Daily Report Archives

Daily Report Archives

Established in December 1993, the Nautilus Institute’s *N*ortheast *A*sia *P*eace and *S*ecurity *N*etwork (NAPSNet) Daily Report served thousands of readers  in more than forty countries, including policy makers, diplomats, aid organizations, scholars, donors, activists, students, and journalists.

The NAPSNet Daily Report aimed to serve a community of practitioners engaged in solving the complex security and sustainability issues in the region, especially those posed by the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program and the threat of nuclear war in the region.  It was distributed by email rom 1993-1997, and went on-line in December 1997, which is when the archive on this site begins. The format at that time can be seen here.

However, for multiple reasons—the rise of instantaneous news services, the evolution of the North Korea and nuclear issues, the increasing demand for specialized and synthetic analysis of these and related issues, and the decline in donor support for NAPSNet—the Institute stopped producing the Daily Report news summary service as of December 17, 2010.

NAPSNet

STATUS OF CHINA’S ENERGY SECTOR, RECENT TRENDS, AND CURRENT AND EVOLVING ENERGY POLICIES: REPORT OF THE CHINA WORKING GROUP TO THE REGIONAL ENERGY SECURITY PROJECT

WANG YANJIA, GU ALUN NOVEMBER 24, 2019  I.  INTRODUCTION   In this Special Report, Wang Yanjia and Gu Alun summarize the status of China’s energy sector and recent trends, and describe projections of China’s energy future in the context of its energy policies. China’s energy imports have been rising in recent years, and environmental, energy […]

Go to the article

FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: THE FUTURE OF C3I ENTANGLEMENT

JAMES M. ACTON NOVEMBER 21, 2019 I.  INTRODUCTION   In this essay, James Acton evaluates the risk of inadvertent escalation arising from attacks on dual-use (nuclear and conventional warfare) command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities in a conventional war because such attacks would degrade the target’s nuclear command-and-control system. James Acton  is co-director of […]

Go to the article

NC3 INSIDER THREATS

RON SCHOUTEN NOVEMBER 14, 2019 I.  INTRODUCTION In this essay, Ron Schouten examines fundamental concepts of insider threats and provides an overview of the extent and significance of insider threats in US and other NC3 systems. A podcast with Ron Schouten, Peter Hayes, and Philip Reiner on China’s NC3 and emerging technologies is found here. Acknowledgments: […]

Go to the article

COUNTER NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS

CAROL ANN JONES OCTOBER 31, 2019 I.  INTRODUCTION In this essay, Carol Ann Jones concludes: “Denying a country use of their nuclear combat forces could be the key to avoiding or limiting damage from a pending strike, but it could trigger unexpected actions from that country’s nuclear forces (assuming the weapons and launch capability were […]

Go to the article

HIDING FROM THE LIGHT: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JOINT AUSTRALIA-UNITED STATES RELAY GROUND STATION AT PINE GAP

RICHARD TANTER NOVEMBER 2, 2019   I.  INTRODUCTION In this essay, the author discusses recently released Australian cabinet papers dealing with a decision in September 1997 to allow the establishment of a Joint Australia-United States Relay Ground Station at Pine Gap to support two United States early warning satellite systems in place of its predecessor, […]

Go to the article

LAW, TARGETING AND NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

WILLIAM H BOOTHBY OCTOBER 31 2019 I.       INTRODUCTION In this essay, Bill Boothby observes: “For all States, there is an obligation to take constant care in nuclear operations to spare civilians and civilian objects. More detailed precautionary rules apply to all States with certain additional rules only applying to States that are party to API […]

Go to the article

WHAT DO WE WANT FROM THE NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM?

PAUL K. DAVIS OCTOBER 24, 2019   I.  INTRODUCTION In this essay, Paul Davis suggest that US NC3 modernization “should place increased emphasis on assuring control, avoiding accidents, and avoiding ill-informed or unwise employment of nuclear weapons.” Paul K. Davis is a senior principal researcher, retired adjunct (RAND). Dr. Davis was a senior executive in […]

Go to the article

NC3 AND CRISIS INSTABILITY–GROWING DANGERS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

DARYL G. PRESS OCTOBER 17 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay Daryl Press focuses on the growing threats to nuclear command and control and communication (NC3) systems around the world and the links between vulnerable NC3 and strategic instability due to the risky steps that nuclear weapons states may adopt to protect their arsenals during […]

Go to the article

ISRAEL’S NC3 PROFILE: OPAQUE NUCLEAR GOVERNANCE

AVNER COHEN OCTOBER 11 2019 I.  INTRODUCTION In this essay, Avner Cohen traces and exposes Israel’s two most fundamental principles of the Israeli NC3 thinking: first, insisting on strict physical and organizational separation between nuclear (e.g., pits) and non-nuclear assets (e.g., military delivery platform); second, creating a two-tier governance architecture at various levels. Avner Cohen […]

Go to the article

INNOVATION AND ADAPTIVE CONTROL IN AMERICA’S ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE: PARALLELS TO NC3

MASON WILLRICH OCTOBER 3, 2019  I.  INTRODUCTION In this essay, Mason Willrich suggests that there are important lessons for NC3 operators in how electric power utilities control their grids, and especially, how they ensure that interconnections with adjacent grids are maintained continuously in spite of the potentially catastrophic risks of grid failure arising from instability […]

Go to the article