Special Reports

Leon V. Sigal, Director, Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council, writes, “While broaching the subject of a NWFZ runs political risks, conventional deterrence continues to operate on the Korean Peninsula. The South has long had conventional forces capable of defeating the North, with or without U.S. troops, and the North has long held Seoul hostage to its forward-deployed artillery. The North’s nuclear weapons affect the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula insofar as they could put U.S. forces and bases in Japan at risk.”

A Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (hereafter KJNWFZ) is a new concept. Once realized, it could help resolve a number of linked and intractable security issues in Northeast Asia at the same time. This includes the need to respond to North Korea’s nuclear breakout without undermining the Global Abolition policy announced by President Obama; the need for Japan and Korea to deepen their non-nuclear commitments to more deeply ingrained “forever” status without hedging; and the need for Japan-Korean cooperation to lay the foundations for a comprehensive security mechanism and long-term regional security institution, including through cooperative nuclear fuel cycle and space development activities.

A version of this concept paper is also available in Korean and Japanese.

Joint Investigation Group released the full report on the sinking of the ROK Corvette Cheonan. This 300 page report includes detailed results from the JIG’s investigation including testimony from survivors and analyses of possible causes of the sinking.  The report concludes that the Cheonan was sunk by a “CHT-02D torpedo with approximately 250kg of explosives manufactured and used by North Korea.”

A collection of links regarding analysis and news of the 1999 East Timor Crisis.   Wade Huntley and Peter Hayes, “East Timor and Asian Security” Theodore Friend, “Indonesia: Confronting the Political and Economic Crisis” James Cotton, “East Timor and Australia- Twenty-Five Years of the Policy Debate” Sylvia Tiwon, “East Timor and the ‘Disintegration’ of Indonesia […]

The ROK Ministry of Unification released this statement explaining the measures that the ROK government will take in response to the sinking of the Cheonan. These measures include a ban on DPRK ships navigating ROK territorial waters, the suspension of trade with and humanitarian aid to the DPRK, a ban on new investment in the DPRK, and the prohibition of travel to the DPRK by ROK citizens.

Read a discussion of this article here.

Dick K. Nanto, Specialist in Industry and Trade, Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, and Kerry Dumbaugh, Specialist in Asian Affairs, at the Congressional Research Service wrote this report on the relationship between the PRC and DPRK. The report examines the PRC’s DPRK policy, the DPRK’s policy objectives in its interactions with the PRC, Sino-DPRK diplomatic and economic relations, and the impact of PRC sanctions on the DPRK.

Michael Hamel-Green of Victoria University and Peter Hayes of the Nautilus Institute argue that a “Korean NWFZ may be a necessary condition to achieving the full denuclearization of Korea”. As well as providing “benefits to the United States in preventing a major direct and wider proliferation threat from North Korea, and to China, Japan and South Korea in maintaining stability in the Northeast Asian Region, it would also serve to address North Korean security concerns about potential US nuclear strikes”. They point out that “the two Koreas have already negotiated a legal basis for a Korean Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the form of the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korea Peninsula.” This could form the basis of a NWFZ covering the peninsula. Alternately, they suggest, the ROK and Japan could create a Japan Korea NWFZ via a bilateral treaty.

Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, analyses developments in the system of United States nuclear hegemony in East Asia deriving from North Korea’s drive for nuclear weapons. Hayes argues that “the nuclear threat projected by the US in this hegemonic system drove the DPRK to adopt a nuclear weapons proliferation strategy that was aimed at compelling the United States to change its policies towards the DPRK. The latter’s successful nuclear breakout demonstrates that today, the hegemon has no clothes, that is, it is not capable of stopping nuclear breakout by a key adversary.” Arguing that the reinforcing of guarantees of extended nuclear deterrence will be unsuccessful and “will lead to eventual nuclear proliferation by the allies themselves”, Hayes concludes that only conventional deterrence “is likely to curb the DPRK’s nuclear threat, head off long-run proliferation by the ROK and Japan, and by realigning its legitimating ideology (“Global Abolition”) with alliance institutions and force structures, restore the now rapidly dwindling US hegemony in the region.”

See-Won Byun, Research Associate at the Asia Foundation, produced this report examining “the main issues on which the United States and South Korea would need to coordinate policies in response to possible North Korean instability at each stage of an unfolding contingency, with a focus on different functional areas of cooperation. It will highlight immediate priority areas for U.S.-ROK cooperation, identifying lead agencies and mechanisms for cooperation, and potential points of conflict in U.S.-ROK efforts to manage instability in North Korea. The assessment will attempt to provide a long-term framework for understanding U.S.-ROK contingency planning for North Korea.”

The International Crisis Group, an independent, non-profit, multinational organization, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict, writes, “While there is an ongoing debate on North Korea policy within Beijing policy circles reflective of divergent views of U.S.- China relations, overall there remains significant aversion to any move which might destablise China’s periphery. Beijing therefore views the nuclear issue as a longer-term endeavour for which the U.S. is principally responsible, and continues to strengthen its bilateral relationship with North Korea.”