Daily Report Archives
Established in December 1993, the Nautilus Institute’s *N*ortheast *A*sia *P*eace and *S*ecurity *N*etwork (NAPSNet) Daily Report served thousands of readers in more than forty countries, including policy makers, diplomats, aid organizations, scholars, donors, activists, students, and journalists.
The NAPSNet Daily Report aimed to serve a community of practitioners engaged in solving the complex security and sustainability issues in the region, especially those posed by the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program and the threat of nuclear war in the region. It was distributed by email rom 1993-1997, and went on-line in December 1997, which is when the archive on this site begins. The format at that time can be seen here.
However, for multiple reasons—the rise of instantaneous news services, the evolution of the North Korea and nuclear issues, the increasing demand for specialized and synthetic analysis of these and related issues, and the decline in donor support for NAPSNet—the Institute stopped producing the Daily Report news summary service as of December 17, 2010.
Jungmin Kang, Science Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University, and Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute Executive Director, write, “Having tested and failed, the DPRK can no longer rely on opacity as the basis for having a credible nuclear force, at least sufficiently credible to threaten its adversaries with a nuclear explosion. The DPRK might believe that a half kilotonne “mininuke” still provides it with a measure of nuclear deterrence and compellence; but it could not rely on other nuclear weapons states to perceive it to have anything more than an unusable, unreliable and relatively small nuclear explosive device.”
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Jungmin Kang, Science Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University, and Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute Executive Director, write, “Having tested and failed, the DPRK can no longer rely on opacity as the basis for having a credible nuclear force, at least sufficiently credible to threaten its adversaries with a nuclear explosion. The DPRK might believe that a half kilotonne “mininuke” still provides it with a measure of nuclear deterrence and compellence; but it could not rely on other nuclear weapons states to perceive it to have anything more than an unusable, unreliable and relatively small nuclear explosive device.”
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Bennett Ramberg, who served in the State Department during President George H.W. Bush’s administration and is the author of three books on international security, writes, “Finally, give the North a greater stake in its financial future – and reduce its isolation and paranoia – by encouraging the South’s efforts at economic engagement. Economic intercourse may deliver another benefit. It could abate Pyongyang’s incentive to sell military equipment – including nuclear materials, or even weapons – to generate hard currency. However, we cannot rely on this tack.”
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NAPSNet Daily Report Thursday, October 19, 2006 NAPSNet Daily Report Thursday, October 19, 2006 I. NAPSNet 1. Inter-Korean Relations and DPRK Sanctions 2. DPRK General on ABC Television 3. DPRK Refugee-Defectors 4. Aid to DPRK 5. US-ROK Security Alliance 6. US-ROK Trade Relations 7. US-Japan Joint Maritime Drills 8. US-Japan Missile Defense Cooperation 9. Japan-Vietnam […]
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NAPSNet Daily Report Wednesday, October 18, 2006 NAPSNet Daily Report Wednesday, October 18, 2006 I. NAPSNet 1. Rice on UN Sactions 2. PRC – DPRK Relations 3. US News Network in the DPRK 4. Documentaries Provide Inside Look into DPRK 5. ROK on PSI 6. Japan on Nuclear Weapons 7. Yasukuni Shrine Issue 8. PRC-India […]
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Julia Choi and Karin Lee, from the National Committee on North Korea (http://www.ncnk.org ), write, “According to the New York Times, prior to the nuclear test an anonymous U.S. official indicated that a North Korean test would trigger extensive U.S. sanctions: ‘We’ll end up going to full-scale sanctions; the only debate is what “full-scale” means.’ With the adoption of Resolution 1718, the meaning of ‘full-scale’ should soon become clear.”
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NAPSNet Daily Report Tuesday, October 17, 2006 NAPSNet Daily Report Tuesday, October 17, 2006 I. NAPSNet 1. DPRK Nuclear Test 2. DPRK on Nuclear Test, UN Sanctions 3. US on DPRK Sanctions 4. US Human Rights Envoy on DPRK Sanctions 5. DPRK Banking 6. Rise of DPRK Military Influence 7. ROK Debate over Inter-Korean Spending […]
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This is the full text of the United Nations Security Council Resolution passed in response to the DPRK nuclear test on October 9th, 2006. Also included is a summary of the response of North Korean Ambassador to the UN Pak Gil Yon to the resolution.
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NAPSNet Daily Report Monday, October 16, 2006 NAPSNet Daily Report Monday, October 16, 2006 I. NAPSNet 1. Question About Success of DPRK Nuclear Test 2. US on DPRK Sanctions 3. Experts on US DPRK Policy Shift 4. PRC and DPRK Sanctions 5. PRC-DPRK Border 6. EU on DPRK Sanctions 7. Japan Naval Redeployment 8. Japan […]
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NAPSNet Daily Report Thursday, October 12, 2006 NAPSNet Daily Report Thursday, October 12, 2006 I. NAPSNet 1. DPRK Sanctions Debate 2. Experts on DPRK Reasoning for Test 3. Question About Success of Nuclear Test 4. Debate on Inter-Korean Projects 5. UN on DPRK Sanctions and Aid 6. ASEAN on DPRK Nuclear Test 7. UNSG Appointment […]
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