DPRK (North Korea) Chronology for 2024

1/1/24:
KCNA: “DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui held a consultative meeting with officials concerned on January 1 to thoroughly carry out the tasks given by the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un at the historic 9th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea to dismantle and reform the bodies in charge of the affairs related to the south and the struggle against enemy and change the fundamental principle and orientation of the struggle. Present there were Ri Son Gwon and other officials in charge of the affairs related to the south.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui Holds Consultative Meeting with Officials Related to Struggle against Enemy,” January 1, 2024)

North Korea is shaking up the way it handles relations with South Korea, enacting changes to policy and government organizations that would effectively treat the South as a separate, enemy state. The moves, which break with decades of policy, could have North Korea’s foreign ministry taking over relations with the South, and potentially help justify the use of nuclear weapons against Seoul in a future war, analysts said. Since the 1950-53 Korean War ended in a stalemate, both nations have had policies that treat each other differently than other countries. That has included relying on special agencies and ministries for inter-Korean relations rather than their foreign ministries, and embracing policies for a future peaceful reunification, usually envisioning a single state with two systems. But in remarks to a year-end party meeting last week, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said peaceful reunification is impossible, and said the government would make a “decisive policy change” in relations with the “enemy”. He also ordered the military to be prepared to pacify and occupy the South in the event of a crisis. The changes in policy could help North Korea justify using nuclear weapons against the South, as it has increasingly threatened in recent years, said Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul. “If they give up on peaceful unification and redefine South Korea as a hostile enemy country with no diplomatic relations, the contradiction of using nuclear weapons against the same people will be eliminated,” Hong said. Some observers say North Korea’s declarations simply reflect the reality of two countries with deep divisions and disparities. “North Korea in recent years had suggested that it was moving toward a fundamental shift in South Korea policy, and the December 2023 Party plenum not only confirmed it, it also formalized it,” said Rachel Minyoung Lee, of the U.S.-based Stimson Center. The extent of the organizational changes is unclear, and some analysts said that because such rhetoric is more closely reflecting the status quo, there is unlikely to be a major shift in the already antagonistic relationship between the two Koreas. Previous periods of high tensions, for example during the “fire and fury” of 2016 and 2017, have also occasionally been followed by periods of detent and diplomacy, including during the 2018 and 2019 summits between Kim and the presidents of South Korea and the United States. The United Front Department (UFD) of the Workers’ Party of Korea has traditionally been tasked with relations with the South, including intelligence gathering and propaganda efforts. But even if talks do someday resume, the announcement likely means that Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui, a seasoned diplomat, will be the one overseeing relations with the South, said Michael Madden, a North Korea leadership expert with the Stimson Center. “I would trace her role as a substantive adviser on unification and South Korea policy to Kim’s 2019 visit to the former inter-Korea resort near Mt. Kumgang. Her attendance at that event was not unprecedented but it was most unusual and portended her writ expanding to South Korean policy,” Madden said. The fact that Choe, a career diplomat who has played little role in inter-Korean affairs, led the task of “dismantling and reforming” entities linked to South Korea, as reported by state media on January 1, could mean the foreign ministry will absorb those organizations and their functions, said Yang Moo-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul. “The United Front Department and the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, which had traditionally handled inter-Korean ties, could be disbanded altogether or at least see their roles significantly reduce,” he said. North Korea could also decide to cut the South out entirely and only deal with the United States, he added. While foreign ministry officials occasionally advised on inter-Korean issues, under Kim there has been no known crossover between foreign ministry and UFD officials, Madden said. Whatever changes occur, key UFD intelligence official are unlikely to be sidelined and the agency is likely to retain authority over some key propaganda broadcasts and websites, he added. (Hyonhee Shin and Josh Smith, “In Threatening Shift, North Korea Moves to Redefine Relations with South, Reuters, January 4, 2024)

1/2/24:
Lee Jae-myung, the leader of South Korea’s main opposition party, was stabbed in the neck at a rally today. The man accused of the stabbing had been stalking him in recent weeks, including attending a political event where Lee was present on December 13, apparently captured on video there wearing a blue paper crown, the police say. At a rally today, the man wearing a similar paper crown and carrying a message supporting Lee and his party was also carrying something else: a knife with a five-inch blade and a plastic handle wrapped with duct tape. The attack, the worst against a South Korean politician in nearly two decades, seriously wounded Lee, who officials said was recovering in an intensive care unit at Seoul National University after surgery. And it deeply shocked a country that values hard-won years of relative peace after an era of political and military violence before establishing democracy in the 1990s. The police said that the suspect, a 66-year-old real estate agent named Kim Jin-seong, had admitted an intent to kill Lee. Armed with a court-issued warrant, the police confiscated Kim’s mobile phone and raided his home and office in Asan, south of Seoul, as they tried to piece together what might have motivated that attack. With details still scarce, public debate and news editorials were expressing a growing concern about South Korea’s deepening political polarization and the hatred and extremism it has seemed to inspire, as well as the challenges it posed to the country’s young democracy. “The opposition leader falls under a knife of ‘politics of hatred,’” read a headline from Chosun Ilbo, the country’s leading conservative daily. The deep and bitter rivalry between Lee and President Yoon Suk Yeol has been center stage in South Korea’s political polarization since 2022, when Lee lost to Yoon with the thinnest margin of any free presidential election in South Korea. Instead of retiring from politics, as some presidential candidates have after defeats, Lee ran for — and won — a parliamentary seat, as well as chairmanship of the opposition Democratic Party. Under Yoon, state prosecutors have launched a series of investigations against Lee and tried to arrest him on various corruption and other criminal charges. Yoon has also refused to grant Lee one-on-one meetings that South Korean presidents had often offered opposition leaders to seek political compromises. Instead, he has repeatedly characterized his political opponents as “anti-state forces” or “corrupt cartels.” For his part, Lee accused Yoon of deploying state law-enforcement forces to intimidate his enemies. His party has refused to endorse many of Yoon’s appointees to the Cabinet and the Supreme Court. Political commentators likened the relationship between Yoon and Lee to “gladiators’ politics.” “The two have been on a collision course for two years,” said Park Sung-min, head of MIN Consulting, a political consultancy. “President Yoon has been accused of not recognizing Lee Jae-myung as an opposition leader but rather as a criminal suspect. I don’t think his attitude will likely change following the knife attack against Lee.” The last major attack on a domestic political leader happened in 2006, when Park Geun-hye, then an opposition leader, was slashed in the face with a box cutter. But the attack was seen largely as an isolated outburst of anger by an ex-convict who complained of mistreatment by the law enforcement system. (Ms. Park went on to win the 2012 presidential election.) But in recent years, politicians have been increasingly exposed to hatred in the public sphere, as political polarization deepened. In a survey sponsored by Hankyoreh in December, more than 50 percent of respondents said they felt the political divide worsening. In another survey in December, commissioned by Chosun Ilbo, four out of every 10 respondents said they found it uncomfortable to share meals or drinks with people who didn’t share their political views. South Koreans had an early inkling of the current problem. During the presidential election campaign in 2022, Song Young-gil, an opposition leader, was attacked by a bludgeon-wielding man in his 70s, who subsequently killed himself in jail. Jin Jeong-hwa, a YouTuber whose channel openly supports Lee and who live-streamed the knife attack on Tuesday, said he could feel the increasing political tension and hatred every day. Once, when he visited a conservative town in central South Korea, people who recognized him tried to chase him out, threatening him with knives and sickles. “You see a lot of anger, vilification, character assassination and demonizing,” Jin said. “I am not sure whether rational debate on issues and ideologies is possible anymore.” Yoon wished Lee a quick recovery, calling attacks against politicians “an enemy of free democracy.” His government ordered beefed-up public security for politicians. But analysts saw little chance of political polarization easing anytime soon as the rival parties geared up for parliamentary elections in April. Social media, especially YouTube, has become so influential as a channel of spreading news and shaping public opinion that politicians said they found themselves beholden to populist demands from activist YouTubers who were widely accused of stoking fear and hatred. Both Yoon and Lee have fervent online supporters who often resort to whipping up insults, conspiracy theories and even thinly veiled death threats against their foes. “Hate has become a daily norm” in South Korean politics, said Park, the head of MIN Consulting. “Politicians must face the reality that similar things can happen again,” he said, referring to the knife attack against Lee. (Choe Sang-Hun and John Yoon, “Stabbing of South Korean Opposition Leaders Raises Alarms in Divided Country,” New York Times, January 4, 2024, p. A-8)

1/4/24:
South Korean and U.S. troops have conducted joint combat firing drills near the border with North Korea involving heavy weapons, as Pyongyang lambasted the allies for dangerous moves pushing the region to the brink of “an inferno of nuclear war.” The exercise by a South Korean Army mechanized infantry brigade and U.S. Army armored Stryker brigade was to test and enhance combat readiness simulating enemy aggression, South Korea said in a statement today The drills took place over a week starting on December 29 and ended today, the South Korean Army said. (Jack Kim, “South Korea, U.S. Conduct Week-Long Firing Drills near N. Korean Border,” Reuters, January 4, 2024) South Korea’s Army said today that South Korea and the United States held a joint live-fire exercise near the border with North Korea, aimed at bolstering their combined operational capabilities against North Korea’s military threats. Defense Minister Shin Won-sik presided over the South’s drills virtually from the JCS’ command post in central Seoul and called for readiness against “reckless provocative” acts by the North. “Our military … needs to be equipped with a retaliatory posture for complete annihilation so that the enemy never attempts another provocation and to ensure peace through powerful strength,” he was quoted as saying North Korea today warned against such provocations under the guise of shoring up readiness, saying its armed forces will demonstrate “tough counteraction on an unprecedented level.” The KPA also referred to the South Korean Army as “the military gangsters.” (Chae Yun-hwan, “North Korea Fires 200 Artillery Shells off Western Coast: S. Korean Military,” Yonhap, January 5, 2024)

The White House accused North Korea today of providing Russia with ballistic missiles that Moscow has begun to fire on targets in Ukraine, and said that in return the North was seeking a range of Russian military technologies. The North Korean-produced missiles, with a range of 550 miles, were shipped to Russia in violation of United Nations restrictions on the North, the White House said as it made public recently declassified intelligence findings. The government of Kim Jong Un regularly ignores the missile restrictions. John Kirby, a White House national security spokesman, said that some of the first of the North Korean-made missiles were fired into Ukraine two days ago, though it was unclear how much damage they might have done. In recent weeks, Russia has stepped up its missile and drone attacks against civilian targets and infrastructure in Kyiv and other cities, intent on trying to erode Ukraine’s will to fight at a moment when Ukraine is running short on missiles and ammunition of its own. Such a move by North Korea poses two major challenges to the United States. It suggests that Russia is bolstering its own production of missiles with new supplies at a time when Congress is still holding up additional aid to Ukraine, including for artillery and air defense systems. And it suggests that Russia, which once cooperated with the United States in trying to restrain North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, is now considering helping the North develop better delivery systems. Russia has rebuilt its own domestic supply of cruise missiles, and shorter-range missiles and artillery, despite Western financial sanctions and export controls. But to keep up with the intensity of the barrage against Ukraine, it has been turning to North Korea and Iran. Kirby said that the range of the missiles now being shipped from North Korea meant that they could be launched from well inside Russia — where launch sites are harder for Ukraine to hit — and still reach a number of Ukrainian cities. The technology North Korea is seeking includes fighter jets and ballistic-missile launch technology, Kirby said. Other American officials have reported that the North is also seeking more help on the range and accuracy of its intercontinental ballistic missiles, which it has repeatedly tested in recent months. But it is not clear whether Russia has agreed to further help the North on these nuclear-capable missiles. In the past, North Korea has relied heavily on what appeared to be Russian missile designs, but it has never been clear how closely it has worked with Russian engineers. (Michael D. Shear and David E. Sanger, “North Korea Providing Moscow With Ballistic Missiles, U.S. Says,” New York Times, January 5, 2024, p. A-4)

The nominee to be the director of South Korea’s spy agency said today he sees North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s daughter, Ju-ae, as his “most likely successor,” marking the agency’s first assessment of her possible succession in the reclusive regime. Ju-ae, believed to be born in 2013, has gained the spotlight since November 18, 2022, when her father brought her to the launch site of a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile in her first public appearance. Since then, her public activities have been centered on military events. North Korea’s state media has begun calling Ju-ae Kim’s “respected” daughter, changing its previous manner of naming her as his beloved or the most beloved daughter, fueling speculation she may be groomed as Kim’s successor. “Based on analyses on her public activities and the level of the North’s respect toward her since her public appearance, Kim Ju-ae appears to be the most likely successor,” Cho Tae-yong, the nominee to lead the National Intelligence Service (NIS), remarked in a parliamentary report for his confirmation hearing. Still, he said the NIS leaves all possibilities open over the North’s power succession, as North Korea’s incumbent leader is still young and apparently has no health problems, and there are also many variables, including the existence of other siblings. (Kim Soo-yeon, “Seoul’s Spy Agency See N.K. Leader’s Daughter Ju-ae As ‘Most Likely Successor,’” Reuters, January 4, 2024)

The South Korean government announced today it will be disbanding the foundation dedicated to matters concerning the industrial complex in Kaesong, North Korea, that had been a symbol of inter-Korean cooperation. Korea’s Ministry of Unification made the announcement that it would shutter the Kaesong Industrial District Foundation at the main government complex in Seoul this afternoon. “We decided to dissolve the foundation after concluding that it essentially cannot carry out its basic mission of developing and operating the industrial complex because the [necessary] conditions are not in place, such as a change in North Korea’s attitude about denuclearization,” the ministry said. Following its dissolution, the ministry said, the foundation will be converted into a corporation in liquidation that will be run by a skeleton staff of five or fewer employees. “The related enforcement decree will be revised by the end of March to initiate the process of dissolving the foundation,” a ministry official said. (Lee Je-hun, “S. Korea Shutters Support Agency for Kaesong Complex in North,” Hankyoreh, January 7, 2024)

1/5/24:
North Korea fired some 200 artillery shells into waters off its western coast this morning, Seoul’s military said, in its latest saber-rattling after it scrapped a 2018 inter-Korean military accord in November. The move prompted an emergency evacuation order for civilians on the South Korean western border islands of Yeonpyeong and Baengnyeong. Also in response, the South Korean military staged live-fire drills on the border islands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the artillery firings from Jangsan Cape and Deungsan Cape, both in the North’s southwestern coastal areas, from 9:00 a.m. to 11 a.m. The shells splashed into the maritime buffer zone north of the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the de facto maritime border in the Yellow Sea. The buffer zone, where artillery firing and naval drills are banned, was set under an inter-Korean military accord signed on Sept. 19, 2018, to reduce border tensions. The JCS said there was no reported damage to South Korean citizens and the military or losses of human life from North Korea’s firing. In the afternoon, South Korean Marine Corps units on the islands of Baengnyeong and Yeonpyeong staged live-fire exercises, involving K9 self-propelled howitzers and other assets, like K1E1 tanks, against simulated targets in waters south of the NLL, according to defense officials. The South fired some 400 rounds into the maritime buffer zone, double the amount fired by the North. The South Korean military fired artillery shots into the buffer zone for the first time since the signing of the 2018 accord. North Korea’s latest firing marked the 16th one of its kind, including a missile launch in 2022. Pyongyang last fired artillery shots into the maritime buffer zone in the East Sea on December 6, 2022. Later in the day, the Korean People’s Army (KPA), the North Korean Army’s official name, issued a statement saying units and subunits overseeing the southwestern coastal defense fired 192 shells into five districts as part of a live-fire drill. In an English-language statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency, the KPA claimed it was “a far-fetched assertion” on South Korea’s part to claim North Korea had fired shells into the buffer zone near Yeonpyeong and Baengnyeong islands. The KPA also said its drill today was “a sort of natural countermeasure” against recent artillery firings by South Korea. South Korea’s Army had said yesterday that South Korea and the United States held a joint live-fire exercise near the border with North Korea, aimed at bolstering their combined operational capabilities against North Korea’s military threats. North Korea today warned against such provocations under the guise of shoring up readiness, saying its armed forces will demonstrate “tough counteraction on an unprecedented level.” The KPA also referred to the South Korean Army as “the military gangsters.” Defense Minister Shin Won-sik presided over the South’s drills virtually from the JCS’ command post in central Seoul and called for readiness against “reckless provocative” acts by the North. “Our military … needs to be equipped with a retaliatory posture for complete annihilation so that the enemy never attempts another provocation and to ensure peace through powerful strength,” he was quoted as saying. (Chae Yun-hwan, “North Korea Fires 200 Artillery Shells off Western Coast: S. Korean Military,” Yonhap, January 5, 2024)

President Yoon Suk-yeol of South Korea ordered the Office of National Security to consider suspending the inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement if the North conducts another provocation that breaches South Korean territory. The president’s latest move comes after North Korean drones infiltrated South Korean airspace above Seoul late last year. This marks the first time the president has directly mentioned suspending the September 19 agreement. According to Kim Eun-hye, Yoon’s senior secretary for press affairs, the president gave the order after receiving confidential reports about response measures to deal with North Korean drones from the Office of National Security, the Ministry of National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Agency for Defense Development at the presidential office on Wednesday morning. “[President Yoon] ordered the South Korean military to respond beyond a proportional level with overwhelming capability to North Korean provocations,” Kim said. “This emphasizes a firm security readiness posture, and, above all, it is [for the president] to fulfill his role and responsibility as the commander-in-chief of the South Korean military, which is supposed to protect the lives and safety of the people,” Kim explained. (Kim Mi-na and Bae Ji-hyun, “Yoon Threatens to Suspend Inter-Korean Agreement Aimed at De-Escalation,” Hankyorehh, January 5, 2024)

KPA General Staff report: “On the ratification of the General Staff of the KPA, units and sub-units in charge of the southwestern coastal defense under the 4th Corps of the KPA staged a naval live-shell firing drill into five districts with 192 shells by mobilizing 47 cannons of various calibers of 13 companies and 1 platoon force from 09:00 to 11:00 on January 5. The claim of the military gangsters of the Republic of Korea that the KPA fired naval artillery shells into the waters north of Paekryong Island and Yonphyong Island, a so-called buffer zone in the West Sea of Korea, is a far-fetched assertion to mislead the public opinion, and their evacuation and firing in return are also a trite method to throw the responsibility for the escalating tension on the KPA’s drill. The direction of naval live-shell firing doesn’t give even an indirect effect on Paekryong and Yonphyong islands. The naval live-shell firing drill conducted in the southwestern sea is a sort of natural countermeasure taken by the KPA against the military actions of the ROK military gangsters who staged large-scale artillery firing and maneuvers in the vicinity of the entire border area by mobilizing units and sub-units of five corps from the outset of the year while vociferating about demonstration of response posture. The military gangsters of the ROK should neither say this or that about the responsibility for escalating tension nor bring misfortune on themselves. If the enemies commit an act which may be regarded as a provocation under the pretext of so-called counteraction, the KPA will show tough counteraction on an unprecedented level. The concept about the same nation and fellow countrymen has already been removed from our cognition.” (KCNA, “KPA General Staff Issues Report,” January 5, 2024)

Rodong Sinmun: “Kim Jong Un, president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, sent a message of sympathy to Fumio Kishida, prime minister of Japan, on January 5. In the message, the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un expressed his deep sympathy and condolences to the prime minister and, through him, to the bereaved families and victims, upon the sad news that big casualties and material losses were caused by earthquakes in Japan from the outset of the new year. The message sincerely hoped that the people in the affected areas would eradicate the aftermath of earthquakes and restore their stable life at the earliest date possible. Rodong Sinmun, “Respected Leader Kim Jong Un Sends Message of Sympathy to Japanese PM,” January 6, 2024)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has sent a “message of sympathy” to Prime Minister Kishida Fumio following the devastating earthquake in Ishikawa Prefecture earlier this week that has left 100 people dead and more than 200 missing. KCNA said in a short dispatch today that Kim had “expressed his deep sympathy and condolences to the prime minister and, through him, to the bereaved families and victims” a day earlier. In the extremely rare communication between the two countries’ leaders — Kim’s first to Kishida — the North Korean strongman said he “sincerely hoped that the people in the affected areas would … restore their stable life at the earliest date possible.” Asked to confirm the letter and if Japan might respond, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa acknowledged the message’s receipt and said the Japanese government “is grateful” for an outpouring from a number of countries. Hayashi did not directly answer if Japan would respond to the North Korean message, instead saying there was no current plan to reply to the numerous countries’ letters of sympathy. Asked about past examples of similar letters from North Korean leaders or senior officials, Hayashi said there had not been such a message since 1995, when one of Pyongyang’s top officials sent a condolence letter following the Great Hanshin Earthquake that rocked the Kansai region that year. Kishida has sought to meet Kim “without preconditions,” and in November reiterated a pledge “to step up efforts to realize an early summit” in a bid to resolve the long festering issue of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korean agents decades ago. Tokyo engaged in several informal contacts with Pyongyang last spring, apparently in an attempt to reach a breakthrough on the abductions issue, according to media reports. Kim’s regime responded to Kishida’s entreaties by having Vice Foreign Minister Pak Sang Gil release a statement saying there is “no reason” for the two countries “not to meet.” (Jesse Johnson, “North Korea’s Kim Sends Rare Sympathy Message to Japan over Ishikawa Quake,” Japan Times, January 6, 2024)

1/6/24:
North Korea fired some 60 artillery shells into waters off its western coast today, South Korea’s military said, conducting live-fire drills near the tensely guarded western border for the second consecutive day. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said it detected the artillery firings in the North’s southwestern coastal areas for an hour from 4 p.m. (Kim Eun-jung, “N. Korea Fires Artillery Shells from Western Coast for 2nd Day: S. Korean Military,” Yonhap, January 6, 2024)

KPA General Staff report: “According to the ratification of the KPA General Staff, the units and sub-units in charge of the southwest coastal defense of the 4th Corps of the KPA on January 6 conducted a deceptive operation simulating shelling and on January 7 performed a naval live-shell firing drill in four areas in the eastern direction parallel to the Military Demarcation Line in sea waters with 88 shells by mobilizing 23 coastal artilleries of five companies and three platoons of the coastal and islet defense detachments deployed in the section from Tungam-ri, Kangryong County to Yonan County. The naval live-shell firing district is not related to the Military Demarcation Line in terms of direction, and any intentional threat was not exposed to an enemy state. The naval live-shell firing drill in the southwest waters was conducted according to a plan within the regular training system of the KPA.” (KCNA, “KPA General Staff Issues Report,” January 7, 2024)

1/7/24:
Kim Yo Jong, vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, [today] issued the following press statement titled “Misjudgment, conjecture, obstinacy and arrogance will invite irretrievable misfortune”: “What disgraceful result is engendered, if someone is engrossed in antagonism and confrontation hysteria? A vivid scene was shown by the military gangsters of the Republic of Korea (ROK) through practical action. The Joint Chiefs of Staff of the ROK on Jan. 6 announced that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) launched artillery firing in the southwestern waters for two consecutive days of Jan. 5 and 6. The military gangsters claimed that the north fired more than 60 shells from the northwest of Yonphyong Island from 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. on January 6 and the shells dropped in the sea buffer zone north of the “northern limit line” in the West Sea. They warned seriously that shelling in a no-hostility zone is an act of threatening peace and escalating tension on the Korean peninsula, and strongly demanded an immediate stop. If the north threatens the people of the ROK through continuous artillery firing in the no-hostility zone, the ROK army will take due military measures and overwhelmingly respond to it on the principle of “promptly, strongly and to the end”, they added. Media of the ROK make a fuss, carrying all at once the military gangsters’ announcement in papers and screens. It is needless to mention how the ROK people are shocked. It seems now that the KPA must have been branded as a “provoker” and “chief criminal escalating tensions.” However, the KPA did not fire even a single shell into the relevant waters. The ROK military gangsters quickly took the bait we threw. We conducted a deceptive operation in order to assess the real detecting ability of the ROK military gangsters engrossed in bravo and blind bravery while crying for “precision tracking and monitoring” and “striking origin” whenever an opportunity presents itself and give a burning shame to them who will certainly make far-fetched assertions. The KPA watched the reaction of the ROK military gangsters while detonating blasting powder simulating the sound of 130 mm coastal artillery for 60 times. The result was clear as we expected. They misjudged the blasting sound as the sound of gunfire and conjectured it as a provocation. And they even made a false and impudent statement that the shells dropped in the sea buffer zone north of the “northern limit line” in the West Sea. The ridiculous behavior of these puppets in military uniform is nothing new today. When a bird flock appeared in the sky above the West Sea before, they mistook it for our plane and made a sortie of a fighter. They also insisted that a latrine door on a hill was a “north drone that made a southward invasion”. They are none other than the ROK military gangsters. As they had such records, the group of gangsters had no choice but to swallow the bait we threw this time. I cannot but say that the ROK people are very pitiful as they entrust “security” to such blind persons and offer huge taxes collected with blood. It is better ten times to entrust “security” to a dog with a developed sense of hearing and smell. If an unexpected case occurs due to misjudgment, conjecture, obstinacy and arrogance of such ignorant military gangsters, think twice what danger will be exposed to Seoul where more than 10 millions of people are crowding. There is a saying that a coward was frightened by his own shadow. The enemy might behave stupidly for the sake of pride misjudging the thundering roar in the northern sky in the future as artillery fire of the KPA. I make myself clear once again that the safety catch of trigger of the KPA had already been slipped. As already declared, the KPA will launch an immediate military strike if the enemy makes even a slight provocation. The military gangsters should bear in mind that they can “die instantly and forcefully and end” if they continue to resort to the so-called principle of counteraction such as “promptly, strongly and to the end” often touted by them. Misjudgment, conjecture, obstinacy and arrogance will invite irretrievable misfortune.” (Press Statement of Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Ko Yong Jong, January 7, 2024)

North Korea fired some 90 artillery shots into waters off its western coast today, South Korea’s military said, the latest in a series of drills near the tensely guarded western border. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the artillery firings into the maritime buffer zone north of Northern Limit Line, the de-facto maritime border in the Yellow Sea, and South Korea’s border island of Yeonpyeong from about 4 p.m. to 5:10 p.m. The buffer zone was set under a 2018 inter-Korean military accord designed to reduce tensions along the border. There was no damage to the South Korean military or civilians from the latest firing, a JCS official said, adding that the South Korean military does not plan to hold drills in response. It marked the third consecutive day of North Korean artillery drills in the area, the South’s military said, raising tension near the maritime border. Earlier in the day, Ongjin County, which has jurisdiction over South Korea’s northwestern border islands, issued a warning to the islands as artillery fire was heard from the North Korean side. North Korea’s Friday artillery firing marked the 16th one of its kind into the zone, including a missile launch in 2022. Earlier today, Kim Yo Jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, claimed the North conducted a “deceptive operation” by detonating explosives simulating the sound of 130 mm coastal artillery the previous day, deriding the South Korean military’s detection capabilities. The JCS dismissed the statement, calling it “comedic low-grade” propaganda attempting to cause division within South Korea and damage trust in the military. “Kim Yo Jong appears to have announced a false statement as (she) was surprised by our military’s detection capabilities,” the JCS official said. “North Korea’s artillery firing (on Saturday) was also detected by our military’s detection assets.” (Chae Yun-hwan, “N. Korea Stages Artillery Drills off Western Coast for 3rd Day: S. Korean Military,” Yonhap, January 7, 2024) Some of the artillery shells recently fired by the North Korean military fell just above the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea, a military source said today, stoking tension on the tensely guarded western border, where past naval skirmishes have taken place. North Korea fired some 200 artillery shells from its southwestern coastal areas Friday, prompting the South Korean troops on the front-line islands of Yeonpyeong and Baengnyeong to stage live-fire drills in response. Most of the North Korean shells splashed into the maritime buffer zone, with some falling in waters as close as 7 kilometers north of the NLL, according to the source. “As North Korea vowed to scrap the inter-Korean military pact and conducted live-fire drills near the maritime buffer zone, mutually agreed buffer zones that ban hostile acts no longer exist,” a military official said, asking for anonymity. The South Korean military is considering taking corresponding measures when North Korea’s artillery shells cross the NLL or land near the de facto maritime border, according to the official. Naval skirmishes between South and North Korea took place near the western maritime border in 1999, 2002 and 2009. In 2010, North Korea fired a barrage of artillery shells on Yeonpyeong Island, killing two South Korean Marines and two civilians. The North has contested the legitimacy of the NLL — drawn unilaterally by the U.S.-led U.N. Command after the 1950-53 Korean War — in recent decades and has demanded that it be redrawn, a request that the South has rejected. (Kim Eun-jung, “North Korean Shells Fell near De Facto Maritime Border: Source,” January 7, 2024)

1/8/24:
Frank Aum: “The United States and North Korea coexist today in an antagonistic, high-risk stalemate. The Kim Jong Un government, feeling besieged by a “hostile” U.S. policy and fearing the potential for regime change, has centered its national defense strategy on strengthening deterrence through nuclear weapons. Facing this intractable nuclear threat, the Biden administration has reinforced a coercive, pressure-based approach that relies on diplomatic isolation, military deterrence and economic sanctions to contain, if not change, North Korea’s defiant behavior. As a result, the two sides have not talked in over four years, have only engaged in official security discussions in one out of the last 11 years and do not appear to be prioritizing future diplomacy seriously. Similarly, their citizens are largely prohibited from visiting and interacting with each other. More worrisome, the two sides are intensifying their military postures to perilous levels. North Korea has developed and tested an array of new nuclear weapon delivery systems, including hypersonic glide vehicles and solid-fuel long-range missiles, emphasized the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and enacted the automatic use of nuclear weapons in its nuclear doctrine. Likewise, the U.S.-South Korea alliance has accelerated the deployment of nuclear-armed submarines, B-52 bombers and other U.S. strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula, increased the scope and scale of bilateral military exercises (and trilaterally with Japan), and sharpened provocative rhetoric about the end of the North Korean regime. The United States has also led international efforts to isolate North Korea diplomatically while applying economic sanctions and financial measures to squeeze it out of the dollar-based global financial system. North Korea has coped, however, by bolstering ties with Russia and China, which all but removes further U.N. Security Council sanctions from the table, and engaging in cyber theft and other U.N.-proscribed activities to subsist economically and advance militarily. The upshot is a dangerous, simmering situation on the Korean Peninsula that is one misstep away from boiling over into a catastrophic conflict. This status quo is untenable. Washington should explore a new modus vivendi with North Korea that reduces the risk of conflict, improves security and builds mutual trust and understanding in a tangible, proactive and realistic way. A hostile relationship between Washington and Pyongyang was not always the case. Even though they have never normalized diplomatic relations and continue to remain in a technical state of war, there was a period not too long ago when the United States and North Korea basically coexisted in relative peace. Between 1994 and 2008, the two countries engaged in meaningful, productive and sustained interactions across the diplomatic, military, economic and people-to-people dimensions, with mostly manageable levels of security tensions. During this period, the two countries participated regularly in diplomatic dialogue to strengthen their respective security and reduce potential misperceptions. Their diplomats met often to implement the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, address North Korea’s incipient ballistic missile program and explore a permanent peace treaty. In 1998, when Washington suspected a North Korean underground site of being nuclear-related, it negotiated visits to the facility to confirm that the site could not house nuclear operations. Diplomacy continued even with setbacks. When North Korea conducted its first intermediate-range missile test in August 1998, the United States arranged senior-level meetings with North Korea, including former Defense Secretary William Perry’s visit to Pyongyang in May 1999 and an exchange of visits by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Jo Myong Rok, vice chairman of North Korea’s National Defense Commission, in 2000, to hear Pyongyang’s perspective and seek an end to its missile program. Productive engagement also occurred beyond the diplomatic sphere. Between 1996 and 2005, U.S. Department of Defense officials worked side-by-side with Korean People’s Army officers in North Korea to recover and repatriate the remains of 153 U.S. servicemembers from the Korean War. U.S. congressional delegations, including members and staffers, periodically visited the country to share perspectives with North Korean government officials. Starting in 1995, numerous U.S. nongovernmental organizations established operations in North Korea to provide aid and assistance on health, agricultural and other humanitarian issues. Approximately 800 to 1,000 U.S. citizens traveled to North Korea every year to go on tours, reunite with family members or conduct academic and scientific exchanges, with minimal negative incidents. Also, North Korean scientific, academic and cultural delegations made dozens of trips throughout the United States to study agriculture, energy, health, business and law, as well as conduct taekwondo demonstrations. Most importantly, during much of this time, security tensions remained relatively low. Between 1994 and 2002, North Korea conducted zero nuclear tests, only one ballistic missile test and did not reprocess any plutonium for fissile material. The environment began to worsen in 2002 when the Bush administration characterized North Korea as part of an “axis of evil” and scrapped the Agreed Framework due to North Korea’s development of a uranium enrichment facility. This led Pyongyang to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty the following year. After the United States froze North Korean assets in a Macau bank out of money laundering concerns in September 2005, North Korea boycotted the Six-Party Talks for a year and conducted its first nuclear test, signaling a shift in its strategic calculus and a tougher road ahead for disarmament efforts. Yet despite all this, the two sides still engaged through the Six-Party Talks process (2003 to 2008) to achieve important outcomes, including North Korea’s delivery of 18,000 pages of nuclear declarations and destruction of a nuclear plant cooling tower in 2008, and even a New York Philharmonic performance in Pyongyang. In essence, for 15 years, the United States and North Korea coexisted in relative peace — to the benefit of the people in both countries and the rest of the international community. The situation today is different. After five additional nuclear tests and hundreds of ballistic missile and other military tests over the past 15 years, North Korea is de facto, and certainly for alliance planning purposes, a nuclear weapon country. It solidified this nuclear status in its constitution, and the U.S. intelligence community assesses that North Korea will not abandon it. In response, the U.S. government, other than then-President Donald Trump’s anomalous year of engagement, has implemented a comprehensive, sustained, and relentless international pressure campaign against North Korea, with the hope of coercing it back to the negotiating table. The dynamics of U.S.-North Korea engagement have also reached uncharted territory. From the early 1970s up until 2019, it was mostly Pyongyang soliciting dialogue with Washington, which had the leverage and standing to accept, ignore or apply preconditions. Since 1992, the United States has chosen to engage with North Korea, but always prioritizing denuclearization on the agenda. Today, the tables have turned. It is now Washington seeking talks, ostensibly without preconditions, and Pyongyang that is shunning them. North Korea likely detects implicit preconditions in the proposal for unconditional talks — that they start at the working-level and they address denuclearization. In response to the most recent U.S. offer, Kim Yo Jong, the North Korean leader’s sister, stated that “[t]he sovereignty of an independent state can never be an agenda item for negotiations, and therefore, [North Korea] will never sit face to face with the United States for that purpose.” The U.S.-South Korea alliance’s approach of prioritizing denuclearization above all else needs to change to fit the new reality. While the denuclearization objective originally began as an effort to reduce the North Korean threat and uphold the nonproliferation regime, it now tends to engender the opposite effect. A rigid, narrow focus on denuclearization has foreclosed opportunities for engagement and accelerated North Korea’s drive to attain a nuclear deterrent, while the constant failures to achieve it in the near term have fueled South Korean debates about pursuing indigenous nuclear capabilities. A more realistic and productive objective would be to proactively pursue mutual interests that tangibly improve military and economic security for both sides. These interests would include, among others, risk reduction, climate and energy cooperation, economic training and projects, academic and scientific collaboration, humanitarian initiatives, and people-to-people exchanges. The primary focus of U.S. policy, within the reality of a nuclear North Korea, should be to strive for peaceful coexistence. This means largely normal bilateral relations that consist of low military hostility and regular engagement aimed at improving diplomatic ties, reducing security risks and tensions, enhancing economic trade and welfare, and facilitating exchanges and dialogue related to humanitarian, human rights and people-to-people matters. Throughout this process, deterrence should be maintained, but diplomacy should be maximized. Peaceful coexistence would not require the U.S.-South Korea alliance to abandon the goals of denuclearization and unification entirely. But subsuming these intractable objectives within the broader, long-term drive for peaceful coexistence and risk reduction could provide a more productive, albeit less immediate, way to skin the cat. Even the desire for a peace treaty and official normalization, goals that might provide an imprimatur of amity but in practice are subject to political realities, legal requirements and potential reversals, should be subordinate to the actual exercise of coexisting peacefully. Initiating this process would be extremely difficult given the history and current environment of animosity and mistrust. Strong political will and unconventional risk-taking would be necessary to transform old paradigms. True unconditional talks and even unilateral conciliatory gestures would be required to overcome diplomatic inertia and propel a cycle of reciprocation. These notions may be tough to stomach but maintaining the status quo of hostile existence could be worse. A scenario like the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and subsequent Israeli response in Gaza may be a little farfetched for the Korean Peninsula, but North Korea has demonstrated a willingness in the past, despite the presence of alliance deterrence measures and extended periods of apparent stability, to take violent action, either to generate a crisis for leverage or to push back against alliance coercion for reputational reasons. Small crises, in an environment that now includes South Korea’s preemptive strike plans and North Korea’s automatic use of nuclear weapons, have the potential to escalate inadvertently to the worst-case scenario — a nuclear conflict that inflicts unspeakable costs on both sides. The concept of peaceful coexistence may raise suspicion for its potential inconsistencies and disingenuousness. For example, when Nikita Khrushchev argued in 1959 that the Soviet Union and the United States should coexist in peace despite their contrary systems to avoid nuclear war, George Kennan incisively responded that the Soviet Union was seeking this to maintain the status quo of the territorial gains it had already pocketed through force and violence. He also noted the contradictory nature of engaging economically with a foreign government that controls all trade and prevents interactions with the other side. And yet, throughout the Cold War, Kennan devoted himself to promoting “serious diplomacy” to reach “an honorable settlement that would reduce tension” between Moscow and Washington. The United States may never succeed in achieving North Korea’s denuclearization in the foreseeable future. But the two sides must never fail in preventing a nuclear war. Washington’s strategies should reflect this distinction.” (Frank Aum, “Exploring Peaceful Coexistence with North Korea,” January 8, 2024, U.S. Institute of Peace)

1/9/24:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, inspected major munitions factories on January 8 and 9 to learn about the production of weapons and equipment. He was accompanied by Jo Chun Ryong, Kim Jae Ryong, O Su Yong, Kang Sun Nam, Kim Jong Sik, Kim Yo Jong, Jang Chang Ha and other senior officials of the Party Central Committee and armed forces organs. … He expressed great satisfaction over the fact that the factories have successfully carried out the plan for deploying new type weapons and equipment to the first-line large combined units and major missile units. … Pointing out some shortcomings recently revealed in the organization of munitions production, he indicated the task for rationally and effectively readjusting the main production indices of munitions factories in a long-term view and on the principle of specialization, independence, consideration of factory capacity and priority over project for implementing the immediate policy. Reiterating that it is necessary to have a correct understanding of the strategic importance of the production of major weapons and equipment prioritized by the Party, he underscored the need to carry on the economic organization and production guidance in a militant and revolutionary way so as to make this year a year of radical turn in boosting the country’s preparations for war. He made an appraisal of the security environment of the DPRK and the regional situation, stating the necessity and validity of the sustained store of incomparably overwhelming strength. Saying that the historic time has come at last when we should define as a state most hostile toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea the entity called the Republic of Korea (ROK) which has pursued a history of vicious confrontation with bloodshot eyes to overthrow our regime and social system for nearly 80 years, he stressed that our state should recognize this unavoidable and irrevocable reality as it is and properly settle the historic problem of actively coping with the new phase of change and thoroughly countering everything. Predicating that the ROK clan is our principal enemy, he said what the DPRK should prioritize in the relations with the hostile state running high fever in arms buildup while inciting the confrontation posture with the former is to bolster up the military capabilities for self-defense and the nuclear war deterrent first of all. He said that we would by no means unilaterally bring a great event by the overwhelming strength in the Korean peninsula but we have no intention of avoiding a war as well. If the ROK dares attempt to use armed forces against the DPRK or threaten its sovereignty and security and such opportunity comes, we will have no hesitation in annihilating the ROK by mobilizing all means and forces in our hands, he said, affirming that we have such will, forces and capabilities and will continue to expand and strengthen them without delay in the future, too. He noted that the DPRK will invariably take its vivid action based on the principle of righteous struggle, unless the gangster-like ruling quarters of the ROK realize the mistake of the self-destructive anti-DPRK confrontation policy, which is running counter to the desire of mankind for peace and bringing misfortune on itself, and completely give it up. And he set forth the revolutionary policies to be permanently held and carried out by the munitions industry field in more strictly perfecting the country’s war preparedness. All the workers in the munitions industry, who have realized the steadfast will of Kim Jong Un reflecting the principle of resolute counteraction against the enemies and the revolutionary stand of our Party and government, are filled with the ardent enthusiasm for firmly defending the sacred revolutionary cause of Juche by surely attaining the fighting goals, set by the Party Central Committee, with the absolute loyalty and the spirit of devoted implementation, again fully aware of the momentous mission that the increased production of military hardware precisely means the safeguard of dignity and sovereignty of the country.” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Major Munitions Factories,” January 10, 2024)

South Korea’s military is expected to resume exercises in buffer zones set under a 2018 inter-Korean military accord as they have become effectively invalid after North Korea’s recent artillery firing, officials said today. Yesterday, the South’s military said it will resume artillery firings and drills near the sea and land border, noting Pyongyang’s recent shelling nullified the zones where live-fire and large-scale drills are banned. Defense ministry spokesperson Jeon Ha-kyou told a briefing today that the nullification will pave the way for South Korean troops to maintain better readiness, noting the agreement had restricted drills near the border. “These issues are expected to be resolved, and I believe that there will be better conditions for exercises by units,” he said. Jeon, however, noted the ministry would have to hold talks with other government branches on whether to completely scrap the 2018 agreement. In light of the nullification, the Army plans to resume exercises halted under the 2018 accord, such as live-fire artillery drills and regiment-level field maneuvers within five kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas. The Navy is also set to conduct live-fire and maneuver drills that had been halted in the maritime buffer zone created by the 2018 agreement. The Marine Corps will also resume regular live-fire artillery exercises with K9 self-propelled howitzers on the northwestern border islands of Baengnyeong and Yeonpyeong. Marines on the two islands staged such drills January 5 for the first time since August 2017 in response to the North’s artillery firing earlier that day. (Chae Yun-hwan, “Military Set to Resume Drills Suspended under 2018 Inter-Korean Pact Buffer Zones,” Yonhap, January 9, 2024)

1/11/24:
Carlin and Hecker: “The situation on the Korean Peninsula is more dangerous than it has been at any time since early June 1950. That may sound overly dramatic, but we believe that, like his grandfather in 1950, Kim Jong Un has made a strategic decision to go to war. We do not know when or how Kim plans to pull the trigger, but the danger is already far beyond the routine warnings in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo about Pyongyang’s “provocations.” In other words, we do not see the war preparation themes in North Korean media appearing since the beginning of last year as typical bluster from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). Raising the specter of Pyongyang’s decision to go to a military solution — in effect, to give warning of war — in the absence of “hard” evidence is fraught. Typically, it will be met with the by-now routine argument that Kim Jong Un would not dare take such a step because he “knows” Washington and Seoul would destroy his regime if he does so. If this is what policymakers are thinking, it is the result of a fundamental misreading of Kim’s view of history and a grievous failure of imagination that could be leading (on both Kim’s and Washington’s parts) to a disaster. A failure to understand the history of North Korean policy over the past 33 years is not simply an academic problem. Getting that history wrong has dangerous implications for grasping the magnitude of what confronts us now. Without grasping in detail what, why, and how North Korean policy retained its central goal of normalizing relations with the United States from 1990 until 2019, there is no way to understand the profound change that has taken place in Pyongyang’s thinking since then. This bedrock policy shift by Kim to gird for a war would only come after he concluded all other options had been exhausted, and that the previous strategy shaping North Korean policy since 1990 had irrevocably failedstrong>. Although Pyongyang’s decision-making often appears ad hoc and short sighted, in fact, the North Koreans view the world strategically and from a long-term perspective. Beginning with the crucial, strategic decision by Kim Il Sung in 1990, the North pursued a policy centered on the goal of normalizing relations with the United States as a buffer against China and Russia. After initial movement in that direction with the 1994 Agreed Framework and six years of implementation, the prospects for success diminished when — in Pyongyang’s eyes — successive US administrations pulled away from engagement and largely ignored North Korean initiatives. Even after the Agreed Framework fell apart in 2002, the North tried to pull the US back into serious talks by giving unprecedented access to the nuclear center at Yongbyon to one of us (Hecker). During the Barack Obama Administration, the North made several attempts that Washington not only failed to probe but, in one case, rejected out of hand. There is much debate in the United States whether the North was ever serious, and whether dialogue was simply a cover for developing nuclear weapons. Our view is that argument was seriously flawed at the time, and today, it stands in the way of understanding not simply why things have developed to such a perilous stage, but more importantly, how dangerous the situation actually is. The issue has moved far beyond assigning blame. What is crucially important is to understand how central the goal of improving relations with the United States was to all three of the Kims who led the DPRK, and thus, how the North’s completely abandoning that goal has profoundly changed the strategic landscape in and around Korea. The second part of the answer as to why the current danger is being missed is the failure to fully understand how the failed February 2019 Hanoi summit affected Kim Jong Un’s views, and how over the next two years the North reexamined its policy options. The June 2018 Singapore summit with President Donald Trump was to Kim the realization of what his grandfather had envisioned, and his father had attempted but never attained — normalization of relations with the United States. Kim poured his prestige into the second summit in Hanoi. When that failed, it was a traumatic loss of face for Kim. His final letter to President Trump in August 2019 reflects how much Kim felt he had risked and lost. Overcoming that psychological barrier would never have been easy, and it goes a long way in explaining the huge subsequent swing in North Korean policy. This was not a tactical adjustment, not simply pouting on Kim’s part, but a fundamentally new approach — the first in over thirty years. The first obvious signs that a decision had been made and a decisive break with the past was underway came in the summer and autumn of 2021, apparently the result of a reevaluation in Pyongyang of shifts in the international landscape and signs — at least to the North Koreans — that the United States was in global retreat. This shift in perspective provided the foundation for a grand realignment in the North’s approach, a strategic reorientation toward China and Russia that was already well underway by the time of the Putin–Xi summit of February 2022 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. There are few signs that relations with China have moved very far, and, in fact, signs of real cooling in China-DPRK relations. However, ties with Russia developed steadily, especially in the military area, as underscored by the visit of the Russian Defense Minister in July and the Putin–Kim summit in the Russian Far East last September. The North’s view that the global tides were running in its favor probably fed into decisions in Pyongyang about both the need and opportunity — and perhaps the timing — toward a military solution to the Korean question. At the start of 2023, the war preparations theme started appearing regularly in high-level North Korean pronouncements for domestic consumption. At one point, Kim Jong Un even resurrected language calling for “preparations for a revolutionary war for accomplishing…reunification.” Along with that, in March, authoritative articles in the party daily signaled a fundamentally and dangerously new approach to the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), introducing formulations putting South Korea beyond the pale, outside what could be considered the true Korea, and thus, as a legitimate target for the North’s military might. At the plenum last month, Kim made that shift crystal clear, declaring that “north-south relations have been completely fixed into the relations between two states hostile to each other and the relations between two belligerent states, not the consanguineous or homogenous ones any more.” Washington and Seoul cling to the belief that their alliance backed by “ironclad” deterrence will keep Kim on the status-quo trajectory, perhaps with some minor provocations. There is a belief, entirely understandable, that more and more frequent symbols of our intent to retaliate will keep the North at bay, as will our oft-stated conviction that if the North attacks, the counterattack will totally destroy the North Korean regime. Yet, in the current situation, clinging to those beliefs may be fatal. The evidence of the past year opens the real possibility that the situation may have reached the point that we must seriously consider a worst case — that Pyongyang could be planning to move in ways that completely defy our calculations. Kim and his planners may target the weakest point — psychologically as well as materially — in what the three capitals hope is a watertight US-ROK-Japan military position. The literature on surprise attacks should make us wary of the comfortable assumptions that resonate in Washington’s echo chamber but might not have purchase in Pyongyang. This might seem like madness, but history suggests those who have convinced themselves that they have no good options left will take the view that even the most dangerous game is worth the candle. North Korea has a large nuclear arsenal, by our estimate of potentially 50 or 60 warheads deliverable on missiles that can reach all of South Korea, virtually all of Japan (including Okinawa) and Guam. If, as we suspect, Kim has convinced himself that after decades of trying, there is no way to engage the United States, his recent words and actions point toward the prospects of a military solution using that arsenal. If that comes to pass, even an eventual US-ROK victory in the ensuing war will be empty. The wreckage, boundless and bare, will stretch as far as the eye can see. (Robert L. Carlin and Siegfried S. Hecker, “Is Kim Jong Un Preparing for War?” 38North, January 11, 2024)

Ruediger Frank: “At the Ninth Enlarged Plenum of the Eighth WPK Central Committee in late December 2023, North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un declared a “new stand on the north-south relations and the reunification policy.” This marked a significant departure from previous policies and carries profound implications: Kim Jong Un has not given up national unification. However, the official North Korean approach now allows a more aggressive official position toward the South, including the promotion of a public uprising and a destabilization of society. This will substantially weaken progressive forces in South Korea that have advocated for cooperative inter-Korean relations. South Korea is now categorized as just another foreign state, eliminating the special treatment of inter-Korean relations based on pan-nationalism. This opens the door to regular interstate relations, including both diplomatic normalization and potential conflict. Kim Jong Un’s declaration of the failure of the previous approach toward South Korea carries implicit criticism of his two predecessors, especially Kim Il Sung. This could be a step toward solidifying his own independent claim to legitimacy and setting the stage for leadership succession. The redefinition of the relationship with South Korea is not an isolated tactical move, but another component of North Korea’s broader de-risking strategy. North Korea has effectively relinquished the “ownership” of pan-Korean nationalism. South Korea is given the golden opportunity to portray itself as the sole supporter of Korean unity, thereby undermining one of the few ideological strengths North Korea had in the bilateral struggle for ideological supremacy. This is reminiscent of the ill-fated strategy applied by East Germany in the early 1970s, making unification by absorption much easier for West Germany in 1990. The consequences of Kim Jong Un’s evolving stance toward inter-Korean relations are numerous and multi-faceted and will trigger a cascade of changes across inter-Korean relations and regional dynamics. In the end, it seems that South Korea, especially its conservative forces, will benefit more than the North Korean leader intended. What Did Kim Jong Un Say? The North Korean leader’s full speech is not yet available. However, Kim Jong Un’s remarks on unification have been quoted in a Rodong Sinmun report. Nowhere in that document did he give up on the goal of national unification as such, as some headlines in Western media suggested. Nevertheless, he did announce a new paradigm, starting with a negative assessment of his own country’s past unification policies. For a long period spanning not just ten years but more than half a century…the idea, line and policies for national reunification laid down by our Party and the DPRK government…has [not] brought about a proper fruition and the north-south relations have repeated the vicious cycle of contact and suspension, dialogue and confrontation. The term “more than half a century” implies a date before 1973. With a look at unification, this can only be a reference to Kim Il Sung’s Three Principles of National Reunification of 1972. These have since become the gold standard for all further North Korean official positions on that issue. The principles are Independence (without interference by any foreign country), Great National Unity, transcending differences in ideologies and systems), and Peacefulness (no unification by military means). Kim Jong Un now argues that this approach has not worked and needs to be replaced. The narrative is “we acted in good faith, but the other side cheated,” as the next quote implies. If there is a common point among the “policies toward the north” and “unification policies” pursued by the successive south Korean rulers, it is the “collapse of the DPRK’s regime” and “unification by absorption”. And it is clearly proved by the fact that the keynote of “unification under liberal democracy” has been invariably carried forward although the puppet regime has changed more than ten times so far. This confirms the year 1972 as Kim’s reference point when South Korea under Park Chung-hee introduced the Yushin Constitution. Key aspects of that constitution have indeed remained unchanged until the present day. The formal claim to sovereignty over North Korea is still included in article three: “The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands.” Article four states, “The Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and democracy.” These two principles can be interpreted as code for a Western-style economic and political system and, therefore, as the aim to replace the state socialist planned economy and the one-party dictatorship in North Korea. Kim Jong Un’s argument is that the South’s policy toward the North has been hostile regardless of who was in charge. It would be naïve for us to assume this is a new insight. As the very cautious and minimalistic reform policy and the repeated cycle of dovish and hawkish behavior in terms of foreign policy and propaganda messaging have shown, the North Korean leadership has never harbored too many illusions about the other side’s true intentions. However, this sense of realism has not been fully reflected in public relations. For tactical reasons and in the hope of extracting concessions, Pyongyang treated progressive administrations in Seoul, like those of Kim Dae-jung, Roo Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in, more favorably than conservative presidents like Lee Myung-bak or Park Geun-hye. Therefore, what is new about Kim Jong Un’s approach is not the insight as such but the public declaration of the fundamental similarity of all South Korean administrations since 1972 and the continuity of their hostile intentions. This dampens hopes for improving inter-Korean relations after the end of the current conservative president Yoon Seok-yeol’s term. I think it is a mistake we should no longer make to regard the clan, who publicly defined us as the “principal enemy” and is seeking only the opportunity of “collapse of power” and “unification by absorption” in collusion with foreign forces, as the partner of reconciliation and reunification…South Korea at present is nothing but a hemiplegic malformation and colonial subordinate state whose politics is completely out of order, whole society tainted by Yankee culture, and defense and security totally dependent on the U.S. These quotes include a certain conditionality, as Kim Jong Un talks about South Korea “at present” and attacks a somewhat ambiguous “clan.” However, since the latter includes all administrations since 1972, it is difficult to imagine a regular future South Korean government that would not fall under this definition. Kim Jong Un has declared an end to unification-oriented talks with any South Korean administration that operates under the current constitution and based on the current principles of liberalism and democracy. This could even be interpreted as an implicit call for an uprising and regime change in South Korea, reminding of Kim Il Sung’s logic on the eve of the Korean War in 1950 when he tried to get Soviet approval for an attack by arguing that “the people of South Korea trust me and rely on our armed might.” The repeated identification of South Korea as a “state” and the use of the term “Republic of Korea” without quotation marks ends the treatment of relations with Seoul as a special, inner-Korean affair. Accordingly, we would expect an eventual shifting of responsibility for relations with South Korea to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The following quote points in that direction: “The conclusion…stressed the need to take measures for readjusting and reforming the organizations in charge of the affairs related to the south including the United Front Department of the Party Central Committee and to fundamentally change the principle and orientation of the struggle.” The United Front Department had de facto operated as a ministry of inner-Korean affairs. This role is likely to be replaced by a more proactive and aggressive posture with the aim of undermining social stability in South Korea “for keeping pace with the powerful military actions of the Korean People’s Army to subjugate the whole territory of the south” as Kim Jong Un said in his speech. Emancipation from His Predecessors? So far, North Korea analysts regard the country’s first leader, Kim Il Sung, as the only primary source of political legitimacy for any of his successors, based on the much-touted “Paektu bloodline.” North Korea does not have a formalized process of power transfer, for example, through general elections or appointment by the Politburo. And unlike a monarchy, the Paektu bloodline is a relatively ambiguous instrument without clearly defined rules for hereditary succession. Nevertheless, it seems to have functioned so far, even in the case of Kim Jong Un, who is “only” a grandson of Kim Il Sung and “only” the third son of Kim Jong Il. Against this background, North Korea has typically been very reluctant to criticize decisions by its founder, who is associated with super-human characteristics, including great wisdom and the ability to look through the enemies’ tactics. This is not to say that the North Korean leadership has never admitted any mistakes or crises. However, it assigned responsibility to external factors such as the American imperialists or officials like Pak Nam Gi in the case of the 2009 currency reform. The “creative principle” of the official Chuch’e ideology also allows policy adjustments if “the environment changes,” as exemplified by Kim Jong Il`s speech in January 2001 when he demanded a departure from the methods of the 1950s and 1960s due to new circumstances. In his December 2023 report, Kim Jong Un did mention the machinations of the enemies and the new geopolitical situation. Both would have been sufficient to explain a new approach. But, as shown above, he went much further and declared that the unification policy developed by Kim Il Sung since 1972 has been a failure. Considering that any criticism of Kim Il Sung amounts to political and ideological heresy in North Korea, why would a leader take such an unnecessary risk? One possible option would be the desire to build his own independent legitimacy to become a new and fresh primary source of power. The merger of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il into a new entity, which can be observed since 2012, points in that same direction. Perhaps Kim Jong Un considers all this necessary to ensure a smooth transfer of power to one of his own offspring, all merely great-grandchildren of Kim Il Sung. If true, this would also put the recent emergence of his young daughter into this context. De-risking Continued? The “new Cold War,” a term Kim Jong Un himself used at the SPA session in late September 2023, led to a review of the many risks North Korea had taken since the collapse of the socialist block in the early 1990s. Indeed, the WPK Plenum report explicitly puts the leader’s remarks on unification and relations with South Korea in a larger geopolitical context. ‘The General Secretary made a detailed analysis of the gigantic geopolitical changes in international geo-political situation and balance of forces in 2023, the main features of present international situation and the external environment of the Korean peninsula… The field of external affairs should actively…cope with the changing and developing international situation …” If we analyze the new unification policy from the perspective of North Korea’s de-risking strategy, the new approach fits nicely into that logic. Major measures trading risk for actual or expected concessions, such as the admission of the two Koreas to the United Nations (UN) in 1991 and the subsequent inter-Korean agreement, the Mt. Kumgang tourism project since 1998, the first inter-Korean summit in 2000 and the groundbreaking for the Kaesong Industrial Zone in 2004 all happened in that context. If Pyongyang has decided to reduce the number of its embassies abroad to minimize the risk of infiltration, defection and intelligence leaks, then it is only consequential that it re-evaluated the cost-benefit equation of its relations with Seoul as well. It is not difficult to put this in the context of repeated complaints by Kim Jong Un about instances of ideological contamination, for example, at the recent fifth National Conference of Mothers in early December 2023, where he about a growing problem of anti-socialist behavior among young people. A Golden Opportunity for South Korea: Sole Ownership of Pan-Korean Nationalism. A central argument against drawing direct lessons from the German case of unification for Korea has been the large number of substantial differences between the two. Now, one of these differences is being removed. German unification in 1990 showed how badly prepared both the political elite and the population of East Germany were for that process. This had complex legal reasons. The German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) went from officially supporting German unification at the time of its foundation to effectively treating it as anti-state thought in the last two decades of its existence. The first GDR constitution of 1949, in article 1, maintained that Germany is one. The constitution of 1968 still included in article 8 the desire to “overcome the… division of Germany.” However, the constitutional change of 1974 deleted this formulation and all other references to German unity. Even years before, the leadership discouraged the singing of the national anthem with the phrase “Germany, united fatherland” and began eliminating most instances of the use of the word “Germany,” which soon became synonymous with only West Germany. Accordingly, the East had no official plans and blueprints for a unified Germany. Apart from a general desire for free travel and a convertible currency, neither the elite nor the population had any solid ideas on the goals and methods of unification. Therefore, West Germany not only had an ideological monopoly on German unification for decades, but was also the only side with specific concepts. This helps in understanding why it took only eight weeks to negotiate the German Unification Treaty — a document of about 1,000 pages. By abandoning all established Northern concepts for Korean unification, including the Three Principles for National Reunification, the Koryo Federation (Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo) and the Ten-Point Program of the Great Unity of the Whole Nation for the Reunification of the Country, Kim Jong Un is now taking the same step as East Berlin did in the early 1970s. His less than thinly veiled statement that Korean unification can only be achieved by forcibly taking over the South or by affecting regime change there will make any preparation by North Korea for an alternative, peaceful option close to impossible. Why Kim Jong Un is giving such a gift to South Korea at this point is unclear and subject to speculation. As a matter of fact, it leaves South Korea as the only Korea with a formal concept for peaceful unification. We have yet to see how far the implementation of the new policy will go. Still, it is fair to assume that the South will be given much more room to portray itself as the sole supporter of Korean unity, thereby undermining one of the few ideological strengths North Korea had in the bilateral struggle for ideological supremacy. Who Wins? The main benefit Kim Jong Un can expect from the new unification policy is that it significantly reduces the risk of an ideological infiltration of North Korea on all levels, from officials to teenagers. However, this same goal could have been achieved by simply discontinuing inter-Korean cooperation, which has been the case for many years already. This only leaves the worrisome explanation that Kim Jong Un found it necessary to prepare his subjects for a much more hardline approach toward South Korea, which bodes ill for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. With a look at the historical experience of the pre-Korean War period, we can expect more robust and more open North Korean efforts at an internal destabilization of South Korea’s society. Ironically, the clear winner of this new policy seems to be South Korea, particularly its conservative forces. Unlike in the past, when Pyongyang used a divide-and-conquer approach to hold only the conservatives responsible for the failure of rapprochement, Kim Jong Un’s remarks are grist to the mill of those who accuse progressives of being naïve and irresponsible. Kim Jong Un’s new policy might end up unifying, rather than dividing, South Korea’s society and lead to a more proactive, hardline policy, including campaigns for breaking the North’s isolation from outside information, active encouragement of defections, and international accusations of human rights violations. Finally, the new North Korean approach of treating South Korea as a regular state theoretically opens the way to diplomatic relations, mutual recognition, and even the establishment of embassies. As the cases of the United States and Japan have shown, the availability of such an option does not automatically mean immediate progress; but Rome was not built in a day.” (Ruediger Frank, “North Korea’s New Unification Policy: Implications and Pitfalls,” 38North, January 11, 2024)

1/13/24:
North Korea is pressing ahead with measures to disband its inter-Korean organizations, apparently stopping a radio station previously used to send encrypted messages to its spies in South Korea. As of today, the North appears to have stopped broadcasting the state-run Pyongyang Radio and cut off access to its website. The latest move comes after North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ordered “readjusting and reforming” its organizations in charge of inter-Korean affairs during a key Workers’ Party meeting last month amid growing cross-border tensions. Pyongyang Radio is known for broadcasting a series of mysterious numbers, presumed to be coded messages, giving directions to its agents operating in South Korea. The North resumed such broadcasts in 2016 after suspending them in 2000, when the two Koreas held their first historic summit. Today, North Korea said it also held a meeting the previous day to decide to dissolve organizations in charge of civilian exchanges with the South, according to KCNA. All relevant organizations, including the North Side Committee for Implementing June 15 Joint Declaration, the North Headquarters of the Pan-national Alliance for Korea’s Reunification, the Consultative Council for National Reconciliation and the Council for the Reunification of Tangun’s Nation, will be readjusted, the KCNA said. (Yo Wonju, “N. Korea Halts Radio Station Known for Sending Coded Messages to Seoul,” Yonhap, January 13, 2024)

1/14/24:
North Korea fired a suspected intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) into the East Sea today, South Korea’s military said, in Pyongyang’s first missile launch this year amid heightened tensions over its continued saber-rattling. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the launch from an area in or around Pyongyang at about 2:55 p.m. and the missile flew around 1,000 kilometers before splashing into the sea. In an interview with Yonhap last week, South Korea’s Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said the North could test-fire a new type of IRBM as early as this month after the country said it staged solid-fuel engine tests for a new IRBM in November. Seoul officials believe Pyongyang’s solid-fuel IRBM under development is capable of targeting U.S. military bases in Japan and Guam. IRBMs have a range of up to 5,500 km. (Chae Yun-hwan, “N. Korea Fires Suspected IRBM into East Sea: S. Korean Military,” Yonhap, January 14, 2024)

KCNA: “On the afternoon of January 14, the DPRK Missile Administration conducted a test-fire of an intermediate-range solid-fuel ballistic missile loaded with a hypersonic maneuverable controlled warhead. The test-fire was aimed at verifying the gliding and maneuvering characteristics of intermediate-range hypersonic maneuverable controlled warhead and the reliability of newly developed multi-stage high-thrust solid-fuel engines. It was successfully conducted. The test-fire never affected the security of any neighboring country and had nothing to do with the regional situation. The Missile Administration explained that the test is a part of the administration and its affiliated defense science institutes’ regular activities for developing powerful weapon systems.” (KCNA, “Hypersonic Missile Test-fire Conducted in DPRK,” January 15, 2024)

Van Diepen: “On January 14, North Korea conducted the initial flight test of its first solid-propellant intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). The missile apparently used the first two stages of the Hwasong (HS)-18, a three-stage, solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Using booster stages that have already been developed for the HS-18 will expedite the development of this new missile. Based on past practice, it will likely be deployed after only one or two more flight tests. The new missile carried a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) previously flown on smaller missiles in 2022, rather than a traditional reentry vehicle (RV). IRBM MaRVs, which can use their maneuverability to complicate missile defenses, make sense for Pyongyang, given ongoing US efforts to strengthen the missile defense of Guam, which is at least 3,300 kilometers (km) from North Korea. If the IRBM is intended for deployment with a traditional RV as well, it is highly likely that North Korea will flight test it in that configuration at least once. It remains to be seen whether the solid IRBM will be produced and deployed in parallel with or instead of the current, liquid-propellant HS-12 IRBM, given the relatively limited number of targets North Korea presumably sees lying between medium (1,000-3,000 km) and ICBM (5,500+ km) ranges. If Pyongyang sees an extensive need to cover targets within medium range with solid missiles, it would be more cost-effective to develop a new medium-range missile based on the IRBM/HS-18’s first stage than to deploy more of the new IRBMs. Given the niche role IRBMs probably fill in Pyongyang’s operational plans, adding a solid-propellant system would provide only a marginal improvement. Solid-propellant missiles are safer and easier to operate in the road-mobile deployments used by the liquid HS-12 and the new IRBM, but North Korea has some 35 years of successfully operating road-mobile liquid missiles. Using the same first and second stages for the HS-18 ICBM and the new IRBM could offer logistical advantages, but devoting stage production to IRBMs would come at the cost of HS-18 production. … South Korea announced a suspected IRBM had been launched by North Korea on January 14 from in or around Pyongyang that flew about 1,000 km. Japan reported that the missile flew to the northeast for at least 500 km at a maximum altitude of about 50 km, landing in the sea. The next day, North Korean media confirmed the “test-fire of an intermediate-range solid-fuel ballistic missile loaded with a hypersonic maneuverable controlled warhead,” reporting that the successful test “was aimed at verifying the gliding and maneuvering characteristics of intermediate-range hypersonic maneuverable controlled warhead and the reliability of newly developed multi-stage high-thrust solid-fuel engines.” An accompanying photograph depicted a two-stage solid-propellant missile in the early stages of flight, carrying a conical, finned payload. This is the initial flight test of North Korea’s first solid-propellant IRBM. Pyongyang had announced conducting static (ground) tests of the first- and second-stage rocket motors for a solid IRBM in November 2023, which was the first indication from North Korea that this system was in the works. The photo released by North Korea indicates that the new IRBM uses the first and second stages of the Hwasong (HS) -18 three-stage, solid-propellant ICBM. The conical, finned payload appears to be the same as that flown on January 5 and 11, 2022 on a shortened, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) version of the HS-12 liquid-propellant IRBM. At that time, North Korea suggested development of the payload, which it termed a “hypersonic glide vehicle,” had been completed. That said, it is unclear how extensively the conical, finned payload has maneuvered in testing to date, including on January 14. While technically “hypersonic,” since it reaches a maximum velocity exceeding Mach 5, this payload is a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) rather than the wedge-shaped boost-glide vehicles (BGVs) used in Chinese, Russian and US “hypersonic missiles.” North Korea apparently flight tested its first version of a MaRV in 2017 on a variant of the Scud short-range ballistic missile. MaRVs are less maneuverable and less technically demanding to develop than BGVs, which can maneuver more drastically, over a larger area, and for a longer portion of the missile’s flight than MaRVs. Deployment likely to be soon. The possibility of an IRBM version of the HS-18 ICBM was flagged in 38 North in April 2023. The Soviets took the same path in the 1970s in using the first two stages of the original SS-16 solid-propellant, road-mobile ICBM to create the later SS-20 IRBM. Using booster stages that have already been developed for the HS-18 will expedite development of the new IRBM, which the North is likely to suggest has begun deployment after one or two more flight tests. IRBM-related motor- and flight testing will add to the North’s confidence in the reliability of the parent HS-18 (and vice-versa). Complicates Guam missile defense.. Initial testing of the new IRBM with a MaRV rather than a traditional reentry vehicle (RV) was a surprise. If the IRBM is also intended for deployment with a traditional RV, it is highly likely that North Korea will flight test it in that configuration at least once. The key comparative advantage of the North Korean MaRV probably is in using its maneuverability to complicate missile defenses, and IRBM MaRVs make sense for Pyongyang given ongoing US efforts to strengthen the missile defense of US bases in Guam (at least 3,300 km from North Korea). North Korea also probably aspires to develop MaRVs equipped with terminal sensors that could maneuver the warhead to precisely hit its target, but it is unlikely to have that capability at IRBM ranges at present. Therefore, this could be one of many areas where technological assistance from Russia would be useful. Add to or replace liquid IRBM production? It remains to be seen whether the solid IRBM will be produced and deployed in parallel with or instead of the liquid HS-12 IRBM. There are good reasons for North Korea to retain both solid and liquid strategic missiles, as it almost certainly is doing with ICBMs. But the relatively limited number of targets North Korea presumably sees lying between MRBM (1,000-3,000 km) and ICBM (5,500+ km) range — Guam, perhaps US bases in the Philippines and Midway, and possibly US missile defense radars in the Aleutians — may argue for concentrating on producing only one IRBM type. Pyongyang may, however, also see IRBMs as useful for covering targets within MRBM range, such as portions of Japan and Okinawa. If Pyongyang sees an extensive need to cover targets within medium range with solid missiles, it would be more cost-effective to develop a new MRBM based on the IRBM/HS-18’s first stage (which could also carry MaRVs) than to deploy more of the new IRBMs. Only a marginal improvement. Given the niche role IRBMs probably fill in Pyongyang’s operational plans, adding a solid-propellant system would provide only a marginal improvement. Solid-propellant missiles are safer and easier to operate in the road-mobile deployments used by the liquid HS-12 and the new IRBM, but North Korea has some 35 years of successfully operating road-mobile liquid missiles. Using the same first and second stages for the HS-18 ICBM and the new IRBM could offer logistical advantages, but devoting stage production to IRBMs would come at the cost of HS-18 production.” (Vann H. Van Diepen, “North Korea Tests New IRBM with MaRV Payload,” 38North, January 18, 2024)

1/15/24:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, made an important policy speech “On the Immediate Tasks for the Prosperity and Development of Our Republic and the Promotion of the Wellbeing of Our People” at the 10th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) of the DPRK on January 15. He said: … Comrade Deputies! Our Republic is a peace-loving socialist state and remains unchanged in its desire for taking the road of independent development in a peaceful and stable environment free from aggression and interference and we have paid dearly for it. But our country’s security environment has been steadily deteriorated, far from being eased, and today it has become the world’s most dangerous zone with the risk of the outbreak of a war The frequent remarks made by the U.S. authorities about the “end of our regime”, vast nuclear strategic assets constantly stationed in the peripheral area of the DPRK, ceaseless war exercises with its followers staged on the largest scale, the military nexus between Japan and the Republic of Korea boosted at the instigation of the U.S., etc. are seriously threatening the security of our state moment by moment. The policy of confrontation with the DPRK pursued by the U.S. century after century and the suicidal acts of such servile states as the ROK unconditionally submitting to the U.S. inflame the enmity of our Republic and at the same time offer reasonable and full justification for strengthening the military capability and more rapidly improving the overwhelming nuclear war deterrent. The U.S. and its stooges are now buoyed with war fever. We should invariably cover the road of bolstering up our military capability for self-defense to ensure wellbeing of the country, the people and the posterity. The deputies present here should not regard the indiscriminate war holocaust in the Middle East as a matter of other but do their best to bolster up our military capability for self-defense to the maximum, cherishing the firm belief that military strength is the security, dignity and prestige of the state and people. Once again, I emphasize that our army should keep a sharp watch on even the enemy’s slight military move and make confident and full preparedness to thoroughly and mercilessly control and frustrate provocative acts of any type through overwhelming counteraction, mindful of its noble mission which is to devotedly defend the security of the country and the wellbeing of the people. As preparations for a great event have become urgent reality and our army has been entrusted with the important mission of ensuring them through a powerful military action, every level of the entire army should sincerely study and implement the spirit of the plenary meetings of the Eighth Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the Party, intensify training under the simulated conditions of an actual war and, at the same time, direct great efforts to the political and ideological education as usual so as to prepare itself enough to surely win in the confrontation with the enemies by dint of political, ideological, military and technological superiority. Kim Jong Un said that the People’s Army’s preparations for war are unthinkable without modernization of its military hardware. He set forth the strategic tasks to be maintained and carried out by the munitions industry in its responsible struggle for bolstering up the DPRK’s nuclear war deterrent and augmenting the national defense capacity this year as required by the prevailing situation and the developing revolution and referred to other issues. He went on: All citizens living on this land should regard national defense as the greatest patriotic work and turn out in it voluntarily. It is our Party’s strategic plan to defend the country and greet a great revolutionary event through all-people resistance. The civilian defense sector should draw a serious lesson from the fact that it had conducted the work for perfecting the preparedness for war in a formalistic and blindfolded way in the past, taking it as routine in the past, and make strenuous efforts in a revolutionary way with the viewpoint and attitude that it makes a new start. As the work for strengthening the country’s defense capabilities and military muscle is a nationwide undertaking both in name and reality, all institutions, enterprises, organizations and citizens in the territory of the Republic should have a correct view of military affairs and regard it as an immutable iron rule to provide everything needed for strengthening the military capability on the top-priority basis and in the highest quality. The people’s government organs at all levels should take thoroughgoing measures to immediately switch over to the wartime system in case of emergency and make full material preparations for all-people resistance. The deputies to the Supreme People’s Assembly should regard it as their due duty to play a key role in strengthening the country’s defense capability, and carry out the military tasks entrusted to their sectors and units without fail and promptly call into question the practices of neglecting the military affairs to thoroughly overcome them. Comrade Deputies! Today the Supreme People’s Assembly newly legalized the policy of our Republic toward the south on the basis of putting an end to the nearly 80 year-long history of inter-Korean relations and recognizing the two states both existing in the Korean peninsula. As solemnly clarified at the 2023 December Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee, our Party, government and people had shown great magnanimity and tireless patience and made sincere efforts always with the view that those of the ROK are still the fellow countrymen and compatriots in the long period of history and even discussed with them the great cause of national reunification in a candid manner. But it is the final conclusion drawn from the bitter history of the inter-Korean relations that we cannot go along the road of national restoration and reunification together with the ROK clan that adopted as its state policy the all-out confrontation with our Republic, dreaming of the “collapse of our government” and “unification by absorption,” and lost compatriotic consciousness, getting more vicious and arrogant in the madcap confrontational racket. The north-south relations have been completely fixed into the relations between two states hostile to each other and the relations between two belligerent states, not the consanguineous or homogeneous ones any more. This is the present situation of the relations between the north and the south today caused by the heinous and self-destructive confrontational maneuvers of the ROK, a group of outsiders’ top-class stooges, and the true picture of the Korean peninsula just unveiled before the world. We have formulated a new stand on the north-south relations and the policy of reunification and dismantled all the organizations we established as solidarity bodies for peaceful reunification at the current session of the Supreme People’s Assembly which discusses the laws of the DPRK. It can be said this is an indispensable process that should take place without fail. As the southern border of our country has been clearly drawn, the illegal “northern limit line” and any other boundary can never be tolerated, and if the ROK violates even 0.001 mm of our territorial land, air and waters, it will be considered a war provocation. In this regard, I think it is necessary to revise some contents of the Constitution of the DPRK. I have already recalled at the recent plenary meeting that the so-called constitution of the ROK openly stipulates that “the territory of the ROK covers the Korean peninsula and its attached islands.” Recently I studied the constitutions of some other countries and found that they clearly stipulate the political and geographical definition of the territorial parts in which state sovereignty is exercised, the territorial land, territorial waters and territorial airspace in other word. There is no provision specifying such definition in the existing constitution of our country. Since our Republic definitely defined the ROK as a foreign country and the most hostile state after completely eliminating the original concept contradictory to reality that the ROK is the partner for reconciliation and reunification and the fellow countrymen, it is necessary to take legal steps to legitimately and correctly define the territorial sphere where the sovereignty of the DPRK as an independent socialist nation is exercised. In my opinion, we can specify in our constitution the issue of completely occupying, subjugating and reclaiming the ROK and annex it as a part of the territory of our Republic in case a war breaks out on the Korean peninsula. And I think it is right to specify in the relevant paragraph of our constitution that such linguistic remnants misinterpreting the north and the south as fellow countrymen as “3 000-ri tapestry-like land” and “80 million compatriots” are not used in the political, ideological, mental and cultural life of our people, and that education should be intensified to instill into them the firm idea that ROK is their primary enemy state and invariable principal enemy. Besides, in my view, it is necessary to delete such expressions in the constitution as “northern half” and “independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity.” I think the constitution of the Republic should be revised in consideration of such matters and they should be discussed at the next session of the Supreme People’s Assembly. The constitutional revision should be followed by timely practical measures to get rid of the remnants of the past era which may be seen as symbols of “north and south Koreas with consanguineous and homogeneous relations”, “By Our Nation Itself” and “peaceful reunification.” For the present, we should take strict stepwise measures to thoroughly block all the channels of north-south communication along the border, including the one of physically and completely cutting off the railway tracks in our side, which existed as a symbol of north-south exchange and cooperation, to an irretrievable level. We should also completely remove the eye-sore “Monument to the Three Charters for National Reunification” standing at the southern gateway to the capital city of Pyongyang and take other measures so as to completely eliminate such concepts as “reunification”, “reconciliation” and “fellow countrymen” from the national history of our Republic. Taking this opportunity, I would like to make clear once again the revolutionary character of the work for strengthening the self-reliant military capabilities, which our Republic firmly preserves as its own life, unfazed by any changes of situation. I reaffirm that the strongest absolute strength we are cultivating is not a means of preemptive attack for realizing unilateral “reunification by force of arms” but the capabilities for legitimate self-defense pertaining to our right to self-defense, which should be bolstered up without fail definitely to defend ourselves. In the present world where jungle law prevails, and to our country located in the hot spot where the danger of war has lingered for decades, the possession of powerful military muscle is an inevitable process of struggle to be indispensably chosen to defend the destiny of our country and nation and a historic task to be accepted as a fate. Despite the worst difficulties accompanied by the enemy’s persistent pressure and sanctions, we have remarkably bolstered up our self-reliant military capabilities and nuclear war deterrent to be strongest without any slightest vacillation. As a result, any aggressor forces on the earth have long dared not push the situation to such worst phase as the outbreak of a war on this land. Explicitly speaking, we will never unilaterally unleash a war if the enemies do not provoke us. The enemies should never misjudge this as our weakness. Then, will we confine our national self-defensive capabilities to serving the purpose of only defending ourselves and preventing war? Absolutely not. I have already clearly mentioned the second mission of our nuclear force, in addition to its basic duty of deterring war. A level-headed judgment of the special environment, in which the most hostile state, the Republic of Korea, exists in our nearest neighborhood, and of the situation, in which instability of the regional situation is soaring due to the U.S.-led escalation of military tensions, has found that the danger of the outbreak of a war to be caused by a physical clash has considerably aggravated and reached a red line. We do not want war, but we also have no intention of avoiding it. There is no reason to opt for war, and therefore, there is no intention of unilaterally going to war, but once a war becomes a reality facing us, we will never try to avoid it, and we will take perfect and prompt action we thoroughly prepared in order to defend our sovereignty, security of the people and right to existence. The war will terribly destroy the entity called the Republic of Korea and put an end to its existence. And it will inflict an unimaginably crushing defeat upon the U.S. Our military capabilities, already in readiness to do so, are being rapidly updated. If the enemies ignite a war, our Republic will resolutely punish the enemies by mobilizing all its military forces including nuclear weapons. Comrade Deputies! Anti-imperialist independence is justice and truth, and dignity and sovereignty, peace and security can be firmly defended only in this way. It is the foreign policy stand of our Party and state to safeguard justice and peace, aspire toward progress and development and promote friendship and solidarity. The DPRK will never tolerate the heinous infringement on its sovereignty by the U.S. which is wantonly trampling down and plundering world peace and stability with illegal double standards, regarding anti-imperialist independence as its immutable and consistent first national policy, but will strive to realize international justice based on respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and establish a new international order. The external affairs sector should strategically and positively conduct the work to cope with the rapid change in the international political structure and security environment on the initiatives, so as to create conditions and circumstances favorable for our revolution and prevent any deviation or concession in the principle of defending national rights and interests. It should set the development of relations with socialist countries as its primary task, further strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation, launch a courageous anti-imperialist joint action and joint struggle on an international scale, and achieve new progress in the work for further expanding the sphere of external relations of the country, uniting and cooperating with all countries and nations aspiring after independence and justice, irrespective of ideology and social system.” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at 10th Session of 14th SPA,” January 16, 2024)

1/16/24:
President Yoon Suk Yeol vowed today to punish North Korea multiple times as hard in the event it carries out a provocation against South Korea, after North Korean leader Kim Jong Un called for defining South Korea as a “primary foe and invariable principal enemy.” Kim issued the call during a parliamentary meeting yesterday, saying the country should revise its constitution to codify the new definition of South Korea and the North’s commitment to “completely occupying” South Korean territory in the event of war. “The current Republic of Korea government is different from any previous government,” Yoon said during a Cabinet meeting, referring to South Korea by its formal name. “Our military has an overwhelming response capability. … Should North Korea provoke us, we will punish them multiple times as hard.” At the Cabinet meeting, Yoon called on the nation and government to come together as one to “defeat” the deceptive tactics and propaganda of the North Korean regime. He also said North Korea’s recent definition of South-North relations as those between “hostile” nations amounted to an acknowledgement of the regime’s nature as an “anti-national and anti-historical group.” Still, Yoon called for embracing the North Korean people. “The North Korean people are one people with us, with the same rights as us to enjoy freedom, human rights and prosperity,” he said. In a video message later in the day, Yoon praised the swift response of the South Korean Marine Corps when North Korea fired approximately 200 artillery shells into waters near the maritime border earlier this month. “I am truly confident and proud of you all, who carried out duties without any single hesitation during the shelling provocations by North Korea on Jan. 5,” Yoon expressed in his message at a Marine Corps event in Seoul. In response to the North’s artillery firings, South Korean Marine Corps units on the border islands of Baengnyeong and Yeonpyeong fired some 400 rounds into the maritime buffer zone, double the amount fired by the North. (Lee Haye-ah, “Yoon Vows Multiple-Times Stronger Punishment in Event of N.K. Provocation,” Yonhap, January 16, 2024)

1/15-17/24:
The top diplomats of North Korea and Russia discussed the schedule of “upcoming political contacts” between their countries during their talks earlier this week, Russian media reported today. North Korea’s Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui held talks with her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, in Moscow on January 16 before meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin later that day amid deepening bilateral ties after their leaders’ summit last September. “There was a thorough exchange of views on topical issues of development of bilateral relations with a focus on implementation of the agreements of the September summit of the leaders of the two countries at the Vostochny spaceport, including the schedule of upcoming political contacts,” TASS quoted the ministry as saying. During the September summit in eastern Russia, Putin accepted North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s invitation to visit his country. The ministry, however, did not offer details on the “upcoming political contacts.” On the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, the ministers confirmed their commitment to settling tensions in the region, which they described as being fueled by “irresponsible provocative actions of the United States and its satellites,” TASS quoted the ministry as saying. Yesterday, Choe also met with Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak and discussed expanding cooperation in trade and the economy, according to KCNA. “The talk discussed the practical issues for revitalizing and expanding the bilateral exchange and cooperation in various fields including trade and economy as the DPRK-Russia friendly and cooperative relations have reached a new strategic level,” KCNA reported in an English-language dispatch. Choe wrapped up her five-day trip to Russia on January 19, according to the Russian ministry. In a photo released by foreign media before her meeting with Putin, one of the members of the North Korean delegation was pictured holding a document apparently titled, “Observation list in space technology field,” in Korean. The list appears to include the Progress Rocket Space Centre and the Voronezh Mechanical Plant, known to produce engines, although the writing is not completely clear. The document suggests possible ongoing cooperation between the two sides in space technology after Putin indicated at the September summit that his country would help Pyongyang build satellites. (Yonhap, “Top Diplomats of NK, Russia Discuss ‘Upcoming Political Contacts’: Report,” Korea Times, January 19, 2024)

DPRK Foreign Minister’s assistant office’s January 20 press release “as regards the results of her visit to the Russian Federation: The government delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea headed by Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui paid an official visit to the Russian Federation from January 15 to 17, 2024 at the invitation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at a time when the friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries have definitely entered the course of a new comprehensive development. During the visit, Choe Son Hui paid a courtesy call on Russian President Vladimir Putin, had a talk with her counterpart Sergei Lavrov and met with Alexandr Nobak, deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation. Choe Son Hui courteously conveyed warm greetings of Kim Jong Un, president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, to Vladimir Putin, president of the Russian Federation, and President Putin asked her to convey his New Year greetings to President of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Kim Jong Un. President Putin expressed deep thanks once again for the invitation of President of the State Affairs Kim Jong Un to visit Pyongyang at a convenient time and expressed his willingness to visit the DPRK at an early date. During the visit both sides discussed the issues of continuously taking practical action measures for comprehensively and thoroughly implementing the agreements reached at the historic DPRK-Russia summit held in September 2023 and of ushering in a new efflorescence of the DPRK-Russia friendship by vitalizing bilateral exchange and cooperation in all fields this year marking the 75th anniversary of the conclusion of the agreement on the DPRK-Russia economic and cultural cooperation. Both sides also had deep strategic communication on various regional and international issues including the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia and reached a consensus of views on them. They expressed their strong will to further strengthen strategic and tactical cooperation in defending the core interests of the two countries and establishing a new multi-polarized international order based on independence and justice. Both sides recognized that the friendly and cooperative relations between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation, independent sovereign states, serve as a powerful strategic fortress and a traction engine in defending international peace and security and promoting the building of a multi-polarized world. They also reached a consensus and satisfactory agreement in the discussion of practical issues of putting the bilateral relations on a new legal basis in the direction of strategic development and expanding and developing them in an all-round way. The DPRK side highly appreciated the important mission and role of the powerful Russian Federation in maintaining the strategic stability and balance of the world and expressed expectation that the Russian Federation would continue to adhere to independent policies and lines in all fields in the future, too, and thus make a great contribution to international peace and security and the establishment of an equal and fair international order. The Russian Federation side expressed deep thanks to the DPRK for extending full support and solidarity to the stand of the Russian government and people on the special military operation in Ukraine. Both sides expressed serious concern over the negative influence of the U.S. and its allied forces’ irresponsible and unjust provocative acts, which seriously threaten the security environment of the Korean peninsula and the sovereign right and security interests of the DPRK in particular, on the peace and security of the region and the rest of the world, and agreed to deal with the regional situation through close cooperation and concerted action of foreign policy bodies of the two countries based on the spirit of the UN Charter and other international laws. The DPRK foreign minister’s successful visit to the Russian Federation, which was held as part of the practical implementation of the agreement reached at the historic DPRK-Russia summit in September 2023, serves as an important step for promoting the reliable development of the strategic and future-oriented DPRK-Russia relations. The DPRK government warmly welcomes President Putin to visit Pyongyang and is ready to greet the Korean people’s closest friend with the greatest sincerity. The traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation, which have been consolidated in all trials and storms of history, will steadily develop into the invincible comradely relations and the eternal strategic relations under the deep friendship and special care of Kim Jong Un, president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Vladimir Putin, president of the Russian Federation.” (KCNA, “Press Release on DPRK Foreign Minister’s Visit to Russian Federation,” January 21, 2024)

1/19/24:
MND spokesman’s statement “We will never tolerate the reckless military confrontation hysteria”: “The U.S., Japan and the Republic of Korea are getting frantic in their provocative military exercises from the outset of the year. Joint maritime exercises were staged again in the waters off Jeju Island for three days from January 15 with the involvement of the U.S. nuclear carrier Carl Vinson and Aegis cruiser Princeton and warships of the Japanese maritime “Self-Defense Force” and the ROK navy. The exercises, which followed the joint establishment of a tripartite multi-year drill plan by military gangsters of the U.S., Japan and ROK in December last year, constituted a cause of further destabilizing the regional situation, and they are an act of seriously threatening the security of the DPRK. In response to it, the Underwater Weapon System Institute under the DPRK Academy of Defense Science conducted an important test of its underwater nuclear weapon system “Haeil-5-23” under development in the East Sea of Korea. Our army’s underwater nuke-based countering posture is being further rounded off and its various maritime and underwater responsive actions will continue to deter the hostile military maneuvers of the navies of the U.S. and its allies. We strongly denounce the U.S. and its followers for their reckless acts of seriously threatening the security of the DPRK from the outset of the year and sternly warn them of the catastrophic consequences to be entailed by them. The armed forces of the DPRK will strike horror into their hearts through responsible, prompt and bold exercise of its deterrent and firmly defend the security of the state and regional peace by dint of great strength, never tolerating the reckless military confrontation hysteria of the enemies.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for Ministry of National Defense of DPRK Issues Press Statement,” January 19, 2024)

1/22/24:
When Russia turned to Kim Jong Un of North Korea to help it through its war with Ukraine, it came with a big shopping list that included a million rounds of artillery to shoot at Ukrainian troops dug into trenches across the south and east, and dozens of North Korea’s newest, barely tested missiles. Now those weapons are beginning to show up, deeply worrying U.S. and European officials who say they fear the North’s ammunition could prove important on the battlefield at a huge moment of vulnerability for Ukraine. While many of the North Korean artillery rounds are proving to be duds — some appear to have been manufactured decades ago — they are giving the Russians something to fire at Ukrainian forces, who are rationing their own dwindling supply. European nations promised Ukraine a huge resupply, but for now seem to have been able to scrounge up only 300,000 or so artillery shells. But it is the missiles that raise the most concern, from the Pentagon to NATO’s headquarters in Brussels. In interviews, a range of officials said they fear the Russians hope to use missiles to overwhelm Western air defenses. While so far the number of missiles transferred is small, likely fewer than 50, U.S. and European officials believe there could be far more to come. And unlike with the artillery rounds, North Korea is not shipping its older equipment. An analysis by Conflict Armament Research, an organization that has documented the arms used in Russia’s war in Ukraine, showed the missiles being provided to Russia are more recent in their design. And U.S. officials say the missiles are proving as accurate as Russia’s home-built equipment. Three barrages of North Korean-made missiles targeted Ukrainian positions around the new year, American officials say, and they believe more were used on the battlefield on January 21. In South Korea, officials and analysts say the Ukraine war is giving the North something it desperately needs: a testing ground to see how its new missile arsenal, designed for a conflict with outh Korea and the United States, fares against Western-designed air defenses. The bulk of the missiles being fired at Ukraine are still produced in Russia. But if North Korea steps up its supply, Ukraine could be forced to shoot off precious rounds of air defenses, a development that could be devastating to Ukraine if additional military funding is not approved by Congress, American officials said. The imports have especially alarmed leading members of NATO, who have declined to speak publicly but say they worry the infusion of the North Korean arms could prove particularly troublesome at a time when Ukraine is uncertain about when, or from whom, it will receive its next supplies. For now, the air defenses are holding. On January 16, Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli, the top American commander in Europe, told Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III that he believed the Ukrainian military had enough air defenses to survive the winter, two senior U.S. officials said. But if North Korea increases its missile shipments, and Congress fails to pass additional aid, that calculation could change. Russia has already obtained several dozen North Korean missiles and is hoping to acquire more. President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia said he planned to visit North Korea soon, according to North Korean state media. Russia has fired North Korean missiles against Ukraine at least three times since late December, including attacks on December 30, January 2 and January 6. The missiles come on top of a steady stream of artillery shells, as many as a million rounds, that North Korea has agreed to ship to Russia. But the quality of those rounds is poor. Some have exploded inside Russian guns, and many of the rest have fallen harmlessly in underpopulated areas. Quantity itself, however, matters on the battlefield. Last summer, Ukraine was firing as many as 7,000 artillery shells a day and had managed to damage Russia’s ammunition supplies to the point that Russia was firing about 5,000 rounds a day, according to U.S. and other Western analysts. Now the Ukrainians are struggling to fire 2,000 rounds daily, while Russian artillery, augmented by the North Korean shells, is reaching about 10,000 a day, analysts said. Still, U.S. officials are far more worried about North Korean missiles. After the first barrage, Jake Sullivan, the U.S. national security adviser, began working on an intensified effort to gather international support condemning the weapons transfer, and trying to increase pressure on North Korea to stop providing the missiles. U.S. officials believe that at times since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, U.S. disclosures of North Korean shipments have caused Pyongyang to halt or delay further transfers. U.S. officials say Ukrainian air defenses are a critical area of concern. After initial setbacks because of Western sanctions, Russia has rebuilt its industrial capacity and stockpiled missiles. But if Russia can get even more North Korean missiles, it will be able to more easily overcome Ukrainian defenses. “The Ukrainians continue to get attacked,” John F. Kirby, a spokesman for the National Security Council, said on Wednesday. “They continue to come under artillery shell, air attacks, ballistic and cruise missile, as well as drone attacks from the Russians.” It will be difficult for the United States to stop those additional shipments. North Korea has been taking a more belligerent position in its foreign policy in recent days. It has declared that it would no longer seek reconciliation with the South, prompting some experts to speculate that the country may be seeking to provoke a new conflict — though the evidence for that is fragmentary at best. Without question, though, it has focused on strengthening its ties with Russia. Yet the nature of the renewed relationship is not clear. Russia is promising an array of technology in return for the North’s ballistic missiles, including aircraft and advanced technological know-how. But U.S. officials do not believe Russia has yet provided the weaponry or additional ballistic missile technology. (David E. Sanger, Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt, “New Concern on Ukrainian Battlefield: North Korea’s Latest Missiles,” New York Times, January 23, 2024, p. A-12)

1/23/24:
North Korea has demolished a monument that symbolized hope for reconciliation with the South, days after the regime’s leader, Kim Jong Un, said the peaceful reunification of the two Koreas was no longer possible. In the latest sign of rising tensions on the peninsula, the Arch of Reunification – built in 2000 after a landmark inter-Korean summit – has disappeared from satellite imagery, according to the NK News website. It was not immediately clear when or how it had been taken down, NK News said. Kim, whose tone has become markedly belligerent in recent weeks, described the concrete arch – which shows two women, one each from the North and South, holding an emblem of the outline of the Korean peninsula – as an “eyesore” at a speech this month to the Supreme People’s Assembly, the North’s rubber-stamp parliament. He added that the North’s constitution should be amended to reflect South Korea’s new status as his country’s “principal enemy” – effectively ending decades of official policy that stressed the eventual reunification of the autocratic North with the democratic South. The 30-metre arch, formally known as the Monument to the Three Charters for National Reunification, symbolized self-reliance, peace and national cooperation, according to South Korean government records. Located on Reunification Highway, which connects Pyongyang to the heavily armed border with the South, it was reportedly erected to commemorate plans for reunification put forward by Kim’s grandfather and North Korean founder Kim Il Sung. (Justin McCurry, “North Korea Demolishes Symbol of Reconciliation with South – Report,” Guardian, January 23, 2024)

1/24/24:
North Korea fired several cruise missiles toward the Yellow Sea today, the South Korean military said, the latest in a series of saber-rattling that heightened tensions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said the North’s launch took place around 7 a.m. but did not elaborate, citing an ongoing analysis. According to sources, the missiles flew in a circular trajectory in waters west of the North Korean capital Pyongyang, similar to cruise missiles that fly at a lower altitude than ballistic missiles. “The range was not short, and it is was presumed to have been launched from the ground,” the source said, speculating that the cruise missiles were likely Hwasal-1 or -2, which are capable of carrying a Hwasan-31 nuclear warhead. It marks the North’s first cruise missile launch since September 2023, when it test-fired two long-range strategic cruise missiles with mock nuclear warheads toward the Yellow Sea. The South Korean military said it will resume artillery firings and drills near the border as Pyongyang’s shelling near the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the de facto maritime border in the Yellow Sea, scrapped the mutually agreed buffer zones. (Kim Eun-jung, “N.K. Fires Several Cruise Missiles into Yellow Sea: JCS,” Yonhap, January 24, 2024)

KCNA: “The Missile Administration of the DPRK conducted the first test-fire of the new-type strategic cruise missile “Pulhwasal-3-31” under development on January 24. The test-fire had no impact on the security of neighboring countries and has nothing to do with the regional situation. The Missile Administration explained that the test-fire is a process of constant updating of the weapon. (KCNA, “DPRK Missile Administration Conducts First Test-fire of New-type Strategic Cruise Missile,” January 25, 2024)

1/25/24:
North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un, could take some form of lethal military action against South Korea in the coming months after having shifted to a policy of open hostility, U.S. officials say. The officials have assessed that Kim’s recent harder line is part of a pattern of provocations, but that his declarations have been more aggressive than previous statements and should be taken seriously. While the officials added that they did not see an imminent risk of a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula, Kim could carry out strikes in a way that he thinks would avoid rapid escalation. They pointed to North Korea’s shelling of a South Korean island in 2010 as an example. The two sides exchanged artillery fire, resulting in the reported deaths of troops on both sides as well as civilians in the South, but both militaries soon stopped. Kim’s more aggressive posture has been evident through a series of actions this month. Yesterday, the North fired several cruise missiles from its west coast into the sea, the South Korean military said. Kim’s government announced on January 14 that it had tested a new solid-fuel intermediate-range missile tipped with a hypersonic warhead. And on January 5, his military fired hundreds of artillery shells into waters near South Korean islands, forcing some residents to seek shelter. At the same time, Kim has decided to formally abandon a longtime official goal of peaceful reunification with South Korea, the North Korean state news media announced on January 16. Kim said in a speech the day before that conciliatory references to unity with the Republic of Korea, as the South is officially known, must be removed from the Constitution. “We can specify in our Constitution the issue of completely occupying, subjugating and reclaiming the R.O.K. and annexing it as a part of the territory of our republic in case a war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula,” Kim said. Kim’s moves also appear to be shutting the door, for now, on any chance of diplomacy with the United States, which he has shunned since his face-to-face talks with President Donald J. Trump failed in 2019. And U.S. officials say the North Korean leader is likely feeling emboldened because of his growing partnership with Russia. “The statements and policy changes are part of a broader strategy to destabilize and create anxiety,” said Jean H. Lee, a fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu. She added that she thought Kim could take military action in an area like the West Sea, or Yellow Sea, where the North disputes a maritime border. Two North Korea experts argued in an article this month that the situation on the Korean Peninsula “is more dangerous than it has been at any time since early June 1950,” when Kim’s grandfather decided to invade the South. In the article, which U.S. government analysts and policymakers have read, the authors wrote that based on their interpretation of recent statements, Kim had “made a strategic decision to go to war.” But so far, U.S. agencies have not detected concrete signs that North Korea is gearing up for combat or a major war, according to American officials interviewed for this article, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence and diplomatic matters. One official said North Korea’s decision to send large numbers of older artillery shells and smaller numbers of more modern ballistic missiles to Russia for its war in Ukraine showed that Kim was not preparing for a prolonged conflict with the South. A leader planning for a major military operation would hoard his stocks of missiles and artillery shells, the official said. When North Korea shelled Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, the South Korean military retaliated, but the two sides quickly ended their artillery exchange. Earlier that year, 46 sailors died when a South Korean warship sank off the country’s west coast; an investigation by international experts concluded a few months after that the warship had been hit by a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine. South Korea imposed sanctions on the North, which had denied any role in the episode, but did not carry out any military strikes. During naval skirmishes in 1999 and 2002, both Koreas were also careful not to escalate into a full-blown war by keeping their interactions proportional. North Korea can decimate cities in South Korea and kill U.S. troops on the peninsula using conventional weapons. The South and the United States also have the means to quickly destroy Pyongyang, the North’s capital, and military sites across the country. North Korea has enough fissile material, mostly highly enriched uranium, for about 50 to 60 nuclear warheads, said Siegfried S. Hecker, a scientist at Stanford University who co-wrote the recent article on Kim going to a war footing. Robert Carlin, the other author and a former U.S. intelligence analyst on North Korea, said in an interview that they had concluded based on the North’s actions and official statements since 2021 that Kim had abandoned a decades-long policy of trying to normalize relations with the United States. “We surprised ourselves by seeing how alarming this situation had turned,” Carlin said. He said he believed North Korean military planners would favor a surprise attack, which commanders carried out when they invaded the South in 1950, to “knock the Americans mentally off-balance, knock everybody off-balance.” The North Korean government seemed to be especially fixated on the U.S. military’s departure from Afghanistan in August 2021, which Trump had planned and Biden carried out. North Korean officials “portrayed it as American global retreat,” Carlin said. Daniel Russel, a vice president at the Asia Society and a former top Asia official at the State Department, said Kim seemed intent on a strike that would go well beyond the shelling in 2010. “We should be preparing for the prospect of Kim doing a shocking kinetic action,” he said. President Biden, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and other U.S. officials have spoken to their Chinese counterparts about trying to persuade North Korea to end its missile tests, which have increased in recent years. Although China helped North Korea evade sanctions, it did not want armed conflict in the region, U.S. officials said. However, there are limits to China’s influence with North Korea — and it could be waning because of Kim’s moves to establish closer ties to President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. Wang Huiyao, the president of the Center for China and Globalization, a research group in Beijing, described the general situation as “very dangerous” and said that “all the parties involved should talk together.” The Biden administration has been trying since 2021 to persuade North Korea to engage in diplomacy. On January 19, the State Department said in a statement that the United States still “seeks dialogue” with the North “without preconditions and harbors no hostile intent.” But Carlin said Kim felt betrayed and humiliated by Trump during the failed diplomacy of 2019. And he said the North Koreans knew the American line about dialogue without preconditions was “an old talking point” that did not signal any potential change in U.S. policy, which is based on sanctions aimed at getting Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program. “If they’ve decided they don’t trust the Americans to do anything useful at any time,” Carlin said, “why would they respond positively?” (Edward Wong and Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Is Watching North Korea for Signs of Lethal Military Action,” New York Times, January 26, 2024, p. A-10)

1/27/24:
KCNA: “Choe Son Hui, foreign minister of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, met Sun Weidong, vice-minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, on a visit to the DPRK [today]. During their talk, they expressed the stands of the two sides to significantly commemorate this year marking the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the DPRK and China as the “year of DPRK-China friendship,” true to the noble intentions of the top leaders of the two parties and the two countries and continue to strengthen tactical cooperation and keep pace with each other to defend the common core interests. The talk proceeded in a comradely and friendly atmosphere. Present there were Pak Myong Ho, vice-minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, and Wang Yajun, Chinese ambassador to the DPRK. (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Minister Meets Chinese Vice Foreign Minister,” January 27, 2024)

