a peaceful resolution — yet doesn’t know how to get there politically. So how do we get out of this mess? First, Trump should stop personalizing and escalating the conflict. Second, we need talks without conditions, if only talks about talks: I’d suggest a secret visit to Pyongyang by a senior administration official, as well as discussions with North Korea’s ambassador to the United Nations. Third, human rights have to be part of the agenda, backed by the threat of suspending North Korea’s credentials at the United Nations. Fourth, we should support organizations that smuggle information on USB drives into North Korea; this would be cheap and might contribute to change in the long term. Fifth, increase cyberwarfare, which the U.S. has already used effectively against North Korea. Sixth, let’s enforce tighter sanctions, but only if harnessed to a plausible outcome. Ultimately, the best hope that is realistic may be a variant of what’s called a “freeze for a freeze,” with North Korea halting its nuclear and missile tests in exchange for a reduction in sanctions and in U.S.-South Korean military exercises — as an interim step, preserving the long-term goal of denuclearization. Unfortunately, both sides resist this approach; I was disappointed in the lack of North Korean interest. So if we can’t work out a freeze for a freeze, realistically the next best option is to settle into long-term mutual deterrence. But that would be risky, not least because we have an American president and a North Korean leader who both seem impetuous, overconfident and temperamentally inclined to escalate any dispute — and the American mainland increasingly will be in the cross hairs of North Korean nuclear warheads. I leave North Korea with the same sense of foreboding that I felt after leaving Saddam’s Iraq in 2002. War is preventable, but I’m not sure it will be prevented. (Nicholas Kristoff, “War Drums Inside the North,” New York Times, October 8, 2017,
10/6/17:
North Korea indirectly acknowledged that it had reopened part of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, claiming it has the right to run the complex in its territory. The previous Park Geun-hye government closed the joint industrial complex in February 2016 in protest of the North’s fourth nuclear test. “What we do in an industrial complex, where our nation’s sovereignty is exercised, is nobody else’s business,” said a post on Uriminzokkiri. “They will clearly see how our workers are proudly working now unless their eyes are blind.” The announcement came a few days after news reports that North Korea was operating factories owned by South Korean companies without reporting to the Seoul government. Quoting unnamed sources, U.S.-funded Radio Free Asia reported on October 2 that the North had been running 19 clothing factories over six months to produce garments for domestic consumption as well as exports to China. The source said the clothing factories were using electricity diverted from munitions plants, with the clothing production kept secret with curtains hiding the light. The unification ministry called for the factories to be closed immediately because operating the complex without the South’s approval is clearly illegal. “North Korea must not infringe on the South Korean companies’ property rights within the joint complex,” a unification official said. But besides such condemnation and protest, there is nothing practical the South can do because all communication channels between the two Koreas have been cut. The government seems to have no particular measures to halt North Korea’s unilateral operation of the inter-Korean joint industrial complex.The ministry had a similar response in August following news reports that North Korea had used vehicles belonging to South Korean companies in the Kaesong complex. Following the reports, South Korean companies formerly operating in the industrial park said they would have an emergency meeting on October 11. They responded cautiously to the reports, saying they would wait for the government’s official explanation. Opposition parties demanded the government take swift countermeasures, criticizing it for being idle against the North’s illegal conduct. “The government should come up with stronger measures against the North this time in close cooperation with the international community,” the main opposition Liberty Korea Party said in a statement. The party said the operation of the complex was a violation of the inter-Korean agreement and U.N. Security Council resolutions. “If the news reports are true, the North’s actions must not be overlooked,” the minor opposition Bareun Party said in a statement. “We cannot help but ask what the government is doing. It has only replied it is checking the facts. When the Korean Peninsula is at risk due to the North’s provocations, the government needs to make utmost efforts to overcome the crisis in every aspect. We urge its swift response.” (Kim Hyo-jin, “N. Korea Secretly Reopens Some Kaesong Factories,” Korea Times, October 8, 2017)
10/7/17:
President Trump continued to make vague threats toward North Korea today, saying that diplomatic negotiations and agreements over the years have not worked and that “only one thing will work,” without elaborating on what that one thing would be. “Presidents and their administrations have been talking to North Korea for 25 years, agreements made and massive amounts of money paid . . . hasn’t worked, agreements violated before the ink was dry, makings fools of U.S. negotiators. Sorry, but only one thing will work!” Trump tweeted in two messages on this afternoon. (Jenna Johnson, “Trump on North Korea: ‘Sorry, but Only One Thing Will Work!’” Washington Post, October 7, 2017)
10/8/17:
KCNA: “The Second Plenum of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea took place in the capital city of Pyongyang on Oct. 7, Juche 106 (2017). Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), guided the meeting. Attending the meeting were members and alternate members of the WPK Central Committee and members of the Central Auditing Commission of the WPK. Present as observers were leading officials of the WPK Central Committee and ministries, national institutions and provinces, cities and counties and officials of major industrial establishments. The plenary meeting dealt with the following agenda items:1. On some immediate tasks to cope with the prevailing situation 2. Organizational matter The first agenda was discussed. Chairman Kim Jong Un made a report on the first agenda. In his report he made an analysis of the complicated international situation prevailing around the DPRK and the important matters arising therefrom and mentioned the orientation of our Party’s immediate activities and economic development to cope with the prevailing situation and set forth the strategic tasks and ways for its materialization. He referred to the fact that the U.S. imperialists are making last-ditch efforts to completely stifle the sovereignty and the rights to existence and development of the DPRK by cooking up UNSC “sanctions resolutions” one after another with mobilization of their vassal forces. He solemnly declared: The nuclear weapons of the DPRK are a precious fruition borne by its people’s bloody struggle for defending the destiny and sovereignty of the country from the protracted nuclear threats of the U.S. imperialists. And they are powerful deterrent firmly safeguarding the peace and security in the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia and reliably guaranteeing the Korean nation’s sovereignty and rights to existence and development and a treasured sword of justice to remove the nuclear clouds of tyranny bringing a horrible disaster to mankind and make it possible for the people to lead an independent and happy life under the clear and blue sky. He noted with appreciation that the country’s science and technology have developed by leaps and bounds and the national economy has grown on their strength this year, despite the escalating sanctions of the U.S. imperialists and their vassal forces. This year’s struggle for implementing the decision of the Seventh WPK Congress gave valuable experience that we can readily blaze our path as long as there are perfect independent economic structure of the country and its solid foundations no matter what sanctions the enemies may impose, he said. The Chairman affirmed that the prevailing situation and the reality show that our Party was absolutely right when it dynamically advanced along the socialist road of Juche, holding fast to the line of simultaneously pushing forward the economic construction and the building of nuclear force and that our Party should invariably keep to this road in the future, too. Clarifying the Party’s principled stand and revolutionary strategy to put an end to the U.S. imperialists’ nuclear blackmail and threat and pave a broad avenue to the building of a socialist economic power by further enhancing the might of the self-supporting national economy, he stressed the need to further strengthen the power of the country under the unfurled banner of independence and self-reliance and thus decisively frustrate the reckless nuclear war provocation and sinister sanctions and pressure of the enemies. Stating that the WPK will victoriously conclude the standoff with the U.S., which has lasted century after century, and bring earlier the victory in the socialist cause by giving full play to its correct leadership ability, the Chairman set forth the orientation and tasks for bringing the revolutionary struggle to a new great upsurge. He emphasized the need to further cement the might of single-minded unity between the Party and the masses. The single-minded unity is the cornerstone for existence of our Party and State and the most powerful weapon of the Korean revolution, he said, adding that it is important to direct and submit all activities of the Party and the State to strengthening the single-minded unity of the revolutionary ranks and steadily make the revolutionary climate of devotedly serving the people prevail throughout the Party. He stressed the need to continue thoroughly implementing the Party’s line of simultaneously developing the two fronts so as to successfully accomplish the great historic cause of building the state nuclear force. …The present situation is stern and we are faced with ordeals but our Party always remains confident and will firmly adhere to the independent line and open the ever-victorious road despite any upheaval as it enjoys absolute support and trust from the entire army and all the people, he stressed. …A decision on the first agenda was adopted at the plenary meeting. Discussed there was an organizational matter, the second agenda. Recall and by-election of members and alternate members of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee were held. Pak Kwang Ho, Pak Thae Song, Thae Jong Su, An Jong Su and Ri Yong Ho were elected members of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee to fill the vacancy. Choe Hwi, Pak Thae Dok, Kim Yo Jong and Jong Kyong Thaek were elected alternate members of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee to fill the vacancy. Vice-Chairmen of the Party Central Committee were relieved of their posts and elected. Pak Kwang Ho, Pak Thae Song, Thae Jong Su, Pak Thae Dok, An Jong Su and Choe Hwi were elected vice-chairmen of the Party Central Committee.” (KCNA, “Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee,” October 8, 2017)
Senator Bob Corker, the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, charged in an interview that President Trump was treating his office like “a reality show,” with reckless threats toward other countries that could set the nation “on the path to World War III.” In an extraordinary rebuke of a president of his own party, Corker said he was alarmed about a president who acts “like he’s doing ‘The Apprentice’ or something.” “He concerns me,” Mr. Corker added. “He would have to concern anyone who cares about our nation.” Corker’s comments capped a remarkable day of sulfurous insults between the president and the Tennessee senator — a powerful, if lame-duck, lawmaker, whose support will be critical to the president on tax reform and the fate of the Iran nuclear deal. It began this morning when Trump, posting on Twitter, accused Corker of deciding not to run for re-election because he “didn’t have the guts.” Corker shot back in his own tweet: “It’s a shame the White House has become an adult day care center. Someone obviously missed their shift this morning.” The senator, Trump said, had “begged” for his endorsement. “I said ‘NO’ and he dropped out (said he could not win without my endorsement),” the president wrote. He also said that Mr. Corker had asked to be secretary of state. “I said ‘NO THANKS,’” he wrote. Corker flatly disputed that account, saying Trump had urged him to run again, and promised to endorse him if he did. But the exchange laid bare a deeper rift: The senator views Trump as given to irresponsible outbursts — a political novice who has failed to make the transition from show business. Trump poses such an acute risk, the senator said, that a coterie of senior administration officials must protect him from his own instincts. “I know for a fact that every single day at the White House, it’s a situation of trying to contain him,” Corker said in a telephone interview. The deeply personal back-and-forth will almost certainly rupture what had been a friendship with a fellow real estate developer turned elected official, one of the few genuine relationships Trump had developed on Capitol Hill. Still, even as he leveled his stinging accusations, Corker repeatedly said that he liked Trump, until now an occasional golf partner, and wished him “no harm.” The White House did not respond to a request for comment on Corker’s remarks. Trump’s feud with Corker is particularly perilous given that the president has little margin for error as he tries to pass a landmark overhaul of the tax code — his best, and perhaps last, hope of producing a major legislative achievement this year. Corker could also play a key role if Trump follows through on his threat to “decertify” the Iran nuclear deal, kicking to Congress the issue of whether to restore sanctions on Tehran and effectively scuttle the pact. Republicans could hold off on sanctions but use the threat of them to force Iran back to the negotiating table — a strategy being advocated by Senator Tom Cotton, the Arkansas Republican. But that approach could leave the United States isolated, and it will be up to Corker to balance opposition to the deal with the wishes of those, including some of Trump’s own aides, who want to change the accord but not blow it up. If the president were to oust Rex W. Tillerson as secretary of state, as some expect, Corker would lead the hearings on Trump’s nominee for the post. In a 25-minute conversation, Corker, speaking carefully and purposefully, seemed to almost find cathartic satisfaction by portraying Trump in terms that most senior Republicans use only in private. The senator, who is close to Tillerson, invoked comments that the president made on Twitter last weekend in which he appeared to undercut Tillerson’s negotiations with North Korea. “A lot of people think that there is some kind of ‘good cop, bad cop’ act underway, but that’s just not true,” Corker said. Without offering specifics, he said Trump had repeatedly undermined diplomacy with his Twitter fingers. “I know he has hurt, in several instances, he’s hurt us as it relates to negotiations that were underway by tweeting things out,” Corker said. All but inviting his colleagues to join him in speaking out about the president, Corker said his concerns about Trump were shared by nearly every Senate Republican. “Look, except for a few people, the vast majority of our caucus understands what we’re dealing with here,” he said, adding that “of course they understand the volatility that we’re dealing with and the tremendous amount of work that it takes by people around him to keep him in the middle of the road.” As for the tweets that set off the feud on Sunday morning, Corker expressed a measure of powerlessness. “I don’t know why the president tweets out things that are not true,” he said. “You know he does it, everyone knows he does it, but he does.” The senator recalled four conversations this year, a mix of in-person meetings and phone calls, in which he said the president had encouraged him to run for re-election. Trump, he said, repeatedly indicated he wanted to come to Tennessee for an early rally on Corker’s behalf and even telephoned him last Monday to try to get him to reconsider his decision to retire. “When I told him that that just wasn’t in the cards, he said, ‘You know, if you run, I’ll endorse you.’ I said, ‘Mr. President, it’s just not in the cards; I’ve already made a decision.’ So then we began talking about other candidates that were running.” One of the most prominent establishment-aligned Republicans to develop a relationship with Trump, the senator said he did not regret standing with him during the campaign last year. “I would compliment him on things that he did well, and I’d criticize things that were inappropriate,” he said. “So it’s been really the same all the way through.” While he opposed President Barack Obama’s divisive nuclear deal with Iran, he did not prevent it from coming to a vote on the Senate floor, which exposed him to fierce fire from conservatives, who blamed him for its passage. Trump picked up on that theme hours after his initial tweets, writing that “Bob Corker gave us the Iran Deal, & that’s about it. We need HealthCare, we need Tax Cuts/Reform, we need people that can get the job done!” Corker was briefly a candidate to be Trump’s running mate in 2016, but he withdrew his name from consideration and later expressed ambivalence about Trump’s campaign, in part because he said he found it frustrating to discuss foreign policy with him. To some extent, the rift between the two men had been building for months, as Corker repeatedly pointed out to argue that his criticism was not merely that of a man liberated from facing the voters again. After a report last week that Tillerson had once referred to Trump as a “moron,” Corker told reporters that Tillerson was one of three officials helping to “separate our country from chaos.” Those remarks were repeated on “Fox News Sunday,” which may have prompted Trump’s outburst. In August, after Trump’s equivocal response to the deadly clashes in Charlottesville, Corker told reporters the president “has not yet been able to demonstrate the stability nor some of the competence that he needs to demonstrate in order to be successful.” He said that he had made all those comments deliberately, aiming them at “an audience of one, plus those people who are closely working around with him, what I would call the good guys.” He was referring to Tillerson, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and White House chief of staff, John F. Kelly. “As long as there are people like that around him who are able to talk him down when he gets spun up, you know, calm him down and continue to work with him before a decision gets made, I think we’ll be fine,” he said. Corker would not directly answer when asked whether he thought Trump was fit to be president. But he did say that the commander in chief was not fully aware of the power of his office. “I don’t think he appreciates that when the president of the United States speaks and says the things that he does, the impact that it has around the world, especially in the region that he’s addressing,” he said. “And so, yeah, it’s concerning to me.” (Jonathan Martin and Mark Landler, “G.O.P. Senator Rebukes Trump over ‘Reality Show’ Behavior,” New York Times, October 9, 2017)
While the embassies of most countries promote the interests of companies back home, North Korea’s are in business for themselves. A series of tough sanctions by the United Nations and an executive order recently signed by President Trump have sought to economically isolate the nuclear-armed regime of Kim Jong-un. But Pyongyang has held on to an array of profit-making ventures, some of which operate in the roughly 40 embassies of the hermit kingdom. Many of these enterprises are hard to trace, but at least one is impossible to miss. For years, neighbors have complained about the noise coming from a large, fenced-in building here in a southern section of Bulgaria’s capital city. It hosts parties a few times a week, many of them capped off with a late-night flurry of fireworks, shot from the roofThe building, filled with gilded halls that can be rented for events, enjoys a kind of diplomatic immunity courtesy of its owner: the government of North Korea. North Korean embassies have spent decades running cash-raising schemes, nearly all of them illicit under current international law. Diplomats and their underlings have brokered deals for weapons and drugs, and more mundane products like machine tools and cows. They have also smuggled liquor, cigarettes, luxury cars and anything else that can be imported duty free and then sold at a gain. “My late father-in-law was an ambassador,” said Marcus Noland, who studies North Korea and is executive vice president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, “and he told me that in India, years ago, it was known within the diplomatic corps that if you wanted to buy beef, you could knock on the backdoor of the North Korean embassy in Delhi. They ran an abattoir in the basement.” Earning money is a necessity for the embassies — North Korea doesn’t fund them. Instead, they are expected to support themselves and send home any surplus. Despite the sanctions it is under, North Korea did $6.5 billion in trade last year. Analysts estimate that embassy revenues represent a small sum compared with the country’s other low-profile foreign ventures. Those included cadres of bodyguards leased to dictators who don’t trust their own citizens, laborers dispatched to work sites around the world who must remit their wages and state-owned companies that export ballistic missiles and other arms to countries like Syria. In some cases, diplomats get involved with weapons deals. The third private secretary of the North Korean embassy in Beijing doubled as an employee of the Haegeumgang Trading Company. The company, according to a United Nations report, supplied surface-to-air missiles and radar systems to Mozambique. Haegeumgang also sold machine tools, and an ad in 2014 for those products on a Chinese website listed the company headquarters at the same address as the North Korean embassy in Beijing. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not respond to faxed questions. Diplomats for the country have been ad hoc entrepreneurs since at least 1976. That year, Norway’s police found through surveillance that every member of the North Korean embassy in Oslo was involved in the import and sale of as many as 10,000 bottles of spirits and 100,000 cigarettes. Today, sanctions have forced many embassies to curb their ambitions, with some intent on keeping the lowest possible profile. The North Korean embassy in London sits unobtrusively in Ealing, a suburb-like section of London, just another brick house in a row of them. The difference is a small sign, barely visible from outside the wrought iron fence: “Residence and office, embassy of D.P.R. Korea.” Aside from black luxury sedans in the driveway, there are rarely signs of life in the building, even to neighbors. The way that the London embassy sustains itself is a mystery. One theory comes from Kim Joo-il, a former member of the North Korean military who defected and moved to London in 2007. He said he often saw embassy employees at a type of Sunday flea market called a car-boot sale. “They are always there buying secondhand electronics, toys, dolls, kitchen goods,” Kim said through an interpreter, seated at a restaurant he owns in a London suburb. “Some of these things they are cleaning up and fixing to resell, others they are sending home to North Korea.” North Korean embassies in the former eastern bloc, where the missions were long ago granted generous square footage, have a more lucrative stratagem. In Poland, 40 businesses are listed at the address of the North Korean embassy in Warsaw, including a pharmaceutical company, several advertising agencies and a yacht club. How many of these businesses are actually staffed there is unclear. In Sofia, the embassy owns a number of buildings on two separate properties. One is a complex that includes the embassy itself. Passers-by can pause at a glass display case — standard issue for embassies in the city — filled with photographs. One captures the Supreme Leader beaming at a crowd, others were of missiles that had just been launched. The event space, known as Terra Residence, is a 15-minute walk east. It’s the former home of the North Korean ambassador, built in the 1980s with dazzle instead of comfort in mind. Photos on Terra’s promotional website show an interior that is essentially a communist take on Versailles — a series of huge and austere halls with chandeliers, gold curtains and paintings of ballerinas. Terra rents out the space for magazine photo sessions, music videos and television ads, including a handful for national banks and one for Bulgaria’s version of “Celebrity Apprentice.” Its main business is weddings, proms and corporate events. Few attendees, it seems, realize they are spending the evening on North Korean property. A spokeswoman for Terra, Anelia Baklova, wrote in an email that the company has had a long-term lease with the embassy of North Korea that predates the imposition of economic sanctions. When the U.N. approved stricter sanctions, this year and last, Terra “froze” its payments, she said. The company has not been evicted, she wrote, because of the “considerable amount of money” it had spent on renovations and upkeep. Emails to the embassy were not returned. Some countries have succeeded in shutting down businesses that rent from North Korea. In May, Germany closed a youth hostel that was operating in what was originally North Korean diplomatic quarters. The governments of Poland and Bulgaria have so far been unable to end the ancillary activities. A spokesman for the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it had repeatedly raised the issue of renting out space with North Korean officials here, urging them to “use properties in Sofia solely for diplomatic and consular activities.” Terra, unlike its landlord, has tried to become a more agreeable neighbor. People who live across the street say that notices are now taped on the doors of their apartment building a day before there will be fireworks, giving a heads up and promising that the show will end by 10 p.m. Surprisingly, residents didn’t seem particularly vexed about living near an enterprise that has pumped money into the world’s most repressive and notorious regime. But that may say more about Bulgaria’s government than the dangers of North Korea. “When you live in a place where it’s so difficult to get even trivial stuff done,” said Nikolova, “it’s hard to worry about World War III.” (David Segal, “North Korean Embassies Host Proms and Sell Cows for Cash,” New York Times, October 8, 2017,
10/9/17:
Trump tweet: “Our country has been unsuccessfully dealing with North Korea for 25 years, giving billions of dollars & getting nothing. Policy didn’t work!”
America’s relationship with North Korea remains a diplomatic one, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis said, but he urged members of the military to be prepared in case the situation breaks down. Mattis also used his keynote speech at the annual AUSA conference in Washington. “It is right now a diplomatically, economic-sanctions-buttressed effort to try and turn North Korea off of this path,” Mattis told the audience. “What does the future hold? Neither you nor I can say.” In contrast to some of the president’s tweets, Mattis’ comments represent a fairly regular baseline of the North Korea situation — that diplomacy has the lead, with the military ready to back it up. (Aaron Mehta, “Mattis to Army: ‘Stand Ready’ If Diplomacy Fails,” Defense News, October 9, 2017) Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley made clear what a bind the US is in when it comes to solving the challenge of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, stating there are “no risk-free options” but said there is also not an “indefinite amount of time” to solve the crisis. “A full-blown war on the Korean Peninsula will be horrific by any stretch of the imagination. No one has any doubts about that,” Milley told reporters during a news conference on the sidelines of the Association of the United States Army’s annual meeting in Washington. And while Milley said that a full-scale military conflict on the Korean Peninsula would be “horrible,” he also suggested that North Korea gaining possession of an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking the US would be similarly unacceptable. “It would be horrible, there’s no question about it, but so would an intercontinental ballistic missile striking Los Angeles or New York City. That would be equally horrible,” he said. And while the Army chief made it clear that the military is ready to act, he said there are no “risk-free options.”
“There are no good, easy, you know, risk-free options here. This is extraordinarily difficult, extraordinarily dangerous. No one should underestimate it,” he said, underscoring that the final decisions on which course of action would be made by elected policymakers and not the military. “That decision will be made by the duly elected representatives of the United States of America,” Milley said, adding “there is a timeline on this” given the development of North Korea’s missile program. “It’s not an indefinite amount of time. And there will be decisions made, there’s no question about it.” (Ryan Brown, “U.S. Army Chief: ‘No Risk Free Options’ on North Korea,” CNN, October 9, 2017)
10/10/17:
President Donald Trump met with his top defense officials for a briefing and discussion on options to respond to any North Korean aggression or if necessary to prevent Pyongyang from threatening the United States and its allies with nuclear weapons, the White House said in a statement. Trump was briefed by Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford at a meeting of members of his national security team, the statement said. (Eric Beech, “Trump, Top Officials Discuss North Korea Options: White House,” October 10, 2017)
The Army’s top officer said that Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has clearly tasked the service with being prepared for war with North Korea. Gen. Mark Milley, the chief of staff, said the U.S. is still seeking a peaceful diplomatic solution to the crisis over the North’s nuclear missile program, but he told the Association of the U.S. Army conference that Mattis had meant what he said when he warned soldiers “you have got to be ready” during a keynote at the same event yesterday. “Secretary Mattis just yesterday very clearly tasked the United States Army to be ready. His words were carefully chosen,” Milley said. “So our No. 1 task, bar none, remains readiness. Readiness for what? It’s readiness for war.” “There’s one thing the U.S. Army can do, and that is, you have got to be ready to ensure that we have military options that our president can employ, if needed,” he said. “No one in this room knows with certainty how this situation will play out and someone in this room will be making the critical decisions,” Milley said. “But you can be sure that decisions will be made one way or the other because of the rapid pace of North Korea’s ICBM and nuclear weapons development.” Milley said “no one wants a war” and detailed the grave consequences if the United States and North Korea do fall into conflict. “All recognize that a war on the Korean Peninsula would be a tragedy on a huge scale with intense levels of violence in dense urban areas, enormous damage to infrastructure, and economic effects felt worldwide,” he said. “Most importantly there would be significant loss of human life, a level of war on a scale that few in the world today have ever seen.” (Travis J. Tritten, “Army Chief: Jim Mattis Very Clearly Tasked Army to Be Ready for War with North Korea,” Washington Examiner, October 10, 2017)
The United Nations has slapped a global port ban on four ships for their dealings with North Korea, including one that was caught smuggling 30,000 North Korean-made rocket-propelled grenades in 2016. Hugh Griffiths, the coordinator for the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea, called the move “swift and decisive.” The port bans were enacted under UN Security Council Resolution 2375 passed last month after North Korea test-fired a missile that overflew Japan. It is the first time the United Nations Security Council 1718 Committee, which oversees sanctions imposed by the Security Council on North Korea, has designated ships for port bans, according to Griffiths. The UN said the four ships were the Jie Shun, the ship caught smuggling grenades; the Hao Fan 6, the Petrel 8 and and the Tong San 2. The Hao Fan 6 is registered in St. Kitts and Nevis, tiny islands in the Caribbean, while the Petrel 8 is a cargo ship registered in the Comoros islands, off the coast of East Africa; according to MarineTraffic.com. The Jie Shun is registered in Cambodia, while the Tong San 2 is under the North Korean flag. (Joshua Berlinger and Richard Roth, “UN Bans 4 Ships from All Ports for North Korea Ties,” CNN, October 10, 2017)
North Korean hackers stole a huge trove of classified U.S. and South Korean military documents last year, including a plan to “decapitate” the leadership in Pyongyang in the event of war, a lawmaker in Seoul said. The purported revelations come at a time of heightened tensions over North Korea. President Trump recently said that “only one thing will work” when it comes to Pyongyang, hinting that he thinks diplomatic efforts are proving futile and military action may be necessary. The defense minister in Japan, a close military ally of the United States, said today that Trump might take such action against North Korea as soon as next month. “I think President Trump will judge in the middle of November how effective pressure and other efforts have been,” Onodera Itsunori told reporters in Tokyo. “If there have been no changes from North Korea, it’s possible that the U.S. will take severe measures.” In Seoul, Rhee Cheol-hee, a lawmaker in the ruling Democratic Party and a member of the parliamentary national defense committee, said North Korean hackers broke into the Defense Integrated Data Center in September last year to steal secret files, including American and South Korean “operational plans” for wartime action. The data center is the main headquarters of South Korea’s defense network. According to Rhee, the stolen documents included OPLAN 5015, a plan drafted two years ago for dealing with full-blown war with North Korea and said to include procedures to “decapitate” the North Korean leadership. He said the cache also included OPLAN 3100, outlining the military response to infiltration by North Korean commandos or another local provocation, as well as a contingency plan in case of a sudden change in North Korea. Pentagon spokesman Army Col. Robert Manning said today he was aware of media reports of the breach but would not say whether sensitive operation documents were exposed. “We are confident in the security of our operations plans,” Manning said. Responding to reports about the plans for decapitation strikes, the North’s Korean People’s Army said in March that it would “deal deadly blows without prior warning” to “the U.S. and South Korean puppet forces.” “They should think twice about the catastrophic consequences to be entailed by their outrageous military actions,” the army’s general staff said, according to a state news report. Rhee made his claims about the alleged cyberattack to South Korean reporters, citing documents obtained from the Defense Ministry under a freedom of information request. Rhee’s aides told the Washington Post today that the lawmaker had collected information from several sources with knowledge of the cyberattacks, and they confirmed that local media had correctly reported Rhee’s remarks. Yonhap, citing Rhee, reported that the hackers took 235 gigabytes of military documents and that almost 80 percent of the stolen documents have not yet been identified. The documents also included reports on key South Korean and U.S. military personnel, the minutes of meetings about South Korean-U.S. military drills, and data on military installations and power plants in South Korea, reported Chosun Ilbo. “I can’t reveal further details because they are a military secret,” Rhee said, according to the paper. The U.S. and South Korean militaries have a mutual defense pact under which the American military would assume operational control of the alliance if a war breaks out. The two militaries conduct large-scale drills twice a year, rehearsing the responses to various scenarios on the Korean Peninsula. As Kim has accelerated his nuclear weapons program and aimed increasingly bellicose threats at the allies, those plans have been updated to include “beheading operations” — strikes designed to take out North Korea’s leaders. South Korea’s Defense Ministry declined to confirm or comment on the reports of a cyberattack. South Korean lawmakers have a spotty record when it comes to revealing information about what is happening inside North Korea, with many claims later turning out to be wrong. But in this case, the claims relate to something that has happened inside South Korea, and there have been hints about such a cyberattack in recent months. In May, the Defense Ministry disclosed that the South Korean military’s intranet had been hacked by people “presumed to be North Koreans.” But the military said that only 53 gigabytes of information were stolen, and it did not reveal what was included. The previous month, reports emerged that North Korean hackers had broken into the Defense Ministry network and infected more than 3,000 computers, including the defense minister’s, with malware. At the time, South Korean newspapers, quoting unnamed government officials, reported that parts of one operational plan, OPLAN 5027, which outlines troop deployment plans and key North Korean targets, were stolen. (Anna Fifield, “North Korea Accused of Stealing U.S.-South Korean Military Files,” Washington Post, October 11, 2017, p. A16)
10/11/17:
North Korea has developed a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile, but quite what it can do is still not known, sources here said. They said Pyongyang in late September completed development of what is believed to be the Hwasong-13, an upgraded version of the Hwasong-14 that Pyongyang test fired twice in July. The Hwasong-14 is a two-stage rocket with a range of 13,000 kilometers or so. The latest development caused Japan, the United States and South Korea to raise their level of alert after satellite images indicated that new ICBMs were being transported by train from an arms factory near Pyongyang in late September, according to the sources who are familiar with North Korean military affairs. Defense experts in Seoul had assumed that Pyongyang would move to develop a three-stage ICBM, which is a norm around the world. The arms factory in Sanum-dong is known for having manufactured long-range Taepodong and other missiles. Experts analyzing the satellite intelligence said the missiles in question were larger in scale than the Hwasong-14. It was not known where the train was heading, the sources said. Rodong Sinmun, mouthpiece of the North Korean regime, reported on its online edition Aug. 23 that Kim inspected the Academy of National Defense Science. The article was accompanied by an image with hangul writing of the Hwasong-13 and a graphic suggesting it was a three-stage rocket. Intelligence officials had assumed that North Korea was demonstrating it was developing a new type of ICBM that can fly farther. (Makino Yoshihiro, “North Korea Said to Have New Types of ICBMs, But Range Not Known,” Asahi Shimbun, October 11, 2017)
The first thing you notice about America’s key diplomat on North Korea is that he has a nice smile and a quick wit, attributes that help lighten the mood in tense times. It was a delightful surprise that Joseph Yun agreed to an on-the-record interview today at the State Department’s annual briefing for opinion page editors. As State Department Spokeswoman Heather Nauert also made clear today, North Korea is the president’s top foreign policy issue. “That is the number one issue the president has asked Secretary Tillerson to engage in.” Yun described how it’s going. When he began his assignment, the North Koreans wouldn’t talk to him. They wanted nothing to do with anyone from the Obama administration. “They said they believed that the Obama administration was interested in a policy goal of regime change … ‘Why would we want to talk to anyone that represents an administration that believes in regime change?’” Things changed after President Trump’s inauguration. “After January 20, I would say things improved and really, we got underway with what we call ‘North Korea policy review.’ And in the review, we came up very clearly that we’re going to increase pressure on North Korea to denuclearize. But at the same time, we would leave room for engagement.” To be clear, when Yun says “denuclearize,” he means North Korea must rid itself of all nuclear capabilities. Personally, I hadn’t realized that was the starting point for talks. The policy, called “maximum pressure and engagement,” grew from North Korea’s failure to stop testing its missiles and nuclear devices. “In fact, in six years under the current leader, Kim Jong Un, they tested 80 times — over 80 times. Compare that with the previous six years, under his father, (Kim Jong Il,) who tested less than 20 times. So this was getting very much accelerated.” To begin a dialogue, Yun invited his North Korean counterparts to New York in late February. But in early February, the North Koreans killed Kim Jong Nam, their leader’s half-brother, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia’s capital. “Not only did they kill him, they killed him using VX nerve agent, which is classified as WMD by the United Nations. There was such an outcry that it was not possible for me to see them and of course we had to say, ‘Now is not the time for talks.’ At the same time, we had three American prisoners in North Korea. So both President Trump and Secretary Tillerson, it’s their very high priority to get American prisoners out. So I told (the North Koreans,) ‘Can we discuss getting the prisoners out and maybe from there we can build a dialogue?’ So that’s when I went to Pyongyang.” Among the prisoners was Otto Warmbier, an Ohio college student held for more than a year for allegedly trying to steal a propaganda poster from a North Korean hotel. Yun saw that Warmbier was not well. His parents later told Fox & Friends that when their unconscious son arrived home, he was blind and deaf, had a nasal feeding tube, was jerking violently and howling involuntarily, and that it looked like someone had taken a pair of pliers and rearranged his bottom teeth. “So what could have been a very positive story turned out quite negative because not only was he unconscious, he came back home and he died in less than a week. As you can see, the public opinion in the U.S. was very much against that. And then, of course, North Koreans, as they rightly should, got the blame. And as a result, we have now restricted travel of all Americans to North Korea.” Meanwhile, North Korea continued to violate world norms and test its missiles and nuclear bombs. In early September, it tested a device that “was probably 150 kilotons, which is, I think, about ten times bigger than the bomb that went off in Nagasaki. And of course they also tested intercontinental ballistic missiles that are capable of hitting Hawaii, hitting Guam and possibly the West Coast. “So this is why you’re seeing the tensions heightened. There is a realization among the American public that there is a genuine homeland security threat. … And this is why you’re seeing open debate on: do we pressure them, do we seek a diplomatic path or do we seek a pressure path? And that, I think, is the really big issue of the day. “I’m a diplomat. I work in the State Department. We have always said we should pursue pressure as well as a diplomatic path. And that is not an easy thing to suggest — to pressure someone at the same time to coax them to dialogue and diplomatic path. That is the challenge we face.” On diplomacy, Yun highlights the Trump administration’s recent success at the United Nations Security Council in securing unanimous resolutions to strengthen global sanctions that limit North Korea’s coal exports, oil imports and overseas workers forced to send “loyalty payments” home. “These guest workers are essentially slave labor,” spokeswoman Nauert later added. “They don’t get to keep their own money. That money goes back to the Kim Jong Un regime … That doesn’t go to feed his own people, to provide medical care to his own people. He uses it to fund extremely expensive weapons programs. We believe that with the sanctions, we could remove money going to those programs.” China remains the biggest holdout. And since China accounts for over 90 percent of trade with North Korea, “it’s crucial that China does its part in sanctions,” Yun says. On the other end of the spectrum, South Korea and Japan, our close allies, “have been very solid in being with us in all aspects of sanction policy as well as diplomatic policy,” he added. “So that’s where we are. And obviously this thing hasn’t yet run its course. I would pose to you that this is a difficult problem that’s been with us for many decades. Their nuclear program probably started in the ‘60s. The first nuclear agreement we reached with them was in ’94. …The second nuclear agreement we reached with them was in six-party talks that went from about 2003 to 2008. So we’ve seen many generations of this and this is a serious problem that’s become even more serious because of the homeland threat.” With that, Yun took questions. What about former President Jimmy Carter’s call to send a high-level delegation to Pyongyang for peace talks or to convene an international conference that includes North and South Korea, the United States and China? “Clearly we’re open to any approach, but let me be frank with you. … The North Koreans have made it clear to me, as well as to the world, that they want to talk to the U.S. They’re not that interested in talking to anyone else, that this is a problem between North Korea and the United States. So I’m not sure internationalizing it, that they would accept that. … North Korea has said they don’t want six-party talks. What they want to do is talk to us.” Do we want to talk to them? “I think we are very much open to talking to them. You’ve seen Secretary Tillerson say that. We want to talk to them. But we also do believe at the same time, they have got to come to talks with some degree of credibility and seriousness. They have agreed many times in the past that denuclearization is also their goal. But they have recently removed that. They said they would not denuclearize. And so that’s a problem for us. If you come to talks and say you’re not going to denuclearize, I’m not sure really what the future of those talks are.” Steve Bannon, former White House chief strategist, recently said that as long as North Korea has thousands of rockets trained on Seoul, there’s no credible military option that doesn’t result in the deaths of millions of South Koreans as well as thousands of U.S. troops stationed there. Is he correct? “You’ll have to ask my colleagues in (Department of Defense.) My main job is diplomacy. It’s not to pull triggers. This is outside, really, my lane.” Why do we expect sanctions to change North Korea’s behavior when they haven’t for decades? And if North Korea doesn’t commit to denuclearization, are we saying we won’t go to the table to talk? “I would say sanctions can be effective if implemented fully and properly. As I have alluded, China has about 90 percent of trade, so the burden does fall on China. It’s very different, by the way, than Iran, where there were many trading partners. In this case, it is China. So really, when you say sanctions have not worked, I think it is because sanctions have not been fully implemented by China. Why? That is a question we’re always trying to come to grips with. I think the common view among the analysts is that China fears the collapse of North Korea more than it fears a nuclear North Korea. They fear if North Korea were to collapse, then U.S. troops might move in along with South Koreans … And if you remember from the Korean War, that is also when the Chinese got into it, when it looked like (Gen. Douglas) MacArthur was driving U.S. troops and South Korea troops up there. So that’s their principle concern. This is why we’ve said to them, to reassure them, Secretary Tillerson has said our policy has four no’s. Number one, it is not about regime change. Number two, it is not about bringing on regime collapse. Number three, it is not about forcing reunification of the Korean Peninsula. And number four, it’s not about stationing American troops north of the DMZ. That was to reassure not just the North Koreans, but the Chinese that this is not about us pushing up beyond DMZ, but rather, it’s about denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula. “Denuclearization is the end goal of U.S. government policy, and it has been for the past three decades. You can ask questions about why it failed, but you’d have to give me another two hours.” There it was. A small chuckle, in a conversation that had grown tense. North Korea has looked at what happened in a denuclearized Libya, and America’s doubtful adherence to the Iran nuclear agreement. Is it realistic to expect Kim to follow a similar path? If he doesn’t, are we looking at South Korea and Japan getting nuclear weapons, or is that threat simply a way to get China’s attention? “This is, of course, what China fears. But if this situation continues, I can predict to you that South Korea and Japan will want stronger and stronger weapons, defensive weapons, or even offensive weapons to counter North Korea’s nuclear weapons … So you are staring at what looks like an arms race. And what is the logical conclusion to that? Already, we are seeing South Koreans, conservative South Koreans, wanting indigenous nuclear weapons. And if we have that, if we have South Korea go nuclear, and Japan go nuclear, that will be practically the end of NPT (the landmark 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty on nuclear weapons.) And NPT, in my view, certainly has been one of the most successful, post-Second World War treaties we’ve had, limiting the number of countries with nuclear weapons. The P-5 — Russia, U.S., United Kingdom, France and China — and there’s only a handful of others, Pakistan, Israel and India. So really, if you imagined in the ‘60s that nuclear weapons would be limited to these few countries, people would have thought you were dreaming. South Korea actually gave up nuclear weapons in the ‘70s because we asked them. So you can imagine if this goes down the path, the logical conclusion. … It will be a nuclear Northeast Asia.” Why do you think South Korea is less concerned by recent events? And what do you think when you hear the trash talking — the “Rocket Man.” Does that make your job more difficult? That’s also outside my lane. (Crowd chuckles.) What was that first question? Are we facing World War III tomorrow or more years of diplomacy? South Koreans in general have become inured to threats from North Korea. Remember, they are facing all these thousands of artillery just across the DMZ, which is about 35 to 40 miles away from Seoul, the center of population. So they have become fairly inured to threats from Pyongyang. In my view, I think for Americans, this is a threat that was somewhat unexpected, even though those who have followed North Korea issues have been predicting it for a while. I do think this is a serious issue. I do welcome the public joining the debate on how to deal with this. What is the right strategy? What does it mean to sanction a country and why are we doing it? Why do we have such a difficult partner or are we being difficult? These are all questions that are worth asking. In the end, I am again from diplomacy school and I would like to think there is a path out there. I would like to think there’s a path that could deliver: number one, lower tensions; number two, try to meet minimum requirements of each other; and number three, build some kind of relationship, build a little bit more trust in each other. I would like to think that is possible, but again it remains to be seen. Meanwhile, since this poses such a threat, we also have to believe we have to put all options on the table and that would have to include a military option. This is not an empty threat. If your homeland is under such a scrutiny and threat, I do believe you have to put all options on the table.” What about those other American prisoners? What can you tell us about your conversations with them? “We raise this at every opportunity. Protection of our prisoners overseas is an incredibly important mission for the State Department, so that really takes priority over anything else. I don’t want to go into too much detail about what kind of conversation we had. They were rather restricted because we were not just the two of us. We had a representative from their government there as well. There are actually three remaining detainees in North Korea. I did see them when I was there in June, but nobody has seen them since then. I assume they are still alive. We have an arrangement with the Swedish Embassy, where the Swedes look after our consular cases. And the Swedes have not seen them, either, since June.” As to the policy of making North Korea give up its nuclear capabilities altogether, spokeswoman Nauert said there’s no other choice. “If North Korea were to become a fully nuclear-capable country with weapons that are able to hit folks around the world, we know that North Korea would not contain itself,” she said. “We know that North Korea would sell those weapons and sell its technology. So the idea of containment may sound nice and rosy, but in reality, there’s no one out there who believes that North Korea could be contained.” (Rosemary O’Hara, “What America’s Key Diplomat Says about ‘Rocket Man,’” Florida Sun Sentinel, October 16, 2017)
10/12/17:
Pyongyang would never agree to any sort of nuclear deal with Washington, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho told Tass so long as the United States keeps applying pressure. He also told l Tass that U.S. President Donald Trump has “lit the fuse of war” with his “belligerent and insane statement” at the United Nations General Assembly, referring to Trump’s address on Sept. 19, threatening to “totally destroy North Korea.” Ri also told Tass. “Our nuclear weapons will never be a subject matter of negotiations as long as the United States’ policy of pressure on the DPRK has not been uprooted once and for all.” The top North Korea diplomat met with a delegation that was led by Sergey Mikhailov, director general of Tass, in Pyongyang at the invitation of KCNA. Ri emphasized North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s warning for the United States to “act sensibly and stop troubling us” if it does not want to face a strike by the regime, adding that the United States will not “go unpunished.” Ri said that it is Washington’s “turn to pay” and that the North Korean military servicemen and people “insistently demand that final scores be settled with the Americans only with a hail of fire, and not with words.” China and Russia have called for a “double freeze,” whereby the North suspends its nuclear and missile tests in exchange for South Korea and the United States halting their joint military exercises, to get Pyongyang back to the negotiating table. This has been rejected by Washington. He added that North Korea sees “no prospect for improving the inter-Korean relations” as long as Seoul continues to resort to sanctions and a pressure campaign in line with the United States. Trump said that he feels “stronger and tougher” than others on North Korea. When asked if he and Tillerson are on the same page on how to deal with North Korea, Trump said he has “a little bit of a different attitude on North Korea than other people might have.” He told reporters as he met with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau at the White House, “I listen to everybody, but ultimately my attitude is the one that matters, isn’t it?” (Sarah Kim, “North Won’t Agree to Nuclear Deal: Ri,” JoongAng Ilbo, October 13, 2017)
South Korea plans to drastically shift its defense strategy to allow for pre-emptive strikes against North Korea and the transfer of military command from the United States as soon as possible. The proposed changes were listed in the National Defense Ministry’s report submitted today to the National Assembly. The report outlines the ministry’s plans to compile new defense guidelines in December. Ministry officials said the new guidelines would be based on the concept of conducting offensive tactics that would lead to military victory with the minimum sacrifice. This aggressive stance comes after repeated military provocations by Pyongyang in the form of ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests.The gist of the past strategy was to go on the counter-offensive after North Korea’s first attack had abated. In the latest report, the ministry said the new system would enable South Korea to pre-emptively strike enemy bases when there are signs of a possible missile launch. The report added that to gain the military initiative in the shortest amount of time possible, an attack on North Korean territory would be conducted as soon as Pyongyang made its first move. The new strategy would also allow Seoul to take a more independent posture in relation to its main ally, the United States, an objective of the administration of South Korean President Moon Jae-in. The U.S.-South Korea mutual defense treaty calls for U.S. command over the South Korean military during a military encounter. “The new guidelines are meant to improve the South Korean military’s capabilities so that it would be possible to seek the early transfer of the command function,” a South Korean defense expert said. (Makino Yoshihiro, “South Korea Plans First Strike Capability in Defense Strategy,” Asahi Shimbun, October 13, 2017)
10/13/17:
South Korea said it detected an earthquake near North Korea’s main nuclear test site, the fourth since the country’s sixth and most powerful nuclear test explosion last month. Some experts suggested the area is now too unstable to conduct more bomb tests. The magnitude 2.7 quake occurred about 54 kilometers (34 miles) northwest of Kilju, the town where the test site is located in northeastern North Korea, according to officials at South Korea’s Korea Meteorological Administration. They said it wasn’t man-made and didn’t appear to cause any damage in the area. The officials said they believe the four quakes probably happened because the underground nuclear test on September 3 weakened or affected the tectonic plate structures in the area. The region isn’t one where earthquakes naturally occur and no quakes were detected after the five smaller nuclear tests North Korea has conducted since 2006. The officials declined to say how the recent quakes might have affected the area and the test site, where all of North Korea’s nuclear bomb tests have taken place. But some civilian experts said North Korea may stop using the site. North Korea, which is accelerating its efforts to develop more powerful nuclear weapons and missiles, is unlikely to waste its limited nuclear materials by conducting tests that are weaker than its sixth. But a more powerful underground detonation at the current site could be “potentially suicidal,” not only because of the weakened ground, but also because of the threat of a volcanic eruption at Mount Paektu, which is about 100 kilometers (60 miles) away, according to Kune Yull Suh, a professor of nuclear engineering at Seoul National University. Du Hyeogn Cha, a visiting scholar at Seoul’s Asan Institute for Policy Studies, previously expressed similar worries, saying he wondered whether North Korea would be able to carry out another nuclear test in the area. Other experts said the quakes might have been caused by landslides or the collapsing of test structures such as tunnels. At the height of the standoff between the countries last month, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho told reporters the country could conduct a hydrogen bomb test over the Pacific Ocean. Suh said Ri’s comments might indicate the North is unable to carry out new explosions at its test site. “It’s likely that North Korea will conduct its next nuclear test in the stratosphere, or about 100 to 300 kilometers (60 to 185 miles) from the ground, where it will be able to conduct more powerful detonations,” Suh said. (Hyung-jin Kim, “4th Small Quake Detected since North Korea’s Nuclear Test,” Associated Press, October 13, 2017)
The South Korean and U.S. navies will kick off high-profile joint drills off the coast of the peninsula next week, the allies announced. The two sides plan to conduct the Maritime Counter Special Operations exercise (MCSOFEX) from Oct. 16-26, in the East Sea and the Yellow Sea, also known as the West Sea. The training is aimed at promoting “communications, interoperability, and partnership in the (U.S.) 7th Fleet area of operations,” the fleet said. U.S. Navy units participating in the exercise include the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) and two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers — USS Stethem (DDG-63) and USS Mustin (DDG-89). The Reagan is expected to operate in the East Sea, while the destroyers will likely be sent to the Yellow Sea during the training period. South Korea will field the Sejong the Great Aegis ship, P-3 Orion anti-submarine aircraft, F-15k, FA-18 and A-10 fighter jets, as well as Lynx and AW-159 Wild Cat naval choppers. (Yonhap, “S. Korea, U.S. to Hold Maritime Drills against N. Korea,” October 13, 2017)
KCNA: “Kim Kwang Hak, researcher at the Institute for American Studies of the DPRK Foreign Ministry, released the following commentary titled “The U.S. reckless military moves compel the DPRK to take action” [today]: Recently the Trump group is making military bluffing against the DPRK, while introducing nuclear strategic equipment into areas around it one after another. According to foreign reports, Trump met top military officers at White House on October 10 to have a confab over military counteraction against the DPRK. Meanwhile, the U.S. staged nocturnal flight exercises with Japan Air “Self-Defense Force” and the south Korean puppet airforce fighters after introducing two B-1B nuclear strategic bombers into the sky above the East Sea of Korea at night on the same day. The Trump group is also inciting military pressure on the DPRK while introducing nuclear submarine Michigan into the Pusan Port of south Korea and planning to dispatch nuclear carrier Ronald Reagan into the waters around south Korea in mid-October to hold “high-intensity” joint exercises with the puppet forces. What should not be overlooked is that such military moves have been conducted at a time when the Trump group posted on twitter such letters reading that the U.S. failed to handle north Korea for the past 25 years and only one thing will prove effective, while frequently hinting at “military option” backed by such rubbish as “a calm before a storm” and “total destruction.” The Trump team is trying to provoke the DPRK through such reckless military provocations as dispatch of B-1B, nuclear submarine and nuclear carrier into the waters around the Korean peninsula. Such military acts compel the DPRK to take military counteraction. Its senseless military provocations make us keenly realize once again that we were quite right when we decided to bolster the nuclear deterrence for self-defense in every way, and harden our conviction that we have to keep to this path forever. We have already warned several times that we will take counteractions for self-defense including a salvo of missiles into waters near the U.S. territory of Guam, an advance base for invading the DPRK, where key U.S. bases are located, as the U.S. has resorted to military actions in sensitive regions, making the waters off the Korean peninsula and in the Pacific restless. The U.S. military action hardens our determination that the U.S. should be tamed with fire and lets us take our hand closer to “trigger” for taking the toughest countermeasure. In case any shocking case occurs on the Korean peninsula, the U.S. will be made to hold responsibility as it is pushing the situation on the peninsula to the point of explosion while going reckless, being carried away by ill-advised bravery.” (KCNA, “U.S. Reckless Military Moves Compels DPRK to Take Action: Research of Institute of American Affairs,” October 13, 2017)
10/15/17:
“Those diplomatic efforts will continue until the first bomb drops,” Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said on CNN’s “State of the Union.” Tillerson’s comments came a day before the latest US-South Korea military exercises off the Korean Peninsula, which Pyongyang claims are rehearsals for a US-led invasion. Despite a statement on Twitter that suggested diplomacy won’t work, the President wants to avoid violence, Tillerson said. “The President has also made clear to me that he wants this solved diplomatically,” Tillerson said. “He is not seeking to go to war.” (Eli Watkins, “Tillerson on North Korea: Diplomacy Will Continue ‘Until the First Bomb Drops,” CNN, October 16, 2017)
The United States has been constantly refining military options to use in the event of a war with North Korea, President Donald Trump’s top security adviser said. National Security Adviser Gen. H.R. McMaster made the remark on Fox News as tensions have heightened over North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. “The president’s been really clear about this. He is not going to permit this rogue regime, Kim Jong-un, to threaten the United States with a nuclear weapon,” he said, referring to the North Korean leader. “So he is going to do anything necessary to prevent that from happening.” McMaster added that military options for North Korea are “under constant refinement.” “Our military’s getting stronger and stronger and our military leaders are refining, improving plans every day,” he said. “Plans we hope we don’t have to use, but we must be ready.” “All of our armed forces,” McMaster said, “are getting to a high, high degree of readiness for this mission if it’s necessary.” (Yonhap, “Military Options for N. Korea ‘under Constant Refinement’: McMaster,” Korea Times, October 16, 2017)
10/16/17:
A North Korean official reaffirmed Pyongyang’s commitment to developing a long-range intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching “all the way to the East coast of the mainland US,” telling CNN that the rogue nation is currently not interested in diplomacy with the US until it achieves that goal. North Korea is not ruling out diplomacy, but “before we can engage in diplomacy with the Trump administration, we want to send a clear message that the DPRK has a reliable defensive and offensive capability to counter any aggression from the United States,” the official said. The comments offer a sobering challenge to the US and the Trump administration which has offered mixed messages regarding diplomatic efforts with North Korea. White House chief of staff John Kelly said last week that Americans should be concerned about North Korea’s ability to reach the United States with an intercontinental ballistic missile, cryptically telling reporters that if the threat grows “beyond where it is today, well, let’s hope that diplomacy works.” Significantly, Kelly noted that Pyongyang “is developing a pretty good nuclear re-entry vehicle.” (Will Ripley, Zachary Cohen and Richard Roth, “North Korea Rejects Diplomacy with U.S. for Now: Source,” CNN, October 17, 2017)
A North Korean diplomat publicly expressed anger over reports that hackers gained access to a US-South Korean plan to “decapitate” the regime’s leadership. North Korea’s deputy UN Ambassador Kim In Ryong warned that the plan is “dangerous” and an insult to the nation. Kim told a UN committee meeting on nuclear issues that “what is more dangerous is that the US dared to formulate a plan and stage the exercise of decapitation operation and secret operation aimed at the removal of our supreme leadership.” “This is an unbearable insult to the supreme dignity of the DPRK and it arouses extreme anger from our people and service personnel,” Ryong said. The North Korean UN diplomat also fiercely defended Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests. “Unless the hostile policy and the nuclear threat of the US is thoroughly eradicated, we will never put our nuclear weapons and ballistic rockets on the negotiation table under any circumstance and will never flinch even an inch from the road we have chosen, upholding the line of simultaneously developing the two fronts, the everlasting banner in safeguarding the peace,” Ryong said. “This year, we have passed the final gate of completing the state nuclear force and thus became the full- fledged nuclear power which possesses the delivery means of various ranges, including the atomic bomb, H-bomb and intercontinental ballistic rockets,” he said. “The entire US mainland is within our firing range and if the US dares to invade our sacred territory even an inch it will not escape our severe punishment in any part of the globe.” (CNN, “North Korean Anger over U.S. ‘Decapitation’ Plan,” October 16, 2017)
When North Korean hackers tried to steal $1 billion from the New York Federal Reserve last year, only a spelling error stopped them. They were digitally looting an account of the Bangladesh Central Bank, when bankers grew suspicious about a withdrawal request that had misspelled “foundation” as “fandation.” Even so, Kim Jong-un’s minions still got away with $81 million in that heist. Then only sheer luck enabled a 22-year-old British hacker to defuse the biggest North Korean cyberattack to date, a ransomware attack last May that failed to generate much cash but brought down hundreds of thousands of computers across dozens of countries — and briefly crippled Britain’s National Health Service. Their track record is mixed, but North Korea’s army of more than 6,000 hackers is undeniably persistent, and undeniably improving, according to American and British security officials who have traced these attacks and others back to the North. Amid all the attention on Pyongyang’s progress in developing a nuclear weapon capable of striking the continental United States, the North Koreans have also quietly developed a cyberprogram that is stealing hundreds of millions of dollars and proving capable of unleashing global havoc. Unlike its weapons tests, which have led to international sanctions, the North’s cyberstrikes have faced almost no pushback or punishment, even as the regime is already using its hacking capabilities for actual attacks against its adversaries in the West. And just as Western analysts once scoffed at the potential of the North’s nuclear program, so did experts dismiss its cyberpotential — only to now acknowledge that hacking is an almost perfect weapon for a Pyongyang that is isolated and has little to lose. The country’s primitive infrastructure is far less vulnerable to cyberretaliation, and North Korean hackers operate outside the country, anyway. Sanctions offer no useful response, since a raft of sanctions are already imposed. And Kim’s advisers are betting that no one will respond to a cyberattack with a military attack, for fear of a catastrophic escalation between North and South Korea. “Cyber is a tailor-made instrument of power for them,” said Chris Inglis, a former deputy director of the National Security Agency, who now teaches about security at the United States Naval Academy. “There’s a low cost of entry, it’s largely asymmetrical, there’s some degree of anonymity and stealth in its use. It can hold large swaths of nation state infrastructure and private-sector infrastructure at risk. It’s a source of income.” Inglis, speaking at the Cambridge Cyber Summit this month, added: “You could argue that they have one of the most successful cyberprograms on the planet, not because it’s technically sophisticated, but because it has achieved all of their aims at very low cost.” It is hardly a one-way conflict: By some measures the United States and North Korea have been engaged in an active cyberconflict for years. Both the United States and South Korea have also placed digital “implants” in the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the North Korean equivalent of the Central Intelligence Agency, according to documents that Edward J. Snowden released several years ago. American-created cyber- and electronic warfare weapons were deployed to disable North Korean missiles, an attack that was, at best, only partially successful. Indeed, both sides see cyber as the way to gain tactical advantage in their nuclear and missile standoff. A South Korean lawmaker last week revealed that the North had successfully broken into the South’s military networks to steal war plans, including for the “decapitation” of the North Korean leadership in the opening hours of a new Korean war. There is evidence Pyongyang has planted so-called digital sleeper cells in the South’s critical infrastructure, and its Defense Ministry, that could be activated to paralyze power supplies and military command and control networks. What has not been disclosed, until now, is that North Korea had also hacked into a British television network a few weeks earlier to stop it from broadcasting a drama about a nuclear scientist kidnapped in Pyongyang. Once North Korea counterfeited crude $100 bills to try to generate hard cash. Now intelligence officials estimate that North Korea reaps hundreds of millions of dollars a year from ransomware, digital bank heists, online video game cracking, and more recently, hacks of South Korean Bitcoin exchanges. One former British intelligence chief estimates the take from its cyberheists may bring the North as much as $1 billion a year, or a third of the value of the nation’s exports. The North Korean cyberthreat “crept up on us,” said Robert Hannigan, the former director of Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters, which handles electronic surveillance and cybersecurity. “Because they are such a mix of the weird and absurd and medieval and highly sophisticated, people didn’t take it seriously,” he said. “How can such an isolated, backward country have this capability? Well, how can such an isolated backward country have this nuclear ability?” Kim Jong-il, like the Chinese, initially saw the internet as a threat to his regime’s ironclad control over information. But his attitude began to change in the early 1990s, after a group of North Korean computer scientists returned from travel abroad proposing to use the web to spy on and attack enemies like the United States and South Korea, according to defectors. North Korea began identifying promising students at an early age for special training, sending many to China’s top computer science programs. In the late 1990s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s counterintelligence division noticed that North Koreans assigned to work at the United Nations were also quietly enrolling in university computer programming courses in New York. “The F.B.I. called me and said, ‘What should we do?’ ” recalled James A. Lewis, at the time in charge of cybersecurity at the Commerce Department. “I told them, ‘Don’t do anything. Follow them and see what they are up to.’” The North’s cyberwarfare unit gained priority after the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States. After watching the American “shock and awe” campaign on CNN, Kim Jong-il issued a warning to his military: “If warfare was about bullets and oil until now,” he told top commanders, according to a prominent defector, Kim Heung-kwang, “warfare in the 21st century is about information.” The unit was marked initially by mishaps and bluster. “There was an enormous growth in capability from 2009 or so, when they were a joke,” said Ben Buchanan, the author of “The Cybersecurity Dilemma” and a fellow at the Cyber Security Project at Harvard. “They would execute a very basic attack against a minor web page put up by the White House or an American intelligence agency, and then their sympathizers would claim they’d hacked the U.S. government. But since then, their hackers have gotten a lot better.” A National Intelligence Estimate in 2009 wrote off the North’s hacking prowess, much as it underestimated its long-range missile program. It would be years before it could mount a meaningful threat, it claimed. But the regime was building that threat. When Kim Jong-un succeeded his father, in 2011, he expanded the cybermission beyond serving as just a weapon of war, focusing also on theft, harassment and political-score settling. “Cyberwarfare, along with nuclear weapons and missiles, is an ‘all-purpose sword’ that guarantees our military’s capability to strike relentlessly,” Kim Jong-un reportedly declared, according to the testimony of a South Korean intelligence chief. By 2012, government officials and private researchers say North Korea had dispersed its hacking teams abroad, relying principally on China’s internet infrastructure. This allowed the North to exploit largely nonsecure internet connections and maintain a degree of plausible deniability. A recent analysis by the cybersecurity firm Recorded Future found heavy North Korean internet activity in India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nepal, Kenya, Mozambique, and Indonesia. In some cases, like that of New Zealand, North Korean hackers were simply routing their attacks through the country’s computers from abroad. In others, researchers believe they are now physically stationed in countries like India, where nearly one-fifth of Pyongyang’s cyberattacks now originate. Intelligence agencies are now trying to track the North Korean hackers in these countries the way they have previously tracked terrorist sleeper cells or nuclear proliferators: looking for their favorite hotels, lurking in online forums they may inhabit, attempting to feed them bad computer code and counterattacking their own servers. For decades Iran and North Korea have shared missile technology, and American intelligence agencies have long sought evidence of secret cooperation in the nuclear arena. In cyber, the Iranians taught the North Koreans something important: When confronting an enemy that has internet-connected banks, trading systems, oil and water pipelines, dams, hospitals, and entire cities, the opportunities to wreak havoc are endless. By midsummer 2012, Iran’s hackers, still recovering from an American and Israeli-led cyberattack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment operations, found an easy target in Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s state-owned oil company and the world’s most valuable company. That August, Iranian hackers flipped a kill switch at precisely 11:08 a.m., unleashing a simple wiper virus onto 30,000 Aramco computers and 10,000 servers that would destroy data, and replace it with a partial image of a burning American flag. The damage was tremendous. Seven months later, during joint military exercises between American and South Korean forces, North Korean hackers, operating from computers inside China, deployed a very similar cyberweapon against computer networks at three major South Korean banks and South Korea’s two largest broadcasters. Like Iran’s Aramco attacks, the North Korean attacks on South Korean targets used wiping malware to eradicate data and paralyze their business operations. It may have been a copycat operation, but. Hannigan, the former British official, said recently: “We have to assume they are getting help from the Iranians.” And inside the National Security Agency, just a few years after analysts had written off Pyongyang as a low grade threat, there was suddenly a new appreciation that the country was figuring out cyber just as it had figured out nuclear weapons: test by test. “North Korea showed that to achieve its political objectives, it will take down any company — period,” Silvers said. A chief political objective of the cyberprogram is to preserve the image of the North’s 33-year-old leader, Kim Jong-un. In August 2014, North Korean hackers went after a British broadcaster, Channel Four, which had announced plans for a television series about a British nuclear scientist kidnapped in Pyongyang. First, the North Koreans protested to the British government. “A scandalous farce,” North Korea called the series. When that was ignored, British authorities found that the North had hacked into the television network’s computer system. The attack was stopped before inflicting any damage, and David Abraham, the chief executive of Channel Four, initially vowed to continue the production. That attack, however, was just a prelude. When Sony Pictures Entertainment released a trailer for “The Interview,” a comedy about two journalists dispatched to Pyongyang to assassinate North Korea’s young new dictator, Pyongyang wrote a letter of complaint to the secretary general of the United Nations to stop the production. Then came threats to Sony. Beyond respect, and retribution, the North wanted hard currency from its cyberprogram. So soon the digital bank heists began — an attack in the Philippines in October 2015; then the Tien Phong Bank in Vietnam at the end of the same year; and then the Bangladesh Central Bank. Researchers at Symantec said it was the first time a state had used a cyberattack not for espionage or war, but to finance the country’s operations. Now, the attacks are increasingly cunning. Security experts noticed in February that the website of Poland’s financial regulator was unintentionally infecting visitors with malware. It turned out that visitors to the Polish regulator’s website — employees from Polish banks, from the central banks of Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Mexico, Venezuela, and even from prominent Western banks like Bank of America — had been targeted with a so-called watering hole attack, in which North Korean hackers waited for their victims to visit the site, then installed malware in their machines. Forensics showed that the hackers had put together a list of internet addresses from 103 organizations, most of them banks, and designed their malware to specifically infect visitors from those banks, in what researchers said appeared to be an effort to move around stolen currency. More recently, North Koreans seemed to have changed tack once again. North Korean hackers’ fingerprints showed up in a series of attempted attacks on so-called cryptocurrency exchanges in South Korea, and were successful in at least one case, according to researchers at FireEye. The attacks on Bitcoin exchanges, which see hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Bitcoin exchanged a day, offered Pyongyang a potentially very lucrative source of new funds. And, researchers say, there is evidence they have been exchanging Bitcoin gathered from their heists for Monero, a highly anonymous version of cryptocurrency that is far harder for global authorities to trace. The most widespread hack was WannaCry, a global ransomware attack that used a program that cripples a computer and demands a ransom payment in exchange for unlocking the computer, or its data. In a twist the North Koreans surely enjoyed, their hackers based the attack on a secret tool, called “Eternal Blue,” stolen from the National Security Agency. In the late afternoon of May 12, panicked phone calls flooded in from around Britain and the world. The computer systems of several major British hospital systems were shut down, forcing diversions of ambulances and the deferral of nonemergency surgeries. Banks and transportation systems across dozens of countries were affected. Britain’s National Cyber Security Center had picked up no warning of the attack, said Paul Chichester, its director of operations. Investigators now think the WannaCry attack may have been an early misfire of a weapon that was still under development — or a test of tactics and vulnerabilities. “This was part of an evolving effort to find ways to disable key industries,” said Brian Lord, a former deputy director for intelligence and cyber operations at the Government Communications Headquarters in Britain. “All I have to do is create a moderately disabling attack on a key part of the social infrastructure, and then watch the media sensationalize it and panic the public.” It ended thanks to Marcus Hutchins, a college dropout and self-taught hacker living with his parents in the southwest of England. He spotted a web address somewhere in the software and, on a lark, paid $10.69 to register it as a domain name. The activation of the domain name turned out to act as a kill switch causing the malware to stop spreading. British officials privately acknowledge that they know North Korea perpetrated the attack, but the government has taken no retaliatory action, uncertain what they can do. While American and South Korean officials often express outrage about North Korea’s cyberactivities, they rarely talk about their own — and whether that helps fuel the cyber arms race. Yet both Seoul and Washington target the North’s Reconnaissance General Bureau, its nuclear program and its missile program. Hundreds, if not thousands, of American cyberwarriors spend each day mapping the North’s few networks, looking for vulnerabilities that could be activated in time of crisis. At a recent meeting of American strategists to evaluate North Korea’s capabilities, some participants expressed concerns that the escalating cyberwar could actually tempt the North to use its weapons — both nuclear and cyber — very quickly in any conflict, for fear that the United States has secret ways to shut the country down. The director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mike Pompeo, said last week that the United States is trying to compile a better picture of the leadership around Kim Jong-un, for a report to President Trump. Figuring out who oversees cyber and special operations is a central mystery. The Japanese press recently speculated it could be an official named Jang Kil-su. Others are curious about Gen. No Kwang-chol, who was elevated to the Central Committee of the North’s ruling party in May 2016, and is one of the only members whose portfolio is undisclosed. The big question is whether Mr. Kim, fearful that his nuclear program is becoming too large and obvious a target, is focusing instead on how to shut down the United States without ever lighting off a missile. “Everyone is focused on mushroom clouds,” Silvers said, “but there is far more potential for another kind of disastrous escalation.” (David E. Sanger, David D. Kirkpatrick, and Nicole Perlroth, “North Korea Deploys Corps of Hackers Bent on Chaos,” New York Times, October 16, 2017,
