North Korea is accused of many things, often encapsulated in the term “rogue state.” Steps are now being taken to apply pressure to bring it back in line with its international obligations, especially those under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Even Australia has become involved, dispatching a three-man mission to Pyongyang. This short paper considers the question of roguishness in international behavior, the appropriateness of international pressure to resolve the problem, and the implications of the widening rift between Washington, persisting in its Cold War policies of containment and Seoul, where confidence in the efficacy of engagement grows.

The following article was contributed by Bryan Port who is presently a graduate student at Georgetown University and an analyst with SAIC supporting a military client. Port asserts that the present Sunshine Policy is incapable of dealing with a politically deteriorating North Korea and ineffective in terms of threat reduction and reunification. Consequently, Port argues that micro-projects must be put in place to prepare for the inevitable collapse of North Korea. Port offers pragmatic examples of micro-engagement such as North-South joint reforestation programs, information technology, infrastructure improvement, and municipal management.

In the essay below, Fred McGoldrick responds to North Korea’s January 10, 2003 announcement of their intended withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by outlining what concrete steps the DPRK could take to implement a freeze of its uranium enrichment activities. McGoldrick also attempts to answer the following questions: What enrichment activities should the DPRK “freeze”? Who should verify such a freeze? How should such a freeze be verified?