1/28/24:
North Korea fired several cruise missiles from its east coast today, the South Korean military said, days after Pyongyang test-fired new strategic cruise missiles from the west coast. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said the North’s launch took place around 8 a.m. in waters off Sinpo, but did not elaborate, citing an ongoing analysis. It marks the North’s second cruise missile launch this year after it test-fired strategic cruise missiles, named Pulhwasal-3-31, toward the Yellow Sea on Wednesday. Experts said the Pulhwasal-3-31 appears to be a nuclear-capable cruise missile, considering that the number in its name is identical to that of the Hwasan-31, a tactical nuclear warhead that North Korea first unveiled in March 2023. The North first test-fired the Hawsal-1 cruise missile in September 2021 and launched several Hwasal-1 and -2 cruise missiles presumed to be capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons last year. Hwasal means an arrow in Korean, and Pulhwasal means a fire arrow. Cruise missiles fly low and maneuver, making them better at evading missile defenses. The launch of a cruise missile is not a direct violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions banning the North’s use of ballistic missile technology. (Park Boram, “N. Korea Fires Several Cruise Missiles from Its East Coast,” Yonhap, January 28, 2024) The location of the most recent launches fueled speculation that the missiles were fired from a submarine, including the Hero Kim Kun Ok tactical nuclear attack submarine first seen last September. Sinpo is home to the North’s submarine-related facilities and was the location where the North claimed it fired a cruise missile from a submarine in the East Sea on March 12, 2023. Powered by jet propulsion technology, cruise missiles usually fly at a lower speed and altitude than ballistic missiles. However, experts say they still pose a risk to South Korea and Japan because they are harder to detect by radar. Advanced cruise missiles are also harder to intercept because they are often self-navigating and can fly on extremely low-altitude trajectories compared to ballistic missiles. North Korea, after the launch today, released a report largely pinning the blame on the United States and South Korea. Referring to the joint cybersecurity exercise between Washington and Seoul on January 15, KCNA said on Sunday that the training was “aimed at provoking war as the United States and its followers openly promote the so-called ‘end of the regime’ and commit reckless military actions.” The report also referred to the joint military exercise between Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo on January 18 involving U.S. Air Force B-1B nuclear strategic bombers and Japan Air Self-Defense Force F-15 fighters, as well as the exercise on Jan. 22 involving the U.S. Air Force’s RC-135 reconnaissance plane. The KCNA report even threatened to use nuclear weapons on the United States and South Korea. “Not only have we demonstrated through many opportunities that the state-of-the-art military equipment we possess is by no means for show off, it has also been a long time since we codified our own nuclear doctrine regarding the use of nuclear force,” it said. “We once again warn the United States and its puppet Republic of Korea that if the fuse of war ignites, they will become the target of our merciless conquest.” (Esther Chung, “ North Korea Fires Cruise Missiles from Sea near Sinpo,” JoongAng Ilbo, January 28, 2024)

KCNA: “Thanks to the wise guidance of the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un who set forth the original orientation for the development of the Juche-based naval force and is dynamically leading the drive for realizing it, a test of a strategic weapon was conducted, clearly demonstrating that a great new era of bolstering up the naval force is being ushered in. The test-fire serves as an occasion of demonstrating the rapid development of the Juche-based naval force and convincing the prospect of bolstering up the naval force of the DPRK. Kim Jong Un’s line of building the strategic force on expanding and strengthening the sphere of operation of the state nuclear deterrence in a diversified way is being carried out in a planned and radical way, accelerating the nuclear weaponization of our navy. In the morning of January 28, Kim Jong Un guided the test-fire of the newly-developed submarine-launched strategic cruise missile “Pulhwasal-3-31”, together with secretaries of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), the commander of the Navy and other leading officials. The cruise missiles flew in the sky above the East Sea for 7 421s and 7 445s to hit the island target. The test-fire had no impact on the security of a neighboring country and has nothing to do with the regional situation. Kim Jong Un expressed great satisfaction over the result of the test. Saying that the prevailing situation and future threats urge the DPRK to put more spurs to the efforts for defending the maritime sovereignty, he stressed that the successes like today’s one, which is of strategic significance in carrying out the plan of the WPK for modernizing the army aimed at building a powerful naval force, should be made one after another. Reiterating that the nuclear weaponization of the navy is an urgent task of the times and a core requirement for building the state nuclear strategic force, he set forth the important tasks arising in realizing the nuclear weaponization of the navy and expanding the sphere of operation of the state nuclear deterrence in a diversified way. That day he learned in detail about the building of a nuclear submarine. He discussed the issues related to the building of a nuclear-powered submarine and other new-type warships, indicated the immediate tasks to be carried out by relevant sectors and state measures to be taken, and made an important conclusion on the ways to implement them.” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Test-fire of Submarine-launched Strategic Cruise Missile,” January 29, 2024)

1/30/24:
North Korea fired several cruise missiles off the west coast today, the South Korean military said, just two days after it test-fired submarine-launched cruise missiles from the east coast. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the North’s launch at around 7 a.m. from its west coast. It did not specify the number of missiles. It marks the third cruise missile launch in a week. North Korea claimed the submarine-launched Pulhwasal-3-31 flew for approximately two hours two day ago and hit preset targets, but the South Korean military speculated the North may have exaggerated the flight time. “The flight time of the cruise missiles launched today flew longer than the ones launched on January 28, which are believed to be flying at a normal range,” a Joint Chiefs of Staff official said on the background. The normal flight range of Hwasal-1 is estimated to be around 1,500 km, while Hwasal-2 is presumed to have a range of about 2,000 km. (Kim Eun-jung, “N. Korea Conducts Another Cruise Missile Launch: JCS,” January 30, 2024)

KCNA: “The Korean People’s Army (KPA) staged a drill of launching strategic cruise missile “Hwasal-2” in the West Sea of Korea on January 30. The drill made a contribution to checking the KPA’s rapid counterattack posture and improving its strategic striking capability and had no adverse effect on the security of a neighboring country.” (KCNA, “Report of KPA General Staff: Launching-Drill of Strategic Cruise Missile Conducted,” January 31, 2024)

North Korea has shut down its diplomatic missions in Hong Kong and Libya, a foreign ministry official said today, as the recalcitrant regime struggles with economic challenges amid prolonged sanctions. They are the latest in the list of overseas missions Pyongyang has shut down in the past months, including Angola, Nepal, Bangladesh, Spain and Uganda. North Korea has said the closures are part of efforts to enhance its diplomatic efficiency. (Yi Wonin, “N. Korea Pulls out of Hong Kong, Libya in Series of Embassy Closures: Official,” January 30, 2024)

2/2/24:
North Korea fired several cruise missiles off the west coast today, the South Korean military said, in the latest in a series of the North’s cruise missile launches this year. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the North’s launch at around 11 a.m. from its west coast. It did not specify the number of missiles. It marked the North’s fourth cruise missile launch this year. (Kim Eun-jung, “N. Korea Fires Several Cruise Missiles off West Coast: JCS,” Yonhap, February 2, 2024)

KCNA: “The DPRK Missile Administration (MA) conducted a cruise missile super-large warhead power test and a new-type anti-aircraft missile test-fire in the West Sea of Korea on February 2. The tests are a part of the normal activities of the administration and its affiliated defense science institutes for the rapid development of the technologies in various aspects such as function, performance and operation of new-type weapon systems and had nothing to do with the regional situation. The tests had no adverse effect on the security of a neighboring country.” (KCNA, “MA Spokesman on Cruise Missile Super-large Warhead Power Test and New-type Anti-aircraft Missile Test-fire,” February 3, 2024)

2/6/24:
Russia has allowed the release of millions of dollars in frozen North Korean assets and may be helping its isolated ally with access to international banking networks, assistance that has come after the North’s transfer of weapons to Moscow for use against Ukraine, according to American-allied intelligence officials. The White House said last month that it had evidence that North Korea had provided ballistic missiles to Russia, and that the North was seeking military hardware in return. Pyongyang also appears to have shipped up to 2.5 million rounds of ammunition, according to an analysis by a British security think tank. While it is unclear whether Russia has given North Korea the military technology it may want, new banking ties would be another sign of the steady advancement in relations between the two countries. Russia has allowed the release of $9 million out of $30 million in frozen North Korean assets deposited in a Russian financial institution, according to the intelligence officials, money that they say the impoverished North will use to buy crude oil. In addition, a North Korean front company recently opened an account at another Russian bank, the intelligence officials say, evidence that Moscow may be helping Pyongyang get around U.N. sanctions that prohibit most banks from doing business with North Korea. Those sanctions have choked the North’s economy and largely shut the country off from international financial networks. The new bank account is held in South Ossetia, a self-proclaimed independent state in the Caucasus region that has close connections with Russia, according to the officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence matters. American officials said they could not confirm the specifics of the banking arrangements. But one senior official, who also requested anonymity to speak about intelligence matters, said that the arrangements fit with U.S. expectations of what North Korea would seek from Russia for its weapon transfers. The banking arrangements could be significant for North Korea, which relies on imports to sustain much of its economy. The relationships could facilitate transactions not only within Russia but also outside the country. North Korea could leverage Moscow’s connections to a handful of countries, including Turkey and South Africa, that still conduct trade with Russia after it was hit with international sanctions over the Ukraine war. If Moscow is allowing North Korea to use Russian banks or is releasing frozen assets, the government will have “crossed the Rubicon of willingness to deal with North Korea and to be a financial and commercial rogue,” said Juan C. Zarate, a former assistant Treasury secretary and expert on financial crimes. While Russia’s release of $9 million in frozen assets is relatively small, the North Koreans “welcome any alternative ways of accessing capital,” Zarate said. The United Nations and the United States have imposed a range of sanctions on North Korea in response to its prohibited nuclear weapons tests. Banking sanctions have “been one of the challenges for the North Koreans and the reason they’ve frankly been creative in how they’ve established their financial networks,” including the use of cryptocurrencies, Zarate said. For Russia, the financial transactions may be more palatable than supplying military expertise and nuclear and other technology. Even though the two countries “could be friends with benefits now,” said Soo Kim, a former C.I.A. analyst on North Korea, their trust is not so great that Russia would “give away its valued secrets.” Experts said that Russia would move cautiously because it was still mindful of U.N. sanctions as a permanent member of the Security Council. Russia, they said, may believe it can sidestep the sanctions in a deniable way. “They can always say, ‘Oh, well, this is a private bank and our investigators will look into it,’ and it will never go any further,” said James D.J. Brown, a professor of political science at the Tokyo campus of Temple University who specializes in relations between Russia and East Asia. Beyond the banking relationships, Russia may simply barter goods that the North needs in exchange for its weapons. “What would be logical for North Korea is to be engaging in swaps of grain and agricultural technology like tractors, which are banned through sanctions,” said Hazel Smith, a professor of Korean studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. “Given the precariousness of the ruble and the complete lack of value of the North Korean won, it’s very difficult to see why major transactions for either Russia or North Korea would be conducted in rubles,” she added. As much as anything, by sending missiles and ammunition to Russia, North Korea has gained the attention of the world and diplomatic perks from Moscow. “I think they value that quite a lot,” said Joseph Byrne, a research fellow who specializes in North Korea at the Royal United Services Institute, a British security think tank. “The ceremony of it, the legitimacy of it.” “It just makes North Korea that much stronger,” Byrne said, “if it looks like they have the full support of Russia.” (Motoko Rich, “Russia May Be Aiding North Korea’s Finances,” New York Times, February 7, 2024, p. A-9)

Despite state-led efforts to suppress market forces in North Korea, people there increasingly resort to one-on-one trade for survival amid a sluggish economy and growing distrust in their government, according to a report revealed today. A study, conducted between 2013 and 2022 based on in-depth interviews with 6,351 North Korean defectors, shows the importance of markets has been expanding in the decades since the de facto collapse of the country’s food rationing system in the 1990s. Today, many would go to the market to take care of their various needs, from buying medicine to hiring workers, in spite of the laws that ban such transactions, the report suggests. More than 90 percent of the interviewees said life would not be sustainable without markets, while 56 percent even said they prefer money to political power. Asked whether they have any experience using private car transportation services in North Korea, 27.1 percent of those who escaped the regime between 2016 and 2020 said they do, compared with 17.9 percent among those who fled between 2011 and 2015. When asked whether they have any experience hiring someone for work, 14.7 percent of those who escaped between 2016 and 2020 said yes, compared with 12.8 percent among those who escaped between 2011 and 2015. People in North Korea are prohibited from lending money and charging interest. But such transactions are very common these days, the respondents said. One notable change is the reasons for borrowing money. Asked about the purpose of their decision to borrow money, 57.4 percent of those who fled North Korea between 2012 and 2020 said they did so for business — another indication of growing market forces. This figure is higher than the 48.8 percent among those who fled before 2012. In response to the question over whether they have received food from the state rationing system, 72.2 percent of those who fled the North between 2016 and 2020 said they have no such experience. North Korea has been suffering from food shortages for decades. Apparently concerned about the increasing power of money, experts say authorities there recently tightened state control on the market economy, particularly on food, which could worsen the problem. “The influence of the market is growing, while the state is trying harder to strengthen its control,” an official at the Ministry of Unification told reporters at a briefing. The irony is that the economic difficulty appears to have helped drive improvements in one important area of North Korean society: women’s rights. Most interviewees who took part in the study said North Korean women’s status has improved as more women engage in economic activities, with more than 40 percent saying their status is now higher than that of men or about the same. The study also suggests that North Koreans are becoming increasingly skeptical of the hereditary succession of power. “Negative public sentiments have been growing toward the ‘Paektu bloodline’-based power succession and this has become more evident since Kim Jong Un rose to power (in 2011),” it said. (Jung Min-ho, “Market Forces Expand in North Korea despite Repression,” Korea Times, February 6, 2024)

2/12/24:
KCNA: “The Academy of Defense Science of the DPRK succeeded in developing new controllable shell and ballistic control system for multiple rocket launcher. The Academy of Defense Science conducted a ballistic control test firing of 240 mm-caliber controllable multiple rocket launcher shells on February 11 to evaluate their accuracy and prove their advantages. The development of 240 mm-caliber controllable multiple rocket launcher shell and its ballistic control system will make a qualitative change in our army’s multiple rocket launcher force. The Academy of Defense Science of the DPRK is convinced that the strategic value and utility of the 240 mm-caliber multiple rocket launcher will be reevaluated and its role in battlefields be increased, according to such rapid technical improvement.” (KCNA, “Controllable Shells for Multiple Rocket Launcher Newly Developed in DPRK,” February 12, 2024)

Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio is intensifying efforts to meet North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, as he pushes for a diplomatic breakthrough with the dictator in a bid to save his faltering premiership. The summit being pushed by Kishida would seek to secure the release of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea decades ago, according to people in Washington and Tokyo familiar with the diplomatic talks. Kishida stepped up efforts this year after promising signs from Pyongyang. But the people close to the talks — some of which are being conducted via a channel in Beijing — said they have yet to pay off because Kim is refusing to co-operate over the abductees. Speaking in the Japanese parliament last week, Kishida told lawmakers it was “extremely important for me to take the initiative to build top-level ties” with Pyongyang and that Japan should “not waste any moment.” Underscoring the sensitivity of the situation, Japan has not told the U.S. about a possible summit, according to people familiar with the situation. The last meeting between a Japanese prime minister and North Korean leader was in 2004, when Junichiro Koizumi met Kim Jong Il, the current leader’s father, in Pyongyang. The prime minister’s office declined to comment but pointed to Kishida’s recent remarks in a magazine interview where he said he was “making various approaches” towards North Korea and was determined to hold direct talks with Kim “without setting any condition.” One U.S. official said Washington would welcome high-level engagement between Tokyo and Pyongyang on condition that Japan smooth over any issues in advance with South Korea. South Korea’s conservative president Yoon Suk Yeol has taken a hardline stance against North Korea since his election in 2022. Christopher Johnstone, a former CIA and White House Japan expert, said high-level contact between Tokyo and Pyongyang “could be useful” given the lack of communication the US and South Korea have with North Korea. “Japan’s desire to make progress on the abductions issue is understandable and urgent, given the age of the affected families, but it’s a fraught exercise,” said Johnstone, now an analyst at the CSIS think-tank. “Transparency in advance with both Washington and Seoul will be critical — particularly about any incentives Japan may consider to bring North Korea to the table.”

Last week, South Korea’s minister of unification Kim Yung Ho told Yomiuri Shimbun that Seoul would assist Tokyo’s efforts by pressing new arrivals from North Korea for information on the Japanese abductees. “We’ll share any information we get with Japan,” he said. Clarity on the fate of the abducted Japanese nationals is critical to arranging any summit. Kishida has stressed that a breakthrough is needed given the ages of the families of those abducted. (Demetri Sevastopulo, Kana Inagaki, and Christian Davies, “Japanese Pushes for Summit with Kim,” Financial Times, February 13, 2024, p. 4)

2/14/24:
North Korea fired several cruise missiles off the east coast today, the South Korean military said. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the missiles launched at around 9 a.m. into waters northeast of Wonsan on the east coast. It did not specify the number of missiles. It marked the North’s fifth cruise missile launch this year. (Kim Eun-jung, “North Korea Fires Several Cruise Missiles off East Coast: JCS,” Yonhap, February 14, 2024)

KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, guided the evaluation test-fire of new-type surface-to-sea missile Padasuri-6 to be equipped by the navy on the morning of February 14. The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un was accompanied by Pak Jong Chon and Jo Chun Ryong, secretaries of the C.C., the WPK, Kim Jong Sik, vice department director of the C.C., the WPK, Army General Jang Chang Ha, general director of the DPRK Missile Administration, Admiral Kim Myong Sik, commander of the Navy of the Korean People’s Army, Vice-Admiral Pak Kwang Sop, commander of the East Sea Fleet of the Navy, Vice-Admiral Pang Song Hwan, commander of the West Sea Fleet of the Navy, Rear Admiral Kim Yong Son, vice commander of the Navy, and directors of missile departments of the east and the west sea fleet commands. The missiles flew over the East Sea for more than 1 400 seconds to hit the target boat. Kim Jong Un expressed great satisfaction over the results of the test-fire and made an important conclusion on the plan of reorganizing the combat formation of the coastal missile battalions of the east and the west sea fleets. He set forth the ways for reliably defending the maritime border by deploying surface-to-sea missile forces in the forward area and strengthening them to the maximum and thoroughly containing and frustrating the adventurous attempt of the enemy navy. Recalling the fact that the ROK puppets let various kinds of battleships intrude into the waters of the DPRK to seriously encroach upon its sovereignty under the pretext of control of fishing boats and ships of a third country and maritime patrol while making desperate efforts to preserve the “northern limit line”, a ghost one without any ground in the light of international law or legal justification, he stressed the need for the DPRK to thoroughly defend the maritime sovereignty by force of arms and actions, not by any rhetoric, statement and public notice. He gave important instructions to bolster up military preparedness particularly in the border waters north of Yonphyong Island and Paekryong Island frequently invaded by the enemies’ warships including destroyers, escort ships and speedboats. He said that it is not important how many lines exist in the West Sea of Korea and there is no need to thrash out the rights and wrongs. What is clear is that when the enemy intrudes into the maritime border recognized by us, we will regard it as an encroachment upon the sovereignty of the DPRK and an armed provocation against it, he affirmed. Steadfast is the stand and will of the KPA to firmly defend the state sovereignty and security with its legitimate and rightful exercise of the right to self-defense by dint of strong military muscle, he said, setting forth military tasks for reliably defending the coastline and the maritime border of the country.” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Test-fire of Surface-to-sea Missile Padasuri-6,” February 15, 2024)

2/15/24:
Vice Department Director of WPK Central Committee Kim Yo Jong’s press statement: “Japanese Prime Minister Kishida reportedly said at a recent meeting of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives that he badly feels the need to boldly change the present situation prevailing between Japan and the DPRK. He also underlined the need to actively establish relations with the President of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), adding that he is now making sustained efforts to do so through different channels. I also take note of the fact that Japanese media commented with regard to Prime Minister Kishida’s remarks that the stand on the DPRK-Japan relations expressed by him was different from the previous one. I think there would be no reason not to appreciate his recent speech as a positive one, if it was prompted by his real intention to boldly free himself from the past fetters and promote the DPRK-Japan relations. It is the fact recognized by everyone that the relations between the two countries have deteriorated for decades since Japan has persistently raised as a precondition the abduction issue, which had already been settled, or the settlement of nuclear and missile issues which have nothing to do with the repair of the DPRK-Japan relations. It is my opinion that if Japan makes a political decision to open up a new way of mending the relations through its courteous behavior and trustworthy action on the basis of courageously breaking with anachronistic hostility and unattainable desire and recognizing each other, the two countries can open up a new future together. Only a politician, who has sagacity and strategic insight for looking far into the future, instead of sticking to the past, and the will and executive power to make a political decision, can take an opportunity and change history. If Japan drops its bad habit of unreasonably pulling up the DPRK over its legitimate right to self-defense and does not lay such a stumbling block as the already settled abduction issue in the future way for mending the bilateral relations, there will be no reason for the two countries not to become close and the day of the prime minister’s Pyongyang visit might come. I think our state leadership still has no idea of repairing the DPRK-Japan relations and has no interest in contact. It is necessary to watch the ulterior intention of Prime Minister Kishida in the future. This is just my personal view only and I am not in the position to officially comment on the relations between the DPRK and Japan.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Kim Yo Jong,” February 15, 2024)

South Korea’s establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba will likely deal a “blow” to North Korea, given the close brotherly ties Pyongyang and Havana have maintained for decades, a senior presidential official said today. Years of secret negotiations and visits went into the formal establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations, which was sealed yesterday by an exchange of diplomatic notes between the two countries’ representatives to the United Nations in New York. The decision reduced to one the number of U.N. member states South Korea has yet to establish diplomatic ties with, namely Syria. “The establishment of South Korea-Cuba diplomatic relations was a long-cherished wish and task in South Korean diplomacy,” the official told reporters. “It appears that it will be inevitable that North Korea will be dealt a considerable political and psychological blow.” Cuba and North Korea described their relations as those of “brotherly solidarity” in a bilateral treaty signed on the occasion of then Cuban President Fidel Castro’s visit to the North in March 1986. “The reason Cuba was unable to readily agree to diplomatic relations despite having positive feelings toward South Korea amid hallyu and other various circumstances was because of its relationship with North Korea,” the official said, referring to the Korean Wave, or the global popularity of Korean pop culture. “This is the completion of our diplomacy vis-a-vis the socialist bloc that was friendly toward North Korea, including countries in Eastern Europe in the past,” the official said, claiming the establishment of South Korea-Cuba diplomatic relations clearly shows where the tide is heading in history and to whom it is turning. Asked whether there was any communication between the two countries’ leaders ahead of the announcement, the official said President Yoon Suk Yeol was briefed in detail on the latest developments as they happened but had no direct contact with his counterpart, Miguel Diaz-Canel, due to the absence of diplomatic relations. The final agreement was reached over the recent Lunar New Year holiday and reported to the president by phone, the official said. The United States was also informed of the decision before the announcement.” (Lee Haye-ah, “Establishment of S. Korea-Cuba Diplomatic Relations Likely to Deal ‘Blow’ to N. Korea: Official,” February 15, 2024)

2/17/24:
China’s foreign minister has called for a “political resolution” to the Korean Peninsula issue. Addressing inter-Korean tensions during his keynote address at the Munich Security Conference on Feb. 17, Wang Yi declared, “China has made tireless efforts for the political resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue.” “Now the most pressing task is to prevent a vicious cycle, address relevant parties’ reasonable security concerns, and deescalate and stabilize the situation,” he said. Wang did not specifically name the “relevant parties,” but the context of his speech indicated he was referring to North Korea. (Choi Hyun-june, “China’s Wag Yi Calls for ‘Political Resolution’ to Korean Peninsula Issue,” Hankyoreh, February 19, 2024)

2/21/24:
A North Korean missile fired into eastern Ukraine by Russia contained hundreds of electronic components that trace back to companies headquartered in Europe, the United States, Japan, China and elsewhere, according to a British research institute. The findings by Conflict Armament Research show that North Korea is able to acquire parts from overseas to manufacture weapons, circumventing U.N. sanctions imposed to curb its ballistic missile and nuclear development programs. The institute analyzed the debris from a North Korean-made missile recovered from the eastern Ukraine city of Kharkiv on January 2 and found that over 290 of its electronic components bear the brands of 26 companies headquartered in China, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan and the United States. Of the components, 75.5 percent were related to companies in the United States, 11.9 percent to companies in Germany and 3.1 percent to those in Japan, with most manufactured within the last three years, the institute said. Based on the findings, the institute concluded that the missile could not have been assembled before March last year. North Korea “has developed a robust acquisition network capable of circumventing, without detection, sanction regimes that have been in place for nearly two decades,” said the institute in the report. The entity did not disclose the names of the companies. (Kyodo, “North Korean Missile Found in Ukraine Used European, U.S.-Made Parts,” February 21, 2024)

2/26/24:
North Korea’s spy satellite appears not to be operational despite successfully entering orbit last November, South Korea’s defense minister said today. “(The satellite) is neither reconnoitering nor communicating with the ground, but just orbiting without activity,” Defense Minister Shin Won Sik told reporters. North Korea has claimed it officially put its Malligyong-1 reconnaissance satellite into service in December. The country said photos taken by the satellite include major South Korean and U.S. military sites, though they have yet to be released. (Kyodo, “North Korean Spy Satellite Apparently Not Working: South Korea,” February 27, 2024)

3/4/24:
The annual Freedom Shield exercise got under way today for an 11-day run amid heightened tensions over Pyongyang’s continued saber-rattling, including artillery firings near the western sea border and a series of missile launches. The springtime exercise marks the first one after Pyongyang in November scrapped a 2018 inter-Korean military accord designed to reduce tensions along the border, raising concerns of the North possibly staging provocative military demonstrations. The exercise will focus on multi-domain operations by utilizing land, sea, air, cyber and space assets, and countering the North’s nuclear operations. It will include training on detecting and intercepting the North’s cruise missiles. The two sides plan to stage a total of 48 on-field drills this month — more than double the number over a similar period last year — although none of them are scheduled near the inter-Korean border, according to the South’s military. Personnel from 12-member states of the United Nations Command, including Australia, Britain, the Philippines and Thailand, will join the exercise, with the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) observing them. The NNSC is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the armistice of the Korean War, which technically never ended as the warring sides did not sign a peace treaty. Amid concerns of provocative acts by North Korea, South Korean and U.S. reconnaissance aircraft were spotted flying over South Korea in apparent missions to monitor the North, according to flight trackers. A U.S. RC-135V plane, which took off from Okinawa, Japan, and a South Korean RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned aircraft were seen flying over waters off the western coast and Gyeonggi Province, which surrounds Seoul. (Chae Yun-hwan “S. Korea, U.S. Begin Key Annual Military Drills amid N.K. Threats,” Yonhap, March 4, 2024)

MOD spokesman’s press statement: “The U.S. and the ROK kicked off again the provocative large-scale joint military drills to boost the unpredictability in the situation in the area of the armistice state. The drills included a plan for outdoor mobile one which doubled the number of last year and even the armed forces of 11 satellite countries under the so-called “UN Command” without any justification for existence were mobilized. The frantic war drills by the ROK puppets and vassal forces led by the U.S. make a clear contrast with the reality of the DPRK mobilizing large-scale military forces into economic construction for the promotion of the people’s well-being, confirm again the source of regional instability and more clearly show who is the arch criminal threatening the mankind with nukes. The large-scale war drills staged by the world’s biggest nuclear weapons state and more than 10 satellite states against a state in the Korean peninsula where a nuclear war may be ignited even with a spark, can never be called “defensive.” The Ministry of National Defense of the DPRK strongly denounces the reckless military drills of the U.S. and the ROK for getting more undisguised in their military threat to a sovereign state and attempt for invading it and severely warns them to stop the moves further causing provocation and instability. The armed forces of the DPRK will continue to watch the adventurist acts of the enemies and conduct responsible military activities to strongly control the unstable security environment on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. and the ROK will be made to pay a dear price for their false choice while realizing that it causes their security uneasiness at a serious level every moment.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for Ministry of National Defense of DPRK Issues Press Statement,” March 5, 2024)

The United States is willing to take “interim steps” toward the eventual denuclearization of North Korea but plans to continue strengthening trilateral cooperation with South Korea and Japan as military ties deepen between the North and Russia, a White House official said at the JoongAng–CSIS Forum in Seoul today. The comments by Mira Rapp-Hooper, the senior director for East Asia and Oceania on the U.S. National Security Council (NSC), underscored the Biden administration’s continuing commitment to hold talks with Pyongyang “without preconditions” to achieve the “eventual” denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but also marked the first time a U.S. official spoke about measures targeting “threat reduction” with regards to the North. During the opening dialogue with Victor Cha, CSIS Senior Vice President for Asia and Korea, Rapp-Hooper acknowledged that “burgeoning” military ties between Pyongyang and Moscow are a source of concern for Washington. “We assess that Pyongyang is seeking direct military assistance, including fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, ballistic missile production equipment and materials and other advanced technology,” Rapp-Hooper said, adding that Russia’s use of North Korean missiles in Ukraine not only “provides valuable technical and military insights” to the North, but also “provides solvency to the regime,” while also making North Korea “an increasingly attractive source for munitions, arms and missiles to other military regimes around the world.” Cha, who also noted that China “jealously” guards its influence over North Korea, said the latter’s deepening military cooperation with Russia would likely lead Beijing to make renewed overtures to Pyongyang. Noting that Kim Jong Un “did not travel to Russia by train just for food and fuel,” Cha expressed concern that Moscow could provide Pyongyang with nuclear submarine technology, citing recent state media reports from Pyongyang that said Kim was “pleased” with plans for such submarines. Cha noted that a North Korea with a burgeoning relationship with Russia to meet its economic and security needs has “no interest in talking in the United States,” but that such cooperation will cause China to reach out once more to the North, as it did after Trump announced he would meet with Kim in 2018. (Michael Lee, “U.S. Willing to Take ‘Interim Steps’ toward North’s Denuclearization, Says White House Official,” Joong-Ang Ilbo, March 4, 2024)

3/5/24:
The top U.S. nuclear envoy pointed out the need today for “interim steps” to be taken on a path towards North Korea’s ultimate denuclearization, which she stressed would not happen “overnight.” U.S. Senior Official for North Korea Jung Pak made the remarks while reiterating Washington’s “clear” goal to pursue the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. “I don’t want to prejudge that as a final step,” she said at a forum hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “But I think it goes without saying that there would have to be interim steps toward ultimate denuclearization.” Pak was responding to a question of whether interim steps would involve the North’s nuclear weapons freeze in return for sanctions relief and how the United States would prevent interim measures from ending up being a final step. Pak called attention to the fact that there are “a lot of weapons to be dealt with” in an apparent indication that those weapons should also be addressed alongside or before potential future negotiations over the North’s nuclear programs. “I think it is really important to acknowledge that there is a lot of weapons to be dealt with,” she said, noting the North’s efforts to develop solid-fuel ballistic missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, hypersonic capabilities and unmanned underwater vehicles. “Given the scope of the DPRK weapons activities and its proliferation, there is a lot to work with there … It is not going to happen overnight. That’s the reality of it,” she added. Touching on Pyongyang’s foreign policy changes, including its growing alignment with Russia, Pak said that the U.S. assesses North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is taking a “long-term strategic shift” to achieve his “primary” goal: the preservation of the dynastic Kim regime. “One question many knowledgeable DPRK watchers have asked is whether Kim is truly undertaking a long-term strategic shift or whether these changes are a tactic intended to create or exploit divisions among the DPRK’s adversaries,” she said. “We believe it’s the former.” Pak said that Kim seems to have decided he cannot achieve his primary goal through negotiations with the U.S. and South Korea. “(Kim) is viewing the world through a new Cold War lens in which the DPRK can benefit from aligning more closely with Russia and the PRC,” she noted. (Song Sang-ho, “U.S. Nuclear Envoy Underlines Need for ‘Interim Steps’ toward Ultimate N. Korea Denuclearization,” Yonhap, March 6, 2024)

3/7/24:
South Korea’s Foreign Ministry today unveiled plans to restructure the office responsible for negotiations on North Korean nuclear issues and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, amid escalating North Korean nuclear threats and a prolonged absence of nuclear talks. The Foreign Ministry announced its decision to rebrand the Office of Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs, tentatively renaming it the Office of Diplomatic Strategy and Intelligence in Korean. The ministry will essentially and symbolically disband the existing bureau dedicated to building a peace regime on the peninsula, with its functions incorporated into a new bureau under the new office. The ministry will also integrate new functions for intelligence collection and strategic planning within the new office, aiming to address North Korean issues from a broader perspective. This announcement was a crucial component of Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul’s briefing on this year’s ministry plan to President Yoon Suk Yeol. The Office of Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs was initially established as an ad hoc organization in 2006 to facilitate six-party talks aimed at finding a peaceful resolution to North Korea’s nuclear program through multilateral diplomatic negotiations. However, in 2011, amidst North Korea’s continued development of its nuclear program, it transformed into a permanent organization. Currently, the office consists of two bureaus and four divisions: the North Korean Nuclear Affairs Bureau, which houses the North Korean Nuclear Affairs Negotiations Division and the North Korean Nuclear Affairs Policy Division as well as the Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Bureau, which encompasses the Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Division and the Inter-Korean Policy Division. The ministry will operate three divisions with potential changes to their current names and under one bureau, tentatively named the “Bureau for Korean Peninsula Diplomacy.” A senior Foreign Ministry official said the ministry plans to name three divisions, reflecting the “absence of negotiations for a peace regime” and the diverse roles it plays concerning North Korean defectors and human rights issues, during a closed-door briefing in February on condition of anonymity and under a publication embargo. However, the Office of Diplomatic Strategy and Intelligence will undertake expanded responsibilities across four key areas: formulating diplomatic strategy, gathering information and intelligence, managing Korean Peninsula affairs, and overseeing international security and cybersecurity. Essentially, within the upcoming office, there will be four bureaus dedicated to the areas. The Foreign Ministry has underscored the inevitability of restructuring the office, citing the evolving nature of North Korean nuclear and missile threats. This highlights the increasing need to address the issue from a broader perspective. “Over the past decade, the North Korean nuclear issue has diversified beyond just North Korea’s nuclear missile threats to encompass cybercrimes for fundraising, prompting the need for responses such as financial sanctions,” the unnamed official said. “Therefore, our objective is to approach Korean Peninsula issues within a broader framework by integrating the functions of strategic planning, intelligence gathering and global security into our management of Korean Peninsula affairs.” The role of a special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, acting as the chief nuclear envoy, will be transitioned to the head of the new Office of Diplomatic Strategy and Intelligence. The restructuring, furthermore, aligns with South Korea’s ambition to become a “global pivotal state.” “Moreover, the development of a strategic vision and precise positioning is becoming increasingly crucial in navigating through complex global crises,” the official added. The Foreign Ministry will also establish a new division dedicated to handling economic security diplomacy within the Bilateral Economic Affairs Bureau. The official said that the decision stems from the recognition that “economic security has been becoming as crucial as traditional security.” Additionally, the five Central Asian countries, which are currently overseen by the European Affairs Bureau, will fall under the jurisdiction of the Northeast Asian Affairs Bureau. The official explained that this reform aims to “enhance the regional linkage and operational efficiency” concerning Central Asian countries, which “possess abundant resources and are gaining significance as new emerging markets.” The Foreign Ministry aims to proceed with the reshuffle in the first half of this year. (Ji Da-gyum, “Foreign Ministry to Disband Peninsula Peace Bureau amid NK Threats,” Korea Herald, March 7, 2024)

3/8/24:
KCNA: “The large combined units of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) conducted an artillery firing drill at a time when the high fighting spirit of the entire army has been boosted day by day to dynamically usher in a new heyday of bolstering up the military capability for self-defense. Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), guided the artillery firing drill of the KPA large combined units on March 7. Accompanying him was Pak Jong Chon, secretary of the WPK Central Committee and vice-chairman of the WPK Central Military Commission. The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un was greeted at the training ground by Kang Sun Nam, minister of National Defense of the DPRK, Ri Yong Gil, chief of the KPA General Staff, and commanders of the KPA large combined units. The drill was aimed at increasing the combat readiness posture and actual war capability of artillerymen by inspecting and evaluating the firepower strike capability of the artillery units under the KPA large combined units in the way of power demonstration and competition. The drill started with the power demonstration firing of the long-range artillery sub-units near the border who have put the enemy’s capital in their striking range and are fulfilling important military missions for war deterrence. The artillery sub-units selected from the large combined units were to take the firing positions according to the order of firing set by lot and fire at the targets and then to be ranked by summing up the number of hits and the time taken for fulfilling their firepower missions. The artillerymen, who had the honor of conducting the drill under the guidance of Kim Jong Un, were filled with the ardent desire to fully display their fighting efficiency which they have developed as the world’s strongest branch of the army, of which everybody else is afraid, under the guidance of the great brilliant commander who clarified the unique outlook on attaching importance to the artillery and the philosophy of the artillery and continues devoting his great efforts to developing the Juche-based artillery force. Kim Jong Un mounted the observation post and was briefed on the plan for the drill and guided the drill. In the drill, the commanders of the KPA large combined units took charge of fire control over the artillery sub-units of their units and decided on the method of firing the artillery pieces according to their determination. The moment the commanders gave the order to fire, the artillerymen opened fire. The valiant artillerymen involved in the drill fully displayed their rapid and accurate marksmanship they have steadily refined in the days of actual war drills for the mobilization of artillerymen for war, always aware of their mission for defending the country, and thus strikingly demonstrated the high combat capability of the all-round artillerymen prepared as a-match-for-a-hundred fighters. Kim Jong Un expressed his great satisfaction over the fact that all the artillery sub-units involved in the drill are fully ready for constant mobilization for battle. He personally went to the firing position and warmly congratulated the brave artillery combatants who fully displayed the might of the KPA and the honor of a-match-for-a-hundred artillerymen. He stressed the need to train all the artillerymen of the whole army into experts in artillery engagement and a-match-for-a-hundred crack gunners by further boosting their enthusiasm for training and emulation and thus prepare them to rapidly and accurately fulfill any combat mission assigned to them in actual battle as in the present drill, and set forth important tasks for rounding off the artillery war preparations. He said that it is necessary to push forward more vigorously the work for making preparations for regular combat mobilization so that all the artillery sub-units can take the initiative with merciless and rapid strikes at the moment of their entry into an actual war and organize more effectively the actual drill for remarkably increasing the combat capability of the artillerymen with realistic and scientific training goals envisaging different situations and thus continue to increase the might of the artillery, the pride and core of the KPA, in every way. On receiving his great trust and important instructions, the commanding officers of the KPA and all the artillery combatants who took part in the drill were filled with the strong will and revolutionary enthusiasm to bring about a great innovation in this year’s struggle for increasing their combat efficiency without fail by making strenuous efforts for the new year’s training, renewing their faith in the Party’s policy on effecting a revolution in training and its idea of attaching importance to the artillery.” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Artillery Firing Drill of KPA Large Combined Units,” March 8, 2024)

3/11/24:
The US intelligence community currently assesses that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is unlikely to escalate tensions into a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula, even as concerns persist over the potential for his closer alignment with the Russian president to embolden his aggressive actions. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines provided the assessment during Tuesday’s House Intelligence Committee hearing while noting that Kim’s recent rhetoric and actions have been increasingly provoking, specifically directed at South Korea. “We believe that it is clear that he is increasingly provocative in the sense and there is more anxiety about the potential of him taking sort of military action, including on the Northern Line Limit,” Haines told the Congress. “Our analysis right now is effectively that he will engage in increasingly provocative behavior, but he is not interested in escalating this into a full-on war, and there is a kind of limit on this.” (Ji Da-gyum, “U.S. Intel Downplays NK Full-Scale War Risks, Noting Putin as Influencer,” Korea Herald, March 13, 2024) Kim Jong Un “almost certainly” has no intentions of negotiating away his nuclear program and aims to use his defense ties with Russia to achieve acceptance as a nuclear state, the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment noted today. “Kim almost certainly has no intentions of negotiating away his nuclear program, which he perceives to be a guarantor of regime security and national pride,” said the report, released by the office of the Director of National Intelligence. “Kim probably hopes that he can use his bourgeoning defense ties with Russia to pursue his goal of achieving international acceptance as a nuclear power,” it added. The report also pointed out that Pyongyang has “emerged from its deepest period of isolation,” and is now pursuing stronger ties with China and Russia with the goal of increasing financial gains, diplomatic support and defense cooperation. In response to the trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, the North has sought to “demonstrate the danger posed by its military through missile launches and rhetoric threatening nuclear retaliation,” according to the report. “North Korea routinely times its missile launches and military demonstrations to counter U.S.–South Korea exercises in part to attempt to coerce both countries to change their behavior and counteract South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s hardline policies toward the North,” it added. On weapons of mass destruction, the report said Kim remains strongly committed to expanding the country’s nuclear weapons arsenal, noting that Pyongyang has been prepared to resume nuclear tests at the Punggye-ri site since mid-2022. “Kim will continue to prioritize efforts to build a more capable missile force — from cruise missiles through intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and hypersonic glide vehicles — designed to evade U.S. and regional missile defenses and imports a variety of dual-use goods in violation of UN sanctions, primarily from China and Russia,” the report said. The annual intelligence report also warned that the North will continue to engage in illicit cyber activities to fund its illegal nuclear and missile development programs. “North Korea will continue its ongoing cyber campaign, particularly cryptocurrency heists; seek a broad variety of approaches to launder and cash out stolen cryptocurrency; and maintain a program of IT workers serving abroad to earn additional funds,” it said. (Yi Wonju, “U.S. Intel Believes Kim Has No Intentions of Negotiating away His Nuclear Program,” Yonhap, March 12, 2024)

North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong-ho has met with Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh for talks on advancing bilateral ties, state media reported today. Their meeting came as a North Korean diplomatic delegation led by Pak departed for the Asian country over the weekend in what marked the first such visit since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020. The North last sent a delegation to the country in 2019. During their meeting today, Pak and Khurelsukh shared views on advancing bilateral ties, and strengthening exchange and cooperation, KCNA said. Pak also met with foreign ministry officials, including Mongolian Foreign Minister Battsetseg Batmunkh, to discuss ways to boost mutual support and cooperation, it added. During talks between Pak and his Mongolian counterpart, Amartuvshin Gombosuren, both sides agreed on the need to further strengthen ties through constructive cooperation and step up collaboration in areas including education, culture and agriculture, Mongolia’s foreign ministry said on its web site. The latest trip is seen as part of the North’s diplomatic efforts to strengthen ties with its traditionally friendly countries. Mongolia is viewed as having close relations with the North, having maintained its diplomatic mission in Pyongyang even during the pandemic despite strict border restrictions. In January, Mongolia’s new top envoy to Pyongyang, Luvsantseren Erdeneddavaa, submitted his letter of credentials to the North. (Lee Minji, “N. Korea’s Vice FM, Mongolian President Discuss Strengthening Ties,” Yonhap, March 12, 2024)

3/11–14/24
South Korean and U.S. warplanes staged a combined live-fire exercise against North Korean cruise missile and long-range artillery threats in waters off the west coast this week, the South’s Air Force said March 15. The five-day drills began Monday, mobilizing some 40 aircraft, including South Korean F-35A, F-15K and F-4E jets, as well as A-10 and F-16 aircraft from the U.S. 7th Air Force stationed in the country. Pilots trained on staging precision strikes against simulated enemy cruise missiles flying at low altitudes with air-to-air missiles and against long-range artillery, using air-to-surface missiles and guided bombs, the Air Force said. North Korea also held live-fire artillery drills, involving units capable of striking Seoul, on March 7, its state media reported, in an apparent response to the annual South Korea-U.S. Freedom Shield exercise that ended March 14. (Chae Yun-hwan, “S. Korean, U.S. Warplanes Stage Live-Fire Drills against N.K. Threats,” Yonhap, March 15, 2024)

3/15/24:
South Korea has conducted large-scale military exercises around western border islands to practice deploying forces in the event of North Korean provocations, the military said March 17. The maneuvers took place March 15 around the islands of Baengnyeong and Yeonpyeong near the Yellow Sea border with the North, involving the Marines’ quick maneuver force, the Navy landing ship (LST-II), the MUH-1 Marineon helicopter, and the Korean Assault Amphibious Vehicle (KAAV), according to the North West Islands Defense Command. Also participating in the drills were Army helicopters, such as the AH-64E Apache. (Yonhap, “S. Korea Conducts Large-Scale Military Exercises near Border Islands,” March 17, 2024)

3/17/24:
John Delury: “How do you solve a problem like North Korea? Since the end of the Cold War, it seems that every formula, from threatening war to promising peace, has been tried. And yet, despite being under more sanctions than just about any other country, North Korea developed a nuclear arsenal estimated at 50 warheads and sophisticated missiles that can, in theory, deliver those weapons to targets in the continental United States. President Biden’s administration has taken a notably more ambivalent approach toward North Korea than his predecessor Donald Trump, who alternately railed at and courted its leader, Kim Jong Un. But we shouldn’t stop trying to come up with bold ways to denuclearize North Korea, improve the lives of its people or lessen the risks of conflict, even if that means making unpalatable choices. On the contrary, there is more urgency now than there has been for years. As the analyst Robert Carlin and the nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker, two experienced North Korea watchers, warned in January, Kim has shifted away from pursuing better relations with the United States and South Korea and closer to President Vladimir Putin of Russia and may be preparing for war. Just days after the two experts issued their warning, Kim disavowed the long-cherished goal of peaceful reconciliation between the two Koreas, and he called for “completely occupying, subjugating and reclaiming” the South if war breaks out. It might seem preposterous, even suicidal, for Kim to seek war. But many people in Ukraine doubted that Putin would launch a full invasion, right up until the rockets began landing in February 2022, and Hamas caught Israel completely by surprise in October. Both conflicts have had devastating human tolls and are severely taxing America’s ability to manage concurrent crises. The people of both Koreas certainly don’t need war, and neither does the United States. Kim’s grandfather started the Korean War, and his father was a master of brinkmanship. Kim is cut from the same cloth and could instigate a limited conflict by, for example, launching an amphibious assault on South Korean-controlled islands in disputed waters of the Yellow Sea, less than 15 miles off North Korea’s coast. North Korea shelled one of the islands in 2010, killing two South Korean military personnel and two civilians and triggering an exchange of artillery with the South. Just two months ago, Pyongyang fired more than 200 shells into waters near the islands. Kim may believe he can manage escalation of such a crisis — threatening missile or even nuclear attack to deter retaliation, perhaps taking the islands, then spinning it as a great propaganda victory and demanding a redrawing of maritime boundaries and other security concessions. If anything like that scenario came to pass, Biden would have to explain another outbreak of war on his watch to weary American voters. And it would provide Trump an opportunity to trumpet his willingness to engage with Kim. The mutual distrust between Washington and Pyongyang has only deepened under Biden, making a breakthrough seem unlikely. Yet there are two underappreciated dynamics at play in North Korea where the United States might find leverage. The first is China. Despite the veneer of Communist kinship, Kim and President Xi Jinping of China are nationalists at heart, and they watch each other warily. I have made numerous visits to both nations’ capitals and met with officials and policy shapers. The sense of deep mutual distrust is palpable. Many Chinese look down on neighboring North Korea as backward and are annoyed by its destabilizing behavior. Many North Koreans resent China’s success and resist its influence; Pyongyang could allow much more Chinese investment but doesn’t want to be indebted to Chinese capital. And Kim seems to delight in timing provocations for maximum embarrassment in Beijing, including testing weapons — prohibited by U.N. sanctions — in the lead-up to sensitive Chinese political events. Kim waited six years after becoming the paramount leader in 2011 before making a trip to Beijing to meet Xi. When Covid emerged, North Korea was among the first countries to shut its borders with China, and ties atrophied during those nearly three years of closure. Last year Kim chose Putin, not Xi, for his first post-pandemic summit, skipping China to travel to Russia’s far east. Kim’s distrust of China is an opening for the United States. The second point is Kim’s economic ambitions. For every speech mentioning nukes, he talks at much greater length about the poor state of his nation’s economy while promising to improve it. It was the prospect of American-led economic sanctions being lifted that persuaded him to make the 60-hour train ride from Pyongyang to Hanoi to meet then-President Trump for their second summit in 2019. Kim explicitly offered to dismantle his main nuclear weapons complex, but Trump demanded the North also turn over all of its nuclear weapons, material and facilities. The talks collapsed, and Trump seemed to lose interest in dealing with Kim. A rare opportunity was wasted, leaving Kim embittered. The key to any new overture to North Korea is how it is framed. The White House won’t like to hear this, but success will probably depend on Biden putting his fingerprints all over the effort, by, for example, nominating a new White House envoy with the stature of someone like John Kerry and announcing a sweeping policy on North Korea and an intelligence review. Only the president can get through to Kim, and only Kim can change North Korean policy. Biden also would need to use radically different language in framing a new overture as an effort to improve relations and aid North Korea’s economy — not to denuclearize a country that in 2022 passed a law declaring itself a nuclear weapons state. Yes, that would be a bitter pill for America to swallow: Denuclearization has been a guiding principle of U.S. policy toward North Korea for decades. But it is unrealistic to pretend that Pyongyang will surrender its nuclear weapons anytime soon. Disarmament can remain a long-term goal but is impossible if the two sides aren’t even talking. Biden’s Republican opponents might accuse him of appeasement by engaging with Kim, but that is precisely what Trump tried. Kim, likewise, might mistake boldness for weakness. But it would be easy enough for the United States to pull back from diplomacy if it goes nowhere. The United States must be realistic. The world is very different from when the United States, China, Russia, Japan and the two Koreas came together in the 2000s for negotiations to denuclearize North Korea. The country is now a formidable nuclear power, and its leader sounds increasingly belligerent. The president needs to get the wheels of diplomacy turning before it’s too late.” (John Delury, “Biden’s Next Crisis May Be in North Korea,” New York Times, March 17, 2024, p. B-10)

3/18/24:
North Korea fired multiple short-range ballistic missiles toward the East Sea today, the South Korean military said, just hours before talks between the top diplomats of South Korea and the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the missile launches in the area of Pyongyang between 7:44 a.m. and 8:22 a.m., which flew around 300 kilometers and landed in the East Sea. “North Korea fired at least three missiles, and their trajectories were similar to those of KN-24,” a senior military official said. The KN-24 is a solid-fuel ballistic missile with a range of up to 410 km and a payload of 400-500 kg. The South Korean military said it immediately detected and tracked the missiles, and shared the information with the U.S. and Japanese authorities, while a comprehensive analysis is under way. The launch comes days after Seoul and Washington wrapped up the annual Freedom Shield exercise, which focused on bolstering deterrence against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. Yesterday, Blinken arrived in Seoul to attend the Summit for Democracy, a ministerial conference that brings together top government officials from some 30 countries. (Kim Eun-jung, “N. Korea Fires Multiple Short-Range Missiles into East Sea: JCS,” Yonhap, March 18, 2024)

KCNA: “In the stirring period when combat training for bolstering up the national defense capability in every way is being staged across the entire army in the flames of effecting a revolution in training kindled by the Party Central Committee, there was a firing drill of the artillery units in the western area, which are in charge of an important firing assignment and equipped with super-large multiple rocket launchers, part of a new generation of core striking means of the Korean People’s Army (KPA). Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, guided the salvo drill of a firepower sub-unit under the relevant unit on March 18. Kim Jong Sik, vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and Jang Chang Ha, general director of the DPRK Missile Administration, reviewed the drill. The drill was aimed at proving the might and the real war capabilities of the weapon system through the sudden maneuvers and salvos of 600mm multiple rocket sub-units, raising the combat morale of rocket artillerymen and checking and enhancing their readiness posture. The artillerymen who came to demonstrate the battery salvo for the first time with the super-large multiple rocket launchers which appeared as a highly powerful weapon system without an parallel in the world on the initiative and under the guidance of the WPK were filled with the great enthusiasm and combat morale to present pleasure and satisfaction to the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un who has made a ceaseless frontline journey for strengthening the military muscles while bolstering up the strongest national defense capability. Going round the firing positions, Kim Jong Un acquainted himself with the automatic fire control system, the combat deployment time and tactical specifications of the transporter- erector-launchers, and watched the artillerymen’s handling of equipment. After being briefed on the firing drill plan of the super-large multiple rocket batteries at an observation post, he gave an instruction to conduct the drill. When the order to fire was issued from the central observation post, the combatants of the batteries simultaneously opened fire with the confidence of a-match-for-a-hundred artillerymen. Massive shells that spurted out of the gun barrels with a thundering explosion flew to the targets, vomiting the flames of annihilating the enemy. In the drill, the artillerymen fully demonstrated their excellent marksmanship and prompt and thoroughgoing combat readiness, consolidated in every way in the crucible of rounding off the artillery war preparations with the combat capability during the days of preparing themselves as master gunners possessed of extraordinary real war capabilities. Expressing great satisfaction over the fact that the artillerymen displayed high maneuverability and accurate and strong striking power in carrying out their sudden combat mission, Kim Jong Un highly appreciated that all the service personnel are fully versed in the Korean-style super-large multiple rocket launcher system, which is the strongest in the world, and are remarkably increasing the militant might with their full combat readiness. After the salvos of the batteries, a test was conducted to simulate an air explosion by a super-large multiple rocket at a preset altitude above the target. Expressing the strong will to completely remove the risks of armed conflict and war and firmly defend peace, stability and sovereignty of the country with the overwhelming military muscles as a deterrent, Kim Jong Un set forth important strategic tasks for bolstering up the artillery forces and rounding off the artillery war preparations. Stressing that the position and role of the newly-equipped super-large multiple rocket launchers in war preparations are very important, he said that as 600 mm super-large multiple rocket launchers would perform their strategic duties as part of the core central striking means of our armed forces, together with other effective and destructive offensive means, the modernization of the artillery forces should continue to be stepped up on the basis of them. He said it is necessary to further impress upon the enemies that if an armed conflict and a war break out, they can never avoid disastrous consequences, adding that in the future, the destructive offensive means possessed by our army should more thoroughly fulfill their missions to block and deter the risks of war with the constant perfect preparedness to destroy the capital of the enemy and the structure of its military forces. He stressed the need to continuously increase the number of batteries of super-large multiple rocket launchers and indicated the tasks and ways for it, referring to the principled issues that serve as guidelines in their operational deployment and application of operation. He called for fully preparing long-range artillerymen as the main combatants and the mainstay of war to annihilate the enemy without hesitation according to their assignments in contingency. He expressed expectation and belief that all the artillerymen of the entire army would always and strictly keep their perfect war posture and high alert, make a great innovation in rounding off war preparations and thus fully prepare themselves to be heroic artillerymen who would take the lead in making a breakthrough in victory of battle with the most powerful and merciless shellfire of justice in a grim moment. All the combatants who took part in the drill were filled with a firm determination to fulfill their sacred missions and duties to devotedly defend the Party, revolution, country and people at the risk of their lives by putting spurs to the completion of artillery war preparations, bearing in mind the deep trust of Kim Jong Un who personally guided their drill, gave them precious instructions for developing the artillery forces into the first branch of the People’s Army both in name and reality and inspired them with the invincible strategy and fighting spirit of annihilating the enemy.” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Firing Drill of Artillery Units in Western Area,” March 19, 2024)

3/20/24:
KCNA: “A ground jet test of a solid-fueled engine for a new-type intermediate-range hypersonic missile, which is of another strategic value, was successfully conducted in the era when eye-opening sci-tech achievements have been successively made in the course of the steady development of the national defense capability. The DPRK Missile Administration and its affiliated engine institute conducted the test of a multi-stage solid-fuel engine for intermediate-range hypersonic missiles at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground on [this] morning and afternoon according to the schedule of a new-type weapon system program. Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, guided the test on the spot together with leading officials of the missile development sector. A timetable for completing the development of the new-type intermediate-range hypersonic missile weapon system was set through the great success in the important test. The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un said that the military strategic value of this weapon system is appreciated as importantly as ICBM in view of the security environment of our state and the operational needs of the People’s Army and that enemies know better about it. Kim Jong Un expressed great satisfaction over the fact that the strategic weapons programs of the five-year plan set forth at the Eighth Congress of the WPK have been successfully completed. KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Test of Solid-fueled Engine for New-type Intermediate-range Hypersonic Missile,” March 20, 2024)

3/22/24:
KCNA: “Kim Song Nam, alternate member of the Political Bureau and director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) who is on a visit to China as head of a WPK delegation, met and had a friendly talk with Cai Qi, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, at the Great Hall of the People on March 22. The head of the WPK delegation courteously conveyed warm greetings from the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un to Cai Qi. Cai Qi expressed deep gratitude for this and asked Kim Song Nam to convey his respects to Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the WPK. Kim Song Nam stressed the need to exchange good experience in various fields, including party building and state management, and boost strategic and tactical cooperation as the DPRK-China relations and socialist construction in the two countries have entered a new stage of development under the direct leadership of the leaders of the two parties. Cai Qi warmly welcomed the delegation of the WPK on a visit to China in the year of China-DPRK friendship, and said that the delegation’s visit served as an important occasion in further strengthening the friendly relations between the two parties. He stated that the China-DPRK friendship formed in blood has greeted a brighter future under the strategic guidance of General Secretary Xi Jinping and General Secretary Kim Jong Un. The CPC will boost mutual communication and beef up practical cooperation together with the WPK, true to the noble will of the top leaders of the two parties, thus actively promoting the further development of the friendly relations between the two parties and two countries this year marking the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, he pointed out. Saying that he was pleased that the WPK has achieved great achievements in the party building, economic development and the improvement of the people’s living standards with the idea of believing in the people as in Heaven and the people-first principle, he wished the Korean people steady progress in accomplishing the cause of socialist construction under the leadership of General Secretary Kim Jong Un. Present at the talk were members of the WPK delegation, DPRK Ambassador to China Ri Ryong Nam, head Liu Jianchao and officials of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the CPC.” (KCNA, “Head of WPK Delegation Meets Member of Secretariat of C.C., CPC,” March 24, 2024)

3/25/24:
WPK Central Committee Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong’s press statement: “Last month, I gave my view on the fact that Japanese Prime Minister Kishida expressed his desire for DPRK-Japan summit talks at the Diet. Shortly ago, Kishida, through another channel, conveyed his intention to personally meet the President of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as soon as possible. As already mentioned, what is important in opening a way out for the improved DPRK-Japan relations is for Japan to make its political decision in actuality. The history of the DPRK-Japan relations gives a lesson that it is impossible to improve the bilateral relations full of distrust and misunderstanding, only with an idea to set out on a summit meeting. If Japan is mulling interfering in the exercise of our sovereign right as now, being engrossed in the abduction issue that has no further settlement and way to know, the prime minister cannot but meet a criticism that his design is little short of a bid for popularity. What is clear is that when Japan infringes upon the sovereignty of the DPRK, doggedly standing hostile to it, the former will become a target of the latter, being regarded as its enemy, never a friend. If Japan truly wants to improve the bilateral relations and contribute to ensuring regional peace and stability as a close neighbor of the DPRK, it is necessary for it to make a political decision for strategic option conformed to its overall interests. The DPRK’s strengthened self-defense capability will never be a threat to the security of Japan, if the latter respects the former’s sovereignty and security interests in a fair and equal stand. The prime minister should be aware of our government’s clear stand. He should not think that it is possible for him to meet our state leadership when he has wanted and decided or such request for summit can be accepted.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Kim Yo Jong,” March 25, 2024)

Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has conveyed his intention to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Pyongyang’s state-run media reported today, quoting a statement by the leader’s sister who called on Tokyo to make a “decision” on improving bilateral ties. Kim Yo Jong said in a statement carried by KCNA that Kishida recently proposed an in-person summit to meet with her brother “as soon as possible” through “another channel,” referring to one other than those that have been used for bilateral communication. Kishida said in parliament today that his government has lobbied for a possible summit meeting with the North Korean leader. He stressed the importance of summit talks to secure the return of Japanese nationals abducted by Pyongyang in the 1970s and 1980s. Later in the day, Kishida told reporters at his office that he is aware of the report but that “nothing has been decided so far on whether a (Japan-North Korea) summit will be realized.” Kim Yo Jong, a senior official in North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party of Korea, said in February a visit by Kishida to Pyongyang is possible if Tokyo does not make the issue of past abductions of Japanese nationals an obstacle between the two countries, according to KCNA. In Monday’s statement, she said the important thing in creating an opening for improved bilateral relations is “for Japan to make its political decision in actuality,” KCNA said, urging Tokyo to change its stance on the abduction issue. Pyongyang claims the issue has already been settled, but Tokyo, which officially lists a total of 17 Japanese nationals as abductees, rejects the assertion. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa Hayashi, Japan’s top government spokesman, reiterated Monday that the claim was “totally unacceptable.” Hayashi told a press conference in Tokyo that Kishida has been calling for a dialogue with Kim Jong Un “through various routes.” But the spokesman declined to provide details, citing the possible negative impact on negotiations with North Korea going forward. Kim Yo Jong said as long as Japan remains “engrossed in the abduction issue that has no further settlement,” Kishida will face criticism that his proposal for summit talks with Kim Jong Un is just “a bid for popularity,” according to KCNA. Furthermore, Pyongyang will regard Tokyo as its “enemy, never a friend” if Japan “infringes upon the sovereignty” of North Korea and stands “hostile” to the neighboring country, she added, calling for “a political decision for strategic option conformed to its overall interests,” the report said. Some observers have interpreted North Korea’s recent offering of an olive branch to Japan as a bid to obstruct trilateral security cooperation between Tokyo, Seoul and Washington. Pyongyang has conducted a series of missile launches in response to U.S.-South Korea joint military drills. Kim’s sister said that North Korea’s strengthened self-defense capabilities will “never be a threat to the security of Japan,” as long as Tokyo respects Pyongyang’s sovereignty and security interests in a “fair and equal” way. Tokyo suspects Pyongyang’s involvement in many more disappearances than the official figure of 17, and that abductees were kidnapped by the country to teach Japanese language and culture to its spies or to steal their identities so they could be used by agents for espionage. In May last year, Kishida made a sudden commitment to establishing high-level bilateral negotiations to pave the way for an early summit, although he has not provided details on what kind of official talks he envisions. Some critics have speculated that the move was aimed at bolstering his Cabinet’s support rate, which has fallen to a record-low level. (Kyodo, “Japan’s PM Kishida Conveys Intent to Meet North Korea’s Kim: KCNA,” March 25, 2024)

3/26/24:
WPK Central Committee Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong’s press statement: “Through a press conference of the chief Cabinet secretary on Monday [yesterday] afternoon, the Japanese side clarified the stand that it can never accept the fact that the abduction issue was settled. Letting out the expression of pending nuclear and missile issue which has nothing to do with it, it tried to interfere in and take issue with the exercise of sovereignty belonging to the DPRK’s legitimate self-defense. Japan has no courage to change history, promote regional peace and stability and take the first step for the fresh DPRK-Japan relations. This is proved by the attitude of Japan clinging to the unattainable issues which can never be settled and have nothing to be settled. The remarks made by Prime Minister Kishida about the DPRK-Japan summit, which have recently attracted the public attention several times, can be regarded as the politically-motivated one. The DPRK-Japan relations should not be used for the political calculation of the Japanese prime minister who is aware of his lowest approval rate. It was the Japanese side that knocked at the door first requesting “the Japan-DPRK summit without preconditions”, and the DPRK only clarified its stand that it would welcome Japan if it is ready to make a new start, not being obsessed by the past. The DPRK government has clearly understood once again the attitude of Japan and, accordingly, the DPRK side will pay no attention to and reject any contact and negotiations with the Japanese side. The DPRK-Japan summit is not a matter of concern to the DPRK.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Kim Yo Jong,” March 26, 2024)

DPRK Foreign Ministry Website: “Russia has started supplying oil directly to North Korea in defiance of UN sanctions, further cementing ties between the two authoritarian regimes and dealing a new blow to international efforts to contain Pyongyang. At least five North Korean tankers travelled this month to collect oil products from Vostochny Port in Russia’s Far East, according to satellite images shared with the Financial Times by the Royal United Services Institute, a UK think-tank. The shipments, which began on March 7, are the first documented direct seaborne deliveries from Russia since the UN Security Council — with Moscow’s approval — imposed a strict cap on oil transfers in 2017 in response to Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons tests. “These oil deliveries constitute a full-frontal assault against the sanctions regime, which is now on the brink of collapse,” said Hugh Griffiths, a former coordinator of the UN panel that monitors sanctions on North Korea. The vessels, which are North Korean-flagged and classified as oil products tankers, all visited the same berth operated by a Ru The moves of the U.S. and the West to isolate and stifle Russia politically and militarily are getting more vicious day by day. Against this background, President Putin clarified his hardline will to firmly defend national sovereignty and security. At a recent interview with the General Director of the Segodnya International News Agency of Russia, President Putin responded to a question concerning whether Russia is actually prepared for a nuclear war as follows: Firstly, in terms of military and technical capabilities, we are, of course, ready. Our nuclear weapons are always on combat readiness. Secondly, it is already a well-known fact that Russia’s triad of nuclear forces is more modern than that of other countries and we have far outpaced the U.S. in this field. On the whole, there is a good balance between the carrier vehicle and the warhead and this is something any expert is aware of. Saying that weapons exist for use, President Putin asserted that Russia is ready to use any kind of weapons including the one(a nuclear weapon) mentioned by the General Director in case the state existence itself is threatened and in case Russia’s national sovereignty and independence are violated. In particular, President Putin warned that the U.S. is weighing the possibility of using nuclear weapons and stressed that if the U.S. conducts a nuclear test, Russia will not exclude taking similar measures.” (DPRK Foreign Ministry, “President Putin Expresses Firm Stand to Defend National Sovereignty and Security,” March 26, 2024)

Russia has started supplying oil directly to North Korea in defiance of UN sanctions, further cementing ties between the two authoritarian regimes and dealing a new blow to international efforts to contain Pyongyang. At least five North Korean tankers travelled this month to collect oil products from Vostochny Port in Russia’s Far East, according to satellite images shared with the Financial Times by the Royal United Services Institute, a UK think-tank. The shipments, which began on March 7, are the first documented direct seaborne deliveries from Russia since the UN Security Council — with Moscow’s approval — imposed a strict cap on oil transfers in 2017 in response to Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons tests. “These oil deliveries constitute a full-frontal assault against the sanctions regime, which is now on the brink of collapse,” said Hugh Griffiths, a former coordinator of the UN panel that monitors sanctions on North Korea. The vessels, which are North Korean-flagged and classified as oil products tankers, all visited the same berth operated by a Russian oil company at Vostochny Port, where they appeared to load. Satellite imagery confirmed that two of the ships then travelled from Vostochny Port to the North Korean port of Chongjin, where they appeared to unload. “The vessels we’ve seen at Russian terminals are some of the largest-capacity vessels in North Korea’s fleet, and the vessels are continually sailing in and out of the port,” said Joseph Byrne, a research fellow at Rusi. “Several of these vessels are also UN-designated, meaning they shouldn’t even be allowed entry into foreign ports, let alone involved in oil deliveries.” The deliveries come after North Korea last August began supplying thousands of containers of munitions to Russia, which military experts argue have made a significant contribution to Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine. According to Rusi, Vostochny Port has also been used as a hub for Russian ships allegedly involved in arms trade between the countries. “What we can see now is a clear arms-for-oil bartering arrangement in open contravention of sanctions that [Russian President] Vladimir Putin signed off on personally, illustrating Russia’s trajectory in recent years from international spoiler to outlaw state,” said Griffiths. A map showing Russia and North Korea. Satellite imagery indicates that the vessel Paek Yang San 1 sailed to the North Korean port of Chongjin after loading oil in Vostochny All five of the North Korean ships made the journeys to Vostochny Port with their transponders switched off. One of those vessels, the Paek Yang San 1, was identified by the UN as having been involved in illicit ship-to-ship oil transfers designed to circumvent the import cap, which restricts North Korea to just 500,000 barrels a year each for oil and petroleum products. Deliveries can also only be deemed compliant if they are reported to a UN sanctions committee. Rusi researchers calculated that the oil deliveries documented from Vostochny Port could amount to 125,000 barrels of oil products — a quarter of the permitted annual quota — in a matter of weeks. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov declined to comment. The operators of the North Korean ships could not be reached for comment. The revelation of the apparent oil-for-arms trade comes as western diplomats are rushing to preserve the UN panel that monitors compliance with sanctions on North Korea, amid fears that Russia could veto a renewal of the body’s mandate, according to three people familiar with discussions at the UN in New York. Western officials postponed a vote on renewing the expert panel last week after Russia and China made proposals to water down its mandate, the people said. The deliberations over the UN sanctions panel, which were first reported by Seoul-based news service NK News, have raised questions about how long the UN body — and the sanctions regime itself — can survive. “While there is a debate about the effectiveness of sanctions, what we are now seeing is what would start to happen if the sanctions were removed,” said Byrne. “This is giving North Korea a very significant lift.” Recommended The Big Read Kim Jong Un’s comeback Montage image of Kim Jong Un, Vladimir Putin and a missile Go Myong-hyun, a senior research fellow at South Korea’s state-affiliated Institute for National Security Strategy think-tank, said direct supplies of oil and petroleum products from Russia to North Korea would “go a long way towards stabilizing the North Korean economy”. “For the past seven years, Pyongyang has had to pay a high premium for the oil products it needs, as it relied on a complex and expensive network of criminal brokers and mid-sea ship-to-ship transfers,” said Go. “But now, it appears it has secured a steady supply of oil either at a heavy discount or as direct payment for the munitions it is supplying to Moscow,” he added. “That is going to free up resources for North Korea’s armed forces and its nuclear weapons program.” (Christian Davies, “Russia Defies Oil Sanctions to Aid North Korea,” Financial Times, March 27, 2024, p 4)

3/28/24:
A veto by Russia today ended the United Nations’ monitoring of sanctions against North Korea over its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, dissolving a U.N. body that for 14 years was responsible for keeping a close eye on Pyongyang’s illicit activities. This was Russia’s first time vetoing what has previously been a routine annual vote to extend the panel’s mandate, which had signified a unified global opposition to North Korea’s expansion of its nuclear weapons program and violations of international sanctions. “With this veto, Russia has transitioned from an international spoiler to an outlaw state, when it comes to nuclear nonproliferation and ballistic missile enforcement norms,” Hugh Griffiths, former coordinator of the panel, told the Washington Post. “It’s told the world that U.N.-prohibited North Korean nuclear weapons programs are now, somehow, okay.” Although the panel does not have enforcement authority, it served as an important investigatory body and a clearinghouse for information on activities by North Korea that run afoul of international prohibitions. The vote does not affect the existing U.N. sanctions on North Korea, which remain in effect. Griffiths noted that one of the important functions of the panel was providing an independent assessment of the companies and individuals that were violating financial sanctions on North Korea or supporting its proliferation networks. That information was used by banks and insurance companies to freeze and close assets of those people and companies verified to be helping North Korea violate international sanctions, he said. “The impact is devastating,” Griffiths said. “Without the panel’s biannual reporting, dozens of global banks and insurance companies now lack the gold standard reports they once used to deny proliferation networks access to the global financial system.” (Michelle Ye Hee Lee and Min Joo Kim, “Russian Veto Ends UN Panel Monitoring North Korea Sanctions,” Washington Post, March 29, 2024)

A Missile Defense Agency release on March 29 stated that on March 28, the agency, in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, had successfully conducted an intercept of an advanced medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) test target using the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) Dual II with Software Upgrade (SWUP). Known as Flight Test Aegis Weapon System (FTM) 32, or Stellar Laelaps, the test demonstrated the capability to detect, track, engage and intercept an MRBM target in the terminal phase of flight culminating in a live intercept by an Aegis Baseline 9–equipped ship, according to the release, with Australian forces participating. The test target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Kauai, Hawaii. Destroyer USS Preble (DDG-88) launched the SM-6 Dual II missiles and successfully intercepted the MRBM test target, stated the release, which added that in addition, destroyer USS Jack H. Lucas (DDG-125), the first Flight III Aegis Destroyer equipped with SPY-6 radar, successfully participated in the event in support of its initial operational test and evaluation campaign. Australia’s support included a demonstration of the radar capabilities of frigate HMAS Stuart (FFH153), together with a Royal Australian Air Force E-7 Wedgetail airborne early-warning and control (AEWC) aircraft assisting in data collection and communications. Australian sensors also provided target-track data in support of a cued-organic simulated engagement, demonstrating allied interoperability, according to the release. The test target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Kauai, Hawaii. Destroyer USS Preble (DDG-88) launched the SM-6 Dual II missiles and successfully intercepted the MRBM test target, stated the release, which added that in addition, destroyer USS Jack H. Lucas (DDG-125), the first Flight III Aegis Destroyer equipped with SPY-6 radar, successfully participated in the event in support of its initial operational test and evaluation campaign. Australia’s support included a demonstration of the radar capabilities of frigate HMAS Stuart (FFH153), together with a Royal Australian Air Force E-7 Wedgetail airborne early-warning and control (AEWC) aircraft assisting in data collection and communications. Australian sensors also provided target-track data in support of a cued-organic simulated engagement, demonstrating allied interoperability, according to the release. On April 2 the Missile Defense Agency issued a release stating that it had successfully demonstrated the first tracking of a live space object by the AN/SPY-7(V)1 solid-state radar integrated with the Aegis weapon system (AWS). The radar is to be installed on Japan’s Aegis system–equipped vessel (ASEV). The trial was also observed by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and a U.S. Navy Aegis technical representative. During the tracking event, which was performed at Lockheed Martin’s Production Test Center in Moorestown, New Jersey, the SPY-7 radar tactical hardware and software detected and tracked objects in space, and then passed data to the AWS for further processing, according to the release. The ASEVs are replacing the two canceled Aegis ashore sites and Japan expects to take delivery of the two destroyers in its FY2027 and FY2028 timeframe. Japan’s MOD issued a short statement on the success of the trial. (Dzirhan Mahadzir, “North Korea Tests Hypersonic Weapon Following US Navy Ballistic Missile Intercept Test,” USNI News, April 3, 2024)

3/29/24:
DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui’s press statement: “Referring to the “abduction issue” again, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida clarified the stand that he would make sustained efforts under the established policy for the settlement of various pending issues between the DPRK and Japan. I cannot understand why he persistently adheres to the issue that cannot be settled and has nothing to be solved while trying hard to deny and shun the reality. The DPRK has nothing to solve as regards the “abduction issue” insisted by Japan and, moreover, it has neither the responsibility nor the will to make any effort for it. I make it clear once again. The DPRK-Japan dialogue is not a matter of concern to the DPRK. And the DPRK will not allow any attempt of Japan to contact the former. And the DPRK will always respond sharply to Japan’s behavior of interfering with its exercise of sovereignty. This is the stand of the DPRK government.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Minister Issues Press Statement,” March 29, 2024)

3/31/24:
National Aerospace Technology Administration (NATPA) Vice General Director Kyong Su’s answer to a question raised by KCNA “as regards the DPRK’s implementation of the goal for space development on the occasion of the founding anniversary of the NATA which supervises and controls the space development of the country in a unified way. The NATA, founded on April 1, Juche 102 (2013) in accordance with the space development policy of the Workers’ Party of Korea and the DPRK government, has steadily guided the country’s space conquer activities for over ten years, he said, and went on: In the period, the work for introducing the application technology into the building-up of national defense and economy and the improvement of the people’s living standards was actively pushed forward, after making a multi-functional and high-performance satellite and solving many technological problems related to satellite control and operation in our own way. Last year, the reconnaissance satellite Malligyong-1 was successfully launched as a part of the efforts for attaining the immediate and long-term goals of the Party’s policy of conquering space. As a result, a big stride was made in bolstering up the national defense capability and this year, too, the launching of several reconnaissance satellites is expected. Scientists and technologists have made a series of successes in the research into core space science and technology with their extraordinary creative spirit and practical ability. The development of space industry is of great significance in building a powerful socialist country where the rapid development is firmly guaranteed by up-to-date science and technology and, accordingly, the need for space development and use is increasing as days go by. For the accelerated development of space, the DPRK government is aimed at carrying out advanced and valuable space development projects ahead of others in the light of the strategic interests of the state at the present stage and building a space power by steadily expanding the successes. In keeping with setting it as a priority task for the state space development to possess weather observation satellite, earth observation satellite and communications satellite, the NATA is pushing ahead with the work to apply space sci-tech achievements in various sectors including agriculture, fishery, meteorological observation, communication, resource exploration, land management and disaster prevention. The work for dynamically pushing ahead with the growth of space industry is brisk in all fields under the nationwide, all-society and all-people concern and support. Seminars on space science and technology, which are serving as important occasions in developing space science and technology, have been regularly held to consolidate the successes made in the field of space science and technology and to open up a new scientific field of key importance in space development and use. Faculties and departments related to space including aerospace, space observation and satellite communication have been established at higher education units and reserve creative talents are trained to make a positive contribution to the development of the country’s space industry. Institutes and laboratories specializing in developing various kinds of working satellites were established at Kim Il Sung University and Kim Chaek University of Technology and research units related to space were formed at the State Academy of Sciences and universities to make thorough preparations for disastrous weather, effectively protect and use the resources of the country and accelerate the scientific development of the national economy. We will surely build a space power by putting sustained spurs to the independent development of space, bearing in mind that the growth of the space industry is a key element and a demonstration of the comprehensive national power in exploring a shortcut to securing the position of a world-class economic and sci-tech power.” (KCNA, “Space Development Will Be Accelerated in DPRK: Vice General Director of NATA,” April 1, 2024)

4/1/24:
North Korea launched an intermediate-range ballistic missile off its east coast today, an indication that the country was continuing to develop missiles capable of targeting American military bases in the Western Pacific. The missile, launched from near Pyongyang, did not fly over Japan, as have some of the IRBMs that North Korea has launched in the past. Instead, it fell in waters between the two countries after flying for 372 miles, the South Korean military said. While inspecting the missile engine test last month, Kim Jong Un said the new intermediate-range missile was as important in strategic value as intercontinental ballistic missiles that it has been testing to target the mainland United States. This year, North Korea has also conducted a series of tests involving an underwater drone and cruise missiles, which it said were being developed to carry nuclear warheads. The North’s last missile test took place on March 18, when it fired several short-range ballistic missiles off its east coast. In a 2022 report, the Pentagon said that “most of North Korea’s ballistic missiles have an assessed capability to carry nuclear payloads,” though using them against the United States or its allies would be suicidal for the regime. “There is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive,” the Pentagon said in its Nuclear Posture Review. Yesterday, it said that it planned to launch several reconnaissance satellites this year to help its military better monitor its enemies and target them with greater precision. In November, North Korea successfully launched its first military reconnaissance satellite in orbit. It claimed that the satellite started its spying mission in December. But South Korea’s defense minister, Shin Won-sik, told reporters in February that the North Korean satellite was so rudimentary in technology that it appeared to be “circling the earth idly” without transmitting any valuable data. (Choe Sang-Hun, “Missile Tested by N.K. Is in Range of U.S. Bases,” New York Times, April 3, 2024, p. A-10)

KCNA: “A test-fire of new-type intermediate-range hypersonic missile of another military strategic value was successfully conducted in the great heyday of development of the Juche-oriented defense industry that witnesses powerful absolute weaponry of Korean style being developed in succession thanks to the devoted efforts of defense scientists upholding with their steadfast faith and correct practice the plan and decision of the Workers’ Party of Korea to bolster up the national defense capability in every way at the highest level. Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), guided the first test-fire of Hwasongpho-16-Na, a new-type intermediate-range solid-fueled ballistic missile loaded with newly-developed hypersonic glide vehicle, on the spot on April 2. Accompanying him was Kim Jong Sik, vice department director of the WPK Central Committee. The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un was greeted on the spot by General Jang Chang Ha, general director of the Missile Administration, and leading officials in the field of defense science. The test-fire was aimed at confirming the designed technical specifications of the new-type intermediate-range hypersonic missile as a whole and verifying the reliability of this weapon system. It was conducted in the way of verifying the characteristics of pull-up flight orbit and cross-range maneuvering capability of the hypersonic glide vehicle while confining its range to 1,000 kilometers, in consideration of safety, and forcibly controlling the speed and altitude by means of delaying the start-up of the second-stage engine and rapidly changing the flight orbit in the active region.The defense scientists were filled with the boundless pride of being scientists of the great military power, great confidence and militant enthusiasm as they were to conduct the test-fire of another powerful ultra-modern weapon capable of defending our state’s right to self-defense in the presence of Kim Jong Un again, who has personally blazed the ceaseless untrodden path to developing and perfecting ultra-modern weapons with his unshakable will and inexhaustible energy, out of the noble sense of responsibility for the destiny of the country and people, and devoted himself to their steady and rapid development. Kim Jong Un went to the launching position and looked round the new-type intermediate-range solid-fueled ballistic missile Hwasongpho-16-Na loaded with a hypersonic glide vehicle to learn in detail about the weapon system. Then he mounted the command observation post and received a report on the plan for test-fire of the missile and issued an order to launch it. General Jang Chang Ha guided the test-fire. When a command was given, the high-tech missile was launched, fully demonstrating the military muscle of the Republic. The hypersonic glide vehicle, separated from the missile after its launch northeastward at an army unit’s training field in a suburb of Pyongyang, reached its first peak at the height of 101.1 kilometers and the second peak at the height of 72.3 kilometers while making 1,000-km-long flight as scheduled and accurately landed on the waters of the East Sea of Korea. The test-fire had no negative effect on the security of the neighboring countries. The characteristics of the prompt and excellent maneuverability of the newly-developed hypersonic glide vehicle was clearly proved through the test-fire and the important military strategic value of the new-type intermediate-range hypersonic missile received a significant appreciation through verification under the extremely worst test conditions. Expressing great satisfaction over the result of the test-fire, Kim Jong Un highly appreciated the feats of the officials, scientists and technicians in the field of defense science who carried out the order given by the Party most excellently, truthfully and perfectly by turning out with their do-or-die determination in the drive for developing the Juche-based weaponry to implement the strategic plan of the Party Central Committee and fully displaying their intense loyalty and patriotism. He said with pride that another powerful strategic offensive weapon was developed to demonstrate the absolute advantage of our defense science and technology and thus we came to successfully implement the Party Central Committee’s three principles of building missile armed force for rapidly, accurately and powerfully striking any enemy target on the globe by perfecting the project for putting all the tactical, operational and strategic missiles with various ranges on a solid-fueled, warhead-controlled and nuclear warhead-carrying basis. Noting that the current epoch-making success serves as a special event in which a great change will be brought about in enhancing the nuclear war deterrent of the armed forces of our Republic, he stressed that it is a precious fruition born of our arduous defense science research spanning nearly ten years, a demonstration of the validity of the WPK’s line of building the military capability for self-defense and a worthwhile victory won by our strength, wisdom and efforts. Gravely referring to the military confrontational acts against the DPRK by the enemies who have recently run higher fever in boosting their military alliance and staging all sorts of war drills, thus threatening the security of our state day after day, he said that it is the most urgent task at present for our state to develop an overwhelming power capable of containing and controlling the enemies and that our defense science sector should continuously bring bigger successes, remaining more faithful to its historic duty to steadily improve the strongest national defense capacity. He affirmed that the WPK will reliably defend the peace, prosperity and future of the country by steadily, rapidly and more thoroughly bolstering up the military capability for self-defense. He set forth the strategic tasks for making a continued leap forward and innovations in the development of ultra-modern weapons by more signally strengthening the self-supporting and modern character of the Juche-oriented military industry. Inspired by his deep trust and militant encouragement, all the defense scientists hardened the firm determination to devote themselves with redoubled courage to the sacred struggle for further boosting the arsenal of the Juche revolution, true to the leadership of the Party Central Committee, and thus bolster up the matchless national defense capability with serial successes in developing ultra-modern strategic and tactical weapon systems.” (KCNA, “DPRK Missile Administration Succeeds in Test-fire of New-type Intermediate-range Hypersonic Missile,” April 2, 2024)

Van Diepen: “On April 2, North Korea conducted the second flight test of a solid-propellant intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), which it designated the Hwasong-16B (HS-16B). The missile carried a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) payload akin to one first flown in September 2021 on a liquid-propellant booster. The booster portion of the April test appears to have succeeded, but the success of the HGV payload is unclear. The North probably considers the booster portion of the solid IRBM system ready for operational deployment, or will after one more flight test. In the near term, however, a deployed system would almost certainly carry the maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) payload demonstrated in the IRBM’s first flight this January, rather than the HGV. (The MaRV version presumably is designated HS-16A.) Compared to a MaRV, an HGV has the potential to conduct much wider maneuvers over a much greater portion of its flight, thus better penetrating missile defenses. But the North’s HGV payload is probably at least several successful flight tests away from deployment, given the materials and guidance challenges of its demanding flight regime and the time it has taken China and Russia to develop their own HGVs. According to the North, this test represented “perfecting the project for putting all the tactical, operational and strategic missiles with various ranges on a solid-fueled, warhead-controlled and nuclear warhead-carrying basis.” This probably is meant to note that North Korea has successfully developed solid-propellant ballistic missiles across the entire spectrum of ranges, not that solids will be replacing liquids entirely. IRBMs — both solid and liquid — have a compelling military mission against US bases in Guam, the Philippines, and farther-flung reaches of Japan, as well as US missile defense radars in the western Aleutians. On March 19, North Korean media reported the ground (static) testing of “a solid-fueled engine for a new-type intermediate-range hypersonic missile, which is of another strategic value.” Because of the successful test, “a timetable for completing the development of the new-type intermediate-range hypersonic missile weapon system was set.” The report quoted Kim Jong Un as saying that “the military strategic value of this weapon system is appreciated as importantly as ICBM.” On April 2, North Korea launched an apparent IRBM to a range of about 600 kilometers (km), according to South Korean military assessments. Japan’s military reported that a ballistic missile flew to the northeast to a range of over 650 km at a maximum altitude of about 100 km, taking about 10 minutes. The next day, North Korean media reported “the first test-fire of Hwasongpho-16-Na, a new-type intermediate-range solid-fueled ballistic missile loaded with newly-developed hypersonic glide vehicle.” (The missile name would be rendered in English as “Hwasong-16B,” or HS-16B.) The missile reportedly made a successful 1,000 km flight with a maximum altitude of 101.1 km, and subsequently engaged in a pull-up maneuver reaching an altitude of 72.3 km, as well as lateral (cross-range) maneuvering. The 1,000 km range reportedly resulted from “forcibly controlling the speed and altitude by means of delaying the start-up of the second-stage engine and rapidly changing the flight orbit in the active region.” The media report also claimed that the flight test of the missile, which it termed as having “another military strategic value,” represented “perfecting the project for putting all the tactical, operational and strategic missiles with various ranges on a solid-fueled, warhead-controlled and nuclear warhead-carrying basis.” The North released photos and video showing what appeared to be the same type of solid-propellant IRBM first launched earlier this year on January 14, but this time carrying a wedge-shaped HGV akin to one first flight-tested in September 2021 on a Hwasong-8 (HS-8) liquid-propellant medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)-class booster. The solid IRBM was launched from a seven-axle, wheeled, transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) featuring an open-front canister or launch tube in which the booster portion of the missile was housed. When stored horizontally on the TEL, the HGV payload attached to the top of the booster was protected by a two-part, hinged clamshell cover that opened to each side prior to the missile being erected for launch. The missile was “cold launched” by a gas generator located at the aft end of the canister/launch tube, which popped the missile up from the canister/tube prior to ignition of its first stage. Despite the North Korean claim of a 1,000 km flight, the South Korean military reported on April 3 that the ROK, Japan, and the US had agreed on a final estimated flight distance of “about 600 km” and claimed the flight data North Korea published was “exaggerated and different from what our military analyzed.” South Korea also claimed that the North had exaggerated the delayed ignition of the second-stage and the rapid change in the missile’s “flight orbit,” further calling the North’s range claim into question. The missile part of the system is about ready. This is the second apparently successful flight of the solid IRBM, which North Korea likely designates as the HS-16. Given past practice, it probably considers the booster ready for operational deployment, or will after one more flight test — especially since the two stages of the HS-16 are probably based on the first two stages of the previously-tested three-stage HS-18 solid-propellant ICBM. If the HS-16 is deployed in the near-term, however, it would almost certainly carry the MaRV payload used this January, rather than the HGV. (The MaRV version presumably is designated HS-16A.) The MaRV was tested twice in January 2022 on the HS-8, apparently successfully, and North Korea suggested at that time the payload’s development had been completed. But the HGV payload has a long way to go. Compared to a MaRV, an HGV has the potential to conduct much wider maneuvers over a much greater portion of its flight, thus better penetrating missile defenses. This is probably behind the North’s references in March and April to the HS-16B providing “another strategic value,” that is, presumably beyond the MaRV. But it is unclear whether either the first flight-test of North Korea’s HGV in 2021 or the latest flight of the payload was successful. If South Korea’s claim is true that the US — whose infrared satellites and other intelligence means should be able determine the ground truth — agreed that the latest test flew to only about 600 km, rather than the 1,000 km claimed by North Korea, that would be a pretty clear indication of an HGV test failure. In any case, the North’s HGV payload is probably at least several successful flight-tests away from deployment, given the materials and guidance challenges of its demanding flight regime and the time it has taken China and Russia to develop their own HGVs. (The North could reach this milestone more quickly if it received assistance from one or both of those countries.) Launcher oddities are probably missile-related. The HS-16B missile probably is “cold launched” from an open-ended canister or launch tube, rather than a sealed canister like the HS-18 ICBM, because the width of the HGV payload extends so far beyond that of the booster. A sealed HS-16B launch canister would have to use a large, bulbous front section or have the entire canister be the width of the HGV, either of which would have complicated mounting the canisterized missile on the TEL and transporting it in the field. The HS-16B TEL probably uses a protective cover over the exposed HGV payload, which extends beyond the canister/launch tube, in order to protect the outer skin of the HGV, which must be intact to survive the extreme temperatures of flight. (The Chinese protect the HGV on their road-mobile, hot-launched DF-17 IRBM by tucking it into a recess in the top of the TEL.) Moving to an all-solid force is highly unlikely. It is unclear what North Korean media meant by saying that “the project for putting all the tactical, operational and strategic missiles with various ranges on a solid-fueled, warhead-controlled and nuclear warhead-carrying basis” had been “perfected.” One possibility is that the North was announcing an intention to phase out all its liquid-propellant ballistic missiles in favor of solids. Alternatively, the North may have been noting its successful development of solid-propellant ballistic missiles across the entire spectrum of ranges, but not that solids would replace all liquids. One source reports that the latter is a more faithful translation of the original Korean. Moreover, given the range/payload advantages of liquids over solids — especially for carrying large payloads like the “multiple reentry vehicles” and “super-large hydrogen bombs” touted by Kim Jong Un in January 2021 — and the North’s existing large inventory of liquid missiles and substantial investment in liquid production infrastructure, it is highly unlikely that Pyongyang intends to phase out liquid-propellant ballistic missiles. IRBMs remain important. It is perfectly plausible that Kim Jong Un would regard solid IRBMs as having “military strategic value… as important as ICBMs.” These systems have a compelling military reason to exist, having the ability to disrupt bases in Guam, the Philippines, and farther-flung reaches of Japan that could support US operations against North Korea, as well as US missile defense radars in the western Aleutians. Additionally, North Korea has put resources against this mission. It has already developed the liquid-propellant Hwasong-12 (HS-12) IRBM, carrying a traditional nuclear reentry vehicle, and suggests it has been operationally deployed since as early as January 2022. And as noted above, it is now in the late stages of developing the HS-16 solid IRBM, which probably will be initially deployed with a MaRV, while the HGV payload continues development. North Korea will continue to devote resources and priority to the IRBM force, probably including the liquid HS-12 as well as the new solid HS-16. Equipping a version of the HS-16 with a traditional reentry vehicle is a strong possibility. HGV development will apparently continue as well, which could also have future use in the ICBM force. Success in the HGV program is far from certain given the technical challenges, especially without help from China and/or Russia. But the more mature MaRV program still provides a robust means for North Korea’s IRBM force to combat US missile defenses on Guam.” (Vann H. Van Diepen, “Second Flight of North Korea’s Solid IRBM Also Second Flight of HGV,” 38North, April 5, 2024)

Tianran Xu: “On April 2, 2024, North Korea flight tested the Hwasong-16Na (referred to in English as the Hwasong-16B), a two-stage solid-propellant booster armed with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), marking the second flight test of the wedge-shaped HGV developed by North Korea. Since September 2021, North Korea has flight tested two types of HGVs, namely a conical shaped one and a wedge-shaped one. In the April 2, 2024 test, the wedge-shaped HGV (atop the Hwasong-16Na) did not demonstrate any clear advantage over the conical-shaped one. In comparison, the conical-shaped HGV appears to have been tested under harsher conditions. Thus, the Hwasong-16Na system as a whole is likely still in an early phase of development. With tests thus far at limited speed and range, it is hard to validate both HGVs at intermediate-range ballistic missile-class (IRBM) ranges. However, the HGVs have shown their potential to strike Japan if they are to be used at medium ranges. This is especially true for the conical-shaped HGV, which has been tested one more time than the HGV atop the Hwasong-16Na and has likely demonstrated a higher speed. Full-range tests are likely needed to verify the performance of both types of HGVs at true IRBM ranges. However, such tests may pose some challenges for North Korea to implement. From September 2021 to early April 2024, North Korea has conducted five tests of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs). The wedge-shaped HGV was first tested in September 2021. It was tested again atop the Hwasong-16Na on April 2, 2024. The conical-shaped HGV has been tested three times from January 2022 to January 2024. Deviating from the use of liquid-propellant boosters, the HGVs tested in 2024 were positioned atop a two-stage solid-propellant booster. … North Korean state media and the Japanese and South Korean governments have given different ranges for some of these tests. The discrepancy could be caused by: 1) exaggerated claims by North Korean state media; 2) different tactics on releasing information; and/or 3) the inability of ground-based radars in Japan and South Korea to effectively track the HGVs when the latter descended below the radars’ line of sight. North Korean state media has published relatively rich information regarding the flight of the conical-shaped HGV tested on January 11, 2022, and the wedge-shaped HGV atop the Hwasong-16Na tested on April 2, 2024. This information, combined with data released by Japan and South Korea, offered a basis to compare the demonstrated performance of the two types of HGVs. According to North Korean announcements, the two types of HGVs have all reached a range of 1000 km during their tests. However, the following two observations suggest that the conical-shaped HGV was likely tested under harsher conditions: North Korea reported that during the April 2, 2024 flight, the wedge-shaped HGV atop the Hwasong-16Na reached an apogee of around 100 km during its first phase glide, and a second apogee of over 70 km during its second phase glide. In comparison, ROK reports claimed the conical-shaped HGV only reached 60 km at its highest point during its flight on January 11, 2022. Gliding in the denser atmosphere at lower altitudes means that the conical-shaped HGV needed higher burnout velocity (velocity when the rocket booster burns out) to overcome the greater aerodynamic drag at such altitudes. Both HGVs reportedly performed a “cross-range,” or turning, maneuver after their first phase glide. However, according to the flight paths North Korean media depicted as being displayed to Kim Jong Un, the turning maneuver conducted by the conical-shaped HGV appeared to be considerably steeper than the one conducted by the wedge-shaped HGV atop the Hwasong-16Na. This steeper turn results in the loss of more energy than the shallower turn. Thus, to reach the same intended range, higher burnout velocity was needed for the conical-shaped HGV. These two observations suggest that the conical-shaped HGV has flown at higher velocity and withstood higher structural and temperature pressures. In addition, the steeper turn also demonstrated a higher degree of agility than the wedge-shaped HGV atop the Hwasong-16Na. In other words, despite its complex aerodynamic layout, the wedge-shaped HGV has not yet demonstrated in testing clear advantages over the conical shaped one. Thus, in comparison, the Hwasong-16Na system as a whole is likely still in an early phase of development. Both types of HGVs have demonstrated sufficient range in flight-testing to strike targets in Japan with a highly depressed flight trajectory. As the actual distance reportedly flown by the HGVs was achieved with loss in speed and altitude caused by a turning maneuver, their maximum flight range without the turning maneuver could possibly surpass 1,000 km, putting them on par with the Hwasong-7 (Nodong) mid-range ballistic missile that mainly targets Japan. This is especially true for the conical-shaped HGV, which has been tested one more time than the HGV atop the Hwasong-16Na and has likely demonstrated a higher speed. North Korea claimed that it had limited the speed of the Hwasong-16Na “by means of delaying the start-up of the second-stage engine and rapidly changing the flight orbit in the active region.” It has also claimed both missiles tested on January 14, 2024 and on April 2, 2024 are of intermediate-range. While the two-stage solid-propellant booster used in both those 2024 tests is most likely of IRBM-class (commonly defined as 3,000 to 5,500 km range), it remains to be seen if the HGV payload could function under realistic conditions at IRBM range. For North Korea, IRBM-class missiles would need at least a 3,300 km range to reach US military bases in Guam. North Korea’s testing standards do not necessarily follow what other states would require to certify strategic missiles as operational. However, tests without limitations on speed would offer a higher degree of confidence in the actual gliding performance, which is vital to the HGVs. Such tests may involve a mid-course flight beyond the atmosphere (during which maneuvers through reaction control mechanisms, such as via small thrusters, are possible) and, upon reentry, a long phase of glide under active control. Such a test would be more challenging to North Korea than full-range Hwasong-12 IRBM tests conducted before with traditional reentry vehicles, the terminal phase of which is brief and without active control. Without forward deployment of vessels in the Pacific, it remains unclear how North Korea would receive telemetry data from the HGVs in a full-range IRBM test, especially during the glide phase. However, novel technology solutions, such as using space-based receivers, may facilitate such tests.” (Tianran Xu, “HGV Unproven at IRBM Ranges: Analysis of the Hwasong-16Na Hypersonic Missile Test,” 38North, April 12, 2024)

Today, the U.S., Japan and South Korea carried out a trilateral flight exercise, though it is unclear whether the exercise was already scheduled or in response to North Korea’s missile launch. According to a release, U.S. Air Force F-16s from the 80th Fighter Squadron, 8th Fighter Wing flew alongside Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) F-2s from the 8th Air Wing, and Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) F-15Ks from the 11th Wing, escorting two U.S. Air Force B-52H Stratofortress Bombers. “The enhanced complexity and fluidity of our collective forces demonstrate the strength of the partnership and cooperation between the three countries, keeping with commitments made to regularize defensive exercise and increase readiness,” read the release. A JASDF release on the flight said the exercise took place in the airspace northwest of the main island of Kyushu with the purpose of strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and advancing Japan-U.S.-South Korea trilateral security coordination. A South Korea Ministry of National Defense (MND) release echoed that the drills were conducted to improve deterrence and response capabilities to North Korea’s escalating nuclear and missile threats. “Going forward, the three countries will continue to expand trilateral exercises based on close coordination and strengthen cooperation to deter and jointly respond to the threat posed by North Korea,” concluded the release. Meanwhile, the U.S. has been strengthening its ballistic-missile defense capabilities with its partners. A Missile Defense Agency release on Friday stated that on Thursday, the agency, in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, had successfully conducted an intercept of an advanced medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) test target using the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) Dual II with Software Upgrade (SWUP). Known as Flight Test Aegis Weapon System (FTM) 32, or Stellar Laelaps, the test demonstrated the capability to detect, track, engage and intercept an MRBM target in the terminal phase of flight culminating in a live intercept by an Aegis Baseline 9–equipped ship, according to the release, with Australian forces participating. (Dzirhan Mahadzir, “North Korea Tests Hypersonic Weapon Following US Navy Ballistic Missile Intercept Test,” USNI News, April 3, 2024)

4/7/24:
South Korea successfully launched its second indigenous spy satellite on a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket from Kennedy Space Center in the U.S. state of Florida today (Seoul time), according to the defense ministry. The Falcon 9 lifted off at 8:17 a.m. (7:17 p.m. local time) from the John F. Kennedy Space Center and sent the reconnaissance satellite into orbit approximately 45 minutes after the launch, the ministry said. It succeeded in communicating with an overseas ground station at 10:57 a.m., it noted. It is the second military satellite launched under South Korea’s plan to acquire five spy satellites by 2025 to better monitor North Korea. The satellite was equipped with synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensors that capture data using microwaves and are capable of collecting data regardless of weather conditions. The other three satellites will also be equipped with SAR sensors. Electro-optical and infrared sensors capable of capturing detailed images of the Earth’s surface were fitted on the first satellite launched in December. When operated together, the five satellites are expected to provide regular coverage at about two-hour intervals, according to analysts. “Our military’s independent surveillance and reconnaissance capability has been strengthened through the first launch of the SAR satellite. We will continue to prepare for upcoming satellite launches,” the ministry said. (Kim Eun-jung, “S. Korea Successfully Launches 2nd Satellite into Orbit,” Yonhap, April 8, 2024)

4/9/24:
South Korea’s liberal opposition party won a landslide victory in the country’s parliamentary elections, putting President Yoon Suk Yeol in a challenging position for the three remaining years of his term. The main opposition Democratic Party, which already holds majority control, won 175 seats in the 300-member single-chamber parliament of South Korea. The ruling conservative People Power Party took home 108 seats, becoming an even smaller minority than it is now. Voter turnout reached 67%, the highest in 32 years for a parliamentary election, according to the National Election Commission. The outcome is largely interpreted as a judgment on President Yoon, whose approval ratings have stayed below 40% for most of his two years in office. Public sentiment toward the president and the ruling party has especially soured in the months leading up to the elections amid soaring food prices and a prolonged medical crisis. Prices of some agricultural products nearly doubled in March, with general consumer prices rising over 3% compared to a year before. Major hospitals have been in an emergency mode since late February as young doctors left jobs over the government’s plan to increase medical school enrollment. Yoon’s critics and the opposition party have also attacked Yoon over scandals involving his family and accused him of eroding freedom of expression. Yoon’s senior aides, including Lee and Prime Minister Han Duck-soo offered to resign to take responsibility for the outcomes. The ruling PPP’s interim chief Han Dong-hoon also stepped down, admitting that his party failed to win people’s minds. The PPP managed to dodge its worst-case scenario, however, with the left-of-center opposition bloc grabbing about a dozen seats short of the two-thirds supermajority, which would have allowed it to override the president’s veto power and single-handedly impeach the president or hold a referendum to amend the constitution. (Se Eun Gong, “South Korea’s Opposition Wins in Landslide Parliamentary Elections,” NPR, April 11, 2024)

J. James Kim: “The South Korean parliamentary election was everything it was hyped up to be, except for the result. With the conservative ruling party adding just five seats, the People Power Party (PPP) fell short of their desired 110+ seats, which would have been a face-saving loss for the leadership. By securing just 90 single-member district seats and 18 semi-proportional representation seats, the ruling party barely prevented the opposition front from achieving a veto-proof supermajority. For this reason, the result was interpreted as a disappointing one for the ruling party. However, one bright spot in this election was the high turnout, which was aided by a very competitive race and the entry of a new third party led by former Justice Minister Cho Kuk. Although the result portends a difficult road ahead for the president and the conservatives, the opposition parties’ ability to constrain the administration will depend on how well they can work together in the coming months. Voter participation was high, with early turnout at 31.3 percent and total turnout at 67 percent, which was 0.8 percentage points higher than the election in 2021). Initial exit poll results projected a landslide victory for the Democratic Party (DP), which would have allowed them to achieve a veto-proof majority (200 seats), but this result never materialized. What this suggests is that the early votes, which were not reflected in the exit poll, are likely to have favored the conservatives more so than the progressives, contrary to mainstream media analysis.In the end, however, the result was as predicted. The ruling party gained a few seats but not enough to tip the balance of the legislative process in their favor.

