Policy Forum

Mark J. Valencia, a Maritime Policy Analyst and a Nautilus Institute Senior Associate, writes, “If PSI effectiveness is not dramatically improved, WMD and related materials will continue to fall into the ‘wrong’ hands… It is time to move beyond the ‘loose arrangement’ dominated by the United States. Gains must be consolidated and legitimacy enhanced, thus attracting broader and more robust PSI participation. This could be achieved by providing PSI with a concrete structure under UN auspices.”

Stephan Haggard, Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies and Director of the Korea-Pacific Program (KPP) at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, Marcus Noland, Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, and Erik Weeks, a research assistant at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, write, “Opening North Korea, through whatever channels possible, is the ultimate route toward a more prosperous future; if this crisis contributes to that process, it would constitute the only silver lining we can see at the moment to what is otherwise yet another sad chapter in the history of the North Korean people.”

Sourabh Gupta, Senior Research Associate at Samuels International Associates, Inc., writes, “With Beijing having internalized the imperative for a changed tone of voice with which it speaks to the Japanese and with nationalist revisionism perhaps having crested in Tokyo… the portents, going forward, this time around however seem a lot better.”

Siegfried S. Hecker, Professor at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University, and William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense from 1994 through 1997, write, “in its remaining months, the Bush administration should focus on limiting North Korea’s nuclear capabilities by concluding the elimination of plutonium production. If it can also get answers on the Syrian operation and resolve the question of uranium enrichment, it will put the next administration in a stronger position to finally end the nuclear threat from North Korea.”

James L. Schoff, Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies at IFPA, Charles M. Perry, Vice President and Director of Studies at IFPA, and Jacquelyn K. Davis, Executive Vice President of IFPA, write, “Building a multilateral response for future stability in East Asia is not a way for the United States, or China, or any other country to abdicate responsibility for North Korea’s nuclear challenge. In fact, it is the growing convergence of interests amongst the countries involved (particularly between China and the United States) to strengthen regional and global non-proliferation norms that could potentially bind the nations of Northeast Asia closer together on security issues, rather than divide them into two separate camps.”

Leonid A. Petrov, Research Associate in the Division of Pacific and Asian History at Australian National University, writes, “Differences in political views and economic systems must not divide but should rather enhance the value of partnership and help complement each other’s strengths. By intensifying diplomatic ties, expanding economic cooperation and providing humanitarian aid both countries can make a significant contribution to the peaceful resolution of the Korean nuclear problem and prepare the basis for durable peace and prosperity in the region.”

This trip report by Keith Luse, Senior Professional Staff Member in the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, notes discussions with DPRK officials over the countries nuclear program. The report includes the comment, “One million tons of HFO was committed, with one-half to be delivered in-kind. Five hundred thousand tons of HFO (in equivalent), should have been delivered in equipment and materials. Only two hundred thousand tons of HFO has been delivered so far. We are adjusting the speed of disablement to the speed of the five parties”.

Siegfried S. Hecker, Professor at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University, writes, “the most important risk-reduction actions now are to stop the production of more plutonium and to stop export of existing plutonium and nuclear technologies. The current situation puts us within reach of stopping plutonium production for the foreseeable future. The five parties should do everything in their power to get the DPRK to finish the disablement expeditiously and to move on to dismantlement.”

Jeffrey Robertson, Senior Researcher in Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security at the Australian Parliamentary Library, writes, “What this study demonstrates above all, is the need to capitalize on periods of relatively reduced security tension on the Korean peninsula During these periods of relative calm, stronger coordination devoted to building momentum in coalition building and ultimately garnering major power support would allow the limited resources of middle powers to be dedicated to an objective that lends itself as both practical and achievable.”

Scott Snyder, Senior Associate in the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation and Pacific Forum CSIS, writes, “the existence or absence of a security alliance between the United States and South Korea would probably not have a decisive impact on civil society interactions across all spheres; the end of the alliance (and more specifically the U.S. military presence in Korea) would actually remove a concern shared by South Korean NGOs working to bring greater transparency and accountability to the U.S.-ROK military relationship.”