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Sagan: “It is time for the U.S. government to admit that it has failed to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the United States. North Korea no longer poses a nonproliferation problem; it poses a nuclear deterrence problem. The gravest danger now is that North Korea, South Korea, and the United States will stumble into a catastrophic war that none of them wants. The world has traveled down this perilous path before. In 1950, the Truman administration contemplated a preventive strike to keep the Soviet Union from acquiring nuclear weapons but decided that the resulting conflict would resemble World War II in scope and that containment and deterrence were better options. In the 1960s, the Kennedy administration feared that Chinese leader Mao Zedong was mentally unstable and proposed a joint strike against the nascent Chinese nuclear program to the Soviets. (Moscow rejected the idea.) Ultimately, the United States learned to live with a nuclear Russia and a nuclear China. It can now learn to live with a nuclear North Korea. Doing so will not be risk free, however. Accidents, misperceptions, and volatile leaders could all too easily cause disaster. The Cold War offers important lessons in how to reduce these risks by practicing containment and deterrence wisely. But officials in the Pentagon and the White House face a new and unprecedented challenge: they must deter North Korean leader Kim Jong Un while also preventing U.S. President Donald Trump from bumbling into war. U.S. military leaders should make plain to their political superiors and the American public that any U.S. first strike on North Korea would result in a devastating loss of American and South Korean lives. And civilian leaders must convince Kim that the United States will not attempt to overthrow his regime unless he begins a war. If the U.S. civilian and military leaderships perform these tasks well, the same approach that prevented nuclear catastrophe during the Cold War can deter Pyongyang until the day that communist North Korea, like the Soviet Union before it, collapses under its own weight. The international relations scholar Robert Litwak has described the current standoff with North Korea as “the Cuban missile crisis in slow motion,” and several pundits, politicians, and academics have repeated that analogy. But the current Korean missile crisis is even more dangerous than the Cuban one. For one thing, the Cuban missile crisis did not involve a new country becoming a nuclear power. In 1962, the Soviet Union was covertly stationing missiles and nuclear warheads in Cuba when U.S. intelligence discovered the operation. During the resulting crisis, Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro feared an imminent U.S. air strike and invasion and wrote to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev advocating a nuclear strike on the United States “to eliminate such danger forever through an act of clear legitimate defense, however harsh and terrible the solution would be.” When Khrushchev received the message, he told a meeting of his senior leadership, “This is insane; Fidel wants to drag us into the grave with him!” Luckily, the Soviet Union maintained control of its nuclear weapons, and Castro did not possess any of his own; his itchy fingers were not on the nuclear trigger. Kim, in contrast, already presides over an arsenal that U.S. intelligence agencies believe contains as many as 60 nuclear warheads. Some uncertainty still exists about whether North Korea can successfully mount those weapons on a missile capable of hitting the continental United States, but history cautions against wishful thinking. The window of opportunity for a successful U.S. attack to stop the North Korean nuclear program has closed. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, both the American and the Soviet nuclear war plans were heavily geared toward preemption. Each country’s system featured a built-in option to launch nuclear weapons if officials believed that an enemy attack was imminent and unavoidable. This produced a danger that the strategist Thomas Schelling called “the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.” That fear was why Khrushchev was so alarmed when a U.S. U-2 spy plane accidentally flew into Soviet airspace during the crisis. As he wrote to U.S. President John F. Kennedy on the final day of the crisis: “Is it not a fact that an intruding American plane could be easily taken for a nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step?” Today, the world faces an even more complex and dangerous problem: a three-way fear of surprise attack. North Korea, South Korea, and the United States are all poised to launch preemptive strikes. In such an unstable situation, the risk that an accident, a false warning, or a misperceived military exercise could lead to a war is alarmingly high. The same approach that prevented nuclear catastrophe during the Cold War can deter Pyongyang. Another factor that makes today’s situation more dangerous than the Cuban missile crisis is the leaders involved. In 1962, the standoff included one volatile leader, Castro, who held radical misperceptions of the consequences of a nuclear war and surrounded himself with yes men. Today, there are two such unpredictable and ill-informed leaders: Kim and Trump. Both men are rational and ruthless. Yet both are also prone to lash out impulsively at perceived enemies, a tendency that can lead to reckless rhetoric and behavior. This danger is compounded because their senior advisers are in a poor position to speak truth to power. Kim clearly tolerates no dissent; he has reportedly executed family members and rivals for offering insufficiently enthusiastic praise. For his part, Trump often ignores, ridicules, or fires those who disagree with him. In May, The New York Times reported that Trump had described his national security adviser, Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, as “a pain” for subtly correcting him when he made inaccurate points in meetings. And in June, the spectacle of U.S. department secretaries falling over themselves to declare their deep devotion to Trump and flatter him on live television during the administration’s first full cabinet meeting brought to mind the dysfunctional decision-making in dictatorships. Any leader who disdains expertise and demands submission and total loyalty from his advisers, whether in a democracy or in a dictatorship, will not receive candid assessments of alternative courses of action during a crisis. Trump’s poor decision-making process highlights another disturbing contrast with the Cuban missile crisis. In 1962, strong civilian leaders countered the U.S. military’s dangerously hawkish instincts. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended an immediate air strike and an invasion of Cuba, Kennedy insisted on the more prudent option of a naval blockade. Together with his subsequent refusal to retaliate with an air strike after an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba, Kennedy’s approach reflected the best kind of cautious crisis management. Now, however, it is the senior political leadership in the United States that has made reckless threats, and it has fallen to Secretary of Defense James Mattis (a former general) and senior military officers to serve as the voices of prudence. In early August, Trump warned: “North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.” By appearing to commit to using nuclear force in response to North Korean threats, he broke sharply with U.S. deterrence policy, which had previously warned of military responses only to acts of aggression. Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and un Ambassador Nikki Haley have not echoed Trump’s “fire and fury” rhetoric, but they have repeated the worrying mantra that “all options are on the table.” That phrase may sound less threatening than Trump’s comments, but it still leaves itself open to misinterpretation. To some listeners, it just suggests that Washington is considering limited military options. But from a North Korean perspective, the statement implies that the United States is contemplating launching a nuclear first strike. This would not be an altogether unreasonable conclusion for Pyongyang to draw. In 2008, U.S. President George W. Bush stated that all options were on the table when it came to U.S. tensions with Iran, and when a reporter explicitly asked Bush whether that included “nuclear options,” Bush simply repeated himself: “All options are on the table.” The Obama administration made a commitment, in its 2009 Nuclear Posture Review, not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclearweapons state that was in compliance with its nonproliferation commitments. But then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates quickly added that “because North Korea and Iran are not in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, for them, all bets are off. All options are on the table.” Such rhetoric is dangerous. The U.S. government must convince Kim that an attack on the United States or its allies would spell the end of his regime. But it is equally important that U.S. leaders acknowledge loudly and often that it would be a disaster for the United States to start a war. If those in the White House do not do so, the civilian and military leadership in the Pentagon should more forcefully and publicly make this point. To back this rhetoric up, the United States should take some military options off the table, starting with a preventive nuclear war. A preemptive strike, the use of force when a country considers an adversary’s first strike imminent and unavoidable, can sometimes be justified strategically and legally as “anticipatory self-defense.” But preventive war—starting a war to prevent another country from taking future action or acquiring a dangerous capability—is rarely justified and arguably contrary to the UN Charter. U.S. military officers are trained to follow orders from political authorities, unless they are clearly unconstitutional. The Constitution, however, says nothing about what to do if a president’s orders are legal but also crazy. This leads to bizarre situations, such as the response that Admiral Scott Swift, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, gave when he was asked at a seminar at the Australian National University in July if he would launch a nuclear strike against China “next week” if Trump ordered him to do so. The admiral should have said that the hypothetical scenario was ridiculous and left it at that. Instead, he answered, “Yes.” Trump’s volatility has produced a hidden crisis in U.S. civil-military relations. In 1974, during the final days of Richard Nixon’s presidency, when Nixon had become morose and possibly unstable, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger told the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George Brown, that if Nixon gave military orders, Brown should contact Schlesinger before carrying them out. Schlesinger’s action was extraconstitutional but nonetheless wise, given the extraordinary circumstances. The U.S. government faces similar dangers every day under Trump. Mattis and senior military leaders should be prepared to ignore belligerent tweets, push back against imprudent policies, and resist any orders that they believe reflect impetuous or irrational decision-making by the president. Their oath, after all, is not to an individual president; it is to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States.” The Constitution’s 25th Amendment lays out procedures on how to relieve an impaired president of his responsibilities. If senior military leaders believe at any time that Trump is impaired, they have a duty to contact Mattis, who should then call for an emergency cabinet meeting to determine whether Trump is “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office” and thus whether to invoke the 25th Amendment. One similarity with the Cuban missile crisis is that those Americans who think the United States should attack North Korea exaggerate the prospects that U.S. military action would succeed and underestimate the costs of a war. In 1962, the CIA and the military assumed that there were no nuclear weapons in Cuba and, on that basis, recommended air strikes and an invasion. But the intelligence assessment was wrong. Well over 60 nuclear warheads, gravity bombs, and tactical nuclear weapons had already arrived in Cuba, and one missile regiment was already operational by the time the Joint Chiefs were advising military action. Any attack on Cuba would almost certainly have led to nuclear strikes on the United States and against invading U.S. forces. Today, U.S. intelligence finds itself once again in the dark. It does not know the status of North Korea’s warheads or the locations of its missiles. For example, when the North Koreans successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile in late July, it came as a complete surprise to the United States and demonstrated that North Korea can now build such missiles, store them, take them out of storage, and launch them, all before the United States could react. Yet U.S. military leaders have failed to pour cold water on the idea of a U.S. first strike. Instead, they have added fuel to the fire. Consider the complaint expressed by General Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the Aspen Security Forum in July that “many people have talked about the military options with words such as ‘unimaginable.’” Dunford insisted that, to the contrary, “it is not unimaginable to have military options to respond to North Korean nuclear capability. What’s unimaginable to me is allowing a capability that would allow a nuclear weapon to land in Denver, Colorado…. And so my job will be to develop military options to make sure that doesn’t happen.” Dunford should have reinforced deterrence. Instead, he created a red line that Kim may have already crossed. The military’s job is to come up with options. That involves thinking the unthinkable. But it is also military leaders’ responsibility to offer brutal honesty to political leaders and the public. When it comes to the current conflict with North Korea, that means admitting that there are no military options that do not risk starting the most destructive war since 1945. Some Trump supporters, including former un Ambassador John Bolton and Trump’s evangelical adviser Robert Jeffress, have argued that a U.S. strike to assassinate Kim is the best solution. Any attempt to “decapitate” the regime, however, would be a gamble of epic proportions. The history of unsuccessful U.S. decapitation attempts, including those launched against the Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi in 1986 and the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in 1991 and again in 2003, warns against such thinking. Moreover, Kim may well have ordered his generals to launch all available weapons of mass destruction at the enemy if he is killed in a first strike—as did Saddam before the 1990–91 Gulf War. There is no reason to think that the North Korean military would fail to carry out such an order. U.S. leaders should also resist the temptation to hope that limited, or “surgical,” conventional attacks on North Korean missile test sites or storage facilities would end the nuclear threat. Proponents of this course believe that the threat of further escalation by the United States would deter North Korea from responding militarily to a limited first strike. But as the political scientist Barry Posen has explained, this argument is logically inconsistent: Kim cannot be both so irrational that he cannot be deterred in general and so rational that he could be deterred after having been attacked by the United States. Moreover, even a limited attack by the United States would appear to North Korea as the beginning of an invasion. And because no first strike could destroy every North Korean missile and nuclear weapon, the United States and its allies would always face the prospect of nuclear retaliation. Nor can missile defense systems solve the problem. The United States should continue to develop and deploy missile defenses because they complicate North Korean military planning, and any missiles that Pyongyang aims at U.S. or allied military targets are missiles not aimed at American, Japanese, or South Korean cities. But military leaders should be candid about the limits of U.S. ballistic missile defenses. Most such systems have failed numerous tests, and even the most effective ones, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, system, could be overwhelmed if North Korea fired multiple missiles—even dummy missiles—in a salvo at one target. That is why North Korea has been practicing launching several missiles simultaneously. Any prudent U.S. planner should therefore assume that in the event of an attack, some North Korean nuclear-armed missiles would reach their targets. Even in the best-case scenario, in which only a few North Korean nuclear weapons penetrated U.S. defenses, the consequences would prove catastrophic. Estimating the potential fatalities in a limited nuclear strike is difficult, but the nuclear weapons scholar Alex Wellerstein has designed a useful modeling tool called NUKEMAP, which uses data from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings to provide rough estimates of how many people would die in a nuclear strike. After North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test, in early September, Japanese, South Korean, and U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly provided a range of estimates of the weapon’s explosive yield, with an average estimate of around 100 kilotons. According to NUKEMAP, a single 100-kiloton nuclear weapon detonated above the port city of Busan, in South Korea (which was shown as a target in a recent North Korean press release), would kill 440,000 people in seconds. A weapon of that size detonated over Seoul would kill 362,000; over San Francisco, the number would be 323,000. These estimates, moreover, include only immediate blast fatalities, not the deaths from fires after a nuclear detonation or the longer-term deaths that would result from radioactive fallout. Those secondary effects could easily cause the number of dead to double. Even if a war were limited to the Korean Peninsula, the costs would still be unacceptable. According to a detailed study published in 2012 by the Nautilus Institute, a think tank based in California, North Korea has thousands of conventional artillery pieces along the demilitarized zone that by themselves could inflict some 64,000 fatalities in Seoul on the first day of a war. A major attack on South Korea could also kill many of the roughly 154,000 American civilians and 28,000 U.S. service members living there. If the North Korean regime used its large arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, the fatalities would be even higher. Finally, there are a number of nuclear power plants near Busan that could be damaged, spreading radioactive materials, in an attack. All told, one million people could die on the first day of a second Korean war. Even if the United States forswore preventive conventional or nuclear strikes, the danger of an accidental war caused by the mutual fear of a surprise attack would remain. South Korea increasingly (and quite openly) relies on a strategy of preemption and decapitation. In 2013, General Jeong Seung-jo, the chairman of the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced that “if there is a clear intent that North Korea is about to use a nuclear weapon, we will eliminate it first even at the risk of a war,” adding that “a preemptive attack against the North trying to use nuclear weapons does not require consultation with the United States and it is the right of self-defense.” A white paper published by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense in 2016 featured an illustration of several missiles being fired at and a group of South Korean commandos attacking the “war command” building in Pyongyang. (Unsurprisingly, the North Koreans have similar ideas about preemption: in April 2016, in response to U.S. and South Korean military exercises, North Korean state media reported that “the revolutionary armed forces of [North Korea] decided to take preemptive attack as the mode of its military counteraction…. The right to nuclear preemptive attack is by no means the U.S. monopoly.”) In such a tense environment, one government’s preemptive-war plan can look a lot like a first-strike plan to its enemies. Would Seoul see the movement of Pyongyang’s nuclear missiles out of the caves in which they are stored as a drill, a defensive precaution, or the start of an attack? Would Pyongyang mistake a joint U.S.–South Korean exercise simulating a decapitation attack for the real thing? Could an ill-timed inflammatory tweet by Trump provoke a military response from Kim? What if a radar technician accidentally put a training tape of a missile launch into a radar warning system—which actually happened, creating a brief moment of panic, during the Cuban missile crisis? Add in the possibility of an American or a South Korean military aircraft accidentally entering North Korean airspace, or a North Korean nuclear weapon accidentally detonating during transport, and the situation resembles less a Cuban missile crisis in slow motion than an August 1914 crisis at the speed of Twitter. The fear of a U.S. attack explains why Kim believes he needs a nuclear arsenal. Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons development undoubtedly appeals to Kim’s domestic audience’s desire for self-sufficiency. But that is not its primary purpose. Kim’s spokespeople have stressed that he will not suffer the fate of Saddam or Qaddafi, both of whom gave up their nuclear programs only to be attacked later by the United States. The North Korean nuclear arsenal is not a bargaining chip. It is a potent deterrent designed to prevent a U.S. attack or disrupt one that does occur by destroying U.S. air bases and ports through preemption, if possible, but in retaliation if necessary. And if all else fails, it is a means for exacting revenge by destroying Kim’s enemies’ cities. That may sound implausible, but keep in mind that Castro recommended just such an attack in 1962. Living with a nuclear North Korea does not, in Dr. Strangelove’s terms, mean learning “to stop worrying and love the bomb.” On the contrary, it means constantly worrying and addressing every risk. U.S. policy should aim to convince Kim that starting a war would lead to an unmitigated disaster for North Korea, especially as his own ministers and military advisers may be too frightened of his wrath to make that argument themselves. The United States should state clearly and calmly that any attack by North Korea would lead to the swift and violent end of the Kim regime. Kim may be under the illusion that if North Korea were to destroy U.S. air bases and kill hundreds of thousands of Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans, the American public would seek peace. In fact, it would likely demand vengeance and an end to Kim’s regime, regardless of the costs. Such a war would be bloody, but there is no doubt which side would prevail. There are few, if any, military targets in North Korea that the United States could not destroy with advanced conventional weapons in a long war. And the Kim regime cannot ignore the possibility of U.S. nuclear retaliation. The more difficult challenge will be convincing Kim that the United States will not attack him first. Reducing the risk of war will therefore require an end to U.S. threats of first-strike regime change. In August, Tillerson told reporters that the United States did not seek to overthrow Kim unless he were to begin a war. Other American leaders should consistently echo Tillerson’s comments. Unfortunately, the Trump administration’s rhetoric has been anything but consistent. Should the United States succeed in bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table, it should be prepared to offer changes to U.S. and South Korean military exercises in exchange for limits on—and notifications of—North Korean missile tests and the restoration of the hotline between North and South Korea. The United States should also continue to extend its nuclear umbrella to South Korea to reduce the incentive for Seoul to acquire its own nuclear arsenal. Some have argued for a return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to air bases in South Korea, but such weapons would be vulnerable to a North Korean first strike. A better option would be to keep nuclear capable bombers at Guam on ground alert. Or the United States could borrow a tactic it used in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis. To assuage Moscow, Washington promised to remove its Jupiter ballistic missiles from Turkey after the crisis. But to reassure Ankara, it also assigned some submarine-based missiles to cover the same retaliatory targets in the Soviet Union that the Jupiter missiles had and arranged for a U.S. submarine to visit a Turkish port. Today, occasional U.S. submarine calls at South Korean harbors could enhance deterrence without provoking North Korea. In 1947, the American diplomat George Kennan outlined a strategy for the “patient but firm and vigilant containment” of the Soviet Union. Writing in this magazine, he predicted that such a policy would eventually lead to “either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.” He was right. In the same way, the United States has deterred North Korea from invading South Korea or attacking Japan for over 60 years. Despite all the bluster and tension today, there is no reason why Kennan’s strategy of containment and deterrence cannot continue to work on North Korea, as it did on the Soviet Union. The United States must wait with patience and vigilance until the Kim regime collapses under the weight of its own economic and political weakness.” (Scott D. Sagan, “The Korean Missile Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2017)
10/19/17:
CIA Director Mike Pompeo said the United States has to act as if North Korea is on the verge of being able to strike it with a missile and act accordingly — and that President Donald Trump is ready to do so. “From a U.S. policy perspective, we ought to behave as if we are on the cusp of them achieving that objective,” Pompeo said at a security forum held by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “They are so far along in that, it’s now a matter of thinking about how do you stop the final step.” “Whether it happens on Tuesday or a month from Tuesday, we’re in a time where the President has concluded that we have a global effort to ensure that [North Korean leader] Kim Jong Un does not obtain that capacity,” Pompeo continued. Pompeo is among a number of former officials who have been signaling the increased possibility of a slide into military confrontation with North Korea over its refusal to back down from its nuclear program. The CIA chief spoke at the forum shortly before national security adviser H.R. McMaster, who also said the President wasn’t prepared to accept a nuclear Pyongyang. The Trump administration comments came a day after former CIA Director John Brennan put the chances of military conflict with North Korea as high as 20% to 25%.The isolated Asian nation conducted its sixth and most powerful nuclear test in September, claiming it had detonated a miniaturized hydrogen bomb that could be mounted on a missile. It’s also been steadily working on its missile capabilities, firing 22 missiles during 15 tests from February to mid-September. Asked at today’s event about the threat posed by North Korea, McMaster said that Trump will not accept a nuclear North Korea that threatens the US, putting the administration in a “race” to resolve the increasingly tense standoff before it devolves into a military confrontation. “He’s not going to accept this regime threatening the United States with nuclear weapons,” McMaster said. “There are those who would say, well, why not accept and deter. Well, accept and deter is unacceptable.” “So this puts us in a situation where we are in a race to resolve this short of military action,” McMaster said. “Everybody knows it. We all know it. … Our allies and partners know it. China knows it. Russia knows it.” Brennan, speaking last night at Fordham University School of Law, stressed that, “there really is no good military solution to this issue.” “The prospects for military conflict on the Korean Peninsula are greater than they have been in several decades,” he said. “I don’t think it’s likely or probable, but if it’s a one in four, one in five chance, that’s too high.” Asked if that’s the rating he’d give for the chances of conflict, he said, “Yeah, I guess I would.” Brennan sketched out a scenario in which, “some kind of limited military engagement that would result in some deaths that could then quickly trigger some retaliatory strikes that could escalate.” On top of that “conventional scenario of escalation,” he reminded the crowd that North Korea has finely honed cyber capabilities. “So I think we have to be mindful here that there are a number of scenarios here that could lead to an escalation that we really need to be trying to avoid,” Brennan said. Trump isn’t helping on that score, he said. “You have two leaders of the two major protagonist countries that are hurling these broadsides back and forth, and they have a lot of personal political face involved in it,” he said. “I don’t agree that the tack that Mr. Trump has taken is a constructive and productive one,” Brennan said, calling the references to “Rocket Man” and other insults “irresponsible.” McMaster praised Trump’s handling of the crisis, saying that the President’s leadership had created the possibility of an “unprecedented level of international cooperation on the issue.” He also praised Tillerson’s efforts to increase international pressure on North Korea, which has moved some countries to cut diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, expel its ambassadors and in some cases, ban North Korean guest workers. North Korea, meanwhile, has said it won’t be willing to talk to the U.S. until it ensures it has missile and nuclear capabilities. (Nicole Gaouette, “U.S. Prepares for North Korea’s “Final Step,’” CNN, October 20, 2017)
10/20/17:
Have North Korea’s nuclear tests become so big that they have altered the geological structure of the land? Some analysts now see signs that Mount Mantap, the 7,200-foot-high peak under which North Korea detonates its nuclear bombs, is suffering from “tired mountain syndrome.” The mountain visibly shifted during the last nuclear test, an enormous detonation that was recorded as a 6.3-magnitude earthquake in North Korea’s northeast. Since then, the area, which is not known for natural seismic activity, has had three more quakes. “What we are seeing from North Korea looks like some kind of stress in the ground,” said Paul G. Richards, a seismologist at Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory. “In that part of the world, there were stresses in the ground, but the explosions have shaken them up.” Chinese scientists already have warned that further nuclear tests could cause the mountain to collapse and release the radiation from the blast. Images captured by Airbus, a space technology company that makes Earth-observation satellites, showed the mountain literally moving during the test. An 85-acre area on the peak of Mount Mantap visibly subsided during the explosion, an indication of both the size of the blast and the weakness of the mountain. Since that day, there have been three much smaller quakes at the site, in the 2- to 3-magnitude range, each of them prompting fears that North Korea had conducted another nuclear test that perhaps had gone wrong. But they all turned out to be natural. That has analysts Frank V. Pabian and Jack Liu wondering if Mount Mantap is suffering from “tired mountain syndrome,” a diagnosis previously applied to the Soviet Union’s atomic test sites. “The underground detonation of nuclear explosions considerably alters the properties of the rock mass,” Vitaly V. Adushkin and William Leith wrote in a report on the Soviet tests for the United States Geological Survey in 2001. This leads to fracturing and rocks breaking, as well as changes along tectonic faults. Earthquakes also occurred at the United States’ nuclear test site in Nevada after detonations there. “The experience we had from the Nevada test site and decades of monitoring the Soviet Union’s major test sites in Kazakhstan showed that after a very large nuclear explosion, several other significant things can happen,” said Richards, the seismologist. This included cavities collapsing hours or even months later, he said. Pabian and Liu said that the North Korean test site also seemed to be suffering. “Based on the severity of the initial blast, the post-test tremors, and the extent of observable surface disturbances, we have to assume that there must have been substantial damage to the existing tunnel network under Mount Mantap,” they wrote in a report for 38 North. (Anna Fifield, “After Six Tests, the Mountain Hosting North Korea’s Nuclear Tests May Be Exhausted,” Washington Post, October 20, 2017)
10/22/17:
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s ruling coalition retained a two-thirds majority in today’s general election, gaining a further mandate after five years in power and offering the bloc the impetus to pursue a first-ever amendment to the Constitution. A divided opposition and low turnout partially due to a typhoon contributed to the outcome of the election, which followed a rough year for Abe amid allegations of cronyism. Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party won 281 seats and the Komeito party 29, securing the two-thirds majority of 310 in the 465-member House of Representatives. The victory could reinforce Abe’s chances of succeeding in the LDP leadership contest in September next year and eventually becoming Japan’s longest-serving prime minister. The two-thirds majority enjoyed by the coalition of the LDP and the smaller Komeito party is significant because it is required in both Diet houses to formally propose a constitutional revision, which must then gain a majority of votes in a national referendum. The coalition already has such a majority in the upper house. “The matter should be debated in the Diet, and at the same time I expect discussions to deepen among the public,” Abe told a television program as results came in. On its own, the LDP has secured a stable majority, defined as at least 261 of the powerful chamber, with which it can control all the house’s legislative committees. The election saw the opposition vote split between the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan and the Party of Hope, new parties formed shortly before the start of campaigning out of the respective liberal and conservative wings of the collapsing Democratic Party. The CDPJ came out on top among the opposition parties, having rapidly built support over the course of the campaign. Led by former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano, the CDPJ absorbed the Democratic Party’s liberals who could not or would not join the Party of Hope led by Tokyo Gov. Yuriko Koike. The Party of Hope failed to maintain the excitement that greeted its formation late last month. It did poorly in single-seat districts in Tokyo — thought to be its stronghold — losing in 22 of the 23 districts in which it fielded candidates. Koike, who broke from the LDP to run for Tokyo governor last year, had refused to resign as governor to run for the lower house with her new party. This meant voters were unsure who the party would back as prime minister in the event it formed a government. Both opposition parties promised to freeze the consumption tax hike planned for October 2019 and abandon nuclear power. Neither had the time or resources to put up candidates in all of the 289 single-seat electoral districts. Final voter turnout stood at 53.68 percent, which was slightly higher than the record-low 52.66 percent in the previous lower house election in 2014 but the second-lowest in the postwar, according to the internal affairs ministry. Rain and wind from Typhoon Lan battered much of the country on Sunday, discouraging voters and likely working in the ruling coalition’s favor. With local authorities encouraging early voting in light of the typhoon, a record high of 21 million people, or around 20.1 percent of the eligible population, cast their ballots early. The number of early votes leaped 62.5 percent from the figure in the last election. (Sarah Jackman, “Abe Wins Big in Japan’s Election, Gets Impetus for Constitutional Reform,” Kyodo, October 23, 2017)
President Donald Trump renewed the possibility of military action against North Korea. Trump said he is “totally prepared” to use military force against the rogue regime if necessary, in an interview with Fox News. In line with Trump’s statement, the US Air Force has ordered its fleet of nuclear-armed B-52 bombers stationed at a base in Louisiana on 24-hour alert, US Air Force chief of staff Gen. David Goldfein told Defense One. The 24-hour alert status for the bombers ended in 1991, as the Cold War faded into history. “The world is a dangerous place and we’ve got folks that are talking openly about the use of nuclear weapons,” Goldfein said while explaining the US Air Force is trying to find ways of using nuclear weapons as a deterrence. The B-52, which can fly up to about 50,000 feet and at supersonic speeds, was designed to carry an array of weapons, including 70,000lbs of nuclear and conventional weapons. Marc Knapper, acting US ambassador to South Korea, said the US is currently focused on imposing diplomatic and economic pressure to denuclearize North Korea by working closely with allies, in a speech at a forum in Seoul on October 23. (Jung Min-kyung, “Trump Says ‘Totally Prepared’ for Military Action; North Nixes Six-Party Talks,” Korea Herald, October 23, 2017) The U.S. Air Force is preparing to put nuclear-armed bombers back on 24-hour ready alert, a status not seen since the Cold War ended in 1991. “This is yet one more step in ensuring that we’re prepared,” Gen. David Goldfein, Air Force chief of staff, said in an interview during his six-day tour of Barksdale and other U.S. Air Force bases that support the nuclear mission. “I look at it more as not planning for any specific event, but more for the reality of the global situation we find ourselves in and how we ensure we’re prepared going forward.” Goldfein and other senior defense officials stressed that the alert order had not been given, but that preparations were under way in anticipation that it might come. That decision would be made by Gen. John Hyten, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, or Gen. Lori Robinson, the head of U.S. Northern Command. STRATCOM is in charge of the military’s nuclear forces and NORTHCOM is in charge of defending North America. “The world is a dangerous place and we’ve got folks that are talking openly about use of nuclear weapons,” he said. “It’s no longer a bipolar world where it’s just us and the Soviet Union. We’ve got other players out there who have nuclear capability. It’s never been more important to make sure that we get this mission right.” During his trip across the country last week, Goldfein encouraged airmen to think beyond Cold War uses for ICBMs, bombers and nuclear cruise missiles. “I’ve challenged…Air Force Global Strike Command to help lead the dialog, help with this discussion about ‘What does conventional conflict look like with a nuclear element?’ and ‘Do we respond as a global force if that were to occur?’ and ‘What are the options?’” he said. “How do we think about it — how do we think about deterrence in that environment?” Asked if placing B-52s back on alert — as they were for decades — would help with deterrence, Goldfein said it’s hard to say. “Really it depends on who, what kind of behavior are we talking about, and whether they’re paying attention to our readiness status,” he said. Already, various improvements have been made to prepare Barksdale — home to the 2d Bomb Wing and Air Force Global Strike Command, which oversees the service’s nuclear forces — to return B-52s to an alert posture. Near the alert pads, an old concrete building — where B-52 crews during the Cold War would sleep, ready to run to their aircraft and take off at a moment’s notice — is being renovated. Inside, beds are being installed for more than 100 crew members, more than enough room for the crews that would man bombers positioned on the nine alert pads outside. There’s a recreation room, with a pool table, TVs and a shuffleboard table. Large paintings of the patches for each squadron at Barksdale adorn the walls of a large stairway. Those long-empty B-52 parking spaces will soon get visits by two nuclear command planes, the E-4B Nightwatch and E-6B Mercury, both which will occasionally sit alert there. During a nuclear war, the planes would become the flying command posts of the defense secretary and STRATCOM commander, respectively. If a strike order is given by the president, the planes would be used to transmit launch codes to bombers, ICBMs and submarines. At least one of the four nuclear-hardened E-4Bs — formally called the National Airborne Operations Center, but commonly known as the Doomsday Plane — is always on 24-hour alert. Barksdale and other bases with nuclear bombers are preparing to build storage facilities for a new nuclear cruise missile that is under development. During his trip, Goldfein received updates on the preliminary work for a proposed replacement for the 400-plus Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the new long-range cruise missile. “Our job is options,” Goldfein said. “We provide best military advice and options for the commander in chief and the secretary of defense. Should the STRATCOM commander require or the NORTHCOM commander require us to [be on] a higher state of readiness to defend the homeland, then we have to have a place to put those forces.” (Marcus Weisgerber, “U.S. Preparing to Put B-52 Bombers back on Alert,” Defense One, October 22, 2017)
10/24/17:
Choe Son-hui called for the United States to drop its hostile policy, saying that it would lead to a “way out” from the current stalemate, a foreign ministry source here said. Choe, director-general of the North American department of North Korea’s foreign ministry, made the remarks during a closed-door session of the two-day conference held last week in Moscow, the official told reporters. “The North will never give up its nuclear weapons as long as the U.S.’ hostile policy, including military activities, sanctions and pressure, continue,” he quoted Choe as saying. “If the U.S. makes the right choice, such as abandoning its hostile policy and moving to coexist with a nuclear DPRK, there will be a way out,” she said, according to the official. Choe reiterated that the North made the “strategic decision” to possess nuclear weapons to deter the military threat from the U.S., saying that it is the only way to maintain its security and peace both on the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asian region, he added. Asked what steps the U.S. should take to give up its hostile policy, Choe cited U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent threatening tweets against the North, saying that it is the reason why the North cannot come to the negotiating table. Choe also said that the North is “not committed” to the September 19 joint statement under which the North promised to give up its nuclear programs in exchange for diplomatic and economic concessions, and that it will not be going back to the long-suspended six-party denuclearization talks, the official said. “For a diplomatic and peaceful resolution, the correct atmosphere should be created, but at a time when there are daily threatening tweets from President Trump, the North cannot sit down for talks,” she was quoted as saying. Choe didn’t dismiss the importance of multilateral efforts altogether, but as the U.S. is leading efforts to crush the North to death, she said that the North doesn’t see how other countries could play any role, according to the official. “North Korea will not be moving an inch,” she said, if the U.S. keeps up its push to lead the North toward collapse. (Yonhap, “N.K. Diplomats Urged U.S. to Make ‘Right Choice’ for ‘Way out’: Seoul Diplomat,” October 24, 2017)
10/25/17:
Diplomatic efforts between the United States and North Korea are in peril with Pyongyang shunning talks in response to President Donald Trump’s increased public attacks on Kim Jong Un, according to multiple U.S. government and congressional officials. Joseph Yun, a top American diplomat to North Korea, has been warning of the breakdown in meetings on Capitol Hill and seeking help to persuade the administration to prioritize diplomacy over the heated rhetoric that appears to be pushing the two nuclear powers closer toward conflict, sources familiar with the discussions told NBC News. Officials throughout government worry that a lack of diplomacy increases the risks of military action in the region. They also explain some of the alarmist comments that have been made by Republican and Democratic Senators in recent weeks, most notable Foreign Relations Committee chair Sen. Bob Corker who has said repeatedly that the president is undercutting diplomatic efforts. While few think that Trump would order a pre-emptive strike, a lack of communication between the two countries or through China increases the chances of miscommunication, leading to a further escalation. Yun’s diplomatic efforts are on their “last legs,” one U.S. official said, adding that Yun is frustrated by an inability to communicate the urgency of the diplomatic situation to the White House. “It is not so much that North Korea is shutting down, it’s that the message from the U.S. government is, ‘surrender without a fight or surrender with a fight,’” a separate U.S. official told NBC News. A Congressional aide who has spoken with Yun directly says the diplomat is searching for a “hail Mary” attempt to restart any sort of talks, including perhaps a high-level envoy or dispatching Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. Yun was not available for comment, but East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau spokesman Justin Higgins told NBC News: “We can’t comment on allegations from anonymous sources. What I can say is that Ambassador Yun has been faithfully executing the Trump administration’s North Korea policy since Jan. 20, including his trip to North Korea at the president’s direction to bring American citizen Otto Warmbier back to the United States after a year in captivity.” The White House did not respond to a request for comment. Yun, the deputy assistant secretary for Korea and Japan at the State Department, has told Congressional aides and government officials that the White House has “handicapped” diplomacy. Corker used similar language when he said recently that tweets from Trump have raised tensions and undercut Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. “When you kneecap that effort you really move our country into a binary choice which could lead to a world war. So yes, I want him to support diplomatic efforts, not embarrass and really malign efforts that are underway,” Corker said on NBC’s “Today” yesterday. Tillerson, originally skeptical of diplomacy, has come around to believing that talks with the North Koreans are increasingly important, a Congressional source said, as the country has ramped up its testing of long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles with increasing success and progressing on his nuclear weapons program. Indian Prime Minister Sushma Swaraj hosted Tillerson for talks today and said India will keep its small embassy in North Korea open as a potential channel for diplomatic talks. “I told Secretary Tillerson that some of their friendly countries should maintain embassies there so that some channels of communication are kept open,” Swaraj told reporters. Trump, however, seems to disagree with that approach. He told Tillerson on Twitter that he is “wasting his time” trying to talk to North Korea. That exchange caused Corker to defend Tillerson and escalate a public feud with the president. Corker recently told the Washington Post that the president has “castrated” Tillerson. While Corker wouldn’t directly respond to stalled diplomacy with North Korea, he told NBC News that “these are the kinds of thing that I’m speaking to.” “Either we’re going to deal with this and deal with China (who is key to North Korea) in a serious way and appropriately use diplomacy as one of our levers or we’re going to end up with a binary choice. And that’s what I’ve been speaking to,” Corker said. (Leigh Ann Caldwell and Vivian Salama, “Breakdown in North Korea Talks Sounds Alarms on Capitol Hill,” NBC, October 25, 2017)
Another nuclear-powered U.S. aircraft carrier, the USS Theodore Roosevelt, has been deployed to the western Pacific, according to the U.S. Navy. The USS Ronald Reagan is already docking at Busan. It is uncertain whether the Roosevelt will head straight for Korean waters as well. The Roosevelt is a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier that carries about 80 aircraft, including FA-18E/F Super Hornet fighter jets. It sailed from its home port of San Diego on October 6 and is surrounded by a strike group or “armada” belonging to the 3rd U.S. Fleet that controls from the eastern Pacific to the U.S. west coast. “Amid the growing nuclear and missile threats from North Korea, the scope of U.S. naval strategic assets available for mobilization in Korean waters has been extended to include the 3rd U.S. Fleet,” a source said. The U.S. military has ramped up pressure on the North by sending B-1 strategic bombers to the Korean Peninsula and putting the Reagan strike group in Korean waters for an extended period. Early next month, 12 F-35A stealth fighter jets will be deployed at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan on a rotational basis for the next six months. The deployments are aimed at deterring the North from carrying out fresh provocations ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to South Korea on November 7-8. part of his first Asian tour. (Yu Yong-weon, “Another U.S. Carrier Fleet Deployed to Pacific,” Chosun Ilbo, October 26, 2017)
10/26/17:
The United States imposed sanctions on seven officials and three entities of North Korea over what Washington described as Pyongyang’s “ongoing and serious human rights abuses.” “Today’s sanctions target the North Korean military and regime officials engaged in flagrant abuses of human rights,” Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in a statement. The Treasury Department is also targeting North Korean financial facilitators who attempt to keep the leadership in Pyongyang afloat with foreign currency earned through forced labor operations. The sanctions, which freeze assets within U.S. jurisdiction and prohibit transactions involving U.S. citizens, are the latest in a series of measures the United States has taken to pressure North Korea into ridding itself of nuclear weapons. Among those subject to the latest sanctions are Jo Kyong Chol, director of the Military Security Command, Ri Thae Chol, first vice minister of people’s security, and Labor Minister Jong Yong Su, as well as the consul general in Shenyang, China, and a diplomat at the North Korean Embassy in Vietnam, according to the Treasury. Mnuchin said the United States is particularly concerned with North Korea’s military, which operates as a secret police force in “punishing all forms of dissent.” “Further, the military operates outside of North Korea to hunt down asylum seekers, and brutally detains and forcibly returns North Korean citizens,” he said. (Kyodo, “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on N. Koreans, Entities over Human Rights Abuses,” October 26, 2017)
A senior North Korean official has issued a stern warning to the world that it should take “literally” his country’s threat to test a nuclear weapon above ground. Ri Yong Pil, who serves as vice president of the Foreign Ministry’s Institute for American Studies, told CNN in an exclusive conversation in Pyongyang that the threat made by North Korea’s foreign minister last month should not be dismissed. North Korea “has always brought its words into action,” Ri said, visibly angry. Speaking on a visit to New York for the U.N. General Assembly last month, Ri Yong Ho, the foreign minister, raised the possibility that North Korea could test a powerful hydrogen bomb over the Pacific Ocean. The threat came hours after President Donald Trump threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea in a speech to the UN. “The foreign minister is very well aware of the intentions of our supreme leader, so I think you should take his words literally,” Ri told CNN in Pyongyang. (Will Ripley, “North Korean Official: Take Hydrogen Bomb Threat ‘Literally,’” CNN, October 26, 2017)
10/27/17:
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis’s visit to the Korean Peninsula’s extremely militarized demilitarized zone was meant to show American solidarity with South Korea against a muscular North, which Mattis accused of building nuclear weapons to “threaten others with catastrophe.” But the trip also highlighted the central contradiction in the Trump administration’s rhetoric on North Korea: that for all the talk of military options, there really aren’t any — at least, none that wouldn’t put the sprawling city of Seoul, with its population of 10 million, in the cross hairs of thousands of Pyongyang’s artillery installations. Standing side by side with Mattis atop an observation post to gaze at the North, South Korea’s defense minister, Song Young-moo, seemed at times to be giving his American counterpart a guided tour of how a strike against North Korea’s nuclear facilities would quickly trigger retaliation. “There are 21 battalions” stationed over the border, Song told Mattis, gesturing toward the hills of North Korea in the distance. “Defending against this many L.R.A.s is unfeasible, in my opinion,” he said, alluding to the bristling array of long-range artillery pointed at his country. Song said that the United States and South Korea would have to destroy the North Korean artillery “the moment the war starts.” But even if the United States and South Korea were able to do so, American defense officials acknowledge that North Korea would still have a significant retaliatory capability, including chemical, biological and nuclear weapons as well as conventional forces. It would be virtually impossible, the officials said, to destroy all of North Korea’s offensive capabilities before it could strike Seoul. Mattis’s very helicopter ride to the DMZ illustrated Seoul’s vulnerability. The defense secretary took 30 minutes, by Black Hawk helicopter, to get to the border, though the trip could easily have easily been done in 10, so short is the distance. Mattis’s copter circled the hills and flatlands that dot the densely packed region. He flew over a succession of high-rise residential complexes and surveyed armored tank positions. But even by road, the trip from Seoul to the DMZ would have taken under an hour with no traffic. Both Mattis and Song appeared in somber dark suits despite reports in the South Korean news media that Song had wanted them to wear their old military uniforms. Mattis “wouldn’t do that,” said Capt. Jeff Davis, a Pentagon press spokesman accompanying the defense secretary. Captain Davis said he could not confirm whether Mr. Song actually made the suggestion, but he added that Mattis, a retired Marine general, was aware that defense secretary was a civilian post. The last thing that Seoul wants is for the United States to make good on all of President Trump’s threats about military options — South Koreans know that they would be the first to feel the repercussions. But at the same time, both South Korea and the United States want Pyongyang to think that Washington might launch a strike, in the hope that fears of such action might force North Korea to the bargaining table over its weapons programs. “Our goal is not war,” Mattis said, “but rather the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” He called North Korea an “oppressive regime that shackles its people, denying their freedom, their welfare and their human dignity,” and said that Pyongyang’s “provocations continue to threaten regional and global security.” As he spoke, patriotic North Korean music wafted through the air from speakers over the border. For the Trump administration, the Korea situation has been complex, in no small part because it now seems as if every time Trump threatens the North, Pyongyang carries out another nuclear or ballistic missile test. North Korea carried out its sixth nuclear test last month. Separately, the Pentagon said it was planning military exercises next month involving three of the Navy’s aircraft carrier strike groups in the Asia-Pacific region. The exercise, scheduled while Trump is traveling through the region, will undoubtedly be interpreted as another warning toward Pyongyang. Defense officials said that the show of military might was intended to demonstrate American capabilities in the region. But they cautioned that any American military strike against North Korea would come at a huge cost — one that neither Washington or Seoul may be prepared to pay. During a brief session with American troops in Seoul, Mattis said that American military might in the region was meant to back up its diplomacy. “We’re doing everything we can to solve this diplomatically, everything we can,” Mr. Mattis said. “But ultimately our diplomats have to be backed up by strong soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. So they speak from a position of strength.” (Helene Gordon, “Defense Chief’s Korea Visit Highlights U.S. Strength and Seoul’s Vulnerability,” New York Times, October 28, 2017,
The United States, South Korea and Japan should establish a “freedom nuclear alliance,” with atomic weapons deployed in all three countries to counter the rising North Korea threat, according to the leader of South Korea’s main opposition party. Hong Joon-pyo, chairman of the Liberty Korea Party, said North Korea is not going to give up its nuclear weapons any time soon and has effectively formed a “socialist nuclear alliance” with China and Russia. So the United States should abandon its policy of pressure and engagement with the regime of Kim Jong Un and move toward a new buildup of nuclear weapons in South Korea, he said. If Washington won’t oblige, South Korea and Japan should develop their own nuclear weapons to even the playing field, he told a group of Post journalists during a visit to Washington this week. Despite criticizing U.S. policy, Hong said he likes President Trump’s brash rhetoric, including his threat to “totally destroy” North Korea in his recent United Nations speech. “One way of dealing with gangsters is to act like a gangster yourself,” said Hong, a former prosecutor. “Mr. Trump’s approach is very appropriate. If you want to deal with a tough guy, you need to be even tougher.” For months, Hong and his party have been pushing the Trump administration to return tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea. “For the U.S. or others to accept or acknowledge that North Korea is a nuclear state or not does not change the fact that they have the capabilities,” he said. “By having a balance of nuclear threats, we will be able to prevent the war we’ve been trying to prevent from the very beginning. And after preventing the war, we can talk about nuclear disarmament.” Just threatening a nuclear escalation could be helpful in scaring North Korea or China into responding to international concerns about Kim’s nuclear arsenal, Hong argued. Trump should tell the Chinese government when he gets to Beijing that if Chinese officials don’t do more, the United States can’t stop South Korea from going nuclear, he said. “We need to put fear in the mind of the dictator of North Korea,” he said. “This is something that [Chinese President Xi Jinping] really wants to avoid at all costs.” (Josh Rogin, “South Korean Opposition Leader Calls for ‘Freedom Nuclear Alliance,’” Washington Post, October 27, 2017)
CRS: “Since 2010, the United States has engaged its allies in the Asia-Pacific, specifically Japan, South Korea, and Australia, to develop and implement an integrated regional BMD capability to deter and counter North Korea ballistic missile threats. Over the past 15 years, the United States has learned how its own BMD capabilities are significantly enhanced by integrating them into a much larger global BMD System (BMDS). The U.S. contribution to NATO’s territorial defense against possible ballistic missile threats from Iran, for example, has led to a phased capability to deploy THAAD radar, sea-based Aegis BMD, and Aegis Ashore capabilities in Europe, and to fully integrate those with the current and prospective range of NATO European BMD capabilities. The concerted effort to develop a similar capability in Northeast Asia has not been as successful, primarily because of outstanding historical and political issues between South Korea and Japan. The inability to fully integrate regional BMD systems amongst U.S., Korean, and Japanese BMD systems results in an unrealized potential that could prove significant if conflict erupts. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). The South Korean Navy has three Aegis destroyers that are similar to U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class Aegis destroyers. The ships, which entered service in 2008, 2010, and 2012, are known as the Sejon Daewang (KDX-3) class. Three additional KDX-3 ships are planned and may enter service in 2023-2027, according to the 2016-2017 edition of IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships. The three additional ships, according to this source, may be built with a BMD-capable version of the Aegis system. The three existing ships are equipped with a version of the Aegis system that is not BMD capable. The Aegis system on the three existing ships can be modified to become BMD sensor-capable, and South Korea reportedly has plans to do this, but that modification is to be done in the future. The three existing Aegis destroyers have participated in U.S.-South Korean-Japanese military exercises. Given their current lack of BMD capability, their potential contribution to any near-term BMD mission would be an indirect one—they could help defend U.S. and Japanese BMD-capable ships from North Korean submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and anti-ship cruise missiles. Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD). South Korea agreed to host a U.S. THAAD battery in 2016. That battery was deployed earlier this year in south central South Korea with four of the eight intended launchers. Until recently, the remaining four launchers had been held up due to outstanding political and environmental challenges. The operational status of the battery is classified, but observers believe the battery is already fully operational, with its eight launchers and its 48 interceptors. THAAD is widely considered to be highly effective against short range ballistic missiles (SRBM) and medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) threats based on its operational test performance over the past many years. THAAD has not been used in conflict, so its wartime performance is untested. THAAD is designed to protect larger areas, such as parts of South Korea including Camp Humphreys and other military assets, for example. It is unclear, however, whether THAAD could counter ballistic missiles targeted against Seoul, because that city lies just outside the unclassified operational effectiveness range from where this THAAD battery is located. Patriot. South Korea currently has a Patriot Advanced Capability-2 missile defense system at the Osan military base in Seoul. South Korea is in the process of receiving upgrades to Patriot Advanced Capability-3, which then-U.S. Army Secretary Eric Fanning said in 2016 would be completed by 2018. The Patriot PAC-2 has demonstrated limited wartime capability against SRBM threats, and while the PAC-3 system has performed well in operational tests according to DOD, it has not been used in conflict. South Korea has been developing an indigenous BMD capability against SRBMs called Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD). In 2016, Korea Defense Minister Han Min-Koo stated that the PAC-3 capability would be deployed in 2020 and 2022 as a part of the KAMD system. In April 2017, the Ministry of National Defense released the 2018-2022 Mid-Term National Defense Plan. This plan includes KAMD as part of a “three-axis system,” which also includes a “kill chain” for a preemptive strike in response to signs of an imminent North Korean missile attack and a Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) system for retaliating directly against the North Korean leadership in the event of a nuclear attack. As a part of efforts to move up development of these capabilities, the South Korean military is working to hasten performance improvements in its medium-range surface-to-air missile (M-SAM) system. These capabilities are currently not available in the near-term. Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD). South Korea agreed to host a U.S. THAAD battery in 2016. That battery was deployed earlier this year in south central South Korea with four of the eight intended launchers. Until recently, the remaining four launchers had been held up due to outstanding political and environmental challenges. The operational status of the battery is classified, but observers believe the battery is already fully operational, with its eight launchers and its 48 interceptors. THAAD is widely considered to be highly effective against short range ballistic missiles (SRBM) and medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) threats based on its operational test performance over the past many years. THAAD has not been used in conflict, so its wartime performance is untested. THAAD is designed to protect larger areas, such as parts of South Korea including Camp Humphreys and other military assets, for example. It is unclear, however, whether THAAD could counter ballistic missiles targeted against Seoul, because that city lies just outside the unclassified operational effectiveness range from where this THAAD battery is located. Patriot. South Korea currently has a Patriot Advanced Capability-2 missile defense system at the Osan military base in Seoul. South Korea is in the process of receiving upgrades to Patriot Advanced Capability-3, which then-U.S. Army Secretary Eric Fanning said in 2016 would be completed by 2018. The Patriot PAC-2 has demonstrated limited wartime capability against SRBM threats, and while the PAC-3 system has performed well in operational tests according to DOD, it has not been used in conflict. South Korea has been developing an indigenous BMD capability against SRBMs called Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD). In 2016, Korea Defense Minister Han Min-Koo stated that the PAC-3 capability would be deployed in 2020 and 2022 as a part of the KAMD system. In April 2017, the Ministry of National Defense released the 2018-2022 Mid-Term National Defense Plan. This plan includes KAMD as part of a “three-axis system,” which also includes a “kill chain” for a preemptive strike in response to signs of an imminent North Korean missile attack and a Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) system for retaliating directly against the North Korean leadership in the event of a nuclear attack. As a part of efforts to move up development of these capabilities, the South Korean military is working to hasten performance improvements in its medium-range surface-to-air missile (M-SAM) system. These capabilities are currently not available in the near-term.” (Kathleen J. McInnis, Andrew Fieckert, Mark E. Manyin, Steven A. Hildreth, Mary Beth Nikitin, and Emma Chanlett-Avery, The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congess (Congressional Research Service Report R44994, October 27, 2017), pp. 48-49)
10/28/17:
President Trump last month agreed to send more of the Pentagon’s “strategic assets” — typically defined as submarines, aircraft carriers, nuclear weapons, or bombers — to South Korea on a rotational basis to deter North Korean provocations, but what exactly that means remains something of a mystery. Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-in agreed to bolster the U.S. presence in the region. The Pentagon describes these forthcoming moves as the “enhanced deployment of U.S. strategic assets in and around South Korea on a rotational basis,” but it has provided few additional details. It appears they are still in the works. Marine Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in an interview today he had just discussed the deployment of strategic assets with South Korean counterparts during two days of meetings in Seoul. “Is it different things? No,” Dunford said. “Is it doing different things at different times? Yes. And is it incorporating other capabilities on occasion? Yes.” Dunford declined to detail what might be used, but said the discussion centered on combining the 28,500 U.S. troops based in South Korea full-time along with annual exercises and “our occasional rotation of forces” to bolster deterrence against North Korea. The point, he said, is to demonstrate the strength in the alliance between South Korea and the United States and the capability to respond militarily if necessary. “It wasn’t a specific, ‘We want this or that,’ ” Dunford said of the message the South Koreans conveyed. “It was more of a conversation about exercise cycles, patterns of deployments and so forth that would most enhance.” Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has been even vaguer. Asked today at a news conference in Seoul if strategic assets will stay on the South Korean Peninsula for a fixed amount of time, he declined to answer. “Regarding our strategic assets, they are global in their positioning,” he said. “They are global in their reach, and we are quite assured that they are in a position to be responsive … So, that’s all I’ve got to say about that.” Mattis’s South Korean counterpart, Defense Minister Song Young-moo, said the two countries have agreed to expand “relevant cooperation” involving strategic assets, including studies to improve deterrence against North Korea. Song also asked last month for the United States to consider reintroducing tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, but the move is considered unlikely among many U.S. military officials. In addition to it potentially putting tensions with North Korea at a new high, Moon has said he is against the idea. Dunford spent the weekend here in Hawaii following his meetings in Seoul for a three-party gathering that again included his South Korean counterpart, Gen. Jeong Kyeong-Doo, along with their Japanese equivalent, Adm. Kawno Katsutoshi. South Korea and Japan have had strained relations for years, dating back at least to the Empire of Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula during World War II and its use of so-called “comfort women,” who were forced into sexual slavery for Japanese soldiers. The three nations have participated together in operations meant to be a unified message for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. In one example, Air Force B-1B bombers from Andersen Air Force base in Guam flew in formation September 17 with fighters from all three nations before dropping live bombs on a range few dozen miles from the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas. The Japanese F-2 fighters broke off from the formation and did not fly over the peninsula, but were depicted in photographs released by the Pentagon in a show of force. The U.S. Navy typically keeps the movements of its submarines secret, but also has periodically sent them to port in South Korea. The USS Michigan, an Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, has appeared at Busan Naval Base in South Korea at least twice this year. It is capable of carrying nuclear missiles, as well as elite Navy SEALs. More recently, the Navy announced last week it has plans for a massive exercise involving three aircraft carriers — the USS Nimitz, the USS Theodore Roosevelt and the USS Ronald Reagan — and their associated strike groups, each of which include dozens of aircraft and thousands of sailors and Marines. The exercise will be carried out as Trump visits South Korea, and is a rarity — no three-carrier operation has occurred since 2007, said Marine Lt. Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., the director of the Pentagon’s Joint Staff. Dunford and others have effectively downplayed the significance of the timing as a coincidence, citing the length of time it takes to plan the movements of aircraft carriers. “These three carriers are not there specifically targeting North Korea,” the chairman said. “This is a routine demonstration of our commitment to the region.” The chairman did acknowledge closer attention is being paid to Pyongyang, in light of its actions. (Dan Lamothe, “In Standoff with North Korea, U.S. Keeps Deployment of ‘Strategic Assets’ Mysterious,” Washington Post, October 29, 2017)
10/29/17:
As North Korea races to build a weapon that for the first time could threaten American cities, its neighbors are debating whether they need their own nuclear arsenals. Doubts are growing the United States will be able to keep the atomic genie in the bottle. For the first time in recent memory, there is a daily argument raging in both South Korea and Japan — sometimes in public, more often in private — about the nuclear option, driven by worry that the United States might hesitate to defend the countries if doing so might provoke a missile launched from the North at Los Angeles or Washington. In South Korea, polls show 60 percent of the population favors building nuclear weapons. And nearly 70 percent want the United States to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use, which were withdrawn a quarter-century ago. There is very little public support for nuclear arms in Japan, the only nation ever to suffer a nuclear attack, but many experts believe that could reverse quickly if North and South Korea both had arsenals. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has campaigned for a military buildup against the threat from the North, and Japan sits on a stockpile of nuclear material that could power an arsenal of 6,000 weapons. A wwek ago, he won a commanding majority in parliamentary elections, fueling his hopes of revising the nation’s pacifist Constitution. Beyond South Korea and Japan, there is already talk in Australia, Myanmar, Taiwan and Vietnam about whether it makes sense to remain nuclear-free if others arm themselves — heightening fears that North Korea could set off a chain reaction in which one nation after another feels threatened and builds the bomb. In a recent interview, Henry A. Kissinger, one of the few nuclear strategists from the early days of the Cold War still living, said he had little doubt where things were headed. “If they continue to have nuclear weapons,” he said of North Korea, “nuclear weapons must spread in the rest of Asia.” “It cannot be that North Korea is the only Korean country in the world that has nuclear weapons, without the South Koreans trying to match it. Nor can it be that Japan will sit there,” he added. “So therefore we’re talking about nuclear proliferation.” Such fears have been raised before, in Asia and elsewhere, without materializing, and the global consensus against the spread of nuclear weapons is arguably stronger than ever. But North Korea is testing America’s nuclear umbrella — its commitment to defend its allies with nuclear weapons if necessary — in a way no nation has in decades. Similar fears of abandonment in the face of the Soviet Union’s growing arsenal helped lead Britain and France to go nuclear in the 1950s. President Trump, who leaves November 3 for a visit to Asia, has intensified these insecurities in the region. During his presidential campaign, he spoke openly of letting Japan and South Korea build nuclear arms even as he argued they should pay more to support the American military bases there. “There is going to be a point at which we just can’t do this anymore,” he told the New York Times in March 2016. Events, he insisted, were pushing both nations toward their own nuclear arsenals anyway. Trump has not raised that possibility in public since taking office. But he has rattled the region by engaging in bellicose rhetoric against North Korea and dismissing talks as a “waste of time.” In Seoul and Tokyo, many have already concluded that North Korea will keep its nuclear arsenal, because the cost of stopping it will be too great — and they are weighing their options. Japan briefly considered building a “defensive” nuclear arsenal in the 1960s despite its pacifist Constitution. South Korea twice pursued the bomb in the 1970s and 1980s, and twice backed down under American pressure. Even Taiwan ran a covert nuclear program before the United States shut it down. Today, there is no question that both South Korea and Japan have the material and expertise to build a weapon. All that is stopping them is political sentiment and the risk of international sanctions. Both nations signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but it is unclear how severely other countries would punish two of the world’s largest economies for violating the agreement. South Korea has 24 nuclear reactors and a huge stockpile of spent fuel from which it can extract plutonium — enough for more than 4,300 bombs, according to a 2015 paper by Charles D. Ferguson, president of the Federation of American Scientists. Japan once pledged never to stockpile more nuclear fuel than it can burn off. But it has never completed the necessary recycling and has 10 tons of plutonium stored domestically and another 37 tons overseas. “We keep reminding the Japanese of their pledge,” said Ernest J. Moniz, chief executive of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and an energy secretary in the Obama administration, noting that it would take years if not decades for Japan to consume its fissile material because almost all its nuclear plants have remained offline since the 2011 Fukushima accident. Analysts often describe Japan as a “de facto” nuclear state, capable of building a weapon within a year or two. “Building a physical device is not that difficult anymore,” said Suzuki Tatsujiro, former deputy chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission. Japan already possesses long-range missile technology, he added, but would need some time to develop more sophisticated communications and control systems. South Korea may be even further along, with a fleet of advanced missiles that carry conventional warheads. In 2004, the government disclosed that its scientists had dabbled in reprocessing and enriching nuclear material without first informing the International Atomic Energy Agency as required by treaty. “If we decide to stand on our own feet and put our resources together, we can build nuclear weapons in six months,” said Suh Kune-yull, a professor of nuclear engineering at Seoul National University. “The question is whether the president has the political will.” President Moon Jae-in has been firm in his opposition to nuclear weapons. He insists that building them or reintroducing American ones to South Korea would make it even more difficult to persuade North Korea to scrap its own. Though Moon has received high approval ratings since his election in May, his view is increasingly a minority one. Calls for nuclear armament used to be dismissed as chatter from South Korea’s nationalist fringe. Not anymore. Now people often complain that South Korea cannot depend on the United States, its protector of seven decades. The opposition Liberty Korea party called on the United States to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea in August after the North tested an intercontinental ballistic missile that appeared capable of reaching the mainland United States. “If the U.N. Security Council can’t rein in North Korea with its sanctions, we will have no option but to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty,” Won Yoo-chul, a party leader, said in September. Given the failure of sanctions, threats and negotiations to stop North Korea, South Koreans are increasingly convinced the North will never give up its nuclear weapons. But they also oppose risking a war with a military solution. Most believe the Trump administration, despite its tough talk, will ultimately acquiesce, perhaps settling for a freeze that allows the North to keep a small arsenal. And many fear that would mean giving the North the ultimate blackmail tool — and a way to keep the United States at bay. “The reason North Korea is developing a hydrogen bomb and intercontinental ballistic missiles is not to go to war with the United States,” said Cheong Seong-chang, an analyst at the Sejong Institute near Seoul. “It’s to stop the Americans from intervening in armed skirmishes or full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula.” The closer the North gets to showing it can strike the United States, the more nervous South Koreans become about being abandoned. Some have asked whether Washington will risk the destruction of an American city by intervening, for example, if the North attempts to occupy a border island, as its soldiers have practiced. For many in South Korea, the solution is a homegrown nuclear deterrent. “If we don’t respond with our own nuclear deterrence of some kind, our people will live like nuclear hostages of North Korea,” said Cheon Seong-whun, a former presidential secretary for security strategy. With nuclear weapons of its own, the South would gain leverage and could force North Korea back to the bargaining table, where the two sides could whittle down their arsenals through negotiations, some hawks argue. But given the risks of going nuclear, others say Seoul should focus on persuading Washington to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons. “The redeployment of American tactical nuclear weapons would be the surest way” to deter North Korea, Defense Minister Song Young-moo said last month, but he added that it would be difficult to get Washington to agree to that. The discussion in Japan has been more subdued than in South Korea, no surprise after 70 years of public education about the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But Japan has periodically considered developing nuclear weapons every decade since the 1960s. In 2002, a top aide to Junichiro Koizumi, the prime minister then, caused a furor by suggesting Japan might one day break with its policy of never building, possessing or allowing nuclear arms on its territory. North Korea has reopened that question. Ishiba Shigeru, a former defense minister seen as a potential challenger to Prime Minister Abe, has argued that Japan needs to debate its nuclear policy given the threat from North Korea. Abe has stopped short of calling for a re-evaluation of the country’s position on nuclear weapons. But he has increased military spending and echoed Trump’s hawkish position against the North. Abe’s administration has already determined that nuclear weapons would not be prohibited under the Constitution if maintained only for self-defense. The Japanese public is largely opposed to nuclear weapons with polls indicating fewer than one in 10 support nuclear armament. But Japan’s relations with South Korea have long been strained, and if Seoul armed itself, those numbers could shift. Some analysts say the discussion is aimed at getting additional reassurance from Washington. “We always do that when we become a little upset about the credibility of the extended U.S. deterrence,” said Michishita Narushige, a professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. Tobias Harris, a Japan analyst at Teneo Intelligence, a political risk consultancy, said Japan would rethink its position on nuclear weapons if it suspects the United States would let it down. “We’re kind of in uncharted waters as far as this goes,” he said. “It’s hard to know exactly what the threshold is that will lead the Japanese public’s switch to flip.” (David E. Sanger, Choe Sang-hun, and Motoko Rich, “Allies Rattled by North Korea Rethink Options,” New York Times, October 29, 2017,
The U.S. military sent a nuclear-capable B-2 stealth bomber from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri on a long-range mission to the Pacific area of operations over the weekend, it said October 29. U.S. Strategic Command said in a statement that the type of long-range mission conducted was to “familiarize aircrew with air bases and operations in different geographic combatant commands, enabling them to maintain a high state of readiness and proficiency.” In a message likely intended to reassure Japan and South Korea ahead of President Donald Trump’s visit to Asia, which kicks off later this week, the statement also referred to the B-2 mission as “a visible demonstration of commitment to our allies and enhancing regional security.” The flight path of the B-2 was unclear, and Strategic Command did not respond to a request for comment, but the last time one of the stealth bombers flew near the Koreas was during a rare show of force over the peninsula in 2013. Military experts say that any U.S. strike on North Korea would almost certainly involve the powerful bombers. Yonhap reported today that Seoul had signaled its intent to offer maintenance support for U.S. strategic military assets to be deployed there on a rotational basis in time of need, citing an anonymous government source. The source was quoted as saying that the plan conveyed Seoul’s “hope that the U.S. will expand its missions on the Korean Peninsula without any concerns over issues of maintenance, fuel supplies and so forth.” (Jesse Johnson, “Nuclear-Capable B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Heads to Pacific As Matthis Blasts ‘Outlaw’ North Korea,” Japan Times, October 29, 2017)
10/30/17:
Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Kyung-wha announced that South Korea would not pursue additional THAAD missile system deployments or participation in the US missile defense system. She also stated in no uncertain terms that trilateral security cooperation with the US and Japan would not develop into a military alliance. Her remarks appeared intended to help the Moon Jae-in administration change the current frame by sending a clear message in response to China’s concerns that the THAAD deployment is part of a strategy to hem it in with a South Korea/US/Japan military alliance. Indeed, a Chinese government official emerged as if on cue to state that Beijing “welcomes” Kang’s remarks – giving the appearance that the two sides engaged in behind-the-scenes discussions on a solution to the strain the THAAD issue has posed on their relations. Observers are also predicting Moon could have a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping during the upcoming APEC summit in Vietnam on November 10–11. Kang lent weight to the predictions by saying preparations were “under way for a bilateral summit at APEC.” The thaw between Seoul and Beijing was evident in Kang’s remarks that day at a Ministry of Foreign Affairs parliamentary audit before the National Assembly Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee. It came in response to a question from Democratic Party lawmaker Park Byeong-seug, who is known as a China expert. Noting that there were “three main important elements” to the South Korea-China conflict, Park asked Kang to clarify the administration’s position on “whether there will be additional THAAD deployments, whether [South Korea is] participating in [US-led] missile defense, and the possibility of a South Korea/US/Japan military alliance.” Kang explained that the three sides’ security cooperation was “intended to enhance deterrence capabilities and effectively respond to the North Korean nuclear and missile threat.” “I would like to make it clear that this cooperation will not develop into a trilateral military alliance,” she continued. The comments were a response to the mention of Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s name and the inclusion of language about “further ways to enhance cooperation” with Japan in a statement from [Moon’s] first U.S. summit in late June, as well as a pledge to “continue developing trilateral security cooperation” in a joint statement from a dinner by the three sides’ leaders at the G20 summit in Germany that took place in July. Along similar lines, Beijing has raised concerns that South Korea’s THAAD deployment means it is being incorporated into the U.S. missile defense system. In her response, Kang reiterated that the Moon administration “is unchanged in its position that we are not taking part in the US missile defense system.” “Our administration is not considering additional THAAD deployments. I want to make that clear,” she added. Her remarks amounted to a pledge, with the Moon administration publicly drawing a line in answer to Beijing’s concerns that the THAAD deployment and a trilateral alliance would turn South Korea into a US forward base against China. Kang also responded to speculation about Seoul and Beijing restoring ties. “I expect I may be able to announce some related news shortly for the development of the two sides’ future-oriented relationship,” she said. “I believe these measures will allow us to overcome difficulties in our relationship and quickly enter a normalization track,” she added. Kang’s remarks gave the appearance of having been coordinated beforehand in working-level discussions between Seoul and Beijing. There has been speculation that China may have demanded that South Korea clarify its positions on the three issues ahead of their summit. The Chinese Foreign Ministry immediately voiced its approval of Kang’s statements. In a regular briefing the same day, ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said Beijing “value[s] these three aspects of the remarks by the ROK.” “The Chinese side has always been opposed to the deployment of the THAAD system in the ROK by the US. We hope the ROK will faithfully follow through on its above-mentioned commitments, properly handle the relevant issue and bring the China-ROK relations back to the track of steady and sound development at an early date,” she added. “For a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson to express hopes for South Korea’s implementation [of its position] is an indication that China plans to accept things at this level and bring the situation to a conclusion,” said Peking University professor Jin Jingyi in a telephone interview. “There was also probably a feeling that it benefits neither side to continue dragging things out conflict without resolving the,” he added. Jin also predicted the two sides were “likely to work quickly now that they have entered relationship-mending mode,” adding that a “schedule for a bilateral summit or China visit by President Moon Jae-in could emerge shortly.” If a summit does happen in the near future, it could prove decisive in smoothing over the THAAD conflict and getting relations back on track. Observers in and around the Blue House had predicted relations with Beijing might improve after the CCP National Congress. The first signs of warmth in the two sides’ relationship for some time were also recently seen in the October 13 extension of their current swap deal deadline and their first defense ministers’ summit in two years on October 24. Kang said that preparations were “under way for a bilateral summit at APEC.” Regarding the possibility of Moon visiting China before mid-December, she replied, “We are working to enable it to happen within the year.” Sungkyun University of China Studies director Lee Hee-ok said South Korea and China “seem to have found the momentum” to improve ties. “The next stage after keeping the status quo without additional THAAD deployments is to explain South Korea’s strategic intentions,” he suggested.
Professor Moon Heung-ho of the Hanyang University Graduate School of International Studies said Seoul and Beijing “agreed that they need to find a way out on the THAAD issue with Xi Jinping beginning his second term and [US President Donald] Trump’s visit coming up.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Lee Do-hoon “is scheduled to hold a meeting of Six-Party Talks chief negotiators on October 31 with Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister and Special Representative on Korean Peninsula Affairs Kou Xuanyou.” “The two sides will be holding in-depth discussions on ideas for cooperation to peacefully and diplomatically resolve the North Korean nuclear issue,” the ministry said. (Kim Ji-eun, Kim Bo-hyeop, and Noh Ji-won, “S.K. Foreign Minister Rules out Additional THAAD Deployments, Joining U.S. MD System,” Hankyore, October 31, 2017)
President Trump does not have authority to use military force in North Korea outside of an imminent threat, Defense Secretary James Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson told lawmakers Monday. But they declined to define what they consider an imminent threat to be. Mattis and Tillerson were testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the issue of authorization for the use of military force (AUMF). Committee ranking member Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Md.) asked the pair if they agree there is no congressional authorization for the use of force in North Korea. “I understand the president’s authorities under Article II. There’s an imminent threat against the United States, he has certain powers. But as far as congressional authorization, there is no authorization. Is that correct?” Cardin asked. Tillerson replied: “That’s my understanding, yes.” “I believe the president has Article II, you know, authority only,” Mattis added. Later in the hearing, Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) pressed them further on whether they believe the president needs congressional authorization to strike North Korea. “I think it would depend again on all circumstances. It’s a fact-based decision,” Tillerson said. “It is a question of the threat, the imminent threat, the nature of the threat as to whether the president would then exercise his authorities without the need for congressional authorizations.” Mattis added he could see a scenario in which there is not enough time to notify Congress before striking. “I believe under Article II, he has a responsibility to protect the country and if there was not time, I could imagine him not consulting or consulting as he’s doing something along the lines of for example of what we did at Shayrat air field in Syria where we struck that and Congress was notified immediately,” Mattis said. “In this case of North Korea, it would be a direct imminent or actual attack on the United States I think Article II would apply.” But asked by Murphy whether possessing a nuclear weapon would be considered an imminent threat, Tillerson and Mattis said that was too hypothetical. “I’m always reluctant to get into too many hypotheticals because the possession could be sitting in an underground, not-ready-to-be-used condition or the possession could be sitting upright on the tail about to be launched,” Tillerson said. “So again, I think it would have to be fact based and given consideration as to the circumstances around an imminent threat.” Mattis added that he agrees. “I think this is an area where a number of facts would have to bear on the problem in order to give you a complete answer,” Mattis said. (Rebecca Kheel, “Mattis, Tillerson: No Authority fpr Military Action outside ‘Imminent Threat,’” The Hill, October 30, 2017) “There is no authorization for the use of military force against North Korea absent an imminent attack against the United States or against U.S. forces in this region,” Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin (Md.), the ranking Democrat on the committee, said at the beginning of the session.
He asked Tillerson and Mattis if they agreed. Tillerson said yes. Mattis said the president has only “Article 2” authority, referring to Trump’s constitutionally mandated duty to protect the nation. Several senators reminded Tillerson and Mattis such authority is interpreted as authorizing the president to use military force only in response to an attack on American citizens or interests, or in the case an attack is “imminent.” The definition of “imminent” is crucial because top Trump administration officials constantly say that Kim Jong Un cannot be allowed to possess the capability to strike the United States homeland with an intercontinental ballistic missile topped with a nuclear warhead. That red line seems to suggest that Trump might attack when North Korea acquires that capability, not when the regime of Kim Jong Un is actually set to use it. “We all understand that ‘imminent’ has some subjectivity,” Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.) told me after the hearing. “But you can’t stretch it to mean to prevent them from the ability to attack us sometime in the future.” Pressed by Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) on whether the Trump team would see North Korea’s mere possession of such a capability as an “imminent” threat, Tillerson said it would have to be a “fact based” analysis at the time. “The possession could be sitting in an underground, not ready to be used position. Or possession could be sitting upright … about to be launched,” Tillerson said. (Josh Rogin, “Can Anyone Stop Trump from Attacking North Korea,” Washington Post, November 1, 2017)
10/31/17:
The United States is quietly pursuing direct diplomacy with North Korea, a senior State Department official said, despite President Donald Trump’s public assertion that such talks are a waste of time. Using the so-called “New York channel,” Joseph Yun, U.S. negotiator with North Korea, has been in contact with diplomats at Pyongyang’s United Nations mission, the official said, at a time when an exchange of bellicose insults between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has fueled fears of military conflict. There is no sign, however, that the behind-the-scenes communications have improved a relationship vexed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests, the death of U.S. university student Otto Warmbier days after his release by Pyongyang in June and the detention of three other Americans. Word of quiet engagement with Pyongyang comes despite Trump’s comments, North Korea’s weapons advances and suggestions by some U.S. and South Korean officials that Yun’s interactions with North Koreans had been reined in. “It has not been limited at all, both (in) frequency and substance,” said the senior State Department official. Among the points that Yun has made to his North Korean interlocutors is to “stop testing” nuclear bombs and missiles, the official said. The New York channel is one of the few conduits the United States has for communicating with North Korea, which has itself made clear it has little interest in serious talks before it develops a nuclear-tipped missile capable of hitting the continental United States. The last high-level contact between Yun and the North Koreans was when he traveled to North Korea in June to secure the release of Warmbier, who died shortly after he returned home in a coma, the State Department official said. At the start of Trump’s presidency, Yun’s instructions were limited to seeking the release of U.S. prisoners. “It is (now) a broader mandate than that,” said the State Department official, declining, however, to address whether authority had been given to discuss North Korea’s nuclear and missile program. The Trump administration has demanded North Korea release three other U.S. citizens: missionary Kim Dong Chul and academics Tony Kim and Kim Hak Song. The official said, however, that “the preferred endpoint is not a war but some kind of diplomatic settlement” and suggestions that Washington is setting up a binary choice for Pyongyang to capitulate diplomatically or military action were “misleading.” Diplomacy, the official said, “has a lot more room to go.” In Beijing, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said China welcomed any dialogue between the United States and North Korea. “We encourage North Korea and the United States to carry out engagement and dialogue,” Hua told reporters, adding that she hoped talks could help return the issue to a diplomatic track for resolution. Democratic U.S. senators introduced a bill today they said would prevent Trump from launching a nuclear first strike on North Korea on his own, highlighting the issue days before the Republican’s first presidential trip to Asia. A high-ranking North Korean defector said in Washington that he backed the Trump administration’s policy of pressuring Pyongyang through sanctions, coupled with “maximum engagement” with the leadership and increased efforts to get information into North Korea to educate its people. “I strongly believe in the use of soft power before taking any military actions,” Thae Yong Ho, chief of mission at Pyongyang’s embassy in London until he defected in 2016, told the Center for Strategic and International Studies. (Arshad Mohammed and Matt Spetalnick, “U.S. Puruses Direct Diplomacy with North Korea despite Trump’s Rejection,” Reuters, October 31, 2017)
South Korea and China agreed to end a dispute over the deployment of an advanced American missile defense system in the South and to restore their economic and other ties. The agreement, unveiled following low-key negotiations involving Chinese and South Korean officials, removed a major obstacle in relations between Seoul and Beijing, one that has complicated international efforts to tame North Korea’s nuclear weapons ambitions. For years, China has vehemently protested the United States’ plan to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, system in South Korea, fearing it would undercut its own national security. After the United States and South Korea pressed ahead with the deployment in Seongju, 135 miles southeast of Seoul, the capital, in April, Chinese customers boycotted South Korean cars, movies and television dramas, as well as South Korean-run supermarkets. “Both sides shared the view that the strengthening of exchange and cooperation between Korea and China serves their common interests and agreed to expeditiously bring exchange and cooperation in all areas back on a normal development track,” said a statement from the South Korean Foreign Ministry. The Chinese Foreign Ministry also issued a similar statement announcing the agreement. The breakthrough came only days after President Xi Jinping of China emerged triumphant from the Communist Party congress this month, more confident than ever in his hold on power and in the pursuit of his foreign policy. The inauguration of Moon Jae-in, a liberal president of South Korea who has stressed the importance of relations with China, his country’s biggest trading partner, in May has also helped thaw relations. In a separate statement, Moon’s office said he would hold a summit meeting with Xi on the sidelines of a summit of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation countries in Vietnam on November 10-11. Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha of South Korea first hinted at a possible breakthrough yesterday, when she said that despite the THAAD deployment, South Korea had no intention of joining the United States’ efforts to build a region-wide missile-defense system aimed at countering China’s expansion of its military capabilities. Ms. Kang also said South Korea would not accept any additional THAAD batteries. She also reiterated that South Korea would not enter any trilateral military alliance with the United States and Japan, something that Xi raised concerns about when he met Moon in July. The United States remains South Korea’s most important military ally. At Washington’s urging, South Korea and Japan have been expanding their military cooperation to better deal with North Korea’s missile threats. But South Korea has repeatedly stressed that it had no intention of entering a military alliance with Japan, its former colonial master, and has been wary of Japan’s ambitions, under its nationalist prime minister, Shinzo Abe, to increase its military profile in the region. Underscoring the continuing threat from North Korea’s nuclear program, the head of South Korea’s weather agency said on Monday that another powerful blast at the North’s underground test site could destabilize the area and send radioactive material into the atmosphere. “Should another nuclear test take place, there is that possibility,” Nam Jae-cheol, director of the Korea Meteorological Administration, told lawmakers inquiring about the potential for radioactive fallout. North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests since 2006, all of them in tunnels buried deep under Mount Mantap in Punggye-ri, in North Hamgyong Province. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea and China Reconcile amid Threat,” New York Times, October 31, 2017,
11/1/17:
South Korea will neither develop nor possess nuclear arms, President Moon Jae-in said, amid conservative opposition parties’ call to redeploy U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. Moon also renewed his call on North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions. “In accordance with the declaration of denuclearization jointly announced by the South and the North, a nuclear-armed North Korea can neither be tolerated nor accepted. We too will not develop or possess nukes,” the president said in his second state of the nation address at the National Assembly. President Moon said the government’s foremost goal was to establish peace. “What we want to realize is peace on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, there can never be any armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula under any circumstances. There cannot be any military action on the Korean Peninsula without a prior consent of the Republic of Korea,” he said, referring to his country by its official name.
