Roger Cavazos writes “China’s relationship is complex and richly interconnected with others in the region and the world.… The way China discusses the North Korea issue with many countries indicates that China may seek to change the international system at the margins, but has no interest in fundamentally changing the system. Nor does the U.S.”
Roger Cavazos is a Nautilus Institute Associate and retired US military intelligence officer.
David von Hippel writes: “A regional approach to nuclear materials security could have positive spillover effects beyond a NWFZ. Creating and monitoring a regional nuclear materials regime could be a core function of a permanent council on security established as part of a comprehensive Treaty on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia.”
David von Hippel is a Nautilus Institute Associate.
This report was originally presented at the New Approach to Security in Northeast Asia: Breaking the Gridlock workshop.
At the tenth anniversary of the decision to commit Australian troops to the Iraq war, Garry Woodard of Melbourne University reconstructs the previously unknown, and remarkably casual, process by which the Menzies government committed Australian troops to Vietnam. Woodard argues that the dismaying similarities between the Australian entries into these two wars strengthen the call for an Australian Iraq War inquiry, following those in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, “in the hope that what is learnt from it will lead to improved procedures for decision-making, under which the government will have to level with the Parliament and the people.””
Garry Woodard is a former Australian ambassador and national president of the Australian Institute of International Affairs and has been a senior fellow at the University of Melbourne since 1986. He is currently working on the Campaign for an Iraq War Inquiry.
Vorontsov writes: “Most media, while painting a vivid picture of North Korea’s militancy, does not help readers to understand why the conflict in Korea is escalating so dramatically. When they do try, they usually name Pyongyang as the instigator of all the troubles, stressing that it was North Korea’s third nuclear test that triggered the “nightmare”. Without any approval whatsoever of Pyongyang’s overreaction to the UNSC Resolution 2094 and its belligerent rhetoric and disproportionate moves, it is urgent to examine the real, underlying causes of what is commonly referred to as “the Korean problem”.”
Alexander Vorontsov is currently the head of the Department for Korean and Mongolian Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russia Academy of Sciences and the MGIMO-University Oriental Studies Sub-faculty associate professor.
In this report, Peter Hayes and Roger Cavazos “examine one North Korean account of the limited war it might fight to occupy Seoul, including the use of nuclear weapons or other unspecified WMD to neutralize American forces. We find that while this account makes for fine propaganda, when viewed through the lens of conventional capabilities, the plan is mainly smoke and mirrors. Nonetheless, if this account is indicative of the belief system of North Korea’s leadership, then it is truly alarming. It suggests that North Korea still adheres to military strategies and tactics that failed in the Korean War, and would fail again, only faster, should war break out in Korea. Moreover, it suggests a fantastic belief that somehow early escalation to nuclear war could make possible a conventional pre-emptive attack on Seoul.”
Peter Hayes is director of Nautilus Institute and Professor of International Relations at RMIT University in Melbourne. Roger Cavazos is an Associate of Nautilus Institute and retired US military intelligence officer.
Squassoni writes: “This memorandum explores the contours of nuclear energy in the DPRK as part of a comprehensive peace settlement. It assumes: a) DPRK must rejoin NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and must ratify the Additional Protocol; b) DPRK is likely to press for the right to nuclear power in any settlement; c) limitations may not be equally applied across all non-nuclear-weapon states (vice Halperin paper); and d) there are no guarantees against proliferation, even in a unified Korea.”
Sharon Squassoni is a Senior Fellow & Director of the Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies.
This report was originally presented at the New Approach to Security in Northeast Asia: Breaking the Gridlock workshop.
Peter Hayes and Roger Cavazos write: “We do not believe that North Korea intends to attack South Korea, pre-emptively or otherwise, in the current cycle of threat projection. However, miscalculation, accidents, or “wild cards” can all activate an unstoppable chain of events that lead to uncontrollable escalation…Talk is cheap, valuable, and entails no concessions. In the current charged environment, the only way to obtain badly needed information about North Korean intentions and therefore, the real level of threat, is to talk to them.”
Peter Hayes is director of Nautilus Institute and Professor of International Relations at RMIT University in Melbourne. Roger Cavazos is an Associate of Nautilus Institute and retired US military intelligence officer.
