Policy Forum

The following is part of a paper presented on March 31, 2005 by Haksoon Paik at the 2nd Korea-U.S. Security Forum, Hyatt Regency Cheju, Korea. Haksoon Paik, Ph.D. is the Director of Inter-Korean Relations Studies Program and the Director of the Center for North Korean Studies at the Sejong Institute, an independent think tank in South Korea. Paik writes: “While the U.S. government does not have any leverage and control mechanism over North Korea’s nuclear-related activities, an inter-Korean channel could be an additional support channel for U.S. efforts to achieve the goal of nonproliferation in North Korea.”

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Tatsujiro Suzuki, Senior Research Scientist, Socio-economic Research Center, Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI), and Visiting Professor, Graduate School of Public Policy, the University of Tokyo, writes, “The primary driving force behind Japan’s reprocessing program is the management of spent nuclear fuel. The back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, i.e. management of spent fuel and waste, would pose significant financial, political, and social risks to Japan’s nuclear power program. Japan should explore alternative socio-political solutions, including multinational approaches, to its complex spent fuel management issues.”

Chalmers Johnson, president of the Japan Policy Research Institute, writes: “As a Hong Kong wisecrack has it, China has just had a couple of bad centuries and now it’s back. The world needs to adjust peacefully to its legitimate claims — one of which is for other nations to stop militarizing the Taiwan problem — while checking unreasonable Chinese efforts to impose its will on the region.”

Kenneth Lieberthal is a professor of political science and of business administration at the University of Michigan, and is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution. He was special assistant to the US president for National Security Affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council, 1998-2000. Kenneth Lieberthal writes: “North Korea is both morally repugnant and a maddening adversary in negotiations. But simply going through the motions of negotiation in the hope that regime change will somehow happen enhances Kim Jong-Il’s opportunity to develop and proliferate nuclear capabilities.”

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Discussion of “The Folly of Forcing Regime Change” Discussion of “The Folly of Forcing Regime Change” PFO 05-25A: March 22nd, 2005 Discussion of “The Folly of Forcing Regime Change” Kenneth Lieberthal CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Comments on Essay by Kenneth Lieberthal Comments by Ralph Cossa Response by Kenneth Lieberthal III. Nautilus invites your responses Go […]

Discussion of “What is the Goal of the U.S. Policy toward North Korea: Nonproliferation or Regime Change?” Discussion of “What is the Goal of the U.S. Policy toward North Korea: Nonproliferation or Regime Change?” PFO 05-30A: March 22, 2005 Discussion of “What is the Goal of the U.S. Policy toward North Korea: Nonproliferation or Regime […]

The following is text of a speech given on March 8, 2005 by Desaix Anderson at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. Desaix Anderson writes: “Kim Jong Il has repeatedly claimed, again last week, that North Korea seeks a solution that would eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs in exchange for ending U.S. hostility. Given the stakes, the U.S. is irresponsible not to test Kim’s real intentions by serious negotiations.”

Discussion of “Pyongyang Raises the Stakes” Discussion of “Pyongyang Raises the Stakes” PFO 05-17A: March 11th, 2005 Discussion of “Pyongyang Raises the Stakes” by Ralph A. Cossa Copyright © 2005 Nautilus of America/The Nautilus Institute CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Comments on Essay by Ralph Cossa Comments by Rupert Atkinson Response by Ralph Cossa III. Nautilus […]

Hy-Sang Lee, emeritus professor of the University of Wisconsin and author of North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress, writes: “Under a settlement allowing a two-bomb scarecrow strategy Pyongyang would be committing suicide if the bombs would be used in a first strike (inviting an obliterating retaliation), and this scarecrow strategy would be rendered precarious if one of the bombs would be sold. Hence, the two-bomb settlement is a second best option which still would respect the red line of the United States.”

Yang Moo-Jin, Professor at Kyungnam University’s Graduate School of North Korea Studies, writes: “Peace and reunification on the Korean Peninsula depend primarily on the efforts of the two Koreas. The situation could be positive or negative according to how they manage it. The year 2005 is very meaningful for both South and North, since it is their 60th year of Independence, and the 5th year of the June 15 Joint Declaration. This year, I expect that we will be able to settle peace on the peninsula more firmly through economic development, improvement of the South-North relationship, and resolution of the North Korea nuclear problem.”