Policy Forum

Leon V. Sigal, Director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council, writes “The hard-liners believe Pyongyang is determined to arm and will never trade away its weapons. Their conviction is not just faith-based: it is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Without a serious U.S. effort to negotiate, they are certain to be right.”

Policy Forum Online 06-61A: July 25th, 2006 Policy Forum Online 06-61A: July 25th, 2006 North Korea Focusing On Technological Development To Revive Economy Report by the Institute for Far Eastern Studies CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Report by the Institute for Far Eastern Studies III. Nautilus invites your responses I. Introduction This report, published by the […]

This report, published by the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University, notes, “North Korea has chosen technology as a national priority and refocused its budget through the principle of ‘focus and choice.’ Furthermore, it seems to be pursuing technological development by simultaneously renewing its existing industries and establishing a foundation for high technology.”

Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute Executive Director, writes “The DPRK can now take two paths. It can do nothing for a while, try to obtain the typical late year delivery of food aid from the ROK before winter hits, and hope to muddle through. Or, it can test and hope to adapt its economy in magnificent, nuclear-armed isolation, waiting for the world to adjustto the new strategic reality of North Koreas existence as a nuclear weapons state.”

Embrace Tiger, Retreat To Mountain, Test Nuke Embrace Tiger, Retreat To Mountain, Test Nuke POLICY FORUM ONLINE 06-60A July 21st, 2006 “Embrace Tiger, Retreat To Mountain, Test Nuke” By Peter Hayes CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Essay by Peter Hayes III. Poem to the NDC Chairman: Kim Jong Il published in Pyongyang by the Rodong Sinmun […]

Paul Carroll, Program Officer at the Ploughshares Fund, was one of three Americans present in the DPRK during the July 4th missile launches. He contributes this insightful trip report on what he saw there. One particularly interesting remark he notes was a statement by DPRK Vice Minister Kim Gae Gwan who made what seemed to be a reference to the DPRK-PRC relationship, “with respect to our missile launch, I am awaiting responses from other parties. What I hear is Big Brothers saying to Little Brother ‘don’t do that’ but we are not a little boy, we have nuclear weapons.”

John J. Tkacik, Jr., Senior Research Fellow in China Policy in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, writes, “It is now incumbent upon the Bush Administration to face facts– Without Chinese interest in disarming North Korea, much less moderating any of Pyongyang’s other odious behavior, there is no solution to the North Korean problem.”

This statement was issued by the DPRK Foreign Ministry on July 16, 2006 in response to UN resolution 1695 condemning in the DPRK’s July 4th missile test. The statements says “First, our Republic strongly denounces and fully condemns the UNSC resolution, a product of the US hostile policy toward the DPRK, and will not be bound to it in the least- Second, our Republic will strengthen its self-defensive war deterrent by all means and methods now that the situation has reached the worst phase due to the extremely hostile act of the United States.”

Lt. General Robert Gard, Senior Military Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, and John D. Isaacs, Senior Policy Director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, write, “It is irresponsible to squander such large amounts on national missile defense when there are higher priority defense and domestic programs that remain under-funded… It is far more likely that rogue states or terrorists will obtain a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials and smuggle a nuclear device into the United States than delivering one by an ICBM.”

Desaix Anderson, who served for thirty-five years as a Foreign Service Officer at the U.S. State Department, working in and on Asian issues, was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-92) and executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) for over three years, writes, “Rather than ‘staying the course,’ President Bush should move quickly past the UN resolution on the rockets, put the best face possible on these developments, rein in his hardliners, appoint a full-time, high-level, fully empowered Coordinator for the Korean Peninsula, and instruct the Coordinator and rest of the Bush government to work urgently, patiently, flexibly, and innovatively to achieve a comprehensive solution to the North Korean nuclear and missile issues.”