Policy Forum

Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Professor of Security Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies and a specialist in Northeast Asian security, politics, and economics, focusing primarily on the Korean Peninsula, writes, “North Korea is an evolved system (not a designed system). Its disaster management mechanisms are a good example of a typical crisis-driven institutional evolution. As such, this system is dynamically stable… It can undergo sudden state changes but then display robust recovery from catastrophic events, as one has been able to witness during the past two decades. The question remains open: Is there a tipping point for such a complex, dynamically stable system like North Korea’s?”

Leon V. Sigal, Director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project in New York and author of /Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea/, writes that “for South Koreans to make the most of this second summit meeting, they must begin by appreciating its real significance as an opportunity to advance reconciliation with North Korea, which is the only way to end its nuclear ambitions and bring about much-needed change in the North.”

Tetsuya Endo, former vice chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, writes, “Japan has the technology to develop nuclear weapons and, with the relevant legal revisions, Japan could actually embark on a nuclear weapons development program… However, it would require huge commitments of manpower, material and money, and it would not be so easy to change the persisting popular anti-nuclear sentiment. More importantly, a nuclear-armed Japan would face severe isolation from the international community. Given all these grave risks, it is clear that the nuclear option is surely not in the national interest of Japan and far from a realistic policy choice.”

Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, writes, “If Roh presses for a North Korean commitment to tangible progress toward denuclearization by the year’s end, then a North-South summit will be a useful adjunct to the Six-Party Talks. It is more likely, however, that the meeting will provide only a patina of progress, and it could actually endanger multilateral efforts to pressure Pyongyang to divest itself of its nuclear weapons.”

Ruediger Frank, Professor of East Asian Political Economy at the University of Vienna, writes, “The sunshine policy, or how ever one prefers to call it, is a long-term strategy. It needs time and continuous support to bear fruits. Nuclear North Korea is a product of failed confrontation, not of naive engagement. Rather than being disappointed by the lack of spectacular solutions, we should take the time to think about what has already been achieved during a historically brief period of time, show some patience, and give the sun a chance.”

A. Greer Pritchett, Assistant Project Director of Northeast Asia Projects for the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, writes, “if a smart policy is crafted now within the current administration, there appears to be little reason for a significant shift in 2009… Further, since the next administration will undoubtedly still be preoccupied and stymied in other parts of the world, a bolstered U.S.-ROK alliance would be a much appreciated housewarming gift.”

Mindy L. Kotler, Director of Asia Policy Point, a nonprofit membership research center that studies the U.S. policy relationship with Japan and Northeast Asia, writes, “Reconciliation and regional peace in Asia are at the heart of the Congressional Comfort Woman resolution. Long overdue apologies and respect for these victims of wartime violence are among the elements needed to achieve this peace. After 60 years of constructive, responsible, and resolutely peaceful membership in the world community, it is unfortunate that Japan must be reminded of the power of justice as a tool for peace.”

Leon V. Sigal, Director of the Northeast Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council and author of Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea, writes, “The irreconcilables insist Pyongyang will never live up to its pledge… How can they be so sure? The fact is, with the possible exception of Kim Jong-il, nobody knows. And the only way for Washington to find out is to proceed, reciprocal step by reciprocal step, in sustained negotiations to reconcile with Pyongyang in return for its disarming.”

Stephan Haggard, Director of the Korea-Pacific Program (KPP) at the University of California at San Diego, and Marcus Noland, Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute, write, “the transformative effects of engagement on the North Korean economy are more likely to hold with respect to Chinese trade and investment with North Korea, which appears to occur on largely market-conforming terms, than they are with South Korea’s, which contains a very substantial noncommercial component.”

Scott Bruce, Program Officer at the San Francisco Office of the Nautilus Institute, and Timothy Savage, Deputy Director of the Seoul Office of the Nautilus Institute, write, “If the experience of the last six years teaches anything, it is that the United States cannot carry out an effective policy toward the DPRK without the active participation of the ROK. Future American policymakers thus would be well advised to take note; the ship of engagement has already set sail, and it would be best to ride alongside, rather than be caught in the wake.”