This statement was issued by the DPRK Foreign Ministry on July 16, 2006 in response to UN resolution 1695 condemning in the DPRK’s July 4th missile test. The statements says “First, our Republic strongly denounces and fully condemns the UNSC resolution, a product of the US hostile policy toward the DPRK, and will not be bound to it in the least- Second, our Republic will strengthen its self-defensive war deterrent by all means and methods now that the situation has reached the worst phase due to the extremely hostile act of the United States.”

Lt. General Robert Gard, Senior Military Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, and John D. Isaacs, Senior Policy Director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, write, “It is irresponsible to squander such large amounts on national missile defense when there are higher priority defense and domestic programs that remain under-funded… It is far more likely that rogue states or terrorists will obtain a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials and smuggle a nuclear device into the United States than delivering one by an ICBM.”

Desaix Anderson, who served for thirty-five years as a Foreign Service Officer at the U.S. State Department, working in and on Asian issues, was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-92) and executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) for over three years, writes, “Rather than ‘staying the course,’ President Bush should move quickly past the UN resolution on the rockets, put the best face possible on these developments, rein in his hardliners, appoint a full-time, high-level, fully empowered Coordinator for the Korean Peninsula, and instruct the Coordinator and rest of the Bush government to work urgently, patiently, flexibly, and innovatively to achieve a comprehensive solution to the North Korean nuclear and missile issues.”

Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute Executive Director, writes, North Koreas missile test was a strategic non-issue. Making a big deal out of it simply enabled the United States to delay dealing with the real issue and made it more likely that North Korea will now test its nuclear weapons. Thus, the outcome of North Koreas nuclear challenge once again hangs in the balance.

Wonhyuk Lim, Nonresident Fellow at the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, writes, “If pre-emption is too risky and malign neglect is too ineffective, the only remaining alternative is to establish a credible red line and negotiate seriously with North Korea through bilateral and multilateral talks– Otherwise, North Korea is sure to produce more fissile material and perfect its missile technology, escalating tension every once in a while to draw attention.”