Policy Forum

The essay below by Will Weaver makes the case that North Korea is undergoing a profound transformation that the rest of the world is unaware of. Consequently, North Korea must be given the chance to nurture its economic and political development through the support of the US and other nations. North Korea has nothing to lose. Therefore, the world must offer them something to gain. Will Weaver presently resides in China and has visited North Korea three times. Will Weaver is a pseudonym.

Dr. Mansourov argues that North Korea is going nuclear, while the United States seriously considers using force to disarm and even dismantle the North Korean regime. Pyongyang and Washington are dead set on a head-on collision course. Whether war will erupt on the Korean peninsula or not will ultimately depend on the choice of the South Korean people. The December 19, 2002, presidential elections will indeed be a watershed event, which may decide whether there will be war or peace on the Korean peninsula after the conclusion of the Iraqi operation next year.

Dr. Mansourov argues that North Korea is going nuclear, while the United States seriously considers using force to disarm and even dismantle the North Korean regime. Pyongyang and Washington are dead set on a head-on collision course. Whether war will erupt on the Korean peninsula or not will ultimately depend on the choice of the South Korean people. The December 19, 2002, presidential elections will indeed be a watershed event, which may decide whether there will be war or peace on the Korean peninsula after the conclusion of the Iraqi operation next year.

Below is commentary by Timothy Savage on Alexandre Mansourov’s essay “North Korea Goes Nuclear, Washington Readies for War, South Korea Holds Key” posted on NAPSNet of December 9, 2002. The original piece can be found

The essay below is by Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Washington-based Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Sokolski asserts that given recent events reviving the 1994 Agreed Framework is unwise, and rather North Korea must pay a price for its violations. Moreover, North Korea must also hand over to the IAEA all the nuclear technology and hardware it illicitly imported. Finally, the United States and its allies should give up the idea of renewing or retaining the 1994 deal, and apply more direct pressure to North Korea.

Peter Hayes argues that the KEDO decision to suspend heavy fuel oil shipments to the DPRK was imprudent. He suggests that the United States has lit a very short fuse to nuclear proliferation in North Korea. He argues that the DPRK should declare a unilateral freeze on its uranium enrichment activity and invite the international community to inspect this freeze pending the resumption of US-DPRK dialogue to resolve the enrichment imbroglio.

The essay below is by Professor Han Sung Joo, President of Korea University and former ROK Foreign Minister (1993-94) when the US-DPRK Agreed Framework was negotiated. Han argues that North Korea must be further embedded into relationships of deeper dependence upon the outside world, particularly South Korea, the United States and Japan. Similar to the 1994 “carrot and stick” approach by South Korea and the United States that led to the Agreed Framework, a similar strategy must be employed today, but with greater multilateral coordination.

The essay below by John Feffer, author of numerous articles on Korea, and editor of the forthcoming “Power Trip: U.S. Foreign Policy after September 11,” asserts that North Korea is keen to win a deal with the United States that will allow it to pursue economic reform, but the Bush administration has largely ignored the DPRK’s attempts to engage the world. At the same time, North Korea fears that the Bush administration, after dislodging Saddam Hussein, will apply its regime-change policy to Pyongyang. The recent nuclear revelations are North Korea’s latest attempt to shock the United States into negotiating a package deal that would include security guarantees. Pyongyang’s policy of nuclear deterrence and Washington’s policy of preemptive strikes are inextricably linked, and a solution to the current crisis requires a rethinking of both policies.

The essay below is by Glyn Ford, member of the European Parliament representing South West England. He has visited North Korea five times. Ford argues that any possible resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue falls squarely on the shoulders of South Korea and Japan. Potentially, the EU and China could help supply the political impetus to overcome US opposition, while South Korea and Japan could provide the bulk of the financial resources in exchange for the normalization of relations with North Korea.

The analysis below is by Steve LaMontagne, senior analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC. LaMontagne notes that the Bush administration faces the same set of policy options as did the Clinton administration in the early 1990s when North Korea threatened to pull out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: War, Isolation, or Diplomacy. While war and isolation entail considerable risks, diplomatic negotiations may find little support on Capitol Hill and among administration hawks who bristle at the thought of being blackmailed by Kim Jong Il. The key test of the administration’s commitment to a diplomatic solution to the North Korea nuclear problem will be whether or not it abandons diplomacy at the first sign of stubborn, erratic, or objectionable behavior by North Korea. If this happens, diplomacy could eventually give way to the threat of military action.