However, the president vowed maximum retaliation against any military provocation from the North. “To this end, we must secure overwhelming power. We will also closely work with the international community, based on the strong Korea-U.S. alliance,” Moon said. He also stressed the importance of maintaining what he has called maximum pressure and sanctions on the North, calling them a way to bring North Korea to the dialogue table. “We must decide the fate of our own nation,” the president said. “We will not repeat the unfortunate history of having our fate decided regardless of our wishes, such as the (Japanese) colonial rule (of Korea) and the division (of the two Koreas).” (Byun Duk-kun, “Moon Says S. Korea Will Neither Develop Nor Possess Nuclear Arms,” Yonhap, October 31, 2017) During his address proposing next year’s budget plan at the National Assembly on Nov. 1, South Korean President Moon Jae-in unveiled five principles for achieving peace on the Korean Peninsula. “The new Administration was launched amidst the gravest security environment we have seen in a long time. The Government is working to stabilize the management of the current situation and, at the same time, ultimately ensure peace on the Korean Peninsula,” he said, as he laid out his five principles. The first principle is “establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula.” “Our top priority is to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula. Thus, armed conflict must be avoided under any circumstance. No military action on the Korean Peninsula shall be taken without prior consent of the Republic of Korea,” he asserted. This appears to be aimed at the US, which continues to toy with the possibility of using the “military option” against North Korea. Significantly, Moon delivered this message on the very podium in the National Assembly where US President Donald Trump will deliver his own address on Nov. 8, exactly one week later. Along with reflecting the fact that concerns remain about a military clash between North Korea and the US, Moon appears to have set the tone for his administration’s Korean Peninsula policy by placing this first among his five principles. Next, Moon reaffirmed the principle of the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” “The Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, signed by both South and North Korea, makes it impossible to accept or acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear power. South Korea will not develop or possess nuclear arms, either,” he added. This was a blunt dismissal of the arguments advanced by South Korea’s conservative establishment following North Korea’s sixth nuclear test to have the US redeploy tactical nuclear weapons or develop South Korea’s own nuclear arsenal. The third principle elucidated by Moon was for South Korea to “take [a] primary role in resolving the inter-Korean issue.” This is a position that Moon has underlined since he became a candidate for president. “The destiny of the Korean nation must be determined by Koreans. The unfortunate past in which our destiny was determined against our will, such as colonial rule and national division, must never be allowed to recur,” he stressed. After this, Moon proposed the principle of “a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.” He reconfirmed that the sanctions and pressure against North Korea imposed by the international community (including the UN Security Council) under the lead of the US are “the means to guide the North toward making the right choice and coming to the negotiating table.” The fifth principle that Moon espoused was “a stern response to any North Korean provocation.” To achieve this, Moon promised to “retain overwhelming military superiority,” “a firm ROK-U.S. alliance” and to “work proactively with the international community.” This was tied to a plan to increase spending on national defense. “In a bid to make our armed forces stronger and to equip them with self-reliant national defense capabilities, the budget for national defense has been increased by 6.9 percent, the highest rise since 2009,. In particular, the budget for the enhancement of defense capabilities saw a marked 10.5 percent increase,” he said. “To protect the people from the North Korean threat, the establishment of the three-pillar system will be completed at an early stage,” Moon said, referring to the Kill Chain, Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR). This reflects Moon’s consistent emphasis on “peace based on strength,” which is not in line with the basic historical position of South Korea’s liberals (currently called the Democratic Party) of achieving peace through improving inter-Korean relations. (Kim Ji-eun, “President Moon Lays out Five Principles for a Peaceful Korea,” Hankyore, November 1, 2017)
11/2/17:
Donald Trump warned China a day before departing on his first Asia tour as president that it must do more to rein in North Korea’s nuclear ambitions or face “a big problem” with “warrior nation” Japan. “Japan is a warrior nation, and I tell China and I tell everyone else that listens, I mean, you’re gonna have yourself a big problem with Japan pretty soon if you allow this to continue with North Korea,” Trump said in an interview on the Fox News program “The Ingraham Angle.” It was unclear what the U.S. leader was referring to, in terms of a “big problem,” but Trump had suggested during his successful campaign for president that he would be open to Japan acquiring its own nuclear weapons. (Jesse Johnson, “Trump Warns China It Could Face ‘Big Problem’ with ‘Warrior Nation’ Japan over North Korea,” Japan Times, November 3, 2017)
President Donald Trump’s national security adviser says North Korea could be returned to the list of countries the U.S. believes sponsor terrorism, as part of Trump’s strategy to counter the North’s growing nuclear threat. “You’ll hear more about that soon, I think,” the adviser, H.R. McMaster, said at a briefing on the eve of Trump’s five-nation tour of Asia. McMaster cited the killing in a Malaysian airport earlier this year of the estranged half-brother of North Korea’s leader as an act of terrorism that could lead to the North’s being added back to a list that includes only Iran, Sudan and Syria. While Malaysia has not directly accused North Korea, South Korea’s spy agency has claimed the attack was part of a plot by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to kill his brother, Kim Jong Nam. “A regime who murders someone in a public airport using nerve agent, and a despotic leader who murders his brother in that manner, I mean, that’s clearly an act of terrorism that fits in with a range of other actions,” McMaster said. He said returning North Korea to the state sponsors of terrorism list “is something that’s under consideration.” Under legislation enacted August 2, the State Department was required to determine within 90 days — or around now — whether North Korea meets the criteria for being designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson “continues to evaluate whether or not to designate DPRK as a state sponsor of terror,” an official said Thursday. “The Department has informed Members of Congress that he expects to conclude his review and announce a decision within the month.” McMaster said the president would not temper his rhetoric against North Korea while on tour. “The president will use whatever language he wants to use,” he said. “That’s been of great reassurance to our allies, partners and others in the region who are literally under the gun of this regime.” McMaster said a denuclearized Korean peninsula “is the only plausible outcome” and he called on other nations, including China — North Korea’s chief benefactor in the region — to do more to help make that a reality. The national security adviser said Trump would address North Korea’s human rights record during the trip. Re-designating North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism would be largely of symbolic significance. North Korea is heavily and increasingly sanctioned for its nuclear and missile activity in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions. Sanctions from a terror designation are unlikely to inflict significant, additional economic punishment. (Darlene Superville, “U.S. Considering Return of N. Korea to List of Terror Sponsors,” Associated Press, November 3, 2017) Military options against North Korea will be on the table when the U.S. and South Korean leaders meet next week, McMaster said. “It would be irresponsible not to talk about the potential for military efforts within the alliance,” he said. “The reason why that topic must be on the agenda is because of the behavior of this rogue regime and the threat that Kim Jong-un poses,” he said in a roundtable interview with news outlets from the five Asian nations Trump will be visiting. Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-in are to meet in Seoul on November 14. “The discussion will also be about what more can we do, what more can all countries do to resolve this short of war,” McMaster added. “What we think is essential is to continue the diplomatic and economic isolation of the North Korean regime so that leaders within that regime recognize that this weapon, this pursuit of this destructive capability, is not making them more secure, it’s making them less secure, and to conclude that it is in their interest to begin denuclearization.” But he also made clear that the U.S. has not given up on diplomacy. “Diplomacy is our main effort now,” he said, “but it’s diplomacy with other countries who recognize the grave threat and who are working together.” McMaster said Trump has instructed officials to ask other countries to do more to isolate the North until the regime realizes it has no option but to denuclearize. McMaster said he welcomes this week’s announcement that Seoul and Beijing have agreed to move forward despite a dispute over South Korea’s hosting of the THAAD U.S. missile defense system on its soil. “What’s important is that China is no longer punishing South Korea for defending itself, which I always thought didn’t make any sense,” he said, referring to Beijing’s economic retaliation against Seoul. “What China may be realizing as well is that it makes more sense, at least from our perspective, to prioritize its relationship with South Korea over its relationship with North Korea, which is not only a dangerous state but a failing state at the same time.” If North Korea continues to pursue nuclear weapons, McMaster said there could be a breakdown of the nonproliferation regime in Northeast Asia. “And that’s not in anybody’s interest, right?” he said, apparently addressing growing calls in South Korea and Japan for their own nuclear armament. (Yonhap, “Moon, Trump to Discuss Military Options against North Korea: McMaster,” Korea Times, November 3, 2017)
11/3/17:
Credible military capabilities should be in place to back up diplomatic and economic sanctions to rein in North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, the chief of the United States Forces Korea said. “The military is in support of these diplomatic and economic actions that are intended to create sufficient pressure to cause (North Korean leader) Kim Jong-un to stop and reverse what it is he is doing so far,” Gen. Vincent Brooks said in his lecture to a group of retired and sitting South Korean military commanders. “As you can see more pressure is needed, but so is more diplomacy and more economic actions,” the commander of 28,500 American forces stationed in South Korea said. “And it has to be done on the foundation of credible and ready military capabilities, and that’s what we are focused on every day in the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance.” “We know it’s not the only answer to solve the problem by itself,” he said of the military capabilities. “But without it, it’s very difficult for diplomacy and economic actions to gain any kind of leverage or traction,” according to the commander. He also called for defense buildup in Seoul and areas surrounding the capital, highlighting that the recent deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system dispelled security threats in the southern portion of South Korea. “On the Korean Peninsula, several things can be held at risk by North Korea. But with the deployment of things like THAAD, that changed what it is Kim Jong-un can hold at risk, especially the southern portion of the peninsula,” Brooks noted. “This is how it should be viewed.” “We need to make sure we are adding to the defense that already exists to protect the population in Seoul and the metropolitan area … so that Kim Jong-un cannot hold this population at risk.” (Yonhap, “Credible Military Capabilities Should Back up Diplomatic Actions to Rein in N. Korea: USFK Commander,” November 3, 2017)
11/4/17:
The only way to locate and secure all of North Korea’s nuclear weapons sites “with complete certainty” is through an invasion of ground forces, and in the event of conflict, Pyongyang could use biological and chemical weapons, the Pentagon told lawmakers in a new, blunt assessment of what war on the Korean Peninsula might look like. The Pentagon, in a letter to lawmakers, said that a full discussion of U.S. capabilities to “counter North Korea’s ability to respond with a nuclear weapon and to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons located in deeply buried, underground facilities” is best suited for a classified briefing. The letter also said that Pentagon leaders “assess that North Korea may consider the use of biological weapons” and that the country “has a long-standing chemical weapons program with the capability to produce nerve, blister, blood and choking agents.” The Pentagon repeated that a detailed discussion of how the United States would respond to the threat could not be discussed in public. The letter was written by Rear Adm. Michael J. Dumont, the vice director of the Pentagon’s Joint Staff, in response to a request for information from two House members about “expected casualty assessments in a conflict with North Korea,” including for civilians and U.S. and allied forces in South Korea, Japan and Guam. “A decision to attack or invade another country will have ramifications for our troops and taxpayers, as well as the region, for decades,” Ted Lieu (D-Calif.) and Ruben Gallego (D-Ariz.) wrote to the Pentagon. “We have not heard detailed analysis of expected U.S. or allied force casualties, expected civilian casualties, what plans exist for the aftermath of a strike — including continuity of the South Korean Government.” The Pentagon said that calculating “best- or worst-case casualty scenarios” was challenging and would depend on the “nature, intensity and duration” of a North Korean attack; how much warning civilians would have to get to the thousands of shelters in South Korea; and the ability of U.S. and South Korean forces to respond to North Korean artillery, rockets and ballistic missiles with their own retaliatory barrage and airstrikes. The letter noted that Seoul, the South Korean capital, is a densely populated area with 25 million residents. Any operation to pursue North Korean nuclear weapons would likely be spearheaded by U.S. Special Operations troops. Last year, President Barack Obama and then-Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter gave U.S. Special Operations Command a new, leading role coordinating the Pentagon’s effort to counter weapons of mass destruction. SOCOM did not receive any new legal authorities for the mission but gained influence in how the military responds to such threats. Elite U.S. forces have long trained to respond in the case of a so-called “loose nuke” in the hands of terrorists. But senior officials said SOCOM is increasingly focused on North Korea. A senior U.S. military official in South Korea, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss ongoing operations, said that while the 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea maintain a high degree of readiness, he “has to believe” that North Korea does not want a war, given all of the nations aligned against it. “If you open the history books, this is not the first time that we’ve been in a heavy provocation cycle,” the official said. On the side of South Korea and the United States, he said, “there is no action taken without extreme consideration of not putting this in a position where a fight is going to happen.” Dumont’s letter also notes that “we have not seen any change in the offensive posture of North Korea’s forces.” A statement by 16 lawmakers, released simultaneously with the Pentagon letter, urged Trump to stop making “provocative statements” that impede diplomatic efforts and risk the lives of U.S. troops. The Pentagon’s “assessment underscores what we’ve known all along: There are no good military options for North Korea,” said the statement, organized by Lieu and Gallego and signed by 14 other members of Congress who are veterans, all but one of them Democrats. In a telephone interview, Lieu said that the intent of asking the Pentagon for information was to spell out the cataclysmic consequences of war with North Korea and the aftermath. “It’s important for people to understand what a war with a nuclear power would look like,” said Lieu, citing estimates of 300,000 dead in the first few days alone. More than 100,000 Americans are potentially at risk. Lieu, who spent part of his time in the Air Force on Guam preparing for military action against North Korea, called the letter a confirmation that a conflict would result in a “bloody, protracted ground war.” The Joint Chiefs, he believes, are “trying to send a message to the American public,” he said. “This is grim,” Lieu said. “We need to understand what war means. And it hasn’t been articulated very well. I think they’re trying to articulate some of that.”
Gallego said that he wanted information because of what he sees as a cavalier attitude in the White House about military action in North Korea. The idea that a ground invasion would be needed to secure nuclear weapons is eye-opening, he said, and raises the possibility of the U.S. military losing thousands of troops. “I think that you’re dealing with career professionals at the Pentagon who realize that the drumbeats of war could actually end up leading us to war,” he said. “They want to make sure that there is full transparency and information out there about what can occur if our civilian leaders make wrong calculations.” The Pentagon letter also notes the possibility of “opposition from China or Russia.” “The Department of Defense maintains a set of up-to-date contingency plans to secure our vital national security interests,” Dumont wrote. “These plans account for a wide range of possibilities, including third-party intervention, and address how best to ‘contain escalation.’ ” The letter says that both “Russia or China may prefer to avoid conflict with the United States, or possibly cooperate with us.” (Dan Lamothe and Carol Morello, “Scenario of War on N. Korea: Invasion,” Washington Post, November 5, 2017,
11/5/17:
President Trump donned a military-style bomber jacket shortly after arriving today in Japan and projected confidence that the United States will confront threats in Asia, telling hundreds of U.S. troops that they will have his administration’s support “to fight, to overpower and to always, always, always win.” Trump’s tough talk in a speech to U.S. and Japanese military personnel at Yokota Air Base, shortly after Air Force One touched down here, aimed to set a tone for his five-nation tour, during which the president said he is likely to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The president told reporters during his flight here that he wants “Putin’s help on North Korea,” as his administration attempts to consolidate support for its strategy to pressure Pyongyang over its nuclear weapons program. “History has proven over and over that the road of the tyrant is a steady march towards poverty, suffering and servitude,” Trump told the troops, perhaps referring obliquely to North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, whose name he did not mention. Noting that he has proposed a bigger military budget, Trump surveyed the troops in an air base hangar and declared: “We’ve got a lot of stuff coming; use it well.” The boisterous scene, during which the troops cheered and chanted “U.S.A.!” was closely watched in capitals across northeast Asia, where governments from Seoul to Beijing are looking for signals of how Trump will address the threat on his first trip to the region. On the plane, Trump told reporters that he plans to decide “very soon” whether to relabel North Korea a state sponsor of terror. The North spent 10 years on that list before being removed in 2008 by the George W. Bush administration for meeting nuclear inspection requirements. Pyongyang later violated the agreement. But Trump also offered encouragement for North Korean citizens, calling them “great people.” “They’re industrious, they’re warm, much warmer than the world really knows and understands,” he told reporters on the plane. “They’re great people and I hope it all works out for everybody. And it would be a wonderful thing if it could work for those great people, and for everybody.” And he seemed unconcerned about the prospect that North Korea might use his trip to the region to demonstrate its military might by firing a missile. “We’ll soon find out,” he said. “Good luck!” (David Nakamura and Ashley Parker, “Arriving in Japan, Trump Projects Confidence, Says He’ll Probably Meet Putin during Asian Trip,” Washington Post, November 5, 2017)
Trump: “Together with our allies, America’s warriors are prepared to defend our nation using the full range of our unmatched capabilities. No one — no dictator, no regime, and no nation — should underestimate, ever, American resolve. Every once in a while, in the past, they underestimated us. It was not pleasant for them, was it? (Applause.) It was not pleasant. We will never yield, never waver, and never falter in defense of our people, our freedom, and our great American flag. (Applause.) That flag stands for the values of our Republic, the history of our people, the sacrifice of our heroes, and our loyalty to the nation we love. As long as I am President, the servicemen and women who defend our nation will have the equipment, the resources, and the funding they need to secure our homeland, to respond to our enemies quickly and decisively, and, when necessary, to fight, to overpower, and to always, always, always win. Right? (Applause.) This is the heritage of the American Armed Forces — the greatest force for peace and justice the world has ever known.” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks of President Trump to Servicemembers at Yokota Air Base, November 5, 2017)
The South Korean government issued its own sanctions against North Korea on Sunday over its nuclear and missile provocations ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to the country. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs unveiled a list of 18 North Korean individuals subject to the unilateral sanctions, saying they will take effect Monday. It marks Seoul’s first unilateral sanctions against the nuclear weapon-seeking country since President Moon Jae-in took power in May. However, the sanctions could only remain ineffective and symbolic because the two Koreas have already cut almost all exchanges. The ministry singled out the figures who had been blacklisted by the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) for being linked to North Korea’s financial networks. The selection came in line with sanctions by the international community, according to the ministry. “They are the executives of North Korean banks overseas suspected of funneling money for the development of weapons of mass destruction for their government,” the ministry said. “The measure is expected to help cut the North’s illegal financial resource and raise awareness of the dangers of transactions with the blacklisted individuals at home and abroad.” The sanctions will freeze property of the sanctioned individuals within South Korean jurisdiction and ban any of their transactions with South Korean banks. The ministry added the government will continue working on resolving the North’s nuclear issue peacefully by making the North come to the dialogue table through sanctions and pressure. The move is interpreted as a show of tightened coordination between Seoul and Washington on the North Korea policy. A senior Cheong Wa Dae official hinted Friday that the move was facilitated at the request of Washington. “The U.S. called on our government to impose additional sanctions as they will carry a symbolic significance regardless of their effectiveness,” the official said. (Kim Hyo-jin, “Seoul Unveils Own Sanctions against N.K.,” Korea Times, November 5, 2017)
11/5/17:
Donald Trump has indicated that he would be prepared to meet the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at some point, though he said it was still “far too early” for a one-to-one conversation with his adversary. Speaking at the outset of a five-nation Asia tour set to be dominated by the standoff over North Korea’s nuclear program, Trump declared himself happy to “sit down with anybody.” “I don’t think it’s strength or weakness, I think sitting down with people is not a bad thing,” he told the journalist Sharyl Attkisson, host of the Full Measure TV show. “So I would certainly be open to doing that [sitting down with Kim] but we’ll see where it goes. I think we’re far too early.” The rare conciliatory tone contrasted with more familiar Trump bluster earlier in the weekend, when he told U.S. troops in Japan that “no dictator” should underestimate America, in a thinly veiled reference to Kim. “No one, no dictator, no regime … should underestimate American resolve,” Trump told cheering servicemen and women after he landed at Yokota airbase near Tokyo today on the first leg of his trip. “You are the greatest threat to tyrants and dictators who seek to prey on the innocent,” he said, adding that authoritarian regimes could also take the route “towards prosperity and peace.” “No nation should ever underestimate American resolve,” said Trump, who did not refer to North Korea by name. “Every once a while in the past they underestimated us. It was not pleasant for them, was it? We will never yield, never waver and never falter in defense of our people, our freedom and our great American flag.” (Justin McCurry, “Donald Trump: I Would Sit Down for Talks with Kim Jong Un,” The Guardian, November 5, 2017) “Together with our allies, America’s warriors are prepared to defend our nation using the full range of our unmatched capabilities,” Trump told American troops at Yokota air force base outside Tokyo. “No one – no dictator, no regime, and no nation – should underestimate, ever, American resolve. Every once in a while, in the past, they underestimated us. It was not pleasant for them.” (Demetri Sevatopulo and Robin Harding, “U.S. Allies Hope fpor Reassurance on North Korea,” Financial Times, November 6, 2017, p. 2)
11/6/17:
President Trump continued his tough line on both North Korea and trade Monday, standing alongside Japanese Prime Minster Abe Shinzo and promising to work in solidarity with Japan to confront “the North Korean menace.” At an afternoon news conference with Abe, Trump said, “the era of strategic patience is over,” and promised to counter “the dangerous aggressions” of North Korea. “The regime continues development of its unlawful weapons programs, including its illegal nuclear tests and outrageous launches of ballistic missiles directly overly Japanese territory,” Trump said. “We will not stand for that.” In his own remarks, Abe affirmed Trump’s stance, saying Japan supports the president’s previous comments that “all options are on the table” and similarly favors an approach of increasing pressure on North Korea rather than continuing dialogue with the nation. Responding to a question — directed at Abe — about news reports that Trump had previously suggested to the Japanese prime minister that the “samurai” nation should have simply shot down the North Korean missiles that flew over it before crashing into the Pacific Ocean earlier this year, the president answered instead on Abe’s behalf. “He will shoot them out of the sky when he completes the purchase of lots of additional military equipment from the United States,” Trump said. “The prime minister is going to be purchasing massive amounts of military equipment, as he should. And we make the best military equipment by far.” (Ashley Parker, “Trump, in Japan, Talks Tough on the ‘Menace’ of North Korea, Trade,” (Washington Post, November 6, 2017) Trump, at a press conference in Tokyo with Japan’s prime minister Abe, said Japan should have shot down the missiles, and that buying missile defenses would boost both the U.S. economy and Japanese security. “[Abe] will shoot missiles out of the sky when he completes the purchase of lots of equipment from the United States,” Trump said. “One very important thing is that Prime Minister Abe is going to be purchasing massive amounts of military equipment, as he should. We make the best by far … it’s a lot of jobs for us, and a lot of safety for Japan.” Trump said the U.S would consider all options, including military force, to counter North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, and defended his occasionally provocative choice of words to describe its leader, Kim Jong-un. “Some people say my rhetoric is very strong, but look what has happened with very weak rhetoric in the last 25 years,” Trump said. Abe, who has been unwavering in his support of Trump’s line on the nuclear crisis, noted that previous efforts to strike deals with the regime in Pyongyang had failed. “Each time, North Korea broke its promises and bought itself time to continue developing nuclear weapons,” he said. “There should be no talks for talks’ sake. Now is the time for Japan and the US to exert maximum pressure on North Korea, using all possible means.” Abe said he welcomed the stronger pressure being applied by China after sanctions were agreed by the UN security council, adding: “It is incumbent on China to play a greater role in getting North Korea to end its development of nuclear weapons.” “Japan supports President Trump when he says that all options are on the table. I reaffirmed [to Trump] that the US and Japan are 100% together.” (Justin McCurry and Patrick Wintour, “U.S.-Japan Arms Deals Will Help Counter North Korea Threat, Says Trump,” The Guardian, November 6, 2017)
On the eve of President Donald Trump’s first visit to South Korea, tensions remain critical because secret back channels with North Korea have collapsed, says South Korea’s First Deputy Chief of National Security Strategies, Sang-chui Lee. He said until recently effective back channels existed between the two armed forces. “I served for 20 years as the [South Korean] representative whenever there were set military talks between the north and south,” he said during an interview with Fairfax Media at the Blue House. “Whenever the two countries’ relations were in difficult straits, in secret our two militaries would meet and would use channels to mitigate and resolve these crises, however currently there is no such mechanism in place. However currently all the communication channels have been cut off and with the heightened tensions on the peninsula there is always the possibility of clashes, and with the lack of communication those accidental clashes may escalate into armed conflict … so I believe the situation is very serious.” Trump has been criticised for his bellicose Tweets threatening North Korea and for his administration’s failure to appoint an ambassador to South Korea. But Lee said cooperation and coordination between the two nations had not been disturbed. “We should not simply look at President Trump’s wording in itself,” he said. “We should take into consideration also the messaging by diplomatic staff, represented by Secretary of State [Rex] Tillerson and [that of] Secretary of Defense [Jim] Mattis as well, so we need to have a comprehensive view of the entire US government’s policy.” Lee dismissed the assertion by some analysts that the North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un could never be induced to relinquish his nuclear weapons. “Many state with finality that Kim Jong-un will never give up nuclear weapons, but I believe strategy is imposing my will upon the other when they do not want to act. So I believe Kim Jong-un will not want to give up nuclear weapons but we have to create a situation where he has no choice but to renounce nuclear weapons, that is the definition of strategy.” For the strategy to work Lee said the international community led by the United States with China, Russia and Japan had to maintain sanctions and pressure upon the North Korean regime to induce it to engage in negotiations. Once in negotiations the international community had to reassure the regime of its own security. He said the North and South Korea needed to begin parallel bilateral talks with a view to finally ending the stand-off with a peace treaty rather than an armistice. All this, he said, would take time, diplomatic delicacy and patience. (Nick O’Malley, “South Korean Adviser Warns Secret Back Channels with North Korea Have Collapsed,” The Age, November 6, 2017)
PRIME MINISTER ABE: (As interpreted.): “For the last two days, I was able to have an in-depth discussion with Donald on a plethora of issues that the international community is faced with. In the discussion, overwhelming importance was occupied by the North Korean issue. We were in complete agreement as to the measures to be taken upon the analysis of the latest situation of North Korea giving a good amount of time. Japan consistently supports the position of President Trump when he says that all options are on the table. Through the talks over two days, I once again strongly reaffirmed that Japan and U.S. are 100 percent together. For more than 20-some years, the international community attempted dialogue with North Korea. At the time of framework agreement of 1994 and at the Six-Party Agreement of 2006, North Korea committed in abandoning their nuclear program. But each time, the promise was broken, which resulted in North Korea buying time for their nuclear and missile development while we were making efforts for dialogue. There is no point in the dialogue for the sake of dialogue with North Korea. Now is the time not for dialogue but for applying maximum level of pressure on North Korea. We completely agreed that, in order to make North Korea change their policy, Japan and U.S. must take leadership in closely collaborating with the international community so that we can enhance the pressure to the maximum level over North Korea through all possible means. I agree with President Trump that we welcome China strengthening her pressure over North Korea, and it is incumbent upon China to play even greater roles to let North Korea relinquish their nuclear and missile development. We reaffirmed once again the importance of further advancing trilateral cooperation among Japan, U.S., and the Republic of Korea — a country President Trump will visit tomorrow. Before this press conference, President and Mrs. Trump were good enough to meet with the members of the families of abductees. I would like to render my heartfelt gratitude for their listening so intently to what the family members had to tell them. Until the day when all the families of the abductees embrace their loved ones in their own arms — until that day, my mission is not complete. I’m sure that the families — I have renewed my resolve to work in full force to seek the resolution of this issue. I have decided to take our own additional sanction measures in our effort to seek the solution of the nuclear missile and the most important abduction issues of North Korea. Tomorrow, there will be a decision of freezing assets of 35 North Korean entities and individuals. Going forward, Japan and U.S. will continue to cooperation closely for the early resolution of the North Korean issue. …PRESIDENT TRUMP: Our nations share an enduring bond. America and Japan face many challenges, many opportunities. There are many things we face, but we will be facing them together, in friendship and as allies. Most importantly, we’re working to counter the dangerous aggressions of the regime in North Korea. The regime-continued development of its unlawful weapons programs, including its illegal nuclear test and outrageous launches of ballistic missiles directly over Japanese territory, are a threat to the civilized world and international peace and stability. We will not stand for that. The era of strategic patience is over. Some people said that my rhetoric is very strong, but look what’s happened with very weak rhetoric over the last 25 years. Look where we are right now. Prime Minister Abe has also shared with me the tragic stories of Japanese young people who North Korea has abducted over the years. Together, we met with the parents of Megumi Yokota who was abducted as a young girl in 1977. No child should ever be subjected to such cruelty. No parent should ever have to endure 40 years of heartbreak. We also had a young wonderful man in our country, Otto Warmbier. We all know the story of Otto; it’s a horrible story, a sad story. And we can’t let that happen. Cannot let that happen. The United States of America stands in solidarity with the people of Japan against the North Korean menace. History has proven over and over that strong and free nations will always prevail over tyrants who oppress their people. … ABE: (As interpreted.) While Japan-U.S. alliance being the foundation of the regional peace and prosperity, precisely when Japan-U.S. partners strongly, the peace of this region becomes unshakeable. From that perspective, I consider that this time we were able to reaffirm strong bonds and ties between Japan and the United States on this opportunity of the visit of President Trump. This was quite significant for the regional peace. On the North Korean situation, between President Trump and myself, we confirmed that we are together 100 percent. We will enhance the pressure that the entire international community exercises over North Korea to the maximum extent by both Japan and the United States collaborating and working toward China and Russia. No one likes conflicts. I don’t like it; Mr. Trump neither. But North Korea continues its provocation against the international community, so we need to collaborate in the international community so that they change their policy. We must exercise our pressure. And from the North Korea, we will change our policy, so please come to talk to us. I think this is what is most important that we expect. And we have a complete agreement with President Trump. And together with many countries, I’m sure that we share in the same thinking. … MS. SANDERS: For the United States’ first question, we’ll go to Steve Holland, from Reuters. Q Thank you, sir. In response to the Texas shooting, what policies would you support to reduce these violent actions? Is gun control the answer? And secondly, you spoke yesterday about the warmth of the North Korean people. What’s your message to their leader, Kim Jong-un, as you prepare to head to South Korea tomorrow? And if I could ask the Prime Minister a question as well: Could you respond to what the President said this morning — that trade is not free and reciprocal with the United States? Thank you. TRUMP: Well, as far as the North Korean people are concerned, Steve, I think that these are great people. They’re under a very repressive regime, and I really think that, ultimately — I can tell you this — that I hope it all works out. It would be better for everybody. Certainly would be better for North Korea, but it would be better for everybody. So we hope that’s going to take place. … MS. SANDERS: Thank you. The second question from the United States — Mark Landler, New York Times. Q Thank you very much. My first question is to President Trump. Mr. President, you’ve spent the last two days reaffirming the U.S.-Japan alliance, and you’ve begun sketching out this vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. But in two days, you’re going to travel to China, a country that is neither free nor open. So my question is, how can the U.S. be a force for freedom and openness in this region without inevitably coming into conflict with China? And then, to the Prime Minister. Mr. Prime Minister, the President has spoken on many occasions in the past about hoping to see the Japanese take a strong role in their own defense. He’d like to sell Japan military equipment, and there have been press reports that the President was disappointed that the Japanese didn’t shoot the North Korean missile out of the sky — the one that was shot over Hokkaido. I’m wondering, did this subject come up? And what message did you have for the President about the role you’d like to see Japan take in its defense? TRUMP: Thank you, Mark. I will say, if I could just take a piece of the Prime Minister’s answer — he will shoot them out of the sky when he completes the purchase of lots of additional military equipment from the United States. He will easily shoot them out of the sky, just like we shot something out of the sky the other day in Saudi Arabia, as you saw. And that was a very rapidly moving missile shot out of the sky. That was a needle in the sky, and it was hit immediately and exploded without damage. So one of the things, I think, that’s very important is that the Prime Minister of Japan is going to be purchasing massive amounts of military equipment, as he should. And we make the best military equipment, by far. He’ll be purchasing it from the United States. Whether it’s the F-35 fighter, which is the greatest in the world — total stealth —or whether it’s missiles of many different kinds, it’s a lot of jobs for us and a lot of safety for Japan and other countries that are likewise purchasing a lot of military equipment from us that, frankly, a year ago and two years ago were not. … ABE: (As interpreted.) Regarding Japan defense equipment, a lot of them we purchase from the United States. The North Korean situation becoming very tough; the Asia Pacific security situation becoming very tough. We qualitatively and quantitatively, we have to enhance our defense capability. As the President mentioned, F-35A is a case in point. SM-3 Block IIA is another plan for purchase from the United States. Aegis vessels — the quality and the quantity must be enhanced. In that process, we will be buying more from the United States. That is what I’m thinking. Now, North Korea: North Korea launched missiles. Immediately after that, we traced them; we were able to grasp and trace where they were going. Missile defense is something which is based upon the cooperation between Japan and the United States. Missile defense system is a cooperation between the two countries for the intercepting and shooting down. If it is necessary, of course, we will do that — if it is necessary. But in doing so, U.S. and Japan will closely coordinate our actions.” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks of President Trump and Prime Minister Abe in Joint Press Conference, Tokyo, November 6, 2017)
11/7/17:
President Trump asserted that his administration is making “a lot of progress” on North Korea, and he urged dictator Kim Jong Un to “make a deal” at the negotiating table on the rogue nation’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. “I believe it makes sense for North Korea to do the right thing, not only for North Korea but for humanity all over the world,” Trump said during a joint news conference with South Korean President Moon Jae-in after a bilateral meeting at the Blue House. “I do see certain movement, yes, but we’ll see what happens,” he added, without offering any details. He praised Chinese President Xi Jinping, whom he will meet in Beijing for a three-day summit starting tomorrow, for being “very helpful” and added that China is “trying very hard to solve the problem.” He offered hope that Russia will “likewise be helpful.” Trump has said he expects to meet Russian leader Vladimir Putin at a regional summit later in the week in either Vietnam or the Philippines. “This not the right time to be doing this, but that’s what I got,” Trump said, complaining that his predecessors at the White House had failed to solve the issue. “This is a problem that should have been taken care of a long time ago.” The president avoided the type of heated rhetoric he has employed in the past while talking about North Korea, but he emphasized that North Korea “knows we have unparalleled strength,” Trump said. “There’s never been strength like this.” He cited the presence of three aircraft carriers and a nuclear submarine in the region. Trump appeared to touch on the themes of his upcoming speech to the South Korean parliament when he urged “people all across the globe to come together to confront North Korea and to prevent North Korea’s dictator from threatening millions of lives. He’s threatening millions and millions of lives so needlessly.” Before the news conference, the president toured Camp Humphreys. The president landed at the $11 billion base, 40 miles south of Seoul, on Marine One and, after saluting several commanding officers on the tarmac, went to the mess hall to have lunch with troops. He sat down on a bench at a long table in between soldiers dressed in green military fatigues. Trump was accompanied by Moon, as well as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Chief of Staff John Kelly and National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster. “Ultimately, it will all work out. It always works out. It has to work out,” Trump said at the start of a briefing with military commanders at the base. The tour of Camp Humphreys comes on the heels of Trump’s visits to Yokota Air Base outside Tokyo and Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Foreign policy analysts said the stakes are high for Trump to deliver a speech tomorrow that clearly spells out his administration’s North Korea policy. “People want clarification,” said a former State Department official who worked on Asian affairs during the Obama administration. He spoke on condition of anonymity because his current job outside government did not allow him to speak on the record. “There’s a lot of nervousness in South Korea.” A senior administration official said in the speech, there will be “some focus on the often-overlooked question of the human rights conditions of North Korea,” said the administration official, who was not authorized to speak on the record in a briefing for reporters in Tokyo on Sunday. “I heard one journalist recently described it as the most totalitarian state in the history of humankind. I don’t think that’s an overstatement.” The official added that “whether it’s bombing airliners or terrorist attacks abroad, or the hundreds of attacks that have taken place over the decades against U.S. and South Korean personnel, or the abductions of Japanese citizens and, of course, South Koreans who have been abducted over the years as well — it would take a lifetime to be able to meet with all of the people who have been victimized by that regime and are still alive to talk about it.”
In Tokyo yesterday, Trump met with the families of Japanese citizens who were abducted by North Korean agents four decades ago to help the regime learn the Japanese language and culture. Five abductees were released more than a decade ago but at least a dozen remain in the North, according to the Japanese government. As he has traveled to the region, Trump also has offered notes of encouragement for North Korea citizens, calling them “great people.” “They’re under a very repressive regime, and I really think that, ultimately, I hope it all works out,” he said. (David Nakamura and Ashley Parker, “Trump Asserts ‘a Lot of Progress’ on North Korea, Urges ‘Deal’ to Resolve Standoff with United States,” Washington Post, November 7, 2017)
The presidents of South Korea and the United States agreed to completely remove the limit on the payload of South Korean ballistic missiles and discuss Seoul’s introduction of nuclear-powered submarines and other advanced weapons, Seoul officials said. The agreement aimed at building up their joint deterrence against a provocative North Korea was made at a bilateral summit between President Moon Jae-in and President Donald Trump at the South Korean presidential office Cheong Wa Dae. “The heads of South Korea and the United States reached a final agreement on removing the limit on missile payloads,” Moon said in a joint press conference with the U.S. president. Trump arrived here earlier today on a state visit, becoming the first U.S. president to do so in 25 years. The leaders also agreed to expand the rotational deployment of U.S. strategic assets to South Korea and its surrounding areas, Moon said at the nationally televised press conference. “We agreed to immediately begin negotiations on South Korea’s development and acquisition of the most advanced military surveillance assets,” he added. A Cheong Wa Dae official later explained the discussion included Seoul’s development or acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. Nuclear-powered submarines are considered asymmetrical assets that can intercept North Korea’s submarine-launched ballistic missiles, but are currently prohibited under a nuclear pact between Seoul and Washington. (Byun Duk-kun, “Moon, Trump Agree to Build up Deterrence, Urge N. Korea to Give up Nukes,” Yonhap, November 7, 2017)
PRESIDENT MOON: (As interpreted.): …“Today we had candid discussions about steadfastness of ROK-U.S. alliance. Moreover, we agreed to work towards resolving North Korean nuclear issue in a peaceful manner and bringing permanent peace to the Korean Peninsula. Against escalating nuclear and missile threats from North Korea, we reaffirmed our principle that we must maintain a strong stance toward North Korean threats based on overwhelming superiority of power. President Trump has reaffirmed his ironclad commitment to defend Korea, and President Trump and I agreed to further strengthen the robust combined defense posture of our two countries. In this regard, President Trump and I agreed to expend rotational deployment of U.S. strategic assets in and around Korean Peninsula. We will step up our collaboration to enhance Korea’s self-defense capability to unprecedented levels. To this end, we reached a conclusion today to lift the payload limit on Korean missiles completely, with a final agreement. We also agreed to begin consultation for Korea’s acquisitions and development of Korea’s state-of-art military reconnaissance assets. Once again, we strongly urge North Korea to halt its nuclear and missile provocation, and to come to a dialogue table for denuclearization as soon as possible. President Trump and I reaffirmed our current strategy, which is to maximize pressure and sanctions on North Korea until it gives up nuclear weapons and to come to the table for dialogue on its own. At the same time, should North Korea choose to make the right choice, we also reaffirmed our view that we are willing to offer North Korea a bright future. Based on such common approach between our two countries, we will continue to lead efforts to bring peaceful and fundamental solutions to North Korean nuclear issues. We will maintain close collaboration with the international community, including the neighboring countries. I sincerely hope that President Trump’s visit at this time will be a turning point for the situation on the Korean Peninsula in a stable manner. …TRUMP: As we work together to resolve this problem using all available tools short of military action, the United States stands prepared to defend itself and its allies using the full range of our unmatched military capabilities if need be. … MS. SANDERS: The first question from the United States will go to Margaret Brennan from CBS. Q Thank you, sir. Mr. President — TRUMP: Which one? (Laughter.) Q President Trump — I will have questions from both of you gentlemen. But, President Trump, you spoke here in South Korea saying that you do believe that the crisis with North Korea will be worked out. So, specifically, have you seen any success in your diplomatic strategy so far? And do you still believe that direct talks are a waste of time? TRUMP: Well, I think you know me well enough to know that I don’t like talking about whether I see success or not in a case such as this. We like to play our cards a little bit close to the vest. I will say this — that I believe it makes sense for North Korea to do the right thing, not only for North Korea, but for humanity all over the world. So there is a lot of reason, a lot of good reason behind it. With that, yes, I think we’re making a lot of progress. I think we’re showing great strength. I think they understand we have unparalleled strength. There has never been strength like it. You know we sent three of the largest aircraft carriers in the world, and they’re right now positioned. We have a nuclear submarine also positioned. We have many things happening that we hope, we hope — in fact, I’ll go a step further, we hope to God we never have to use. With that being said, I really believe that it makes sense for North Korea to come to the table and to make a deal that’s good for the people of North Korea and the people of the world. I do see certain movement, yes. But let’s see what happens. Q And on direct talks, sir? TRUMP: I don’t want to say that. Q Okay. TRUMP: I just don’t want to say that. You can understand that. Q. I do sir. Q And, President Moon, you, in your meeting earlier with President Trump, were spoken about by President Trump when he gestured to the military purchases that your country will be making. And I’m wondering, as you look towards that military build-up, if that signals something — perhaps a change in your view — where you believe a more aggressive stance towards North Korea is more appropriate. … MOON: (As interpreted.) I’m not entirely sure which direction your question was, but I can say one thing: When it comes to the state of our reconnaissance assets and the strategy assets — on acquisition of this U.S. strategy assets, we have agreed to begin the consultations for Korea’s acquisition of such assets. And that is to enhance Korea’s defense capabilities and also the combined defense posture of Korea and the United States. I think it is essential. TRUMP: Margaret, if I may add to that, that the President and I have agreed they’ll be buying a tremendous — which they want, and which they need, and everybody thinks it makes a lot of sense. We make the greatest military equipment in the world, whether it’s planes, whether it’s missiles. No matter what it is, we have the greatest military equipment in the world. And South Korea will be ordering billions of dollars of that equipment, which, frankly, for them makes a lot of sense. And for us, it means jobs; it means reducing our trade deficit with South Korea. But they’ll be ordering billions of dollars’ worth of equipment, and we’ve already approved some of those orders. Okay? Q I have a question for President Moon: Between Korea and the United States, I think one of the most important diplomacy challenges will be to work on — resolve the nuclear problem of the DPRK. And you gave a foreign press interview — you talked about bringing balance and diplomacy, and you talked about resolving nuclear problem and the close cooperation between Korea and the United States, and you talked about China’s role. Are you referring to the balance between the U.S. — balance of Korea between U.S. and China, or are you referring to something else? And you have had a third summit meeting at the summit meeting you just had. You said that you have agreed to bring permanent peace to (inaudible) on the Korean Peninsula. And what kind of role are you expecting the United States and President Trump to play with regards to settling peace on the Korean Peninsula? MOON: (As interpreted.) So on bringing balance in our diplomatic approaches, this is not about our stance vis-à-vis the United States and China. We are trying to bring a solution to the DPRK nuclear problem and to bring permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. And, moreover, we would like to promote peace, stability and prosperity of the Northeast Asian region. So we would like to expand our diplomatic efforts in this regard. And that should include our efforts for China as well as (inaudible) and Russia and the EU. I believe that we should diversify efforts — diplomatic efforts — so that we can pursue a more balanced approach. So that was the intention of making such comment. And to establish permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula and to resolve the nuclear problem, I think there’s role to be played by the United States and China. And when it comes to the United States, a very strong sanctions and pressure is being put by the United States. The U.S. is leading efforts, and I am very sure that substantive results will be realized through such efforts. And China has also faithfully implemented the U.N. resolution to impose sanctions on DPRK. So we have heightened the pressure and sanctions on DPRK, and I think this will also contribute to resolving the nuclear problem. And if our international society’s efforts bear fruits and if we can really make a turnaround, then I’m sure that we will be able to bring North Korea to the table of dialogue. And through such dialogue, I am very confident that we can freeze a nuclear program and ultimately dismantle the weapons of the DPRK entirely. And in this, I believe that cooperation from the U.S. and China is essential. And on establishing a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula, I don’t think it’s the right timing that we talk about this issue. Now we should focus on bringing an end to the DPRK provocations, and bringing DPRK to the table for dialogue. This is a pending challenge we must address now. So we must focus on sanctions and pressure. And there is a time — the time finally comes that we should certainly make efforts to further consult each other — Korea and the U.S. — for settling peace on the Korean Peninsula. TRUMP: I want to just say that President Xi — where we will be tomorrow, China — has been very helpful. We’ll find out how helpful soon. But he really has been very, very helpful. So China is out trying very hard to solve the problem with North Korea. We hope that Russia, likewise, will be helpful. We also hope that other countries — and we know for a fact that other countries have already started. And we’ve had great dialogue with many other countries, as you know, and they’re really helping a lot. So if we get China, if we get Russia — and we have some other countries, but we want to get most of them — we think that things will happen, and they could happen very quickly. This is a problem, by the way, that should have been done over the last 25 years, not now. This is not the right time to be doing it, but that’s what I got. That’s what I got. This is a problem that should have been taken care of a long time ago.” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Trump and President Moon of the Republic of Korea in Joint Press Conference, Blue House Seoul, November 7, 2017)
The Japanese government approved at a Cabinet meeting additional sanction measures it will impose on its own against North Korea, freezing the assets of 35 organizations and individuals linked to the country. Under the new sanctions, Japan will freeze the assets of nine North Korean organizations and 26 individuals. “It includes North Korean groups and individuals with addresses registered in China, Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Libya,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide told a press conference. In total, 84 organizations and 108 individuals are now subject to the asset freeze by Japan. The fresh sanctions will be imposed “from the viewpoint of further boosting pressure on North Korea on the basis of Japan-U.S. unity,” Suga said, citing as reasons North Korea’s nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches over Japan, as well as the lack of progress in efforts to resolve the issue of Pyongyang’s abductions of Japanese nationals. “We strongly demand that North Korea take concrete actions,” Suga said. (Jiji, “Japan Adopts Additional Sanctions on N. Korea,” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 7, 2017)
Singapore suspended trade relations with North Korea, a customs notice obtained today showed. “Singapore will prohibit all commercially traded goods from, or to, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),” the city-state’s customs said in the notice sent to traders and declaring agents. The suspension would take effect from November 8, Fauziah A. Sani, head of trade strategy and security for the director-general of customs, said in the notice. The move comes about two months after the United States imposed North Korea-related sanctions on a number of firms and individuals, including two entities based in Singapore. Repeated breach of the new prohibitions is punishable by a fine of up to S$200,000 ($147,340.50) or four times the value of the goods traded, imprisonment of up to three years, or both, it added. Singapore is North Korea’s seventh largest trading partner. The Philippines, Pyongyang’s fifth biggest trading partner, suspended trade with North Korea in September to comply with a U.N. resolution. (Reuters, “Singapore Suspends Trader Relations with North Korea,” November 16, 2017)
Carlin: “Last March, I worried aloud that the gods of war were pleased by the arc of the North Korean issue, and could see a clash not far off, on the near horizon. How much more pleased they must be today as they patiently wait, armor gleaming in the autumn sunlight, their swords whetted, the plumed horses hitched to war chariots ready to leap into the bloody fray. Over the past six months, several opportunities to explore something other than open conflict emerged but then faded once again. Especially in the early months of the current administration, there seems to have been a golden moment when the two sides might have changed course. That disappeared when Washington decided on “maximum pressure and engagement,” while Pyongyang chose to resume, at a breakneck pace, developing what it terms its “state nuclear force.” Is there similar opportunity now? Can we draw a doorway on the rock face of the mountain and then open it at the last moment before disaster, as if in a Road Runner cartoon? It seems unlikely. The situation has become significantly more complicated from where it was in January 2017 when the outgoing US president handed his successor the dangerous mess created under his watch. In recent weeks, the gathering storm has been described by countless observers on an almost daily basis. Anyone who reads a newspaper of whatever political stripe knows the dangers and the potential catastrophic losses in blood and treasure if current trends continue. Perhaps what has been lacking has been a closer look at the clockwork mechanisms driving the dangers to higher and higher levels. One problem not well understood is that the North Koreans believe recent developments in their nuclear weapons program have boosted them to a level of invulnerability, and that as a result, Washington—whatever it might say—is without options to counter them. In fact, Pyongyang is so convinced that its strategic position has fundamentally changed for the better that it has recently suggested there may be no need for it to continue building up its program. Since two successful ICBM launches last July, the North’s position is that it has reached the “final stage” in bolstering the nuclear force. It has even explicitly laid out a final goal, a “practical equilibrium” with the United States. What that means exactly we do not know, though presumably Pyongyang has something specific in mind. In my view, the North is carefully laying the foundation for declaring a victory on the first half (the nuclear buildup) of Kim Jong Un’s March 2013 two-line policy (byungjin) and then turning the focus to the other half—the economy. We don’t have to believe or disbelieve that this is Kim’s real line of march. All we need do is watch to see how he proceeds in the next few months, and judge whether developments provide an opportunity for both sides to step back long enough to explore how to stabilize the situation, that is, take a first step toward entering into longer-term negotiations that wrestle with the core issues. The problem at the moment is that of trapeze artists seeking to perfect their timing. Pyongyang cannot afford to misjudge the moment of a leap from the nuclear to the economic sectors. I do not know the exact right instant for Kim Jong Un to move, but much more important, neither does the North. This sort of timing is art, not science. Waiting a beat too long could be fatal, but it would not be the first time the North was off in its timing. If it is Kim’s intent to leap from one trapeze to another, there are a number of crucially important questions he may have already considered, and we might as well do so, too. When will Pyongyang believe it has achieved the goal of a “practical equilibrium” with the US? Why doesn’t the North deem its current arsenal and delivery capacity developed enough to pause and explore what else is possible? If the nuclear arsenal and delivery systems the North currently possesses are not a credible deterrent, what in the world is? Most important, does Pyongyang understand that “demonstrating” to the outside world the final level of its nuclear capability, taking one more fatal step, is liable to be the straw that breaks the camel’s back? Having succeeded in getting this far with nothing more than sanctions, Pyongyang could easily believe that one more step will not elicit anything worse, and that there is no sense sitting down with the Americans until the final “demonstration” step is taken. Watching events in Washington, it would not be surprising if the North has concluded that the President is too weak and embattled to take decisive action in response. On the US side, the President may well believe that his personal style has thus far proved successful on any number of policy fronts. That’s up to him. But on the North Korean issue, I can only say, no, it is not working here. I know it is not, and with all humility, I’d tell him so if he asked. Whether he subsequently adjusted his approach would obviously be his choice. Up to now, the North Korean issue is one on which he is apparently listening to his advisers. They are failing him. The President’s senior White House advisers may well believe—and believe fervently—that history shows diplomacy with North Korea always fails because each time the North takes what it wants and then breaks the agreements. On this, they are—plain and simple—wrong. This wouldn’t matter on some arcane problem (people misread history all the time), but there is the mistaken notion that using this interpretation is a solid platform for a “new” policy on North Korea. Actually, it is a rotten plank. A misinterpretation of the facts here will not support anything but still more failed policy, repeating the same failure that has marked US policy on the Korean issue since January 2001. On the Korean issue, windows open and close, when A is ready, B is not. Several times over the past nine months, one side or the other has backed away from a chance to talk. Each of these episodes may seem only a hiccough, and individually they would not be serious if nothing else were going on. Yet in this dynamic situation, every opportunity missed has made the next one more important, yet harder to achieve. After the verbal slugfest between the two leaders in September, there have been only the wispiest of contacts between the sides. The result is like trying to stop a charging elephant with a blade of grass. Meanwhile, “progress” as defined by each side has been in all the wrong places. US pressure—masquerading as diplomacy—has increased, while Washington has bound itself in a tangle of sanctions—multilateral and unilateral—in response to rapid-fire growth in what the North terms its “deterrence.” The gods of war are pleased when mortals stumble over their own misperceptions, when they are overwhelmed by myths about themselves and their opponents, when no one is talking anymore, when options narrow, when momentum dictates decisions, when doors slam and are bolted, when sacrifice is glorified and slaughter becomes acceptable. The dawn when the swords are unsheathed is coming; the gods of war can feel it in their bones.” (Robert Carlin, “Death’s Dusty Measure,” 38North, November 7, 2017)
11/8/17:
President Trump warned against the threat posed by “a country ruled by a cult” in a hardline speech aimed at rallying international pressure against North Korea over its escalating nuclear weapons program. Trump, in an address to South Korea’s National Assembly, said dictator Kim Jong Un’s regime seeks to “sow conflict abroad to distract from total failure they suffer at home.” “Do not underestimate us,” Trump said, directing his remarks at North Korea. “And do not try us. We will defend our common spirit, our shared prosperity and our sacred liberty.” He emphasized that the United States is not seeking conflict, but he added, “We will never run from it. History is filled with discarded regimes that have foolishly tested America’s resolve.” “We will not be intimidated,” Trump said. This morning, Trump attempted to make a surprise visit to the demilitarized zone, but his helicopter was forced to turn back because of bad weather. Moon had been expected to join him at the dangerous border, in what White House press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders had billed as a “historic moment” — the first time leaders of both the United States and South Korea would have visited the DMZ together. Sanders had alerted reporters traveling with the president to the surprise trip by holding up a piece of paper on which “DMZ” had been scrawled and announcing, “This is where we’re going.” White House officials, at least publicly, had scrapped the idea of a trip to the DMZ before Trump left Washington — with one even describing it as “a little bit of a cliche” — but the president had repeatedly hinted at “a surprise” while in South Korea, and many aides privately said they didn’t think Trump would be able to resist a visit — and the ensuing photo opportunity. (Ashley Parker and David Nakamura, “Trump to N. Korea: ‘Do Not Underestimate Us and Do Not Try Us,” Washington Post, November 8, 2017, p. A-12) President Trump has said on several occasions that he’s willing to talk to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Well, today, Trump did — after a fashion. The American president directly addressed his 33-year-old nemesis during his speech to South Korea’s National Assembly. This time, Trump didn’t call Kim “Little Rocket Man” or use the kinds of rhetorical flourishes that play so well on Twitter. But the words that Trump used will have cut deeper because they strike at the very heart of the Kim regime. If there is one thing that Kim Jong Un has shown that he cannot tolerate, it’s personal criticism. “North Korea is not the paradise your grandfather envisioned,” Trump said to Kim, who, if he was in Pyongyang, was just 120 miles away. “It is a hell that no person deserves.” Trump devoted a large part of his address to detailing the human rights abuses that the Kims have committed in North Korea, filling his speech with words like “twisted,” “sinister,” “tyrant,” “fascism” and “cult.” Trump noted the slave-like conditions that North Korean workers endure, the malnutrition among children, the suppression of religion, and the forced-labor prison camps where North Koreans endure “torture, starvation, rape, and murder on a constant basis.” “President Trump spoke about human rights in North Korea more than any other previous U.S. president,” said Jeong Kwang-il, who was held as a political prisoner in North Korea and now runs the “No Chain for North Korea” human rights group in Seoul. “I’m hopeful that American policy toward North Korea will focus more on improving human rights there.” The president did not mince his words about the way the Kim regime has managed to retain its grip on the populace. “North Korea is a country ruled as a cult. At the center of this military cult is a deranged belief in the leader’s destiny to rule as parent protector over a conquered Korean Peninsula and an enslaved Korean people,” he said. The success of South Korea discredited “the dark fantasy at the heart of the Kim regime,” Trump said. n a “fantasy” and that the country is something other than a socialist paradise amounts to heresy in North Korea. “This speech made the ‘axis of evil’ speech look friendly,” said John Delury, a professor of international relations at Yonsei University in Seoul, referring to President George W. Bush’s 2002 State of the Union speech, in which he included North Korea as a country seeking weapons of mass destruction. “That sent a signal to Pyongyang that the Americans are not open to changing their relationship with North Korea and that the president was deeply hostile and ideologically hostile to them.” But others saw an opening from Trump, with his suggestion there was a way out of the current quagmire. “Despite every crime you have committed against God and man . . . we will offer a path to a much better future,” Trump said, saying that this would require total denuclearization. The president publicly offered a “diplomacy exit ramp” to the Kim regime, Victor Cha, tipped to be Trump’s nominee for ambassador to South Korea, wrote on Twitter. At a news conference with South Korean President Moon Jae-in the previous day, Trump urged North Korea “to come to the table” and “do the right thing, not only for North Korea but for humanity all over the world.” At recent meetings near Geneva and in Moscow, Pyongyang’s representatives have signaled an interest in talks with the United States — as long as those talks are not about denuclearization, a non-starter for Washington. The regime in Pyongyang is likely to react angrily to Trump’s speech. “North Korea tends to react sensitively to criticism in human rights,” said Cheong Seong-chang, director of the unification strategy program at the Sejong Institute, a private think tank in South Korea.
He predicted that the response would be especially sharp because of the time that Trump spent talking about North Korea and the detail he went into, plus the president’s repeated calls for the world to isolate the country. “North Korea is highly likely to take Trump’s address as a declaration of war and call for a holy war of its own against the U.S.,” Cheong said. (Anna Fifield, “Trump Strikes at the Heart of North Korean Regime with Speech,” Washington Post, November 8, 2017)
Trump: “The regime has made numerous lethal incursions in South Korea, attempted to assassinate senior leaders, attacked South Korean ships, and tortured Otto Warmbier, ultimately leading to that fine young man’s death. All the while, the regime has pursued nuclear weapons with the deluded hope that it could blackmail its way to the ultimate objective. And that objective we are not going to let it have. We are not going to let it have. All of Korea is under that spell, divided in half. South Korea will never allow what’s going on in North Korea to continue to happen. The North Korean regime has pursued its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in defiance of every assurance, agreement, and commitment it has made to the United States and its allies. It’s broken all of those commitments. After promising to freeze its plutonium program in 1994, it repeated [reaped] the benefits of the deal and then — and then immediately continued its illicit nuclear activities. In 2005, after years of diplomacy, the dictatorship agreed to ultimately abandon its nuclear programs and return to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation. But it never did. And worse, it tested the very weapons it said it was going to give up. In 2009, the United States gave negotiations yet another chance, and offered North Korea the open hand of engagement. The regime responded by sinking a South Korean Navy ship, killing 46 Korean sailors. To this day, it continues to launch missiles over the sovereign territory of Japan and all other neighbors, test nuclear devices, and develop ICBMs to threaten the United States itself. The regime has interpreted America’s past restraint as weakness. This would be a fatal miscalculation. This is a very different administration than the United States has had in the past. Today, I hope I speak not only for our countries, but for all civilized nations, when I say to the North: Do not underestimate us, and do not try us. We will defend our common security, our shared prosperity, and our sacred liberty. We did not choose to draw here, on this peninsula — (applause) — this magnificent peninsula — the thin line of civilization that runs around the world and down through time. But here it was drawn, and here it remains to this day. It is the line between peace and war, between decency and depravity, between law and tyranny, between hope and total despair. It is a line that has been drawn many times, in many places, throughout history. To hold that line is a choice free nations have always had to make. We have learned together the high cost of weakness and the high stakes of its defense. America’s men and women in uniform have given their lives in the fight against Nazism, imperialism, Communism and terrorism. America does not seek conflict or confrontation, but we will never run from it. History is filled with discarded regimes that have foolishly tested America’s resolve. Anyone who doubts the strength or determination of the United States should look to our past, and you will doubt it no longer. We will not permit America or our allies to be blackmailed or attacked. We will not allow American cities to be threatened with destruction. We will not be intimidated. And we will not let the worst atrocities in history be repeated here, on this ground, we fought and died so hard to secure. (Applause.) That is why I have come here, to the heart of a free and flourishing Korea, with a message for the peace-loving nations of the world: The time for excuses is over. Now is the time for strength. If you want peace, you must stand strong at all times. (Applause.) The world cannot tolerate the menace of a rogue regime that threatens with nuclear devastation. All responsible nations must join forces to isolate the brutal regime of North Korea — to deny it and any form — any form of it. You cannot support, you cannot supply, you cannot accept. We call on every nation, including China and Russia, to fully implement U.N. Security Council resolutions, downgrade diplomatic relations with the regime, and sever all ties of trade and technology. It is our responsibility and our duty to confront this danger together — because the longer we wait, the greater the danger grows, and the fewer the options become. (Applause.) And to those nations that choose to ignore this threat, or, worse still, to enable it, the weight of this crisis is on your conscience. I also have come here to this peninsula to deliver a message directly to the leader of the North Korean dictatorship: The weapons you are acquiring are not making you safer. They are putting your regime in grave danger. Every step you take down this dark path increases the peril you face. North Korea is not the paradise your grandfather envisioned. It is a hell that no person deserves. Yet, despite every crime you have committed against God and man, you are ready to offer, and we will do that — we will offer a path to a much better future. It begins with an end to the aggression of your regime, a stop to your development of ballistic missiles, and complete, verifiable, and total denuclearization. (Applause.) A sky-top view of this peninsula shows a nation of dazzling light in the South and a mass of impenetrable darkness in the North. We seek a future of light, prosperity, and peace. But we are only prepared to discuss this brighter path for North Korea if its leaders cease their threats and dismantle their nuclear program. The sinister regime of North Korea is right about only one thing: The Korean people do have a glorious destiny, but they could not be more wrong about what that destiny looks like. The destiny of the Korean people is not to suffer in the bondage of oppression, but to thrive in the glory of freedom. (Applause.) What South Koreans have achieved on this peninsula is more than a victory for your nation. It is a victory for every nation that believes in the human spirit. And it is our hope that, someday soon, all of your brothers and sisters of the North will be able to enjoy the fullest of life intended by God. Your republic shows us all of what is possible. In just a few decades, with only the hard work, courage, and talents of your people, you turned this war-torn land into a nation blessed with wealth, rich in culture, and deep in spirit. You built a home where all families can flourish and where all children can shine and be happy. This Korea stands strong and tall among the great community of independent, confident, and peace-loving nations. We are nations that respect our citizens, cherish our liberty, treasure our sovereignty, and control our own destiny. We affirm the dignity of every person and embrace the full potential of every soul. And we are always prepared to defend the vital interests of our people against the cruel ambition of tyrants. Together, we dream of a Korea that is free, a peninsula that is safe, and families that are reunited once again. We dream of highways connecting North and South, of cousins embracing cousins, and this nuclear nightmare replaced with the beautiful promise of peace. Until that day comes, we stand strong and alert. Our eyes are fixed to the North, and our hearts praying for the day when all Koreans can live in freedom.” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Trump to the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, Seoul, November 7, 2017)
Newly declassified documents show that a quarter-century ago as worries were emerging over North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney told allies the U.S. should not consider military action as it could jeopardize diplomatic efforts. In 1991, when Cheney served as Pentagon chief for President George H. Bush, his outlook on how to deal with North Korea was very different from his later approach to Iraq. With the Cold War over, the elder Bush had enacted a major change in military policy by withdrawing from the field all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, including from South Korea. That offered an opening to secure North Korea’s assent to agreements banning nuclear reprocessing and enrichment, and by extension nuclear weapons, from the peninsula. Documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and published today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University provide insight into the U.S. diplomatic “game-plan” to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Concerns had been growing in Washington over the North’s nuclear capabilities. A reactor built in the mid-1980s offered it the means to produce plutonium that could potentially be used for bombs. Among the documents is a briefing paper prepared for a December 1991 meeting of deputies in the National Security Council and other U.S. government agencies to discuss a U.S. strategy that offered progress toward dialogue and diplomatic normalization if the North allowed international safeguards and inspections. The paper mentions potentially seeking sanctions if North Korea stalled, but it took one potential stick off the table. The briefing paper says Cheney had told leaders in U.S.-allied South Korea and Japan that the U.S. “should not consider ‘military measures,’ since such discussion could jeopardize our initial diplomatic strategy.” (Matthew Pennington, “Dick Cheney Once Warned against Military Action on N. Korea,” Associated Press, November 8, 2017)
11/9/17:
Tillerson: “The key topic of discussion was our continued joint effort to increase pressure on North Korea, to convince them to abandon their nuclear and missile program. President Trump and President Xi affirmed their commitment to achieve a complete, verifiable, and permanent denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. President Trump and President Xi will not accept a nuclear-armed North Korea. We’re grateful for China’s cooperation. President Trump has made clear the need to not just maintain the current peaceful pressure efforts, but to do even more. … Q Mr. Secretary, on North Korea, the President was asking Xi Jinping to do more — to close down bank accounts, send North Korean workers back, cut out the oil supplies. Where did you get on that front? And will the President meet with Vladimir Putin in Da Nang? TILLERSON: The President and President Xi did have a very, very detailed exchange on what both sides are doing, and in particular what China is doing with respect to first fully implementing all the provisions and the intent of the U.N. Security Council resolutions that are imposing sanctions. President Xi shared very specific actions they’ve taken, including the bank accounts that you just mentioned and other areas to comply fully. We talked about foreign labor, as well. And a lot of businesses up along the China-North Korean border are shutting down as a result of the sanctions. President Xi took the views that the sanctions are going to take a little while, that he didn’t expect immediate results, but that, clearly, from his perspective, the North Korean regime is feeling the full effects of the sanctions themselves. In terms of how much stress it will create on them, time will tell. Q (Inaudible.) They are complying with the U.N. Security Council resolution to not allow any increases in delivery of oil. And as you know, that resolution put a cap on fuel products — primarily fuel products, and then a capital no increase in oil exports. With respect to the potential meeting between President Trump and President Putin, that’s still under consideration. …Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary. In that vein, the conversation when the President was pressing China to ramp up the pressure on North Korea, if you could get into some detail on that for us. And also, is one of the areas of disagreement North Korea? TILLERSON: There is no disagreement on North Korea. In fact, we were quite pleased and gratified that President Xi himself and all the representatives that we deal with — our counterparts on the Chinese side — have been very clear and unequivocal they will not accept a North Korea with nuclear weapons. So there’s no space between both of our objectives. There are — clearly, we have our own views of the tactics and the timing and how far to go with pressure, and that’s what we spent a lot of timing exchanging views on. President Trump, our President, has been very clear with President Xi that he takes the view that you are a very powerful neighbor of theirs; you account for 90-plus percent of their economic activity; you’re a strong man — you can, I’m sure, solve this for me. And so he was very clear with him and said he believes it can be solved. I think our task now is how to work jointly with our efforts. Our efforts are complementary, and not in any way contradictory, but complementary to bring the regime in North Korea to the negotiating table ready to start the long process of how they denuclearize their country. … Q Mr. Secretary, one question about this agreement between China and the U.S. on North Korea. You said China will not accept a nuclear-armed North Korea. Well, clearly it has accepted a nuclear-armed North Korea. North Korea has nuclear weapons now. Are you telling us that China has agreed with the President that the era of strategic patience is over, and they’ve reached a new determination about this threat that they didn’t have before President Trump took office? And when President Xi said sanctions will take a little while, did he give any clarity on what that length of time is? And is the President comfortable waiting however long President Xi thinks sanctions will take? TILLERSON: Well, I don’t want to speak for President Xi or the Chinese government as to how they view the statement they’ve made to us now that they will not accept a nuclear-armed, nuclear-weaponized North Korea. I’ll let them speak for themselves. But they’re unequivocal in that statement. And so that puts us both on the same objective, policy-wise, to achieve that denuclearization. I think in terms of how long will it take, no one is making any predictions. I think there’s just a recognition that it’s taken us about the last four to five months, really, is when we finally got all of these sanctions provisions passed by the U.N. It takes a while for countries to then comply, and so I think — and I have the expectation we’re going to have to wait and let this take its effect. There are clear signs, and the Chinese side has shared with us some of the signs they’re seeing. We see certain signs of our own through intel and other sources we have that it is creating some stress within North Korea’s economy and with some of their citizens, potentially even within some of their military. So it is something, though, that sanctions themselves always require some time for inventories to be used up, for alternatives to be closed off. And a lot of the sanctions compliance is us identifying places where they’re re-shifting to try to maintain certain economic activity, but we try to close that off them. Q And you said the two nations have their own views on tactics and timing. Would you describe that as a large gap in the two countries’ views on timings and tactic? TILLERSON: I don’t think it’s a large gap. It’s kind of back to your other question of do we have a prediction on when we think sanctions are going to really bite. I think the Chinese clearly have always taken a view that this needs to be solved through dialogue, it needs to solved through diplomatic efforts. The President, I think, made clear in his address in Seoul yesterday to the general assembly a similar view, and he invited North Korea to come to the table in those remarks — please come to the table and talk to us. But there’s also — that’s backed up, though, but the strong military posture that the President has been very unequivocal that if we deem the threat to be sufficient to require a military response, we will be ready with that response. That’s not his first choice, it’s not our first choice. We are going to work hard on the diplomatic effort as well. Q Another thing the President said today that they agreed on were the solutions when it comes to North Korea. Could you explain to us a little bit more about that? And then also on that note, on this trip, the President used very strong words for Kim Jong-un’s government when he was in South Korea, but we didn’t hear him use some of the same derogatory language for him that we’ve heard from him in the past, like at the United Nations, like “Little Rocket Man.” I’m wondering if the Japanese government, or the South Korean government, or even the Chinese government asked him not to use that kind of language and to kind of tone it down while he was so close to North Korea. TILLERSON: We had no such request that I’m aware of. I think, if you really look at the entirety of the President’s speech to the general assembly in Seoul yesterday — which I thought was a historic speech — it was a great contrast in what is possible — what is possible for North Korea. And it’s a bright line of what democracy, democratic values, allowing the will of the people to advance their lives under their own aspirations against what life under an autocratic dictator looks like. I mean, I don’t know of another place — you can search the globe — and I don’t know where else on the world’s surface you’ll see such a contrast of the same peoples. And it’s been, I think, an exhibit in the power of democracy and democratic values when people are allowed to govern their lives that way. And he was really, I think, creating that aspiration for North Korea. And that is part of the way forward. So when you said, “what is the way forward,” I think the Chinese government feels the same is that the way forward is to enable North Korea to advance its economy — advance opportunity for its citizens, who, as you know, struggle — many of them struggle.” ((White House Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Beijing, November 9, 2017)
Trump-Xi: “XI: “On the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, we reiterated the firm commitment to achieving denuclearization of the Peninsula and upholding international nonproliferation regime. The two sides will continue to fully and strictly implement U.N. Security Council resolutions. At the same time, the two sides commit to working toward a solution through dialogue and negotiation. And we are ready to discuss with relevant parties the pathway leading to enduring peace and stability in the Peninsula and the Northeast Asia. The two sides will maintain communication and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula issue. We believe that China and the United States are countries with important influence in the Asia Pacific. As I said to the President, the Pacific Ocean is big enough to accommodate both China and the United States. The two sides need to step up communication and cooperation on Asia Pacific affairs, foster common friends, build constructive interactions, and jointly maintain and promote peace and stability and prosperity in the region. …TRUMP: As I said in my address yesterday in Seoul, the entire civilized world must unite to confront the North Korean menace. And the entire world is watching us right now. Today, President Xi — we discussed our mutual commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea. We agreed not to replicate failed approaches of the past — and there were many. We agreed on the need to fully implement all U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea and to increase economic pressure until North Korea abandons its reckless and dangerous path. All responsible nations must join together to stop arming and financing — and even trading with — the murderous North Korean regime. Together, we have in our power to finally liberate this region and the world from this very serious nuclear menace. But it will require collective action, collective strength, and collective devotion to winning the peace.” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Trump and President Xi Of China in Joint Press Statement, Beijing, November 9, 2017)
Rogin: “In South Korea, President Trump abruptly shifted position on negotiations with North Korea, saying he wanted to “make a deal” with the Kim Jong Un regime. If he means it, there may be an opening, because his State Department has been working on a new initiative to break the diplomatic stalemate with Pyongyang, starting with a proposed 60-day freeze in nuclear and missile tests. “I really believe that it makes sense for North Korea to come to the table and to make a deal that’s good for the people of North Korea and the people of the world,” Trump said in Seoul. “I do see certain movement, yes. But let’s see what happens.” Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and his top North Korea official, Joseph Yun, have a concrete idea of how to get from here to there. Yun told an audience at the Council on Foreign Relations on October 30 that if North Korea halted nuclear and missile testing for about 60 days, that would be the signal the United States needs to resume direct dialogue with Pyongyang. Yun’s remarks, which were off the record, were described by two attendees. Yun declined to comment. Administration sources said that Yun’s remarks were consistent with what Tillerson has been saying privately and publicly. “The best signal that North Korea could give us that they’re prepared to talk would be to stop these missile launches,” Tillerson told reporters in August. “We’ve not had an extended period of time where they have not taken some type of provocative action by launching ballistic missiles. So I think that would be the first and strongest signal they could send us is just stop, stop these missile launches.” The most recent North Korean provocation was the launch of an intermediate-range ballistic missile September 15, almost two months ago. But administration sources said Yun’s 60-day clock hasn’t started yet because the administration has no information on why the North Koreans haven’t conducted tests recently. The North Koreans must tell the United States that they are starting the freeze before the clock can start. While they are waiting for that signal, Tillerson and Yun have been enlisting others in support of their plan. Yun traveled to Moscow in September to discuss North Korea with top officials there. Tillerson has conferred with his Russian counterpart as well. Yun also keeps in touch with the North Korean government. He met with Choe Son Hui, the head of the North Korean Foreign Ministry’s North America bureau, in Oslo in the spring. He communicates regularly with North Korean officials at the United Nations through what’s known as the “New York channel.” There are other obstacles that must be overcome before direct dialogue with North Korea can start. In exchange for a testing moratorium, the North Koreans are sure to want a sign of good faith from Washington. China and Russia have proposed that the United States and South Korea halt joint military exercises, but that’s a non-starter. Pyongyang will have to come up with a more reasonable ask. Then, Tillerson and Yun will have to convince a skeptical White House that “talks about talks” with North Korea are a good move. Trump has often criticized the idea of dialogue with the Kim regime and promised not to get ensnared in what he views as a trap of bribing Pyongyang for deals it later violates. If talks ever begin, the two sides have little common ground on where they should end up. North Korea wants to be accepted as a nuclear state. The United States wants North Korea to give up its nukes altogether. The White House will have to be convinced that some middle ground, at least in the interim, is worth negotiating over. Regardless, Trump’s public endorsement of the idea of talks with North Korea does provide an opening for the diplomats under his charge who are looking to begin that process. “Nobody is against a diplomatic settlement, it’s just about how we get there,” an administration official said. “There are a lot of questions about this engagement that are still unanswered.” Trump’s shift in Asia from “fire and fury” to a mix of condemnation and outreach is in part due to his desire to speak to several audiences. Trump wants to express solidarity with South Korean President Moon Jae-in. He also needs to show flexibility and a willingness to embrace diplomacy to persuade China and Russia to apply more pressure on the Kim regime. For Trump, “progress” may mean that the U.S. campaign of pressure and isolation is advancing. But that is just a means to an end. The end goal of any sensible North Korea policy is to “make a deal” and avoid a war. (Josh Rogin, “Inside the Drive to ‘Make a Deal’ with North Korea,” Washington Post, November 9, 2017)
If a conflict between North Korea and the United States suddenly broke out, U.S. troops in South Korea would be “outnumbered” and undersupplied, warns Lt. Gen. Jan-Marc Jouas, former deputy commander of U.S. Forces in Korea. “The 28,500 U.S. Armed Forces personnel in South Korea are vastly outnumbered by North Korean forces, as well as [South Korean] forces that will conduct the overwhelming majority of the fighting. Unlike every conflict since the last Korean War, we will not be able to build up our forces prior to the start of hostilities,” Jouas wrote in a November 7 letter obtained by Newsweek to several Democratic members of Congress. The letter is addressed to Representatives Ted Lieu and Ruben Gallego and Senator Tammy Duckworth, all veterans of the U.S. military who’ve recently expressed grave concern over President Donald Trump’s rhetoric and stance toward North Korea. From January 2012 to December 2014, Jouas was intimately involved in formulating plans to counter a North Korean attack on South Korea. “This threat was the most dangerous I’d faced since the end of the Cold War, and planning for it the most challenging problem I’d encountered in my 35-year career,” he said. According to Jouas, it would take days to months for the necessary U.S. reinforcements, supplies and equipment to reach the Korean Peninsula. Once the troops finally arrive, Jouas added, “they may well find their bases subject to attack by conventional or chemical weapons, which will further delay their entry into the war.” Jouas also highlighted the risk a conflict would pose to both South Korean and American civilians living in the region. He said it would take “days” to eliminate North Korean artillery, rockets and missiles that threaten the South Korean capital of Seoul, which is home to 25 million people. Meanwhile, “an enormous casualty and evacuee crisis will develop and include over a hundred thousand non-combatant Americans, many of who will turn to U.S. forces to get them off the peninsula,” Jouas added. He also warned that the protection of South Korean civilians and evacuation of U.S. civilians would be “significantly complicated” by the “expected use” of nuclear and chemical weapons by Kim Jong Un’s regime. Finally, Jouas emphasized any military action against North Korea by the U.S., “no matter how limited,” would likely spark a full-scale war and be unlikely to “completely eliminate North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.” Lieu, who served in the U.S. Air Force and was at one point stationed in Guam, told Newsweek what really “jumped out” to him about the letter was how clear it outlines the logistical issues the U.S. military faces in terms of dealing with North Korea. Unlike conflicts in the Middle East, the U.S. “can’t just send over troops and equipment right now because that would provoke a North Korean attack,” Lieu said. “It would take many days to get rid of North Korea’s artillery and all their other weapons. In the meantime, a lot of people are going to die.” The California congressman also noted that although the U.S. has an extremely advanced military and “the best air force in the world,” its advantage in this regard would essentially be eliminated once “North Korea sends their massive army down to population centers in South Korea.” (John Haltiwanger, “U.S. Could Lose in a War against North Korea’s Massive Army, Former Pentagon Commander Warns,” Newsweek, November 9, 2017)
Rogin: “While drinking tea with South Korean President Moon Jae-in before their bilateral meeting last week in Seoul, President Trump posed an unusual question about North Korea-South Korea relations to his host: “Do you have to reunify?” Trump asked. Many Koreans might have seen it as a tactless, insensitive inquiry. …But rather than take offense to Trump’s question, Moon took the opportunity to educate Trump on the history of the Korean conflict and relate that to the crisis facing the peninsula today. “Posing the question ‘Do you have to reunify?’ to a member of a separated family could be quite hurtful, because it’s like as if asking, do you have to see your family members or not?” Choo Mi-ae, the leader of Moon’s ruling Democratic Party, told me in an interview November 15. “This could have been asked by anybody, but people who come to South Korea almost never ask it,” said Choo. “The fact that he posed this question, frankly speaking, gave us the opportunity to explain the need for reunification.”