Figure 2. Results of the 21st and 22nd General Election. (Source: NEC)

Twenty-four of the 254 single-member district races were nailbiters, with a margin of victory being less than three percentage points. Although the outcome was not a complete loss for the PPP, the conservatives’ inability to prevent the opposition coalition from attaining a filibuster-proof supermajority (i.e., greater than 180 seats) was interpreted as a failure. At the end of the day, the interim PPP leader, Han Dong-hoon, had to admit defeat and resign from his post, as did most of the key personnel in the presidential office except for the national security team. … Higher turnout was also aided by the introduction of new parties, such as the RKP, which was able to energize undecided voters. In fact, when we compare the characteristics of the support for the RKP, we can see disproportionate support among individuals in their 40s (17 percent) and 50s (23 percent) and among those who self-identified as progressive (21 percent) or moderate (15 percent). Incidentally, these are also the groups that tended to support the DP more so than the PPP. Given the higher early voting turnout in Jeolla Province and the result, which seems to suggest that many moderate votes are likely to have gone toward the RKP (see below), the introduction of third parties appears to have energized the undecided voters who were not entirely satisfied with the establishment choices.… (J. James Kim, “Beyond the Ballot: Analysis and Implications of the South Korean General Election of 2024,” 38North, April 16, 2024)

4/12/24:
South Korea and the United States kicked off a joint annual air exercise today, involving some 100 warplanes, to strengthen their readiness against North Korean military threats, their air forces said. The two-week Korea Flying Training (KFT) got under way at Kunsan Air Base in Gunsan, 178 kilometers south of Seoul, with plans to mobilize around 25 types of aircraft, including U.S. F-35B and South Korean F-35A stealth fighters, according to a joint release. The exercise, which will also involve U.S. Army and Marine Corps personnel, focuses on integrating advanced fighter jet operations, enhancing precision strike capabilities, and training troops on combat search and rescue scenarios and mass paratrooper airdrops, it said. (Chan Yun-hwan, “S. Korea, U.S. Begin Large-Scale Annual Air Drills,” Yonhap, April 12, 2024)

4/13/24:
Zhao Leji, who ranks third in the ruling Communist Party hierarchy and heads the ceremonial parliament, reaffirmed ties with North Korea during a meeting today with the country’s leader Kim Jong Un in the capital Pyongyang, China’s state media reported, in the highest-level talks between the allies in years. Xinhua reported that Zhao told Kim at the meeting concluding his three-day visit that China, the North’s most important source of economic aid and diplomatic support, looked forward to further developing ties, but made no mention of the political situation on the peninsula or the region. KCNA said Kim held unspecified discussions with Zhao on “boosting the multi-faceted exchange and cooperation” and “other important issues of mutual concern.” KCNA said the Chinese delegation left the country later today. Zhao met his North Korean counterpart Choe Ryong Hae on April 11 and discussed how to promote exchanges and cooperation in all areas, KCNA reported. (Associated Press, “A Chinese Leader Meets North Korean Leader Kim in Highest-Level Talks in Years,” April 14, 2024)

4/19/24:
Special operations forces of South Korea and the United States have staged an airborne training to enhance their joint operability as part of ongoing air drills between the two nations. About 200 personnel from South Korea’s Special Warfare Command and U.S. Special Operations Command Korea participated in a static-line airborne training operation at Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek, 60 C-130s and CASA 235s. The training was held as part of Korea Flying Training, which has been underway since April 12. The annual air drill mobilized around 25 types of aircraft, including U.S. F-35B and South Korean F-35A stealth fighters. The joint and combined exercise, which also involves U.S. Army and Marine Corps personnel, focuses on integrating advanced fighter jet operations, enhancing precision strike capabilities, and training troops on combat search and rescue scenarios and mass paratrooper airdrops, according to their air forces. (Kim Eun-jung, “S. Korea, U.S. Special Operations Forces Stage Airborne Drills,” Yonhap, April 19, 2024)

KCNA: “The DPRK Missile Administration conducted a power test of a super-large warhead designed for “Hwasal-1 Ra-3” strategic cruise missile and a test launch of “Pyoljji-1-2” new-type anti-aircraft missile in the West Sea of Korea in the afternoon of April 19. Through the test launch, a certain goal was attained. Both tests were part of the regular activities of the administration and its affiliated defense science institutes for the rapid development of technologies in various aspects such as tactical and technical performance and operation of new-type weapon systems, and they had nothing to do with the surrounding situation.” (KCNA, “DPRK Missile Administration’s Announcement: Super-large Warhead Power Test for Cruise Missile and Test Launch of New Anti-aircraft Missile Conducted,” April 20, 2024)

Delury, Halperin, Hayes, Moon, Pickering, and Sigal: “The security environment in Northeast Asia has deteriorated significantly over the past five years. The most alarming development is the sharp increase in US-China competition. That rivalry, coupled with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has led to a firming up of US-ROK-Japan military cooperation and a widening Asia-Pacific effort to contain China. A US-driven effort to impede exports of militarily significant technology to China and to reduce its supply chain dependence has led to some economic decoupling, compounding the dislocation of global trade resulting from China’s shutdown during the COVID pandemic. The Chinese economy has yet to recover. Beset by deflation, its growth has slowed appreciably, with adverse consequences for GDP in South Korea and Japan. It has also limited Chinese economic support for the DPRK. The economic fallout of these two developments has affected domestic politics in Northeast Asia. Economic slowdown, rising inequality, and slumping support for leaders, have spawned fear and loathing and scapegoating of “the other” in most countries and rising authoritarianism in some. Russian revanchism has affected regional security — not only because of its aggression in Ukraine, but also because of its effort to restore its influence in the former Soviet republics, its active courting of North Korea, and its reintroduction of submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the northwest Pacific and the Arctic and other shorter-range nuclear missile and strategic bomber aircraft, including on the Russian-Chinese border. Moscow’s veto of UN sanctions monitoring and potential help for DPRK missile and nuclear development in return for Pyongyang’s supply of military arms for use against Ukraine are fundamentally destabilizing. Although Russia’s provision of oil, military technology, and employment of North Korean workers ties may benefit the DPRK in the short run, it cannot meet Pyongyang’s long-term technological and infrastructure rehabilitation needs. Nevertheless, Russia’s new assertiveness poses a challenge to China’s dominant role in the DPRK’s external relations, arousing concern in Beijing. Arms racing is speeding up as military budgets expand. The US is modernizing its nuclear arsenal as is Russia. China is expanding its nuclear forces by 7 per cent a year, rapidly and massively increasing their lethality. In South Korea and Japan there is louder talk and increased public support for nuclear arming. Submarine capabilities are increasing throughout the region. China is developing an offshore anti-submarine warfare capability, which may eventually enable it to challenge US and Japanese naval dominance in the Taiwan Straits. Space-based capabilities are growing, along with cyberthreats, which endangers C3I assets. Arms control is moribund. Northeast Asia is riven by conflict — between the DPRK and the ROK and its allies, between the United States and Russia over the war in Ukraine, between the United States and China over the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea, and between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands. Elsewhere there is the potential for clashes in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean and the risk of horizontal escalation of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. Two flashpoints in Northeast Asia stand out — the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Straits — spurring fear of a two-front war in the region. The most imminent risk of military conflict arises from the rivalry between the ROK and the DPRK. Top military commanders perceive that the risk of inadvertent war and possible nuclear escalation in Korea is increasing. As Kim Jong Un himself has acknowledged, a “physical clash can be caused and escalated even by a slight accidental factor in the area along the Military Demarcation Line where large armed forces of both sides are standing in confrontation with one another.” Amid this unraveling, diplomatic re-engagement, de-escalation, and arms control are imperative and there is no shortage of opportunities for cooperative initiatives on climate change; energy insecurity; pandemic threats; regulation, standard setting, and sharing of technological innovation in sectors ranging from vaccines to AI; food and energy insecurity; nuclear insecurity due to terrorism; regulation of new military and economic competition in the melting Arctic and Antarctic, in space, or on and beneath the oceans (the latter perhaps spearheaded by retired submariners and starting with a commitment to cooperative rescue operations). The region faces some disturbing and immediate uncertainties. What, for example, are the prospects for balancing against an expansionist Russia? Is the DPRK’s alignment with Russia a marriage of convenience that does not preclude its eventual reaching out to the US? Is China subtly tilting the global balance against Russia, just as the US did with China in the late 1960s? In 2018, we saw the Korean nuclear issue to be a relatively easy starting point for greater power cooperation that would enable the formation of a regional security institution. Today, we see that a regional approach, short of an inclusive institutional framework, as the best way to address the grave risk of war in Korea with attendant risk of escalation to nuclear war. Progress in reducing tension on the Peninsula could facilitate broader collaboration in other contested areas, thereby creating the conditions for dialogue about a comprehensive regional security settlement and framework and inverting our earlier assumption that a regional security dialogue and institution building should precede and thereby enable an incremental resolution of the Korean nuclear issue. In previous reports, we examined the prospects for a Comprehensive Security Settlement at the global and regional level with a focus on nuclear war risk reduction via denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the form of war avoidance, crisis management, and eventually, disarmament in Korea, combined with constructive peace-making centered on a Northeast Asia Security Council. Although a regional approach is still valid, a key premise — that a Council should be convened to kickstart a comprehensive regional security process — is currently open to question. If it were to be formed now, such a Council might function to firm up two new blocs, which would impede rather than promote resolution of any regional conflicts. Moscow’s involvement may complicate efforts to resolve differences between Washington and Beijing, who might make more headway trying to ease tensions bilaterally, starting with issues where they have interests in common such as climate change, pandemics, etc. Also, a Council may prove dysfunctional at a time when conservatives in Seoul and Tokyo strongly support security trilateralism based on upgraded military cooperation with each other and their US-led alliances. Conversely, some in Tokyo and Seoul (mostly on the center-left) may be concerned about entrapment in a US-China conflict over Taiwan. They in turn may resist security trilateralism and support cooperation in the Council’s deliberations. Overall, the Council idea seems premature in today’s circumstances and as likely to be divisive as constructive of security cooperation. Another of our premises was that the DPRK would engage seriously, and in the long run, would have no alternative but to curtail its nuclear program, rather than to stay at the bottom of the deep economic hole it has dug for itself leading to isolation and poverty that undermine the foundations of its national power, and therefore, reduce the prospects for regime survival. Underlying that premise was the assumption that the DPRK was motivated to seek a fundamental improvement in its political relationship with the United States, the ROK, and Japan — to end US enmity, or what it called the United States’ “hostile policy” — to hedge against excessive dependence on a rising China and to curtail the ROK using its rising power to crush the DPRK and to entertain US troops remaining in the ROK. In return for US commitments to reduce its hostility embodied in various types and levels of cooperation — most notably the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and more recently, not staging US-ROK military exercises, the DPRK showed it was prepared to restrain its nuclear and missile programs. Today Pyongyang has less urgent need to improve relations with Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo in order to hedge against the rise of China because of its warming ties with Moscow, which, in turn, might make Beijing reluctant to differ with Pyongyang. An implicit message of the regional concept in our 2018 analysis was that Korea was only one of a number of security issues that needed to be settled in Northeast Asia, and was not even the most important of them, although it would likely be the first to be taken up in a regional approach, and in fact any progress on that front would make addressing other security issues easier. Today, the risk of a conflict in Korea that could escalate to nuclear war demands urgent attention in its own right. Moreover, it may also be necessary to defer striving directly for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula for the moment although we believe that it is still possible to approach that issue on a regional basis in a carefully sequenced manner, as we explain below. As in the region, so too in Korea much has changed since 2018, little of it for the better. During the Cold War, Kim Il Sung played off the former Soviet Union and China against one another in a delicate balancing act to maintain some freedom of action of its own. In 1988, anticipating the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Kim felt compelled to reach out to Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo in hopes of securing greater autonomy from a rising China and developing the DPRK’s economy. His son Kim Jong Il, and then his grandson Kim Jong Un, sustained that effort. The Kims demonstrated their willingness to reciprocate. After Washington announced its intention to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from Korea, Pyongyang unilaterally stopped reprocessing plutonium in 1992, then concluded the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework with the United States shutting the operating nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, halting construction of a larger reactor, storing plutonium-laden spent fuel in a cooling pond, and allowing around-the-clock international monitoring from 1994 until 2002 — at a time when North Korea had no nuclear weapons. The DPRK changed its strategy after Donald Trump walked away from the 2019 Hanoi summit with Kim Jong Un and reneged on his subsequent promise to forgo joint military exercises in Korea. Perceiving little prospect of persuading Washington to end enmity, Pyongyang had no motive to curtail arming. Instead, it reverted to its Cold War strategy of playing off a revived Russia and a greatly strengthened China. At the same time, Kim Jong Un stepped up its development and testing of missiles and expanded the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal. When a conservative government was elected in 2022 in Seoul that confronted the DPRK with provocative “Kill Chain” plans for preemptive attack, hardline rhetoric, and an increase in intensity and pace of joint ROK-US drills — including a well-publicized “decapitation” of the DPRK leadership exercise by special forces — Pyongyang reacted with ever more menacing arming, missile tests, rhetoric, and military drills. As part of its new strategy, Pyongyang has cut off nearly all contact, both official and unofficial, with Washington and Seoul for the past five years. Yet it has held several meetings with Japanese officials and Kim Jong Un even sent a message of sympathy to Prime Minister Kishida Fumio after a January 2024 earthquake. Kishida has encouraged contacts, but his term as prime minister is coming to an end and Pyongyang’s opposition to discussing denuclearization or abductees raised doubts about prospects for summitry anytime soon. Much of the DPRK’s hostile rhetoric is a tit-for-tat response to ROK threats. For instance, after ROK President Yoon Seok-yol warned, “If North Korea uses nuclear weapons, its regime will be brought to an end by an overwhelming response from the ROK-U. S. alliance.” Kim countered, “If the ROK dares attempt to use armed forces against the DPRK or threaten its sovereignty and security and such opportunity comes, we will have no hesitation in annihilating the ROK by mobilizing all means and forces in our hands.” Worse yet, both sides eroded existing checks on military confrontation. Notably, the September 19th Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain, or the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), made public at the Panmunjom summit meeting between Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong Un, is now defunct. It barred “all live-fire artillery drills and field training exercises at the regiment level and above within 5km from the MDL [the Military Demarcation Line that splits the Demilitarized Zone separating the ROK and the DPRK] ,” “all live-fire and maritime maneuver exercises” near the contested waters of the East Sea, imposed “no fly zones” on various aircraft in the vicinity of the MDL, established “permanent communication channels” — hotlines — to prevent any accidental military clash, provided for a “maritime peace zone” in the West Sea “to prevent accidental military clashes and ensure safe fishing activities,” committed the sides to “completely withdraw all guard posts within the DMZ,” to demilitarize the “Joint Security Area in Panmunjom,” and set up a “Joint Remains Recovery Site and minesweeping” area in the DMZ. Both sides gradually whittled away the provisions with repeated violations. Having disparaged his predecessor’s handiwork, President Yoon seized on a North Korean launch of its first satellite in November 2023 to suspend the accord partially. A North Korean drone flight over the South in January 2024 prompted him to threaten to suspend the accord altogether. Kim Jong Un beat him to the punch. In a fundamental restatement of inter-Korean policy, he told a plenary meeting of the Central Committee on December 30, 2022, “The general conclusion drawn by our Party, looking back upon the long-standing north-south relations is that reunification can never be achieved with the ROK authorities that defined the ‘unification by absorption’ and ‘unification under liberal democracy’ as their state policy.” He went on, “The north-south relations have been completely fixed into the relations between two states hostile to each other and the relations between two belligerent states.” From now on, the South would be treated as a separate state: he “stressed the need to take measures for readjusting and reforming the organizations in charge of the affairs related to the south including the United Front Department of the Party Central Committee.” He elaborated that stance in a speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly on January 15, 2024, “We have formulated a new stand on the north-south relations and the policy of reunification and dismantled all the organizations we established as solidarity bodies for peaceful reunification at the current session of the Supreme People’s Assembly which discusses the laws of the DPRK.” Kim drew particular attention to the contested waters of the West Sea, where deadly clashes have taken place in prior decades: “As the southern border of our country has been clearly drawn, the illegal ‘northern limit line’ and any other boundary can never be tolerated, and if the ROK violates even 0.0001 mm. of our territorial land, air, and waters, it will be considered a war provocation.” He also called for the removal of a monument to reunification, and added, “We can specify in our constitution the issue of completely occupying, subjugating and reclaiming the ROK and annex it as a part of the territory of our Republic in case a war breaks out on the Korean peninsula.” He called for education to instill “the firm idea that ROK is their primary enemy state and invariable principal enemy.” He went on, “We will never unilaterally unleash a war if the enemies do not provoke us…We do not want war, but we also have no intention of avoiding it. There is no reason to opt for war, and therefore, there is no intention of unilaterally going to war, but once a war becomes a reality facing us, we will never try to avoid it.” By reformulating the North’s relationship with the South as an enemy state, not part of one nation, Kim underscored plans to use nuclear weapons against it, a step that Kim Il Sung had opposed but his grandson first promulgated in the revised Law on Nuclear Forces Policy enacted in 2022. At least theoretically, Kim Jong Un also left open the possibility of abandoning efforts to subvert each other and even establishing normal state-to-state relations between the two Koreas, however unlikely any diplomatic engagement between them seems for the foreseeable future. The very steps that both sides in Korea are taking to bolster deterrence — stepped up arming, accelerated tempo and increased size of military exercises, and threatening rhetoric — have increased the likelihood of inadvertent loss of control or accidental clashes that could quickly escalate. Deterrence alone will not suffice to forestall war in Korea. Reassurance is also needed. And it is not enough to reassure US allies. It is also essential to reassure the DPRK’s leaders. In this respect, actions can speak louder than words. Although Washington trumpets its commitment to deterrence, USFK has quietly discouraged Seoul from conducting live-fire drills too close to the contested waters of the West Sea. Yet with the 2019 CMA guardrails dismantled, both Korean leaders are engaged in competitive risk-taking. Given these negative trends and dangerous dynamics, does a comprehensive cooperative security strategy still offer a way to establish a durable peace and to improve security while reducing the risks of nuclear war and proliferation? We highlight four cooperative solutions to reduce the insecurity that grips the region, in particular, the risks arising from the nuclear-prone Korean conflict. In sum, these are: 1. Tension Reduction: The US concentrates its diplomacy on restraining Seoul while China does the same in Pyongyang using measures that underscore the seriousness of their respective demarches. 2. Reassurance: Concurrently, China reaches out to reassure the ROK while the US takes steps to reassure the DPRK, employing measures that suffice to underscore the seriousness of their respective demarches. These combinations of restraint and reassurance diverge from typical unilateral great power influence in that the respective foci of China and the US would reinforce rather than opposing each other’s effects in Seoul and Pyongyang. 3. Inadmissibility of Nuclear Weapons Use Declaration: Capitalizing on Beijing’s stance opposing nuclear use in Ukraine, the US quietly suggests that China take the lead in proposing a joint statement renouncing the threat or use of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia similar to the G-20 and other statements as to the inadmissibility of use of nuclear weapons. That, in turn, would lead to formulating a nuclear-weapons-free zone and to articulation of a changed US nuclear posture in Korea (that was always implicit in the denuclearization of the whole Korean peninsula declared as a Six-Party goal in 2004), in turn reengaging Pyongyang to resume steps towards its own denuclearization. 4. Peace regime in Korea: Capitalizing on Kim Jong Un’s implicit proposal to normalize relations between the ROK and the DPRK, Washington and Seoul make explicit the political and economic benefits to the DPRK of curbing its nuclear armament, including a peace process to culminate in an inter-Korean peace treaty, access to advanced information technology, access to space services, and its integration into regional and global institutions with concomitant increased stature. Seoul under a center-left government might be better positioned to open the way for Pyongyang to engage Washington, but it would have to overcome DPRK skepticism about past failure to deliver on that potential. Conversely, conservatives can shift quickly when circumstances change and external imperatives that affect the DPRK and the ROK in fundamental ways are possible over the next few years. It is therefore prudent to prepare for the best as well as the worst possible outcomes. We spell out these steps in more detail in the rest of this section. A. US-China cooperation on Korea Getting the DPRK and the ROK to back away from the brink will be difficult without engagement by outsiders. The key to that effort lies in Washington and Beijing. The DPRK’s new strategy worries China’s leaders. Preoccupied with its domestic concerns, Beijing does not want trouble on its borders. Addressing the Munich Security Conference on February 17, 2024, Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, “Now the most pressing task is to prevent a vicious cycle, address relevant parties’ reasonable security concerns, and de-escalate and stabilize the situation.” Beijing also showed resentment at Pyongyang’s warming relations with Moscow as undercutting its own influence. During DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Song Hui mid-January mission to Moscow, she was hosted by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and met with President Vladimir Putin presaging a return summit meeting with Kim Jong Un. Contrast that with her low-key meeting later that month with Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Sun Weidong in Pyongyang. A deadly clash in Korea may pose a difficult choice for Beijing: whether to intervene militarily to support a conventionally inferior Pyongyang or risk North Korean escalation of the conflict to nuclear war. At that point, too, Washington’s bluff could be called: whether to engage in a conventional war with China or resort to nuclear escalation of its own. Tensions in the Taiwan Straits could add to the incentives for both Beijing and Washington to calm tensions in Korea. Such considerations might provide an opening for cooperation between the United States and China to engage in preventive diplomacy in an effort to forestall war in Korea. This cooperation might take either of two paths. First, Washington might temper Seoul’s assertiveness while Beijing attempts to reassure Pyongyang. The impediment to this alternative is the deep distrust between China and the DPRK. Alternatively, the Chinese might reach out to Seoul while it would be up to the Americans — as the stronger party — to counter the DPRK’s distrust of the US built up from decades of failed negotiations by taking some unilateral steps to open the way for talks with the DPRK to resume: Washington might restrain Seoul from conducting especially provocative military exercises and adjust the tempo of its own forward deployments. It might also discourage Seoul from demonizing Pyongyang and encourage it to tone down its rhetoric. At the same time, Beijing might indicate to Seoul and Tokyo its willingness to enter into trilateral dialogue on a range of contentious low and high security issues, possibly at meetings of the existing Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat. Joint US-ROK military exercises are a bête noire for the DPRK which not only sees them as evidence of enmity but also compels it to mobilize some of its own forces as a precaution. A more demanding gesture would be to convince Seoul to suspend a planned large-scale joint exercise and gauge Pyongyang’s reaction. At the same time, China might refrain from naval exercises near Korean waters. Depending on Pyongyang’s reaction, and with Seoul’s acquiescence, Washington might make an even more forthcoming move by trying to open back-channel diplomacy with the DPRK and pledging to work toward what former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo once called “a fundamentally different strategic relationship” with the DPRK. That pledge could be underscored in a letter to Kim Jong Un from the US president committing to negotiate an end-of-war declaration, as the starting point of a peace process in Korea, and designating a presidential envoy to engage the DPRK on this process. As noted above, for all Kim’s tough talk and rewriting of DPRK laws and its constitution, the DPRK faces irresoluble economic and strategic dilemmas unless he obtains significant external support that only the United States can deliver. That makes it difficult for Kim to ignore American overtures in the long run even as he buys time and seeks strategic flexibility by embracing Russia in the short-term. Behind the scenes, USFK might talk to Seoul about restoring confidence-building measures as an initial step to reviving the September 19th Comprehensive Military Agreement between North and South. Meanwhile, China might quietly suggest that Pyongyang reciprocate by restoring its military and other hotlines with Seoul. A more far-reaching and more likely more effective move would be for Washington to propose establishing a hot line between the US President and the DPRK’s leader to kick-start a top-down approach to “rebooting” the US-DPRK relationship. Such steps could pave the way to more far-reaching regional cooperation efforts enumerated below. B. Gradually relax sanctions on the DPRK over time Although the DPRK’s economy has limped along even when sanctions were applied maximally by the UNSC and the United States and its allies, it remains at the bottom of a very deep economic hole. The DPRK simply does not have the wherewithal to self-fund the capital reconstruction of its key infrastructure and its state-owned industries. This reality does not inhibit its nuclear weapons program which is relatively cheap. Nothing Kim has said or done has resolved this strategic dilemma. Closely related to this domestic situation is the DPRK’s continuing high dependence on China for trade and essential inputs, especially food, given the limits of trade with Russia. This reality constitutes a second strategic dilemma that remains unresolved by Kim Jong Un. Re-engaging Russia and deploying nuclear weapons buys Kim Jong Un some time, but his options remain highly constrained by these twin, inter-twined strategic dilemmas. Ultimately, Pyongyang needs an opening to Seoul and Washington in order to prosper and to lessen China’s grip on the DPRK’s future. Sanctions on the DPRK have always served primarily as a political tool with limited economic effectiveness. Politically, they allow the proponents of sanctions to claim they are doing something to punish Pyongyang for its perceived transgressions. Yet the crime-and-punishment approach has never worked. Despite the enthusiasm for sanctions in some political circles in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo, they have had limited effectiveness in compelling Pyongyang to do what the sanctions enthusiasts want. Evasion has been rampant — all the more so as the competition between Russia and China for influence in Pyongyang has intensified. Most borders are porous: few states have been able to control smuggling. Sanctions have always been regarded in Pyongyang as evidence of enmity. Given the DPRK’s pre-existing economic isolation and the recent shift in Russian and Chinese enforcement of sanctions imposed on the DPRK, easing them might not matter much economically to Pyongyang but it would send an important political signal. US unilateral sanctions rely primarily on market mechanisms that cannot be simply reversed by state-diktat. Lifting them has seldom been easy, politically or administratively, and takes time; but it is an essential tool for easing tensions. Coordinating UNSC de-sanctioning with China, Russia, and other member states would be easier as a first step and also may enable the United States to realign its policies with the reality of already-eased sanctions by China and Russia in recent years. C. Declare non-hostility This is a critical step to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. It should not be taken lightly. Rhetoric alone will not suffice; actions that match the words are essential. Pyongyang has heard Washington say such words many times before and vice versa. Seoul would do well to underscore the political gesture with military moves to build confidence. Washington might lend credence to its words by communicating its willingness to normalize diplomatic relations and to begin a peace process that would culminate in a peace treaty. A lesser version of this approach would be to declare that the US will not be first to use nuclear weapons in Korea; that it will not use cyberattacks to disable DPRK nuclear command-and-control systems; and that it will not introduce AI systems into US NC3. These measures could be offered unilaterally or introduced on a mutual basis. A US-DPRK presidential hotline could serve as a political kick-starter to this process. D. Begin a peace process to replace the Korea Armistice with a peace treaty and/or a “peace regime.” If Pyongyang is willing to re-engage diplomatically with Washington, then it is up to Seoul to convey its seriousness by toning down its rhetorical excesses and curb some of its military drills. The peace process could begin with confidence-building measures by both sides, culminating in the revival of the September 19th Comprehensive Military Agreement. In light of Kim Jong Un’s policy change renouncing claims to sovereignty over the ROK, the DPRK may be open in the future to a formal inter-state treaty between the two Koreas that was formerly precluded by their mutual claim to sovereignty over the other. That is more likely if the center-left comes to power in Seoul but if external circumstances change rapidly and massively, a conservative-led government may abandon anachronistic reunification goals and discover that Kim Jong Un’s generation in both the ROK and the DPRK prefer pragmatic peace-making to conducting ideological battles let alone war. E. A US-China Nuclear Initiative As part of its stance on Ukraine, China stated on February 24, 2023: “Nuclear weapons must not be used and nuclear wars must not be fought. The threat or use of nuclear weapons should be opposed. Nuclear proliferation must be prevented and nuclear crisis avoided.” That statement provides an opening for a US-China initiative to address North Korea’s growing nuclear weapons arsenal. A year later, on February 26, 2024, the director-general of the arms control department of the PRC Foreign Ministry, Sun Xiaobo, told the UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva, “Nuclear-weapon states should negotiate and conclude a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other or make a political statement in this regard.” Taking up this initiative, Washington might quietly broach the idea that China propose a joint US-PRC declaration on the inadmissibility of using or threatening to use nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia as a stepping stone to resuming talks with Pyongyang on the nuclear issue. Once they agree, Washington would sound out Seoul and Tokyo about the possibility of a negotiating nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in Northeast Asia as a means of inducing Pyongyang to resume incremental steps toward denuclearization starting with a reaffirmation of its commitment to nuclear disarmament and willingness to adjust its own nuclear posture in the region as it pertains to the Korean peninsula. Beijing would do the same with Pyongyang. F. Defer Formation of a Six-Party Northeast Asia Security Council Participation in an inclusive Northeast Asia Security Council would obliquely address a longstanding DPRK demand for “respect for its sovereignty.” At its heart that demand means that other states will not attempt to overthrow its government. Its membership in a regional security council also would underscore its stature as a sovereign equal and give it a voice in a range of regional security concerns including threatened use of nuclear weapons. But all these possibilities would require it to re-engage with the ROK, which is difficult to foresee with the current ROK presidential incumbent. The inclusion of Russia would give the DPRK some assurance that the other parties would not gang up against it, a complaint it voiced in the Six-Party Talks whenever China sided with the common front put up by the United States, ROK, and Japan. Conversely, while it would likely be welcomed in Pyongyang, Russia’s involvement under current geopolitical circumstances would pose serious political difficulties in Washington as long as Vladimir Putin wages war in Ukraine. That difficulty is compounded by North Korean arms exports to Russia, including artillery shells and short-range missiles that have been used on the battlefields of Ukraine. In return, the Russians are suspected of offering technological assistance for DPRK arming as well as busting the UNSC sanctions aimed at reversing the DPRK’s nuclear armament. Worse yet, Moscow may have an incentive to keep tensions high in Korea in order to distract Washington from its aggression in Ukraine. The Council might also become embroiled in disputes between China and the United States, reducing its utility in solving problems on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing may also be reluctant to side with Washington given its rivalry with Moscow over Pyongyang’s affections. In short, Council deliberations might exacerbate inter-Korean differences without helping to resolve them, let alone reduce the risk of war and nuclear escalation. While it is necessary to defer its establishment for now, the eventual establishment of the Council remains a critical step for regional security since it would provide a forum for all the relevant parties. The Council is also an ideal vehicle for providing the DPRK with multilateral security assurances that are critical to establishing a nuclear weapons free zone. Some elements of our regional approach may be helpful in ameliorating if not resolving the looming crisis in Korea and any progress might underscore the value of such an approach. At some point, sufficient cooperation may be achieved to bring back the Council idea usefully as a vehicle for providing the DPRK with multilateral security assurances — but not now. For the same reason, regional summitry by heads of state as suggested in 2018 is premature until Putin’s war on Ukraine is resolved or at least eased to the point that the US and Russian heads of state are able to meet. Meanwhile, finding a diplomatic pathway whereby China and the United States can realign on how best to curb the DPRK’s nuclear and military threats to the United States and its allies is the highest priority. In the short-term, this imperative entails changing Kim Jong Un’s calculus as to the value of embracing Putin and his war in the Ukraine and bringing ROK president Yoon Suk-Yeol or his successor to the negotiating table with the DPRK. G. Establish a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) to re-establish the DPRK’s non-nuclear commitment in a legally binding manner that treats all parties on an equal basis Although denuclearization remains the ultimate goal, the NWFZ we proposed in 2018 needs to give way for now to heading off the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula. Not focusing on its nuclear assets may reassure the DPRK for the moment. By the same token, the drumbeat of proponents of nuclear-arming in the ROK and Japan poses a risk that might be headed off by involving them in talks about a NWFZ — if the US-China initiative succeeds. That might pave the way for eventually engaging the DPRK on joining a NWFZ. Thus, we propose that China, the United States, and perhaps other regional states initiate an inclusive, UN-led dialogue to discuss a NWFZ in the region as the follow-on to a regional declaration on the inadmissibility of nuclear weapons in the region suggested above. CONCLUSION The temptation for leaders is to bolster deterrence and tighten alliances, relying on them to prevent war. Yet the resulting downward spiral of security in Northeast Asia, if not arrested, could lead to the very war that deterrence is presumed to prevent. Slowing and reversing that spiral requires diplomatic re-engagement, de-escalation, and arms control — in short, a revival of cooperative security — starting in the Korean peninsula where tension is highest and rising prompting the two sides to bolster deterrence in ways that could erupt in a deadly clash with the attendant danger of escalation. There, too, lies the best prospect for cooperation with the highest payoff in security gains, however difficult it may seem. If successful, diplomatic intervention by the US and China could, in turn, reopen the way to address the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. As an inducement to DPRK steps to denuclearization, that process could begin with a US-PRC commitment to negotiate a regional declaration on the inadmissibility of using or threatening to use nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia as a stepping-stone to resuming talks with Pyongyang on the nuclear issue, followed by efforts to negotiate a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia that the DPRK could ultimately join. Any progress in easing tensions in Korea could then inspire cooperative security efforts elsewhere in Northeast Asia, thereby laying the groundwork for resumption of efforts to create a regional Security Council and other institutional means that are required to lay the foundations for a durable peace built on comprehensive security.” John Delury, Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes, Moon Chung-in, Thomas Pickering, and Leon Sigal, “Revisiting the Comprehensive Security Roadmap to Reduce the Risk of War on the Korean Peninsula,” Nautilus Institute, April 19, 2024)

4/22/24:
North Korea fired several rounds of short-range ballistic missiles toward the East Sea today, the South Korean military said, three days after it launched cruise missiles into the Yellow Sea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said it detected what appeared to be several short-range ballistic missiles launched from the Pyongyang region at 3:01 p.m. “The North Korean missiles flew about 300 kilometers and splashed into the sea,” the JCS said in a text message to reporters. (Kim Eun-jung, “N. Korea Fires Several Short-Range Ballistic Missiles into East Sea,” Yonhap, April 22, 2024)

KCNA: “There took place a drill on April 22 to operate super-large multiple rocket units that are to play an important role in substantially strengthening the prompt counterattack capacity of the state nuclear forces and raising a war deterrent under the state’s nuclear weapon combined management system “Nuclear Trigger” for the first time. The drill, whose main purpose was to demonstrate the reliability, superiority, might and diverse means of the DPRK’s nuclear forces and to strengthen the nuclear forces both in quality and quantity would be a clear warning signal to the enemies as it was conducted at a time when the enemies’ military confrontation racket against the DPRK is being committed with extremely provocative and aggressive nature. The U.S. and the ROK puppet military warmongers have staged a “combined joint formation drill” with more than one hundred warplanes of various kinds in the Kunsan Air Base of the ROK from April 12. They have incited extreme war fever through one hundred sorties on a daily average, openly talking about an “advance” towards the DPRK after completely taking off their mask of “defense” and “deterrence” worn during their previous drills. Not content with frequently introducing nuclear strategic assets into the surrounding area of the DPRK and staging war drills with its vassal forces, the U.S. is giving publicity that this drill is aimed right at the DPRK. Such military provocations of the U.S. are scheduled to last till April 26. On April 18, the U.S. and the ROK special units staged a “joint airborne infiltration drill” for the purpose of rapidly infiltrating any region to “remove a target.” The security environment of the DPRK is seriously threatened by the hostile forces’ ceaseless military provocations to stifle the DPRK by “force”. This reality which cannot be overlooked urgently requires the DPRK to more overwhelmingly and more rapidly bolster up its strongest military muscle capable of actively controlling the situation to ensure the security of the country and the regional peace. Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, guided a combined tactical drill simulating a nuclear counterattack involving super-large multiple rocket artillerymen. He was accompanied by Kim Jong Sik, vice department director of the Central Committee of the WPK, and Jang Chang Ha, general director of the DPRK Missile Administration, commanded the drill. The drill was conducted, divided into an actual drill for making units be versed in the procedure and process of switching over to a nuclear counterattack posture at a time when the “Volcano Alarm” system, the state’s greatest nuclear crisis alarm, is issued and a drill for operating the nuclear counterattack commanding system. It was also conducted according to the order of making the sub-units assigned to the nuclear counterattack task be practiced in the process and order and of carrying out their tasks and firing shells of super-large multiple rocket launchers tipped with simulated nuclear warheads. Through the drill, the reliability of the system of command, management, control and operation of the whole nuclear forces was reexamined in a many-sided way and the action order and combat methods for making the super-large multiple rocket units rapidly switch over to a nuclear counterattack were mastered. A firepower assault company selected from a relevant combined unit participated in the drill and commanding officers and soldiers of relevant units and sub-units watched the drill conducted under the “Nuclear Trigger” system for the first time and the salvo drill. The artillerymen of super-large multiple rocket launchers fired in salvo, with firm hostility toward the enemy and thoroughgoing viewpoint on the archenemy. The super-large multiple rocket launchers accurately hit the target islet within 352 km range, fully demonstrating their matchless might and perfect actual war posture. Expressing great satisfaction over the result of the drill, the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un appreciated the high and accurate hit of the super-large multiple rocket launchers, saying that it seems that he has seen the firing of a sniper’s rifle and that the Korean-style tactical nuclear strike means boasting of the formidable might, the most powerful in the world, have strictly prepared themselves to be faithfully mobilized in carrying out their important strategic task in contingency in a rapid and consistent counterattack posture. He appreciated with satisfaction that the combined tactical drill simulating a nuclear counterattack involving even artillerymen of super-large multiple rocket launchers was successfully conducted and, thereby, the plan of the Party Central Committee for building up the nuclear forces to expand the operational space of tactical nuclear attack and diversifying it has been translated into reality. Stressing the need to continuously complete tactics and operation in the orientation of steadily enhancing a pivotal role of the nuclear forces in all strategic aspects of deterring and fighting a war and to perfect the regular combat readiness of the nuclear forces, he clarified the principled matters to be taken as a guideline in the struggle for strengthening the strategic nuclear forces of the country. He said that through the combined tactical drill, the might and effect of our nuclear combat forces involving even super-large multiple rocket launchers have remarkably increased and all sub-units are full of great confidence and the drill served as an important occasion in thoroughly preparing our nuclear force to be able to rapidly and correctly carry out their important mission of deterring a war and taking the initiative in a war at any time and in any sudden situation. The nuclear force of the DPRK will keep the war posture with their more developed capacity, thoroughly deter the moves and provocation of the enemies and carefully watch them and carry out their important mission without hesitation if the enemies attempt to have recourse to armed forces.” (KCNA, “Report on Participation of 600 mm Super-large Multiple Rocket Sub-units in First Combined Tactical Drill Simulating Nuclear Counterattack; Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Combined Tactical Drill Simulating Nuclear Counterattack,” April 23, 2024)

4/24/24:
WPK Central Committee Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong’s statement: “Evil doer’s audacity can never work on us”: “The regional situation has been plunged deeper into a dangerous vortex due to the U.S.-led hostile forces’ ceaseless military moves. The U.S., as ever, doesn’t miss the chance for making stereotyped far-fetched assertion with evil doer’s audacity terming our activities pertaining to our right to self-defense a “violation of UNSC resolution” and a “grave threat to regional and international peace and security.” The world should understand the issue correctly. The U.S., together with Japan and the ROK puppets, are ceaselessly staging military exercises under various codenames against the DPRK almost every week. Witnessing such muscle-flexing alone, one can easily understand the reason why tensions are soaring in the region like a kindled detonating fuse. The U.S., which kicked off its madcap war drumbeats in the new year through a “joint combat firing drill” with the gangsters of the ROK puppet army on Jan. 4, has frantically staged war drills under various codenames such as “drill of neutralizing CBR weapons storage facilities”, “allied cyber training” and “joint special operation drill.” From January 15 the U.S., together with Japan and the ROK puppets, conducted a “joint maritime drill” with the involvement of its nuclear carrier Carl Vinson for four days in the waters off Jeju Island. On the first day of the drill, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff of the ROK puppet army appeared on the nuclear carrier to make a false show of power, saying “ROK-U.S.-Japan maritime drills have made a core contribution to deterring and coping with the ever-escalating nuclear and missile threats from the north.” In February the U.S., together with the gangsters of the ROK puppet army, were hell-bent on such drills as “joint marine corps drill”, “winter joint drill”, “joint air drill” and “commanding communication drill”. Not content with this, it staged 48 rounds of extremely offensive and provocative war exercises day and night in March, including “joint air strike drill”, “joint tactical live-firing drill”, “joint drill for air-to-air firing and air-to-ground bombing”, “Ssangmae joint air drill” and various outdoor mobile drills, under the signboard of Freedom Shield, the large-scale joint military exercise. In April, too, the U.S., Japan and ROK puppets have ceaselessly staged reckless military drills with the involvement of U.S. nuclear strategic assets. On April 2, a tripartite air drill involving U.S. nuclear strategic bomber B-52H was staged. A few days later, a naval drill was kicked off with the U.S. nuclear carrier Theodore Roosevelt involved. A “joint airborne infiltration drill” was staged on April 18. Furthermore, a “combined joint formation drill,” which was launched on April 12 with more than 100 warplanes involved, will last till April 26. In August last year, the summit meeting of the U.S., Japan and the puppet ROK, held at Camp David in a suburb of Washington, specified, planned and formulated all these nuclear war provocation against the DPRK and decided to stage tripartite military drills annually, and all the above-said drills that have been accordingly staged are “rehearsals” designed to put the U.S. nuclear war scenario against the DPRK into practice. Entering this year, the U.S. has staged more than 80 rounds of military drills with its lackeys and those individually staged by the ROK puppets total more than 60. This evidently shows who the arch criminals straining the regional situation are. Nonetheless, the U.S. and its stooges are behaving like a guilty party filing the suit first. Who are the real criminals disturbing peace and stability? We will continue to build up our overwhelming and most powerful military muscle to defend our sovereignty and security and regional peace. No one can break our determination. If the U.S. persists in its moves to threaten the security of the DPRK, boasting of its strength by rallying its stooges, the security of the U.S. and its allies will be exposed to greater danger. The U.S. should stop fostering the reckless bravery of its top-class minion ROK. Of course, a scared dog barks louder, but the bosses of the ROK puppet military gangsters have gone too far in their barks recently. If they attempt at armed counteraction against the DPRK counting on their master, they will be immediately annihilated.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Kim Yo Jong,” April 24, 2024)

A South Korean nanosatellite successfully communicated with its ground station after being launched into space as part of the nation’s project to create a satellite constellation by 2027, officials said today. The Earth observation satellite lifted off aboard Rocket Lab’s Electron rocket from a spaceport at 7:32 a.m. in Mahia, New Zealand, according to the Ministry of Science and ICT. The satellite, named NEONSAT-1, was deployed into space at an altitude of 520 kilometers, about 50 minutes after the rocket’s launch. NEONSAT stands for the New-space Earth Observation SATellite constellation for national safety. The science ministry confirmed that the launch was successful as the satellite entered the orbit and made two-way communications with Korea’s King Sejong Station in Antarctica at around 2:13 p.m. and 3:44 p.m. NEONSAT-1 is planned to begin its official earth observation mission in December following a performance review, it added. The satellite was the first among 11 nanosatellites to form a satellite constellation to monitor and take images of the Korean Peninsula and its surrounding regions.South Korea plans to launch five more nanosatellites into space in June 2026 and five more in September 2027. The launch was originally set to take place at 7:08 a.m. but was delayed due to a potential risk of colliding with another space vehicle and other issues, according to the ministry. The launch project was named B.T.S., short for “The Beginning of the Swarm,” by the launch service provider Rocket Lab. The ministry said it has initiated the 231.5 billion-won (US$168 million) project to create a satellite swarm as part of efforts to bolster South Korea’s capabilities in public safety, national security and response to natural and manmade disasters by securing high resolution optical images captured by the swarm. The swarm is also expected to contribute to creating new economic opportunities in the space industry considering that the nanosatellites can be mass produced, the ministry explained. (Kim Na-young, “S. Korea’s Nanosatellite Makes Successful Communication with Ground Station,” Yonhap, April 24, 2024)

4/25/24:
Vice-Minister for U.S. Affairs Kim Un Chol’s press statement: “The U.S. is busy filling up a breach of tattered sanctions and pressure mechanism as its illegal existence, engaged in the supervision over implementation of the anti-DPRK sanctions resolutions for the past decade, has been put at stake in the UN. The intense sanctions, revealed by the present U.S. administration, are by no means new for the DPRK which has lived under such sanctions of the hostile forces for more than half a century. Sanctions, a diplomatic tool extremely favored by the U.S., can be regarded as an inseparable means of existence for the U.S. that is staking its fate on domination and subordination upon other nations. But it is an undeniable reality that the means has become a noose tightening the neck of the U.S. in the Korean peninsula. Whenever the U.S. cooked up a new sanctions resolution in the UN arena, it triggered a more powerful and more developed nuclear test of the DPRK. Like this, the U.S. harsh sanctions have acted as catalyst and motive force that has encouraged the stepwise upgrade of the DPRK’s national power. It was just due to the U.S. nuclear threat that the DPRK decided to have access to nukes, and it was also due to the former’s ceaseless hostile policy and sanctions and pressure that the latter could rank itself among the world’s nuclear powers by running straight ahead. Of course, the DPRK people had to pay a huge price under untold sufferings caused by the U.S. sanctions, the most brutal and unethical ever in history in terms of width, depth and duration. As clarified by Kim Jong Un, the respected president of the State Affairs of the DPRK, the pain the U.S. has imposed upon the DPRK people has turned into a strong rage against the U.S., the wrath that is redoubling the DPRK’s determination and will to bolster up the most powerful strength no one can match. The DPRK has got used to the U.S. sanctions and acquired the capability and great strength to make headway against any harsh sanctions. The DPRK is a state entity that grows stronger before harsher sanctions and pressure. It is correctly looking through what the Biden administration is attempting to enliven the worn-out sanctions and pressure on the DPRK. Clearly speaking, if the U.S. introduces a new version of sanctions against the DPRK, the latter will take a new opportunity necessary for its upward readjustment of force which the U.S. is most afraid of. The U.S. can never deprive the DPRK of its self-respect, its strength and its will to counter the U.S. What the DPRK will lose in the confrontation with the U.S. is the chain of sanctions and the nuclear threat and what the former will gain there is its eternal security and prosperity. The DPRK will reliably defend its sovereign rights and security interests from the U.S. ever-escalating hostile threat and sanctions and pressure and take more powerful practical actions to make its military technical strength irreversible and raise the capability of controlling the security situation in its vicinity.” (KCNA, “Press Statement by Vice-Minister for U.S. Affairs of DPRK Foreign Ministry,” April 25, 2024)

4/?/24:
North Korea is believed to have conducted an unannounced test of a liquid propellant rocket engine at the Yunsong vertical engine test stand within the Sohae Satellite Launching Station in the fourth week of April, the Center for Strategic and International Studies said May 7, based on satellite imagery and knowledgeable sources. The Washington-based think tank said the test is a clear indication North Korea is advancing its development of more sophisticated long-range ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles and satellites. The imagery from April 29, disclosed by CSIS, showed traces of burned vegetation near the test stand. (Kyodo, “North Korea Tested Rocket Engine in Late April, U.S. Think Tanks Says,” May 7, 2024)

4/28/24:
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un raised fears he was preparing for war this year when he renounced the country’s commitment to peaceful reunification with the south. But since then, North Korea’s armed forces have had a more prosaic task: making good on the 40-year-old leader’s promise to build a factory in each of the country’s 200 counties and cities over the next 10 years. “The overall regional economy is in a terrible situation,” Kim told the country’s rubber stamp parliament in January as he acknowledged his own “failure to provide the people in local areas with basic living necessities.” With many of North Korea’s existing factories already running under capacity, experts are skeptical that the regime’s latest development initiative — the regional development 20×10 policy — will bear fruit. But they said its ambition — and Kim’s unusual willingness to outline concrete metrics for success — reflected his growing confidence as a result of his burgeoning relationship with Russian president Vladimir Putin following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine two years ago. “The war in Ukraine has proven a bonanza for North Korea,” said Peter Ward, a research fellow at the Sejong Institute think-tank in Seoul. “After years of severe hardship for ordinary North Koreans during the coronavirus pandemic, Kim appears determined to use some of his windfall to improve living standards and increase his industrial base. Last month, Moscow vetoed a UN panel’s mandate to monitor compliance with international sanctions on North Korea, in effect collapsing a central pillar of the sanctions regime. Financial Times had earlier revealed that Russian ports are being used by sanctioned North Korean tankers to collect tens of thousands of barrels of oil and petroleum products, in apparent payment for the delivery of millions of artillery shells for use on the battlefield in Ukraine. North Korea has welcomed Russian tourist groups in recent months, while Russia’s ambassador to North Korea said in February that Moscow and Pyongyang were discussing new rail, ferry and car routes. A North Korean delegation led by a high-ranking agricultural official visited Russia this week, according to North Korean state media. South Korean defense minister Shin Won-sik said North Korea’s economic situation “has improved significantly” in recent months as a result of Russian deliveries of food, raw materials and oil products. This marks a turnaround in fortunes since 2021, when the regime admitted to a “food crisis” brought on by pandemic-era border closures, tough international sanctions and a miserable harvest. Experts stressed that the exact state of North Korea’s economy is impossible to measure in the absence of reliable official data. South Korea’s central bank estimated last year that the North Korean economy contracted for the third straight year in 2022, with a real gross domestic product of $24.64bn, equating to an annual GDP per capita of $1,123 — about 30 times less than that of South Korea. The economy, which largely relies on the production of coal, concrete and industrial plastics, has been kept afloat by food, fuel and fertilizer from neighboring China, Pyongyang’s biggest trading partner. The state’s resources, topped up by criminal enterprises including smuggling and crypto theft, are directed towards the military and Pyongyang. Provincial areas are largely expected to fend for themselves, with ordinary North Koreans surviving on small-scale farming and grassroots market activity. “Kim will have been worried about what he saw when he travelled the country during the pandemic — not just its state of disrepair and the plight of his people, but the extent to which it relies on China for necessities,” said Ward. The regional development drive is “perfectly compatible” with Kim’s desire to build up the country’s capabilities for a future conflict, said Rachel Minyoung Lee, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center think-tank in Washington. “If North Korea can encourage its regional economy to take care of itself, that will eventually free the center to devote more attention and resources to its real priorities, which include building its military capabilities and providing for the elites in Pyongyang,” said Lee. “Whether or not Kim Jong Un cares about the ordinary North Korean, it’s important for him to be seen to care,” she added. “If the time comes, he needs a loyal and motivated population that is prepared to fight for him.” So far, Kim’s “20×10” factory initiative has got off to an energetic start. Over a six-day period in March, 13 groundbreaking ceremonies took place, state media reported. While North Korean state media have not said what the individual factories will make, Ward noted that Kim Jong Un — who has talked repeatedly of the country’s “import disease” — was likely to prioritize the production of basic goods such as paper and soap as well as processed food and clothing that are traditionally imported from China. “Kim wants to reduce his exposure to global markets, not increase it,” said Ward. “You can make a quick buck in the Chinese market, but from a North Korean perspective to rely on the good graces of Beijing for such basic things is a security nightmare.” But he added that “with so many of their existing factories already running under capacity, to build 200 more is irrational”. Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, an expert on the North Korean economy at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, said that Kim appeared to be motivated by a desire to return to a situation similar to the cold war, when Pyongyang could “exploit the benefits of having two patrons rather than one”. “By strengthening his economic partnership with Russia while reducing his dependence on China, Kim is reviving that strategy,” he said. (Christian Davies, “North Korea Uses Putin Ties to Rebuild Economy,” Financial Times, April 29, 2024, p. 4)

5/1/24:
Van Diepen: “All of North Korea’s known missile activities during the first four months of 2024 have involved theater strike systems. This included two flight tests in January and April of the new, solid-propellant Hwasong-16 intermediate-range ballistic missile, and the reported test in January of the “Haeil-5-23” theater-range unmanned underwater vehicle intended to carry a nuclear payload. However, the bulk of missile activities involved theater-range land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) and the KN-25 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). The LACM activities thus far have included the unveiling of a new variant of the Hwasal-1 system with a “super-large” warhead (almost certainly conventional and probably reducing significantly the missile’s range), a “rapid counterattack” drill for the improved Hwasal-2 that underscores the system’s continued deployment, and the unveiling of a new “Pulhwasal-3-31” LACM characterized as submarine-launched but probably destined for other basing modes as well. These launch activities underscore the importance of LACMs in supplementing North Korea’s much larger force of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, in both nuclear and conventional roles. The KN-25 was used in two drills supervised by Kim Jong Un in March and April. The first was a “salvo drill,” apparently including six launchers, each firing a KN-25 simultaneously, as well as a probable simulated nuclear airburst. The second drill simulated a rapid “nuclear counterattack” by four KN-25 launchers, each firing one missile simultaneously while using the North’s “nuclear counterattack commanding system” with the newly revealed name of “Nuclear Trigger.” These drills demonstrate the nuclear role of the dual-capable KN-25, and are consistent with the North’s emphasis on “tactical nukes” in recent years. This emphasis serves both propaganda and deterrence purposes, highlighting South Korea’s vulnerability to such weapons, and is intended to drive wedges between Seoul and Washington. In spotlighting the “nuclear strike control system,” Pyongyang shows that its tactical nuclear weapons remain under centralized control even when dispersed and field-deployed, while also remaining ready to launch on short notice if needed. This emphasis on theater strike systems coincides with Pyongyang’s changed stance toward South Korea, in which it now rejects the premise that peaceful reunification can be achieved and designates the South as its primary enemy. Whether motivated by this policy shift or not, the North’s missile activities are consistent with the idea that its conventional and nuclear strike capabilities against South Korea need to be bolstered, exercised and advertised. Most of the missile launch events reportedly conducted by North Korea in the first four months of 2024 involved LACMs. These include: The introduction of a “super-large” LACM warhead, a “power test” of which reportedly occurred on February 2. “Several” missiles may have been involved, according to the ROK military. Given the diameter of the Hwasal-series LACMs, the “super-large” warhead — which presumably could be fitted to any of the Hwasal types — is almost certainly conventional rather than nuclear. The size limits of the Hwasals’ fuselages also indicate that the additional volume such a warhead requires would have to come at the expense of fuel, meaning a Hwasal carrying this warhead would have significantly reduced range. The introduction of a new Hwasal-1 variant. Another “super-large” warhead test occurred on April 19, which North Korean media reported was designed for the “Hwasal-1 Ra-3” strategic cruise missile. This is presumably a new version of the Hwasal-1, which was shown being fired from a road-mobile launcher. The announcement indicates that the Hwasal-1 continues to have a role in the LACM force despite the advent of later systems. A “launching drill” for the Hwasal-2 LACM on January 30, characterized by Pyongyang as testing the military’s “rapid counterattack posture and improving its strategic striking capability.” Associated photos depicted the use of a road-mobile launcher. According to the ROK military, the drill involved “several” cruise missile launches. The Hwasal-2, which apparently has an improved propulsion system over the Hwasal-1, previously has been reported to have flown 2,000 kilometers (km). This test underscores that the Hwasal-2 remains operationally deployed. The introduction of a third type of LACM, the “Pulhwasal-3-31,” which, according to the North, was launched for the first time on January 24. Two more of the new LACMs, characterized as “submarine-launched strategic cruise missiles,” were reportedly launched on January 28 in a test supervised by Kim Kong Un. Photos associated with the later test showed a LACM emerging from underwater at an angle consistent with being launched from a torpedo tube rather than a vertical launch tube, although the launch platform was not identified. The new LACM was also associated by the North with nuclear weapons, although a conventionally armed version is also likely. The reported flight times for the January 28 tests were consistent with a range of about 1,500 km, akin to that claimed for the first flight test of North Korea’s first LACM, the Hwasal-1. It remains to be seen how the “Pulhwasal-3-31,” which is likely to be deployed in additional basing modes, differs from the earlier Hwasal-1 and -2 LACMs. Implications. These launch activities underscore the importance of LACMs in supplementing North Korea’s much larger force of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, in both nuclear and conventional roles. Basing the bulk of the LACM force on road-mobile launchers while deploying some missiles on submarines (the North first claimed to have launched LACMs from a submerged sub in March 2023) and surface warships (from which Pyongyang claimed to have launched LACMs in August 2023) adds to the survivability of the North’s overall missile force, as well as its diversity and flexibility. Low-flying, maneuverable LACMs will further complicate Allied regional air and missile defense efforts — especially in attacks coordinated with ballistic missiles. The only SRBMs known to have been launched by Pyongyang in the first four months of 2024 were KN-25s, dual-capable solid-propellant systems referred to by the North Korean media as “600 mm super-large multiple rockets.” North Korea announced two firing drills involving KN-25 units during the spring of 2024: A March 18 “salvo drill” that was supervised by Kim Jong Un. Accompanying photos suggest six road-mobile launchers each fired one KN-25 missile simultaneously. The missiles flew to a range of about 350 km, according to the Japanese government. A few minutes later, a KN-25 was launched “to simulate an air explosion…at a preset altitude above the target,” as one would expect for a simulated nuclear airburst. The KN-25 unit reportedly used an “automatic fire control system” — not unusual for modern artillery systems — and Kim stressed that “the modernization of the artillery forces should continue to be stepped up on the basis of” the KN-25. An April 22 “combined tactical drill simulating a nuclear counterattack,” also overseen by Kim, apparently involving four KN-25 road-mobile launchers each firing simultaneously one missile “tipped with simulated nuclear warheads” to a range of 352 km. The drill reportedly focused on: 1) having the KN-25 unit “rapidly switch over to [a] nuclear counterattack” (possibly in the course of a simulated ongoing conventional conflict) “at a time when the [‘Volcano Alarm’] system, the state’s greatest nuclear crisis alarm, is issued;” and 2) using “the state’s nuclear weapon combined management system [called ‘Nuclear Trigger’]” also described as the “nuclear counterattack commanding system.” This is the first publication of the “Nuclear Trigger” name. Although the North Korean press statement could be understood as saying this drill was the first use of the “Nuclear Trigger” system, it probably was calling the drill the first use of that system by the KN-25 unit in question. (The “Nuclear Trigger” is probably the same as the “nuclear strike control system” the North reported using in conjunction with a “combined tactical drill for nuclear counterattack” overseen by Kim Jong Un in March 2023.) Implications. North Korea may have refrained from launching any of its modern, solid-propellant KN-23 or KN-24 SRBMs during this period because it has reportedly been exporting such missiles to Russia for use against Ukraine. Some 50 North Korean SRBMs have been used by Russia between late December 2023 and mid-March 2024, according to US and Ukrainian officials. Pyongyang’s other modern SRBM, the smaller solid-propellant missile first tested in April 2022 and apparently designated Hwasong-11D by the North, may have too short a range (some 110 km) for the deep-strike missions Russia apparently has assigned to SRBMs in Ukraine — especially given the likely need to stand well back from the battlefront to avoid being attacked by Kyiv’s drones. Although there were no launches of the Hwasong-11D in this period, North Korean media provided photos in conjunction with Kim Jong Un’s inspection of major munitions factories on January 8 and 9 that showed some 45 road-mobile launchers for that missile system under construction. North Korea has been consistently emphasizing “tactical nukes” in the past few years, such as in its announcement of extensive drills in September and October 2022 involving KN-23 and KN-25 launches; its February 2023 military parade; and the previously mentioned March 2023 counterattack drill. Pyongyang clearly sees substantial propaganda and deterrent value in brandishing “tactical nukes.” Advertising these weapons, which uniquely threaten South Korea, underscores the ROK’s vulnerability to such weapons and helps drive wedges between Seoul and Washington. The North probably hopes that touting a substantial tactical nuclear capability, in concert with its capability to threaten the US homeland with strategic nuclear weapons, will help dissuade US escalation in a crisis or provocation and erode Seoul’s confidence in the credibility of US extended deterrence. Pyongyang probably also relishes the common perception that “tactical” nukes imply more technical sophistication. At the same time, in depicting again the use of the “nuclear strike control system” with such weapons, Pyongyang is emphasizing that its “tactical nukes” remain under centralized control even when dispersed and field-deployed while also remaining ready to launch on short notice if needed. This was made most explicit in the March 2023 exercise, during which the North stressed that its nuclear command and control system included: 1) a “launch approval system,” along with “procedures of issuing and receiving an order of nuclear attack” and “final nuclear attack order authentication”; and 2) “technical and mechanical devices” apparently governing nuclear weapons control, including “nuclear explosion control devices and detonators fitted in the [mock] nuclear warhead” (possibly referring to Permissive Action Links [PALs] or other means of preventing unauthorized arming or launch). It is interesting to note that Pyongyang’s apparent focus on theater strike systems in the first four months of 2024 coincides with the ongoing implementation of North Korea’s “fundamental turnabout” in its attitude toward South Korea, in which the ROK is now regarded as “our most dangerous and first enemy state and invariable archenemy that stands in our way” and with which negotiated reunification “can never be achieved.” While averring that the North would be “completely occupying, subjugating and reclaiming the ROK and annex[ing] it as a part of the territory of our Republic in case of a war breaks out on the Korean peninsula,” Kim Jong Un also claimed that this new policy is not intended as “a means of preemptive attack for realizing unilateral ‘reunification by force of arms’ but the capabilities for legitimate self-defense,” and that “we will never unilaterally unleash a war if the enemies do not provoke us.” Whether motivated by this policy shift or not, the North’s missile activities in the first few months of 2024 are consistent with the idea that its conventional and nuclear strike capabilities against South Korea need to be bolstered, exercised and advertised. (Vann H. Van Diepen, “North Korea Emphasizes Theater Strike Weapons in the First Third of 2024,” 38North, May 1, 2024)

5/2/24:
Russia is shipping refined petroleum to North Korea at levels that exceed U.N. Security Council limits, the White House said today, signaling it will impose new sanctions against those involved in facilitating the transfers. The United Nations had set an annual 500,000 barrel global cap on refined petroleum products to North Korea as part of its years-long effort to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. White House national security spokesman John Kirby said that in March alone, Russia shipped more than 165,000 barrels of refined petroleum to North Korea. With the close proximity of Russian and North Korean commercial ports, Russia could sustain these shipments indefinitely, he said. The Biden administration has declassified and publicized intelligence that shows that Russia has become increasingly reliant on North Korea, as well as Iran, for arms for its war in Ukraine. “Russia’s actions are unprecedented for a member of the P5 to break a long-standing, consistent effort by the United Nations Security Council to support denuclearization and nonproliferation efforts,” Kirby said, referring to the permanent five members of the Security Council. “The United States is going to continue to impose sanctions against all those working to facilitate arms and refined petroleum transfers” between Russia and North Korea. Earlier this year, the White House said North Korea had sent ballistic missiles to Russia that had been used in Ukraine. The White House in October said that North Korea delivered more than 1,000 containers of military equipment and munitions to Russia. U.S. intelligence officials believe that North Korea, in return for its arms support, wants Russia to provide it with aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, ballistic missile production equipment and other advanced technologies. Kirby said that the U.S. would work with Australia, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and Britain on the expected follow-up sanctions over the petroleum shipments. (Aamer Madhani, “Russia Is Violating UN Sanctions on Petroleum Shipments to North Korea, the White House Says,” Associated Press, May 2, 2024)

5/8/24:
A senior U.S. military official has cautioned against “overreacting” or “underreacting” in the midst of tensions heightened by North Korea’s persistent nuclear and missile threats and its tough rhetoric against South Korea and the United States. The official made the remarks in an interview with Yonhap News Agency today, as he noted the need to prevent escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the absence of meaningful dialogue between the two Koreas and between the U.S. and the North. “We just need to be cautious that we don’t overreact or underreact, that we avoid miscalculation and maintain communication as much as possible,” the official said in a phone interview. Washington has apparently been seeking to forestall further escalation on the peninsula amid security uncertainties stemming from Russia’s protracted war in Ukraine and the war between Israel and the Hamas militant group. Asked if he sees the current security situation as worrisome, he is “no more concerned today” than before. The official portrayed North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (KJU) as a rational actor — a premise underpinning deterrence efforts. “When we look at KJU, he’s a rational actor. He will not do something that undermines his own regime,” he said. “So ensuring he knows that we are capable of defending ourselves, both the U.S. and South Korean homelands, and that he does not have the capability to overcome that … That’s what integrated deterrence is,” he added. “Integrated deterrence” refers to an approach that leverages U.S. national assets as well as regional allies and partners for optimal and efficient deterrence against potential adversaries. Commenting on lingering questions over the North Korean regime’s unpredictability and rationality, the official said, “unpredictable does not mean irrational.” “I think if we are surprised by something (Kim) does, it’s a mistake on our imagination and understanding of it,” he said. (Song Sang-ho, “U.S. Military Official Stresses Need Not to ‘Overreact’ or ‘Underreact’ to N.K. Threats,” Yonhap, May 9, 2024)

5/10/24:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, learned about the technically updated version of the 240mm multiple rocket launcher system and oversaw on May 10 the test-fire of controllable shells for multiple rocket launcher produced at different national defense industrial enterprises. The updated multiple rocket launcher with high mobility and concentration of fire has an automatic fire combined control system and will be deployed in units of the Korean People’s Army as replacement equipment from 2024 to 2026. The launched eight shells hit the target point, intensively proving the advantages and destructive power of the updated rocket launcher system and the controllable shells for multiple rocket launcher. Kim Jong Un discussed the ways for putting greater spurs to the national defense economic work to raise to the highest level the production of the technically updated multiple rocket launcher system and controllable shells for multiple rocket launcher, and set forth important tasks and orientations to this end. A significant change will be soon made in increasing the artillery combat capability of our army. Accompanying him were Pak Jong Chon, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea and secretary of the C.C., WPK, Jo Chun Ryong, secretary of the C.C., WPK, Ri Yong Gil, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army, Kim Jong Sik, first vice department director of the C.C., WPK, and Kim Yong Hwan, president of the Academy of Defense Sciences.” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Oversees Test-Fire of Controllable Shells for Multiple Rocket Launcher,” May 11, 2024)

5/15/24:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), on May 14 acquainted himself with the tactical missile weapon system with which the combined missile units of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in charge of an important firing assignment will be equipped. The relevant defense industrial enterprises under the Second Economic Commission have fulfilled their munitions production plans for the first half of this year and will carry out the plans for the production of tactical missile weapon system assigned by the WPK Central Military Commission by the end of the year. Expressing great satisfaction over the production results registered by the defense industrial enterprises in the first half of the year, the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un particularly stressed the need to bring about an epochal change in the preparations of the KPA for war by carrying out the munitions production plans for 2024 without fail. The firepower assault combined units of the KPA’s western operation group will be equipped with the missile launchers produced in the first half of the year. Kim Jong Un was accompanied by Pak Jong Chon, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission of the WPK and secretary of the C.C., WPK, Jo Chun Ryong, secretary of the C.C., WPK, Kang Sun Nam, minister of National Defense of the president of the Academy of Defense Sciences.” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Learns about Production of Major Weapons and Equipment,” May 15, 2024)

Faced with other more pressing developments in Ukraine and Gaza, the Biden administration has largely kept the threat of North Korea’s nuclear program on the back burner. But tensions around the Korean peninsula have been ratcheting up for years, opening a new and uncertain chapter in a pitched standoff that, just six years ago under then-President Trump, seemed to be on the cusp of a major breakthrough. Biden, if reelected, is widely expected to pursue his current strategy of maintaining sanctions and military deterrence, keeping with his wider regional strategy of expanding U.S. influence in Asia. Under President Yoon Suk-yeol, a conservative, South Korea joined a U.S.-led trilateral military alliance with Japan — a buffer against China as well as North Korea. But that is not to say the door to dialogue with North Korea is shut. In March, senior U.S. officials said that they would be open to exploring “interim steps” toward denuclearization with North Korea, but that the goal of nuclear disarmament remains unchanged. Yet this is essentially the same offer that has failed to produce meaningful outcomes in the past — including at the Trump-Kim summits — and North Korea has been ignoring the Biden administration’s attempts to make contact. “The worst kept secret in the Korea policy community is that demanding denuclearization of North Korea is a nonstarter — totally unrealistic,” said Van Jackson, a former Pentagon official and currently a professor of international relations at Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand. “North Korea will come back to the negotiating table only if it receives presidential honors like summits, or tangible accommodations that signal turning over a new leaf — sanctions relief, ending the Korean war,” he said. “There’s a way in which North Korea’s position here is understandable,” Jackson added. “They don’t have any intention of denuclearizing and they’d be foolish to disarm without having confidence that their much larger adversary is not really an adversary anymore. “ A Trump win would entail far more variables. “There’s an assumption that if Trump reaches out to Kim, that they would immediately resume their love letters, but we have to remember that Kim was blindsided and jaded by the Trump team in Hanoi, so he will not necessarily come running to Trump,” said Andrew Yeo, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. In other words, drawn out once with the prospect of a groundbreaking deal that never materialized, a warier Kim may not be so quick to do so again. “Additionally, the geopolitical landscape has changed where Kim has much more support from China and Russia than during the first Trump administration, so he may have less incentive or need to talk to the U.S.,” Yeo said. Still, many Asia experts believe that dialogue with North Korea is more likely under Trump rather than Biden — with the possibility of a second round of high-level meetings on the table. “If Trump wins, I fully expect Kim to press the ‘Hey, remember me?’ button and resume summit diplomacy,” Jackson said. “But it’s totally unclear how Trump would respond to that this time around.” In the event of another summit, the question is how much ground Trump would be willing to give for the sake of consummating a deal to his credit — whether he might, for example, be open to a nuclear freeze rather than disarmament. “The bureaucracy under Trump will still have hawkish preferences, but if Kim Jong Un is able to manipulate Trump, it’s much more likely this time around that Trump will be able to impose his preferences for Korea,” Jackson said. “In 2018 and 2019, Trump faced a lot of resistance from civil servants and political appointees, but MAGA has since built a cadre of loyalists who are going to exist to ensure Trump’s whims are carried out.” Yet even dialogue that doesn’t lead to tidy deals may be worthwhile as a kind of pressure valve — a way to ease growing tensions, said Kim Dong-yup, the professor. “It provides an opportunity to rethink and temper hostile stances,” he said. “And once you begin talking, new solutions may emerge over time.” (Max Kim, “Will North Korea Be a Bigger Threat under Biden or Trump?” Los Angeles Times, May 15, 2024)

5/16/24:
Western countries are trying to replace a UN body that monitors compliance with international sanctions on North Korea after it was disbanded earlier this month in a blow to global nuclear non-proliferation efforts. The eight-member panel of experts was first appointed by then-UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon in 2009 to document sanctions violations for the UN Security Council as it sought to convince North Korea to abandon its illicit nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development programs. That mandate expired on April 30, resulting in the body’s dissolution and hindering long-standing international efforts to restrict Pyongyang’s access to foreign finance, energy and technologies. “The sanctions remain in place on paper, but Russia’s veto removes the UN Security Council’s one impartial source of information on who is breaching the sanctions and how,” said Maya Ungar, UN analyst at the International Crisis Group. As relations between the west and Russia and China deteriorated sharply in recent years, Moscow and Beijing have grown increasingly critical of the sanctions. In March, the Financial Times reported that Russia had begun providing large-scale supplies of oil and petroleum products to North Korea, in apparent exchange for ballistic missiles and millions of artillery shells supplied by Pyongyang to Moscow for its war in Ukraine. “Despite signing up to the sanctions, Russia never supported the work of the panel in any meaningful way,” said Eric Penton-Voak, a former British official who served as coordinator of the panel between 2021 and 2023. “But with weapons being traded and Russian oil being imported into North Korea — all of it clearly visible from satellite imagery — the panel would have become an increasingly annoying presence, so Moscow dispensed with it.” After the panel’s mandate expired, US ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield delivered a statement on behalf of 50 countries stressing the need for ongoing monitoring efforts. “We must now consider how to continue access to this kind of objective, independent analysis in order to address [North Korea’s] unlawful WMD and ballistic missile advancements,” she said. In a commentary issued after Moscow’s veto, Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova argued the panel had become “an obedient tool of [North Korea’s] geopolitical rivals.” One alternative under consideration by western countries, said Ungar, was establishing a new monitor under the auspices of the UN General Assembly, which unlike the Security Council would not be vulnerable to a Russian or Chinese veto. “But it would raise tricky legal and budgetary questions, while a lot of General Assembly members inside and outside Asia would prefer to avoid getting into a fight involving the US and China,” she added. Analysts noted that any new body would face opposition from Beijing, which has been angered by western military surveillance of seaborne trade with North Korea near Chinese airspace. Earlier this month, a Chinese fighter jet dropped flares in front of an Australian helicopter patrolling the Yellow Sea to enforce the UN sanctions. Beijing has accused Canberra of using the sanctions as a pretext for spying on Chinese naval exercises. Hugh Griffiths, a sanctions expert who served as coordinator of the panel between 2014 and 2019, said a monitoring mechanism would be “hugely improved” by operating outside the UN altogether. “A new panel could be better resourced and equipped and made up of professional investigators rather than diplomats and academics,” said Griffiths, though he acknowledged that the authority of such a body could suffer without the UN’s imprimatur. The UN Security Council’s investigations and pressure had persuaded countries including Namibia, Mozambique and Egypt to abandon co-operation with North Korea in the past, he noted. “Some countries in the global south, particularly in Africa, might be less willing to co-operate with a body that doesn’t have that UN stamp on it, and that could give North Korea an opportunity to expand its global criminal financing operations,” he said. Griffiths added that despite its limitations, the panel had some success in spreading awareness among the private sector of the risks of being associated with North Korean trade and financing. “Our unpublicized interactions with banks, global commodity traders, insurance companies, container shipping lines, logistics and fast parcel operators did lead to important compliance changes,” said Griffiths. “We exposed a lot of bad guys.” Some analysts argued that with the sanctions regime already in tatters, western countries should reconsider a strategy that has failed to halt Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. Penton-Voak said western countries needed to articulate a clearer rationale for maintaining the sanctions, though he added: “This was not a failure of the sanctions themselves, but a failure by Russia and China to implement measures they themselves voted for.” “Are they punitive? Are they to prevent the proliferation of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities? Or are they to send a warning signal to others who might follow the same path?” (Christian Davies, “Hunt under Way for New North Korea Watchdog,” Financial Times, May 16, 2024, p. 4)

Advanced South Korean and U.S. stealth fighters staged joint air combat drills Thursday, the South’s Air Force said, in an apparent show of air power against evolving North Korean military threats. The exercise, involving two South Korean F-35As and two U.S. F-22 Raptors, took place over a central region in South Korea, after the U.S. aircraft arrived in the country earlier this week. During the drills, the two sides’ fighters took turns conducting attack and defense missions, facing off against each other in close proximity, the Air Force said, noting that it marked the first exercise of its kind between the two sides’ advanced aircraft. South Korean F-35As and U.S. F-22s previously staged a joint flight with a U.S. B-52H bomber in December 2022. Earlier this week, the U.S. military released photos showing that at least four F-22s landed in South Korea on Monday, marking the fighter’s first known arrival in the country since last October when it took part in a defense exhibition. South Korea has a fleet of 39 F-35A fighters, while the F-22 is operated only by the U.S. military, which its Air Force describes as being unmatched by any known or projected fighter aircraft. Meanwhile, South Korea plans to kick off a large-scale air exercise tomorrow to train response capabilities against enemy cruise missiles and aircraft incursions, as well as striking targets, such as transporter erector launchers. The eight-day Soaring Eagle exercise will begin at an air base in Cheongju, 112 kilometers south of Seoul, mobilizing some 60 aircraft, including F-35As, F-15Ks and F-16s, as well as more than 500 personnel. The Air Force’s Space Operations Squadron will join the exercise for the first time to support fighter jets by providing accurate global positional system (GPS) data. Soaring Eagle first launched as a biannual exercise in 2008. Separately, a group of 131 Army personnel returned home today after taking part in a monthlong training event at the U.S. National Training Center in the Mojave Desert in California. (Chae Yun-hwan, “S. Korean F-35A, U.S. F-22 Fighter Jets Hold Joint Combat Drills,” Yonhap, May 16, 2024)

5/?/24:
North Korea and Japan held a clandestine meeting in Mongolia last month, reported JoongAng Ilbo on June 13, despite Pyongyang’s recent public refusal to talk with Japan. “Officials from both countries met near Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, around mid-May,” disclosed a source familiar with the matter to the JoongAng Ilbo, an affiliate of the Korea JoongAng Daily. “The North Korean delegation reportedly included representatives from the Reconnaissance General Bureau and foreign currency sectors, while Japan sent a politician from a prominent family.” “Both parties were set to reconvene in Inner Mongolia in the latter half of last week,” added another source, though the actual occurrence of this meeting remains uncertain. The Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on June 6 and 7 focused on Northeast Asian security, sparking speculation about potential North Korea-Japan contacts. However, no North Korean officials attended the conference. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa on June 13 acknowledged the report regarding Japan’s meeting with North Korea but refrained from further comment. “While Japan has been making various approaches to North Korea through various channels, I’ll refrain from answering [a question about the report] due to the nature of the matter,” Hayashi said during a press conference as reported by Japanese media outlets. Hayashi reaffirmed that “there is no change” to Tokyo’s commitment to pursuing high-level talks under Kishida’s direct leadership to achieve a summit with North Korea. The top Japanese government spokesperson also declined to confirm local reports suggesting Kishida is considering a visit to Mongolia in early to mid-August to address the Japanese abductions issue. The recent contact between North Korea and Japan is significant, given North Korea’s public statement just three months ago rejecting engagement with Japan. Kim Yo-jong, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, mentioned Kishida’s proposal for a summit on March 25, only to dismiss Japan the next day. “Japan has no courage to change history, promote regional peace and stability and take the first step for the fresh DPRK-Japan relations,” Kim said, using the acronym of North Korea’s official name. “The DPRK side will pay no attention to and reject any contact and negotiations with the Japanese side.” Three days later, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui echoed the sentiment, saying that “DPRK-Japan dialogue is not a matter of concern to the DPRK.” Despite North Korea’s conditioning of a summit on Japan refraining from discussing denuclearization and abductions, the recent meeting in Mongolia suggests North Korea is exploring alternative approaches to address its domestic and international challenges. The composition of the delegations at the secret meeting in Mongolia is also noteworthy. North Korea’s inclusion of officials from the Reconnaissance General Bureau, its primary intelligence agency directly under Kim Jong Un’s command, suggests Kim’s personal oversight. Experts interpret this inclusion as signaling North Korea’s reluctance to address the abduction issue, given the Bureau’s involvement abroad and its connection to the abductions. The presence of foreign currency earners in North Korea’s delegation may indicate economic interests, although speculation also exists that these officials could be from the Ministry of State Security posing as businessmen. Japan’s inclusion of a prominent politician suggests a direct communication channel with the prime minister, underscoring the seriousness of Japan’s intent to engage with North Korea. “Japan fundamentally prioritizes the abduction issue and trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and South Korea, but also recognizes the need to exert independent influence on North Korea,” said Lim Eul-chul, a professor at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies. “From North Korea’s perspective, they might seek adjustments in U.S.-South Korea-Japan military exercises or protection of Chongryon [a pro-Pyongyang association of Korean residents in Japan].” North Korea and Japan’s recent meeting in Mongolia also marks a departure from the two sides’ long reliance on the Beijing channel to communicate. Experts speculate that this might demonstrate North Korea’s intent to engage Japan more independently of China’s influence. This shift may relate to recent signs of strain between North Korea and China, notably China’s removal of a commemorative plaque marking Kim Jong Un and President Xi Jinping’s friendly stroll during Kim’s 2018 visit to Dalian. Despite apparent interest in expedited negotiations, pessimism also exists. “There are numerous obstacles to improving relations between North Korea and Japan,” said Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification. “The complex interplay of U.S.-South Korea-Japan security cooperation and sanctions on North Korea creates significant structural difficulties.” “From Japan’s perspective, it will be difficult to advance negotiations unless North Korea shows a more forward-looking attitude on the abduction issue,” said Lee Won-deok, a professor of Japanese studies at Kookmin University. “Contacts between Japan and North Korea should proceed in a manner that contributes to North Korea’s denuclearization and peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula,” Lim Soo-suk, spokesperson for South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reiterated during a briefing on June 13. (Chung Yeong-gyo, Park Hyun-ju, and Seo Ji-eun, “North Korea, Japan Held Secret Meeting in Mongolia Last Month,” JoongAng Ilbo , June 13, 2024)

5/17/24:
North Korea fired several short-range ballistic missiles toward the East Sea today, the South Korean military said, a day after South Korea and the United States staged combined aerial drills involving advanced stealth jets. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected what are presumed to be short-range missiles fired off the eastern coastal city of Wonsan at 3:10 p.m. toward the East Sea. “The North Korean missiles flew about 300 kilometers and landed in the East Sea,” the JCS said. The launch comes after the North fired 600-mm super-large shells, considered to be short-range ballistic missiles, toward the East Sea on April 22. North Korean state media said leader Kim Jong Un has guided tactical drills simulating a nuclear counterattack involving “super-large” multiple rocket launchers for the first time. Pyongyang’s latest missile launch comes a day after two South Korean F-35As and two U.S. F-22 Raptors carried out joint combat drills over the central region of South Korea in an apparent show of air power against evolving North Korean military threats. On the same day, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping issued a joint statement opposing “acts of military intimidation” against North Korea by the U.S. and its allies during their summit in Beijing. Earlier in the day, Kim Yo Jong, the sister of Kim Jong Un, dismissed allegations of military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow, emphasizing the country’s weapons are solely intended to target South Korea. (Kim Eun-jung, “N. Korea Fires Short-Range Missiles toward East Sea: JCS,” Yonhap, May 17, 2024)

KCNA: “The DPRK Missile Administration conducted a test fire of tactical ballistic missile, which employed a new autonomous navigation system, in the East Sea of Korea today. Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, oversaw the test fire. The accuracy and reliability of the autonomous navigation system were verified through the test fire. The test fire is part of the regular activities of the administration and its affiliated defense science institutes for rapid technological development of weapon systems. The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un, expressing great satisfaction at the strategic military value involved in the result of the independent development and successful introduction of the autonomous navigation system, highly appreciated the relevant defense science and technology team, which contributed to achieving the valuable success. He was accompanied by Pak Jong Chon, Kim Jong Sik, Jang Chang Ha and Kim Yong Hwan.” (KCNA, “DPRK Missile Administration Conducts Test Fire of Tactical Ballistic Missile That Employs New Technology,” May 18, 2024)

Van Diepen: “North Korean media reported the use of a “new autonomous navigation system” on a May 17 test of a small solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) first flight-tested in April 2022. That system has apparently been designated as Hwasong-11D. Just two days earlier, media reports of Kim Jong Un inspecting a new defense production facility showed some 99 road-mobile Hwasong-11D launchers on display. Assuming the Democratic Republic of Korea’s (DPRK or North Korea) reporting is accurate, these recent activities are notable in at least four key respects. The missile flew 300 kilometers (KM) compared to the previous 110 km. However, this longer range probably was the result of a different flight profile that would reduce the missile’s accuracy. The nature of the new “autonomous” guidance system and its accuracy are unknown, but presumably it is intended to avoid reliance on global navigation satellite systems. Most options for a new guidance system would take up additional payload space and weight, requiring a reduction in explosive warhead weight within the same payload envelope. Sufficient accuracy improvement could offset such a warhead reduction, however. Very large deployments of the Hwasong-11D apparently are intended, especially since each launcher can carry four missiles, and North Korea probably intends to conduct multiple rounds of launches per vehicle. Although a large force underscores the potential availability of the system for export, its shorter range compared to the KN-23 and KN-24 may make it less desirable for export customers. The very large number of deployed Hwasong-11D missiles is consistent with an important conventional role for the system. The number of deployed SRBMs is much larger than the number of nuclear warheads North Korea is likely to allocate to SRBMs, especially given the numerous other types of weapons systems Pyongyang has linked with nuclear weapons. The war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of conventionally armed SRBMs in modern warfare, as well as the large numbers of such missiles that must be expended over long periods of time in order to have a meaningful battlefield and strategic impact. The mid-May Hwasong-11D activity is fully consistent with the focus of North Korean missile activities on theater strike systems during the first four months of 2024. Spotlighting guidance improvements and impending large deployments of this SRBM underscores Pyongyang’s “long-range artillery” threat to South Korea, both nuclear and especially conventional. According to North Korean media, Kim Jong Un visited an unnamed “defense industrial enterprise” on May 14 and “acquainted himself with the tactical missile weapon system” with which “the combined missile units of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in charge of an important firing assignment” will be equipped. The report noted that “The firepower assault combined units of the KPA’s western operation group” will be equipped with “the missile launchers produced [at the enterprise] in the first half of the year.” Associated photographs depicted Kim in a large building with some 99 road-mobile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) for the small solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) first flight tested in April 2022, which is apparently designated Hwasong-11D by the North. On May 17, North Korea launched multiple probable SRBMs from Wonsan on its east coast to a range of about 300 km, according to the South Korean military. The next day, North Korean media announced that “a test fire of tactical ballistic missile, which employed a new autonomous navigation system” had occurred. Kim Jong Un reportedly oversaw the test, noting “the independent development and successful introduction of the autonomous navigation system.” Associated photos showed an apparent Hwasong-11D missile in the early launch phase and a video monitor next to Kim Jong Un displaying a Hwasong-11D TEL with the launcher erected and the aftermath of an explosion on an apparent target island. Assuming the North Korean reporting is accurate, these recent activities related to the Hwasong-11D SRBM system are notable in at least four key respects. Longest system range to date. In two previous flights, both in April 2022, the Hwasong-11D reportedly demonstrated a range of 110 km and a maximum altitude (apogees) of 25 km; no such data was available for the four remaining previous flights, all in March 2023. At least the April 2022 missiles probably flew highly depressed trajectories entirely within the atmosphere, as has been the case for most flights of the contemporary North Korean KN-23/-24/-25 SRBMs, which allows the missiles to be guided during the entire flight and complicates interception by missile defenses — but at the expense of range. The 300 km range reported for the May 2024 launches most likely means that the Hwasong-11Ds flew in a standard, “minimum energy” trajectory that maximizes range. No changes to the missile’s propulsion system would have been required, just the use of a different trajectory. If the latest flights used such a trajectory, the increased range would have come at the expense of accuracy, since the missile would not be able to perform guidance maneuvers throughout flight, only during boost phase and atmospheric reentry. That change also would increase the missile’s exposure to missile defenses in wartime due to its higher apogee and the reduced opportunities for the missile to maneuver. Guidance system unknown. North Korea did not reveal the nature of the “new autonomous navigation system” reportedly employed on the latest Hwasong-11D tests. Most Western analysts presume that the original Hwasong-11D, along with the other current-generation North Korean SRBMs, probably uses modern inertial guidance updated by global navigation satellite systems. The reference to “autonomous” suggests the objective of the new guidance system was to provide a guidance mode not reliant on inputs external to the missile, like satellite signals, that could be jammed. A new guidance system might also be intended to help restore the accuracy lost in shifting from the highly depressed trajectory used in at least April 2022 to a likely minimum-energy trajectory. The missile photos released with the North Korean announcement of the launch did not reveal any differences from those released in April 2022, further complicating any assessment of the new guidance system. But the main possibilities are: An “autonomous” version of the Hwasong-11D relying solely on inertial navigation, the traditional ballistic missile guidance method using acceleration and orientation sensors within the missile. This would be immune from jamming, but would result in substantially lower accuracy, especially at longer range because inertial accuracy degrades as a function of flight time (and, thus, range). Terminal guidance using an optical seeker to replace the use of navigation satellites. This is a relatively less technically demanding form of terminal guidance, but often results in visible changes to the missile’s nose tip not seen in the North Korean photos. Passive radar homing, where the missile guides in on intercepted radar signals and destroys the emitting radar. This would also be less technically demanding, but would only be useful against emitting targets. Active radar homing, where the missile emits its own radar signal and uses it to navigate to the target. This would be the most technically demanding of these alternatives but potentially the most capable. Except for inertial-only guidance, these new guidance systems also would take up additional payload space and weight, requiring a reduction in explosive warhead weight within the same payload envelope. Sufficient accuracy improvement could offset such a warhead reduction, but the potential accuracy of any new terminal homing system is unknown. Large deployments expected. The display of 99 Hwasong-11D TELs indicates a very large deployment of this system is intended. Indeed, in 2021, North Korea had only deployed some 200 launchers for ballistic missiles of all types, according to the US Defense Intelligence Agency. The apparent Hwasong-11D force is especially impressive given that each TEL can launch four missiles, and North Korea probably intends to conduct multiple rounds of launches per TEL by using missile reloads. Moreover, the North’s May 15 announcement suggests these TELs are intended only for “the KPA’s western operation group,” and, thus, others have been or will be deployed elsewhere. Recent analysis also indicates that the TEL facility Kim Jong Un reportedly visited on May 14 was only brought online as of about December 2023, supplementing another facility building Hwasong-11D TELs that Kim reportedly visited in January 2023. Although a large Hwasong-11D force suggests the potential availability of the system for export, there is as yet no evidence that this system has been used by Russia in Ukraine, or by any other potential customer. It may be that the system’s relatively short range compared to the KN-23 (up to 690 km demonstrated) or KN-24 (up to 410 km), which have been found on the battlefields in Ukraine, makes it less desirable for export customers. In particular, its range may be too short for the deep-strike missions Russia apparently has assigned to SRBMs in Ukraine — especially given the likely need to stand well back from the battlefront to avoid being attacked by Kyiv’s drones. It should be noted, however, that any loss in accuracy stemming from using the Hwasong-11D at the 300-km range probably would not be seen by Russia as a downside, given its indiscriminate use of SRBMs against Ukraine’s civilian population. Conventional role underscored. The Hwasong-11D was the first SRBM North Korea directly associated with “tactical nukes.” It has also been associated, from its first introduction, with “drastically improving the firepower of the frontline long-range artillery units.” The very large number of launchers, and, thus, deployed missiles, indicated by the recent North Korea reporting, underscores the significant conventional role of the Hwasong-11D. That number of deployed missiles is much larger than the number of nuclear warheads North Korea is likely to allocate to SRBMs, especially given the numerous other types of weapons systems (including other SRBM types) Pyongyang has linked with nuclear weapons. Moreover, the war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of conventionally armed SRBMs in modern warfare, as well as the large numbers of such missiles that must be expended over long periods of time in order to have a meaningful battlefield and strategic impact. The mid-May Hwasong-11D activity is fully consistent with the focus of North Korean missile activities on theater strike systems during the first four months of 2024. Spotlighting guidance improvements and impending large deployments of this SRBM underscore Pyongyang’s “long-range artillery” threat to South Korea, both nuclear and especially conventional.” (Vann H. Van Diepen, “North Korea Claims ‘Autonomous’ Guidance and Big Deployment of Its New Small Solid SRBM,” 38North, May 29, 2024)

WPK Central Committee Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong’s press statement: “As already reported, our defense industry has made rapid progress, repeating technological transformation. I am not going to give another explanation of it but I feel need to take the fact that the hostile forces are misleading the public opinion with a false rumor that the weapon systems produced by the DPRK are “for export to Russia.” As we have already stated several times, the “rumor about arms dealings between the DPRK and Russia” woven with mistaken view and fiction is the most absurd paradox which is not worth making any evaluation or interpretation. The technology of weapon systems we have recently developed and updated cannot be open to the public and, therefore, the possibility of export itself cannot be discussed. We have no intention to export our military technical capabilities to any country or open them to the public. But to satisfy great curiosity, I make our stand clear. The recent diverse activities in our national defense sector are pursuant to the five-year plan for our national defense development and it is aimed at bolstering our army’s combat efficiency from A to Z. What is most urgent for us is not to “advertise” or “export” something, but to make the war readiness and war deterrent of our army more perfect in quality and quantity and to make the enemy unable to overcome the inferiority in military capability. No matter how much rhetoric they spread with such wild guess as that our weapon systems are “for export”, it would not be easy for them to allay their security uneasiness while seeing our increased military muscle which they are hard to feel actually. Tactical weapons including multiple rocket launchers and missiles shown by us recently are produced to discharge the only one mission. We don’t conceal the fact that such weapons will be used to prevent Seoul from inventing any idle thinking. The more persistently the U.S. resorts to different military acts of threatening the DPRK by instigating the ROK military vassals and the more desperately the ROK keeps clinging to its confrontation posture while boosting its reckless “boldness”, in reliance on its master, the more thickly the dark clouds and shadow of curse would hang over their heads. We will more briskly conduct necessary activities in direct proportion to the undisguised and tricky political scheme by the hostile forces against our state.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Kim Yo Jong,” May 17, 2024)

5/20/24:
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s press statement: “The U.S. Nuclear Security Agency recently announced that the U.S. conducted a sub-critical nuclear test, the third of its kind under the present U.S. administration. This is a dangerous act that renders the extremely worsening global security environment more unstable, having seriously negative impact on the strategic balance among major nuclear powers. By doing so, the U.S. has revealed itself that it is its strategic goal to militarily control other countries with the unchallenged nuclear edge and that the present administration’s commitment to alleviating the danger of strategic misjudgment and easing military tension by reducing its dependence on nuclear weapons is nothing but rhetoric. The U.S. is not qualified to talk about a nuclear war threat from other country as it is the world’s biggest nuclear weapons state and only nuclear weapon user which conducted nuclear tests more than any other countries in the world. Last year, the U.S. deployed a strategic nuclear submarine in the Korean peninsula for the first time in several decades. It has frequently put into operation the “Nuclear Consultative Group” plotting to use nuclear weapons against the DPRK and is planning to stage actual nuclear operation exercises with the ROK in August. What should never be overlooked is the U.S. recent sub-critical nuclear test’s impact on the military security situation of the Korean peninsula as it has added new tension to the military showdown among nuclear weapons states, fomenting the international nuclear arms race. To cope with the strategic instability in the region and the rest of the world caused by the U.S. unilateral action, the DPRK cannot but reconsider the measures necessary for the improvement of the overall nuclear deterrence posture within the range of its vested sovereign right and possible options. The DPRK will not tolerate the creation of strategic imbalance and security vacuum in the Korean peninsula, but firmly defend its security, rights and interests through powerful deterrent action against the evolving nuclear threat from the U.S.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues Press Statement,” May 20, 2024)

5/24/24:
The Biden administration is increasingly concerned that the intensifying military alliance between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un could vastly expand Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities and increase tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, six senior U.S. officials told NBC News. U.S. officials are also bracing for North Korea to potentially take its most provocative military actions in a decade close to the U.S. presidential election, possibly at Putin’s urging, the officials said. The timing, they said, could be designed to create turmoil in yet another part of the world as Americans decide whether to send President Joe Biden or former President Donald Trump back to the White House. “We have no doubt that North Korea will be provocative this year. It’s just a matter of how escalatory it is,” a U.S. intelligence official said. U.S. intelligence officials accused Russia of interfering in the 2016 election to help elect Trump. The Biden administration had tense relations with Russia, which collapsed after it invaded Ukraine in 2022. After the publication of this story, Steven Cheung, a Trump campaign spokesman, said “the only ‘October surprise’ will be the look of shock” among reporters when Trump wins re-election. With Putin expected to visit North Korea to meet with Kim in the coming weeks, U.S. officials expect them to solidify a new deal to expand transfers of military technology to Pyongyang. “2024 is not going to be a good year,” said Victor Cha, senior vice president for Asia and Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “It’s going to be a bit of a roller coaster.” U.S. intelligence officials believe Putin is providing North Korea with nuclear submarine and ballistic missile technology in exchange for Pyongyang’s sending Russia large amount of munitions for its war in Ukraine, the senior U.S. officials said. North Korea provides Russia with more munitions than Europe provides to Ukraine, including millions of artillery shells. Officials are also concerned that Russia might help North Korea complete the final steps needed to field its first submarine able to launch a nuclear-armed missile. In September, North Korea unveiled a submarine, based on an old Soviet model, but U.S. officials said Pyongyang was most likely exaggerating its capabilities. They said the submarine still needed additional technology before it could deploy or launch a nuclear-armed missile. Despite repeatedly offering to begin talks without any conditions, the U.S. has had no significant dialogue with the Kim regime for three years, the officials said. The administration reached out to North Korea again this year, but it did not respond. U.S. officials said they do not have an entirely clear understanding of the types of technology Russia is supplying North Korea. Unlike weapons transfers that can be physically tracked, sharing of military technology is not as easily detected. “The higher-end Russia technical assistance comes in forms that are very difficult indeed to monitor,” a senior administration official said. U.S. officials cautioned that the North Korean ammunition is most likely old and unreliable. But North Korea sent the artillery at a time when Ukraine was struggling with stockpiles and had to ration ammunition, so the influx gave Russia an advantage on the battlefield. The officials said that in exchange for the ammunition it is providing Moscow, North Korea wants Russia to provide it with ballistic missile parts, aircraft, missiles, armored vehicles and other advanced technologies. In recent months North Korea has continued to advance its missile program, including testing a solid-fuel engine for a hypersonic missile and other incremental advances that together have made its missile program more reliable, U.S. officials warn. Pyongyang has long sought a long-range ballistic missile able to fly thousands of miles and then re-enter the atmosphere with the payload intact. U.S. officials warn that Russia could now be helping it achieve the final steps. A nuclear-capable missile with survivable re-entry vehicles would present a significant challenge for U.S. missile defense systems. U.S. officials also said there has been increased activity at one of the North Korean nuclear test facilities, which could indicate preparations for another test. Satellite images published in April by Beyond Parallel, a project examining the Korean Peninsula at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, showed activity at Tunnel No. 3 at the Punggye-ri nuclear facility. The group said that “both the United States and South Korea have assessed North Korea as having completed all the required preparations for conducting a seventh nuclear test from the tunnel.” The Biden administration has been expecting a nuclear test from North Korea for some time. The U.S. recently prepared contingency plans for how to respond if Kim takes aggressive actions in the demilitarized zone with South Korea or shells South Korea’s border islands, which he has not done since 2010. “We are going to be ready and prepared,” the senior administration official said, noting the administration’s coordination with South Korea and Japan. U.S. officials said they are also concerned that Moscow could help North Korea with its domestic manufacturing of weapons and even create a defense industrial base partnership. Whether or not Putin encourages Kim to take provocative actions designed to create a so-called October surprise in the U.S. presidential election, a second senior administration official said Russia might hesitate to such a step. The official said China, which has also grown closer to Russia and helped Putin wage his war in Ukraine, typically does not want instability in the region. Still, U.S. officials concede there is much about the Russia-North Korea alliance — and where it could go from here — that they do not know. (Courtney Kube and Carol E. Lee, “Are Russia and North Korea Planning an ‘October Surprise’ That Aids Trump,” NBC News, May 24, 2024)

5/26/24:
DPRK Vice-minister of National Defense Kim Kang Il’s press statement: “National sovereignty, security and interests will be protected with strong power for self-defense. Various air spying means of the U.S. and the ROK puppet air force are openly intensifying their hostile air espionage against the DPRK recently. 16 strategic reconnaissance planes of the U.S. Air Force, five RC-135s and eleven U-2Ss, were involved in air espionage against the DPRK from May 13 to 24. Notably, the U.S. Air Force mobilized three RC-135s from May 20 to 23.The U.S. and the ROK puppet air force are still seriously encroaching upon the sovereignty and security of the DPRK, conducting air espionage at the level beyond the wartime situation by repeatedly mobilizing reconnaissance drone RQ-4B and other reconnaissance aircraft almost without any time lag every day. Such hostile military espionage, together with various military drills, has become the root cause of ever-escalating regional military tensions. Recently, the ROK gets undisguised in its despicable psychological warfare by scattering leaflets and various dirty things near border areas of the DPRK. Scattering leaflets by use of balloons is a dangerous provocation that can be utilized for a specific military purpose. We have already clarified our stand on the dangerous farce of scattering things by balloons. The number of enemy’s intrusion across our maritime border is also increasing. Various sorts of warships of the navy and the maritime police of the puppet ROK are frequently crossing our maritime border under such pretexts as mobile patrol. A dangerous consequence will be entailed by such frequent intrusion across our maritime border. We have never crossed the northern limit line touted by the ROK. We have already warned that we would take a necessary military measure to defend our sovereignty and security. We officially warn that we can never tolerate such continued encroachment on our maritime sovereignty and that we may exercise our self-defensive power on or under the water at any moment. If any incident occurs on the sea, the ROK will be held wholly accountable, for its violation of the maritime sovereignty of the DPRK in disregard of its warning. It is a choice made by us that if the ROK refuses to respect the maritime border declared by the DPRK, it should make the ROK afraid of crossing it. The supreme military leadership of the DPRK on May 24 instructed its army to take offensive action against the enemy’s provocative encroachment upon the sovereignty of the DPRK. Tit-for-tat action will be also taken against frequent scattering of leaflets and other rubbish by the ROK near border areas. Mounds of wastepaper and filth will soon be scattered over the border areas and the interior of the ROK and it will directly experience how much effort is required to remove them. When our national sovereignty, security and interests are violated, we will take action immediately.” (KCNA, “Press Statement by Vice-Minister of National Defense of DPRK,” May 26, 2024)

A large number of Russian experts have entered North Korea to support its spy satellite launch efforts, and Pyongyang has staged more engine tests than expected to likely meet their “high” standards, a senior South Korean defense official said today. Two days ago, South Korea’s military said it had detected apparent signs of preparations for a new launch after previously stating that there were no indications of an imminent one. “North Korea has very carefully conducted (rocket) engine tests much more than expected,” the official told Yonhap. “Looking at North Korea’s activities last year, it should have already staged a (launch).” The official said many Russian technicians have entered North Korea after Russian President Vladimir Putin pledged to support the North’s satellite program last year, and they likely have “high” standards, prompting the delay. “North Korea might have been brave enough to stage launches when it didn’t know much, but the (Russian) experts likely told them not to,” the official said. (Lee Minji and Chae Yun-hwan, “Large Number of Russian Experts Enter N. Korea to Help Spy Satellite Launch Efforts: Source,” Yonhap, May 26, 2024)

