Policy Forum

Henry Sokolski, the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, D.C. and former Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense from 1989 to 1993, writes, “The U.S. will not even discuss providing light-water reactors until Pyongyang completely disarms and rejoins the NPT. Still, the deeper negotiators delve into the endless issues that must be resolved to disarm Pyongyang, the clearer the dangers and costs of doing so are likely to become.”

Response to “Light Water Reactors at the Six Party Talks: The Barrier that Makes the Water Flow” Response to “Light Water Reactors at the Six Party Talks: The Barrier that Makes the Water Flow” Discussion of Policy Forum Online 05-78A: September 28th, 2005 Response to “Light Water Reactors at the Six Party Talks: The Barrier […]

Response to “Light Water Reactors at the Six Party Talks: The Barrier that Makes the Water Flow” Response to “Light Water Reactors at the Six Party Talks: The Barrier that Makes the Water Flow” Discussion of Policy Forum Online 05-78A: September 27th, 2005 Response to “Light Water Reactors at the Six Party Talks: The Barrier […]

Bruce Klingner, Korea analyst for Eurasia Group, the world’s largest political risk consultancy firm, writes: “Pyongyang’s actions will affect the public’s perceptions of Roh’s engagement policy. North Korea’s agreement to a joint statement of principles on 19 September might have offered a respite to Roh’s declining popularity had Pyongyang not followed with a provocative statement within 24 hours… Despite $3.5 billion in South Korean aid during the past decade, Seoul has achieved little change to North Korean behavior or the nature of its regime.”

The DPRK took less than twenty-four hours to dispel any illusions that the Joint Statement Released at Six-Party Talks on September 19th, 2005 had resolved the nuclear confrontation between the international community and North Korea (hereafter DPRK). The media and American analysts in particular have suggested that North Korea’s declarations after the Joint Statement were made in bad faith. We suggest otherwise: that North Korea was simply following the formula suggested by the United States to clarify the issues that remain to be resolved. We also believe that there is a way past the LWR obstacle that may be acceptable to all parties. In essence, substituting Russian VVER LWR technology for American-sourced LWR technology may be the solution.

Read discussion of this essay by Chaim Braun.

Read discussion of this essay by Georgy Bullychev.

Light Water Reactors at the Six Party Talks: The Barrier that Makes the Water Flow Light Water Reactors at the Six Party Talks: The Barrier that Makes the Water Flow Policy Forum Online 05-78A: September 21th, 2005 Light Water Reactors at the Six Party Talks: The Barrier that Makes the Water Flow By Peter Hayes, […]

Rose Gottemoeller, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was responsible for nonproliferation policy at the Department of Energy from 1997 to 2000, Seoul, writes: “The point of the Sister Laboratory program is to build mutual confidence and transparency in a low-key way, without major transfers of funds, equipment or materials. This message should be very welcome to the North Koreans. The United States, in its turn, has been able to leverage the relationships to establish new joint work in the nonproliferation arena – exactly the goal that Washington seeks with North Korea.”

Discussion of “Food Aid to North Korea or How to Ride a Trojan Horse to Death” Discussion of “Food Aid to North Korea or How to Ride a Trojan Horse to Death” Policy Forum Online 05-75A: September 13th, 2005 Discussion of “Food Aid to North Korea or How to Ride a Trojan Horse to Death” […]

Ruediger Frank, a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Korea University, Seoul, writes: “And so, it comes as no surprise to read in the Chosun Ilbo that the World Food Program was asked to shut down its Pyongyang office. We know what happens next. The North Koreans will be accused of not being grateful, the South Koreans will be told that it is their fault, the already not-so united front of the five nations at the Six Party Talks will be further weakened, and the North Korean leadership will open a bottle of Champaign.”

Read discussion of this essay.

Jung-min Kang, a Nautilus Institute Senior Associate, writes: “Pyongyang also has to realize that South Korea, which operates 20 nuclear power reactors at present, has had no problem generating nuclear power without enriching or reprocessing uranium, in accordance with the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”