Nuclear Proliferation


  • The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This document describes the Agency’s safeguards system as it currently operates, how it is changing, and how it likely to further change as safeguards strengthening measures are fully implemented.
  • Are IAEA Safeguards on Plutonium Bulk-Handling Facilities Effective? Marvin Miller, MIT, August 1990. The purpose of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of international (IAEA) safeguards at peaceful nuclear fuel cycle facilities which handle plutonium in bulk form. There are two facilities of this type: reprocessing plants which extract the plutonium from nuclear fuel irradiated in nuclear reactors, and fabrication plants which process the extracted plutonium into fresh fuel assemblies.
  • International Safeguards and Verification Challenges. James W. Tape, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2003. This paper examines some of the challenges with developing more effective safeguards and verification systems, and suggest possible solutions including the use of new safeguards technologies, proliferation resistance concepts, institutional measures, and considering “rethinking” the safeguards system.
  • International Confidence to Japanese Nuclear Activities. Takaaki Kurasaki, Japan Atomic Energy Agency, 7 February 2006. This presentation outlines, in English and Japanese, the international perception of Japan’s nuclear safeguards.
  • Nonproliferation Policy and Safeguards R&D Initiatives in Japan. Kaoru Naito, International Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Forum, 19 May 2006. This presentation outlines Japan’s nonproliferation policy, its initiatives for realizing efficient and effective IAEA safeguards, and advanced safeguards technology for the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.
  • U.S. Efforts to Advance the Safeguards “State-of-the Art”. William C. O’Connor, International Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Forum, 19 May 2006. This presentation outlines new approaches being developed by the IAEA to improve safeguards technology.
  • Safeguards Statement for 2007. International Atomic Energy Agency. In 2007, safeguards were applied for 163 States with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. The Secretariat´s findings and conclusions for 2007 are reported with regard to each type of safeguards agreement.

Nuclear Smuggling and Sabotage

  • Sabotage at Nuclear Power Plants. James W. Purvis, Sandia National Laboratories, 1999. This paper provides an overview of all potential types of sabotage at nuclear power plants. The paper discusses emerging threats and weapons of choice for sabotage. Potential consequences, including economic and political, are discussed, and applicability of risk-assessment and mitigation methods are presented.
  • Nuclear Forensics Support. IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 2. 2006. By the end of 2004 IAEA Member States had confirmed 504 cases of illicit trafficking of radioactive material, while approximately 500 other cases remained unconfirmed. This document brings together a concise but comprehensive description of the various tools and procedures of nuclear forensic investigations.

Proliferation Resistance

Nonproliferation and Disarmament

  • Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Arms. Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee, 2006. The Committee on WMD makes several recommendations on how to reverse the negative trend on proliferation in recent years and begin the process of banning nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons once and for all.
  • The Permanent Nth Country Experiment: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in a Rapidly Changing World. Mycle Schneider, The Greens/European Free Alliance, 24 March 2007. This report attempts to clear up public misunderstandings and confusion on nonproliferation issues, including the relationship between civilian nuclear power and nuclear weapons, and to highlight counterproliferation efforts.
  • Are New Nuclear Bargains Attainable? Deepti Choubey, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2008. If the United States and other countries with nuclear weapons take action toward further disarmament, they hope that countries without them will support additional efforts to prevent the further spread and use of nuclear weapons. But non–nuclear-weapon states, citing the unfulfilled promises of nuclear-weapon states, declare such a bargain to be unfair and a misreading of the political landscape. A better understanding of the views of non–nuclear-weapon states would provide the next U.S. administration with a serious opportunity to lead the rebuilding of a dangerously damaged nonproliferation regime.