South Korea and China agreed to set up a high-level diplomatic and security dialogue between the two countries during a meeting between President Yoon Suk Yeol and Chinese Premier Li Qiang in Seoul, today. Yoon also held a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, during which he urged careful management of the dispute surrounding the popular messaging app Line to prevent it from becoming “an unnecessary pending issue” between the two countries. The bilateral meetings came a day before the three leaders sit down for their first trilateral summit in four years and five months. The trilateral summit has been widely accepted as a test bed for gauging if the Northeast Asian neighbors can normalize and restore their cooperative framework. As a prelude to the summit, the leaders engaged in bilateral meetings to narrow their differences in key areas of interest. According to South Korean First Deputy Director of National Security Kim Tae-hyo, Yoon and Li agreed to set up a Korea-China security and diplomatic dialogue, with the first session planned for next month. As a two-plus-two discussion body, the dialogue will involve Seoul’s vice foreign minister, a director-level official from the defense ministry and their Chinese counterparts. “President Yoon stressed that the two countries should maintain close communications under all circumstances, which will enable them to respect each other, pursue common interests and shape regional peace and prosperity,” Kim said, adding the leaders agreed to resume a string of bilateral dialogues involving both governments and private sectors. During his opening remarks, Yoon said “South Korea and China should cooperate closely for not only our bilateral relations, but also for the peace and prosperity of the global community” and he hopes “the two countries will continue strengthening their exchanges and cooperation, respecting each other and pursuing mutual interests.” This was Li’s first visit to Korea after he became premier in March last year. The previous meeting between Yoon and Li was in September last year on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in Jakarta, Indonesia. The meeting bears significance as the two countries have been working to improve their bilateral relations, which have been facing difficulties in the wake of the escalating rivalry between the United States and China, South Korea’s growing inclination toward the U.S. and North Korea’s increasing belligerence. Regarding North Korea, Yoon stressed that China should play its role in containing the regime’s growing missile and nuclear threats. “Yoon asked China, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to play its role as the bastion of peace, amid the North’s repeated provocations and military cooperation with Russia,” a senior presidential official said. On the economic front, Yoon and Li agreed to promote bilateral trade and economic partnerships, by resuming the second phase of their free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations. The South Korea-China FTA will mark its 10th anniversary next year, but its effectiveness has been questioned due to the relatively narrow range of products subjected to tariff benefits compared to South Korea’s other free trade pacts. To this end, the two sides’ representatives will meet early next month to resuscitate the stalled negotiations. The second phase will cover a broader range of exchanges between the two countries in the fields of culture, tourism and legal services. To further promote exchanges, the two sides also agreed to resume the South Korea-China Investment Cooperation Committee, which has been inactive since 2011. “During the past three decades of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the bilateral relations promptly achieved abundant progress, especially in the fields of economy and trade, bringing huge benefits to the people of both countries,” Li said during his opening remarks. “China wishes to work together with South Korea so that the two countries can become reliable and good neighbors and partners who support each other’s success.” Hours later, Yoon sat down with Kishida and exchanged cordial remarks over their efforts to mend the two countries’ soured relations last year. They also explored ideas on enhancing bilateral partnerships in practical areas before the two countries celebrate the 60th anniversary of normalizing their diplomatic ties next year. It was the first Yoon-Kishida summit this year, after they had seven summits last year alone as part of the two countries’ efforts to normalize their diplomatic relations. During the summit, the leaders also exchanged their opinions on the controversy surrounding the Japanese administrative guidance issued to LY Corp., the operator of the popular messaging app Line, which is controlled by a 50-50 joint venture between South Korea’s Naver and Japan’s SoftBank. The guidance, issued in March and again in April, urged LY Corp. to review its capital relationship with Naver following a massive data leak of user information last November, triggering controversies and criticisms in South Korea that the Japanese government is seeking to take Line away from Naver. “Yoon said that he understands the guidance does not mean that Naver should sell down its stake, and the South Korean government perceives this issue separately from the diplomatic relations between the two countries,” the senior official said. “The president thus said that the two countries should manage this issue carefully to prevent it from becoming an unnecessary pending issue.” Kishida replied that the guidance is understood in line with the Japanese government’s stance to promote foreign companies’ investments nto Japan, and it is aimed at guiding the company to review its “security governance related to the data leak,” according to the official. During the summit, the leaders also agreed to establish a bilateral dialogue on the hydrogen economy within next month, to capitalize on the two countries’ respective expertise in hydrogen energy. The dialogue will explore bilateral cooperation for setting up hydrogen energy standards and policies. (Nam Hyun-woo, “S. Korea, China Agree to Set up Diplomatic, Security Dialogue,” Korea Times, May 26, 2024)

5/27/24:
South Korea today staged an air exercise near the inter-Korean border in response to an announcement from North Korea that it would launch a military reconnaissance satellite within the next seven days. According to South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, the drills involving some 20 fighter jets — including F-15Ks, KF-16s and the stealth F-35As — were carried out in the skies south of the no-fly zone from around 1 p.m. Col. Lee Sung-jun, the South Korean JCS spokesperson, said in a press briefing today that North Korea would be violating United Nations Security Council resolutions with its announced launch of what would be its second reconnaissance satellite. “North Korea has told international organizations of its plans to launch a so-called military reconnaissance satellite on this day. As this is an act of provocation that violates UN Security Council resolutions, our military will take steps to demonstrate our capabilities,” he said. He added that South Korea was closely working with the US and Japan to monitor and track North Korea’s possible satellite launch. The North Korean announcement came just before the trilateral summit of South Korea, Japan and China in Seoul today. The Kyodo News agency, citing Japan’s coast guard, said in a report that Pyongyang informed Tokyo of its plan to launch a space rocket carrying the satellite before June 3. On May 24, the South Korean military also warned that it had detected increased activities in North Korea suggesting possible signs of an imminent satellite launch. On the possibility of North Korea taking other forms of provocations, such as the firing of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the JCS said that the South Korean military was “fully prepared for” either scenario. “I would say that we are at full preparedness, for a reconnaissance satellite and missiles being launched at the same time,” Lee said. “The military is prepared for a kind of possibilities, and we are maintaining that level of preparedness and readiness.” The presidential office made a similar assessment in a closed-door briefing to reporters yesterday that North Korea may launch ICBMs alongside a reconnaissance satellite. “We understand that North Korea’s launch of a satellite using ICBM technology or ICBMs themselves may be imminent,” the official said. “There is also a possibility of other missile launches happening simultaneously, so our government will thoroughly prepare for security and defense readiness during and after the South Korea-Japan-China summit.” (Kim Arin, “South Korea Flies Fighters near Border with North Korea over Spy Satellite Alarm,” Korea Herald, May 27, 2024)

Leaders of South Korea, Japan and China reaffirmed today that maintaining peace, stability and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula serves their common interest and is their responsibility, amid continued provocations from North Korea that have undermined regional peace in Northeast Asia. In the first trilateral summit in 4 1/2 years hosted in Seoul, the three countries represented by President Yoon Suk Yeol, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Chinese Premier Li Qiang reiterated their stances on “regional peace and stability, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the abductions issue, respectively,” according to a joint statement today. President Yoon, both in the trilateral meeting and the subsequent joint press conference at Cheong Wa Dae, called on the three countries to stem North Korea’s provocations jointly, bringing up Pyongyang’s notification to Tokyo the same day about launching a new space satellite. “In order to ensure regional peace and security, which is to the common benefit of all three countries, it is important to achieve a free, peaceful and united Korean Peninsula,” Yoon told reporters after the three-way summit. In the opening remarks of the three-way summit, Yoon also said, “I hope that, as active members of the United Nations Security Council, we the three countries can contribute to global peace and prosperity by gathering wisdom and strength in the face of geopolitical tensions.” Yoon described any attempt by North Korea to launch a military space satellite as “an apparent breach of the United Nations resolution,” and urged the international community to take bold action against North Korea’s provocation, during the trilateral summit. Kishida echoed Yoon in urging North Korea to stop its satellite launch plan. North Korea last launched a space satellite into orbit in November. But South Korea claimed the satellite did not appear to be operational, and the satellite launch breaches UN Security Council sanctions banning North Korea from launching ballistic missiles, out of a belief that North Korea has disguised a test of the ballistic missile technology as a satellite launch. Kishida added that North Korea’s denuclearization and the stabilization of the Korean Peninsula benefit all three countries. He also said Yoon and Li expressed their understanding about solving the Japanese abductee problem in North Korea. Li, who represented a longtime ally of North Korea, said at the conference that the parties involved should stop the situation on the Korean Peninsula from further escalating. “I think the relevant parties (on the Korean Peninsula) should exercise restraint,” said Li in his remarks translated into Korean, in an apparent reference to the parties concerned, including North Korea. The presidential office declined to clarify what Li had meant by saying “the relevant parties.” “China has always been committed to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula,” Li also said, and wants to “push forward the process for a political settlement.” According to presidential spokesperson Kim Soo-kyung, Yoon asked Li for China to play a constructive role as a UN Security Council permanent member to ensure nuclear nonproliferation across the world, including in North Korea. Yoon also sought Li’s cooperation on North Korean defector issues, apparently referring to China’s forced repatriation of defectors back to the regime. Human rights group North Korean People’s Liberation Front estimated that China sent back 2,000 refugees to North Korea between August and September. Li responded that Beijing was aware of Seoul’s concern, adding that he stressed both the peaceful resolution of issues on the Korean Peninsula and regional stability. Yesterday, South Korea and China agreed to initiate talks involving their foreign ministers and defense ministers beginning in June, at the summit of Yoon and Li. According to Yoon’s office Sunday, the trilateral talks would “unlikely lead to an uncluttered three-way agreement regarding North Korea issues, the regime’s denuclearization and inter-Korean relations.” The three countries also agreed to resume the annual three-way summit, which had been stalled because of the turbulence in the three countries’ relationship coupled with the COVID-19 pandemic, with the next rotating chair being Tokyo in 2025. Achieving regional and international peace and prosperity was one of the key goals laid out in the joint statement following the trilateral summit. The three countries agreed to carry out projects aimed at people-to-people exchanges; climate change response for sustainable development; economic cooperation and trade; public health and aging society; digital transformation; and disaster relief and safety. Regional cooperation in and near East Asia will also be at play, on the foundation of the trilateral ties. For example, the three countries agreed to tackle problems arising from yellow dust and sandstorms by trying to collaborate with Mongolia through the Trilateral+X Cooperation framework. The three countries also agreed to designate 2025 and 2026 as years of cultural exchange between the three countries, in hopes that a total of 40 million people from the three countries combined would travel to one of the other two countries for the purposes of culture, tourism and education by 2030. “When we faced the unprecedented challenge of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, we opened up a new opportunity for trilateral cooperation,” Yoon said in the opening remarks for the three-way summit. “I believe that the many challenges we face today at the regional and global levels can also be transformed into new opportunities to promote communication between the three countries and expand the horizons of cooperation.” (Son Ji-hyoung, “Leaders Agree to Revive Three-Way Cooperation, Reaffirm Security Efforts,” Korea Herald, May 27, 2024) China’s Premier Li Qiang hailed a “both a restart and a new beginning” in relations between Beijing and Washington’s east Asian allies as the three countries pledged to revive talks on a free trade agreement. “We will keep discussions for speeding up negotiations for a trilateral free trade agreement,” South Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol, Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Li said in a joint statement after their summit in Seoul today. The summit, arranged at short notice and the first of its kind since 2019, came amid disquiet in Beijing over Seoul and Tokyo’s participation in sweeping U.S. export controls designed to restrict Chinese access to cutting-edge chip technologies, as well as their burgeoning military co-operation with the U.S. The three countries agreed to strengthen supply chain co-operation and communicate more closely on export control measures, Li, the former Shanghai party chief who became Chinese premier last year, said, stressing that he opposed protectionism and decoupling of supply chains. “In order to create a more favorable environment, China, Japan and South Korea need to properly address sensitive issues and differences in opinion,” Li said in a joint press conference following the summit. He also urged Seoul and Tokyo to “take care of each other’s core interests” in a thinly veiled warning against joining Washington’s increasingly assertive policies on China. The three leaders agreed to meet on an annual basis. The summit’s official agenda did not touch on regional points of conflict such as North Korea or Taiwan and instead focused on academic and tourism exchanges, as well as co-operation on climate change and future pandemic planning. “Foreign-funded enterprises are an indispensable force for China’s development and China’s mega-market will always be open to foreign-funded companies,” Li was quoted as saying by Chinese state news agency Xinhua. (Christian Davies, Kana Inagaki, and Edward White, “China Hails Restart at Summit with Japan and South Korea,” Financial Times, May 28, 2024, p. 2)

North Korea fired what it claims to be a military spy satellite today, but the projectile ended up as multiple pieces of debris shortly after launch, South Korea’s military said, an apparent indication that Pyongyang’s satellite launch plan ended in failure. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the suspected satellite-carrying rocket being launched in a southward direction over the Yellow Sea from the Tongchang-ri area in the country’s northwest at about 10:44 p.m. The projectile, however, was detected as multiple pieces of debris in the country’s waters two minutes later, the JCS said in a text message sent to reporters, noting that a detailed analysis is under way between the intelligence authorities of South Korea and the United States about whether the projectile flew normally. If confirmed, it would mark the North’s latest satellite launch attempt after the country successfully put its first military spy satellite into orbit in November last year after two unsuccessful attempts in May and August, respectively. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has vowed to send three more spy satellites into orbit in 2024. South Korea’s Defense Minister Shin Won-sik, however, has said the North’s satellite launched last year appears to be orbiting Earth without activity, suggesting that it is not functioning properly. (Chae Yun-hwan, “N. Korea Launch of What It Claims to Be Military Spy Satellite Ends up Multiple Pieces of Debris: S. Korea Military,” Yonhap, May 27, 2024)

KCNA: “The Korean Central News Agency made public the following report on May 27 as regards an accident occurred during the launch of military reconnaissance satellite: The National Aerospace Technology Administration (NATA) of the DPRK conducted the launch of reconnaissance satellite Malligyong-1-1 aboard the new-type satellite carrier rocket at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground in Cholsan County of North Phyongan Province on May 27, Juche 113 (2024). The launch failed due to the air blast of the new-type satellite carrier rocket during the first-stage flight, the vice general director of the NATA said. He said that the experts’ examination of the field headquarters of the non-permanent preparatory committee for launching satellites made a preliminary conclusion that the cause of the accident is attributable to the reliability of operation of the newly developed liquid oxygen + petroleum engine, adding that other causes will be examined.” (KCNA, “KCNA Report on Accident in Launch of Military Reconnaissance Satellite,” May 28, 2024)

DPRK FoMin spokesperson’s press statement “Hostile acts of infringing upon our inviolable national sovereignty will never be tolerated”: “In connection with the prevailing unpardonable situation, in which the sovereignty of the DPRK has been seriously violated by an act of running counter to the UN Charter and all principles of international law with equal sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs as their core, the DPRK Foreign Ministry states as follows: At a ROK-Japan-China tripartite summit held on Monday under the sponsorship of the ROK, a “joint declaration” calling for maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region and denuclearizing the Korean peninsula was made public. It is a mockery of and trickery against the regional countries and the international community that the ROK is talking about “denuclearization”, “peace and stability” as it has brought a grave security crisis to the Korean peninsula and the rest of the Northeast Asian region by frantically strengthening military alliance for aggression with hegemonic forces outside the region. As regards the grave political provocation of denying the constitutional position of the DPRK, committed at an international meeting sponsored by the ROK, the DPRK Foreign Ministry strongly denounces and rejects it as a blatant challenge to the sovereignty of the DPRK and wanton interference in its internal affairs. To discuss the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula today constitutes a grave political provocation and sovereignty violation that totally denies the DPRK’s inviolable sovereignty and constitution reflecting the unanimous will of all the Korean people, before being an issue concerning any international duty or justification. It is an insult never to be pardoned and a declaration of war against the DPRK that the ROK, in the most hostile relations with the DPRK, attempts to force the DPRK to violate its constitution in denial of its sovereign rights. It is an undeniable fact and history that the U.S. nuclear threat, which has lasted for more than half a century, triggered off the DPRK’s access to nuclear weapons and that hostile acts and military blackmail by the U.S. and the ROK have been a decisive factor of accelerating the DPRK’s steady advance for bolstering up its nuclear force. Various U.S.-led military blocs exist throughout the Asia-Pacific region including the Korean peninsula and the “nuclear consultative group” aimed at using nuclear weapons against the DPRK is operating. Furthermore, regional peace and stability are exposed to serious threats due to the U.S. and its vassal countries’ ceaseless war drills for aggression. Given this grave security environment, denuclearization will only bring a nuclear crisis, instead of peace and stability. Denuclearization on the Korean peninsula means a power vacuum and hastened war. If anyone tries to deny or violate the constitutional position of our country as a nuclear weapons state, preaching the benefits of denuclearization to us, it will be regarded as the most serious infringement upon sovereignty forcing us to renounce our constitution and social system. Such thing as “complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula” has already died out theoretically, practically and physically. The DPRK will firmly defend the dignity and sovereignty of the nation and its people and its constitution from all sorts of attempts of the hostile forces to deny its absolute sovereignty, and make crucial efforts to build a new mechanical structure in the region based on justice and equity.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Spokesperson of DPRK Foreign Ministry,” May 27, 2024)

Tianran Xu: “On May 27, 2024, a “new-type” rocket carrying the Malligyong-1-1 spy satellite blasted off from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK or North Korea) Sohae Satellite Launching Station. The rocket exploded during the first stage of flight (Figure 1). On May 28, Kim Jong Un reportedly stated that the “mission failed with a destruct system being activated due to malfunctioning of the first-stage engine” when visiting the Academy of Defense Sciences. The May 27 launch was the ninth satellite launch attempt and the sixth failed one in North Korea Judging by the drop zones announced by North Korea, the intended orbit for the Malligyong-1-1 spy satellite is a sun-synchronous orbit, a type of low Earth orbit frequently used for Earth observation satellites. Currently, the size and configuration of this new type of rocket are unclear. But, if the North Korean state media announcement is true, the “new-type” rocket would be the first North Korean carrier rocket powered by liquid oxygen (LOX)-kerosene propellants. This would reflect a notable departure in the country’s liquid-propellant engine development, in pursuit of more efficient SLVs, but is unlikely to have much practical impact on the country’s ballistic missile capabilities. Historically, LOX-kerosene was used as the oxidizer and fuel for early liquid-propellant intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In fact, LOX was the oxidizer for Nazi Germany’s V2, the world’s first ballistic missile. However, as LOX boils off easily, it is not friendly for outdoor handling and cannot be stored in a silo-based missile for an extended period of time. As such, Earth-storable oxidizers with low handling requirements soon replaced LOX in liquid-propellant ballistic missiles. That said, due to relatively high combustion efficiency, LOX-kerosene has remained the most popular combination for dedicated space launch vehicles (SLVs), such as the Russian Soyuz and US Falcon-9. Due to the characteristics of LOX, this combination is often categorized as a “semi-cryogenic” propellant. North Korea has already developed the “March 18” series IRBM/ICBM engines with a maximum thrust of approximately 80-ton force that use storable (not LOX) propellants. With this engine, North Korea can build a whole family of carrier rockets that could satisfy a wide range of missions ranging from high orbit launches to crewed space missions. For reference, China has been using storable liquid-propellant, ICBM-based carrier rockets (powered by about 70-ton force engines) for almost 50 years. The family of CZ-2/3/4 rockets has proven to be versatile, cheap and reliable — its human-rated variant has sent crewed spacecraft into space 19 times without fail. To date, these rockets are still workhorses despite the introduction of the new generation of LOX-kerosene rockets. In Europe, the Ariane 1 to 4 series carrier rockets, powered by approximately 70-ton force storable propellant engines, established the European Space Agency as one of the leading launch service providers in the world. As such, storable liquid-propellant, ICBM-based carrier rockets offer North Korea the following advantages: minimizing developmental costs and resources, especially given the weak economy of North Korea; reducing the risk of failures and delays while offering decent capacities; and increasing the reliability and credibility of North Korean ICBMs using the same engines, especially when the number of North Korean ICBM flight tests has been limited. While LOX-kerosene engines could provide better performance, they no longer have practical applications in ballistic missiles, only SLVs. It remains unclear when exactly North Korea embarked on a LOX-kerosene engine program. However, when the “March 18” engine was first revealed to the outside world in September 2016, state media stated the engine test “provided the DPRK with a scientific and technical guarantee for confidently developing and completing the carrier rocket for the geo-stationary satellite.” A geostationary orbit is much higher and more difficult to reach than the low Earth orbit that has been used by North Korea to date. This may imply that the North’s plan was to stick to storable propellants for more demanding missions and that the decision to go for the LOX-kerosene engine may have occurred sometime after 2016. Given the context above, a combination of the following factors may have led to the choice of LOX-kerosene engines. First, North Korea appears to be moving from developing liquid-propellant IRBMs and ICBMs to solid-propellant ones, largely reducing the need to improve the reliability of liquid-propellant ICBM engines through space launches. However, Kim Jong Un reportedly visited a vehicle factory to inspect at least eight transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) for Hwasong-17 liquid-propellant ICBMs and eight TELs for Hwasong-18 solid-propellant ICBMs on May 17. This indicates that the Hwasong-17 still plays a considerable role in North Korea’s ICBM force thanks to its high throw weight and that it may still be produced. Nonetheless, solid-propellant ICBMs have, in general, reduced the importance of liquid-propellant ICBMs in the DPRK. Second, possible Russian technology transfer may have facilitated North Korea’s choice of LOX-kerosene engines. During his summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in September 2023, Kim Jong Un was briefed on the assembling of an Angara rocket and characteristics of the Soyuz-2 carrier rocket at Russia’s Vostochny Cosmodrome, while Putin vaguely signaled his willingness to assist North Korea in space and satellite programs. Before the May 27 launch, a South Korean official stated that many Russian technicians had entered North Korea after the Putin-Kim summit, and that North Korea has staged more engine tests than expected to “likely meet high standards of Russian technicians.” South Korean media have speculated that the RD-191 engine powering Russia’s Angara rocket had been transferred to North Korea. To date, however, none of those reports have been confirmed in the open-source domain. Third, in some areas of weapon development, North Korean leadership appears to have shown a tendency to take higher risks in the spirit of “surpassing the cutting edge.” This tendency could lead to rapid technological updates in a short period of time, but at the expense of higher investment of resources and at the risk of encountering more hurdles and delays. In addition, North Korea beat South Korea in 2012 as the first to put a satellite into orbit using a domestic rocket. However, South Korea’s Nuri, powered by domestic LOX-kerosene engines, has become the most capable carrier rocket on the peninsula. The development and/or the subsequent success of Nuri might have prompted Kim Jong Un to go for LOX-kerosene engines so that the North could compete with the South on an equal footing. If North Korea has indeed developed LOX-kerosene engines for its SLVs, this may imply that the North may be turning to high-energy, “civilian” propellant (meaning no practical applications in ballistic missiles) in pursuit of world-class propulsion efficiency for its SLVs. However, this is unlikely to have any practical impact on the North’s IRBM or ICBM forces, especially as the country moves toward more solid-propellent systems.”(Tianran Xu, “Surpass the Cutting Edge: Reflections on North Korea’s Failed May 27 Satellite Launch,” 38North, June 7, 2024)

5/28/24:
Robert Gallucci, the chief U.S. negotiator during the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, said normalizing relations with North Korea should come before discussing denuclearization. As denuclearization is increasingly seen as an unlikely outcome amid stalled diplomacy and North Korea’s continued provocative threats, the United States should push toward forging normal ties as an effort to engage Pyongyang, according to Gallucci. “The only way we’re going to get at the nuclear issue, in my view, is to change the nature of the political and diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and the DPRK and that is going to require improvement of relations, diminishing the threat at all times,” Gallucci said during an interview with The Korea Times at Yonsei University, today. Gallucci, a distinguished professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service, explained that the threat from North Korea has evolved to the point that the U.S. ballistic missile defense may not be particularly effective against the North’s sophisticated attack. In January, he wrote in National Interest that “we should at least entertain the thought that nuclear war could break out in Northeast Asia in 2024.” “Now we are starting to get into a much more dangerous situation in terms of nuclear weapons. An increased level of threat from North Korea is largely due to two things — their capability to do damage and their declaratory posture,” he said. “We are now dealing with a nuclear weapons state that has somewhere between 50 and 100 nuclear weapons. They’ve gotten better in accuracy, reliability and perhaps even in sophistication.” Asked if North Korea’s failed satellite launch has any implications, he said, “I would say that’s not significant. If you look at the American or the Russian development of ballistic missiles — particularly the very long-range ones like ICBMs — there are lots of failures in developing.” Gallucci asserted there is no geostrategic or permanent reason for hostility between Pyongyang and Washington, adding that the U.S. should be looking for areas in which it can have a useful conversation with the reclusive regime. “The Biden administration doesn’t want to be responsible for having no progress in reducing tensions with the DPRK. It also has a prejudice that if we invest in negotiations with the North, there’s a high chance it will fail,” he said. The former nuclear envoy stressed that the U.S. can have relations with countries whose values don’t match perfectly with its own and who don’t live in a Jeffersonian democracy. “I wouldn’t remove sanctions now without cause, but I would look for sanctions relief to be part of a negotiation. We might be able to scale back ROK-U.S. military exercises to dial them (the DPRK) back a little. Maybe we can get the Chinese to help,” he said. Stressing that denuclearization is a realistic, but long-term goal, Gallucci said the trilateral summit involving South Korea, Japan and China can serve as an opening for negotiations with North Korea. “I hope the Japanese and the South Koreans emphasized to the Chinese to assist in restraining North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in his enthusiasm for highlighting the threat he presents to everybody in Northeast Asia except China,” he said. “There’s a new relationship between Pyeongyang and Moscow, which may worry Beijing, but the relationship between China and North Korea has been a durable one. So we would like the Chinese to use their influence to help loosen the North Korean position.” Gallucci downplayed concerns regarding Russia’s potential transfer of sensitive military technology to North Korea. “I don’t know whether to believe it or not, but Russians have at least given some of our colleagues assurances that they would not do bad things or stupid things like getting involved with the transfer of sensitive technology to North Korea,” he said. (Kwak Yeon-soo, “Ex-U.S. Negotiator Says Normalizing Relations with NK Should Come before Denuclearization,” Korea Times, May 30, 2024)

5/28-29/24:
North Korea has resumed an unusual operation to show anger at South Korea: dumping trash from the sky across the world’s most heavily armed border. Between the past two nights, the South Korean military said that it found 260 balloons drifting across the Demilitarized Zone, the buffer between the two Koreas. Soon, residents across South Korea, including some in Seoul, the capital, reported seeing plastic bags falling from the sky. The authorities sent chemical and biological terrorism response squads, as well as bomb squads, to inspect the payloads. But they only found garbage, like cigarette butts, plastic water bottles, used paper and shoes, and what looked like compost. The South Korean military said the garbage was released by timers when the balloons reached its airspace. The North Korean balloons arrived in South Korea days after Pyongyang accused North Korean defectors living in South Korea of “scattering leaflets and various dirty things” over its border counties and vowed to take “tit-for-tat action.” “Mounds of wastepaper and filth will soon be scattered over the border areas and the interior” of South Korea, Kim Kang Il, a vice defense minister of North Korea, said in a statement on May 25. “It will directly experience how much effort is required to remove them. The two Koreas agreed to de-escalate their propaganda duel after a landmark summit in 2000 at which they agreed to promote reconciliation. The nations again reaffirmed that agreement when the North’s leader, Kim Jong Un, and President Moon Jae-in of South Korea met in 2018. But North Korean defectors and conservative activists in the South continued to send balloons to the North. Their balloons carried mini-Bibles, dollar bills, computer thumb drives containing South Korean soap operas, and leaflets that called Kim and his father and grandfather, who ruled the North before him, “pigs,” “vampires” and “womanizers.” These balloons, their proponents said, helped chip away at the information blackout and a personality cult North Korea imposed against its people. North Korea took offense, so much so that its military fired antiaircraft guns to shoot down the northbound plastic balloons. In 2016, it retaliated by sending balloons loaded with cigarette butts and other trash, as well as leaflets calling the then South Korean leader, Park Geun-hye, an “evil witch.” A few years later, it claimed that balloons from the South were carrying the Covid-19 virus. In 2021, South Korea enacted a law that banned the spreading of propaganda leaflets into North Korea. The government at the time said that the balloons did little more than provoke the North and also created trash in the South because some balloons never make it across the border. But last year, the South’s Constitutional Court struck down the law, calling it an unconstitutional infringement on the freedom of speech. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Rains Bags of Garbage on South,” New York Times, May 30, 2024, p. A-9)

5/29/24:
A debate has resurfaced over the idea of the United States redeploying tactical nuclear arms to South Korea for more robust deterrence against persistent North Korean threats amid questions over whether such an option is feasible and effective. This month, U.S. Republican Senators Jim Risch and Roger Wicker floated the idea as Pyongyang has been forging ahead with its nuclear and missile programs in the absence of meaningful diplomacy aimed at removing, freezing or at least slowing its menacing weapons projects. Some experts expressed skepticism as the redeployment of nuclear weapons, which were withdrawn from Korea in 1991, would require a raft of political, diplomatic, technical and other steps, including building domestic consensus and securing storage and maintenance facilities for nuclear arms. Apparently mindful of the renewed debate, Vedant Patel, the State Department’s deputy spokesperson, told reporters that the U.S. has “no plans to forward-deploy” nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula. During a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on May 15, Risch called for Washington to look into options for redeploying nuclear weapons to assure its allies as he stressed that East Asian allies worry about North Korea being “on track to field a diverse nuclear arsenal in the hundreds.” “The U.S. should modify our nuclear forces to reassert deterrence and reassure our allies. Importantly, we should explore options for returning nuclear weapons to the theater for the purpose of assuring our allies,” Risch, the committee’s ranking member, said. “Discussing this should not be a taboo, our enemies are watching,” he added. Today, Wicker brought up the issue again in a report, titled “21st Century Peace Through Strength: A Generational Investment in the U.S. Military.” “Because there is no immediate diplomatic solution in sight, the United States must ensure that deterrence does not erode on the Korean Peninsula,” Wicker, a ranking member of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, said in the report. “That means maintaining readiness with regular U.S.-Republic of Korea military exercises, keeping a persistent U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula and exploring new options — such as nuclear-sharing agreements in the Indo-Pacific and redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula — to bolster deterrence on the Korean Peninsula,” he added. The senators’ security proposal added to growing speculation that should former President Donald Trump — the presumptive Republican presidential nominee — return to the White House, he could bring about a foreign policy shift. Former security officials, who served during the Trump administration, have already talked about the need to consider such options as the redeployment of tactical nuclear arms to Korea in the event of the security situation deteriorating to serious levels. “That’s always on the table,” Christopher Miller, who served as the acting defense secretary under Trump, said in a recent interview with SBS, a South Korean broadcaster. “But we have to be really respectful of the Korean people. I think it’s definitely an option if things just got really bad.” Miller has been mentioned as a potential candidate for defense secretary should Trump be reelected. In an interview with Yonhap this month, Elbridge Colby, a deputy assistant secretary during the Trump administration, also said that “all options” should be on the table to ensure South Korea’s security, including its nuclear armament. Colby is seen as a potential candidate for national security advisor should Trump be reelected. The nuclear option for South Korea’s security resurfaced despite efforts by Seoul and Washington to shift away from it. The allies’ efforts included last year’s launch of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), a bilateral body to discuss nuclear and strategic planning issues. The NCG establishment was part of the Washington Declaration that President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden issued after their summit in the U.S. capital in April last year. The declaration reaffirmed Seoul’s commitment to its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The declaration was seen as part of an effort to enhance the credibility of the U.S.’ “extended deterrence” commitment to using the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear, defend its ally while helping ease growing calls for South Korea’s nuclear options. But security jitters in South Korea have continued to deepen due to Pyongyang’s dogged pursuit of its formidable weapons systems, including tactical nuclear arms and various weapons delivery vehicles, as well as its strategic military alignment with Russia. “The current approach of extended deterrence is reaching its limits. Deploying low-yield nuclear weapons to the peninsula would be less disruptive to regional security than building a South Korean bomb,” Patrick Cronin, chair for Asia-Pacific security at the Washington-based Hudson Institute, told Yonhap News Agency via email. “Perhaps the decision to do so could prompt Pyongyang to enter some type of arms control talks although we should have no illusions they would negotiate away a nuclear weapon capability altogether,” he added. Noting that he is “warming” to the idea of the U.S. redeploying tactical nuclear arms to Korea, Cronin said that there will be “various decision points” along the way. “We can declare an interest without committing to a final decision to deploy,” he said, “We need to be sure both Washington and Seoul are in accord and then determine implementation while closely monitoring regional developments.” Some experts raised questions over the feasibility of South Korea hosting U.S. tactical nuclear arms again. Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at RAND Corp., enumerated several “problems” with the redeployment idea. He said that the U.S. has only 200 tactical nuclear weapons in active inventory — 100 in Europe and the other 100 stored as a strategic reserve in the U.S. “With the Russian aggression over Ukraine, it is hard to imagine the United States taking any significant number of weapons out of Europe,” he said. “With China on the rise, the U.S. will be inclined to leave its strategic reserve in the U.S. and certainly not deploying it in the forward area where it could potentially be vulnerable to Chinese and/or North Korean interdiction,” he added. Bennett also touched on the need to have a modernized facility to store nuclear arms in Korea, stressing the requirement of sophisticated electronics and other elements for weapons storage. “Before the United States would feel comfortable putting U.S. nuclear weapons in Korea, it would first need to modernize that storage, he said. “To do that, Congress would presumably have to authorize that modernization, making the process very political.” In addition, he warned of potential massive demonstrations that could flare up against the redeployment of nuclear arms to Korea. “I would expect that South Korean progressives would begin massive demonstrations against that prospect –demonstrations likely to make the THAAD experience look like a minor political ripple,” he added, referring to domestic repercussions surrounding the installation of the U.S. anti-missile system. Commenting on the idea of Washington redeploying nuclear weapons to Korea, Robert Gallucci, a former U.S. nuclear negotiator, said it is “ignorant” to explore the option. “You are arguing for weapons of mass destruction to be reintroduced to the environment and on the Korean Peninsula,” Gallucci said during a press conference on the margins of an annual peace forum on South Korea’s southern resort island of Jeju. “For me, that’s manifestly stupid. So, these are not stupid people, I just think they are very ignorant.” (Song Sang-ho, “Debate Rekindled over Tactical Nuke Redeployment to Korea amid Doubts over Feasibility,” Yonhap, May 31, 2024)

5/30/24:
North Korea fired [18] short-range ballistic missiles into the East Sea today, the South Korean military said, a day after sending hundreds of large balloons carrying trash and manure into the South. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the flight vehicles presumed to be short-range ballistic missiles fired from the Sunan area in Pyongyang at 6:14 a.m. toward the East Sea. It did not provide further details as an analysis is currently under way. The missile launches came after the North sent hundreds of large balloons carrying trash and fecal matter to the South the past two days after warning of a “tit-for-tat action” against anti-Pyongyang leaflets sent by activists in South Korea. The latest launches mark Pyongyang’s first ballistic missile launch since May 17, when it test-fired tactical ballistic missiles equipped with what it called a new “autonomous” navigation system, considered to be short-range ballistic missiles. (Lee Minji, “N. Korea Fires around 10 Short-Range Missiles into East Sea: JCS,” Yonhap, May 30, 2024)

KCNA: “The regime of gangsters and the puppet army of the ROK infringed upon the sovereignty of the DPRK in an intolerably hideous act of provocation in which they performed a clumsy counteraction of dangerous show of military power against its exercise of legitimate sovereign right. In this regard, the super-large multiple rocket launcher sub-units conducted a power demonstration firing aimed at them in order to clearly show the DPRK’s corresponding will to ensure the sovereignty and security of the state with powerful and overwhelming means of war and to carry out even a preemptive attack by invoking the right to self-defense at any time if the enemies attempt to use military force against the DPRK. The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un directly gave an order to organize the power demonstration firing and oversaw it on the spot. Repeatedly stressing that it is the duty and mission of the armed forces of the DPRK approved by its Constitution to mobilize the military retaliatory forces for safeguarding the sovereignty of the state and the territorial integrity, he declared that today’s power demonstration firing, which is to be held under the situation in which the enemy is desperately conducting political and military maneuvers to plunder the DPRK of its sovereignty, will be an occasion for clearly showing what consequences our rivals will face if they provoke us. The salvo of a firepower sub-unit was carried out by operating the integrated fire-control system, a part of the national combined nuclear weapons management system. The drill was attended by the 3rd Battalion of the 331st Red Flag Artillery Regiment under the artillery combined unit of the Korean People’s Army in charge of the important firing attack task in the western border area. A secret code order of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea on the firepower mission was given to the fire attack companies of the battalion and the salvo of the battalion was carried out based on the integrated fire-control system. When Kim Jong Un gave an order to fire at the observation post, General Jang Chang Ha, director general of the Missile Administration of the DPRK, commanded the fire attack. Just then, as loud explosive sound rending heaven and earth broke out, and showers of fire for annihilation boasting marvelous strength clearly demonstrated the DPRK’s will to defend its sovereignty and react against the enemy. A-match-for-a-hundred artillerymen, fully charged with firm hostility toward the enemy and clear outlook on the arch enemy, accurately hit an island target 365 km away and successfully carried out their power demonstration firing task. Kim Jong Un highly appreciated that the world’s most powerful war attack means of Korean style, which boast formidable power, are maintaining prompt and thoroughgoing counterattack posture and are fully prepared. He stressed that the nuclear forces of the DPRK should be more thoroughly prepared to promptly and correctly perform the important mission of deterring a war and taking the initiative in the war at any time and in any emergency. The means of war and preemptive attack forces of the DPRK’s armed forces will maintain their war posture with their more enhanced capacity and fulfill their important mission of deterring a war and defending sovereignty.” (KCNA, “Report on Power Demonstration Firing of 600mm Super-large Multiple Rocket Launcher Sub-Units; Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Oversees Power Demonstration Firing,” May 31, 2024)

5/31/24:
North Korea staged GPS jamming attacks in waters near South Korea’s northwestern border islands for a third straight day today, the South’s military said, in the latest in a series of provocative acts this week. The military detected the jamming signals from about 8 a.m. directed toward the islands near the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea, the de facto western maritime boundary between the two Koreas, according to a South Korean military official. The latest attempt has not hindered the military’s operations, the official said, although similar attempts the previous day led to glitches in the navigation systems of fishing boats and passenger ships in the waters. The military detected yesterday’s jamming attack shortly after the North launched 18 rounds of multiple rocket launchers toward the East Sea. (Chae Yun-hwan, “N. Korea Stages GPS Jamming Attack for Third Day,” Yonhap, May 31, 2024)

6/2/24:
North Korea has sent around 720 more balloons carrying trash to South Korea and continued jamming GPS signals for five straight days against the South, Seoul’s military said today, as South Korea’s presidential office was considering taking countermeasures. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it has detected some 720 balloons that floated across the Military Demarcation Line separating the two Koreas and fell in different parts of the country between 8 p.m. Saturday and 1 p.m. Sunday. The balloons carried various pieces of trash, such as cigarette butts, paper and plastic bags, just like the previous balloons, according to the JCS. “About 20 to 50 balloons are moving per hour through the air and coming down in Seoul, Gyeonggi Province, North Chungcheong Province and North Gyeongsang Province,” a JCS official said on the condition of anonymity. The official later stated that no additional balloons had been detected after 1 p.m. North Korea previously sent around 260 balloons carrying trash and excrement to the South on Tuesday and Wednesday after it warned of a “tit-for-tat action” against anti-Pyongyang leaflets sent by the South’s activists. The total number of balloons is similar to the total amount observed annually in the 2016-2017 period. The JCS advised people not to touch the objects and report them to nearby military or police authorities. It also warned of possible danger from the balloons. The military dispatched teams to recover the debris instead of shooting down the balloons, as the possibility of them carrying toxic chemicals cannot be completely ruled out. There have been no reports of injuries so far. North Korea has been jamming GPS signals .ks in waters near South Korea’s northwestern border islands for the fourth straight day Saturday. (Kim Han-joo, “N. Korea Sends Some 720 More Trash-Carrying Balloons to S. Korea, Continues GPS Jamming for 5 Days,” Yonhap, June 2, 2024) North Korea sent another batch of balloons carrying filth and propaganda to South Korea over the weekend, prompting a stern reaction from the South Korean government, which vowed Sunday to take “unendurable” action. “Dispatching of trash balloons and jamming GPS are despicable and irrational acts of provocation that could not have been imagined by a normal country,” National Security Adviser Chang Ho-jin said after presiding over a National Security Council meeting called in response. “We will take measures that will be unendurable for North Korea following today’s meeting,” the NSA adviser added, warning against any further provocations, which he said were aimed at causing anxiety and confusion in the South. A senior source from the presidential office did not elaborate what consequences North Korea would face, but that it would not rule out resuming anti-North Korea loudspeaker broadcasts along the border. (Kim Arin and Son Ji-hyoung, “Seoul Vows Strong Action against NK Trash Balloons,” Korea Herald, June 2, 2024)

DPRK Vice Minister of National Defense Kim Kang Il’s press statement: “From the night of May 28 to the dawn of June 2, we scattered 15 tons of wastepaper, favorite toy of the human scum, over the border areas of the ROK and its capital region with more than 3 500 balloons of various sorts. We made the ROK clans get enough experience of how much unpleasant they feel and how much effort is needed to remove the scattered wastepaper. We are going to halt wastepaper scattering over the border temporarily as our action was a countermeasure from A to Z. But, if the ROK clans resume anti-DPRK leaflet scattering, we will correspond to it by intensively scattering wastepaper and rubbish hundred times the amount of scattered leaflets and the number of cases, as we have already warned.” (KCNA, “Press Statement by Vice-Minister of National Defense of DPRK,” June 2, 2024)

6/3/24:
The presidential National Security Council (NSC) decided today to suspend the 2018 inter-Korean reduction pact until mutual trust is restored in response to North Korea’s massive sending of trash-carrying balloons into South Korea. The NSC held a meeting with related ministries to evaluate North Korea’s recent series of provocations and agreed to propose a motion suspending the Comprehensive Military Agreement during a Cabinet meeting slated for tomorrow. “The attendees decided to submit a proposal to suspend the entire effectiveness of the September 19 Military Agreement until mutual trust between the two Koreas is restored,” the presidential office said in a release. The NSC meeting, presided over by Deputy Principal National Security Adviser Kim Tae-hyo, concluded that North Korea’s recent provocations have caused real harm and threats to South Korean citizens and negatively impacted the military’s readiness posture. “This measure will enable military training near the Military Demarcation Line, which has been restricted by the agreement, and allow for more adequate and immediate responses to North Korean provocations. The government will take all necessary measures to protect the lives and safety of our citizens,” the office said. Ye3sterday, National Security Adviser Chang Ho-jin said the government will take “unbearable” measures against North Korea in response to its sending of trash balloons and continued jamming of GPS signals last week. It raised speculation over resuming propaganda campaigns via loudspeakers along the border. Hours after the warning, North Korea said it will temporarily stop sending trash-carrying balloons across the border, though it also threatened to resume such operations if anti-Pyongyang leaflets are sent from South Korea. The North said its balloon campaign came purely in response to leaflets sent by South Korean activists. To resume the front-line broadcasts, it would be necessary to nullify a 2018 inter-Korean military agreement, which bans hostile acts between the two Koreas. The loudspeakers used to air criticism of the Kim Jong Un regime’s human rights abuses, news and K-pop songs, drawing angry responses from Pyongyang. The 2018 agreement, signed to reduce tensions along the border, remains effectively scrapped after the North conducted live-fire artillery drills near the western border islands in January. (Kim Eun-jung, “NSC Decides to Fully Suspend 2018 Inter-Korean Tension Reduction Pact Following N.K. Trash-Carrying Balloon Campaign,” Yonhap, June 3, 2024)

6/4/24:
South Korea will resume all military activities near the Military Demarcation Line and its northwestern border islands for the first time in more than five years, with the full suspension of a 2018 inter-Korean tension reduction pact, the defense ministry said today. The announcement came after President Yoon Suk Yeol endorsed a motion to fully suspend the Comprehensive Military Agreement until mutual trust is restored in response to the North’s trash-carrying balloon campaign and jamming of GPS signals in recent days. “This measure is restoring to normality all military activities by our military, which had been restricted by the 2018 pact,” Cho Chang-rae, deputy defense minister for policy, said in a press briefing, vowing to take “all possible measures” to protect the lives and safety of the South Korean people. “All responsibility for causing this situation lies with the North Korean regime and if the North attempts to stage additional provocations, our military will sternly retaliate based on a firm S. Korea-U.S. combined defense posture,” Cho said. Signed on Sept. 19, 2018, the suspended deal included setting up a land buffer zone, where artillery drills and regiment-level field maneuvers are to be suspended, and maritime buffer zones, where artillery firing and naval drills are to be banned. It also designated no-fly zones near the border to prevent accidental aircraft clashes. With today’s suspension, South Korea will be able to carry out drills to bolster front-line defenses, with respective units now allowed to draw up training plans near the MDL and the border islands. The suspension will also allow South Korea to restart loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts toward the North, a key tool for psychological warfare involving criticism of the Kim Jong Un regime’s human rights abuses, news and K-pop songs, which had prompted angry responses from Pyongyang. Earlier in the day, Joint Chiefs of Staff spokesperson Lee Sung-jun said various measures could be taken after the suspension, noting that the military has operated both fixed and mobile loudspeakers on the front lines. “Fixed loudspeakers need to be connected to power and installing them could take hours to a few days,” Lee told a regular briefing. “Mobile loudspeaker operations can be conducted right away.” A government source said there appears to be no plan to immediately install the fixed loudspeakers as such activities could heighten military tension, noting that the military will likely operate the mobile equipment first if such broadcasts are resumed. A unification ministry official said the South still remains open to dialogue with the North, noting that Pyongyang continues to walk the path of isolation after severing inter-Korean communication lines in April last year. “North Korea should not take actions of self-isolation through such provocations but take the path of denuclearization and people’s livelihood,” the official said. “We will continue to make efforts so that North Korea comes to the path of dialogue.” (Lee Minji and Chae Yun-hwan, “S. Korea to Restore All Border Military Activities Restricted under 2018 Pact with N. Korea,” Yonhap, June 4, 2024)

6/5//24:
The United States today deployed one B-1B bomber for joint bombing drills in South Korea for the first time in seven years amid heightened tensions over North Korea’s trash balloon campaign and GPS jamming attacks. The U.S. heavy bomber from Andersen Air Base in Guam and two South Korean F-15K fighters released live GBU-38, 500-pound joint direct attack munitions, to strike multiple simulated targets at Pilsung Range in Taebaek, 181 kilometers southeast of Seoul, according to the U.S. 7th Air Force in South Korea. The U.S. bomber also staged joint air-to-air training with South Korean F-35A and KF-16 fighters, as well as U.S. F-35B and F-16 jets over the country’s western region, according to the 7th Air Force. (Chae Yun-hwan, “U.S. B-1 Bomber Holds Bombing Drills in S. Korea for 1st Time in 7 Years,” Yonhap, June 5, 2024)

South Korea’s spy agency said today it has detected signs that North Korea has recently been demolishing some sections on the northern side of the inter-Korean railway on the east coast in an apparent move to erase the legacy of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. South and North Korea agreed to restore two railways — the Gyeongui and Donghae — in 2000, when the divided countries held the first summit of their leaders. The Donghae railway linked eastern coastal cities across the heavily fortified border. North Korea has been focusing on erasing unification references since its leader Kim Jong Un defined inter-Korean ties as those “between two states hostile to each other” at a year-end party meeting. For the Donghae railway, the track passing through the heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas was built in 2006, linking a some 27-kilometer section along the east coast. But it has not been operated, except in the pilot operation in 2007. (Kim Soo-yeon, “Signs Detected of N. Korea Demolishing Part of Donghae Inter-Korean Railway: NIS,” Yonhap, June 5, 2024)

6/6/24:
A North Korean defectors’ group said today it has sent about 10 large plastic balloons carrying propaganda leaflets against the North Korean regime across the border, raising concerns Pyongyang could resume sending trash-filled balloons. Filled with 200,000 flyers criticizing the regime, dollar bills and USB sticks loaded with K-pop and trot music, the balloons were floated from Pocheon, north of Seoul, early today, according to Park Sang-hak, head of the Fighters for a Free North Korea (FFNK). A military source confirmed that some of these balloons have flown into the North but said no signs of retaliatory action were detected yet from the North Korean side, including any launch of ballistic missiles or release of balloons loaded with trash. (Yi Wonin, “Defector Group Send Leaflets to Pyongyang; No Sign of N.K. Provocation,” June 6, 2024)

6/8/24:
South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said late today that North Korea was flying balloons loaded with trash once again, as the wind was forecast to veer south. Following the JCS announcement an alert was issued across Seoul and areas near the border warning residents to beware of falling objects and to report sightings to authorities. The South Korean military has been watching for another wave of the North Korean balloons after a group of activists called Fighters for Free North Korea tried to send 10 balloons carrying removable drives containing K-pop music and anti-Pyongyang leaflets two days ago. The JCS then confirmed that at least a few of those balloons had crossed the border to North. (Kim Arin, “North Korea Resumes Trash Balloons: JCS,” Korea Herald, June 8, 2024)

6/9/24:
South Korea will install loudspeakers near the border and resume propaganda broadcasts today, the presidential office said, in response to North Korea’s repeated launches of balloons filled with trash. It would be the first propaganda broadcast near the heavily fortified border since January 2016, when the South Korean military resumed its loudspeaker campaign in retaliation for North Korea’s fourth nuclear test. The National Security Council (NSC) convened an emergency meeting and approved the measure, a day after the North floated the balloons in retaliation against South Korean civic groups’ recent launch of balloons carrying anti-Pyongyang propaganda leaflets across the border. The expanded NSC meeting was presided over by NSC adviser Chang Ho-jin and attended by the ministers of foreign affairs, defense and unification as well as the spy agency chief, the government coordination policy chief and deputy directors of the national security office. The announcement came hours after the South Korean military said it detected some 330 waste-carrying balloons launched by the North since yesterday, with more than 80 of them landing inside South Korea. The North has staged the balloon campaign, which it described as a “tit-for-tat” response to anti-Pyongyang leafleting by activists in South Korea. It launched nearly 1,000 trash-carrying balloons into the South late last month and early last week. or years, North Korean defectors in the South and conservative activists have sent leaflets to the North via balloons to help encourage North Koreans to eventually rise up against the Pyongyang regime. North Korea has bristled at the propaganda campaign amid concern that an influx of outside information could pose a threat to its leader Kim Jong Un. In 2014, the two Koreas exchanged machine-gun fire across the border after the North apparently tried to shoot down balloons carrying propaganda leaflets critical of North Korea. With the NSC’s approval, the military is expected to resume the propaganda broadcasts on the front lines later in the day. Last week, the military conducted drills to operate the propaganda loudspeakers for the first time since 2018, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The Echo of Freedom exercise inspected operational procedures of the equipment to inform North Koreans of the reality of their country, South Korea’s development over the years and its popular culture, the JCS said. A JCS official said the military has completed preparations for loudspeaker operations, noting that it will broadcast “Voice of Freedom,” a radio program run by the defense ministry’s psychological warfare unit, but declined to provide details, such as the specific timing of the resumption, the amount of equipment mobilized and its location. The fixed loudspeakers were dismantled following the 2018 inter-Korean tension pact and have been stored in warehouses, while the mobile units are parked by nearby military bases, according to military officials. Fixed loudspeakers, audible up to 24 kilometers, had been installed at around 10 front-line locations, while about 40 mobile units, with a greater range, were also used. Loudspeaker propaganda began in 1963 under former President Park Chung-hee’s administration and was halted in 2004 following an inter-Korean military agreement during the liberal Roh Moo-hyun administration. In 2015, the two Koreas engaged in a brief exchange of artillery fire over the western part of their border over a propaganda loudspeaker campaign that Seoul resumed in retaliation for North Korea’s landmine attack, which had maimed two South Korean soldiers. North Korea later expressed regret over the land mine attack and South Korea agreed to halt anti-Pyongyang broadcasts. (Kim Eun-jung and Chae Yun-hwan, “S. Korea to Resume Propaganda Broadcasts against N. Korea’s Trash-Balloon Campaign,” Yonhap, June 9, 2024)

About 20 North Korean soldiers briefly crossed the inter-Korean land border earlier this week and went back to the North’s side after the South’s military fired warning shots, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said June 11. The North Korean soldiers crossed the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas in the central section of the border at around 12:30 p.m. June 9, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The South Korean military conducted warning broadcasts and fired warning shots, prompting the North Koreans to return to their side of the border, the JCS said, adding that there was no unusual activity after the warning shots. JCS spokesperson Col. Lee Sung-jun said the military assesses the soldiers, who were working on an unspecified task inside the DMZ, did not intend to cross the MDL, considering that they returned immediately after the warning shots. Lee added that the DMZ is currently thick with grass and bushes, making the MDL sign difficult to see. (Chae Yun-hwan, “N. Korean Soldiers Briefly Cross Inter-Korean Border, Return after Warning Shots,” June 11, 2024)

WPK Central Committee Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong’s Press Statement: “The ROK connived at the provocative act of scattering the political agitation rubbish across the border of the DPRK again on June 6 and 7 despite our repeated warning against the intemperate psychological warfare of the scum who defected from the DPRK, thus aggravating the situation. In the period between June 6 and 8, the despicable political agitation rubbish was discovered in Singye and Thosan counties of North Hwanghae Province, Jangphung County and Phanmun District of Kaesong Municipality, Kosan, Phyonggang and Cholwon counties of Kangwon Province and other areas of the DPRK near the border. As already warned, the DPRK scattered 7.5 tons of waste paper with more than 1 400 balloons over the border of the ROK from the night of June 8 to the dawn of June 9. As you will see, we have only scattered empty waste paper without any political agitation. It is quite different from the provocative political agitation rubbish scattered by the scum of the ROK against the DPRK. Our minimum reaction is only the just and reflective reaction at the very low level. Our reaction was scheduled to end on June 9, but the situation has changed. The reason was explained by the act of the ROK. The loudspeaker broadcasting provocation started in the border area at last. This is a prelude to a very dangerous situation. Politicians of Seoul are trying hard to justify their stand with the only and strange deformed logic in the world that regulates and judges the “freedom of expression” and “provocation” in the windward direction. And they formalized their behavior just like a guilty filing the suit first that they have resumed the loudspeaker broadcasting smear campaign again against the DPRK’s counteraction against their challengeable act, thus creating a new crisis. We strongly denounce the despicable and childish behavior of the ROK and clarify our stand responding to it. If the ROK simultaneously carries out the leaflet scattering and loudspeaker broadcasting provocation over the border, it will undoubtedly witness the new counteraction of the DPRK. The ROK will suffer a bitter embarrassment of picking up waste paper without rest and it will be its daily work. I sternly warn Seoul to stop at once the dangerous act of bringing the further confrontation crisis and discipline itself.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Kim Yo Jong,” June 10, 2024)

6/15/24:
Opposition leader Lee Jae-myung today said the two Koreas should sit together and communicate to ease the escalating tensions over Pyongyang’s trash-carrying balloon campaign and Seoul’s response. On social media, Lee said the peace built up on the Korean Peninsula is at risk as the two Koreas have been engaged in tit-for-tat measures. Referring to the North’s sending balloons carrying trash across the border, South Korean civic group’s sending of anti-Pyongyang leaflets and suspension of the inter-Korean military pact, Lee said North Korea should stop provocative actions and seek to establish an eternal peace regime, as reflected in the June 15 Declaration, the joint declaration for the two Koreas’ first inter-Korean summit on June 15, 2000. “(The South Korean government) should realize that ordinary citizens and residents near the border will bear any damage should it stick to a hardline, eye-for-eye stance,” Lee said. (Park Sang-soo, “Opposition Leader Calls for Inter-Korean Talks amid Tensions,” Yonhap, June 15, 2024)

North Korea’s military has been carrying out unexplained construction activities inside the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas, according to a military source today. “Recently, the North Korean military has been erecting walls, digging the ground and constructing roads in some areas between the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and the Northern Limit Line in the DMZ,” the source said. The source added it was unclear whether these activities indicate an intention to build a long wall north of the MDL or simply to establish defensive structures at specific points. Earlier this week, about 20 North Korean soldiers briefly crossed the inter-Korean land border before going back to the North’s side after the South’s military fired warning shots amid heightened tensions over Pyongyang’s trash-carrying balloon campaign. Military watchers speculate the incident could be related to the North’s wall construction. At the time of the border incursion, the North Korean soldiers were carrying work tools, such as pickaxes and shovels. (Chang Dong-woo, “N. Korean Military’s Construction Activities Spotted inside DMZ: Source,” Yonhap, June 15, 2024)

6/17//24:
KCNA: “At the invitation of Kim Jong Un, president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, president of the Russian Federation, will pay a state visit to the DPRK from June 18 to 19.” (KCNA, “Russian President to Visit DPRK,” June 17, 2024)

6/18/24:
KCNA: “V. Putin, president of the Russian Federation, released an article titled “Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Tradition of friendship and cooperation lasts decade after decade.” V. Putin in an article said that he would like to tell the readers of Rodong Sinmun in the DPRK and abroad about the prospect of the partnership between the two countries and its significance in the present world before paying a state visit to the DPRK. The friendship and good neighborly relations between Russia and the DPRK based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and trust have passed 70 years and been recorded with the glorious historic tradition, the article said, and went on: The people of the two countries preciously cherish the memory of the hard-fought common struggle against Japanese militarism and pay tribute to the heroes who fell victims. The monument on Moran Hill erected in the center of Pyongyang in 1946 in commemoration of the liberation of Korea by the Red Army is a symbol of militant friendship between the peoples of the two countries. The Soviet Union recognized the young DPRK for the first time in the world and established diplomatic relations with the DPRK. The agreement on economic and cultural cooperation between the Soviet Union and the DPRK was concluded on March 17, 1949 when Comrade Kim Il Sung, founder of the DPRK, visited Moscow for the first time, and the agreement laid a legal foundation for boosting bilateral cooperation in the future. Even in the difficult period of the 1950-1953 Fatherland Liberation War, the Soviet Union rendered assistance to the DPRK people and supported them in their struggle for independence. My visit to Pyongyang in 2000 and the visit to Russia next year by Comrade Kim Jong Il, chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK, served as a new and important milestone in the relations between the two countries. The bilateral declarations issued at that time had defined the main stand and orientations of our creative and many-sided partnership in the future. Comrade Kim Jong Un, the present leader of the DPRK, is confidently adhering to the line laid down by Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, the preceding leaders, distinguished statesmen and friends of the Russian people. I was convinced of this once again during our meeting at the Vostochny Spaceport of Russia in September last year. As before, Russia and the DPRK are now actively developing the many-sided partnership. We highly appreciate that the DPRK is firmly supporting the special military operations of Russia being conducted in Ukraine, expressing solidarity with us on major international issues and maintaining the common line and stand at the UN. As our reliable comrade and supporter yesterday and today, Pyongyang is willing to resolutely oppose the ambition of the “Western group” to hinder the establishment of a multi-polarized world order based on mutual respect for justice and sovereignty and consideration of mutual interests. In essence, the U.S. is making every desperate effort to impose on the world the so-called “order based on rules” which is nothing but a world-wide neocolonialist dictatorship based on the “double standards.” The U.S. and its followers are openly claiming that their aim is to deal “strategic defeat” to Russia. They are doing everything they can do to delay and further aggravate the conflicts in Ukraine triggered by them by backing and fabricating the armed coup in Kiev in 2014 and the war in the Donbas area afterward. Russia is ready to have an equal dialogue on all the most complicated issues in the past and in the future, too. I mentioned this again at a recent meeting with Russian diplomats in Moscow. Meanwhile, our enemies are conversely continue to supply neo-Nazi Kiev authorities with money, weapons and reconnaissance data, allowing modern weapons and technical equipment offered by the West to be used for attacking the Russian territory and, in fact, encouraging them. But although they make desperate efforts, all their attempts to repress and isolate Russia have been frustrated. We are pleased that the friends of the DPRK are defending their interests very effectively despite the U.S. economic pressure, provocation, blackmail and military threats that have lasted for decades. We are seeing the DPRK people fight to defend their freedom, sovereignty and national traditions with what strength, dignity and courage. Russia has supported the DPRK and its heroic people in the struggle to defend their rights to choose the road of independence, originality and development by themselves in the confrontation with the cunning, dangerous and aggressive enemy yesterday and tomorrow, too, and will invariably support them in the future, too. We are firmly convinced that we will put bilateral cooperation onto a higher level with our joint efforts and this will contribute to developing reciprocal and equal cooperation between Russia and the DPRK, strengthening our sovereignty, deepening economic and trade relations, developing the ties in the field of humanitarianism and, consequently, improving the well-being of the citizens of the two states. The article wished Comrade Kim Jong Un good health and all the friendly DPRK people great success on the road of peace and development.” (KCNA, “Russia and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Tradition of Friendship and Cooperation Lasts Decade after Decade,’ June 18, 2024)

Around 20 to 30 North Korean soldiers working in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) crossed the military demarcation line (MDL) but returned immediately after warning shots and broadcasts from the South Korean military, Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said today.
The JCS believes that the crossing of the MDL by North Korean soldiers was a simple mishap since they returned north immediately after warnings were given. Previously, on June 9, dozens of North Korean soldiers working in the DMZ similarly crossed the MDL but retreated after receiving warning shots from the South. The JCS also judged this as unintentional. “The area where the North Korean military crossed the MDL today is different from the area that was crossed on June 9,” said an official from the JCS. “North Korea has deployed a large number of troops to various frontline areas, including the Northern Limit Line, since April this year, where they have been laying mines, reinforcing tactical roads and installing unidentified structures that appear to be anti-tank barriers,” the JCS official said. The DMZ is currently overgrown with vegetation, sometimes making MDL markings challenging to see. The JCS also announced today that a number of North Korean soldiers were recently killed or injured by landmine explosions while working in the DMZ. “It appears that the North Korean military is continuing to carry out work in the DMZ in an unreasonable manner despite the fact that many casualties are occurring due to landmine explosions,” said an official from the JCS during a press briefing today. (Lim Jeong-won, “North Korean Soldiers Briefly Cross Border for Second Times This Month,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 18, 2024)

6/19/24:
Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signed a new partnership deal that resurrected a mutual defense commitment in case either country is attacked in a summit held under the wary eyes of the international community on Wednesday. “The comprehensive partnership agreement signed today provides, among other things, for mutual assistance in the event of aggression against one of the parties to this agreement,” Putin was quoted as saying by state news agency TASS, after one-on-one talks that lasted for around 2 hours. Calling it a “breakthrough” treaty with North Korea, the Russian leader said it would take their bilateral ties to a “new level.” He also said the two countries stand against “politically motivated sanctions” after the signing ceremony. Putin also mentioned that Russia does not rule out developing military-technical cooperation with North Korea in connection with the signed agreement. Kim lauded the agreement as the “strongest treaty in the history of bilateral ties,” elevating them to “a new, high level of alliance.” Moscow and Pyongyang had kept automatic military intervention in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed in 1961 during the Cold War era. Putin earlier in the day announced a “new fundamental document” that would form the basis of relations between Russia and North Korea “for the long term” during an enlarged meeting at the Kumsusan Palace in the capital of the isolated country. Putin’s aide for foreign affairs Yury Ushakov announced yesterday that the new treaty would replace the 2000 treaty and the Moscow and Pyongyang Declarations of 2000 and 2001. The new treaty, therefore, has elevated their relationship to just below the level of a strategic alliance. Traditionally, Russia categorizes its foreign relations into several levels of closeness: good neighborly relations, strategic cooperative partnership, comprehensive strategic partnership, and strategic alliance. The Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness, and Cooperation signed between Moscow and Pyongyang in February 2000, five months before Putin’s first-ever trip to Pyongyang, established their relationship at the lowest level: good neighborly relations. Director of the Institute for Eurasian Strategic Studies Park Byung-hwan pointed out that the “North Korea-Russia relationship has been elevated to a higher level than the South Korea-Russia relationship.” South Korea and Russia have maintained a strategic cooperative partnership since 2008. Ushakov also disclosed Wednesday that Kim received a tea set, an admiral’s dagger and a Russian-produced new Aurus luxury car from Putin. In February, Putin gifted an Aurus Senat to Kim, drawing criticism from the international community for violating UN Security Council Resolution 2397. At the highly-watched meeting, Putin and Kim also flaunted a united front on Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and vowed to expand their strategic partnership against the US and its allies. Putin also expressed Russia’s appreciation for North Korea’s consistent and unwavering support of Russian policies, including its stance on the war in Ukraine. “I am referring to our struggle against the hegemonic policy imposed for decades, the imperialist policy of the United States and satellites towards the Russian Federation,” Putin said as quoted by state-run Sputnik News during his meeting with Kim. In return, Kim noted Russia’s role in “maintaining strategic stability and balance in the world.” Kim also expressed “full support and solidarity to the Russian government, army and people in carrying out the special military operation in Ukraine to protect sovereignty, security interests and also territorial integrity.” “Now the situation in the world is becoming more complicated and changing rapidly. In this situation, we intend to further strengthen strategic communication with Russia, with the Russian leadership,” Kim said. Putin commenced his first visit to Pyongyang in 24 years with a lavish official welcoming ceremony at Kim Il Sung Square. The square was adorned with large-scale portraits of Kim and Putin and thronged with children and residents cheering, dancing, and waving flowers and the flags of the two countries, as shown in video footage provided by the Kremlin. Putin and Kim inspected the military guards, strolled along a red carpet and rode together in a car through streets adorned with enthusiastic crowds waving the flags of their respective nations before proceeding to engage in high-level discussions with their delegations, according to video footage by the Kremlin and Russian state-run media outlets. The Russian delegation includes high-ranking officials from a broader range of sectors compared to Putin’s trip to Pyongyang in 2000. Among the delegation are Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, the point man for the energy sector; Minister of Natural Resources and Environment Alexander Kozlov; Head of the Roscosmos State Space Corporation Yuri Borisov; and Russian Railways CEO Oleg Belozerov. Additionally, the delegation features First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Deputy Defense Minister Aleksey Krivoruchko, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Transport Minister Roman Starovoit, Health Minister Mikhail Murashko, and Oleg Kozhemyako, Governor of the Russian Far Eastern region of Primorsky Krai. North Korean state media today highlighted that Putin’s visit came “at a crucial time” when the friendly relations between North Korea and Russia “have emerged as a strong strategic fortress for preserving international justice, peace and security and an engine for accelerating the building of a new multi-polar world.” State media also said the meeting between Kim and Putin amply demonstrated the “invincibility and durability of the DPRK-Russia friendship and unity,” referring to North Korea by an acronym of its official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Putin arrived at Pyongyang International Airport early this morning, several hours later than originally planned, for his two-day trip to Pyongyang. However, Kim waited for Putin alone, without a North Korean welcoming delegation, on a red carpet at the airport. The scene was adorned with a banner in Korean and Russian reading “the DPRK-Russia friendship will last forever,” along with the national flags of North Korea and Russia. After exchanging handshakes and embracing, the two leaders shared a few more words before proceeding to Putin’s presidential Aurus limousine. North Korean state media reported that the two leaders “exchanged their pent-up inmost thoughts and opened their minds to more surely develop the DPRK-Russia relations in conformity with the common desire and will of the peoples of the two countries with the meeting as a momentum” en route to the Kumsusan State Guest House, Putin’s residence. The Putin-Kim summit has sparked concerns over furthering their illicit military cooperation, which involves North Korea supplying weapons to support Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken reaffirmed yesterday that “North Korea is providing significant munitions to Russia, and other – and other weapons for use in Ukraine” during a joint press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg when the war going,” Blinken said. Stoltenberg also pointed out, “We are, of course, also concerned about the potential support that Russia provides to North Korea when it comes to supporting their missile and nuclear programs.” At the UN Security Council meeting, South Korean Ambassador to UN Hwang Joon-kook underscored yesterday that “Not only what Russia receives from this deal, but also what North Korea gets in return, may pose a significant threat to international peace and security.” The “illegal and perilous military cooperation between these two countries has emerged as a grave international security concern in Europe, Asia and beyond,” Hwang said. (Ji Da-gyum, “Putin, Kim Sign Treaty for Mutual Assistance against ‘Aggression,’” Korea Herald, June 19, 2024) President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un, revived a Cold War-era mutual defense pledge between their nations today, signing a new agreement that calls for them to assist each other in the event of “aggression” against either country. The Russian president, in a briefing after the two leaders signed the document, did not clarify whether such assistance would require immediate and full-fledged military intervention in the event of an attack, as the now-defunct 1961 treaty specified. But he said that Russia “does not exclude the development of military-technical cooperation” with North Korea in accordance with the new agreement. The pact was one of the most visible rewards Kim has extracted from Moscow in return for the dozens of ballistic missiles and over 11,000 shipping containers of munitions that Washington has said North Korea has provided in recent months to help support Putin’s war in Ukraine. It also represented the farthest the Kremlin has gone in throwing its weight behind North Korea, after years of cooperating with the United States at the United Nations in curbing Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile program — a change that accelerated after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. “This is a truly breakthrough document, reflecting the desire of the two countries not to rest on their laurels, but to raise our relations to a new qualitative level,” Putin added. Neither North Korea nor Russia immediately released the text of the new agreement. Putin denounced the United States for expanding military infrastructure in the region and holding drills with South Korea and Japan. He rejected what he called attempts to blame the deteriorating security situation on North Korea, which has carried out six nuclear test explosions since 2006 and tested intercontinental ballistic missiles that could reach the United States. “Pyongyang has the right to take reasonable measures to strengthen its own defense capability, ensure national security and protect sovereignty,” Putin said. Kim called the pact a “most powerful agreement” and praised the “outstanding foresight” of Putin, “the dearest friend of the Korean people,” the state-owned Russian news agency RIA Novosti said. The pledge of mutual assistance is likely to further alarm Washington and its allies, particularly South Korea, because it could not only provide further support for Russia’s war in Ukraine but also undermines efforts to curb North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Putin’s remarks recalled the 1961 treaty of friendship and mutual assistance between Pyongyang and Moscow under which the two countries were obliged to “immediately extend military and other assistance” with all means at their disposal, should one of them find itself at war. That treaty became defunct after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. When Moscow and Pyongyang signed a friendship agreement in 2000, it lacked a clause on automatic military intervention, calling only for mutual “contact” if a security emergency were to arise. It did not stipulate military intervention or military aid. Putin is the first major head of state to visit North Korea since the pandemic, highlighting its importance to Russia: It is one of the few like-minded countries able and willing to supply Moscow with badly needed conventional weapons. Kim gave the Russian leader a red-carpet welcome early Wednesday in Pyongyang, the North’s capital. His energy-starved government flooded downtown Pyongyang with bright lights as the two leaders were driven in the same car — the Russian-made Aurus limousine that Putin gave Kim last year — to the state guesthouse. Despite sweltering heat, huge crowds were mobilized to a welcoming ceremony for Putin in the main square of Pyongyang later today, complete with goose-stepping honor guards and colorful balloons released into the air. The crowds waved paper flowers and the national flags of the two nations as Putin arrived. As negotiations began, Putin touted a new strategic partnership document that the two leaders had signed at the summit. “We greatly appreciate your consistent and unwavering support for Russian policy, including with regard to Ukraine, in light of our fight against the imperial policy the United States has pursued over decades in relation to the Russian Federation,” Putin told the North Korean leader. Putin, who last visited North Korea shortly after becoming president in 2000, noted the changes in the capital over the intervening years and said the city had become beautiful under Kim’s leadership. He expressed hope that the next meeting between the two leaders would take place in the Russian capital. In his remarks, Kim underscored what he called Russia’s role in supporting strategic stability and balance in the world, according to reports in Russian state media. The North Korean leader reiterated his support for Russian operations in Ukraine, cheering a new era of prosperity in relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, the state news reports said. Later today, Putin was scheduled to visit the only Russian Orthodox Church in North Korea, built in the mid-2000s. Putin has received artillery shells and missiles from North Korea to help fuel his drawn-out war in Ukraine, according to American and South Korean officials, though both Russia and the North have denied any arms transfers. For his part, Kim covets Russian help in easing his country’s oil shortages, improving its weapons systems and undermining Washington’s attempts to strangle its economy with international sanctions. North Korea’s military has long been ridiculed for its backward technologies and vast stockpile of outdated Soviet-era weaponry, such as artillery shells. But the fact that Putin was visiting Pyongyang for the first time in 24 years demonstrated how such old-fashioned munitions are among those that Russia most desperately needs in its war of attrition in Ukraine. (Choe Sang-hun and Paul Sonne, “Putin and Kim Sign Pact Pledging Mutual Support against ‘Aggression,’” New York Times, June 20, 2024)

As Vladimir V. Putin’s Russia and Xi Jinping’s China deepened their confrontation with the West over the past decade, they were always united with the United States on at least one geopolitical project: dismantling or at least containing North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. That is, until the war in Ukraine broke out two years ago. In one of the starkest back-to-the-Cold War moments yet, Putin’s visit today to Pyongyang — and the announcement of a pact to provide “mutual assistance in the event of aggression” — underscored that efforts by the world’s three biggest nuclear powers to halt nuclear proliferation by North Korea had been dying for some time. Putin and Kim Jong Un just presided over the memorial service. Putin did far more than drop any semblance of a desire to ensure nuclear restraint. He promised unspecified technological help that — if it includes the few critical technologies Kim has sought to perfect — could help the North design a warhead that could survive re-entry into the atmosphere and threaten its many adversaries, starting with the United States. Nowhere in the statements made Wednesday was there even a hint that North Korea should give up any of its estimated 50 or 60 nuclear weapons. To the contrary, Putin declared: “Pyongyang has the right to take reasonable measures to strengthen its own defense capability, ensure national security and protect sovereignty” — though he did not address whether those measures included further developing the North’s nuclear weapons. While the shift has been clear-cut, what it could portend is stunning. “This is a renewal of Cold War-era security guarantees, no doubt,” said Victor Cha, who worked on North Korea issues during the George W. Bush administration. Those guarantees date to a now-defunct 1961 mutual defense treaty between Pyongyang and Moscow. This time, however, the agreement “is based on mutual transactional needs — artillery for Russia and high-end military technology” for North Korea, said Cha, now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “They are united not by ideology, as in the Cold War, but in common opposition to the U.S. and the Western liberal order,” he added. The Russians signaled what was coming 18 months ago. Desperate for more artillery to press the war effort in Ukraine, Putin turned to Kim for some modest help with ammunition in late 2022. That trickle has now reportedly turned into a flood: five million rounds of ammunition, by the estimates of Western intelligence services, and a growing array of North Korea-made munitions, jammed into what the State Department said were 11,000 shipping containers full of arms. Ballistic missiles followed. It reflects the fact that North Korea now has, for perhaps the first time in its history, a valuable bargaining chip that one of its allies in its standoff with the West needs: It is a prodigious arms producer. At first, Kim was happy to receive oil and food in return. But in the intelligence assessments circulating in Washington and Europe, officials say, there is growing concern that the North Korean leader is now determined to surmount the last big technological hurdle in making his country a full-fledged nuclear weapons state — the capability to reach any American city with his nuclear weapons. Russia holds the keys; the question is whether it is willing to hand them over. “Russia’s need for support in the context of Ukraine has forced it to grant some long-sought concessions to China, North Korea and Iran,” Avril Haines, the director of national intelligence, told Congress in March, “with the potential to undermine, among other things, long-held nonproliferation norms.” In closed, classified sessions, she was far more specific, taking key members of Congress through the array of technologies Kim has not yet shown he can master. Most of them involve keeping a nuclear warhead aloft for 6,000 miles and making sure it can survive, and accurately hit its target, on re-entry to the atmosphere. That is the step a series of American presidents have said they cannot live with. Before the conclusion of this week’s meeting in Pyongyang, Cha wrote that the prospect of Russian help to the North “presents the greatest threat to U.S. national security since the Korean War.” “This relationship, deep in history and reinvigorated by the war in Ukraine, undermines the security of Europe, Asia and the U.S. homeland. Amid front-burner issues like the wars in Ukraine and Gaza,” he contended, the “administration relegates this problem to the back burner at its own peril.” Of course, Washington has faced so many warnings about the dangers of North Korea’s arsenal — dating to its first nuclear test 18 years ago — that it has become almost the background music of geopolitical upheaval. A seemingly endless series of United Nations financial sanctions has failed to cripple either the nuclear expansion or the North’s closely related missile program. American efforts at sabotage have worked, but not for long. So that leaves the United States dependent on the cold calculus of deterrence: reminding the North, with exercises of long-range bombers, that a strike on the United States or its allies would almost certainly result in the destruction of the country. But a credible security pact with Moscow would complicate that reasoning, with its suggestion that Russia could potentially strike back on the North’s behalf. The terms of today’s agreement, however, were not clearly spelled out. Putin’s announcements on Wednesday were also a reminder that North Korea’s continued success in pursuing nuclear weapons marks one of Washington’s greatest bipartisan failures. It began in the Clinton administration; faced with an emerging crisis with the North in 1994, the administration considered taking out its emerging nuclear program before it produced a single weapon. President Bill Clinton pulled back, convinced that diplomacy was the better route — the beginning of three decades of on-again, off-again negotiations. China and Russia helped, joining in the “Six Party Talks” with North Korea that sought to buy off its program. When that collapsed, there were sanctions and a United Nations monitoring group that was supposed to publicly present evidence of sanctions evasion. When the monitoring operation came up for renewal at the United Nations recently, Russia successfully led the charge to get rid of it, at least for now. Now there are two immediate challenges ahead for the United States, Japan, South Korea and other allies. The first is to attempt to stop the transfer of the technology Kim has on his shopping list. It includes, Cha and other experts say, the means to build quiet nuclear-armed submarines, and the technology to evade missile defenses. In the past, Putin has provided missile designs to the North, American intelligence officials have reported, but there is little evidence that he has helped with actual nuclear weapons. Now the North has leverage: Keeping the artillery store open for Putin may hinge on Kim’s getting what he wants. And no one is watching this more closely than the Iranians. They, too, are supplying the Russians with drones. U.S. officials believe the two are discussing missiles. And just last week, the Iranians stepped up pressure on Israel and the United States, saying they were putting their most advanced centrifuges — capable of quickly turning Iran’s fuel stockpile into the material needed to make three nuclear weapons — deep inside an underground facility that may be beyond Israel’s ability to reach with bunker-busting bombs. If North Korea’s gambit works, the Iranians may also see a benefit in growing even closer with Russia. And Putin may conclude he has little to lose. (David E. Sanger, “Putin Signals Chilling Shift in Pyongyang,” New York Times, June 20, 2024, p. A-1)

In the contest of global narratives, China has sought to cast itself as a peaceful nation opposed to dividing the world into rival camps. In contrast, it has accused the United States of building alliances that will drive the world toward a new Cold War. Yet Russia and North Korea’s mutual defense treaty, which calls for the two countries to provide immediate military assistance to each other in the event of war, is exactly the kind of bloc-building that China has charged the United States with. China’s closest strategic partner and its only treaty ally — Russia and North Korea — are now the ones heightening the risk of Cold War-style confrontation in northeast Asia. The pact also creates more headaches for Beijing by appearing to deepen the semblance of a trilateral axis between China, Russia and North Korea, which China has sought to avoid. “Beijing has very carefully stayed away from the optics of a China-Russia-North Korea axis,” said Yun Sun, the director of the China program at the Stimson Center in Washington. “It wants to keep its options open.” Japan, South Korea and the United States could now decide that the threat posed by a Russian and North Korean defense treaty requires them to enhance their own security arrangement, announced last year at Camp David, by increasing troop levels or strengthening defenses along China’s periphery. For those reasons, China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, might not welcome the budding bromance between President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea. Meeting in Pyongyang today, Putin and Kim heralded the defense agreement as the beginning of a new era in their relations. The pact also exposed the limitations of China’s partnerships with both countries, analysts said. Xi has declared a “no limits” relationship with Putin and pledged “unswerving” support for North Korea — linking arms with two like-minded authoritarian countries to push back against what they regard as American bullying around the world. But by aligning with two pariah states, Xi is also at risk of facing fallout from the actions of their unpredictable leaders. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has severely damaged China’s relationship with the West, which has accused Beijing of not doing enough to rein in Russia. And Kim’s nuclear saber rattling has helped bring two tense neighbors — Japan and South Korea — together in a trilateral defense partnership with the United States. Fears already abound that Russia may provide North Korea with technology to bolster Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program in exchange for munitions for use in Ukraine. Xi can ill afford more surprises at a time when he needs to turn around China’s struggling economy. Despite his increasingly adversarial tone toward the West, Xi remains invested in maintaining China’s position in the current economic global order. “The new pact between Putin and Kim is not good news for Beijing,” said John Delury, a professor of Chinese studies at Yonsei University in Seoul. “Xi Jinping has never had an easy relationship with the headstrong Korean dynast and now has increasing reason to worry about Putin encouraging Kim’s aggressive tendencies.” Between the war in Ukraine and the risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, Delury said, “Putin and Kim are forces of instability at a time when China benefits from an orderly environment.” China has sought to distance itself from the new pact, with a spokesman at the Foreign Ministry on June 20 declining to comment, saying it was a Russian and North Korean issue. In reality, the Russia-North Korea treaty, coupled with the alliance between the United States, Japan and South Korea, has “significantly exacerbated” the risk of “confrontation, rivalry or conflict” in the region, in China’s view, said Shi Yinhong, an international relations professor at Renmin University in Beijing. Shi said peace on the Korean Peninsula was a top priority for China, and the increasing militarization of the region put one of “China’s vital interests at stake.” China still holds considerable sway over Russia and North Korea. The United States contends the Kremlin would not be able to sustain its war in Ukraine if China did not buy massive quantities of Russian oil or supply Russia with consumer goods and dual-use technologies, like chips and machine tools, to fuel its war machine. At the same time, North Korea relies on China for virtually all its trade, including food and energy. That sway over Moscow and Pyongyang has bolstered Beijing’s importance at times when other countries have called on China to use its influence — unsuccessfully — to rein in North Korea’s nuclear buildup or Russia’s war in Ukraine. But Putin’s wooing of Kim creates a new competitor for Beijing for influence over North Korea, creating “a windfall for Kim and a headache for Xi Jinping,” said Danny Russel, a diplomacy and security analyst at the Asia Society Policy Institute. “Importantly for Pyongyang, the partnership with Putin — while not without limits — generates valuable leverage against Beijing,” Russel said. “Playing major powers off against each other is a classic play in Korean history, and North Korea’s massive dependence on China in recent decades has been a liability that Kim Jong Un is eager to reduce.” “The scorecard shows North Korea gaining the most by far, with China potentially the biggest loser,” he added. Keeping the Kim regime in power is a priority for Beijing to preserve a buffer between the Chinese border and U.S.-led forces stationed in South Korea. China and North Korea officially say they are as close as “lips and teeth,” but relations between the two neighbors have long been fraught, with a mix of mutual mistrust and common interests. (By David Pierson and Choe Sang-hun, “Russia’s and North Korea’s Defense Pact Is a New Headache for China,” New York Times, June 20, 2024)

KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, president of the Russian Federation, signed the “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the DPRK and the Russian Federation” on June 19. According to the treaty, the two sides, taking into account their national laws and international obligations, shall permanently maintain and develop the comprehensive strategic partnership based on mutual respect for state sovereignty, territorial inviolability, non-interference in internal affairs, principle of equality and other principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation between nations. The two sides shall exchange views on the issues of bilateral relations and international issues of mutual concern through dialogue and negotiations, including summit talks, and intensify concerted action and cooperation in the international arenas. The two sides shall aspire to global strategic stability and establishment of a new fair and equal international order, maintain close mutual communication and strengthen strategic and tactical cooperation. In case a direct threat of armed invasion is created against any one of the two sides, the two sides shall immediately operate the channel of bilateral negotiations for the purpose of adjusting their stands at the request of any one side and discussing feasible practical measures to ensure mutual assistance for removing the prevailing threat. In case any one of the two sides is put in a state of war by an armed invasion from an individual state or several states, the other side shall provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the laws of the DPRK and the Russian Federation. Each side is obliged not to conclude with any third country any agreement encroaching upon the other side’s sovereignty, security, territorial inviolability, rights to freely opt for and develop political, social, economic and cultural systems and other core interests, nor to take part in such actions. The two sides, with the aim of maintaining international peace and security, shall discuss and cooperate with each other in the matters concerning the global and regional development that could be a direct or indirect challenge to their common interests and security within the framework of international bodies, including the UN and its specialized organs. The two sides shall provide mechanisms for taking joint measures with the aim of strengthening the defense capabilities for preventing war and ensuring regional and global peace and security. The two sides shall strive to increase the volume of mutual trade, create conditions favorable for economic cooperation in such fields as customs and financial service, and encourage and protect mutual investment in accordance with the DPRK-Russia intergovernmental agreement on promotion and mutual protection of investment adopted on Nov. 28, 1996. The two sides shall provide support to the special or free economic zones of the DPRK and the Russian Federation and to the organizations working in such zones. The two sides shall develop exchange and cooperation in the fields of science and technology, including space, biology, peaceful atomic energy, artificial intelligence, IT, etc., and proactively facilitate joint research. Both sides shall support regional or frontier regional cooperation and development in fields of mutual concern, proceeding from the special importance of extending the comprehensive bilateral relations. The two sides shall create favorable conditions for establishing direct ties between regions of the DPRK and the Russian Federation and promote mutual understanding of the economic and investment potentials of regions by holding such inter-regional joint events as business forum, seminar, exhibition and trade fair. The two sides shall boost exchange and cooperation in the fields of agriculture, education, public health, sports, culture, tourism, etc., and cooperate with each other in the fields of environmental protection, prevention of natural disasters and eradication of their aftermath. The two sides shall oppose the application of unilateral compulsory measures including the measures that assume extraterritorial nature, and regard the implementation of such measures as illegal ones running counter to the UN Charter and international law and regulations. In case any third country takes unilateral compulsory measures against one side, the two sides shall reduce the danger and make practical efforts to eliminate or minimize their direct or indirect impact on the mutual economic ties, natural persons and corporate bodies of the two sides, their properties under the jurisdiction of the two sides, the goods transported from one side to the other, the results of jobs, services, information and intellectual activities provided by payers of the two sides and the monopoly on them. The two sides shall cooperate with each other in combating such challenges and threats as international terrorism, extremism, multinational organized crime, human traffic, hostage taking, illegal immigration, illegal circulation of money, legalization (laundering) of income obtained in a criminal way, financing of terrorism, financing of WMD proliferation, illegal acts posing threat to the safety of civil aviation and maritime navigation and illegal circulation of goods, funds, means of funds, drug, psychic energizer and their ingredients, weapons, and cultural and historical relics. The two sides shall cooperate with each other in the field of international information security and aspire to strengthen the bilateral cooperation in the way of developing the relevant legal and normative foundation and deepening dialogue between institutions, etc. The two sides shall proactively cooperate in concluding and implementing sectional agreements for honoring this treaty and other agreements concerning the fields not specified in this treaty. This treaty shall be in indefinite effect.” (KCNA, “DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” June 20, 2024)

6/20/24:
North Korean soldiers working in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) breached the military demarcation line (MDL) on the morning of June 20, retreating northward after warnings from the South Korean military, the Joint Chiefs of Staff here said on June 21. According to the JCS, several North Korean soldiers conducting operations within the DMZ on the central front crossed the demarcation line around 11 a.m. on June 20. In response, the South Korean military issued warning broadcasts and conducted warning shots, prompting the soldiers to retreat northward immediately. This marks the third instance this month of North Korean soldiers breaching the MDL. Around 20 to 30 North Korean soldiers crossed the line on June 9 by about 50 meters during DMZ operations but retreated after warning shots. Similarly, on June 18, another group of 20 to 30 North Korean soldiers violated the MDL by about 20 meters and retreated following warnings from the South Korean military. (Lee Mi-ho and Kim Seo-young, “N. Korean Soldiers Cross DMZ Border for 3rd Time This Month,” Chosun Ilbo, June 21, 2024)

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia directly warned the United States and its allies that he is willing to arm North Korea if they continue to supply Kyiv with sophisticated weapons that have struck Russian territory, raising the stakes for the Western powers backing Ukraine. Putin made the threat in comments to reporters traveling with him late today in Vietnam before he flew home to Russia after a trip there and to North Korea. He had made a similar, though significantly less overt, threat a day earlier in Pyongyang, where he revived a Cold War-era mutual defense pact with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un. The pact requires each nation to provide military assistance to the other “with all means at its disposal” in the event of an attack. “Those who supply these weapons believe that they are not at war with us,” Putin said. “Well, as I said, including in Pyongyang, then we reserve the right to supply weapons to other regions of the world.” “And where will they go next?” Putin asked of the weapons, suggesting that North Korea could then sell the Russian arms to other rogue actors hostile to the United States and its allies around the world. Though Putin didn’t say what weapons he would give to North Korea, Kim is seeking to advance his nuclear warheads, missiles, submarines and satellites — all areas where Russia possesses some of the most sophisticated and dangerous technology in the world. Putin has dramatically changed course, advocating the end of the very sanctions he approved, driven by his desire to raise the cost to the United States of supporting Ukraine and Russia’s need for North Korea’s vast stores of conventional ammunition and weaponry to use on the battlefield. “Here the Westerners supply weapons to Ukraine and say that ‘we don’t control anything here at all, and it doesn’t matter how they are used,’” Putin said. “We can also say that we delivered something to someone, and then we have no control over anything. Let them think about that.” His revival of the Cold War-era mutual defense pledge with North Korea, and his suggestion that he may arm Kim’s regime, stoked fears in South Korea and Japan, which house tens of thousands of American troops on U.S. bases. South Korean officials said they would consider providing lethal assistance to Ukraine in response. Putin warned them against such a decision in his remarks today before leaving the region. “This would be a very big mistake,” Putin said. “I hope this doesn’t happen. If this happens, we will also take appropriate measures, which are unlikely to please the current leadership of South Korea.” He said the mutual defense pact shouldn’t worry South Korea, because it calls for Russia’s military intervention only in the event of aggression against North Korea, and as far as he knew, he said, Seoul had no intention of carrying out such an attack. The Russian leader, who has made criticizing the “strangulation of sanctions” a centerpiece of his international messaging, compared the restrictions on North Korea to the siege of Leningrad by the Nazis during World War II, which caused the death of his older brother, who was then a year old. Putin reiterated in his comments today that those sanctions should be re-evaluated, in particular questioning those related to labor migration, saying that North Korean families were unable to earn money and feed their children. “Does this remind you of anything?” Putin said, referring to World War II. “And is this humane?” The Russian leader also claimed Moscow was considering changing its nuclear doctrine in response to new devices being developed by the West that lower the threshold for nuclear use. Russia possesses the world’s biggest arsenal of so-called tactical nuclear weapons, which have lower yields and can be used in more limited battlefield scenarios. Putin ordered his troops to practice using such weapons earlier this year in response to Britain’s announcement that Ukraine could use its weapons to strike Russia and to suggestions by President Emmanuel Macron of France that Western nations might put troops on the ground in Ukraine. The Kremlin leader has regularly warned his Western foes against pursuing Moscow’s “strategic defeat” through a loss in the war against Ukraine — a message he reiterated today. “This means the end of the 1,000-year history of the Russian state,” he said. “I think this is clear to everyone. And then the question arises: Why should we be afraid? Isn’t it better to go all the way?” (Paul Sonne, “Putin Threatens to Arm North Korea in Response to West’s Ukraine Policy,” New York Times, June 22, 2024, p. A-7)

6/21/24:
WPK Central Committee Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong’s press statement: “The border area of the DPRK was again littered with dirty wastepaper and things. Those were found on farm fields, the margin of reservoirs and orchards near the border. There is also a possibility to find such things in addition. Disgusting defectors from the DPRK to the ROK, human scum, did not hide via report the fact that they sent leaflets over the border to our country. Those human scum would be condemned by population of the ROK. It is natural that there would be something trouble to happen as they did again what they had been urged not to do.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Kim Yo Jong,” June 21, 2024)

A North Korean defectors’ group said today it has sent more balloons carrying anti-Pyongyang leaflets to North Korea the previous day, after the North warned of counteractions against such a leaflet campaign and Seoul’s propaganda loudspeaker broadcasts. The Fighters for a Free North Korea (FFNK) said it sent 20 balloons carrying some 300,000 leaflets, USB sticks and U.S. dollars across the border on Thursday night in the border city of Paju. The group said the USB sticks contained hit K-drama “Winter Sonata” and songs by popular trot singer Lim Young-woong. North Korean defector Park Sang-hak, head of the FFNK, earlier warned he will continue to send propaganda leaflets to the North until North Korean leader Kim Jong Un apologizes for the North’s sending of trash-carrying balloons to the South. Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, earlier warned that her country could take an unspecified “new counteraction” against South Korea if Seoul keeps sending such leaflets and blaring its loudspeaker broadcasts across the border. (Kim Soo-yeon, “N. Korean Defectors Send Anti-Pyongyang Leaflets Again to N. Korea,” June 21, 2024)

South Korea will determine the extent of its arms supply to Ukraine based on Russia’s stance toward its relations with North Korea, a presidential official said today. National Security Adviser Chang Ho-jin said yesterday South Korea will review the possibility of supplying weapons to Ukraine after North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a pact pledging mutual defense in the event of war. In response, Putin warned South Korea would be making a “big mistake” if it decided to supply lethal weapons to Ukraine. “There are various options for providing weapons, and our position on the recent developments between Russia and North Korea depends on how Russia approaches the situation going forward,” the official said in a phone call with Yonhap. South Korea has only supplied non-lethal items and equipment to Ukraine for its war against Russia under a policy that bans providing lethal weapons to countries at war. Among potential weapons under consideration are 155-mm artillery shells, as well as air defense systems, which are needed in Ukraine, according to government sources. Seoul officials have maintained strategic ambiguity regarding the types of weapons, seen as a diplomatic move to leverage the option to pressure Moscow to refrain from transferring key military technology to Pyongyang. Later in the day, South Korea is expected to call in the top Russian envoy in Seoul to lodge a protest over the new treaty signed with North Korea, according diplomatic sources. (Kim Eun-jung, “S. Korea’s Level of Arms Supply to Ukraine Hinges on Russia’s Actions: Presidential Office,” Yonhap, June 21, 2024)

Corrado and Ponomarenko: “…When discussing arms trade between North Korea and Russia, the most commonly addressed theme is that of numbers. In February, the US State Department said North Korea had shipped 10,000 containers, while South Korea said 6,700 containers. The proportion of different armaments (which is unknown) affects the bottom-line estimate. For instance, South Korea reported that 6,700 containers could fit either “3 million rounds of 152 mm artillery shells or more than 500,000 rounds of 122 mm multiple rocket launchers.” However, what is less discussed is the quality of the artillery shells. Artillery is especially important to sustain Russia’s style of fighting in Ukraine, as it inflicts up to 80 percent of the casualties in the conflict. Russia relies on artillery bombardments in Ukraine, just like it did in the Chechen Wars and the war in Syria, to compensate for shortcomings like poor performance in combined arms and joint maneuvers. Although the infusion of fresh arty is a welcome relief for Russia, the poor-performing North Korean arms can’t help but have an impact on Russia’s ability to gain and hold territory. Novel primary sources derived from the Ukrainian military-related Telegram (a messaging and social media service) channels shed more light on this issue. Ukrainian Telegram channel administrators have accessed and collected pictures and discussions from Russian Telegram channels in order to provide contextual clues and visual evidence of North Korean shipments. While the authors are unable to independently verify the authenticity of the photos, the low quality of the ammunition evident in the photographs is consistent with other evidence about the performance of North Korea’s arms. When North Korea struck South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 with multiple rocket launchers, “fewer than half of them hit the island; of those, about 25% failed to detonate,” according to the South Korean military. In December 2023, the Ukrainian army reported on Facebook that North Korean artillery shells were often defective. The post said, “Due to the unsatisfactory state of such ammunition, there are only cases of their breaking directly into the barrels of the occupiers’ cannons and mortars, resulting in the loss of weapons and personnel of the invaders.” Observing the dispersed pattern of Russian blast craters, a South Korean defense analyst assessed that North Korean artillery “cannot be fired accurately.” Finally, a Ukrainian defense intelligence official said in late February that half of the artillery, which is from the 1970-80s, “does not function, and the rest require either restoration or inspection before use.” The evidence from Telegram tells a similar story. An early indicator of North Korean ammunition arriving in Russia dates back to October 29, 2023, roughly a month after Kim’s summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin. First to come were the highly coveted 152mm artillery shells. Figures 1a-1d present the North Korean High-explosive Fragmentation (HE-frag) 152-mm artillery shells for D-20/D-30 howitzers shared by Russian soldiers on their Telegram channel and reposted on a Ukrainian military-themed Telegram channel. North Korean 152-mm shells for Russia bear an official name 1-52D, as seen on the shells themselves, as well as their packaging. The second indication of the arrival of North Korean ammunition was on November 2, 2023, which was even more important. Leaked Russian documents present firing instructions for a wide variety of North Korean arms, which supports the hypothesis of their wide-scale incorporation into the Russian army. The list includes: 120-mm mortar shell, titled Product 120-1; 122-mm rocket for the BM-21 “Grad” rocket artillery system, titled Product 122-1-RS; 122-mm HE-frag shell, titled Product 122-1; 152-mm HE-frag shell, titled Product 152-1. According to the analysis conducted by the Ukrainian channels, firing instructions are almost identical to those of the standard USSR/Russian army munitions, with percentage adjustment on the range for mortar shells (Figures 2a-2d). Furthermore, the source concludes that 122-mm and 152-mm HE-frag artillery shells supplied by North Korea, based on the firing instructions and tables, are identical copies of the Soviet-made OF-462 and OF-540 shells. In addition to this, the source states that according to preliminary information (derived from the comment section in the Russian Telegram channels), the projectiles are thin-walled (compared to the Soviet/Russian ones), which makes them of poorer quality. However, the information was not confirmed in any way by the documents. As early as two months into the shipments, the first concerns about the quality of the shells began to arise. On November 12, 2023, Ukrainian channels shared pictures taken from Russian Telegram, that depict North Korean 120-mm mortar shells (Product 120-1). The shells are very similar to the Soviet-made OF-843/843B 120-mm mortar shell family (Figures 3a and 3b). However, due to lower quality and different charges, the shells have a different range, which is indicated in the aforementioned firing instructions. Evidently, due to Russia’s inability to cover its artillery consumption, imports from other countries are present alongside imports from North Korea. On April 3, 2024, Ukrainian channels presented pictures, published by a Russian Telegram channel, that show a side-by-side comparison of the North Korean (Product 120-1) and Iranian 120-mm mortar shells. The North Korean ammunition has a distinctive blue paint coating. Iranian shells, on the other hand, are green and are believed to be better than North Korean due to better weight distribution and more convenient gunpowder rings. In addition to this, a firing table for Iranian mortar shells in English is provided by the source (Figures 4a, 4b and 5). Mortar shells were not the only low-quality products supplied by North Korea. On April 11, 2024, a Ukrainian channel presented evidence of the extremely poor quality of other North Korean supplies. Specifically, the DPRK-supplied 122-mm HE-frag shells (Product 122-1, copy of the Soviet OF-462 shell). According to the analysis, projectiles for the barrel artillery, provided by North Korea, are extremely old. Evidence of this is the absence of paint on the driving band and bourrelet, as well as very few markings. This distinguishes these North Korean projectiles from newer ones (produced in the 2000s-2010s), which have the entire structure of the projectile painted and at least some markings present. Evidently, the analysis in the source suggests that the artillery and mortar shells are being bought from the old stockpiles of the DPRK from various periods. The source poses a question: how many shells from stockpiles will Kim Jong Un be willing to sell to Russia, and what is the state of the production of new ammunition in the DPRK? Another Ukrainian channel published more evidence on the same day. Pictures found on the Russian channel (Figures 6a-6c) focus on the North Korean 120-mm mortar shells (Product 120-1, copy of the Soviet OF-843/843B). As the source claims, Russian troops complain about the extremely poor quality of the shells. Indicators of poor quality are: 3 layers of distinctive blue paint, the body that has defects due to poor casting quality, and the tails of the mortar shells that are covered in a “centimeter layer of solidol [lubricant/oil-based grease].” While there are reports that North Korean factories are producing only new munitions for Russia, evidence from Russian Telegram channel administrators shows that only a portion of the munitions shipped by North Korea appear to be new. From all the evidence we were able to gather, we could only find a handful of pictures from Russian sources that showcase shells in good condition that are believed to be newly produced specifically for Russia. For instance, there is an example from January 12, 2024, which showcases a side-by-side comparison of three 122mm shells: Iranian, North Korean, and Russian (Figure 7). In the comment section, there is another picture of a North Korean shell with a production date/title: LOT 21/2023. The shell is believed to have been produced in 2023, hence the different gray paint coating instead of the older blue version. However, as seen in Figure 8, the quality of the shell is still quite poor, with lubricant markings on the bottom of the shell. Even larger Ukrainian military outlets have been paying attention to the low quality of North Korean shells. According to the sources, North Korean-supplied 152-mm HE-frag shells failed to impress the Russian Army while undergoing quality control (Figures 10a-10d). The shells apparently have differing amounts of gunpowder, resulting in varying combustion dynamics and alternate ranges for the projectiles, as well as open sealing covers, which could lead to the presence of moisture in the shells. Finally, the dates indicated in some of the picture sources are open to scrutiny. Some of the pictures presented were traced to the channels where they were originally posted and, consequently, the first time they surfaced online: Figures 8, 9a and 9b and Figures 1a-1d. Figures 8, 9a and 9b are the most recent, taken on April 11, 2024, and depict the poor quality of 120-mm North Korean mortar shells. Another piece of evidence that is quite up-to-date is a post on X made by a Russian person (presumably a soldier) who customizes shells for a price. The date of the post is May 2, and the shell depicted is a North Korean 122-mm HE; however, there is snow on the ground, which means that the picture was likely taken earlier, perhaps in the winter or late spring of this year. Despite the difficulty of pinpointing the exact dates of the images, it is unlikely that there is a large time lag between the day the original pictures surfaced and the day they were reposted. Ukrainian Telegram channels are incentivized to repost pictures from Russian propaganda channels as quickly as possible. This highlights the problematic nature of the North Korean shells used by Russia and raises international awareness about North Korean illicit arms shipments. Based on these sources, at least two conclusions may be drawn. First, North Korea has supplied Russia with either old ammunition from North Korea’s stockpiles (shipments without markings and with scuffs), or new shells, but of extremely low quality. So far, there are no indications of high-quality, newly manufactured munitions made specifically for Russia. Even most new shells are oversimplified copies of Soviet/Russian designs. Although we cannot hold out the possibility that North Korea is specifically sending defective armaments, it is entirely plausible that the armaments shipped to Russia are an indicator of the quality of North Korea’s ammunition stockpiles and production capacity. If true, this has major implications for North Korea’s conventional warfighting capacity. Second, no matter how desperate Russia may be for artillery, its military and political leaders are likely frustrated with the low quality of the armaments. Moscow probably has or will implore Pyongyang to provide newer, higher-quality munitions.” (Jonathan Corrado and Anton Pomorenko, “North Korea’s Flawed But Winning Strategy in Ukraine,” 38North, June 21, 2024)

6/26/24:
North Korea launched a ballistic missile toward the East Sea today, but the missile exploded in the air, South Korea’s military said, amid a possibility that the North could have test-fired a hypersonic missile. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said the missile was launched from an area in or around Pyongyang at around 5:30 a.m., and the intelligence authorities of South Korea and the United States are conducting a detailed analysis. A military source told Yonhap News Agency that the North appears to have test-fired a hypersonic missile, but the test is believed to have ended in failure after the missile flew some 250 kilometers. A JCS official later told reporters that the military is considering the possibility of a hypersonic missile launch, noting that the missile exploded in midair over waters off the North’s east coast. Smoke appeared to emanate from the missile more than previous launches, the official said, raising the possibility of combustion issues. The official added the missile could possibly be powered by solid propellants. The launch came after the North slammed the arrival in South Korea of the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt and warned of taking “overwhelming and new” deterrence measures against what it called a “provocative” act. The aircraft carrier arrived in Busan, 320 kilometers southeast of Seoul, on three days ago, ahead of a trilateral exercise with South Korea and Japan. President Yoon Suk Yeol boarded the aircraft carrier yesterday, saying the visit symbolized the “firm” U.S. security commitment to South Korea and that trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan will become another “powerful” deterrent. (Chae Yun-hwan, “N.K. Missile Launch Ends in Mid-Air Explosion amid Possibility of Hypersonic Missile Test,” Yonhap, June 26, 2024)

