Special Reports are longer, often more technical, documents consisting of entire articles, government statements, and other documents relevant to security and peace in Northeast Asia.
NAPSNet, Special Reports
INNOVATION AND ADAPTIVE CONTROL IN AMERICA’S ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE: PARALLELS TO NC3
MASON WILLRICH OCTOBER 3, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Mason Willrich suggests that there are important lessons for NC3 operators in how electric power utilities control their grids, and especially, how they ensure that interconnections with adjacent grids are maintained continuously in spite of the potentially catastrophic risks of grid failure arising from instability […]
Go to the articleNUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (NC3): THE CASE OF PAKISTAN
FEROZ HASSAN KHAN SEPTEMBER 26, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Feroz Hassan Khan describes the unique challenges faced by Pakistan’s NC3 given “the volatile nature of national and security situations, compounded by evolving military doctrines warranting sudden transition from peace to crises to war management.” Pakistan, he notes, “is grappling with the pace […]
Go to the articleA NEW FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT REGIONAL NC3?
VIPIN NARANG SEPTEMBER 19, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Vipin Narang argues that eventually “all states delegate—that is, cede the ability to use nuclear weapons, irrespective of the authority to do so—at some point. The question is when.” Vipin Narang is an Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT and a member of MIT’s Security Studies Program. A podcast […]
Go to the articleUNITED KINGDOM: NUCLEAR WEAPON COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS
JOHN GOWER SEPTEMBER 12, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, John Gower states that the UK Nuclear Weapon Command Control and Communications (UK NC3) architecture is designed and operated to support SSBN strategic nuclear deterrence in all foreseeable circumstances from peacetime to nuclear conflict. “Through multiple paths and frequencies, fall-back and alternative systems and […]
Go to the articleEMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, EMERGING CHALLENGES — THE POTENTIAL EMPLOYMENT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN FUTURE PLA NC3
ELSA B. KANIA SEPTEMBER 5, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Elsa Kania assesses how emerging technologie…
Go to the articleTHE NON-STATE DIMENSION OF NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS
GARY A. ACKERMAN AUGUST 29, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Gary Ackerman introduces how violent non-state actors (VSNAs) may approach the command and control of nuclear weapons. He suggests that understanding the complexity presented by VNSA NC3 entails considering “traditional concepts of state NC3 (such as the always/never dilemma) and dynamics that are […]
Go to the articleNUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS: US COUNTRY PROFILE
JEFFREY LARSEN AUGUST 22, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Jeffrey Larsen reviews the legacy NC3 system of the United States now in the midst of a sea-change. He concludes: “The need to ensure robust existing capabilities for the current system, plus the desire to create a new system that is more than a […]
Go to the articleNC3 DECISION MAKING: INDIVIDUAL VERSUS GROUP PROCESS
ALEX WELLERSTEIN AUGUST 8, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Alex Wellerstein sketches a framework for thinking about how concentrated nuclear use authority should be at the top. While he discusses specific US proposals for reform in response to the debate about President Donald Trump’s fitness, the scope of his analysis is global and […]
Go to the articleCOMMAND AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN INDIA
M.V. RAMANA & LAUREN J. BORJA AUGUST 1, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, M.V. Ramana and Lauren Borja state that Indian nuclear weapons reportedly are “controlled by the Nuclear Command Authority, a two layered structure, one of which is headed by the Prime Minister. Nuclear command and control in India,” they conclude, “has […]
Go to the articleAN ENGINEERING PERSPECTIVE ON AVOIDING INADVERTENT NUCLEAR WAR
NANCY LEVESON JULY 25 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Nancy Leveson argues that using conservative techniques and avoiding software in critical functions in NC3 systems circumvented nuclear catastrophe in the past. Today, she concludes, a new approach is needed that avoids unnecessary complexity; emphasizes less not more technology; and improves NC3 systems by developing […]
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