Daily Report Archives

Daily Report Archives

Established in December 1993, the Nautilus Institute’s *N*ortheast *A*sia *P*eace and *S*ecurity *N*etwork (NAPSNet) Daily Report served thousands of readers  in more than forty countries, including policy makers, diplomats, aid organizations, scholars, donors, activists, students, and journalists.

The NAPSNet Daily Report aimed to serve a community of practitioners engaged in solving the complex security and sustainability issues in the region, especially those posed by the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program and the threat of nuclear war in the region.  It was distributed by email rom 1993-1997, and went on-line in December 1997, which is when the archive on this site begins. The format at that time can be seen here.

However, for multiple reasons—the rise of instantaneous news services, the evolution of the North Korea and nuclear issues, the increasing demand for specialized and synthetic analysis of these and related issues, and the decline in donor support for NAPSNet—the Institute stopped producing the Daily Report news summary service as of December 17, 2010.

NAPSNet

Supporting Online Material: North Korean Nuclear Statements (2002-2010)

This report is a collection of selected North Korean statements on their nuclear program. This material was assembled to support the report, “North Korean Nuclear Nationalism and the Threat of Nuclear War in Korea” by Peter Hayes Professor, RMIT University and Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute and Scott Bruce, Nautilus Institute Director. These sources are meant to show the change in DPRK statements on its nuclear program between October 2002 and the present. Statements from the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP), Korean People’s Army (KPA), and DPRK Cabinet are labeled as such so that the distinctions between the views of these different institutions in the DPRK can be observed.

We invite our audience to send us other relevant statements that may compliment and expand this study.

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Policy Forum 11-10: Fukushima’s Implications for Korea’s Nuclear Dilemmas

Peter Hayes, Professor, RMIT University and Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, writes “Here, the point I want to make is that after Fukushima, Seoul must make a choice. It could engage the North to ensure that the small light water reactor project becomes an authentically inter-Korean project, and is implemented to international standards for design, engineering, and construction…Alternately, it could treat the North’s small light water reactor as a rapidly emerging environmental security threat to South Korea’s population and land, and decide whether it will act militarily to halt the reactor’s operation once it is turned on.”

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NAPSNet 12 May 2011

  1. DPRK: S. Korea simulates N. Korea attack on nuclear site
  2. GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: Lee conditionally invites N.K. leader to join Nuclear Summit
  3. DETERRENCE: A code of conduct for transfer of nuclear power plant technology to consumer countries
  4. ENERGY SECURITY: Shut down being considered for Fukushima No. 2
  5. CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: Cities and climate change: policy directions
  6. AUSTRAL SECURITY: Timor rejected Chinese spy offer
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(South) Africa and the Control of Non-State Nuclear Proliferation: Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction with Reference to UNSC Resolutions 1540 and 1373

Noël Stott, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security Studies, offers an overview of UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1373 in the African and South African contexts with specific recommendations for implementation, including “streamlining the various counter-terrorism committees, including those established pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004), so that together they could form a coordinated UN Security Council body for the prevention and combating of terrorism.”

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A Code of Conduct for Transfer of Nuclear Power Plant Technology to Consumer Countries

This report by Gordon Thompson outlines a code of conduct for transfer of nuclear power plant (NPP) technology to consumer countries.  The term “consumer” is used here to refer to a country that is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has not developed an indigenous capability to design or manufacture the major components of an NPP.  The code outlined here would apply to the transfer of Generation III nuclear power plant technology during the next few decades.  Relevant items of technology would pertain to light-water reactors or CANDU reactors.  Before outlining the content of a potential code, this report provides background regarding codes of conduct, sustainability, and trends in the use of nuclear power.  It then discusses ten issue areas for a code of conduct, and outlines a process for constructing a code that accounts for each issue area.

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NAPSNet 5 May 2011

  1. AUSTRAL SECURITY: US asked to ratify nuclear-free Pacific
  2. DETERRENCE:  Regional responses to extra-territoriality and non-state nuclear actors: a perspective from Southeast Asia
  3. DPRK: KCNA commentary slashes at US invariable ambition for preemptive nuclear attack
  4. GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: North Korea ‘behind South Korean bank cyber hack’
  5. ENERGY SECURITY: The path from Fukushima: short and medium-term impacts of the reactor damage caused by the Japan earthquake
  6. CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: The use of scenarios in adaptation planning – managing risks in simple to complex settings
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Regional Responses to Extra-Territoriality and Non-State Nuclear Actors: A Perspective From Southeast Asia

Raymund Jose G. Quilop, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines

and Secretary of the Philippine Political Science Association, writes “In making Southeast Asian states more receptive to the practice of extraterritoriality particularly in regard to preventing non-state actors from having access to WMD, it would be helpful to fully utilize existing mechanisms for exchanging information including the numerous platforms that bring together leaders, foreign and defense officials as well as making existing treaties such as the SEANWFZ adapt to the changed regional environment where nuclear proliferation is no longer solely the result of state action but involves non-state actors too. Indeed, the complexity of the challenge of terrorism is eventually pushing governments to become more receptive to the idea of working together, not merely in having their efforts coordinated but in finding ways to collaborate with one another.”

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Beyond the Nuclear Umbrella: Re-Thinking the Theory and Practice of Nuclear Extended Deterrence in East Asia and the Pacific

Peter Hayes, Professor, RMIT University and Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, and Richard Tanter, Nautilus Institute Senior Associate,  provide an overview of the Nautilus Institute’s exploration of two inter-linked but highly contested aspects of the strategic nuclear situation on the Korean peninsula: the complexity and uncertainty associated with United States assurances of nuclear extended deterrence to South Korea (and Japan), and the potential contribution a nuclear weapon free zone to shifting the current impasse concerning North Korean nuclear weapons.

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NAPSNet 28 April 2011

  1. DETERRENCE:  Tracking nuclear capable individuals
  2. AUSTRAL SECURITY: U.S.-Australia civilian nuclear cooperation: issues for congress
  3. ENERGY SECURITY: The world nuclear industry status report 2010–2011
  4. GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: President Son of Soft Bank donates 1 billion yen to establish the foundation for denuclearization
  5. DPRK: Inter-Korean coal mine projects suspended during Lee administration
  6. CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: Risk and resilience in three Southeast Asian cross-boarder areas
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North-South Korean Elements of National Power

Peter Hayes, Professor, RMIT University and Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, writes, “In this Special Report, we compare and contrast six elements that constitute national power for the ROK and the DPRK.   These are: Diplomacy and international relations, Military power, Economic power, Governance and internal security, Social development, Perceptions of future prospects—internal and external to the two Koreas. This comparison demonstrates that the ROK has achieved overwhelming superiority in every dimension of national power, especially in conventional military power. ”

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