Moon relayed the story to Choo the next day. According to Choo, Moon told Trump about his great sense of responsibility for those people who are still in North Korea, suffering under the inhumane treatment of the Kim Jong Un regime. Moon also talked about the need to bring the light of democracy to the North Korean people. Although it’s impossible to know exactly why Trump asked Moon about reunification, Moon and his team saw the interaction as an unscripted and therefore very honest exchange. After hearing Moon’s explanation, Trump asked him, “Then, what can I do for Korea?” At this point, Moon took the opportunity to ask Trump for a favor. The success of the upcoming Winter Olympics in South Korea is complicated by the high tensions related to the North Korean nuclear crisis, he told Trump. Trump told Moon he would personally try to promote the South Korean-hosted games. The conversation was unusual by presidential standards, but not particularly so for Trump. Contrary to the public perception that Trump is obstinate and hardheaded about foreign policy, several foreign diplomats have told stories about Trump being highly inquisitive and eager to learn in meetings with foreign leaders. Trump asks lots of questions in these meetings, often challenging basic assumptions about foreign policy (such as whether Korean reunification is necessary) or seeking advice for what he should do. Moon, clearly well prepared for his Trump meeting, gave him a history lesson, made a plea for peace and then asked Trump for something small and specific. Trump’s education in South Korea didn’t stop at tea. When Trump told Moon he wanted to visit the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea, the most heavily fortified border in the world, Moon suggested he would tag along. The plan was foiled by foggy weather, but Choo said the helicopter ride alone gave Trump new and useful perspective. “While [Trump] was up in the air, he was able to view the DMZ and its vicinity and he could see with his own eyes how close the DMZ was to Seoul and how many people actually live so close to the DMZ,” she said. “I believe this gave President Trump an opportunity to realize that in land where so many people live, there should never be a war.” The South Korean government is cautiously optimistic that they got through to Trump about the dangers of war on the peninsula and the need for dialogue. In his news conference with Moon the same day, Trump said he wanted to “make a deal” with Kim. The next day, speaking to South Korea’s National Assembly, Trump again emphasized his offer for North Korea to come out of its isolation and join the world community. Choo said that the Trump team was making revisions to the speech up to the very last minute. She was nervous but then was relieved because Trump left the door open for a diplomatic solution. And although Trump’s tweet insulting Kim as “short and fat” a few days later seemed like a setback, the South Koreans are hoping Trump’s education in Asia will have a lasting effect. “After seeing the realities in Korea, I believe that he must have clearly understood why we are saying no war and why we are calling for peace,” she said.” (Josh Rogin, “Trump Asks South Korean President, ‘Do You Have to Reunify?’” Washington Post, November 15, 2017)
11/10/17:
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said he can envision the U.S. and North Korea agreeing to hold talks at some point as a precursor to formal negotiations. “Eventually we’re going to have one of those days where we’re both going to say OK, maybe it’s a good time to have that first conversation,” Tillerson told reporters on board a flight from Beijing to Danang, Vietnam. “Not to start negotiations but to have that conversation.” Tillerson said he didn’t want to over-interpret the gap of nearly two months since North Korea’s last missile launch. He said he’d look for a “relative period of quiet and an indication from Kim Jong Un himself that they would like to have some type of a meeting.” The U.S. has “two or three channels” in which they can send messages to Kim and receive them back, Tillerson said. He said that the U.S. wouldn’t threaten Kim if he gave up his nuclear weapons. “If North Koreans want to live under his dictatorial regime, so be it, but when he picks up nuclear weapons he changes it for everyone,” Tillerson said. “We would ignore him otherwise, quite frankly.” North Korea’s last launch was on September 15. Joseph Yun, the U.S.’s top North Korean official, was reported by the Washington Post as saying on October 30 that if the regime halted nuclear and missile testing for about 60 days that would be the signal Washington needs to resume direct dialogue with Pyongyang. Tillerson denied the U.S. had a specific window. “That may be Joseph’s view that 60 days would be a pretty good run, and it would be a pretty good run,” he said. Even so, he added: “Now Kim could surprise us tomorrow with another missile launch.” U.S. officials have been burned in the past for interpreting lulls in North Korean weapon tests as olive branches. After a relatively long pause in August, President Donald Trump told a rally that Kim was “starting to respect” the U.S., speculating that “maybe, probably not, something positive will come out of it.” Days later, he was condemning the nation for firing a ballistic missile over Japan. (Nick Wadham, “Tillerosn Says He Envisions U.S.-North Korea Talks,” Bloomberg, November 10, 2017)
The United States is currently having an assortment of direct contact with North Korea, but little progress has been made toward any serious dialogue, a senior South Korean diplomat said. “Exchanges and contact are regularly ongoing between the U.S. and North Korea through a New York channel and there’s also a variety of contact through the so-called 1.5 track or academic exchange, however there’s no detailed progress to note,” Vice Foreign Minister Lim Sung-nam told the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee. He was responding to a lawmaker’s query on President Donald Trump’s reference to talks with North Korea during his visit to South Korea earlier in the week. In his press conference on November 7, Trump said, “I do see certain movement, yes. But let’s see what happens,” after being asked about “direct talks” with North Korea. “I really believe that it makes sense for North Korea to come to the table and to make a deal that’s good for the people of North Korea and the people of the world,” Trump also said, offering talks with North Korea. “It could be assessed that U.S efforts and approach toward North Korea are producing a degree of results,” Lim said, adding that North Korea has not conducted any military provocations for nearly two months since Sept. 15, when North Korea last launched a ballistic missile. “I assume Trump may have hinted at some kind of progress, although it was not specific, based on this assessment,” the vice minister said. (Yonhap, “Little Progress in U.S.-N. Korea Talks: Senior Envoy,” November 10, 2017)
South Korea’s military announced it will kick off a rare combined exercise with three U.S. aircraft carriers near the peninsula this weekend aimed at demonstrating the allies’ firm defense posture against North Korean threats. Their navies plan to begin the four-day drill, which will involve the three flattops — USS Ronald Reagan, USS Nimitz and USS Theodore Roosevelt — in the East Sea tomorrow, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The carriers, already operating in the Western Pacific, will sail one by one into the waters east of Korea for the event, it added. Also to be mobilized are 11 U.S. Aegis ships and seven South Korean warships, including two Aegis vessels. “The participating forces of the two nations plan to enhance combined operation capability and interoperability through aircraft carrier escort operation, aviation operation and aerial firing,” said the JCS. The upcoming practice is aimed at bolstering the South Korea-U.S. alliance’s policy of “extended deterrence” against the North’s nuclear and missile provocations, it added. The allies will also show off their readiness to mount a strong retaliation with overwhelming firepower in the event of an emergency, the JCS stressed. The U.S. Navy’s previous training operation involving three carriers was in the vicinity of Guam in the Western Pacific in 2007 during the Valiant Shield exercise. (Yonhap, “S. Korea to Train with Three U.S. Aircraft Carriers,” November 10, 2017)
11/11/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesperson’s statement: “Trump went on his first tour of Asia since he took office and is bustling about in the surrounding region of our country from the 5th day of this month. His current trip to our surrounding region is a warmonger’s visit for confrontation to rid the DPRK of its self-defensive nuclear deterrence. It is also nothing but a business trip by a warmonger to enrich the monopolies of the U.S. defense industry by milking the moneybags from its subordinate “allies.” Trump, during his visit, laid bare his true nature as destroyer of the world peace and stability and begged for a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula. What cannot be overlooked is the fact that Trump, not long after his lunatic remarks of totally destroying the DPRK at the United Nations General Assembly in September this year, made his conceived attempt yet again to alienate our people from the government and keep up rivalry between the DPRK and the international society by “demonizing” our country while making nonsensical remarks of completely denying our ideology and system. He boasted about the “overwhelming superiority of U.S. power” and “peace through strength”. But, he needs to be well advised that it is the stand of the DPRK to defend our sovereignty and rights to existence and development by keeping a real balance of force with the U.S. The historical lessons in decades-long history of the DPRK-U.S. showdown such as the U.S. ignominious defeat in the 1950’s Korean War, the incident of the U.S. armed spy-ship “Pueblo”, the incident of “EC-121” reconnaissance plane and so on, give a clear answer to the question: Who is the one that should not underestimate or try its opponent. The DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons was a righteous and inevitable choice to defend our national sovereignty and dignity and our people’s rights to existence and development from increased nuclear threats and blackmail by the U.S. and its hostile moves against the DPRK. Time is now gone forever when the U.S. used to threaten and blackmail us with nuclear weapons. The reckless remarks by a dotard like Trump can never frighten us or put a stop to our advance. This rather gives us an assured conviction that our choice to embark on the road of simultaneously promoting the economic construction and the up-building of the nuclear force was all the more righteous one, and it pushes us to speed up the efforts to accomplish the great cause of completing the state nuclear force. The DPRK remains strong in courage and faith and it will surely win the final victory in the showdown with the U.S. as it is under the distinguished guidance of the great leader and has the single-minded unity of the army and people rallied closely around their leader as well as the invincible military strength.” (KCNA, “Trump’s Visit Is Business Trip: FM Spokesman,” November 11, 2017)
President Moon Jae-in and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to “normalize exchanges and cooperation in all areas” during their summit in Da Nang, Vietnam, signaling a thaw in bilateral relations following the row over the deployment of an American antimissile system. The two leaders held their second summit on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders’ meeting, both expressing the need to manage the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and for the North Korean nuclear issue to ultimately be resolved through dialogue, according to the Blue House. The summit was initially scheduled for 30 minutes but lasted 43 minutes. Moon said to Xi during the meeting, “Korea-China relations briefly faced difficulty, but on the other hand, it was an opportunity to reconfirm how valuable we are to one another. Let us both work hard to recover lost time.” Xi replied that the two countries “hold extensive shared interests in regard to economic growth and global peace” and that he believes the meeting “will serve as an important opportunity for the two countries to show cooperation and leadership for the development of bilateral relations and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula issue.” The two leaders last met in July in Berlin, on the sidelines of the Group of 20, or G-20, summit. Moon agreed to make his first visit to China next month, said presidential chief press secretary Yoon Young-chan in a press briefing, which would mark his first visit to the country since he took office. Moon also invited Xi to visit Korea next February, during the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics. Xi reportedly said he would try to visit, and that in case he is unable to attend he will send a high-level delegation instead. Restoring relations between Korea and China, getting North Korea to participate in the PyeongChang Olympics and creating an atmosphere conducive to talks with Pyongyang about denuclearization is a part of Moon’s comprehensive strategy toward the North, outlined in his Berlin address in July. By agreeing on Moon’s visit to Beijing in December, the first step is now seen as having been achieved. At the end of last month, the two countries put bilateral ties back on track after a yearlong standoff over the deployment of the U.S.-led Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in Korea, and the recent summit further cements the normalization of relations. The Blue House initially said the Thaad issue was not going to be raised during the summit, but Xi brought it up. Xi emphasized that the October 31 agreement between the two countries marked a “new start and a good beginning.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement afterward that Xi reiterated China’s position on THAAD and that Moon said that he recognized China’s concerns and that Korea has no intention of harming its security interests. The Blue House statement on the results of the meeting did not go into detail regarding Thaad, but a Blue House official told JoongAng Ilbo, when asked whether Moon addressed Korean companies in China being affected by economic retaliation over THAAD, “There was confirmation that the economy has to be improved comprehensively and quickly, and I believe that was included in this.” The official added, “There was talk of improving relations in all areas, and there was already mutual understanding reached beforehand that this includes the companies and tourism [affected by China’s retaliation], and the two leader’s perception was in line with this.” (Sarah Kim and Kang Tae-wha, “Moon, Xi Agree to ‘Normalize’ Relations ‘in All Area,’” JoongAng Ilbo, November 13, 2017)
11/12/17:
President Donald Trump is exchanging school yard taunts with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un. In a response to North Korea calling Trump’s speech in South Korea “reckless remarks by an old lunatic,” Trump tweeted from Hanoi on Sunday morning: “Why would Kim Jong-un insult me by calling me ‘old,’ when I would NEVER call him ‘short and fat?'” Trump goes on to say sarcastically, “Oh well, I try so hard to be his friend — and maybe someday that will happen!” Trump has been working to rally global pressure against North Korea’s nuclear weapons program on a trip to Asia. Yesterday, Kim’s Foreign Ministry responded by accusing Trump of trying to demonize North Korea, keep it apart from the international community and undermine its government. “Reckless remarks by an old lunatic like Trump will never scare us or stop our advance,” it said in a statement. “On the contrary, all this makes us more sure that our choice to promote economic construction at the same time as building up our nuclear force is all the more righteous, and it pushes us to speed up the effort to complete our nuclear force.” Asked at news conference with Vietnam’s president later today if he could become friends with the North Korean leader, Trump replied it “might be a strange thing to happen but it’s certainly a possibility.” He said he doesn’t know if that friendship will develop, but added it would be “very, very nice if it did.” (Associated Press, “Trump Taunts Kim: ‘I Would NEVER Call Him Short and Fat,’” November 11, 2017) For the last week on the road, President Trump had been measured, disciplined and studiously scripted as he picked his way through the geopolitical minefields of Asia. Then came the weekend. In a stream of tweets today, the president said those who wanted to investigate his ties to Russia were “haters and fools,” ridiculed “crooked” Hillary Clinton’s ill-fated effort to reset relations with Russia and fired back at North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, for calling him old, saying that he could call Mr. Kim “short and fat” — but had restrained himself. That followed a freewheeling session with reporters on Air Force One yesterday, in which Trump dismissed the Russia investigation as a Democratic “hit job” and derided as “political hacks” three former chiefs of the nation’s intelligence agencies, all three of which concluded that Russia had meddled in the 2016 presidential election. It was hard to say what prompted the sudden change in the president’s demeanor. Trump, 71, could also simply be tired, though his aides insist he is not, even if the people around him are. In the short run, Trump’s comments broke with a narrative that the White House had carefully constructed during this 12-day trip — that of a statesman marshaling a worldwide coalition to confront a nuclear North Korea, and a populist leader working to right trade imbalances. The president’s tweets and comments also complicated life for White House officials, who had been encouraged by his friendly meetings with the leaders of Japan, China and South Korea and by what they characterized as one of the most effective foreign-policy speeches of his presidency, on the need to confront a nuclear North Korea. Speaking to reporters here in Hanoi on Sunday, the White House chief of staff, John F. Kelly, insisted that he did not pay attention to Trump’s tweets or allow his staff to be distracted by them. “They are what they are,” Kelly said. “But like, you know in preparation for this trip, we did the staff work, got him ready to go and then at each place we brief him up on whatever the next event is and all that. The tweets don’t run my life; good staff work runs it.” Until today, Trump had been careful not to make things personal with Kim. But after his speech in Seoul, in which he cataloged the brutality of the Kim government, North Korea described him as a “lunatic old man” and urged Americans to force him out of office or face an “abyss of doom.” That prompted an indignant response from Mr. Trump, who seemed more offended by the gibe about his age than about his mental condition. Shortly before leaving his hotel to meet the Vietnamese president, he tweeted, “Why would Kim Jong-un insult me by calling me ‘old’ when I would NEVER call him ‘short and fat?’ Oh well, I try so hard to be his friend.” Once at the Presidential Palace, however, Trump seemed to have gotten over it. Asked whether he could see himself becoming friends with Kim, he said: “Strange things happen in life. That might be a strange thing to happen, but it’s certainly a possibility.” “If that did happen,” he continued, “it would be a good thing for — I can tell you — for North Korea. But it would also be good for lots of other places, and it would be good for the world.” Trump’s comments were in keeping with his hot-and-cold approach to Kim. At times, he has floated the idea of a meeting with Kim and praised the North Korean leader for consolidating power in his country at a young age. But he has also ridiculed him as “Little Rocket Man” for his ballistic missile tests. (Mark Landler, “After a QuietWeek, Trump Aims at Critics,” New York Times, November 13, 2017, p. A10)
11/13/17:
North Korean troops fired on a fellow soldier who was defecting to South Korea across the heavily armed border dividing the countries, South Korean officials said, amid heightened tensions over the North’s nuclear weapons program. The fully armed troops violated the truce that halted the 1950-53 Korean War when they fired weapons across the border while chasing a fellow soldier defecting to South Korea, the United Nations Command said on November 22. One of the North Korean chasers briefly crossed the borderline before turning back in a hurry, another violation of the Korean War armistice, the command said. The American-led United Nations Command, which oversees the armistice, notified the Korean People’s Army of its findings and demanded a meeting to discuss ways to prevent future violations, the command said in a statement. The command also released closed-circuit television footage that illustrated the North Korean’s dramatic defection through the Joint Security Area north of Seoul. It was a close escape for the soldier, who bolted toward the border line just yards ahead of former comrades who had started to shoot. According to the footage, the defector sped a drab, olive-colored military jeep along a tree-lined road and into the Joint Security Area after crossing a North Korean landmark known as the 72-Hour Bridge. When the vehicle did not stop at a North Korean guard post and drove into the North Korean side of the Joint Security Area, Communist troops wearing helmets and carrying sidearms and rifles poured out of their buildings. The jeep got stuck near the border line, a white concrete marker barely taller than a brick, which bisects the two sides of the Joint Security Area. The defector got out and dashed for life across the line, while four North Korean soldiers, one of them lying on the ground, unleashed a hail of bullets to stop him. In the next segments of the footage, the North Korean defector lay motionless among leaves beside a wall 55 yards south of the border. Two South Korean Army sergeants crawled to him and dragged him to safety, while North Korean soldiers watched them from their guard post. A United States Army medical helicopter evacuated the defector to a South Korean hospital, where he has gone through a series of surgeries to treat at least five gunshot wounds. When doctors opened his abdomen to patch up the damaged digestive tract, they found it riddled with parasitic worms. Analysts considered the discovery evidence of the dire conditions in North Korea, including poor hygiene and nutrition. Yonhap reported on November 21 that the soldier had woken up and begun talking, and the next day Dr. Lee Cook-jong, a lead surgeon, confirmed that he was conscious and “is not going to die.” The soldier — whose name, rank and other information have not been released — is still too weak to undergo a debriefing, doctors and officials said. Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, an American who leads the United Nations Command, said his troops had acted “in a manner that is consistent with the armistice agreement, namely — to respect the demilitarized zone and to take actions that deter a resumption of hostilities.” He added, “The armistice agreement was challenged, but it remains in place.” A North Korean soldier last defected through the area in 2007. (Choe Sang-hun, “U.N. Says North Defied Pact to End Korean War,” New York Times, November 22, 2017, p. A-10) The Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas saw an unusual amount of action, with an American man unsuccessfully attempting to cross into the North and a North Korean soldier successfully defecting to the South. A 58-year-old man from Louisiana was arrested by South Korean forces for crossing the Civilian Control Line, just outside the DMZ, as part of an attempt to get into North Korea “for political purposes,” authorities said. A resident of the border county of Yeoncheon, 40 miles north of Seoul, saw the man and alerted police, Yonhap reported. The man, identified only as “A,” had arrived in South Korea only three days earlier. The American Embassy in Seoul was aware of the report and was looking into it, an official said. “If it is determined that a U.S. citizen has been detained, the U.S. Embassy will provide appropriate consular services,” he said.
In a separate incident, a North Korean soldier manning a guard post on the northern side of the Joint Security Area — the area with the blue huts straddling the DMZ, where inter-Korean meetings are sometimes held — defected to the South. He was shot by North Korean soldiers while he was escaping across the line and is now being treated in a hospital, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said. “The military has raised its alertness against the North Korean military’s possible provocations and is maintaining its full readiness posture,” a military official said, according to Yonhap. (Anna Fifield, “American Detained Trying to Enter North Korea While North Korean Soldier Escapes South,” Washington Post, November 13, 2017)
11/15/17:
China announced that it would send a high-level diplomat to North Korea for the first time in two years, in a move less than a week after President Trump’s visit that is likely to resume pressure on the North to curb its nuclear arms program. The head of the Communist Party’s external affairs department, Song Tao, is scheduled to leave for Pyongyang on November 17, Xinhua reported. The official announcement said that Song would inform North Korea of the results of the 19th Communist Party congress last month that reappointed President Xi Jinping to a second term. Xinhua also reported that Song would “visit” the north, a phrasing that Chinese specialists on international relations called an oblique way of saying that Song would carry a message from Xi. They said the message would most likely urge the North to join negotiations to halt its nuclear program, and convey the contents of Xi’s discussions with Trump about North Korea. Last week in Beijing, the talks between President Xi and Trump focused heavily on North Korea. After he left Beijing, Trump tweeted that he was impressed with China’s efforts to push for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. But it was unclear whether Xi had promised to take any new steps, as denuclearization has long been China’s policy goal there. “I believe Song Tao will take a very clear message on the Trump summit with Xi Jinping,” said Cheng Xiaohe, professor of international relations at Renmin University of China in Beijing. “He will focus on North Korea needing to talk about denuclearization.” KCNA today confirmed Song’s trip, a signal that after months of rebuffing Chinese attempts to send envoys to Pyongyang, the government had agreed to Song’s visit. But expectations were muted about whether the visit could move Kim to negotiate. There was not even a guarantee that Mr. Song would see Kim in person, said Yang Xiyu, a Chinese diplomat who led the so-called six-party talks with North Korea more than a decade ago. He noted that it was most likely that the North Korean leader would only be willing to negotiate after conducting another missile test of the kind that has shaken the world this year. “I am afraid that Kim will do something more terrible and will come to the negotiating table only after a big intercontinental ballistic missile test,” Yang said. “Then Kim will talk from a position of power.” The last senior Chinese official to visit North Korea, Liu Yunshan, then a member of the elite Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party, appeared with Kim on the reviewing stand at a military parade in Pyongyang in October 2015. Liu made no headway then in curbing the North’s nuclear weapons expansion, and he retired last month. Song accompanied Liu and met the North Korean leader on that trip. A lull in nuclear tests by North Korea since September has led to speculation, particularly in South Korea, that the North may be open to negotiations. But Chinese officials have been careful not to publicly encourage such assumptions. Briefings to North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party after China party congresses — held every five years — are routine. The party officials who went to Pyongyang five and 10 years ago were of more senior rank than Song, though clearly this time Song’s mission is broader than a mere tally of last month’s proceedings, Yang said. Now that Xi is firmly in place for his second term he will turn his hand to North Korea, Chinese experts said, in part to keep good relations with the United States. If nothing else, Song should return with a reading of Kim’s intentions, Professor Cheng said. “All the news commentaries from North Korea say North Korea will not negotiate,” he said. “If that’s the real intention, then China can make decisions. To get clear unambiguous information is the most important.” (Jane Perlez, “North Korea to Be Visited By an Envoy from China,” New York Times, November 16, 2017, p. A-10)
President Trump said he and Asian leaders have a new resolve to confront North Korea and its rogue nuclear weapons program, claiming credit for projecting a stronger and more confident United States unafraid to insist on sovereignty and respect. “Time is running out” on dealing with North Korea, Trump said at the White House. With China, North Korea’s most important ally, Trump said he reaffirmed that “all options are on the table.” Trump spoke on his first full day back in Washington after a 12-day, five-nation trip to Asia. “America’s renewed confidence and standing in the world has never been stronger than it is right now,” Trump said. In his remarks Wednesday, Trump gave a retrospective of what he called his forceful approach to U.S. foreign policy. Insisting on sovereignty and respect has led to stronger relationships, great NATO defense commitments, and U.S. arms sales and spending, Trump asserted. “America is back,” he said. The rising threat from North Korea was the main security issue for his discussions, and Trump claimed credit for greater unity in applying sanctions aimed at persuading Pyongyang to back off threats against the United States and its allies. “I called on every nation, including China and Russia, to unite in isolating the North Korean regime — cutting off all ties of trade and commerce — until it stops its dangerous provocation,” Trump said. An editorial in a North Korea state-run newspaper today called Trump a coward who deserved the death penalty. “The worst crime for which he can never be pardoned is that he dared [to] malignantly hurt the dignity of the supreme leadership,” the editorial in Rodong Sinmun said. “He should know that he is just a hideous criminal sentenced to death by the Korean people.” (Anne Gearan, “Trump Claims His Trip Forged New Unity against North Korea,” Washington Post, November 15, 2017)
11/16/17:
Concerned that the missile defense system designed to protect American cities is insufficient by itself to deter a North Korean attack, the Trump administration is expanding its strategy to also try to stop Pyongyang’s missiles before they get far from Korean airspace. The new approach, hinted at in an emergency request to Congress last week for $4 billion to deal with North Korea, envisions the stepped-up use of cyberweapons to interfere with the North’s control systems before missiles are launched, as well as drones and fighter jets to shoot them down moments after liftoff. The missile defense network on the West Coast would be expanded for use if everything else fails. In interviews, defense officials, along with top scientists and senior members of Congress, described the accelerated effort as a response to the unexpected progress that North Korea has made in developing intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear bomb to the continental United States. “It is an all-out effort,” said Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, who returned from a lengthy visit to South Korea last month convinced that the United States needed to do far more to counter North Korea. “There is a fast-emerging threat, a diminishing window, and a recognition that we can’t be reliant on one solution.” For years, that single solution has been the missile batteries in Alaska and California that would target any long-range warheads fired toward the American mainland, trying to shoot them down as they re-enter the atmosphere. Such an approach, known as “hitting a bullet with a bullet,” remains of dubious effectiveness, even after more than $100 billion has been spent on the effort. Antimissile batteries on ships off the Korean coast and in South Korea protect against medium-range missiles, but not those aimed at American cities. Washington is responding to the North Korean nuclear threat with a rush of money to strengthen old antimissile systems and inaugurate new ones. The diagram shows a mix of current and proposed options for defeating the North’s long-range missiles. So the administration plans to pour hundreds of millions of dollars into the two other approaches, both of which are still in the experimental stage. The first involves stepped-up cyberattacks and other sabotage that would interfere with missile launches before they occur — what the Pentagon calls “left of launch.” The second is a new approach to blowing up the missiles in the “boost phase,” when they are slow-moving, highly visible targets. President Trump has praised the existing missile defense system, insisting last month that it “can knock out a missile in the air 97 percent of the time,” a claim that arms control experts call patently false. In trial runs, conducted under ideal conditions, the interceptors in Alaska and California have failed half of the time. And the Pentagon has warned administration officials that the North will soon have enough long-range missiles to launch volleys of them, including decoys, making the problem far more complex. That helps explain the rush for new protections. “They’re looking at everything,” said Thomas Karako, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, who recently led two antimissile studies and closely monitors the administration’s planning. “What you’re seeing is a lot more options on the table.” The $4 billion emergency budget sought by the White House is on top of the $8 billion that the Missile Defense Agency has already been granted for this fiscal year, as well as what other military services and agencies are putting into missile defense. Another $440 million was moved from existing programs to antimissile work two months ago, as the North Korea threat became more serious. In the emergency request to Congress, and in documents made public by its committees, the precise use of the funds is cloaked in deliberately vague language. Hundreds of millions of dollars, for example, are allotted for what the documents called “disruption/defeat” efforts. Several officials confirmed that the “disruption” efforts include another, more sophisticated attempt at the kind of cyber and electronic strikes that President Barack Obama ordered in 2014 when he intensified his efforts to cripple North Korea’s missile testing. Using cyberweapons to disrupt launches is a radical innovation in missile defense in the past three decades. But in the case of North Korea, it is also the most difficult. It requires getting into the missile manufacturing, launch control and guidance systems of a country that makes very limited use of the internet and has few connections to the outside world — most of them through China, and to a lesser degree Russia. In the operation that began in 2014, a range of cyber and electronic-interference operations were used against the North’s Musudan intermediate-range missiles, in an effort to slow its testing. But that secret effort had mixed result. The failure rate for the Musudan missile soared to 88 percent, but it was never clear how much of that was due to the cyberattacks and how much to sabotage of the North’s supply chain and its own manufacturing errors. Then Kim Jong-un, the country’s president, ordered a change in design, and the test-launches have been far more successful. The experience has raised difficult questions about the effectiveness of cyberweapons, despite billions of dollars in investment. “We can dream of a lot of targets to hack,” said Michael Sulmeyer, director of the Cyber Security Project at Harvard and formerly the director for cyberpolicy planning and operations in the office of the defense secretary. “But it can be hard to achieve the effects we want, when we want them.” Congressional documents also talk of making “additional investments” in “boost-phase missile defense.” The goal of that approach is to hit long-range missiles at their point of greatest vulnerability — while their engines are firing and the vehicles are stressed to the breaking point, and before their warheads are deployed. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis is also weighing, among other boost-phase plans, formulas that draw on existing technologies and could be deployed quickly. One idea is having stealth fighters such as the F-22 or the F-35 scramble from nearby bases in South Korea and Japan at the first sign of North Korean launch preparations. The jets would carry conventional air-to-air missiles, which are 12 feet long, and fire them at the North Korean long-range missiles after they are launched. But they would have to fly relatively close to North Korea to do that, increasing the chances of being shot down. A drawback of boost-phase defense is the short window to use it. Long-range missiles fire their engines for just five minutes or so, in contrast to warheads that zip through space for about 20 minutes before plunging back to earth. And there is the risk of inviting retaliation from North Korea. “You have to make a decision to fire a weapon into somebody’s territory,” Gen. John E. Hyten of the Air Force, commander of the United States Strategic Command, which controls the American nuclear missile fleet, recently told a Washington group. “And if you’re wrong, or if you miss?” A boost-phase idea getting much notice would be to have drones patrol high over the Sea of Japan, awaiting a North Korean launch. Remote operators would fire heat-sensing rockets that lock onto the rising missiles. “It’s a huge advance,” Gerold Yonas, chief scientist for President Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars” program, said of the drone plan. “It’s one of those things where you hit yourself on the forehead and say, ‘Why didn’t I think of that?’” Leonard H. Caveny, a main planner of the rocket-firing drones and a former Navy officer who directed science and technology at the Pentagon’s antimissile program from 1985 to 1997, said an accelerated program could produce the weapons in a year or less. Dr. Caveny’s team is considering use of the Avenger, a drone made by General Atomics that has a wingspan of 76 feet. “This is going to be a game changer,” said Arthur L. Herman, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, who collaborates with Dr. Caveny. The Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency is also developing a drone that would fire potent laser beams at rising missiles. But recent plans would have it make its debut no sooner than 2025 — too late to play a role in the current crisis or the Trump presidency. Even so, the effort has influential backers. In the recent talk, General Hyten of Strategic Command called lasers much better than interceptor rockets because they avoided questions over firing weapons into sovereign territories, especially to knock out missile test-flights. A potent beam of highly concentrated light, he said, “goes out into space,” avoiding the trespassing issue. In recent months, Congress has urged Pentagon officials to develop both varieties of drones. Theodore A. Postol, a professor emeritus of science and national security policy at M.I.T. who has drawn up plans for a missile-firing drone, argued that fleets of such weapons patrolling near the North, threatening to undo its strategic forces, would be extremely intimidating and create new diplomatic leverage. “We need it now,” he said. “My concern is that we get something out there quickly that will pressure North Korea to negotiate.” (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “To Counter North Korean Missiles, U.S. Is Racing for Plans B and C,” New York Times,
11/17/17:
The top nuclear envoys of South Korea and the United States reaffirmed Friday that they are seeking a “peaceful” way to resolve North Korea’s nuclear stalemate and vowed to keep their joint campaign of pressure to bring Pyongyang to talks on its denuclearization. The reaffirmation came after Lee Do-hoon, South Korea’s special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, and his U.S. counterpart, Joseph Yun, met on the southern resort island of Jeju to discuss their coordinated approach towards the North’s nuclear and missile threats. “There is no doubt that both of the presidents want to find a peaceful way in regard to North Korea’s nuclear issue. So we discussed them and we agreed the pressure campaign has to be a central element,” Yun told reporters after completing a meeting that lasted for more than a hour. “We have been engaged with countries like China, Russia, as well as Japan and the EU, aimed at getting pressure on North Korea to have a meaningful and credible dialogue with us so that they can take steps towards the denuclearization,” he said. “We very much agree on that, and again today we reaffirmed that goal.” Answering a question seeking comments on a planned visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping’s special envoy to North Korea, Yun hoped that it would help “forward” the goal of its denuclearization. “China, of course, has a big role to play on Northeast Asia security issues. I hope, as China has done within the [United Nations Security Council] and elsewhere, it regards the denuclearization as a critical goal. We do hope that special envoy will forward that goal,” he said. Lee also drew more significance from the fact that China will send a special envoy to Pyongyang, saying that South Korea is closely watching what will come out of the visit. “It could have a very significant meaning considering the current situation,” he told reporters. “We will keep an eye on the outcome and meet again [with Yun] as soon as possible to analyze it together.” He noted that the current pressure and sanctions-oriented drive is aimed at bringing the North to the negotiating table and emphasized that Seoul and Washington have no difference in the approach. The two seem to not to put much emphasis on more than a two-month lull in North Korea’s provocations, saying that they have not been able to confirm Pyongyang’s real intention. “I hope that they will stop forever. But we had no communication from them so I don’t know whether to interpret it positively or not. We have no signal from them,” Yun said. Upon arriving in South Korea on November 14, Yun said that he did not know why the North had halted its provocations but urged the North to stay provocation-free “for a period of time,” adding that it would be a “good start.” North Korea has not carried out provocation since September 15, when it fired a missile over Japan. Asked to clarify his “period of time” observation, he didn’t comment. The foreign ministry later said in a press release that Lee and Yun agreed to meet again “as soon as possible” to discuss detailed follow-up measures based on the talks that they had here. The ministry added that South Korea’s deputy nuclear envoy Jeong Yeon-doo also met yesterday with his Japanese counterpart on the sidelines of a forum held in Seoul where they discussed ways to make denuclearization efforts for North Korea move forward. (Koh Byung-joon, “S. Korea, U.S. Vow Peaceful Resolution to N.K. Issue, Seek Sanctions, Pressure,”Yonhap, November 17, 2017) South Korean Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Lee Do-hoon told press that the U.S. and South Korea did not consider the two-month pause in testing to constitute a serious ceasing of “provocations.” “North Korea hasn’t yet shown their intention [to stop provocations],” Lee said. “[The hiatus in provocations] is a clearly good thing, but what representative Yun says is that North Korea should say ‘we don’t make provocation for dialogue,’” he added. When asked what accounted for the two-month pause, Lee said Seoul and Washington “can’t positively interpret it far ahead, but we can’t also consider it pessimistically.” But Lee said the two agreed on the necessity of a program of “pressure and sanctions” on the North. Defense Secretary James Mattis on November 15 said that the U.S. would consider talks with North Korea “if they stop their shooting missiles, stop developing nukes, stop building more nukes.” Speaking to media en route to Colorado, the Pentagon chief also said the North could resume dialogue with the U.S. so long as “they don’t export the weapons.” Pentagon chief spokesperson Dana White on Wednesday said Washington “wouldn’t speculate” on Pyongyang’s motivations for the two-month pause. “I think it’s perilous to predict anything about what North Korea does or doesn’t do. But we’re continuing to monitor the situation,” White said. “Our policies remain to have the verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. So it’s a diplomatic effort. We’ll continue to support our diplomats and ensure that they can negotiate from a position of strength.” (Dagyum Ji, “U.S. Has Received ‘No Signal’ That North Korea Is Seeking Dialogue: Yun,” NKNews, November 17, 2017)
11/18/17:
The commander of the U.S. nuclear arsenal says he would not blindly carry out an ordered strike by President Donald Trump. General John Hyten says he’s well aware of the rules of engagement with nuclear weapons, telling an audience of senior political, military and diplomatic officials gathered in Halifax that he’s thought about this a lot. “If you execute an unlawful order you will go to jail, you could go to jail for the rest of your life,” he said during a panel discussion at the Halifax International Security Forum. “The way the process works is simple. I provide advice to the president and he will tell me what to do. And if it’s illegal… I’m going to say ‘Mr. President, it’s illegal’ and you know what he’s going to do. He’s going to say ‘What would be legal?’ and we’ll come up with options, a mix of capabilities to respond to whatever the situation is,” Hyten said. “And that’s the way it works.” Hyten says his role is to provide the room for diplomacy and sanctions to work. “We are ready every minute of every day to respond to any event that comes out of North Korea,” he said. “That’s the element that has to be clear. And it is clear. If he [Kim] goes down that path, it will not end well.” But those international efforts, especially diplomacy, don’t appear to be working, says Kim Sung-han, director of the Ilmin International Relations Institute at Korea University, in Seoul. He told the summit North Korea has deployed nearly a thousand short-range ballistic missiles and is close to being able to fire a nuclear missile capable of hitting targets in North America. “For now we are depending on the extended deterrence, the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States,” he told the summit. “But it’s time to think about plan B, some other alternatives, when we all agree on the fact that our diplomatic efforts have been a failure.” One option is to re-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on the peninsula. Another is for South Korea to have its own nuclear weapons. Hyten doesn’t agree. He was in South Korea six weeks ago to guarantee the U.S. deterrent is there for them. (Chris Hall, “U.S. Nuclear Commander Would Propose Other Options before a Strike on North Korea,” CBC, November 18, 2017)
11/20/17:
President Donald Trump put North Korea back on a list of state sponsors of terrorism, a designation that allows the United States to impose more sanctions and risks inflaming tensions over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. The Republican president, who has traded personal insults with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un but has not ruled out talks, said the Treasury Department will announce additional sanctions against North Korea tomorrow. “In addition to threatening the world by nuclear devastation, North Korea has repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism, including assassinations on foreign soil,” Trump told reporters at the White House. “This designation will impose further sanctions and penalties on North Korea and related persons and supports our maximum pressure campaign to isolate the murderous regime.” Trump, who has often criticized his predecessors’ policies toward Pyongyang, said the designation should have been made “a long time ago.” Experts say the designation will be largely symbolic as North Korea is already heavily sanctioned by the United States, a reality that U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson seemed to acknowledge while saying it would help dissuade third parties from supporting Pyongyang. “The practical effects may be limited but hopefully we’re closing off a few loopholes with this,” he told reporters. The United States has designated only three other countries — Iran, Sudan and Syria — as state sponsors of terrorism. Some experts think North Korea does not meet the criteria for the designation, which requires evidence that a state has “repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” In his remarks, Trump remembered Otto Warmbier, the college student from Ohio who died in June shortly after his return from North Korea, where he was held for more than a year. His death caused outrage in the United States and further inflamed tensions with Pyongyang. A U.S. intelligence official who follows developments in North Korea expressed concern that Trump’s move could backfire, especially given that the basis for the designation is arguable. The official said Kim could respond in a number of ways, including renewing missile or nuclear tests in “a very volatile environment.” The move also could undercut Trump’s efforts to solicit greater Chinese cooperation in pressuring North Korea to halt its nuclear and ballistic missile tests, the official said. (Reuters, “Trump Declares N. Korea State Sponsor of Terrorism,” November 20, 2017) A bipartisan group of lawmakers had urged Trump to make the designation. “Such acts are not isolated events, but part of a consistent pattern by the Kim regime,” stated the letter, signed by Rep. Edward R. Royce (R-Calif.), chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Rep. Eliot L. Engel (N.Y.), the committee’s ranking Democrat, among others. “There’s no doubt the Kim regime thrives off spreading mayhem around the globe, and today’s decision is another step in the administration’s effort to bring the greatest pressure to bear on the Kim regime,” Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) said today. But Sen. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) said the move is largely for show. “Our diplomatic strategy should be consistent and coordinated, but President Trump’s symbolic designation only ratchets up rhetoric while failing to apply maximum pressure through targeted sanctions,” Markey said. “Only pressure combined with direct diplomacy can help us achieve the ultimate goal of peaceful and complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Daniel Russel, former National Security Council senior Asia director under President Barack Obama, agreed that the move was symbolically potent because the lifting of the sanctions represented the “high-water mark of U.S.-North Korea efforts to reconcile their differences and negotiate and engage in 2008.” The relisting of the North is tantamount to “taking one of the trophies out of the glass case and shattering it.” Russel said the Obama administration had deliberated over the North’s behavior but had been unable to cite a legal rationale for relisting the country on the terrorism sponsor list. He suggested that the Kim Jong Nam assassination provided such a rationale for the Trump administration. (Anne Gearan and David Nakamura, “Trump Relists N. Korea as a Terrorism Sponsor,” Washington Post, November 20, 2017) Christopher R. Hill, who negotiated the 2008 deal and helped persuade President Bush to drop the terrorism designation against North Korea, said on Monday that he was “surprised that it took this long” to re-list the country. “I had thought that maybe the Obama administration would do it,” Hill said in an interview. “What I always told everyone in 2008 was that if the North doesn’t do what it’s supposed to do, we can put them back on the terrorism list.” But Hill, who also served as ambassador to Iraq during the Obama administration, added that the State Department list was “largely symbolic.” For example, a country listed on it cannot receive American military equipment. That has not been an issue with North Korea for more than seven decades. Trump and Tillerson both cited the assassination as evidence that North Korea sponsors international terrorism and deserves to be on the State Department list. In recent weeks, administration officials had hinted that the president was considering adding North Korea back to the terrorism list in light of the assassination and the country’s nuclear ambitions. But some veterans of North Korean diplomacy questioned whether the killing of a family member qualifies as international terrorism. “It seems to me counterproductive, nutty and maybe tragically miscalculating,” said Robert Gallucci, who was the lead negotiator for the United States during nuclear talks with North Korea under President Bill Clinton. Gallucci said the killing of a member of the ruling family — despite its brutality — does not amount to evidence that the country has recently engaged in international terrorism: “I don’t see a current policy reason for doing this.” Trump’s decision to blacklist North Korea, which reflects his policy of applying “maximum pressure” on Pyongyang, will probably invite angry reaction from Kim’s government and dim chances for easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Gallucci said he worried that today’s designation would make it harder, not easier, to persuade the North Koreans to negotiate. “Does the United States actually want these guys to come to the table, or do we not?” he said. Kim has a history of resorting to extreme measures against his enemies. Since taking power after the death of his father in 2011, he has executed dozens of senior officials deemed not loyal enough, often killing them with antiaircraft machine guns, in what South Korean officials called a “reign of terror.” They said Kim probably considered Kim Jong-nam, his father’s firstborn, as his potential replacement should his government lose control. In recent days, Kim has moved to discipline the leadership of his country’s most powerful military organization, the latest sign of his efforts to tighten his grip on party elites and the armed forces, according to South Korea’s main intelligence agency. Analysts and experts pay close attention to any rumblings within the secretive government, looking for possible implications for the stability of Kim’s rule and for his nuclear and missile programs. They have said that Kim appeared to be using his tactic of instilling fear in the elites to strengthen his control as North Korea braced for the pain that is most likely to result from recently imposed United Nations sanctions. During a closed-door parliamentary briefing on Monday, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service told lawmakers that North Korea’s General Political Bureau was being “audited” by the government for the first time in 20 years. The military organization’s director, Vice Marshal Hwang Pyong-so, and his deputies were “punished,” according to lawmakers who briefed reporters after the session. (Michael D. Shear and David E. Sanger, “Trump Revives Terrorist Label for Pyongyang,” New York Times, November 21, 2017,
President Trump: “We just returned from a historic 12-day trip to Asia. Everywhere we went, the American delegation was greeted with tremendous hospitality and tremendous respect. People are respecting our country again, believe me. …One of the primary goals of our trip was to pursue the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. I want to begin this morning by meeting and by talking about the fact that we will be instituting a very critical step, and that will start right now. Today, the United States is designating North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. It should have happened a long time ago. It should have happened years ago. In addition to threatening the world by nuclear devastation, North Korea has repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism, including assassinations on foreign soil. As we take this action today, our thoughts to turn to Otto Warmbier, a wonderful young man, and the countless others so brutally affected by the North Korean oppression. This designation will impose further sanctions and penalties on North Korea and related persons, and supports our maximum pressure campaign to isolate the murderous regime that you’ve all been reading about and, in some cases, writing about. Tomorrow, the Treasury Department will be announcing an additional sanction, and a very large one, on North Korea. This will be going on over the next two weeks. It will be the highest level of sanctions by the time it’s finished over a two-week period. The North Korean regime must be lawful. It must end its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile development, and cease all support for international terrorism — which it is not doing.” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Trump before Cabinet Meeting, November 20, 2017)
11/21/17:
Treasury Department officials announced a new round of sanctions aimed at disrupting the North’s nuclear and ballistic missile program. They were levied against Chinese trading companies and several North Korean shipping vessels and companies, freezing their assets and prohibiting Americans from engaging in transactions with them. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson had described the sanctions as extensions of existing prohibitions. “It may, though, disrupt and dissuade some third parties,” he said. “This will close a few additional loopholes off.” Analysts said they doubted that new sanctions would make any real difference on the already heavily penalized country. If anything, they said, the designation will make diplomacy more difficult without increasing Washington’s leverage, warning that Pyongyang will probably take the naming and shaming as another reason to stick to its hardline policy of developing and testing nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). “It’s hard to see any real impact on North Korea, which has lived through all manners of sanctions for seven decades,” said Paik Hak-soon, a senior analyst at the Sejong Institute, a South Korean research organization. “What it does instead is to send a clear message to North Korea that Trump is not interested in talks, another sign and reconfirmation that the Americans remain a hostile force.” President Xi Jinping of China, who has been under pressure from Trump to do more to rein in its Communist neighbor, sent a special envoy to Pyongyang over the weekend in what Trump called a “big move” to persuade the North to change course. The envoy, Song Tao, returned home yesterday, apparently empty-handed. Neither China nor North Korea has indicated that Song met Kim. (Choe Sang-hun, “Restoring North Korea to Terrorism Blacklist Dims Hopes for Diplomacy,” New York Times, November 22, 2017,
11/21-22/17:
North Korean representatives and academics from various countries took part in discussions in Sweden hosted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), multiple participants told NK News. “The group looked at the background, the current situation, the drivers, the risks and possible measures for reducing risk,” Dan Smith, Director of SIPRI, told NK News. “The aim of the meeting was for participants to learn more and see if we could generate some ideas about what to do,” he added. Smith described the event as “an experts roundtable, focusing on European perspectives on Northeast Asia regional security and, in particular, obviously, on North Korea,” but said that it had not been a Track 2 dialogue. Suzanne DiMaggio, a director and senior fellow at New America, participated in the event and told NK News that the dialogue was formatted as an “expert roundtable” however, “with some elements of a ‘Track 2’ dialogue.” Georgy Toloraya, a former Russian diplomat and Director of Korean Programs at the Institute of Economy of Russian Academy of Sciences, also participated in the discussions and described it as a Track 2 event. “There are hopes and the intention for dialogue based on the freeze idea,” he said, referring to a proposal tabled by China in which North Korea would freeze missile tests in exchange for the U.S. and South Korea freezing their joint military exercises. In addition to its North Korean participants, the event featured experts from Russia, China, the UK, Italy, Germany, the U.S., and Switzerland. While Smith and DiMaggio were not willing to discuss details about the North Koreans attending the event, Toloraya said that the four DPRK representatives were from the Korea-Europe Association, a de facto arm of the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While hopeful, participants appear less optimistic about positive outcomes amid the current crisis. “While I found the discussion to be constructive, it’s difficult to feel optimistic at this time,” DiMaggio told NK News. “The longer the current course of escalation persists and intensifies, the greater the chances for spiraling into military conflict either by design or by miscalculation.” None of the participants NK News spoke to indicated that they received any signal regarding the impending missile test that was to come one week after the event, nor any indication of the reasons behind the relative lull in testing that preceded it. Evans Revere, a senior director with the Albright Stonebridge Group, has previously taken part in such dialogues – including at the Track 2 level – and told NK News that the efficacy of such non-official events is limited in the absence of higher-level talks. “Having attended some Track 2 events recently, I am convinced they are only marginally useful at this moment,” he said. “What is required now is direct, quiet, authoritative, and urgent communication, especially between Pyongyang and Washington, in order to de-escalate tensions and explore whether there is any basis for a dialogue on the main issues of concern, including denuclearization.” “Unfortunately, too many Track 2 dialogues in recent years have provided venues for the North Koreans to be told what they want to hear, not what they need to hear,” he added. Revere said that this has encouraged the North Korean side to get a false sense of what is possible and “to receive a skewed interpretation” of the U.S. government’s bottom line. Echoing DiMaggio’s comments, Revere warned that the possibility of confrontation and miscalculation also remains very real. “Direct dialogue, in which each side raises the issues that are important to it, should be the top priority,” he said. (Hamish Macdonald, “North Korean Officials, Foreign Academics, Held Dialogue prior to ICBM Launch,” NKNews, December 6, 2017)
11/22/17:
DPRK: FoMin DPRK spokesperson‘s answer to a question raised by KCNA “as regards the fact that the U.S. re-listed the DPRK as a “state sponsor of terrorism”: On November 21, the U.S. made a scene of re-listing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a “state sponsor of terrorism”. Following Trump’s reckless remark on the UN arena of “totally destroying” our country, the U.S. labeled the DPRK as a “state sponsor of terrorism” this time. This is a serious provocation and a violent infringement upon our dignified country. Since 1979 the U.S. has been labeling the countries that are not obedient to it as “state sponsors of terrorism”. In January 1988, it listed our country as a “state sponsor of terrorism” and de-listed it in October 2008. The U.S. deleted Iraq and Libya from the list of “state sponsor of terrorism” that gave in to its pressure. It also deleted Cuba from the list as a part of the normalization of bilateral relations. These facts clearly show that the label of “state sponsor of terrorism” is just a tool for American style authoritarianism that can be attached or removed at any time in accordance with its interests. The U.S., the kingpin of all kinds of terrorism who cannot even prevent terror in its own territory, is acting like an “international judge on terrorism” while attaching or removing the label of “state sponsor of terrorism” on sovereign countries. This is clearly an absurdity and a mockery to the world peace and security. The act of listing other countries as “state sponsors of terrorism” by the U.S. is one of the heinous means to suffocate independent countries disobedient to it, and it is only a cloak to hide its incompetence. The DPRK government values international justice and peace, and consistently stands against all forms of terrorism and any sponsorship for terrorism. That’s why the DPRK announced that it would faithfully fulfill its duty of nuclear non-proliferation before the international society as a responsible nuclear power. We have nothing to do with “terrorism” and we do not care whether the U.S. puts a cap of “terrorism” on us or not. This time, while re-listing the DPRK as a “state sponsor of terrorism”, the U.S. announced additional sanctions against the DPRK under the pretext of blocking illegal funds for “prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile program of the DPRK.” The nuclear weapons of the DPRK are the deterrence to safeguard our sovereignty and our rights to existence and development from the U.S. heinous hostile policy and nuclear threats that have lasted for over half a century, and as long as the U.S. continues with its anti-DPRK hostile policy, our deterrence will be further strengthened. By re-listing the DPRK as a “state sponsor of terrorism”, the U.S. openly revealed to the whole world its intention to destroy our ideology and system by using all kinds of means and methods. Not content with its sanctions against our country, the U.S. is making a last-ditch attempt to suffocate our country by labeling it as a “state sponsor terrorism”. However, no sanction or pressure can stand up to the great and limitless strength of self-reliance and self-development of our people who are closely rallied around their leader. Our army and people are full of rage and anger towards the heinous gangsters who dared to put the name of our sacred country in this wretched list of “terrorism” and are hardening their will to settle all accounts with those gangsters at any time in any way. The U.S. is talking about some kind of “peaceful solution” while making a provocation by labeling our dignified country as a “state sponsor of terrorism”. Its pitiful lot reaffirms the philosophical truth that we were absolutely right to choose the path for simultaneously pushing forward the economic construction and the up-building of the nuclear force and we must continue to keep the treasured nuclear sword in our hands more tightly. The U.S. will be held entirely accountable for all the consequences to be entailed by its impudent provocation to the DPRK.” (KCNA, “FM Spokesperson Blasts U.S. for Re-Listing DPRK as ‘Sponsor of Terrorism,’” November 22, 2017)
11/24/17:
KCNA: “The U.S. has gone mischievous nowadays to stop the DPRK from making advance as the nuclear force of Juche Korea has almost reached the phase of completion. As the DPRK’s action for completing its state nuclear force is becoming a fait accompli, the Trump group is floating the story of “nuclear attack” on the DPRK, trying to make it sound plausible. By putting forward those soldiers who retired from service of the nuclear force, the U.S. is opening to public every procedure for executing the nuclear attack. The group is getting vocal that “President Trump would choose a plan already existing on table when he see it as a moment to use a nuclear weapon against north Korea” and that “it is almost impossible to stop the decision.” Meanwhile, the U.S. is setting afloat information that it is making actual preparations for a nuclear war with the DPRK as evidenced by the report about the August nuclear bombing drill targeting the DPRK which B-52 of its air force conducted with Japan Air “Self-Defense Force” in areas around the Korean peninsula. Such movement of the Trump group is aimed to pressurize the DPRK from taking a measure for completing the building of a nuclear force at the final phase. In conclusion, the U.S. had better clearly understand who its rival is. If the U.S. is finally going to inflict a nuclear war on the DPRK, by finding fault with the DPRK’s self-defensive measure for completing the national nuclear force, the DPRK will not hesitate to respond to it with the nuclear attack to wipe out the U.S., empire of evil, from the earth. It seems that the U.S. has lingering attachment for the Caribbean crisis in the 1960s. It will be a grave miscalculation for the U.S. to think that it can revive the Caribbean crisis on the Korean peninsula and bring down the DPRK. The Korean peninsula is not the Caribbean region and the Korean People’s Army is not such a weak one who would put down its nuclear weapon at the nuclear threat and blackmail of the U.S. The KPA is the invincible and ever-victorious powerful army full of the spirit of annihilating enemies. The KPA is a heroic army which wrested surrender documents from the U.S. without nuclear weapons in all forms of confrontation with the U.S. including the 1968 Pueblo incident and the 1976 Panmunjom case. No force on the earth can bring into submission the DPRK whose leader, army and people have formed a harmonious whole and it is truth proven by the history of the DPRK-U.S. stand-off that the DPRK will always emerge victorious. The DPRK is a dignified nuclear power and a world-level military power and gone are the days never to return when the U.S. used to threaten the DPRK with nuclear weapons. Trump had better ponder over the saying that ‘Give measure for measure.’” (KCNA, KCNA Commentary Urges U.S. to Stop Nuclear Threat to DPRK,” November 24, 2017)
11/27/17:
Russia’s deputy foreign minister said North Korea’s current pause in provocations — the longest since last winter — indicates a step toward denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. “I think North Korea’s restraint for the past two months is within the simultaneous freeze road map” suggested by China and Russia, Igor Morgulov told reporters in Seoul. Russian and Chinese foreign ministers proposed in July a “double freezing” initiative, under which North Korea refrains from missile and nuclear tests, and the U.S. and South Korea halt large-scale military exercises. North Korea’s last provocation was on September 15, when it fired its second missile over Japan in as many months. The 73-day pause is the longest since a 116-day break between October 2016 and February. Morgulov, Russia’s deputy minister responsible for relations with East and South Asia, said that following a “freeze for freeze” the next step would be to hold exchanges with Pyongyang. Once North Korea agrees to a moratorium on testing and talks are taking place, the process can move to discussion of denuclearization, he said. “We will have to see a certain change of attitude of the U.S., especially on freezing or reducing” its military drills, Morgulov said. “It’ll be difficult for us to play the role of persuading North Korea” not to provoke anymore without a change in the U.S. position. (Kanga Kong, “Ruissia Suggests North Korea Taking Step toward Denuclearization,” Bloomberg, November 27, 2017)
11/29/17:
KCNA: “A test-fire of the inter-continental ballistic rocket Hwasong-15 was successfully conducted on November 29 under the guidance of Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army. Kim Jong Un personally supervised the whole course of the test-fire. He indicated the orientation of developing a new type rocket that can make the final victory of the country in the showdown with the U.S. imperialists and gave detailed instructions every day to the Academy of Defense Science for doing so and thus made sure that the Hwasong-15 weapon system was successfully completed. Upon receiving the report that it is ready to test-fire the new type ICBM on November 28, he came out to the place where technical preparations for the rocket was under way late at night to see the 9-axis self-propelled launching vehicle manufactured by workers of the munitions industry. He praised them for having successfully made the vehicle to be impeccable. He expressed great satisfaction over the fact that such vehicles can be manufactured as many as the country wants now that the munitions industry has made a breakthrough in putting the production of all parts of the vehicle on a domestic and Juche basis 100 percent. He went to the launching ground and meticulously guided the pre-launch processes one by one including the one for vertically standing the rocket. At an observation post for command he learned in detail about the launching plan and issued an order to launch the rocket. The rocket successfully blasted off and soared into the sky. The ICBM Hwasong-15 soared to the highest altitude of 4 475 km and made a flight over the distance of 950 km for 53 minutes before making an accurate landing in the preset waters in the open sea in the East Sea of Korea. The test-fire confirmed that all the integers of the weapon system have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of design and that it is capable of fully ensuring reliability in combat situation to serve its mission as strategic weaponry system. Particularly, the accuracy of hitting targets by posture control and speed correction in the mid-flight section, accuracy in operation of high-thrust engine to which propulsion vector control is applied and the engine of high specific thrust was confirmed, and the accuracy of design integers of subsequent guided and stabilization systems was verified. Also confirmed were mobile and hoisting capabilities and operational reliability of launching system of the nine-axis self-propelled launching vehicle newly developed and completed. The test-fire also re-confirmed the control and stabilization technology, phase-separation and start-up technology and the safety of warhead in the atmospheric reentry environment that had already been confirmed. The ICBM Hwasong-15 weapon system represents the weapon system peculiar to the Workers’ Party of Korea, which was developed with domestic efforts and technology 100 percent to suit the specific conditions of the country. With this system, the DPRK has become possessed of another new-type inter-continental ballistic rocket weaponry system capable of carrying super-heavy nuclear warhead and attacking the whole mainland of the U.S. Greatly satisfied with the at-a-go success in the test-fire of the newly developed ICBM Hwasong-15, respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un was so excited to express his great satisfaction and extend his heartfelt gratitude to all those who took part in the development of the new type rocket weapon system. He said that the day was a significant day when the historic cause of completing the state nuclear force, the cause of building a rocket power was realized, adding that the day, on which the great might of putting the strategic position of the DPRK on a higher stage was given birth, should be specially recorded in the history of the country. The dazzling achievements made in all fields of the country recently including the field of national defense science are a great victory which can be won only by the heroic people of the DPRK who remain true to the cause of our Party without vacillation, weathering all tempests of history. He warmly congratulated scientists, technicians, workers and officials in the field of the defense science who demonstrated once again the dignity and might of Juche Korea by succeeding in the test-fire of the newly-developed ICBM Hwasong-15, and had a photo taken with them.
