Policy Forum

This essay highlights the major parameters of the Kelly process and discusses the possible outlines of Kim Jong Il’s grand strategy vis-a-vis the United States. It argues that the North Korean leadership used the “Kelly moment” to send a dual message of nuclear deterrence and cooperative engagement to the Bush administration. The author believes that whereas in the short run, the ongoing “chicken hawk engagement” between Pyongyang and Washington is likely to bring to an end the agreed framework era on the Korean peninsula, in the long term, it is likely to lead to a quiet burst of the DPRK’s “nuclear bubble” and eventual “friendly co-optation” of the DPRK’s nuclear assets by the ROK “white knight.”

Dr. C. Kenneth Quinones short essay offers an alternative approach to dealing with North Korea. Abandoning the narrow rubric of “carrots” or “sticks,” Quinones argues for a reminder and re-visitation of the over-arching objective of peace and stability. After all, complete US disengagement from North Korea will only further isolate North Korea, while straight-up appeasement will only encourage North Korea to continue its history of coercive diplomacy. Therefore, cooler heads must prevail and calm and collected multilateral engagement free of pre-conditions must be pursued on both sides.

This essay focuses on the consequences and future implications of relations between North Korea and the United States given the North Korea’s surprise admission of a clandestine nuclear weapons program via enriched uranium. It argues that the United States is in a lose-lose foreign policy situation due to potential accusations of hypocrisy (vis a vis its foreign policy with Iraq) and accusations of wrongful appeasement. While it remains unclear why North Korea chose now to reveal its nuclear weapons program, the essay asserts that Pyongyang stands to gain much potential political leverage over the United States, as war is not an option, and neither is permitting Pyongyang to continue its uranium enrichment program.

This essay analyzes breaking news that the United States holds the DPRK to be in “material breach” of its promise to not develop nuclear weapons. It reviews what the DPRK might be doing with uranium enrichment and concludes that there is no innocent explanation. It speculates that the DPRK might have aimed to force the United States to resume dialogue. Alternately, it might have been developing a clandestine nuclear weapons capacity for long run strategic value in the face of its degraded conventional military forces. Finally, the essay states that the Agreed Framework has been dead for some time, but that short of war, it is inevitable that eventually the DPRK and the United States create a new cooperative framework.

Koizumi and Kim Jong-Il: Hope for the best, prepare for the worst NAPSNet Policy Forum, September, 2002 Victor Cha I. INTRODUCTION This short piece on the meaning and implications behind Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi’s upcoming historical trip to North Korea is by Professor Victor Cha of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Cha asserts that […]

This short piece on the meaning and implications behind Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi’s upcoming historical trip to North Korea is by Professor Victor Cha of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Cha asserts that while Koizumi’s trip to North Korea this month appears to be a positive development aimed at reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula and a step toward convincing the Bush administration’s skeptics to press forward with engagement, the mission could end up reinforcing hawk perceptions in Washington that engagement with the DPRK is a necessary, albeit, fruitless exercise, doomed for failure. Professor Cha is also director of the American Alliances in Asia Project at Georgetown University

The essay below is by Yoshikazu Sakamoto who is Professor Emeritus at Tokyo University. Sakamoto argues that the United States occupation of Iraq is not true democratization. Democracy in Iraq will only take root through autonomous opposition to the occupation. Postwar democracy in Japan was not a direct consequence of democratization from above but through spontaneous opposition to the policy of the anti-communist occupation force. The administrations of the U.S. and Japan need to learn from this paradoxical lesson.

This is a slightly revised version of the article appeared in The Japan Times, January 1, 2004.

The following article was contributed by Peter M. Beck, Director of Research at the Korea Economic Institute of America. Beck argues that the Bush administration’s current campaign against North Korea has more to do with political convenience than it does with combating terrorism. Consequently, Beck asserts that if the Bush administration has decided to be part of the problem rather than part of the solution, then it is ultimately up to the North and the South to determine the fate of the Korean Peninsula.

The following article was contributed by Bryan Port who is presently a graduate student at Georgetown University and an analyst with SAIC supporting a military client. Port asserts that the present Sunshine Policy is incapable of dealing with a politically deteriorating North Korea and ineffective in terms of threat reduction and reunification. Consequently, Port argues that micro-projects must be put in place to prepare for the inevitable collapse of North Korea. Port offers pragmatic examples of micro-engagement such as North-South joint reforestation programs, information technology, infrastructure improvement, and municipal management.

October 18, 2001 By Ralph A. Cossa I. Introduction This article is contributed by Ralph A. Cossa, President of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Cossa asserts that as tragic as the September 11th attacks may be, they nonetheless present a […]