KCNA: “The DPRK Missile Administration successfully conducted the separation and guidance control test of individual mobile warheads on June 26, which is of great significance in attaining the goal of rapidly developing the missile technologies. The test was overseen by Pak Jong Chon, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and secretary of the WPK Central Committee, and Kim Jong Sik, first vice department director of the WPK Central Committee. The test was carried out by use of the first-stage engine of an intermediate-range solid-fuel ballistic missile within a 170~200 km radius, which is favorable for ensuring maximum safety and measuring the flight characteristics of individual mobile warheads. The separated mobile warheads were guided correctly to the three coordinate targets. The effectiveness of a decoy separated from the missile was also verified by anti-air radar. The test is aimed at securing the MIRV capability. The test is part of the normal activities of the administration and its affiliated defense science institutes for the rapid technical development of weapon systems. According to the administration, it is of great significance in bolstering up the DPRK’s missile forces and developing the missile technologies that such technological test has entered a full-scale stage. The senior officials, who watched the test, said that to enhance the MIRV capability is a very important defense technological task and a top priority of the WPK Central Committee, stressing the need to take proper scientific and technological steps to further improve the effectiveness of decoys.” (KCNA, “DPRK Missile Administration Conducts Test of New Important Technology,” June 27, 2024)

South Korea’s military the next day dismissed North Korea’s claim of successfully conducting a multiple-warhead missile test earlier this week as a form of “deception,” reaffirming its assessment the missile exploded in the air. “North Korea’s missile launched yesterday exploded in an early stage of the flight,” Col. Lee Sung-jun, spokesperson of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), told reporters in a briefing. “North Korea made a different announcement this morning but (we) believe that this is merely a method of deception and exaggeration.” (Chae Yun-hwan, “S. Korean Military Dismisses N.K. Claim of Successful Multiple-Warhead Missile Test,” Yonhap, June 27, 2024)

South Korea’s military conducted a live-fire artillery exercise on islands near the western inter-Korean maritime border for the first time in seven years today, according to the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps said troops from the 6th Marine Brigade under the North West Islands Defense Command fired more than 290 live rounds into the sea from K-9 howitzers and Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher systems deployed on Yeonpyeong and Baengnyeong islands, which lie south of the Northern Limit Line (NLL). The exercise took place three weeks after South Korea fully suspended its participation in a 2018 inter-Korean military agreement intended to reduce tensions after the North jammed GPS signals along the border and launched hundreds of trash-laden balloons into the South. Earlier the same day, the North launched a ballistic missile that exploded midair, according to the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Marine Corps held its last full-scale live-fire exercise on the islands in 2017, a year before Seoul and Pyongyang signed the military accord. The accord banned live-fire artillery drills 85 kilometers (52.8 miles) south and 50 kilometers north of the NLL to lower the risk of accidental clashes. While the NLL functions as the de facto inter-Korean maritime boundary in the Yellow Sea, the North has disputed the line on multiple occasions. The North fired around 170 artillery shells on Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 after shells fired by the South Korean military during a live-fire exercise landed south of the NLL but within the 12-nautical mile zone claimed by the North as its territorial waters. The North’s bombardment of the island killed two South Korean soldiers and two civilians. Eight months prior, the South Korean Navy frigate ROKS Cheonan sank near Baengnyeong Island following an explosion that an official investigation attributed to a North Korean torpedo fired by a midget submarine. Forty-six seamen died in the sinking. The Marine Corps’ resumption of live-fire artillery drills along the NLL came the same day that the Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt departed Busan to take part in Freedom Edge, the first trilateral multi-domain exercise between South Korea, the United States and Japan. (Michael Lee, “South Korea Conducts First Live-Fire Artillery Drill along Maritime Border in Seven Years,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 26, 2024)

6/27/24:
Japan, the United States and South Korea today began a new joint military exercise in the East China Sea spanning aerial, naval and cyber domains, apparently to boost their readiness against North Korea’s missile and nuclear threats. The three-day “Freedom Edge” drills involve the helicopter carrier Ise and the Aegis destroyer Atago from Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force and the U.S. nuclear-powered carrier Theodore Roosevelt, according to a trilateral statement released by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. South Korean destroyers, as well as aircraft from the three nations, are also joining in the exercise, the statement said. The drills — which started on the high seas south of South Korea’s Jeju Island, according to a South Korean military source — express “the will” of Tokyo, Washington and Seoul “to promote trilateral interoperability and protect freedom for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, including the Korean Peninsula,” the statement said. The exercise will focus on “cooperative ballistic missile defense, air defense, anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, maritime interdiction, and defensive cyber training,” it added. The launch of the annual multi-domain trilateral exercise was agreed by Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and his U.S. and South Korean counterparts, Joe Biden and Yoon Suk Yeol, when they held a summit at Camp David near Washington in August last year. (Kyodo, “Japan, U.S., South Korea Begin New Military Exercise to Counter North Korea,” June 27, 2024)

The South Korean government imposed independent sanctions on five entities, four ships and eight individuals involved in the transportation of weapons and import of refined oil into North Korea, the Foreign Ministry announced today. North Korea’s Missile Administration was one of the targets of the new sanctions, which is responsible for the latest missile launch on Wednesday that South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff assessed as a failure. The Missile Administration was established in April 2016 and oversees the production, management and administration of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles. The four other entities designated as targets of sanctions are Russian shipping companies Transmorflot LLC, M Leasing LLC, IBEX Shipping Inc. and a company called Euromarket located in South Ossetia, Georgia. Ships owned by the three shipping companies carried large quantities of containers and transported military supplies between Russia and North Korea, and Euromarket was involved in selling Russian refined oil to Pyongyang, according to Seoul’s Foreign Ministry. Four Russian ships, the Patriot, Neptun, Bella and Bogatyr, were sanctioned for their involvement in supplying oil to North Korea and violating UN Security Council resolutions. Individuals targeted for sanctions were all involved in the North’s missile development within the Missile Administration. Within the agency, Han Kum-bok and Kim Chang-rok worked on missile development, while Choi Chol-ung and Ma Chol-wan were involved in missile operations. Choi traveled to Russia in September last year with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Ryu Sang-hun, an official leading the program to develop a spy satellite, was also sanctioned, while Bang Hyun-chol, Ha Jung-kuk and Jo Tae-chul worked as researchers in developing ballistic missiles. The Foreign Ministry said the sanctions were in response to Pyongyang’s and Moscow’s continued military cooperation in violation of UN Security Council resolutions and threatening South Korea’s security interests by signing a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty. (Lim Jeong-won, “Seoul Imposes More Sanctions on North Korean, Russian Entities, Ships, and Individuals,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 27, 2024)

6/28/24:
Public support in South Korea for developing its own nuclear weapons has rebounded this year, with 66 percent backing the idea amid ongoing nuclear threats from North Korea, a new poll shows. According to a report released on Thursday by the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), a state-funded think tank, 66 percent of 1,001 respondents indicated they “support or strongly support” the idea of equipping their country with nuclear weapons unless the North Korean regime abandons its nuclear ambitions. The support rate has increased from the think tank’s 2023 poll, where 60.2 percent expressed favorability toward the idea. The previous result was published shortly after the Washington Declaration, in which U.S. President Joe Biden affirmed American commitment to defending the South against any potential nuclear attack from the North. With no guarantee of another term for Biden next year, more South Koreans now say they prefer having their own nuclear weapons over U.S. military forces being stationed in their country. According to this year’s poll, 44.6 percent said they prefer having South Korea’s own nuclear arms to having U.S. military equipment and soldiers stationed here ― marking the first such preference shift since the think tank began including that question in its report in 2021. Just last year, 49.5 percent preferred having U.S. military forces stationed in their country, while only 33.8 percent favored possessing their own nuclear arms. When asked about the credibility of Washington’s nuclear umbrella, 66.9 percent said they trust it, down from 72.1 percent last year. All of this suggests a growing concern among South Koreans about the potential for changes in America’s foreign policy, including its security commitments, especially with the prospect of Donald Trump securing a second presidential term. During his first term, Trump repeatedly proposed completely withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea, former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper said in a memoir. The KINU’s report shows that 52.2 percent of respondents believe Trump’s election win would mean the deterioration of diplomatic ties between the two countries. For that important reason among others, 62.8 percent said they prefer Biden to Trump as the leader of the U.S., while only 10.6 percent said they prefer having Trump in that position. In another notable result, 56.6 percent said they believe that, if Trump returns to the White House, he will likely hold another summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, despite their two previous fruitless meetings during Trump’s first term. (Jung Min-ho, “66% of South Koreans Favor Nuclear Armament amid North Korean Threats: Poll,” Korea Times, June 28, 2024)

7/1/24:
North Korea fired two ballistic missiles in a northeastern direction today, South Korea’s military said, with one of the launches possibly failing and the missile falling inland within the country. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said one short-range ballistic missile was launched from the Jangyon area in South Hwanghae Province at about 5:05 a.m. and flew about 600 kilometers, landing in waters off the North’s northeastern city of Chongjin. Another ballistic missile was launched from the same area at around 5:15 a.m. and flew only about 120 kilometers, before its trail disappeared from radar. Col. Lee Sung-jun, spokesperson of the JCS, told a briefing the second missile may have flown abnormally during the early stage of its flight and that if it exploded in midair, its debris could have fallen inland. “We are conducting a comprehensive analysis on various possibilities,” Lee said, when asked if the missile had exploded or fallen inland. He declined to comment on where it may have come down. “It is difficult to know the missile’s exact point of impact, but there is a possibility that it went toward Pyongyang,” a JCS official said. The eastern part of Pyongyang is located about 120 kilometers northeast of the southwestern county of Jangyon. The military is considering the possibility the latest launch involved the Hwasong-11, also known as KN-23, and potentially a new weapon for the second missile, Lee said. The launch came a day after the North’s foreign ministry denounced a joint exercise between South Korea, the United States and Japan, saying the country would take “offensive and overwhelming” countermeasures against what it called an attempt to strengthen a military bloc. The three-day multidomain Freedom Shield exercise, which ended two days ago, involved fighter jets and warships, including a U.S. aircraft carrier, in international waters south of South Korea’s southern resort island of Jeju. (Chae Yun-hwan, “North Korea Fires 2 Ballistic Missile; 1 Possibly Fails,” Yonhap, July 1, 2024) North Korea said the next day that it had tested a new ballistic missile with a “super-large warhead,” the most recent development in an arms race with South Korea as the countries vie to introduce weapons of increasingly destructive power. Two of the new missiles, known as the Hwasong-11Da-4.5, were launched today, each with a dummy warhead that weighed 4.5 tons, KCNA said. Ballistic missiles often carry warheads that weigh less than a ton. South Korea already has similar missiles that can deliver large warheads. Col. Lee Sung-jun, a spokesman for the South’s military, said the North’s Hwasong-11 series missiles were believed to be capable of carrying payloads of half a ton to 2.5 tons, but that it was “theoretically possible” to modify them to deliver a 4.5-ton payload. But Colonel Lee accused North Korea of deceptively exaggerating its capabilities in the report. One of the two missiles the North launched today crashed in an empty field after an “abnormal” flight, he said. The launch Monday was the second major weapons test reported by the North since its leader, Kim Jong Un, hosted President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia for talks in Pyongyang on June 19. Last week, North Korea claimed for the first time that it had tested technology for launching several nuclear warheads with a single missile; the South cast doubt on that report, too. South Korea, citing the North’s growing nuclear threat, has ramped up its own military spending in recent years. That includes its development of ballistic missiles with large warheads, meant to target underground bunkers where North Korea keeps its nuclear arsenal, and where its political and military leaders could hide in the event of war. The South has also procured American stealth jets. In 2020, the South said it had developed a ballistic missile with “one of the largest warheads in the world.” In 2021, Kim vowed to develop a “super-large nuclear warhead,” and later that year, North Korea said it had launched a new ballistic missile that could carry a 2.5-ton warhead. South Korean defense officials later said they were developing a ballistic missile with an even bigger warhead. South Korean news outlets said it could carry a payload of up to eight tons. Putin’s visit to Pyongyang last month triggered fears in the region that Russia would help North Korea develop its missiles in return for large shipments of artillery shells, ballistic missiles and other conventional munitions for Russia’s war of attrition in Ukraine. North Korea said its missile test this week was a success “of great significance.” The results were reported to a plenary meeting of the ruling Workers’ Party’s Central Committee that ended on Monday, the state media report said. It said the Hwasong-11Da-4.5 would be tested again later this month. (Choe Sang-Hun, “Ballistic Tests In North Korea Turn Up Rivalry With the South,” New York Times, July 3, 2024, p. A-4)

KCNA: “The DPRK Missile Administration successfully conducted a test-fire of new-type tactical ballistic missile Hwasongpho-11Da-4.5 on July 1. The new-type missile is a tactical ballistic missile capable of carrying 4.5 ton-class super-large warhead. The test-fire was conducted with a missile tipped with a simulated heavy warhead to verify flight stability and hit accuracy at the maximum range of 500 km and the minimum range of 90 km. The Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea reported to the plenary meeting of the WPK Central Committee on the result of the Missile Administration’s test which is of great significance. The test of the new-type weapon system is part of the regular activities of the administration and its affiliated defense science institutes. The Missile Administration said that it will test-fire new-type tactical ballistic missile Hwasongpho-11Da-4.5 to verify flight characteristics, hit accuracy and explosion power of super-large warhead at the medium range of 250km in July.” (KCNA, “DPRK Missile Administration Conducts Test-Fire of New-Type Tactical Ballistic Missile,” July 2, 2024)

7/4/24:
A Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer temporarily sailed into Chinese territorial waters off the country’s eastern province of Zhejiang last week, despite repeated warnings by Chinese vessels, diplomatic sources said Wednesday. The Suzutsuki, tasked with monitoring Chinese military drills on the high seas, navigated into Chinese waters on July 4, in a rare move by a Self-Defense Forces vessel. Beijing has conveyed its serious concern to Tokyo over the incident, leading the Japanese Defense Ministry to launch an investigation into the ship’s captain, the sources said. The ministry declined to comment on matters concerning SDF operations. A day before the MSDF destroyer entered Chinese waters, Zhejiang authorities said a no-sail zone would be set up in a nearby area for the Chinese military to conduct a live-fire drill, opening up the risk of a contingency occurring because of the Suzutsuki’s presence. The Chinese government suspects the incident was an “intentional provocation” by the destroyer, and has been collecting and analyzing relevant information, according to Chinese sources. The Suzutsuki, which was on a mission to monitor the live-fire drill, was urged by the Chinese vessels to leave the area when it approached within 12 nautical miles (22 kilometers) off the coast of Zhejiang, but it sped up and navigated into the Chinese waters for some 20 minutes before leaving the territorial waters, the diplomatic sources said. The MSDF ship has in the past monitored the activities of the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning, deployed in the East China Sea, but Japanese destroyers tasked with surveilling Chinese vessels usually stay away from territorial waters off Zhejiang, they added. In unofficial talks between the two sides, a Japanese official pointed to the possibility that the entry was a “procedural error,” they said. A Chinese security expert, however, has cast doubt on Tokyo’s unofficial view that the MSDF destroyer might have entered the Chinese waters by mistake, citing the Japanese crew’s skill levels. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea recognizes the right to “innocent passage,” allowing for a vessel to pass through the territorial waters of another state unless it compromises the safety of the coastal state. Tokyo maintains that the Suzutsuki’s entry into Chinese territorial waters was not illegal, citing the right to innocent passage. But Beijing argues the MSDF ship did not fulfill its requirements under Chinese domestic law that foreign vessels seek its prior permission to enter its waters, the Chinese sources said. Tsuruta Jun, associate professor of international law at Meiji Gakuin University in Tokyo, said there has been a debate on whether the right to innocent passage can be granted to military vessels as well as commercial ships, and that the issue has not been completely settled based on UNCLOS adopted in 1982. As Tokyo recognizes the right to innocent passage for foreign military ships navigating into Japanese territorial waters, SDF vessels would not likely seek Beijing’s prior approval based on Chinese law before entering the neighboring country’s waters, Tsuruta pointed out. China regularly sends its military and coast guard vessels into Japanese territorial waters near the Tokyo-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, which Beijing claims and calls Diaoyu. While the intention of the destroyer’s crew has not been clarified, Japan should refrain from escalating tensions in regional seas, the associate professor said. “I wonder why Japan made such a provocative move amid efforts by both countries to stabilize relations,” a Chinese diplomatic source said. Sino-Japanese relations have deteriorated over a host of issues, including the release of treated radioactive water from the crippled Fukushima nuclear power plant that began in August last year, prompting Beijing to impose a total import ban on Japanese seafood. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida agreed during their November meeting in San Francisco to build “mutually beneficial” bilateral relations based on common strategic interests, with Chinese Premier Li Qiang and the Japanese leader confirming the agreement in Seoul in May. Despite this, negotiations to improve bilateral ties have been slow. (Kyodo, “Japan Destroyer Sailed into China Territorial Waters Despite Warnings,” Kyodo, July 11, 2024)

7/8/24:
WPK Central Committee Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong’s press statement: “ The ROK military gangsters recently kicked off live ammunition firing drills on the ground and in the sea simultaneously near the southern border of the DPRK. On June 26, they resumed their maritime firing drill that had been halted for a while in the biggest hotspot of the West Sea of Korea. They also launched artillery firing drills near the front, including eastern and western sectors along the southern border, all at once on July 2. Not content with this, the impudent enemy announced their plan to regularly stage artillery firing drills and task forces’ training near the border of the DPRK and kick off various other military exercises such as large-scale combined outdoor mobile drill and joint firing drill of army and navy, in particular. I affirm that such an undisguised war game being staged by the enemy near the border of the DPRK is just an inexcusable and explicit provocation that aggravates the situation. “War energy” has been over-concentrated on the Korean peninsula and its vicinity to reach the brink of explosion due to various war games of the U.S. and other hostile forces and ceaseless deployment of their cutting-edge war hardware. Freedom Edge, the first multi-domain joint military exercises between the U.S., Japan and the ROK staged shortly ago in the waters near the DPRK, was the height of confrontational hysteria against it. The war drumbeats clearly showed that the U.S. and other hostile forces’ rash maneuvers for military hegemony in the region have crossed the red line. A touch-and-go situation is prevailing. Clear to everyone is the riskiness of the above-said reckless live ammunition firing drills of the ROK army coming nearer to the border of the DPRK under such situation. Then, the question is why the enemy kicked off such war drills near the border, suicidal hysteria, for which they will have to sustain terrible disaster. The world should pay attention to the fact that the number of people petitioning for proposing a bill on impeachment of Yoon Suk Yeol has exceeded one million as of now. The Yoon and his group, plunged into the worst ruling crisis, are attempting an “emergency escape” through the platform of ever-escalating tensions. That is the reason why the puppet regime persists in destabilizing the regional situation and stirring up the warmongering atmosphere in the face of internal and external criticism of the war maniacs, and even spearheads the extremely dangerous live ammunition drill in the areas near the border. It would be hard to find current security environment in the past period of relations between the north and the south. Anyone cannot but acknowledge that the president, elected by people, has made the fate of the ROK hang by a thread. The war maniacs should judge by themselves what result such desperate war drill hysteria would bring in the end. In case it is judged according to our criteria that they violated the sovereignty of the DPRK and committed an act tantamount to a declaration of war, our armed forces will immediately carry out its mission and duty assigned by the DPRK Constitution.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Vice Department Director of WPK Central Committee Kim Yo Jong,” July 8, 2024)

7/9/24:
The Biden administration’s lack of engagement with North Korea has come under fresh scrutiny following the resignation of its top nuclear envoy without an immediate appointment of a successor, according to diplomatic observers Thursday. According to the U.S. Department of State, Jung Pak, senior official for North Korean policy and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, recently stepped down. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said during a briefing today that he did not have any additional personnel announcements following Pak’s resignation. He added that Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Dan Kritenbrink would continue to oversee North Korea policy, while Seth Bailey, director for the Office of Korean and Mongolian Affairs, would remain as the deputy special representative for North Korea. South Korea’s foreign ministry said July 9 that Bailey is

expected to act as the U.S. counterpart to Seoul’s top nuclear envoy, Lee Jun-il, director-general for Korean Peninsula policy. Pak assumed her position at the end of 2023 following her predecessor Sung Kim. Notably, she was given the title of “senior official,” differing from Kim’s title of “special representative.” This distinction had raised speculation about whether the Biden administration is reducing its focus on the North Korean issue. Harry Kazianis, senior director of national security affairs at the Center for the National Interest, a Washington-based think tank, said that the absence of an immediate successor to Pak shows that “North Korea is not an important issue for Biden.” “Even though I give Washington and Seoul high praise for building up the alliance over the Biden presidency, Team Biden has done little to stop North Korea’s missile and nuclear program from getting ever more dangerous,” Kazianis told Korea Times in an email. The U.S. expert did not anticipate major ramifications in this stance, as the Biden administration does not consider North Korea an important foreign policy priority. He said, “(Biden officials) have done little to press Russia or China to enforce sanctions, and, in fact, President Biden has never even given a major address on the North Korea issue itself as the exclusive topic of his remarks, something strange when you consider how dangerous the North Korea’s missile and nuclear program have become … He appears to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state and sees very little he can do about it.” Joseph DeTrani, former U.S. special envoy to the six-party talks with North Korea, also viewed that the incumbent U.S. administration’s approach to Pyongyang has not yielded fruitful results. “Given North Korea’s past desire to normalize relations with the U.S. — and others — and its recent decision to embrace Russia while supporting Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, I would have to say the Biden administration’s approach to North Korea has not been effective,” DeTrani said. Regarding Pak’s resignation, DeTrani suggested it might signal a reassessment of U.S. policy toward North Korea rather than indicating neglect of North Korean affairs. He noted that Pyongyang’s increasing military ties with Moscow could have heightened the urgency of the Korean Peninsula issue among Washington officials. The former diplomat also advised the United States and South Korean governments to renew efforts to engage with North Korea and confront the reality of growing ties between Russia and North Korea. “That is something the Biden and Yoon Suk Yeol administrations need to address — and correct. Sanctions relief is what (North Korean leader) Kim Jong Un asked for in Hanoi in 2019, and that is a tool we should use to re-engage with Pyongyang,” DeTrani said. (Lee Hyo-jin, “Biden’s North Korea Strategy under Scrutiny Following Top U.S. Nuclear Envoy’s Resignation,” Korea Times, July 11, 2024)

7/10/24:
The United States wants to “institutionalize” the grouping of South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand — the four Indo-Pacific partners of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a senior U.S. diplomat said today, amid concerns over a deepening military alignment between North Korea and Russia, and China’s growing assertiveness. In an exclusive interview with Yonhap, Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell made the remarks, stressing Washington is “absolutely” committed to its deterrence guarantees for South Korea, while casting the allies’ security initiatives as “resolute,” “adaptive” and “determined.” His comment came as the leaders of the transatlantic alliance’s four Indo-Pacific partners, dubbed IP4, have been invited to the ongoing NATO summit in Washington, which runs through tomorrow. “We’re also looking to find opportunities to include South Korea in other engagements as well. So, for instance, I think you’ll be hearing more in the coming days about the Indo-Pacific 4 — the grouping that is with us here in Washington,” Campbell said during the interview at the State Department. “We want to institutionalize that. I think you’re going to see multifaceted efforts to make sure that we recognize and acknowledge that the ROK is increasingly important, not just a regional role, but a global role going forward,” he added, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea. The U.S.’ pursuit of IP4 institutionalization falls in line with the Biden administration’s efforts to leverage alliances and partnerships in fit-for-purpose groupings under a concept of what has been dubbed as “diplomatic variable geometry.” As part of the IP4, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol is in Washington to join a set of NATO meetings, underscoring Seoul’s growing partnership with the 32-member alliance. Seoul has been deepening cooperation with NATO at a time of burgeoning military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, a development that has raised anew questions in South Korea over whether the country should go nuclear or continue to rely on America’s “extended deterrence” commitment to using the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear, to defend the Asian ally. Concerns about the North Korea-Russia alignment escalated further after Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signed a “comprehensive strategic partnership” treaty during their summit in Pyongyang last month. Mindful of such concerns, Campbell reiterated the U.S.’ security commitment to Seoul. “We’re always looking at opportunities to demonstrate clearly and unmistakably our resolve in this arena and we’re going to continue to do that. We are absolutely committed to our extended deterrence guarantees to the Republic of Korea,” he said. “We reaffirm it every chance we can, and we recognize the importance that the initiatives that we undertake are seen as resolute adaptive and determined.” Calling the treaty from the Putin-Kim summit an “unwelcome” development, Campbell said that the U.S. is both “concerned and vigilant.” “We’re determined to meet any challenge with a very robust response, and we are coordinating not only at the bilateral level, but trilaterally and increasingly with other countries in the Indo-Pacific,” he said. “I expect that will continue going forward.” Asked to share his assessment of the treaty’s true nature, Campbell struck a cautious note, saying, “We will know it in time.” “However, from the highly visible nature of (Putin’s) visit, what North Korea has already done in terms of supporting Russia’s defense industrial base … and other engagements that run the other direction, Russia’s support for North Korea … there’s already enough there to concern us,” he said. “I think we’ve been working closely with South Korean partners together to evaluate every element of what has taken place between Moscow and Pyongyang.” Adding to rising security uncertainties on the Korean Peninsula is the U.S. presidential election in November, where President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump are set to face each other. Observers said that should Trump return to the White House, he could bring about a major policy shift. Campbell expressed optimism that Washington’s efforts to strengthen alliances in the Indo-Pacific will continue under “whatever political circumstances.” “I believe we have every reason to think we will continue under whatever political circumstances going forward,” he said. “I’m quite optimistic that there is a substantial bipartisan dynamic that leads to forward momentum that should be reassuring to our allies, partners and friends in the Indo-Pacific region.” Commenting on the negotiations between Seoul and Washington over the cost sharing for stationing 28,500 U.S. troops in Korea, the deputy secretary pointed to “good progress.” “With the negotiations under way — they are complex, they are making good progress — I don’t think I can give you any specific timeline although I will say that both countries are approaching these engagements with a degree of urgency,” he said. He was responding to a question over whether the negotiations will be concluded before the U.S. presidential election.Asked to comment on the departure of Jung Pak, the top U.S. official for North Korea policy, Campbell underlined the State Department’s “most resolute” focus on issues related to the recalcitrant regime. Her departure has cast added uncertainty over Washington’s hitherto unanswered outreach to Pyongyang. “She did a remarkable job here at the State Department, but we have many other officials in our government that had been focused on the DPRK for decades. I would modestly include myself in among that group,” he said, referring to the North by its official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. “I do want to underscore that we continue the most resolute focus on these issues. We are looking at also bringing in new capacity as well. I don’t want to get into details about that. But we recognize the importance here.” As international support for Ukraine features prominently at the NATO summit, much attention has been paid to a tricky question of whether South Korea will make a decision to send lethal weapons to the war-torn country in a policy shift. After the Pyongyang summit, Seoul said it would reconsider its policy ban on the provision of lethal arms. On this issue, Campbell said that such decisions “fundamentally are in the arena of domestic jurisdiction for South Korea.” “We have confidence in our alliance and relationship more generally. We have to leave some of this to internal discussions and engagements between the executive branch, the leadership in Korea, with others inside the Korean government, opposition parties,” he said. “I don’t think I could comment really directly on what South Korea should do going forward only to say that we’ve been very pleased and encouraged and grateful for what South Korea has done today.” (Song Sang-ho and Cho Joon-hyung, “U.S. Wants to ‘Institutionalize’ Grouping of NATO’s Four Indo-Pacific Partners: Campbell,” Yonhap, July 10, 2024)

7/11/24:
U.S.-ROK Joint Statement: “President Joseph R. Biden of the United States of America (U.S.) and President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea (ROK) met on July 11, 2024 to reaffirm the advancements in U.S.-ROK security cooperation on extended deterrence since their announcement of the U.S.-ROK Washington Declaration in April 2023. The progress made since the establishment of the U.S.-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) demonstrates the truly global, comprehensive, strategic alliance between the two countries, the ever-stronger mutual defense relationship, and our shared interest in peace, stability, and the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The NCG was established as an enduring bilateral consultative body that has implemented the U.S.-ROK Washington Declaration, directly strengthened U.S.-ROK cooperation on extended deterrence, and managed the threat to the nonproliferation regime posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The NCG has facilitated joint U.S.-ROK nuclear and strategic planning with a focus on ensuring the continued safety and security of the people of the ROK, as well as the U.S. servicemembers deployed to the Korean Peninsula, in the face of the advancing nuclear threat posed by the DPRK. The NCG contributes to the efforts by the U.S-ROK Alliance to enable joint planning and execution for ROK conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency. The NCG also facilitates continuous improvement to U.S.-ROK combined exercises and training activities, including through regularized table-top exercises and whole-of-government simulations. President Biden and President Yoon commend and endorse the tremendous progress that the U.S.-ROK Alliance has achieved in the first year of the NCG, as evidenced by the signing of the U.S.-ROK Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula (“Guidelines document”) by the U.S. Department of Defense and the ROK Ministry of National Defense. The Presidents underscored that the Guidelines document provides a solid foundation for enhancing U.S.-ROK extended deterrence cooperation in an integrated manner. The Guidelines document provides guidance to Alliance policy and military authorities in maintaining and strengthening a credible and effective nuclear deterrence policy and posture. The Presidents reiterated the need to continue to make swift progress on NCG workstreams, including security protocols and expansion of information sharing; nuclear consultation processes in crises and contingencies; nuclear and strategic planning; ROK conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency through conventional-nuclear integration; strategic communications; exercises, simulations, training, and investment activities; and risk reduction practices. The Presidents reaffirmed their commitments in the U.S.-ROK Washington Declaration and highlighted that any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the ROK will be met with a swift, overwhelming and decisive response. President Biden reiterated that the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence to the ROK is backed by the full range of U.S. capabilities, including nuclear. President Yoon reiterated that the ROK’s full range of capabilities will greatly contribute to the Alliance’s combined defense posture.” (White House, “Joint Statement by President Joseph R. Biden of the United States of America and President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea on U.S.-ROK Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula,” July 11, 2024)

U.S. nuclear forces will be assigned to missions on the Korean Peninsula not only in wartime but also in peacetime to deter and respond to North Korea’s nuclear threats. The U.S. and South Korea have agreed to discuss the deployment of U.S. strategic assets, such as strategic bombers and strategic nuclear submarines (SSBN), 24/7 and to deploy them on the Korean Peninsula at a level comparable to permanent deployment. This is the first time such details have been formalized in a document. The joint statement reaffirms the unwavering commitment of the two presidents to respond decisively to any nuclear attack by North Korea against the ROK. This commitment, as reiterated by President Biden, is backed by the full range of U.S. capabilities, including nuclear. President Yoon also emphasized that the ROK’s full range of capabilities will significantly bolster the Alliance’s combined defense posture. ROK’s First Deputy Director of National Security Kim Tae-hyo stressed in the briefing after the summit meeting that this is a special commitment provided by the U.S. to the ROK as its ally, underscoring the strength of the alliance. The ROK Ministry of National Defense clarified that the joint guidelines are primarily aimed at increasing the frequency and intensity of the deployment of U.S. strategic assets. This strategic move is designed to deter North Korea’s nuclear threats and ensure an immediate nuclear retaliation posture (nuclear umbrella) in the event of a North Korean nuclear attack, thereby enhancing the security of the region. (Joo-Young Jeon, “U.S. Nuclear Forces on Permanent Mission to Korean Peninsula,” Dong-A Ilbo, July 13, 2024)

Signs that North Korea has been dismantling part of a western inter-Korean railway have been detected, Seoul’s defense ministry said today, the latest in Pyongyang’s apparent move to eliminate routes once seen as symbols of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. The military has detected the North removing ties and rails on the northern side of the Gyeongui line that connects the military demarcation line to the North Korean border city of Kaesong since late June, according to the ministry. The move is the latest in the North’s push to demolish inter-Korean routes after its leader Kim Jong Un gave instructions for “strict” measures to block all the channels of inter-Korean communication along the border on the North’s side to an “irretrievable level” in January. (Yonhap, “N. Korea Expands Inter-Korea Railway Demolition to Gyeongui Line: Seoul,” July 11, 2024)

7/13/24:
DPRK MoD spokesman’s press statement “Our army will guarantee the national security in every way with its powerful nuclear war deterrent readiness”: “The chief executives of the U.S. and the ROK made public a “joint statement” that openly plotted a nuclear showdown with the DPRK on July 11.The military of the U.S. and the ROK signed the “guidelines on nuclear deterrence and nuclear operations on the Korean peninsula,” occasioned by the Washington NATO Summit, thus betraying their sinister intention to step up their preparations for a nuclear war against the DPRK by realizing the integration of the nuclear forces of the U.S. and the conventional forces of the ROK. The DPRK Ministry of National Defense strongly denounces and rejects the reckless provocative act of the U.S. and the ROK that pushes the regional military tensions to extremes through extremely incendiary and malicious rhetoric and provocative action. The provocative behavior fully shown again by the U.S. and the ROK is the root cause of endangering the regional security. We come to the conclusion that there is only one option for us to take against such confrontational fanatics. Our enemies’ nuclear threat, which is ever-escalating in an offensive and frantic manner, and the dangerous regional security environment brought by it urgently require the DPRK to further improve its nuclear deterrent readiness and add important elements to the composition of the deterrent. We know what we have to do and we will continue our activities necessary for it. We seriously warn the hostile states not to commit such provocative acts causing instability any more. If they ignore this warning, they will have to pay an unimaginably harsh price for it.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Spokesman for DPRK Ministry of National Defense,” July 13, 2024)

DPRK FoMin spokesman’s press statement “We will deter the looming serious threat with tougher strategic counteraction”: “The U.S. revealed its sinister intention to further strengthen the collusion and nexus between NATO and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region, terming the just and legitimate exercise of sovereignty of the independent states including the DPRK a “threat” at the NATO summit held in Washington. The “Washington Summit Declaration,” cooked up and made public on July 10, goes to prove that the U.S. and NATO, reduced to a tool for its confrontation, pose the most serious threat to the global peace and security. The DPRK Foreign Ministry most strongly denounces and rejects the “declaration”, an illegal document that violates the legitimate rights of independent sovereign states and a confrontational program that incites new Cold War and military confrontation on a global scale. The U.S. moves to expand military blocs are the vicious root cause of seriously threatening the regional peace, extremely exacerbating the international security environment and sparking off worldwide arms race. Before shifting on to other countries the responsibility for the deteriorated security in the Europe-Atlantic, the U.S. will have to clarify who has constantly destroyed the security environment in Europe for the past decades through NATO’s reckless policy for eastward advance and expansion. It should also explain who has persistently tried for the last ten-odd years to inveigle the pro-American satellite countries in Asia into NATO, before claiming that the security between the Northern Atlantic and the Asia-Pacific is linked with each other. We solemnly warn that NATO’s strategy for “globalization”, pursued by the U.S., may certainly bring the danger of a worldwide war. The U.S. should be held totally responsible for seriously infringing upon the sovereignty and security interests of other countries and constantly destroying the strategic stability of the world while wantonly violating the recognized principles of international law including respect for sovereignty, non-interference, equality and mutual benefit. The prevailing situation requires a new force and mode of counteraction to foil the U.S. attempt for expanded military bloc, an urgent challenge to international peace and stability. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will never overlook or avoid the looming grave threat but thoroughly deter the aggression and war threat with stronger level of strategic counteraction and defend peace and security in the region and the rest of the world.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman,” July 13, 2024)

7/16/24:
A North Korean diplomat who had been stationed in Cuba defected to South Korea last year, South Korea’s spy agency said today, the latest in a small but growing number of defections by North Koreans in elite groups. The National Intelligence Service confirmed a media report that Ri Il-gyu, who had served as the counselor of political affairs at the North’s embassy in Cuba, entered South Korea in November with his family. It did not provide further details. The defection came as efforts were under way for South Korea to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba. In February, the two countries forged formal ties in a surprise move widely seen as a setback to North Korea, which has long boasted about its brotherly ties with the Caribbean country. Ri, 52, is believed to be a veteran diplomat who served stints spanning around nine years in Cuba after joining the North’s foreign ministry in 1999. His latest stint reportedly involved stopping Havana from forging official diplomatic ties with Seoul, according to an interview published by Chosun Ilbo. The report said Ri was commended by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during his duty in Cuba. But he was quoted as saying that he made the decision to defect out of frustration and anger over what he called an unfair work evaluation at the North’s foreign ministry and its refusal of his request to receive medical treatment in Mexico. Ri is the first North Korean diplomat known to have defected to South Korea since Ryu Hyun-woo arrived in Seoul in September 2019 after serving as an acting chief of North Korea’s embassy in Kuwait. (Lee Minji, “Former N. Korean Diplomat Stationed in Cuba Defected to S. Korea Last Year,” Yonhap, July 16, 2024)

Ri Il-gyu, a 52-year-old former counselor responsible for political affairs at the North Korean Embassy in Cuba, appeared calm and gentle in an interview with Chosun Ilbo at a hotel in Seoul on July 14. If not for his Pyongyang accent, it would be hard to believe he had defected just eight months ago. However, he was resolute when criticizing Kim Jong Un’s “anti-reunification two-state policy” as “an act that obliterates the soul of the nation.” … The 10th Bureau of the WPK Central Committee (formerly the United Front Department), rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led North Korea-U.S. talks. “Kim Jong Il frequently called the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at night, with documents being reported without any time restrictions. However, since Kim Jong Un came to power, these calls have significantly decreased. There was even an order prohibiting document reports after 11 PM. Consequently, the authority and influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been completely diminished.” … Around that time, the then-Vice Foreign Minister who was in charge of U.S. affairs, and Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho fell from power. What happened to them? “Han Song-ryol was publicly executed on charges of being a U.S. spy. On Feb. 12, 2019, senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, above the rank of deputy director, were gathered near Pyongyang Sunan Airport at the Kang Kon Military Academy to witness the execution. I could not attend as I was being assigned to Cuba at the time. Those who witnessed the execution reported being unable to eat for several days afterward. In December 2019, Ri Yong-ho was accused of corruption, leading to his entire family being sent to a political prison camp. An embezzlement case involving a secretary at the embassy in China revealed Ri Yong-ho’s involvement during the investigation of higher-ranking officials who had accepted bribes. Kim Jong Un, furious over the matter, stated, ‘No wonder he couldn’t do his job properly if he was engaged in such activities behind my back.’ He then criticized Ri Yong-ho for half a day during the third day of the Central Committee plenary meeting from December 28 to 31, 2019. Attendees remarked that they believed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might be entirely dismantled.” (Kim Jin-myung, Kim Seo-young, and Kim Mi-geon, “’N. Korea Has No Hope under Kim Jong Un’s Regime,’”Chosun Ilbo, July 16, 2024)

Sue Mi Terry, a prominent voice on American foreign policy, had a refined palate, a love for top-shelf sushi and a taste for designer labels. She liked coats by Christian Dior, handbags by Bottega Veneta and Louis Vuitton, and Michelin-starred restaurants. And, according to federal prosecutors in Manhattan, she accepted such luxury goods and other gifts in exchange for serving the South Korean government in Seoul. Terry, a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst and a senior fellow for Korea studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, is accused in a 31-page indictment released today of a years-long effort to assist South Korean spies. The indictment says she even introduced the spies to congressional staff members, an action that she described as “bringing the wolf in.” The charges, which were brought by the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, were part of a concerted push by the Justice Department to combat foreign influence in American affairs, which has produced dozens of prosecutions in recent years. Such cases have been set off by illegal campaign contributions from overseas, covert influence operations and even the bribing of Senator Robert Menendez, for which he was convicted today. In Terry’s case, prosecutors say she began operating as a foreign agent in 2013, five years after leaving the C.I.A. She was first contacted by an intelligence officer posing as a diplomat for the Korean mission to the United Nations in New York City, the indictment said, and in return for her work over the next decade, Terry received handbags, clothing and at least $37,000 in covert payments to the think tank where she was employed at the time. “Despite engaging in extensive activities for and at the direction of” the South Korean government, Terry did not register as a foreign agent with American officials, as required by law, prosecutors said. She faces two counts, one for failing to register under the federal Foreign Agents Registration Act, and the other for conspiring to violate it. In a statement, Lee Wolosky, Terry’s lawyer, said that the allegations were unfounded and distorted “the work of a scholar and news analyst known for her independence and years of service to the United States.” “Dr. Terry has not held a security clearance for over a decade, and her views on matters relating to the Korean Peninsula have been consistent over many years,” Wolosky said. “In fact, she was a harsh critic of the South Korean government during times this indictment alleges that she was acting on its behalf.” He added, “Once the facts are made clear, it will be evident the government made a significant mistake.” Nicholas Biase, a spokesman for the Southern District, declined to comment. The South Korean embassy did not immediately return a message seeking comment. Considered an expert on North Korea and broader security issues in the region, Terry has worked not only at the C.I.A., but at the National Intelligence Council and the National Security Council, places where she produced “hundreds of intelligence assessments,” according to her biography on the Council on Foreign Relations website. According to the indictment, federal agents had suspicions regarding Terry’s contact with Seoul as early as November 2014, when the F.B.I. called her in for a voluntary interview. As she was questioned, Terry became “visibly nervous, changed her speech pattern and began to stutter and shift in her seat,” the indictment said. Over the ensuing years, agents would track Terry to numerous restaurants and luxury stores in Washington, providing photos of her dining with her handlers and standing next to them at cash registers as they bought her expensive goods. Several were included in court papers today. In an interview with the F.B.I. in June 2023, Terry, who was born in Seoul but raised in the United States, admitted that she had resigned from the C.I.A. in 2008 rather than be fired because the agency had “problems” with her contacts with members of South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, the indictment said. But her national-security work was only prelude to more wrongdoing after she left the government, according to prosecutors, including disclosing “nonpublic U.S. government information” to intelligence officers working for South Korea. The indictment says that Terry handed over handwritten notes of a private group meeting in 2022 regarding the U.S. government’s policy toward North Korea that she attended with Secretary of State Antony Blinken. During this period, the indictment said, Terry worked for several well-known think tanks in Washington. Terry’s activity on behalf of South Korea started small and became more ambitious as she worked with three different handlers, the indictment said. At first, she mainly published opinion articles favorable to South Korea’s stance on North Korea, but soon she was facilitating meetings between incoming Trump administration officials and South Korean intelligence agents in 2016. By 2018, Terry was hosting meetings at a think tank at the request of her South Korean handlers, giving them access to U.S. national security officials, the indictment said. Terry made media appearances and wrote articles in American and South Korean publications reflecting Seoul’s policy priorities, the indictment said, including an opinion piece for The New York Times in 2014. She also co-wrote a piece with her husband, Max Boot, a Washington Post columnist, about the improving relationship between South Korea and Japan. On three occasions, Terry testified before Congress about North Korea, which required her to sign a form before each hearing declaring that she was not a registered foreign agent. In April 2023, Terry hosted an event at a think tank where she invited congressional staff members and worked to study South Korea’s alliance with the United States at the request of the South Korean National Intelligence Service. Terry then invited the staff members to a happy hour where South Korean intelligence officers were present, allowing the officers to “spot and assess” potential recruits, according to the indictment. As her work became riskier, her rewards were greater, prosecutors said. Her payment started with a $2,950 Bottega Veneta bag and ballooned to lump sums of $11,000 and then $25,000, paid to Terry’s gift account at the think tank where she worked, over which she had sole discretion, they said. During lavish dinners at primarily Michelin-starred sushi restaurants, followed by drinks at rooftop bars, Terry’s handler would feed her lines she would then parrot in media appearances in the form of policy recommendations regarding U.S.-South Korea relations, the indictment said. Iva Zorić, a spokeswoman for the Council on Foreign Relations, said the organization had learned of the indictment today and placed Terry on unpaid administrative leave. She added that the council would cooperate with any investigation. (Claire Fahy, Jesse McKinley and Benjamin Weiser, “U.S. U.S. Charges a Former C.I.A. Analyst with Helping South Korean Spies,” New York Times, July 18, 2024, p. A-9) The federal prosecutor’s indictment states that on Apr. 16, 2021, Terry had dinner with a National Intelligence Service (NIS) agent in Washington, D.C., during which they discussed her close relationship with a high-ranking State Department official responsible for Korean affairs. Terry allegedly described the official’s previous roles in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Intelligence Council (NIC). While the indictment does not explicitly name former Deputy Assistant Secretary Jung Pak, the described background of the high-ranking official closely matches Jung Pak’s profile. Jung Pak previously served as the Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Korea at the NIC under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and as the Head of the CIA’s East Asia and Pacific Mission Center. In January 2021, she was appointed as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, overseeing matters related to Korea. However, she abruptly resigned on Jul. 5. Although neither he nor the State Department explained the reason for her resignation, there were speculations within diplomatic circles that it was unusual for her to resign suddenly without any specific reason. Some have suggested that Jung Pak might have resigned to take responsibility for the unofficial remarks of the State Department head being leaked. (Lee Min-seok, Kim Eun-joong, and Lee Jung-soo, “Top U.S. Korean Policy Official Resigns: Is the Sue Mi Terry Incident to Blame?” Chosun Ilbo, July 18, 2024)

7/18/24:
Trump Acceptance Speech: “I got along very well, North Korea, Kim Jung Un. I got along very well with him. The press hated when I said that. ‘How could you get along with him?’ Well, you know, it’s nice to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons or otherwise. See, in the old days, you’d say that’s a wonderful thing. Now they say, ‘How can you possibly do that?’ But no, I got along with him and we stopped the missile launches from North Korea. Now, North Korea is acting up again. But when we get back, I get along with him. He’d like to see me back too. I think he misses me, if you want to know the truth.” (“Transcript of Donald J. Trump’s Convention Speech,” New York Times, July 18, 2024)

7/19/24:
Tianran Xu: “In any high-intensity war with North Korea, South Korea and the United States will heavily rely on air strikes to attack key North Korean locations and assets. Though the dense network of air defense systems in North Korea provides overlapping and redundant coverage of the country at medium and high altitudes, the effectiveness of these systems has drastically diminished in the face of evolving air threats, leaving the country vulnerable to air strikes to the extent targets can be located. However, North Korea has been making efforts to try to reduce this vulnerability, and some technical breakthroughs for upgrading its air defense capabilities might be near at hand. A modernized air defense network could not only better protect strategic locations, but also provide cover for the operations of North Korean troops, especially the nuclear forces. Mid- and Long-range Air Defense Systems In a high-intensity war scenario, South Korea, the United States and possibly Japan could launch a wide range of precision land-attack munitions against North Korea from air, land and sea. These munitions mainly include: Tactical ballistic missiles and possibly hypersonic missiles in a few years; Subsonic land-attack cruise missiles; Loitering munitions and suicide drones; Guided bombs and other precision munitions. Considering cost-effectiveness, and due to a limited radar line of sight at low altitudes, especially in mountainous terrains, mid- and long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are better suited to engage manned aircraft, medium and large drones, and, when possible, cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles. In North Korea, obsolete Soviet-era SAMs remain the backbone of ground-based, mid- and long-range air defense systems. These equipment could only pose very limited threats to US and South Korean air assets. The Soviet S-75 (SA-2) has been the most numerous SAM in North Korea. According to open-source research, North Korea was also able to produce its own S-75 missiles with Chinese assistance. Legacy Systems Upgrade Both the S-75 (SA-2) and S-125 (SA-3) are guided by radio command. Under this guidance mode, the missile is steered via radio command from a ground-based engagement radar, which tracks both the missile and its target. Judging from limited footage released by state media, North Korea has added an infrared seeker to at least some of its S-75 missiles. This modification would bring about three improvements: A terminal infrared seeker could improve accuracy, especially at longer range, as the accuracy of radio command guidance decreases when the missile flies further from its ground-based engagement radar. A switch of guidance mode during flight could, in theory, increase difficulties for ECM (electronic countermeasures). As soon as the infrared seeker locks onto target, the ground-based radar could choose to disengage, which may slightly improve operational flexibility and survivability of the radar. In addition, North Korea has also tried to mount S-75 launchers on tracked and wheeled road-mobile platforms, despite the fact that the S-75 is a relatively cumbersome, liquid-propellant missile (with a solid booster). The accumulation of these upgrades led to a unique North Korean S-75 system equipped with infrared seekers and carried by mobile launchers. This modification was first unveiled at the Exhibition House of Military Hardware of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in 2012. With improved mobility, accuracy and ECCM (counter-electronic countermeasures) capabilities, the upgraded S-75 systems might pose a modest threat to US and South Korean aircraft — although this vintage system is well understood by the alliance, which presumably has deployed various countermeasures against it. If and to what extent these modifications have been adopted by the KPA remains unconfirmed in the open-source domain, though some have claimed that there is a “widespread introduction” of infrared seekers among existing S-75 missiles deployed at fixed sites. Meanwhile, North Korea’s efforts to upgrade the S-125 system appears to have been limited to only improvement in mobility, which possibly is a function of fewer available S-125 units. Systems Under Development 번개 5 (Pongae-5/Lightning-5/KN-06). North Korea revealed a new solid-propellant SAM referred to as the Lightning-5 (US designation KN-06) during a military parade in October 2010. Key components of the Lightning-5 appear to be similar to that of the Russian S-300 (SA-10) long-range SAM, and are mounted on wheeled vehicles. South Korean authorities do not regularly report on North Korean SAM activities. But, according to media reports, the North might have test fired the Lightning-5 in May 2009 and June 2011. In a January 2015 KCTV documentary, an engagement radar of the Lightning-5 was seen participating in a joint live fire drill. North Korean state media publicly reported on the test launch of the Lightning-5 in April 2016 and May 2017. According to South Korean authorities, a Lightning-5 missile in the April 2016 test reached a range of around 100 km. Considering that pure radio command guidance would limit the range of a SAM to around 70 km, the Lightning-5 likely adopted a more sophisticated guidance mode. Overall, the Lightning-5 probably represents substantial improvements in mobility, range and multi-target engagement capabilities in comparison to the S-75, S-125 and S-200 legacy SAMs currently in service with the KPA. During the May 2017 test, Kim Jong Un stated that the Lightning-5 “should be mass-produced to deploy in all over the country like forests.” However, despite Kim’s order, there is no substantial evidence in the open-source domain suggesting that the Lightning-5 has been deployed in any significant numbers or that it has ever entered active service. There could be a number of explanations for the Lightning-5’s apparent lack of progress after 2017, such as technological flaws, quality issues, inability to initiate mass production or constraints in resources and budget. The appearance of another new-type SAM in 2020, however, indicated that North Korea might have decided to halt the development of Lightning-5 in favor of an even more ambitious project. 별찌-1-2 (Pyoljji-1-2/Meteor-1-2) During a parade in October 2020, another type of long-range solid-propellant road-mobile SAM was put on display. North Korea subsequently claimed that this new SAM was tested in September 2021, November 2022, February 2024 and April 2024. During the April 2024 test, the SAM was referred to by state media as Meteor-1-2. To meet different range requirements, the Meteor-1-2 can be put on either a short booster or a longer one. After booster burnout, the Meteor-1-2 is then powered by a sustainer motor. Notably, the missile appears to have two sets of aerodynamic control surfaces (eight control surfaces in total, referred to by the KCNA as twin-rudder control technology) and four fixed wings to provide stability and additional lift. This rather unconventional design is reminiscent of Israel’s Stunner missile and, to a lesser extent, Japan’s Type 03 Chū-SAM. Considering its overall layout, the Meteor-1-2 could, in theory, have a longer range and higher maneuverability than the Lightning-5 because: A two-stage rocket could enable the missile to fly further than a single-stage rocket of similar size; After booster burnout, the missile becomes considerably smaller and lighter than the Lightning-5; and It is steered by eight movable fins instead of four. This comparison seems to support the maneuverability and range aspects of state media’s claim that the Meteor-1-2 features “rapid responsiveness and guidance accuracy of missile control system as well as the substantial increase in the distance of downing air targets.” According to images released by state media, the engagement radar of the Meteor-1-2 also appears to be different from that of the Lightning-5. Most notably, the absence of the feedhorn behind the phased array antenna indicates that further modifications have been made to the Meteor-1-2’s radar. It is possible that both the Lighting-5 and Meteor-1 systems are supposed to receive target information from the same new-type target acquisition radar and new-type early warning radar North Korea unveiled in 2021, which would possibly serve as crucial components in North Korea’s future air surveillance network. However, there is no updated information regarding these radars at this point. Short-range Air Defense Systems. Short-range air defense systems are primarily intended to conduct close-in intercepts of low-altitude cruise missiles, loitering munitions, suicide drones, glide bombs and other precision munitions launched from aircraft, as well as manned aircraft within their reach. The ongoing war in Ukraine once again clearly demonstrated the necessity for short-range defense systems to help counter these air threats. North Korea has produced and deployed relatively modern man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) that are intended to engage both aircraft and small, low-altitude targets such as cruise missiles and a large number of towed and self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. In addition, the country also operates a number of Soviet 9K35 (SA-13) mobile short-range SAMs. According to currently available open-source information, however, most of these systems lack effective means for target acquisition and fire control by modern standards. Upgrade Potentials.The most comprehensive short-range air defense suite in North Korea to date could be found onboard a new class of naval corvettes that was revealed by state media in August 2023. The corvette, referred to as the Amnok class by the outside world, features a short-range, low-altitude search radar, electro-optical sensors, Gatling guns and a MANPADS launcher. Compared with surface combatants of developed navies, the Amnok class only has very basic close-in self-defense capabilities. However, the sensors on board, especially the low-altitude search radar and electro-optical sensors, could, in theory, also be incorporated into land-based systems to increase the effectiveness of the North’s short-range air defense assets. Systems Under Development North Korea showcased its most ambitious short-range SAM project during a military parade in October 2020. In concept, this new SAM shares a close resemblance to the Russian Tor (SA-15) and Chinese HQ-17 systems. Same as the Tor and the HQ-17, the new-type SAM appears to have adopted the simple radio-command guidance mode, but should be able to engage more than one target simultaneously thanks to the introduction of an electronically scanned array engagement radar. It is unclear how many missiles the North Korean version is designed to carry per vehicle. For reference, the Tor M2 variant carries up to 16 vertical launch tubes, while older types and the Chinese HQ-17 carry up to eight tubes. The maximum range of a Tor missile is about 12 km, tripling that of typical MANPADS. If deployed in large numbers, this new-type SAM should, in theory, significantly strengthen air defense at short-range and at low-to-medium altitude, although the Tor system in Ukraine appears to have shown a mixed performance. To date, North Korea has not reported any test fire and the future of this SAM project remains opaque. In addition, in 2021, North Korea also displayed air-to-air missiles with modern aerodynamic layouts in an arms exhibition. These air-to-air missiles, if successfully developed, could be converted into short-range SAMs without major modifications. Conclusion Efforts made in the past 20 years have yielded few results in enhancing North Korea’s outdated air defense capabilities, leaving the North’s conventional and nuclear capabilities vulnerable to strikes from the air. On the other hand, North Korea appears to be close to achieving more capable anti-air assets. However, it remains unclear how long it would take the North to upgrade its legacy air defense network across the country, and the extent to which such upgrades would keep pace with evolving aerial threats.” (Tianran Xu, “Development of North Korea’s Land-Based Air Defense Systems,” 38North, July 19, 2024)

7/23/24:
KCNA Commentary: “The U.S. is running high fever in its move to expand the overall structure of confrontation against the DPRK. According to the data released on July 21, more than ten FA-18 Super Hornets belonging to an attack squadron of the U.S. marines, named Fighting Bengals, were recently deployed in the Suwon Air Force Base in Kyonggi Province of the ROK. The U.S. Defense Department said that it is aimed at providing the experience in operation in the Indo-Pacific region, adding that these fighters are training to increase their preparedness and the power of fatal blow with its ally. And as if threatening someone, it opened to the public the several FA-18 Super Hornets taking off. It is said that these fighters will stay in the ROK in and after August for different joint exercises. It is known to the world that FA-18 Super Hornet is the one for special warfare which has its mission to hit the major bases and the “war command” of the other party with JDAM and other precision guided bombs in the way of “high-density strike.” The ROK military side, encouraged by the bluffing of its master, said that “as the powerful air forces of the U.S. marines are permanently deployed in fact, the effect of increasing the deterrence against the north is also expected.” This being a hard reality, a few days ago, the U.S. made a spokesperson for the Department of State, the U.S. ambassador to the ROK and others let loose a spate of rhetoric about dialogue, saying that the U.S. policy toward the DPRK including dialogue remains unchanged and the door of negotiations with the DPRK is still opened. The confrontation maniacs, suffering from the endemic like the “hostility toward the DPRK”, are talking about honeyed dialogue. This is prompted by the ulterior intention to easily realize their ambition for stifling the DPRK by leading it to mental and psychological slackness. Dialogue with sinister attempt and such dialogue as an extension of confrontation are needless to be held from the outset. Through the decades-long relations with the U.S., the DPRK has keenly and fully felt what the dialogue brought to it and what it lost. Watching the whole course of the DPRK-U.S. dialogue, the fair international community has already come to a conclusion that the U.S. is a perfidious country which does not fulfill its promises, saying this or that. The DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework was adopted as a result of the DPRK-U.S. dialogue during the Clinton administration, but the U.S. had put the brake on its implementation under this or that pretext and completely scrapped it while entering the Bush administration. This is a typical example. It admits of no argument about the reliability as regards the political climate of the U.S. which “cooks” at random the inter-state agreement solemnly declared before the world in conformity with the “taste” and “feeling” of the political faction in power whenever the government is replaced and throws away it like “waste.” All facts go to prove that the U.S. is a “backward country and rogue state in politics” which makes no scruple of turning over the inter-state treaty and agreement in a moment. Amid the full-dress presidential election race in the U.S., Trump, who has been officially confirmed as a candidate for the Republican Party, said in his speech of acceptance for candidate that “I got along with them and it is nice to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons and otherwise,” thus buoying a lingering desire for the prospects of the DPRK-U.S. relations. Even if any administration takes office in the U.S., the political climate, which is confused by the infighting of the two parties, does not change and, accordingly, we do not care about this. It is true that Trump, when he was president, tried to reflect the special personal relations between the heads of states in the relations between states, but he did not bring about any substantial positive change. He that puts on a public gown must put off a private person. The foreign policy of a state and personal feelings must be strictly distinguished. For nearly 80 years since the founding of the DPRK, the U.S. has pursued the most vicious and persistent hostile policy toward it. The DPRK has bolstered up its self-defensive capabilities to safeguard its ideology, social system, dignity and life and is fully ready for all-out confrontation with the U.S. Due to the serious strategic mistakes of the successive administrations, the era has come when the U.S. should really worry about its security. No matter what rhetoric like dialogue and negotiations it may let loose while frequently staging frantic war rehearsals for aggression foreseeing the nuclear operation by dispatching nuclear strategic assets regardless of the time and reinforcing the ultra-modern weapons and equipment, can we believe it? The U.S. had better make a proper choice in the matter of how to deal with the DPRK in the future, while sincerely agonizing the gains and losses in the DPRK-U.S. confrontation. Whether the second hand of the DPRK-U.S. confrontation stops or not entirely depends on the U.S. act.” (KCNA, “Whether Second Hand of DPRK-U.S. Confrontation Stops or Not Depends on U.S. Act: KCNA Commentary,” July 23, 2024)

7/24/24:
The United States today slapped sanctions on a China-based network of six individuals and five entities for their alleged involvement in the procurement of items supporting North Korea’s ballistic missile and space programs. The Treasury Department stressed that the new sanctions reaffirm that relevant UNSC resolutions remain “in full force” and reiterate the U.S.’ “commitment to countering sanctions evasion and strengthening efforts for enforcement.” “The DPRK’s continued development and proliferation of its ballistic missile technologies — in violation of U.N. sanctions — is both irresponsible and destabilizing for both the region and the international community,” Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson said. “The United States remains committed to using our tools to enforce these international sanctions, including disrupting the illicit procurement networks that provide key inputs for these technologies and holding accountable those who seek to enable these activities,” the official added. Among the five entities are Beijing Sanshunda Electronics Science and Technology, and Shenzhen City Mean Well Electronics. The six individuals include Chen Tianxin and Du Jiaxin, according to the department. In a press release, the department said that the North’s ballistic missile and space programs rely on foreign-sourced materials and components, and that the North uses an extensive network of overseas agents to procure those materials and components, “The DPRK also leverages foreign-incorporated companies to purchase items in support of its ballistic missile and weapons production,” it said. “These companies consolidate and repackage items for onward shipment to the DPRK, concealing the true end-user from the manufacturers and distributors of the items.” The new sanctions came amid concerns that the disbandment of a U.N. sanctions-monitoring panel in April would weaken international efforts to identify and prevent Pyongyang’s sanctions violations and evasion. (Yonhap, “U.S. Sanctions China-Based Individuals, Entities Accused of Supporting NK Missile, Space Programs,” Korea Times, July 25, 2024)

7/25/24:
A federal grand jury today indicted a North Korean man on charges of stealing huge amounts of data from the computers of American military bases and defense contractors, as well as NASA and several Asian companies, in the latest sign of North Korea’s malicious cybercrime and espionage abilities. Federal prosecutors accused the man, Rim Jong Hyok, of working with unnamed co-conspirators to steal data in 2022 from four unnamed American defense contractors and from Randolph Air Force Base in Texas and Robins Air Force Base in Georgia. The indictment also said that the North Koreans had extracted data from computers in NASA’s inspector general office over three months that year. In what experts called standard practice for North Korea’s cyber-operatives, Rim and his collaborators subsidized their espionage with money procured in ransomware attacks on American hospitals and health care companies, the indictment said. The North Koreans extracted technical data from the defense contractors, including information related to uranium processing as well as military aircraft, shipbuilding and satellites, the indictment said. The hackers also infiltrated the computer systems of defense companies in South Korea, Taiwan and even an energy company in China, which has friendly relations with North Korea. The data stolen from the South Korean and Taiwanese companies, the indictment said, included “technical and design information about military weapons and vehicles, such as tanks, fighter jets, rockets and torpedoes.” The indictment was released on the same day that the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other U.S. and foreign agencies jointly released a public advisory warning that North Korea’s main intelligence service is conducting cyberoperations to assist the country’s military and nuclear programs. It was not clear how precious the data acquired by the North Koreans might be. Much of the data stolen from one of the U.S. defense contractors was from 2010 or earlier, according to federal documents. Also today, the State Department offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the identification or location of Rim or anyone else involved in the conspiracy or associated with the North Korean group, which is widely known as Andariel. The reward offer, using an abbreviation for “weapons of mass destruction,” said that North Korea works to “generate illicit revenue through malicious cyberactivity, which it uses to fund its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs.” In the case of Rim and his accomplices, prosecutors say, the North Koreans hacked into the computer systems of U.S. hospitals and health care providers in 2021 and 2022, installing a ransomware program known as Maui that encrypted targeted computers, including ones used for medical testing, electronic medical records and other health care services. The North Koreans then anonymously demanded payment in Bitcoin to restore regular access to the victimized computers. In the case of a hospital in Kansas, where the indictment was filed, the North Koreans encrypted four computer servers in May 2021, including the hospital’s X-ray and diagnostic imaging server, forcing the cancellation of some appointments. A ransom note that appeared on the hospital’s computer network warned that if the ransom was not paid, all the files would be posted on the internet, “which may lead to the loss of reputation and cause troubles for your business.” “Please do not waste your time! You have 48 hours only! After that the Main server will double your price,” it said, adding: “Let us know if you have any questions.” The hospital paid the unspecified ransom, which was converted from Bitcoin to another cryptocurrency and then to Chinese yuan, transferred to a Chinese bank, and withdrawn from an A.T.M. in China just across the border from North Korea, the indictment said. In all, two hospitals and three health care companies in five states were targeted, according to the indictment. Michael Barnhart, principal analyst with the cybersecurity company Mandiant, a subsidiary of Google Cloud, said that the indictment reveals “the gravity of what’s going on” as North Korea’s cyberactivity grows more sophisticated and aggressive. “When Kim Jong Un demands better missiles, these are the guys who steal the blueprints for him,” he said, referring to the North Korean leader. He added that North Korean hackers are not “bound by ethical considerations and have demonstrated they’re willing and agile enough to target any entity to achieve their objectives, including hospitals.”(Michael Crowley, “ U.S. Indicts North Korean in Ransomware Attacks and Theft of Military Data,” New York Times, July 26, 2024, p. A-4)

7/28/24:
In one of the biggest upgrades to the U.S.-Japan alliance since its inception, the U.S. will revamp its command in Japan, giving it a “direct leadership role” over American forces in operational planning in both peacetime and in potential crises, the countries’ defense chiefs and top diplomats announced Sunday, as the allies’ look to counter what they say is an increasingly assertive China. The announcement, which came after “two-plus-two” talks between Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and Defense Minister Minoru Kihara and their U.S. counterparts, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, was among a number of fresh defense and security initiatives unveiled after the meeting, the first since January last year. “The United States will upgrade the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) to a joint force headquarters with expanded missions and operational responsibilities,” Austin told a joint news conference after the meeting. “This will be the most significant change to U.S. Forces Japan since its creation — one of the strongest improvements in our military ties with Japan in 70 years.” According to Austin, the unified command would be upgraded in a step-by-step manner. “To facilitate deeper interoperability and cooperation on joint bilateral operations in peacetime and during contingencies, the United States intends to reconstitute U.S. Forces Japan as a joint force headquarters reporting to the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command,” according to a joint statement released by the officials. Through the phased approach, the new USFJ joint force headquarters will “enhance its capabilities and operational cooperation” with the Self-Defense Forces’ own new permanent joint headquarters, which is due to be established before the end of this fiscal year, which ends next March. The new USFJ headquarters will also “assume primary responsibility for coordinating security activities in and around Japan in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security,” according to the statement. The move means the reconfigured command will take over operational command responsibilities of the roughly 55,000 personnel stationed in Japan, from the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command — some 6,200 kilometers away in Hawaii — amid rising fears that a delay in bilateral communications could cost the allies dearly in any potential conflict. Plans for the U.S. command upgrade gained steam last month, following comments by Austin that basing a four-star commander in the country is something the Pentagon was “looking at very closely.” While U.S. defense officials said the commander would remain a three-star general, Austin did not rule out the possibility of having a more senior officer in the role eventually. Tokyo is believed to have long sought a four-star commander, who would be expected to wield operational command. Japan and the U.S. will launch working groups to hash out the details of the move. Meanwhile, some observers have argued that the effectiveness of the new structure could partially depend on the level of funding it gets, whether for additional assets, personnel or infrastructure, from the currently Republican-controlled U.S. Congress. This issue could become highly politicized, particularly if former President Donald Trump returns to the White House and shifts Washington’s geopolitical priorities. In the joint statement, the officials also struck a strident tone on China, which observers say has played a crucial role in the allied decisions to push these changes forward, claiming that Beijing’s “foreign policy seeks to reshape the international order for its own benefit at the expense of others.” They reiterated “strong objections” to China’s “unlawful maritime claims, militarization of reclaimed features and threatening and provocative activities in the South China Sea” — pointing to unsafe encounters at sea and in the air, efforts to disrupt other countries’ offshore resources exploitation and the “dangerous use of Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels.” (By Jesse Johnson, Gabriel Dominguez and Kathleen Benoza, “In Historic Move, U.S. to Upgrade Military Command Structure in Japan,” Japan Times, July 28, 2024)

8/1/24:
South Korea’s Red Cross today proposed providing humanitarian aid to North Korea over damage from the recent downpours in its northern border areas along the Amnok River, as the North is believed to have sustained huge casualties. “We are ready to discuss the items, scale and method of support with our North Korean counterpart. We expect North Korea’s swift response,” it said. North Korea’s border city of Sinuiju and Uiju County in the northwestern province of North Pyongan were pummeled by heavy rains, with more than 4,100 houses and nearly 3,000 hectares of farmland left submerged, according to the North’s state media. (Yonhap, “Seoul’s Red Cross Proposes Providing Humanitarian Aid to NK over Flood Damage,” Korea Times, August 1, 2024)

South Korea and the United States staged their first-ever table-top exercise on integrating Seoul’s advanced conventional forces with Washington’s nuclear capabilities this week to better respond to North Korea’s nuclear threats, officials said today. The three-day discussion-based exercise, named “Iron Mace 24,” concluded earlier in the day at the U.S. Forces Korea’s (USFK) Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, 60 kilometers south of Seoul, after the allies signed a joint guidelines document on nuclear deterrence last month. (Chae Yun-hwan, “S. Korea, U.S. Hold 1st-Ever Table-Top Exercise on Integrating Nuclear, Conventional Capabilities,” Yonhap, August 2, 2024)

8/4/24:
KCNA: “The Workers’ Party of Korea, which set forth the grand national defense development strategy for accomplishing the cause of building a rich country with a strong army at its historic Eighth Congress, has dynamically guided its implementation, thus firmly defending and vigorously leading the grand all-people advance toward comprehensive national prosperity by dint of rapid modernization and super-strength of the armed forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. … Demonstrating the infinite development of the national defense capability and the great leaps forward in modernizing the powerful army, which serve as a powerful pillar and driving force for achieving signal victories eternally in the revolution, a ceremony for transferring 250 new-type tactical ballistic missile launchers, produced at major munitions enterprises, to the first-line units on the border of the DPRK took place in the capital city of Pyongyang with splendor. … A ceremony for celebrating the transfer and receiving of new-type tactical ballistic missile system took place on August 4. … Prior to the ceremony, Kim Jong Un looked round new-type tactical ballistic missile launchers to be commissioned as a new core striking weapon of the DPRK armed forces. … The ceremony was attended by leading officials of the Party, the government and the military, officials of the Party Central Committee, defense scientists, officials, technicians and workers in the munitions industry, and meritorious persons in Pyongyang Municipality. Also present there were commanders of services, commanders of large combined units and other service personnel of the KPA .The national anthem of the DPRK was played. Jo Chun Ryong, secretary of the WPK Central Committee, reported to Kim Jong Un that his special order on munitions production was successfully implemented. The secretary mentioned that officials and workers in the munitions industry sector finished the production of 250 new-type tactical ballistic missile launchers, true to the strategic plan of the Party Central Committee, and were ready to transfer them to KPA units. He said that the tactical ballistic missile system newly developed and produced by munitions industry workers are a powerful up-to-date tactical strike weapon of our style, whose production Kim Jong Un personally initiated and energetically led to perfection. … Kim Jong Un gave written orders in the name of the chairman of the Central Military Commission of the WPK on equipping the first-line units of the KPA on the frontier with the new-type tactical ballistic missiles to the chief of the KPA General Staff and commanders of the large combined frontline units. … The commissioning ceremony of new-type tactical ballistic missile launchers, held in the presence of Kim Jong Un, will be recorded in history as a historic event which further strengthened the iron faith of the army and people, advancing under the ever-victorious leadership of the great Party Central Committee, in the validity and invincibility of their cause and their conviction in the future of the country that will endlessly become powerful and prosperous.” (KCNA, “Commissioning Ceremony of Ultimate Weaponry Demonstrating Sure Victory of Cause of Building Powerful Army; Ceremony for Celebrating Transfer and Receiving of New-Type Tactical Ballistic Missile System Takes Place with Splendor,” August 5, 2024)

KCNA: “On August 4 Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and President of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, attended the ceremony of transferring and receiving new-type tactical ballistic missile system and made a speech. He said: Comrades, Today we have gathered for this characteristic ceremony to celebrate the transferring of new-type tactical weapons to our army. We are now witnessing a moment of the course of our state’s defense capability increasing day by day. Representatives of defense scientists and munitions industry workers, who have worked with devotion in the struggle to produce these tactical weapons of great military significance, which would fill up the major gaps in our state’s defense capability and form a main force in our military forces, Officers and soldiers of the frontline missile artillerymen’s units, who will soon receive the new weapons, Dear comrades, As you see, we are now facing 250 new-type tactical ballistic missile launchers, which our munitions industry workers have produced by their own efforts and technology. Those weapons, lining up in columns in front of us, will be transferred to our army now and will play an important military role in the border areas of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. This of course means no more than attaining our first-stage goal of building missile forces in the first-line units on the front. Every year we will show the whole world without filtering the procedure of the change of generations of our military hardware with new ones. It is because this has enough special effect on deterring war. The world is witnessing the course of development of our armed forces. We have become able to take the operational initiative with the overwhelming attack forces and striking means superior to the enemy on all fronts, achieve the multifaceted nature of the spaces of firepower tasks and improve the practical effectiveness of the special physical strength, tactical nuke. I am very pleased to make public that an important item in the practical guidelines for building up the military capability, which was decided on at the Eighth Congress of our Party and the enlarged meetings of the Central Military Commission of the Party held during the eighth term of the Party Central Committee, has been brought to fruition. Greeting this moment that declares a great change in our armed forces and their prospective development, I, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, extend warm thanks to the workers, scientists and officials in the munitions industry, who have proudly carried out their revolutionary tasks of great strategic significance in steadily developing our state’s self-reliant national defense capability. Comrades, Thanks to the firepower of this weapon system, presenting a threatening appearance for the first time since the founding of our country and army, we have become able to possess a sure and overwhelming strength with which to contain the enemy’s reckless provocative moves against us. The fact that these military hardware of a new generation have been produced in less than one year in the circumstances, in which the hostile forces’ challenges and moves of blockade persisted on an unprecedentedly extreme degree, adequately demonstrates the potential and might of our self-reliant defense industry. By waging a heroic production struggle and presenting the products encapsulating their pure conscience and ennobling outlook on life, our munitions industry workers fully demonstrated the faith and revolutionary nature inherent in them.… Comrades, As the relationship of the U.S.-led alliance is, in terms of its nature and character, evolving into a nuclear-based military bloc, the military security environment surrounding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is facing drastic changes, both strategically and structurally. This highlights the fact that our state has no reason to rest content with its current level of war deterrent. To look back on the past five years, we can see that the concept of nuclear has been associated with every military action targeting the DPRK taken by the United States, and now its vassal states have grown reckless enough to share its nukes. This situation demands that we keep accelerating the development of our Republic’s armed forces for maintaining their supremacy, and also of the self-reliant defense industry that provides solid support to this end. Genuine peace can be guaranteed only by the build-up of immense strength. Negotiations and confrontation are among our options, but we must be more thoroughly prepared to cope with the latter–this is the review and conclusion we have derived from the 30-odd years of dealing with the United States, and it is the keynote of our consistent policy towards the United States. The fact that the United States and the groups of its top-class stooges are overstepping the mark in their outrageous military maneuvers provides evidence for the justice of our cause, and this compels us to bolster up our self-defensive military capability more perfectly and rapidly. This will inevitably hasten the failure, shame and destruction on the part of the enemy. The United States we are now confronting is by no means an administration that remains in power for a tenure of some years, but a hostile state that our descendants, too, will have to counter generation after generation. This fact testifies to the inevitability of the steady improvement of our defense capability. We should possess the capability to cope on our own initiative with new, potential dangers to our security, as well as the various imminent threats by the United States. This is a crucial task for providing a long-term guarantee for defending the sovereignty, security, interests and territorial integrity of our state. At present, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has built up its national system of nuclear forces, with which to promptly counter any type of threatening actions by the nuclear-armed enemy states, and we have made steady efforts to make the nuclear forces fully ready for action. However, witnessing the rapidly-changing global security environment and the reckless expansion of the U.S.-led military bloc system, we have come to a conclusion that the nuclear forces of our state and its nuclear posture should be more thoroughgoing and perfect, and we feel its necessity every day and every minute. Our mightiness is not what it is now, but it lies in our relentless pursuit of mightiness. Stagnation in military supremacy is just the beginning of inferiority in defense capability. We must never forget that if we rest content with the present level of supremacy that has taken so much cost for us to reach, we should pay more later. Clear is our standpoint in coping with the U.S. moves to aggravate the situation. If it continues attempting to jeopardize the security of the region in disregard of our repeated warnings, we will make the United States acutely aware that there will be fatal consequences for its own security. I make it clear once again: Whether engaged in negotiations or confrontation, possessing a great military strength is an obligation and right a sovereign state must never neglect or budge on at any moment. Unless an end is put to the nuclear threat against us, and as long as there exist the imperialist forces that resort to nukes as a means of their tyranny, there will never be a moment’s halt or a breathing space on our journey for the consolidation of our nuclear war deterrent. Our strength will continue to evolve, and our military supremacy will deny its limits forever. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will resolutely face both imminent and potential challenges by attaining a more refined and improved posture of its nuclear forces as soon as possible to contain any nuclear threats and defend itself from them. Given the fact that the United States and its vassal forces have been tightening the screw on the DPRK by resorting to military means, Kim Jong Un said, it has been an indisputable option for the DPRK to make sustained efforts to increase its defense capability. He went on: Building up the nuclear war deterrent and developing it to the highest level possible is the best option for effectively confronting the nuclear blackmail and multi-faceted isolation schemes by the United States and for earmarking a larger investment for economic development and improvement of the people’s living standards–this is the principled standpoint we have consistently maintained over the last ten or so years since we proclaimed the new line of promoting the country’s economic construction and building up its nuclear forces simultaneously, and its validity and viability have been clearly proved through practice. … The army units, to which the new-type weapon system is to be transferred, should master the new system as early as possible, actively organize and conduct training in a real-war atmosphere to operate it so effectively as to maximize its efficiency in battle, and maintain a prompt and proper operational posture. In this way, they can creditably implement their military duties to deter war and take the initiative. What our proud new missile units will receive today is not merely the new weapons. Like all other weapons of ours, these embody our people’s firm will to put an end to the threats of aggression against our Republic, as well as their spirit of self-respect to make theirs an invincible country that no force will dare to attack and their desire to develop it into a powerful nation. We will continue to develop and produce more powerful and sophisticated military hardware of our own style and deploy them for action, thus ensuring that the People’s Army keeps gaining in strength over time. The Party Central Committee will always accompany and properly lead our munitions industry workers, both faithful and dependable, on this responsible and important journey. Comrades, Let us bear in mind once again that absolute and matchless self-defense capability provides a sure guarantee for independence, justice and peace. Ever-developing, inexhaustible strength is fundamental to our eternal victory, genuine peace, happiness and safety. Let us all strive undauntedly and achieve constant transformations and innovative successes for the independent development of our great state and a peaceful and prosperous new life of our people. .” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Speech at Ceremony of Transferring and Receiving New-Type Tactical Ballistic Missile System,” August 6, 2024)

8/10/24:
KCNA: “The following is the full text of the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un’s important speech before flood victims: … Comrades, It is necessary for us to impress on our mind once again that the current rehabilitation project is not simply an undertaking for our own but also a serious struggle against the enemy. At present, the enemy, misusing the occasion when we have suffered damage, is continuing to make foolish attempts to tarnish the image of our state. It is important to inform Party organizations and working people’s organizations at all levels, various networks of education and the people of these facts and thus make them have a correct understanding of the ROK scum bordering on us. The rubbish ROK’s media are desperately slandering all the socialist benefits and measures taken by our Party and government for the flood victims and also the communist traits displayed throughout the society, abusing them as a means of achieving some sort of internal unity and a type of demonstration. They are also fabricating such false information, in their frantic maneuvers to slander our government and system, that the missing persons in the afflicted areas exceed 1,000 in number and that its intelligence authorities found out that several helicopters had fallen on rescue mission. Worse still, they are spreading a baseless rumor that the V-day celebrations took place in Pyongyang on the 27th of last month when loss of life occurred in the flood-hit areas. Because the rumor is in wide circulation in the ROK society that its government is always late in coping with all sorts of accidents that happened there and such is an everyday occurrence in the country, they seem to weave absurd sophistry that slanders and slights us in an attempt to coax their citizens and stir up world public sentiments. When I visited the helicopter unit that rescued you, I gave full account of the rescue operation, including the crash-landing by one helicopter during the operation, and expressed my gratitude that there had been no casualties in the turmoil. The enemy even went so far as to say that I reacted personally to the report fabricated by their media because there were heavy casualties and I intended to cover it up. What is their dogged insistence on making you, safe and sound like this, missing or dead? It is an open and shut case. This is a smear campaign and a grave provocation against our state as well as an insult to you. I have reason and feel it necessary to say this about the media of the dirty, rubbish country. There is no need for us to make separate materials for education. It is because these clear facts are actual and educational materials good enough to clearly bring home to the people how filthy the enemy clan is, what ancient and old-fashioned way they resort to for fabrication and political smear campaign to tarnish the image of our state, what their ulterior motives are and why we call the enemy the enemy and scum. No country in the world has such media which does nothing but to invent groundless and exaggerated lies. What we must clearly realize is that the enemy is what we see them now. Referring to these actual facts, the whole country should have a correct understanding of the enemy and cultivate a correct feeling against them. Our enemy is an unchangeable enemy. We should make the current opportunity, which helps us to have a correct understanding of what our enemy is, an opportunity of having a correct stand towards the enemy. … At present, many countries and international organizations are expressing their willingness to provide us with humanitarian assistance. I extend thanks to them. But what we put forward first in all domains and processes of the state affairs is the way of addressing problems by relying on the firm trust in the people and entirely on our own efforts. What the Party Central Committee and the government relies on in the current rehabilitation campaign is also the patriotic enthusiasm and valor of our people and the potentials of our state from A to Z. As we have always done, we will value our confidence in our own strength more than anything else, solve all problems by enlisting the strength and wisdom of the people, and continue to steadily expand and increase our state’s strength in that way to shape our future with our own strength and efforts in the future, too.” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Clarifies in His Speech Stand of Party and Government on Repairing Flood Damage and Consoles Flood Victims,” August 10, 2024)

8/12/24:
President Yoon Suk Yeol named Presidential Security Service chief Kim Yong-hyun as new defense minister while Defense Minister Shin Won-sik was named as new national security adviser, his office said today. National security adviser Chang Ho-jin was named as special adviser for foreign affairs and security, a newly created post, presidential chief of staff Chung Jin-suk said in a briefing. Kim, a former three-star Army general, has served as PSS chief since Yoon took office in May 2022. (Kim Eun-jung, “Yoon Names New Defense Minister, National Security Adviser,” Yonhap, August 12, 2024)

8/14/24:
Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio today set the stage for his departure as premier after three years in power by announcing he will not run in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s presidential race next month to take responsibility for a slush funds scandal. The sudden announcement came as Kishida’s Cabinet stepped up disaster preparedness after the weather agency last week issued its first-ever advisory warning of the increased risk of a megaquake along the Nankai Trough that stretches from central to southwestern Japan in the Pacific. “As a first step to impress on the public that the LDP has changed, I have decided not to run in the presidential race,” Kishida said at a press conference at the prime minister’s office, adding he had made the choice at a time when he was free of immediate diplomatic commitments. Kishida, who hosted the Group of Seven summit in his home constituency of Hiroshima in 2023, has seen the approval ratings for his Cabinet, launched in October 2021, plunge to the 20 percent range in the wake of the scandal, which first broke late last year. (Iizuka Satoshi, “Kishida Ready to Resign as Japanese PM after Withdrawing from LDP Race,” Kyodo, August 14, 2024)

8/15/24:
President Yoon Suk Yeol unveiled a vision for unification with North Korea today, pledging to expand outside information in the reclusive nation and proposing an official dialogue channel that can “take up any issue.” Yoon made the remark in an address marking Liberation Day, which celebrates the 1945 end of Japan’s colonial rule, saying, “Complete liberation remains an unfinished task” as the Korean Peninsula still remains divided. “The freedom we enjoy must be extended to the frozen kingdom of the North, where people are deprived of freedom and suffer from poverty and starvation,” Yoon said. “Only when a unified free and democratic nation rightfully owned by the people is established across the entire Korean Peninsula will we finally have complete liberation.” Yoon laid out three key tasks for unification: defending freedom in South Korea from fake news and other destabilizing elements, bringing about changes in North Korea through human rights improvements and outside information, and strengthening cooperation with the international community. He also proposed “a working group” between the two Koreas to discuss ways to ease tension, resume economic cooperation and increase exchanges. “This body could take up any issue, ranging from relieving tensions to economic cooperation, people-to-people and cultural exchanges, and disaster and climate-change responses,” he said. “We will also be able to discuss pending humanitarian issues, such as separated families and South Korean prisoners of war, abductees and detainees still kept in the North.” Yoon urged the North to respond to the proposal, saying dialogue and cooperation can bring about substantive progress in inter-Korean relations. Among the plans outlined was the expansion of North Koreans’ “right of access to information” to help awaken the outside world. “Testimonials from numerous North Korean defectors show that our radio and TV broadcasts helped make them aware of the false propaganda and instigations emanating from the North Korean regime,” Yoon said. “If more North Koreans come to recognize that unification through freedom is the only way to improve their lives and are convinced that a unified Republic of Korea will embrace them, they will become strong, friendly forces for a freedom-based unification,” he said, referring to South Korea’s official name. He reiterated his commitment to the “audacious initiative” unveiled two years ago, which calls for offering massive assistance to help the impoverished North rebuild its economy in return for denuclearization steps. “We will begin political and economic cooperation the moment North Korea takes just one step toward denuclearization,” he said. Nuclear negotiations between the North and the United States have remained stalled since the 2019 Hanoi summit between then U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ended without a deal. The presidential office said it will seek ways to inform North Korean people in various ways with “more colorful and interesting content” without too much emphasis on ideological and political aspects. “While loudspeakers and propaganda leaflets may have some effect, we do not intend to overly rely on such analog methods, especially when they heighten inter-Korean tensions,” a senior presidential official told reporters. “As North Korea is already undergoing a process of digitalization, we believe there are multiple ways for North Korean residents to access the outside world. Yoon said the South will establish a North Korea Freedom and Human Rights Fund to actively support nongovernmental activities that promote freedom and human rights in the country while continuing to try to provide humanitarian aid to the North. “We offered relief supplies for flood victims in North Korea, making clear that our government has no intention of turning a blind eye to the North Korean people’s suffering,” he said. “Even though the North Korean regime rejected our offer yet again, we will never stop making offers of humanitarian aid.” South Korea’s Red Cross has offered to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea over damage from the recent downpours in its northern border areas, but Kim Jong Un pledged to take care of flood victims without outside help. (Kim Eun-jung, “Yoon Unveils Vision for ‘Freedom-Based Unification, Proposes Dialogue with N.K.,” Yonhap, August 15, 2024)

8/16/24:
President Yoon Suk Yeol’s defense minister nominee Kim Yong-hyun today said “all options are open” on the possibility of arming South Korea with its own nuclear weapons to keep North Korea in check. He was responding to a press question asking his personal views on South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons on the first day of his work at the Army Club in Seoul’s central Yongsan as nominee. “Under the Yoon administration, our alliance with the US has been elevated to a ‘nuclear-based’ alliance. We respond to North Korean nuclear threats based on the US nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence — that’s the bottom line,” he said. “However, that being said, as we put the safety of South Koreans as our ultimate priority, if that alone could not suffice as a nuclear deterrent against North Korea, I would say that all options are open,” he continued. This posture marks a departure from that of Shin Won-sik, the sitting minister of national defense, who drew the line at suggestions South Korea could go nuclear. The nominee’s remarks come as some in the ruling party raised calls for South Korea to brace for the possibility of the country’s nuclear armament in light of nuclear and missile threats from North Korea. People Power Party Reps. Han Ki-ho, Yu Yong-weon and Lim Jong-deuk on the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee launched a website — titled “Freedom is not free” — to collect signatures to rally support for South Korea developing nuclear capabilities. Signatures can be submitted from Aug. 22. Yoon nominated Kim, who has been heading the presidential security service since the president’s inauguration, to succeed Shin as defense minister. Shin was tapped as national security adviser on the same day. (Kim Arin, “Defense Minister Nominee Says ‘Options Open’ on Seoul Getting Nukes,” Korea Herald, August 16, 2024)

8/18/24:
Ever since the Korean War was halted in an uneasy truce in 1953, South Koreans have lived under an American promise to defend their country, if necessary, with nuclear weapons. President Biden emphatically reiterated that commitment last year, vowing that any nuclear attack by North Korea would lead to the destruction of its government. But decades of American assurances have failed to deter North Korea from building a nuclear arsenal and then expanding it. Led by Kim Jong Un, North Korea has also become more provocative, testing missiles powerful enough to reach the United States. And it has rattled South Korea by reviving a Cold War-era defense agreement with Russia, another nuclear-armed state. The South has long considered it a taboo to pursue atomic weapons in defiance of Washington’s nonproliferation policy. But jitters about security here have been intensified by the possible re-election of former President Donald J. Trump, whose commitment to the alliance between Washington and Seoul appears to be shaky at best. Now, a growing majority of South Koreans say their country needs its own nuclear weapons instead of relying on the United States for protection. The idea, although still disavowed by the South Korean government, is increasingly becoming part of mainstream political debate. Polls show that many South Koreans say they can no longer trust the American nuclear umbrella to guard them from North Korea. They doubt that Washington would come to their aid in the event of a conflict with North Korea now that Pyongyang is racing to develop the ability to attack American cities with nuclear warheads. “We cannot expect — and should not ask — the American president to use his nuclear weapons to defend an ally at the risk of sacrificing his own people,” said Cheong Seong-chang, who leads a group of 50 analysts pushing for a domestic nuclear arsenal in South Korea. “We must defend ourselves with our own.” South Korea abandoned its nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, as Washington pushed nonproliferation, and chose to rely on the United States to defend it against the North. Tens of thousands of American troops have been garrisoned for decades in the South, which for many years also hosted U.S. nuclear weapons. Washington withdrew those arms in 1991, hoping the disarmament would incentivize Pyongyang to stop pursuing its own nuclear weapons. In June, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated that North Korea had built roughly 50 nuclear warheads and had enough fissile material to build another 40 or so. It was also focusing on tactical nuclear weapons, which have a smaller payload. “There is a growing concern that North Korea might intend to use these weapons very early in a conflict,” wrote Matt Korda, a researcher at the institute. It was fears such as these that President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea tried to address when he met Biden at the White House last year. The two leaders deepened their alliance and signed the Washington Declaration to show that the American defense commitment was ironclad. Last month, they reaffirmed that any nuclear attack by North Korea would be met with “a swift, overwhelming and decisive response.” “For the first time, it has been written down in a document that American nuclear assets will be tasked with deterring and countering North Korea’s nuclear force,” said Kim Tae-hyo, Yoon’s deputy national security adviser. But that has done little to tamp down misgivings in South Korea about the American nuclear umbrella, which also covers Japan. A poll in February showed that the percentage of respondents who said Washington would defend their country with nuclear weapons even though North Korea could attack the mainland United States with nuclear missiles had dropped to 39 percent from 51 percent last year. Another survey, which has been conducted annually for a decade, found a historical shift. Asked to choose between having nuclear weapons or U.S. troops on their soil, more South Koreans, for the first time, picked the former. Other surveys have found as many as 70 percent of all South Koreans supporting an independent nuclear arsenal. It has become increasingly common for conservative politicians and private and government analysts to support or discuss the idea, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine highlighted the extent to which a nuclear-armed power could get away with invading a nonnuclear neighbor. “The call for nuclear weapons will be anything but short-lived because ‘going nuclear’ sounds sexy as a slogan,” said Lee Byong-chul, who has studied nuclear nonproliferation at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul. “But there is a huge gulf between high public support and a lack of technical capabilities and political intention to build nuclear weapons.” South Korea has neither facilities to produce fuel for nuclear bombs nor the technical know-how to design nuclear weapons. And while Yoon has been more antagonistic toward the North than his recent predecessors and briefly warmed to the idea of going nuclear, there is little political will in the South to pursue atomic weapons. Strengthening reconnaissance and missile abilities, analysts say, would serve South Korea better and give it the ability to launch pre-emptive strikes against the North. Building nuclear weapons would be “redundant” and “would not make South Korea any safer,” said Chun Yung-woo, a former national security adviser, “as long as the South Korea-U.S. alliance is alive and well.” But the future of that alliance is likely to be volatile if Trump — who tried to negotiate with Kim face to face — is re-elected in November. “It’s nice to get along when somebody has a lot of nuclear weapons,” Trump said of Kim when he accepted his party’s presidential nomination last month. “I think he misses me, if you want to know the truth.” For supporters of a domestic nuclear force in South Korea, Trump’s potential return to power could be a good thing. He once said he would be open to allowing Japan and South Korea to build their own nuclear arsenals rather than depend on the American nuclear umbrella. “It could open a window of opportunity,” said Cheong, the pro-nuclear analyst. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Koreans Craving Nuclear Arms of Their Own,” New York Times, August 18, 2024, p. A-11)

8/19/24:
U.S. and South Korean troops kicked off a large-scale exercise today aimed at strengthening their combined defense capabilities against nuclear-armed North Korea, which again accused the allies of practicing an invasion. The annual summertime exercise comes amid heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula as the pace of both North Korea’s weapons demonstrations and the U.S.-South Korea combined military exercises have intensified in a cycle of tit-for-tat. The exercise began hours after North Korea’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement repeating the North’s contention that such exercises are “provocative war drills for aggression.” It said the North’s nuclear ambitions are thus justified, adding that it is crucial to “constantly maintain the balance of power for preventing a war by stockpiling the greatest deterrence.” The United States and South Korea described their joint drills as defensive in nature and have been expanding and upgrading their training in recent years to cope with the North’s evolving threats. The U.S. and South Korean militaries did not immediately react to the North Korean Foreign Ministry statement. The Ulchi Freedom Shield drills, which continue for 11 days, through August 29, include both computer-simulated war games and more than 40 kinds of field exercises, including live-fire drills. The allies said this year’s program is focused on enhancing their readiness against various North Korean threats, including missiles, GPS jamming and cyberattacks and will also reflect lessons learned from recent armed conflicts. About 19,000 South Korean military personnel will participate in the drills, which will be held concurrently with civil defense and evacuation drills from Monday through Thursday that will include programs based on North Korean nuclear attack scenarios. The U.S. military has not confirmed the number of American troops participating in the drills or said whether they will involve U.S. strategic assets. The United States in recent months has increased its regional deployment of long-range bombers, submarines and aircraft carrier strike groups to train with South Korean and Japanese forces. The drills could trigger a belligerent response from North Korea, which has been flaunting its growing weapons program and issuing verbal threats of nuclear conflicts against Washington and Seoul. (Kim Tong-hyung, “U.S. and South Korea Begin Military Drills Aimed at Strengthening Their Defense against North Korea,” Associated Press, August 19, 2024)

8/22/24:
Lim Dong-won, who was unification minister at the time of the first inter-Korean summit in 2000, gave the keynote address at the “Seeking South Korea’s Path Forward on a Turbulent Korean Peninsula” forum held to commemorate the centennial of the birth of President Kim Dae-jung. Lim said, “The unification ideas expressed by President Yoon Suk-yeol in his National Liberation Day celebratory address were a declaration that he wishes to pursue unification by absorption [of North Korea] rather than peaceful reunification.” “Unification by absorption is an unacceptable approach, in that we cannot rule out the possibility of it leading to war,” he added. Lim’s keynote presentation was entitled “Kim Dae-jung’s legacy and peace on the Korean Peninsula.” “In 2000, Kim Dae-jung brought about a historic inter-Korean summit and the South-North Joint Declaration of June 15, while leading to the adoption of a joint communiqué by the US and North Korea,” Lim said. “But the Korean Peninsula peace process has been suspended, and the South and North have been reversing course toward hostility and confrontation since the Yoon Suk-yeol administration took office,” he lamented. Singling out Yoon’s National Liberation Day celebratory address for criticism, he said, “President Yoon’s idea of unification is one that involves unification by expanding the values of freedom into North Korean territory.” “There has not been one word about peaceful reunification,” he added, suggesting that this “indicates that he wishes to pursue unification by absorption rather than peaceful reunification.” He also said, “The current reality is one where we worry that an unintended military clash [between South and North] could escalate into war.” “The four parties to the Armistice Agreement [South Korea, North Korea, the US and China] need to initiate four-party peace talks, and they need to implement the Singapore agreement reached by the US and North Korean heads of state in June 2018,” he urged. (Park Chan-su, “Kim Dae Jung’s Unification Minister Says Yoon’s ‘Unification by Absorption’ Approach Runs Risk of War,” Hankyoreh, August 22, 2024)

8/24/24:
DPRK FoMin spokesperson’s press statement “We will resolutely cope with any type of nuclear threat posed by the U.S.”: “Recently, a spokesperson for the U.S. National Security Council officially admitted the fact that the U.S. administration revised its “nuclear weapons employment planning guidance” in March last, clarifying the stand that the revision is not aimed at a specified country. However, the spokesperson expressed “concern” over the rapid development of nuclear force of the DPRK, Russia, China and other sovereign countries. This is nothing but a childish red herring to justify its dangerous nuclear-use strategy aimed at military deterrence and maintenance of geopolitical hegemony against other countries and evade criticism of the international community. The DPRK Foreign Ministry expresses serious concern over and bitterly denounces and rejects the behavior of the U.S. which is pursuing the unilateral nuclear edge while going against the desire of the international community for global peace, stability and detente by continuously fabricating someone’s “nuclear threat.” The coordination of nuclear posture of the U.S., which has kept the world’s biggest nuclear arsenal, has a serious negative impact on the global nuclear balance, security environment and nuclear disarmament system. In June, too, an official concerned of the U.S. National Security Council made clear who is the target of the U.S. administration’s “nuclear weapons employment planning guidance”, saying that the guidance underscores the need to simultaneously deter the independent sovereign states including the DPRK. The present U.S. administration put forward a deceptive “policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons” as part of its election commitments. But, in fact, it denied this policy in the “nuclear posture” issued after its emergence, and has spent astronomical amount of money on modernizing the nuclear force every year. In particular, the U.S. developed the structure of alliance with its satellite countries in the Asia-Pacific region including the ROK and Japan into a nuclear-based military bloc. And it has operated even a group aimed at using nukes against a sovereign state, contrary to the UN Charter and other universal international law principles. The situation goes to prove that the U.S., which likes to talk about non-existent “nuclear threat” from others, is the most irresponsible actor and rogue state triggering a nuclear arms race and increasing the possibility of nuclear clashes worldwide. Had the U.S. neither made nor used nuclear weapons, the concept of “nuclear threat” would not have appeared on the earth at all. The nuclear threat to the international community has come from the U.S. not only in the 20th century but also in the 21st century, and its origin and orientation will remain unchanged in the future, too. Other sovereign states’ efforts for bolstering up their defense capabilities to cope with the ever-increasing nuclear threat from the U.S. can never be a pretext for its nuclear arms buildup for aggression and provocative coordination of nuclear posture. No matter how desperately the U.S. may exaggerate the “nuclear threat” from other countries, the DPRK will push forward the building of nuclear force sufficient and reliable enough to firmly defend the sovereignty and security interests of the country on its fixed timetable, and this is the most essential and legitimate exercise of the right to self-defense to ensure the regional peace and security and protect itself. The DPRK will as ever bolster up its strategic strength in every way to control and eliminate all sorts of security challenges that may result from the U.S. dangerous nuclear posture readjustment, and resolutely counter any type of nuclear threat.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Spokesperson for DPRK Foreign Ministry,” August 24, 2024)

KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, oversaw a performance test of various drones organized by the Drone Institute of the Academy of Defense Sciences on August 24. He was accompanied by Jo Yong Won, Ri Pyong Chol, Pak Jong Chon and other senior officials of the WPK Central Committee. The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un got firsthand information on the drones under development by the Drone Institute. The drones to be used within different striking ranges are to perform a mission to attack any enemy targets on the ground and in the sea. The drones of various types correctly identified and destroyed the designated targets after flying along different preset routes. Developing different types of drones and steadily increasing their combat performance take an important share in preparing for a war in view of the trend of world military science and combat experience on battlefields, Kim Jong Un said, adding that it is necessary to develop and produce more suicide drones of various types to be used in tactical infantry and special operation units, as well as strategic reconnaissance and multi-purpose attack drones. Calling for constantly developing not only underwater strategic weapon systems like a nuclear torpedo but also various types of unmanned underwater suicide attack craft in conformity with the characteristics of our country as a maritime nation, and opting for proactively introducing artificial intelligence technology into the development of drones, he specified the tasks and ways to this end. Expressing satisfaction over the tactical and technological specifications and data of the newly-developed drones, he stressed the need to more intensively conduct tests for their combat application and equip the units of the Korean People’s Army with them as early as possible. Officials, scientists and researchers of the Drone Institute under the Academy of Defense Sciences were filled with surging emotion, looking up at him who personally oversaw the test on the spot and indicated the path to be followed by them in enhancing the combat efficiency of drones and developing the drone industry, and hardened their determination to thoroughly carry out the important tasks set forth by him and thus make a positive contribution to bolstering up the country’s military capabilities for self-defense.” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Oversees Performance Test of Drones,” August 26, 2024)

Photos carried by the KCNA showed two white suicide attack drones hitting and destroying a mock target that looked like a South Korean K-2 tank. North Korea has unveiled photos of such weapons for the first time. Among the unveiled drones, one of them appeared similar to Israel’s Harop unmanned vehicle, while another model looked akin to Russia’s Lancet drone, raising questions about possible cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow in drone development efforts. Hong Min, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, raised the possibility that Pyongyang may have publicized the test to seek cooperation with Russia in drone technology and production, citing Moscow’s use of the Lancet in the war in Ukraine. Suicide drones, also known as loitering munitions, have emerged as important weapons in the war as they can attack tanks and other targets at relatively low cost. When asked whether Moscow may have directly supplied drones to Pyongyang, South Korea’s military said more analysis is needed but noted that Russia has gifted the North with some drones in the past. “Whether such drones underwent performance upgrades and other various possibilities require analysis,” Lt. Col. Lee Chang-hyun, a spokesperson at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a regular briefing. “Our military is thoroughly equipped with detection and interception systems against North Korean unmanned vehicles,” he said. (Kim Soo-yeon and Chae Yun-hwan, “N. Korean Leader Oversees Suicide Drone Tests, Calls for More Production,” Yonhap, August 26, 2024)