He was accompanied by Jang Chang Ha, Jon Il Ho, Jo Yong Won and Yu Jin.” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of ICBM Hwasong-15,” November 29, 2017)
Elleman: “The Hwasong-15 is considerably larger than the Hwasong-14, and initial calculations indicate the new missile could deliver a moderately-sized nuclear weapon to any city on the US mainland. The Hwasong-15 is also large and powerful enough to carry simple decoys or other countermeasures designed to challenge America’s existing national missile defense (NMD) system. A handful of additional flight tests are needed to validate the Hwasong-15’s performance and reliability, and likely establish the efficacy of a protection system needed to ensure the warhead survives the rigors of atmospheric re-entry. The Hwasong-15 is a two-stage, liquid-fueled ICBM. Photographs of the Hwasong-15 reveal that its first stage is powered by a pair of engines that share the same external features found on the single chamber engine used by the Hwasong-14. The two-chamber configuration found on the Hwasong-15 is very similar to the original design of the RD-251 engine block developed and produced in the former Soviet Union, suggesting that the total thrust generated at lift-off is about 80-tons force. This is reasonably consistent with the estimated mass of the new missile, which is between 40 and 50 metric tons. The configuration of the second stage is not known, though its overall size suggests it contains 50 percent more propellant than the Hwasong-14. Taken together, and applying conservative assumptions about the second-stage propulsion system, it now appears that the Hwasong-15 can deliver a 1,000-kg payload to any point on the US mainland. North Korea has almost certainly developed a nuclear warhead that weighs less than 700 kg, if not one considerably lighter. The missile also features a new steering mechanism that is more efficient and simpler than the methods used in North Korea’s other missiles. North Korea’s older, Scud-based missiles employed jet vanes for steering during the boost phase. The Hwasong-12 and -14 used four small engines mounted in parallel to the main thrust chamber for missile control during first stage operations. North Korean engineers have mounted each of the main engines of the Hwasong-15 on a slotted gimbal that allows each to be reoriented in one dimension to control the direction of the exhaust gases to provide control. Little is known about the construction of the second stage. Most likely it is powered by four small engines derived from the Soviet R-27 missile. Such an arrangement would mean the upper-stage is underpowered, when compared to ICBMs fielded by other nations, but it would not prevent the Hwasong-14 from being used to threaten the entire US. Less likely, but possible, North Korea has obtained a new engine for use on the second-stage. Its inclusion in the design would enhance the Hwasong-15’s capabilities. The Hwasong-15 also incorporates other important qualitative improvements. It could be fitted with a post-boost control system to make final adjustments to the payload’s velocity and position in space, a measure that could substantially improve the missile’s precision. It is also possible that the missile has been designed to carry simple decoys, or other countermeasures, to confuse the US missile defense system. The missile has the throw-weight capacity to carry the countermeasures along with the warhead, but it is far from certain these were included in this most recent flight test. The appearance of the Hwasong-15 marks a significant improvement in North Korea’s ability to target the US. How many more tests North Korea will undertake depends on the regime’s perceived needs. At least one or two more tests on a standard trajectory are needed to validate its performance as a ballistic missile. Additional flight tests should be performed to determine the missile’s reliability, establish its accuracy and verify the re-entry protection system. However, if low confidence in the missile’s reliability is acceptable, two or three test firings over the next four to six months may be all that is required before Kim Jong Un declares the Hwasong-15 combat ready.” (Michael Elleman, “The New Hwasong-15 ICBM: A Significant Improvement That Could Be Ready As Soon As 2018,” 38North, November 30, 2017)
North Korea fired an intercontinental ballistic missile that flew both higher and longer than previous such launches, a bold act of defiance against President Trump after he put the country back on a list of state sponsors of terrorism. The president reacted cautiously to news of the launch, stating, “It is a situation that we will handle.” But Defense Secretary Jim Mattis expressed greater concern, emphasizing what he said were technical advances on display in the 53-minute flight, which began when the missile was launched northeast of the capital, Pyongyang, and ended nearly 600 miles to the east, when it landed in the Sea of Japan. “It went higher, frankly, than any previous shot they’ve taken,” Mattis said in the White House, where he was taking part in a budget meeting with the president and Republican congressional leaders. “The bottom line is, it’s a continued effort to build a threat — a ballistic missile threat that endangers world peace, regional peace, and certainly, the United States,” the defense secretary said. North Korea said that it had successfully tested its “most powerful” ICBM, the Hwasong-15, saying it “meets the goal of the completion of the rocket weaponry system” North Korea has been developing for decades. North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, watched the launch, a broadcaster said, reading a prepared statement on the North’s Central Television. Experts said this latest launch — which landed west of the northern end of Honshu, Japan’s largest island — exhibited characteristics that underscored the increasing sophistication of North Korea’s program. The missile flew higher and for a longer duration than two previous intercontinental ballistic missile launches, which flew for 37 minutes on July 4 and for 47 minutes on July 28. David Wright at the Union of Concerned Scientists said the missile performed better than the two fired in July, and exhibited a potential range of more than 8,000 miles, able to reach Washington or any other part of the continental United States. “It’s pretty impressive,” Dr. Wright said of the test flight. “This is building on what they’ve done before. It’s muscle-flexing to show the U.S. that they’re going to continue to make progress.” However, Dr. Wright noted that in an effort to increase the vehicle’s range, the North Koreans might have fitted it with a mock payload that weighed little or next to nothing. So the distance traveled, while impressive, does not necessarily translate into a working intercontinental ballistic missile that could deliver a thermonuclear warhead. For all the evidence of technical advancements, a senior White House official said the significance of the launch should not be overstated, given the number of missile tests North Korea has carried out this year. The White House had expected some form of retaliation after it put the North back on its list of state sponsors of terrorism last week. Trump, officials said, will stick to his policy of rallying nations to apply economic pressure on North Korea, backed up by the threat of military action. In a statement, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson condemned the launch. But he added, “Diplomatic options remain viable and open, for now.” The launch came in the middle of the night on the peninsula, with less advance warning, according to experts. Aerial photographs of North Korean launch sites did not show missiles waiting on launch pads to be fueled, although Japanese officials had reported that radio telemetry pointed to a possible launch. Some experts theorized that North Korea was now fueling missiles horizontally, before they are placed on the launch pad. In the past, it went through a lengthier process of rolling a missile onto a launch pad, filling it with liquid fuel and then launching it — steps that could take days. “This shortens the time from when they become visible to when they go in the air, and makes it less likely that the U.S. will be able to strike before it launches,” said Rodger Baker, a vice president of strategic analysis with Stratfor, a geopolitical risk analysis company. American officials offered no proof of the horizontal fueling theory, but they acknowledged that North Korea is searching for ways to get around the United States’ ability to mount a pre-emptive strike. Mattis noted that South Korea had fired several “pinpoint missiles” into the water after the launch “to make certain North Korea understands that they could be taken under fire by our ally.” Although it was the third time that the South had fired missiles in response to a North Korean missile test, this response was more muscular, officials said, with South Korea firing from a land-based missile battery, a Navy destroyer and an F-16 fighter jet. It was meant to show that the South had multiple ways of hitting a North Korean missile on the launch pad in a pre-emptive strike, according to South Korean military officials. After the launch, the United Nations Security Council scheduled an emergency meeting on the issue for tomorrow afternoon. Matthew Rycroft, Britain’s ambassador to the United Nations, told reporters that the launch appeared to be “yet again, a reckless act by a regime which is more intent on building up its ballistic missile nuclear capability than it is on looking after its own people.” President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan each called meetings of their national security councils to discuss the North’s latest provocation. Mr. Trump called both leaders on Tuesday, at their request, according to the White House. Unlike the launches over the summer, when the missiles flew over Japan’s northern island, Hokkaido, the government did not issue cellphone alerts to warn its citizens. In Washington, a spokesman for the Defense Department, Col. Robert Manning of the Army, said that the launch “did not pose a threat to North America, our territories or our allies,” and added that the American commitment to the defense of South Korea and Japan “remains ironclad.” Trump avoided threats of military retaliation against the North today. But he did not hesitate to use the specter of a military confrontation in Asia as leverage against the Democrats in the budget wars in Washington. The missile launch, he predicted, would “have a huge effect on Schumer and Pelosi,” referring to Senator Chuck Schumer of New York and Representative Nancy Pelosi of California, the chambers’ Democratic leaders, both of whom boycotted his budget meeting. “If you look at the military, we want strong funding for the military,” Trump said. “They don’t.” North Korea has persisted in its nuclear weapons and missile development despite nine rounds of sanctions that the Security Council has imposed since its first nuclear test in 2006. (Mark Landler, Choe Sang-Hun, and Helene Cooper “Missile’s 53-Minute Test Flight Is Longest Yet by North Korea,” New York Times, November 29, 2017,
President Trump: “As you probably have heard, and some of you have reported, a missile was launched a little while ago from North Korea. I will only tell you that we will take care of it. We have General Mattis in the room with us, and we’ve had a long discussion on it. It is a situation that we will handle. With that being said, Chuck Schumer and Nancy Pelosi did not show up for our meeting today. I’m not really that surprised. We have a lot of differences. They’re weak on crime, they’re weak on illegal immigration. They want the illegal folks to come pouring into our border and a lot of problems are being caused, although we’ve stopped it to a large extent as much as you can without the law, which we’re going to get. Before this meeting and before this missile launch, they’ve been weak on military. In terms of spending, they’re very hard to get the military — they want it for a lot of other things, but the military is always secondary to them. The military, to me, is number one. We won’t be here without our powerful military, and we’re building it up stronger, bigger, better than ever before. And General Mattis can testify to that. And the other thing: They want tax increases, and we want major tax decreases. So they decided not to show up. They’ve been all talk and they’ve been no action, and now it’s even worse. Now it’s not even talk. So they’re not showing up to the meeting. I will say this: In light of the missile launch, probably they’ll be here fairly quickly, or at least discussions will start taking place fairly quickly. … MATTIS: Mr. President, Senator, Speaker, a little over two and a half hours ago, North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile. It went higher, frankly, than any previous shot they’ve taken. It’s a research and development effort on their part to continue building ballistic missiles that could threaten everywhere in the world, basically. And in response, the South Koreans have fired some pinpoint missiles out into the water to make certain North Korea understands that they could be taken under fire by our ally. But the bottom line is, it’s a continued effort to build a threat — a ballistic missile threat that endangers world peace, regional peace, and certainly, the United States. PRESIDENT: Thank you, General. And we will take care of that situation. Thank you all very much. I appreciate it. Thank you. Q. Does this change anything to your basic approach to North Korea, these missile launches today? Does it change anything about your basic approach to dealing with them? PRESIDENT: Nothing changed. Nothing changed. We have a very serious approach, but nothing changed. We take it very seriously.” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Trump in Meeting with Congressional Leadership, November 28, 2017)
Tillerson statement: “The United States strongly condemns North Korea’s launch of what is likely an intercontinental ballistic missile into the Sea of Japan, indiscriminately threatening its neighbors, the region and global stability. The D.P.R.K.’s relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them must be reversed. Together the international community must continue to send a unified message to North Korea that the D.P.R.K. must abandon its WMD programs. All nations must continue strong economic and diplomatic measures. In addition to implementing all existing UN sanctions, the international community must take additional measures to enhance maritime security, including the right to interdict maritime traffic transporting goods to and from the D.P.R.K. The United States, in partnership with Canada, will convene a meeting of the United Nations Command Sending States to include the Republic of Korea and Japan and other key affected countries to discuss how the global community can counter North Korea’s threat to international peace. Diplomatic options remain viable and open, for now. The United States remains committed to finding a peaceful path to denuclearization and to ending belligerent actions by North Korea.” (DoS, Statement by Secretary of State Rx W. Tillerson, November 28, 2017)
President Trump pledged yesterday that “additional major sanctions” would be imposed on North Korea after Pyongyang’s latest intercontinental missile test. Trump’s statement followed a telephone conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping, whose country is an economic lifeline for North Korea. Beijing’s backing is needed for any additional economic pressures on the regime of Kim Jong Un, and it was unclear how far China could go in applying new sanctions. “Just spoke to President XI JINPING of China concerning the latest provocative actions of North Korea,” Trump tweeted. “Additional major sanctions will be imposed on North Korea today. This situation will be handled!” In a statement, the White House said Trump had “underscored the determination of the United States to defend ourselves and our allies from the growing threat posed by the North Korean regime” in his call with Xi. “President Trump emphasized the need for China to use all available levers to convince North Korea to end its provocations and return to the path of denuclearization,” said the statement, In a brief statement carried by China’s state news agency Xinhua, Xi was reported to have told Trump that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is “China’s unswerving goal and China is ready to join the U.S. in pushing the nuclear issue toward a peaceful settlement.” Earlier yesterday, China’s Foreign Ministry expressed its “grave concern and opposition” to the launch by North Korea, which it refers to by its official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK. “We strongly urge the DPRK side to abide by the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions and halt any moves that could aggravate the situation on the Korean Peninsula,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told a regular news conference. But the question remains: How far is China prepared to push its neighbor and fellow Communist regime, at the behest of the United States and in the quest for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula? Before the phone call between Trump and Xi, Chinese experts were skeptical that Beijing would go much further. “If China imposes heavier sanctions, that would be symbolic at best I think,” said Song Xiaojun, who used to run a government-linked military magazine. “China has a bottom line: ‘Don’t affect the life of the North Korean people, on humanitarian principles.’ It gives them things like oil and food to allow people there to survive.” The latest missile test may not have come as a surprise in Beijing, since North Korea had already made it clear it was continuing with its missile test program, said Zhao Tong, a nuclear policy expert at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center here. But it will still underline Beijing’s discomfort with its truculent neighbor, and lead inevitably to further economic pressure, he said. “The degree of further economic sanctions depends on North Korea’s next step. For example will they launch a complete ICBM or take a more extreme step such as a nuclear test in the Pacific Ocean or atmosphere?” he said. “But the trend toward increasing the economic sanctions is going to continue.” Yet there are also signs that China may be tiring of the American approach of “maximum pressure.” In an editorial in its Chinese-language edition issued Wednesday, Global Times said the test was a sign that past U.S. policy toward North Korea had failed, and that the approach tried under Trump had also been unsuccessful. The United States, it said, “despised Pyongyang” and as a result had ignored North Korea’s security concerns and missed an opportunity to negotiate an end to the nuclear program — instead increasing pressure, raising tensions and narrowing the space for diplomacy since Trump took office. China Daily also issued an editorial that tried to shift the blame onto Trump for last week declaring North Korea a state-sponsor of terrorism, at a time when Pyongyang had briefly paused its missile testing program. “It is vexed that a golden opportunity to build concerted momentum to encourage Pyongyang to engage in talks has been so casually wasted by the Trump administration’s recent action of renaming Pyongyang a state sponsor of terrorism, which may have prompted Pyongyang’s latest missile launch,” it wrote. “There is a severe trust deficit among the relevant parties that is being exacerbated by the actions of Washington and Pyongyang.” That attempt to blame Washington rather than Pyongyang doesn’t get much traction in the West, but does reveal a mind-set among sections of the Communist Party. “The United States has demanded that the Security Council hold an emergency meeting, but the leverage exerted by the international community on North Korea is almost exhausted,” it wrote. “Now Pyongyang is extremely confident, for condemnation by the U.N. Security Council and possible new sanction measures are equal to a few more grains of dust on its body, or a few more drops of rain.” Yet there is no doubt that patience with Pyongyang is also in short supply in China right now. Lu Chao, a Korea expert at the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences in Shenyang, called the latest test a “a very dangerous provocation.” “It will almost certainly provoke a U.S. reaction which will further destabilize situation on the peninsula,” he said adding that North Korea was “going on its own.” “It’s certain that, on issues regarding nuclear and missile tests, China opposes them but doesn’t have much influence on North Korea,” he said. “On the situation in the Korean Peninsula, China and North Korea lack effective communication.” There was a hint of an opening between Beijing and Pyongyang last month, experts say. North Korea refrained from conducting any missile tests during an important Communist Party Congress meeting in November at which Xi was granted another five years in power. A few days later, Xi sent a senior envoy, Song Tao, to brief the regime in Pyongyang about the party congress — although the envoy didn’t get to meet North Korean leader Kim. Lu said the lack of a meeting might have been a sign that Kim was preparing to launch another missile. “If he met with Song Tao and then launched the missile, it would have infuriated China more,” he said. Since Trump’s visit, China’s Foreign Ministry announced the main road connection with North Korea, the bridge across the Yalu River at the Chinese city of Dandong, would be temporarily closed while North Korea repairs the approach road on its side. A few days before, state-owned Air China also suspended flights between Beijing and Pyongyang, citing a lack of demand. Those measures could be interpreted as signals to Pyongyang, but if they were, they were largely aimed at placating Washington rather than changing North Korea’s strategic calculations, said Euan Graham, director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute in Sydney. (Simon Denyer, “Trump Pledges New Wave of ‘Major Sanctions’ on North Korea after Call with China’s Xi,” Washington Post, November 29, 2017) President Donald Trump called on China to cut all oil supplies to North Korea, as the United States urged the international community to sever all diplomatic and trade ties with the regime.
Trump threatened “major sanctions” on the regime, following Pyongyang’s launch of an ICBM that can strike the United States, tweeting that he had just spoken with Chinese President Xi Jinping “concerning the provocative actions of North Korea.” He added, “Additional major sanctions will be imposed on North Korea today. This situation will be handled!” Such measures could also include sanctions against financial institutions, maritime interdiction and the cutting off of energy supplies to the regime. “President Trump called Chinese President Xi this morning and told him we have come to the point that China must cut off the oil from North Korea,” said U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley at an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council in New York this evening. “That would be a pivotal step in the world’s effort to stop this international pariah.” She called on Xi to “show leadership and follow through,” saying, “China can do this on its own, or we can take the oil situation into our own hands,” hinting at possible military action. Beijing has previously resisted attempts to cut off all oil supplies to Pyongyang, which would cripple the regime. “Today, we call on all nations to cut off all ties with North Korea,” said Haley. “In addition to fully implementing all UN sanctions, all countries should sever diplomatic relations with North Korea and limit military, scientific, technical or commercial cooperation. They must also cut off trade with the regime by stopping all imports and exports and expel all North Korean workers.” She also noted that North Korea and its enablers are using deceptive tactics to smuggle coal, banned under UN sanctions, into the regime, and bring in refined petroleum through illegal ship-to-ship transfers. “The regime has shown time and again that it doesn’t want to talk,” said Haley, pointing out that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un “didn’t even speak with President Xi’s envoy when he was sent to talk with the regime.” Chinese senior diplomat Song Tao made a four-day trip to Pyongyang on Nov. 17, but returned without meeting with leader Kim. She also pointed out that while North Korea declared itself a nuclear power following its missile launch Wednesday that title “comes with certain standards.”
Haley added, “The dictator of North Korea made a choice yesterday that brings the world closer to war, not farther from it. We have never sought war with North Korea, and still today we do not seek it. If war does come, it will be because of continued acts of aggression like we witnessed yesterday.” She went on to say, “And if war comes, make no mistake, the North Korean regime will be utterly destroyed.” Saying it was a “time of reckoning,” Haley advised that North Korea’s UN rights and privileges to be taken away, including its voting powers, and pointed out that member states “have it within their power to further isolate, diminish and god willing, reverse the dangerous course of the North Korean regime.” Through an emergency meeting, the 15-member UN Security Council has called on nations to prevent the escalation of tension after the recent launch of the regime’s Hwasong-15. Wu Haitao, China’s deputy ambassador to the United States, urged North Korea to stop escalating tension on the Korean Peninsula, expressing regret that the stable situation in the past two months failed to achieve dialogue. He continued to stress the need for diplomacy, while again raising China’s initiative with Russia for a double suspension of the North’s nuclear activities and the United States’ military exercises with South Korea. “We urge Pyongyang once again to seize the rapidly closing window of opportunity to resolve its nuclear problem peacefully,” said Cho Tae-yul, South Korean ambassador to the United Nations, who also attended the meeting upon the invitation of the council. The White House said in a statement on Trump’s call with Xi that Trump “underscored the determination of the United States to defend ourselves and our allies from the growing threat posed by the North Korean regime.” It added that Trump “emphasized the need for China to use all available levers to convince North Korea to end its provocations and return to the path of denuclearization.” (Sarah Kim, “Trump Asks China to Cut All Oil to North,” JoongAng Ilbo, December 1, 2017)
11/30/17:
During a brief press availability at the Pentagon with Libyan Prime Minister Fayez Serraj, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis was asked whether the launch meant that a diplomatic approach with North Korea just hasn’t worked. “I am not willing to say that diplomacy has not worked,” Mattis said. “We will continue to work diplomatically, we will continue to work through the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council and we will be unrelenting in that.” “At the same time, our diplomats will speak from a position of strength because we do have military options.” (Tara Kopp, “Mattis: Diplomacy Hasn’t Failed with North Korea,” Army Times, November 30, 2017)
12/2/17:
White House national security adviser H.R. McMaster said that North Korea represents “the greatest immediate threat to the United States” and that the potential for war with the communist nation is growing each day. “I think it’s increasing every day, which means that we are in a race, really, we are in a race to be able to solve this problem,” McMaster told an audience at the Reagan National Defense Forum in Simi Valley, California when asked if North Korea’s launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile November 29 had increased the chance of war. President Donald Trump remains committed to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, McMaster said, adding that there are nonmilitary ways to deal with the issue, such as calling on China to impose greater economic sanctions against Pyongyang. McMaster noted that Beijing’s “tremendous coercive economic power” over North Korea. “There are ways to address this problem short of armed conflict, but it is a race because he’s getting closer and closer, and there’s not much time left,” McMaster said, referring to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. With every missile launch or nuclear test, Kim has improved his country’s capabilities, McMaster said. “We’re asking China not to do us or anybody else a favor,” he said. “We’re asking China to act in China’s interest, as they should, and we believe increasingly that it’s in China’s urgent interest to do more.” China should take unilateral action to cut off North Korean oil imports, McMaster said, adding, “you can’t shoot a missile without fuel.” He said that both he and Trump felt that a 100% oil embargo would “be appropriate at this point.” But the national security adviser said Kim was extremely unlikely to change his behavior “without some significant new actions in the form of much more severe sanctions” and “complete enforcement of the sanctions that are in place.” On military options, McMaster acknowledged that given North Korea’s fielding of conventional artillery and rockets aimed at Seoul, South Korea, “there’s no military course of action that comes without risk.” But he said that Pyongyang’s actions had made America’s alliances with Japan and South Korea “stronger than ever.” (Ryan Browne and Barbara Starr, “McMaster: Potential for War with North Korea ‘Increasing Every Day,’” CNN, December 2, 2017)
12/3/17:
On December 3, after another North Korean ICBM test, Sen. Lindsay Graham advocated removing U.S. troops’ families from South Korea in an interview. The book says that, the following day, McMaster was informed that Ri Su-yong, a vice chairman of the North’s ruling Workers’ Party Central Committee and director of the committee’s International Affairs Department, told intermediaries “that the North would take the evacuation of U.S. civilians as a sign of imminent attack.” Hence, withdrawing the dependents of American troops should be “one of the last cards to play,” and the possible tweets were described by Woodward as having “scared the daylights out of the Pentagon leadership,” Defense Secretary James Mattis and Dunford. Graham, in a change of heart, was said to have advised Trump in a phone call in January that a decision to withdraw U.S. troops’ families is “hard to go back” on, and that it would “rock the South Korean stock market and the Japanese economy.” When asked by Trump if he should delay such an evacuation, Graham, who has been a hard-liner on the North, was quoted as telling him, “I don’t think you should ever start this process unless you’re ready to go to war.” (Sarah Kim, “’Fear’ Shows How Close Korea Came to War,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 14, 2018)
12/4/17:
South Korea and the United States kicked off a major air force exercise against North Korea’s threats, with two dozen U.S. stealth jets mobilized. The five-day Vigilant annual air combat exercise (ACE) comes less than a week after the North fired a new intercontinental ballistic was scheduled before the provocation. It’s known as the largest-ever combined air force drill between the allies, involving more than 230 warplanes and around 12,000 personnel. They include six F-22 Raptors and six F-35As, which have been deployed temporarily to Korea for the practice. It marks the first time that six Raptors, not just a few, have joined an exercise simultaneously in Korea. A dozen F-35Bs operated by the U.S. Marine Corps will take part in the training, flying from their base in Japan. Other assets include two B-1B Lancer bombers, six EA-18G Growler electronic warfare jets, and dozens of F-15C and F-16 fighter jets. The two sides plan to fly the aircraft at eight South Korean and U.S. military installations, according to the U.S. Seventh Air Force. “This exercise is comparable in size to previous Vigilant ACE exercises,” while the fifth-generation stealth jets are new to the training, the Seventh Air Force said in a press release. Including the newest fighter jet in the inventory in exercises like this allows the military to learn more about the F-35s capabilities and how best to utilize them and integrate them with other platforms, it added. It’s unusual for the U.S. to reveal the size of its participating forces in the training and other details. “The realistic air combat exercise is designed to enhance interoperability between the U.S. and Republic of Korea and increase the combat effectiveness of both nations,” the unit said. South Korea has fielded F-15K, KF-16, FA-50 and F-5 fighters, as well as other planes. “It’s aimed at enhancing the all-weather, day and night combined air power operation capabilities of South Korea and the U.S.,” the defense ministry said. The allies will conduct the drills under various wartime scenarios, including simulated precision strikes on mock North Korean nuclear and missile targets, it said. It remains unclear whether some of the U.S. fighter jets from outside Korea will remain here after the training. The South Korean government has requested the U.S. to expand the rotational deployment of its high-profile defense assets to and around its territory. “Such a drill is a dangerous provocation as it is driving the tension on the Korean peninsula to the brink of a nuclear war,” Rodong Sinmun argued in a commentary. “The U.S. and the South Korean puppet forces are so foolish as to run amok with such stealth fighters.” The North’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country, an organization handling Pyongyang’s relations with Seoul, also issued a strongly worded war threat. “The U.S. and south Korean puppet military warmongers should bear in mind that their escalating provocation and adding to crimes will only invite more terrible retaliation and precipitate their self-destruction,” it said in a statement. (Lee Chi-dong, “S. Korea, U.S. Begin Massive Air Combat Drills,” December 4, 2017)
In “Fear,” Woodward reports National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster “received a warning at the White House. Ri Su-yong, the vice chairman of the Politburo, had told intermediaries ‘that the North would take the evacuation of U.S. civilians as a sign of imminent attack.’” (Glyn Ford, “Bob Woodward’s ‘Rage’ Reveals More about Trump Than North Korea,” NKNews, October 29, 2020)
12/5/17:
United Nations political affairs chief Jeffrey Feltman arrived in North Korea for a rare visit that some analysts and diplomats hope could spark a U.N.-led effort to defuse rising tensions over Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs. The former senior U.S. State Department official is the highest-level U.N. official to visit North Korea since 2012. During a four-day visit he is due to meet Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho to discuss “issues of mutual interest and concern.” “This is broadly a policy dialogue with the DPRK. I think we have to wait and see what comes out,” U.N. spokesman Stephane Dujarric told reporters. “All key member states … were informed and briefed of the visit.” U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres told Russia, Japan, the United States, China and North and South Korea in August he was available to help broker talks. So-called six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program stalled in 2008. A U.N. official described expectations for Feltman’s visit as “modest and high at the same time, meaning that they depend on what our hosts are thinking as well.” “We need to find a way to scale back tensions,” the official said. “I don’t think we will have a major breakthrough being announced at the end of this trip. But the visit could serve as a step to build a framework for engagement.” Suzanne DiMaggio of the New America Foundation think tank, a participant in recent unofficial talks with North Korea, said Feltman could propose during his visit to Pyongyang that Guterres play a mediation role. “I do think that the Trump administration would like to explore talks about talks at this stage. I think the North Koreans are assessing the timing of when to do that,” she told a seminar in Washington on North Korea. State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert said Feltman was not traveling on behalf of the U.S. government. “And he’s not traveling – I want to make this clear – with any kind of message from the U.S. government … He’s going on behalf of the U.N., not the U.S. government,” she told a regular news briefing. Nauert said Washington remained open to talks if North Korea showed it was serious about giving up its nuclear weapons, but added: “The activities they have been engaged in recently have shown that they are not interested, they are not serious about sitting down and having conversations.” (Michelle Nichols and David Brunnstrom, “UN Official’s Visit to North Korea Sparks Hope of Mediation Role,” Reuters, December 5, 2017) Ignatius: “A senior U.N. envoy who visited Pyongyang this month carrying a pressing appeal for diplomacy was told by his North Korean hosts that it was “too early” for steps that might ease the confrontation over their nuclear program. “There was no sense of urgency” among North Korean officials, said one source familiar with the December 5 to 9 journey by Jeffrey Feltman, the U.N. undersecretary for political affairs and a former senior U.S. diplomat. His trip, which has received relatively little attention, was the first to Pyongyang by a high-level U.N. official in six years. The North Korean reluctance to enter talks now puts it on a potential collision course with the United States. … North Korea’s seeming disinterest in any early negotiations was “convincing diplomatic theater, if it was theater,” said one analyst. Feltman made three requests of the North Koreans during his 15½ hours of talks, sources said. He proposed that they reopen military-to-military channels that were cut in 2009, so that the risk of accidental war might be reduced; he urged them to signal that they were ready to engage the United States in talks, following their November 29 proclamation that North Korea had completed its “state nuclear force”; and he asked them to implement Security Council resolutions condemning their weapons programs. To dramatize his message about the risk of unintended conflict, Feltman gave North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho a copy of historian Christopher Clark’s study, “The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914.” Ri was the most senior North Korean official Feltman met. Feltman was carrying a letter from U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, arguing that Pyongyang’s attempt to gain nuclear deterrence could produce the very conflict that it seeks to avoid. Feltman’s message was reviewed before the trip by the United States, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia, the nations that joined in the “Six-Party Talks” with North Korea from 2003 to 2009 that sought unsuccessfully to halt its nuclear program. Analysts interpreted the North Korean response as an indication that Pyongyang plans more missile and nuclear tests to convincingly demonstrate its ability to strike the U.S. mainland with a nuclear-tipped missile. “They don’t feel they are quite there yet,” said one source. Such additional North Korean weapons tests might trigger a U.S. response. The North Koreans engaged in spirited exchanges with Feltman, posing many questions about U.S. decision-making, the sources said. But they were elusive when asked to explain how they wanted the United States to change its “hostile” policy toward the regime, and what they meant in the November 29 announcement that North Korea had completed its state nuclear force. The North Koreans evidently want to bargain, but from a position of maximum strength. They agreed, for example, that a restoration of military-to-military contacts would at some point be necessary, but not yet. They also agreed that denuclearization is the ultimate long-term goal for Korea, but not yet. And they expressed interest in a follow-up meeting, though nothing specific is planned. One perversely encouraging sign is that after Feltman urged the North Koreans to engage the Security Council more closely, U.N. ambassador Ja Song Nam attended a Council discussion Friday with Guterres and senior diplomats focusing on the danger of accidental war on the Korean Peninsula. …The sleepwalkers of 2017 should consider: On the brink of conflict, you never know just where the edge of the cliff may be. (David Ignatius, “Sleepwalkers in North Korea,” Washington Post, December 20, 2017, p. A-16)
12/5/17:
Ignatius: “A senior U.N. envoy who visited Pyongyang this month carrying a pressing appeal for diplomacy was told by his North Korean hosts that it was “too early” for steps that might ease the confrontation over their nuclear program. “There was no sense of urgency” among North Korean officials, said one source familiar with the December 5 to 9 journey by Jeffrey Feltman, the U.N. undersecretary for political affairs and a former senior U.S. diplomat. His trip, which has received relatively little attention, was the first to Pyongyang by a high-level U.N. official in six years. The North Korean reluctance to enter talks now puts it on a potential collision course with the United States. … North Korea’s seeming disinterest in any early negotiations was “convincing diplomatic theater, if it was theater,” said one analyst. Feltman made three requests of the North Koreans during his 15½ hours of talks, sources said. He proposed that they reopen military-to-military channels that were cut in 2009, so that the risk of accidental war might be reduced; he urged them to signal that they were ready to engage the United States in talks, following their November 29 proclamation that North Korea had completed its “state nuclear force”; and he asked them to implement Security Council resolutions condemning their weapons programs. To dramatize his message about the risk of unintended conflict, Feltman gave North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho a copy of historian Christopher Clark’s study, “The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914.” Ri was the most senior North Korean official Feltman met. Feltman was carrying a letter from U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, arguing that Pyongyang’s attempt to gain nuclear deterrence could produce the very conflict that it seeks to avoid. Feltman’s message was reviewed before the trip by the United States, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia, the nations that joined in the “Six-Party Talks” with North Korea from 2003 to 2009 that sought unsuccessfully to halt its nuclear program. Analysts interpreted the North Korean response as an indication that Pyongyang plans more missile and nuclear tests to convincingly demonstrate its ability to strike the U.S. mainland with a nuclear-tipped missile. “They don’t feel they are quite there yet,” said one source. Such additional North Korean weapons tests might trigger a U.S. response. The North Koreans engaged in spirited exchanges with Feltman, posing many questions about U.S. decision-making, the sources said. But they were elusive when asked to explain how they wanted the United States to change its “hostile” policy toward the regime, and what they meant in the November 29 announcement that North Korea had completed its state nuclear force. The North Koreans evidently want to bargain, but from a position of maximum strength. They agreed, for example, that a restoration of military-to-military contacts would at some point be necessary, but not yet. They also agreed that denuclearization is the ultimate long-term goal for Korea, but not yet. And they expressed interest in a follow-up meeting, though nothing specific is planned. One perversely encouraging sign is that after Feltman urged the North Koreans to engage the Security Council more closely, U.N. ambassador Ja Song Nam attended a Council discussion Friday with Guterres and senior diplomats focusing on the danger of accidental war on the Korean Peninsula. …The sleepwalkers of 2017 should consider: On the brink of conflict, you never know just where the edge of the cliff may be. (David Ignatius, “Sleepwalkers in North Korea,” Washington Post, December 20, 2017, p. A-16)
Mattis: “Q: Let me ask you about Korea again. As we were in the Middle East, H.R. McMasters said at the Reagan Forum in California that “every day we move closer to war.” Senator Lindsey Graham said, “Now is the time for the United States to start flying out non-combatant U.S. citizens from Korea.” MATTIS: Who said that? Q: Senator Lindsey Graham has advocated evacuating non-combatants from South Korea. I need to get your reaction to those two remarks. Do you feel that every day we’re moving closer to war on the Korean Peninsula if we don’t resolve the nuclear issue? MATTIS: Tony, without trying to dissemble, okay, I don’t comment on — because every day someone is saying something. And I see myself and the Department of Defense in a position to defend America, to allow people to have freedom of speech. There needs to be in a democracy robust discussions, and if at certain seminars, conferences, on Capitol Hill, news conferences people say things, — basically, I can be reacting or responding to those, rather than remaining focused on the issues. And you know where I stand on this as we try to resolve this with diplomatic means. You’ve seen me full heart — full effort in the United Nations in New York, led by Ambassador Haley. You’ve seen Secretary Tillerson making this his number one priority. The Canadian foreign minister and Secretary Tillerson recently came out and said they’re pulling the sending states together — these are the states that sent troops to Korea in 1950 under the U.N. mandate — plus ROK, Republic of Korea and Japan, in British Columbia. But it’s under the foreign minister’s authority, not the defense minister, not the secretaries of defense. So, I think right now there are some issues that I know it’s frustrating for you all. But if they are not handled in private, political maneuver room can be reduced. In other words, even by going into some of this in the open, we can reduce other nations’ ability to look like they’re acting on their own rather than to something. So at times, as frustrating as it is, I don’t want to engage publicly on it. I’m just trying to give you some of the why I won’t. Because if I do that, I actually work against sometimes the very end. I don’t control — once those words are out there. I think it was Lee Kuan Yew who said, Words are very precious things. Once they’re let out, they can never be recalled. So in this question, I don’t want to have to try to recall words, because it’s a dynamic situation. But it remains diplomatically led right now, even as we exercise in order to keep the military options available.” (DoD, Media Availability by Secretary Mattis En Route to U.S., December 5, 2017)
The United States currently has no plan to move military dependents out of South Korea despite rising tensions with North Korea, the Pentagon said. “The Department of Defense currently has no intent to initiate departures for military dependents, whether on a voluntary or mandatory basis, and no intent to modify the policy authorizing military dependents to accompany military members being stationed in South Korea,” Lt. Col. Chris Logan, a Pentagon spokesman, said in emailed remarks to Yonhap. Commenting on North Korea’s latest launch of a long-range missile, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) argued two days ago that the US should stop sending military dependents to South Korea and transfer those that are already there. The senator had told CBS that South Korea should be an unaccompanied tour. “It’s crazy to send spouses and children to South Korea, given the provocation of North Korea,” he said. (Yonhap, “U.S. Has No Plans to Move Military Dependents out of Korea: Pentagon,” Korea Herald, December 6, 2017)
Japan put a damper on plans for a multilateral meeting this month on North Korea proposed by the United States and Canada, in a rare split from its defense ally. Speaking after a Cabinet meeting, Foreign Minister Kono Taro indicated that the talks, to be hosted by Canada, will not take place this year. A Japanese government source said Canada invited the members of the United Nations Command and others to meet in Vancouver later this month to discuss North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile development, but Japan expressed reluctance due to the potential for dialogue to be valued over pressure in dealing with Pyongyang. Japan received a reply from Canada that it would rearrange the talks, the source said. The United Nations Command was set up in the Korean War as a U.S.-led coalition of the countries that sent troops to support South Korea. While the Japanese government’s move is broadly in line with its “pressure, not dialogue” stance on North Korea, it also comes amid speculation that U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who would co-chair the talks, may not have long left in his post. Canadian Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland and Tillerson announced the talks in November 28 press statements following North Korea’s latest ballistic missile test. Kono said he had explained to the Canadian side that the meeting as originally scheduled would clash with the U.N. Security Council’s schedule. He is expected to chair a ministerial-level Security Council meeting on North Korea in New York on December 15. Kono also said he told Canadian officials that “they should narrow down the participating countries a little more,” citing the distance between some of the “sending states” and the current situation on the Korean Peninsula. A senior Foreign Ministry official expressed displeasure with the idea of the meeting itself, saying it would “be out of step with Japan’s direction.” Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his administration have long pushed for the international community to increase diplomatic and economic pressure on North Korea and put aside any possibility of direct dialogue until the North makes clear it will give up its nuclear program. (Kyodo, “Japan Throws Cold Water on U.S.-Led Dialogue on N. Korea,” December 5, 2017)
William Perry, former U.S. defense secretary, expressed skepticism toward the options of nuclear deployment or armament in South Korea and Japan as a deterrent against North Korea’s growing threat. “I do not think it is either desirable or necessary to deploy (U.S.) nuclear weapons again in South Korea or in Japan,” he told the Arms Control Association. “I do think, however, it is preferable to those countries getting an independent nuclear force.” Perry said the U.S. should first provide “solid reassurance” to both allies that its commitment to extended deterrence is “real and will be honored.” “If we can do that, then over time we will work with North Korea to stop them from getting a nuclear arsenal,” he said. “I don’t see that happening today. I think we have to stabilize the situation with our allies first.” Talks with Pyongyang are still useful, Perry said, but only with lowered expectations. North Korea cannot be expected to give up its nuclear arsenal readily, although it might happen over time, so talks should aim to lower the risk of an accidental war, according to the former secretary. The U.S. should initially propose a freeze on nuclear and missile testing in exchange for economic and security assurances, such as building on the now-shuttered inter-Korean industrial park in North Korea’s border city of Kaesong, he added. (Yonhap, “Ex-U.S. Defense Secretary against Nuclear Options to Defend S. Korea, Japan,” December 5, 2017)
U.S. intelligence and military officials believe Kim Jong Un is a rational actor, a conclusion that for now is guiding Washington’s approach to the North Korean leader as he risks economic sanctions and military reprisals to build nuclear weapons and threaten rivals. The assessment by the main components of the U.S. national security community has shaped their thinking toward North Korea in two major ways, U.S. officials said. It means they believe that Kim understands that any attack on the U.S. or its allies threatens the security of his country and his grip on power. And it means that they believe there is potential to alter his behavior through diplomacy to lower the threat of war. U.S. officials are also calculating that Kim’s ability to act rationally is compromised. “We in the intelligence community…have said that Kim Jong Un is rational, but it is also the case today that we don’t think he has an understanding about how tenuous his position is—domestically and internationally,” Central Intelligence Agency Director Mike Pompeo said in an address at a security forum in California on December 2. U.S. military and intelligence officials, detailing the U.S. assessment in interviews, said that conclusion doesn’t mean Kim isn’t brutal or provocative, and they consider him to be immature and brash. But the finding means the U.S. sees someone who is methodical and driven by a desire for world recognition, securing his family’s dynasty and developing his nation economically. “Rational actors have clear goals and know how they want to get there based on reality,” a senior U.S. intelligence official explained. “He hasn’t demonstrated anything that would make one reconsider his rationality.” Had the U.S. feared an irrational actor, U.S. officials would likely have gone beyond threats of military action and undertaken a massive and sustained U.S. military buildup around the peninsula in anticipation of unexpected actions by North Korea, two U.S. officials said. Pompeo and White House national security adviser Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster said over the weekend, at the Reagan National Defense Forum, that current U.S. efforts rely on economic and diplomatic measures, including appealing to China—steps that are possible only because the U.S. believes that Kim is rational, two U.S. military officials said. “The fact that we are leaning on China says that we think he is someone who can be bartered with. If we had no faith in that, why would we bother to ask China to do more?” said a former administration official. “We may have even done something pre-emptively by now.” A driving factor behind the U.S. assessment is that each time North Korea could have behaved in dangerous ways regarding its nuclear weapons, Kim hasn’t taken that risk. While angry exchanges of tweets and statements by President Donald Trump and North Korea this year appeared to portend an imminent threat, national security experts said the uptick in rhetoric didn’t appear to change Kim’s calculations or behavior. “Rhetorically, they have ratcheted it up a notch,” the senior U.S. intelligence official said. “But the focus on capability has not changed.” Intelligence officials said they first assessed that Kim was a rational actor after a 2012 launch was met by sanctions and international condemnation. For months afterward, Kim heightened his rhetoric against the U.S., at one point saying it was the target of his program. But by April, he stopped. “He learned something. He fanned the flames, but didn’t take it further,” the intelligence official said. More recently, during Trump’s visit to China in November and the meeting of China’s Party Congress a month earlier, North Korea didn’t conduct any weapons tests, its longest lull of the year. A test in October would have risked embarrassing an important ally, with Chinese President Xi Jinping seeking to shore up his political standing at home, some U.S. officials concluded. During Trump’s Asia visit, there were three U.S. carrier strike groups conducting exercises in the region. U.S. military officials have said that Kim’s decision to not conduct a test in the midst of an extensive U.S. military presence was, for them, a rational act. “He could have conducted [the latest] test sooner, but he waited until it was best for him to do,” one U.S. military official explained. “He was not going to risk a test during the [U.S. presidential] visit.” While U.S. officials believe he is rational, that doesn’t mean they believe that acquiring nuclear weapons is the best means for Kim to achieve his goals. “Just because he is rational does not mean he is right,” the former administration official said. “To some, testing nuclear weapons while your people are starving is not rational,” the senior U.S. intelligence official said. “But when you believe those weapons are critical to your survival, it is not so irrational.” Among other signs of rationality, U.S. military officials noted that there is no indication of a North Korean military buildup. There is no movement of troops or provocative acts toward U.S. Navy ships or aircraft in the region, a sign, they said, that Kim isn’t seeking to engage in impetuous, ill-advised military actions. The U.S. still has gaps in its understanding of North Korea; U.S. officials concede, for example, that they don’t understand Kim’s command and control structure. South Korean officials have arrived at similar conclusions about Kim. A former top South Korean government official who took part in talks with senior aides to Kim in 2014 and 2015 said the approach to negotiations by North Korea under Kim was rational and well-thought out. Aides frequently took breaks to relay meeting updates to the Pyongyang leadership, and key decisions were almost certainly made by Kim, the former official said. During talks in 2015 over an armed standoff, North Korea initially refused to discuss the precipitating incident, a land mine explosion at their shared border that maimed two South Korean soldiers. Under pressure from South Korea to apologize, the North Koreans switched tactics and agreed to express regret and defuse the crisis, the former top official said. “Kim Jong Un’s leadership is better than we had expected,” he said. While some U.S. officials are worried about Kim isolating himself from valuable information, Melissa Hanham, senior research associate at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey, noted that his father and grandfather operated in much the same way and that he is believed to benefit from advice from his sister. “I don’t know he is more isolated than his father,” Ms. Hanham said. (Nancy A. Youssef, “Why the U.S. Considers North Korea’s Kim a ‘Rational Actor,’” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2017)
12/6/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesperson’s answer to a question raised by KCNA “as regards the fact that high-level politicians of the U.S. are now constantly making reckless remarks about our country: Recently, as the U.S. is conducting the largest-ever joint aerial drill on the Korean peninsula targeting the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), its high-level politicians are showing alarming signs by making bellicose remarks one after another. The national security advisor of the White House and a Republican senator said that “the chances of war with north Korea” are increasing every day, a “preemptive war” with north Korea is becoming more likely, the families and dependents of the U.S. troops should be moved out of south Korea. These confrontational warmongering remarks cannot be interpreted in any other way but as a warning to us to be prepared for a war on the Korean peninsula. Worse still, the CIA director has made a provocation against us by impudently criticizing our supreme leadership which is the heart of our people. This is the revelation of the U.S. cunning and heinous intention which is to instigate our strong countermeasures and use them to ignite the fuse for a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula. The large-scale nuclear war exercises conducted by the U.S. in succession are creating touch-and-go situation on the Korean peninsula and series of violent war remarks coming from the U.S. high-level politicians amid such circumstances have made an outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula an established fact. The remaining question now is: when will the war break out. The careless remarks of war by the inner circle of Trump and the reckless military moves by the U.S. substantiate that the current U.S. administration has made a decision to provoke a war on the Korean peninsula and is taking a step-by-step approach to get there. The world should not harbor any prejudice in discerning who the main culprit behind the tense situation on the Korean peninsula is and who the violator of world peace and stability is. The U.S. is going frantic in advertising the nuclear war on the Korean peninsula every day and this invites our due vigilance. We do not wish for a war but shall not hide from it, and should the U.S. miscalculate our patience and light the fuse for a nuclear war, we will surely make the U.S. dearly pay the consequences with our mighty nuclear force which we have consistently strengthened. If the U.S. does not want to be burnt to death by the fire it ignites, it would better behave with prudence and caution.” (KCNA, “DPRK FM Spokesman Blasts American High-Level Politicians for Making Reckless Remarks about DPRK,” December 6, 2017)
South Korea and the US stressed that now is not the time for talks with North Korea over its nuclear and missile program, as a US B-1B Lancer bomber flew over the Korean Peninsula for a joint aerial drill with the South Korean military. While seeking to resolve the nuclear standoff with “diplomatic and peaceful means,” the two countries will place their emphasis more on maximizing sanctions and pressure against the reclusive regime, the two countries’ government said. “While we still want to see a peaceful, diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear and missile threat, now is clearly not the time for talks,” Katina Adams, US State Department spokeswoman, said in an interview with Voice of America. “We must remain focused on increasing the costs for Pyongyang to continue to advance its WMD (weapons of mass destruction) programs. … We remain fully committed to the defense of our allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan, using the full range of our conventional and nuclear capabilities.” South Korea’s Unification Ministry Spokesperson Baek Tae-hyun echoed the notion, saying the ministry would focus on implementing sanctions and pressure against North Korea and work with the international community to bring them back to the negotiating table. (Yeo Jun-suk, “S. Korea and U.S. Says Now Not Time for Talks with North Korea,” Korea Herald, December 6, 2017)
12/7/17:
John Bolton meets with President Trump in the Oval Office: “I explained why and how a preemptive strike against North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programs would work; how we could use massive conventional bombs against Pyongyang’s artillery north of the DMZ, which threatened Seoul, thereby reducing casualties dramatically; and why the United States was rapidly approaching a binary choice, assuming China didn’t act dramatically, of either leaving the North with nuclear weapons or using military force. The only other alternatives were seeking reunification of the Peninsula under South Korea or regime change in the North, both of which required cooperation with China, which we had not even begun to broach with them. Trump asked, ‘What do you think the chances of war are with North Korea? Fifty-fifty?’ I said I thought it all depended on China, but probably fifty-fifty. Trump turned to Kelly and said, ‘He agrees with you.’” (John Bolton, The Room Where It Happened (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020), pp. 26-27)
Joseph Yun, the senior US representative for North Korea Policy, said a “60-day plan” for dialogue with Pyongyang is still valid. The message comes amid a mixture of hardline and more moderate positions on Pyongyang within the Trump administration since North Korea’s ICBM test launch on November 29. Speaking to foreign correspondents at an end-of-year gathering jointly organized in Washington by the Korea Foundation and George Washington University Institute for Korean Studies, Yun said Washington could attempt dialogue if 60 days pass without nuclear and missile provocations after a message from Pyongyang that it intends to stop. The 60-day plan, also known as the “Tillerson plan,” is an exit strategy for dialogue developed with the support of both Yun and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. “Regarding 60 days or any number of days…Secretary Tillerson has made it clear that a good first step for North Korea would be to stop testing nuclear devices and missiles. And then we are open to holding a dialogue,” Yun said during the lecture. “When you stop testing, for example, you really ought to tell us you are stopping testing because you want a dialogue… It’s very important to state your intentions,” Yun emphasized. “So far, I can report no real progress on diplomatic engagement. So really… there is no choice but continued pressure policies.” But State Department Spokesperson Heather Nauert expressed a somewhat different perspective during the daily press briefing today. When asked about remarks by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that North Korea wants direct talks with the US about its security, Nauert said, “As a general matter the issue of direct talks with North Korea is not on the table until they are willing to denuclearize.” (Yi Yong-in, “U.S. Special Representative for NK Policy: 60-day Plan for Dialogue Remains on the Table,” Hankyore, December 9, 2017)
More than 40 warships from China’s navy took part in a major exercise in the East China Sea, just days after reports that the country’s air force had carried out similar high-level drills, and as tensions remain high over the North Korean nuclear crisis.
The vessels, from the North Sea, East Sea and South Sea fleets, demonstrated the navy’s growing anti-missile and emergency response capabilities in “all-weather conditions”, according to a report published on its website. Military experts said the air- and seaborne exercises were evidence that all divisions of the People’s Liberation Army were boosting their combat readiness. On December 4, air force spokesman Shen Jinke announced that Chinese aircraft recently conducted drills over the Yellow and East China seas near the Korean peninsula using “routes and areas it has never flown before.” Shen did not say exactly when the drills took place, though the timing of the announcement coincided with the start of a five-day exercise by U.S. and South Korean forces. China’s navy said that today’s drill was conducted as “an assessment competition” simulating “real warfare” and was designed to test the performance and interception capabilities of its guided-missile frigates. During the exercise, warships were required to deal with repeated “multi-target missile attacks” at “extremely low altitude”, the website report said. The accompanying photographs showed a Type-056 Huaian frigate firing a rocket to take down a missile launched by a “rival” Type-052D Putian warship. Type 054 Changzhou frigates were also involved in the drill. Song Zhongping, a retired instructor at the PLA’s Second Artillery Corps – the predecessor to the current Rocket Force – said the exercise showed that China was determined to boost its anti-missile capabilities, both on land and at sea. “The United States’ missile systems are mostly sea-based, which has been central to its ability to expand its influence overseas,” he said. China was keen to test its naval missile defense capabilities as the North Korean nuclear crisis had highlighted the limitations of its land-based defense systems, Song said. In September, South Korea deployed the United States’ THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) anti-missile system. The PLA expressed its concern at the time, saying it moved the US, South Korea and Japan one step closer to creating a “mini Asian version of Nato” to counter China in the region. “The North Korea nuclear crisis has resulted in several [of China’s] neighboring countries, including North and South Korea, and Japan having guided missiles … In other words, whoever owns nuclear weapons is a security threat to China,” Song said. “In the interests of combat readiness, it is necessary for China to conduct more anti-missile drills on land, air and sea in all-weather conditions.” Hong Kong-based military expert Liang Guoliang said the images posted on the navy’s website showed warships testing the PLA’s advanced HHQ-10 anti-missile system, which was on a par with the United States’ Rolling Airframe Missile system. In staging its latest naval and air force drills China was sending a clear signal to the US, South Korea and Japan, which have been conducting joint exercises in the region for several months, he said. “There is a clear political message Beijing wants to deliver to the U.S., South Korea and Japan that the PLA’s training will continue as long as those three continue their joint drills in the region,” he said. (South China Morning Post, “China Puts on Show of Strength for North Korea … and United States’ East Asia Alliance,” December 8, 2017)
Roberta Cohen: “As the UN Security Council prepares to meet next week to draw the connection between the North Korea’s human rights practices and international peace and security, it is pertinent to review the latest report of the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in the DPRK. Appointed in 2016, Special Rapporteur Tomás Ojea Quintana of Argentina offers something for everyone, in particular the supporters of engagement with the DPRK. He gives special emphasis to issues that might resonate positively with the North Korean government and expresses confidence in the North’s ability to cooperate with the UN if access to and engagement with the government are pursued. At the same time, he acknowledges that human rights pressure has had impact on North Korea and his report does not shy away from addressing human rights issues objectionable to the regime. He seeks a greater balance between calls for accountability and efforts to engage. The pursuit of both, he believes, can lead to changes on the ground. Whether this new approach will achieve what his two predecessors and the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) did not—a visit to the country or a meaningful dialogue—remains to be seen. By opening his report with the statement that “patterns of human rights violations” continue to be documented in North Korea, Mr. Ojea Quintana offers a lower-key description than that put forward in earlier Special Rapporteur reports and in the COI report, which found crimes against humanity and called for referral of the case to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The language mirrors that of the new UN Secretary-General António Guterres, who in reporting to the General Assembly, described “persisting patterns of serious human rights violations,” in sharp contrast to former Justice Michael Kirby, chair of the COI, who termed this characterization “a serious understatement.” Justice Kirby stated: “As the UN’s COI report made clear, North Korea is not simply another country causing ‘serious human rights violations.’ The COI found that it is guilty of ‘crimes against humanity’…. Such crimes demand immediate accountability.” Although the Special Rapporteur says he will “closely attend” to implementing the accountability recommendations of the Human Rights Council and Group of Independent Experts, the overall descriptive language used throughout of “violations” falls short of what would be required to hold perpetrators accountable in an international court focused on war crimes and crimes against humanity. That the Special Rapporteur seeks to be responsive to the DPRK is also evident in the emphasis he gives to the “unintended negative impact” of sanctions on the North Korean people. He warns that economic sanctions approved by the UN Security Council could affect the welfare of the population and becomes the first Rapporteur to call for a “full assessment” of the impact of sanctions. In particular, he highlights the possible “detrimental impact” of “export bans” on vital sectors (e.g. coal, iron, seafood, textiles) and on “ordinary” North Koreans. (His position on this contrasts with that taken by the General Assembly, which in its November 14 resolution condemned the North Korean government for setting aside the welfare of its people by “diverting its resources” to its nuclear program.) To address the chronic malnutrition of nearly a quarter of the population, Mr. Ojea Quintana appeals for increased international humanitarian aid to North Korea, noting that sanctions could interfere with the timely delivery of aid, but also calls on North Korea to make food security a priority and to “carefully balance out subsistence needs with defense and security expenditures.” On the political side, the Special Rapporteur addresses the impact of the rise in tensions between the DPRK and the United States on ordinary people’s lives, and appeals for a reduction of “conflict rhetoric” and “incitement to armed confrontation.” He endorses “dialogue” with the DPRK, with human rights high on the agenda, and strongly supports rapprochement between North and South Korea, as proposed by the Moon Jae-in administration. When the UN in 2004 created the position of UN Special Rapporteur “to investigate and report” on the human rights situation, North Korea made clear that it would not allow the Rapporteur to visit because it considered the appointment “a political plot” intended to “change the ideology and system of our country.” In 2014, it changed course and invited then Special Rapporteur Marzuki Darusman for a visit in exchange for the deletion of paragraphs on crimes against humanity and the ICC from the General Assembly resolution. When the paragraphs remained, the DPRK withdrew its invitation. In the case of Mr. Ojea Quintana, North Korean diplomats suggested that he undertake “a private visit” to the DPRK in his capacity as a law professor. But when he “signaled his availability,” he was told he would not be welcome as long as he remained Special Rapporteur. Nevertheless, the Special Rapporteur expresses his intention to continue informally to discuss with North Korea an official visit, or as a “starting point,” “a dialogue,” and he calls upon the DPRK to invite him “in the near future.” He also explores alternative routes in his report, citing, for example, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities who paid the first visit of any thematic rapporteur to the DPRK in 2017. Although some in the human rights field questioned her decision to go when the country rapporteur was denied entry, Mr. Ojea Quintana considers the visit progress on the road to opening up North Korea. He would like to see other thematic rapporteurs visit as well as representatives of UN treaty bodies as part of their review of North Korea’s compliance with human rights agreements to which it has acceded. Such visits and interactions, he believes, can lead to legal and policy changes. In a nod to proponents of accountability, Mr. Ojea Quintana credits international human rights pressure, in particular the COI, with a number of “positive” steps taken by North Korea to engage with UN human rights mechanisms: 1) the visit of the disability rapporteur; 2) the submission of reports on women’s and children’s rights to the UN treaty bodies; and 3) the acceptance of more than 100 recommendations made to the DPRK by UN member states at the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). He also links UN efforts at accountability to “unconfirmed” reports of improvements in detention facilities and predicts that further measures, such as the recruitment of international criminal law experts by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Seoul, could have a deterrent effect as well. Although the extent to which all these steps will lead to genuine reform can be questioned, they do show that North Korea is sensitive to human rights criticism and considers it useful to engage with at least some parts of the UN human rights system. The Special Rapporteur regards such “openings” as “opportunities” for engagement and improving conditions on the ground. In addition to dealing with political prison camps, abductions, forced repatriations and restrictions on freedom of information, the report also introduces new issues, such as North Korea’s treatment of foreigners in detention, the need for humanitarian organizations to gain access to prisons, and the negative effect of corruption on human rights. Foreign Nationals in Detention After the Special Rapporteur criticized the treatment of Otto Warmbier, the detained American student brought back to the United States in a coma, North Korea denounced Mr. Ojea Quintana as “the model servant of the hostile forces.” His report nonetheless continues to remind the DPRK of its international legal obligations in the Warmbier case and toward nine other foreign nationals held in detention (three Americans and six South Koreans). It implies that although different international rules apply to them, their fate may be as precarious as North Koreans held in detention. A Role for Humanitarian Organizations Mr. Ojea Quintana breaks welcome new ground in calling for humanitarian agencies to take account of the food and medical deprivations of detained North Koreans, who number more than 100,000. Since the introduction of the UN’s Human Rights Up Front Approach (HRuF) in 2013, the entire UN system is expected to come together to address situations of serious human rights violations that can become atrocities. In the DPRK, however, the humanitarian agencies on the ground have been fearful of jeopardizing their programs. The Special Rapporteur encourages them to seek to reach all vulnerable groups with their aid, including “persons in detention.” Recalling Typhoon Lionrock (where the humanitarian organizations failed to request access), he warns that prisoners could be at risk in future natural disasters, and urges that “priority” be given to reaching them. He offers to work closely with the Country Team and Resident Coordinator and proposes discussions with the DPRK about access to the camps. Corruption The extensive use of bribes in North Korea to secure “access to public services” such as employment, medical care, travel and housing, is given attention in the report, as are bribes to avoid arrest. The rapid growth of markets, considered beneficial to the population, has at the same time increased corruption levels, with business people having to pay off government officials to operate. To address the “poorly structured economic, political and social institutions” at the root of this widespread practice, the Special Rapporteur proposes reforms and technical assistance but does not question whether the DPRK, as presently constituted, is capable of effectively transforming itself. While little optimism is generally to be found in reports about North Korea’s human rights record, Mr. Ojea Quintana sees the “possibility to achieve immediate, concrete changes on the ground” as a result of North Korea’s engagement with UN human rights mechanisms. Certainly, it is to be hoped that the lives of disabled persons will be improved by the visit of the disability rapporteur and that the outcome of North Korea’s exchange with the treaty bodies on children and women will lead to results, not to mention the hoped for implementation of the UPR recommendations. But given North Korea’s past practices, skepticism is warranted, underscoring the need for continued human rights pressure. Visits of additional thematic rapporteurs could be useful, but an agenda of the UN’s human rights priorities in North Korea should be developed. It would need to encompass not only those issues North Korea might be willing to talk about but those it excluded from consideration at the UPR, in particular the ones deemed to have crossed “the high threshold of crimes against humanity.” The Special Rapporteur is right when he describes “widespread fear among the population of political prison camps.” These deplorable facilities and other abhorrent human rights practices must remain center stage even while the Special Rapporteur seeks balance.” (Roberta Cohen, “A New UN Approach to Human Rights in North Korea: The 2017 Special Rapporteur’s Report,” 38North, December 7, 2017)
12/8/17:
Russia has accused the U.S. of thwarting a diplomatic initiative to defuse the North Korean missile crisis, underscoring the gap between Moscow’s and Washington’s assessment of the situation on the peninsula. Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, said that the U.S. had indicated to Moscow in September that no more US military exercises around the Korean peninsula were planned until the spring, a message the Russian government took as a signal that Washington was ready to “create the conditions for dialogue” with North Korea. “We passed that signal on to Pyongyang, and they didn’t say no, but promptly two days later unscheduled large-scale exercises were announced for October,” he said at a press conference in Vienna. “Russia condemns North Korea’s missile tests, but it seems that the US is trying to provoke more risky antics from them.” Lavrov’s outburst follows repeated efforts by Moscow to mediate between the US and North Korea. “We tried very hard to explain to our American partners that there was an opening after the missile and nuclear tests in September, when North Korea abstained from further tests for a relatively long period,” said a senior Russian foreign policy official. “But unfortunately the US government appears fixated on forcing North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.” Under a joint Russian-Chinese plan, Moscow proposes a “dual freeze”: North Korea should suspend missile and nuclear tests, while the U.S. and South Korea would put a moratorium on joint large-scale military drills. The communication from Washington alleged by Lavrov, that the US had no plans for exercises for several months, was interpreted in Moscow as a possible opening for such a deal. “We were further encouraged when Pyongyang began hinting that they might not need to further step up testing,” the Russian official said. Choe Son Hui, head of the America department at the North Korean foreign ministry, said at a non-proliferation conference in Moscow in October that the “final goal” of her country’s nuclear program was to create a balance of power that would ultimately deter the US from attacking North Korea. “Today we have almost reached a balance of power with the US,” she added. Her remarks were read by experts as a veiled offer to stop the spiral of escalation. Similar language has since reappeared in North Korea’s official statements. Moscow believes that tacit toleration of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is the only way to keep Pyongyang from developing its program further. “They observe that no nuclear power has ever been invaded, so they believe that they will be safe with the nuclear deterrent they are now getting ready. Such is their logic,” said Vladimir Sukhinin, former Russian ambassador to Pyongyang. Pointing to North Korea’s 2013 law on nuclear weapons, he said that Pyongyang, if given enough assurances that its own capabilities would not be touched, could be trusted to act just as responsibly as other nuclear powers. A delegation of Russian lawmakers to Pyongyang at the beginning of the month brought back the same message. “They believe they have achieved their goal and become a nuclear power, and now they are ready to negotiate with the US,” Vitaly Pashin, a member of the delegation, said on his return on December 1. Yesterday, Lavrov reiterated that message in talks with Secretary of State Tillerson. “We know that North Korea, above all else, wants to talk with the U.S. about guarantees of its security. We are ready to support that and facilitate such negotiations,” he said after the meeting. “Our American colleague has heard this.” Washington was quick to push back. State department spokeswoman Heather Nauert said that direct talks with North Korea were “not on the table until they are willing to denuclearize.” (Kathrin Hille, “Russia Accuses U.S. of Thwarting North Korea Diplomacy,” Financial Times, December 8, 2017)
KCNA: “The U.S. has become desperate in its moves to carry out sea blockade against the DPRK. In a bid to provide the legal ground for sea blockade, the U.S. State Department nowadays seeks to modify such phrases as “consent of flag states” and “reasonable grounds” in the UN “sanctions resolution” 2375 into “by use of all necessary measures”, claiming that “being continuously captured is the situation in which north Korea is using restricted vessels for illegal activities by means of handy methods.” The White House National Security Adviser McMaster and other high-ranking officials of the Trump administration and other hardline elements of U.S. Congress are calling for sea blockade against the DPRK. The U.S. moves for sea blockade can never be tolerated as they constitute a wanton violation of the sovereignty and dignity of an independent state. The U.S. is trying to openly take the measure of sea blockade against the DPRK and strangle its economy in peace time. This is part of its scheme to escalate political and economic blockade against the DPRK which has lasted for decades. In the past the U.S. carried out collective sanctions and blockade campaign as evidenced by the manipulation and application of “proliferation security initiative” and “regional sea security initiative” targeting sea blockade by cooking up all sorts of ridiculous schemes, thereby escalating the degree of economic pressure on the DPRK. Under the pretext of checking the “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” the U.S. has manipulated the international naval interception drill for blocking the DPRK from the sea. The U.S. Pacific Command has prepared the sea blockade operation in real earnest from the second half of this year and last month it conveyed to the south Korean puppet forces its action program, by which it ordered the puppet navy to take charge of the open sea in the East and South Seas of Korea, the Japan Maritime “Self-defense Force” to look after the distant waters in the East Sea and the U.S. navy to take care of the waters south of Jeju Island. It is stipulated in the London Treaty on definition of invasion and the UNGA resolution 3314 that blockade-type sanctions against a sovereign state in peace time becomes an act of invasion, an illegal act. Now the U.S. is trumpeting about sea blockade, not content with staging largest-ever nuclear war drills against the DPRK in the sea and air after shipping the strategic assets into the Korean peninsula. This is a hideous war criminal act to push the situation to an “uncontrollable” catastrophic phase and to a touch-and-go phase of a war. The U.S. blockade against the DPRK started long ago and the people of the DPRK will never be browbeaten by this. The moves for blockading the DPRK from the sea are tantamount to war acts. The Trump group should be mindful that should they show even the slightest movement to put its attempt at sea blockade into practice, it will be followed by an immediate and merciless counteraction for self-defense from the DPRK. The U.S. and the riff-raffs following it should ponder over the catastrophic consequences to be entailed by their sea The U.S. and the riff-raffs following it should ponder over the catastrophic consequences to be entailed by their sea blockade moves and stop the reckless act.” (Jong Hyon, “Sea Blockade Is Act of War,” KCNA, December 8, 2017)
12/9/17:
Japan is to acquire medium-range, air-launched cruise missiles, capable of striking North Korea, a controversial purchase of what will become the longest-range munitions of a country that has renounced the right to wage war. Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori did not refer to North Korea when announcing the planned acquisition and said the new missiles would be for defense, with Japan still relying on the United States to strike any enemy bases. “We are planning to introduce the JSM (Joint Strike Missile) that will be mounted on the F-35A (stealth fighter) as ‘stand-off’ missiles that can be fired beyond the range of enemy threats,” Onodera told a news conference. Japan is also looking to mount Lockheed Martin Corp.’s extended-range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM-ER) on its F-15 fighters, he said. The JSM, designed by Norway’s Kongsberg defense & Aerospace, has a range of 500 km. The JASSM-ER can hit targets 1,000 km away. The purchase plan is likely to face criticism from opposition parties in parliament, especially from politicians wary of the watering down of Japan’s renunciation of the right to wage war enshrined in its post-World War II Constitution. (Reuters, “Japan to Acquire Air-Launched Cruise Missile Able to Strike North Korea.” Asahi Shimbun, December 9, 2017)
12/7-9/17:
KCNA: “The UN Under-Secretary-General Mr. Jeffrey Feltman and his delegation visited the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from December 5 to 9. During the visit Under-Secretary-General paid a courtesy call to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and had talks with Vice Foreign Minister on issues of common interest including the relations of cooperation between the DPRK and the UN and the issue of cooperation by the UN organizations in our country and the situation on the Korean peninsula. He also visited some of the project sites of the UN organizations in our country. The DPRK side, stressing that the current tense situation on the Korean peninsula is completely due to the U.S. hostile policy and nuclear threats against the DPRK and that even at the very moment of their talks the U.S. is revealing its intention of launching a surprise nuclear preemptive strike on the DPRK by conducting the largest scale ever joint aerial drill mobilizing different kinds of nuclear strategic bombers, clarified its principled stand concerning the issues of preserving peace on the Korean peninsula and impartiality of the UN. The UN secretariat side expressed concerns on the escalation of tension on the Korean peninsula and its willingness to contribute to the efforts for preventing escalation of tension on the Korean peninsula in accordance with the UN Charter which defined the main mission of the UN as preserving international peace and security. Looking around the project sites of the UN organizations including the Pyongyang Children’s Foodstuff Factory, the Breast Tumor Institute of the Pyongyang Maternity Hospital, the Central Tuberculosis Preventive Institute, the Pediatric Hospital in Phyongsong City, Under-Secretary-General became aware that sanctions are having negative impact on the field of humanitarian cooperation and expressed his intention to put in efforts to ensure that the cooperation is carried out in accordance with its humanitarian mission. The DPRK side and the UN Secretariat side acknowledged that Under-Secretary-General’s visit to the DPRK contributed to promoting trust between the two sides and agreed to have regular exchanges of opinions through frequent exchanges of visits at various levels.” (KCNA, “Press Release Regarding Visit of U.N. Under-Secretary General Mr. Jeffrey Feltman to DPRK,” December 9, 2017) Feltman, a veteran American diplomat who is the U.N. undersecretary-general for political affairs, said December 12 that senior North Korean officials told him during his visit last week “that it was important to prevent war” over the country’s rapidly advancing nuclear and ballistic missile programs. He told reporters after briefing the U.N. Security Council privately that “how we do that” was the topic of more than 15 hours of discussions he had with Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho, Vice Minister Pak Myong Guk, and other officials. He told the North Koreans “they need to signal that they’re willing now to go in a different direction, to start some kind of engagement, to start talking about talks.” He said he stressed “the urgent need to prevent miscalculation and reduce the risk of conflict,” while he also underlined both the international community’s commitment to a peaceful solution and its opposition to North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. He said he emphasized the importance of opening channels of communications “such as the military-to-military hotline to reduce risks, to signal intentions, to prevent misunderstandings and manage any crisis.” It was the first in-depth exchange of views between the U.N. and the DPRK in almost eight years. Feltman called the mission the most important one that he has ever undertaken and called it “constructive and productive.” He said he believes he conveyed the concerns of Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, the Security Council and the international community, but he was cautious about the impact. “They listened seriously to our arguments … they argued with us,” Feltman said. “They did not offer any type of commitment to us at that point. They have to reflect on what we said with their own leadership.” “I think we’ve left the door ajar, and I fervently hope that the door to a negotiated solution will now be opened wide,” he added. Feltman said both sides agreed the situation on the Korean Peninsula is “the most tense and dangerous peace and security issue in the world today.” He said they also agreed that his visit “was only a beginning and that we should continue our dialogue.” He said the U.N. and others are prepared to facilitate any new opening for talks. Feltman, when asked about Tillerson’s comments on December 12, said the Security Council is united on the need for a political solution, “so I would underscore that that was the message I took to Pyongyang.” “But we have to get there by opening the door to a different direction from the current trajectory” that North Korea is on, he said. “They agreed that it was important to prevent war,” he said. (Edith M. Lederer, “U.N. Official: N. Koreans Said It Is Important to Prevent War,” Associated Press, December 12, 2017)
12/10/17:
The Donald Trump administration has nominated former White House official and Washington-based academic Victor Cha as the next US ambassador to South Korea and asked for Seoul’s approval, US sources said. According to sources in Washington, the request was recently delivered to the South Korean government in the form of an “agreement,” a formal request sent to the receiving state from the sending state before dispatching a diplomatic representative. The decision was made after an extensive vetting process, it added. The nominee’s appointment will be subjected to a US Senate confirmation hearing soon, which may allow Cha to take office before the PyeongChang Olympics here in February. “We are working closely (with the US government) to enable (Cha) to take office early,” an official at South Korea’s Foreign Ministry said. “We cannot confirm whether the agreement has been sent and any relevant procedures at this stage.” Cha is a former director for Asian affairs on the White House National Security Council and served as deputy head of the US delegation in multilateral talks with North Korea over its nuclear program during the administration of President George W. Bush. He now serves the Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. If Cha is appointed, he is slated to become the second Korean-American to take the post after Ambassador Sung Kim. He has been widely seen as a strong candidate since August. (Jung Min-kyung, “Trump Nominates Victor Cha as Ambassador to Seoul,” Korea Herald, December 11, 2017)
An additional 20 North Korean firms and 12 individuals will be subjected to Seoul‘s sanctions from tomorrow, Seoul’s Foreign Ministry said. “It is expected that the updated sanctions will block the inflow of illegal financial funding into North Korea and raise the risk of trading with such organizations and individuals,” a Foreign Ministry official said. Organizations that will be added to the blacklist include Rason International Commercial Bank, Agricultural Development Bank, Cheil Credit Bank, International Industrial Bank, Koryo Commercial Bank, Korea Daebong Shipping Company and Yusong Shipping Company. Named individuals are mostly North Korean agents and ranking bank officials including Kim Su-kwang, a North Korean intelligence agent based in Belarus, Kim Kyong-Hyok, a First Credit Bank representative in Shanghai, Pak Chol-nam, a First Credit Bank representative in Beijing, Ri Ho-nam, a Ryugyong Commercial Bank representative in Beijing, and Ji Sang-jun, an official of Korea Kumgang Group Bank in the United Arab Emirates. The latest list is a follow-up to South Korea’s sanctions announced last month, a day ahead of US President Donald Trump’s state visit here. It is in accordance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions that aims to cripple the North’s economic growth. At a campaign-style rally in Alabama on December 8, Trump said he doesn’t know if the international sanctions will have an effect on Kim Jong-un, but added “we need to give it a shot.”
