Policy Forum

Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online: A Bad Idea in Vietnam, an Even Worse Idea Today Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online: A Bad Idea in Vietnam, an Even Worse Idea Today PFO 03-17: March 9, 2003 A Bad Idea in Vietnam, an Even Worse Idea Today By Peter Hayes and Nina Tannenwald CONTENTS I. Introduction II. […]

Alexandre Y. Mansourov argues that Kim Jong Il is engaged in a two-level game whereby his domestic political and economic considerations are as important to him, if not more, as the signals, which he sends to and receives from the international community. The author believes that at the current stage of confrontation, Kim Jong Il is not interested in any sort of negotiations with the United States. Kim wants the Bomb, and North Korea will do its utmost to become a nuclear state, whether it will officially declare it outright or not. On its part, Washington refuses to negotiate with Pyongyang because it pursues a Reaganesque strategy, reminiscent of the old Cold War days, of mounting international isolation and an escalating arms race that will hopefully lead to an implosion of the bankrupt North Korean state. The author argues that the real danger from such an uncontrolled escalation of tensions is an accidental outbreak of hostilities contrary to the real intentions of all the parties concerned. Mansourov outlines the initial steps to be required to jump start constructive negotiations between Pyongyang and Washington at the time of total mutual distrust, zero credibility, and personal enmity among leaders. Mansourov is Associate Professor of Security Studies Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

This essay is by John Fetter, President of FSI Energy, a consulting organization specializing in energy and environmental improvement. Fetter asserts that a gas fired electrical generation strategy would benefit the DPRK for several significant reasons. Gas fired electric generation would provide the DPRK with clean, technologically appropriate, available generation capacity in a reasonable time frame. Gas would also supply industrial fuel and excellent power quality without relying on a limited transmission grid.

This essay is by Marcus Noland, Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Economics. Noland asserts the following three arguments: (1) engagement with the aim of transforming North Korea is a desirable policy from the standpoint of South Korea; (2) collapse and absorption along German lines would not be catastrophic for South Korea; and (3) regardless of South Korea’s stance toward the North, it remains economically vulnerable to the vagaries of North Korean behavior. This paper is to be presented to the Roh Government Transition Team in Seoul, Korea on February 24, 2003.

The essay below is by Phar Kim Beng. Beng asserts that living next to North Korea, a threatening neighbor that has the means and intent to go nuclear, Japan has every reason to follow suit. However, there is a whole gamut of issues, political, strategtic, psychological, and even technical, that Japan has to overcome before it can adopt a nuclear deterrent. Consequently, Japan cannot be a nuclear power in the foreseeable future. Beng is a Malaysian and former Asian Public Intellectual fellow attached to the United Nations University.

Dr. Alexandre Y. Mansourov argues that as the security dilemma facing the United States and North Korea in the current nuclear standoff aggravates, they increasingly fall into the war trap. Although Pyongyang and Washington talk peace, neither side has the interest nor will to negotiate at the present time. Instead, they are both stuck in the escalation mode and actively prepare for war. Dr. Mansourov suggests that perhaps, in the long run, a South Korean protectorate over the North Korean state, encompassing the areas of national security and foreign policy, can bring about peaceful resolution of the escalating nuclear crisis and guarantee peace and stability on the nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, argues that unless the Bush administration initiates talks directly with North Korea immediately, the United States will end up with a nuclear-armed North Korea, no military option to exercise, and a ruptured alliance with South Korea who will go-it-alone.

This paper by Jon B. Wolfstahl, Director, Non-Proliferation project at the Carnegie Endowement for International Peace, analyzes how North Korea could “unfreeze” its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, especially at the pond that stores plutonium in spent fuel rods. The paper explains the operations that may be underway according to news that American spy satellites over North Korea have detected trucks moving fuel rods at the Yongybon nuclear facilities. These rods could be spent fuel from the storage pond en route to the reprocessing plant (or new fuel headed for the research reactor, or both). Whichever, the DPRK may be crossing a “red line” for the Bush Administration. It also outlines what would need to be done to “refreeze” these facilities as part of the Bush Administration’s diplomatic search for a peaceful solution to the nuclear confrontation with the DPRK. The paper was presented at the US-DPRK Next Steps Workshop in Washington DC on January 27, 2003, an event co-sponsored by Nautilus Institute and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The following paper is by Chung-in Moon. Moon outlines several cooperative schemes to aid the ROK and US in coping with North Korean uncertainty. Concurrently, they also serve as confidence building measures between the ROK and US. Chung-in Moon is professor of political science at Yonsei University and vice president of the International Studies Association (ISA) in North America. This paper was presented at the US-DPRK Next Steps Workshop, organized by Nautilus and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 27, 2003, Washington, D.C.

The paper below is by Seongwhun Cheon, Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification in South Korea. It will be presented at the U.S.-DPRK Next Steps Workshop on January 27, 2003, in Washington, D.C. The workshop is co-sponsored by the Nautilus Institute and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In his paper, Cheon outlines interim and final solutions to feasibly inspecting North Korea’s uranium and plutonium programs, as well as offers his insight on the short and long term political implications of the present North Korea nuclear stand-off.