8/25/24:
South Korean Marines and naval forces are set to kick off the annual Ssangyong amphibious landing exercise with U.S. and British counterparts in Pohang and along the eastern coast on Monday, defense officials said today. The exercise is scheduled to take place from tomorrow to September 7 and will involve division-level landing groups and approximately 40 naval vessels, including the amphibious assault ships ROKS Dokdo, ROKS Marado and USS Boxer, as well as F-35B stealth fighters and amphibious combat vehicles, according to a joint release by the South Korean Navy and Marine Corps. The Royal Marines Commandos from Britain, who took part in last year’s Ssangyong exercise, are scheduled to participate this year, too. Drones operated by a joint military command established in September last year will conduct surveillance activities during the exercise for the first time, defense officials said. They added that a combined staff group of leaders from the South Korean and U.S. Marine Corps will oversee the exercise from the ROKS Marado. The Ssangyong exercise was revived last year after being effectively suspended from 2018 to 2022 while the previous Moon Jae-in administration tried to lower tensions with North Korea, whose official media has criticized joint South Korea-U.S. drills as rehearsals for an invasion of its territory. Ssangyong in Korean means “double dragons,” referring to South Korea and the United States. The allies plan to carry out what officials have called the “decisive action” phase of the landing exercise early next month. In the past, that stage saw troops from landing ships storming a beach with support from fighter jets and helicopters, with South Korean Marines making landfall first using amphibious assault vehicles and securing a perimeter before U.S. Marines arrive on air-cushioned landing craft. Fighter jets, helicopters and tiltrotor aircraft are used to defend the landing forces as they establish a beachhead. The Ssangyong exercise kicks off the same day as the second phase of the joint Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise, which began on August 19. The first phase, which concluded on August 22, included civil defense and evacuation drills conducted by the South Korean government and training in preparation for a hypothetical North Korean nuclear attack. The second phase consists solely of military drills, including computer-simulated war games and 48 kinds of field training, including live-fire artillery drills. According to the JCS, approximately 19,000 South Korean soldiers across the country’s armed forces are expected to participate in 48 field training maneuvers during Ulchi Freedom Shield. (Michael Lee, “South Korean, U.S., British Marines to Begin Ssangyong Amphibious Landing Exercise Monday,” JoongAng Ilbo, August 25, 2024)

8/27/24:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, oversaw on August 27 a test-fire of the 240mm-calibre MRLS under production at defense industrial enterprises under the Second Economy Commission. The MRLS, technically updated in its maneuverability and concentrated firing capability, proved to be advantageous in all indices, including a newly-applied guided system, controllability and destructive power. The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un set forth an important policy to be maintained in producing new artillery pieces and equipping army units with them as the replacement of older ones. He was accompanied by Pak Jong Chon, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission of the WPK and secretary of the Central Committee of the WPK, Jo Chun Ryong, secretary of the Central Committee of the WPK, Ri Yong Gil, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army, Kim Jong Sik, first deputy department director of the Central Committee of the WPK, the commanders of KPA large combined units, and Kim Yong Hwan, president of the Academy of Defense Sciences.” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Oversees Test-fire of 240mm-calibre MRLS,” August 28, 2024)

8/30/24:
An official at South Korea’s top military intelligence agency leaked classified data, including a list of undercover operatives, to a suspected Chinese intelligence agent for years in exchange for cash, defense officials said today. The 49-year-old civilian employee at the Korea Defense Intelligence Command was arrested last month and formally indicted August 27 on charges including bribery and handing over sensitive data, via documents or voice messages, 30 times since 2019. The leaked information included a list of undercover agents from the command who were operating in China, Russia and other countries, military prosecutors said at a briefing this week, according to the defense ministry. The command specializes in spying on North Korea, a heavily militarized country that often threatens its southern neighbor. The leak has raised awkward questions for South Korea because it comes at a time when the country is expanding military intelligence sharing with the United States and Japan to help guard against North Korea and China. South Korea and the United States have depended on each other to spy on North Korea, combining resources such as satellites, cyber intelligence and human agents, like those working for the command. The leak, first uncovered in June, has prompted the Defense Intelligence Command, one of South Korea’s most secretive government agencies, to recall undercover agents based overseas back home. Undercover agents have been active in China, where they have tried to recruit spies and collect intelligence among North Koreans who traveled there or among ethnic Koreans in China who often traveled to North Korea. But their undercover identities were sometimes exposed and they became targets of the authorities in China as well as undercover North Korean counterintelligence agents operating there. Investigators are still assessing the scale of damage done to South Korea’s decades-old intelligence war against North Korea, as South Korean lawmakers and media have voiced suspicions that the data may have eventually gone to Pyongyang. The indicted official, whose identity was not revealed by prosecutors, was secretly detained and blackmailed into working for the suspected Chinese agent in Yanji in northeastern China, in April 2017, according to military prosecutors. He was in the city, near the North Korean border, to check on his intelligence-gathering network there, they said. He printed documents, and took memos or screenshots of classified documents, as well as taking cellphone pictures of them. He smuggled them out and sent them through China-based, password-protected cloud services or through a voice-messaging function within an online gaming app. In return, he has received at least $120,000 from his Chinese contact, military prosecutors said. “Check the file I have sent,” the official was quoted as saying in a message to his Chinese contact. “If you pay me more, I will share more.” Criminal charges brought against the official included taking bribes and violating laws on protecting military intelligence. Prosecutors said they were still investigating whether the suspected Chinese agent was linked to North Korea. The South Korean intelligence authorities first learned of a possible leak at the command after their hacker discovered a list of South Korean undercover agents while snooping on North Korean computer networks, according to the office of Kim Min-seok, a senior lawmaker at South Korea’s main opposition Democratic Party, which first alerted media to the breach. The last time a major leak was reported at the command was in 2018, when an affiliated active-duty military officer was found to have sold classified information to foreign agents in China and Japan through a retired South Korean intelligence officer. The information he sold reportedly included data on the command’s agents in China and on North Korean weaponry. “The latest case raises serious questions about the ethics of an agent — this kind of leak threatened the lives of other South Korean agents abroad — and about the system that has failed to catch him for so long,” said Yoo Dong-ryul, a security analyst and head of the Korea Institute of Liberal Democracy who has been studying the intelligence war between the two Koreas. It was still unclear how extensive the latest leak was. Investigators did not cite any of the exposed agents or informants as operating inside North Korea. The leak did include information on the command’s structure and operational methods, they said. Kim Yong-hyun, who was appointed as defense minister earlier this month, vowed to take “extraordinary measures” to address any problems discovered during the investigation. The Defense Intelligence Command’s undercover agents did some of South Korea’s most dangerous spy work. Unlike other agents who operated with diplomatic immunity, many of them did not carry diplomatic visas, and posed as businessmen, which left them vulnerable to arrests, threats and blackmail in countries like China. One such agent helped the manager of a North Korean restaurant in China defect to South Korea with a dozen waitresses in 2016. But in 1998, a lieutenant colonel at the command who was working undercover in Dandong, a Chinese city near its border with North Korea, was kidnapped to North Korea. After he was released six months later, he revealed during his debriefing that North Korean interrogators tortured and blackmailed him with threats to kill his family in the South. The officer was released only after he identified other South Korean undercover agents in northeastern China and promised to work as a double agent for the North, according to “Covert Operations,” a 2018 book about the undercover agents. (Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Says Data Was Leaked to Chinese,” New York Times, August 31, 2024, p. A-7)

9/5/24:
The Marine Corps today conducted firing drills on islands near the tense western inter-Korean maritime border, officials said, in the second such exercise held after South Korea’s suspension of an inter-Korean military pact restricting such drills. The hourlong exercise took place on the islands of Yeonpyeong and Baengnyeong in the Yellow Sea, just south of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) from 2 p.m., according to the Marine Corps. “The firing drills, which are defensive in nature, involved K-9 self-propelled howitzers and Chunmoo multiple rocket launchers and a total of 390 rounds were fired,” the armed forces said in a notice to reporters. The Marine Corps said it will continue to conduct regular maritime firing drills in the area to enhance its artillery operations capabilities and maintain a firm military readiness posture. Today’s exercise came about three months after South Korea fully suspended the 2018 inter-Korean tension reduction accord on June 4 in response to the North’s trash-balloon campaign and GPS jamming attacks. The accord calls for setting up a maritime buffer zone and banning such drills to reduce cross-border tensions. With the suspension of the pact, South Korea resumed live-fire drills on the border islands for the first time in seven years on June 26. North Korea has never recognized the NLL, demanding that it be re-drawn further south. (Lee Minji, “Marie Corps Holds Firing Drills on Border Islands,” Yonhap, September 5, 2024)

9/9/24:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), made an important speech “Let Us Further Strive for the Prosperity of Our Great State” on September 9, the 76th founding anniversary of the DPRK. … Kim Jong Un stressed the need to continue to push ahead with the work for further consolidating the national defense capabilities as required by the present situation. As the reckless expansion of the military bloc system led by the U.S. and its development into the character of a nuclear-based military bloc, the military security environment around the DPRK has come close to us as a grave threat. Such actual threats will inevitably bring about more various threats in the future and, accordingly, such situational development requires us to take more important measures and make constant efforts to maintain and further boost military supremacy. The obvious conclusion is that the nuclear force of the DPRK and the posture capable of properly using it for ensuring the state’s right to security in any time should be more thoroughly perfected. We are now perfectly carrying out the policy on building the nuclear armed forces on increasing the number of nuclear weapons by geometrical progression, and the nuclear combat forces of the Republic are being operated under the strict command and control system. Our state is a responsible nuclear weapons state. We are constantly exposed to a serious nuclear threat. Our nuclear weapons for defending ourselves do not pose a threat to anyone. Forces, which call the nuclear armed force of the DPRK threatening, only reveal their admission that they have the hostile intention to attack the DPRK with nukes. Under the different threats posed by the United States and its followers and under the security circumstances facing us, the possession of powerful military power is the duty and right to existence that our Party and Government should not miss even a moment and make no concession. Strong power is just a genuine peace and an absolute guarantee for the development of our state. It is the most important national affairs of the Party and the government and the first task of the revolution to constantly strengthen and develop our army’ capability to fight a war and thus actively cope with the regional security environment and defend the sovereignty, security and interests of the state by dint of powerful strength. The DPRK will steadily strengthen its nuclear force capable of fully coping with any threatening acts imposed by its nuclear-armed rival states and redouble its measures and efforts to make all the armed forces of the state including the nuclear force fully ready for combat. Repeatedly stating, the DPRK’s military muscle will develop in an accelerated and continued way thanks to our aspiration and steady efforts and we will not set a limit to its attainment.…” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Important Speech on National Day,” September 10, 2024)

9/11/24:
North Korea has continued to supply advanced short-range ballistic missiles to Russia in defiance of sanctions meant to prevent Pyongyang from developing such weapons and Moscow from importing them, according to a report by a weapons research group. Remnants of four of the missiles, which are called Hwasong-11, were examined in Kyiv by investigators from Conflict Armament Research, an independent group based in Britain that identifies and tracks weapons and ammunition used in wars around the world. That team decoded production markings on several parts from each missile collected by Ukrainian authorities. A Hwasong-11 missile used in an Aug. 18 attack on Kyiv had markings showing that it was made this year. Internal parts from three others, which were used in attacks in July and August, lacked markings that would indicate when they were manufactured. The researchers released those findings in a report today. In early January, the White House accused North Korea of providing ballistic missiles to Russia, but subsequent shipments had not been previously reported. The Hwasong-11 missile has a range of about 430 miles and can be fitted with nuclear or conventional warheads, according to a U.S. Army report. It is visually similar to the Russian Iskander short-range ballistic missile and may have been made with foreign assistance, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. “The determination of the production year that we were able to North Korea, a country that has been under sanction for almost two decades.” “It also shows, because this is at least a second shipment, continued violation of the sanctions because they continue to produce those missiles, to transfer them and then those missiles are being used in Ukraine,” he said. “It wasn’t a one-off in January,” Spleeters added. In March, Russia used its veto power on the U.N. Security Council to end monitoring of North Korea’s efforts to evade sanctions on its nuclear program. The termination of monitors, Spleeters said, was a major reason the country has been able to continue building and transferring ordnance to Russia. Weapons like the Russian Iskander and the North Korean Hwasong, which are fired from truck-based mobile launchers, are difficult to defend against because they fly much faster than other incoming threats like cruise missiles and can maneuver just before impact. The Hwasong missiles that were examined used common commercially available electronic components made by Western nations as recently as last year that ranged from the unsophisticated to fairly advanced, Spleeters said. They were similar to the components found in many Russian weapons examined by the group months into the 2022 invasion. The finding should not be a surprise, Spleeters said, given that Russia has also been able to build advanced weapons while under international sanctions aimed at slowing their production. “North Korea doesn’t have a domestic semiconductor industry,” he said. “So it makes sense that they would also take advantage of the global market to get access to those components.” “This means that we also can trace them and identify the entities responsible for their diversion,” he added. North Korea is not the only country sending such weapons to Russia. Two days ago, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken accused Iran of shipping short-range ballistic missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine. As a result, Blinken said, the Biden administration was imposing more sanctions against Tehran. In August, the investigators reported that Russian forces were launching Kh-101 cruise missiles into Ukraine sometimes just weeks or months after the weapons left the factory. (John Ismay, “Russia Wields North Korean Arms,” New York Times, September 12, 2024, p. A-7)

9/12/24:
North Korea fired multiple short-range ballistic missiles toward the East Sea today, the South Korean military said, a week after Pyongyang warned that South Korea and the United States will have to pay a “dear price” for their joint drills. “The North Korean missiles flew about 360 kilometers and landed in the East Sea,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said. It said it detected the missiles launched from the Pyongyang area at 7:10 a.m., but it did not provide any further details, such as the number of missiles fired. The distance, if fired southward, is sufficient to affect major South Korean cities such as Seoul and Daejeon as well as key military facilities in Gyeryong and Gunsan. Today’s launch also came hours after North Korea sent another batch of suspected balloons containing trash toward the South on Wednesday night, according to the JCS. Around 20 balloons were floated but they failed to cross the Military Demarcation Line, it added. No balloons were floating in the air as of this morning. In response to the balloon launches, the South’s military has been blasting daily anti-North Korean propaganda broadcasts through loudspeakers on the border since July 21. (Lee Minji and Chae Yun-hwan, “N. Korea Fires Multiple Short-Range Missiles toward East Sea,” Yonhap, September 12, 2024)

KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, oversaw the test-fire for verifying the performance of a new-type 600mm multiple rocket launcher. A defense industrial enterprise under the Second Economy Commission developed and produced the new-type 600mm multiple rocket launcher whose performance has been improved as required by the army’s conducting of operation. The test was conducted, aiming at verifying the combat effectiveness of the launcher whose driving system has been further developed and whole process of firing has fully been automated. That day, the excellent combat performance of the launcher was clearly proved through the driving and volley tests, and was favorably commented by service personnel. The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un appreciated the superiority of the newly-developed launcher in terms of maneuverability and efficiency as compared to the existing ones. The multiple rocket launcher shells hit a target on an island in the East Sea. Present at the test were Kim Jong Sik, first deputy department director of the Central Committee of the WPK, and Jang Chang Ha, director general of the Missile Administration of the DPRK.” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Oversees Test-fire for Verifying Performance of New-Type 600mm Multiple Rocket Launcher,” September 13, 2024)

9/13/24:
DPRK FoMin Disarmament and Peace Institute spokesperson’s press statement “The collective confrontational cooperation against the DPRK will be accompanied by the strengthened formation of strategic axis for improving the security environment of the region”: “The U.S. and its vassal forces held the second defense authority meeting between the ROK and member nations of the “UN Command” on September 10. Their moves to revitalize a tool for war and confrontation, which usurped the signboard of the UN, on the Korean peninsula are arousing a serious concern of the international community. Another anti-DPRK confrontation confab was held in the name of the “UN Command” whose dismantlement was declared by the international community decades ago. This is an insult to the inviolable UN and the UN Charter and one more important occasion judging who is the illegal force inciting military conflict in the Korean peninsula. A “joint statement” adopted after the meeting shows that the U.S. is buckling down to drawing member states of the “UN Command” into different joint military drills of aggressive nature to make them proficient in its-led war scenario and substantially enhance their capabilities to fight a war. Terming the U.S. and its vassal forces’ confrontational movement an extremely dangerous political and military provocation that causes security imbalance and escalates the danger of war in the Korean peninsula and the region, we resolutely denounce and reject it. The expansion of the “UN Command” is a prelude to the establishment of “NATO of Asian version” which will result in pushing the Asia-Pacific region deeper into the structure of new cold war, not easing the military tensions in the Korean peninsula and the region. When taking into consideration the fact that the revival of the “UN Command” is further increasing the possibility of military conflict in the Korean peninsula by stirring up the war hysteria of the ROK military gangsters running amuck in the military confrontation with the DPRK, the danger of such moves can never be overlooked. Moreover, if countries in different regions take part in the moves to revive the “UN Command”, blindly following the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK, military conflict in the Korean peninsula will not be confined to the one between the DPRK and the U.S. but will inevitably lead to the start of a new world war. It is an essential requirement for the national security and the region’s peaceful development to steadily improve the strategic force capable of deterring and weakening the hostile countries’ will for war provocation. The U.S. and its vassal countries’ collective military confrontation against the DPRK will serve as a motive and catalyst for accelerating the formation and development of a just strategic axis that thoroughly disallows the imbalance of power in the Korean peninsula and the region. The DPRK will steadily take a new strategic counteraction to contain and frustrate the reckless confrontation moves of the hostile forces to disturb peace and stability in the Korean peninsula by mobilizing the illegal war organization.” (KCNA, “Press Statement by Spokesperson for Disarmament and Peace Institute of DPRK Foreign Ministry,” September 13, 2024)

KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, inspected the Nuclear Weapons Institute and the production base of weapons-grade nuclear materials, acquainted himself with the production of nuclear warheads and the current production of nuclear materials and set forth important tasks concerning a long-term plan for increasing the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials. He was accompanied by Hong Sung Mu, first deputy department director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. He highly praised the scientists, technicians and officials in the field of nuclear weapons production for carrying out without fail the plan for producing weapons-grade nuclear materials needed for manufacturing nuclear warheads, cherishing the firm and steadfast revolutionary spirit and faith to firmly defend the victorious advance of the revolutionary cause of Juche with the strongest nuclear force. He went round the control room of the uranium enrichment base to learn about the operation of production lines in all aspects. He expressed great satisfaction after being briefed on the fact that the base is dynamically producing nuclear materials by studying, developing and introducing all the system elements including centrifugal separators and various kinds of sensors and controllers with its own efforts and technology. Personally looking round the production site, he said that it is invigorating to see the place, and continued: In order to exponentially multiply the nuclear weapons for self-defense true to the Party’s line of building the nuclear force, it is necessary to further increase the number of centrifuges, not content with the successes achieved, and, at the same time, to enhance the individual separation ability of the centrifuge and push forward with the introduction of a new-type centrifuge, which has already reached the completion stage, as planned, so as to consolidate the foundation for producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. Going round the construction site for expanding the capacity for the current production of nuclear weapons, he learned in detail about the daily plan for the assembly of equipment. Expressing great satisfaction repeatedly over the great technological capabilities of the nuclear power field of the DPRK, he said that the WPK has set forth a new important strategy for building up the nuclear force, believing in the combatants in the nuclear power field who have turned out as one with an ardent mind to open up a broad avenue for the revolutionary cause of Juche on the strength of nuclear weapons. The red nuclear scientists faithful to the Party should implement the Party’s policy of nuclear force building unconditionally and without an inch of deflection with their strong faith and high practical ability, he encouraged. Noting that anti-DPRK nuclear threat moves of the U.S. imperialists and their vassal forces have become more undisguised and crossed the red-line, he said the security environment facing the DPRK, the peculiarity of the Korean revolution compelling the country to constantly confront the U.S. and contain it and prospective threats require the DPRK to steadily expand and bolster up its military capability for self-defense and the capability for preemptive attack with the nuclear force as the backbone. He stressed again that a more rapid and sure advance should be made in the struggle to always maintain the thoroughgoing counteraction posture of the nuclear force and improve the posture to a high level. The combatants in the field of nuclear weapons production, assuming the most important responsibility, that is, the historic mission to bolster up the nuclear war deterrent of the country in quality and quantity and in a sustained and accelerated way, should keep exerting themselves in production and thus more creditably fulfil the sacred duty they took on for the Party and the revolution, he instructed. He stressed the need to set a higher long-term goal in producing nuclear materials necessary for the manufacture of tactical nuclear weapons and concentrate all efforts on making a fresh leap forward, and set forth important tasks and orientation. Upon receiving his on-site instructions, all the nuclear combatants made a firm determination to make a great leap forward in implementing the Party’s nuclear strategy and line by absolutely and firmly guaranteeing the continuous and successful birth of powerful Korean-style nuclear weapons, bearing in mind the deep trust of Kim Jong Un, who put them forward on the outpost of the sacred struggle as he further bolsters the world’s strongest nuclear arsenal which will steadfastly defend the independent development of the state, the happy life and safety of the people and the road ahead for the Juche revolution.” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Nuclear Weapons Institute and Production Base of Weapons-Grade Nuclear Materials,” (September 13, 2024)

Photos of North Korea’s its uranium enrichment facility may show an undeclared site for building nuclear bombs just outside of its capital, analysts said. North Korea for the first time showed images today of the centrifuges that produce fuel for its nuclear bombs, as leader Kim Jong Un visited a uranium enrichment facility and called for more weapons-grade material to boost the arsenal. The report did not mention the facility’s location. North Korea watchers and analysts said the site, known as Kangson, is suspected to be a covert uranium enrichment plant. Jeffrey Lewis, a non-proliferation expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, said five images of the inside facility, including of the “big” hall and an annex released by state media, match features of satellite imagery of the nuclear site. The annex’s odd shape and it unusual set of columns and beams are a “strong match” to the site North Korea constructed this year, he said. “That’s likely Kangson. It is an enrichment plant,” Lewis added. North Korea is believed to have several sites for enriching uranium. Analysts say commercial satellite imagery has shown construction in recent years at the main Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and the Kangson site, suggesting possible expansion in both places. Colin Zwirko, a senior analytical correspondent with NK Pro, a Seoul-based website that monitors North Korea, said the photos and satellite imagery indicate the complex is Kangson. In June, Rafael Grossi, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s director general, said a new annex to the main building in the Kangson complex was being built this year, adding that the complex shared “infrastructure characteristics with the reported centrifuge enrichment facility at Yongbyon.” During the visit that was covered by North Korean media, Kim stressed the need to boost the number of centrifuges to “exponentially increase” the nuclear arsenal, and expand the use of a new type of centrifuge to strengthen the production of weapon-grade nuclear materials. The photos that showed an advanced design of centrifuges and the hall with cascades connecting the centrifuges suggested the North Korea had made progress in uranium enrichment program, according to experts. “The size of the cascades and hall shown also signify substantial capacity, perhaps not to the level of ‘exponential growth’ as Kim has mandated, but significant growth, nonetheless,” 38 North, a Washington-based North Korea monitoring program, said in a note. “It is probable that these centrifuges are North Korean designed and manufactured,” it said, adding that the location showed in the photos could be Yongbyon. (Ju-min Park and Josh Smith, “Photos Likely Show Reuters, September 15, 2024)

Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, on September 13 met Sergei Shoigu, secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, who was on a visit to the DPRK. … At the talk, there was a wide-ranging exchange of views on the issues of steadily deepening the strategic dialogue between the two countries and strengthening cooperation to defend the mutual security interests and on the regional and international situations. The talk reached a satisfactory consensus of opinions on the presented issues. Appreciating the dynamic development of the bilateral relations in all fields including politics, the economy and culture according to the agreement reached at the DPRK-Russia Pyongyang summit held last June, Kim Jong Un affirmed that the DPRK government would further expand cooperation and collaboration with the Russian Federation true to the spirit of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the future, too. That evening Kim Jong Un met Sergei Shoigu again, and continued the constructive talk.…” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Receives Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of Security Council of Russian Federation,” September 14, 2024)

9/18/24:
North Korea fired multiple short-range ballistic missiles in a northeastern direction today, South Korea’s military said, further ratcheting up tensions already heightened by its rare disclosure of a uranium enrichment facility last week. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the launches at about 6:50 a.m. from the North’s Kaechon area in South Phyongan Province, north of Pyongyang, and the missiles flew about 400 kilometers. It did not provide further details, such as the number of missiles fired or where they landed. The latest launch is suspected to have involved missiles similar to the North’s Hwasong-11 family of missiles, previously launched in July. The North fired two ballistic missiles in a northeastern direction on July 1, including one that landed in the East Sea and another that flew 120 km before disappearing off the radar and possibly falling inland, according to the JCS. The North’s state media said the next day the country had test-fired the new Hwasong-11Da4.5 missile at its maximum and minimum ranges, noting they are capable of being tipped with a 4.5-ton “super-large” warhead. It notified of another test-firing the same month at the missile’s medium range, but it apparently did not take place. (Chae Yun-hwan, “N. Korea Fires Multiple Short-Range Ballistic Missiles: JCS,” Yonhap, September 18, 2024)

KCNA: “The Missile Administration of the DPRK successfully conducted test-fires of the new-type tactical ballistic missile Hwasongpho-11-Da-4.5 and an improved strategic cruise missile [today]. The new-type tactical ballistic missile was tipped with a 4.5 tonnage super-large conventional warhead according to design. Its test-fire was aimed at verifying the accuracy of hit at medium range of 320 km and explosive power of the super-large warhead with a missile loaded with such a warhead. The administration also conducted a test-fire of strategic cruise missile whose performance has been highly upgraded for its combat use. Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, guided the test-fires. He expressed great satisfaction over the test results. He said that such tests and steady improvement of performance of weapons and equipment through them are directly related to the grave threat of outside forces to the state security environment of the DPRK. The military and political situation in the region threatening the present state security environment indicates that the work for bolstering up the military capability for self-defense should be the most important affair of the country, he said. Our military superiority proved once again today is enough to judge the speed of development of the DPRK’s armed forces, he said, stressing the need to continue to bolster up the nuclear force and have the strongest military technical capability and overwhelming offensive capability in the field of conventional weapons, too. Only when we have strong power, can we contain and frustrate the enemies’ strategic misjudgment and will to use armed forces, he said, adding this is a true deterrent for defending peace and stability. He also oversaw several kinds of small arms including a 7.62 mm sniper rifle and a 5.56 mm automatic rifle developed by the Academy of Defense Sciences and set forth the orientation of production and the important tasks for further increasing technical foundation of the factory. Accompanying him were Pak Jong Chon, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission of the WPK and secretary of the C.C., WPK, Jo Chun Ryong, secretary of the C.C., WPK, Kim Jong Sik, first vice department director of the C.C., WPK, Jang Chang Ha, director general of the Missile Administration of the DPRK, Ri Chang Ho, deputy chief of the General Staff and director of the General Reconnaissance Bureau of the Korean People’s Army, Kim Yong Bok, deputy chief of the KPA General Staff, Kim Kang Il, vice-minister of National Defense of the DPRK, and Kim Yong Hwan, president of the Academy of Defense Sciences.” (KCNA, “DPRK Missile Administration and Academy of Defense Sciences Make Public Important Scientific Research Achievements,” September 19, 2024)

Hecker and Carlin: “Last Friday, nearly 14 years after the North Koreans surprised our Stanford group by unveiling an ultra-modern centrifuge facility in the Yongbyon nuclear complex, KCNA reported a visit by Kim Jong Un to a centrifuge plant, including photos. During our November 2010 visit, we were not allowed to take photos. That makes direct comparisons between what we saw and what KCNA published difficult. But the questions are clear — what did Kim Jong Un want to show, why now, and what difference does it make? The centrifuge hall shown in the KCNA photos was not the same one we saw in November 2010. The overall building layout looked nearly identical, but the centrifuges and piping were different. The centrifuges appeared to be about the same diameter but possibly somewhat shorter. Their exterior housing (likely a high-strength aluminum alloy) has a gray/white patina, whereas the ones we saw were shiny aluminum. The most significant difference is the current photos show many more small-diameter pipes leading to and from the centrifuges. The additional piping provides a hint about the new centrifuges. We concur with Heinonen et al. that these likely are cooling coils that lead inside the centrifuge housing to cool the rapidly spinning rotors. In 2010, we were told the centrifuges had maraging steel rotors, which is consistent with the performance characteristics they claimed for their centrifuges. The new centrifuges may be spinning faster because North Korea may have switched to composite material rotors. Separation capacity also depends on rotor length, but the new centrifuges are of similar length. We believe the new centrifuges provide only a modest increased capacity because they are of similar length, and it has been reported that Iran has had great difficulty increasing centrifuge performance with composite rotors. North Korea could, of course, increase enrichment capacity just by building more centrifuge plants. They apparently did so by 2013 when they added an annex of identical size to the building we visited, likely doubling the original 2,000 centrifuge capacity of 8,000 kg-SWU/year. Based on our visit, we concluded that they had additional centrifuge facilities outside Yongbyon because they could not have built the one we saw without first demonstrating that their centrifuges performed satisfactorily linked in cascades. The facility we visited in 2010 could have produced either low enriched uranium (LEU) to fuel the new experimental light water reactor (ELWR) under construction or highly enriched uranium (HEU) for bombs. We were told the facility was producing LEU, which was likely correct for that centrifuge hall as well as for the second one at Yongbyon. Some of the LEU was used to make reactor fuel, but some was likely sent to an undeclared facility to stepwise boost the enrichment from approximately four percent Uranium-235 to weapons grade at 90 percent. In the intervening years North Korea may also have built additional facilities outside Yongbyon dedicated primarily to HEU production. We do not know the location of the facility Kim visited, although it is almost certainly outside Yongbyon. Reports that it is near Pyongyang at Kangson, which may have housed centrifuge facilities in the past, remain in dispute. However, the actual location of the facility is not crucial to the arguments we make here. All estimates of the North’s enrichment capacity are highly uncertain. We have no independent confirmation of the centrifuge designs or rotor materials. All estimates use our assessment that their original centrifuges used maraging steel rotors with a 4.0 kg SWU/yr separation capacity. If we were wrong and North was not able to produce or acquire maraging steel, but rather had to use aluminum alloys as did Iran at the time, the estimates would be too high by a factor of four. That is one of the reasons we tried to convince successive American administrations that there is great benefit to a deal that allows access to Yongbyon, but to no avail. Another reason for the high uncertainty is that we do not know how many centrifuge facilities North Korea has (nor where they all are). We have assumed North Korea has similar enrichment capacity outside Yongbyon in undeclared facilities to what is inside the complex. For reference, the total estimated capacity in Yongbyon is approximately 16,000 kg-SWU/yr, which, if dedicated to HEU, could produce about 80 kg/yr. However, some of the enrichment capacity is used for LEU fuel for the experimental light water reactor (ELWR), which appeared to be operational by the end of 2023 (over a decade after construction began). Therefore, we do not know how much of the enrichment capacity was dedicated to HEU for bombs. Moreover, we do not know how North Korea partitions its HEU inventory between tactical nuclear weapons and components of their hydrogen bombs. Given these uncertainties, we believe North Korea already has sufficient HEU for 50 or so tactical nuclear weapons. It could have considerably more, as some analysts have estimated, but it also could be a lot less if our assumptions are incorrect. It does not fundamentally change the threat but is a stark reminder of just how menacing the North’s nuclear arsenal is. In his remarks at the facility, Kim stressed the need to increase the production of “nuclear materials necessary for the manufacture of tactical nuclear weapons.” This facility may increase the production of HEU by around 25 percent, but not exponentially as Kim Jong Un has previously called for. Producing more HEU bomb fuel is important to bolster the North’s regional deterrent of tactical nuclear weapons, which can reach all of South Korea and much of Japan. However, it does not improve the sophistication or versatility of the North’s nuclear arsenal. We believe that North Korea has dedicated only two of its six nuclear tests (February 2013 and September 2016) to developing tactical nuclear weapons. Without additional nuclear tests, it will be difficult to improve the performance of the warheads and mate them to the apparently great variety of short and medium-range missiles that North Korea has tested that are believed to be nuclear capable. Yet, Kim has previously shown off a room full of small tactical nuclear weapons (mockups, presumably) that are claimed to fit into eight different delivery platforms. More HEU also does little to enhance the North’s strategic nuclear arsenal, which we believe is based on plutonium and tritium. North Korea has produced rather modest amounts of plutonium and tritium in its 5 MWe Gas-graphite Reactor in Yongbyon over the years. Production of plutonium and tritium may now be augmented by the operation of the ELWR. Enhancing the strategic nuclear arsenal will require more plutonium, more tritium, more missile testing (especially to gather reentry data), and more nuclear testing. All pose technical and political risks. One concern we have is that the new partnership with Russia may offer North Korea shortcuts in one or all of these. The importance of the report on Kim’s appearance at the enrichment facility comes from the context in which it occurred. Since the end of August, Pyongyang has been ramping up attention to its defense sector and especially to Kim Jong Un’s focus on nuclear weapons. This has been a two-pronged effort, aimed at preparing the population for an uptick in tensions while signaling to Washington that Kim’s nuclear capacity, already strong, is getting stronger. Kim’s visit to the enrichment plant appears to be part of that effort. With all of this as the overture, Kim has signaled a significant move to be made at the upcoming October 7 Supreme People’s Assembly meeting to declare new national borders. That will almost certainly increase tensions on the peninsula, especially in the West Sea. Kim has several times in the past emphasized the ability to launch an overwhelming attack, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, on key military and civilian infrastructure in the South. By showing the enrichment facility, he has signaled an increased ability to produce uranium warheads for use on the peninsula and, to a lesser extent, against Japan. With plutonium and tritium production for strategic weapons still limited, it’s unlikely he intends to use nuclear weapons against the continental United States from the start. But he may want to have enough capacity regionally with tactical nuclear weapons — and wants the US to think he has more than enough — to keep the US out of the fight, something he no doubt knows his grandfather failed to do in June 1950. By drawing the attention of the domestic audience to military issues and by underlining his involvement in them, Kim appears to be moving into a dangerous new phase, signaling to the population that despite the regime’s focus on economic policy in recent months, there is a need to continue preparing for potential confrontation.” (Siegfried S. Hecker and Robert L. Carlin, “A Closer Look at North Korea’s Enrichment Capability and What It Means,” 38North, September 18, 2024)

9/19/24:
The United States imposed sanctions today on a network of five groups and one person for enabling payments between Russia and North Korea to support Moscow’s war in Ukraine and Pyongyang’s weapons programs, the Treasury Department said. “Today’s action holds accountable parties that have assisted the DPRK and Russian sanctions evasion,” Treasury said in a statement. The measures also show U.S. commitment to disrupting networks “that facilitate the funding of the DPRK’s unlawful weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs and support Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine,” it said. “The growing financial cooperation between Russia and (North Korea) directly threatens international security and the global financial system,” State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said in a statement. “Russia has become increasingly dependent on the DPRK as it faces mounting battlefield losses and increasing international isolation.” The sanctions target financial schemes by the North Korean state-run Foreign Trade Bank (FTB) and Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation, both of which had previously been sanctioned by the U.S. (Doina Chiacu, “U.S. Imposes New Sanctions Related to Russia, North Korea, Says Treasury,” Reuters, September 20, 2024)

9/21/24:
South Korea’s military today vowed to take “stern” military measures should North Korea “cross the line” with its ongoing trash balloon campaign or inflict serious damage to the South Korean people. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) made the remark in a statement in response to the North’s repeated launch of trash-carrying balloons across the border, including those attached with timer devices that could potentially cause fires. Since late May, the North has launched some 5,500 balloons carrying trash on over 22 occasions in retaliation against anti-Pyongyang leaflets sent across the border by North Korean defectors and activists in South Korea. The North floated some 120 balloons from yesterday evening to this morning in its latest launch. No additional balloons were spotted midair, the JCS said in a notice sent to reporters at 9:14 a.m. “While there may be inconveniences and difficulties caused by North Korea’s trash balloons, our fundamental measure to eradicate them is to show that ‘there is nothing to gain for the enemy,'” the JCS said in the statement. “Still, if serious danger is caused to the safety of our citizens or if the North is assessed to have crossed the line, our military will take stern military measures,” it added. JCS spokesperson Col. Lee Sung-jun declined to elaborate when asked what such a threshold would be. “It is a message issued given that North Korea’s gray zone provocations are extending into the long term, and causing inconvenience and anxiety among the public,” Lee told a regular press briefing, adding “corresponding measures” could be taken should North Korea’s trash balloons cause damage. The military, which has refrained from directly shooting down the balloons, ruled out views calling for such action, saying that they could lead to bigger issues for the public’s safety. In response to the balloon launches, the South’s military has been blasting daily anti-North Korean propaganda broadcasts through loudspeakers on the border since July 21. (Lee Minji, “S. Korean Military Vows ‘Stern’ Measures Should N. Korea Cross the Line with Balloon Campaign,” Yonhap, September 23, 2024)

9/24/24:
WPK Central Committee Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong’s Press Statement titled “An abnormal object appeared at Pusan Port: U.S. strategic assets would not find their resting place in the Korean peninsula”: “The Aerospace Reconnaissance Agency, an independent intelligence organ directly under the head of state of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, captured an abnormal object at a wharf, a subject of its constant attention at Pusan Port of the ROK at 10:03:10 [yesterday] and reported its reconnaissance data. A nuclear submarine appeared on the wharf where a U.S. aircraft carrier used to moor at. The latest nuclear submarine, which has never appeared openly since it was commissioned in 2020, made its appearance at the Pusan operation base for the first time in history. It can be hardly regarded as a “sightseeing voyage.” Given the U.S. has been demonstrating its overall strength recently while making public the “might” of its nuclear strategic assets in order, one can easily guess the true aim of the open port call of the nuclear submarine which should have been concealed under the “surface of water.” In June the U.S. forces launched Minuteman-3 intercontinental ballistic missiles twice and on September 18 they opened to the public the test-flight image of B-21 Raider, a next-generation stealth strategic bomber, for the first time. The U.S. let the latest nuclear submarine of the U.S. Navy anchor in Pusan Port of the ROK, thus took out all its cards called “three nuclear strategic assets.” This clearly reveals the frantic military and strategic attempt of the U.S. hell-bent on intentionally demonstrating the “superiority of strength” before the world. The U.S. is now experiencing unprecedented strategic inferiority in the Korean peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region and is very afraid of the reality in which the entity of the strong power of independence against the U.S. and the fortress for defending justice is beginning to make its appearance in the region. Therefore, it is deploying all nuclear strategic assets in the Korean peninsula and its vicinity while cooking up various large and small military blocs in the region to contain the DPRK and independent sovereign states by force of arms and to “bind” the group of its followers who feel uneasy and impatient. The Wilmington Declaration making the “nuclear threat” from anyone the subject of discussion was fabricated at the QUAD summit meeting held in Delaware State of the U.S. some days ago and the promise for the U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation to cope with the so-called “ever-increasing nuclear threat” was made at the U.S.-Japan summit held on the same day. They are also typical products of the U.S. geopolitical sinister intention to politically and militarily encircle and stifle the DPRK and regional countries. The U.S. latest nuclear submarine’s visit to the port of the ROK is a proof that the U.S. ambition to often take up nuclear strategic assets, boast of its strength, increase its threat to the rival and “enjoy” its hegemonic privilege by dint of its malicious strength at any cost is getting ever more extreme. No matter how the U.S. may demonstrate its “overwhelming capability” by rising to the surface even a submarine whose mission is to mount a final nuclear strike under the sea, nothing will change. The DPRK’s nuclear war deterrent to cope with and contain various threats from outside is bound to be bolstered up both in quality and quantity continuously and limitlessly as the security of the state is constantly exposed to the U.S. nuclear threat and blackmail. The U.S. nuclear submarine’s call at Pusan Port may be a break time for the U.S. marines and a comfort for the U.S. stooges, but it can never be an object of fear in the face of the super-powerful entity standing over against the U.S. The U.S. strategic assets will never find their resting place in the region of the Korean peninsula. We will continue to inform that all the ports and military bases of the ROK are not safe places. The U.S. is by no means a “pronoun of security.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Vice Department Director of WPK Central Committee Kim Yo Jong,” September 24, 2024)

9/25/24:
DPRK FoMin spokesman’s press statement “The signboard of ‘maintaining peace and stability’ can never be a lever for the U.S. to justify its policy of inter-camp confrontation”: “Recently, the U.S. slandered the DPRK’s exercise of its righteous and legitimate sovereign rights with the QUAD summit meeting as an occasion and perpetrated a grave political provocation of inciting the atmosphere of collective pressure on the DPRK. The White House is claiming that the meeting targets no specific nation, but the “joint statement” fabricated and made public this time shows that QUAD is nothing but a political and diplomatic tool serving the implementation of the U.S. strategy for uni-polar domination. The Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea expresses serious concern over the fact that the U.S. has become more brazen in its most hostile confrontational attempt while wantonly violating the DPRK’s rights to sovereignty and development, and strongly denounces and rejects it. Today, QUAD, the end product of the U.S. Cold War mentality and policy of inter-camp confrontation, has become a dangerous factor that deepens mistrust and antagonism between countries in the Asia-Pacific region and provokes international instability. The U.S. tried to cover up the confrontational colors of QUAD with such rhetoric as “tightened cooperation” in climatic change, food security and public health but it is a well-known fact that its justification for existence and main object are to establish a U.S.-led “rules-based international order.” This time the U.S. turned QUAD into a de facto international “maritime police organization” under the pretext of “freedom of navigation”, terming sovereign countries’ exercise of legitimate rights “threats.” This clearly proves that the entity is just an appendage of Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The current U.S. administration further sticks to the anachronistic “minority” politics but it only proves that its high-handed and arbitrary practices no longer work in the international arena and its diplomatic platform is narrowing. The U.S. policy of fomenting inter-camp confrontation that challenges justice and goes against the trend of the times is a harmful root cause of exposing world peace and security to the most serious threat. The DPRK will never tolerate any hostile acts of encroaching upon its national sovereign rights, security and interests but as ever make responsible efforts to establish a multi-polarized international order based on independence and justice.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Spokesperson for DPRK Foreign Ministry,” September 25, 2024)

Since May, defector groups in South Korea have been launching balloons bearing propaganda leaflets across the inter-Korean border to the north, while the North Korean authorities have been floating trash-carrying balloons across the border in the other direction. But the number of propaganda balloon launches doubled in August, which was followed by a similar doubling of trash balloon launches in September, Hankyoreh has found. Launches of the two types of balloons, some carrying propaganda and some carrying trash, have created a feedback loop that is raising tensions between the two Koreas. While the South Korean government attacks North Korea’s balloons as an “international disgrace” and “vulgar,” it may be more accurate to say that provocations are being committed by both sides. Yesterday, Hankyoreh compared data about trash balloons (May 28-September 23) collated by South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff with data about propaganda balloons (May 3-September 19) collated by the National Police Agency. Our comparison showed that in nearly all cases, North Korea’s trash balloon launches were preceded by defector groups’ propaganda balloon launches. Propaganda balloons have been launched 51 times between May 3 and September 19. In contrast, trash balloons were launched 22 times between May 28 and September 23. Launches of propaganda balloons remained in the single digits in May, June and July before markedly increasing to 12 times in August and 13 times in September (as of September 19). That shows that launches are occurring with greater frequency. Trash balloons were launched on 2-9 days in May through August, but the number of launch days jumped to 12 in September. According to figures about propaganda balloon launches from the police, there were 8 launches in May, 9 in June, 9 in July, 12 in August and 13 in September (through September 19), with the first launch occurring on Ganghwa Island, Incheon, on May 3. These figures were submitted to the office of Kim Joon-hyung, a lawmaker with the Rebuilding Korea Party. To summarize, there were an average of 8-9 propaganda launches in May, June, and July, but then 12 in August and 13 in September (through September 19; the police data do not cover September 20-23). In other words, the launches are growing more frequent with time. The number of areas from which the large leaflet-carrying balloons are being launched has also grown more diverse: four areas in May, four in June, two in July, five in August and seven in September. While all balloons were launched from sites in Incheon and Gyeonggi Province until August, defector groups expanded to sites in Gangwon Province, including Cheorwon County and Sokcho, in September. Ganghwa Island, Incheon, has seen the most balloon launches, at 22, followed by Yeoncheon County (Gyeonggi) at 11, Paju (Gyeonggi) at 8, Gimpo (Gyeonggi) at 6, and Gapyeong (Gyeonggi), Gyeyang (Incheon), Sokcho (Gangwon) and Cheorwon (Gangwon) with 1 launch each. According to data about North Korean trash balloon launches made public by the Joint Chiefs of Staff since launches began on May 28, balloons were launched on 2 days in May, 9 days in June, 4 days in July, 2 days in August and 12 days in September. The number of balloon launches decreased considerably in July and August, apparently because North Korea was preoccupied with disastrous flooding along the Amnok (Yalu) River in late July. (Lee Je-hun, “Data Shows North Korea’s Trash Balloons Aren’t Mere One -Sided Provocation,” Hankyoreh, September 25, 2024)

China launched an intercontinental ballistic missile carrying a dummy warhead that landed in the Pacific Ocean today, the country’s defense ministry announced, in a sign of President Xi Jinping’s commitment to keep strengthening China’s missile force after a period of corruption scandals and command turbulence. The launch appeared to be the first time in 44 years that China has publicly announced a test of an intercontinental ballistic missile in the Pacific region. It was fired by the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force and struck in the “high seas,” China’s Ministry of National Defense said, without giving details of where the dummy warhead fell, what model of missile carried it or where it was launched. It said the dummy warhead “fell precisely into the assigned seas.” (Chris Buckley, “China Says It Launched Rocket With Dummy Warhead Into the Pacific,” New York Times, September 26, 2024, p. A-13)

Carlin: “Pyongyang continues to alter how it frames the international security landscape, increasingly portraying itself as part of a larger collection of countries standing against the United States (US). Rather than suggest it is facing the US alone, it is painting itself as part of a group of “independent sovereign states” being threatened. Recently it has refined that image further, and suggested the next step will be formation of a “just strategic axis” to redress what it calls an “imbalance” of forces on the Peninsula and in the region created by new US-led defense alignments in the Indo-Pacific. This framing has policy implications on several levels. Internally, it may be meant to reassure the domestic audience that the North will not be alone in the event of a confrontation with the US. Externally, Pyongyang may anticipate that grouping itself with “independent sovereign states” will be useful in providing cover — however thin — for any action it takes, blunting US efforts to gather a broad anti-DPRK coalition in event of a crisis. While the new term “just strategic axis” may be largely propaganda-speak, the concept of a broader, more concrete security alignment may be the next step in Pyongyang’s more aggressive stance on the Peninsula. The term first appeared in a press statement issued by the Foreign Ministry’s Institute for Disarmament and Peace on September 13, the same day Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of the Russian Security Council, arrived in Pyongyang. That raises the possibility that enhanced DPRK-Russia military cooperation may have been a topic during the visit. The term appeared again in a long article on September 14 (the day Shoigu departed), by one of the North’s “international analysts” criticizing AUKUS and warning of other moves by the US to fashion a new security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. Shoigu, who flew directly from St. Petersburg, where Russian President Putin had just warned of a tough response if the US and NATO approved Ukrainian use of their weapons for deep strikes into Russia, could have been prepared to discuss with Kim what Putin meant and how the North fit in. On the ground in Pyongyang for only 13 hours, Shoigu had two meetings with Kim Jong Un. To demonstrate how well the meetings went and the strength of Pyongyang’s ties with Moscow, Kim broke with protocol and personally saw Shoigu off at the airport. Less than a week after Shoigu’s visit, there was an odd ballet of official Russian aircraft flying between Khabarovsk (Kh), Vladivostok (Vv), and North Korea.1 On September 19, a Special Flight Squadron (SFS) plane and a Russian Air Force IL 62 landed in Vladivostok within minutes of each other. Later the same day, the SFS plane flew to somewhere on the North’s east coast, returned to Vv a few hours later, then left for Novosibirsk. Within a short time the Air Force plane took off for Pyongyang, stayed on the ground only about an hour before flying directly to Kh; the following day (September 21) the Air Force plane flew back to Vv, remained there until 22 September, returned briefly to Kh, then flew directly to Pyongyang where it was on the ground for about two hours before returning to Vv for a brief stop before taking off near dawn on 23 September for an airport outside of Moscow. (AF IL 62 itinerary 19-23 September): Moscow-Vv-Py-Kh-Vv-Kh-Py-Vv-Moscow Precisely what those flights were supporting or delivering is unknown, but their unusual itineraries, their proximity to the Shoigu visit, and the appearance of the new North Korean language on a “just strategic axis” suggest that they were connected in whole or in part with developments in Russian-DPRK military ties. All along, in addition to stronger diplomatic backing, Kim has undoubtedly been expecting Russian support in terms of military technology and hardware. With the possibility of another round of escalation in the Ukraine war, Kim may have decided the time is ripe to push Putin to see that it is in Russia’s interest for North Korean action that will distract the US and interfere with ROK supplies of armaments that find their way to support for Ukraine . Pyongyang may hope to see a “strategic axis” that includes both Russia and China one day, however that isn’t the case right now. China-DPRK relations are sore lagging the North’s deepening cooperation with Russia. In fact, Pyongyang rarely mentions China at all, in stark contrast to its fulsome public support for Russia. The temperature may have dropped several degrees as a result of Kim Jong Un’s markedly cool personal treatment of Chinese leader Xi Jinping in a message sent earlier this week. Kim only dropped one adjective (“deep”) normally found in such messages, but Beijing will notice.” (Robert Carlin, “Pyongyang’s New Frame,” 38North, September 25, 2024)

Rafael Grossi, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), described North Korea as a “de facto” nuclear weapons state while arguing that the international community needs to engage in dialogue with the North to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Grossi asked during an interview with the press in New York on September 26 whether closing the door to dialogue with North Korea had resolved anything or whether it had “on the contrary, [exacerbated] the conditions for a situation that may go out of hand?” He said North Korea’s nuclear program should be condemned for violating Security Council sanctions and international law. But there has been no international engagement since 2006 when the country became ‘a de facto nuclear weapon possessor state’ and since then its nuclear program has expanded significantly,” the Associated Press reported. While recognizing the importance of continuing calls for North Korea to halt its nuclear program, Grossi said, “at the same time, we need to start thinking seriously about stopping to talk past each other.” “We must be proactive, and we must open doors for dialogue,” the IAEA director general remarked. “My credo [. . .] has always been engage, talk, try things.” Establishing the trust needed for engagement with Pyongyang requires “very careful, diplomatic preparatory moves.” “I hope that will be possible,” he added. Grossi stated that nuclear safety is one possible issue that the international community and North Korea should discuss. While pointing out that tons of material is being used at its nuclear facilities, he stated that North Korea is “perhaps the only one in the world on which there is no visibility in terms of the observance of the basic international nuclear safety standards.” “As these pictures show, and beyond that, they have a vast nuclear program,” Grossi stated regarding North Korea’s unveiling of its uranium enrichment facility on September 13, confirming that the IAEA assesses North Korea’s nuclear program as “very, very solid.” Grossi stated there is speculation on whether North Korea has 30 or 50 nuclear warheads, asking what Kim means when saying that North Korea should make stronger efforts to “exponentially” produce more nuclear weapons during his visit to the uranium enrichment facility. “We are at an international juncture,” where other countries are increasing their arsenal of nuclear weapons, Grossi said, stating that this is a “symptom of our underlying, very profound malaise.” (Park Byong-su, “IAEA Chief Calls North Korea a ‘De Facto’ Nuclear State, Calls for Dialogue with Pyongyang,” Hankyoreh, September 30, 2024)

9/29/24:
South Korea will showcase its so-called Hyunmoo-5 missile, capable of delivering powerful retaliatory strikes against North Korea, during the 76th Armed Forces Day parade in central Seoul in two days, according to multiple military sources today. The Hyunmoo-5 is a key asset in South Korea’s “Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation” (KMPR) plan, part of the military’s “three-axis” deterrence system. This system is designed to neutralize North Korea’s leadership in the event of a major conflict. The Hyunmoo-5 can carry a warhead weighing up to eight tons, making it the heaviest warhead of its kind in the world. Its heavy warhead can reportedly penetrate and destroy underground facilities, including bunkers more than 100 meters deep, which could potentially serve as hiding places for the North Korean leadership. (Seo Ji-eun, “South Korea to Reveal Missile Carrying Massive Warhead at Military Parade amid Tensions with North,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 29, 2024)

9/30/24:
DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “Kim Song, permanent representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the United Nations made a speech at the general debate of the 79th Session of the UN General Assembly on September 30. Having outlined the line of the DPRK government on achieving socio-economic development and the steady implementation of it, he clarified the principled position of the DPRK government to defend regional peace and stability and to realize international justice. He said that the security environment of the Korean peninsula is bound to be intricately complicated through to the next generation as well, unless the U.S. and its followers change their confrontational and aggressive nature. Under such circumstances, it is an indispensable exercise of sovereign rights for the DPRK to maintain powerful strength capable of defending national security interests and guaranteeing peaceful development, he added. He then continued as follows: The situation on the Korean peninsula has not entered war even though it is fraught with extreme tension. It is totally attributable to our country’s powerful war deterrence which helps stave off threat of aggression and keep the balance of power in the region. Therefore, we continue to increase our war deterrence capabilities not only from our obligation to ensure national security but also from our mission to maintain peace and security in the region and beyond. Comrade Kim Jong Un, President of the State Affairs of the DPRK, said that we can choose either dialogue or confrontation but we should go further in getting ourselves fully prepared for confrontation and that this is the review and conclusion drawn from the 30-year-long DPRK-U.S. relations. When it comes to the right to self-defense, a legitimate right of a sovereign state, we will never go back to the point in the far-off past. When it comes to the national prestige, we will never bargain over it with anyone for it was gained through the bloody struggle of the entire Korean people. Whoever takes office in the U.S., we will only deal with the state entity called the U.S., not the mere administration. Likewise, any U.S. administration will have to face the DPRK which is different from what the U.S. used to think.…” (DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “DPRK Permanent Representative to UN Makes Speech at 79th Session of the UN General Assembly,” October 7, 2024)

North Korea appeared today to dismiss the possibility of a return to the personal diplomacy its leader Kim Jong Un had with former President Donald Trump, no matter who wins the U.S. presidential election. “Whoever takes office in the U.S., we will only deal with the state entity called the U.S., not the mere administration,” Pyongyang’s ambassador to the United Nations Song Kim told the annual U.N. General Assembly. “Likewise, any U.S. administration will have to face the DPRK, which is different from what the U.S. used to think,” he said. Song Kim said U.S. hostility and the nuclear threat it had posed to North Korea for more than 70 years compelled Pyongyang to acquire nuclear weapons. He said Kim Jong Un had said, “we can choose either dialogue or confrontation, but we should go further in getting ourselves fully prepared for confrontation.” A senior North Korean diplomat who defected to South Korea told Reuters recently that North Korea wants to reopen nuclear talks with the United States if Trump is reelected and is working to devise a new negotiating strategy and unprecedented diplomacy with North Korea during his previous term that ended in 2021. The defecting diplomat, Ri Il Gyu, said Pyongyang’s diplomats were mapping out a strategy should Americans elect Trump over Vice President Kamala Harris, with the goal of lifting sanctions on its weapons programs, removing its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and eliciting economic aid. At an August press conference, Trump said Kim Jong Un “liked me a lot.” “He doesn’t like this group,” Trump added, referring to the Biden-Harris administration. “We are in great danger. We’re at great danger of being in World War Three.” (Michelle Nicholls and David Brunnstrom, “North Korea Appears to Dismiss Return to Personal Diplomacy with U.S.,” Reuters, September 30, 2024)

10/1/24:
DPRK vice-minister of National Defense Kim Kang Il’s press statement titled “The U.S. reckless military bluff and moves for escalating tensions will only increase security instability of its mainland”: “Pentagon’s confrontational attempt to permanently deploy nuclear strategic assets to the Korean peninsula and its vicinities to intentionally demonstrate the “upper hand in strength” and put military pressure on the sovereign states in the region is being manifested in a diverse way. Shortly ago, the latest nuclear submarine of the U.S. Navy openly revealed its shape at Pusan Port of the ROK. And, this time, B-1B bomber, one of the three air strategic assets of the U.S. Air Force, will be reportedly to fly in the sky above the Korean peninsula and conduct a demonstration flight, timed to coincide with a military parade on the “ROK army day.” The U.S. bluffing military demonstration is nothing but a “hallucinant” to save even a bit its military face driven into a strategic disadvantage in the Korean peninsula and calm down a sense of collapse of its stooge having a poor sleep at night from chronic nuclear phobia. In June the U.S. B-1Bs flew over the sky of the Korean peninsula to stage a joint air drill with military gangsters of the ROK and a precision guided bomb dropping drill for the first time in several years. And nuclear carrier Theodore Roosevelt entered the Pusan operational base to insist on the “combined defense posture” and “demonstration of extended deterrence”. All those facts clearly show where the intemperate hysteric confrontation racket of the ROK is based on. The Korean People’s Army (KPA) is keenly watching the frequent deployment of U.S. strategic assets and their traces in the Korean peninsula and is fully ready to thoroughly defend the security environment of the state from any threat. It is the invariable stand of KPA that the U.S. which is seized with violence and high-handed practices, should be governed from the stand of strength. Now that the U.S. unannounced deployment of strategic assets has fixed as an incurable bad habit, a measure of unpredictable strategic nature corresponding to it should be an inevitable and legitimate right of a sovereign state, and fresh methods of adding serious concern to the security of the U.S. mainland should be surely produced. We can examine such fresh action plans any time and carry them out. The armed forces of the DPRK will never remain a passive onlooker to the military provocative acts of the hostile forces escalated in three dimensions in the Korean peninsula and its vicinities, but take a thoroughgoing action corresponding to them and steadily improve their powerful war deterrent capable of initiatively coping with any instable situation of security caused by the U.S. irresponsible acts.” (KCNA, “Press Statement by Vice-Minister of National Defense of DPRK,” October 1, 2024)

New Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru took office today, but he will get no honeymoon period as he looks to unite a divided Liberal Democratic Party ahead of an October 27 general election amid internal strife over his picks for his Cabinet and the party lineup. Ishiba unveiled his Cabinet the same day as his election as prime minister by parliament, having announced senior party appointments a day earlier. The new leader selected those who were largely untainted by a party political funds scandal that heavily damaged public trust in the LDP. “The first thing we must do in order to win back people’s trust is make political reforms. If politics costs money, we must explain this in a careful and thorough manner. It is, of course, necessary to disclose the money collected with complete transparency,” Ishiba said at a late Tuesday evening news conference. Calling the security environment around Japan the most severe it has been since World War II, he also vowed to strengthen Japan’s deterrence and defense capabilities. “Through diplomacy based on realistic national interests, we will expand the circle of friendly nations, with the Japan-U.S. alliance its core,” Ishiba said. A number of Ishiba’s Cabinet picks include those close to his predecessors, Yoshihide Suga and Kishida. An LDP faction that Kishida led previously was the first of several to be dissolved in the wake of the scandal. These picks include former defense chief Iwaya Takeshi — Ishiba’s campaign chief and a onetime member of a faction led by former Vice LDP President Aso Taro — who took the Foreign Ministry portfolio, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa, who stays on in the key post of top government spokesman. Meanwhile, the finance chief portfolio went to Kato Katsunobu, one of Ishiba’s eight rivals in last week’s LDP leadership race, while former Defense Minister Gen Nakatani was tapped for a new stint in his old post. But Ishiba bypassed members of a faction previously led by the late former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, which was at the center of the scandal. He has also removed former Prime Minister Aso Taro from the post of party vice president. Aso, whose faction managed to avoid much of the fallout from the scandal and remains intact in the LDP, was especially angry when his rival, Suga, was named the new vice president. While Ishiba had offered party positions to his presidential election rivals, Takaichi Sanae and Kobayashi Takayuki, both of them turned him down, highlighting an apparent split in the party. Takaichi was a close ally of Abe’s and received the backing of Aso to run against Ishiba during last week’s vote, while Kobayashi enjoys support from many younger lawmakers who were members of the former Abe faction. Meanwhile, Ishiba received the backing of Kishida and many of his allies, who dislike Takaichi’s strong conservatism and hawkishness, as well as that of Suga and many of his supporters. This has left the LDP divided between a pro-Ishiba camp on one side and an anti-Ishiba camp on the other. The growing divisions emerge as Ishiba announced his plan yesterday for an October 27 snap election — earlier than what he’d hinted at during the LDP presidential election campaign. When he announced his candidacy on Aug. 24, Ishiba said he would dissolve the Lower House only after budget committee sessions attended by all Cabinet ministers were held in order to demonstrate what his administration wanted to do. Holding parliamentary budget committee sessions, however, requires a certain amount of days for deliberation, which led to speculation an election would be held in November or later this year. But yesterday, a day ahead of his formal election as Japan’s new leader, Ishiba surprised everyone and announced his plan to dissolve the Lower House — the sole prerogative of a sitting prime minister — for a general election on October 27, effectively ruling out time for lengthy discussions in the budget committee sessions. Local media reported that Ishiba changed his stance after Hiroshi Moriyama, who he named LDP secretary-general on Monday, pushed him into holding the election earlier than his original plan — a development that highlights his weak standing within a divided LDP. Ishiba’s Cabinet includes 13 first-time ministers, with many unaccustomed to answering probing and often critical questions from opposition lawmakers. Still, Ishiba has also tapped a handful of lawmakers with prior government experience, leaning heavily on former defense ministers and naming four of them to key positions. He chose Iwaya, who was defense chief for nearly a year in 2018-19, as Japan’s new top diplomat. The appointment of Iwaya — a longtime friend of Kishida’s — could highlight the sway that the new prime minister’s predecessor maintains in the new government. But Iwaya will also bring baggage into the new Cabinet due to his links to the slush funds scandal. In December, it was revealed that his political fund management organization failed to report ¥5 million ($34,780) in donations from a faction over the past two years, though he denied any kickback from party fundraising tickets, citing an administrative error. Meanwhile, Nakatani will reprise his role as defense minister as China’s military assertiveness grows and an ally — the U.S. — gears up for one of its most consequential and divisive presidential elections ever. A former Ground Self-Defense Force officer, Nakatani is known to be a leading expert on security policy within the LDP, having shepherded negotiations with the U.S. over new bilateral guidelines for defense cooperation in 2015. He will be tasked with following through on Ishiba’s ambitious defense goals that could include seeking revisions of Japan’s security treaty and Status of Forces Agreement with the U.S. to put the allies on more “equal terms.” Analysts say these plans, the details of which remain largely unclear, have already raised eyebrows in Washington. (Eric Johnston and Takahara Kanako, “New Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru Unveils Cabinet as LDP Divides,” Japan Times, October 1, 2024)

Sheila Smith: “Foreign policy and defense played a large role in the LDP campaign, revealing just how focused Japan’s political leaders are on their security. Two issues drew considerable commentary. The first was how Japan should improve its defense readiness. The possibility of a Taiwan Strait crisis was widely discussed in a Fuji Television debate. Ishiba, a former Minister of Defense, was forthright in outlining how Japan needed to study various contingencies and the capabilities it might need to muster in a crisis. Just before the campaign began, Ishiba had visited Taiwan and met with President Lai Ching-te to discuss the situation across the Straits and Japan-Taiwan ties. Similarly, the debate included reference to Chinese pressures on the Philippines and what, if anything, Japan should do. Here again Ishiba, and others, saw opportunity for alliance cooperation but there was less interest in direct military involvement in a South China Sea crisis. Ishiba drew headlines during the campaign for his suggestion that Japan ought to consider joining an Asian-NATO style arrangement. He suggested Japan could join ANZUS, but the heart of his comments really focused less on which powers Japan could partner with than the idea that it was time for Tokyo to consider the reciprocity required of a collective security arrangement. Second, Ishiba had some very specific ideas about revisions needed to the Status of Forces Agreement that governs the U.S. military presence in Japan. Arguing that the time had come to adapt the bilateral agreement, Ishiba suggested this would be a priority for his Cabinet. Moreover, while in Okinawa, Ishiba also argued that the time had come for joint use of the bases there so that the Japanese government could directly manage the interactions between the residents and the military forces on the bases. A second foreign policy focal point in the campaign was the Japanese response to the death of a ten-year-old Japanese child while his mother walked him to school in Shenzhen on September 18. Chinese officials claimed it was a random incident, but it occurred on the anniversary of the Mukden Incident of 1931 that led to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Japanese business exposure in China remains considerable. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 2023, over 101,786 Japanese resided in China. In January of this year, members of the Keidanren (Japanese Business Federation) met with Chinese Premier Li Qiang in Beijing, a first since 2019, suggesting an improved atmosphere for commerce. But in the wake of the stabbing, Japanese companies announced measures to help Japanese families leave China. Foreign Minister Yōko Kamikawa, herself a candidate for the party presidency, met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in New York on September 23 at the United Nations General Assembly to discuss the murder and its consequences. She urged Wang Yi to take steps to ensure the safety of Japanese citizens living in China. A series of military interactions between Japan and China, as well as Russia, raised anxiety in Japan and provided the backdrop to further discussion about how the Self-Defense Force responds to intruders. The list of incidents over the past month is long. Chinese and Russian incursions into Japanese airspace have provoked protests from the Japanese government. A Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer also “inadvertently” ventured into Chinese waters. China launched an ICBM test into the Pacific Ocean without prior notification to the Japanese government. Ishiba’s thinking on how to manage this intensifying military pressure on Japan by its neighbors matters a great deal. Here, Ishiba was explicit and detailed. He supports what would be a shift in the Rules of Engagement to date for defending Japanese territory. Arguing that the SDF has largely acted as a law enforcement agency, Ishiba said it was time that they were allowed to fire warning shots at any foreign military that intrudes into Japan’s airspace and waters. Here, Ishiba will have others, including Takaichi Sanae and Kobayashi Takayuki, who will want to see the SDF given authority to offer a firm response to foreign military challenges.” (Sheila A. Smith, “The LDP Leadership Race: Ishiba Shigeru Wins,” Council on Foreign Relations Blog Post, September 27, 2024)

10/2/24:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, inspected the training base of the special operation units of the Korean People’s Army in the western area on October 2 to learn about the drills of combatants. He was accompanied by Ri Yong Gil, chief of the KPA General Staff, Kim Yong Bok, deputy chief of the KPA General Staff, and Ri Chang Ho, deputy chief of the General Staff and director of the General Reconnaissance Bureau of the KPA. He was greeted by commanding officers of the special operation units at the training base. … He stressed once again that the special operation forces of the KPA are now the pivotal and core force in the Republic’s war deterrent and capability for fighting a war. Underlining the need to make a stride forward more clearly in the development of the armed forces of the DPRK by steadily expanding and strengthening the special operation forces into the strongest combat forces, he set forth new policies related to the orientation of the building of the special operation forces. He said: As I mentioned before, it is necessary to firmly hold fast to the policy of making a radical improvement in training, ideology and equipment and apply it in the building of the special operation forces and thus prepare them more perfectly so that they can take their place as the main force of war and play a decisive role in winning victory in the war. These units should steadily study and apply a new methodology of Korean style in training, make the combatants master it and thus create an absolute standard incomparable with that of any army. That day he told the commanding officers about a ceremony held by the enemy in Seoul on October 1, called the “ROK army day.” He said: The puppet Yoon Suk Yeol, obsessed with anti-DPRK intent, read a commemorative address running through with his will for counteraction out of his delusion of persecution by our Republic. This is a reflection of the security uneasiness and restless psychology of the puppet forces. Through careless words, he made a bluff of a “resolute and overwhelming response by the ROK-US alliance” and the “end of regime,” clamoring about the character of the ROK-US alliance based on nukes, and fully betrayed the bellicose temerity. This means that they themselves acknowledged that they are the forces destroying regional security and peace. The world would not but laugh at such poor rhetoric and showy action. The puppet Yoon bragged about overwhelming counteraction of their military muscle at the doorstep of a state possessing nuclear weapons, and it was a great irony that caused misgivings about whether he is an abnormal man. The enemy’s threatening rhetoric, actions, tricks and attempts have failed to check the growth of our powerful military strength and will never deprive us of our nuclear weapons. We have secured an irreversibly absolute strength as a nuclear power and the system and functions for using it by overcoming the challenges for a long time. “If” the enemy, seized with extreme foolishness and recklessness, make a step forward and attempt to use their armed forces to encroach upon the sovereignty of our Republic, full of excessive “confidence” in the ROK-US alliance, in disregard of our repeated warnings, the DPRK will use without hesitation all the striking forces in its possession, including nuclear weapons.…” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Training Base of Special Operation Units of KPA in Western Area ,” October 4, 2024)

10/4/24:
Six North Korean officers were killed in a Ukrainian missile strike on their position along the Russian frontline of the occupied Donetsk region, according to Ukrainian news reports today.
Ukrainian military intelligence officials who were quoted anonymously by the Kyiv Post and Interfax-Ukraine said over 20 military personnel, including the North Korean officers, were killed in the strike. Russian military bloggers reported earlier in the day that North Korean military officers were visiting the frontline to see how Russian forces set up defensive positions and were “preparing for assault operations” before the Ukrainian missile struck. According to the Russian Telegram channel Kremlin Snuffbox, three North Korean officers were also injured in the strike and were sent to Moscow to be treated. (Michael Lee, “North Korean Military Officers Reportedly Killed in Ukrainian Missile Strike near Donetsk,” JoongAng Ilbo, October 6, 2024)

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky the week of October 14 confirmed reports of North Korean troops supporting Russians inside Ukraine, warning that the alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang is growing stronger and evolving beyond transferring weapons. A Ukrainian military intelligence official told The Washington Post last week that “several thousand” North Korean infantry soldiers are undergoing training in Russia now and could be deployed to the front line in Ukraine by the end of this year. South Korea’s defense minister Kim Yong-hyun last week called the reports of North Korean military personnel helping Russia “highly likely.” The Kremlin has dismissed the assertion as a “hoax.” “We see that the alliance between Russia and such regimes as the North Korean one is getting stronger,” Zelensky said in his video address on Sunday. “This is not just about the transfer of weapons, this is in fact about the transfer of people from North Korea to the armed forces of the occupiers.” Why is North Korea sending its citizens to support Russia? North Korea has been one of the most vocal backers of Russia’s war in Ukraine, with leader Kim Jong Un pledging “full” support for President Vladimir Putin’s “sacred war for regional peace and international justice.” In March 2022, a month after the invasion, North Korea was one of just four countries that joined Moscow to vote against a United Nations resolution condemning the aggression. Since then, Pyongyang has been helping Putin by sending the old Soviet-era munitions that Russia desperately needs, according to U.S., Ukrainian and South Korean officials. U.S. officials say those shipments have included artillery shells and other weapons, and in return, North Korea may be receiving Russian help to advance its own weapons program. Now there are reports that North Koreans may be sending military personnel to the Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory of Donbas. Some military officers may already have been killed and injured, according to reports that surfaced last week on Telegram channels and in the Ukrainian press. The Ukrainian military intelligence official said that while there were North Korean combat troops in Russia, none were in the Donbas region and the officers who were killed did not directly participate in combat. South Korean experts say it’s plausible that Pyongyang would send military personnel to Russia, especially technical advisers to supervise the use of North Korean weapons on the ground. Given reports that many of North Korea’s shells are duds, and other issues with the weaponry that Pyongyang sent, it would make sense for North Korea to dispatch personnel to help with maintenance, management and evaluation of their weapons, said Lee Ho-ryung, North Korean military expert at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses in Seoul. “It is completely feasible that North Korea is dispatching not only military supplies but also engineers,” Lee said. This comes after Putin and Kim signed a mutual defense pact this summer, vowing to expand their military cooperation. Sending personnel to help Russians use North Korean weapons could be a sign that the military cooperation between the two countries is deepening, experts say. The Ukrainian official said Putin may have asked North Korea for help with manpower to avoid a new wave of mobilization to replenish his troops. North Korean troops could free up reserve troops who are currently within Russia, which could have “a significant impact” in certain areas on the front lines, the official said. North Koreans may already be in Russia aiding with reconstruction efforts in Ukraine’s Donbas region, according to Daily NK, a Seoul-based monitoring group with informants inside North Korea. Citing unnamed sources in North Korea and Russia, the outlet reported in April that Pyongyang sent about 150 new laborers there to help with rebuilding efforts. As far back as 2022, Russian officials were publicly welcoming North Koreans helping mitigate the labor shortage caused by the war. “[North] Korean builders will be an asset in the serious task of restoring social, infrastructural and industrial facilities” in Donbas, Russia’s ambassador to North Korea, Alexander Matsegora, told Izvestia in the first year of the war. Alexei Kolmakov, construction minister of Novosibirsk Oblast in Siberia, said last year that the region had requested to bring about 2,000 North Korean workers to address construction labor shortages in Siberia and the breakaway republic of Luhansk. North Korea has a long history of sending workers — mainly lumberjacks and builders — to Russia to earn money for the cash-strapped regime. Kim is especially desperate for cash after the pandemic, which forced him to close his borders even to China, cutting off the trade that keeps his economy afloat. North Korea was already facing mounting international sanctions before covid, and its economy shrank from 2020 to 2023, according to South Korea’s central bank. While trade with China has resumed since Kim began reopening borders in 2023, it has not yet reached pre-pandemic levels. These workers provide a stream of valuable foreign currency that helps Kim and his rule. They often work long hours in dangerous conditions with little safety training or gear. The vast majority are men whose passports are confiscated once they enter Russia and whose wives and children must remain in North Korea to deter the men from trying to escape while abroad. Last month, the Telegram-based Russian outlet Mash claimed that a North Korean construction worker in Khimki, in Moscow Oblast, fell off a scaffolding. The worker’s supervisor transported him under a bridge and left him there to die, Mash reported. North Koreans have continued to work in Russia and elsewhere despite a United Nations prohibition on governments issuing new work permits to North Koreans and requiring countries to repatriate all laborers by the end of 2019. The U.N. Security Council targeted the worker program, which has long subsidized Kim’s nuclear ambitions, as a part of sanctions placed on Pyongyang after its sixth nuclear test. Russia criticized the sanctions but agreed to adhere to them. But North Koreans remained in Russia, including those who could not return home after North Korea’s borders were closed in 2020, The Post found. After the U.N. ban, North Koreans continued to enter Russia with tourist or student visas and work for Russian companies, according to the South Korean Unification Ministry’s 2024 report based on escapees’ testimonies. (Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “Why North Korea Is Sending Soldiers to the Russian Front Lines,” Washingt5on Post, October 15, 2024) Since the Korean War, North Korea has not fought another major conflict. But it has sought opportunities to sell weapons and other military assistance to friendly countries. It sent pilots to aid North Vietnam during the Vietnam War. Its pilots also flew for Egypt in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. North Korea also sent missile technicians and, according to Tass, the Russian state news agency, two small units of combat troops to fight for the Assad regime during Syria’s civil war in 2016. “It has been a pattern: When North Korea has sold weapons to countries at war, they sent personnel not only to help those countries use the weapons, but often also to fight there themselves,” said Yang Uk, a military expert at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul. “They don’t seem to like missing opportunities to fight in a war and gain experience.” If North Korea sent ground troops to Ukraine, it would be “their first major war in decades, an opportunity where their officers could get a sample of how modern war is fought, including the use of drones,” Yang added. “They will study how the knowledge they gain there can be translated into the Korean theater.” Neither Ukraine nor South Korea has presented evidence of North Korean troops. NATO’s secretary general, Mark Rutte, said October 16 that the alliance did not have definitive information on that possibility. American intelligence and military officials expressed some skepticism at the Ukrainian claims that North Korean mercenaries were now fighting, in significant numbers, against Ukrainian forces. But they said that they had little doubt that North Korean engineers and observers are in Russia and parts of Ukraine, in part to construct and operate the North Korean-made ballistic missiles that Russia has purchased. There have been unconfirmed reports of North Koreans killed in Ukrainian attacks. But the American officials said that they were recruits. One official said they would not be surprised if North Korea sends troops — to train and perhaps to fight — but they did not yet have evidence. Washington has repeatedly warned of growing military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, providing photographic evidence that weapons from North Korea, especially its KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles, have been used against Ukraine. The KN-23 is one of a series of nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles North Korea has developed and tested in recent years. It would be one of the main weapons North Korea would use against South Korea should war break out on the Korean Peninsula, military experts said. “From the battlefield use, North Korea will collect valuable data to improve its missiles’ effectiveness — data it can also use to help sell the missiles to foreign buyers,” said Yang Moo-jin, the president of the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul. Analysts in South Korea said that North Korea’s main personnel contribution to Russia’s war would be engineers and weapons advisers to help the Russian military operate its weapons, observe defects and collect data from their battlefield use. Many of the North Korean artillery shells and missiles are said to be of poor quality, turning out to be duds. Some analysts doubted that North Korea would commit a large number of troops to the war in Ukraine anytime soon. “That kind of operation requires extensive preparations by both sides, like those annual military exercises South Korea and the United States conduct,” said Park Won-gon, a political scientist at Ewha Woman’s University in Seoul. Both Moscow and Pyongyang have denied engaging in arms shipments from North Korea. Russia also called reports that North Korean troops were fighting alongside its troops “another fake news story.” In recent weeks, Ukrainian officials and news media have increasingly reported such accusations, without providing photographic or other evidence. “We see an increasing alliance between Russia and regimes like North Korea,” Zelensky said on October 13. “It is no longer just about transferring weapons. It is actually about transferring people from North Korea to the occupying military forces.” As North Korea has fueled its partnership with Russia, it has also turned increasingly hostile toward South Korea, demolishing all railway and road links between the two Koreas with dynamites this week in a symbolic gesture of declaring the South as an enemy state. “The sense of being allied with Russia can embolden North Korea to become more aggressive toward South Korea,” Park said. (Chie Sang-hun, “North Korea Is Said to Be Sending Russia Not Just Arms but Troops, Too,” New York Times, October 17, 2024,p. A-10)

10/8/24:
The military has detected apparent signs that North Korea has started to build a possible nuclear-powered submarine, a lawmaker said today, amid concerns over Pyongyang’s push to acquire advanced weapons. In January, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspected a project to build a nuclear-powered submarine after vowing to develop such a submarine among other sophisticated weapons systems during a ruling party congress in 2021. “Partial signs that appear to be the start of the submarine’s construction have been detected,” the Defense Intelligence Agency said in a report to Rep. Kang Dae-sik of the ruling People Power Party. “As construction is still in its early stages, further confirmation is needed on whether it is nuclear powered,” it said, without providing details. A military official said authorities have spotted the North’s construction of a submarine bigger than existing vessels in the northeastern Sinpo area, where its submarine-related facilities are located. “Its exact tonnage and other (details) can be accurately determined once progress is made,” the official said. The military is said to be looking into the possibility of the vessel being nuclear powered due to its size. But the North is assessed to have yet to acquire a nuclear reactor and other key components for such a submarine. North Korea has recently pushed to acquire advanced naval vessels, unveiling a new “tactical nuclear attack submarine” in September last year. South Korea’s military, however, has said the submarine does not appear to be ready for normal operations. North Korea operates approximately 70 submarines, including midget submarines, while South Korea’s submarine force consists of about 10 vessels, according to the South’s Defense White Paper published in 2023. (Chae Yun-hwan, “Military Detects Signs of N. Korea Building Possible Nuclear-Powered Submarine: Lawmaker,” Yonhap, October 8, 2024)

10/9/24:
KPA General Staff report: “The hostile forces are getting ever more reckless in their confrontational hysteria, openly revealing their scheme to use armed forces in violation of the sovereignty of the DPRK. This pushes the grave security situation of the Korean peninsula to a more unpredictable phase. Amid various war exercises for aggression being staged simultaneously in the region of the ROK every day near the southern border of the DPRK, strategic nuclear assets of the U.S. frequent the region and the war maniacs loudly talk about the “end of regime” in the DPRK so often. This proves the gravity of the situation that can never be overlooked. The acute military situation prevailing on the Korean peninsula requires the armed forces of the DPRK to take a more resolute and stronger measure in order to more creditably defend the national security. Given the critical situation where touch-and-go danger of war is ever-escalating in the area along the southern border of the DPRK, the General Staff of the KPA proclaims that it will take a substantial military step to completely separate the territory of the DPRK, where its sovereignty is exercised, from the territory of the ROK (Republic of Korea). To this end, a project will be launched first on October 9 to completely cut off roads and railways connected to the ROK and fortify the relevant areas of our side with strong defense structures. For our army to permanently shut off and block the southern border with the ROK, the primary hostile state and invariable principal enemy, in the current situation is a self-defensive measure for inhibiting war and defending the security of the DPRK. Our army sent a telephone message to the U.S. forces side at 09:45 of October 9, prompted by an intention to prevent any misjudgment and accidental conflict over the fortification project to be launched in the acute southern border area.” (KCNA, “Report of KPA General Staff,” October 9, 2024)

10/11/24:
DPRK FoMin crucial statement “The trigger for defending sovereignty and security will be pulled up without hesitation”: “The ROK is crossing the red line in its provocation against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The most hostile and malicious rogue state, the ROK, committed such a grave political and military provocation as infiltrating drones into Pyongyang, the capital city of the DPRK. Drone infiltrations were conducted by the ROK on October 3 and 9. They were followed by perpetration of such a hideous crime as scattering a huge number of anti-DPRK smear leaflets over the central part of Pyongyang through a midnight drone infiltration on October 10. Smear leaflets, run through with inflammatory rumors and rubbish tarnishing the national sovereignty and dignity of the DPRK and malignantly hurting its socialist system, were scattered in the central part of the capital city. Not content with scattering leaflets along the border by balloons, the ROK infiltrated even into the sky of the DPRK’s capital such drones which can be regarded as military attack means. The case is a serious provocation that can neither be overlooked nor be pardoned. Its provocation beyond the limit line constitutes an open infringement on the sacred national sovereignty and security of the DPRK and a wanton violation of the international law and a grave military attack, for which the ROK must pay a dear price. The ROK should neither justify the recent case in a trite way nor think of shirking its responsibility by making far-fetched assertions again. The case is a typical instance that vividly betrays the national position of the ROK belonging to the most shameless, childish and vulgar category in the world and meanness of its clans. It also evidently shows that the danger of armed conflict is created on the Korean peninsula due to the reckless and adventuristic acts of the ROK. The international community should strongly denounce the bravado of the ROK, which is steadily escalating the danger of military conflict in the region while unhesitatingly committing provocations hard to sustain their aftermath, and unanimously call for thoroughly deterring them. International law does not allow free flight of foreign aircraft or flying objects in the territorial airspace of a country, as well as “harmless flight.” The recent intrusion into the airspace is a grave crime encroaching upon the sovereignty of the DPRK and a clear target of the exercise of the right to self-defense. The ROK chose self-destruction and is hastening its doom. In the world, there is no country which will not react to the violation of its airspace and the drones of a hostile country flying over its capital. We regard the recent provocation of the ROK as a serious political and military provocation that deserves retaliation according to the right to self-defense, without any further explanation and necessity. The recent adventurous provocation of the enemies urgently requires our army to promptly judge what kind of action measure should be taken to discharge its sovereignty-defending mission granted by the DPRK Constitution and make a decision on launching the relevant retaliatory action. The Ministry of National Defense, the General Staff and the army at all levels of the DPRK set about the preparations to cope with different occasions of the developing situation. First, all the offensive means of the DPRK, to be involved in getting the military structures near the southern border and in the ROK collapsed, will get ready to carry out their activities promptly at any moment. The stand expressed by our head of state some days ago that the DPRK has no intention to attack the ROK, does not mean that we are not ready to attack the ROK. With the possibility of using all means of attack in readiness, we seriously warn the ROK as an ultimatum again to the last. The ROK should immediately stop such irresponsible and dangerous provocation that may cause an armed conflict and lead to a war between the two sides. If the ROK commits such a provocation as infiltrating a drone into airspace of the DPRK once again, the DPRK will launch an action immediately without any warning. Taking this opportunity, we make it clear once again that the source and cause of all these disasters making the world people uneasy are in the ROK which has scattered political agitation scum into our inviolable territory despite our repeated warnings. The ROK, which wantonly violated the inviolable sovereignty of the DPRK, will face a horrible situation if it continues provocations, not bearing in mind this last warning of the DPRK. The trigger safety device is now off. The time for our attack is not decided by us. We will watch everything in full preparedness. Criminals should no longer gamble at risk for the lives of their people.” (KCNA, “Crucial Statement of DPRK Foreign Ministry,” October 11, 2024)

North Korea claimed today that South Korea had sent unmanned drones carrying leaflets over Pyongyang on October 3, 9, and 10. South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun, however, said South Korea has not sent a drone to North Korea. “We have not done that. I am not aware of the situation,” Kim said during a parliamentary audit, when asked by lawmakers on the news report. The JCS also echoed the view, noting it will check whether the leaflets were sent by private organizations. In response to the North’s balloon launches, the South’s military has been blasting daily anti-North Korean propaganda broadcasts through loudspeakers along the border since July. It has refrained from directly shooting down the balloons, citing safety concerns. (Kang Yoon-seung, “North Korea Again Sends Trash Balloons, Claims Seoul Sent Drones over Pyongyang,” Yonhap, October 11, 2024)

10/12/24:
WPK Central Committee Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong’s press statement titled “ROK military will be hard to evade the blame for having orchestrated or joined in committing such a grave infringement on DPRK sovereignty”: “The most childish and ignorant Republic of Korea is resorting to a stereotyped method pertaining to its inborn nature to evade the blame for the recent drone intrusion case. As soon as the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK issued a crucial statement, military gangsters of the ROK were busy trying to evade the responsibility while making a shameless and childish excuse, saying that they did not do it and have not yet grasped the situation and the military did not send drones to the north and should confirm the fact that a non-governmental organization might send drones. It is a miscalculation if the ROK thought that they could go unpunished after committing such grave infringement upon the sovereignty of our state, though the military impudently asserts that they did not do it, and avoid the concern of the international community. It would be evidently problematic if the military did not identify that drones by a non-governmental organization crossed the border at random. The ROK military has loudly advertised its “watertight detection and tracking ability.” The military would strain its nerves, mistaking a flying flock of birds for “drones from the north”. Then, did it become blind all of sudden? It has asserted that the fact about drones from its region, which had crossed the border several times, should be confirmed. Accordingly, I wonder what the ROK people talk about the military. Leaflet-scattering over the capital city of the opponent country is regarded as a grave politically-motivated provocation and an infringement upon sovereignty, but what is the basic gravity of the recent case is the fact that drones are means which carried those leaflets. If the military has connived at the fact that its people committed an act of openly infringing upon other’s sovereignty by use of drones recognized by the world as an undeniable military multi-purpose means and at the fact that such infringement means that can be considered to be provocative can trigger an incident fostering the danger of arms conflict, crossing the border of the country at war, it is a deliberate connivance and conspiracy and only provides a clear proof that the leading figures in the drone infiltration case are none other than the military gangsters. Even though they boasted that they are the “strong ROK army”, talking about “together with the people” on the “ROK army day” some days ago, they are using the people as a shield without hesitation at a blind alley. Their sordid wordplay only reveals the meanness and baseness of the military of the ROK. As their assertion shows, it means that though our non-governmental organizations scatter political agitation leaflets in the sky over the presidential office in Seoul with drones, it is not problematic. I’d like to watch how the government of the ROK and, in particular, the military gangsters will respond to such real thing. In conclusion, the ROK military directly committed the drone infiltration case or the provocation of infringing upon the sovereignty of the DPRK was committed under its positive fostering and connivance. Indeed, the minister of National Defense of the ROK, when his petty excuse of shifting the blame to the non-governmental organization did not work on, expressed his uncertain attitude, saying that “it is impossible to confirm it strategically in terms of national security and strategic security.” Such attitude of neither denying nor admitting the case proves that the military admitted by itself that it is the chief criminal or accomplice of the current incident as a revelation of its mental state that it can admit the case, unable to deny it. It is little short of an open declaration that even though a provocation of infringing upon the sovereignty of the DPRK that “cannot be confirmed” is repeated or it leads to the outbreak of war, they have no responsibility for it. As we have already foreseen and the world has witnessed at all times, this time, too, the ROK is trying hard to distort the truth and deceive the world people with groundless assertion made by it with its habitual excuse and deformed thinking. Revealed before the world once again were the base nature and astonishing real picture of dangerous those to gamble with the lives of the people. Clear is that ROK scum conducted a rubbish balloon campaign with provocative nature for the first time and those of the ROK have steadily aggravated the situation, far from abandoning their dirty bad habit despite our warning. The ROK is crying that we had flied “dirty balloons” 28 times just like a guilty party filing the suit first but it is well advised to make public how many times the organizations of defectors from the DPRK did such acts before it calculates the times. Our entire act is an essential measure taken in the principle of correspondence. No matter how desperately the ROK may try to mislead public opinion as if our correspondence is taken without reason, it will not come up to its intention. We have no concern about who is the main force of provoking the recent drone incident and its performers. We only look squarely the fact that whatever the military gangsters and an organization of human scum who defected from the DPRK, they are the fellows of the shameless ROK. As we repeat our clear stand, we will take a strong corresponding retaliatory action in disregard of ingredient in case drones carrying anti-DPRK political motivation rubbish from the ROK across the border infiltrate again into the territorial sky of the DPRK. This is the exercise of the sovereign state’s right to self-defense that cannot be considered. Those who are not taking any proper stand to check escalation of tension and armed conflict but making a bluff and lame excuse with reckless courage, even though they made Seoul Municipality and the whole of the ROK a target and put their people on the kitchen board will certainly hear only the people’s voices of criticism. They will be well advised to worry about the immediate price for repeated provocation and cope with it. Even though the ROK military is racking its brain to evade the responsibility for their infringement upon the sovereignty of the DPRK with incoherent impudence and abnormal sophism, they will certainly pay a dear price for violently infringing upon the inviolable sovereignty of our state and doing a serious harm to its security in any way. I hope that the people will judge whether the strong and brave reckless and bold attitude of the ROK military which jumps from the frying pan into the fire will defend the genuine safety of the ROK. As I reaffirm once again, as clarified by the DPRK Foreign Ministry, our attack time for destroying Seoul and the military force of the ROK is not clarified in our military action plan. That time is not set by us. However, the moment that a drone of the ROK is discovered in the sky over our capital city once again will certainly lead to a horrible disaster. Personally, I wish that such thing will not happen. (KCNA, “Press Statement of Vice Department Director of WPK Central Committee Kim Yo Jong,” October 12, 2024)

10/13/24:
South Korea warned North Korea today that it will see “the end of its regime” if it causes any harm to its people, after the North threatened a “horrible disaster” over the alleged flight of drones over its capital. The South’s defense ministry issued the statement after Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of the North’s leader Kim Jong Un, made the threat in a commentary carried by its state media, just a day after the reclusive state claimed the South had sent unmanned drones over Pyongyang three times this month. “We clearly warn that if North Korea inflicts harm on the safety of our people, that day will be the end of the North Korean regime,” the defense ministry said in a statement released to reporters. “Kim Yo-jong’s remarks reflect the North’s hypocritical behavior, which continues with provocations, and has recently resorted to vulgar and petty tactics, like floating trash-filled balloons,” it said. The South’s defense ministry accused the North of shifting the blame to South Korean activists sending anti-Pyongyang leaflets, to make up for its “continued failure” in the running of state affairs, including the failed launches of military spy satellites. The ministry called Kim’s statement a “typical ploy” by the North to stoke an internal feud among South Koreans and it chose to do so again out of “anxiety” felt by the dictatorial regime. “North Korean authorities should start off by stopping the internationally embarrassing trash balloon launches, rather than being so frightened by just one drop of ‘drone leaflets’ that are unidentifiable,” it said. The defense ministry also said the North has already intruded into the South’s airspace “over 10 times,” in an apparent reference to incidents dating back to 2022. (Kim Seung-yeon, “S. Korea Warns N. Korea Will See End of Regime If It Harms Its People,” Yonhap, October 13, 2024)

DPRK Ministry of Defense spokesman’s press statement “Gambling with the lives of people will result in miserable ruin” on October 13: “The Republic of Korea persists in letting out lame excuses and impudent rubbish despite the fact that it perpetrated a grave provocation of violating the sovereignty of the DPRK. The national security office chief of the puppet presidential office spouted such rubbish that “defiance” of the warning is “the most correct answer,” far from seriously reflecting on the case and making efforts to prevent recurrence. The territory of the ROK will be mercilessly plunged into a terrible disaster in case of recurrence. However, he asserts defiance is the correct answer. It seems that he has secured an assurance of recurrence prevention although he says he doesn’t know the one behind the case. The world has clearly heard such absurd remarks unhesitatingly let out by a guy responsible for the security of the ROK. Any tiny spark may trigger an armed clash on the Korean peninsula physically in a state of hostilities. So it is needless to say that the infiltration of drones playing a primary striking role on current battlefields into airspace above the capital city of a belligerent country constitutes an undeniable war provocation. Now a hair-trigger situation, in which a war may break out any moment, is prevailing on the Korean peninsula due to the reckless bravery of the ROK’s military. Now that powerful attack means might be used according to our judgment and decision and the whole ROK might turn into piles of ashes, the man with the title of security office chief only busies himself with face saving, bluffing with nasty language and gambling with the lives of his people. We are curious about the follow-up rating of his behavior. Then, let us consider once again the stand of the ROK’s minister of defense taking an ambiguous stand without denying or acknowledging the current situation. The drone that had infiltrated into the sky above the capital city of our Republic is not the one that can be flied by a civilian organization anywhere. It is the one to be flied with special launcher or runway so such excuse that it was flied by civilians cannot work. Then, let’s assume that the drone provocation was committed by a civilian organization used as an excuse, as claimed by the Ministry of Defense of the ROK. Can it be understood that its military and police, which claim are put on “high alert”, failed to notice civilian organizations flying drones across the border by using a launcher or a runway? We have already judged that the military of the ROK is behind a series of drone infiltrations. And we warn repeatedly that we will take action according to our judgment, regarding any drones to be spotted again as the ones from the ROK and deeming it a declaration of war. It had better interpret the meaning of the word “terrible ruin” and judge what choice we will make true to our declaration about terrible ruin.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Spokesman for Ministry of National Defense of DPRK,” October 13, 2024)

KCNA: “Grave touch-and-go military tensions are prevailing on the Korean peninsula due to the ROK’s wanton violation of the sovereignty of the DPRK through infiltrations of drones into its capital city of Pyongyang. On October 12 the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), estimating that there is a high possibility of ROK’s additional drone infiltration into our airspace above the border and the capital city, conducted relevant undertakings to fully prepare units at all levels for coping with any developments of situation, presupposing the circumstances in which immediate strikes on specific enemy targets are inevitable in confirmation of the recurrence of provocation and it is impossible to rule out the possibility of an ensuing extended armed conflict. A spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea made public a statement in this regard on Sunday afternoon. The spokesman also made public that the General Staff of the KPA issued a preliminary operation order on October 12 to the combined artillery units along the border and the units taking on an important firepower task to get fully ready to open fire. According to the spokesman’s statement, the General Staff’s preliminary operation order specified an instruction to place eight artillery brigades fully armed at full wartime strength on standby to open fire and complete various operational supply undertakings until 20:00 of October 13. The General Staff instructed units and sub-units of all levels to intensify monitoring on full alert. Anti-air observation posts have been reinforced in the capital city of Pyongyang.” (KCNA, “Statement of Spokesman for Ministry of National Defense of DPRK,” October 13, 2024)

10/14/24:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, convened a consultative meeting on national defense and security on October 14. The meeting was attended by No Kwang Chol, minister of National Defense of the DPRK, Jo Chun Ryong, secretary of the WPK Central Committee, Ri Yong Gil, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army, Ri Chang Ho, deputy chief of the General Staff and director of the General Reconnaissance Bureau of the KPA, Ri Chang Dae, minister of State Security, and commanding officers of the Artillery Bureau, Detection and Electronic Warfare Bureau and other major bureaus of the KPA General Staff. The meeting heard a report of the director of the General Reconnaissance Bureau on the general analysis of the serious incident of the enemy’s provocation of violating the sovereignty of the DPRK, a report of the chief of the KPA General Staff on the military counteraction plan, a report of the minister of National Defense on the measures for modernizing military technical equipment, a report of the WPK secretary in charge of the munitions industry on the production of weapons and equipment, and a report of the minister of State Security on the situation of intelligence operation. Kim Jong Un made assessments and conclusions on the information and suggested measures specified in the reports of different defense and security organs. After hearing a report on the relevant work done by the General Staff and the major combined units’ combat readiness, he set forth the direction of immediate military activities and indicated important tasks to be tackled in the operation of the war deterrent and the exercise of the right to self-defense for safeguarding the national sovereignty, security and interests. He expressed a tough political and military stand of the WPK and the DPRK government at the consultative meeting. (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Convenes Consultative Meeting on National Defense and Security,” October 15, 2024)

WPK Central Committee Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong’s press statement: “We clearly know that the military dregs of the ROK are chiefly to blame for the case of drone infiltration into Pyongyang. If the sovereignty of a nuclear weapons state was violated by mongrels tamed by Yankees, the master of those dogs should be held accountable for this.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Kim Yo Jong,” October 14, 2024)

In a statement today, North Korea identified the South Korean military as being responsible for planning and executing the scattering of leaflets in Pyongyang via drones. It also stated that it intended to hold the US responsible for the “violation of sovereignty.” The message in the statement was that since the South Korean military was deemed clearly responsible for sending the drones into North Korean airspace, the U.S. should take action to control such behavior as part of its responsibilities for managing the Armistice Agreement. While the North has been issuing hardline rhetoric and threats of corresponding military measures toward South Korea, its message to the U.S. signals that it does not want to see military tensions escalate further. “Kim Yo-jong has made remarks of an unprecedented nature for three consecutive days. While her language is rough, she has emphasized the use of military force to prevent a repeated incident,” said Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies. “Her words contain a message that the US has done a poor job in its role of managing and overseeing the Armistice Agreement. But they’re also a message asking for Washington to prevent another drone incursion,” Yang added. “North Korea is holding the US responsible under the assumption that South Korea would not be able to send a drone over its border without the US knowing. The message is also demanding that Washington rein in Seoul,” said Chang Yong-seok, a senior fellow at Seoul National University’s Institute for Peace and Unification Studies. Before Kim’s remarks were published, the UN Command had announced it was currently investigating the matter in strict accordance with the Armistice Agreement. (Park Min-hee and Kwon Hyuk-chul, “North Korea Spends Its Third Days Taking about Drone Incursion – Here’s What It Says to U.S.” Hankyoreh, October 15, 2024)