(Jung Min-kyung, “S. Korea Updates Its N.K. Sanctions Blacklist,” Korea Herald, December 11, 2017)
12/11/17:
Amid fears that North Korea is rapidly developing its submarine-launched ballistic missile technology, the United States, Japan and South Korea are teaming up for a drill to track such hard-to-detect missiles, military officials said. The drill is taking place over two days in waters between Japan and the Korean Peninsula, said South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, and will involve destroyers from the three nations doing computer-simulated training to track submarine missile launchings by North Korea. The drills come in the wake of news reports that North Korea is making progress developing submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or SLBMs. The website 38 North, based at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University, obtained images of cylindrical objects, evidence that “suggests construction of a new submarine” at a facility on North Korea’s east coast. (Gerry Mullany, “North Korean Submarine Missile Threat Prompts U.S.-Led Military Drills,” New York Times, December 11, 2017)
A Chinese county along the border with North Korea is constructing refugee camps intended to house thousands of migrants fleeing a possible crisis on the Korean Peninsula, according to an internal document that appears to have been leaked from China’s main state-owned telecommunications company. Three villages in Changbai County and two cities in the northeastern border province of Jilin, have been designated for the camps, according to the document from China Mobile. The document appeared last week on Weibo, a microblogging site. The camps are an unusual, albeit tacit, admission by China that instability in North Korea is increasingly likely, and that refugees could swarm across the Tumen River, a narrow ribbon of water that divides the two countries. Lu Kang, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, told reporters on Monday that he was unaware of the plan for the refugee camps, but he did not deny their existence. “I haven’t seen such reports,” Lu said. Changbai County officials did not answer telephone calls on Monday, and an executive at China Mobile in Changbai declined to discuss the matter. The China Mobile document said that a manager of the company inspected five sites on December 2 at the request of the Changbai County government. The company was asked to ensure there was viable internet service in the areas that would be used for the camps. “Because the situation on the China-North Korea border has intensified lately, Changbai County government plans to set up five refugee sites in Changbai,” China Mobile said in the document. Last week, the Jilin Daily, a provincial newspaper, advised residents on how to react in case of a nuclear explosion or radioactive fallout. Although China does not appear to have changed its basic position on maintaining stability, the increasingly hostile talk in Washington appears to be spurring contingency preparations. Zheng Zeguang, the vice minister of foreign affairs, rushed to Washington last week to discuss what Chinese officials call the “black hole of confrontation” between the United States and North Korea. As a result of the rising tensions, one of China’s most prominent experts on North Korea, called building the camps “absolutely reasonable.” “It is highly possible that there is a conflict between North Korea and the United States now,” said Zhang Liangui, a professor of international strategic research at the Communist Party’s Central Party School. “What China does here is to be prepared for any kind of situation happening on the Korean Peninsula.” (Jane Perlez, “China Girds for North Korean Refugees,” New York Times, December 12, 2017, p. A-13)
12/12/17:
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson softened America’s stance on possible talks with North Korea, calling it “unrealistic” to expect the nuclear-armed country to come to the table ready to give up a weapons of mass destruction program that it invested so much in developing. Tillerson said his boss, President Donald Trump, endorses this position. Tillerson’s remarks came two weeks after North Korea conducted a test with a missile that could potentially carry a nuclear warhead to the U.S. Eastern Seaboard. “We are ready to talk anytime North Korea would like to talk. And we are ready to have the first meeting without preconditions,” Tillerson said at the Atlantic Council think tank. He said that the North would need to hold off on its weapons testing. This year, the North has conducted more than 20 ballistic missile launches and one nuclear test explosion, its most powerful yet. “Let’s just meet and we can talk about the weather if you want to. We can talk about whether it’s a square table or a round table if that’s what you are excited about,” Tillerson said. “But can we at least sit down and see each other face to face and then we can begin to lay out a map, a road map, of what we might be willing to work towards.” Although Tillerson said the goal of U.S. policy remained denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, he added it was “not realistic to say we’re only going to talk if you come to the table ready to give up your program. They’ve too much invested in it. The president is very realistic about that as well.”Baik Tae-hyun, spokesman of Seoul’s Unification Ministry, said of Tillerson’s comments that Seoul wishes for talks to “happen soon” if they contribute to the goal of finding a peaceful solution for the North Korean nuclear problem. He said Washington and Seoul both maintain a firm stance that North Korea’s nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated and should be completely discarded in a peaceful way. White House spokeswoman Sarah Huckabee Sanders said in a statement later in the day, “The President’s views on North Korea have not changed.” She added, “North Korea is acting in an unsafe way not only toward Japan, China, and South Korea, but the entire world. North Korea’s actions are not good for anyone and certainly not good for North Korea.” Trump, who has traded insults with Kim, kept up his tough talk today. As he signed a $700 billion defense authorization bill that includes additional spending on missile defense, he referred to North Korea as a “vile dictatorship.” “We’re working very diligently on that — building up forces. We’ll see how it all turns out. It’s a very bad situation — a situation that should have been handled long ago by other administrations,” Trump said. Tillerson did not indicate that North Korea had signaled a new readiness to talk, but said that “they clearly understand that if we’re going to talk, we’ve got to have a period of quiet” in weapons tests. Tillerson stressed that the U.S. would not accept a nuclear-armed North Korea, as it flouts international norms and might spread weapons technology to non-state groups in ways that other nuclear powers have not. In a rare admission of discussion of a highly sensitive topic, Tillerson said Washington has discussed with Beijing how North Korea’s nuclear weapons might be secured in case of instability there. “The most important thing to us would be securing those nuclear weapons that they have already developed and ensuring that nothing falls into the hands of people who we would not want to have it. We’ve had conversations with the Chinese about how that might be done,” Tillerson said. It appeared to the first public recognition from an administration official that the U.S. has discussed North Korean contingencies with China, which fought with the North against the U.S. in the 1950-53 Korean War. The Trump administration has held a series of high-level dialogues with Beijing this year, and U.S. and Chinese generals held rare talks in late November about how the two militaries might communicate in a crisis although U.S. officials said the dialogue wasn’t centered on North Korea. Tillerson said that the U.S. has assured China that in the event that American troops had to cross northward of the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, it would retreat back south once stability returned. “That is our commitment we made to them. Our only objective is to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, and that is all,” Tillerson said. (Matthew Pennington, “Tillerson Softens U.S. Stance on Possible Talks with N. Korea,” Associated Press, December 12, 2017)
Tillerson: “Our policy with respect to the DPRK is really quite clear, and that is the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It is a policy that is shared by others in the region; in fact, that is China’s policy as well. And Russia has stated it is also its policy. So it is – while it is commonly held, our tactics for implementing the policy may differ a bit among parties in the region. Our approach, as you’ve seen, is to impose ever greater penalties and ever greater pressure on the regime in North Korea to persuade them to halt their current nuclear weapons development program and their systems by which they can deliver these weapons, and to change that course and choose a different course. We have put in place now over the past many months the most comprehensive set of economic sanctions that I think have ever been assembled through two very comprehensive UN Security Council resolutions with the support, notably, of both China and Russia, clearly indications of how they view the seriousness of the threat as well. These sanctions now have banned all coal exports from the North – from North Korea. They have ended their textile exports. They have put limits and will bring to an end the export of forced labor. They have also limited the imports of fuel and reduced all imports, each – with each action increasing the pressure on North Korea. We do know that these are having effects on the North. This is evidence in terms of what we see happening with fuel prices for North Korean citizens, which initially jumped 90 percent. They’re now back to where they’re up only 50 percent. We also know there are shortages beginning to appear, and there’s also, though appearing on the shelves of North Koreans, products which previously had been exported. So now they have to be consumed internally. These are combined with diplomatic sanctions where we have called on nations the world over to not just fully implement the UN Security Council economic sanctions, but where they have a sense and a desire to do so, to also isolate the North Korean regime further by recalling their diplomats, closing their offices, and letting North Korea know that with each one of these provocative tests, they only become more and more isolated. More than 22 countries have sent North Korea’s diplomats back home. And for some, it may not seem significant, but for small countries that may not have a lot of economic influence, it is yet another important signal. So from nations like Peru to Spain to Italy to Portugal have cut off the diplomacy ties as well. And we know the regime notices when that ambassador comes home because they’re not representing that office elsewhere, further isolating them from their contact with the rest of the world. These are all very important steps, again, to reinforce to the regime that with each step you take, you only isolate yourself further and you do not improve your security, but you degrade your own security. Important to the success of all of this is the very strong trilateral relationship that exists between the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. This is a basis for the security structure of the region and it is one that we continue in place and we continue to exercise together so that we are ready for any possible military response that might be required. The enforcement of these sanctions have also gone beyond the direct entities, but we’ve also sanctioned individuals and other entities, including banks – some banks within China and elsewhere – who are facilitating violations of these sanctions by North Korea. So anywhere we see North Korea attempting to exploit loopholes or attempting to exploit other avenues to skirt these sanctions, we attempt to close those off as well. Time is marching on and with each additional test, North Korea does demonstrate the advancement of its program. The most recent intercontinental ballistic missile test, I think, demonstrates they certainly have capability to continue to advance their program, and we would expect they’re doing the same on other elements of an integrated nuclear weapons system. So we need the DPRK to come to the – come to the table for talks. We’re ready to talk anytime they’d like to talk, but they have to come to the table and they have to come to the table with a view that they do want to make a different choice. In the meantime, our military preparedness is strong. Because of the situation, the President has ordered our military planners to have a full range of contingencies available, and they are ready. As I’ve told people many times, I will continue our diplomatic efforts until the first bomb drops. I’m going to be confident that we’re going to be successful, but I’m also confident Secretary Mattis will be successful if it ends up being his turn. With respect to China, North Korea really represented our first engagement of this new administration with China. It was – the first trip I made overseas was to Japan, South Korea, and China to begin the first articulations of this policy on North Korea’s nuclear program, the end of the strategic patience. In many ways, this, I think, was fortuitous because it allowed this administration in its first engagements with China to find something that we could work together on. And when we understood that our policies were identical and our objectives were the same, then that gave us a platform from which to engage on a positive way from the outset. The history, as all of you know, of U.S.-China relations has been defined since the historic opening of the relationship with Nixon’s visit. And that served the U.S. and the Chinese well and it served the rest of the world well. But times have changed. China has risen its economic power. And in many ways, the successful Beijing Olympics was perhaps the coming-out of China to the rest of the world with a new sense of confidence and a new sense of a way forward. I think both of us, the U.S. and China, are now searching for what will define the U.S.-China relationship for the next 50 years, because that relationship that was defined by the “one China” policy and the three joint communiques has served everyone well. China has risen as an economic force in the world. And while they like to continue to describe themselves as a developing nation because they have hundreds of millions who still need to move out of poverty, they are not a developing nation in the traditional sense. They have an economy that is very large, and it certainly has its influence on global markets. But as China has risen, a number of disparities have now occurred between the U.S. and China trade relations and China and other nations in trade relations as well which have to be addressed. So in engaging with China in the first summit with President Xi coming to Mar-a-Lago, we worked with the Chinese to find a way to begin an exchange of understanding in views at a much higher level than had previously been conducted. As many of you know, there were many, many dialogue mechanisms with China over the past several years. I think when we – when I got to State Department, we had 26 different dialogues at various levels. Our view was we needed to elevate these dialogues to a much higher level within our respective governments, closer to the ultimate decision makers. So we created four significant high-level dialogues with representation from our side and from the Chinese side that is very close to President Trump and very close to President Xi. The four dialogues are led by cabinet-level secretaries on our side and equivalents on the Chinese side. This diplomatic and strategic Dialogue is chaired by Secretary Mattis and myself, and this dialogue is really to explore areas that we can work together and explore areas where we have differences, and in this exploratory process create results that will over time hopefully allow us to define what this new relationship will be. The other dialogues are economic and trade, law enforcement and cyber, and social people-to-people dialogues. All four of the dialogues met throughout the last year, and they are designed to be results-driven, and the results of those were reported out at President Trump’s summit in Beijing, his state visit plus. So I think with respect to our relationship with China, we now have a very active mechanism in which we can put complex issues on the table. And we have differences, such as the South China Sea and China’s building of structures, militarization of these structures, and how that affects our allies in the region as well in terms of free and open trade. As we’ve said to the Chinese, we hope we can find a way to freeze this particular activity. Whether we can reverse it remains to seen. But it is not an acceptable – it’s not acceptable to us that these islands continue to be developed, and certainly not for military purposes. In Southeast Asia, we had a – we put forth a policy here not too long ago of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and this was built on the back of some of our views about China’s One Belt, One Road policy. China’s One Belt, One Road, we understand, is a policy they have to continue their economic development, and our policies do not seek to contain China’s economic development. But China’s economic development, in our view, should take place in the system of international rules and norms, and One Belt, One Road seems to want to define its own rules and norms. I like to quote Secretary Mattis’ comment on One Belt, One Road. For China, he said: Well, the U.S. and the rest of the world has many belts and many roads, and no one country gets to decide what they are. So a free and open Indo-Pacific means all countries have access to continue their economic development and free access for trade through the region. As part of the free and open Indo-Pacific, we have elevated our engagement with India. We’ve long had a trilateral relationship in the Indo-Pacific between Japan, Australia, and the U.S., and we’re now working towards whether this will become a quad relationship to include India because of the importance of India’s rising economy as well and I think shared national security concerns that we have with India. …HADLEY: Since this is a conference focused on South Korea and Asia, we should probably start with North Korea. I have probably 10 questions on that subject. They center on two things which I’d like to cover with you: One, how optimistic are you about being able to achieve denuclearization through diplomacy? And if you’re optimistic, then when do we start the diplomacy? There’s a view out among some that in fact the administration is and should be letting the pressure build on North Korea – ramping up the sanctions, putting pressure on China to put more pressure on North Korea, getting Russia into the tent so they don’t substitute for what China might be cutting off. And that may be the right approach, but in your view, when do we get to the negotiations? And is there any precondition? And the one, of course, people are concerned about: North Korea says they will not come to the table to talk about denuclearization; our position is that’s the only thing worth talking about. How do you get over that? So can you talk about how the diplomatic process might unfold? TILLERSON: Well, first I would say the diplomacy is underway. It has been underway. In fact, the entire sanctions regime, the pressure campaign, that is a piece of diplomacy, is – it is how to create an understanding on the part of the North Koreans that the world does not accept this, so that they understand that if they continue, the isolation just continues. So that in and of itself is diplomacy, and it was – and was a very deliberate decision taken at the outset of the policy itself, is that simply picking up the phone and calling Kim Jong-un back in February when – and March when we first were developing this and saying, “Hey, we really don’t like those nuclear tests you’re doing. Can we sit down and talk,” probably was not going to get anyone to the table. So I think we took the view and we looked at the past efforts and talks, and the President has touched on this many times, that others – we’ve looked at what others tried and failed, and the North Koreans have been masters at always gaming those talks. And they have never proven to be a reliable counterparty. So we decided we were going to undertake this very intensive campaign of sanctions this time, but it was only going to be successful if first we built up very broad international participation. So this wasn’t just about the United States and a few other countries, but it was very broad-based in its participation, and it had to have the active engagement of China and Russia in a very serious way. And this really was the beginning of discussions with China, and much of the decision to go forward hinged on China’s telling us they would participate. And I will tell you, in our judgment, they have participated; they are fully implementing the sanctions. That’s why it is having an effect. The President would like to see China cut the oil off. The last time the North Koreans came to the table, it was because China cut the oil off. Three days later, the North Koreans were at the table talking. And the President feels we’re really at that stage. So he’s putting a lot of pressure on the Chinese to do more with respect to oil. When do the talks begin? We’ve said from the diplomatic side we’re ready to talk anytime North Korea would like to talk, and we’re ready to have the first meeting without precondition. Let’s just meet and let’s – we can talk about the weather if you want. We can talk about whether it’s going to be a square table or a round table if that’s what you’re excited about. But can we at least sit down and see each other face to face? And then we can begin to lay out a map, a roadmap of what we might be willing to work towards. I don’t think – it’s not realistic to say we’re only going to talk if you come to the table ready to give up your program. They have too much invested in it. And the President is very realistic about that as well. And so it’s really about how do you even begin the process of engagement, because we’re dealing with a new leader in North Korea that no one’s ever engaged with. And he clearly is not like his father nor is he like his grandfather, and we don’t know a whole lot about what it will be like to engage with him. And that’s why I think my expectations of how to start are really framed around, first, I have to know who my counterpart is. I have to know something about them. I have to understand how do they process, how do they think. Because getting to an agreement, as all of us know, in negotiations means a willingness to talk about a lot of things. Let’s just put a lot of things on the table. And what do you want to put on the table? And we’ll tell you what we want to put on the table. And the important thing is that we get started. The only – if there was any condition at all to this, it’s that, look, it’s going to be tough to talk if in the middle of our talks, you decide to test another device. It’s going to be difficult to talk if in the middle of our talks, you decide to fire another one off. So I think they clearly understand that if we’re going to talk, we have to have a period of quiet. We’ve got to have a period of quiet or it’s going to be very difficult to have productive discussions. And so we continue to indicate to them we need a period of quiet. You need to tell us you want to talk. The door is open. But we’ll show up when you tell us you’re ready to talk. HADLEY: Right. Let me ask you a second question. There is a lot of talk about use of force. Some people have said the likelihood of a use of force in a conflict on the peninsula is at 40 percent. I sometimes puckishly say to people, well, that’s an indication – that people are talking in that way is an indication of the success of the President’s policies, because he’s really convinced people that solving this problem is really important and it is part of the way of getting attention of both North Korea and China. On the other hand, there are a lot of people who have written risks and concerns, and a concern, for example, with someone like Kim Jong-un, who we do not know and who’s been pretty isolated, that he might at some point think the United States is coming for him militarily and then preempt. So how do you look at this issue of the likelihood of military force when we hear from administration folk – spokesmen that there are military options? What are they talking about? TILLERSON: Well, I think any successful diplomatic effort of this nature has to be backed up with some type of a military alternative, and it can’t just be a threat. It has to be a credible alternative. And the President also requested that from the outset, that the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea – now, I know many people have asked the question of, well, why can’t you live with a containment strategy? You lived with it with Russia; you lived with it with China; you lived with it with others. And the difference is that the past behavior of North Korea, it’s clear to us that they would not just use the possession of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. This would become a commercial activity for them. Because we already see elements of it in the commercial marketplace. And in a world we live in today where our greatest threats are non-state actors, we simply cannot accept that. We can’t accept a nation that has no established record of abiding by any kind of international norms. That certainly was not the case with the Soviet Union. It’s certainly not the case with China. It’s certainly not the case with other nuclear countries that possess nuclear weapons. These are countries that have a history of abiding by certain international norms. North Korea has no such record. In fact, their record is quite contrary to that. And that’s the reason the President and I agree with his assessment that we simply cannot accept a nuclear-armed North Korea, and I think that’s why it is the policy of the neighborhood as well. So it is important that the diplomatic effort be backed up by a very credible military alternative. And yes, there are – there are multiple military options that have been developed to deal with a failure on my part. That’s why I say we’re going to work hard to not fail. And the President wants that, and he has encouraged our diplomatic efforts. But I think he also takes his responsibilities to protect the U.S. and our allies from this kind of a threat seriously, and he intends to ensure that they do not have a deliverable nuclear weapon to the shores of the United States. HADLEY: We’re running out of time and a lot of subjects we could cover. I’m going to stay on this one to try to cover it intensively and give you two things to respond to, and then we’ll wrap it up. One is respect to China. A number of people say that China is concerned that if it puts too much pressure on North Korea, the regime will collapse. That means refugees going across the border, and maybe the United States and South Korean forces moving into North Korean territory. And there have been a lot of people who have talked about the need for a strategic conversation at high levels with China to get an understanding about what would happen and not happen on the part of China and the United States in the event of those contingencies. You’ve been public about some noes that I think have been reassuring. What are the prospects? Is the U.S.-China relationship – and I’m not asking you to go into any details – but is the U.S.-China relationship at a point where that kind of discussion is possible? And secondly, we haven’t talked about Russia because the more pressure China puts on North Korea and cuts off resources, it’s a potential that Russia would come in and fill those. Is Russia on side in this effort? And can you talk a little bit about the diplomacy with Russia regarding North Korea? TILLERSON: Well, let me address the Chinese question first. And one of the real values of these new high-level dialogues and the diplomatic and strategic dialogue that Secretary Mattis and I chair with our counterparts, and we actually have included Joint Chief of Staff Chairman Dunford, General Dunford, and his counterparts from China as well. These are the subjects of these dialogues, and to try – for us to gain an understanding of, first, how credible do we think the Chinese concern is about a mass flow of refugees across the border in the event of a regime collapse. China is taking steps to prepare for such an eventuality. I think it is something that they can manage. I don’t think the threat is as significant as perhaps others view it. I don’t want to be dismissive of it, but it’s not an unmanageable situation. And they already are taking preparatory actions for such an event. We also have to – have had conversations about in the event that something happened – it could happen internal to North Korea; it might be nothing that we from the outside initiate – that if that unleashed some kind of instability, the most important thing to us would be securing those nuclear weapons they’ve already developed and ensuring that they – that nothing falls into the hands of people we would not want to have it. We’ve had conversations with the Chinese about how might that be done. The four noes that I articulated in that first trip to Asia were intentional: that we do not seek regime change; we do not seek regime collapse; we do not seek an accelerated unification of the Korean Peninsula; we do not seek a reason to send our own military forces north of the demilitarized zone. We have had conversations that if something happened and we had to go across a line, we have given the Chinese assurances we would go back and retreat back to the south of the 38th parallel when whatever the conditions that caused that to happen. That is our commitment we made to them. Our only objective is to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, and that is all. And out of that and out of these discussions, perhaps we can create a different future for the North Korean people because the one they have right now is pretty dismal. As to Russia’s participation, Russia has been very supportive of the UN Security Council resolutions. They could have vetoed them. They could have blocked them, but they didn’t. I think on the sanctions implementation, it’s not as clear to us how fully those are being implemented. We know there are some violations. They’re not hard to see. We see what they are, and we, in particular, have had – I’ve had many conversations with Foreign Minister Lavrov about specific issues that we see that we would ask that they close those off. Forced labor is one in particular. There are a large number – something around 35,000 – North Koreans working in Russia to date. Russia has a labor shortage. They have economic development in the east in particular that they’re undertaking. So I understand why they have an economic stake in this. But it is also undermining the effectiveness of the sanctions. So we do talk very specifically with our Russian counterparts about what we ask that they do. By and large at the Security Council, again, they’ve been very supportive of the sanctions. They voiced their view of how effective they think those may be. But we do need Russia’s support. And when we get to the point that we’re actually going to start solving this problem, we’re going to need everyone in the neighborhood, I call it. And it’s going to be important, obviously, first and foremost, to our allies in the Republic of Korea, but it’s going to be important to Japan, Russia, China, everyone is there to help ensure success around a diplomatic talk – around diplomatic talks.” (Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, “Meeting the Foreign Policy Challenges of 2017 and Beyond,” Remarks at the 2017 Atlantic Council-Korea Foundation Forum, Washington, December 12, 2017)
Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson let slip last week a few tantalizing details about one of the nation’s most secret military contingency plans: how the United States would try to race inside North Korea to seize its nuclear weapons if it ever saw evidence that Kim Jong-un’s government was collapsing. For years, American diplomats have been trying to engage their Chinese counterparts in a discussion of this scenario, hoping to avoid a conflict between arriving American Special Forces — who have been practicing this operation for years — and the Chinese military, which would almost certainly pour over the border in a parallel effort. And for years the Chinese have resisted the conversation, according to several former American officials who tried to engage them in joint planning. The Chinese feared that if news of a conversation leaked, Beijing would be seen as conspiring with the United States over plans for an eventual North Korean collapse, eroding any leverage that Beijing still held over Kim. So it was surprising to Tillerson’s colleagues in the White House and the Pentagon when, in a talk to the Atlantic Council last week, he revealed that the Trump administration had already provided assurances to China’s leadership that if American forces landed in North Korea to search for and deactivate nuclear weapons, the troops would do their work and then retreat. North Korea has defied past predictions of collapse, and one does not appear imminent. But if a collapse were to occur, the aftermath could present grave dangers. American officials have envisioned that North Korean officers, fearing the end of Mr. Kim’s government, might lob a nuclear weapon at South Korea or Japan as a last, desperate act — or detonate it on North Korean territory to make occupation impossible. Today, speaking from note cards, Tillerson said at a conference on the Korea crisis that the United States and China “have had conversations about in the event that something happened — it could happen internal to North Korea; it might be nothing that we from the outside initiate — that if that unleashed some kind of instability, the most important thing to us would be securing those nuclear weapons they’ve already developed and ensuring that they — that nothing falls into the hands of people we would not want to have it.” He added, “We’ve had conversations with the Chinese about how might that be done.” He repeated his past assurance that the administration was not seeking “regime collapse” or “an accelerated unification of the Korean Peninsula.” But if America’s hand is forced, he added, “we have had conversations that if something happened and we had to go across a line, we have given the Chinese assurances we would go back and retreat back to the south of the 38th parallel” when conditions allowed. In other words, the United States would essentially cede North Korean territory to the Chinese military, or let China and South Korea figure out who would control 46,500 square miles of territory and take care of its 25 million occupants, many of whom already do not have enough to eat. In an interview on other national security issues on December 15, a senior administration official who has been deeply involved in the North Korea contingency planning declined to speak about the issue, even to confirm that the conversations the secretary described had taken place. The White House has been more focused on the beleaguered Tillerson’s public offer to begin talks with North Korea on any issues, even “the weather,” from which he backtracked December 15 in a presentation to the United Nations. But the reference to planning for North Korean collapse, while not drawing wide notice, caught the attention of those who have been drawing up military plans for a number of possible scenarios, including American pre-emptive strikes. Asked whether Tillerson had referred by mistake to entreaties to the Chinese that previous administrations kept secret, Steven Goldstein, the new under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs, said it was quite deliberate. “The secretary reiterated the position he has taken in meetings with Chinese counterparts,” he said. “He would like the U.S. and Chinese military leaders to develop a plan for the safe disposition of North Korea’s nuclear weapons were the regime to collapse.” He added: “While the secretary has never advocated for regime change, we all have an obligation to be prepared for any scenario.” There is no indication that the Chinese have responded, or that military officials have met — though Beijing would almost certainly keep that secret if it occurred. According to current and former American officials, the contingency plans to seize North Korea’s nuclear arsenal have grown in complexity in recent years, largely because the North Korean arsenal has grown. There are competing estimates among American intelligence agencies over how many weapons the North possesses. Most estimates range from 15 to 30 nuclear devices, but the Defense Intelligence Agency, which is responsible for protecting American troops on the Korean Peninsula, projected this year that the number could be in excess of 50. The North is presumed to have undertaken an elaborate effort to hide the weapons. The result, one senior military official said recently, is that even if dozens of weapons were seized and deactivated, there would be no way to determine whether many more were still hidden away, perhaps under the control of surviving members of Mr. Kim’s military. In the secret American rehearsals of how to execute a seizure of the North’s weapons — more of which are planned for the first half of next year, officials say — speed is of the essence. Finding those weapons, landing “render safe” teams to disarm them and airlifting them out of the country would be a difficult enough task in peacetime. But the American planning assumes a three-way scramble to seize both weapons and territory, involving Chinese troops who may find themselves facing off against the United States and its South Korean allies. “Washington should assume that any Korean conflict involving large-scale U.S. military operations will trigger a significant Chinese military intervention,” Oriana Skylar Mastro, a professor of security studies at Georgetown University, wrote this month in the journal Foreign Affairs, in a provocative article titled “Why China Won’t Rescue North Korea.” China, she wrote, “will likely attempt to seize control of key terrain, including North Korea’s nuclear sites,” most of which are within 60 miles or so of the Chinese border. Because of geographic advantage, they would probably arrive long before American forces. In the past, American planning was based on an assumption that China would come to the aid of North Korea, as it did during the Korean War nearly seven decades ago. But Ms. Mastro, who also advises the United States Pacific Command, wrote that today “the Chinese military assume that it would be opposing, not supporting, North Korean troops.” Her analysis mirrors what is increasingly becoming the dominant thinking among American military planners. That has made the secret discussion that Tillerson alluded to all the more vital. Curiously, some Chinese academics have begun writing about the need for the United States and China to prepare a joint strategy. Such public airing of the issue would have been banned in Chinese publications even a few years ago. Tillerson’s public comments prompted memories of a lengthy conversation between the American ambassador in South Korea and a senior South Korean official in 2010. The details were revealed by WikiLeaks in a trove of 250,000 State Department cables that included secret discussions about how to deal with China’s ambitions for North Korean territory in the event of a collapse. Over a lunchtime conversation, the South Korean diplomat confidently predicted to the American ambassador at the time, Kathleen Stephens, that North Korea would collapse “two to three years” after Kim Jong-il, the dictator at the time, died. In fact, he died in 2011, but the predicted collapse never came. The diplomat then described plans to assure that Chinese companies would have plenty of commercial opportunities to mine minerals in the northern part of the peninsula. Stephens’s description of the lunch, sent back to Washington, included the caution that “China would clearly ‘not welcome’ any U.S. military presence north of the DMZ.” There is no indication that those discussions included the sensitive issue of disposing of nuclear weapons. At the time, the North had only a handful. (David E. Sanger, “Tillerson Speaks on a Largely Secret North Korea Contingency Plan,” New York Times, December 18, 2017,
The US military is reportedly in talks with South Korea on the timing of large-scale annual military exercises that always infuriate nuclear-armed Pyongyang and could coincide with next year’s Winter Olympics. The Foal Eagle and Key Resolve drills usually start in late February or early March and involve tens of thousands of troops from the two allies, which say they are purely defensive. Next year’s Winter Olympics take place in Pyeongchang in the South from February 9-25, followed by the Paralympics. According to reports Seoul has asked Washington to delay the drills until after the Games to lower the chances of provocations by Pyongyang. “The ROK-US alliance continues to discuss the way ahead on the exercises Key Resolve and Foal Eagle, to include the appropriate timing,” said US Pacific Command spokesman Commander Dave Benham, Yonhap reported. (AFP, “U.S., S. Korea ‘Discuss’ Military Drill amid Olympics Worries,” Korea Herald, December 12, 2017)
U.N. undersecretary-general for political affairs Jeffrey Feltman said that senior North Korean officials told him during his visit last week “that it was important to prevent war” over the country’s rapidly advancing nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Feltman told reporters after briefing the U.N. Security Council privately that “how we do that” was the topic of more than 15 hours of discussions he had with Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho, Vice Minister Pak Myong Guk, and other officials. Feltman, a veteran American diplomat who is the, said he told the North Koreans “they need to signal that they’re willing now to go in a different direction, to start some kind of engagement, to start talking about talks.” He said he stressed “the urgent need to prevent miscalculation and reduce the risk of conflict,” while he also underlined both the international community’s commitment to a peaceful solution and its opposition to North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. He said he emphasized the importance of opening channels of communications “such as the military-to-military hotline to reduce risks, to signal intentions, to prevent misunderstandings and manage any crisis.” It was the first in-depth exchange of views between the U.N. and the DPRK in almost eight years. Feltman called the mission the most important one that he has ever undertaken and called it “constructive and productive.” He said he believes he conveyed the concerns of Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, the Security Council and the international community, but he was cautious about the impact. “They listened seriously to our arguments … they argued with us,” Feltman said. “They did not offer any type of commitment to us at that point. They have to reflect on what we said with their own leadership.” “I think we’ve left the door ajar, and I fervently hope that the door to a negotiated solution will now be opened wide,” he added. Feltman said both sides agreed the situation on the Korean Peninsula is “the most tense and dangerous peace and security issue in the world today.” He said they also agreed that his visit “was only a beginning and that we should continue our dialogue.” He said the U.N. and others are prepared to facilitate any new opening for talks. (Edith M. Lederer, “U.N. Official: N. Koreans Say It Is Important to Prevent War,” Associated Press, December 12, 2017)
12/?/17:
Mastro: “U.S. officials have long agreed with Mao Zedong’s famous formulation about relations between China and North Korea: the two countries are like “lips and teeth.” Pyongyang depends heavily on Beijing for energy, food, and most of its meager trade with the outside world, and so successive U.S. administrations have tried to enlist the Chinese in their attempts to denuclearize North Korea. U.S. President Donald Trump has bought into this logic, alternately pleading for Chinese help and threatening action if China does not do more. In the same vein, policymakers have assumed that if North Korea collapsed or became embroiled in a war with the United States, China would try to support its cherished client from afar, and potentially even deploy troops along the border to prevent a refugee crisis from spilling over into China. But this thinking is dangerously out of date. Over the last two decades, Chinese relations with North Korea have deteriorated drastically behind the scenes, as China has tired of North Korea’s insolent behavior and reassessed its own interests on the peninsula. Today, China is no longer wedded to North Korea’s survival. In the event of a conflict or the regime’s collapse, Chinese forces would intervene to a degree not previously expected—not to protect Beijing’s supposed ally but to secure its own interests. …The real possibility of chaos on the peninsula means that the United States needs to update its thinking about Beijing’s motivations. In the event of an escalation, China will likely attempt to seize control of key terrain, including North Korea’s nuclear sites. The large-scale presence of both American and Chinese troops on the Korean Peninsula would raise the risk of a full-blown war between China and the United States, something neither side wants. But given how weak Beijing’s ties to Pyongyang are, and given China’s own concerns about North Korea’s nuclear program, the two great powers may find surprising common ground. With some forward thinking, the United States could lessen the risk of an accidental conflict and leverage Chinese involvement to reduce the costs and duration of a second Korean war. …Xi has publicly stated that the 1961 treaty will not apply if North Korea provokes a conflict—a standard easily met. In my travels to China over the past decade to discuss the North Korean issue with academics, policymakers, and military officials, no one has ever brought up the treaty or a Chinese obligation to defend North Korea. Instead, my Chinese colleagues tell me about the relationship’s deterioration and Beijing’s efforts to distance itself from Pyongyang, a change that a Global Times public opinion poll suggests enjoys wide support. As the Chinese scholar Zhu Feng has argued in Foreign Affairs, giving up North Korea would be domestically popular and strategically sound. …In fact, the bilateral relationship has gotten so bad that officers in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have suggested to me in private meetings that Beijing and Pyongyang may not take the same side in the event of a new Korean war. The Chinese military assumes that it would be opposing, not supporting, North Korean troops. China would get involved not to defend Kim’s regime but to shape a post-Kim peninsula to its liking. These policies have shifted alongside China’s increasing confidence about its capabilities and regional influence. Chinese thinking is no longer dominated by fears of Korean instability and a resulting refugee crisis. The PLA’s contingency planning previously focused on sealing the border or establishing a buffer zone to deal with refugees. Indeed, for decades, that was probably all Chinese forces could hope to achieve. But over the past 20 years, the Chinese military has evolved into a far more sophisticated force by modernizing its equipment and reforming its organizational structure. As a result, China now has the ability to simultaneously manage instability at its borders and conduct major military operations on the peninsula. If Kim’s regime collapsed, the People’s Armed Police, which has approximately 50,000 personnel in China’s northeastern provinces, would likely be in charge of securing the border and handling the expected influx of North Korean refugees, freeing up the PLA for combat operations further south. China currently has three “group armies” in the Northern Theater Command, one of the PLA’s five theater commands, which borders North Korea. Each of these armies consists of 45,000 to 60,000 troops, plus army aviation and special forces brigades. And if it needed to, China could also pull forces from its Central Theater Command and mobilize the air force more extensively. When China reorganized its military regions into “war zones” in February 2016, it incorporated Shandong Province into its Northern Theater Command, even though it is not contiguous with the rest of the command, most likely because military leaders would require access to the shoreline to deploy forces to North Korea by sea. The last two decades of military modernization and reform, along with China’s geographic advantages, have ensured that the Chinese military would be capable of quickly occupying much of North Korea, before U.S. reinforcements could even deploy to South Korea to prepare for an attack. In the past, part of what explained China’s attachment to North Korea was the notion that the latter served as a buffer between China and a once hostile capitalist, and later democratic, South Korea. But China’s increased power and clout have all but eliminated that rationale, too. Beijing may have previously been wary of a reunified Korea led by Seoul, but no longer. Some prominent Chinese scholars have begun to advocate abandoning Pyongyang in favor of a better relationship with Seoul. Even Xi has been surprisingly vocal about his support for Korean reunification in the long term, albeit through an incremental peace process. In a July 2014 speech at Seoul National University, Xi stated that “China hopes that both sides of the peninsula will improve their relations and support the eventual realization of an independent and peaceful reunification of the peninsula.” Still, the Chinese calculus on South Korea has not completely changed. …China’s chief concern remains the prospect of U.S. forces in a reunified Korea. Although China still supports Korean reunification, it also wants to shape the terms. And its approach will likely depend on the status of its bilateral relationship with South Korea. Given the costs of a war on the Korean Peninsula, U.S. planners have long thought that China would do everything it could to avoid becoming entangled in a major conflagration involving South Korean and U.S. forces. If China did intervene, policymakers assumed that Beijing would limit its role to managing refugees close to the border or supporting the Kim regime from a distance through political, economic, and military aid. Either way, Washington believed that China’s role would not significantly impact U.S. operations. This is no longer a safe assumption. Instead, Washington must recognize that China will intervene extensively and militarily on the peninsula if the United States seems poised to move its forces north. This is not to say that China will take preemptive action. Beijing will still attempt to keep both sides from leading everyone down the path to war. Moreover, if an ensuing conflict were limited to an exchange of missile and air strikes, China would most likely stay out. But if its attempts to deter the United States from escalating the crisis to a major war failed, Beijing would not hesitate to send considerable Chinese forces into North Korea to ensure its interests were taken into account during and after the war. China’s likely strategic assertiveness in a Korean war would be driven largely by its concerns about the Kim regime’s nuclear arsenal, an interest that would compel Chinese forces to intervene early to gain control over North Korea’s nuclear facilities. In the words of Shen Zhihua, a Chinese expert on North Korea, “If a Korean nuclear bomb explodes, who’ll be the victim of the nuclear leakage and fallout? That would be China and South Korea. Japan is separated by a sea, and the United States is separated by the Pacific Ocean.” China is well positioned to deal with the threat. Based on information from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a U.S. nonprofit, if Chinese forces moved 100 kilometers (about 60 miles) across the border into North Korea, they would control territory containing all of the country’s highest-priority nuclear sites and two-thirds of its highest-priority missile sites. For Chinese leaders, the goal would be to avoid the spread of nuclear contamination, and they would hope that the presence of Chinese troops at these facilities would forestall a number of frightening scenarios: China could prevent accidents at the facilities; deter the United States, South Korea, or Japan from striking them; and block the North Koreans from using or sabotaging their weapons. Beijing is also concerned that a reunified Korea might inherit the North’s nuclear capabilities. My Chinese interlocutors seemed convinced that South Korea wants nuclear weapons and that the United States supports those ambitions. They fear that if the Kim regime falls, the South Korean military will seize the North’s nuclear sites and material, with or without Washington’s blessing. Although this concern may seem far-fetched, the idea of going nuclear has gained popularity in Seoul. And the main opposition party has called for the United States to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula—an option that the Trump administration has been reluctant to rule out. Beyond nuclear concerns, China’s stance on North Korea has shifted as part of its more general geopolitical assertiveness under Xi. Unlike his predecessors, Xi is not shy about China’s great-power ambitions. In a three-and-a-half-hour speech he gave in October, he described China as “a strong country” or “a great country” 26 times. That is a far cry from the dictum that one of his predecessors, Deng Xiaoping, preferred: “Hide your strength, bide your time.” Under Xi, China is increasingly playing the role of a major power, and he has pushed for military reforms to ensure that the PLA can fight and win future wars. Most important, a war on the Korean Peninsula would represent a litmus test of China’s regional competition with the United States. Indeed, Chinese concerns about Washington’s future influence best explain why China is unwilling to push North Korea to the degree that the Trump administration wants. China will not risk instability or war if the outcome could be a larger U.S. role in the region. Given this, China no longer feels comfortable sitting on the sidelines. As one PLA officer asked me, “Why should the United States be there but not us?” For this reason alone, Chinese scholars and military leaders argue, China will need to be involved in any contingency on the peninsula. The bottom line, then, is that Washington should assume that any Korean conflict involving large-scale U.S. military operations will trigger a significant Chinese military intervention. That does not mean that the United States should try to deter China: such a response would almost certainly fail, and it would increase the chances of a direct military confrontation between Chinese and U.S. forces. Moves that could damage the relationship between Beijing and Washington would also impede contingency planning or coordination before and during a crisis, raising the risks of miscalculation. Instead, Washington must recognize that some forms of Chinese intervention would actually be beneficial to its interests, especially with regard to nonproliferation. First and foremost, U.S. officials should note that Chinese forces are likely to make it to North Korea’s nuclear sites long before U.S. forces, thanks to advantages in geography, force posture, manpower, and access to early warning indicators. That is a good thing, since it would reduce the likelihood that the collapsing regime in Pyongyang would use nuclear weapons against the United States or its allies. China could also prove helpful by identifying nuclear sites (with the assistance of U.S. intelligence), then securing and accounting for the nuclear material at those sites, and finally inviting international experts in to dismantle the weapons. The United States, meanwhile, could lead multilateral efforts to intercept North Korean nuclear materials at sea, in the air, or traveling overland and to guarantee their accounting, safe storage, and disposal. More than anything, U.S. policymakers must shift their mindset to view China’s involvement as an opportunity instead of as a constraint on U.S. operations. For example, the U.S. Army and the Marines must accept that although securing nuclear facilities is currently a key mission in North Korea in the event of a conflict, they will have to change their plans if the Chinese get there first. At the political level, Washington must be willing to take greater risks to improve coordination with China in peacetime. This may mean bilateral consultation with Beijing, even though that would conflict with Seoul’s preference to keep China at arm’s length. Granted, sharing intelligence with China and jointly planning and training for contingencies would seem unnatural, since the United States is simultaneously engaged in a long-term strategic competition with China. The U.S. Defense Department considers China to be one of its top five global threats, along with Iran, North Korea, Russia, and extremist organizations. But strategic challenges and severe threats often bring together potential adversaries, and rightfully so. With North Korea out of the way, the United States would have more resources at its disposal to address other threats. Of course, such an effort to cooperate would require a massive degree of coordination. China has long opposed engaging in discussions with the United States on how it would behave in the event of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula or the North Korean regime’s collapse because of its distrust of U.S. intentions and fears that Washington would use those conversations to sabotage Beijing’s attempts to resolve the nuclear crisis peacefully. But China appears to be softening its position. In a September op-ed in the East Asia Forum, Jia Qingguo, a professor at Peking University, argued that China should cooperate with the United States and South Korea, especially on the question of North Korea’s nuclear weapons arsenal. In Jia’s words, “The omens of war on the Korean peninsula loom larger by the day. When war becomes a real possibility, China must be prepared. And, with this in mind, China must be more willing to consider talks with concerned countries on contingency plans.” If Beijing continues to resist proposals to work together, Washington should consider unilaterally communicating aspects of U.S. contingency plans to reduce the risk of accidental clashes. It could even provide the Chinese side with intelligence to help the PLA secure the most important nuclear facilities. Alternatively, the two countries could use established mechanisms for nuclear security cooperation in the civilian sector, such as the jointly established Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security, or organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct technical training. No country has more experience dismantling and securing nuclear weapons than the United States. Although China has the manpower to seize control of the sites, it is unclear whether it has the expertise necessary to render safe, transport, or destroy nuclear weapons and material. Sharing best practices would help ensure that China can safely handle what it will find at these sites. Every strategy has its tradeoffs. Coordinating with or conceding to Chinese involvement in a Korean contingency does have a number of downsides, as critics are bound to point out. For starters, the South Koreans completely oppose the idea of any Chinese involvement on the peninsula, let alone Chinese boots on the ground. U.S. moves to coordinate efforts with China would harm U.S. relations with Seoul, although the benefit of managing the demise of North Korea at a lower cost would be worth it. Potentially more worrisome is the fact that Chinese intervention in North Korea would entail the loss of some U.S. influence on the peninsula. At a fundamental level, China would be acting not to assist the United States but to ensure that a reunified Korea would not include U.S. troops. But that may not be so bad, after all. In frank discussions, Chinese interlocutors have insinuated that Beijing may yet accede to a U.S. alliance with a reunified Korea. In that case, the end of a permanent U.S. military presence on the peninsula would be a reasonable price to pay to ensure that a second Korean war had the best possible outcome. (Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Why China Won’t Rescue North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2018, 58-66)
12/13/17:
No negotiations can be held with North Korea until it improves its behavior, a White House official said, raising questions about Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s offer to begin talks with Pyongyang anytime and without pre-conditions. “Given North Korea’s most recent missile test, clearly right now is not the time [for negotiations],” the White House National Security Council spokesman told Reuters. Tillerson said yesterday the United States was “ready to talk anytime North Korea would like to talk,” backing away from a key U.S. demand that Pyongyang must first accept that any negotiations would have to be about giving up its nuclear arsenal. A day after Tillerson’s appearance before Washington’s Atlantic Council think tank, the White House official, who declined to be named, laid out a different formula for any engagement with North Korea. The administration is united in insisting that any negotiations with North Korea must wait until the regime fundamentally improves its behavior,” the official said. “As the secretary of state himself has said, this must include, but is not limited to, no further nuclear or missile tests.” The White House has declined to say whether President Donald Trump, who has taken a tougher rhetorical line with North Korea than his chief diplomat, gave approval for the diplomatic overture. (Matt Spetalnick and David Brunnstrom, “White House Says Not Right Time for North Korea Talks Despite Tillerson Overture,” Reuters, December 13, 2017) President Trump and Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson are once again at odds over how to deal with nuclear-armed North Korea after Tillerson declared yesterday that the United States was ready to open talks with the North “without precondition.” The secretary’s comments were remarkably conciliatory for an administration that has repeatedly threatened North Korea with military action, and ruled out any negotiations, if it did not curb its missile and nuclear programs. But a few hours later, the White House distanced itself from his overture. In an unusual statement released to reporters on Tuesday evening, the press secretary, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, said Mr. Trump’s position on North Korea had not changed — namely, that talks were pointless if the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, continued to menace his neighbors. “North Korea is acting in an unsafe way not only toward Japan, China, and South Korea, but the entire world,” she said. “North Korea’s actions are not good for anyone and certainly not good for North Korea.” White House officials were alarmed by Tillerson’s conciliatory tone, according to several people, because they feared that it would sow confusion among allies after Trump rallied them behind a policy of “maximum pressure.” There were no signs that Tillerson intended to signal a change in policy. He was speaking to the Atlantic Council in what was billed as a wrap-up of foreign-policy challenges in the administration’s first year. Asked about the prospects for diplomacy with the North, he said, “We’re ready to talk anytime North Korea would like to talk, and we’re ready to have the first meeting without precondition.” To some extent, Tillerson was merely playing the role he has played throughout the administration’s confrontation with North Korea — the diplomat offering a softer line while Trump and other White House officials warn about the consequences if North Korea does not back off. But Tillerson indicated an urgency about getting to the table with North Korea, which officials said runs counter to the White House’s view that negotiations are unlikely to happen anytime soon, given Kim’s repeated tests of nuclear devices and ballistic missiles. Tillerson did say that talks would only make sense if North Korea paused those tests. Still, his statements reverberated in Beijing, where South Korea’s president, Moon Jae-in, was meeting with Chinese leaders about North Korea. Russia welcomed Tillerson’s remarks, saying they were an improvement over “the confrontational rhetoric we have heard so far,” according to Dmitri Peskov, a spokesman for President Vladimir V. Putin. Adding to the muddled messages, Tillerson spoke a few hours after the national security adviser, Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, warned that time was running out to avoid a military confrontation with North Korea, and that China needed to do more to squeeze the North economically. Speaking at a conference sponsored by a British think tank, Policy Exchange, General McMaster singled out shipping companies that he said were smuggling goods to North Korea and helping it evade sanctions. “A company whose ships would engage in that activity ought to be on notice that that might be the last delivery of anything they do for a long time, anywhere,” he said. General McMaster has been among the most hard-line among administration officials in his approach to North Korea, raising the prospect of preventive military strikes if the North appeared on the verge of launching a nuclear-tipped missile capable of reaching the United States. Analysts said there was nothing wrong with Tillerson’s emphasis on diplomacy, but that conditions for any meeting with North Korea were critical. “There’s a middle ground between setting ridiculous preconditions for negotiations, and accepting North Korea’s terms,” said Daniel R. Russel, who served as assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs in the Obama administration. “It’s very important that we not appear to be accepting North Korea’s terms for negotiations.” Michael J. Green, a National Security Council official in the George W. Bush administration, said, “some communication and consultation with North Korea is appropriate. But there’s a big difference between that and a dramatic announcement about negotiations.” (Mark Landler, “White House Corrects Tillerson on North Korea Talks,” New York Times, December 14, 2017, p. A-10)
In the weeks before U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s call for talks with Pyongyang, North Korean officials were privately telling their international counterparts that they see little point in discussions with the United States and other key powers, several current and former U.S. and U.N.-based officials told Foreign Policy. North Koreans complained that Washington reneged on a pledge made earlier this fall to to restart talks with Pyongyang if it halted all nuclear and missile tests for sixty days, according to those sources. Instead of talks, North Korea says, it got slapped with a fresh round of U.S. sanctions. The development has dealt a blow to diplomatic efforts by the State Department and the United Nations to restart great-power talks with North Korea, which withdrew from those discussions in April 2009 to protest U.N. sanctions. “The North Koreans have put the whole issue of contacts with the Americans on hold,” said Joel Wit, a senior fellow at the U.S.-Korea Institute at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, who said the North Koreans are likely confused by the contradictory messages emerging from Washington. “The Trump administration is sending mixed signals, and it is only undermining Secretary Tillerson’s effort to start some sort of dialogue,” Wit said. The administration, he added, “needs to get on the same song sheet, and the White House needs to be backing Tillerson in everything he says.” The United States and North Korea have been engaged in a mostly secret diplomatic dance for much of the year, according to several published reports. But even before the latest round of U.S. sanctions in November, Pyongyang seemed to have gotten cold feet about the idea of returning to the negotiating table. In a closed-door briefing to the U.N. Security Council Tuesday night, U.N. Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman, who just concluded a visit to Pyongyang, said the North Korean government told him that the time is not right for such talks, according to a Security Council diplomat — though Pyongyang is open to continuing discussions with the United Nations. North Korea has sent similar messages to the United States through a number of intermediaries, including the Russians and Chinese envoy Song Tao, who visited Pyongyang in November in what one well-placed diplomat characterized as a “failed” effort to start talks. The State Department reached out to the North Koreans in May, when the State Department’s special representative for North Korea policy, Joseph Yun, traveled to Oslo, Norway, for secret talks with a senior North Korean official, Choe Hon Sui, the director-general of her foreign ministry’s North America bureau, to discuss Washington’s concerns about American detainees. The talks covered more ground than just prisoners, providing an opening for broader nuclear talks, according to current and former U.S. officials. Tillerson encouraged Yun to maintain his contacts with Choe as well as with diplomats at the North Korean mission to the United Nations to explore the possibility of reopening stalled talks. For her part, Choe signaled that North Korea had its own red line. Speaking to a group of former U.S. officials in separate meeting in Oslo, Choe said that her government would not enter into talks with the United States if Washington sought to make North Korea give up its nuclear weapons, according to a source familiar with those talks. As part of his outreach, Yun signaled to the North Koreans that Pyongyang could create an atmosphere for direct talks if they enforced a voluntary moratorium on nuclear and ballistic missile tests for 60 days, according to current and former U.S. officials. The Washington Post previously reported on Yun’s proposal. Trump followed up on November 21 by relisting North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and imposed a new round of sanctions. Before the month was over, North Korea launched its most powerful intercontinental ballistic missile ever, a monster Hwasong-15 missile capable of traversing the American mainland. But North Korea’s interest in talks had already cooled after President Trump delivered a highly provocative address in September to the U.N. General Assembly, where he threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea. The following month, North Korea’s negotiator, Choe, attended a Moscow conference on nonproliferation along experts and former U.S. officials, including Wendy Sherman, the former U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs. This time, she declined to hold any discussions with any of the Americans. Instead, she met with Russian officials, and informed them that her government was not prepared to restart nuclear talks with the United States. “Choe rejected talks when she went to Moscow in October,” said one diplomat briefed on the back-channel talks. “Kim Jong Un clearly said ‘no’ through all the diplomatic channels.” Still, Trump had not fully closed the door to diplomacy. In October, the president gave his blessing to an initiative by U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres to try a diplomatic approach, several sources said. During an October 20 White House meeting, the U.N. chief broached the idea of sending a personal envoy to Pyongyang, envisioning it as a way to calm the war of words between Trump and Kim. That meeting came about one month after North Korea’s foreign minister, Ri Yong Ho invited Guterres during the U.N. General Assembly summit to send a personal envoy to Pyongyang to begin discussions on a range of issues. Trump expressed skepticism that a fresh U.N. initiative could persuade North Korea’s leader to contain his increasingly provocative nuclear activities, but gave enough encouragement for Guterres to dispatch Feltman on a three-day trip to Pyongyang in December. When he got back, Feltman said there could “only be a diplomatic solution” in North Korea, and underscored the urgency of opening diplomatic channels to “prevent miscalculations” that could lead to war. Though Feltman told the U.N. Security Council late Tuesday that North Korea wasn’t ready for talks, all the progress that Pyongyang has made on its weapons program — and continued U.S. and U.N. sanctions — might be changing that calculus. Since it appears to have overcome many of its technical hurdles, North Korea may be ready to come to the table, said Robert Einhorn, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s arms control and nonproliferation initiative. “I think the North Koreans will wait a few days to see if this is a genuine signal from the Trump administration. They will want to see what the president has to say or tweet about it,” he said. “But they are undoubtedly getting more pressure from the Chinese, and the Trump administration has done a pretty good job of tightening the screws. They may be beginning to feel the pressure pinch.” But there are differing views inside the administration as to the prospects of diplomacy, and some officials who are skeptical of talks are more inclined to potential military action against North Korea, former officials and congressional aides said. For the moment, the White House believes the sanctions are working and it doesn’t need a full-court diplomatic press. “I think they’re satisfied with the trajectory of the pressure campaign,” said Ely Ratner of the Council on Foreign Relations. “So they’re not going to take their foot off the gas right now,” said Ratner, who was former Vice President Joe Biden’s deputy national security advisor. The question is whether there’s enough time left to pressure Pyongyang after the latest milestones in long-range missile development. “It’s unclear there’s enough runway left for the administration to do that, given how quickly the North Koreans are moving,” he said. “And it’s unclear if there’s a negotiating partner on the other side.” (Colum Lynch and Dan DeLuce, “North Korea Had Spurned Talks with U.S. Due to Latest Sanctions,” Foreign Policy, October 13, 2017)
12/14/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s answer to a question put by KCNA “as regards the fact that the U.S. is now talking about a naval blockade against the DPRK: The gang of Trump, being terrified by our accomplishment of the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force, is driving the situation on the Korean peninsula more and more close to the brink of war, acting recklessly without any sense of reason. Recently, speaking at a gathering in Florida, Trump cried out for the harshest sanctions on our country. Soon after his remarks, Haley, U.S. permanent representative to the UN who is scorned by the world as an evil woman, dared to wag her tongue about further tightening the sanctions against north Korea and utterly destroying it without realizing the meaning of words coming out of her mouth. Besides, high-ranking officials of the U.S. administration like Tillerson, U.S. secretary of State, and McMaster, national security advisor at the White House, are crying out for sea blockade against our country. The U.S. is trying to arrange a ministerial-level meeting at the United Nations Security Council on the 15th to cook up another extremely harsh “sanctions resolution” against the DPRK such as enforcing the naval blockade under the excuse of “non-proliferation.” The naval blockade the gang of Trump is trying to pursue is something that was already tried and ended in vain during the collective sanctions campaign against us undertaken by the Bush administration under the signboard of “Proliferation Security Initiative” in the early 2000s. A naval blockade is an act of wanton violation of the sovereignty and dignity of an independent state and an act of war of aggression which cannot be tolerated. The gang of Trump is taking extremely dangerous and big step towards the nuclear war by recklessly seeking the naval blockade against our country, neglecting the strategic prestige of our country that has achieved the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force. Should the U.S. and its followers try to enforce the naval blockade against our country, we will see it as an act of war and respond with merciless self-defensive counter-measures as we have warned repeatedly. The international society should increase its vigilance on the reckless moves of the U.S. trying to ignite a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula, and if the UNSC does not wish to see the Korean peninsula and the whole world plunging into a nuclear war, it should act properly in accordance with its original mission which is to preserve peace and security of the world.” (KCNA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Warns U.S. and Its Followers against Sea Blockade on DPRK,” December 14, 2017)
DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s press statement: “Japan, holding the presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) during December this year and instigated by the United States, is now trying to make an evil use of its opportunity to convene a ministerial-level meeting of UNSC on “non-proliferation” issue of the DPRK. The said meeting is none other than a desperate measure plotted by the U.S. being terrified by the incredible might of our Republic that has successfully achieved the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force, the cause of building a rocket power, through the “great November event.” If “non-proliferation” issue is to be discussed, the first countries to be brought before the court of justice are the U.S. who is the kingpin of vertical and horizontal proliferation, pouring astronomical amount of funds into the modernization of nuclear weapons and hindering in every way the denuclearization of the Middle East, and Japan who keeps more than necessary stockpile of plutonium and seeks every opportunity to produce nuclear weapons. Our possession of nuclear weapons was an inevitable self-defensive measure to defend our sovereignty and rights to existence and development from the U.S. nuclear threat and blackmail and if anyone is to blame for it, the U.S. is the very one who must be held accountable. It is also disturbing to see the UN acting like a puppet of the U.S. and dancing to its tunes instead of keeping impartiality as the lifeline in its activities, true to its mission to preserve international peace and security. It is UN of today that, while ignoring our repeated complaints to take up the issue of the provocative and aggressive joint military exercises, the most graphic manifestation of nuclear threat and blackmail of the U.S., keeps itself busy kowtowing to the U.S. that asserts sanctions and pressure against us by condemning our self-defensive measures. As we have clarified in the government statement, the development and advancement of the strategic weapon of the DPRK are entirely to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country from the U.S. imperialists’ nuclear blackmail policy and nuclear threat and to ensure the peaceful life of the people and therefore, they would not pose any threat to any country and region as long as the interests of the DPRK are not infringed upon. The DPRK, as a responsible nuclear power and a peace-loving state, will sincerely fulfill its non-proliferation obligation assumed before the international society and put in every effort to achieve the noble cause of safeguarding world peace and stability.” (KCNA, Press Statement of DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesperson,” December 14, 2017)
After more than a year of frosty relations bordering on hostile, South Korea’s leader, Moon Jae-in, pledged a “new start” in his country’s dealings with China as he met with President Xi Jinping, a re-engagement that China hopes will lead to stepped-up diplomacy on disarming North Korea. China moved to settle the dispute over the antimissile system in late October, and began to ease the unofficial trade war it had launched against Korean cars and consumer goods. But Beijing argues that the agreement was only “provisional,” and is pushing for the eventual removal of THAAD. Under pressure from the United States not to give further ground to China, Moon appears to have fallen short of pleasing Beijing on THAAD, and Xi acknowledged those lingering tensions. “China-South Korea relations experienced a setback due to the reason we all know,” he said at the meeting, according to pool reports. “I am confident the president’s visit will be an important opportunity for us to improve our relationship by paving a better way based on mutual respect and trust.” The two sides agreed before the meeting not to issue a joint statement, South Korean officials said, signaling that China was sticking to a tough position on the antimissile system. Moon expressed a desire for a new beginning in the two countries’ relationship. “I believe that trust is most important not only in a relationship between persons but also between countries,” he said at the beginning of his meeting with Xi, according to Yonhap. In an interview with the Chinese state broadcaster CCTV before leaving Seoul, Moon tried to satisfy China, saying Beijing did not need to worry about the antimissile system because South Korea would ensure that its radar did not penetrate far into Chinese territory. “We will make sure THAAD does not violate China’s security beyond its original purpose of defending South Korea against North Korean missiles,” Moon told the broadcaster. “And the U.S. has guaranteed this as well on multiple occasions.” Moon, who leans in Xi’s direction about the need for diplomacy to cool tensions on the peninsula, showed no sign of agreeing to the Chinese freeze for freeze proposal, and analysts doubted it would get traction. “I don’t think South Korea will go for it,” said Yun Sun, an analyst at the Stimson Center in Washington. “And North Korea has not agreed to it.” On the first full day of Moon’s visit, China tried to show that economic relations, at least, were on the mend. Accompanied by a large contingent of South Korean businessmen, Moon visited a trade fair at Beijing’s vast convention center yesterday where about 200 of his country’s companies exhibited their goods to an estimated 500 Chinese buyers. The show was marred by a squad of more than a dozen Chinese security guards who beat a South Korean photojournalist trying to cover Moon as he toured the booths. The journalist needed to be taken to a hospital, and the attack drew a vigorous protest from the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China. Moon’s big request to China was for Xi to attend the opening ceremony of the 2018 Olympics in Pyeongchang in early February. Concern over North Korea’s nuclear weapons tests has depressed overseas ticket sales for the Winter Games. Xi’s presence would almost guarantee that large numbers of Chinese tourists would attend. Chinese tourism, once a lucrative market for South Korea, was cut in half when the Chinese government issued advisories to travel agents to stop sending tour groups there. Chinese officials said that Beijing wanted the Winter Games to succeed as a symbol of peace in a tense region. There would still be time in the coming weeks for Xi to agree to go, a Chinese official said this week. After his visit to Beijing, Moon is scheduled to visit Hyundai Motor’s new $1 billion assembly plant in Chongqing, its fifth in China. Hyundai was one of the companies most severely hit by the government urging Chinese consumers to boycott South Korean products. (Jane Perlez, “South Korean Leader Seeks ‘New Start’ With China in Bid to End Trade War,” New York Times, December 15, 2017,
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed hope that Seoul, Washington and Tokyo would jointly conduct air drills, the leader of South Korea’s main opposition Liberty Korea Party said. “Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said it is regrettable that the Seoul government is not doing it despite his hope that the three countries conduct joint air drills in Japanese skies,” Hong Joon-pyo told reporters following his talks with Abe. (Yonhap, “Abe Hopes for Joint Seoul, Washington, Tokyo Air Drills: S. Korea’s Opposition Leader,” December 14, 2017)
China did not export any refined oil products to North Korea in October under United Nations sanctions, Voice of America reported, citing data from the Korea International Trade Association.
