Policy Forum

Peter Hayes, Director of the Nautilus Institute and Professor of International Relations at RMIT University, writes, In short, whatever its shortcomings, the critics of the Beijing Deal who denounce it as simply the revival of the logic and scope of the old Agreed Framework have got it completely wrong. We are nowhere near a comprehensive agreement that captures the DPRK nuclear weapons program. Nor did the DPRK achieve a victory over the United States in Beijing. Rather, both sides wrestled the other …to the end.

The Beijing Deal is not the Agreed Framework The Beijing Deal is not the Agreed Framework Policy Forum Online 07-014A: February 14th, 2007 The Beijing Deal is not the Agreed Framework By Peter Hayes CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Article by Peter Hayes III. Nautilus invites your responses I. Introduction Peter Hayes, Director of the Nautilus […]

Young Whan Kihl, Professor of Political Science Emeritus at Iowa State University, Ames, writes, “The Roh Moo-hyun government ‘Peace and Prosperity Policy’ was aimed at the Northeast Asian region as a whole, but it rested on the premise that the North Korean nuclear issue will be resolved peacefully. Roh’s vision of making his country an economic hub, together with playing a ‘balancer role’ in regional dynamics, will go nowhere if North Korea continues to refuse to abandon its nuclear program.”

Jungmin Kang, Nautilus Institute Senior Associate and Science Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University, describes the first steps that can be taken by the DPRK to “irreversibly dismantle its plutonium production programs and move the Six Party Talks forward.” In response, he argues, the other five nations should take corresponding actions that might include, “a significant albeit partial lifting of economic sanctions imposed to North Korea by the US, energy and food assistance to North Korea by the other five countries, and legally binding security assurances to North Korea.”

Read a response to this article.

Response to “First Technical Steps for North Korean Denuclearization” Response to “First Technical Steps for North Korean Denuclearization” Policy Forum Online 07-011A: February 8th, 2007 Response to “First Technical Steps for North Korean Denuclearization” Article by Kosima Weber Liu CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Comments by Kosima Weber Liu on “First Technical Steps for North Korean […]

Nicholas Eberstadt, Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), writes, “The Dear Leader and his team understand very well that the Six-Party ‘denuclearization’ farce now provides perfect international diplomatic cover for an unobstructed North Korean nuclear arms buildup. What the other parties in the talk do not seem to understand–or in the case of an increasingly weakened Bush Presidency, perhaps fear to face–is that the only “solutions” to the North Korean nuclear crisis worthy of the name require a better class of dictator in Pyongyang.”

Robert Carlin, a former State Department analyst who participated in most of the U.S.-North Korea negotiations between 1993 and 2000, and John Lewis, professor emeritus at Stanford University who directs projects on Asia at the university’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, write, “Denuclearization, if still achievable, can come only when North Korea sees its strategic problem solved, and that, in its view, can happen only when relations with the United States improve.”

Suh Kim, a professor of international finance and the coordinator of finance and international business at the University of Detroit Mercy, writes, “From a U.S. perspective, it is difficult to see how the FTA could grant advantages to North Korean production while North Korea continues to engage in developing weapons of mass destruction However, it also makes sense to support the South Korean vision for Korean reunification by setting out procedures in the FTA itself for updating the pact if and when that process moves forward.”

Bryan Port, an staff officer at the Pentagon for the Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence (G2) holds Masters Degree in Security Studies from Georgetown University and has spent six years in Korea working in various capacities for the US Government, writes, “The recent nuclear tests serve to highlight the importance of the succession issue to the US and the DPRK’s neighbors. While external reasoning may have lead Kim Chong-il to test a nuclear device, it is more likely that internal considerations are driving decisions not only on WMD development, but also on the issue of leadership succession in the DPRK.”

Aidan Foster-Carter, is honorary senior research fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds University in the UK, writes, “A nuclear North Korea is indeed a worry, but it is not the only one. The world, and even Pyongyang, will take the death of Paek Nam Sun (who?) in its stride. But Kim Jong Il could go just as suddenly. In that case all bets for North Korea would be off.”