During his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention in July, Donald Trump doubled down on a well-worn riff about one of his administration’s major foreign policy achievements. Because he “got along very well” with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, he had persuaded Kim to stop conducting ballistic missile and nuclear tests, claimed the former president. It’s “nice to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons,” he added. It was a dovish aside during an otherwise hawkish speech. But it captures the extraordinary transformation of Trump’s public approach to North Korea. It’s a shift that, if Trump were to again win the presidency, could have profound consequences for peace on the Korean peninsula — and for the potential outbreak of nuclear war in East Asia. In 2017, many feared that such a war between the U.S. and North Korea was also likely. Harsh saber-rattling against Pyongyang dominated the early Trump presidency. Amid his administration’s strategy of “maximum pressure,” Trump threatened Kim — whom he nicknamed “little rocket man” — with “fire and fury like the world has never seen” if the country continued its missile launches. That same year, Trump ordered a top-to-bottom review of military options for North Korea; this included updating ultra-secret U.S. military plans for killing North Korean leadership as well as wholesale invasion and regime-change scenarios, according to Bob Woodward in his Trump-era book Rage. (The U.S. military has war plans for all kinds of scenarios, but these were distinct: precipitated by a president who seemed quite willing to strike Pyongyang, amid a deep crisis between the two nuclear-armed powers.) Some of Trump’s ideas regarding North Korea were highly unconventional, to say the least. “Why don’t we take out the whole North Korean Army during one of their parades?” asked the former president, according to the new memoir from H.R. McMaster, who served as Trump’s national security adviser from February 2017 to April 2018. Trump reportedly even privately mulled dropping nuclear weapons on North Korea — and somehow blaming another actor for the strike. Then-Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis worried Trump’s policies toward Pyongyang could lead to “incinerat[ing] a couple million people,” according to Woodward in Rage. Soon, however, Trump made an extraordinary about-face on North Korea, at least in public. In June 2018, amid warming ties, he met Kim in Singapore for the first summit between a U.S. president and a North Korean leader. He later said that Kim had written him “beautiful letters” and that the two leaders had “fallen in love.” Another Trump-Kim tête-à-tête followed in Vietnam in 2019; Trump even briefly stepped onto North Korean soil for the third meeting between the two leaders later that year. Now, with Trump running to reclaim the presidency, it’s unclear which Trump might materialize on North Korea policy, if he wins: the belligerent Trump who threatened “fire and fury” and a potential nuclear holocaust against Pyongyang, or the conciliatory Trump who exchanged “love letters” with the North Korean dictator. “When President Trump is back in office, he will restore his peace-through-strength policies that secured peace around the globe,” Trump campaign national press secretary Karoline Leavitt tells Rolling Stone. Regardless, if elected again, Trump will inherit the U.S. military’s regime-change plans for North Korea, modernized during his own prior administration. But he will also inherit updated, ultra-secret plans for CIA assistance in any such invasion, according to three former CIA and U.S. intelligence officials familiar with the agency’s North Korea overhaul. Then-CIA Director Mike Pompeo hinted at these revived plans in a 2017 talk at the Aspen Institute, where Pompeo also pointedly suggested the administration was mulling pathways to regime change in Pyongyang. CIA will “deliver a range of options that can do what ultimately needs to be achieved,” said Pompeo in Aspen. When it came to North Korea, “I took it as my mission to build a set of clandestine capabilities that could be deployed in case the president found diplomacy and conventional military power insufficient,” Pompeo writes in his 2022 memoir, Never Give an Inch. (Pompeo did not respond to a request for comment.) But details of the CIA’s review of its role in a potential war with North Korea, and wider planning within the agency surrounding enhanced covert action in service of the administration’s “maximum pressure campaign,” have never been told. The 2017 review, which was overseen by the CIA’s paramilitary Special Activities Center (SAC), did not begin auspiciously. Agency officials reached out to their counterparts at the Pentagon’s Special Operations Command-Korea (SOCKOR), which had developed war plans involving CIA paramilitaries and other special operations forces in case conflict were to erupt between the U.S. and North Korea. But when CIA paramilitaries reviewed SOCKOR’s plans, they were “stunned,” recalled a former senior CIA official. They hadn’t been updated for decades. SOCKOR planners hadn’t even ever actually spoken with anyone at CIA about them. And, to make matters worse, they “were just outright ludicrous,” recalled the former official. It was, “‘OK, so we’ll take three CIA people with us, and they’ll ride in the tank with us as we’re rolling through.’ And I’m like, that’s fucking dumb. That’s actually not going to happen. There were plans that were like, who the fuck thought this out, Wile E. Coyote?” Further conversations with top SOCKOR officials did nothing to allay CIA paramilitaries’ fears about their plans. “Talking with one of the generals, he’s like, ‘We’ll just … rendezvous with the mountain people in North Korea because mountain people typically don’t get along with city dwellers in Pyongyang,’” recalled the former official. “And I said, this is not a spaghetti Western movie … and you can’t just make a war plan based upon your hoping that the people you’re going to link up with in the mountains of North Korea are just going to roll in with you into Pyongyang,” said the former CIA official. “That sounds like a really bad bet. I hope you don’t go to fucking Las Vegas and spend all of your wife’s money.” Some of the military’s plans were solid, but many seemed like they were the result of “too many martinis,” said the former official. CIA paramilitaries also pried open, and overhauled, the CIA’s own in-house contingency plans in case of war with North Korea — its “holiest of secret plans,” said the former senior official. These plans, too, had not been updated for decades, according to the former official, and had been left to molder over time. The attitude at Langley had been, “in case of emergency break glass and open up this book, and this is the operation,” recalled the former official. But these plans also had long been rendered obsolete — or were simply “nonsensical,” said the former official. The authors of the North Korea overhaul tried to replace these archaic contingency plans with updated, viable wartime operations dealing with issues like emergency communications, according to the former official. But to some, aspects of the CIA’s new Korea schemes were also outlandish. “Korea got weird, man,” said a former CIA contractor, who recalled “a variety of strange plans” emanating from CIA’s Special Activities Center at the time, many of them focused on penetrating North Korean tunnels and underground facilities. Some of “it was like, ‘All right, 80 percent of you are gonna die, but then four of you might make it through,’ and so you’re like, what the fuck.” Because these underground facilities were so difficult to gather intelligence on — say, via satellite imagery or drones — other suggestions for “weird” plans kept percolating, recalled the former CIA contractor, such as sending trained dogs underground to conduct reconnaissance and other missions alongside U.S. operatives in case of an invasion. “It was, how much can a dog haul? Can a dog carry ammo? I think they were even asking about [night-vision] goggles for dogs. We were like, ‘What the fuck, do you want us to chase down vets?’” The CIA declined to comment on a list of detailed questions provided by Rolling Stone. The Pentagon referred all questions to the CIA. The agency’s North Korea overhaul dovetailed with a larger, previously unreported CIA enterprise called the “Expeditionary Initiative.” The initiative, which was overseen by a senior CIA officer based in the agency’s Special Activities Center, was launched at the end of the Obama administration. One goal of the campaign was to try and develop ways of integrating new tech-focused and paramilitary capabilities across the agency, including outside of war zones, recalled former officials. But as the Trump administration pursued its maximum pressure campaign against North Korea, punching at Pyongyang became a major focus of the Expeditionary Initiative, and the CIA’s paramilitary wing more broadly. Though couched as a broader campaign, it “didn’t take a fucking rocket scientist” to figure out that the initiative was focusing on worst-case scenario planning for North Korea, recalled the former CIA contractor. Within the Expeditionary Initiative, the war-plan overhaul was complemented by aggressive new plotting to sabotage ships carrying illicit goods for Pyongyang, whose economy was then being choked by multilateral sanctions on key exports like coal and seafood, according to former officials. Orders to do so came from the top. Trump believed that “maybe we need to go total old school against the North Koreans,” recalled the former senior agency official. It is unclear to what extent the agency actually carried out its sabotage campaign against North Korean ships. The thinking was, “let’s at least train for that, in case we need to do it,” recalled the same former CIA official. (In Never Give an Inch, Pompeo brags elliptically about how as CIA director he altered the “rules of engagement” for agency paramilitaries in Syria and other unnamed countries.) The sabotage plotting was a small, if key, component of the administration’s much-broader maximum pressure campaign against Pyongyang at the time, which included employing overt diplomatic and financial levers of U.S. power, as well as covert intelligence-led efforts, recalled another senior CIA official. “All the options were on the table” when it came to North Korea, said the former official, “including some that we looked at, and you’re like, ‘Goddamn, that’s pretty spicy.’” Sabotage operations were “five percent of the overall effort” against Pyongyang — but it was integral to the larger maximum pressure campaign, according to the former official. “All that was [part] of what we were doing because — stopping a coal ship, well, you could stop a coal ship in a hell of a lot of different ways,” said the former official, who declined to provide further details about the potential covert action campaign. One senior Trump administration official expressed disappointment in the lack of covert disruption or sabotage of North Korean ships during Trump’s prior tenure in the White House. “We looked at a lot of those things…. We had various technologies that could do that, but never could get the decision to actually do it,” recalled the former official. “Trump talks a big game a lot, but in terms of really making a hardcore decision to pull a trigger, he was very reticent.” Still, the maximum pressure campaign didn’t cease when Trump began gushing over Kim in public — far from it, according to the second former senior CIA official. “We were getting the guidance to amp it up, and really calibrate it the president’s negotiations,” recalled the former official. It was, “‘Hey, we’re gonna negotiate with the kid, let’s bring as much heat as we can, to give the president as much leverage as we can.’” During the Trump era, the CIA helped identify and interdict millions in illicit goods (such as coal) being secretly exported by North Korea or other goods (like oil, and luxury products such as caviar) being smuggled into the country, according to the former official. The agency also helped seize money from sanctions-busting North Korean overseas construction and fishing conglomerates. “We were pounding them,” said the former official. But Trump’s favorite part of the CIA’s campaign? Freezing North Korean funds from U.S. companies unwittingly doing business with Pyongyang — and then quietly letting those firms keep the money, according to the former official. In these cases, U.S. officials would swoop in, inform the shocked American firms about the true identity of the end-user of their products, and return the firms’ goods, which U.S. officials had seized before they made their way to North Korea. The American companies thus recouped their products and kept North Korea’s payment for them. “Trump loved [that] the most,” said the former official, who estimated these U.S. companies ultimately pocketed hundreds of thousands of dollars in illicit North Korean funds. Ultimately, the CIA-led campaign — which had notched some successes — faced difficult headwinds. The CIA had helped claw back a million here and there from Pyongyang, recalled the former senior official. But by 2018, North Korean hackers began “knocking over Crypto exchanges left and right” — in one case netting hundreds of millions of dollars in a single heist, recalled the former official. The CIA’s covert battle became increasingly Sisyphean. Whether a newly-elected Trump offers Kim Jong Un the gun or the olive branch, he would be reckoning with a North Korea that’s learned a few things since his last stint in office. Even if the CIA’s war and sabotage plans for North Korea haven’t changed, “Maximum Pressure 2.0” won’t look the same as it did during Trump’s first term. (Zach Dorfman, “Inside the Trump Administrations Secret Battle Plans for North Korea,” Rolling Stone, October 14, 2024)

Former President Donald Trump had delegated to his defense secretary the authority to shoot down a North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) during his time in office if it threatened the United States, according to a U.S. journalist’s new book released tomorrow. In the book War, Bob Woodward revealed that Trump had delegated the authority to then-Defense Secretary James Mattis, underscoring the Pentagon chief’s concerns about the potential escalation of tensions with Pyongyang. “Former Secretary of Defense James Mattis had been so worried that Trump would have a nuclear war with North Korea during his watch that he had slept in gym clothes. Ready in an emergency to join a secure call, a National Event Conference, to deal with the threat,” Woodward wrote. “If North Korea launched an ICBM, Trump had delegated the authority to the secretary of defense to shoot down a missile that threatened the United States,” he added. The journalist recalled Trump telling him, “If he shoots, he shoots,” in reference to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. “This cavalier attitude about nuclear weapons and impulsive, combative diplomacy terrified Trump’s national security advisers,” Woodward said. He also said that Mattis privately went to a cathedral in Washington to pray and prepare himself for the possibility of having to use nuclear weapons against North Korea to defend the U.S. In a 2019 interview at the White House, Woodward said that on one side of Trump’s office, there was a binder of letters Trump had exchanged with Kim, and that on the other side were large photos of Trump standing next to Kim shaking his hand and smiling. The journalist also explained a classified report that Director of the Central Intelligence Agency William Burns presented to President Joe Biden after his trip to China in June this year. In the report, Burns noted that “the increasingly strong defense partnership between Russia and North Korea unsettled the Chinese to some extent because it emboldened Kim Jong Un.” Woodward said the Chinese were concerned that the partnership could make Kim “more reckless,” especially if Kim felt he was not receiving enough attention. On the North’s missile program, he said Pyongyang still depended on sourcing materials from outside North Korea. But the North’s nuclear program was largely homegrown and no longer depended on outside support or technology, he said. “Kim did not yet have the capability to efficiently and accurately deploy a nuclear weapon on an intercontinental ballistic missile to reach the U.S., but he was getting closer,” Woodward wrote. “It had been a focus for Kim in recent years. That’s part of the risk with the Russia-North Korea defense partnership. Burns assessed the flow of weapons supplies and capabilities could flow both ways.” On the possibility of a North Korean nuclear attack on the U.S., Woodward cited Burns as reporting that “logically and rationally,” Kim would not do it. “But just having that capacity to do it is really troubling,” Burns wrote. (Yonhap, “Trump Delegated Defense Secretary Authority to Shoot down North Korean ICBM, Woodward Book Reveals,” JoongAng Ilbo, October 16, 2024)

10/15/24:
North Korea today blew up roads connected to South Korea once seen as symbols of inter-Korean cooperation as it seeks to cement its animosity toward the South, which it regards as a “primary foe.” “The North Korean military conducted detonations, assumed to be aimed at cutting off the Gyeongui and Donghae roads, at around noon and is carrying out additional activities using heavy equipment,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said in a text message to reporters. The JCS said the South’s military did not suffer any damage and that it responded by firing shots south of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) as a means of self-defense and as a warning against acts that likely violate the Armistice Agreement. The detonations took place in areas just 10 meters away from the MDL at 11:49 a.m. on the road along the Gyeongui line and at 12:01 p.m. on the road along the Donghae line, respectively, affecting land routes measuring tens of meters, a JCS official said. Last week, the North’s military announced a plan to “completely separate” North Korea’s territory from South Korea, saying it had informed the U.S. military of the move to “prevent any misjudgment and accidental conflict.” The Koreas are connected by roads and railways along the Gyeongui Line, which connects the South’s western border city of Paju to the North’s Kaesong, and the Donghae Line along the east coast. The North has since removed street lamps and installed mines along its side of the Gyeongui and Donghae roads, as well as deploying troops to build apparent anti-tank barriers and reinforce barbed wire within its side of the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas. Last week, JCS Chairman Adm. Kim Myung-soo told lawmakers that the Gyeongui and Donghae routes had been effectively cut off in August, noting that the military had been monitoring the North’s activities. A JCS official projected that North Korea may build concrete walls over the roads where the explosions took place but said it is unlikely that the North may stage another “show” to demonstrate its push to eliminate signs of unification. “Blowing up the inter-Korean roads may be its final show as it has already destroyed other visible signs of inter-Korean cooperation, such as the inter-Korean joint liaison office,” the official said. The official said the North apparently aimed to shore up internal unity by showing its residents that all ties between the Koreas have been severed, while warning the South that ties between the two Koreas are no longer viable. Tensions have further heightened after North Korea claimed four days ago that the South had sent drones over Pyongyang three times this month. Kim Yo-jong, the influential sister of the North Korean leader, warned the following day of a “horrible disaster” if South Korean drones are flown again over the North’s capital. South Korea has neither confirmed nor denied the claim and warned that the North will see “the end of its regime” if it causes any harm to South Koreans. (Lee Minji and Chae Yun-hwan, “N. Korea Blows up Inter-Korean Roads, Cuts off Land Routes with South,” Yonhap, October 15, 2024)

WPK Central Committee Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong’s press statement: “We secured clear evidence that the ROK military gangsters are the main culprit of the hostile provocation of violating the sovereignty of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by intruding into the sky over its capital city. The provocateurs will have to pay a dear price.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Kim Yo Jong,” October 15, 2024)

10/16/24:
KCNA: “KCNA reported on October 16 that the roads and railways connected to the ROK in the east and west parts of the southern border of the DPRK have been completely blocked. The report says: Under the order No. 00122 of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army on Oct. 15 took a measure to physically cut off the DPRK’s roads and railways which lead to the ROK through the east and west sections of the southern border of the DPRK as part of the phased complete separation of its territory, where its sovereignty is exercised, from the ROK’s territory. A spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense of the DPRK said that in the daytime of October 15, the 60-metre-long sections of the roads and railways in Kamho-ri, Kosong County, Kangwon Province and the 60-metre-long sections of the roads and railways in Tongnae-ri, Panmun District, Kaesong Municipality have been completely blocked through blasting. This is an inevitable and legitimate measure taken in keeping with the requirement of the DPRK Constitution which clearly defines the ROK as a hostile state, and due to the serious security circumstances running to the unpredictable brink of war owing to the grave political and military provocations of the hostile forces. A spokesman for the Ministry of Land and Environment Protection of the DPRK confirmed that the blasting had no negative effect on the surrounding ecological environment and that the routes linking the DPRK to the ROK have been completely separated. A spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense of the DPRK said that the DPRK will continue to take measures to permanently fortify the closed southern border.” (KCNA, “Roads and Railways to ROK Completely Blocked: KCNA Report,”

A new multinational monitoring body to oversee the enforcement of sanctions against North Korea has been launched, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced today. This development follows the dissolution of a U.N. monitoring body six months ago due to a veto from Russia. The new mechanism, called the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), aims to ensure accurate and ongoing reporting on the implementation of sanctions against Pyongyang, according to the ministry. This initiative comes as the reclusive regime continues to evade sanctions through its illicit nuclear program and weapons trade. The MSMT consists of 11 countries, including South Korea, the United States, and Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The new monitoring body serves as an alternative to the U.N. Panel of Experts on North Korea, which was disbanded in April. Unlike its predecessor, the MSMT operates outside the U.N. framework and thus does not report directly to the U.N. Security Council (UNSC). “Our government will closely cooperate with participating countries to ensure that the MSMT will serve as a major monitoring mechanism to enforce UNSC sanctions on North Korea,” said First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun, announcing the launch of the framework at a press briefing. “The MSMT is open to additional participation by other countries that are committed to the robust implementation of the sanctions,” he added. The event was attended by his counterparts from the U.S. and Japan, as well as the ambassadors of the participating nations in South Korea. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said, “Despite the panel’s demise, all DPRK related UN Security Council resolutions remain in effect, and all U.N. member states are required to implement all of them.… We look forward to continue momentum and close collaboration as we take steps to move beyond Russia’s veto and reinstate high quality public reporting on DPRK sanctions’ non-compliance.” According to the foreign ministry, the primary function of the MSMT is to continuously monitor violations and evasion activities related to UNSC sanctions against North Korea, similar to the previous U.N. Panel of Experts, and to publish reports on these activities. However, it remains unclear whether the monitoring body will issue an annual report, as the expert panel did. “The fact that it is outside the U.N. organization allows it to overcome the limitations of previous panel of experts reports, as it is free from the dynamics within the U.N. Security Council that sometimes limited the panel’s activities,” a ministry official said during a closed-door briefing. In a joint statement, the MSMT participating nations said, “The goal of the new mechanism is to assist the full implementation of UN sanctions on the DPRK by publishing information based on rigorous inquiry into sanctions violations and evasions attempts.” The UNSC expert panel, which had overseen sanctions enforcements against North Korea since 2009, expired at the end of April after Russia vetoed the annual renewal of the panel’s mandate in March. China abstained. Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo have since been actively discussing the establishment of an alternative monitoring body with like-minded nations. The launch of the MSMT apparently did not involve discussions with Russia or China, as officials in the U.S. have previously stated that these two countries would be reluctant to support the agenda. South Korea and its allies have speculated that Russia has already violated multiple international sanctions on North Korea through arms transactions, which intensified following a major military agreement signed with Pyongyang in June. (Lee Hyo-jin, “South Korea, 10 Other Nations Form Sanctions Monitoring Body,” Korea Times, October 16, 2024)

10/17/24:
Hecker: “…Although North Korea has amassed a threatening nuclear arsenal, it still has significant gaps in its capabilities. For example, North Korea has limited inventories of plutonium and tritium, the bomb fuels required for modern hydrogen bombs. The sophistication and miniaturization of its nuclear warheads are limited by having conducted only six nuclear tests to date, in comparison to 1,054 for the United States, 715 for the Soviet Union, and forty-five for China. North Korea has demonstrated rocket technologies of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) class to reach the American mainland. However, none of their ICBMs have been launched in normal trajectories, and all have been lofted to stay close to the Korean Peninsula, which is required for obtaining crucial guidance and re-entry data. The concern is that Russia could help North Korea close these gaps quickly.…” (Siegfried Hecker, “Could Russia Help North Korea with Its Nuclear and Missile Programs?” National Interest, October 17, 2024)

10/18/24:
South Korea’s spy agency on Friday confirmed that North Korea has decided to send around 10,000 troops to support Russia in its war against Ukraine and has already begun deployment. The National Intelligence Service’s (NIS) confirmation came after South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol convened an emergency security meeting amid mounting speculation that the North may be providing its soldiers to fight Russia’s war in Ukraine. Following the meeting, the NIS said it has confirmed the “beginning of the North’s direct involvement” in the Ukraine war, after having learned that troops from the North were moved aboard Russian Navy transport ships. The NIS also said it has confirmed that Pyongyang began transporting its special forces troops to Russia from Oct. 8 to 13. According to the NIS, approximately 1,500 North Korean soldiers were transported during the first phase, using four amphibious landing ships and three escort vessels owned by Russia. These troops were moved from areas near the North’s cities of Chongjin, Hamhung and Musudan to Vladivostok. The NIS said it expects that a second phase of transport will occur soon. A Seoul intelligence source said North Korea is expected to deploy a total of 12,000 troops, including those from the country’s most elite military units, to the war in Ukraine. North Korean troops deployed to Russia have been stationed across various locations in the Far East, including Vladivostok, Ussuriysk, Khabarovsk and Blagoveshchensk, where they are currently integrated with Russian military units. According to the Seoul spy agency, they have been issued Russian military uniforms and weapons. Additionally, fake identifications disguising them as locals were also provided, apparently to conceal their participation, by making them appear as part of the Russian forces. Once they complete their adaptation training, they are expected to be sent to the front lines, according to NIS officials. Yesterday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky cited Ukrainian intelligence reports indicating that North Korean personnel have already been deployed in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories, with an additional 10,000 troops being prepared to join the fight. Zelensky suggested that Russia is relying on North Korean forces to compensate for its substantial troop losses, as many young Russians seek to avoid conscription. (Chang Dong-woo, “N. Korea Decides to Send Around 10,000 Troops to Support Russia in Ukraine War: Seoul,” Yonhap, October 18, 2024)

KCNA: “A spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense of the DPRK said on October18 that the ROK military gangsters’ involvement in the serious provocation of violating the DPRK’s sovereignty was clearly proved through the discovery of decisive material evidence and an objective and scientific investigation into it. According to the spokesman, the Pyongyang Municipal Security Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security of the DPRK on October 13 discovered the remains of a crashed drone in the area of the neighborhood No. 76, Sopho-dong No. 1, Hyongjesan District while intensively searching the districts of Pyongyang Municipality. A joint investigation group of the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of State Security and other relevant specialized institutions was organized to forensically examine the remains of the drone. As a result, it was scientifically proved that the drone came from the ROK. Through the technical examination and analysis, the experts judged that the drone was a “light one for long-range reconnaissance” equipped with by the “Drone Operation Command” of the ROK military and that it is the type same as the vehicle-carried one opened to public at an event marking the “ROK Army Day.” From the remaining battery power and fuel of the drone, they inferred that the drone might have been used at least five to seven days ago. In light of the drone’s shape, the presumptive period of flight, the leaflet-scattering box fixed to the underpart of the drone’s fuselage, etc., it is quite likely that the drone is the one which scattered leaflets over the center of Pyongyang Municipality. But the conclusion has not yet been drawn. If the drone’s involvement in the recent leaflet-scattering incident is denied, it will be evidence of another wanton violation of the airspace of our country by a military means of the ROK and it will be taken more seriously as an example of a series of provocations by the military gangsters of the hostile country. Despite the shameless excuses made by the ROK military, the objective evidence and scientific analysis go to clearly prove the ROK committed a hostile provocation of violating the DPRK’s sovereignty. Explicitly speaking again, the DPRK is not interested in the chief culprit and perpetrators of the drone provocation but focus on the fact that the criminals, whether they are military gangsters or scum of out-of-border fugitives’ organization, all belong to the clan of the hostile country. The Ministry of National Defense of the DPRK and the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army gave all units in the capital city and near the border instructions to reinforce anti-air observation posts. The General Staff decided to keep the combined artillery units and the units with important fire duties near the border in full combat readiness, and this decision has been approved. A spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense of the DPRK warned that if a violation of the DPRK’s territorial ground, air and waters by ROK’s military means is discovered and confirmed again, it will be regarded as a grave military provocation against the sovereignty of the DPRK and a declaration of war and an immediate retaliatory attack will be launched.” (KCNA, “Truth about ROK’s Serious Provocation of Violating DPRK’s Sovereignty Uncovered: Spokesman for DPRK Ministry of National Defense,” October 19, 2024)

10/19/24:
DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui’s press statement titled “The countries involved in imposing illegal and outrageous sanctions on the DPRK will have to pay a dear price”: “Contrary to the recognized principles of international law with sovereignty equality and noninterference in internal affairs as their core, the U.S. and its vassal countries are working hard to revive the structure of sanctions and pressure on the DPRK, which went bankrupt structurally and is on the verge of collapse. The “multilateral sanctions monitoring team,” which allegedly acts on behalf of the panel of experts, a has-been involved in monitoring the implementation of the UN “sanctions resolutions” for more than 10 years, is utterly unlawful and illegitimate in terms of its justification for existence and purpose, and its existence itself constitutes a denial of the UN Charter. I express serious concern and regret at the U.S. habitual misconduct of arbitrarily flouting the international order in pursuit of its hegemonic interests, and vehemently condemn and reject it as a challenge to international justice and the most undisguised violation of the DPRK’s sovereignty. The U.S.-led sanctions against the DPRK are by no means a new experience for us. However, the unilateral behavior of the U.S., obsessed with the suicidal concept of pressure without sound thinking and sense of reality, and of some countries blindly following it has emerged as a threatening entity shaking the international relations to their foundations and seriously polluting the world security environment. The emergence of another hostile threatening factor calls for ceaselessly adding new factors to the corresponding counteraction force for deterring it. Wrong practice is bound to entail an inevitable reaction and corresponding punishment. If the U.S. expected that it can surprise the DPRK and stop its advance with such worn-out means as sanctions and pressure, it is just a fatal misjudgment. As clarified by the president of the State Affairs of the DPRK, the pain the U.S. has inflicted on our people has provoked a towering rage towards the U.S. and this has become a decisive factor and a strategic opportunity for redoubling our strength. If the U.S. seeks to control the world by dint of high-handed and arbitrary practices, self-righteousness and prejudice, more countries will become interested in putting an end to the American-style hegemony and it will bring earlier the emergence of the anti-U.S. global solidarity structure. The DPRK remains steadfast in its will to safeguard its sovereign rights, development and interests, regional and global peace and security to cope with the ever more undisguised sinister and hostile scheme of the U.S. and its satellite countries. I take this opportunity to recall the criminal act of the ROK which violated the sovereignty and territory of the DPRK and caused the current mishap, and make it clear that the U.S. will be held accountable for it. We will correctly remember the U.S. and the ROK, which have taken the lead in illegal and outrageous sanctions and pressure on the DPRK, and Japan, Canada, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand, which actively joined it, and record all their hostile acts. The forces involved in the smear campaign against the DPRK will have to pay a dear price for it.” (KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui Issues Press Statement,” October 20, 2024)

10/23/24:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, inspected strategic missile bases. He was accompanied by Kim Jong Sik, first deputy department director of the Central Committee of the WPK, and Kim Yo Jong, deputy department director of the Central Committee of the WPK. He examined the readiness for action of the strategic deterrent directly related with the security of the country, including the functions and capabilities of the elements of launch-related facilities in the missile bases and the combat duty of strategic missiles. He appreciated the services of the missile soldiers in the strategic missile bases for fulfilling the sacred duty they have assumed before the country and the people, keeping themselves always on alert on combat duty as required by the prevailing situation. Noting that the strategic missile force is the core force playing a pivotal role in the country’s war deterrent, he stressed that it is an important principle of the defense building strategy consistently maintained by the WPK to technically modernize the overall armed forces by giving priority to the strategic missile force in the future, too. As I have stressed on several occasions recently, the U.S. strategic nuclear means pose an ever-increasing threat to the security environment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the prospective threats urgently demand that the DPRK bolster up its war deterrent definitely and take a thoroughgoing and strict counteraction posture of its nuclear forces, he said. He stressed the need to further modernize and fortify the strategic missile bases and ensure that all of them make every effort to maintain a thoroughgoing counteraction posture so as to promptly deal a strategic counterblow to the enemy at any time and in different circumstances.” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Strategic Missile Bases,” October 23, 2024)

Around 3,000 North Korean soldiers were believed to have been sent to Russia so far to support its ongoing war with Ukraine, with a total of 10,000 expected to be deployed by December, South Korea’s spy agency said Wednesday. The National Intelligence Service (NIS) shared the information with lawmakers during a closed-door meeting of the parliamentary intelligence committee, according to officials. The NIS earlier confirmed that the North was sending troops to Russia in line with its decision to dispatch around 10,000 soldiers to fight alongside Russia against Ukraine, and approximately 1,500 soldiers were transported in a first batch by around last week. “After the first batch arrived in Russia from Oct. 8-13, an additional 1,500 soldiers have been sent there,” Rep. Park Sun-won of the main opposition Democratic Party told reporters, citing a report by NIS Director Cho Tae-yong. The troops have not been deployed to a battlefield. Instead, they are stationed at military facilities in Russia and are adjusting to their new circumstances. The soldiers are undergoing special training on how to use military equipment and fly unmanned aerial vehicles, among other things. A North Korean soldier receives around US$2,000 per month for the service to Russia, according to the agency. The total number of troops joining Russia is expected to reach 10,000, including the 3,000 already deployed, it added. “Russian instructors believe that North Korean soldiers are fit both physically and mentally, but they lack the understanding of modern warfare, such as drone attacks. They also expect multiple casualties among the North Koreans,” the NIS was quoted as saying by the lawmaker. The NIS also reported signs that North has relocated the families of the dispatched troops to an unidentified place for isolation in order to manage the situation confidentially and effectively. North Korea has not commented on the matter, but the news has spread to the local community and some of their family members “have wailed,” the agency said. (Oh Seok-min, “N. Korea So Far Sent 3,000 Soldiers to Russia; Total 10,000 To Be Dispatched by Dec.: NIS,” Yonhap, October 23, 2024) North Korea has sent troops to Russia to join the fight against Ukraine, a major shift in Moscow’s effort to win the war, U.S. officials confirmed today. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III called the North’s presence a “very, very serious” escalation that would have ramifications in both Europe and Asia. “What exactly are they doing?” Austin told reporters at a military base in Italy after a trip to Ukraine. “Left to be seen.” He gave no details about the number of troops already there or the number expected to arrive. Austin cast President Vladimir V. Putin’s need for North Korean mercenaries as a sign of desperation. “This is an indication that he may be in even more trouble than most people realize,” he said. “He went tin-cupping early on to get additional weapons and materials from the D.P.R.K.,” he said, “and then from Iran, and now he’s making a move to get more people.” But he said intelligence analysts were still trying to discern whether the troops were moving toward Ukraine. Ukrainian officials insist they are headed there, and Ukraine’s defense minister was quoted today saying he expected to see North Korean troops in Kursk, the Russian territory that Ukraine has occupied, in the coming days. Austin’s statement came as American intelligence officials said they were preparing to release a trove of intelligence, including satellite photographs, that show troop ships moving from North Korea to training areas in Vladivostok on Russia’s east coast and other Russian territory further to the north. For two weeks, there have been reports of the movements, fueled by the Ukrainian and South Korean governments, that more than 12,000 North Koreans were training to fight alongside Russian soldiers. John F. Kirby, a national security spokesman at the White House, said on Wednesday that between early and mid-October, the United States tracked about 3,000 North Korean troops who were transported by ship from the North Korean port city of Wonsan to Vladivostok in Russia. Those troops have since been taken to three separate training sites in the Russian Far East, he said. Kirby said he had no specific assessment of what kind of training the North Korean troops were receiving nor was it known for certain that they would be deployed to the war in Ukraine or how useful they would be given the language and cultural differences. “But,” he added, “this is certainly a highly concerning possibility.” He said the United States had not yet seen any specific quid pro quo for North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un. “What does Kim Jong Un think he’s getting out of it?” Kirby asked, suggesting it could be some form of technology transfer or other help with North Korea’s military capability. “That’s what’s so concerning to us.” Anton A. Kobyakov, an adviser to Putin, did not explicitly confirm or deny the reports during a summit today in Kazan, Russia. “The Pentagon is not an accountable organization,” he said in response to a reporter’s question. Russia has denied earlier reports on North Korea’s troop presence. But Moscow is straining to maintain its costly offensives in Ukraine without destabilizing Russian society. U.S. officials estimate that Russia is recruiting 25,000 to 30,000 new soldiers a month, just enough to replace the dead and the wounded. Some military analysts believe the Kremlin will have a hard time maintaining that pace without resorting to another round of unpopular mobilization. To avoid the political cost of a draft, the Russian government has resorted to increasingly unorthodox recruitment tactics. Many Russian regions have sharply increased sign-up bonuses paid to volunteer soldiers and expanded recruitment from prisons and from poor nations such as Cuba and Nepal. Nonetheless, both Russia and North Korea experts called the arrival of North Korean troops a watershed moment. Desperate not to stir up domestic resentments about the huge casualties Russia has taken — over 600,000 killed or wounded, American officials recently estimated — Putin is now reaching for mercenary forces, supplied by the same country that has sold him more than a million artillery rounds, many of them defective. For Kim, the war in Ukraine has been a pathway out of geopolitical isolation. For the first time in decades, the North has assets that a major power is willing to pay for. His longer-term plan, experts say, may be to improve the reach of his intercontinental ballistic missiles. He is eager, American intelligence agencies believe, to make it clear that his arsenal of nuclear-tipped weapons is capable of hitting American cities. “This is the real ‘no-limits partnership,” said Victor Cha, a North Korea expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies who was a member of President George W. Bush’s National Security Council. “We are in a whole different era if North Korean soldiers are dying for Putin. It will raise the ask when Kim makes demands, and Putin will give him what he wants.” In comments to reporters two days ago, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine sought to portray North Korea’s presence as an attempt by Putin to avoid an unpopular mobilization. “I wouldn’t say they have run out of personnel,” the Ukrainian leader said of Russia. “However, the reluctance to mobilize their own people is certainly increasing, and there are formats for mobilizing North Korean troops. This is definitely happening.” “This indicates that the consequences of this war are already impacting Russian society,” he added. One of the central mysteries American and South Korean intelligence agencies are focused on is what Kim may be receiving in return for contributing troops, even though officials say the United States has not picked up intelligence suggesting that Russia agreed to pay for the mercenaries, or provide oil or much-needed military technology in return. But there have been reports of increased cooperation on missile technology, and in that arena, Kim has some very specific needs. He has been trying to demonstrate that his intercontinental ballistic missiles have the range to reach the United States — a goal that North Korea has had since it seriously began work on its nuclear weapons program in the early 1980s. As Kim’s missiles have grown more accurate, he has conducted flight tests that have flown in high arcs into space and landed in the Pacific. But he has not yet conducted a test across the Pacific, one that could also demonstrate that his warheads could survive the intense heat and vibration of re-entering the atmosphere — a challenge that plagued the American and Soviet missile programs in the 1950s. “Kim may believe that going this far for Putin will mean that he can raise the ceiling on what he wants in return, possibly higher-end technology for ICBMs and nuclear subs,” said Cha. “Both are stated goals of the program.” Putin, American intelligence officials suggest, may also have a reason to cooperate. With the Biden administration gradually allowing American-made missiles to be shot into Russian territory by Ukrainian forces, some senior officials believe, Putin has every incentive to help North Korea show that it could threaten American territory. Another mystery is how China is reacting to the North’s new deals with Russia. U.S. intelligence has concluded that Chinese officials now want to assure that Russia wins in its conflict with Ukraine, demonstrating that the West, with all its firepower, cannot prevail far from its shores. But North Korea has always been highly dependent on Beijing, and Kim’s move to take advantage of Russia’s need for ammunition and troops is presumed to be unwelcome in Beijing. China remains the North’s critical supplier of oil, and its major trading partner. And it has sometimes used that leverage to insist that Kim not create instability or conflict in Asia. Now the provision of troops threatens all that. But so far, officials say, they have not picked up evidence that China is expressing its displeasure. (Eric Schmitt, David E. Sanger, and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “N. Korean Troops Aid Russia in War,” New York Times, October 24, 2024, p. A-1) Heads of state rarely send thousands of their soldiers to fight in someone else’s war without expecting something in return. So the decision by Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea, to deploy 3,000 troops to the battlefield in Ukraine has left American officials with several urgent questions: What is President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia giving. Kim? Could Russia help North Korea develop more lethal missiles and nuclear capabilities? And could the exchange be evidence of a dangerous new military alliance? Analysts and experts who have spent decades tracking the military efforts of Pyongyang say Kim is most likely seeking help from Russia in two broad categories: short-term assistance with his military capabilities and longer-term strategic assurances that could bolster Kim’s ability to confront the United States and his neighbors. “There is no stronger signal that one country can send to another than sending troops into the battlefield,” said Victor D. Cha, a professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown University and the Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Cha said sending the troops would give the North Korean leader leverage to ask Russia for a lot in return. “At a symbolic level, and in terms of Kim’s asking price, it’s a pretty high price,” he said. In the short term, analysts say Kim is probably looking for several concrete things from his Russian counterpart. North Korea needs help perfecting its missile capabilities. Recent reports suggest that North Korean missiles used by Russia against Ukraine have not performed as well as expected. Russia could help Kim make them better. Kim might also seek help advancing his nuclear program, including his goal of acquiring a quiet, nuclear-powered submarine capable of launching multiple ballistic missiles that could reach the United States or other allies. North Korea has had less success developing the kind of countermeasures that allow missiles to evade sophisticated, antimissile systems deployed by the United States and its allies. North Korea also has not met its goal of launching three military satellites — an area where Russia could be very helpful. Russia could also help modernize North Korea’s conventional forces. Most of the tanks, planes and other equipment used by North Koreans are aging, Soviet-era weapons that are in critical need of replacing and updating. And it could continue providing North Korea money, food and other direct assistance. But Sydney Seiler, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who spent 40 years in government dealing with North Korea, said the bigger danger to the United States and its allies could be the longer-term goals that Kim could try to leverage in exchange for helping Russia in Ukraine. “Now he’s got a path to survival,” Seiler said. “He’s got friends that have his back, and the pressure and threats from the United States and the international community regarding his nuclear program — you can now blow them all off. He’s got a friend in Vladimir Putin.” Cha said that the troop movements suggested that Kim was in a position to demand even more from Putin as he pursues his goal of becoming a modern, nuclear state with the ability to directly threaten the United States and the entire region. “For the first time in the history of this relationship, he’s in the driver’s seat,” Dr. Cha said of the North Korean leader. “Why wouldn’t he exact a high price?” (Michael D. Shear, “Will North Korea Sending Its Troops To Help Russia Aid Its Nuclear Aims,” New York Times, October 25, 2024, p. A-6)

10/25/24:
The Air Force today staged drills to prepare against a large-scale aerial attack amid efforts to bolster readiness against evolving North Korean military threats. The drills, involving some 70 warplanes, including F-35A stealth fighters, and various air defense systems, got under way earlier in the day under a scenario of some 800 simulated North Korean aerial targets flying into the South, according to the Air Force. Fighter jets will train on intercepting enemy aircraft, while air defense systems, including the homegrown Cheongung-II medium-range surface-to-air missile system, will focus on shooting down enemy ballistic and cruise missiles. The drills will not involve actual live rounds due to safety concerns. The exercise will also focus on training pilots to intercept cruise missiles and destroy enemy ballistic missile launch sites, the Air Force said. (Chae Yun-hwan, “Air Force Holds Drill against Large-Scale Aerial Attack,” Yonhap, October 25, 2024)

The Navy has staged warship maneuver drills in the East Sea to enhance its readiness against possible North Korean maritime infiltrations and attacks, officials said Friday. The four-day exercise kicked off October 22, involving some 20 vessels, including the ROKS Seoae Ryu Seong-ryong Aegis-equipped destroyer, and various aircraft, such as the P-3 maritime patrol plane and the Air Force’s F-5 fighter. The U.S. military also joined the drills by deploying P-8 maritime patrol aircraft and A-10 attack aircraft. This week’s exercise was focused on training troops to respond to various attack scenarios, such as countering infiltrations by enemy special forces and other surprise underwater, maritime and aerial provocations, the Navy said. It also included other drills to boost readiness, such as those on anti-submarine warfare and electronic warfare, according to the Navy. (Yonhap, “Navy Conducts East Sea Drills to Boost Defense against North Korea Threats,” JoongAng Ilbo, October 25, 2024)

Even before Kim Jong Un sent troops to support Russia’s fight against Ukraine, there were signs that North Korea’s main backer, China, was unhappy with his regime’s deepening ties with Moscow. In a letter last week seen as signaling Beijing’s growing displeasure, Chinese President Xi Jinping thanked Kim for a congratulatory message on the 75th anniversary of Communist China’s founding — but omitted a traditional reference to North Korea as a “friendly neighboring country.” Kim appears unabashed. Western allies this week revealed that North Korea had sent more than 12,000 troops, disguised as ethnic minorities from Siberia, to fight on Russia’s front lines, a move that analysts say will only heighten Beijing’s concerns over its neighbors’ increasingly cozy military ties. “The North Korean troop deployment is a dramatic step, and China will not like it one bit,” said Andrei Lankov, a North Korea expert at Kookmin University in Seoul. For China, the deployment — a sharp escalation in a partnership that has deepened since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 but was previously largely limited to munitions — threatens to destabilize the delicate balance of power on the Korean peninsula. Closer Russian-North Korean ties could also spur the U.S., Japan and South Korea to strengthen their military alliance in east Asia, which Beijing already views as aimed at containing its growing power. Beijing wants to avoid at all costs a rerun of the early years of the cold war, when the Soviet Union, North Korea and China formed a “northern triangle” that faced off against a “southern triangle” of South Korea, Japan and the US, Chinese scholars said. “China’s situation now is really difficult, genuinely a dilemma,” said Zhu Feng, executive dean of the School of International Studies at Nanjing University. “On the one hand, we don’t want to see the return of the cold war to east Asia. On the other hand, the US is trying to strengthen solidarity with South Korea and Japan.” Japan’s chief cabinet secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa yesterday said that escalating Russian-North Korean co-operation was “deeply concerning” and would “worsen the situation in Ukraine and impact the security of the region around Japan”. China’s wariness has been evident since April, when it sent one of its most senior officials, Zhao Leji, to Pyongyang. While the two sides did not reveal details of the talks, analysts said Beijing was unhappy about the prospect of losing influence over North Korea, which it sees as a crucial buffer state against US-backed South Korea. In June, Kim went further, agreeing a strategic partnership with Putin that contained a mutual assistance clause in cases of aggression against one of the signatories — a move that was of deep concern to China. The following month, the Chinese ambassador to North Korea did not attend July anniversary commemorations in Pyongyang marking the end of the Korean war, despite the two countries marking 75 years of diplomatic relations this year. China’s foreign affairs ministry on Thursday said Beijing was “not aware of the relevant situation” when asked about Pyongyang’s decision to send troops. China’s concerns include becoming potentially embroiled in the conflict itself if North Korean troops’ involvement in the fight against Ukraine made the Asian country — Beijing’s only military alliance partner — a legitimate target for Kyiv, said Shen Dingli, a Shanghai-based international relations professor. “China has a treaty-bound obligation to defend North Korea,” said Shen. “If North Korea is attacked, China is legally bound to send its troops and [if necessary] to use all means to protect North Korea.” Some defense analysts have raised concerns that North Korea’s contribution to Russia’s war effort could mean Pyongyang has secured a reciprocal commitment from Moscow to intervene in a conflict on the Korean peninsula — a prospect that would alarm Beijing. But Lankov said such a possibility remained “extremely remote.” “The North Koreans are doing this for money, military technologies and battlefield experience, not out of any sense of solidarity with Russia,” he said. “Russia is not going to get themselves into trouble just out of gratitude to Kim Jong Un.” China is also worried about Russia helping North Korea improve its nuclear capabilities, which could accelerate an arms race in the region, said Chen Qi at the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing. But Chen was skeptical Russia would prioritize its relations with North Korea over those with China, on which Moscow has relied for economic and geopolitical support since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Some analysts said Beijing might be tolerating North Korean arms shipments to Russia to alleviate pressure to provide direct military assistance itself. Jaewoo Choo, head of the China center at the Korea Research Institute for National Security think-tank in Seoul, said “Beijing may actually be secretly pleased that Russia is providing economic aid to North Korea in China’s place,” at a time when China’s own domestic growth was lagging. “China remains in the driving seat because ultimately it has control over both countries,” said Lankov, referring to Pyongyang’s reliance on aid from Beijing. “If China wanted to put a stop to this nonsense as they see it, then they could do so.” (Joe Leahy and Christian Davies, “China Unsettled by Kim’s Troops in Russia,” Financial Times, October 26, 2024, p. 2)

10/26/24:
DPRK FoMin External Policy Office chief’s press statement titled “The U.S. will be held wholly responsible for pushing the situation on the Korean peninsula to an uncontrollable one”: “Amid the extreme tension prolonging on the Korean peninsula due to the recent crucial provocation of the ROK against the DPRK, the U.S. more openly reveals its military confrontational attempt against the DPRK. From October 21, the U.S., together with the ROK military warmongers, has staged a large-scale joint air drill Freedom Flag by drawing the Australian Air Force into the Korean peninsula. And it has resorted to extreme confrontation hysteria, openly claiming that the purpose of the drill is aimed at the DPRK. The U.S. and the ROK are trumpeting that they would master the compound operation capability by mobilizing fighters and drones for the first time and conduct exercises for increasing the survivability in airborne infiltration into an enemy’s position through the large-scale joint air drill which integrates the annual combined joint formation drill and a joint air drill Vigilant Defense. The military drill of the U.S. and the ROK, which shows the offensive and aggressive nature more vividly in its scale, content and character, is a very dangerous military provocation aimed at preemptive and surprise strike at the DPRK. The U.S. is staging “joint air re-supply drill” and “joint river-crossing drill” with the ROK and a large-scale marine corps’ joint military drill Keen Sword with Japan. At the same time, it is further escalating the military tension while dispatching the super-large nuclear carrier George Washington task force around the Korean peninsula. We strongly denounce the U.S. hostile act of resorting to reckless military demonstration with its allies, not content with the present political and military tension on the Korean peninsula which is exposed to the danger of a touch-and-go explosion, as a clear threat and a grave provocation to the security of the region. The U.S. can never cover up its criminal nature of driving the situation on the Korean peninsula into an uncontrollable one with any rhetoric. It is a fact known to the world that the ROK committed illegal and grave provocation of openly infiltrating military attack means into the sky above a sovereign state under the shelter of “military cooperation” with someone. The DPRK keeps in sight the dark shadow of the U.S. which is hidden behind the fearless provocative acts of the ROK. The U.S. has patronized the ROK’s scattering of political motivational rubbish over the territory of the DPRK as the so-called “freedom of expression” and instigated the bellicose hysteria of its ally with frequent deployment of strategic assets and ceaseless joint military drills. The U.S. confrontation history will be exactly recorded and calculated. If a situation that no one wishes is created on the Korean peninsula, the U.S., the arch criminal and mastermind escalating the tension in the region, will be held wholly responsible for it.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of External Policy Office Chief of DPRK Foreign Ministry,” October 26, 2024)

10/27/24:
A series of “politics and money” scandals drove the Liberal Democratic Party to a crushing defeat in today’s House of Representatives election. The LDP secured only 191 seats, 56 fewer than it held before the lower house was dissolved. Even combined with the seats earned by its coalition partner Komeito, the ruling bloc now holds 215 seats, not enough for a majority in the 465-seat lower house. Komeito has 24 seats, down eight from its pre-dissolution figure, and its leader Ishii Keiichi was defeated in his constituency. In the previous 2021 election, Komeito fielded candidates in nine constituencies and won all of them. But this time, 11 candidates ran in single-seat constituencies, and only four won. In contrast, the opposition Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan increased its seats significantly from 98 to 148, while the Democratic Party for the People quadrupled its number to 28. The Japan Innovation Party earned all 19 seats in Osaka constituencies but fought uphill battles outside the Kansai region, ultimately losing six seats to now hold 38. Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru expressed the next day his intention to remain in office despite the defeat of the ruling bloc. “National politics cannot be allowed to stagnate, even for a moment, in this severe security and economic environment,” said Ishiba, who is also president of the LDP, during a press conference at the party’s headquarters. “We received an extremely harsh judgment from the public. It is deeply regrettable that we have lost so many valuable members of the LDP and Komeito.” However, he said, “I want to fulfill my duty to protect Japan and its people.” Regarding the issue of “money in politics,” Ishiba said, “I will eliminate ‘inner circle and party thinking’ and strive for party reform.” . CDPJ President Noda Yoshihiko the next day reported the result to Yoshino Tomoko, president of the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo) at Rengo’s headquarters in Tokyo. “We were able to drive the ruling coalition down to below a majority, and that’s a certain achievement,” Noda told reporters after his meeting with Yoshino. “There are lots of things we need to do, including the special Diet session and a House of Councilors election [next summer].” DPFP leader Tamaki Yuichiro is reluctant to join hands with the LDP, saying, “Once we’re in power, we’ll have to agree to things we don’t necessarily agree with.” Ishiba is expected to seek a “partial coalition,” in which he asks for cooperation on a policy-by-policy basis. Noda also intends to seek support of the DPFP and the JIP in the Diet’s vote on the prime minister. If Ishiba does not win a majority, a runoff vote will be held between the top two candidates. Reiwa Shinsengumi gained six more seats before the lower house dissolution to nine, the Japanese Communist Party secured eight seats, down two from before the dissolution. The Social Democratic Party retained one seat and Sanseito got two more seats to secure three in total. (Yomiuri Shimbun, “Japan Election: Japan’s Ruling Bloc Suffers Crushing Blow in Election; Combined 215 Seats Fall Short of Lower House Majority,” (October 28, 2024)

KCNA: “A spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense of the DPRK released [today] the final results of investigation into the case of infringement upon its sovereignty which confirmed the take-off point and route and purpose of intrusion by the drone from the ROK found in the area of the DPRK capital city. According to the spokesman, under the instruction of the DPRK government on scientifically and thoroughly proving the truth behind the case of the grave infringement upon the country’s sovereignty by a drone, a military means recognized by the world, the joint investigation group involving the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of State Security and other relevant specialized organs completely dismantled the flight control module from the remains of a crashed enemy drone and analyzed the flight plan and flight log in a comprehensive way. The results of analysis of the flight control program of the enemy drone conducted by the joint investigation group indefensibly and clearly proved the most vulgar and shameless provocative nature of the ROK military gangsters who have persistently evaded the responsibility for the illegal intrusion by their drone into the sky above the capital city of the DPRK. The collected evidence data include 238 flight plans and flight logs worked out between June 5, 2023 and October 8, 2024, and the remaining data except the data of October 8 are the data of flight in the territory of the ROK. According to the analysis of the flight control program, a plan for scattering political motivational rubbish is to be worked out when the flight plan is drawn out, and when the drone reaches the position reflected in the scattering plan, the flight control module is to send an electrical signal to the scattering means. The flight data number of the enemy drone crashed after intruding into the DPRK on October 8 was analyzed. The plan for scattering political motivational rubbish and the scattering log were recorded correctly in the enemy drone. It was proved that the drone of the ROK military gangsters which took off at Paekryong Island at 23:25:30 on October 8 and intruded into the territorial air of the DPRK flied over Jangyon County of South Hwanghae Province and the waters around the Cho Islet till the waters around Namjoap Islet, and then over Chollima District, Nampho Municipality and intruded into the capital city of the DPRK. The enemy drone scattered the political motivational rubbish in the sky above the area between the building of the DPRK Foreign Ministry and Sungri Station of the Pyongyang Metro at 1:32:8 on October 9 and in the sky above the building of the Ministry of National Defense at 1:35:11. The confirmed objective and scientific evidence data expose that the intrusion by the drone is aimed at scattering the anti-DPRK political motivational rubbish and that the principal of the hostile infringement upon the DPRK sovereignty is none other than the puppet ROK military gangsters. The spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense stressed once again that the last warning to the dangerous and reckless, political and military provocation by the ROK military gangsters which went beyond the limit of patience has already been made. In the case of infringement upon the sovereignty of the DPRK reoccurs due to the blind trust in the master, seizing the ROK, the most vulgar and malignant rogue state, and its extremely bad habit of challenge, the source of all misfortunes and provocations will disappear forever by the merciless offensive of the DPRK.” (KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK Ministry of National Defense Makes Public Final Results of Investigation into Case of Grave Infringement upon Sovereignty by Drone from ROK,” October 28, 2024)

WPK Central Committee Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong’s press statement: “An unidentified drone appeared in the sky above Seoul and leaflets criticizing puppet Yoon were scattered. The military, individual organization or any individual of the DPRK did not let fly a drone. We cannot confirm it and it is worthless to give answer to it. This is an assumed situation. Under such situation, I’d like to see once how the dirty curs in Seoul bark. The world may also be curious about it.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK,” October 28, 2024)

10/28/24:
North Korea said today that its analysis of the flight log of a drone that crashed in Pyongyang earlier this month showed it took off from a South Korean border island in the Yellow Sea, insisting that the South Korean military is behind what it claimed were South Korea’s drone incursions. South Korea’s military called the North’s latest claim “unilateral,” saying it is “unworthy” of verifying or responding to. (Kim Soo-yeon and Lee Minji, “N. Korea Claims S. Korean Drone Took off from Western Border Island in Oct. for Incursion into Pyongyang,” Yonhap, October 28, 2024)

10/31/24:
KCNA: “A spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea said in a statement that an ICBM test-fire was conducted [this] morning. The Missile Administration of the DPRK conducted a very crucial test on Thursday. The test-fire, conducted under the order given by the head of state of the DPRK, updated the recent records of the strategic missile capability of the DPRK and demonstrated the modernity and creditability of its world’s most powerful strategic deterrent. The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un said on the spot: “The test-fire is an appropriate military action that fully meets the purpose of informing the rivals, who have intentionally escalated the regional situation and posed a threat to the security of our Republic recently, of our counteraction will, and it also constitutes an indispensable process in the course of constantly developing our state’s strategic attack forces. As recently witnessed by us, the rivals’ dangerous tightening of their nuclear alliance and various adventuristic military maneuvers go to further highlight the importance of strengthening our nuclear forces. We should never allow any threat to approach the security sphere under our state’s influence. The security situation of our state and ever-aggravating prospective threats and challenges require us to continue to bolster up our modern strategic attack forces and more perfectly round off our nuclear forces’ response posture. I affirm that the DPRK will never change its line of bolstering up its nuclear forces.” (KCNA, “ICBM Test-fire Conducted in DPRK,” October 31, 2024, boldface in original)

KCNA: “The cause of the DPRK reliably defending the regional and global peace and security as a responsible nuclear weapons state and achieving the comprehensive rejuvenation of the country and promoting the well-being of its people is accompanied with vicious challenges of the most hostile and threatening rival states and an ever-growing war crisis. The most hostile enemies of the DPRK have evolved into a nuclear alliance and the U.S. imperialists and the ROK puppets have recently intensified the frantic arms buildup and provocative attempts at the most serious level in history while often letting loose reckless threatening remarks against the DPRK government. All these are posing a grave danger to the DPRK’s sovereignty and security environment and provoking the surging anger and retaliatory will of its army and people. The present grave reality, seriously reminding people of the instructive law of history that the disrupted balance of forces between friend and foe just leads to a war, more clearly emphasizes the necessity of the absolute power capable of deterring the enemy and controlling the situation at all times and the validity of its steady increase. It also calls for continuously developing and updating the strategic weapons as a deterrent capable of actively coping with any military threat and foiling the enemy’s provocative attempt and will for war in advance. At a time when the strategic option for reliably defending national security and regional peace from the adventurous military maneuvers of the U.S. and its vassal forces for aggression and the urgency of its powerful implementation are being further highlighted, another new entity has emerged to demonstrate the absolute edge of the DPRK nuclear combat forces rapidly developing with each passing day. Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, issued an order to the Missile Administration to conduct a test-fire of the latest-type ICBM Hwasongpho-19 and oversaw on the spot the crucial test, which would set an epochal milestone in perpetuating the absolute superiority of the strategic armed forces of the DPRK, on the morning of October 31. The tremendously powerful absolute weapon, a product of the DPRK’s might and spirit which have been steadily augmented for the great dignity and honor of the country and people, for the duty of defending peace and the right to existence that should never be conceded, and for a new world of justice where war, hegemony and injustice are not allowed, advanced to the launching position at dawn, showing signs of new strength the world has never experienced. The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un, assuming the noblest and heavy mission of firmly safeguarding the sovereignty of the DPRK and its absolute security and rights to development, went to the launch site to learn about the preparations and plan for the test-fire and went to the central command and observation post. The launch site, prior to the historic moment when the DPRK’s new updated ultra-powerful offensive means, an ICBM of ultimate version, would reveal its appearance, was seething with the will of all the defense scientists and strategic missile soldiers to strike terror into the most ferocious enemies keen on nuclear confrontation with the DPRK by demonstrating its war deterrent which has reached the highest level in the world. The moment has come to display the awesome force of the world’s most powerful strategic missile. When Kim Jong Un approved the test-fire, General Jang Chang Ha, director general of the Missile Administration, gave an order to the Honored 2nd Red Flag Company. The moment, the entity with absolute power lifted off revealing its imposing figure, loaded with the DPRK people’s bitter enmity and strong will to punish all evils and injustice on earth and annihilate the enemy. The missile travelled up to the maximum altitude of 7 687.5km and flew a distance of 1 001.2km for 5 156 seconds before landing on the preset target area in the open waters of the East Sea of Korea. The test-fire had no negative effect on the security of neighboring countries. The test of the ultramodern strategic weapon system updated the latest records of strategic missile capabilities and showed off the modernity and creditability of the world’s most powerful strategic deterrent of the DPRK. On the spot, Kim Jong Un expressed great satisfaction, saying that the successful test-fire of the new-type ICBM has come to prove before the world that the dominant position the DPRK has secured in the development and manufacture of nuclear delivery means of the same kind is absolutely irreversible. The perfected weapon system of ICBM Hwasongpho-19, to be used by the strategic forces of the DPRK along with Hwasongpho-18, pursuant to the long-term plan for building the state nuclear forces set forth by the Party Congress, will perform the mission and duty as the primary core means in defending the DPRK, thoroughly deterring the enemies’ acts of aggression and reliably protecting national security. Kim Jong Un said that the test-fire is an appropriate military action that fully meets the purpose of declaring the DPRK’s counteraction will to the rivals who have recently escalated the regional situation deliberately and posed a threat to its security, and also constitutes an indispensable process in the course of constantly developing its strategic strike forces. He went on to say: As we have witnessed these days, the rivals’ dangerous moves to strengthen their nuclear alliance and various adventurist military activities further highlight the importance of the buildup of our nuclear forces. We should never allow any threat to approach the sphere of influence of our national security. The security situation of our state and the ever-growing prospective threats and challenges require us to continue to bolster up our modern strategic strike forces and more perfectly round off our nuclear response posture. He clearly reaffirmed that the DPRK would never change its line of bolstering up its nuclear forces under any circumstances. On behalf of the Party, the government and all the Korean people, he gave the highest thanks to the defense scientists and the munitions workers for their distinguished contribution to fully demonstrating the DPRK’s matchless strategic nuclear strike capability to the whole world. He once again stressed that only the peace that can be defended by the strength great enough to control and deter the enemy is the reliable, secure and durable peace and herein lies a sure guarantee for the peace and future of the DPRK and its people. And he clarified important tasks to be constantly tackled by the defense science field in implementing the line of bolstering up the state nuclear forces. Expressing expectation and belief that the defense science and technology group, always faithful and absolute in fulfilling the demand of the revolution, would achieve better defense development successes and thus always remain faithful to the sacred obligation and duty, he had a photo session with the masters of this great event at the historic site where the absolute prestige of the state was lifted once again. All the defense scientists and strategic missile soldiers vowed to devote themselves with redoubled courage to the sacred struggle for building up the arsenal of the Juche revolution into an invincible one and strengthening the state’s nuclear response posture.” (KCNA, “Crucial Test Demonstrating DPRK’s Definite Reaction Will and Absolute Superiority of Its Strategic Strike Capability; Test-fire of DPRK’s Latest-type ICBM Hwasongpho-19 Successfully Conducted under Guidance of Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un,” November 1, 2024)

North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile off its east coast today, shortly after the United States and South Korea condemned the country for deploying troops near Ukraine to join Russia’s war effort. The missile was fired from Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, at a deliberately steep angle so that it reached an unusually high altitude but did not fly over Japan, the South Korean military said in a brief statement. The missile landed in waters between North Korea and Japan. Thursday’s ICBM flew for a longer time than any previous one North Korea has launched — approximately 86 minutes, according to Japan’s Defense Ministry. North Korea has launched several ICBMs in recent years, including ones with solid propellant that are easier to move and hide, and faster to launch, than its old liquid-fuel versions. But all of those missiles were fired at steep angles, rather than being sent across the Pacific. North Korea has never demonstrated an ability to fire an ICBM on a normal, flatter trajectory. Another technological hurdle the North has yet to show it has cleared is so-called re-entry technology. After soaring into space, an ICBM warhead must endure intense heat and friction as it crashes back into the earth’s atmosphere and toward its target. (Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Fires a Long-Range Missile,” New York Times, November 1, 2024, p. A-7) Defense Minister Gen Nakatani. The previous record altitude was 3,850 miles, recorded in March 2022. As usual, North Korea aimed for height instead of distance with the launch to try to ensure the missile did not hit land. It traveled about 621 miles, splashing down west of Okushiri Island, in the sea between the Korean Peninsula and northern Japan. (Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “North Korea Launches New, More Powerful Missile in This Year’s First ICBM Test,” Washington Post, October 31, 2024)

Van Diepen: “ On October 31, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) conducted the initial flight test of the new Hwasong-19 (HS-19) solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Photos show the missile is longer than the North’s first solid ICBM, the Hwasong-18 (HS-18). This explains the increased boost capability shown in the missile’s longer flight time and higher maximum altitude, and thus is not an indication of technological assistance from Russia, as some analysts have speculated. Because the HS-18 can already reach targets throughout the U.S., the HS-19’s additional boost capability will probably be used to loft heavier payloads. A multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)-associated probable post-boost vehicle (PBV) was shown in stage-separation photos from the launch released by Pyongyang. One or two more successful flight tests will likely be needed before considering the HS-19 booster ready for deployment, but a MIRV payload would require at least several successful tests over at least a few years to be ready. The most likely reason for developing another solid ICBM with more boost capability than the existing HS-18 is to loft a heavier MIRV payload to a similar range. Deployment of MIRVs on the HS-19 (and probably the larger, liquid-propellant HS-17), in combination with single-RV versions and the HS-18 force, will significantly boost the number of deployed North Korean warheads for a given number of missiles and launchers, increase the number of targets that a surviving missile force can retaliate against after absorbing a first strike, and further complicate the task of allied missile defenses by forcing them to cope with more relatively small objects in the same timeframe. But this potential depends on how the North chooses to allocate its relatively limited nuclear warhead production among many different weapons systems. On October 30, it was reported that South Korean military intelligence had detected signs North Korea would soon launch an ICBM, including the placement of a missile and its mobile launcher. The Japanese Ministry of Defense reported the launch of an ICBM-class missile on October 31 from the suburbs of Pyongyang to the northeast, landing in the sea after a flight of about 86 minutes covering some 1,000 kilometers (km) at a maximum altitude of over 7,000 km. South Korea’s military confirmed the launch and impact areas, as well as a highly lofted trajectory. Images in the Japanese media of apparent reentering objects suggested the flight was successful. That same day, the North Korean press announced “an ICBM test-fire,” but provided no further technical information. North Korean media provided further information on November 1, reporting the ICBM was “the latest-type ICBM Hwasongpho-19” (aka Hwasong-19 or HS-19), which flew for 85.93 minutes to a maximum altitude of 7,687.5 km and a distance of 1,001.2 km. Accompanying photos depicted the launch of a three-stage, solid-propellant missile from a canister mounted on an 11-axle road mobile launcher (TEL, or transporter-erector-launcher), and also depicted missile staging, including a photo captioned “third stage separation” of two rocket nozzles remaining on the bottom of the missile’s payload section as the expended third stage falls away. North Korean TV video shows the missile being “cold launched” from its canister on an 11-axle TEL. The missile. The HS-19’s use of an 11-axle TEL indicates that the new missile is longer than North Korea’s first solid-propellant ICBM, the HS-18, which uses a nine-axle TEL. Initial analyses differ on whether the HS-19 is larger in diameter, as well. Either way, the size increase provides for additional solid propellant to increase the HS-19’s total boost capability — which is consistent with the new missile’s increased flight time (about 13 minutes) and altitude (some 1,100 km altitude) compared to the most recent HS-18 launch on December 18, 2023. Although the increased boost capability could be used to extend the HS-19’s range, the HS-18 can already cover anywhere in the United States from anywhere in North Korea. It is much more likely that the new missile’s increased capability will be used to boost a heavier payload. The payload. In the North Korean photos, the nozzles protruding from the bottom of the payload section, which remained in place after third-stage separation, are consistent with the presence of a PBV, a rocket-powered platform used to maneuver between drop-off locations for MIRVs. The PBV dispenses each reentry vehicle (RV) onto its own discrete trajectory toward a separate target. The payload of a MIRVed missile has to include the weight of the PBV and its propellant, not just that of the multiple RVs, and so a MIRV payload would be a good use for the increased boost capability of the HS-19. We do not know if the apparent PBV in the HS-19 test was operational or a dummy, if it carried actual RVs or payload simulators, if it maneuvered or was used for range extension, or if it released any RVs — although there is no reporting of unusual reentry objects. Although North Korea first mentioned interest in multiple warheads in January 2021 and conducted what it claimed was a MIRV test in June 2024 (that probably failed before RV release), it has yet to successfully demonstrate MIRV capability. The June test used a booster based on the first stage of the HS-16 solid-propellant intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), which is probably based on the first stage of the HS-18 and, according to North Korea, was intended to release three RVs and a decoy. This may be reflective of the payload intended for the HS-19. The weight of the payloads flown on the HS-18 and HS-19 is unknown. The increased payload capability of the HS-19 would more easily accommodate the 1960s-style heavier, blunter RVs that North Korea probably deploys on its ICBMs to have sufficient confidence they will survive reentry at operational ranges despite the lack of flight testing to such ranges. (All of the North’s ICBM tests to date have been highly lofted, with much shorter ranges than targets in the US.) If the HS-19 is larger in diameter than the HS-18, it would also better accommodate multiple such RVs. No sign of recent Russian assistance. Although some instant commentary attributed the greater performance of the October 31 launch over previous HS-18 launches to the recent receipt of technical assistance from Russia — even to the provision of “a key propellant component that can boost a missile’s engine thrust” — there is no open-source evidence of this occurring. Moreover, the increased performance of the new missile is fully explainable by the increased size of the HS-19, which is itself fully obtainable from the HS-18 technology base that was probably catalyzed some 7-10 years ago. That said, any assistance North Korea has or will obtain from Russia for its ICBM program is a continuing wildcard that could increase the capability, reliability, and/or timeliness of strategic missile developments. More tests to come. The apparent success of the first HS-19 test continues the impressive reliability demonstrated by North Korean solid-propellant ballistic missiles, even as such missiles have gotten larger in diameter and thus more challenging to produce with good quality control. One or two more successful flight tests would probably be sufficient in the eyes of the North Koreans to qualify the HS-19 booster for deployment. However, if the missile has a MIRV payload, this is a demanding technology, and at least several successful payload tests on the HS-19 over at least a few years are likely before North Korea operationally deploys MIRVs. Assistance from Russia could somewhat accelerate the timeline but would not obviate the likely need for at least a few successful MIRV flight tests. Likely to augment rather than replace. According to North Korean media, the HS-19 is intended to be used “along with Hwasongpho-18…as the primary core means in defending the DPRK.” It remains to be seen whether HS-19s carry MIRVs and HS-18s carry single RVs, but except perhaps for the deployment of extremely large, high-yield warheads, the HS-18 has enough range/payload capability to deliver single RVs to any place North Korea might reasonably want to target. North Korea is likely to deploy a mix of MIRV and single RV payloads to cover different missions and use scenarios, to hedge against the potential loss of multiple RVs on a single booster to reliability problems or enemy action, and to help manage the challenges of allocating a relatively limited number of nuclear weapons across a large number and variety of potential delivery systems. Moreover, the HS-19 is likely to share MIRV duty with the large, liquid-propellant HS-17 ICBM. The probable greater payload capability and larger diameter of the latter make it extremely well suited to carry MIRVs — and potentially more RVs and/or decoys per missile than the HS-19. Construction over the past year at North Korea’s key liquid-propellant strategic rocket engine production facility, the Thaesong Machine Factory, is consistent with a continuing role for liquid ICBMs. It will be survivable. Some have contended that the larger size of the HS-19 renders it too visible and too hard to move, imperiling its survivability. Although the length and weight of the HS-19 and its TEL will keep it from using some roads and off-road areas available to smaller North Korean mobile ICBMs, it will still be able to move out of garrison to remote locations and be camouflaged during a pre-war crisis period or in the run-up to any DPRK-initiated crisis or conflict. Once dispersed over hundreds of square miles of wooded terrain, the increased size of the HS-19 would not appreciably increase its detectability. If caught in garrison, even smaller mobile ICBMs would be highly vulnerable; the larger HS-19 is unlikely to be much worse off. As with the probably heavier (when fueled) HS-17, North Korea also has the option of putting the HS-19 on a rail-mobile launcher if it sees the need. What about the 12-axle TEL? Immediately after the October 31 launch, it was speculated that the new missile might have been launched from the new 12-axle TEL revealed in North Korean photos released in September 2024 in conjunction with factory visits by Kim Jong Un. Now that it is clear the HS-19 was launched from an 11-axle TEL (albeit one resembling the 12-axle vehicle rather than the type of 11-axle TEL used with the HS-17), the question remains of what system(s) the 12-axle TEL supports. As noted previously in 38 North, the new TEL could be used with a longer variant of the HS-17 or HS-18 (or now the HS-19), a space-launch vehicle, a space-launch version of an existing ICBM (which would have a longer payload section), or to improve the mobility of the existing HS-17. The Bottom Line The revelation of an apparent PBV on North Korean photos from the HS-19 test is consistent with the use of a MIRV payload. In a few years, with or without additional Russian help, North Korea is likely to complete MIRV development via the requisite flight testing, resulting in an ICBM force with more flexibility, able to cover more targets, and possessing a more robust second-strike capability.” (Vann H. Van Diepen, “North Korea Tests New Solid ICBM Probably Intended for MIRVs,” 38North, November 5, 2024)

11/1/24:
KCNA: “A press statement on strategic dialogue between Choe Son Hui, foreign minister of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Sergei Viktorovich Lavrov, foreign minister of the Russian Federation, was issued on November 1. The press statement says: “The relations between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation are growing stronger at a new strategic level in the spirit of the DPRK-Russia treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership concluded at the historic DPRK-Russia Pyongyang summit in June 2024. Against this backdrop, a strategic dialogue between Choe Son Hui, foreign minister of the DPRK, and Sergei Viktorovich Lavrov, foreign minister of the Russian Federation, took place in Moscow on November 1. Prior to the strategic dialogue, the two foreign ministers attended a ceremony held at Yaroslavl Railway Station to unveil the tablet to honor the first visit of Comrade Kim Il Sung, premier of the DPRK Cabinet, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in March 1949. At the strategic dialogue, there was an in-depth exchange of views on the practical issues for development of the bilateral relations, with the emphasis on implementing the agreements reached at the DPRK-Russia summit meeting during the DPRK visit of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, president of the Russian Federation, in June. Both sides reaffirmed their firm will to correctly implement the provisions of the treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership which put the traditional DPRK-Russia friendly relations on a new quality level. The exchange of views on major international issues confirmed that the two sides are unanimous in their assessment of the present international situation. The two sides expressed the common understanding that the root cause of ever-escalating tensions in the Korean peninsula, Northeast Asia and other parts of the world lies in the provocations of the U.S. and its vassal countries. The Russian side expressed full support for the measures taken by the DPRK leadership to deter the aggressive policy of the U.S. and its allies and ensure regional peace and stability. The strategic dialogue marked an important occasion of substantially contributing to comprehensively developing the bilateral relations in conformity with the comprehensive strategic partnership between the DPRK and the Russian Federation. The foreign ministers of the DPRK and Russia agreed to hold more dialogues between external policy organs of the two countries, including the ministerial strategic dialogue, at various levels.” (KCNA, “Press Statement on Strategic Dialogue between DPRK and Russian FMs Released,” November 2, 2024)

North Korea’s foreign minister, currently visiting Russia for talks, said the strategic value of her country’s relations with Russia holds greater importance in the severe international political landscape, the country’s state media reported Saturday. Choe Son-hui made the remarks during her speech at a ceremony unveiling a plaque honoring North Korean founder Kim Il Sung’s first official visit to the former Soviet Union, held at Moscow’s Yaroslavl Railway Station the previous day, according to KCNA. Choe said that thanks to the close relations between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin, “the strategic value and significance of the DPRK-Russia relations are given greater importance in the severe international political landscape.” The North Korean official also expressed the “belief” that Russia, courageously engaging in the “just” struggle for establishing a new international order, “would achieve a victory without fail” in its war against Ukraine, pledging support for the neighboring country. “The great friendship and unity” built between North Korea and Russia to attain the common objective “would be firmly carried forward and developed along with the new era of overall efflorescence,” she said. The KCNA report quoted Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who attended the ceremony, as saying in his speech that the cooperative relations between the two nations are accelerating to a new high across all fields. Lavrov referred to a recently signed treaty between their two nations pledging mutual defense, stating that “the treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership … has already entered the phase of practical implementation.” Choe has been in Russia on an official visit since October 29, as the North is confirmed to have dispatched troops to Russia for potential engagement in Russia’s war against Ukraine. The previous day, Choe held talks with Lavrov, stating that the current situation on the Korean Peninsula requires Pyongyang to make efforts to bolster its readiness against nuclear retaliation. (Park Boram, “N.K. FM: Strategic Value of Ties with Russia Gains Greater Importance in Severe Int’l Landscape,” Yonhap, November 2, 2024)

The Biden administration is turning to an unlikely interlocutor as North Korean troops move into combat position to help Russia in its war in Ukraine. To convey threats to North Korea, U.S. officials are talking to China. And American officials say they hope the conversations further stoke any suspicions China might feel about the troop deployment. The U.S. government has assessed that China is uneasy about the rapidly strengthening security partnership between Russia and North Korea. China is North Korea’s longtime ally and its most powerful economic and military partner, but the Russia-North Korea collaboration means Beijing has to increasingly share influence over Pyongyang with Moscow. And North Korea’s intervention in Ukraine draws Europe deeper into East Asian security matters, which China does not want. Yesterday, North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile, its first such test in almost a year, raising alarms among nations around the world. The State Department has raised the issue of the troops directly with Chinese officials in recent days, a senior administration official told The New York Times. The latest conversation took place on October 29, when Kurt Campbell, the deputy secretary of state, Daniel J. Kritenbrink, the department’s top Asia official, and James O’Brien, the top Europe official, all met with Chinese diplomats for several hours at the home of Ambassador Xie Feng in Washington. And Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke to Andriy Yermak, a top Ukrainian official, the same day about diplomatic efforts with China and other nations, the official said. Blinken said at a news conference yesterday that he expected Russia to send the North Koreans into combat “in the coming days,” and that they would be legitimate military targets once they were in battle. Asked about diplomacy with China on the troops, he said, “We had a robust conversation just this week, and I think they know well the concerns that we have and the expectations that, both in word and deed, they’ll use the influence that they have to work to curb these activities.” Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s national security adviser, has urged U.S. agencies to convey the concerns to China and stress potential consequences, a second U.S. official said. The official declined to give more details. The hope is that China will at the very least pass the message on to Kim Jong Un, the young autocrat leading North Korea, or try to get Kim to limit or halt the deployment. Even before news of the North Korean troops emerged in public, Blinken had raised the country’s growing partnership with Russia in recent meetings with Wang Yi, China’s top foreign policy official, the first U.S. official said. China and Russia have been getting closer themselves over many years. In February 2022, Beijing announced a “no limits” partnership with Moscow right before the Russian military’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. U.S. officials say China supports Russia’s war efforts by buying Russian oil and doing trade that has helped President Vladimir V. Putin rebuild his country’s defense industry, which is under severe American and European-led sanctions. So on the surface, it might seem that China would support the idea of North Korean troops fighting with Russia against Ukrainian soldiers. Yet China’s views on the issue are murky, and U.S. intelligence agencies are trying to figure out what China’s leader, Xi Jinping, and other top Chinese officials think of the deployment, which Biden has called “very dangerous.” American officials and analysts say the three nations with Communist roots are still ideologically aligned against the United States. But they also say China, as the most powerful nation in the group, is uneasy about the renewed bond between Russia and North Korea, which relies on China to prop up its isolated economy. And China could be irate if European nations get more involved in East Asian security issues — including on Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula — as a result of North Koreans fighting for Russia in Europe, analysts say. China opposes the United States encouraging its Atlantic and Pacific allies and partners to forge greater ties. If there is tension within China over the North Korean troop deployment, American officials would aim to exploit it. Matthew Miller, the State Department spokesman, told reporters on Wednesday that the United States had been talking directly to China “to make clear that we think this ought to be a source of concern for China as well as other countries in the region.” Last week, John F. Kirby, a White House spokesman, said: “We don’t know how President Xi and the Chinese are looking at this. One would think that — if you take their comments at face value about desiring stability and security in the region, particularly on the Korean Peninsula — one would think that they’re also deeply concerned by this development.” “But,” he added, “you can expect that we’ll be communicating with the Chinese about this and certainly sharing our perspectives to the degree we can — and gleaning theirs.” When asked to comment on the North Korea issue for this article, the Chinese Embassy in Washington referred to remarks by Lin Jian, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, at a news conference last week in Beijing. Answering a question about the North Korean troops, he reiterated China’s main talking point on the Ukraine war: “We hope all parties will promote the de-escalation of the situation and strive for a political settlement.” American officials also hope allies will express their concerns about North Korea to China. That includes European nations, Japan and South Korea, all of which have important trade ties with China. Yesterday, Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III spoke with their South Korean counterparts in Washington about the issue. “It would not be surprising if U.S. officials try to leverage North Korea’s provocation to shift the calculus of their Chinese counterparts,” said Ali Wyne, a senior researcher on U.S.-China relations at the International Crisis Group. The American goal, he added, would be “to underscore concerns that are likely growing in Beijing: that it may have overestimated its influence over Moscow and Pyongyang, and that those two care little about the reputational costs that it stands to incur should instability expand across Europe and Asia.” Yun Sun, the director of the China program at the Stimson Center, said she met with officials in China in September who had a “negative attitude” about Russia-North Korea relations. The general view, she said, is that Russia and North Korea have “selfish incentives that have acted against regional peace and stability, and that their alignment will only bolster their capabilities in such endeavors.” “More importantly,” she said, “the Chinese detestation of the Russia-North Korea rapprochement comes from the conviction that Kim Jong Un is ‘using Russia to poke China.’” China has approached North Korea with wariness in recent years. Chinese officials are disturbed by North Korea’s military provocations in Asia, including its frequent launches of ballistic missiles. China prefers that North Korea curb its robust nuclear weapons program, and it even joined Russia years ago in approving United Nations sanctions pushed by two American presidents against North Korea. More recently, China has helped North Korea evade some of those sanctions but remains uneasy about its nuclear program, analysts say. There is no doubt that Chinese officials will be watching to see whether Russia shares nuclear and space technology with North Korea in exchange for its troops. “From a Chinese perspective, you’re concerned about specific technologies that the Russians could help with to advance the program that much more,” said John Delury, a historian of modern China and the Cold War. “And there’s also intelligence sharing — this is a classic way that countries with this kind of partnership rapidly upgrade their relationship. If you’re China, you’re worried about Russia and North Korea sharing intelligence, which could include intelligence on China.” The consequences of North Korean troops fighting in Europe could be far-reaching. Besides possibly bringing Europe deeper into East Asian security discussions, it would most likely reinforce the growing military coalition of Japan, South Korea and the United States, which is aimed at countering both China and North Korea. On the other hand, any reservations Chinese officials might have about the North Korean troops could be minor next to the nation’s foreign policy priorities. Xi and Putin have formed a strong personal bond over the years, and China has given Russia diplomatic and economic aid throughout the Ukraine war, while stopping short of sending weapons directly to the Russian military. “North Korea’s provision of troops to Russia supports this top-tier priority, even though it also complicates Beijing’s efforts to stabilize relations with Seoul and Tokyo,” said Ryan Hass, a China expert at the Brookings Institution who was on the National Security Council during the Obama administration. “Any American judgment that the Russia-North Korea collaboration will create space to drive a wedge between China and Russia would be built on hope, not evidence,” he added. “China is deeply invested in its relationship with Russia. North Korea’s dispatch of troops is not going to diminish China’s decision to stand firmly behind Putin.” (Edward Wong, “U.S. Turns to China to Stop North Korea From Jumping Into Russia’s War,” New York Times, November 1, 2024, p. A-8)

South Korea today announced fresh sanctions targeting 11 North Korean individuals and four entities in response to the North’s latest launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) earlier this week. Seoul’s foreign ministry said the individuals are suspected of involvement in exports of North Korean weapons and related items, including five officials who worked for a company allegedly engaged in nuclear and missile development and earning money for the North Korean government. Choe Chol-min, a diplomat stationed in the North’s embassy in China, was included in the list for his role in procuring ballistic missile components and other dual-use items. The four entities are Tongbang Construction, Patisen S.A., the Kumrung Company and EMG Universal Auto, suspected of involvement in the North’s dispatch of its workers overseas to earn hard currency for the Kim Jong Un regime. Under multiple U.N. Security Council sanctions resolutions, member countries are prohibited from sales and transfers of goods to and from North Korea that can be used in weapons development. (Kim Seung-yeon, “S. Korea Imposes Sanctions on 11 N. Korean Individuals, 4 Entities over ICBM Launch,” Yonhap, November 1, 2024)

DPRK FoMin spokesperson’s statement titled “The DPRK will further intensify its practical efforts to deter the military threat of the hostile forces and maintain the balance of forces in the region” today: “The test-fire of the latest ICBM Hwasongpho-19 recently conducted by the DPRK constitutes a legitimate and just exercise of the right of a sovereign state to self-defense from A to Z as it is a part of the practical counteraction to the provocative reckless moves of the hostile forces to openly destroy peace and stability in the region around the Korean peninsula while blatantly challenging the sovereignty, security and interests of the DPRK. However, the U.S. and its vassal forces revealed their provocative intention to convene a meeting of the UNSC with an aim to seriously encroach upon the DPRK’s right to self-defense, not content with staging joint air drills of aggressive nature on the Korean peninsula and in its vicinity while viciously slandering its reasonable exercise of sovereignty. The Foreign Ministry of the DPRK expresses serious concern over the hostile forces’ confrontational behavior to create a critical situation against the security environment of the DPRK by means of illegal double standards and sophism just like a guilty party filling the suit first. It strongly denounces and rejects this as a wanton violation of the UN Charter and other recognized international laws with sovereign equality and non-interference in internal affairs as their core and a grave challenge to international peace and security. There is no such place on earth as the Korean peninsula where touch-and-go and acute nuclear confrontation continues and unilateral military provocations against a sovereign state and extremely malicious and provocative rhetorical threats like the “end of regime” are rampant. This year alone, the U.S. and the ROK have further detailed a dangerous nuclear war scenario while breeding various sorts of war plots more than 20 times to use nuclear weapons against the DPRK, including the third meeting of the “Nuclear Consultative Group” and the 5th meeting of the “Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group.” According to it, various strategic assets of the U.S. including the Theodore Roosevelt nuclear carrier task force, Bermont nuclear submarine and B-52H nuclear strategic bomber were deployed on the Korean peninsula and in its vicinity more than ten times and various forms of war drills against the DPRK including “Freedom Shield”, “Ulji Freedom Shield”, “Freedom Edge”, “Iron Mace”, “Nuclear Consultative Group simulation drill” and “Freedom Flag” were staged without a break this year. The reckless military confrontation racket kicked up by the hostile forces far beyond the sphere of stereotyped threat becomes a grave challenge to the DPRK’s right to security and a root cause of destroying the balance of power in Northeast Asia and Asia-Pacific region beyond the Korean peninsula. It is the steadfast strategic option and will of the DPRK to thoroughly deter the danger of outbreak of a nuclear war and powerfully control and manage the political and military situation in the region by countering the ever-dangerous military threat of the U.S. and its vassal forces with the overwhelmed and absolute power. The DPRK will perfectly defend its sovereign right, security and development interests under any circumstances and further intensify its practical efforts to ensure the permanent stability of the Korean peninsula and the region in a responsible manner and resolutely counter any threat and challenge in the present and future. The more provocative act the hostile forces take in defiance of the DPRK’s grave warning, the stronger counteraction they will face.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Spokesperson for DPRK Foreign Ministry,” November 2, 2024)

11/3/24:
South Korea’s military said it held joint air drills today with the United States and Japan, three days after North Korea fired an intercontinental ballistic missile that marked the longest-ever flight time for such a weapon from the country. In response to Pyongyang’s missile launch, the trilateral exercise took place in airspace where the air defense identification zones of Seoul and Tokyo overlap, north of South Korea’s southern island of Jeju, the military said. At least one U.S. Air Force B-1B strategic bomber participated, the military added. It marked the fourth time in 2024 that a U.S. strategic bomber has been deployed around the Korean Peninsula. The three nations conducted similar drills once earlier this year. Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s F-2 fighter jets and South Korean F-15s also joined Sunday’s exercise the military said, with fears growing that the North may carry out its seventh nuclear test in the near future following the latest ICBM launch. (Kyodo, “South Korea, U.S., Japan Run Joint Air Drills after North Korea ICBM Launch,” November 3, 2024)

11/4/24:
WPK Central Committee Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong’s press statement “Ever-escalating military threats of hostile forces only prove the validity of our line of bolstering up nuclear forces”: “The U.S., Japan and the ROK frantically staged a combined air drill targeting our Republic once again in front of us on November 3.Various fighter jets of the three countries, led by U.S. strategic bomber B-1B, were involved in the drill under the signboard of “counteraction” and “warning” to our latest strategic weapon test. They reportedly got familiar with the “mode of promptly and correctly striking” the simulated opponent’s core objects.The military gangsters of the ROK declared that they would further tighten the triangular military cooperation against us in the future, blustering “the drill showcased the strong countering will and capability based on the ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, as well as the integrated extended deterrence execution faculty of the ROK-U.S. alliance to counter and deter ever-escalating nuclear and missile threats from the north.” This is just another outright action-based explanation of the most hostile and dangerous aggressive nature of the enemy toward our Republic and, at the same time, another absolute proof of the validity and urgency of the line of building up the nuclear forces we have opted for and put into practice. Today upset of the balance of power between rivals on the Korean peninsula and in the region precisely means a war. And this is an undeniable objective reality. I point out once again that the U.S. and its followers held more than 20 rounds of various war confabs to map out plans for using nuclear weapons against our state this year alone and ceaselessly staged one hundred and tens of anti-DPRK military drills all the year round to implement them. The drastically increased number of war rehearsals like Freedom Edge, the first multi-domain joint military exercises between the U.S., Japan and the ROK, and Iron Mace, a nuclear operation drill simulating an all-out nuclear war on the Korean peninsula, posed a serious threat to not only our state but also regional peace and security. This year nuclear aircraft carrier strike groups, including the one of Theodore Roosevelt, were deployed near the Korean peninsula three times and the nuclear-powered strategic submarine Vermont made its first appearance in the ROK, while B-52H and other nuclear-capable strategic bombers flied in the sky above the Korean peninsula five times, updating once again the recent records of deployment of U.S. strategic assets. The critical security environment facing our state eloquently proves the inevitability of the strategic choice made by us to creditably defend our state’s security and regional peace from the U.S. and its followers’ aggressive and adventuristic military threats. The ever-escalating hysteric military threats of the rivals will further highlight the justness and urgency of our line and it will be implemented in corresponding dynamic and intensity. The line of bolstering up the self-defensive nuclear deterrent, being pursued by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, is the most correct, one and only choice made by it in the current situation, and we will never vacillate in that way.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Vice Department Director of WPK Central Committee Kim Yo Jong,” November 5, 2024)

11/5/24:
North Korea fired multiple short-range ballistic missiles into the East Sea on Tuesday, South Korea’s military said, in the latest saber-rattling just hours ahead of the U.S. presidential election. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the launches at about 7:30 a.m. from the Sariwon area in the western province of North Hwanghae, and they flew about 400 kilometers before splashing into the sea. A JCS official told reporters that the latest launches apparently involved the North’s KN-25 super-large 600-millimeter multiple rocket launchers. The weapon system is believed to be capable of striking anywhere in South Korea when fired from Sariwon. The official declined to specify the number of missiles fired, noting a detailed analysis is under way. The launches came five days after the North launched the new Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) — theoretically capable of reaching the U.S. mainland — into the East Sea on October 31. In response to last week’s launch, South Korea, the United States and Japan staged combined air drills, involving a U.S. B-1B bomber, over waters east of the southern island of Jeju on Sunday, according to the JCS. Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of the North’s leader, blasted the air exercise just before the latest launch, describing it as demonstrating the “most hostile and dangerous aggressive nature” of the enemy. North Korea has bristled against the deployment of U.S. strategic assets to and near the Korean Peninsula, accusing Washington of heightening tensions. Considering the timing of the latest launches, the JCS official said they were assessed to be a show of force against the combined air drills. The official said they also appeared to be threats against the South, considering the location of the launch and the North’s claim of the 600 mm multiple rocket launcher being nuclear capable. “It is not a location where it usually fires missiles,” the official said, noting they appeared to demonstrate North’s capabilities to launch a surprise missile attack against the South. (Chae Yun-hwan, “North Korea Fires Multiple Short-Range Ballistic Missiles Just ahead of U.S. Election,” Yonhap, November 5, 2024) At least seven short-range missiles flew a distance of 400 kilometers with an altitude of up to about 100 km after they were fired from North Korea’s west coast between around 7:30 a.m. and 7:39 a.m., the Japanese ministry said. The missiles fell outside Japan’s exclusive economic zone, in waters around the east coast of the Korean Peninsula. (Kyodo, “North Korea Launches Short-Range Missiles ahead of U.S. Election,” November 5, 2024)

A joint team of Air Force Global Strike Command Airmen and Navy aircrew launched an unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile equipped with multiple targetable re-entry vehicles from aboard the Airborne Launch Control System (ALCS) Nov. 5, 2024, at 11:01 p.m. Pacific Time from Vandenberg Space Force Base, California. Such tests have occurred over 300 times before, and this test is not the result of current world events. The ICBM’s reentry vehicle traveled approximately 4,200 miles to the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command’s Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site located within Republic of the Marshall Islands at the Kwajalein Atoll. Reagan Test Site sensors, including high-fidelity metric and signature radars, as well as optical sensors and telemetry, support the research, development, test and evaluation of America’s defense and space programs. The LG-35A Sentinel will replace the Minuteman III ICBM with an initial capability of 2029. Until full capability is achieved in the mid-2030s, the Air Force is committed to ensuring Minuteman III remains a viable deterrent. (Space Launch Delta 30 Public Affairs, “Minuteman III Test Launch Showcases Readiness of Nuclear Force’s Safe, Effective Deterrent,” November 6, 2024)

11/8/24:
Donald Trump’s election victory has sparked speculation about whether he will renew diplomacy with North Korea, but former U.S. officials say a fundamentally different global situation means we’re unlikely to see a repeat of the 2018-2019 summitry. During Trump’s first term, Washington’s engagement with Pyongyang was marked by extreme highs and lows, as the two sides moved from trading insults like “dotard” and “rocket man” to a series of high-profile summits, before fizzling into non-engagement. But while Trump has repeatedly emphasized his close friendship with Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s increasing nuclear testing will no longer be his “most urgent problem” when he returns to the White House, meaning Pyongyang is likely to play second fiddle to major conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. To get a sense of the incoming president’s probable approach to North Korea in his second term, NK News reached out to over a dozen former U.S. officials with knowledge of Washington’s inner workings. In the first part of a two-part series, seven ex-officials weigh in on Trump’s approach to North Korea’s denuclearization and personal engagement with Kim Jong Un. The nature of U.S.-DPRK relations has fundamentally changed since the start of Donald Trump’s first term, the former U.S. officials told NK News, calling into question whether the leader will prioritize diplomacy with Pyongyang. “At that time, North Korea was rattling its sabers by testing its nuclear weapons and launching missiles at a rapid pace,” said Edwin Sagurton Jr., a former political minister-counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. He stated that the Trump administration took his predecessor Barack Obama’s warning that Pyongyang was Washington’s “most urgent problem” very seriously when he took charge and immediately conducted an in-depth DPRK policy review. The new direction did not fundamentally differ much from the Obama administration, but Trump’s personal approach to implementation, including threatening to “totally destroy” North Korea and calling Kim Jong Un a “little rocket man,” spiked tensions on the Korean Peninsula and raised fears of conflict. Robert Abrams, a former commander of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), highlighted Trump’s clear policies and statements in his first term regarding strategic deterrence against North Korean weapons, when he warned that DPRK threats toward the U.S. would be met with “fire, fury and frankly power the likes of which this world has never seen before.” However, Kim and Trump completely reversed direction in 2018 as North Korea embarked on a series of summits with long-time friends and enemies alike, and in June, the two leaders made history with the first-ever U.S.-DPRK summit in Singapore. The follow-up summit in Hanoi in February 2019 stalled as the two sides reportedly failed to see eye-to-eye on crucial matters including denuclearization, and a hastily arranged meeting at the inter-Korean border four months later did little more than showcase their personal relationship. “Unfortunately, and as is often the case with North Korea, the meetings did not result in even an inch of progress in resolving the North Korean situation,” Sagurton stated. Abrams told NK News that nothing materialized from Trump’s attempted outreach in the months after he “rightfully walked away from a bad deal” in Vietnam, and Pyongyang’s “bellicose rhetoric” and ballistic missile tests only increased until it eventually sealed borders at the start of the pandemic in 2020. Former National Intelligence Officer for North Korea Sydney Seiler said it is unlikely either Trump or Kim will return to the direct engagement given all that has transpired since the Hanoi summit. “Kim Jong Un thought he had a way, enabled by the Moon [Jae-in] administration, to outsmart Trump, get sanctions relief for some marginally important actions limited to Yongbyon, and thus lock in permanently his nuclear power status,” he told NK News. “Trump also was fully aware of the dynamics in play at Hanoi, the North’s unwillingness to put anything on the table that could be called authentic or credible, and the fact that Pyongyang’s position on denuclearization has only hardened over time,” he added. Since the failed Hanoi summit, North Korea has eschewed engagement with South Korea and the U.S. and declared its nuclear status “irreversible,” and Seiler said Kim would prefer to be part of an “alternative world order” with “like-minded revisionist” countries like Russia, in which he does not need to worry about denuclearization and sanctions. Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Evans Revere told NK News that Donald Trump’s outreach convinced many that the nuclear and missile issues were being resolved but said the reality proved different. “Trump masterfully created the ‘appearance’ of progress where there was none. In fact, things got worse,” he said. He stated that the former U.S. president accepted Pyongyang’s preferred language and priorities during the Singapore summit and unilaterally suspended joint U.S.-ROK military drills, but North Korea pushed ahead with missile tests and nuclear development despite Trump’s claims to the contrary. “The Trump-Kim diplomacy ultimately ended in failure at the Hanoi Summit when Trump realized that the North Korean leader had no intention of giving up his core nuclear weapons production capabilities,” he said. Frank Aum, a former senior adviser at the Department of Defense, said the changed security landscape since 2018 and Pyongyang’s opposition to negotiations make U.S.-DPRK engagement on denuclearization more difficult. Following reports last year that Trump may seek alternative approaches to encourage North Korea to freeze nuclear and missile testing, the former official said the incoming president will have to weigh various options. These include considerations about which side should make the first move toward engagement, whether “saber-rattling” is necessary to create leverage, the possibility of “unilateral conciliatory gestures” and whether to stick to the goal of “complete denuclearization.” The DPRK has consistently rejected denuclearization negotiations with the U.S. over the past five years, and former officials were divided on whether Trump’s self-proclaimed personal friendship with Kim could open the door for renewed diplomacy. “With the caveat that Donald Trump is unpredictable, I expect he would again try to meet with Kim Jong Un and to strike a deal he could claim as a personal achievement,” former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Non-Proliferation Mark Fitzpatrick told NK News. He said Trump views the Singapore summit as a “huge success” despite the lack of subsequent progress, but that it remains to be seen what he can achieve with a repeat. “Kim certainly won’t give up nuclear weapons, but he might again offer to close down the Yongbyon nuclear center in exchange for lifting U.N. sanctions,” he said. Fitzpatrick added that Trump will be “unfettered, for better or worse,” in his second term thanks to the absence of hawks like John Bolton, who reportedly opposed partial measures at Hanoi. “While North Korea won’t be the top item on his agenda by any means, it would rank higher under him than it has under President Biden,” he said. “The era of strategic patience is probably closing.” Seiler suggested Trump could pursue a surprise summit with Kim, even if it is only “exploratory.” He added that the media will likely blow such moves out of proportion and South Korea will fear the prospect of Washington bypassing it to engage Pyongyang directly, but that ultimately it comes down to Trump. “Would Trump appear to be cheapening diplomacy and the position of the president? Yes, because his view of both is different,” he said. He explained that Trump would take a different track from Joe Biden and Barack Obama’s “strategic patience” approach, and if he downscales military exercises and displays of extended deterrence, North Korea’s leadership may have fewer pretexts for “chest-thumping shows of force.” “If [foreign minister] Choe Son Hui convinces Kim Jong Un to allow some ‘creative’ diplomacy such as attending the U.N. General Assembly, exploring Track 1.5 opportunities, etc., perhaps we will have spurts of dialogue: meaningless, but near-cost-free,” he said. Revere also said Trump’s “penchant for diplomatic showmanship” could tempt him into reviving diplomacy, but added that the former president will soon find that the situation has completely changed. “Kim is likely to see an opportunity to exploit Trump’s naivete and ego and trap him into a deal that effectively accepts the DPRK as a de facto nuclear power by launching ‘arms control’ talks, and also puts U.S. nuclear and conventional assets and the U.S.-ROK alliance on the negotiating table.” The former State Department official said some in the new administration will look to “control” or “limit” North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, but emphasized Pyongyang will not follow through on any promises it makes in return for concessions. “Of course the DPRK has no intention of freezing or otherwise limiting its nuke program,” he said. “Have we learned nothing from 32 years of negotiations?” Aum also said Trump will likely attempt to restart personal diplomacy. “Trump has experience addressing the North Korea challenge, a greater willingness to shun convention and engage Kim Jong Un than most world leaders, and a desire to achieve foreign policy legacies,” he stated. Despite Trump’s personal rapport with Kim, several officials said the president could be too distracted by other concerns to focus on diplomacy with North Korea in a second term. Aum suggested Trump will likely have to limit his engagement with the DPRK due to challenges such as China, Russia and the Middle East. Van Jackson, an Obama-era Pentagon official and a professor of international relations at Victoria University of Wellington, said North Korea likely ranks low on the incoming U.S. president’s priority list, but that this does not preclude “reality TV show”-style engagement. “I’m confident Trump doesn’t care about Kim Jong Un, but if Kim is willing to make overtures again — possibly with Russia’s support — it’s possible Trump will entertain kayfabe-type summit diplomacy again,” he said. Jackson said Trump could offer concessions such as withdrawing U.S. forces from South Korea as part of a “peace bargain,” but if tensions flare, there is also a risk of Kim embarrassing Trump with nuclear tests, military incursions or aggressive rhetoric. “There are scenarios where we end up in a nuclear crisis not so much because of Trump but because of the national security state being so readily prepositioned to coerce and meet force with force,” he said, adding that Trump’s probable administration of “ethno-nationalist and imperialist” hawks could impede cooperation with allies. Former USFK commander Abrams said it’s unlikely anyone can predict Trump’s approach, but suggested ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East will dominate Trump’s security agenda at first. “I expect Trump to pick up where he left off with North Korea when he left office in Jan. 2021 — which is to say I don’t think it will be a top priority to restart personal diplomacy with Kim Jong Un,” he said. Sagurton agreed that the “unpredictable” leader is unlikely to focus on the DPRK as much as he did the first time around, given other global conflicts and the current South Korean government’s reluctance to engage Pyongyang. “The bottom line is that Trump gave his personal charm and negotiating skills the best shot during his first term and he will be hesitant to try it again,” he said. Based on Pyongyang’s own unwillingness to engage with Washington and Seoul in recent years and its “hostile acts” toward South Korea, Sagurton said it is hard to be optimistic about a change of direction. However, he added that there is still some scope for engagement and Pyongyang could use its support for Russia’s war against Ukraine as a bargaining chip to help Trump address interconnected challenges. “The North has a history of changing course when it is least expected … so it might look at the return of Trump as a tempting opportunity to give engagement another try,” he said. (Chad O’Carroll and Shreyas Reddy, “Why North Korean Denuclearization Will Take a Back Seat in Second Trump Term,” NKNews, November 8, 2024)

During his 2024 election campaign, Donald J. Trump described the United States’ alliance with South Korea as a terrible bargain for his country, accusing the Asian ally of not paying enough for the 28,500 American troops stationed on its soil. But when he mentioned Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea who has threatened to use nuclear weapons against the South, he talked as if Kim were a long-lost friend. “It’s nice to get along when somebody has a lot of nuclear weapons or otherwise,” Trump said about Kim in July. “He’d like to see me back, too. I think he misses me, if you want to know the truth.” South Koreans are bracing themselves for Trump’s return to the White House with growing anxiety and uncertainty, as it raises the specter of the diplomatic roller coaster ride on the Korean Peninsula they endured during his first term. Some fear that Trump will once again threaten to withdraw American troops from South Korea unless it greatly increases its share of the costs, and that he will rekindle an ill-calculated diplomatic bromance with Kim. “South Korea-U.S. relations will sail into a storm,” said Lee Byong-chul, a North Korea expert at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul. “But we will likely see Kim Jong Un and Trump exchanging love letters again.” North Korea has not reacted to Trump’s election. But analysts say Kim may see it as an opportunity to restart negotiations with the United States — with more bargaining power than he wielded when he first met Trump. Between then and now, North Korea’s nuclear and missile abilities have expanded significantly, allowing Kim to demand a higher price tag for making a concession on his nuclear program, the analysts said. After launching a new Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile last week, Kim said North Korea would “never change its line of bolstering up its nuclear forces.” South Korean officials warned that Kim may even conduct his country’s seventh nuclear test, which would be its first since 2017, to further elevate his leverage before negotiating with Trump. Trump will most likely begin his second term with more political clout, too, after a big election win and with the Republicans on track to control both chambers of Congress, though he also faces foreign policy challenges including the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine. If he takes on North Korea, he will confront a decades-old riddle that successive American governments have tried to solve but failed. The last time he did, he veered between applying pressure and unleashing insults against Kim to friendlier toned, one-on-one diplomacy, but he, too, failed. If Kim and Trump were to restart talks, Kim would be widely expected to try to persuade Trump to ease sanctions and reduce the American military footprint on the peninsula in return for freezing North Korea’s long-range ballistic missile program and limiting — but not eliminating — its nuclear arsenal. For decades, Washington and its allies have pushed for a “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement” of North Korea’s nuclear program. “Kim Jong Un wants the United States to accept his nuclear weapons as a fait accompli and engage him in arms-reduction talks,” said Cheon Seong-whun, a former head of the Seoul-based Korea Institute for National Unification. “If such negotiation happens, it will cause shock and confusion in South Korea because it will be tantamount to recognizing North Korea as a nuclear weapons power.” Trump and Kim spent much of 2017 exchanging personal insults and threats of nuclear war. Trump threatened to rain down “fire and fury” and “totally destroy” North Korea in the aftermath of its nuclear and long-range ballistic missile tests. He sent long-range bombers and aircraft carriers toward the peninsula to warn Kim, whom he referred to as the “little Rocket Man.” Kim called Trump a “mentally deranged U.S. dotard.” Then they did an about-face, meeting in Singapore in 2018 in the first summit meeting between their nations. Trump facilitated his diplomacy with Kim by canceling or scaling down joint military drills with South Korea, which had long symbolized the alliance’s will to deter North Korea and, more recently, China. Trump later said he and the North Korean dictator “fell in love.” South Koreans had watched their meetings with both skepticism and hope, many wishing that the two leaders would negotiate a history-making peace deal on the peninsula, one of the world’s most enduring flash points since the 1950-53 Korean War ended with a truce and left the two sides technically at war. But negotiations between Trump and Kim fell apart in 2019, as they disagreed on how far North Korea should roll back its nuclear program in return for relief from international sanctions that Kim badly needed for economic development. Kim has since found a new way, rapidly expanding his nuclear arsenal while cutting off all dialogue with Washington and Seoul. He also forged a new alliance with Russia, shipping both weapons and troops to aid in its war against Ukraine. Since he took office in 2022, President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea has worked with the Biden administration to restore and expand the joint military drills involving the allies. He will find his legacy at risk if Trump again diminishes those military exercises, which he has called “very expensive,” and resumes diplomacy with Kim at a time when North Korea has rejected South Korea as a dialogue partner. When Trump talked with Yoon on the phone on November 7, he showed “interest in North Korea,” kicking off discussions of the country, including its recent missile tests and its offensive of “trash balloons” sent into South Korea, Yoon said. The two leaders agreed to meet soon, he added. South Korea’s leader said American politicians told him that he and Trump may share “chemistry,” perhaps because both entered politics after spending a lifetime in other fields. Trump and Kim appeared to have such chemistry when they first met in Singapore, reveling in the global publicity their rare meeting generated. But their second summit, in 2019 in Hanoi, Vietnam, proved an extraordinary embarrassment for Kim, whose propagandists had built up expectations at home that he would achieve a monumental deal with the United States. Instead, he risked looking weak by returning empty-handed. Although the two leaders met a third time — when Trump became the first sitting U.S. president to set foot in North Korea by briefly crossing the demarcation line with the South — the dialogue petered out and Kim later declared he had no interest in further talks. “This time, he will be more careful, trying to set strict preconditions for meetings, in order not to repeat the humiliation of the first round of negotiations with Trump,” said Park Won-gon, a political scientist at Ewha Womans University in Seoul. Complicating matters for South Korea and its leader is Trump’s tendency to see alliances in transactional terms. Trump has said that if he won the election, he would make Seoul pay $10 billion for keeping U.S. troops in South Korea. It currently pays a little over $1 billion, having signed an agreement with the Biden administration to increase its annual contribution to $1.13 billion by 2026. “They have a money machine,” Trump told Bloomberg last month. “We protect them from North Korea and from other people.” Trump could make more South Koreans wonder how much and for how long they can rely on the alliance for their defense and ask whether they should also build nuclear weapons to deter North Korea. Around 70 percent of South Koreans already believed that their country should have its own nuclear weapons, according to surveys. “The more likely Trump’s re-election, the more likely our fears will be realized that we will confront nuclear-armed North Korea alone and without nuclear weapons,” Park In-kook, South Korea’s former ambassador to the United Nations, said during a forum in July. Yoon once warmed up to the idea of arming South Korea with nuclear weapons. But he shelved that option last year when he and President Biden signed the “Washington Declaration,” in which South Korea recommitted itself to nonproliferation while the United States reaffirmed its promise to protect its ally with all its military resources, including nuclear. “Trump will turn the Washington Declaration into a piece of waste paper,” said Cheong Seong-chang, a senior analyst at the Sejong Institute in South Korea. “South Korea will have to have a fundamental review of its diplomatic and security policies. And we will see more South Koreans supporting nuclear armament.” (Choe Sang-hun, “South Koreans Worry That Trump Will Rekindle Warm Ties With Kim,” New York Times, Nov. 12, 2024, p. A-7)