China’s export volume of all refined oil products such as gasoline to North Korea were marked “0” in October in the KITA data on trade between the two countries, down from $166,106 in September, VOA said. China exported $240,000 worth of other petroleum products to North Korea in October, but most of them were lubricants and items unrelated to the UN sanctions, VOA said. Russia, however, was not disclosing its October data on oil exports to North Korea, according to the VOA. (Kim So-hyun, “China Stopped Refined Oil Exports to N. Korea in Oct.: Report,” Korea Herald, December 15, 2017)
The North Korean economy is reliant on hard currency to function, especially on US dollars. … Even prior to international sanctions, North Korean banking regulations restricted how its financial institutions could reach international markets. Using a small number of foreign exchange banks, the regime created an inter-bank clearing system, effectively bottlenecking access to foreign currency reserves and international transactions. These institutions were themselves sanctioned for their role in financing the regime’s nuclear and missile programs. Reliant on continued access to foreign currency, they adapted how they accessed the international market by outsourcing large pieces of their financial infrastructure to overseas commercial networks. According to the US Department of Justice, the ensuing illicit overseas financial networks, like Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co. Ltd. and Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co. Ltd., provided pathways for North Korea to illicitly transact billions of dollars on the regime’s
behalf. … In maintaining access to international financial, commercial, and logistics networks, North Korea has had to hide its activity, and more importantly its money, using an interconnected web of networks. These networks draw together revenue from disparate illicit activity into a centralized structure that finances the system of North Korean sanctions evasion. The system makes no distinction between sources of revenue. …North Korea is reliant on a system it cannot control. Its vulnerability is economic; our leverage is financial. … The use of foreign currency within the North Korean domestic economy has become a fact of life for average North Koreans. … In November 2009, the regime revalued the North Korean Won in an attempt to suppress unofficial economic activity and inflation. It limited the amount of old money that North Korean citizens could exchange for new bills and put in place a timeframe during which these exchanges could occur. The reform’s immediate effect was to wipe out much of the savings of average North Koreans and trigger hyperinflation. …As average North Korean citizens searched for a stable way to securely store their assets and make daily purchases, they increasingly turned to foreign currency. While foreign currency had been a staple of the unofficial market economy since the early 1990’s, the reforms of 2009 were decisive in bringing its use out of the shadows and more into the formal economy. …[A] survey, conducted by the Bank of Korea, showed that after the 2009 currency reforms, 70.7 percent of respondents held 90 percent or more of their assets in US dollars or Chinese Renminbi. … To generate foreign exchange from around the world, the regime has relied on a wide array of transnational illicit schemes. These illicit networks have been highly diverse, highlighting the ingenuity and resilience of North Korean overseas networks to exploit the international market to ensure positive cash flows on the regime’s behalf. There is perhaps no better example of this than the growing use of North Korean-backed cybercrime to help raise funds. …On February 4, 2016, the Bangladesh Central Bank sent out thirty-five transfer orders, requesting that nearly $1 billion be sent out of the bank’s settlement account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Manipulating the bank’s access to SWIFT, an international financial network through which banks send financial messages, hackers stole $81 million dollars before mistakes in payment documents halted the remaining transfers. To gain access to the bank’s computer system, hackers had used malware embedded on a benign website as early as seven months before the attack and subsequently introduced engineered code capable of circumventing traditional security backstops to issue the fraudulent transfer requests. In April 2017, cyber security researchers at Kaspersky Lab used common attack signatures to link the attack to a specific North Korean cyber network: the “Lazarus Group,” … alleged to be a branch of North Korea’s premier intelligence agency Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). … If the Lazarus Group did, in fact, steal $81 million from the Bangladesh Central Bank, the subsequent laundering of the stolen money required the work of a much larger global illicit network. The proceeds were sent to accounts at Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation in the Philippines. Account holders, who were later found to have opened the accounts with false documents, withdrew the funds, converted them to Philippine pesos and consolidated the money into the account of a Chinese-Filipino businessman. The attack was planned meticulously. The transfer requests came over the Chinese New Year, ensuring that bank employees would not be at work to catch the suspicious activity. By the time regulators were able to send out alerts to freeze and repatriate the funds back to the Bangladesh Central Bank, the $81 million had been withdrawn, redeposited, and transferred through different accounts several times over. Planners had identified loopholes in Philippine anti-money laundering regulations, specifically that casinos had been exempt from reporting regulations introduced in 2013. The money was used to buy a large number of chips in VIP junket rooms at several casinos, before then disappearing. To date, only a fifth of the $81 million has
been recovered and returned to the Bangladesh Central Bank. … To be of use, any potential funds raised from the Bangladesh heist would have to find their way back to the North Korean financial system. This newly raised capital would then join funds raised from other revenue-generating organizations, both licit and illicit, in North Korea’s foreign reserve accounts. While the importance of hard currency to the regime has increased, the financial institutions tasked with the day-to-day management of these funds have faced unprecedented challenges, causing fundamental shifts in the North Korean banking sector. … Today, rather than traditional financial institutions that handle funds on behalf of their clients, North Korea’s foreign exchange banks work as large-scale accounting firms, moving money held in accounts in the name of front companies to maintain the balances of their domestic North Korean customers, including the regime itself. The US Department of the Treasury has stated that “the DPRK uses and maintains a network of financial representatives, primarily in China, who operate as agents for North Korean financial institutions.” It further stated that by operating outside of North Korea, these agents are free to “orchestrate schemes, set up front or shell companies, and manage surreptitious bank accounts to move and disguise illicit funds, evade sanctions, and finance [WMD] proliferation.” In outsourcing these financial functions, North Korean foreign exchange banks such as FTB and KKBC were able to turn to those individuals or companies that stood to profit the most from North Korea’s continued presence in international trade—the Chinese companies that were most central to their overseas business. Although China makes up over 90 percent of North Korean trade today, it has not always been this way. According to John Park, director of the Korea Working Group at the Harvard Kennedy School, the main catalyst for this shift didn’t occur until Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s 2009 visit to Pyongyang. Wen signed three agreements – under the headings of economic development, tourism, and education – that signaled to Chinese companies that it was legal to conduct commercial activities with North Korean entities and provided a loophole with respect to UN sanctions. Park states that “the loophole took the form of a clause in UN Security Council resolutions stipulating that member states are not prohibited from engaging in economic development or humanitarian activities with the DPRK. When subsequently pressed to implement sanctions more robustly, Chinese authorities claimed that the commercial interactions in question were legitimate economic development activities.” By further sanctioning the regime, Park points out, the United States had succeeded in elevating the risk for some of those doing business with North Korea, dissuading them from continuing to do so. But “other Chinese middlemen saw the elevated risk as a special business opportunity. Rather than being deterred by the elevated risk, it incentivized them.” By paying higher commission fees due to the increased risk, North Korean entities were able to motivate their Chinese counterparties to provide additional services, such as banking, effectively circumventing international sanctions. Incentivized by higher commission fees and increased price tags for illicit items, North Korean entities were able to rent more sophisticated procurement and logistics capabilities from more capable Chinese middlemen. These middlemen developed multi-purpose business partnerships with select North Korean clients that covered selling goods from the North as well as procuring illicit components in the Chinese marketplace. These sophisticated activities soon began to bring in larger contracts for the middlemen, consolidating the number of major firms that did business with the North Korean regime. By 2016, the top ten importers of North Korean goods in China controlled nearly 30 percent of trade revenue. The reasons for the success of this outsourcing are clear: 84 percent of entities designated by the US Department of the Treasury are located within North Korea or are North Korean citizens. To date, only 55 non-North Korean entities have been designated for sanctions, many of which were only designated in the past year. These more recent actions by the US Department of the Treasury have begun to reveal that even after FTB and KKBC were able to successfully offshore key components of their financial infrastructure, the system remained remarkably centralized. Disparate illicit activity and networks were shown to have been connected by a narrow structure of illicit financial proxies. Although North Korea was able to successfully offshore aspects of its financial infrastructure to companies overseas, the connected structure of its foreign exchange began to link its overseas networks. Actions taken by the US Department of Justice have revealed the relationships, including specific transactions (citing information otherwise unobtainable in the open source) that highlight the degree to which these firms interacted with each other. Chinese financial institutions like the Bank of Dandong were perfect conduits at the start of this development in outsourcing. According to the US Department of the Treasury, between May 2012 and May 2015, the Bank of Dandong conducted roughly $133.6 million in transactions through US correspondent accounts that were with or on behalf of US and UN sanctioned entities. Representatives from KKBC were present at the bank, providing a direct link between North Korean foreign exchange institutions and the Bank of Dandong, an institution that the US Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) called “a gateway for North Korea to access the US and international financial systems despite US and UN sanctions.” In its June 29, 2016 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, announcing the designation of the bank as a financial institution of primary money laundering concern, FinCEN highlighted that millions of dollars of transactions had been made on behalf of companies involved in the procurement of ballistic missile technology. However, when KKBC was sanctioned in 2009, North Korea began to adapt the way in which it interacted with financial institutions. One of KKBC’s best international gateways was one of Bank of Dandong’s minority stakeholders: Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co. Ltd. (DHID). According to a US Department of Justice indictment, DHID represented 20 percent of China-North Korea trade in 2010. … The company was a leader in the development of trade with North Korea and was headed by a Chinese national and Communist Party member, Ma Xiaohong. Ma’s operation eventually expanded to include holdings as varied as international freight and travel services, restaurants, hotels, and Chinese-North Korean joint ventures. On its website, the company described itself as a “bridge between DPRK and the world.” Documents released by the US Department of Justice indicate that when KKBC was sanctioned in 2009, bank representatives needed to find a reliable and secure way to maintain its ability to conduct transactions in US dollars. It found its solution by using DHID and its front companies. Nearly 60 percent of the 28 front companies owned by DHID were registered or purchased within two years of August 11, 2009, the day KKBC was sanctioned. Of these, only two had been incorporated or purchased prior to August 2009. By the end of 2016, the DHID global network had expanded to include 43 companies on four continents. According to the US Department of Justice, DHID helped North Korea conduct foreign trade through this elaborate network of shell and front companies, using the US financial system without detection for seven years. In September 2016, the Public Security Department of Liaoning Province announced that it was investigating DHID for “serious economic crimes” and the US Department of Justice unsealed an indictment charging DHID, Ma Xiaohong, and several other top employees with aiding KKBC and acting as a financial proxy to evade sanctions. DHID was not only a major conduit for North Korean finance, but also a regional hub for North Korean activity. One of the company’s holdings, the Chilbosan Hotel, was reported to be a command outpost for North Korean cyber activity. According to US technology firm Hewlett Packard, within China “[North Korea] maintains technical reconnaissance teams responsible for infiltration of computer networks, hacking to obtain intelligence, and planting viruses on enemy networks.” Transactions made between different overseas networks even connect global nodes of North Korea’s system of illicit international finance. Documents released by the United Nations Panel of Experts on North Korea (UN POE) in 2017 show one of DHID’s front companies, Nice Field International, received $610,000 in payments from MKP Capital. Malaysia Korea Partners (MKP), the owner of MKP Capital, is a Malaysia-based firm controlled by Han Hun Il, a reported associate of Kim Jong-un’s uncle Jang Song Thaek, who was purged in 2013. According to Lee Chol Ho, a North Korean defector who worked for Han for nine years, “When people from the [North Korean] Central Committee visited Malaysia, they only met with Han….They didn’t even bother to see the ambassador.” These same branches of the system also connected foreign exchange banks. Nice Field International also did significant business with Mingzheng International Trading Co. Ltd, which the US Department of Justice alleges was making illicit payments on behalf of the North Korean government, acting as a “front company for a covert branch of FTB,” and laundering US dollar payments. The connections between North Korea’s overseas networks, which conduct multiple types of illicit activity on behalf of different North Korean organizations, begin to reveal how deeply interconnected its overseas system is. Losing the ability to rely on a single piece of that system, such as DHID, can dramatically raise the transaction costs for multiple networks around the globe. … Using these networks, North Korean’s foreign exchange banks were able to maintain access to US dollar accounts and transact globally without detection until earlier this year. Most notably, DHID reportedly allowed KKBC to conduct over $1.3 billion in transactions, DZMM reportedly conducted over $700 million in prohibited transactions, and Bank of Dandong reportedly conducted $133 million. This money, over $2 billion dollars within a seven-year period, is not a trivial figure in an economy as small as North Korea’s. Moreover, these funds were spent to circumvent international sanctions meant to prevent North Korea from obtaining WMD’s. The same day that DZMM was sanctioned by the US Department of the Treasury for its role in managing the finances of FTB, two other Chinese companies were designated: Dandong Tianfu Trade Co. Ltd. and Jin-hou International Holding Co. Defector testimony included in the Department of Justice documents stated that DZMM was one of three “primary China-based importers of North Korean coal, all three of which followed the same general business patterns…moving coal out of North Korea and moving illegal goods—including military munitions and items—into North Korea.” These statements further detailed that the regime uses 95 percent of its foreign exchange revenue from coal for its military and WMD programs. According to trade records from 2013 to 2016, the four major Chinese companies sanctioned for North Korean ties—DHID, DZMM, Dandong Tianfu Trade Co., and Jin-Hou International Holding Co. Ltd.—were responsible for importing over 30 percent of North Korean coal over that time period. … North Korea’s overseas networks have been vital proxies for the regime and its foreign exchange system. The fact that they exist outside North Korea has provided them greater opportunities to freely transact internationally. The benefits of being entrenched within international systems of banking and trade, though, is accompanied by an inherent vulnerability to international sanctions and restrictions. In fact, since September 2016, eight large-scale Chinese trading firms have been sanctioned by the US Department of the Treasury for their roles in supporting North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. … New sanctions and actions to enforce them can change the incentive structure companies face in doing business with North Korea and cause large-scale repercussions for the regime’s foreign exchange earnings, but it will take time for these measures to impact the regime’s bottom line. The US Department of Justice has clearly accelerated its targeting of North Korea’s foreign currency income and exchange reserves. Since September 2016, it has filed civil forfeiture complaints against funds held by North Korea-linked companies, including DHID, DZMM, and Mingzheng International Trading Corporation. It has identified North Korea-linked funds in US dollar accounts at some of the world’s largest banks. In the DHID forfeiture action alone, it sued to forfeit 25 bank accounts in 12 banks, including Agricultural Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. Funds placed under civil asset forfeiture from these networks, totaling $84,364,544, represent a portion of the hard currency accounts of North Korea’s foreign exchange banks. They are vital regime assets. The Department of Justice’s seizures since September 2016 amount to three times what was frozen in 2005 from Banco Delta Asia (BDA) after the US Department of the Treasury named the Macau-based institution as a primary money laundering concern. According to retired World Bank expert Brad Babson, the $25 million frozen by Macau from BDA and the closure of its foreign reserve accounts was enough to have “an unusually effective impact.” Continued targeting of North Korea’s foreign currency accounts will allow the international community to generate additional leverage to coerce the regime into disarmament negotiations. Furthermore, as the entire system is interlinked, actions taken against nodes can lead to the identification of other parts of the network, achieving an unravelling effect and exposing the entire system. … Yet the question remains: how can members of international law enforcement bodies identify these networks to enforce the coercive economic measures of successive UN resolutions? The answer lies in following the money. Even the actions of North Korea’s premier intelligence agency, the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), are limited by their need to maintain accounts in North Korea’s foreign exchange banks. The RGB, which the US Department of the Treasury designated in August 2010, “trades in conventional arms and controls … Green Pine Associated Corporation (Green Pine), which was also identified for sanctions by the President … for exporting arms or related materiel from North Korea.” To raise hard currency for the regime, RGB and Green Pine have reportedly sold conventional weapons to countries around the world, including Syria, Egypt, and the UAE. In this respect, these weapons proliferators serve a role analogous to those of the “strategic chokepoint” trading companies, such as DHID and DZMM. Just as in the cases of DHID and DZMM, the illicit networks employed by RGB are both connected to North Korean illicit activity and to the illicit system of North Korean overseas finance. Reporting done by Reuters and the UN POE highlights the extent of the network surrounding the RGB’s use of the Malaysia-based firm Global Communications (Glocom). Although North Korean companies have been banned since 2009 from exporting arms and related material, Glocom, operating under the slogan “Anywhere, Anytime in Battlefield,” has sold radio systems meant for military and paramilitary organizations. In July 2016, customs agents interdicted an air shipment headed to Eritrea that had originated in China. The cargo of 45 boxes, bound for Eritech Computer Assembly & Communications Technology PLC, was made up of high-frequency software-defined radios, crypto-speaker microphones, GPS antennas, high-frequency whip antennas, clone cables, camouflaged rucksacks, and carry pouches. Some of the boxes were labeled Glocom, and some included material marked “made in DPR Korea.” Although Glocom maintains an office in the “Little India” neighborhood of Kuala Lumpur, no company exists under the name Global Communications in the Malaysian business registry. However, two Malaysian front companies operated by North Koreans, International Golden Services Sdn Bhd and International Global Systems Sdn Bhd, operate Glocom out of its second-floor “Little India” office. Furthermore, the UN POE shows Glocom is a front company for the North Korean firm Pan Systems Pyongyang. Both International Golden Services and Pan Systems Pyongyang are controlled by RGB agent Ryang Su Nyo, who has been involved in multiple instances of illicit activity involving the raising of hard currency for the regime. In February 2014, for example, Ryang and two other North Korean agents were detained in Kuala Lumpur International Airport for attempting to smuggle $450,000 in cash through customs. When questioned, the trio told Malaysian authorities that the funds belonged to the North Korean embassy. Through Pan Systems Pyongyang and under the alias Wonbang Trading Co., Ryang may also be involved in revenue generation through RGB coal exports. The UN POE has stated that an investigation is ongoing to determine whether this company is in fact Wonbong Trading Co., a leading North Korean coal exporter run by the RGB. Ryang is reportedly an employee of the RGB’s Liaison Office 519, an organization that specializes in overseas operations to conduct arms sales and weapons procurement. In the past, Ryang’s Pan Systems Pyongyang had transacted with multiple organizations related to North Korean weapons procurement. According to media reports, the organization has even sold arms to Somali pirates. Between 2011 and 2015, Pan Systems Pyongyang had regular transactions with the sanctioned North Korean weapons proliferator KOMID. In 2010 and 2013 the company also made transactions to the Hong Kong-based company Greenpine International, whose sole shareholder, Kim Song Il, was arrested in Hawaii attempting to purchase night vision goggles from a federal agent. Information provided to C4ADS by someone with knowledge of the Glocom network indicates that one of the RGB representatives, Kim Chang Hyok, met with an Egyptian general in 2011. Reporting by the Washington Post confirmed that a seized shipment of $23 million worth of rocket propelled grenades was found aboard the North Korean ship the Jie Shun, which was purchased by the Egyptian government. Estimates claim North Korea raises between $100 and $300 million annually through the sale of arms and related material. To be of use to the regime, funds generated by Ryang and Glocom’s illicit military equipment sales, like those stolen from the Bangladesh Central Bank, would need to be placed within the North Korean foreign exchange system. To access the international financial system and procure arms and related material, Pan Systems Pyongyang and its front companies used an extensive network of offshore bank accounts. These accounts, in both dollars and euros, were operated by Daedong Credit Bank (DCB), a sanctioned subsidiary of Korea Daesong Bank (KDB) and third arm of North Korean’s foreign exchange system. Since 1998, DCB had helped Ryang to move money in and out of North Korea—between Pan Systems and more than 20 companies on the Chinese mainland, in Hong Kong, and in Singapore. … Like the North Korean regime, the RGB is reliant on access to foreign currency to function. Although it is the country’s main foreign intelligence agency, large pieces of RGB’s internal infrastructure are built to ensure positive cash flow through a diversified set of illicit activities: Glocom using sales of military equipment, the Lazarus group through hacking, and Wonbang Trading Co. Ltd. through sales of coal. Glocom’s ties to the foreign exchange system through accounts at DCB illustrate the same institutional bottleneck seen in various other North Korean networks. The system is fundamentally interconnected and vulnerable. The success of North Korea’s illicit activities is contingent on a range of foreign entities providing key services, from passing through payments to providing logistics, none of which North Korea can control. However, it is an environment that the international community does control. By levying fines, denying access to the US financial system, seizing assets, and filing indictments, it is possible to expose and disrupt this system. It is imperative to follow the money. (C4ADS and Sejong Institute, The Forex Effect: U.S. Dollars, Overseas Networks, and Illicit North Korea Finance, December 2017)
12/15/17:
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson urged North Korea, for the second time this week, to enter negotiations and give up its nuclear weapons. Speaking at the United Nations Security Council in a session called for foreign ministers, Tillerson said the United States asks that any talks be preceded by a “sustained cessation of North Korea’s threatening behavior.” Tillerson did not repeat an assertion he made Tuesday that there are no preconditions to having talks. He said the ultimate goal must be the “complete, verifiable and irreversible abandonment of its nuclear weapons programs.” That position could preclude any negotiations. Pyongyang has been adamant it will never even consider abandoning its nuclear weapons program, which it regards as a deterrent against a U.S. invasion designed to oust the regime. North Korea’s ambassador to the U.N., Ja Song Nam, joined the Security Council session in a rare appearance. The Security Council meeting was called amid rising concerns the world is on the brink of nuclear conflict. “The worst possible thing that could happen is for us all to sleepwalk into a war that might have very dramatic circumstances,” U.N. Secretary General António Guterres said yesterday. In Russia, President Vladimir Putin warned yesterday that the United States should not further aggravate North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. ((Carol Morello, “Tillerson Offers Olive Branch to North Korea If It Returns to talks,” Washington Post, December 15, 2017)
Tillerson: “…Each UN member state must fully implement all existing UN Security Council resolutions. For those nations who have not done so, or who have been slow to enforce Security Council resolutions, your hesitation calls into question whether your vote is a commitment to words only, but not actions. For countries who have not taken action, I urge you to consider your interests, your allegiances, and your values in the face of this grave and global threat. We believe that more can and must be done beyond enforcing the minimum requirements of the Security Council resolutions directed at the DPRK. Last spring, the United States initiated a peaceful pressure campaign of economic and diplomatic sanctions against North Korea, with the intent of setting conditions for North Korea to engage in serious negotiations toward the complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment of its nuclear weapons programs. Our resolve to continue this campaign is even greater today. Over the past year, many allies and partners of the United States have joined our campaign, going beyond mere compliance with the Security Council resolutions. We ask these nations to continue to increase pressure through unilateral action. Doing so will further isolate North Korea politically and economically, cutting off support and funds for its unlawful nuclear and missile programs. We particularly call on Russia and China to increase pressure, including going beyond full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions. Continuing to allow North Korean laborers to toil in slave-like conditions inside Russia in exchange for wages used to fund nuclear weapons programs calls into question Russia’s dedication as a partner for peace. Similarly, as Chinese crude oil flows to North Korean refineries, the United States questions China’s commitment to solving an issue that has serious implications for the security of its own citizens.” (Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, Remarks at the United Nations Security Council Ministerial Meeting on DPRK, December 15, 2017)
Tillerson: MODERATOR: Conor Finnegan, ABC News. Q: Mr. Secretary, you’ve previously said that a precondition to talks with North Korea is the regime agreeing to give up its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. On Tuesday, you said that wasn’t realistic. And today, you didn’t even mention the issue at all, despite what was in your prepared remarks. Does it remain a precondition for the United States and are you and President Trump on the same page on whether and when to engage in talks? TILLERSON: The President’s policy on North Korea is quite clear, and there is no daylight at all between the President’s policy and the pursuit of that policy. And the President, I think, has been very clear that we are going to lead this pressure campaign, we’re going to unite the international community, and we’re going to keep the pressure as much as we can and increase it where possible. Most recently, the President called President Xi personally and asked him for China to cut the oil supplies off to North Korea to increase this pressure. That is intended to lead to diplomatic talks. In the meantime, the President has been very clear: Militarily, we are going to be prepared should something go wrong. And our military is prepared. With respect to the talks, the pre – we are not going to accept preconditions. You heard others who have called for a freeze for freeze. We do not accept a freeze for freeze as a precondition to talks. We do not accept any relaxing of the sanctions regime as a precondition of talks. We do not accept a resumption of humanitarian assistance as a precondition of talks. So we are not going to accept preconditions for these talks, but as I indicated in my remarks, our communication channels remain open. North Korea knows they’re open; they know where the door is; they know where to walk through that door when they want to talk.” (Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, Press Availability at the United Nations, December 15, 2017)
“It’s very hard to discern what their intent is without, as I said, having a real dialogue,” Joseph Yun, U.S. Special Representative on North Korea policy, said of the reclusive regime. “We are open to dialogue. And we hope they will agree to have a dialogue,” he told reporters in Bangkok. It is necessary to exercise both “direct diplomacy as well as sanctions” to rein in the pariah state’s nuclear program, he added. Yun is in Bangkok as part of a December 11-15 trip that also included a stop in Japan, as Washington seeks to shore up regional support for its “maximum pressure” campaign. Tillerson said earlier this week, Washington was ready to negotiate with the North without preconditions, following a “period of calm.” When asked whether Pyongyang would need to meet any specific or even minimum prerequisites before a dialogue could begin, Yun said: “My boss’s statement… addresses that. I think we have to start, and he mentioned we are open to dialogue, and let’s see how they respond.” (AFP, “U.S. Diplomat Says ‘Real Dialogue’ Needed with N. Korea,” December 15, 2017)
U.N. Sec-Gen: Mr. President, allow me to first thank Japan, and thank you personally, for convening this meeting. I would also like to acknowledge and welcome the many Ministers and other representatives around this table, as well as the participation of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in this important meeting. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is the most tense and dangerous peace and security issue in the world today. I am deeply concerned by the risk of military confrontation, including as a result of unintended escalation or miscalculation. I know that the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs briefed the Security Council earlier this week on his recent visit to the DPRK. I will not repeat what he said, but I want to note that it was the first in-depth political exchange of views between the United Nations Secretariat and officials in Pyongyang in almost eight years. His visit came at the end of a difficult period. In 2017, the DPRK conducted activities related to its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes at an alarming and accelerated pace. On September 3rd, it [conducted] its sixth nuclear explosive test, involving what it claimed was a “two-stage thermo-nuclear weapon”. This test caused a seismic event of magnitude 6.1. Over the year, the DPRK conducted 20 ballistic missile launches. This has included its first tests of two intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, as well as tests of new medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. In September, two Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missiles overflew Japan. No aviation or maritime safety notifications were given for any of these launches. The International Atomic Energy Agency remains unable to access the DPRK to verify the status of its nuclear programme. The Agency monitors developments through satellite imagery. At the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, it has observed signatures consistent with the operation of the plutonium production reactor and reported centrifuge enrichment facility. The Agency also continues to observe indications of ongoing mining, milling and concentration activities at the Pyongsan uranium mine and Pyongsan uranium concentration plant. The DPRK remains the only country to continue to break the norm against nuclear testing. Its actions show blatant disregard for the will and resolutions of the Security Council and undermines the international norm against nuclear testing and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Security Council resolution 2375, adopted in September, includes the strongest sanctions ever imposed on the DPRK. I reiterate my call on the DPRK leadership to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions and allow space for the resumption of dialogue on denuclearization and sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula.
While all concerned seek to avoid an accidental escalation leading to conflict, the risk is being multiplied by misplaced over-confidence, dangerous narratives and rhetoric, and the lack of communication channels. It is time to re-establish and strengthen communication channels, including inter-Korean and military to military channels. This is critical to lower the risk of miscalculation or misunderstanding and reduce tensions in the region. Any military action would have devastating and unpredictable consequences. The unity of the Security Council is an essential instrument to achieve the goal of denuclearization and creates the space for diplomatic initiatives aimed at achieving it in a peaceful manner. The Security Council’s call in resolution 2375 is united: “to further work to reduce tensions so as to advance the prospects for a comprehensive settlement” …. expressing “its desire for a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the situation” … and “welcoming efforts by Council members as well as other Member States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue.” The Secretariat and I are your partner in this effort. My good offices remain always available. I believe the United Nations Secretariat adds strategic value in three key areas. First, impartiality. Second, the voice and norms, values and principles for peaceful and diplomatic solutions, in line with international law. Third, offering channels of communication with all parties. The Organization is a key venue where all six parties are represented and can interact to narrow differences in understanding and promote confidence building measures. As Secretary-General, I commit to protecting and strengthening these three areas. Security Council unity behind this effort is essential. I welcome the Council’s humanitarian and human rights concerns. The Secretariat has consistently conveyed the importance of disassociating the peace and security situation from the humanitarian imperative. Seventy per cent of the population of the DPRK is categorized as food insecure and 40 percent are malnourished. The 2017 DPRK Humanitarian Needs and Priorities document calls for $114 million to meet urgent requirements. This is only 30 per cent funded. I ask all Member States, particularly those around this table, to carefully consider the humanitarian principles that underpin our work. The people of the DPRK need generosity and help. Not long from now, athletes will gather in Pyeongchang for the Winter Olympics. I express my sincerest hope that the DPRK will take part. As the General Assembly has recognized, these Games can foster an atmosphere of peace, development, tolerance and understanding on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. We need to spread and deepen that spirit of hope and possibility. Diplomatic engagement is the only pathway to sustainable peace and denuclearization. We must do everything we can to reach that objective – and avoid a level of danger that would be unpredictable in its trajectory and catastrophic in its consequences.” (U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guteres, Remarks to the Security Council on Non-Proliferation/DPRK, December 15, 2017)
12/16/17:
Visiting ex-White House chief strategist Steve Bannon lauded Prime Minister Abe Shinzo for his Trump-like effort to infuse Japan with a spirit of nationalism while unleashing a volley of scathing criticism against what he called the “mainstream media,” likening them to “running dogs” with a globalist agenda. Bannon, who was in Tokyo over the weekend to attend a gathering of conservatives, said Japan was on the right track under Abe, whom he called a “Trump before Trump.” “He talked about a nation’s pride, a nation’s destiny, a nation taking control of its future,” Bannon said when talking about Abe in his speech at the Japanese Conservative Political Action Conference 2017, co-hosted by the Japanese Conservative Union and the American Conservative Union. As such, Bannon, who is now head of the right-wing news website Breitbart News, credited Abe for trying to “re-instill the spirit of nationalism” and for not shying away from discussing “vital” issues including Japan’s “rearmament.” “Japan has every opportunity to seize its destiny, to re-establish its national identity (and) in true partnership with the United States, reverse what the elites have allowed to happen,” he said. He added it is not a “full-blown conclusion” yet that Japan has to keep languishing under the shadow of a rising China. Bannon’s attack on those who he referred to as “elites” and a “nullification project” that he claims is being led by the mainstream media, both overseas and in Japan, was another recurring theme in the blistering speech he delivered Sunday. “The mainstream media, liberal media, remember, they are the running dogs of the globalist. They are a propaganda machine,” Bannon said, quoting a source in Japan as telling him that the Japanese news coverage of U.S. politics makes it sound as if Trump will be impeached “tomorrow morning.” “The ‘hobbits,’ ‘deplorables,’ and the forgotten men and women that put him in office in November 2016 will never allow” him to be ousted, Bannon said, as core Trump supporters are often called by their political opponents. “They will only be there for him to make sure he wins a glorious re-election,” he said, eliciting a burst of applause. On trade, Bannon backed Trump’s controversial decision to pull out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, even though withdrawing from the multinational deal amounted to the U.S. essentially spoiling what would have been a perfect “China-containing project,” as freelance journalist Taro Kimura put it during his joint appearance with Bannon. In response, Bannon called the TPP an “ill-defined, generalized” agreement that the U.S. cannot get into anymore, and clarified Trump’s “America First” slogan as meaning an “America in partnership.” “If the Japanese intelligentsia is sitting around and waiting for us to re-hit the bid on TPP, it’s not going to happen.” Referring to joint military exercise between the U.S. Navy and the Self-Defense Forces, Bannon said “there is not a finer group of people” than the SDF. “If we come together as friends and partners, (sunlight) opens up ahead of us,” he said, referring to U.S. allies in Asia, including Japan, South Korea, India and Singapore. (Osaki Tomohiro, “Former Trump Strategist Bannon Praises Abe’s Agenda,” Japan Times, December 17, 2017)
Sanctions aimed at punishing the North Korean regime are hampering the ability of aid groups to operate inside the country, triggering warnings that the international campaign is harming ordinary North Koreans. Difficulties in obtaining supplies, including medical equipment, and in transferring money to fund aid programs could have a direct impact on health and nutrition levels throughout North Korea, aid groups say. “We need to deal with the nuclear problem, but we need to properly ponder our means for achieving that goal,” Tomás Ojea Quintana, the U.N. special rapporteur on North Korean human rights, said in an interview in Tokyo. About 70 percent of the North Korean population is already categorized as “food insecure,” meaning constantly struggling against hunger, and growth stunting occurs in 1 in 4 children. The sanctions could increase the levels of food insecurity and the incidence of acute malnutrition among children. “These are not just statistics. This is reality in the DPRK,” Quintana said, using the abbreviation for North Korea’s official name. “It’s my responsibility to remind the Security Council that they should develop a comprehensive assessment of the possible impact of their sanctions,” he said. “What is the concrete impact on humanitarian agencies working inside North Korea?” The U.N. World Food Program, UNICEF, the World Health Organization and the U.N. Development Program all have operations in North Korea. A small number of humanitarian agencies based in the United States and elsewhere provide food, medicines and agricultural assistance from bases outside the country. But the waves of multilateral and direct U.S. sanctions that have been imposed on Kim Jong Un’s regime have now made operations so difficult that some agencies are pulling out. Save the Children has shut down its operations in Pyongyang, billing the move as a “temporary suspension.” “U.S. and international humanitarian NGOs working in North Korea are experiencing death by a thousand cuts,” said Keith Luse, executive director of the Washington-based National Committee on North Korea, which includes many humanitarian agencies among its members. “These sanctions were not intended for them, but they have ended up being victims of the international sanctions regime,” Luse said. At a U.N. Security Council meeting December 15, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that it was the responsibility of the North Korean regime to care for its own people. “The regime could feed and care for women, children and ordinary people of North Korea if it chose the welfare of its people over weapons development,” Tillerson said. “It can reverse course, give up its unlawful nuclear weapons program, and join the community of nations, or it can continue to condemn its people to poverty and isolation,” he said. The difficulties have mounted as the crackdown has broadened, from “smart sanctions” designed to cut off parts and funding for the nuclear weapons program to more general measures that are starting to look like a trade embargo. Sanctions imposed in September through the Security Council, at the United States’ instigation, banned North Korean exports of seafood, garments and coal, adding to previous prohibitions on commodities. Japan, which holds the rotating presidency of the Security Council, is urging other member states to cut off humanitarian aid to North Korea. The campaign is having a tangible impact. The British government announced that it would no longer send assistance to North Korea. “We will use whatever means we have to make clear our displeasure at the reckless provocations from Kim Jong Un,” Mark Field, the British minister of state for Asia, told Yonhap in Seoul last month. The South Korean government, which has vowed not to let political considerations affect humanitarian decisions, has not delivered on its September pledge to give $8 million to the World Food Program and UNICEF for children and pregnant women. Seoul was still “in consultation” with the two agencies, said Unification Ministry spokeswoman Choi Ji-seon. The relatively few aid agencies still working to help North Koreans face increasing bureaucratic challenges to operate in a country replete with difficulties. The sanctions were becoming a “serious concern” for U.N. agencies operating in North Korea and could “hamper assistance and relief activities,” Tapan Mishra, the U.N. resident coordinator in Pyongyang, wrote in letters to U.N. officials at the end of October. “Crucial relief items, including medical equipment and drugs, have been held up for months despite being equipped with the required paperwork affirming that they are not on the list of sanctions items,” he wrote in the letters, which were first reported by NK News, a specialist website. Items that had been blocked included anesthesia machines used for emergency operations and digital X-ray machines needed to diagnose tuberculosis. American aid agencies must get licenses from the Commerce or Treasury departments to send goods needed for their work into North Korea and now are required to get special dispensation to airfreight time-sensitive equipment, such as medical supplies, because Air Koryo, North Korea’s national carrier, is under sanction. “It’s all very tricky and new for us,” said one American humanitarian worker, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because sensitive negotiations were ongoing. “It’s been weeks and months of back-and-forth and talking to lawyers. It’s very complex and challenging, but if we don’t do it, we can’t continue.” Chinese customs officials are also cracking down on shipments to North Korea — and to a surprising extent, given Beijing’s previous halfhearted implementation of international sanctions. They have become stricter about shipments, asking for detailed inventories, including lists of manufacturers’ names and materials used in every item. A container of wheelchairs sent by a South Korean aid agency was blocked by China, as were water purification tablets meant for flood victims, according to people with knowledge of the incidents. A Pyongyang-based humanitarian worker said there were also “self-imposed sanctions” by suppliers in China. “Chinese suppliers who had been sending us raw materials we need for our projects have just suddenly disappeared,” the worker said. “They’re not doing anything that’s banned by sanctions, but they seem to have decided that it’s not worth the exposure or the risk to their reputations.” Meanwhile, Chinese banks are refusing to handle any money related to North Korea, say humanitarian workers who are trying to wire money to Chinese suppliers of medical equipment for use inside North Korea — even when the supplier is Chinese-owned. While foreign journalists invited to North Korea see the impressive construction projects in the capital, life is very different in the rest of the country, regular visitors say.
“It’s going to be the people who are the most vulnerable, the people outside Pyongyang, who will suffer,” said Kee Park, an American neurosurgeon who performs operations in North Korea. The sanctions on the fishing, garment and coal industries, coupled with South Korea’s decision to close a joint factory complex that employed more than 50,000 North Koreans, will deprive many people of their incomes in an economy that is increasingly market-based, Park said. “Sanctions are designed to hurt so that the government will change its policy,” he said. “But they’re hurting the wrong people.” (Anna Fifield, “Sanctions Hit Humanitarian Aid in N. Korea,” Washington Post, December 17, 2017, p. A-10)
When the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un celebrated the launch of a powerful new missile last month, he was surrounded by a group of top scientists and officials. State media did not identify them, but they have all been seen with Kim before. These men – known by nicknames such as the “nuclear duo” and the “missile quartet” – have built an intercontinental ballistic missile that appears capable of hitting any city in the United States, an extraordinary scientific achievement for the world’s most isolated country. At only 33, Kim has been ruthless about consolidating power, executing scores of senior officials, including his own uncle. “We have never heard of him killing scientists,” said Choi Hyun-kyoo, a senior researcher in South Korea who runs NK Tech, a database of North Korean scientific publications. “He is someone who understands that trial and error are part of doing science.” Analysts are still trying to explain how North Korea managed to overcome decades of international sanctions and make so much progress so quickly. But it is clear the nation has accumulated a significant scientific foundation despite its backward image. “They are already pretty sophisticated in metallurgy, mechanical engineering, and to some extent chemistry,” all areas tied to the nation’s civilian and military needs, said Joshua Pollack, a senior research associate at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, California. North Korea has imported scientific papers and journals from Japan for decades. And when it sends students abroad, it orders them to copy scientific literature and bring it home, said Michael Madden, who runs the North Korea Leadership Watch website. The internet has also been a gold mine for the North. While the state blocks public access, it allows elite scientists to scour the web for open-source data under the watch of security agents. The North has also built digital libraries of approved material that are accessible across the country. North Korea funnels its top science students into military projects. Those selected for the nuclear and missile program are relocated from their hometowns and allowed to return for visits only with government minders, according to defectors and analysts. But they are also given better food rations — and access to weapons designs and components obtained by the nation’s spies and hackers, who have focused on the former Soviet republics. Scientists and engineers also enjoyed special privileges under Kim’s grandfather, Kim Il-sung, as he struggled to rebuild North Korea from the ruins of the Korean War. He embraced those trained in Japan when Korea was a Japanese colony and later sent hundreds of students to the Soviet Union, East Germany and other socialist states. One of them was So Sang-guk, a nuclear scientist who emerged as a key figure in the nation’s nuclear program but seems to have retired. Since taking power, Kim Jong-un appears to have overseen a generational shift at the top of the weapons program, elevating a group of scientists and officials about whom little is known. He tends to assign officials to different projects, letting them compete for his attention and favor. But analysts have identified six figures who have repeatedly appeared alongside Kim at key moments — four tied to missile development and two associated with nuclear tests. Two members of the “missile quartet” are scientists, according to state media. 1 Jang Chang-ha is 53 and president of the Academy of National Defense Science, and 2 Jon Il-ho, 61, is commonly described as an “official in the field of scientific research.” Ri Pyong-chol appears to be the quartet’s highest-ranking member. A former air force commander, he serves as first deputy director of the ruling Workers’ Party’s munitions industry department. Kim Jong-sik, 49, first began appearing with Kim Jong-un in February 2016 and has an engineering background. His rise has coincided with an acceleration of test launches, but he and Mr. Ri did not attend last month’s launch. Ri Hong-sop, the director of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute, appears to be a leading figure in the nuclear program. He has been blacklisted by the United Nations since 2009. Hong Sung-mu, the other member of the “nuclear duo,” is a former chief engineer at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, the birthplace of the North’s nuclear weapons program. North Korea has also recruited scientists from the former Soviet Union, offering salaries as high as $10,000 per month, according to Lee Yun-keol, a defector who runs the North Korea Strategic Information Service Center in Seoul and has studied the history of the North’s nuclear program. In 1992, a plane carrying 64 rocket scientists from Moscow was stopped before departing for North Korea. It is not clear how many, if any, former Soviet scientists made it to North Korea in the decades since. Theodore A. Postol, a professor emeritus of science, technology and international security at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said the North has “this fantastic record for flying rockets the first time and having them succeed.” “We think it’s because they had rocket motors and designs that were basically Russian designs, and they had the expertise of Russian engineers who knew how to solve the problems,” he said. Little is left to chance in propaganda related to the weapons program. Even the smallest of details can be laden with significance. “By launching rockets and treating scientists like stars, Kim Jong-un gives his people a sense of progress,” Mr. Lee said. “It’s not just a military project but also a political stratagem.” Missile experts were shown sharing cigarettes with Mr. Kim after last month’s missile launch — an almost unimaginable privilege in a nation where he is portrayed as a godlike figure. After successful tests, Kim is sometimes even shown embracing his scientists, some of whom can be seen weeping. (Choe Sang-hun, Motoko Rich, Audrey Carlsen, and Natalie Reneau, “North Korea Leader’s Heroes: His Rocket Scientists,” New York Times, December 17, 2017, p. 8)
12/18/17:
President Donald Trump vowed to take “all necessary steps” to compel North Korea to denuclearize as he unveiled a new national security strategy on Monday at the White House. Trump said in an address that the campaign of maximum pressure on North Korea has resulted in the toughest-ever sanctions on the regime, but “there is much more work to do.” He continued, “America and its allies will take all necessary steps to achieve a denuclearization and ensure that this regime cannot threaten the world.” The situation, he said “will be taken care of,” adding that the United States has “no choice” in the matter. “A nation that is not prepared to win a war is a nation not capable of preventing a war,” said Trump, as he called for a modernization and massive buildup of the U.S. military. Trump said he carried the United States’ message to Saudi Arabia, Poland, the United Nations General Assembly in New York and South Korea, referring to it as “the seat of democracy on the Korean Peninsula,” as he recalled his trips to 13 countries over 11 months in office. The strategy unveiled by Trump focused on four pillars buttressing his “America first” vision, which included protecting U.S. citizens and the homeland, promoting prosperity, preserving peace through strength and advancing American influence in the world. A newly released National Security Strategy report described North Korea as a “ruthless dictatorship without regard for human dignity” that “starves its own people,” spending hundreds of millions of dollars on its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. “We remain ready to respond with overwhelming force to North Korean aggression and will improve options to compel denuclearization of the peninsula,” the 55-page document stated. H. R. McMaster, the White House national security adviser, previously raised the possibility of “a preventive war” against North Korea, and in an interview with MSNBC in August said that Trump was “not going to tolerate” Pyongyang being able to threaten the United States. The report, however, took a more restrained tone in that it did not make mention of a preventive war, or a pre-emptive strike, against the North, nor directly refer to “military options.” “The longer we ignore threats from countries determined to proliferate and develop weapons of mass destruction, the worse such threats become, and the fewer defensive options we have,” it continued. A 2002 NSS report by the George W. Bush administration emphasized that the United States maintains an “option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security,” though it was more focused on a war against terrorists than North Korea. (Sarah Kim, “Trump’s Security Policy Pledges a No-Nukes North,” JoongAng Ilbo, December 20, 2017)
NSS: “[T]he dictatorships of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran are determined to destabilize regions, threaten Americans and our allies, and brutalize their own people.Access to technology empowers and emboldens otherwise weak states. North Korea—a country that starves its own people—has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that could threaten our homeland. …North Korea seeks the capability to kill millions of Americans with nuclear weapons. …As missiles grow in numbers, types, and effectiveness, to include those with greater ranges, they are the most likely means for states like North Korea to use a nuclear weapon against the United States. North Korea is also pursuing chemical and biological weapons which could also be delivered by missile. …The United States is deploying a layered missile defense system focused on North Korea and Iran to defend our homeland against missile attacks.This system will include the ability to defeat missile threats prior to launch. Enhanced missile defense is not intended to undermine strategic stability or disrupt longstanding strategic relationships with Russia or China. …North Korea is ruled as a ruthless dictatorship without regard for human dignity. For more than 25 years, it has pursued nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in defiance of every commitment it has made. Today, these missiles and weapons threaten the United States and our allies. The longer we ignore threats from countries determined to proliferate and develop weapons of mass destruction, the worse such threats become, and the fewer defensive options we have. …In Northeast Asia, the North Korean regime is rapidly accelerating its cyber, nuclear, and ballistic missile programs. North Korea’s pursuit of these weapons poses a global threat that requires a global response. Continued provocations by North Korea will prompt neighboring countries and the United States to further strengthen security bonds and take additional measures to protect themselves. And a nuclear-armed North Korea could lead to the proliferation of the world’s most destructive weapons across the Indo-Pacifi c region and beyond. U.S. allies are critical to responding to mutual threats, such as North Korea, and preserving our mutual interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Our alliance and friendship with South Korea, forged by the trials of history, is stronger than ever. We welcome and support the strong leadership role of our critical ally, Japan. …We will maintain a forward military presence capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating any adversary. We will strengthen our long-standing military relationships and encourage the development of a strong defense network with our allies and partners. For example, we will cooperate on missile defense with Japan and South Korea to move toward an area defense capability. We remain ready to respond with overwhelming force to North Korean aggression and will improve options to compel denuclearization of the peninsula.” (White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, December 18, 2017)
12/19/17:
McMaster: “NORAH O’DONNELL: Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster is the President’s National Security Advisor, he helped in crafting this document, he joins us now from the White House. …NORAH: Thank you. Let me just ask you about a bit of news this morning. North Korea has rejected Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s proposal for talks without preconditions. Does that mean the military option is the only one left? MCMASTER: No, what we’re doing is really applying maximum pressure to North Korea to convince Kim Jong Un that this is a dead end, this pursuit of nuclear weapons and an intercontinental ballistic missile — long range ballistic missile which of course poses a grave danger to the whole world. So what you’ve seen is an effort led by the President worldwide really though to isolate that regime, to cut off not just what is restricted by the current national — the current UN Security Council resolutions but to do more. The President has asked all nations to cut off all trade with this rogue regime which you see has never met a weapon it didn’t use or proliferate or sell to somebody else. You saw that with the cyberattacks you just discussed and you saw it with the murder of Kim Jong Un’s brother in a public airport with a banned nerve agent. So this is a regime that can’t get this — this destructive capability. NORAH: One of the things that I’ve noticed is the President spoke with Russian President Putin several times in the last couple of weeks and yet Russia has increased its trade and its oil exports to North Korea. Did the President specifically ask Putin to stop that? MCMASTER: Yes, the President did ask President Putin to do more. He wants all nations to do more and it just doesn’t make sense that Russia would increase trade and alleviate any pressure on the North Korean regime. Of course, North Korea poses a grave direct threat to all nations including China and Russia, but what happens when North Korea gets this capability? What if other nations in the region arm in this way and that’s going to be even more destabilizing and of course, as I mentioned, North Korea has never met a weapon it didn’t try to sell to somebody else. ANTHONY MASON: So General, you’re saying that there’s — is there any way in which the US can coexist with a nuclear North Korea? MCMASTER: Anthony, I don’t think we can’t tolerate that risk. The world can’t tolerate that risk. I mean, if North Korea has a nuclear weapon, I mean, who are you going to try to prevent getting one? Look at the behavior of this regime, the hostility of this regime to the whole world. GAYLE KING: You know, President Trump and Secretary Rex Tillerson have had some high profile disagreements. Does that undermine Rex Tillerson’s capability while he’s traveling overseas? MCMASTER: No, the President has made very clear that on North Korea for example, now is not the time to talk. And what he means is, there can’t be negotiations under these current conditions. The north has to show initial steps toward denuclearization and the reason for this is previous approaches to negotiating with North Korea have failed miserably. What the regime does is they enter into negotiations, all the while they continue these very destructive programs, these talks often times end in a — in a weak agreement and then North Korea immediately violates that agreement. The problem is now that their programs have advanced so far we don’t have time to do that again and so we can’t repeat the failed pattern of the past.” (Rebecca Shabad, “H.R. McMaster Says Trump Administration Will Confront Russia’s ‘Destabilizing Behvior,’” CBS News, December 19, 2017)
The Trump administration formally accused North Korea of creating the WannaCry cyberattack that briefly paralyzed the British health system and placed ransomware on computers in dozens of countries around the world. President Trump’s homeland security adviser, Thomas P. Bossert, wrote in an op-ed published in The Wall Street Journal that the conclusion was “based on evidence” that he did not disclose. He suggested that the United States would act against North Korea — beyond the sanctions now being imposed for its rapid expansion of its nuclear weapons program, writing, “When we must, the U.S. will act alone to impose costs and consequences for cybermalfeasance.” The New York Times reported in May that North Korea was the leading suspect in the attack, which encrypted hard drives on hundreds of thousands of computers and demanded the payment of ransom to unlock the data. Later, British officials reported that their forensic evidence and intelligence pointed to Pyongyang, and Bossert wrote that in recent days, Microsoft and other companies that track major threats have closed pathways that the North’s army of hackers could use for similar breaches. Still, the assertion by the administration, which officials said would be supported at a White House news conference tomorrow, was notable for three reasons. It came almost three years to the week since President Barack Obama, appearing in the White House press room, accused North Korea’s leadership of mounting a similarly sophisticated cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment. The North was enraged that Sony was releasing a comedy, “The Interview,” envisioning a C.I.A.-ordered assassination of Kim Jong-un, the country’s young leader. That was the first time the United States had accused another nation of a direct, destructive online intrusion on an American target. But the decision to name the North also stands in stark contrast to how Trump has dealt with evidence that Russian hackers, under orders from President Vladimir V. Putin, organized the attack on the Democratic National Committee and the information warfare campaign that was meant to influence the 2016 election. Mr. Trump has often dismissed the intelligence finding that Russia was behind the hacking, declaring last month, “Putin said he did not do what they said he did.” It is the same intelligence agencies — and some of the government’s same experts — that built the case against North Korea, according to members of the intelligence community who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the investigation. But the third, and perhaps most delicate, element of the WannaCry attack revolves around a fact that Bossert did not address in his op-ed: The North exploited vulnerabilities in software developed by the division of the National Security Agency that builds the United States’ cyberweapons. The code pulled off networks and computers compromised by WannaCry appears to have its roots in what the agency formerly called the Tailored Access Operations division, which devised online breaches. Once it was clear the code had been stolen, the National Security Agency rushed to contain the damage, asking Microsoft to build a “patch” in its operating systems to prevent the attacks. But the agency has never talked about the group that stole the computer code, called the Shadow Brokers, which many officials believe is operating on behalf of the Russian government. But Bossert and his deputy, Rob Joyce, who formerly ran the Tailored Access Operations, have argued that it is the perpetrator of the attacks, not the United States government, that must take all of the responsibility for the damage it has wreaked. “The consequences and repercussions of WannaCry were beyond economic,” Bossert wrote. “The malicious software hit computers in the U.K.’s health care sector particularly hard, compromising systems that perform critical work. These disruptions put lives at risk.” The assertion by the White House came only hours after Trump published his new national security strategy, which calls for pushing back on states that sponsor cyberactivity. And even some alumni of the Obama administration now agree that they often underreacted to a range of digital threats, including Iran’s 2012 attacks on American banks, the hacking at Sony and the effort by Russia to intervene in the election. Until now, North Korea’s cyberstrikes have prompted almost no punishment. Bossert seems determined to change that, and he wrote about elements of a new digital strategy that suggests that the Trump administration will be more aggressive in alerting manufacturers to flaws found in their software. But he has been vague about what kind of actions might be taken against those who initiate cyberattacks. Robert Hannigan, the former director of Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters, said last month that in the realm of digital breaches, North Korea had benefited from being underestimated. “Because they are such a mix of the weird and absurd and medieval and highly sophisticated, people didn’t take it seriously,” he said. “How can such an isolated, backward country have this capability? Well, how can such an isolated backward country have this nuclear ability?” (David E. Sanger, “U.S. Accuses North Korea of Cyberattack on British Health System,” New York Times, December 19, 2017, p. A-18) Facebook and Microsoft acted last week to disable a number of potential North Korean cyber threats, a senior White House official said, as the United States publicly blamed Pyongyang for a May cyber attack that crippled hospitals, banks and other companies. “Facebook took down accounts and stopped the operational execution of ongoing cyber attacks and Microsoft acted to patch existing attacks, not just the WannaCry attack initially,” White House homeland security adviser Tom Bossert said. Bossert said at a White House news conference that Pyongyang was responsible for the WannaCry cyber weapon launched in May. The attack was “meant to cause havoc and destruction,” Bossert said, while conceding there was little the United States could do to exert further pressure on Pyongyang. “We don’t have a lot of room left here to apply pressure to change their behavior,” Bossert said. “It’s nevertheless important to call them out, to let them know that it’s them and we know it’s them.” (Reuters, “Facebook and Microsoft Independently Stopped North Korean Cyberattacks Last Week, a U.S. Official Says,” December 19, 2017)
The Japanese Cabinet approved the installation of two land-based Aegis Ashore missile defense systems to defend against North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile threats, highlighted by a test of what appeared to be an intercontinental ballistic missile last month. The approval will allow the Defense Ministry to buy two Aegis Ashore systems to add to Japan’s current two-step missile defense system consisting of Patriot batteries and Aegis-equipped destroyers. Defense Ministry officials said the government plans to deploy the systems in two places, by 2023 at the earliest, but that the locations are yet to be decided. The cost of each system could be more than ¥100 billion, they said. Noting that North Korea’s nuclear and missile development poses a “new level of threat” to Japan’s security, the government said in a document endorsed by the Cabinet that Japan needs “to fundamentally improve our ballistic missile defense abilities to protect our country at all times and in a sustainable manner.” Aegis Ashore, a U.S.-made land-based version of the Aegis combat system developed for warships, is a collection of radars, computers and missiles. Acquiring Aegis Ashore would protect the entire country, from Hokkaido to Okinawa Prefecture, the government says. The government had also considered a different U.S. system, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), but it would require six sites to cover the nation. Aegis Ashore is more cost effective, according to the Defense Ministry. (Kikuchi Daisuke, “Japan Approves Introduction of Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System amid North Korea Threat,” Japan Times, December 19, 2017)
12/19/17:
The U.S. is reportedly weighing South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s proposal on December 19 to postpone joint military exercises until after the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. In an interview with NBC that day, Moon said he was considering bold measures such as downscaling of joint South Korea-US military exercises to reduce tensions on the peninsula during the Olympics. The interview took place on board “Train 1,” an exclusive presidential KTX train service line between Seoul and Gangneung that is set to open on December 22 ahead of the Games. “It is possible that South Korea and the US will examine whether their joint military exercises can be postponed,” Moon said. “I made the proposal to the US, and the US is currently examining it,” he added. At the same time, Moon said that “everything hinges on what North Korea does.” While Moon was commenting on the possibility of North Korea taking part in the Pyeongchang Olympics, Gangwon Gov. Choi Moon-soon reportedly met with Ryomyong football team director Mun Ung on both Deccember 18 and 19 in Kunming, China, where the 3rd Ari Sports Cup international youth football championship is being held. Choi’s meetings with Mun, a vice minister-level figure in the North Korean athletic community, is being seen as significant progress with other inter-Korean dialogue channels in the sports world all but silenced in the wake of the North’s nuclear tests. “I hope this football tournament will help lead to North Korea’s athletes, supporters, and members of its culture and arts community taking part in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics,” Choi said after a Dec. 18 dinner with the North Korea team. An agreement was also reached to hold two exchange matches next year, one in Pyongyang during the first half of the year and another in South Korea during the second half. (Jung E-gil and Kim Dong-hoon, “President Moon Hints at Possibility of Postponing Joint Military Exercises,” Hankyore, December 20, 2017) Any North Korean nuclear or missile provocation before the PyeongChang Winter Olympics next February will influence Seoul and Washington to withdraw their consideration of delaying their joint military drills during the Olympic period, a Cheong Wa Dae official said. The remark comes a day after President Moon Jae-in said in an interview with U.S. broadcaster NBC that South Korea proposed postponing the annual military exercises until after the Olympics to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula if North Korea does not make any provocations. When asked whether Seoul will scrap the exercise postponement idea if Pyongyang makes a provocation before the Olympics, a senior Cheong Wa Dae official said, “Of course the two [delay and provocation] are linked. If the North makes a provocation, we will have to make a decision at that time, but I’m sure the provocation will affect the decision.” He added a provocation by the North would cause negative sentiment toward Pyongyang from international society and possibly bring more sanctions from the United Nations Security Council. “So the consideration of delaying military drills is a sign toward the North [not to make a provocation],” the official said. He said Seoul proposed the delay idea to Washington and is waiting for the latter’s answer. “We believe the U.S. will make a decision after taking various international situations into consideration.” When asked about the possibility of Seoul and Washington deferring more exercises in the future if the North does not make any provocations until the Olympics are over, the official said that was unknown for the moment. “For now, the suspension proposal is limited to this Olympic period,” he said. The official added Seoul and Washington are considering “delaying” the drills, not “curtailing” them. In the NBC interview, the interviewer said Moon was considering even curtailing frequent military exercises with the U.S., but Cheong Wa Dae said Moon did not say this, disclosing his Korean-version remarks. (Kim Rahn, “’Delay of Drills Depends on North Korea,’” Korea Times, December 20, 2017) Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said he is not aware of any plans to postpone joint military exercises ahead of the 2018 Winter Olympics. “I’m not aware of any plans to halt our long-standing and scheduled and regular military exercises with our partners in South Korea — the Republic of Korea — or our partners in Japan,” he said, speaking at a joint news conference with Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland. “These exercises have been ongoing for many years,” Tillerson said. “They’re carried out on a scheduled basis. We announce them in advance. There’s nothing surprising about them, and I’m not aware of any plans to change what is scheduled.” (Max Greenwood, “Tillerson: Not Aware of Plans to Curb Joint Military Drills with South Korea,” The Hill, December 19, 2017) “We want the Pyeongchang Olympics to be successful and have committed to our ally that we will aid their success,” the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) said on December 20 regarding the exercises’ postponement. “We, as allies, are committed to an alliance decision on the exercises and will announce the decision when appropriate,” it continued. The CFC statement made no direct reference to whether the exercises would be postponed. (Park Byong-su and Seong Yeon-cheol, “”Decision Expected Soon on Postponing Joint Military Exercises,” Hankyore, December 21, 2017)
12/20/17:
McEachern: “North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile testing has accelerated to an unprecedented pace since the death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011 and transfer of power to his son, Kim Jong Un. How should we understand Kim Jong Un’s explicitly-stated and observable effort to qualitatively and quantitatively “diversify” his country’s nuclear arsenal? Which North Korean statements are boiler-plate rhetoric and which reflect policy? This paper will address these questions and the continuities and differences between Kim Jong Il’s and Kim Jong Un’s efforts to develop a credible nuclear deterrent. … Kim Jong Un did not have the same decision calculus as his father or grandfather to moderate his development of nuclear weapons. Kim Jong Un’s nuclear weapons capability was not an aspirational capability as it was under his father, rather it was a tested one. Kim Jong Un appeared uninterested in trading away his tested nuclear program at the price offered during the Six Party Talks when North Korea’s nuclear program had not yet demonstrated the same level of functionality. Without an active diplomatic process to freeze or reverse his nuclear program, Kim Jong Un moved forward with developing a more sophisticated nuclear deterrent. … Kim Jong Un inherited a tested nuclear device. In theory, he could reverse, sustain, or advance the program. Reversing North Korea’s nuclear program in a “grand bargain” could generate substantial economic benefits and alternative security arrangements at the expense of a technical means to provide for the country’s security. Sustaining the program with a capped number of nuclear weapons might entice foreign partners to offer more modest security or economic rewards – or forego additional punishments – without completely abandoning a basic nuclear deterrent. Advancing the nuclear program would double down on the world’s most powerful weapons for regime security. Kim Jong Un to date has chosen the third option to advance his regime’s nuclear weapons capability. The advancement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability raises a number of questions. Why has the regime gone beyond a basic ability to impose unacceptable costs on its adversaries with a first generation nuclear device and singular means of delivery to provide a nuclear deterrent to pursuing thermonuclear devices and an array of missiles? Does the Kim Jong Un regime have additional goals in addition to existential deterrence, such as providing an insurance policy against retaliation for a more aggressive military approach to peninsular or regional objectives? What can we say about North Korea’s budding nuclear weapons doctrine? … In the first four years of his reign, Kim Jong Un urged unity of thought on the regime’s approach to nuclear weapons. With a vague goal of advancing nuclear weapons development combined with the established technical means to do so, Kim Jong Un seemed not to entertain internal arguments voiced and adopted at times by his father to moderate the regime’s quest for nuclear weapons. Under his father’s leadership, one could see various views on approach articulated by different North Korean political institutions and media outlets. But this internal debate had vanished under Kim Jong Un as the new leader seemed to put together his own nuclear playbook. He did not allow distinct views to be expressed publicly nor would he oscillate between competing objectives around the North’s nuclear program. Although it would only become clear with the luxury of time to note a pattern, Kim Jong Un would come to articulate a more sophisticated nuclear doctrine based on diversifying in quantity and quality the regime’s nuclear forces and tangibly advance those stated goals. … Major mouthpieces of the regime in the first year of the Kim Jong Un government neither articulated coherent policy platforms nor seemed fully informed on the pending decisions from the top. In mid-July 2012, Rodong Shinmun published that South Korea was “boisterously circulat[ing…] absurd claims” about a pending North Korean nuclear test. Four days later, the Foreign Ministry announced the DPRK would “totally reexamine the nuclear issue” given increased concerns about the U.S. “hostile policy” in the wake of an alleged infiltrator demolishing statues in the country and harming the leader’s dignity. Three days later the Party daily caught up, referring to foreign allegations of a possible nuclear test and noting the U.S. hostile policy would prompt the regime to “strengthen our self-defensive nuclear deterrent.” North Korea’s major mouthpieces returned to safe ground for the next six months. The Foreign Ministry and the Cabinet’s daily, Minju Joson, criticized diplomatic remarks in Seoul by the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea policy, who reiterated standard U.S. positions that the DPRK should implement its obligations under the September 19 joint statement. The Party daily stayed quiet on the nuclear issue as it shifted to welcoming inter-Korean cooperation ahead of the South Korean presidential election. … On December 12, 2012, the DPRK launched another rocket with the Party, Cabinet, and Foreign Ministry each separately claiming success. Foreign sources widely confirmed the DPRK’s claim that the satellite launch had successfully reached orbit, followed by another UN Security Council Resolution and new sanctions. The DPRK Foreign Ministry again took the lead condemning the UN denunciation and threatening “physical countermeasures at our discretion to expand and strengthen the self-defensive military power, including nuclear deterrent, both qualitatively and quantitatively.” The National Defense Commission and Party daily followed, reiterating the nuclear test threat more explicitly, and the Cabinet daily warned about the impact on the inter-Korean agenda. North Korea’s main institutions remained united. Politburo member Kim Ki Nam followed with a speech noting the Party’s importance to upholding the general principles of the DPRK under the leadership of the Kims, prioritization of defense, economic self-reliance, and scientific advancement “as a dignified nuclear state and a legitimate space power.” Consistent with the broad themes in the speech, Kim Ki Nam cited Kim Jong Un as saying, “Only when the party cells, which are the basic organization of the party, are reinforced and their role is enhanced is it possible to unite extensive circles of the masses around the party, reinforce the party’s militant might in every way, and thus turn our country into a politically and ideologically powerful state, a militarily powerful state, and an economically powerful state.” The Party’s role in DPRK politics, Kim Jong Un instructed, is the traditional role of providing strategic instruction in all fields, including the economy, under the leader’s guidance to achieve the general, ideologically-defined goals of the regime. The Korean Worker’s Party under Kim Jong Un would start to look and act more like the Party under Kim Il Sung. … Kim Jong Un also reduced the role of North Korea’s military in national politics. His speech in August 2013 laid out a new interpretation of “military first politics” that did not include the military’s enhanced political roles that it enjoyed under his father. Kim Jong Un referred to the military first ideology as originating with Kim Il Sung, emphasizing a narrower interpretation of the idea as prioritizing resources for the military. But “the army of the leader [must be] boundlessly faithful to the cause of the WPK (Workers’ Party of Korea).” Kim acknowledged that his father modified this conception of military-first by establishing the NDC as a “new state administrative structure,” but Kim did not indicate he would rule primarily through this institution or afford the military the type of political role it enjoyed under his father. The KPA, Kim Jong Un continued, “with importance being attached to military affairs and primary efforts directed to building up the army” should focus its energies on its particular sphere rather than have a hand in all national decisions and their implementation. The 1990s was a particular time of crisis for North Korea, Kim Jong Un explained, and his father would adapt the ruling ideology to focus more on the military as an institution to get through that particularly difficult time. But the foundation of the regime had been restored, suggesting these special measures would no longer be necessary: “The officers and men of the KPA should burn their hearts with a single idea, a single determination, to support only the Party and the leader.” The speech marked a subtle but steady effort to reduce the military’s roles in national policy that would culminate three years later in the abolition of the National Defense Commission. Kim Jong Un’s speech did not come out of the blue. Senior military leaders had already been refocusing more exclusively on military affairs in public comments. For example, a month before Kim’s speech, Korean People’s Army General Political Department Director Choe Ryong Hae delivered a speech focused exclusively on military affairs, providing additional data points suggesting that the prior Cabinet and military roles in high-level political affairs had been receding. However, exceptions remained that showed the military taking on new roles on particular policy issues, most notably the NDC’s newfound role dealing with South Korea on inter-Korean affairs and even making new diplomatic offers to the United States. As inter-Korean conflict over the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) came to a head, the NDC was the institution that issued a statement threatening to close the complex. The Cabinet Premier toured coal, iron, and energy facilities as its mouthpiece reiterated finger pointing at the ROK for any closure of the KIC. The Party daily entered the fray only to reiterate what the NDC had already articulated. Despite Kim Jong Un’s emphasis on unity and pursuing nuclear weapons, his regime has offered to engage in talks with the United States. This cannot be sourced to a particular institution within the DPRK as the regime retained its outward unity. However, these offers do undermine any thesis that Kim Jong Un is unswervingly loyal to nuclear advances without consideration of competing objectives. Empirical reality is more complex than neat theories allow, and Kim’s words and deeds provided mixed messages. In a March 31, 2013 speech before the Party’s Central Committee Plenum, Kim Jong Un re-introduced the concept of byungjin, defining it as “a new strategic line on carrying out economic construction and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously… [expanding upon the] original [byungjin] line of simultaneously developing economy and national defense.” Kim noted byungjin is permanent and not intended as a political bargaining chip. The “nuclear shield” is for self-defense, and “the nuclear armed forces should be expanded and beefed up qualitatively and quantitatively until the denuclearization of the world is realized.” He instructed the KPA to integrate nuclear weapons into its “war strategy” and “combat posture.” Two days later, a spokesman for the DPRK’s General Department of Atomic Energy, citing Kim’s speech, announced that it would restart both the uranium enrichment and 5MW reactor at Yongbyon. The regime inscribed the guidance in the 2013 Nuclear Weapons State Law. Yet in June, the NDC urged “senior level talks” between the DPRK and the United States and noted, “The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was behests of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il and a policy task which the party, state, army and people of the DPRK have to carry out without fail.” The NDC repeated a similar diplomatic offer publicly to the United States in October 2013. The DPRK relaxed its super-inflated rhetoric on the United States, but unclassified satellite data showed in September that amid the offers to negotiate that the DPRK had restarted its 5MW reactor at Yongbyon, which had been disabled for six years. Ultimately, these offers did not materialize into sustained negotiations that could test Kim Jong Un’s seriousness about denuclearization. … The U.S. Director of National Intelligence visited Pyongyang to secure the release of two American citizens in November 2014, and North Korean officials would later note their disappointment that this did not provide a diplomatic opening. There was no public DPRK debate on approaches to dealing with the Americans or the nuclear issue as they continued to develop their nuclear capability. In December 2014, U.S. authorities noted that the DPRK conducted a cyberattack on Sony Pictures. …While the incident exemplified a worrying trend of new security challenges, it did not appear to be related directly to the long-standing issues in the U.S.-DPRK relationship. Indeed, in the same month that the United States imposed new sanctions on the DPRK for the Sony hack, the DPRK offered a moratorium on nuclear tests for a discontinuation of joint military exercises. The United States rejected the DPRK offer; the DPRK Foreign Ministry concluded, “The Obama Administration will have to disappear from the arena” before Pyongyang found an interlocutor in Washington it judged it could work with. Kim Jong Un injected new uncertainty on whether he was simply unwilling to negotiate on limiting his nuclear weapons program or the two sides simply had far different expectations about the nature of a possible deal. … In mid-January 2016, the DPRK Foreign Ministry reiterated the country’s offer to suspend nuclear tests for a suspension of U.S.-ROK joint military exercises and noted its continued desire to negotiate a peace treaty with the United States ending the Korean War. It is unclear if the offer was an opening salvo, a tactical effort to water down UN Security Council sanctions under consideration, or both. The proposal did not gain traction, and the Foreign Ministry made no outward signs of pushing the agenda within the regime. … The Korean Workers Party held its Seventh Congress in May 2016 – the first in 36 years. While the Sixth Congress in 1980 officially debuted Kim Jong Il as his father’s successor, the Seventh Congress would come after Kim Jong assumed his new roles. Nevertheless, it showed Kim Jong Un’s desire to resurrect party institutions that his grandfather used and his father sidelined. During and following the Congress, North Korea’s institutions publicly spoke with one voice. Kim Jong Un’s opened the Congress noting the importance of “single-hearted unity of the Korean Workers Party, the army and the people around the leader,” blamed the “imperialists’” hostile policy and sanctions for economic woes, heralded the most recent nuclear test and rocket launches, and focused on increasing domestic production for economic growth. He closed the Congress with a more ideological speech, stressing the centrality of “establishing the monolithic leadership system of the party” under his guidance. Kim did not assign specific responsibility for issue sets to individual institutions, rather articulated the importance of the guiding role of the Korean Workers Party under his leadership – a goal this study shows he has attempted to resurrect since his assumption of power after his father’s death. Though not a centerpiece of wide-ranging Party Congress, Kim Jong Un’s comments provided the best single sketch available for the regime’s nuclear doctrine. North Korean leaders, including Kim, would continually reference his Party Congress speech following significant missile and nuclear tests in subsequent years as implementing actions for that vision. Summarizing the work of the Party Central Committee at the Congress, Kim Jong Un said, “As long as nuclear threats and the tyranny of imperialism continue, we will permanently adhere to the strategic line of simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear armed forces. As long as the aggressive hostile forces do not infringe upon our sovereignty with nuclear [weapons], our Republic, as a responsible nuclear state, will not use a nuclear weapon first, as already elucidated; will faithfully carry out the obligation, assumed before the international community, to prevent nuclear proliferation; and make effort to achieve the denuclearization of the world.” Kim Jong Un seemed to adopt a “no first use” doctrine of sorts, which would be later refined and clarified. He articulated a nuclear doctrine that included securing an existential nuclear deterrent and engaging in global nuclear arms control efforts as a nuclear weapons state. Results of the Party Congress provided additional detail on the goals and methods of North Korea’s nuclear pursuit. The Congress stressed the regime’s nuclear weapons were intended to safeguard the country’s sovereignty, independence from imperialism, and removal of foreign bases from other countries. Interestingly, the party decided not to specify “imperialist” threats to the DPRK alone or the removal of U.S. troops from South Korea, but couched its ambitions in much more grandiose and global terms. More specifically, the Party concluded, “Let us turn our country into a matchless nuclear power by bolstering up the Juche-based nuclear force in quality and quantity to mercilessly stamp out the enemies challenging us, whether they are in the sky or underground or on the sea.” In subsequent years, the DPRK would indeed pursue a variety of land- and sea-based missile programs simultaneously as well as advance efforts to develop higher yield nuclear weapons and consistently cite these actions as working towards the nuclear doctrine articulated at the Party Congress. At North Korea’s National Defense University a month after the Congress, Kim Jong Un provided on-the-spot guidance that reiterated his goals for North Korea’s nuclear program. He went beyond existential deterrence as the singular purpose of the North’s nuclear program, indicating the nuclear program was also tied to the regime’s power and prestige as a regional power. “The respected and beloved Comrade Kim Jong Un said that the basic duty of the National Defense University is to more excellently train greater numbers of future leaders who further consolidate and glorify the status of military-first [North] Korea as a great nuclear power and the most powerful military state of the East.” The call to create the most powerful military in the region could be dismissed if a single data point, but Kim Jong Un made it a theme. Celebrating the launch of a ballistic missile and giving binding on-the-spot guidance to the regime’s rocket scientists, Kim urged continued diversification in the regime’s nuclear and missile forces without a clear end in sight. “Kim Jong Un said that the preemptive nuclear strike capabilities should be constantly expanded and augmented, and a variety of strategic attack weapons should be continuously researched and developed [to create] a militarily powerful country that is equipped with the most powerful nuclear deterrent and is the most invincible under heaven.” North Korea’s Foreign Ministry spokesman likewise responded to UN criticism of the North Korean missile launch by noting the pursuit of diversified missile capabilities. “As long as the U.S. persists in its hostile policy toward the DPRK, the latter will further bolster its nuclear deterrence for self-defense in quality and quantity and will continue to exercise its legitimate right to develop space for peaceful purposes no matter what others may say.” The DPRK noting nuclear “preemption” as part of its doctrine appeared to contradict Kim Jong Un’s promise not to use nuclear weapons first. Kim Jong Un had previously stated this no first use pledge would apply if the United States did not infringe on North Korea’s sovereignty with nuclear weapons. Kim could broadly interpret (or ignore) the required condition of a violation of its sovereignty for the no-first use pledge, limiting the meaning of the statement. Indeed, Kim noted that he ordered a ballistic missile drill to practice preemptive attacks: “The drill was conducted by limiting the firing range under the simulated conditions of making preemptive strikes at ports and airfields in the operational theater in south Korea where the U.S. imperialists nuclear war hardware is to be hurled” and praised “developing diverse type ballistic rockets.” Kim Jong Un also lauded the importance of nuclear technology to the DPRK’s position on the global stage. Following the test launch of a Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile, he noted operational specifics and wider implications: “we have joined in a dignified manner the ranks of the military powers that perfectly possess nuclear attack capabilities… no matter how hard the United States may deny it, the US mainland and the Pacific operational theater are now definitely in our hands…. [which will] uphold in practice our party’s plan for the construction of a powerful country of rockets.” Kim Jong Un expressed a sense that joining the ranks of the nuclear weapons states would establish his country as a global power better able to influence a range of security matters. The DPRK conducted its fifth nuclear test days later. … Kim personally ordered and observed the test launch of a surface-to-surface ballistic missile in February 2017, claiming the North’s “nuclear attack means” now extended “to most accurately and most rapidly perform its strategic mission at any place — underwater or on the land.” He couched the technical development in terms of nationalism, highlighting the indigenous nature of the developments, and its role in preserving the DPRK’s freedom of movement in foreign affairs: “[This] proves that nothing can frustrate the unswerving faith and revolutionary will of our army and people who accomplish what they decide to do to the end.” Given North Korea’s revolutionary ambitions and demonstrated willingness to use force especially against South Korea, a self-perception of greater freedom of action in conventional military affairs afforded by its nuclear program is concerning. Kim Jong Un observed military drills to utilize nuclear weapons against U.S. bases in Japan while repeatedly referring to the DPRK’s “retaliatory strike” capability, again suggesting a second-strike warfighting role for North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. He provided on-the-spot guidance to “Hwasong artillery units of the KPA Strategic Force tasked to strike the bases of the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces in Japan in a contingency.” He later celebrated the regime’s “nuclear deterrence” to counter American nuclear blackmail and military intimidation efforts. “The most perfect weapon systems in the world will never become the eternal exclusive property of the U.S.,” he said, expressing the belief that “the day when the DPRK uses the similar retaliatory means will come.” The party daily the following day further noted that the North would rely on its nuclear arsenal to end confrontation with the United States but not start it. Diversifying North Korean missile capabilities would be useful in combat and enhance deterrence, Kim argued. Claiming to put U.S. military assets in Alaska and Hawaii in range and aim for deployable nuclear weapons, the party daily described the latest ballistic missile test as “carried out with the objectives to make a final validation of the technical indexes of the overall weapon system of the “Pukku’kso’ng-2” model surface-to-surface medium long-range strategic ballistic missile, sufficiently examine the adaptability in different combat environments, and deploy the missiles to military units for actual warfare…. The supreme leader reemphasized that we have to more expeditiously make our nuclear armed forces diverse… to strongly consolidate the country’s self-defensive national defense capabilities and nuclear deterrent.” Kim Jong Un would similarly instruct the development of precision ballistic missiles with quick launch for use in warfare and development of forces for use in a contingency, not a first strike. The binding nature of this guidance provided directly to missile and security practitioners suggests it reflects the regime’s nuclear doctrine. Contrary to early test flights developing a capability to range U.S. forces in the region, Kim said the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile launch on July 4, 2017 targeted the U.S. mainland with nuclear-tipped missiles. He claimed his country had achieved a nuclear deterrent, would not negotiate it away, and would further bolster its nuclear force unless the U.S. changed its “hostile policy.” The DPRK would “neither put its nukes and ballistic rockets on the table of negotiations in any case nor flinch even an inch from the road of bolstering the nuclear force chosen by itself unless the U.S. hostile policy and nuclear threat to the DPRK are definitely terminated. The ICBM launch had “fundamentally changed the strategic position of our Republic and the structure of global politics” and advanced the guiding nuclear goals set forth at the Seventh Party Congress. In a congratulatory banquet for the North’s rocket scientists, Kim again ordered the continued qualitative and quantitative “bolstering” of its strategic weapon systems. … For decades, the DPRK has called for an end to what it terms Washington’s “hostile policy.” It has usually remained vague and articulated as part of the regime’s blaming the United States for its economic woes or need to mobilize North Korea society for defense. Countering the U.S. “hostile policy” is part of the DPRK’s raison d’etre. The DPRK is standing up to the imperialists and protecting the Korean nation and its independence, they claim. Yet the DPRK has defined in specific terms what it means by the “U.S. hostile policy” during the Kim Jong Un reign, and reviewing even this static description of an evolving concept can help us understand North Korea’s comprehensive goals vis-à-vis the United States as they articulate them. In a lengthy Foreign Ministry memorandum in 2012, the DPRK describe the U.S. “hostile policy” as the “root cause” of tensions on the Korean Peninsula that stimulated North Korea to pursue nuclear weapons “and therefore, only when the U.S. abandons its hostile policy, will it be possible to resolve the issue.” The DPRK Foreign Ministry documented examples from the last two decades of U.S.-DPRK interactions to specify its meaning. The U.S. taking issue with North Korea’s satellite launches given dual-use missile concerns while ignoring other countries’ space exploration efforts, breakdown of the 1994 Agreed Framework and inclusion of the DPRK in the “Axis of Evil” speech, failure to deliver on the Six Party Talks and provide North Korea a Light Water Reactor (LWR), and sanctions on a uranium enrichment program needed to fuel a LWR all show a hostile American approach to North Korea, it claimed. The Foreign Ministry continued that the last twenty years represented only the tip of the iceberg. U.S. hostility towards North Korea extends much further into the past before the nuclear issue came to the fore. The United States has refused to recognize the DPRK even as it recognized other socialist bloc states during the Cold War and the UN admitted North Korea as a member state in 1991. The U.S. denied a unified Korean nation by hastily drawing the 38th parallel in service of its Cold War objectives over the interests of the Korean people and threatened nuclear attack on the DPRK almost since its inception. Later that month, speaking at the UN General Assembly and referencing the Seventh Party Congress, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho urged an end to the U.S. “hostile policy.” He called for an end to U.S.-ROK military exercises, conclusion of a peace agreement, and withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea that would allow the two Koreas to find a mutual solution to outstanding differences and pursue unification. Absent this, North Korea needed “to take measures to strengthen its national nuclear armed forces in both quantity and quality” to deal with U.S. nuclear threats. By the end of 2016, Kim Jong Un still hit the same theme, telling a conference of party committee chairs that the regime’s nuclear and missile efforts were “remarkably increasing the strategic position of the DPRK… the DPRK bolstered up its nuclear force both in quality and quantity by succeeding in developing Korean-style latest strategic weapons.” … For the DPRK, removing the U.S. “hostile policy” is a far-reaching objective and their only articulated quid-pro-quo to the complete resolution of the nuclear issue. In maximalist form, the DPRK Foreign Ministry suggests that ending the U.S. hostile policy would include comprehensive sanctions relief, a legally binding peace treaty, an end to U.S.-ROK military exercises and U.S. Forces Korea, diplomatic recognition, acceptance of North Korean space activities, and provision of nuclear energy assistance. However, the DPRK Foreign Ministry noted that it did not expect Washington to heed its demand: “The U.S. hostile policy pursued by the U.S. [sic] makes the prospect of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula all the more gloomy. At present stage, there is no possibility of the U.S. giving up its hostile policy towards the DPRK.” It concludes that the DPRK did not develop nuclear weapons to trade them away and these weapons remain fundamental to the country’s security as long as the perceived American threat remains. In short, ending the “U.S. hostile policy” is realizing the full corpus of North Korea’s strategic goals vis-à-vis the United States. It is a high bar, and the same fundamental demands have transgressed administrations in the DPRK. It is North Korea’s version of comprehensive foreign demands of North Korea to denuclearize, ends its ballistic missile programs, reduce tensions with South Korea, and radically improve its human rights and humanitarian situation, including the resolution of the abduction issue. Ending the “U.S. hostile policy” is the ultimate North Korean maximalist demand, rooted in the regime’s founding ideology, and, by their own account, unlikely to be achieved. The maximalist demands from both sides are useful starting points. Foreign analysts do not need to speculate on what North Korea really wants, just as North Korean analysts should be able to piece together the comprehensive demands of the United States and its allies and partners. From those maximalist demands, the two sides can work backwards to craft tangible and reciprocal actions to address sustainably the other’s concerns. The history of diplomatic progress with the DPRK has focused on more discreet and phased objectives to each side’s significant demands of the other.” (Patrick McEachern, “Reading Kim Jong Un’s Lips: What Is His Playbook and Intention with Nuclear Weapons?” NAPSNet, December 20, 2017)
