1960 CINCPAC China Assessment

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Recommended Citation

"1960 CINCPAC China Assessment", Nuclear Strategy, January 31, 2000, https://nautilus.org/projects/nuclear-strategy/1960-cincpac-china-assessment/

The most important change in China’s posture was the addition on seven Soviet Whiskey-class submarines to the fleet, increasing it from 13 to 20. Other changes included some improvement in the Air Force which replace some older MIG-15s by newer MIG-17s, as well as radar and advanced warning capabilities. Overall, however, purely military changes were relatively minor.

There were no evidence that China had acquired either a missile or nuclear capability during the period, “although analysis of Red Chinese progress in nuclear research indicated that the detonation of a test device could occur before 1965.”

The Taiwan Straits and the off-shore islands remained comparatively quiet during 1960 as the crisis of the previous two years abaded in 1960. As a result, there were no difficulties in maintaining supplies on the off-short islands, which had been a major problem in 1959.

Specific military planning relating to China concerned defense of North Korea and Taiwan, coordination with the United Kingdom for the eventual evacuation of Hong Kong, and support of internal Chinese uprisings.

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, “CINCPAC Command History 1960,” May 4, 1961. Only selected pages. Partially declassified and released under FOIA. (0.83 MB)


Funding for this project was provided by the The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation andPloughshares Fund. For information about the Nuclear Strategy Project contact Hans M. Kristensen.

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