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This 1980 report, prepared by the Comptroller General, reviews the roles of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and his unified command structure. This report provides 1) detailed information on the unified command’s missions, specific tasks, and functions, 2) the number and grade of personnel assigned throughout the command, 3) the cost to maintain the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and 4) an assessment of the Commander-in-Chief’s, Pacific, role in training and other areas.

This report was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) Multinational Strategy (MNS), published in 1986, defines USPACOM objectives in working with each nation in the pacific theater.

The report states that “the need for a multinational strategy was first expressed in the Defense Guidance budget of President Reagan’s administration.  The Defense Guidance stated that global strategy required the U.S. and its allies to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world.”

The MSN thus examines the objectives of the USPACOM  in working with multiple nations. The report states that “the USPACOM Stategy is built primarily on a foundation of bilateral relationships. Larger regional coalitions, to the extent that they can exist, depend on these bilateral relationships and the interactions of the coalition members.”

This report was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

This 1983 report by John L. Buckley “examines the need for reorganizing the United States Army command and control structure in the Pacific theater both to meet peacetime requirements and to ensure an effective transition to war. The investigation is focused on an analysis of historical experience, contemporary issues in the theater, and the results or the five most recent studies on the subject. The study postulates a detailed reorganization proposal, beginning with the establishment of a Northeast Asia Command.

Conclusions reveal that or the Army structure must be done in a joint context and must accommodate the sensitivities and complexities of both military and political requirements. The current structure, although workable, is not optimal to ensure a transition to regional, theater, or global war. Should an effective remedy not be applied before the outbreak of hostilities in the region, the price of transition will be expensive in both time and resources. That remedy should be in the form of a Northeast Asia Command.”

This report was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

This 1956 report was “promulgated for the purpose of establishing normal procedures which will ensure the most efficient and expeditious employment of atomic weapons in accordance with JCS policy…Upon initiation of hostilities, on a scale warranting the use of atomic weapons, it is expected that Commander-in-Chief, Far East (CINCFE) will be authorized to employ atomic weapons, in the accomplishment of the theater mission…This standing operating Procedure (SOP) established the procedure to be used in the Far East Command (FEC) for the control and expenditure of atomic weapons. The procedures set forth herein shall be adhered to by all commands concerned with the planning for and execution of atomic strikes…”

This report was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).