Tag Archives: Nuclear Strategy Project

China conducted its second nuclear test explosion in May. In contrast with the first test in 1964, which was not weaponized, the new test involved an actual bomb that was dropped from an H-6 bomber giving China its first — albeit very limited — nuclear strike capability. Missile development progressed at “an evenly-paced rate,” and […]

The most important development in 1964 was the Chinese explosion of a nuclear device on October 16. China also halted the decline of its air forces and increased the number of MIG-19 Farmer aircraft. Of the estimated fifteen surface-to-air missile sites in China, thirteen were confirmed as SA-2 sites by the end of 1964. The […]

Countering the Chinese military influence in 1963, CINCPAC described to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, meant that PACOM was “occupied holding in check the biggest part of the Red Chinese dragon, the head of which was in Manchuria and the body in the area of the Taiwan Strait and Southeast China so that the tail […]

During 1962, Chinese ground forces lost one line division, even though the army had a slight gain in personnel. The air force suffered a significant loss of jet aircraft, most probably because of lack of essential spare parts, a dwindling production rate, and a virtual absense of deliveries of aircraft or spare parts from Soviet […]

During 1961, China began adding missiles to their forces for the first time. A launch complex, consisting of probably surface-to-surface missiles launch test sites and a surface-to-air missiles site, was reported at Tien Tsung Ta Wan. Moreover, three surface-to-air missile sites were reported at Peiping. Other force developments included the loss of eight ground force […]

The most important change in China’s posture was the addition on seven Soviet Whiskey-class submarines to the fleet, increasing it from 13 to 20. Other changes included some improvement in the Air Force which replace some older MIG-15s by newer MIG-17s, as well as radar and advanced warning capabilities. Overall, however, purely military changes were […]

CINCPAC’s assessment for 1968 was almost identical to the previous year, indicating that Chinese force developments were modest. China only conducted one nuclear explosion, although this involved the first use of an H-6 bomber for a nuclear test. Only “a few” missile test firings took place, but the number of SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites increased […]

China conducted two nuclear test explosions in 1969, including the first underground test. Other developments were modest and the number of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles only increased slightly from 37 to 39 sites. Chinese passiveness was also evident on the northern border with the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Union had doubled its conventional forces in […]

China conducted a single nuclear explosion in 1970 and no missile tests were highlighted. Although CINCPAC had predicted an operational nuclear capability in 1967 and 1969, the 1970s assessment was that “China was expected to have a credible nuclear capability in the next few years.” The ballistic missile submarine program remained at a single possible […]

China conducted one nuclear test explosion in 1971, and CINCPAC’s assessment of the Chinese nuclear threat “remained unchanged” during 1971. China was still recovering from the effects of the Cultural Revolution, but CINCPAC concluded that the country was expected to continue to develop a “credible nuclear capability” during the 1972-1975 time period. CINCPAC intelligence concluded […]