12/21/17:
A North Korean soldier fled to South Korea through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), followed by gunfire from both sides, the South’s military said. The “low-ranking” soldier appeared in front of a guard post on the mid-western front at around 8:04 a.m. amid thick fog, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). After the defection, the North’s border guards approached the military demarcation line (MDL) apparently in search of the defector, a JCS official told reporters. In response, the South’s troops sent a warning broadcast and fired some 20 warning shots from a K-3 machine gun at around 9:24 a.m. in accordance with related rules, he said. In less than an hour, there was the sound of several gunshots from the North, but no bullets were found to have crossed the border, he added. The North Korean soldier was identified as a 19-year-old man, and he was carrying an AK rifle, a defense source said, adding that the guard post was located in Yeoncheon, Gyeonggi Province. “We are coordinating with the Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine the circumstances surrounding the defection,” the United Nations Command (UNC) said in a statement. “Armistice Agreement rules are in effect throughout the Demilitarized Zone, including the area where the defection occurred.” It pointed out that a UNC flag flies at the GP near where the defector was first encountered, like all other GPs in the DMZ. The command, a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean War, oversees the armistice on the peninsula. Meanwhile, the Unification Ministry said two North Korean people aboard a small wooden boat defected to the South yuesterday. “The Navy found it in waters about 100 kilometers north of Dokdo during a patrol mission,” a ministry official said at a press briefing. “A joint probe into the details of their identities is under way.”The North Korean men expressed their intent to defect and agreed to abandon the aged and apparently damaged ship, added the official. An official tally of the JCS shows that 15 North Korean people, including four soldiers, have fled directly to the South this year, versus one soldier and four civilians in 2016. (Lee Chi-dong and Kim Soo-yeon, “S. Korea Fires Warning Shots at N. Korea after Defection,” Yonhap, December 21, 2017)
12/22/17:
The United Nations Security Council placed new sanctions on North Korea that significantly choke off fuel supplies and order North Koreans working overseas to return home, in what may prove the last test of whether any amount of economic pressure can force the isolated country to reverse course on its nuclear weapons program. The sanctions, proposed by the United States and adopted by a vote of 15 to 0, were the third imposed this year, in an escalating effort to force the North into negotiations. China and Russia joined in the vote, in a striking display of unity, but only after the Trump administration agreed to soften a couple of the provisions. Under the new sanctions, the amount of refined petroleum North Korea can import each year will be cut by 89 percent, exacerbating fuel shortages. Roughly 100,000 North Korean laborers who work in other countries, a critical source of hard currency, will be expelled within two years. Nations will be urged to inspect all North Korean shipping and halt ship-to-ship transfers of fuel, which the North has used to evade sanctions. But the resolution does not permit countries to hail or board North Korean ships in international waters, which the Trump administration proposed in September. That would be the most draconian measure, because it would enable the United States Navy and its Pacific allies to create a cordon around the country, though Pentagon officials say it would risk setting off a firefight between North Korea and foreign navies. The new sanctions are the toughest ever, but so were the last two rounds: In August, the Security Council blocked North Korean exports of coal, iron, iron ore, lead, lead ore and seafood, and in September, it blocked textile exports, curbed oil imports and called for inspections of ships that have visited the North’s ports. Experts, and even the White House, agree that the United States is running out of sanctions options. The C.I.A. assessment is that no amount of economic sanctions will force the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, to give up his country’s nuclear program. “President Trump has used just about every lever you can use, short of starving the people of North Korea to death, to change their behavior,” the White House homeland security adviser, Thomas P. Bossert, said December 19. “And so we don’t have a lot of room left here to apply pressure to change their behavior.” The United States, which has led the sanctions effort at the Security Council, drafted the latest round in consultation with other members, notably China, which historically has been reluctant to impose them for fear of destabilizing North Korea, its neighbor. There were some last-minute changes in the final version of the resolution, partly to satisfy Russian complaints. The changes included doubling the deadline for the return of North Korean workers to 24 months from 12 months. Russia’s deputy ambassador, Vladimir Safronkov, who attended the Security Council vote, made a point of complaining about negotiations over the resolution, in which he said Russia had not been adequately consulted. Still, Russia went along with the new measures — though American officials have charged that in recent months the Russians have secretly opened new links to the North, including internet connections that give the country an alternative to communicating primarily through China. The unanimous decision was a diplomatic achievement for the Trump administration, only a day after most members of the United Nations General Assembly, brushing aside President Trump’s threats of retaliation, condemned the United States’ new recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. China’s deputy ambassador, Wu Haitao, said the latest measures reflected “the unanimous position of the international community” and he urged North Korea to “refrain from conducting any further nuclear and missile tests.” But he also emphasized China’s longstanding position that all antagonists in the dispute needed to de-escalate and find ways to resume a dialogue, asserting that there was “no military option for settling the nuclear issue” on the Korean Peninsula. The increased sanctions are part of a strategy that, so far, has relied more on coercive diplomacy than on military action, though there is a long history of American efforts to sabotage North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs. But inside the administration, there are clear differences of opinion over how long Trump can, or will, tolerate a growing threat from North Korea without resorting to some kind of military force. While diplomacy backed by sanctions is the clear preference of Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, others inside the administration say there is little time left for the sanctions to stop the North from achieving the ability to strike the United States with a nuclear weapon. Yet to prove effective, sanctions must be strictly enforced and require many months or several years to take effect. Even then, there is no guarantee: Despite all the sanctions heaped on North Korea in recent years, its economy grew 3.9 percent last year, by most estimates. Trump’s national security adviser, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, has said in recent weeks, “There isn’t much time left.” That would suggest that even the new sanctions may not bite in time to change the calculus of the North Korean leadership. The fear in Washington, among those looking for a diplomatic solution, is that Trump will decide on some kind of pre-emptive strike, betting that the North will stop short of major retaliation. Experts on North Korea said the new measures had the potential to dissuade Mr. Kim from further escalating tensions with more tests, but they were cautious about predicting his behavior. “If the international community, including countries like China and Russia, implements these measures fully, faithfully and quickly, it will apply an unprecedented and irresistible level of pressure on the North Korean regime,” said Evans J. R. Revere, a former senior State Department diplomat for East Asia. If that happens, he said, it would force North Korea “to make a choice” between defiance and negotiations. Others were more skeptical. “If we are playing the long game, the accumulation of sanctions could eventually force North Korea to come to the table and negotiate,” Sue Mi Terry, a former C.I.A. analyst now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in an email. However, she said it was doubtful that the move would persuade Kim “to give up his nuclear arsenal or even discuss a freeze” in 2018. Jae H. Ku, director of the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, said he feared that North Korea would “continue to weather the pressure” of sanctions. “The upshot,” he said, “would be the Trump administration admitting that maximum pressure to gain a diplomatic solution is a lost cause.” (Rick Gladstone and David E. Sanger, “Security Council Toughens Curbs on North Korea,” New York Times, December 23, 2017,
UNSC 2397: “The Security Council, Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013), resolution 2094 (2013), resolution 2270 (2016), resolution 2321 (2016), resolution 2356 (2017), resolution 2371 (2017), resolution 2375 (2017), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7), 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13), and 29 August 2017 (S/PRST/2017/16), Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security, Expressing its gravest concern at the ballistic missile launch by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“the DPRK”) on 28 November 2017 in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), and 2375 (2017) and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“the NPT”) and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond, Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community including the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare, inherent dignity, and rights of people in the DPRK, and expressing great concern that the DPRK continues to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by diverting critically needed resources away from the people in the DPRK at tremendous cost when they have great unmet needs, Acknowledging that the proceeds of the DPRK’s trade in sectoral goods, including but not limited to coal, iron, iron ore, lead, lead ore, textiles, seafood, gold, silver, rare earth minerals, and other prohibited metals, as well as the revenue generated from DPRK workers overseas, among others, contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities have destabilized the region and beyond, and determining that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under Article 41,
- Condemns in the strongest terms the ballistic missile launch conducted by the DPRK on 28 November 2017 in violation and flagrant disregard of the Security Council’s resolutions;
- Reaffirms its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation; shall immediately suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on all missile launches; shall immediately abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; and shall abandon any other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;
Designations
- Decides that the measures specified in paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and decides further that the measures specified in paragraph 8(e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;
Sectoral
- Decides that all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles and whether or not originating in their territories, of all crude oil, unless the Committee approves in advance on a case-by-case basis a shipment of crude oil which is exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals and unrelated to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) or this resolution, further decides that this prohibition shall not apply with respect to crude oil that, for a period of twelve months after the date of adoption of this resolution, and for twelve months periods thereafter, does not exceed 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons in the aggregate per twelve month period, and decides that all Member States providing crude oil shall provide a report to the Committee every 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution of the amount of crude oil provided to the DPRK;
- Decides that all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all refined petroleum products, decides that the DPRK shall not procure such products, further decides that this provision shall not apply with respect to procurement by the DPRK or the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles, and whether or not originating in their territories, of refined petroleum products, including diesel and kerosene, in the aggregate amount of up to 500,000 barrels during a period of twelve months beginning on January 1, 2018, and for twelve month periods thereafter, provided that (a) the Member State notifies the Committee every thirty days of the amount of such supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK of refined petroleum products along with information about all the parties to the transaction, (b) the supply, sale, or transfer of refined petroleum products involve no individuals or entities that are associated with the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), or this resolution, including designated individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, directly or indirectly, or individuals or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions, and (c) the supply, sale, or transfer of refined petroleum products are exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) or this resolution, directs the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 75 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached, also directs the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 90 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached, and further directs the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 95 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached and to inform them that they must immediately cease selling, supplying, or transferring refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year, directs the Committee to make publicly available on its website the total amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK by month and by source country, directs the Committee to update this information on a real-time basis as it receives notifications from Member States, calls upon all Member States to regularly review this website to comply with the annual limits for refined petroleum products established by this provision beginning on 1 January 2018, directs the Panel of Experts to closely monitor the implementation efforts of all Member States to provide assistance and ensure full and global compliance, and requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect and provide additional resources in this regard;
- Decides that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, food and agricultural products (HS codes 12, 08, 07), machinery (HS code 84), electrical equipment (HS code 85), earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia (HS code 25), wood (HS code 44), and vessels (HS code 89), and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of the above-mentioned commodities and products from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, clarifies that the full sectoral ban on seafood in paragraph 9 of resolution 2371 (2017) prohibits the DPRK from selling or transferring, directly or indirectly, fishing rights, and further decides that for sales of and transactions involving all commodities and products from the DPRK whose transfer, supply, or sale by the DPRK are prohibited by this paragraph and for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution, all States may only allow those shipments to be imported into their territories up to 30 days from the date of adoption of this resolution with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 45 days after the date of adoption of this resolution;
- Decides that all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles and whether or not originating in their territories, of all industrial machinery (HS codes 84 and 85), transportation vehicles (HS codes 86 through 89), and iron, steel, and other metals (HS codes 72 through 83) and further decides that this provision shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300);
- Expresses concern that DPRK nationals continue to work in other States for the purpose of generating foreign export earnings that the DPRK uses to support its prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile programs despite the adoption of paragraph 17 of resolution 2375 (2017), decides that Member States shall repatriate to the DPRK all DPRK nationals earning income in that Member State’s jurisdiction and all DPRK government safety oversight attachés monitoring DPRK workers abroad immediately but no later than 24 months from the date of adoption of this resolution unless the Member State determines that a DPRK national is a national of that Member State or a DPRK national whose repatriation is prohibited, subject to applicable national and international law, including international refugee law and international human rights law, and the United Nations Headquarters Agreement and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and further decides that all Member States shall provide a midterm report by 15 months from the date of adoption of this resolution of all DPRK nationals earning income in that Member State’s jurisdiction that were repatriated over the 12 month period starting from the date of adoption of this resolution, including an explanation of why less than half of such DPRK nationals were repatriated by the end of that 12 month period if applicable, and all Member States shall provide final reports by 27 months from the date of adoption of this resolution;
Maritime Interdiction of Cargo Vessels
- Notes with great concern that the DPRK is illicitly exporting coal and other prohibited items through deceptive maritime practices and obtaining petroleum illegally through ship-to-ship transfers and decides that Member States shall seize, inspect, and freeze (impound) any vessel in their ports, and may seize, inspect, and freeze (impound) any vessel subject to its jurisdiction in its territorial waters, if the Member State has reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel was involved in activities, or the transport of items, prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), or this resolution, encourages Member States to consult with the flag States of relevant vessels once they are seized, inspected, and frozen (impounded), and further decides that, after six months from the date such vessels were frozen (impounded), this provision shall not apply if the Committee decides, on a case-by-case basis and upon request of a flag State, that adequate arrangements have been made to prevent the vessel from contributing to future violations of these resolutions;
- Decides that when a Member State has information to suspect that the DPRK is attempting to supply, sell, transfer or procure, directly or indirectly, illicit cargo, that Member State may request additional maritime and shipping information from other relevant Member States, including to determine whether the item, commodity, or product in question originated from the DPRK, further decides that all Member States receiving such inquiries shall respond as promptly as possible to such requests in an appropriate manner, decides that the Committee, with the support of its Panel of Experts, shall facilitate timely coordination of such information requests through an expedited process, and requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect and provide additional resources to the Committee and the Panel of Experts in this regard;
- Reaffirms paragraph 22 of resolution 2321 (2016) and decides that each Member State shall prohibit its nationals, persons subject to its jurisdiction and entities incorporated in its territory or subject to its jurisdiction from providing insurance or re-insurance services to vessels it has reasonable grounds to believe were involved in activities, or the transport of items, prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), or this resolution, unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that the vessel is engaged in activities exclusively for livelihood purposes which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate revenue or exclusively for humanitarian purposes;
- Reaffirms paragraph 24 of resolution 2321 (2016) and decides that each Member State shall de-register any vessel it has reasonable grounds to believe was involved in activities, or the transport of items, prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), or this resolution and prohibit its nationals, persons subject to its jurisdiction and entities incorporated in its territory or subject to its jurisdiction from thereafter providing classification services to such a vessel except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis, and further decides that Member States shall not register any such vessel that has been de-registered by another Member State pursuant to this paragraph except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis;
- Expresses concern that DPRK-flagged, controlled, chartered, or operated vessels intentionally disregard requirements to operate their automatic identification systems (AIS) to evade UNSCR sanctions monitoring by turning off such systems to mask their full movement history and calls upon Member States to exercise enhanced vigilance with regards to such vessels conducting activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), or this resolution;
- Recalls paragraph 30 of resolution 2321 (2016) and decides that all Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any new or used vessels, except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis;
- Decides that, if a Member State has information regarding the number, name, and registry of vessels encountered in its territory or on the high seas that are designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as subject to the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006), the various measures imposed by paragraph 12 of resolution 2321 (2016), the port entry ban imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 2371 (2017), or relevant measures in this resolution, then the Member State shall notify the Committee of this information and what measures were taken to carry out an inspection, an asset freeze and impoundment or other appropriate action as authorized by the relevant provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) , or this resolution;
- Decides that the provisions of this resolution shall not apply with respect solely to the trans-shipment of Russia-origin coal to other countries through the Russia-DPRK Rajin-Khasan port and rail project, as permitted by paragraph 8 of resolution 2371 (2017) and paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017);
Sanctions Implementation
- Decides that Member States shall report to the Security Council within ninety days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, requests the Panel of Experts, in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist Member States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner;
- Calls upon all Member States to redouble efforts to implement in full the measures in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and this resolution and to cooperate with each other in doing so, particularly with respect to inspecting, detecting and seizing items the transfer of which is prohibited by these resolutions;
- Decides that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution and further decides that the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and modified in paragraph 1 of resolution 2345 (2017), shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution;
- Decides to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) or this resolution that are identified in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Development of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972;
- Emphasizes the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;
- Emphasizes that the measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and this resolution shall in no way impede the activities of diplomatic or consular missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations;
Political
- Reiterates its deep concern at the grave hardship that the people in the DPRK are subjected to, Condemns the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles instead of the welfare of its people while people in the DPRK have great unmet needs, emphasizes the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare and inherent dignity of people in the DPRK, and demands that the DPRK stop diverting its scarce resources toward its development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles at the cost of the people in the DPRK;
- Regrets the DPRK’s massive diversion of its scarce resources toward its development of nuclear weapons and a number of expensive ballistic missile programs, notes the findings of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance that well over half of the people in the DPRK suffer from major insecurities in food and medical care, including a very large number of pregnant and lactating women and under-five children who are at risk of malnutrition and 41% of its total population who are undernourished, and, in this context, expresses deep concern at the grave hardship to which the people in the DPRK are subjected;
- Reaffirms that the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively or restrict those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and this resolution, and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK, stresses the DPRK’s primary responsibility and need to fully provide for the livelihood needs of people in the DPRK, and decides that the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions;
- Reaffirms its support for the Six Party Talks, calls for their resumption, and reiterates its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and the return of the DPRK to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards at an early date, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States parties to the NPT and underlining the need for all States parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each other’s sovereignty and exist peacefully together, that the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments;
- Reiterates the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, and expresses its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic, and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by the Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and stresses the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond;
- Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance, and, in this regard, expresses its determination to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch, and decides that, if the DPRK conducts a further nuclear test or a launch of a ballistic missile system capable of reaching intercontinental ranges or contributing to the development of a ballistic missile system capable of such ranges, then the Security Council will take action to restrict further the export to the DPRK of petroleum;
- Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Annex I Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)
CH’OE SO’K MIN a. Description: Ch’oe So’k-min is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative. In 2016, Ch’oe So’k-min was the deputy representative at the Foreign Trade Bank branch office in that overseas location. He has been associated with cash transfers from that overseas Foreign Trade Bank office to banks affiliated with North Korean special organizations and Reconnaissance General Bureau operatives located overseas in an effort to evade sanctions. b. AKA: n/a c. Identifiers: DOB: 25 July 1978; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
CHU HYO’K a. Description: Chu Hyo’k is a North Korean national who is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative. b. AKA: Ju Hyok c. Identifiers: DOB: 23 November 1986; Passport No. 836420186 issued 28 October 2016 expires 28 October 2021; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
KIM JONG SIK a. Description: A leading official guiding the DPRK’s WMD development efforts. Serving as Deputy Director of the Workers’ Party of Korea Munitions Industry Department. b. A.K.A.: Kim Cho’ng-sik c. Identifiers: YOB: between 1967 and 1969; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male; Address: DPRK
KIM KYONG IL a. Description: Kim Kyong Il is a Foreign Trade Bank deputy chief representative in Libya. b. AKA: Kim Kyo’ng-il c. Identifiers: Location Libya; DOB: 01 August 1979; Passport No. 836210029; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
KIM TONG CHOL a. Description: Kim Tong Chol is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative. b. AKA: Kim Tong-ch’o’l c. Identifiers: DOB: 28 January 1966; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
KO CHOL MAN a. Description: Ko Chol Man is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative. b. AKA: Ko Ch’o’l-man c. Identifiers: DOB: 30 September 1967; Passport No. 472420180; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
KU JA HYONG a. Description: Ku Ja Hyong is a Foreign Trade Bank chief representative in Libya. b. AKA: Ku Cha-hyo’ng c. Identifiers: Location Libya; DOB: 08 September 1957; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
MUN KYONG HWAN a. Description: Mun Kyong Hwan is an overseas Bank of East Land representative. b. AKA: Mun Kyo’ng-hwan c. Identifiers: DOB: 22 August 1967; Passport No. 381120660 expires 25 March 2016; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
PAE WON UK a. Description: Pae Won Uk is an overseas Daesong Bank representative. B. AKA: Pae Wo’n-uk c. Identifiers: DOB: 22 August 1969; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male; Passport No. 472120208 expires 22 Feb 2017
PAK BONG NAM a. Description: Pak Bong Nam is an overseas Ilsim International Bank representative. b. AKA: Lui Wai Ming; Pak Pong Nam; Pak Pong-nam c. Identifiers: DOB: 06 May 1969; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
PAK MUN IL a. Description: Pak Mun Il is an overseas official of Korea Daesong Bank. b. AKA: Pak Mun-il c. Identifiers: DOB 01 January 1965; Passport No. 563335509 expires 27 August 2018; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
RI CHUN HWAN a. Description: Ri Chun Hwan is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative. b. AKA: Ri Ch’un-hwan c. Identifiers: DOB 21 August 1957; Passport No. 563233049 expires 09 May 2018; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
RI CHUN SONG a. Description: Ri Chun Song is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative. b. AKA: Ri Ch’un-so’ng c. Identifiers: DOB: 30 October 1965; Passport No. 654133553 expires 11 March 2019; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
RI PYONG CHUL a. Description: Alternate Member of the Political Bureau of the Workers’ Party of Korea and First Vice Director of the Munitions Industry Department. b. A.K.A.: Ri Pyo’ng-ch’o’l c. Identifiers: YOB: 1948; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male; Address: DPRK
RI SONG HYOK a. Description: Ri Song Hyok is an overseas representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank and has reportedly established front companies to procure items and conduct financial transactions on behalf of North Korea. b. AKA: Li Cheng He c. Identifiers: DOB: 19 March 1965; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
RI U’N SO’NG a. Description: Ri U’n-so’ng is an overseas Korea Unification Development Bank representative. b. AKA: Ri Eun Song; Ri Un Song c. Identifiers: DOB: 23 July 1969; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
Annex II Asset Freeze (Entities)
MINISTRY OF THE PEOPLE’S ARMED FORCES (MPAF) a. Description: The Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces manages the general administrative and logistical needs of the Korean People’s Army. b. Location: Pyongyang, DPRK
12/24/17:
DPRK FoMin spokesperson’s statement: “The United States, completely terrified at our accomplishment of the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force, is getting more and more frenzied in the moves to impose the harshest-ever sanctions and pressure on our country. On December 23, the U.S., while denouncing our successful test launch of ICBM Hwasong-15, cooked up once again the UN Security Council “sanctions resolution” 2397 which is tantamount to complete economic blockade of the DPRK. We define this “sanctions resolution” rigged up by the U.S. and its followers as a grave infringement upon the sovereignty of our Republic, as an act of war violating peace and stability in the Korean peninsula and the region and categorically reject the “resolution.” The reason we have achieved the great cause of completing the state nuclear force, overcoming all kinds of hardships and weathering through manifold difficulties is to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, ensure the peaceful life of the people and reliably guarantee peace and security of the Korean peninsula and the world against the nuclear blackmail policy and nuclear threats of the U.S imperialists. As we have stated several times, our nuclear weapons are self-defensive deterrence that does not contradict any international law since we have developed and completed them in a fair and legitimate way outside of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in order to put an end to the hostile policy and nuclear threats and blackmail of the U.S. It is a philosophical truth we have found through the past showdown with the U.S. that strengthening the powerful nuclear deterrence in every way is the only way to frustrate the moves of the U.S. who makes it its daily business to carry on military threats and blackmail in every region to realize its preposterous dream of hegemony over the world, advocating the “America First Policy” based on force. There is no more fatal blunder than the miscalculation that the U.S. and its followers could check by already worn-out “sanctions” the victorious advance of our people who have brilliantly accomplished the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force, the cause of building a rocket power capable of coping with any nuclear war against the U.S. The U.S. should not forget even a second the entity of the DPRK which rapidly emerged as a strategic state capable of posing a substantial nuclear threat to the U.S. mainland. If the U.S. wishes to live safely, it must abandon its hostile policy towards the DPRK and learn to co-exist with the country that has nuclear weapons and should wake up from its pipe dream of our country giving up nuclear weapons which we have developed and completed through all kinds of hardships. Those countries that raised their hands in favor of this “sanctions resolution” shall be held completely responsible for all the consequences to be caused by the “resolution” and we will make sure for ever and ever that they pay heavy price for what they have done. Whatever difficulties and challenges lie ahead of our road of advance, we neither feel disappointed nor are afraid of them but are optimistic about brighter future, and no force in the world can break our people’s indomitable spirit. We will further consolidate our self-defensive nuclear deterrence aimed at fundamentally eradicating the U.S. nuclear threats, blackmail and hostile moves by establishing the practical balance of force with the U.S. No matter how crazy the U.S. and the hostile forces become in their maneuvers against our country, our Republic that advances with the great power of the invincible single-minded unity around the great leader, the strongest military force and the self-reliance and self-development will always shine as the powerful country and the fortress of independence in politics, self-support in the economy and self-reliance in defense.” (KCNA, “Statement of Foreign Ministry Spokesman,” December 24, 2017)
12/26/17:
Forecasting North Korea’s nuclear weapons program for the new year, the Unification Ministry in South Korea said on Tuesday that the North “will continue to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities” in 2018 despite its claims about completing its nuclear force. North Korea will conduct at least one more missile test to master the re-entry technology for its warheads, analysts said. But the North also was racing against time to secure full ICBM capabilities before new United Nations sanctions begin squeezing its economy, they said. “Re-entry is a question North Korea must solve to boost its negotiating leverage and for its military and technological purposes,” Shin Beom-chul, a security analyst, said in a report published over the weekend by the government-run Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security in Seoul. “For North Korea, there is a big difference between entering negotiations with the United States after acquiring full ICBM capabilities and starting such talks without them.” Analysts warned that in its next long-range missile test, the North could launch a missile on a full ICBM trajectory and even carry a live nuclear warhead to demonstrate its mastery of warhead re-entry technology. “The North’s seventh nuclear test could take place not underground but over the Pacific,” said Cheong Seong-chang, a senior analyst, in a report published by the independent Sejong Institute of South Korea. From January to November, North Korea’s trade with China, its only major remaining trading partner, declined to $4.7 billion, a drop of more than 10 percent, the Unification Ministry said today. Its exports to China plummeted nearly 32 percent in the same period, the ministry said. The Treasury Department today imposed sanctions on two senior North Korean officials for their work on the country’s ballistic missile program. One of the officials, Kim Jong-sik, was reportedly crucial to North Korea’s efforts to develop solid fuel rockets, which are more difficult to defend against because they can be launched quickly. Liquid fuel rockets can take hours to fuel. The other official, Ri Pyong-chol, is said to have played a key role in developing North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile program, the Treasury Department reported. Reacting to the United Nations’ latest sanctions resolution, the North Korean Foreign Ministry said December 24 that the country “will further consolidate our self-defensive nuclear deterrence.” But it did not specify any missile or nuclear tests. Instead, North Korea might be preparing for a satellite launch, JoongAng Ilbo said today, citing an anonymous government source. South Korea saw “nothing out of ordinary at this moment” while it and the United States were closely monitoring for possible provocations from the North, Noh Jae-chon, a South Korean military spokesman, said. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Won’t Stop Its Arms Tests Anytime Soon, the South Warns,” New York Times, December 27, 2017,
U.S. reconnaissance satellites have spotted Chinese ships selling oil to North Korean vessels on the West Sea around 30 times since October. According to South Korean government sources, the satellites have pictured large Chinese and North Korean ships illegally trading in oil in a part of the West Sea closer to China than South Korea. The satellite pictures even show the names of the ships. A government source said, “We need to focus on the fact that the illicit trade started after a UN Security Council resolution in September drastically capped North Korea’s imports of refined petroleum products.” The U.S. Treasury Department placed six North Korean shipping and trading companies and 20 of their ships on sanctions list on Nov. 21, when it published spy satellite images taken on Oct. 19 showing a ship named Ryesonggang 1 connected to a Chinese vessel. The department noted that the two ships appeared to be illegally trading in oil from ship to ship to bypass sanctions. Ship-to-ship trade with North Korea on the high seas is forbidden in UNSC Resolution 2375 adopted in September, but such violations are nearly impossible to detect unless China aggressively cracks down on smuggling. The problem is that any oil embargo imposed on the North in the event of further provocations will probably be futile as long as illegal smuggling continues. It is uncertain whether the Chinese government is deliberately looking the other way, but it seems unlikely that it is unaware given the sheer volume. (Yu Yong-weon and Kim Jin-myung, “Chinese Ships Spotted Selling Oil to N. Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, December 26, 2017)
12/27/17:
South Korea’s previous government of ousted President Park Geun-hye kept part of a 2015 deal with Japan on resolving the issue of wartime sexual slavery secret from the public in order to avoid criticism of concessions made to Tokyo, a task force said Wednesday. After months of looking into how the unpopular deal was reached, the foreign ministry task force also said that the Park administration failed to make adequate efforts to listen to victims before reaching the agreement. It called for the government to come up with a longer-term approach to resolve such a historical matter as the so-called comfort women issue, saying that “give-and-take” negotiations or political compromise could not be the ultimate solution. “A victims-centered approach, which has become the norm when it comes to the human rights of women in time of war, has not been sufficiently reflected and the deal was reached through give-and-take negotiations like an ordinary diplomatic agenda” the task force said in its 31-page report on the outcome of its review. “The agreement was finalized mostly based on government views without adequately taking into account the opinions of victims in the process of negotiation,” it added. (Yonhap, “Task Force Says Comfort Women Deal Lacked Victims’ Views, Confirms Existence of Secret Agreements,” December 27, 2017)
A few months after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a group of American investors and Russian scientists struck a deal to begin marketing one of the crown jewels of Moscow’s strategic arsenal: an entire family of missiles designed for launch from submarines. Up for sale were powerful missiles called “Calm” and “Ripple,” built to lob heavy warheads into space from a barge or a submarine tube, and a new model called “Surf” that could be rolled off the side of a ship and fired straight out of the water. The idea of the joint venture, as one of its U.S. partners wrote in early 1993, was to link American satellite companies to a top Russian weapons laboratory to “convert potentially threatening submarine missiles into peaceful space boosters.” The Americans quickly ran aground on a series of legal and bureaucratic barriers, but the Russians forged ahead with a new partner willing to pay cash for Soviet military technology: North Korea. More than two decades later, some of the Soviet designs are reappearing, one after another, in surprisingly sophisticated missiles that have turned up on North Korean launchpads over the past two years. Now, newly uncovered documents offer fresh clues about the possible origins of those technical advances, some of which seemed to outside observers to have come from nowhere. “The question that has long been raised is: Did North Korea get this technology from a [Russian] fire sale?” said David Wright, a missiles expert at the Union of Concerned Scientists. “Did they get plans years ago and are just now at the point where they can build these things?” North Korea is known to have relied on Russian parts and designs for its older missiles, including the Scud derivatives that had dominated its stockpile since the 1980s. The newly uncovered documents include technical drawings for much more advanced missiles — designs that include features seen in some of the newest missiles in North Korea’s expanding arsenal. The documents from the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau include marketing brochures for an array of top-of-the-line Soviet missiles that were able to deliver nuclear warheads to U.S. cities. Initially designed for the Soviet navy’s nuclear submarines, some of the models offered for sale could be launched from a large boat, a submerged barge, or a capsule dropped into the ocean, negating the need for a modern submarine fleet. “The missile could be floated and ignited without any need for a launch platform,” recalled Kyle Gillman, the former executive vice president of the U.S.-Russian joint venture known as Sea Launch Investors. Gillman, who negotiated the business agreement with Russia’s Makeyev scientists, reviewed and authenticated the documents obtained by The Washington Post. The evidence that the designs eventually ended up in North Korea is partly circumstantial. In summer 1993, with the U.S.-Russian project flagging, more than 60 Russian missile scientists and family members from the Makeyev facility were arrested at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo International Airport as they prepared to travel to Pyongyang to work as consultants. U.S., Russian and South Korean intelligence officials later concluded that some of the scientists eventually succeeded in traveling to North Korea to offer blueprints and technical advice for the country’s missiles program. But U.S. analysts see more persuasive evidence in the actual missiles that North Korea has put on display over the past two years. In the most striking case, the Hwasong-10, or Musudan, a single-stage missile successfully tested by North Korea in June 2016, appears to use the same engine and many design features as the Soviet Union’s R-27 Zyb, a submarine-launched ballistic missile designed by Makeyev scientists and advertised in one of the brochures obtained by The Post. The fact that it has taken Pyongyang so long to exploit the Russian designs is perplexing, but North Korea had long lacked the sophisticated materials, engineering expertise and computer-driven machine tools for the kinds of advanced missiles it has recently tested, weapons experts say. With an industrial base enhanced by years of slow, patient acquisition efforts, North Korea is only now in a position to capitalize on technology it had been sitting on for years or even decades, analysts say. “North Korea was just recently able to acquire machine tools that were state-of-the-art in the 1990s, meaning they are still damn good machine tools,” Wright said. “Once you have the plans, and are able to get your hands on the materials and the right kinds of tools, you have a real leg up.” The U.S. founders of Sea Launch Investors saw their joint project with the Russians as the profitable answer to two pressing global concerns, company documents show. One was a shortage of launch capacity for a new generation of satellites servicing the rapidly expanding global telecommunications industry. The other was the problem of newly idle weapons scientists in labs and factories across the former Soviet Union. The abrupt halt to the Cold War in 1991 upended the careers of the thousands of physicists, chemists, microbiologists and engineers who built the Red Army’s vast stockpile of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, along with the missiles for delivering them. Once among the elites of Soviet society, these highly skilled scientists faced an uncertain future with little meaningful work and a plummeting standard of living. The United States would ultimately commit billions of dollars to help secure or dismantle Soviet weapons stockpiles and repurpose former weapons laboratories. Yet, in the early 1990s, U.S. officials remained gravely worried about the possible leakage of Soviet weapons secrets, and perhaps of the weapons themselves. The Americans who founded Sea Launch Investors in 1992 believed that their project could help prevent the poaching of Russian weapons experts by terrorists and rogue states, at least from the community of rocket scientists at the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau, the premier Soviet manufacturer of submarine-launched ballistic missiles headquartered in Miass, a small city in Russia’s southern Ural Mountains. “We not only help the Russians to pay their bills and stabilize their country by showing them how the free enterprise system works,” John E. Draim, a Navy pilot and engineer, wrote in the company’s business plan in 1993, “but we also help those Americans who are looking for an economical way to get satellites into orbit.” In May of that year, a Protocol of Intent agreement was signed by retired Adm. Thomas Moorer, a former Joint Chiefs chairman and head of the American team, and retired Russian Adm. Fyodor Novoselov, a former deputy fleet commander for shipbuilding and armaments. The joint venture acquired exclusive rights to Makeyev’s inventory of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and then developed marketing materials that showcased a line of products that could be converted for use in commercial ventures. These included a missile known as the R-27 Zyb — or “Ripple” — the squat, blunt-nosed workhorse of the Soviet Union’s Yankee-1 Class submarine fleet, along with larger, more powerful missiles such as the 50-foot-tall R-29 Shtil — or “Calm” — and the newer, solid-fueled R-39 Rif. The latter two were true intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of more than 5,000 miles. But the marquee item was the Priboi, or “Surf,” a hybrid model that the investors planned to create by combining parts of the Shtil and Rif into two-stage spacecraft designed to put small satellites into orbit. The Surf’s most extraordinary feature was that it could be fired into space without a submarine or conventional launchpad. Using techniques that both the United States and Russia had developed experimentally in the 1960s and ’70s, the missile could be launched from a floating tube, virtually anywhere in the world. Here, Russian missiles had a distinct advantage, as their lower specific gravity allowed them to float vertically, like an ocean buoy. Moreover, the engines for Soviet submarine missiles were specifically designed to ignite while their nozzles were still in the water. Backers of the plan envisioned a day when Russia’s missiles could launch commercial satellites into space quickly and cheaply, using a nearly infinite number of launch sites across the world’s oceans. “Erection in the water, even for the largest rockets, will take less than a minute,” Draim wrote in the 1993 business plan. Telecommunications companies would save millions of dollars, he wrote, while eliminating a real threat to U.S. national security. As the months passed, Makeyev’s managers became increasingly frustrated as their American partners ran into a series of obstacles, including reservations about whether the joint venture was permissible under U.S.-Russian arms-control agreements. In April 1993, Gen. Colin L. Powell, then the Joint Chiefs chairman, informed Sea Launch Investors that the project could not proceed without a government review and a formal waiver of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. No waiver was granted, and by the spring of 1995, it was clear that the company was a dead end. “The present ground rules . . . practically put us out of business,” Moorer complained in a memo on April 26 of that year. By then, some of the Makeyev drawings and blueprints had apparently gone out the door. The Russian scientists arrested at the Moscow airport in August 1993 acknowledged to investigators that they had been recruited as a group to assist North Korea in building rockets, ostensibly as space boosters for satellites. In “The Dead Hand,” David E. Hoffman’s Pulitzer Prize-winning history of the last years of the Cold War, a Russian security official describes how the North Koreans systematically chose experts from across Makeyev’s entire production line, from fuels specialists to engineers who designed the nose cone and payload chamber. The salary offer, $1,200 a month, was 200 times as much as some of the scientists were earning at home. “This was the first case when we noticed the North Korean attempts to steal missile technology,” the security official is quoted as saying. Other attempts would follow. U.S. and South Korean intelligence officials have confirmed that Makeyev scientists eventually did land jobs as consultants for the North Koreans, and technical drawings were passed to Pyongyang, either directly or through intermediaries. Some of Makeyev’s missile secrets appear to have left Russia before the joint-venture effort officially disbanded. Still, years later, the company’s former executive vice president remains convinced that most, if not all, could have been kept locked away if Western governments had acted quickly. “We just needed to be creative, and try and win the peace,” Gillman said. “But our government and military and intelligence agencies were shortsighted.” On June 22, 2016, North Korea successfully tested a mysterious new missile that differed dramatically from anything in Pyongyang’s known arsenal. The 36-foot-tall missile had a squat, snub-nosed frame and used a liquid propellent more powerful than the kerosene-based fuels the North Koreans had used in the past, potentially allowing it to fly farther, with heavier payloads. The missile was dubbed the Hwasong-10, or Musudan. But experts noted striking similarities to the R-27 Zyb, or Ripple, manufactured by the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau. Two months later, on Aug. 24, 2016, North Korea successfully tested the Pukguksong-1, a submarine-launched missile that also incorporates some features from the Zyb. Both models are “generally regarded as derived from the designs of the Makeyev Bureau’s R-27,” said Joshua Pollack, an analyst at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif. Those two tests were followed in recent months by even greater technological leaps, culminating in the successful tests this year of North Korea’s first true intercontinental ballistic missiles, capable of reaching every city in the continental United States. There have been no further tests of the Musudan, but satellite images released this month show that North Korea is building floating barges thought to be intended for tests of new submarine-launched missiles. The construction is occurring in two different ports on opposite sides of the country. U.S. analysts also believe that North Korea is working on an improved version of the Pukguksong.
“I have to assume that Makeyev pitched part, if not all, of these concepts and proposals to other interested investors, including the North Koreans,” said Michael Elleman, a former missiles scientist and a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a British think tank. While there is “solid evidence” that North Korea acquired blueprints for the R-27 Zyb, there is no proof so far that Pyongyang is building a clone of the R-29 Shtil, with its more powerful engine and 5,000-mile range. But Elleman cautioned: “It may be there, and appear in the future.” (Joby Warrick, “Documents Shed Light on Gains by N. Korea,” Washington Post, December 28, 2017,
Escalating U.S. rhetoric towards North Korea this year has stoked fears of war but Donald Trump’s threats of “fire and fury” have yet to be matched by the logistical and military build-up that would almost certainly precede any strike. While the U.S. could launch some kind of pinprick attack on an individual target without the need for huge firepower, experts say the Pentagon would have to prepare for the possibility of serious retaliation. “If you start to shoot first, you better be prepared for a full range of counter-reactions,” said William Fallon, former head of US Pacific Command and Central Command. “You would want to have a very heavy capability to try to deter a significant counter-action.” With more than 200,000 US citizens in South Korea and another 50,000 in Japan, Washington would almost certainly want to conduct an evacuation. But this would be a big logistical operation and could itself be the trigger for pre-emptive action by Kim Jong Un’s nuclear-armed regime. The U.S. has “a war plan in South Korea that we have been polishing for 70 years”, said Dennis Blair, a retired admiral who commanded a carrier battlegroup in 1994 when Bill Clinton was considering striking North Korea and later headed Pacific Command. That plan covers, he said, among other things “the transportation preparation, logistics — such as breaking out pre-positioned war material — communications, call up of reservists, preparations for non-combatant evacuation operations — the actions you really have to do if you think that serious conflict is a possibility.” The logistical complexity serves as a reminder of why the U.S. and its allies have long discounted the possibility of an attack — something that could lead to the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives and widespread economic disruption A huge complicating factor for the U.S. is the difficultly in locating North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Even if the U.S. knew where they were, the only way to destroy them without visible preparations would be a nuclear first strike, launched by stealth aircraft flying from the U.S. mainland, argues one former US military officer who has worked in the region. Blair, who has served as the head of the U.S. intelligence community, said it was “inconceivable that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons” to launch a pre-emptive strike. “It just would be such a Pandora’s box and would make us the first country in history to use nuclear weapons for coercive purposes since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which is absolutely the wrong signal to send.” The U.S. would be more likely to look at other options, from precision strikes on weapons facilities to a wider assault aimed at regime change. Dennis Wilder, a former senior CIA analyst and Asia adviser to George W. Bush, believes the U.S. could, for example, attempt to destroy the facility near Pyongyang where North Korea fuelled and stored the recently fired Hwasong 15 intercontinental ballistic missile. Recommended Australian man accused of brokering N Korean missiles Trump, Putin discuss ‘working together’ on North Korea Putin hopeful of U.S. policy shift on North Korea “There are many options for hitting a target or targets associated with . . . missile and nuclear development efforts,” Wilder said. “The U.S., while lacking precise information on where the nuclear weapons are stored, has closely monitored all the facilities associated with nuclear and missile R&D.” The problem for Washington, however, is that there is no guarantee that North Korea would not respond with a barrage of artillery fire on Seoul. As such, visible preparations — both offensive and defensive — would precede any strike, according to military experts. According to operational plans for war with North Korea, nearly 700,000 US soldiers would be mobilised alongside 160 ships, 1,600 aircraft and about 2.7m South Korean reservists, said Kim Yeol-soo, head of security at the Korea Institute for Military Affairs. Strategic assets, such as aircraft carriers, F-22 jets and B1-B bombers, would also be deployed. Such assets are occasionally used in training exercises on the peninsula, which North Korea bitterly criticizes as precursors to an invasion. When F-22 Raptor jets participated in air drills this month, Pyongyang said the “outbreak of war” had become an “established fact.” Daniel Pinkston, a lecturer at Troy University in Seoul, believes North Korea has grounds for concern over such exercises. “If you are going to initiate a conflict, any military is going to do it when at the advantage of peak readiness,” he said, suggesting conflict was most likely during North Korea’s winter maneuvers or the allied Foal Eagle drills in the spring. Kim Woo-chul, a former intelligence officer with the South Korean air force, said the US had stockpiled enough fuel and equipment following a year of preparations in 2017. The key indication of an imminent conflict, he said, would come from the movements and signals of the U.S. military brass in the region. “This cannot be done by U.S. Forces Korea only. This will require additional forces and movement into U.S. bases in Okinawa,” he said, pointing out that there are only about 30,000 US troops stationed in South Korea. By comparison, Pyongyang has more than 7.5m reserve forces. “This is not a rerun of the 1950s Korean war,” he said. “There is no front line. The real assets are the top decision makers. The human decisions will be critical.” (Bryan Harris, Robin Harding, and Demetri Sevastopulo, “U.S.-North Korea War Talk Runs up against Logistical Challenges,” Financial Times, December 27, 2017, p. 3)
12/28/17:
Did a Chinese ship deliver oil to North Korea in defiance of the U.N. Security Council? President Trump and South Korea seem to think so. China does not. Trump tweeted, “Caught RED HANDED – very disappointed that China is allowing oil to go into North Korea. There will never be a friendly solution to the North Korea problem if this continues to happen!” He then posted a clip of himself talking about North Korea’s nuclear program in a television interview that aired 18 years ago. Hours later, on December 29, South Korea South Korean authorities said that they had seized and inspected a Hong Kong-flagged vessel on November 24 that on October 19 transferred 600 tons of refined petroleum to a North Korean vessel. But at a daily press briefing in Beijing, a spokeswoman for China’s foreign ministry flatly dismissed the claim, saying media accounts “did not accord with the facts.” “China has always implemented U.N. Security Council resolutions pertaining to North Korea in their entirety and fulfills its international obligations,” said the spokeswoman, Hua Chunying. “We never allow Chinese companies and citizens to violate the resolutions,” she said.
People’s Daily followed up with a detailed account of her response, noting that she “hit back at the speculation with eight questions to drive home the point that the conclusion is based on speculation and not facts.” The headline: “China tells foreign media to stop it with the wild speculation.” (Emily Rauhala, “Beijing Denies Charge It Sold Oil to North Korea,” Washington Post, December 30, 2017, p. A10) A Hong Kong-flagged vessel chartered by a Taiwanese company transferred 600 tons of refined oil products to a North Korean ship last October in international waters, violating United Nations Security Council sanctions forbidding ship-to-ship transfers to or from North Korea, Seoul said December 29. South Korea’s Foreign Ministry said authorities seized the Hong Kong vessel, the Lighthouse Winmore, after it entered the port of Yeosu, South Jeolla, on the southern tip of the country last month, and has since been investigating the illegal transfer. Whether or not the shipment actually arrived in North Korea is not known. According to a senior Foreign Ministry official who briefed local reporters, the Lighthouse Winmore, chartered by Taiwanese company Billion Bunker Group Cooperation, initially entered Yeosu Port on October 11 with 23 Chinese and two Burmese on board and loaded nearly 14,039 tons of refined petroleum products from Japan. It left on the morning of October 15, officially informing South Korean customs authorities that it was headed for Taiwan. But officials from the Korea Customs Service said the vessel was ordered by the Taiwanese company to transfer its load to three other ships chartered by the same company on October 19 in international waters near the East China Sea, about 3,500 tons each. A separate load of 600 tons was given to a North Korean vessel, the Sam Jong 2, in the same area. The South Korean Foreign Ministry official said the government had kept an eye out on the shady transfer through “several routes,” some from the United States, and seized the Lighthouse Winmore when it returned to Yeosu on November 24. Lighthouse Winmore and Sam Jong 2 were two among ten ships that Washington proposed to the UN Security Council last week to blacklist, according to Reuters. Only four ships, including the Sam Jong 2 but excluding the Lighthouse Winmore, were eventually included in Resolution 2397, supposedly due to a protest from China. (Lee Sung-eun, “Seoul Seizes Ship Breaking North’s Oil Sanctions,” JoongAng Ilbo, December 30, 2017)
Trump interview: “MICHAEL SCHMIDT: Explain your North Korea tweet to me today. TRUMP: Which one? SCHMIDT: You said about the oil, that China. … What’s going on there. Tell me about that. TRUMP: Yeah, China. … China’s been. … I like very much President Xi. He treated me better than anybody’s ever been treated in the history of China. You know that. The presentations. … One of the great two days of anybody’s life and memory having to do with China. He’s a friend of mine, he likes me, I like him, we have a great chemistry together. He’s [inaudible] of the United States. …[Inaudible.] China’s hurting us very badly on trade, but I have been soft on China because the only thing more important to me than trade is war. O.K.? [Cross talk with guests.] SCHMIDT: Can you finish your thought on North Korea. What’s going on with China? TRUMP: I’m disappointed. You know that they found oil going into. …SCHMIDT: But how recently? TRUMP: It was very recently. In fact, I hate to say, it was reported this morning, and it was reported on Fox. Oil is going into North Korea. That wasn’t my deal! SCHMIDT: What was the deal? TRUMP: My deal was that, we’ve got to treat them rough. They’re a nuclear menace so we have to be very tough. RUDDY: Mr. President, was that a picture from recent or was that months ago? I don’t know. …TRUMP: Oil is going into North Korea, I know. Oil is going into North Korea. So I’m not happy about it. SCHMIDT: So what are you going to do? TRUMP: We’ll see. That I can’t tell you, Michael. But we’ll see. I can tell you one thing: This is a problem that should have been handled for the last 25 years. This is a problem, North Korea. That should have been handled for 25, 30 years, not by me. This should have been handled long before me. Long before this guy has whatever he has. SCHMIDT: Do you think we’ve been too soft on China on North Korea? TRUMP: No, look, I like China, and I like him a lot. But, as you know, when I campaigned, I was very tough on China in terms of trade. They made — last year, we had a trade deficit with China of $350 billion, minimum. That doesn’t include the theft of intellectual property, O.K., which is another $300 billion. So, China — and you know, somebody said, oh, currency manipulation. If they’re helping me with North Korea, I can look at trade a little bit differently, at least for a period of time. And that’s what I’ve been doing. But when oil is going in, I’m not happy about that. I think I expressed that in probably [inaudible]. TRUMP, as aides walk by: And, by the way, it’s not a tweet. It’s social media, and it gets out in the world, and the reason I do well is that I can be treated unfairly and very dishonestly by CNN, and, you know, I have — what do have now, John, 158 million, including Facebook, including Twitter, including Instagram, including every form, I have a 158 million people. Reporting just this morning, they said 158 million. So if they a do a story that’s false, I can do something — otherwise, Andy, otherwise you just sort of walk around saying what can I do? What, am I going to have a press conference every time somebody, every time Michael writes something wrong? So, China on trade has ripped off this country more than any other element of the world in history has ripped off anything. But I can be different if they’re helping us with North Korea. If they don’t help us with North Korea, then I do what I’ve always said I want to do. China can help us much more, and they have to help us much more. And they have to help us much more. We have a nuclear menace out there, which is no good for China, and it’s not good for Russia. It’s no good for anybody. Does that make sense? SCHMIDT: Yeah, yeah, it makes a lot of sense. TRUMP: The only thing that supersedes trade to me — because I’m the big trade guy, I got elected to a certain extent on trade. You see, I’m renegotiating Nafta, or I’ll terminate it. If I don’t make the right deal, I’ll terminate Nafta in two seconds. But we’re doing pretty good. You know, it’s easier to renegotiate it if we make it a fair deal because Nafta was a terrible deal for us. We lost $71 billion a year with Mexico, can you believe it? $17 billion with Canada — Canada says we broke even. But they don’t include lumber and they don’t include oil. Oh, that’s not. … [Inaudible,] … My friend Justin he says, “No, no, we break even.” I said, ‘Yeah, but you’re not including oil, and you’re not including lumber.” When you do, you lose $17 billion, and with the other one, we’re losing $71 billion. So the only thing that supersedes trade to me is war. If we can solve the North Korea problem. China cannot. … SCHMIDT: You still think there’s a diplomatic solution? TRUMP: China has a tremendous power over North Korea. Far greater than anyone knows. SCHMIDT: Why haven’t they stood up? TRUMP: I hope they do, but as of this moment, they haven’t. They could be much stronger. SCHMIDT: But why not? TRUMP: China can solve the North Korea problem, and they’re helping us, and they’re even helping us a lot, but they’re not helping us enough.” (Excerpts from Trump’s Interview with the New York Times, December 28, 2017)
12/29/17:
Mattis: “Q: On North Korea, Mr. Secretary, what should we make about the seizure of a Hong Kong-flagged vessel doing an illegal transfer at — (CROSSTALK) MATTIS: Who seized it? Q: The South Koreans are saying they did. And are we going to be seeing more of this? Is the U.S. Navy going to get involved? And does this amount to some kind of naval blockade? MATTIS: Yes, I don’t speculate, as you know, about future operations by our forces. But with three U.N. Security Council resolutions in a row, unanimously adopted, that — each one has put significantly more pressure on the North Korean regime for its provocations, for its outlaw activities. I think you will see increased pressure. What form that pressure takes in turns of physical operations is something that will be determined by the Congress and government. Obviously, if a government finds that there’s a ship in their port, conducting trade that was forbidden under the U.N. Security Council resolution, then they have an obligation. And, so far, we’ve seen nations take that obligation seriously. Q: Is the United States closer to going to war with North Korea? MATTIS: You know, I provide military options right now. This is a clearly — a diplomatically led effort with a lot of international diplomatic support. It’s got a lot of economic buttressing, so it’s not like it’s just words. It’s real activities. And, as you know, secretary of state will get together in Vancouver, British Colombia, co-hosting (inaudible) with the foreign minister of Canada, here in mid-January. And that shows we still have the diplomats in the lead to solve this. …Q: Quickly, on North Korea, can we expect to see a pause in military exercises with the Olympics coming up? MATTIS: A pause? Q: In military exercises, joint exercises with Japan and Korea. MATTIS: No. Q: Have you been impressed with the gains North Korea has made in its missile program over the past year. MATTIS: Nothing impresses me. (Laughter.) Q: Going back to the exercises, so – Foal Eagle — specifically the one in February — is that not being delayed until the Olympics are done? MATTIS: That’ll be announced by the U.S. and ROK government. ROK is the hosting government. And what will happen is — we always adjust exercise dates. There’s reasons for it, because we have ships available at certain times and there’s political considerations or there’s local holidays and this sort of thing. We do this all the time, and I honestly don’t have the answer to that question right now. Q: That “no” is not specifically to the exercise in February, then? MATTIS: I thought the question is, are we going to pause exercises? We may schedule — I don’t consider rescheduling to be pausing them. Okay, I see what you mean. Yes, it — the rescheduling of the exercises will be, as always, subject to both countries, the military — all the different things that go into it. They’re not — if pause is — I’m pausing them for a period of time because of — how to explain this — because of a diplomatic issue or something, no. I don’t anticipate that right now.” (DoD, Press Gaggle with Secretary Mattis, December 29, 2017)
12/31/17:
South Korea has seized and inspected a Panama-flagged ship suspected of selling oil to North Korea at sea in violation of U.N. sanctions, maritime authorities said. The 5,100-ton KOTI is being held in the western port of Pyeongtaek-Dangjin, Gyeonggi Province. Security and customs officials held a meeting on December 21 and decided not to allow the vessel to depart from the port, the local maritime office said. It is the second known vessel under probe by South Korea on suspicions of ship-to-ship supplies of petroleum products to North Korea, banned under the international sanctions over its nuclear and missile programs. The authorities said most of the crew of the ship KOTI are Chinese and Myanmarese. They declined to provide details of the probe, and the foreign ministry also said it has yet to receive any formal notification from the related agencies on the inquiry. (Yonhap, “Panamanian Vessel Probed for Suspected Oil Supplies to N. Korea,” December 31, 2017)
At an isolated shipyard on Poland’s Baltic coast, men in coveralls used welding torches under a cold drizzle, forging an oil tanker for a customer in the Netherlands. The scene was unremarkable, save for the provenance of a dozen of the workers. “Yes, we are from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” one of them said. “We have been here quite a while.” Then he hurried away, alarm seizing his face. Four other welders confirmed that they were also from North Korea, the pariah state threatening the United States and much of East Asia with nuclear weapons. They, too, then scampered off. For decades, North Korea has dispatched laborers to points around the globe, engaging tens of thousands in logging, mining and construction ventures while taking a hefty slice of their earnings. The United States has sought to shut down this enterprise, lobbying other countries to eject the workers and eliminate a source of hard currency for the North Korean economy. But the continued presence of these workers in Poland — a NATO ally at the heart of the European Union — underscores how difficult it is to fully sever North Korea from the global economy, even as the nation accelerates efforts to build a nuclear missile capable of striking the United States. In December, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution requiring all countries to expel North Korean workers within two years. Poland sent soldiers to fight alongside Americans in Iraq, but is nonetheless one of the few countries still hosting North Korean workers over Washington’s objections. The State Labor Inspectorate, which regulates working conditions at Polish companies, said that perhaps 450 North Koreans remained in the country as of mid-2017, employed by at least 19 companies, including a complex of greenhouses growing tomatoes south of Warsaw. But the New York Times found North Korean workers at two other businesses — the shipyard in Police, near the German border, and a factory that makes shipping containers in the town of Czluchow, 100 miles southwest of Gdansk. In Poland, provincial governments issue work permits to foreign laborers, and there is little coordination with national agencies. As a result, no one appears to know precisely how many North Koreans are in Poland or what they are doing. The Foreign Ministry has urged local governments to stop approving work permits for North Koreans, and new legislation taking effect in January will require them to do so. But until now, the provinces have persisted, illustrating the durability of commercial relationships forged during the Cold War, when Poland was a fellow member of the Communist bloc. Poland remains one of seven European nations to maintain embassies in Pyongyang. The Times requested information on work permits issued to North Koreans from Poland’s 16 provincial governments. Nine responded, reporting that they had given 124 new permits to North Koreans in 2017, and 253 the previous year. Washington has intensified pressure on countries to stop hosting North Korean laborers, and the list of countries doing so has dropped to perhaps 16, including Austria and several Persian Gulf states, from about 40, according to human rights groups and United Nations reports. The Polish government has repeatedly pledged to phase out work permits for North Koreans after negative attention in academic papers and news reports. But the European Union has not pressed the issue, fearful of ratcheting up tensions over sovereignty issues after Britain’s vote to exit the bloc. Poland’s right-wing government has bristled at European criticism of its moves to exercise greater control of the courts. “The E.U. has been afraid of driving Poland further away,” said Remco Breuker, a historian and Korea expert at Leiden University in the Netherlands. In a warren of streets near the Oder River in Police, a dreary town of 40,000, North Korean workers are often seen walking near train tracks from the Partner shipyard to a grocery store. Sometimes they squat on the sidewalks in front of their dormitory, smoking cigarettes while braced against a biting wind. In the evenings, they trudge to buy pastries or vegetables. On Sundays, they congregate at a local elementary school for soccer games. “It’s something very unusual,” said Pawel Wieczorkowski, deputy director of the local unemployment office. “It’s exotic.” The workers appear intent on maintaining a low profile. With few exceptions, North Korea’s totalitarian government forbids citizens from mixing with outsiders. Those who fall under suspicion can face arrest. “We are here legally. We pay taxes to the local government,” a North Korean worker said after being approached outside the dormitory. Asked about reports that workers have been mistreated, he snapped, “They are all lies!” Then he got in a van and drove away, down a muddy alley. North Koreans working elsewhere in Poland also keep to themselves. At the greenhouse complex that employs North Koreans, the workers’ dormitory was surrounded by a seven-foot-high concrete wall. But through a crack, a heavyset man in a thick parka could be seen directing six women to wash a blue Ford van in the winter chill. In Koldowo, a speck of a village some 200 miles northwest of Warsaw, residents said a group of North Koreans arrived in early 2017 for jobs at Remprodex, a manufacturer of shipping containers in the nearby town of Czluchow. During their first months, they slept inside empty containers despite the cold, residents said. Later, the workers rented half of a house tucked inside a walled compound. Remprodex did not respond to questions, and Times reporters were turned away at the estate of the Kociszewscy family, which owns the greenhouses. The countries hosting North Korean workers have defended the arrangements, arguing that they expose the laborers to the outside world and help them support their families. Conditions back home can be so desperate that some North Koreans pay bribes to get these jobs. But human rights organizations, North Korean defectors and United Nations monitors have described the assignments as forced labor because the workers are physically confined, under constant surveillance and deprived of most of their wages. As many as 147,000 North Koreans now work abroad, according to a recent estimate by the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul, and the ruling Workers’ Party in Pyongyang is said to seize anywhere from 30 to 80 percent of each laborer’s earnings. That amounts to a significant revenue source for a regime increasingly pinched by international sanctions — between $200 million and $500 million annually, according to most experts. The call that would put her in business with North Korea came around 2007, Cecylia Kowalska recalled. At the time, she ran a company in the port city of Gdansk that supplied electrical and welding services to the shipping and construction industries. A shipyard in Gdansk needed someone to manage 10 North Korean welders who had worked there in the past, she said. They had been employed through another firm that had struggled to pay them on time. Ms. Kowalska, now 67, said her company, Armex, assumed responsibility for the workers, and then established a relationship with the North Korean partners who had brought them to Poland. She later began supplying North Korean welders to two other shipyards, run by Crist S.A. and Nauta S.A., both companies that make war vessels for NATO members. “They were skilled and hard-working,” she said of the North Koreans. Ms. Kowalska also served as the legal representative of a company called Wonye that was established to supply workers to factories, shipyards, and fruit and vegetable wholesalers, according to Polish corporate records. The records identify Wonye’s president as a North Korean named Jo Chol-yong. In the mid-1990s, a man of the same name and birth date worked for a North Korean company controlled by the ruling party department that oversees the nation’s nuclear and missile programs, according to a registry of Pyongyang residents smuggled out of North Korea. Wonye’s vice president is listed as Kang Hong-gu, who appears to have previously served as commander of a unit involved in construction, the 8th Sokdojon Brigade, according to the Pyongyang registry. Ms. Kowalska said she helped establish Wonye in 2015 as a favor to one of her North Korean partners but never took an active role and sold her shares the next year. According to research by Breuker and his colleagues, Armex received its workers from the Rungrado General Trading Corporation, a North Korean supplier of overseas workers sanctioned by the United States in 2016 and accused of funding the department that oversees the nuclear weapons program. Asked about her partners, Ms. Kowalska said she was uncertain of their names and promised to look them up. But she later declined to identify them, saying that doing so would divulge “trade secrets.” Once, she recalled, one of the North Koreans suggested she buy a gift for officials in Pyongyang — a sword. “A sign of our thanks for this partnership,” she said. “I thought it was like buying someone flowers.” The sword was later displayed in a hall for gifts to North Korea’s leaders and highlighted in a North Korean propaganda video that identified Armex by name. Ms. Kowalska said the partnership proceeded smoothly until three years ago, when a North Korean welder without adequate safety gear burned to death at the Crist shipyard. The accident alarmed Crist’s customers, among them a Danish shipbuilder that had employed the Polish shipyard to handle work on a war vessel for Denmark, another NATO member. Soon afterward, Ms. Kowalska said, she stopped hiring North Korean workers “because it became such a sensitive issue.” She added that she was now retired and no longer managed North Korean workers. But her North Korean partners still appear to be active in Poland. On a recent afternoon, Times reporters spotted two vehicles with Polish license plates parked outside the workers’ dormitory at the tomato greenhouses: the van that was being washed and a dark Mercedes sedan. According to records seen by the Times, the van is registered to Wonye’s vice president, Mr. Kang, and the Mercedes to its president, Mr. Jo. Though the European Union maintains extensive labor protections, North Koreans who have worked there describe a parallel reality. “Our girls lived as if they were in prison,” said Kim Tae-san, a North Korean defector who worked in the Czech Republic from 2000 to 2002 supervising 200 young North Korean women in a shoe factory. He said the women were forced to remain during off-hours in their dormitory, where they attended ideological study sessions and could watch only movies and propaganda documentaries sent from home. Once a week, he added, they were allowed out to go to the market — but only in groups. North Koreans sent to work overseas are vetted for political loyalty, but the government also sends minders to watch them. Kim said the workers also “monitored each other.” The women worked six days a week, earning $150 a month but keeping only about $25 for food and savings. Their supervisors took the rest, Mr. Kim said, spending some of the money on housing but sending most of it back to the authorities in North Korea. Poles who have worked with North Koreans describe similar conditions. A shipyard worker at Crist, for example, recalled how a North Korean colleague fell ill on the job and was urged by a paramedic to stop working. Instead, the man became frantic, insisting he had to continue. “This is slave labor,” said Agnes Jongerius, a Dutch member of the European Parliament, who has urged European authorities to force Poland to stop admitting North Korean workers. Kowalska scoffed at allegations of abuse and said the North Koreans she managed enjoyed “a normal life.” “They asked us for advice on what to buy their wives and kids,” she said. “They liked to buy lingerie for their wives. It was a popular gift, and they would ask us about inexpensive shops.” She said her company paid the workers about $780 per month. She acknowledged at first that Armex sent a portion of their wages to a North Korean company, but later said she had misspoken and no one took a cut. As international scrutiny has intensified, the State Labor Inspectorate has vowed to investigate claims of abuse. So far, the agency has found “no signs of forced labor,” said Dorota Gorajska, an official responsible for companies that employ foreign workers. Officials acknowledged, however, that inspections have generally been confined to paperwork and that when interviews are conducted, investigators typically rely on translators provided by employers. Given North Korea’s reputation, does that not taint their findings? An official at the inspectorate, Michal Tyczynski, took a deep breath. “It’s a tricky question,” he said. “There is no good answer to this question.” (Peter S. Goodman, Choe Sang-hun, and Joanna Berendt, “Earning Wages for Pyongyang in a Polish Port,” New York Times, January 1, 2018)
1/1/18:
North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, moved to ease his country’s isolation by offering to send a delegation to the Winter Olympics in South Korea next month, even as he claimed to have accomplished the ability to launch a nuclear missile at the mainland United States. Mixing the nuclear threat with an overture for easing tensions on the divided Korean Peninsula, Kim proposed immediate dialogue with South Korea to discuss the North’s participation in the Olympics. If such talks were held, they would mark the first time the two Koreas have had an official dialogue since the South’s new president, Moon Jae-in, took office in May. Moon has doggedly championed dialogue with the North, even as President Trump has threatened military action to stop the North’s nuclear weapons program. “I am willing to send a delegation and take necessary measures, and I believe that the authorities of the North and South can urgently meet to discuss the matter,” Kim said in his annual New Year’s Day speech, broadcast on North Korea’s state-run television. “We sincerely hope that the South will successfully host the Olympics.” “Above all, we must ease the acute military tensions between the North and the South,” Kim said. “The North and the South should no longer do anything that would aggravate the situation, and must exert efforts to ease military tensions and create a peaceful environment.” But Kim also reiterated that his country had mastered a state nuclear deterrent force, which he said would prevent the Trump administration from starting a war on the Korean Peninsula. “It’s not a mere threat but a reality that I have a nuclear button on the desk in my office,” he said. “All of the mainland United States is within the range of our nuclear strike.” But it has yet to demonstrate that its nuclear warhead could survive the re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere and hit such long-range targets. He said his government would accelerate the production of nuclear warheads and rockets to launch them. Government and private analysts in South Korea have recently said that despite its claim to have achieved its nuclear ambitions, the North is likely to conduct more weapons tests to improve its nuclear and long-range ballistic missile capabilities. At the same time, they said North Korea will also seek opportunities to engage in dialogue with South Korea and the United States, hoping to use its nuclear threats as leverage to gain concessions, like easing sanctions. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korean Leader Offers a Hand to South While Chiding the U.S.,” New York Times, January 1, 2018)
KCNA: “Respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un made the New Year Address for 2018.The full text of the New Year Address reads: …The year 2017 was a year of heroic struggle and great victory, a year when we set up an indestructible milestone in the history of building a powerful socialist country with the spirit of self-reliance and self-development as the dynamic force. Last year the moves of the United States and its vassal forces to isolate and stifle our country went to extremes, and our revolution faced the harshest-ever challenges. …An outstanding success our Party, state and people won last year was the accomplishment of the great, historic cause of perfecting the national nuclear forces. On this platform one year ago I officially made public on behalf of the Party and government that we had entered the final stage of preparation for the test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile. In the past one year we conducted several rounds of its test launch, aimed at implementing the program, safely and transparently, thus proving before the eyes of the world its definite success. By also conducting tests of various means of nuclear delivery and super-intense thermonuclear weapon, we attained our general orientation and strategic goal with success, and our Republic has at last come to possess a powerful and reliable war deterrent, which no force and nothing can reverse. Our country’s nuclear forces are capable of thwarting and countering any nuclear threats from the United States, and they constitute a powerful deterrent that prevents it from starting an adventurous war. In no way would the United States dare to ignite a war against me and our country. The whole of its mainland is within the range of our nuclear strike and the nuclear button is on my office desk all the time; the United States needs to be clearly aware that this is not merely a threat but a reality. We have realized the wish of the great leaders who devoted their lives to building the strongest national defense capability for reliably safeguarding our country’s sovereignty, and we have created a mighty sword for defending peace, as desired by all our people who had to tighten their belts for long years. This great victory eloquently proves the validity and vitality of the Party’s line of simultaneously conducting economic construction and building up our nuclear forces and its idea of prioritizing science, and it is a great historic achievement that has opened up bright prospects for the building of a prosperous country and inspired our service personnel and people with confidence in sure victory. I offer my noble respects to the heroic Korean people who, despite the difficult living conditions caused by life-threatening sanctions and blockade, have firmly trusted, absolutely supported and dynamically implemented our Party’s line of simultaneously promoting the two fronts. …The nuclear weapons research sector and the rocket industry should mass-produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles, the power and reliability of which have already been proved to the full, to give a spur to the efforts for deploying them for action. And we should always be ready for immediate nuclear counterattack to cope with the enemy’s maneuvers for a nuclear war. …Last year, too, our people made strenuous efforts to defend the peace of the country and hasten national reunification in keeping with the aspirations and demands of the nation. However, owing to the vicious sanctions and pressure by the United States and its vassal forces and their desperate maneuvers to ignite a war, all aimed at checking the reinforcement of the self-defensive nuclear deterrent by our Republic, the situation on the Korean peninsula became aggravated as never before, and greater difficulties and obstacles were put on the road of the country’s reunification. Even though the conservative “regime” in south Korea, which had resorted to fascist rule and confrontation with fellow countrymen, collapsed and the ruling circles were replaced by another thanks to the massive resistance by the enraged people of all walks of life, nothing has been changed in the relations between the north and the south. On the contrary, the south Korean authorities, siding with the United States in its hostile policy towards the DPRK against the aspirations of all the fellow countrymen for national reunification, drove the situation to a tight corner, further aggravated the mistrust and confrontation between the north and the south, and brought the bilateral relations to a fix that can be hardly resolved. We can never escape the holocaust of a nuclear war forced by the outside forces, let alone achieve national reunification, unless we put an end to this abnormal situation. The prevailing situation demands that now the north and the south improve the relations between themselves and take decisive measures for achieving a breakthrough for independent reunification without being obsessed by bygone days. No one can present an honorable appearance in front of the nation if he or she ignores the urgent demands of the times. This year is significant both for the north and the south as in the north the people will greet the 70th founding anniversary of their Republic as a great, auspicious event and in the south the Winter Olympic Games will take place. In order to not only celebrate these great national events in a splendid manner but also demonstrate the dignity and spirit of the nation at home and abroad, we should improve the frozen inter-Korean relations and glorify this meaningful year as an eventful one noteworthy in the history of the nation. First of all, we should work together to ease the acute military tension between the north and the south and create a peaceful environment on the Korean peninsula. As long as this unstable situation, which is neither wartime nor peacetime, persists, the north and the south cannot ensure the success of the scheduled events, nor can they sit face to face to have a sincere discussion over the issue of improving bilateral relations, nor will they advance straight ahead towards the goal of national reunification. The north and the south should desist from doing anything that might aggravate the situation, and they should make concerted efforts to defuse military tension and create a peaceful environment. The south Korean authorities should respond positively to our sincere efforts for a detente, instead of inducing the exacerbation of the situation by joining the United States in its reckless moves for a north-targeted nuclear war that threatens the destiny of the entire nation as well as peace and stability on this land. They should discontinue all the nuclear war drills they stage with outside forces, as these drills will engulf this land in flames and lead to bloodshed on our sacred territory. They should also refrain from any acts of bringing in nuclear armaments and aggressive forces from the United States. Even though the United States is wielding the nuclear stick and going wild for another war, it will not dare to invade us because we currently have a powerful nuclear deterrent. And when the north and the south are determined, they can surely prevent the outbreak of war and ease tension on the Korean peninsula. A climate favorable for national reconciliation and reunification should be established. The improvement of inter-Korean relations is a pressing matter of concern not only to the authorities but to all other Koreans, and it is a crucial task to be carried out through a concerted effort by the entire nation. The north and the south should promote bilateral contact, travel, cooperation and exchange on a broad scale to remove mutual misunderstanding and distrust, and fulfil their responsibility and role as the motive force of national reunification. We will open our doors to anyone from south Korea, including the ruling party and opposition parties, organizations and individual personages of all backgrounds, for dialogue, contact and travel, if they sincerely wish national concord and unity. A definite end should be put to the acts that might offend the other party and incite discord and hostility between fellow countrymen. The south Korean authorities should not try, as the previous conservative “regime” did, to block contact and travel by people of different social strata and suppress the atmosphere for reunification through alliance with the north, under absurd pretexts and by invoking legal and institutional mechanisms; instead, they should direct efforts to creating conditions and environment conducive to national concord and unity. To improve inter-Korean relations as soon as possible, the authorities of the north and the south should raise the banner of national independence higher than ever before, and fulfil their responsibility and role they have assumed for the times and the nation. Inter-Korean relations are, to all intents and purposes, an internal matter of our nation, which the north and the south should resolve on their own responsibility. Therefore, they should acquire a steadfast stand and viewpoint that they will resolve all the issues arising in bilateral relations on the principle of By Our Nation Itself. The south Korean authorities need to know that they will gain nothing from touring foreign countries to solicit their help on the issue of inter-Korean relations, and that such behavior will give the outside forces, who pursue dishonest objectives, an excuse for their interference and complicate matters further. Now it is not time for the north and the south to turn their backs on each other and merely express their respective standpoints; it is time that they sit face to face with a view to holding sincere discussions over the issue of improving inter-Korean relations by our nation itself and seek a way out for its settlement in a bold manner. As for the Winter Olympic Games to be held soon in south Korea, it will serve as a good occasion for demonstrating our nation’s prestige and we earnestly wish the Olympic Games a success. From this point of view we are willing to dispatch our delegation and adopt other necessary measures; with regard to this matter, the authorities of the north and the south may meet together soon. Since we are compatriots of the same blood as south Koreans, it is natural for us to share their pleasure over the auspicious event and help them. We will, in the future, too, resolve all issues by the efforts of our nation itself under the unfurled banner of national independence and frustrate the schemes by anti-reunification forces within and without on the strength of national unity, thereby opening up a new history of national reunification. Availing myself of this opportunity, I extend warm New Year greetings once again to all Korean compatriots at home and abroad, and I sincerely wish that in this significant year everything would go well both in the north and in the south. Comrades, The international situation we witnessed last year was clear proof that our Party and our state were absolutely correct in their strategic judgement and decision that when we are confronting the imperialist forces of aggression who are attempting to wreck global peace and security and make mankind suffer a nuclear holocaust, our only recourse is the power of justice. As a responsible, peace-loving nuclear power, our country will neither have recourse to nuclear weapons unless hostile forces of aggression violate its sovereignty and interests nor threaten any other country or region by means of nuclear weapons. However, it will resolutely respond to acts of wrecking peace and security on the Korean peninsula. …” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Makes New Year Address,” January 1, 2018)
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