Policy Forum

Yul Sohn, Professor of International Studies at Yonsei University, writes, “a traditional military alliance is necessary yet insufficient to deal with Japan’s new strategic dilemmas… Japanese leaders should recognize that what is needed is not tightening up but transforming the alliance structure into a complex one.”

Jia Xijin, Associate Professor at the NGO Research Center at Tsinghua University, writes, “because of the importance of freedom of expression and the value of information to promote social justice the government should control and supervise the internet very cautiously. That’s why people are concerned about Green Dam. Qin suggests that, except for illegal information which is banned by law enacted through due process and authority, adult citizens should asses the harmfulness of information, not the government.”

Wooksik Cheong, Representative of the Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea, writes, “If North Korea denuclearized it would lose its leverage to compel the US to fulfill the agreement. This is a fundamental asymmetry in the US-North Korea relationship. Once North Korea denuclearizes itself, the process will be very difficult to reverse. However, for the US, it is easy to change its policy toward a denuclearized North Korea.”

John S. Park, Senior Research Associate and Director of Northeast Asia projects at the U.S. Institute of Peace’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention and an Associate with the Harvard Kennedy School’s Managing the Atom Project, writes, “NGOs and government organizations seeking to achieve economic development goals can work closely with Chinese merchants to leverage routes and mechanisms to increase the flow of goods across HamJi. In doing so, these various players can substantially help improve human security in a key part of North Korea.”

Andrei Lankov, Associate Professor at Kookmin University, writes, “Perhaps the most important reason why Pyongyang should be engaged is the long-term domestic impact of talks. Negotiations and aid create an environment where contacts between the isolated population and the outside world steadily increase, exposing the total lie in which North Koreans have to live. In the long run, this will undermine the regime, bringing the country’s radical transformation – and, probably, a solution of the nuclear issue.”

Barry M. Blechman, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center and a Stimson Distinguished Fellow, writes, “the contrast between murmurings of defense officials in private meetings and their horror at the thought of public debate about nuclear deployments makes clear that extended deterrence is a concept that served a vital purpose during the Cold War, but whose time has come – and gone.”

Tong Kim, Adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University SAIS and a visiting professor at the University of North Korean Studies, writes, “it is high time that both Washington and Pyongyang take a fresh look at where they are and to get out of the box in search for a bold pragmatic path toward a win-win resolution of the half century old U.S.-North Korea hostile relationship. North Korea can survive without nuclear weapons and the United States can undertake negotiations before the North gives up its nuclear programs. The Clinton trip offers both sides a fresh opportunity to make the first positive move.”

Read a discussion of this article here.

John Delury, Associate Director of the Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations and director of the North Korea Inside Out Task Force, writes, “the symbolism around Mr. Clinton’s visit, and his direct talks with Kim Jong Il, suggests we may be on the cusp of some positive movement, at last. With wise, creative and determined follow-through, hopefully Pyongyang and Washington can make some verifiable and irreversible (if not complete) improvement in normalizing their relationship.”

Read a discussion of this article here.

Jeff Goldstein, a State Department desk officer for North Korea from 1994 to 1996, writes, “the provision of a LWR will not be the centerpiece of an agreement, as was the case with the Agreed Framework… this time around, Pyongyang will certainly demand far more concrete concessions from the United States and its allies in those areas. Nevertheless, a LWR project might be a useful – perhaps even an essential – component of a negotiated resolution that achieves the goal of verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.”

Read a discussion of this article here.

Choi Jinwook, Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), writes, “North Korea has taken a harsher position since Kim Jong-il’s illness. It is not the Department of United Front but the military that plays a more important role in inter-Korean relations… The decision to launch a long-range rocket and carry out a nuclear test was clearly made by the military, not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The military seems to believe that it needs to become a nuclear power rather than try to resume talks with the United States at an earlier date.”