Policy Forum

Mr. Wit, Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, is currently on leave from the US State Department, where he was in charge of implementing the US-DPRK Agreed Framework since 1995. Wit calls for a more aggressive diplomacy to deal with the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. He argues that the goal of stopping the DPRK from developing nuclear weapons cannot be accomplished without an overall improvement in US-DPRK relations. Therefore what is needed is an overall diplomatic strategy, which even if it fails, would establish the basis for regional action to deal with the DPRK nuclear problem.

Mr. Kanter, a Senior Fellow at the Forum for International Policy, served as US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1991 to 1993 and Special Assistant to the President for Defense Policy and Arms Control on the National Security Council staff from 1989 to 1991. Kanter discusses the failure of the 1994 Agreed Framework to accomplish its goals, and calls for a thorough reevaluation of US policy toward the DPRK. He argues that the US must forge a new approach to reduce the risk that the DPRK poses to peace, not only on the Korean peninsula, but to the region as a whole. This essay originally appeared as the Forum for International Policy Issue Brief #98-15 on November 6, 1998.

This essay is by Leon V. Sigal, a consultant at the Social Science Research Council in New York and author of Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (1998). Sigal argues that Japan and the US have overreacted to the DPRK’s August 31 launch of a Taepodong I missile. He states that the DPRK has consistently indicated its willingness to give up its missile program in exchange for an monetary compensation and an easing of the US embargo. Sigal calls on the US and Japan to take the DPRK up on this offer, as part of a comprehensive program to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula.

Describes the compilation of two country-by-county scenarios of electricity supply in Northeast Asia and concludes that, independent of the systems for waste isolation (or recycling) chosen, the quantities of nuclear materials implied in either of the two scenarios will require regional cooperation on nuclear fuel and nuclear waste technologies, handling protocols, and planning.

Discussion of NAPSNet Forum #21– North Korea’s Underground Construction Discussion of NAPSNet Forum #21– North Korea’s Underground Construction Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network DISCUSSION OF “NORTH KOREA’S UNDERGROUND CONSTRUCTION” #21B — October 13, 1998 The is intended to provide expert analysis of contemporary peace and security issues in Northeast Asia, and an opportunity to […]

I. Introduction The following essay was written by Dr. C. Kenneth Quinones, US Asia Foundation Representative to Korea. Dr. Quinones was formerly North Korean desk officer at the US State Department. The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not represent those of any government or institution. Quinones argues that the media […]

I. Introduction The following essay was written by Dr. C. Kenneth Quinones, US Asia Foundation Representative to Korea. Dr. Quinones was formerly North Korean desk officer at the US State Department. The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not represent those of any government or institution. Quinones argues that the media […]

In this essay, Dr. C. Kenneth Quinones, Asia Foundation Representative to Korea and former North Korean desk officer at the US State Department argues that the media reports of the construction of an alleged underground nuclear facility in the DPRK are the result of deliberate “leaks” by members of the US intelligence community who wish to influence the debate on US policy toward the DPRK. He points to evidence from his own extensive visits to the DPRK that the DPRK relies heavily on underground facilities for a variety of purposes. He argues that, before jumping to any conclusions, the US should demand an on-site inspection of the facility to determine its actual nature.

Discussion of NAPSNet Forum #20– Think Again: Nonproliferation Discussion of NAPSNet Forum #20– Think Again: Nonproliferation Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network DISCUSSION OF “THINK AGAIN: NONPROLIFERATION” #19B — September 24, 1998 The is intended to provide expert analysis of contemporary peace and security issues in Northeast Asia, and an opportunity to participate in discussion […]

This essay by George Perkovich, Director of the Secure World Program at the W. Alton Jones Foundation, is adapted from Mr. Perkovich’s article, originally published in the Fall 1998 issue of Foreign Policy. Perkovich argues that the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan were motivated more by political pressures than by security interests. For that reason, rolling back nuclear development tends to be more difficult in democratic nations where policymakers are less insulated from domestic politics. Given these conditions, Perkovich argues that nonproliferation efforts need to address the question of inequity in international arms control regimes.