11/9/24:
North Korea staged GPS jamming attacks for the second consecutive day today, affecting several ships and dozens of civilian aircraft, South Korea’s military said. The jamming attacks were conducted in the North’s Haeju and Kaesong areas, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said, warning vessels and civilian aircraft operating in the Yellow Sea to beware of the attacks. Military operations and equipment were not affected, according to the JCS. The latest threat came three days after the South’s military detected a similar movement November 5. The GSP jamming attacks this week, however, involved a weaker signal compared with the multiple attacks the North conducted near the northwestern border areas between May 29 and June 2, according to a JCS official. In June, South Korea raised the North’s repeated GPS jamming with three relevant international agencies — the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) — requesting due measures to be taken for the provocations. (Lee Minji, “North Korea Jams GPS Signals, Affecting Ships, Civilian Aircraft: JCS,” Yonhap, November 9, 2024)

11/11/24:
KCNA: “The “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation”, which was concluded in Pyongyang on June 19, 2024, was ratified as a decree of the President of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The DPRK head of state signed the decree on November 11, 2024. The treaty will take effect from the day when both sides exchanged the ratification instruments.” (KCNA, “Treaty on DPRK-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Ratified,” November 12, 2024)

South Korea’s defense minister told lawmakers today there were no signs that the North tested a new rocket engine before launching the Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) last month, raising suspicions that it received technical assistance from Russia amid mounting military cooperation between the two countries. Speaking at a meeting of the National Assembly’s Defense Committee, Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun said that “signs of the North conducting an engine test were not detected” and that the possibility that Moscow provided Pyongyang with the technology to leapfrog development of the new ICBM “could not be ruled out.” Launches of previously untested missiles by the North have typically been preceded by announcements from its state media about combustion tests for new engine systems. South Korean and U.S. military intelligence have also discerned whether the North tested new propulsion systems through satellite images of the regime’s Sohae Satellite Testing Ground in Dongchang-ri, North Pyongan Province. However, South Korean military intelligence said it detected no such signs ahead of the launch of the Hwasong-19 ICBM, which the North’s state media described as the “ultimate” addition to its long-range missile series. The last test detected by the South’s military took place on March 20, when the North’s state media said the regime had conducted a ground test of a solid-fuel engine for a new type of intermediate-range hypersonic missile. In its report, the DIA said the possibility of the North receiving support from Russia “regarding technologies that can be applied to the development of ballistic missiles under the guise of ‘space technology cooperation’ cannot be ruled out.” (Michael Lee, “Russia May Have Help North Korea Develop New ICBM: South’s Defense Chief,” JoongAng Ilbo, November 11, 2024)

Despite leading his party to big losses in a snap general election last month, Ishiba Shigeru, the prime minister of Japan, won a vote in Parliament today to carry on as the country’s leader. Ishiba, whose Liberal Democratic Party lost its parliamentary majority for the first time in 15 years, will effectively lead a minority government. The result puts Ishiba in a precarious position as his government continues to deal with the aftermath of a political finance scandal, along with inflation, labor shortages and the increasing burdens of an aging population. Analysts said Ishiba could struggle to survive in the long term, putting Japan at risk of returning to a revolving door of prime ministers just as it prepares to grapple with increased unpredictability in the United States, its most important international ally, following the re-election of Donald Trump as president. In a runoff election with the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party, Japan’s largest opposition group, Ishiba defeated Noda Yoshihiko, a former prime minister, 221 to 160. Ishiba was first elected prime minister in September. Although the Constitutional Democrats made significant gains in last month’s election, they did not win a majority in the lower house of Parliament, which would have given them the right to select the prime minister. With seven other small opposition parties fielding leadership candidates, Noda could not amass enough unified support to unseat Ishiba. With nearly one in five members of the lower house declining to cast a vote for either candidate in the runoff, Ishiba has a fragile hold on power. At a news briefing late this evening, Ishiba said that the minority government “may be desirable for democracy,” as the various parties would have to consult more closely. “Please don’t misunderstand,” he said. “It’s not that I’m saying it’s desirable that the ruling bloc lost the majority, but it’s desirable because the discussions will become in-depth and intricate and detailed.” The prime minister also vowed to revise political finance laws in Japan to increase transparency and supervision. Ever since he was first chosen as leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, Ishiba’s approval ratings have steadily declined. With upper house elections coming next summer, the Liberal Democrats “may try to change the book cover” and push out Ishiba in favor of another leader, said Nakabayashi Mieko, a professor of politics at Waseda University in Tokyo. The domestic political instability could undermine Japan’s international leadership role at a time its steadying hand could be necessary. Under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan was able to act as a stabilizer in the Pacific in part because Abe was in office for most of Trump’s first term. During that time, Japan helped resuscitate the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a broad trade pact from which Trump withdrew on his first weekday in office in 2017. Japan spearheaded the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific, embraced by several democratic allies around the Pacific Rim to cooperate in holding back territorial expansion by China in the South China Sea. Japan also invested in infrastructure projects in Southeast Asian countries as a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which enlisted China’s economic might to enhance its geopolitical interests. If Ishiba heralds an era of short-term prime ministers, that instability could “have a direct impact on Japan’s ability to exert leadership in foreign policy,” said Phillip Lipscy, professor of political science and director of the Centre for the Study of Global Japan at the University of Toronto. “Given that Ishiba is in such a precarious domestic political situation, it makes it much more challenging for Japan to formulate an effective strategy in managing what’s likely to be an extremely volatile period in U.S.-Japan relations coming up,” Lipscy said. In his remarks to the press, Ishiba said that his government “needs to make sure it’s not going to be a face-to-face clash” between American and Japanese interests when Trump resumes office. “We need to make sure there is going to be a synergy for each other and that Japan can make a proposal for peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region,” Ishiba said. A scandal ruffled the election today after a tabloid magazine reported that Tamaki Yuichiro, leader of the Democratic Party for the People, which analysts had speculated might join the Liberal Democrats in a coalition government, had recently had an extramarital affair. In a hastily called news conference this morning, Tamaki acknowledged the liaison and said he had gotten “carried away” and “had reflected on it very much.” The revelations seemed to have had little effect on his performance in the leadership election, in which all members of his party voted for him as prime minister in the lower house during a first round of voting. In the run-up to the leadership vote, Tamaki had publicly said he would not join a coalition government. Instead, he touted his intention to push Ishiba and the Liberal Democrats to accept some of his top policy priorities in exchange for his party’s support in other legislative votes. Tamaki’s top agenda item is to push for an increase in a minimum tax deduction that would enlarge take-home pay for taxpayers. In a press briefing at the end of last month, Hayashi Yoshimasa, the chief cabinet secretary, said this initiative could lose as much as 8 trillion yen — about $52 billion — in tax revenues, or the equivalent of the Defense Ministry’s entire annual budget. Analysts said that given the Liberal Democrats’ weak position, they will accommodate Tamaki’s proposals, even if the marital scandal might momentarily taint him. “Tamaki had been very adamant,” said Kohno Masaru, a political scientist at Waseda University in Tokyo. “I don’t think this is going to affect the way that the Democratic Party for the People is going to conduct its business.” A budget compromise resulting in a decline in tax revenues could undermine Japan’s commitment to raise its defense budget to more than 2 percent of its gross domestic product. That could cast a shadow over future conversations with Trump, who during his first presidential administration repeatedly harangued Japan and other allies for not paying what he considered to be enough for their own defense. Political experts had said that Japan’s defense budget increase could help ameliorate some of Trump’s critique. “If you’re going to keep on increasing outlays, at some point revenues have to increase to offset that,” said Nakano Koichi, a visiting scholar at the Weatherhead Program on U.S.-Japan Relations at Harvard University. “And currently it is not clear where those revenues are going to come from.” Nakano said that the Liberal Democrats might use the re-election of Trump as a justification for bolstering their power again. It is “an excuse that there is no time for unstable, unpredictable weak government in Japan,” said Nakano. “Forget about the voters pronouncing a clear rejection of the L.D.P.,” he added. Nakano predicted that the party and its media proxies were likely to say: “This is not the time for that.” (Motoko Rich and Hisako Ueno, “Ishiba Is Still on Thin Ice, Despite His Win to Stay As Japan’s Prime Minister,” New York Times, November 12, 2024, p. A-6)

The impending return of Donald Trump and his “transactional” approach to alliances could drastically alter Washington’s approach to combating North Korean threats in his second term, former U.S. officials tell NK News. In particular, continuing reports of North Korean troop deployments to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine highlight the interconnected global threats that Trump will face, with finding a resolution to the Ukraine war likely to be the incoming leader’s biggest priority. However, unlike his predecessor Joe Biden, Trump’s personal affinity for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un suggests he could seek a solution that benefits Moscow, according to the former U.S. officials. This would eliminate its need for North Korean support and give him leverage over Pyongyang. At the same time, Trump will likely squeeze South Korea and Japan for additional payments for troops support, though this could empower South Korean advocates for nuclear armament, the officials say. To understand the incoming president’s probable approach to balancing old alliances and new global threats, NK News reached out to over a dozen former U.S. officials with knowledge of Washington’s inner workings. In the second part of a two-part series, seven ex-officials weigh in on Trump’s approach to countering DPRK-Russia cooperation and working with allies like South Korea and Japan to deter North Korea. Since Donald Trump’s first term in office, North Korea has gone down a few pegs on Washington’s priority list due to crises in other parts of the world, most notably Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. North Korea’s support for Moscow’s war efforts through alleged arms exports and troop deployments has now inextricably linked the two challenges, but Trump’s biggest concern will likely remain the conflict in Ukraine, according to Edwin Sagurton Jr., a former political minister-counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. “While North Korea’s support for Russia in its invasion of Ukraine as well as other North Korea-Russian cooperation are troublesome, addressing this will not be a top priority for Trump, whose focus will most likely be directed at Putin and Zelensky,” he told NK News. Evans Revere, former principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said North Korea seeks Russian military technologies in exchange for sending munitions and troops. “For Kim, the risks he is taking with Russia are worth the reward of getting the tools, technologies and the support he will need to survive in the hostile environment he anticipates,” he stated, highlighting growing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and shifting alliances across the Indo-Pacific region. “Ironically, a second Trump presidency may offer Kim a chance to buy the time he needs to grow stronger, especially if he can convince the United States to come to the negotiating table and accept, as it has before, Pyongyang’s false and insincere promises,” Revere added. However, some officials believe Trump could see an opportunity in the combined challenge from Russia and North Korea. “Trump probably sees the issue from the demand side rather than the supply side,” former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Non-Proliferation Mark Fitzpatrick told NK News. “If he can stop the Ukraine war, there would be no need for North Korean troops, artillery and missiles in that theater.” Despite Pyongyang abandoning efforts toward “normalization” with Washington in favor of closer Russia ties, the former U.S. official said Kim Jong Un would not be averse to dealing with Trump if he sees scope for “gifts,” such as a halt to U.S.-ROK joint exercises. Revere agreed that Trump could try to counter DPRK-Russia cooperation by trying to bring about an end to the war with a “peace proposal” designed to suit Moscow’s needs. “Trump’s plan may be to bring about an end to Putin’s war against Ukraine on terms favorable to Moscow, thereby eliminating the need to compensate North Korea for its military support in the form of sensitive military technologies,” he said. Robert Abrams, former commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), told NK News that North Korea’s increasing cooperation with Russia underscores its abandonment of engagement with the U.S. But if Trump can follow through on his bold claim that he can resolve the Ukraine war in a day, it would drastically alter Washington’s dealings with Moscow and Pyongyang, he added. “A cessation of hostilities and movement toward a peaceful settlement between Russia and Ukraine would likely reduce the importance of the North Korea-Russia partnership in the eyes of Moscow,” he said. Former National Intelligence Officer for North Korea Sydney Seiler warned that Trump’s emphasis on ending the war quickly will “inflame concerns he will work out something quickly with Putin while abandoning Zelensky” so that the White House can turn its attention to China. “We sense Trump’s team views the Ukraine crisis as draining and distracting,” he told NK News. “One can imagine Trump as seeking Moscow’s cooperation on curtailing cooperation with North Korea as part of a package settlement to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.” However, Seiler added that the U.S. has little leverage to intervene beyond a deal with Moscow, and is unlikely to offer incentives to Pyongyang to withdraw troops. Trump’s personal support for Putin’s strategy could open the door for greater engagement with Pyongyang, according to Van Jackson, an Obama-era Pentagon official and a professor of international relations at Victoria University of Wellington. “Trump likes Russia, North Korea is aligned with Russia, so it’s possible North Korea is on the positive side of the coming Trump administration,” he said. Jackson suggested Trump could try to broker a deal for North Korean troops’ withdrawal from Ukraine but that he will be constrained by Washington’s existing policies to “monitor, sanction and constrain North Korea.” Frank Aum, a former senior advisor at the Department of Defense, said North Korea’s alliance with Russia gives it greater “leverage” than during the Kim-Trump summits in 2018-19, which it could use to seek greater benefits including sanctions relief. “North Korea has historically been savvy enough to hedge its bets and not put all its eggs in one basket,” he told NK News. “Recognizing that the benefits derived from Russia may not last, North Korea may be open to initial talks with the United States to see whether Trump’s offer has improved in the intervening years.” To reduce Pyongyang’s leverage and incentivize a return to dialogue, Trump would seek a quick end to the Ukraine conflict and then look to make a deal with North Korea to lower tensions and remove its need for military development, Aum added. In addition to distancing himself from his predecessor Joe Biden’s approach to Russia and North Korea, Trump has repeatedly signaled a different direction to cooperation with allies. Biden prioritized coordination with South Korea and Japan to deter North Korean threats, but Jackson said trilateralism will likely “languish, or at least become perfunctory,” under the next administration. He said Trump could pursue a policy of “extortion or abandonment” to convince allies to cough up more money for U.S. military support, particularly from countries he views as “freeriders,” like South Korea and Japan.” Abrams said the likely direction regarding cost-sharing is evident in the Project 2025 conservative road map favored by many in the Trump camp, which calls on U.S. allies to “take far greater responsibility for their conventional defense.” “It is entirely possible for the Trump administration to revisit all existing burden-sharing agreements, not just with the ROK,” he stated. The road map also specifically calls on Seoul to take the lead in conventional defense against the DPRK, but Abrams noted that this is already the case. Aum said South Korea’s move to reach an early cost-sharing deal with the Biden administration may amount to naught as Trump previously pulled out of other agreements. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s “hawkish” approach advocating stronger pressure on Pyongyang could also conflict with Trump’s vision of personal engagement with Kim Jong Un and give the incoming U.S. president leverage to ask for greater compensation from Seoul, according to the former Pentagon senior advisor. “U.S. diplomacy with North Korea doesn’t necessarily exclude some of these pressure tactics, at least initially, but these will be competing forces at some point that the two allies will have to reconcile,” he said. Revere similarly said that a push to reopen cost-sharing negotiations with Seoul and Trump’s threats to withdraw U.S. forces will concern the Yoon administration. “How U.S.-South Korea alliance ties develop under Trump will largely depend on whether he intends to resume his attacks on Seoul over its contributions to the upkeep of U.S. forces, and whether he still has doubts about the value of the alliance,” he said. The former diplomat added that the future of the U.S.-ROK-Japan alliance will depend on Trump’s willingness to honor the Biden administration’s “unprecedentedly strong security commitments and assurances,” and warned that the incoming president “would be foolish in extreme” to abandon the trilateral partnership in the face of threats from North Korea, Russia and China. Former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Non-Proliferation Fitzpatrick said U.S. officials will likely try to promote continuing trilateral cooperation and NATO-type nuclear sharing agreements, but warned that Trump’s financial motivations could change the nuclear status quo. “Given his transactional approach to alliances, Trump likely will again push both the ROK and Japan to sharply increase their financial support for US forces,” he said. “If they don’t agree, he will be inclined to lessen U.S. commitments and to encourage them, at least implicitly, to defend themselves by acquiring their own nuclear weapons,” he added. The U.S. diplomat Sagurton similarly warned that Trump’s policies could lend weight to South Korean conservatives’ push to acquire nuclear weapons. “The net effect of Trump’s approach would likely lead South Koreans to question how committed the U.S. is to defending South Korea specifically and the U.S.-South Korea alliance more broadly, and will encourage some South Koreans to again call for the South to go nuclear,” he said. The former State Department official Revere also warned that Washington could reduce its emphasis on the alliance as Trump turns his attention to Chinese threats. “Future signals from the Trump administration that it is not prepared to live up to the strong extended deterrence commitments made by President Biden, or signs that Trump seeks to deemphasize the U.S.-ROK alliance, would further encourage those advocating a nuclear South Korea,” he added. Trump could “directly or indirectly” encourage the ROK to go down the nuclear path in order to take greater responsibility for its own defense, Seiler stated. Jackson echoed similar concerns that Trump would support a South Korean bid to go nuclear in order to get U.S. troops out of South Korea. “It would make South Korea look really bad, but it would also be an excuse in Trump’s mind to stop being the sucker providing protection to this country that can obviously defend itself,” he added. Aum stated that any deal between Trump and Pyongyang that falls short of “complete denuclearization” will only add to calls within South Korea to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He added that Trump’s “transactional” approach fuels concerns that the U.S. cannot be counted on to fulfill extended deterrence commitments, while Trump has previously called for more countries to possess nuclear weapons. “Trump has demonstrated a willingness and track record of operating outside of the conventional policy windows,” he said. “The bottom line is that President Trump could open greater possibilities for different deals, but these possibilities would introduce more risk.” (Chad O’Carroll and Shreyas Reddy, “How the Ukraine War Could Play into Trump’s Plans to Counter North Korea,” NKNews, November 11, 2024)

11/12/24:
President-elect Donald Trump’s high-stakes, unpredictable leadership could bring new “costs” to South Korea while giving allies a rare chance to translate decisions swiftly into action with greater momentum, a high-level Seoul official said today. “One risk factor lies in the increased uncertainty associated with President-elect Trump’s leadership style, which amplifies unpredictability,” a high-level Foreign Ministry official said during a closed-door press briefing, responding to The Korea Herald’s question on the risks and opportunities of Trump’s second term. “His fundamental strategy is to enhance the US’ bargaining power by increasing leverage through uncertainty, regardless of whether the counterpart is an ally, a friendly country or a hostile state. This approach may lead to costs for us rather than posing a risk factor,” the official said. However, the official noted that opportunities still exist for US allies under a second Trump term. “The opportunity lies in areas where Korea and the US are fully aligned, without any political nuances or differing opinions. In such cases, action can be taken more swiftly,” the official said. “There is a possibility that the usual complex considerations may be simplified compared to past (US) administrations. If (allies’) interests align, this could allow for us to take quicker, more decisive actions. I have a tentative sense that this could be the case.” At the same briefing, Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul highlighted that Trump’s policy emphasis on an expanded role and security contributions from allied nations aligns well with South Korea’s vision of a “global pivotal state,” committed to fulfilling responsibilities that match its national strength and status. Cho added that the Trump administration’s first term and the Yoon administration share strong alignment in their Indo-Pacific strategy. “The Foreign Ministry intends to further strengthen cooperation with a second Trump administration through detailed policy coordination based on these policy alignments,” Cho said. When asked by Korea Herald about the Foreign Ministry’s alliance-related priorities for discussions with the incoming Trump administration, the unnamed official said the ministry would concentrate on areas where Trump’s second term is expected to diverge from Biden’s approach. “We will identify areas where the Trump administration differentiates itself from the Biden administration regarding the Korea-US alliance. Then, the focus will likely shift to coordinating policies in those areas, which seems like the most logical course of action,” the official said, without providing concrete examples. Concerning a potential request from Trump to renegotiate the defense cost-sharing agreement from 2026 to 2030 that was officially signed on November 4, the unnamed official emphasized the importance of “having it ratified by the National Assembly and brought into effect” to bolster South Korea’s position and “ensure legal stability.” The signed 12th Special Measures Agreement requires National Assembly ratification in South Korea, whereas in the US, it is treated as an executive agreement that allows Trump the authority to revoke or renegotiate the agreement. The unnamed high-level official also acknowledged the possibility of Trump pursuing another summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, though emphasized that nothing is certain and much remains in flux. “President-elect Trump’s typical negotiation strategy often begins with a hard stance to disrupt the status quo, followed by moves to advance national interests. With this approach, I personally believe there’s a fair chance he will follow the same path if he pursues dialogue with North Korea,” the official said. “However, the essential point is that any dialogue with North Korea should be led by South Korea’s initiative and reflect our position, which is the most critical prerequisite.” Regarding South Korea’s Russia policy, the official gave an affirmative response when asked by The Korea Herald whether the end of the Ukraine war could serve as a key factor in adjusting Korea’s stance toward Russia. “Is it possible to adjust relations with Russia once the war in Ukraine ends? It would be difficult for relations to immediately normalize simply because a cease-fire is reached. Many variables will depend on the conditions under which the cease-fire occurs and the postwar resolution process,” the official said. “However, I can confidently say that our scope for diplomatic engagement with Russia will likely be significantly broader after the war than it is during the war,” he said of South Korea. The official, however, clarified that given the current situation — with Russia continuing its invasion of Ukraine and North Korea supporting Russia in the unlawful war — achieving meaningful progress in dialogue between Seoul and Moscow remains challenging. “Diplomacy with Russia is ongoing,” the official said. “However, expecting any improvement in relations under these circumstances is ultimately highly unrealistic.” (Ja Da-gyum, “Trump’s Unpredictable Leadership Could Cost S. Korea: Official,” Korea Herald, November 12, 2024)

11/14/24:
KCNA: “Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, guided on the spot on November 14 the performance test of suicide attack drones of various types, produced by an institute and enterprises under the Unmanned Aeronautical Technology Complex. He was accompanied by Ri Pyong Chol and Jo Yong Won, members of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK, and other senior officials of the Central Committee of the WPK and the general manager of the UATC. He acquainted himself with the attack drones under development and oversaw their test. The suicide attack drones, designed to be used within different striking ranges on the ground and the sea, are to perform a precision attack mission against any enemy targets. In the test, the drones of various types precisely hit the targets after flying along preset tactical routes in the striking ranges. Expressing satisfaction with the tactical and technical characteristics and specifications of the newly developed unmanned aerial vehicles, Kim Jong Un highly appreciated the fact that the UATC has achieved remarkable successes in promoting the projects the plenary meetings of the Party Central Committee and the Party Central Military Commission decided and instructed to the defense industry. Then he underscored the need to build a serial production system as early as possible and go into full-scale mass production. He said: The competition for using UAVs as the main means of military capabilities by introducing innovative technology is being accelerated in the world. It is easy to use them as a component of striking power in a new domain for their ever-expanding range of use in military activities, low production cost and simple production lines. The military authorities in the world might have recognized that the UAVs are achieving clear successes in big and small conflicts. This is a current trend that has emerged as an essential requirement in military aspects. Such an objective change poses a pressing need to update many parts of military theory, practice and education and keenly calls upon the fields of defense science and education to take prompt practical actions and redouble their efforts. He affirmed that the DPRK has full possibility and potentiality to produce and introduce various types of UAVs and it would open a prospect of combining and applying new and promising tactical methods also in the aspect of art of war as required by modern warfare. He said that recently the WPK has attached importance to and steadily supplemented the line of perfectly combining unmanned military hardware systems with operational plans and war principles in its military policy. He referred to the plan of the Party Central Committee on developing unmanned military hardware and set forth a crucial strategic policy for implementing it. His on-site guidance on the work of the UATC serves as a landmark occasion that gave fresh vitality to the struggle for firmly defending the sovereignty and security of our Republic by dynamically promoting the qualitative development of the unmanned military hardware systems that are practical and essential in bolstering up the national defense capabilities and actively deterring and controlling potential challenges and threats in all defense areas with their absolute superiority.” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Performance Test of Suicide Attack Drones of Various Types,” November 15, 2024)

11/15/24:
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un won’t negotiate denuclearization with the United States, as he has more powerful weapons and support from Russia, Joseph Yun, a former U.S. envoy on North Korea policy, said today. Yun, who served as special representative for North Korea policy during the early phase of the first Donald Trump administration, made the remarks at a symposium co-hosted by Triforum and the Asiatic Research Institute, Korea University, discussing the global order in light of Trump’s election to his second term. Trump’s return to the presidency has sparked speculation about his resuming personal diplomacy with Kim following their two landmark summits in Singapore and Vietnam. “In the absence of any deal, North Korea has become more threatening. Their weapons have become more powerful,” Yun said, noting that now North Korea is no longer an isolated pariah, thanks to “the strongest possible support from Russia.” “We have to accept reality. There is no chance that North Korea will start any negotiation with anyone which (requires) upfront complete denuclearization. That’s a non-starter,” he noted. Instead, the U.S. might need to start with “small steps,” such as weapons reduction, freezing new technology and fostering some kind of engagement between South and North Korea, while building on agreements Trump already made with Kim in order to eventually seek denuclearization, he said. “If I were, you want to make sure that Singapore agreement is still valid on both sides. … Where the Trump administration left off, which is in Hanoi. Hanoi (dialogue), I think, if you just added pieces to it, could be made into a deal,” Yun noted. “We cannot jump to complete denuclearization. CVID (complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization) as we used to call it, I’m sorry, but it’s kind of dead.” Drawing on North Korea’s dispatch of troops to fight for Russia against Ukraine, Yun said the decision was a “very smart” move in securing money and weapons technology from Russia, effectively rendering international sanctions “out of the window.” At the forum, Robert O’Brien, former national security adviser to Trump during his first term, echoed Yun’s assessment, saying that reaching a deal with North Korea “is not going to be easy.” “The best we can do is trying to assure our South Korean friends … that the U.S. nuclear umbrella covers South Korea,” he said. O’Brien predicted that Trump’s tariff plans in his second term wouldn’t negatively affect South Korea, citing South Korean companies’ investments and factories operating in the U.S. (Park Boram, “Ex-Trump Envoy on N. Korea Says Kim Jong Un Won’t Negotiate Denuclearization,” Yonhap, November 15, 2024)

The leaders of South Korea, the United States and Japan announced the establishment of a secretariat for trilateral cooperation and condemned North Korea and Russia’s decision to “dangerously expand” Moscow’s war in Ukraine as they met on the margins of a multilateral summit in Peru. President Yoon Suk Yeol, U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru issued a joint statement after they held a trilateral meeting in Lima on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. During the last such gathering before Biden leaves office in January, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the trilateral partnership, which they believe remains critical to countering regional security threats and fostering stability in the Indo-Pacific. “Today, we announce the establishment of the Trilateral Secretariat responsible for coordinating and implementing our shared commitments,” the three leaders said in a joint statement. “This new secretariat will seek to ensure that the work we do together further aligns our objectives and actions to make the Indo-Pacific a thriving, connected, resilient, stable, and secure region,” they added. Touching on the envisioned launch of the secretariat, the leaders stressed the three countries’ partnership as one that is “built to last.” The secretariat will coordinate and oversee cooperation projects across various fields, including security, economy, advanced technologies, and people-to-people exchanges, Principal Deputy National Security Adviser Kim Tae-hyo said in a briefing. The three countries will rotate the presidency every two years, with South Korea’s foreign ministry set to establish the secretariat soon. (Kim Eun-jung, “S. Korea, U.S., Japan Unveil Secretariat Establishment, Decry N.K.-Russia Decision to Expand Ukraine War,” Yonhap, November 16, 2024)

11/16/24:
Loud, crackly noises that sounded like an ominous, giant gong being beaten again and again washed over this village on a recent night. On other nights, some residents described hearing wolves howling, metal grinding together or ghosts screaming as if out of a horror movie. Others said they heard the sound of incoming artillery, or even a furious monkey pounding on a broken piano. Although they heard different sounds at different times, people in Dangsan on the border with North Korea all call themselves victims of “noise bombing,” saying they find the relentless barrage exhausting. Since July, North Korea has amped up loudspeakers along its border with South Korea for 10 to 24 hours a day, broadcasting eerie noises that have aggravated South Korean villagers like no past propaganda broadcasts from the North ever did. The offensive is one of the most bizarre — and unbearable — consequences of deteriorating inter-Korean relations that have sunk to their lowest level in years under the North’s leader, Kim Jong Un, and the South’s president, Yoon Suk Yeol. Since the 1960s, loudspeakers have been as much a fixture of the DMZ as razor-wire fences and land-mine warning signs. People living along the border endured propaganda broadcasts as a part of frontier life, as the rival governments switched them on and off, depending on the political mood. When they were on, both sides insulted each other’s leaders as “puppets.” The latest bombardment from the North contains no human sound or music — just nonstop noises that villagers find hard to describe, other than calling them “irritating” and “stressful.” They have blamed them for insomnia, headaches, and even goats miscarrying, hens laying fewer eggs and the sudden death of a pet dog. The noise was part of a series of steps North Korea has taken to retaliate against what it called South Korean hostility. Recent events might explain why the sounds have become so intolerable. Since his negotiations with President Donald J. Trump collapsed in 2019, Kim has shifted the course of his country’s external relations, turning increasingly hostile toward South Korea, in particular. Some analysts say that by raising tensions, Kim was building the case for why the next American president needed to engage with him as he seeks an easing of international sanctions in return for agreeing to contain his nuclear program. But others say Kim’s recent rhetoric toward the South reflected a fundamental shift, channeling his belief in the advent of a “neo-cold war.” The catalyst for this change was waves of anti-Kim propaganda leaflets that were sent across the border via balloons by North Korean defectors living in the South, said Koh Yu-hwan, a former head of the Korea Institute for National Unification. These leaflets called Kim “a murderous dictator” or “pig” and urged North Koreans to overthrow his government. In May, North Korea retaliated by sending its own balloons to the South, loaded with trash in response to what Pyongyang called political “filth” from the South. Weeks later, South Korea ended a six-year hiatus in propaganda broadcasts, switching its loudspeakers back on to blast K-pop and news to the North. The North responded with its blasts of strange, nerve-racking noises. “North Korea knows its propaganda no longer works on South Koreans,” said Kang Dong-wan, an expert on North Korea at Dong-A University in the South. “The goal of its loudspeakers has changed from spreading propaganda to forcing South Korea to stop its own broadcasts and leaflets.” Until inter-Korean tensions caught up with them, Dangsan residents were proud of their quiet rural life despite their proximity to the border. They grew red peppers and thick radishes in their gardens. Cats sauntered under persimmon trees strung with heavy fruits. Wild geese took off from harvested rice fields in a chorus of honking. These days, however, villagers keep their windows shut to minimize the noise from North Korea. Some have installed Styrofoam over them for extra insulation. Children no longer play on outdoor trampolines because of the noise. Political leaders have visited Dangsan to offer their sympathies. But officials suggested neither a plan to de-escalate the psychological war with the North nor a solution to the noise, villagers said, other than offering double-pane windows for villagers and medication for their livestock to better endure the stress caused by the noise. “The solution is for the two Koreas to recommit themselves to their old agreements not to slander each other,” said Koh, of the Korea Institute. But things have only worsened. Last month, North Korea demolished all railway and road links between the two Koreas with dynamite. This month, it disrupted GPS signals near the western border with the South, affecting some civilian ship and air traffic, according to the South Korean military. (Choe Sang-hun, “Blaring Dreadful Noise Across Border, North Korea Adds Insomnia to Its Arsenal,” New York Times, November 17, 2024, p.A-1)

Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden held their final summit in Lima, Peru today. During the meeting, Xi declared that China “does not allow conflict and turmoil to happen on the Korean Peninsula,” a declaration that echoes back to 2016 and 2017. The revival of this statement after seven years demonstrates the shrewd diplomatic calculations of China and the message it wishes to convey concerning the current political climate. During the summit on the sidelines of an APEC gathering today, Xi remarked that for US-China relations, the Thucydides Trap “is not a historical inevitability.” “A new Cold War should not be fought and cannot be won. Containing China is unwise, unacceptable and bound to fail,” the Chinese leader noted, emphasizing the importance of cooperation between the two countries ahead of Trump’s return to the White House. Xi proceeded to mention the Taiwan question, China’s development rights in trade, science and technology and internet security fields, the South China Sea issue, the war in Ukraine and the situation on the Korean Peninsula, stating, “China does not allow conflict and turmoil to happen on the Korean Peninsula. It will not sit idly by when its strategic security and core interests are under threat.” Xi previously stated during the fifth Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, in April 2016, that “as a close neighbor of the [Korean] Peninsula, we will absolutely not permit war or chaos on the peninsula. This situation would not benefit anyone.” During the South Korea-China summit held in Beijing on Dec. 14, 2017, Xi and then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in agreed that the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue could be resolved through peaceful means such as dialogue and consultation, and that war and chaos on the peninsula cannot be tolerated. 2016 and 2017 marked the height of worries over a military conflict breaking out on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea had carried out its fourth, fifth and sixth nuclear tests and continuously launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) such as the Hwasong-14. Then-US President Donald Trump suggested the possibility of preemptive attacks on North Korea by warning that its threats would be met with “fire and fury,” only for North Korea to shoot back by threatening the US airbase in Guam. In the midst of political chaos, China made its position clear by sending strong warnings to North Korea by halting oil product exports, deploying tanks along the Yalu River (Amnok River) to exert pressure and resolutely backing UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea. Seven years later, the incoming second Trump administration warns of further pressure on China while also anticipating dialogue with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Xi’s reassurance that war will not be tolerated on the Korean Peninsula in such a political climate reads as a complex and comprehensive strategic calculation. First off, it’s a message that he will manage relations with South Korea. During his summit with Xi on Friday, Yoon requested that China play a “constructive role” in response to the deepening military cooperation between North Korea and Russia. Xi replied that China hopes that regional tensions will ease and does not wish for increased escalation on the Korean Peninsula. Xi expressed hope that the relevant parties will peacefully resolve their issues through dialogue and negotiation and find a political solution. When addressing the North Korea issue during the South Korea-China summit in Bali two years ago, Xi expressed hope that South Korea would “actively work” to improve inter-Korean relations, emphasizing a change in South Korea’s policy when it came to easing inter-Korean tensions. This time, however, he called on the “relevant parties,” which includes North Korea, to resolve the issue. A subtle change, but it reflects a slight willingness to contain North Korea while extending an olive branch to South Korea. Secondly, Xi’s comments served as somewhat of a warning aimed at North Korea, which has elevated inter-Korean tensions to levels similar to 2016-2017 through its military provocations and military cooperation with Russia. Superficially, North Korea-China relations hang a banner of friendly, strategic cooperation, but mutual dissatisfaction and conflict are brewing and expanding beneath the surface. “North Korea has defined the current world order as a ‘new Cold War’ and emphasized the conflict that pits South Korea, the US and Japan against North Korea, China and Russia; but China does not view the South Korea-US-Japan vs. North Korea-China-Russia structure as beneficial to China as it continues its hegemonic competition with the US,” said Kim Han-kwon, a professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy. “North Korea’s troop deployment to Russia, in particular, is a bit of a headache from China’s standpoint,” Kim added. Finally, Xi’s comments hint at China’s preparations for negotiating with the US in anticipation of the renewed US-North Korea nuclear negotiations under the second Trump administration. North Korea’s multiple provocations involving nuclear missiles cast a chill over its relations with China in 2016 and 2017, but as soon as Trump and Kim Jong Un began talks, China and North Korea began cooperating again. China influenced the negotiations as North Korea’s “sponsor.” “In preparation for another Trump administration, China is emphasizing the need for nuclear negotiations between North Korea and the US under the premise that the threat of war on the Korean Peninsula right now is ‘very real.’ All the while, Beijing is moving to increase its leverage in the negotiations,” Kim assessed. “If North Korea and the US renew their negotiations, China has a chance to restore its relations with North Korea and regain its regional influence, as it did in 2016 and 2017, which would give Beijing the opportunity to play the ‘constructive role’ in inter-Korean relations,” Kim added. It is possible, however, that North Korea may choose to exploit its relations with Russia, not China, as leverage in the next round of negotiations. But if Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine, there is a high chance that North Korea will turn away from complete reliance on Russia and seek to improve relations with China. (Park Min-hee, “Unpacking Strategy behind Xi’s Statement That China Won’t Allow Conflict on Korean Peninsula,” Hankyoreh, November 20, 2024)

11/21/24:
KCNA: “The following is the full text of the speech made by the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un at the opening ceremony of the military hardware exhibition Defense Development-2024 on November 21: … What makes the current exhibition weightier in the practical aspects and more significant in the political and military aspects is that these exhibits are fruition gathered in defense development by exercising our right to self-defense on the principle of countering power with power and of head-on contest in 2024, when the hostile attitude of the United States and its allied forces for confrontation and their adventurist military records exceeded the peak year level. These brilliant successes we have achieved in the defense sector year after year afford us glimpses at its development potential and speed, which fairly convince us that we are possessed of definite capability and a guarantee for security to cope proactively with not only the various threats the enemies are posing to us now but also the security threats we are likely to face in future. Our defense industry has at last been upgraded as a cutting-edge one that can offer the most suitable and thoroughgoing support for military activities as required in each stage, each period and each situation of our revolution; it has also been built up as a strategic fortress that firmly guarantees the position of our state as a world-class military power. Our cutting-edge defense sci-tech sector and the technological foundations of our munitions economy are also exerting important effects on, and playing the leading role in, transforming the structure of the national industry as a whole. Comrades, The military hardware on display here represent what we have achieved this year, 2024, and yet, until they presented their majestic appearance here, they witnessed arduous courses accompanied by painstaking and pioneering research work in renewing each of their records, whose value can hardly be measured by the lapse of time alone. We can compare [this] military hardware with world-class ones of their kinds in terms of design, manufacturing skills, grade of materials or combat and technical specifications, but it is hard to fully estimate their true value. In an attempt to suffocate and destroy our self-reliant defense industry completely, the hostile forces have pursued unprecedentedly cruel sanctions and blockade against us, leaving us in difficulty and in short supply of everything. But the Party and the people have adhered to the view that strengthening the defense capabilities is the supreme expression of their patriotism and consciousness of the revolution, and fully aware of their great expectations, our defense sci-tech group and workers in the munitions industry have worked with devotion to live up to them, regarding doing so as their duty. Their ennobling spirit is embodied in the weapons here. For this reason, our military hardware, in terms of the righteous purpose and character, the indomitable spiritual strength and unheard-of fighting spirit embodied in them, has thousands of times greater–utterly incomparable–power than those the military-industrial complexes of imperialist countries manufacture in pursuance of massacre, destruction and economic profit. Comrades, Today our Republic has risen as a powerful axis exerting an influence on political and military developments around the world. It owes this status to the absolute dignity and strength it has gained thanks to its revolutionary ideology, cause of justice and perseverance. However, without the extraordinary wisdom and courage and undying perseverance that would surpass those which we have displayed in clearing a thorny path and going through the successive stages by leaps and bounds, we can neither cope with the ever-changing reality nor guarantee our foreseeable future. As we are witnessing now, our planet is in the grip of confusion and violence, the worst ever since the end of the Second World War. The United States is growing more brazen in trying to place the whole world under the sphere of its interests, and the consequent contradictions and confrontations of every hue have passed all critical points to develop into too unjust, horrible wars and catastrophic disasters. This is literally a pandemonium, in which some reckless and high-handed powers violate international norms, regardless of their obvious purpose of, and orientation towards, respecting the territories and sovereignty of all countries and nations and defending global peace and security. Nearly a century ago, fascisms in Europe and Asia colluded with each other to throw the world into turmoil. Likewise, the reactionary forces in the West and East, allied under the baton of the US imperialists, are now attempting to establish a rapacious and tyrannical world order. This is a present reality. In particular, the United States is expanding the nuke-sharing military alliance system to contain our Republic’s rapid rise, which is an insurmountable obstacle in the way of implementing its policy of dominationism, and to retain and increase its influence over its vassal countries. On the other hand, it is going to great lengths to ratchet up the military pressure and provocations against our country by deploying around it a vast array of strategic strike means and troops of its allies. The Korean peninsula has never been under such a critical situation as the present, in which there is a growing likelihood of a most destructive thermonuclear war breaking out amid the acutely dangerous confrontation between the belligerents. Another fact that we must point out here is that this extreme tension in the peninsula is by no means something caused by the misunderstanding of each other’s rival. We already did everything possible in the bilateral negotiations with the United States, and what we were eventually convinced of was not the superpower’s will to co-exist with us but its domineering stand and unchangeably aggressive and hostile policy towards the DPRK. American politicians still say, as they are wont to do, that the United States has never been hostile. This odd-sounding rhetoric has long been rejected by the world as anything but plausible. The US imperialists’ and their vassal forces’ wild ambition to obliterate our ideology and system at any cost and destroy our people to the last one has never changed. Rather, they are recklessly maneuvering to realize this ambition in this century. In the present world where military conflicts are growing rampant, a country which gave up building its own defense capability cannot be called a sovereign state; a weak country will fall victim to tyranny and is bound to be ravaged by foreign invasion. All facts convince us, with each passing moment of the day, that the greatest defense capability with which to overpower the enemies is just the key to safeguarding peace and guaranteeing durable stability and development. Our Party and government will never remain an onlooker to any encroachment upon our state’s sphere of security, and we make clear once again that we will never lower the weight of military balance on our side by ourselves. We will go on with resolute actions for removing all manner of military threats to our state and people and thoroughly break the enemies’ will to use armed forces by steadily developing our defense capability and exercising our legitimate right to self-defense. Comrades, It is an indispensable and consistent demand of our Party’s line of building up the self-reliant defense to bolster up our strength without interruption and limit and steadily raise the tremendous capabilities of deterring and fighting a war to defend the sovereignty, interests and security environment of our state in a responsible manner. The enemies, too, keep whetting their sword for evolution. Accordingly, only when we make a more unequalled leap forward can we prevent military conflicts with the enemies and take the strategic initiative in controlling the political and military situation. We should not content ourselves with the present mightiness but push for infinite mightiness. In this aspiration and will lie the true mightiness of our state and the sure guarantee for its security. Our main purpose of holding this military hardware exhibition is not merely to look back on the history or to congratulate ourselves on the current level. It is to highlight more clearly the necessity for us to step up the important change of defense capability and markedly enhance its strategic position and role by bringing about leaps forward in the self-reliant defense industry at any cost. I think that as long as there exist the forces attempting to infringe upon our sovereignty and the enemies persist in their vicious moves, we should continue to upgrade various kinds of military hardware and make them cutting-edge as much as the security environment of our state requires us and as many as the changes in the current wars show us. Given the new aspects of modern warfare and the enemies’ war tactics that are transforming in a dangerous way day after day, we should develop our defense capability more aggressively and limitlessly while promoting technological modernization of our army and equipping it with a larger number of powerful means. Rapid development of science and technology is continuously transforming the world, and this transformation of enormous significance greatly affects the security of every country. That it must acclimatize to the change of the objective world and cope with it rapidly and promptly is the character of the main duty and development orientation of our defense science sector today. Military capability should be constantly upgraded. Stagnation in increasing overwhelming military strength means the start of the defense capability becoming inferior. Our Party and government will show more concern to search for answers to this end, mapping out a greater number of long-term projects and implementing them actively. Comrades, To remain more faithful to the line of self-reliance in national defense, whose scientific accuracy and power have been clearly proved through the prolonged revolutionary practice, and make steady, invariable and more vigorous advance–herein lies the eternal security and future of our state and our people. Pioneering this road and the will to pioneer the road constitute our boundless worth of life, pride and honor. Our Party and government will make all their efforts to increase more advanced capability of military technology, powerful military strength, thus safeguarding our glorious motherland, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, on the strength of reliable defense capability. I hope that all those attending this event will have a pleasant time looking round the exhibition with due pride in our defense capability and with optimism for and confidence in the limitlessness of its development. Thank you.” (KCNA, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Speech at Opening Ceremony of Military Hardware Exhibition Defense Development-2024,” November 22, 2024)

11/22/24:
Russia has provided North Korea with anti-air missiles and air defense equipment in exchange for its troop deployment in support of Moscow’s war in Ukraine, National Security Adviser Shin Won-sik said today. “Russia is believed to have provided equipment and anti-air missiles to strengthen Pyongyang’s vulnerable air defense system,” Shin said in an interview with broadcaster SBS when asked about what the North would be getting from Russia in return for the troop dispatch. “Following North Korea’s failed military spy satellite launch on May 27, Russia had already declared its intention to support satellite-related technologies (to the North), and it reportedly supplied various military technologies,” Shin said. “We believe that there has also been economic aid in various forms,” he added. South Korea’s spy agency told lawmakers earlier this week that the troops deployed to Russia are believed to have been assigned to Moscow’s airborne brigade and marine corps on the ground, with some of the soldiers having already entered combat. The Wall Street Journal reported yesterday that a senior North Korean general was wounded in a Ukrainian strike in the Kursk region. (Kim Seung-yeon, “Russia Provided N. Korea with Anti-Air Missiles in Exchange for Troop Deployment: S. Korea’s Top Security Adviser,” Yonhap, November 22, 2024)

President-elect Donald Trump named Alex Wong, who was engaged in working-level nuclear talks with North Korea during his first term, as his principal deputy national security adviser amid expectations he could seek to reengage with Pyongyang after returning to office. Trump issued a statement on his decision to appoint Wong, who served as the deputy special representative for North Korea and the deputy assistant secretary for North Korea in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the State Department when he was in office. The personnel choice came amid speculation that Trump could move to revive his personal diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in an effort to complete the unfinished business of addressing the recalcitrant regime’s worsening nuclear quandary. “As Deputy Special Representative for North Korea, he helped negotiate my Summit with North Korean Leader, Kim Jong Un,” Trump said. “Alex also led the State Department’s efforts to implement the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.” When he was in office, Wong served as the No. 2 negotiator in denuclearization talks with North Korea. He engaged in follow-up talks with the North in Pyongyang in July 2018 after the first-ever summit between Trump and Kim in Singapore in June 2018. He was also part of the preparation team for the second summit between the leaders in Hanoi in 2019. Observers said that Trump’s selection of Wong for the White House post bodes well for the resumption of diplomacy with the North, though it remains uncertain whether Pyongyang would accede to any diplomatic overture from Washington when it has a growing military partnership with Moscow. In a photo book published in September, Trump said that his summitry with Kim during his presidency showed that “real change” was “indeed” possible, portraying it as “honest, direct and productive.” (Song Sang-ho, “Trump Picks Ex-N. Korea Policy Official as Principal Deputy National Security Adviser,” Yonhap, November 22, 2024)

11/23/24:
DPRK MOD Information Office Chief’s press statement titled “It is constitutional duty of the DPRK to take self-defensive measures for defending its security environment”, which said: “The military tension in the region has recently become more acute as the U.S. continuously flexes its military muscle against the DPRK on the Korean peninsula and in its vicinity. The U.S., which deployed the George Washington nuclear carrier strike group in the waters around the Korean peninsula, staged Freedom Edge, the multi-domain joint military drills, with Japan and the ROK from November 13 to 15. On November 18, Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered attack submarine Columbia, arrived at the Pusan operation base to incite the atmosphere of nuclear confrontation, and on November 21, the strategic reconnaissance plane RC-135S flied above the East Sea of Korea, conducting undisguised air spying on the strategic depth of the DPRK. The U.S. military provocations, being committed in the Korean peninsula where huge armed forces of two belligerent sides are on high alert and the possibility of constant military conflict lingers, constitute the source of plunging the regional situation into an irretrievable catastrophe. We strongly warn the U.S. and its followers hostile towards the DPRK to immediately stop the hostile acts of further causing provocation and instability that can drive the military confrontation in the Korean peninsula and its vicinity into a real armed conflict. The danger of the U.S. military provocations against the DPRK is that it will never end in muscle-flexing for frightening other or security instability limited to the region of the Korean peninsula. The present grave political and military situation in which the U.S. military adventurism has gone beyond the red-line on a global scale foretells that the U.S. military moves targeting the DPRK can lead to a real war situation anytime. It is the constitutional duty of the armed forces of the DPRK to take self-defensive measures to protect the security environment of the state and maintain the strategic stability and balance of strength in the region. The KPA is closely following the military moves of the U.S. and its allies, opening up the possibility of all options in its combat readiness. If it is judged necessary, it will immediately take action to pre-contain the danger and achieve the military and strategic goal of the state.” (KCNA, “Press Statement by Chief of Information Office of DPRK Ministry of National Defense,” November 23, 2024)

11/26/24:
WPK Central Committee Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong’s press statement: “On November 26, various kinds of political agitation leaflets and dirty things sent by the ROK scum were dropped again in different areas near the southern border of the DPRK. The security forces organs in the areas have blocked the relevant districts and are conducting the work for searching, gathering and disposal. We strongly denounce the despicable acts of the ROK scum who committed the provocation of polluting the inviolable territory of the DPRK by scattering anti-DPRK political and conspiratorial agitation things again.” (KCNA, “Press Statement of Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK,” November 26, 2024)

Russia is considering deploying medium- and short-range missiles to Asia in response to possible U.S. missile redeployments, Moscow’s deputy foreign minister said today, sparking concerns that North Korea could emerge as a potential host for Russian weapons as the two states grow closer. “The appearance of such U.S. systems in any region of the world will determine our next steps, including in the field of organizing a military and military-technical response,” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov told reporters today when asked whether Russia was considering the possibility of deploying medium-range and short-range missiles in Asia. Ryabkov emphasized that Russia’s newly developed Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missile, used for the first time against Ukraine’s city of Dnipro on November 21, is not restricted under current international treaties. The missile features multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology, which North Korea has yet to develop. The statement follows reports that the United States is considering deploying missiles to Japan’s southwestern islands and the Philippines in preparation for a potential conflict between China and Taiwan. While Belarus remains the most likely location for additional Russian missile deployments as the country already hosts Russian tactical nuclear weapons, experts do not rule out North Korea as a potential host.
During a July meeting of Russia’s Security Council, President Vladimir Putin called for the resumption of intermediate-range missile production and hinted at a possible deployment in Asia following U.S. actions in Europe and Asia. “Although Russia did not directly refer to North Korea, Moscow’s mention of Asia could serve as a symbolic and psychological gesture to demonstrate the extent of its partnership with Pyongyang and to pressure Seoul and Washington,” said Kim Young-jun, a professor at Korea National Defense University. However, in a March interview, Putin downplayed the possibility of directly supplying nuclear weapons to Pyongyang, stating that North Korea has its “own nuclear umbrella.” “Russia’s message is another form of rhetoric aimed at escalating nuclear threats,” said Hyun Seung-soo, deputy director of the Korea Institute for National Unification. “The timing strongly suggests that the primary goal is to deter South Korea from providing lethal weapons to Ukraine.” Ryabkov’s comments coincided with a meeting between South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha‎ at the G7 Foreign Ministers’ summit in Fiuggi, Italy, today. During the meeting, Cho emphasized that South Korea would implement “effective measures in stages” to address threats posed by North Korea-Russia military cooperation. Sybiha expressed optimism that Ukraine’s special envoy would visit South Korea soon to continue discussions. Ukraine reportedly plans to send Defense Minister Rustem Umerov to South Korea as a special envoy. Cho welcomed the initiative, expressing hope for meaningful consultations during the visit. (Seo Ji-eun, “Fears Grow That North Korea Could Host Russian Missiles after Senior Envoy’s Remarks,” JoongAng Ilbo, November 26, 2024)

President-elect Donald Trump’s team is discussing pursuing direct talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, hoping a fresh diplomatic push can lower the risks of armed conflict, according to two people familiar with the matter. Several in Trump’s team now see a direct approach from Trump, to build on a relationship that already exists, as most likely to break the ice with Kim, years after the two traded insults and what Trump called “beautiful” letters in an unprecedented diplomatic effort during his first term in office, the people said. The policy discussions are fluid and no final decisions have been made by the president-elect, the sources said.What reciprocation Kim will offer Trump is unclear. “We have already gone as far as we can on negotiating with the United States,” Kim said last week in a speech at a Pyongyang military exhibition, according to state media. It was not clear what result a new diplomatic effort would yield. An initial Trump goal would be to reestablish basic engagement but further policy aims or a precise timetable have not been set, the people said. And the issue may take a backseat to more pressing foreign policy concerns in the Middle East and Ukraine, according to one person briefed on the transition’s thinking. North Korean state media have not yet publicly mentioned the re-election of Trump, and Kim said this month that the United States was ramping up tension and provocations, raising the risks of nuclear war. Trump and some of his allies left office with the impression that the direct approach was Washington’s best shot at influencing behavior north of the demilitarized zone, which has divided the Korean Peninsula for seven decades. The countries’ war was never technically ended even as the guns fell silent. On Friday, Trump named one of the people who implemented that initial North Korea strategy, former State Department official Alex Wong, as his deputy national security adviser. “As Deputy Special Representative for North Korea, he helped negotiate my Summit with North Korean Leader, Kim Jong Un,” Trump said in a statement. Trump inherits an increasingly tense situation with Kim when he returns to the White House in January, as he did in 2017, an atmosphere allies expect the incoming president to confront head-on. “My experience with President Trump is he’s much more likely to be open to direct engagement,” said U.S. Senator Bill Hagerty, a Trump ally, in an interview with Reuters earlier this year. “I’m optimistic that we can see an improvement in the relationship and perhaps a different posture adopted by Kim Jong Un if that dialogue were reopened again.” Washington has a dossier of concerns over the country’s expanding nuclear weapons and missile program, its increasingly hostile rhetoric to South Korea and its close collaboration with Russian President Vladimir Putin. These topics are expected to feature in Biden administration transition briefings for Trump aides, according to a U.S. official. The Trump team has yet to sign transition agreements, which could limit the scope of some of these briefings. Particularly concerning to Washington are the prospects of increased sharing of nuclear or missile technology between Russia and North Korea and the deployment of thousands of North Korean troops to Russia to help in the war with Ukraine. Reuters reported on Monday that North Korea is expanding a key weapons manufacturing complex that assembles a type of short-range missile used by Russia in Ukraine, citing researchers at a U.S.-based think tank who examined satellite images. U.S. officials said those factors raise the risk of a conflict between multiple nuclear armed nations in Europe or Asia, including the United States and its allies, which include South Korea and Japan. In his final meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping earlier this month in Peru, Biden asked for Beijing to use its leverage to reel in North Korea. Trump said last month the two countries would have had “a nuclear war with millions of people killed,” but that he had stopped it, thanks to his ties with the North’s leader. (Trevor Hunnicutt, “Trump Team Weighs Direct Talks with North Korea’s Kim in New Diplomatic Push,” Reuters, November 26, 2024) While Kim has drawn a line against denuclearization, experts suggest that North Korea may push for arms control talks instead, positioning itself as a nuclear-armed state to enhance its bargaining power. Observers predict that U.S.-North Korea dialogue during Trump’s second term may emerge later in his presidency, as Trump is expected to focus on resolving pressing issues such as Russia’s war against Ukraine before turning to North Korea as a potential diplomatic breakthrough. “The realization of U.S.-North Korea summit diplomacy is only a matter of time,” said Yang Moo-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies. “Considering global priorities and the necessity of engagement, a summit could occur during the second half of 2025 or the first half of 2026,” he added. “North Korea’s ability to focus on negotiations with minimal variables could give it an advantage over the United States, which faces numerous domestic and international considerations.” (Seo Ji-eun, “Trump Team Discusses Renewed Direct Talks with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un: Report,” JoongAng Ilbo, November 27, 2024)

12/3–4/24:
President Yoon Suk Yeol declared emergency martial law, accusing the nation’s opposition of paralyzing the government with “anti-state activities,” but the National Assembly voted hours later to demand that Yoon lift martial law. “Martial law is aimed at eradicating pro-North Korean forces and to protect the constitutional order of freedom,” Yoon said in an emergency national address televised live late Tuesday. It marks the first declaration of emergency martial law in South Korea since 1979. The surprise announcement came after the opposition Democratic Party (DP) railroaded a downsized budget bill in the parliamentary budget committee, and submitted impeachment motions against a state auditor and the chief prosecutor. Under the Constitution, the president can declare martial law in response to military needs during times of war, armed conflict, a national emergency, or when public safety and order require it. Following the address, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Park An-su, who was named as leader of martial law command, announced a decree banning all political activities, including protests and activities by political parties. At at around 1 a.m, December 4, the 300-member National Assembly convened a plenary session to demand that Yoon lift martial law, with the resolution approved with 190 members present and 190 votes in favor. With the motion’s passage, the martial law declaration is void, according to the parliamentary speaker’s office. Under the Constitution, martial law must be lifted when a parliamentary majority demands it. Yoon said the decision to declare martial law was aimed at “rebuilding and safeguarding” the nation, which he described as facing significant challenges. While the declaration might cause “some inconvenience” to citizens, Yoon vowed to “normalize” the country swiftly, saying the government remains committed to its foreign policy of fulfilling its responsibilities within the international community. Yoon highlighted that 22 impeachment motions have been filed against government officials since his inauguration in May 2022, with the opposition pursuing its 10th impeachment effort since the 22nd National Assembly convened in June. He characterized the move as an “unprecedented” situation in the country’s history and in global politics, alleging that these actions have significantly hampered the executive branch’s function. In regard to the downsized budget bill, Yoon said the reductions would undermine the government’s essential functions, including drug crime prevention and public safety measures, saying it has pushed the country toward becoming a “haven for drugs and left public safety in a state of crisis.” Yoon accused the DP of using budget bills and impeachment motions as a political tool to shield DP leader Lee Jae-myung from prosecution, who is facing several trials. “The National Assembly has become a haven for criminals, paralyzing the judicial and administrative systems and attempting to overthrow the free democratic system through legislative dictatorship,” he said. Shortly after Yoon’s address, the DP called in its lawmakers urgently to the National Assembly. With 170 seats in the 300-member parliament, the DP has the capacity to revoke martial law with a majority vote. Han Dong-hoon, leader of the ruling People Power Party, said Yoon’s declaration of martial law is “wrong” and that he will “block it” together with the people. (Kim Eun-jung, “Yoon Declares Emergency Martial Law; Parliament Votes to Lift Declaration,” Yonhap, December 4, 2024) A vote by 190 sitting National Assembly lawmakers effectively ended a two-and-a-half-hour period of martial law in South Korea early morning on December 4 after President Yoon Suk-yeol unexpectedly invoked military rule the previous night. Yoon’s late-night martial law declaration sent a massive shockwave through Korean society, leaving many questions in its wake. After using civic power to overcome a military dictatorship and simultaneously achieve democratization and economic growth to stand among developed nations, the people of Korea were suddenly and surreally thrust back into a reality where martial law was being declared. The last time emergency martial law was invoked was 45 years ago under the junta of Chun Doo-hwan. Reminiscent of the martial law edict of Park Chung-hee’s Yushin regime, the first condition stipulated in the martial law decree announced by Army Chief of Staff Park An-su, who was appointed martial law commander by Yoon, contained language like “arrest, detain and punish without warrants.” Upon such an announcement, the shock felt by the Korean public soon turned into rage. A sense of stability and calm was gradually restored once the National Assembly passed a resolution demanding the end of martial law, at which point civic leaders and political leaders alike began calling for Yoon to be punished for insurrection and impeached. Early on Wednesday morning, People Power Party leader Han Dong-hoon entered negotiations with the Democratic Party regarding Yoon’s impeachment. Many view Yoon’s declaration as irrational and political suicide, with some even calling the president “insane” (Cheon Ha-ram of the Reform Party). Key questions remain: Why did Yoon declare martial law that didn’t even last for three hours? Whom did he consult before making this decision? Why did he make such a declaration without meticulously preparing first? Presidential office correspondents were made aware at around 9:50 last night that the president would be making an emergency address. Reportedly, even top advisers in the presidential office were unaware that such an announcement was going to be made. Reporters were only told that the announcement was related to initiatives by the opposition party in the National Assembly to impeach the chair Board of Audit and Inspection and a senior prosecutor, as well as unilateral decisions on proposals for national budget cuts. Yoon’s announcement began at around 10:25 pm and was broadcast live on KBS. With a reddened face, Yoon read from a statement that referred to the National Assembly as the “main cause of our national ruin,” “anti-state forces looking to overthrow the government,” and “monsters.” It’s difficult to say that his language was based on sound emotional judgment. At around 10:28 pm, he announced, “I declare martial law to protect our free constitutional order.” The Republic of Korea Constitution (Article 77) states: “When it is required to cope with a military necessity or to maintain public safety and order by mobilization of the military forces in time of war, armed conflict or similar national emergency, the President may proclaim martial law under the conditions as prescribed by Act.” Yoon’s martial law declaration did not fulfill a single one of the conditions outlined in the Constitution: war, armed conflict, national emergency, a situation where military force is required to maintain public stability and order. Moreover, there was no situation that required the mobilization of the military. The Constitution also states: “When the President has proclaimed martial law, he shall notify it to the National Assembly without delay.” Once again, Yoon did not fulfill this condition. Rather, his appointed martial law commander dispatched an airborne unit to the National Assembly, where lawmakers were preparing to issue a demand to rescind martial law. Some of these troops broke into the National Assembly by breaking windows. The Martial Law Act states: “The declaration of martial law or alteration in its nature by the President shall undergo deliberation by the State Council,” referring to the Cabinet. The act also states that the martial law commander must be “recommended by the Minister of National Defense from among general-level officers in active service and appointed by the President after deliberation by the State Council.” Yonhap reported in the early hours of Wednesday that before making his declaration, Yoon had held a Cabinet meeting with Prime Minister Han Duck-soo and others, but did not specify who besides Han attended the meeting. For an agenda item to go to a resolution, a majority of Cabinet members must be present at the meeting, and a two-thirds majority must approve the agenda item. As soon as word got out about Yoon’s imposition of extraordinary martial law, lawmakers from both the opposition and ruling parties headed to the National Assembly to pass a resolution to demand that martial law be lifted. Meanwhile, Park An-su, the appointed martial law commander, issued a martial law edict stating: “All political activities, including National Assembly sessions; local government assemblies; political party activity; and political association, rallies, and protests, are forbidden. Violators will be arrested, detained, searched and punished without warrant.” Police and military began sealing off the vicinity of the National Assembly, and paratroopers were dispatched to the National Assembly. There were concerns that lawmakers would be arrested or detained for violating the martial law edict to prevent them from passing a resolution to rescind martial law. During the process of former President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment, the Defense Security Command drafted a plan for declaring emergency martial law. The plans contained specific measures to arrest and detain opposition lawmakers for violating martial law edicts in order to prevent a National Assembly quorum from convening and passing a resolution to rescind martial law. As Speaker Woo Won-shik was in the process of issuing a resolution to rescind martial law, some paratroopers shattered windows to gain access to the National Assembly building and scuffled with aides and other staffers. The scene added to fears about lawmakers being arrested and detained, with many Koreans and others watching live broadcasts of the incident on the edge of their seats. At around 1 am, the 190 lawmakers gathered unanimously passed a resolution demanding that the president rescind martial law, after which point the troops that had entered the National Assembly withdrew from the building. Lawmakers have already begun discussing measures to impeach Yoon on charges of insurrection. “President Yoon and Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun should be arrested and impeached for inciting a military insurrection,” said Cho Kuk, the leader of the Rebuilding Korea Party and a constitutional scholar, who suggested that Yoon’s declaration was an attempt at an insurrection that mobilized fellow Choongam High School alumni like Kim Yong-hyun who make up his close’s aides. Both the police and military were mobilized to enforce an emergency martial law decree that was a clear violation of the Constitution and the law. Kim Yong-hyun and Interior Minister Lee Sang-min, two of Yoon’s Choongam loyalists, likely had a hand in the martial law declaration, and will inevitably face impeachment and investigation as well. (Kim Nam-il, “Yoon’s Invocation of Martial Law Raises Questions about Prior Planning by Loyal Aides,” Hankyoreh, December 4, 2024) A military decree had banned all political activities and civil gatherings, and declared that “all news media and publications are under the control of martial law command.” It warned that those who spread “fake news” could be arrested without a court warrant. But the Korean media did not acquiesce. News organizations spanning the political spectrum, even right-leaning publications more aligned with Yoon and his conservative party, stood united in criticism of his actions and any efforts to limit a free press. An editorial in Chosun Ilbo, one of South Korea’s biggest daily newspapers which has often been friendly toward Yoon, called the president’s actions an international embarrassment. Yoon needed to answer to the public on how he intended to “take responsibility” for this situation, it added. Sung Deuk Hahm, a professor of political science at Kyonggi University, west of Seoul, said “the best option” for Yoon was to resign. “As tragic as it may seem, what happened overnight showed the resilience and durability of South Korean democracy,” he said. Hahm, who has known Yoon since before his election, said the president appeared to grow increasingly despondent in recent months, particularly over escalating scandals surrounding him and his wife and the relentless political pressure from the opposition. “Things have become too much for him,” Hahm said. “He became mentally unstable under political pressure.” A former presidential aide to Yoon, who agreed to discuss the president’s leadership style on the condition of anonymity, said Yoon was surrounded by a handful of aides, including former military generals, who were not used to second-guessing their boss’s decision. That small circle raised questions about how thoroughly Yoon had prepared for martial law, the aide said. The aide added that as soon as he heard the declaration of martial law, he called contacts in Yoon’s office and other branches of the government. None of them had had advance knowledge of what was coming. Even top leaders of Yoon’s party said they had learned of the declaration through the media. Kim Byung-joo, an opposition lawmaker and former general, told MBC Radio on Wednesday that when he called army generals near the border with North Korea, none of them knew what was happening. (Choe Sang-Hun, John Yoon, Victoria Kim, and Thomas Fuller, “Effort to Expel Leader Builds In South Korea,” New York Times, December 5, 2024, p. A-1) The South Korean army general who was put in charge of a sudden declaration of martial law told parliament on December 5 that he had only learnt about the move when President Yoon Suk Yeol announced it on national television. Park An-su, South Korea’s army general and martial law commander, was one of a number of defense officials questioned by lawmakers as they started efforts to impeach the president and investigate the short-lived imposition of martial law. The emergency decree was issued in Gen Park’s name. “I found out about the martial law declaration watching Yoon’s press conference,” Gen Park said, adding that defense minister Kim Yong-hyun “orchestrated the military moves” after the president’s declaration. Kim Sun-ho, the vice-defense minister, also said he was informed of the president’s plans only after Yoon’s TV statement. The officials blamed Kim Yong-hyun for the decision to dispatch troops. Yoon on Thursday accepted the resignation of the defense minister, who said he was responsible for the order for soldiers to enact martial law. (Edward White, Song Jung-a and Christian Davies, “South Korean General ‘Found out about Martial Law from television,” Financial Times, December 6, 2024, p. 4)

12/4/24:
NATO secretary-general Mark Rutte has accused Russia of assisting North Korea’s nuclear program in exchange for Pyongyang sending troops to help its war against Ukraine, the first such claim by a senior western official. “In return for troops and weapons, Russia is providing North Korea with support for its missile and nuclear programs,” Rutte said after meeting Nato foreign ministers in Brussels today. “These developments could destabilize the Korean Peninsula and even threaten the United States.” When asked what had prompted his statement on today, Rutte declined to provide details of any “intelligence information”, adding: “But more generally, let me say we should not be naive.” “Nuclear technology, missile technology, is flowing into North Korea, and therefore [there] is a risk now that North Korea will use it,” he added. Rutte’s remarks will intensify pressure on South Korea, which is in the midst of a political crisis following President Yoon Suk Yeol’s failed attempt to impose martial law, to provide arms directly to Ukraine. (Christian Davies and Henry Foy, “Rutte Accuses Moscow of Backing North Korea Nuclear Program,” Financial Times, December 5, 2024, p. 2)

KCNA: “The ratification instruments of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation signed by the heads of states of the two countries in Pyongyang on June 19, 2024 were exchanged in Moscow on December 4. Vice Foreign Minister of the DPRK Kim Jong Gyu and Vice Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Andrei Yurievich Rudenko signed the protocol on exchange of ratification instruments. The treaty has an effect from December 4, 2024 when the ratification instruments were exchanged according to Article 22 of the treaty. Thereby, the treaty of friendship, good neighborliness and cooperation between the DPRK and the Russian Federation concluded on February 9, 2000 became ineffective. The treaty serves as a legal framework for realizing the far-reaching plan of the state leadership of the two countries and the desire of the two peoples by putting the bilateral relations on a new strategic level and building a powerful state while firmly defending the regional and global security environment in conformity with the common interests. The mighty DPRK-Russia relations based on the treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership will be a powerful security device that promotes the wellbeing of the peoples of the two countries, eases the regional situation and guarantees international strategic stability, and will serve as a strong driving force accelerating the establishment of independent and just multi-polarized world order without domination, subjugation and hegemony.” (KCNA, “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between DPRK and Russian Federation Comes into Force,” December 5, 2024)

12/7/24:
South Korean lawmakers’ attempt to impeach President Yoon Suk Yeol ended in failure tonight, prolonging the political upheaval and uncertainty that has roiled the country since his short-lived imposition of martial law this week. The failed vote was a reversion to political deadlock in the deeply divided country, despite large-scale protests calling for the president’s removal. It was a contrast to the brief moment early December 4 when lawmakers across the political spectrum came together to vote swiftly and unanimously against the president’s martial law declaration. Saturday’s move by the opposition to impeach Yoon was foiled by his conservative People Power Party, which boycotted the vote and prevented the necessary quorum. All but one member of the party walked out of the room before the impeachment motion was put to a vote, making the effort moot even before the first ballot was cast. The opposition drew out the vote over several hours into the night, urging lawmakers to return to the chamber to participate in the democratic process, in the very building that had been stormed days earlier by hundreds of soldiers acting under martial law orders. “The South Korean people were watching our decision today. Nations around the world were watching us. It is utterly unfortunate that the vote effectively didn’t occur,” the assembly speaker, Woo Won-shik, said as he called the session to a close. Earlier today, Yoon bowed before the nation and apologized in a brief televised address, his first public appearance since the move to install martial law. He said that he had taken the step out of desperation, and that he would not try to avoid legal or political responsibility for the martial decree. But Yoon — who keeps on his desk a plaque given to him by President Biden with the words “The buck stops here” — made no mention of resigning, or of the impending impeachment vote. As the week wore on, Yoon had appeared increasingly isolated, with members of his party openly criticizing the decision and casting doubt on his political future. The apology appeared to be a last-ditch attempt to avoid impeachment in the National Assembly by putting his fate in his party’s hands. Ultimately, partisan politics appeared to prevail. The leader of Yoon’s party, Han Dong-hoon, said before the vote that the president could not carry out his duties and should not serve out his term. Even so, he did not specifically mention impeachment, leaving open the possibility of an alternative resolution. Despite surviving the impeachment attempt, it is unlikely Yoon will be able to carry out any significant government business or represent the country after his failed decree, which was nearly universally condemned. Though his party’s walkout seemed to buy Yoon some time, another threat is looming: South Korean prosecutors said Saturday that they had launched a criminal investigation into the declaration of martial law. As the assembly weighed Yoon’s fate Saturday afternoon, huge crowds of protesters filled the eight-lane-wide street outside, demanding his ouster late into the night despite below-freezing temperatures. Buses and vans were left parked across open spaces around the assembly, out of concern that troops might once again attempt to land there by helicopter, as they did earlier this week when they stormed the legislature. The images of armed soldiers moving against lawmakers and demonstrators raised painful memories of the traumatic period of the country’s recent history when the military indiscriminately killed civilians and quashed political opposition with force. The upheaval has brought a wider swath of the South Korean public onto the streets, with younger demonstrators joining with some of the generation who defied the military and helped usher in the country’s democracy four decades ago. But in a sign of the continuing divisions cleaving the country, a smaller group gathered across town in support of the president. The people in that crowd barely mentioned the martial law declaration that started the crisis. Instead, many focused on branding the opposition as Communist sympathizers who endangered the country, echoing one of Yoon’s favored lines of attack. Many of the protesters calling for Yoon’s removal said they felt compelled by the president’s actions to take to the streets despite never having been to a political gathering before. (Victoria Kim, “South Korean President Survives Impeachment Vote in Assembly,” New York Times, December 8, 2024 p. A-1)

12/8/24:
President Yoon Suk Yeol yesterday dodged an opposition-led motion to impeach him at the National Assembly. Most ruling party lawmakers — 105 of the total 108 — boycotted a floor vote, which prevented the two-thirds quorum needed for the motion to pass. The main opposition, however, said it plans to “repeatedly” table new impeachment motions against Yoon until one passes. The prime minister and the leader of the ruling conservative party today jointly announced their plans to fill in for Yoon, claiming he will no longer be involved in handling state affairs, in a move denounced by the main opposition as unconstitutional. In a public address given by Prime Minister Han Duck-soo and the ruling People Power Party Chair Han Dong-hoon, the two said they would cooperate in operational matters related to “national governance.” They did announce when any such transition would take place. Han Dong-hoon said they plan to map out the president’s “orderly resignation,” but did not elaborate on how their decision would correspond with the Constitution. “President Yoon will not be involved in handling state affairs, including foreign policy, even before his resignation,” Han Dong-hoon said in the joint public address. “We plan to minimize the turmoil (stemming from Tuesday’s martial law decree) through President Yoon’s orderly resignation,” he added. The announcement came as part of the second meeting between the prime minister and the ruling party leader held after Yoon’s surprise decree of martial law late Tuesday. Regarding the details of Yoon’s “orderly resignation,” Han Dong-hoon said it will be “swiftly announced after discussions within the (ruling) party.” He highlighted Yoon’s remarks made at a brief televised address aired Saturday morning, in which the president said he would “leave it up to” his party to “take steps to stabilize the political situation,” including the issue of his term in office. According to Han, “(Based on this remark by President Yoon) there will be no confusion in the process of pursuing the president’s early resignation.” Prime Minister Han Duck-soo echoed the ruling party leader’s sentiment, saying that the Cabinet plans to take a “humble” stance and work with the People Power Party in “matters related to national governance.” “The administration of state affairs must not be hindered,” the prime minister said, stressing the urgency of passing a national budget to ensure effective governance amid the political uncertainty. Though the prime minister expressed agreement with Han regarding the need for cooperation between the Cabinet and the ruling party on managing state affairs, he refrained from discussing Yoon’s possible resignation in his public address. The prime minister and the ruling party leader plan to meet at least once every week for the time being to tackle the task of “minimizing the damage” to the people stemming from the current political turmoil, the joint statement read. The meeting between Han Dong-hoon and Han Duck-soo is expected to replace the weekly sessions between Yoon and the prime minister. The prime minister’s office announced in the afternoon that the next weekly meeting between Yoon and Han Duck-soo, originally scheduled for tomorrow, was canceled. National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik and main opposition leader Lee Jae-myung strongly criticized the ruling camp’s plan, both denouncing it as unconstitutional. Rep. Lee Jae-myung, the Democratic Party leader, said Han proposing to “share the president’s powers is completely baffling.” “The people elected Yoon, not Han, as president. This is another coup that destroys the Constitutional order,” he said. Lee said that contrary to Han’s claim that Yoon would no longer exercise his presidential power, the president continued to do so when he approved the resignation of Lee Sang-min as interior minister on Sunday. Lee said he believed Yoon was capable of declaring martial law again “at any moment.” “It is incredibly dangerous that a man like Yoon still has authority over our military. Yoon must be permanently removed from office through a trial at court,” he said. Woo Won-shik, the speaker of the National Assembly, said the prime minister and the ruling party leader were violating the Constitution by putting themselves in charge of the country. “The prime minister and the ruling party’s announcement that they will jointly exercise the powers of the president, which no one has given them, is clearly unconstitutional. It is extreme arrogance, and disrespects the nation’s sovereignty and the Constitution,” he said. Woo said the ruling party and the prime minister were misleading the public with their announcement. “As the speaker of the Assembly, I am warning you,” he said. Rep. Kim Min-seok, who is on the Democratic Party’s Supreme Council and is considered the main opposition’s No. 2 leader, said the ruling party proposal to take over from the president was “unconstitutional and illegitimate.” “Nobody gave Han Dong-hoon that kind of power. This is just another insurrection,” he said. Kim said Yoon and all those involved in Tuesday’s martial law declaration should be arrested immediately. That included the prime minister, who was at a Cabinet meeting held right before the president made the martial law announcement, the Democratic Party lawmaker said. “The prime minister cannot be put in charge of running the country (like this). Not only is it a violation of the Constitution, he is also a main accomplice. He was in a position where he was aware of everything, and yet he let it happen,” Kim said. Kim also opposed the ruling party’s suggestion of Yoon’s “orderly and smooth” removal, saying the president needed to be taken down “this instant, as soon as possible.” “South Korea cannot be safe until Yoon is no longer president,” he said. The Democratic Party lawmaker said his party would suspend Yoon from office before Christmas. (Jung Min-kyung and Kim Arin, “Conflict Erupts over Ruling Camp’s Takeover Plan,” Korea Herald, December 8, 2024)

12/12/24:
The United States today offered a $5 million reward for information about an alleged scheme in which North Korean technology workers got jobs at unsuspecting U.S. companies then stole their trade secrets for ransom, with the proceeds used to fund Pyongyang’s weapons programs. The U.S. State Department said about 130 North Korean workers got IT jobs at U.S. companies and nonprofits from 2017 to 2023 and generated at least $88 million that Pyongyang used for weapons of mass destruction. Part of the total was the workers’ compensation from the employers, which ultimately went to the North Korean government, the U.S. said. The companies were not identified. The State Department said in a statement it sought information on two sanctioned North Korean companies — China-based Yanbian Silverstar Network Technology and Russia-based Volasys Silverstar — that it said handled the workers. The U.S. Department of Justice separately announced indictments of 14 North Koreans accused of operating and working for the two companies as part of the scheme. Operating from either China or Russia, the workers stole sensitive company information, including proprietary source computer code, and threatened to leak it unless the employer made an extortion payment, the government said. The 14 people were charged with wire fraud, money laundering and identity theft among other offenses. “To prop up its brutal regime, the North Korean government directs IT workers to gain employment through fraud, steal sensitive information from U.S. companies and siphon money back to the DPRK,” Deputy U.S. Attorney General Lisa Monaco said in a statement. The people and their unnamed associates used the stolen identities of hundreds of Americans to get hired under the scheme, the government said. People in the U.S. aided the scheme by purchasing laptops or receiving laptops from U.S. employers for the fraudulent workers. The Justice Department has obtained indictments of Americans accused of operating so-called laptop farms in recent months. One North Korean IT defector told Reuters in November 2023 that he would try to get hired and then create additional fake social media profiles to secure more jobs. (Susan Heavey and AJ Vicens, “U.S. Claims North Korea Put Workers in U.S. Companies to Extort Money for Weapons,” Reuters, December 12, 2024)

12/14/24:
The National Assembly voted today to impeach President Yoon Suk Yeol over his botched imposition of martial law, suspending him from his duties until the Constitutional Court decides whether to reinstate him or remove him from office, with citizens cheering over his impeachment. The impeachment motion against Yoon passed 204-85, with three abstentions and eight invalid ballots, after all 300 members of the Assembly cast their votes. The motion’s passage came 11 days after Yoon declared martial law in an announcement that caught the nation by surprise and drew outrage, as troops encircled the National Assembly compound in an apparent attempt to stop lawmakers from repealing the decree. The martial law order, which was lifted within six hours after the Assembly voted it down, has prompted investigations by the police, the prosecution and the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials into whether Yoon staged an insurrection. He is currently banned from leaving the country. Yoon was suspended from his duties at 7:24 p.m., the moment the impeachment resolution was delivered to his office and about 2 1/2 hours after the impeachment motion passed. Prime Minister Han Duck-soo immediately began his duties as the acting president and convened a Cabinet meeting at the government complex in Seoul. A two-thirds majority was required to approve the motion, with the opposition bloc accounting for 192 of the 300 members of parliament. Yoon’s People Power Party (PPP) decided shortly before the proceeding to take part in the vote but oppose impeachment. The result showed 12 PPP lawmakers likely broke from their party line to vote in favor of impeachment. A second impeachment motion against Yoon was introduced two days ago by the DP and five other minor opposition parties, accusing him of violating the Constitution and other laws by declaring martial law. The second motion was revised from the first motion to remove some charges against Yoon but add others, including allegations that Yoon ordered troops and the police to arrest lawmakers while martial law was in force. The impeachment resolution was sent to the Constitutional Court, which will decide whether to reinstate Yoon or remove him from office. The impeachment trial can take up to 180 days. If the impeachment is upheld, Yoon will become the second president to be ousted after former President Park Geun-hye in 2017, triggering a snap presidential election within 60 days. Former President Roh Moo-hyun was impeached in 2004 but reinstated. Hundreds of thousands of people who were gathered near the Assembly and other major locations across the country erupted in cheers after Yoon’s impeachment motion passed. (Lee Haye-ah and Yi Wonju, “Nat’l Assembly Votes to Impeach Yoon pover Failed Martial Law Bid,” Yonhap, December 14, 2024) The ruling party said that it officially opposed impeachment, but its lawmakers were allowed to cast their secret ballots. The result indicated that 12 lawmakers from Yoon’s party had joined the opposition to impeach him and another 11 abstained or cast invalid votes, sealing his fate. (Choe Sang-Hun, Jin Yu Young, and Victoria Kim, “Lawmakers Vote To Oust Leader In South Korea,” New York Times, December 15, 2024, p.A-1)

12/16/24:
The United States hit North Korea and Russia today with new sanctions targeting Pyongyang’s financial and military support to Moscow as well as its ballistic missile program. The sanctions, which list North Korean banks, generals and other officials, as well as Russian oil shipping companies, are the latest U.S. measure aimed at disrupting North Korea’s support to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The North Korean banks targeted include Golden Triangle Bank, one of the biggest banks in the northeastern Rason Special Economic Zone, and Pyongyang-based Korea Mandal Credit Bank, which has representatives throughout China, the Treasury Department said in a statement. South Korea’s foreign ministry separately said on December 17 that it has blacklisted 11 individuals and 15 entities linked to illicit military cooperation between North Korea and Russia. “The United States remains committed to disrupting the illicit procurement and facilitation networks that enable these destabilizing activities,” he said. The officials sanctioned by both Washington and Seoul include North Korean generals leading tens of thousands of North Korean troops in Russia, including Kim Yong Bok, who has appeared at seven events with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un this year, including special forces exercises. South Korea separately blacklisted the North’s special forces unit known as the Storm Corps, also in Russia fighting against Ukraine, and its chief, Ri Pong Chun. Ukraine said today that at least 30 North Korean soldiers had been killed or injured in combat in Russia’s Kursk region over the weekend. It said that Moscow began deploying them in the southern region in significant numbers last week to conduct assaults on Ukrainian forces. Ukraine launched a cross-border incursion into Kursk in August. The Treasury sanctions freeze the U.S. assets of the designated entities, ban their trade with Americans, and block them from transactions with the U.S. financial system. The Treasury blacklisted Russia-based foreign trade companies that it said were shipping oil and gas to North Korea. The companies include Vostok Trading, DV Ink, and Novosibirskoblgaz. Treasury said they began shipping “thousands of tons of oil and gas” to North Korea beginning in 2022 and continuing through at least April 2024. North Korea has likely received more than 1 million barrels of oil from Russia over an eight-month period this year in breach of U.N. sanctions, according to an analysis of satellite imagery published in November by the British-based Open Source Centre and the BBC. North Korean oil tankers have made more than 40 visits to Russia’s Far Eastern port of Vostochny since March, the report on the research group Open Source Centre’s website said. The sanctions also targeted Sibregiongaz, AO, the Russia-based parent company and 100% owner of Novosibirskoblgaz. They also hit Okryu Trading Company, or Okryu, a North Korea-based foreign trade company that Treasury said has received thousands of tons of oil shipments from Russia. (Timothy Gardner and Doina Chiacu, “U.S. Hits North Korea and Russia with New Sanctions, Treasury Says,” Reuters, December 16, 2024)

12/17/24:
The United States believes North Korea has suffered some “significant” troop losses during combat alongside Russian forces against Ukraine, a White House official confirmed today, noting the troops were seen moving from the second lines on the battlefield to the front lines. National Security Communications Adviser John Kirby made the remarks as Kyiv’s intelligence authorities have said that some 200 Russian and North Korean soldiers were estimated to have been killed while fighting in combined units against Ukrainian forces. “We do believe that they have suffered some significant losses, killed and wounded, but it’s difficult for me to put an actual number on it. I would say, certainly in the realm of dozens, several dozens,” Kirby said in an online press briefing. “We’ve just started to see this movement of them from the second line to the front line. So, it’s a fairly new development, and we might be able to have a little bit more granularity as days go on,” he added. It marks the first time that Washington publicly confirmed North Korean fatalities during Russia’s war against Ukraine. (Song Sang-ho, “U.S. Confirms N. Korea Suffered ‘Significant Losses’ in Combat against Ukraine,” Yonhap, December 17, 2024) Sending the troops brings a range of benefits for North Korea, including much-needed cash and diplomatic leverage. Kim is receiving billions of dollars’ worth of food, oil, cash and advanced weapons systems from Russia that will help his regime endure international sanctions and upgrade its conventional armed forces, analysts say. Kim had been in desperate need of such a breakthrough. Brisk weapons exports to Russia are bringing life to North Korea’s munitions industry. The North has earned up to $5.5 billion through arms deals with Russia, according to Olena Guseinova, a researcher at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul. In a report published in October, she also estimated that North Korea could bring in up to $572 million annually through deploying troops — a huge sum by the North’s standards. The country’s official exports amounted to $330 million only last year. Neither Russia nor North Korea has revealed how Moscow was paying North Korea. But North Korean oil tankers have been bringing in far more oil from Russia than is allowed under U.N. sanctions, according to an analysis of satellite imagery published last month by the UK-based Open Source Center and the BBC. On the ground, North Korea’s military is also gaining valuable battlefield insights for the first time in decades, including innovations in drone use that are changing modern warfare. The war against Ukraine is providing North Korea with its first opportunity to test its newer KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles against Western air defense systems in live combat. Its technicians traveled with the missiles to identify the deficiencies and collect data to take home, according to officials in South Korea. One fear in Seoul is that in the future Kim may be able to bargain for Russian help to master technologies needed for nuclear missiles that could hit targets across the Pacific. “I don’t think they have yet reached the stage where Russia would provide sensitive nuclear and missile technologies and components,” said Jang Seho, an analyst at the Seoul-based Institute for National Security Strategy. The new stream of revenues and weapons technologies from Russia will cushion North Korea from U.N. sanctions and embolden Kim’s postures toward Washington and its allies. But the deployment also carries several risks for Kim. The North Korean special forces have been fighting alongside Russian paratroopers and marines to help Russia retake territories lost to Ukraine in its Kursk region, South Korean intelligence officials said. It was unclear how well they were prepared for a war of attrition fought in trenches and on flatlands with artillery and drones, military experts said. South Korean officials are closely monitoring how the North’s weapons and troops fare in the war — with the potential for battlefield desertions — to glean insights into its military’s preparedness. Many of the North Korean artillery rounds were decades old and have proven to be duds. The drain on its supplies may weaken North Korea at home. North Korea has already sent so many conventional weapons and ammunition to Russia “it cannot fight a war in Korea right now even if it wanted to,” said Doo Jin-ho, a senior analyst at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses in Seoul. “That may be Kim Jong Un’s biggest vulnerability now.” Some South Korean analysts doubt that collaboration between Pyongyang and Moscow will endure. The two economies have so little to offer each other that Russia would account for less than 2 percent of North Korea’s international trade other than arms deals, while China accounts for more than 90 percent, according to a report by But even bilateral trade between North Korea and China slowed to $1.5 billion in the first nine months of the year, down from $1.6 billion during the same period a year ago. That may reflect another gamble by Kim. North Korea has long sought to play Beijing against Moscow, but some analysts say that North Korea’s deepening military ties with Russia could damage its relations with China. (Choe Sang-hun, “What North Korea Gains, and Risks, From Ties With Russia,” New York Times, December 18, 2024, p. A-8) When North Korean troops began arriving in Russia this fall, some Western officials believed it was a sign that the Kremlin had reached out in a desperate need for more soldiers. But U.S. intelligence agencies have now assessed that the deployment was North Korea’s idea and not Russia’s, though President Vladimir V. Putin quickly embraced it, American officials say. U.S. officials do not believe Kim has received anything immediate in return. Instead, they say, he appears to be hoping that Russia will repay the favor in the future by offering support in diplomatic fights, assisting if a crisis breaks out and providing technology. According to American and Ukrainian officials, the North Korean troops have now entered the fight in a major way, and some have been killed. “We have seen these North Korean soldiers move from the second lines on the battlefield to the front lines on the battlefield meant to be actively engaged in combat operations,” The officials interviewed for this article would not describe when, or how, the United States gathered the information on the discussions between the North Koreans and Russians. But they indicated that it was not immediately after the agreement was made or when the deployments began. The Ukrainian official said that as many as 200 North Koreans had been killed and slightly more wounded, but cautioned that the Russians were trying to conceal those losses. American officials said it was not clear how effective the North Korean troops have been. North Korea sent its best-trained special forces to the fight, but many appear to be malnourished. And North Korean soldiers have no real-world combat experience. The senior Ukrainian official said North Korean platoons do not seem to be fully integrated into the Russian fighting force and at times appeared to be operating independently, which has increased the risk of casualties. At the same time, the official said, the North Korean troops seem to receive better medical treatment than their Russian counterparts. The wounded are often driven straight to larger hospitals in the city of Kursk, bypassing smaller, lower-quality village hospitals closer to the battlefield. (Julian E. Barnes and Michael Schwirtz, “North Korea Asked to Send Troops to Help Russia, U.S. Says,” New York Times, December 24, 2024, p. A-7) For years, North Korea’s military has helped its leader, Kim Jong Un, keep control of his people and provide a buffer against the country’s sworn enemy, South Korea. With 1.3 million members, the North’s army is among the world’s largest conventional armed forces. Now, with more than 11,000 North Korean troops fighting alongside Russian forces against Ukraine, it’s playing a more prominent role in Kim’s geopolitical gambit for much-needed cash and diplomatic leverage. The troops that North Korea deployed are from its “Storm” Corps, special forces that are among the military’s best trained and most heavily indoctrinated. But they were badly prepared for drone attacks and the unfamiliar terrain far from their isolated homeland, according to South Korea’s National Intelligence Service. More than 100 of them were killed and 1,000 others wounded in their first battles, the intelligence agency told South Korean lawmakers in a briefing on December 19. The agency said a general-ranking officer may be among those killed, according to Lee Seong-kweun, a lawmaker who spoke to reporters after the closed-door briefing. The agency said Kim appeared to be preparing to send more troops to Russia, as he sees Europe’s biggest conflict since World War II as an opportunity to advance his own military and diplomatic ambitions. The North’s special forces have trained mainly for sniper missions, urban warfare and infiltrations by sea, air and across Korea’s many mountains. They have not trained enough for drone and trench warfare waged over terrain like the mostly open and flat Russia-Ukraine front line, said Doo Jin-ho, a senior analyst at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses in Seoul. The North Korean troops’ deployment was so rushed that it could take time for Russia to integrate them properly into its military, South Korean intelligence officials told lawmakers. They were thrust into battle after learning a smattering of military terms, like “open fire,” “artillery” and “in position” in Russian, potentially creating problems in battlefield communications, they said. “From top to bottom, the North Korean military has had no live combat experiences for decades,” said Ahn Chan-il, a former North Korean army sergeant living in South Korea. “The troops must have had a crash course on drone and infantry warfare, but the question is how well they are familiarized with it.” Kim Jong Il, led his country with a “military-first” policy. He relied on the Korean People’s Army to hold the country together in the wake of a famine in the 1990s. In return, he allowed it to hog government resources, as well as to run profitable operations, such as mining, fisheries and smuggling. Once Kim Jong Un took over after his father’s death in 2011, he moved to subjugate the military elites, banishing or executing top generals. In 2015, Gen. Hyon Yong-chol, then the defense minister, was executed with an antiaircraft gun after he dozed off in Kim’s presence, according to South Korean intelligence officials. In 2017, Kim sidelined Vice Marshal Hwang Pyong-so, the military’s top political officer. For two months, Hwang was made to sweep the front yard of a party building in Pyongyang, said Lee Ilkyu, a North Korean diplomat in Cuba who defected to Seoul last year. North Korean officials live with constant fear because they don’t know when they might fall victim to Kim Jong Un’s impulsiveness, Lee added. Outside analysts closely watch who accompanies Kim on his tours of military units and weapons test sites for signs of who might be in — or out of — his favor. In September, the analysts began noticing two new faces in the circle of top officials around Kim: Col. Gen. Kim Yong-bok and Col. Gen. Ri Chang-ho. Their importance to Kim was revealed when they later accompanied the troops to Russia. General Kim was identified as commander of the North’s special forces during a military parade in 2017, according to Hong Min, an analyst at the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul. General Ri headed the military’s Reconnaissance General Bureau, which is involved in arms trade, cybercrime and other illicit activities to fatten Kim’s coffers. The soldiers sent to Russia were probably from poor families. The chance to go abroad and the prospect of cash can be huge incentives for them, Ahn said. Russia could pay as much as $2,000 a month per North Korean soldier, according to South Korean intelligence. Although their government is expected to take most of it, the remainder can still be a huge sum for an ordinary soldier. (Choe Sang-hun, “Heavy Losses in Ukraine for North Korean Forces,” New York Times, December 24, 2024, p. A-7)

12/19/24:
North Korean groups have stolen $1.34bn through cryptocurrency hacks this year, their highest level of such thefts on record, underlining the importance of this revenue stream for Pyongyang. The total value of the thefts by North Korean-affiliated groups, across 47 incidents in 2024, is more than double the amount they took last year, according to data from Chainalysis, a blockchain research group. It means the country now accounts for two-thirds of cryptocurrency hacks globally. North Korean operatives have emerged as “the world’s leading bank robbers” in recent years, according to US officials, after developing an army of highly trained hackers over decades to target western institutions. A UN panel of experts that monitors the implementation of international sanctions has identified that North Korea uses the money raised by criminal cyber operations to help fund its illicit ballistic missile and nuclear program. The US has estimated that as much as a third of North Korea’s missile program is funded by cybercrime. “North Korea has long sought to evade international sanctions to support its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles programs,” said Andrew Fierman, head of national security intelligence at Chainalysis. “Historically, North Korea has done so through a variety of techniques, including evasive shipping tactics, overseas workers and the use of shell companies. Stealing cryptocurrency has become another mechanism in their toolkit to fund the regime.” Among the more daring heists attributed to North Korean hackers was the theft of 4,500 bitcoin with a value of $305mn from Japanese crypto exchange DMM Bitcoin in May. Chainalysis traced much of the stolen bitcoin through a web of intermediaries before it eventually ended up at a Cambodian crypto exchange. DMM Bitcoin announced this month it would close down after the hack and transfer its customers’ accounts to other exchanges. The total value of stolen cryptocurrency rose 21 per cent to $2.2bn this year, according to Chainalysis’s data, while the number of recorded hacks hit an all-time high of 303. The thefts come as bitcoin has soared this year to more than $100,000, boosted by Donald Trump’s US presidential election victory in November. Recommended The Big Read From the archive: How North Korea became a mastermind of crypto cybercrime The North Korea flag of a red star against a red and blue background with a hand emerging from the flag holding an ethereum coin. However, Chainalysis’s data also shows North Korea’s hacking activity slowed in the second half of the year after the country’s leader, Kim Jong Un, and Russia’s Vladimir Putin, signed a strategic partnership in June to deepen trade and military links between the two countries. The agreement has led to North Korean troops fighting alongside Russians in Ukraine. Analysts suggest that as North Korea has received more support from Russia it is becoming less reliant on cybercrime. Since the agreement was signed, the average daily crypto loss attributed to North Korean groups has halved, while losses with no link to the country have risen slightly. “It may be possible that the hermit kingdom has had less reliance on its cybercriminal activity in the second half of the year,” said Chainalysis’s Fierman. (Owen Walker, ”North Korea Steals $1.3bn in Crypto Hacks,” Financial Times, December 19, 2024, p. 8)

12/27/24:
The National Assembly voted today to impeach acting President Han Duck-soo less than two weeks after he took over for President Yoon Suk Yeol who was impeached for his botched imposition of martial law. A motion to impeach Han passed unanimously in a 192-0 vote, marking the first time an acting president was impeached by parliament. Han will be suspended from his duties as soon as the impeachment resolution is delivered to him, putting Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok in his seat to serve as both the acting president and the acting prime minister. “I respect the decision of the National Assembly, and in order not to add to the confusion and uncertainty, I will suspend my duties in line with relevant laws, and wait for the swift and wise decision of the Constitutional Court,” Han said in a statement. The ruling People Power Party (PPP) protested the decision, however, saying the vote was invalid as the quorum for impeachment was set at a simple majority of 151 votes, which applies to Cabinet ministers, not at a two-thirds majority of 200 votes, which applies to the president. The quorum was announced by National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik immediately before the vote, sending PPP lawmakers scrambling to encircle the speaker’s seat and punch the air while shouting “null and void.” The impeachment motion against Han was introduced by the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) the previous day after he refused to appoint additional justices to the Constitutional Court that will adjudicate Yoon’s impeachment trial. The DP listed five reasons for his impeachment, including his refusal to appoint justices, his involvement in Yoon’s martial law imposition and his refusal to promulgate two special counsel bills targeting Yoon and first lady Kim Keon Hee. The PPP is widely expected to seek an injunction or take other legal steps to nullify Han’s impeachment. (Lee Haye-ah and Yi Wonju, “Nat’l Assembly Votes to Impeach Acting president Han,” Yonhap, December 27, 2024) The National Assembly held a plenary session this afternoon, during which it passed a bill to elect three justices recommended by the parliament to the Constitutional Court and reported a bill to impeach Han. Both Ma Eun-hyeok and Jeong Gye-seon, judges nominated by the Democratic Party, and Cho Han-chang, nominated by the People Power Party, received 195 votes, passing the quorum (151) for the ballot, which requires a simple majority of the members present. The Democratic Party brought the impeachment bill to the plenary session as Han refused to officially appoint the nominees to the Constitutional Court, calling for the ruling and opposition party to meet a consensus in a last-minute public address this morning. “The opposition is pressuring the acting president to exercise the president’s power to appoint constitutional institution’s personnel without the consensus of the ruling and opposition parties,” Han said. “If the ruling and opposition parties agree and submit a proposal, judges will be promptly appointed.” However, the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court have ruled that it is not in violation of constitutional principles for the acting president to appoint constitutional judges recommended and elected by the National Assembly. The National Assembly passed the motion to impeach Han in a plenary session on Friday, with all 192 lawmakers present voting in favor. (Um Ji-won, staff reporter; Goh Gyoung-ju, “Han Impeach after Slow-Walking Impeachment Proceedings for Yoon,” Hankyoreh, December 27, 2024)

12/28/24:
KCNA: “…The Enlarged Meeting of the Eleventh Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea was held at the headquarters of the Party Central Committee, the General Staff of the revolution, from December 23 to 27 to review the remarkable achievements made in 2024 by dint of the irresistible might peculiar to the DPRK and its people, which is stronger than trials and challenges, and to decide on the development orientation of the Party and state affairs and policies for them in 2025, which will constitute another watershed in the history of the growth and development of our Party and the Republic. … Our Republic reliably defended its inviolable sovereign rights and achieved successes of strategic significance from the viewpoint of prospective growth of the interests and enhancing the prestige of the state while responding promptly and smartly to the harsh regional situation and the unsteady structure of the international relations, and firmly maintained its principled foreign policy stand and orientation of struggle. In this way, it has firmly occupied the international position as a representative and powerful independent force that dynamically pushes forward the building of a righteous multi-polar world. The concluding speech put forward the strategic and tactical tasks for bringing about a more favorable external phase for the Korean revolution through proactive and offensive external activities in line with the Party’s external strategic plan and intentions. The U.S. is the most reactionary state that regards anti-communism as its invariable state policy, the alliance between the U.S., Japan and ROK has expanded into a nuclear military bloc for aggression, and the ROK has turned into an out-and-out anti-communist outpost of the U.S. This reality clearly shows which direction we should follow and what we should do and how. The concluding speech clarified the strategy for the toughest anti-U.S. counteraction to be launched aggressively by the DPRK for its long-term national interests and security. It indicated the tasks for the field of external affairs to wage a dynamic struggle for defending the national sovereign rights on the principle of enhancing the prestige and defending the interests of the state and to positively promote the development of relations with the friendly countries that respect the dignity and interests of the DPRK. Kim Jong Un pointed to the special importance to thoroughly prepare the People’s Army as a revolutionary army of the Party, boundlessly loyal to its leadership and strong in ideology and technology. Holding fast to strengthening its politico-ideological might as its primary strategic task for building itself up, the KPA should develop itself into a revolutionary army that always emerges victorious by dint of ideology, train all its service personnel to be genuine patriots, most powerful in their spiritual strength, and in particular, dynamically conduct the ideological work aimed at fully equipping them with keen awareness of the enemy, an immutable outlook on the archenemy and firm will to fight a decisive battle with them. In order to meet the demands and features of modern warfare and cope with the ever-changing enemy’s war scenario and execution mode, it should enhance its capabilities for fighting a war by intensifying research into our own style of tactics, giving an uninterrupted spur to the work of putting its operations command on an IT and modern basis and steadily studying and applying scientific forms and methods of training. We should also push ahead with fully preparing the civil defense sector for a war. Kim Jong Un clarified the strategic and tactical policies for more reliably guaranteeing the bolstering of war deterrence for self-defense through accelerated progress of defense science and technology and radical development of the defense industry to cope with the ever-increasing military provocations of the U.S. and its vassal forces against the DPRK, and set forth the tasks for their implementation. Saying that next year’s struggle for successfully carrying out the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the WPK requires the Party organizations, the political staff of relevant sectors and units, to enhance their functions and activities more than ever before, he stressed that all Party organizations should dynamically conduct their organizational and political work to attain their struggle goals without fail by making sound preparations and redoubled efforts. In particular, all Party officials should bear in mind once again the true meaning of the slogan “Everything for the people and everything by relying on them!” and devote their all to the work for the people, as intended by the Party Central Committee, he said, adding: The unprecedentedly harsh situation will persist in the future, too, but the invaluable experience and lessons, gained and drawn in this year’s intensive struggle for ushering in a new era of transformation unprecedented since the founding of the nation, and our confidence and internal force that have grown a hundredfold will surely encourage us to attain with credit the goals we have set. He then ardently called on all the participants to remain true to their heavy duty and responsibility they have assumed for the times and revolution and the country and people, and wage a bolder struggle with higher confidence in the vanguard of the general offensive for a great victory and glory in 2025.…” (KCNA, “Report on Enlarged Meeting of Eleventh Plenary Meeting of Eighth Central Committee of WPK,” December 29, 2024)