The essay below is by Professor Han Sung Joo, President of Korea University and former ROK Foreign Minister (1993-94) when the US-DPRK Agreed Framework was negotiated. Han argues that North Korea must be further embedded into relationships of deeper dependence upon the outside world, particularly South Korea, the United States and Japan. Similar to the 1994 “carrot and stick” approach by South Korea and the United States that led to the Agreed Framework, a similar strategy must be employed today, but with greater multilateral coordination.

The essay below by John Feffer, author of numerous articles on Korea, and editor of the forthcoming “Power Trip: U.S. Foreign Policy after September 11,” asserts that North Korea is keen to win a deal with the United States that will allow it to pursue economic reform, but the Bush administration has largely ignored the DPRK’s attempts to engage the world. At the same time, North Korea fears that the Bush administration, after dislodging Saddam Hussein, will apply its regime-change policy to Pyongyang. The recent nuclear revelations are North Korea’s latest attempt to shock the United States into negotiating a package deal that would include security guarantees. Pyongyang’s policy of nuclear deterrence and Washington’s policy of preemptive strikes are inextricably linked, and a solution to the current crisis requires a rethinking of both policies.

The essay below is by Glyn Ford, member of the European Parliament representing South West England. He has visited North Korea five times. Ford argues that any possible resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue falls squarely on the shoulders of South Korea and Japan. Potentially, the EU and China could help supply the political impetus to overcome US opposition, while South Korea and Japan could provide the bulk of the financial resources in exchange for the normalization of relations with North Korea.

The analysis below is by Steve LaMontagne, senior analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC. LaMontagne notes that the Bush administration faces the same set of policy options as did the Clinton administration in the early 1990s when North Korea threatened to pull out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: War, Isolation, or Diplomacy. While war and isolation entail considerable risks, diplomatic negotiations may find little support on Capitol Hill and among administration hawks who bristle at the thought of being blackmailed by Kim Jong Il. The key test of the administration’s commitment to a diplomatic solution to the North Korea nuclear problem will be whether or not it abandons diplomacy at the first sign of stubborn, erratic, or objectionable behavior by North Korea. If this happens, diplomacy could eventually give way to the threat of military action.

The essay below is by Ralph A. Cossa President of Pacific Forum CSIS. Cossa asserts that what President Bush needs to do during his summit meeting with ROK President Kim Dae-jung and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro is to clearly spell out his preconditions for a resumption of US-DPRK dialogue. Moreover, President Bush should also reiterate his administration’s pledge to engage in constructive dialogue, once Washington’s immediate security concerns are satisfactorily (and verifiably) addressed. Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi should make it clear in his own statement that, while dialogue will continue, there will be no real progress toward normalization until the nuclear issue is resolved. Finally, South Korean President Kim, instead of pressuring Washington to resume talks with Pyongyang, must also endorse Washington’s preconditions and announce that further progress in North-South relations, and especially hard currency payments that could easily be diverted to pay for a nuclear weapons program, will also hinge on Pyongyang removing this clear and present danger to the people of South Korea.