Special Reports

The International Crisis Group, an independent, non-profit, multinational organization, that works through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict, write “resolving territorial and historical disputes that have been building for decades will not be easy or quick but failure at least to ameliorate them risks undermining the peace and prosperity of the region.”

Sheena E. Chestnut, MPhil student in International Relations at Oxford University and graduate of Stanford University’s International Security Studies honors program, writes “Although interdiction remains a useful counter-proliferation tool, the potentially multi-use nature of criminal networks suggests that interdiction is insufficient in addressing the risks of nuclear smuggling from North Korea. the effectiveness of this kind of deterrence may rest as much on a sophisticated understanding of North Korean participation in illicit networks as on the notorious difficulties of interdiction. For these reasons, identifying and limiting North Korean involvement in illicit activity must remain a key component of U.S. policy toward the D.P.R.K.”

Brent Choi, a North Korea Specialist at the Joongang Daily, writes “most of the reports on North Korea’s successor are 99% wrong. Kim Jong-il’s sons might not even make it to the list of candidates. In order to become a successor the prospective leader will have to prove oneself in enhancing both economy and ideology. The winner “Mr. X” will sooner or later emerge at the front seat of the power through generation shifts after winning the tacit approval and confirmation from political elites. That precise timing will be in accordance with the seventh Party Convention. Let’s just continue to keep a close eye on the North for 2-3 years more.”

Siegfried S. Hecker, currently at the Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, presented this technical summary of the DPRK nuclear program at the 2005 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference. The report contains a survey of North Korean nuclear facilities. Hecker provides an update on the status of the 5 MWe Yongbyon reactor, the 50MWe Yongbyon reactor, and the 200MWe Taechon reactor. Hecker concludes by suggesting that the “DPRK is moving full-speed ahead with nuclear weapons program.”

Bong Dae Choi and Kab Woo Koo, researchers at Kyungnam University, write: “The mid- to late-80s saw the sidelining of farmers’ markets due to government regulations while at the same time, saw the emergence of black markets increase their importance. The presiding factors over the sideline activities and reemergence of farmers’ markets were the physical change in the state distribution system and the binding power of the intangible anti-market sentiment? We will have to wait and see how the latest reversal in policy is seen by the marketeers of North Korea.”

The Institute of Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University released this report on inter-Korean economic cooperation. The report states: “As a joint agreement founded on the goal of resolving the North Korean nuclear issues has been adopted, in South Korea, the spotlight will now largely shine on South Korea’s plans for developing inter-Korean economic cooperation.”

The Central Bureau of Statistics, Institute of Child Nutrition of the DPRK in collaboration with UNICEF and WFP, released this report on nutrition in the DPRK. The report states:” The most common source of staple foods was the PDC rations or Farmers rations, but a quarter of the households reported WFP foods as a source of their staple food. The most common sources of beans were farmer’s rations, self production, markets, kin support and WFP foods. The sources of fruits and vegetables were state shops, markets, self production and farmer’s rations. WFP foods were not a source of these foods.”

The Institute of Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University released this report on the status of markets in the DPRK. The report states: “However, as North Koreans gradually become more quality- conscious, Chinese-made goods will loose market strength, especially as better quality imports — such as those from South Korea, which are imported on a limited basis — begin to raise the awareness of North Koreans.”

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) released this report on the DPRK’s plutonium stock and its means to produce and separate plutonium. The report states: “Assuming that the recently unloaded fuel has not yet been separated, the DPRK has about 15-38 kilograms of separated plutonium. At 4-5 kilograms of plutonium per weapon, this plutonium is enough for 3-9 nuclear weapons.”

This is the full text of the joint statement issued at the close of the fourth round of six-party talks.