Tag Archives: Nuclear Strategy Project

Chinese-U.S. relations entered a new phase with the visit by President Nixon to China in February 1972. As a result of the so-called Shanghai Communique, which acknowledged the Chinese claim that Taiwan remained a part of China and envisioned the ultimate withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Taiwan, caused Taiwan to question — and the […]

The “limited-range ICBM,” which had been under development in 1973, was operationally deployed in 1974. The missile, which may have been the DF-4/CSS-3, was capable of reaching all of Russia and part of Alaska. China was not expected, however, to have an operational full-scale ICBM until late in the 1970s. According to CINCPAC: “The nucleus […]

CINCPAC estimated that China would be “the second strongest potential enemy in PACOM,” but that its conventional threat would be substantially limited to the PACOM area. The “détente” with China continued with attempts to normalize relations following President Nixon’s historic visit the previous year. Yet as Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson reminded the Congress, “regardless […]

President Ford visited China in December and news agencies carried several high-profile reports on how China had slowly built up a sizeable naval force. CINCPAC’s intelligence assessment described how China was moving toward “a more extensive role” for the Navy. This assessment was supported by the launching of China’s first nuclear powered attack submarine. Overall, […]

China’s strategic forces “continued to develop slowly.” The DF-4/CSS-3 surface-to-surface missile had been tested in its ballistic missile role three times: 1970, 1971, and in May 1976. It had also been used to place two small satellites in orbit (1970 and 1971). Two operational silos had been identified, but CINCPAC considered it probable that only […]

All sections relating to CINCPAC’s threat assessment for China were withheld in full from the 1977 Command History. Given the discretionary disclosure demonstrated by the partial release of previous and subsequent China assessments, the complete denial was clearly an error and a new request for the 1977 sections is currently under processing. The new material […]

On December 15, 1978, President Carter announced that U.S. and China had agreed to establish formal diplomatic relations by January 1, 1979. As a result, the U.S. pledged to remove all military forces from Taiwan by April 30, 1979. The Mutual Security Treaty with Taiwan would be terminated by January 1, 1980. The joint U.S.-Chinese […]

China attacked Vietnam on February 17, 1979, but quickly announced on March 5 that it would withdraw and completed the withdrawal on March 16. The aggression and the abrupt pull-back reflected serious conflicts with the Chinese leadership. Chinese Vice Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping had previously spoken of Vietnamese “small hegemonism” as merely “making trouble,” but […]

China did not feature prominently in the U.S. threat assessment for 1980. Focus was on the Soviet build-up, the crisis in Iran, and efforts to bring political stability to the Korean peninsula following the assassination of South Korea’s president in 1979. Instead, the normalization of U.S.-China relations in January 1979, “greatly influenced the strategic situation […]

One of the most important new developments was the launching of China’s first nuclear-powered ballistic missiles submarine. Designated the “Xia” class by the West, the new submarine had been under development for about 20 years and was equipped with 12 launch tubes for ballistic missiles (the designated JULANG-1 missile did not become operational until a […]