The following is text of a speech given on March 8, 2005 by Desaix Anderson at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. Desaix Anderson writes: “Kim Jong Il has repeatedly claimed, again last week, that North Korea seeks a solution that would eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs in exchange for ending U.S. hostility. Given the stakes, the U.S. is irresponsible not to test Kim’s real intentions by serious negotiations.”

Discussion of “Pyongyang Raises the Stakes” Discussion of “Pyongyang Raises the Stakes” PFO 05-17A: March 11th, 2005 Discussion of “Pyongyang Raises the Stakes” by Ralph A. Cossa Copyright © 2005 Nautilus of America/The Nautilus Institute CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Comments on Essay by Ralph Cossa Comments by Rupert Atkinson Response by Ralph Cossa III. Nautilus […]

Hy-Sang Lee, emeritus professor of the University of Wisconsin and author of North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress, writes: “Under a settlement allowing a two-bomb scarecrow strategy Pyongyang would be committing suicide if the bombs would be used in a first strike (inviting an obliterating retaliation), and this scarecrow strategy would be rendered precarious if one of the bombs would be sold. Hence, the two-bomb settlement is a second best option which still would respect the red line of the United States.”

Yang Moo-Jin, Professor at Kyungnam University’s Graduate School of North Korea Studies, writes: “Peace and reunification on the Korean Peninsula depend primarily on the efforts of the two Koreas. The situation could be positive or negative according to how they manage it. The year 2005 is very meaningful for both South and North, since it is their 60th year of Independence, and the 5th year of the June 15 Joint Declaration. This year, I expect that we will be able to settle peace on the peninsula more firmly through economic development, improvement of the South-North relationship, and resolution of the North Korea nuclear problem.”